UNIVERSITY OF THE
FREE STATE
UNIVERSITEIT VAN DIE
VRYSTAAT
YUNIVESITHI YA
FREISTATA

UFS
UV

Trans-Mediating Nationhood in the Imaginings of the New Pan-Kalenjin Co-Presences

By

Daudi Kipkemoi Rotich

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy with specialisation in English in the Faculty of Humanities, Department of English, at the University of the Free State

March 2022

Supervisor: Prof. Irikidzayi Manase

Co-Supervisor: Dr. Philip Onoriode Aghoghovwia

Declaration

I, Daudi Kipkemoi Rotich declare that this thesis hereby submitted for the qualification of Doctor of Philosophy (English) at the University of the Free State is my own work and that I have not previously submitted the same work at another university.

Signature:

Date: 07 March 2022

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the people who assisted me in this study. My supervisors, Prof. Irikidzayi Manase and Dr. Philip Aghoghowvia offered me immensurable ideas in carrying out the research and writing the thesis. I am indebted to my parents, family and friends for their encouragement. I am grateful to the University of the Free State for granting me a bursary which assisted in the payment of the tuition fees. The following assisted in the development of my research concept in many ways: Prof. Peter Wasamba, Dr. Tom Odhiambo, Dr. Godwin Siundu, Dr. Kimingichi Wabende, Dr. Ernest Monte and Dr. Dishon Kweya. In addition, Dr. Abdourahman Yacin, Dr. Said Djama, Dr. Jennifer Muchiri and Dr. Mumia Osaaji contributed indirectly to the study in important ways. I thank my fellow doctoral students in the Department of English, University of the Free State, Drs. Timothy Mhiti, Doreen Tivenga and Abenea Ndago, for exchanging with me ideas which aided this study. I also thank my friends at the English Department, University of Djibouti, Dr. Douglas Orangi, Mr. Idriss Houssein and Ms. Hanna Kimondo for reading the draft thesis and suggesting various ways of improving it. Ms. Anne Musyoka and Mr. Patrick Lumasia also gave me valuable concepts in developing the approaches to the study. I am also grateful to Mr. Mike Kipngeno (Tambach Teachers' College) and Mr. Kipkemoi Cheruiyot (Laikipia University) for assisting me in translating texts from Kalenjin to English, as well as Ms. Susan Cherotich for organising and proofreading the manuscript. The friends I made in the Kass FM, in particular, Mr. Kiplangat Mutai and Mr. Vincent Chepkwony, are highly acknowledged for their kindness in facilitating access to information I required for the study. Finally, I am grateful to Ms. Carmen Nel, the librarian at the University of the Free State, for attending to me promptly whenever I needed library services.

Dedication

For Rodah, Kyle, Karrel and Kyla.

Abstract

The thesis is a literary and cultural examination of the trans-mediation of the Kalenjin pan-ethnic nation constituted at the end of Daniel Moi's tenure in 2002 as the president of Kenya. The study is concerned with the trajectories of imagining the Kalenjin pan-ethnic ethos, since the group's formation in the 1940s, documented in selected media and cultural texts. I depart from the historical and political approaches which associate the Kalenjin mediation with historical and political events that direct the members of the group towards the federal outfit against the individual ethnic identities. I propose that events are less constitutive by their instructive attribute than by the power to perform and complement each other in producing meaning. Hence, I contend that the making of the Kalenjin pan-ethnic nationhood should be understood through a literary and cultural lens to account for the dramatic interaction of the group's historical and contemporary events.

I suggest that the Kalenjin historical and contemporary cultural dramas are represented adequately in four journalese stories, one inquiry report story, four popular songs, two Facebook group discussions, two sermons, two documentaries, and two comedies, which incorporate notions of Kalenjin nationhood the end of the Moi presidency. I consider the rise and end of Daniel Moi's presidency as the narrative range within which the Kalenjin mediation story should be examined. This relates to how Daniel Moi established himself as a central figure in the group in the post-independence ethnic politics which coincided with popularising the pan-ethnic identity among the Kalenjin constituent groups. Thus, I submit that the discontinuation of Moi's power represents the disorientation of the group's pan-ethnic life and, hence, the narrative premise by which the signification of the new Kalenjin nationalism is ingrained.

I approach the study from a social drama perspective which offers that seemingly unrelated events bearing on a collective can be ordered into a narrative of a dramatic process. I observe that social drama is appropriate given that it embraces the interface between historical and cultural accounts as a viewpoint about the constitution of collective realities. I also draw on theories on nationhood that highlight the relationship between social situations and groups concepts of selfhood and otherness to assess how social drama represents varying temporal concepts of nationhood. Hence, I compare the documentations of the major historical events in the Kalenjin community since its formation in the 1940s with cultural expressions produced

between 2002 and 2019 to determine how they engage with the end of the Moi presidency to re-imagine the Kalenjin nationhood.

I affirm that the Kalenjin trans-mediation story relates significantly with the four stages of social drama which are breach, crisis, redress and reintegration. The stages represent the concepts of nationhood produced in the various trans-mediation junctures. The most significant comprise the function of suspense and surprise in the stretch that culminates into breach, victimhood in crisis, honour in redress and ethics of entanglement in reintegration.

Key Words: Ethnic nationalism, Trans-mediation, Social drama, Victimhood, Honour, Entanglement.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: SITUATING THE CASE OF KALENJIN TRANS-MEDIATION

1.1: The Kalenjin nation, co-presences and trans-mediation: an overview

The study examines the role of historical and contemporary events in selected media and cultural texts in the dramatic revitalisation of the twenty-first century Kalenjin nationhood. The study draws on the perspectives on nationalism, such as Billig (1995) and Edensor (2002), which posit that the events that directly promote nationhood, like national days, do not often succeed as much as the nuances of the events, and the everyday activities and situations. Nuances and banal settings are valued here as contexts of vitalising nationhood considered as performative rather than instructive on the idea of belonging. Performativity is used in the thesis to refer to the power to initiate popular meanings, which describes the success by which ideas become an integral part of the peoples' worldview. This derives from Butler's (1988) assertion that realities such as identity are constituted in time "through a stylized repetition of acts." In this light, I presume that popular meanings are largely assimilated forms, which means that they represent the sum of peoples' subjective knowledge of themselves, others and situations. This suggests that publics are active participants in meaning-making processes, which means that new encounters in life only signal new ideas to the publics. Nonetheless, the real meanings are to be found in how the publics recast the ideas to their way of life. Accordingly, this thesis examines the role of nuances of events and everyday life in the Kalenjin nation in the performance of nationhood. In this way I pay attention to what events, both historical and contemporary, do about the Kalenjin peoples' senses of nationhood as they carry out their activities.

The Kalenjin community is a group of linguistically related ethnic groups in the Rift Valley region of Kenya. It is the third largest ethnic group in the country after the Kikuyu and the Luhya with a population of 6.3 million according to the 2019 national census (Agutu, 2020). The exact number of the Kalenjin sub-groups is difficult to ascertain because some of them, such as Tugen and Marakwet, bear further sub-divisions. The Tugen, for example, comprise of the Aror, Samor and Lembus groups, while the Marakwet has the Sengwer group that seeks to be identified independently. Others, such as the Ogiek, identify themselves dually as Kalenjin and Maasai. However, the commonly listed groups are: Nandi, Tugen, Kipsigis, Keiyo, Marakwet, Pokot, Sabaot, Terik (Lynch, 2011: 4). The Kalenjin community was formed in the 1940s as an

association of seven students at Alliance High School (Sambu, 2011: 3). Alliance High School is one of the top national schools in Kenya and one of the first schools to provide education to African students during the colonial era. The objective of the Alliance High School association formation was to consolidate the minority ethnic identity in order for it to measure up to the major ethnic groups, such as the Gikuyu, Luo and Luhya (Lynch, 2011: 37). The students, led by Taaitta Toweett, chose '*Kaaleenjin*,' which translates to 'I am telling you,' as the name of the association since the phrase is commonly used across all the dialects. Thus, the students identified themselves by the shared use of the expression, 'I am telling you,' and hence, the 'people of *Kaaleenjin*,' which has been simplified presently as 'The Kalenjin People.' The concept of the Kalenjin people was popularised in the community by the election of Daniel Moi in 1955 to the Legislative Council to represent the Rift Valley regions and later through his appointment as the country's Vice President in 1967. The reality that Moi could become the president was relevant to the Kalenjin groups at a time when the groups needed protection and would ensure that the former White Settler pieces of land in the Rift Valley would not be taken by other ethnic groups. Concurrently, the then vernacular broadcasting radio station, Voice of Kenya (VoK), and music by notable artists such as Kipchamba Arap Topotuk, adopted and regularised the newfound ethnicity (Sambu, 2011: 4).

Several sociocultural enterprises in the Kalenjin community that began to appear at the start of the twenty-first century engage in activities that indicate an extra-organisational quality of re-forming the community. Most of these initiatives are organised as co-presences of either deliberating on or fulfilling important living programmes in the community. A co-presence, here, refers to the physical and virtual simulations of a community assembly, such as community-based radio, Facebook group, festival, sport, and investment society, where the entire community is assumed to be convened to observe or do things together in the absence of 'others.'

Significant here are the Kalenjin Forum and the Gotabgaa Forum Facebook groups, the Emo Community Development Society, the Kass International Marathon, and the Kalenjin Nights. The Kalenjin and Gotabgaa Forums draw membership from the Kalenjin community for the purpose of interacting on emerging issues from within and outside the community. The Emo Society is a community-based socio-economic association and Christian fellowship founded in 2001. The Kass Marathon was started in 2008, organised by the Kass Media Group, which is a company that owns KASS FM radio and TV that broadcast primarily in the Kalenjin language.

The marathon is held towards the end of each year in Eldoret, Kenya, which is the major commercial centre in the Kalenjin region. The Kalenjin Nights showcase the Kalenjin brands of what Ogude (2012: 147) refers to as 'theme nights,' which are popular music and dance festivals that rose in the early 2000s in discotheques, entertainment halls and restaurants in Kenya's major urban places. A given community's Night entails showcasing music, fashion and cuisine associated with the community. The remarkable feature about these enterprises is that they are set to fulfil everyday living needs such as entertainment, interaction, livelihood, information and spirituality. They are not intended plainly to promote ethnic nationhood. Nonetheless, the Kalenjin locality and the mobilising factor in the enterprises suggest that 'Kalenjinness' is necessarily dealt with in the processes of 'communalising' entertainment, interaction, livelihood, information or spirituality. Thus, I examine the events hosted in these enterprises from a literary and cultural perspective owing to two characteristics of the events, as discussed below.

The first one is a transition motif and an allusion to the early twenty-first century. The transition motif refers to a sensibility that the Kalenjin community needs a major transformation of ethos with respect to a recent happening. The term, ethos, drawing on Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport (2001), refers here to the ideal values, which mediate allegiance to a community. These are the crucial concepts by which people establish a sense of belonging together in a community. The allusion to the early twenty-first century notes a major life-changing incident in the history of the Kalenjin nation in the early 2000s which produces a need for change. In my view, the most significant historical episode in the Kalenjin life in the noted period is enshrined in the departure of Daniel Moi from Kenya's presidency, which was accompanied by the humiliating defeat of his Kenya African National Union (KANU) party and his preferred successor, Uhuru Kenyatta in the 2002 elections.

Moi is a Kalenjin from the Tugen sub-group and was Kenya's second and longest-serving president (1978-2002). The Kalenjin story and Moi are mutual in the sense that Moi's political rise into the Legislative Council in 1955, as the Vice President of the Republic in 1967, and as the president in 1978, coincided with the formation of the Kalenjin community. Sambu (2011) and Lynch (2011) claim that Moi's political rise prompted the Kalenjin ethnic communities to embrace solidarity in order to compete favourably with the more populous ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya. Consequently, Moi served the Kalenjin as a unifying factor through the logic of protection of shared interests among the constituent groups within the idea that Moi

would champion the interests. The significant interest was the struggle across the country to inherit the white settler pieces of land in the Rift Valley region, which the Kalenjin claimed as their ancestral homeland. The Moi presidency would aid the Kalenjin to take most of the land and assure constituent groups invariable ownership. The wish was significantly fulfilled in the 24-year rule of the Moi presidency as settlement of ethnic groups from outside the Rift Valley lessened. Therefore, it is considered here that the end of the Moi presidency presented to the Kalenjin the fears of losing control over the Rift Valley and a possible disintegration of the pan-ethnic power. Accordingly, I employ the end of the Moi presidency and the 2002 juncture as the analytic tropes of the Kalenjin trans-mediation since the notions suggest cases of and a transition between the Moi and the post-Moi ethos.

The second one is theatricality. Theatricality, here, refers to the "metaphorical relationship between the theatre and the world" (Tronstad, 2002: 216). This underscores the relationship between play and reality and, hence, the power of performance to reveal and to constitute realities. In this light, the theatrical sense of the events under focus in this study relates to the way the noted Kalenjin trans-mediation is effected through the Kalenjin public 'theatres.' The term, 'theatre,' is used in the thesis in the publicity sense. It sums the public events, such as highlighted in relation to such as political rallies and mediatised interactions on radio and social media platforms such as Facebook, in which the key participants attempt to 'impress' others. The notion alludes to the standpoint in Performance Studies as postulated by critics such as Turner (1987: 4) and Bauman and Briggs (1990: 79) that social actions constitute performances as long as skill and effectiveness are deployed to affect the audience in a special way. The critical point here is that impressing others entails the use of space, objects and actions to transmit meanings. It is considered here that the choices on space, objects and actions are revealing about the making of realities of a people. Hence, I explore how performativity, which is the manner in which space, objects and actions commission meanings via stylisation and synchrony (Butler, 1988: 520). The aim is to account for the change of the sense of 'Kalenjinness' in the Kalenjin and Gotabgaa Forums, the Emo, the Kass Marathon, and the Kalenjin Nights.

The co-incidence of transition and theatricality in the above enterprises indicates a collective interrogation of the contemporary senses of living in relation to histories in order to map the future of the community. Therefore, the thesis examines the resonance between the post-Moi events and the major histories in which the Kalenjin community is involved in a prominent

role to the extent that the Kalenjin nation is prominently addressed or depicted in the unfolding of the events. In this thesis, I enlist three histories as the ultimate contexts of interrogating the contemporary senses of belonging in the Kalenjin nation.

The central one is the story of the start of the KANU/Moi woes before the 2002 election defeat. This entails the 1991-1992 political events when the opposition forced Moi to accept multi-party politics. The new politics implied that KANU could lose given that it did not enjoy support from the more populous ethnic groups. I am interested in the episode because it marks the beginning of the fear among the Kalenjins that the party, which defined their lives, could fall.

The second history is about the making of the symbiotic relationship between Moi and the Kalenjin through which KANU and Moi became a sense of lifeline and a form of ethos to the community. I posit that the incident relates to the rise of Moi to become the president in 1978 after the death of Jomo Kenyatta and taking over from the Kikuyu ethnic group, which was Kalenjin's leading rivals in contesting the settler pieces of land in the Rift Valley after independence. Moi's rise in power hinted, to the Kalenjin, the possibility of overcoming the land problems in the Rift Valley through a collective relationship with Moi as a member of one of the constituent groups. Thus, I am interested in what Moi's rise in power meant to the Kalenjin group in relation to the Kikuyu threat as an understanding of why the ending of the Moi presidency was catastrophic to the Kalenjin group's sense of living is significant for this study.

The third history is about the Kalenjin in the transition from KANU to the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) after the defeat of KANU. The event is crucial here because it documents how the KANU defeat mediated different meanings on life to the Kalenjin and the rest of the Kenyans. I am concerned with the experience of the Kalenjin nation as the major ethnic group in the minority opposition. Here, I seek to determine how the group adjusts to life outside the patronage of the Moi and privilege. In sum, I examine these histories as the constituent parts of the Kalenjin national narrative and, hence, the discursive nuances in configuring the contemporary Kalenjin nationhood.

1.2: Trans-mediation as resolving the Kalenjin pan-ethnic question: a review of literature

This research addresses what may be called the Kalenjin pan-ethnic question. The study interrogates how a grouping of the more than eight ethnic communities with historical and cultural differences has, over a considerably short time, developed into a seemingly regular ethnicity. A regular ethnicity here refers to that which is considered to have existed in its form

from a timeless past. Here, I do not suggest that ethnicities do not change over time; rather, I conceive that, in 'regular' ethnicities, such changes do not result in sudden and colossal forms such as change of name or membership as it is the case among the Kalenjin.

Previous inquiries on the Kalenjin pan-ethnic question show a significant interest in the Kalenjin community as a modern and artificial community that succeeds in appearing like a regular ethnicity. The inquiries by Simatei (2008); Sambu (2011) and Lynch (2011) show a linkage between the modern construction and the idea of a proto-Kalenjin past, the historical events in the country that have uniquely affected the Kalenjin, and the rhetoric of a present homogenised Kalenjin identity.

Sambu (2011) examines the link between the Kalenjin and the ancient *Misiri* (Egyptian) society through a comparative analysis of myths and linguistic forms. Sambu (2011: 3) reflects on the Kalenjin pan-ethnic question, suggesting that the individual Kalenjin groups had little affiliation with one another before the coinage of "Kalenjin" name in the 1940s. To the view that political rhetoric was used to unite the various ethnic groups, Sambu (2011: 13) says the Kalenjin constitutes a 'once-unitary-entity,' referring to the idea that the Kalenjin had been a unitary community, but divisions occurred due to migratory dispersions and, later, colonialism. The name of the proto-Kalenjin, according to Sambu (2011), is possibly *Sabiiny*, *Sebei*, *Sabaoot*, and *Myoot*. Since then, '*Myoot*' has been taken up in the community because one of the present Kalenjin constituent groups is called Sabaot (or Sebei in Uganda), which could derail the unifying agenda in that it would seem to favour the Sabaot as the 'supreme' member. There is presently an institution of Kalenjin elders, known as the Myoot Council of Elders or simply the Myoot, which speak on behalf of the community in national matters.

In this light, Sambu (2011) highlights the centrality of the past in Kalenjin attempts at making sense of their present nationhood given that it indicates a common descent and migration. The present-day Kalenjin ethos does not entail a sensibility to a sound past. Rather, it points at a different sensibility that is hinged on the realities of fulfilling life in the modern era. For example, the concept of 'Myoot,' the newly 'discovered' designation of 'Kalenjinness', which the council of elders tried to popularise, has failed to take effect. No Kalenjin presently identifies themselves as a Myoot as they commonly state that they are Kalenjin. This indicates a likelihood that the Kalenjin people presently do not require legitimations from the past to mobilise into the nationhood. As a result, this thesis is premised on the agency of the present in

the sustenance of the Kalenjin nationhood. It examines the present circumstances on fulfilling life as the modes in which people make sense of collectiveness.

Lynch (2011) presents an account of political events related to the rise of the Kalenjin nation. The study attributes the rise of the pan-ethnic idea in the 1940s to the highly 'ethnicised' Kenyan political environment, which prompted the need to form a formidable ethnicity to face the other more populous ethnic groups. Lynch (2011: 32) observes that the Kalenjin ethnicity has been constructed through rhetorical interpretation of historical episodes that unite the Kalenjin people and differentiate them from others. Accordingly, Lynch (2011: 2, 21), departs from the 'once-unitary-entity' hypothesis, celebrated by Sambu (2011) and describes the group as a latter-day 'territorial association.' The assertion demonstrates an emphasis on the Kalenjin separateness before the 1940s through which the Kalenjin emerges as a modernistic invention. The territorial association label, as an answer to this question, assigns value to the utility of Moi in safeguarding the Rift Valley land that was claimed by the Kalenjin groups. The utility alludes to the Kalenjin groups fear that land in the Rift Valley would be lost entirely since the Kikuyu had acquired huge pieces of land in the Jomo Kenyatta regime. The Moi presidency was, for this reason, significant in that it would protect the territory for the community. At the same time, Moi also needed a formidable ethnic following to buttress his political career. Accordingly, Lynch's (2011) account of the rise of the Kalenjin identity as a political product conveys the view that the Kalenjin and Moi stories are inseparable and create a symbiotic relationship. This shows that Moi constituted the Kalenjin ethos, which supports the premise in this thesis that the post-Moi Kalenjin re-formation activity concerns a disrupted ethos.

However, Lynch (2011) is limited to the examples of what Billig (1995: 47) describes as 'hot nationalism.' This refers to vigorous public events that include struggles for independence or secession, wars over control of territories, and political events such as national days. The events are considered hot in the sense that the claim of nationhood is forceful. Lynch (2011), for example, focuses on the Kalenjin politics of independence, such as *Majimbo*ism,[1] the political rise of Moi and *Nyayo*ism[2], multi-party politics, and ethnic violence. I propose in this study an

[1] '*Majimbo*ism' is a concept of government in support of regionalism. *Majimbo* is a Kiswahili word for regions which featured significantly in the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) party manifesto in the early 1960s that agitated for federalism government structure, or '*Majimbo*ism.'

[2] '*Nyayo*,' a Kiswahili word for 'footsteps,' refers to a philosophy that was developed by Moi upon taking over the presidency from Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. *Nyayo*ism emphasised continuance of the founding KANU ideologies as set by the first president, Jomo Kenyatta.

approach that combines both hot nationalism and what Billig (1995) calls banal nationalism. The latter refers to the everyday life events in which the 'nation' is not consciously considered but is performed inadvertently. I consider that this sense of nationalism regards texts of inter (-) activities of the ordinary people in commonplace spaces such as Facebook groups, spiritual fellowships, athletics and dance events. The banal texts are valued in the thesis and viewed as 'promiscuous', which conceptualises them as being present everywhere and as unrestrained expressions. The selected co-presences demonstrate this omnipresence from how they include the economic, spiritual, cultural and physical fitness enterprises. Thus, banal nationalism is everywhere rather than among the elite nationalists such as politicians. The texts are unrestrained in the sense that they are localized, and accordingly, produced against the need to be extra cautious in interaction. Discussions on ethnicity, for example, are more explicit in Facebook groups than in a public political rally or a musical publication. I propose here an assessment of histories alongside related banal discourses and, in this way, the discourses animate the histories by re-staging them. For instance, a reading of dialogue or listening to a song that was part of a given historical event offers a 'live-like' view of the event.

Simatei (2008) addresses the Kalenjin pan-ethnic question as a literary and cultural problem. The study examines the popular pieces of music which have emerged since 2002 as a medium of consolidating the Kalenjin nationhood. The year 2002 is problematised as a rupture of the Kalenjin mobilising factor concerning the exit of Moi from Kenya's presidency. The study notes that the moment just after the year 2002 projected itself as a crisis to the Kalenjin in the form of perceived retaliatory threats posed by the new political dispensation. The NARC regime that ousted KANU from power was dominated by the Gikuyu, Luo and Luhya, who also happen to have been the groups that the Kalenjin feared in the struggle for ownership of the Rift Valley land before Moi became the president. Simatei (2008) shows that popular music that articulated the Rift Valley as a Kalenjin 'national' space functioned as the Kalenjin means of overcoming the renewed fear. Accordingly, the study affirms two of the assumptions that are crucial in this thesis. Firstly, the Kalenjin community is sustained mainly through nationalist efforts as depicted in the popular music claim of space and recognition. The significant sense of the Kalenjin community is here not based on ethnic sameness but shared fears relating to economic interests. Secondly, Kalenjin nationalism resides in the literary and cultural discourses in the community's co-presences. This is depicted in the significance of the music in articulating the Rift Valley as a

Kalenjin 'national' space in the context of the vernacular radio station in which the community is 'assembled.'

The study demonstrates that historical happenings are further 'read' in community co-present sites and in unique ways relating to how the events touch their everyday life. I employ the term 'reading' here to emphasise what Turner (1980: 147) calls the 'gossips' genres. These are shared reflections of an event in informal co-presences in which people can express their feelings unreservedly. Popular music falls into this category if the artist addresses universal themes but speaks to a localised audience in translating how the events affect them uniquely. The noted music in Simatei (2008) reflects on the 2002 ending of the Moi presidency event and its affect the Kalenjin community's later in life. Accordingly, the music appeals to the Kalenjin community to unite and safeguard the Rift Valley as a sacred possession of the community even at the juncture in which the community is a minority owing to their support for KANU which was defeated by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) by a huge margin. Nonetheless, Simatei (2008) is a journal article which only focuses on the aftermath of the ending of the Moi presidency in 2002 and refers limitedly to musical texts. As a result, this thesis considers multiple texts and these include non-musical texts such as Facebook posts and discussions, as well as music, sermons, promos, documentaries and comedies. I also expand on the historical scope to include the events both before and immediately after the year 2002 to afford a complete view of the trajectory of the Kalenjin re-formation. Here, the pre-2002 events visualise the independence politics featuring the Jomo Kenyatta rule in which Moi was a major opposition figure and, later on, Moi's shifting of political support to Jomo Kenyatta through which he became the vice president and then president. I consider this view as representative of the nature of the Kalenjin group, on one hand, as a 'protected' community and, on the other, as a 'threatened' community as per the rise and fall of Moi in position of power.

The above review reveals that the intersection between historical trajectories and related cultural expressions in the Kalenjin pan-ethnic question has not been adequately evaluated. The intersection is important, given that the major characteristics of the noted Kalenjin re-formation that comprise sensibility to unstable ethos, the twenty-first century turning point and the theatricality of nationhood, present an interaction of histories and performances. The sensibility to unstable ethos characteristic indicates encounters of nationhood challenges and, at the same time, encounters mediated by historical circumstances. Of interest here is how these exposures

and corrective measures are both historical and theatrical. Arguably, historical events trigger theatrical action and, therefore, this inquiry considers trans-mediation as a complementary relationship between histories and the after commentaries by the people affected by the historical event.

1.3: Research questions and objectives

The thesis addresses the question: what is the nature and function of the twenty-first century Kalenjin nation as an identity in transition? The question evaluates the modalities by which the Kalenjin nation has transformed after the end of the Moi presidency and how the Kalenjin people understand themselves as a nation across the juncture. This is necessitated by the noted sensations of unstable ethos, transition and performance. Accordingly, the question determines how these sensations intersect to constitute trans-mediation.

The above-noted question leads to a further four specific questions that are considered in this thesis. The first question is: how is the end of the Moi presidency a significant dramatic premise in the history of the Kalenjin nation to produce a trans-mediation process? A dramatic premise refers here to an event that affects the living of a group of people in such a way that returning it to normalcy entails a substantial process. Thus, the aim is to assess the nature of the end of the Moi presidency and determine its fundamental impact on the Kalenjin. I am fascinated by how the fall of a political regime triggers a process of re-imagining an ethnic group's ethos. The triggering signals a unique way in which the relationship between the group and the regime was constructed. This calls for an assessment of the pre-2002 historical texts and meta-dramas that carry the intersections between the Moi and the Kalenjin stories to determine how they build up the magnitude in which the Kalenjin sense of living as a group is lost.

The second one is: what is the theatricality of the trans-mediation process of the Kalenjin nationhood? This question addresses the intersection between the historical dramas and the attendant meta-dramas, occasioned by the end of the Moi presidency, and the realities in the Kalenjin way of life. The question on theatricality aims at determining the cause and effect of the trans-mediation process considered here as a chain of events. The dramatic premise of the ending of the Moi presidency, for example, intimates that the Kalenjin re-formation activity is caused by the subtle interaction between the KANU[3] regime and the Kalenjin ethos. It is, therefore, compelling to assume that the period after the KANU downfall is marked by a chain of

[3] The Kenya African National Union party which established the Moi regime

culminations leading to the return of their ways of life to normalcy which is unique at each stage. As a result, the thesis identifies and analyses the group's historical episodes that can be ordered into a theatrical narrative of re-imagined ethos.

The third is: what is the performativity of the sequences of activities in the Kalenjin trans-mediation process? I have defined performativity as the power of actions to institute agreeable social realities through creativity. This indicates a difference from the question on the theatricality that focuses on the relatedness of the episodes in the Kalenjin history to form a chain of a re-imagination narrative. The question on performativity is about the power to create effects. Each of the levels of re-imagining the Kalenjin is considered here as bearing unique motivations and purposes and, hence, should first be examined individually. The significance of this venture concerns how the co-presence interactions and displays are not literal expressions of reforming 'Kalenjinness.' Rather, they are set on fulfilling other everyday life needs of the community. For example, a Kalenjin Facebook community site is set as a platform for interaction, entertainment and sharing information. Re-imagining ethos is not stated overtly as an activity on the site. Nonetheless, the activity is carried out subtly in the process of interacting, entertaining and sharing information.

The fourth is: what is the relationship between the performances and various forms of nationalism? This forms the thesis summative question given that the study is concerned with the nature of the 'Kalenjinness' as nationhood in motion. This bears on an assumption that the various points in a motion produce various imaginings of a nation, which draws on Brubaker's (2004: 122) view on a nation that it is imagined in ''different ways at different times." It means that nationalism is a social process by which speaking to and about the nation is a subjective and circumstantial experience and, hence, nationhood bears different meanings at different times. Thus, the question determines the temporal strands of nationalism produced in the Kalenjin trans-mediation process.

Five objectives are formulated from the above-highlighted questions and these are:

- To establish the dramatic circumstance that the end of the Moi presidency initiated as a form of a Kalenjin trans-mediation process.
- To determine the Kalenjin states of unrest consequent to the end of the Moi presidency as dramatic premises of various strands of nationalism
- To identify and analyse the major Kalenjin histories as trans-mediation dramas.

- To assess the emerging Kalenjin co-presence interactions as trans-mediation meta-dramas.
- To examine the fulfilment of nationalism in the trans-mediation process.

1.4: Historicity and theatricality as social drama: a review of concepts and hypotheses

This thesis adopts social drama as the analytic and narrative framework because social drama represents the aspects of historicity and theatricality in the selected texts. Social drama refers to the archetype developed mainly by Turner (1974 and 1980) which proffers that the seemingly fragmented and disordered social situations hold a neat dramatic pattern. Turner (1974) discusses how social life is processual and ritual-like and, hence, a social drama. The drama demonstrates how events are chained in such a way that an aspect of an event constitutes the premise of the next and several others. It also shows that the chaining of the events follows an archetypal pattern related to the conventional drama as it depicts dramatic premise, climax and resolution. Boje (2003: 10), an exponent of the social drama theory, calls this pattern a narrative of performance process owing to how narrating an event relates to narrating a dramatic chain of events. Turner (1980) is an expansion of the idea of social life as caught up in a complementary relationship with time. It discusses how social drama is not just a chain of histories but a product of cultural performances, which expounds on how social life affects future social situations. Bell (2006: 2), expanding on this relationship, argues that social drama "tells half of the story" by giving only the plot. The secondary stories about crucial happenings give life to social drama, which means that happenings are not static but are assigned new meanings in different situations in a collective. Thus, social drama connects with trans-mediation on the idea of 'process,' which is about the accomplishment of an event as a function of a concatenation of smaller events.

Accordingly, this thesis examines and narrates the Kalenjin trans-mediation by focusing on the records of the national 'dramas' and 'meta-dramas' reflected in both the historical trajectories and contemporary interactions of the nation. Historic events are examined in the thesis as 'dramas' owing to the stage effect they carry. A momentous event draws people in the surroundings to pay attention to the position from which the event happens and the people involved, which relates to a theatrical action affecting the audience. Interactions are examined here as meta-dramas conceptualising the presence of a subsequent commentary action in society after the occurrence of a major event. The after-events witness people referring back to the

events in social and cultural expressions. The term, 'meta-drama,' (also known as meta-theatre) embraces the analogy of 'meta-language.' Thus, the notion meta-theatre, is employed here in the same way Boje (2003: 6) notes that given that meta-language refers to the language about language, then meta-theatre is the theatre about theatre. It means that if a discourse about the Kalenjin nation generates another discourse across space or time, then the marginal discourses are meta-dramas. Accordingly, historical and meta-commentary texts are examined in this thesis on their performative and processual power to restructure realities.

In the thesis, I focus on the relationship between social drama and the processual effects on nationalism. Here, I suppose that the various stages of social drama configure different notions of nationhood. Turner (1974; 1980 and 1987) offer a four-staged concept of social drama namely, 'Breach,' 'Crisis, 'Redress' and 'Reintegration' which this thesis employs. Below I explain the meanings of these stages and the assumptions about the multiple relationships between the stages and the various theoretical concepts by which nationalism and performance link.

Breach describes the non-fulfilment of what regulates an intercourse between a collective and a crucial source of a satisfying life in the collective (Turner, 1974: 38). It refers to the rise of a disruptive event that violates a custom of deriving a valued living between a collective and another party. A living, here, refers to the means of satisfying needs considered in a collective as the most favourable. I propose that the magnitude by which a norm is satisfying to a living, and, hence, the level at which it disrupts the living, relates to how the norm was initially constructed. People make life choices based on what is best for them in given junctures. For example, they choose one leader against another or adopt a certain form of livelihood over another depending on their concept of value in their living, respectively. However, the (im)prudence of a choice may not be known until the choice is hit by a catastrophe. At this juncture, the people learn whether they were prudent or not in making the choices. The salient question at the juncture would be: was the choice worth the predicament? Given this, a prudent choice does not endanger the living. It should be safe either by being everlasting or less impactful should it end.

Consequently, I examine the ending of the Moi presidency, as Kalenjin 'Breach', based on the assumption that the Kalenjin regulated their dealings with the Moi presidency through vulnerable concepts. Here, 'vulnerable concepts' describe the rationalities in establishing dealings which, in the case of the Kalenjin, entail the Moi presidency as a mobilising logic

despite being transitory. In this case, I consider that where vulnerable concepts are chosen, they are appeased by imaginations which make them appear either everlasting or less impactful in the event of an ending.

Iwata (2008) offers an analogy through which the idea of a vulnerable concept can be linked to appeasement. The work is about the creation of interests in literary texts through suspense and surprise as interdependent forms. It submits that surprise is a function of the reader's imaginative flaws in experiencing the progress of a story. This is argued in the statement that the interest in a surprise relates to the magnitude in which a narrative twist develops so that the reader is taken back to the story to re-interpret and integrate the unfolding and the end of the story (Iwata, 2008: 183). The statement indicates that the power of great writing to keep the reader off an astonishing narrative outcome depends on projecting a false state of normalcy which makes certain things unforeseeable. Here, I employ Iwata's idea of surprise in the metaphorical sense to figure how the unfolding of events in a world can be so interesting to a section of people that certain happenings hit them with a life-changing surprise. In this respect, the 'reader' compares with the Kalenjin people in establishing nationhood via the notion of the Moi presidency such that the ending of the presidency impacted them as a disruptive surprise.

The location of Breach within surprise raises the notion of cultural trauma which is handled in Alexander (2004). Cultural trauma is defined as the collective's sensation when their environment changes in an "unforeseen and unwelcome manner" such as the death of a leader, wars and inter-group persecution (Alexander, 2004: 5). The definition indicates the significance of catastrophic experiences to initiate fundamental changes in peoples' life. Alexander (2004) shows that cultural traumas are not accidental incidents but socially constructed. This means that the unforeseen and unwelcome manner of cultural traumas depends on the nature in which the life of the victims is intertwined with their environment.

There are also views that rationalisation plays a crucial role in people's engrossment with the present circumstances according to which the future is taken for granted. Murray (2019: 140) provides the idea of the "meaning-making" principle, which is a derivation from the Freudian (1920) pleasure and reality principles on the oppositional working of the mind over gratification. On one hand, the pleasure principle calls for the immediate satisfaction of desires, and, on the other, the reality principle necessitates the deferral of the immediate satisfaction because of the unpleasant realities about the gratification. Murray (2019: 140-141) proposes a midsection that

neither steers clear of the pleasurable aspect of gratification nor defers it, but imposes the 'need for things to make sense,' which is submitting to the meaning-making principle. Edensor (2002: 55, 84) postulates the idea of "improvisational knowledge" which refers to the meaning-making that does not need to go through a rigorous vetting to serve in a given situation but one that is endowed to serve despite the lack of accurate knowledge on the reality. These perspectives are applied in the thesis to analyse the dramas and meta-dramas of the making of the ending of the Moi presidency to determine how the ending event constituted a Kalenjin Breach. In this case, Breach symbolises a surprising catastrophe that reverses a past in which things were made to make sense even in the face of flaws.

Crisis refers to the spread of anguish, following a disruption of living in a group, to the other groups in a wider but bounded environment (Turner, 1980: 150). A coup, for example, is likely to set the supporters of the deposed into war with the supporters of the coup executers because of the divergent emotions that will be projected by the factions. The disruption of a singular group's living has a way of disrupting living of several 'others.' The sense is that Crisis is a moment in which the victim group vents their sorrow and fear which, as Turner (1974: 38) observes, tends to intersect with the existing cleavages that define the relations between the victim group and the 'others.' Therefore, the stages of Crisis have a way of reviving the existing conflicts among groups.

Here, I am concerned with the similarity between the restoration of past conflicts in Crisis and the stories of the ethnic violence in Kenya in 1992, 1997 and 2007 in which the Kalenjin community was pitted against several other ethnic communities. There were also notable outcries concerning persecution by the new (NARC) regime that came from the community in 2002 after the ending of the Moi presidency. These events signal anguish that is projectable to 'others.' They depict a way in which the anguish can be alleviated through (mis)attribution to others. Accordingly, the thesis examines the episodes of these projections by considering perspectives on estrangement as a projection of defense mechanism. The most salient here is the idea, discussed by Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992), Billig (1995), Kim (2016) and Bilewicz and Liu (2020), of siege mentality. This refers to the perception of being surrounded by the majority 'others' who are perceivably harmful. The perspectives indicate that siege mentality does not need to be based on real threats; rather, it is triggered by prejudicial imaginations of 'others,' as opposed to the 'self,' as the undeniable initiators of trouble. Thus, a siege mentality is

an exoneration of the 'self' and the blame of 'others.' In addition, a siege mentality can be examined as a context for victimhood forms of nationalism because the prominent action in siege mentality is "preparing for the worst" (Kim, 2016: 224). This indicates a state of expecting harm from the larger partner and, accordingly, a defensive projection of aggression towards the larger partner.

Jacoby (2015) and Noor, et al (2017) discuss the idea of victimhood, which is the activity of sensing and communicating the opinion that a group that is constituent to a larger group is being victimised by the majority. The discussions show that victimhood is not a mere sensation of victimisation but an activity of communication. The context provides an assessment of the Kalenjin spates of communicating sorrows and fears as a form of nationalism. Alongside, Mbembe (2019) discusses the perspective of enmity and its role in modern society in consolidating communities. This book offers a way of viewing the Kalenjin siege mentality as a revitalisation of solidarity given that projections of anguish on 'others' depict an 'enemy' trope as a mode of relating with the 'others.' Here, I am interested in how the Kalenjin imagines enmity between the 'self' and the other ethnic groups in the country after the ending of the Moi presidency and how this escalates to the other pre-existing conflicts.

Handmer's (2003) concept of a vulnerable community is also considered here as an example of the role of victimhood in consolidating nationhood. Handmer (2003: 57) observes that a particular group is vulnerable if the "people are assumed to have little resilience or coping capacity within the ambit of public policy." This is invoked through the reality that estrangement bears upon sensations of a disadvantage as a minority, and how the Kalenjin constituted a weak opposition after the 2002 elections since most of Kenya's other ethnic groups had supported NARC. The idea of the Rift Valley territorial claim forms a major focus in this thesis because it relates to the independence politics that Lynch (2011) discusses and through which Moi and the Kalenjin entered into a symbiotic relationship. Accordingly, I also consider, in the thesis, thoughts on place-based vulnerability. McKnight, et al. (2017) and Edensor (2002) offer that a geographically bounded community — which conceives of a sense of community that is attached to a place — is threatened by the loss or defilement of their place at the level at which "place" symbolises homeliness. According to Edensor (2002: 57), the symbolic sense of a "home" concerns "a place of comfort", "where the body is relaxed and unselfconscious." It refers to a space in which residents experience ownership, freedom, and connectedness. Therefore, the

thesis considers that a community is threatened when its homeliness is disrupted. Here, I am interested in how the Kalenjin anguish relates to the territorial issues of a region known as the Rift Valley, which is claimed by the community as ancestrally belonging to them while the other ethnic groups are interested in settling there too because it has vast pieces of lands that were formerly white Settler farms.

As a result, the victimhood concepts of vulnerability and threat of homeland are examined as aspects of understanding Crisis. Victimhood expresses persecution while vulnerability is a form of victimhood that emphasises disadvantage. The notion of a threatened community of place suggests that the community faces extinction because their homeland is infiltrated. The performativity of these expressions is evident in the way that they are discharged through a projection of permitting narratives, which is the use of morally analytical accounts to uphold the systematic and illegitimate nature of the harm (Billig, 1995: 15; Jeffery and Candea, 2006: 291 and Rempell, 2013: 343). Thus, I make the supposition here that the Kalenjin narratives of vulnerability and threats over the homeland are the contexts in which Kalenjin victimhood forms of nationalism are produced.

The Redress stage is defined in social drama as the rise of mechanisms, such as "personal advice and informal arbitration to formal juridical and legal machinery" to resolve the effects of the Crisis (Turner, 1980: 151). This describes the rise of activity within the victim group or involving the 'others' in the wider group or region, to resolve the conflict. The stage is borne from the human processes striving towards resolving things. There exists an overriding human desire to return things in the life to normalcy. Here, I am interested in the meaning of Redress as a means "to correct a wrong" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020, "Redress") that presupposes a sensation of having acted inappropriately. The idea of correcting a wrong emanates from the characteristic of the Crisis stage being anguishing and engaging in antagonism. Crisis also alienates the victim group from other groups in the surrounding. As such, Crisis damages the relations with 'others' and, hence, lowers the quality of life in the group. Thus, the Kalenjin Redress drama should be examined as episodes of the Kalenjin sensation of having acted inappropriately during Crisis. I contend that the idea of inappropriateness entails honour. Honour is a quality that is earned through being judged by others and here, the Kalenjin honour at the post-Crisis stage is arguably low. Therefore, I examine the stage as the Kalenjin sensations of

dishonour from the other ethnic groups surrounding them and the need to rectify approaches to life in co-existing with others.

Appiah (2010) and Oprisko (2012) discuss the concept of the value of honour. Oprisko (2012: 2) defines honour as the "process of designating social value upon an individual (or sub-group) by a group" and thus, a means of deriving a living. According to Appiah (2010: i), honour concerns a moral revolution which is the "rapid transformation in moral behaviour" and, hence, a fundamental change of the principles governing the concept of correctness in an individual or a group. I am interested here in Appiah's (2010: 11) concept of entitlement to respect, which refers to the codes of earning respect in a plurality with 'others' as a means of overcoming them. It conceptualises a way in which individuals or groups constituting a wider group are conscious of difference and conflicts but, rather than triumphing over the others through immoral means such as violence, build about themselves attributes of being the most respectable. Appiah (2010: 8) discusses two approaches, which are recognition respect and appraisal respect. Recognition respect regards conferring someone respect not because they have excelled above others in performing a good deed but because they have not failed to perform the deed. One does not need to work to achieve this respect, which means that it is always given as long as one does not fail to uphold the deed. Examples here include civility, abidance by the law and observance of customs. Appraisal respect refers to excelling above others in performing a good deed such as topping in the country in business or education. According to Appiah (2010), appraisal respect is the most preference of being entitled to respect by others due to difference. A group under siege mentality does not want the other groups to do anything good to them but simply to respect their significant because it is democratic. Here, respect is not reserved for some specific 'individual' but earned through struggles towards excellence.

I examine the representations of the Kalenjin Redress within the assumption that the Redress shifts from recognition to appraisal respect given that siege mentality relates to the difference between the two. A shift to appraisal respect, therefore, hints at a desire to be respected as the most excellent in being good among others. Hence, I am interested here in how appraisal respect is also a mode of conceiving nationhood on honour. An appropriate metaphorical view of a moral shift is Lasskens (2017) notion of "de-roling" through which moral revolution functions as a derivation of appraisal respect. 'De-roling,' in this case, refers to the process of separating an individual from the character of a role played earlier to reintegrate the

individual into reality (Lassken, 2017: 167). Role-playing then refers to a 'state of being' an 'other' as a result of the specialised codes of conduct, practices and responsibilities (Lassken, 2017: 166). The value of 'de-roling' is that it prevents the confusion between "fictional" behaviour and reality (Lassken, 2017: 167. A soldier, for example, who has not been 'de-roled' may encounter challenges adjusting to civilian life after retirement or loss of job because of the dissonance between the 'soldier' role and the reality in the civil world. Hence, I invoke the metaphor as a means of understanding the post-crisis Kalenjin nation as undergoing detachment from their cultural identity traits that are considered immoral.

According to Oprisko (2012), the value of honour lies in being true to reality. 'Reality,' here, refers to "what we wish the world to be, but the world as it is" (Oprisko, 2012: 42). This suggests that human desires are often in conflict with the nature of the world and, hence, an affair of honour regards gratifying desires through modes that conform to the world. Here, I am interested in Oprisko's (2012: 113, 120) sense of conforming to 'reality' which relates to the notions of dignity; the process where an 'individual' inscribes social value "onto the self by the self" and honourableness, which is the acceptance of an 'individual' to be valued externally. Dignity relates to the Kalenjin cultural heritage that distinguishes them from the 'others.' Heritage is considered here as a set of ways of life that are valued irrespective of whether they uplift standards of living or not. This is because they are not subject to the appraisal, which means that they are practised as obligations of belonging to a group. As a result, honourableness is employed here as an understanding of the appearance in which the Kalenjin are abandoning obligation-oriented concepts of honour to the ones oriented on uplifting the standards of living.

Reintegration is the stage in which the victim group returns to normal life having resolved an earlier conflict or having accepted enmity as a form of relationship with the 'others' (Turner, 1974; 1980; 1987). It is a juncture of adapting to the demands and challenges of setting normalcy in the context of plurality with 'others.' The stage offers a roadmap to establishing new norms and new relationships in fulfilling life. Here, I postulate Reintegration metaphorically as a 'game of co-existence' given that it entails shrewdness in co-existing with 'others.' The slipperiness of co-existence here relates to balancing the means of uplifting the 'self' with guarding against offending 'others.' This situation is experienced in bounded establishments hosting multiple identities such as countries where there is competition for control of resources, recognition and power, and the need to appreciate each other as members of the establishment.

Nuttall (2009) considers a similar situation to the "game of co-existence" in the racially pluralistic South Africa as a racial entanglement. This refers to the desire by a racial group to be different from an 'other' and yet it is caught up with an irreversible co-location with the 'them.' Therefore, entanglement is a term that is employed both for a condition and a strategy. It is a condition that threatens the individuality and identity of one group because it is overflown with being caught up with other (often antagonistic) identities. Even so, it is a strategy of improving life owing to how plurality offers fields of inter-dependence. Nuttall (2009: 28) notes that the proximity with other identities engenders 'transgression' which is the urge to step out of one's identity to address the challenges of everyday life. Thus, entanglement, other than threatening individuality, opens new crevices through which co-existence becomes a value such as leveraging on the 'other' to do business or enrich culture. I am fascinated here with how the racial concept of entanglement can be appropriated to the situation in which the Kalenjin interacts with the rest of Kenya in the later post-Moi era as noted in my conceptualisation of the case of ethnic entanglement in Kenya. This is because I note, in the selected histories and cultural expressions that, the Kalenjin is caught up between imagining sameness and imagining difference in seeking to reintegrate themselves with the rest of the Kenyans.

Appiah (2005) offers the notion of "ethics" as a style of imagining sameness and imagining difference at the same time. The notion underscores the discomfort of co-existence with different 'others' that must be overcome through creativity. Ethics represent this creativity in the sense that being ethical refers to an effort seeking to depict behavioural rightness before others in life (Appiah, 2005: xv) while being conscious of difference and the potential harmfulness of 'others.' Hence, I am concerned here with how the Kalenjin co-exist with others amicably as a function of ethics. A significant concept of this ethicality in the selected texts is what Appiah (2005: 213) calls "rooted cosmopolitanism." This refers to the view that communities should interact freely while maintaining their concepts of difference. Thus, the single community logic in cosmopolitanism should not lead to homogenisation of cultures but a self-conserving interaction of identities. As a result, I examine the notions, entanglement and capital, in the Kalenjin process of reintegrating with the rest of Kenya, as practising difference while making it less conspicuous.

In sum, the notions, Breach, Crisis, Redress and Reintegration, are used in this thesis to trace the range of nationhood imaginings from the moments preceding the ending of the Moi

presidency to the present. They locate the Kalenjin trans-mediation action within the performativity of events. This concerns the context of co-presence, which describes the assembly situation of a community, and the vigorous action of dealing with things. Therefore, the different historical circumstances in which the Kalenjin community are assembled, and the different ways in which things are dealt with in the assemblies, constitute the Kalenjin trans-mediation process which, by extension, affords a wide view of the trajectory of trans-mediating the Kalenjin nation.

Nevertheless, I am aware of the pitfall of selection bias that is associated with social drama analysis. The social drama process entails identifying historical trajectories and texts that narrate an ideal structure, which obscures the presence of other structures such as those that challenge the ideal structure. The phases, Breach, Crisis, Redress and Reintegration, for instance, do not always follow each other in the given order. Sometimes Crisis does not lead to Redress but turns out to another Crisis as noted in the way a civil war may spread to the neighbouring countries and becomes an intercountry war. Reintegration can also reverse the social situation into a new Crisis such as when a party in a dispute feels shortchanged in a chosen procedure of settling disputes. In addition, the concepts, suspense and surprise, victimhood, honour and entanglement, are situational shades of Breach, Crisis, Redress and Reintegration. It is possible that the shades can fall into any of the different phases. For example, victimhood can be the initiator of Breach rather than being limited to a Crisis activity. Even so, the value of social drama is that it adequately addresses the presence of a human plot which characterises most of the events in collectives. As Turner (1980: 140) and Schechner (1988: 166) opine, a typical spontaneous behaviour is involved in the groups' dealings with a disruptive event towards a resolution. Hence, the social drama is a useful framework for measuring the dramatic passage of a problem to a resolution given that the phases, Breach, Crisis, Redress and Reintegration, represent a social flow from disruption to resettlement. This is important in understanding events in societies as functions of interrelations of histories, concepts and the present rather than being isolated happenings.

1.5: Methodology and ethical considerations

The thesis focuses on texts which depict the Kalenjin nation as the main subject, co-presence, and the interplay between historicity and theatricality.

The Kalenjin subject refers to the conversations on the Kalenjin group by other people or the sense of 'Kalenjinness' by the Kalenjin people. Here, I enlist a sample of journalese and

inquiry report stories[4] as conversations on the various roles of the Kalenjin community in events such as inter-ethnic violence and projections of victimhood. There are also Facebook posts and comments made by participants who are arguably non-Kalenjin about the Kalenjin on the character of the Kalenjin people. These texts are valued here as representations of the Kalenjin by others in Kenya and lenses by which the Kalenjin people understand themselves as a function of being an 'other' but inextricable member of the Kenyan community. The Crisis stage in the social drama scale proffered in the foregoing section, for example, implies that expressions of anguish by a group over a calamity incorporates the existing perceptions of difference between the victim group and the others. Thus, the external conversation about the Kalenjin offers a view on how the Kalenjin nation is constructed by others. The conversations show how the Kalenjin derive selfhood as a reflection of both the positive and the negative notions produced externally. I enlist the Kalenjin-centred Facebook community discussions, sermons, music and events as textual representations of the sense of 'Kalenjinness' by the Kalenjin people. The sampled texts depict the Kalenjin people discoursing on the idea of being Kalenjin while considering the past, present and the future. These texts are viewed in the thesis as representations of the Kalenjin understandings of themselves and analysed to determine how the community engages in an internal activity of remaking itself. Hence, both the texts on the external and internal understandings of the Kalenjin community are examined in the thesis as representations of a wider and complex mode by which the Kalenjin nation is re-imagined.

The idea of co-presence refers to a situation in which a group sense of being assembled and in a position to do things and affect each other (Zhao, 2003: 445). Regional political rallies, Facebook community groups and radio call-in programmes in the local language are considered here as the main medium by which ethnic communities are assembled in Kenya. This thesis examines texts on the political rallies and Facebook community groups' discussions. The radio call-in programmes are left out because they are set in a similar inter (-) action as the Facebook group discussions. Both Facebook and radio represent the members of the community engaging in topical issues that affects the community. This is valued here based on how the engagement simulates a theatrical event in that the participants aim at impressing the community audience. In

[4] I use the term, story, to refer to the newspaper and inquiry report narratives, within the understanding of a 'story' as an account of events whether factual or fictitious. I suggest that newspaper and inquiry report narratives should be viewed as both factual and fictional stories. The accounts are set mainly to offer factual information about issues to the readers; however, the authors should be considered as equally projecting subjective opinions given that the media and judicial judgments are not free from subjectivity.

this case, the events represent the dramatic passage of ideas from individual to the collective realm. Nonetheless, the thesis focusses on the Facebook group discussions and not the radio-call in programmes because of productivity. Facebook is argued here as more productive owing to how it is set in a less restraining medium than the radio. The local language radio in Kenya is highly regulated. As a result, the participants' discussion on their ethnicity or the others' are limited. In addition, Facebook community groups are marked by overflowing discussions on ethnicity. The significance of this overflowing in the thesis is that it represents the aforementioned idea of 'gossip genres,' the unreserved expressions of feelings, which Turner (1980: 147) argues are more performative on the basis that they affect the people's local senses of understanding themselves and others.

The interplay between historicity and theatricality refers to how the present social events are hinged on historical happenings. The present events in the noted post-Moi Kalenjin events depict nuances of revisiting histories to deal with the present life. As a result, I consider a sample of Kalenjin popular songs, sermons, documentaries and comedies as represent this interplay in that they show a connection between the present state of the Kalenjin nation and the most significant historical trajectories in the relationship between the Kalenjin nation and Moi before 2002. In this case, the samples are examined as representations of historical themes and, hence, as senses of being caught inextricably by the past in remaking the present.

Nonetheless, the assessment of the texts is limited to the sign and symbolic tie between the concepts, suspense and surprise, victimhood, honour and entanglement, with ethnic nationalism. The reason is that media and cultural texts, as well as analysis of signs and symbols, yield various meanings from different theoretical perspectives. Additionally, the study is limited to the texts whose meanings weave a social drama pattern. It is possible that other texts from or about the Kalenjin community bear meanings that undermine this pattern. In this light, the thesis focuses on the texts which connect the concepts, suspense and surprise, victimhood, honour and entanglement, and ethnic nationalism, with social drama. The intention is to establish the understanding of Kalenjin nationhood as a temporally constituted reality that bears on patterned histories.

Ethical issues are considered in the thesis. The study considers the emotiveness of the topic of ethnicity and discusses it with objectiveness. The sentiments in the selected texts in which members of an ethnic group remark on the members of another are discussed only at the

level at which they convey aspects of the Kalenjin community reconstructing itself. Further to this, the selected co-presences from which texts are obtained, such as Kalenjin Forum, Gotabgaa Forum, Emo Society, Kalenjin Nights and Kass Marathon, are enterprises that operate legally in Kenya under the watch of the Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), which is the body charged with checking hate speech in the country. In addition, permission to examine the enterprises was obtained. The identities of the participants in the texts have been replaced with codes except in published texts such as newspapers and website materials. These measures were presented to the ethics clearance department at the University of the Free State and the study was cleared as per the clearance number UFS-HSD2018/0033.

1.6: Thesis organisation

The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 presents the background of the study. It focuses on the historical outline of the Kalenjin nation and defines trans-mediation as the discursive framework of the thesis. It also locates the study within a body of literature, identified as the Kalenjin pan-ethnic question. Here, relevant literature is reviewed to situate the value of a literary and cultural inquiry in the understanding of the Kalenjin pan-ethnic question. It also justifies social drama as a relevant analytic and narrative framework in the thesis.

Chapter 2 explores the end of the Moi presidency event as Breach of the Kalenjin ethos. It focuses on the events preceding the downfall as dramatic modes in which the nation constructed Breach. It offers an understanding of the production of the Kalenjin trans-mediation activity, which affords a basis for the exploration of the events that unfold later in the group's history as dramatic units of imagining various concepts of nationhood.

Chapter 3 examines the Crisis stage of the Kalenjin nationhood. It examines texts, themed on historical trajectories, such as the 1992 ethnic violence and the 2002 Kalenjin claims of persecution, which depict the immediate set of events consequent to the ending of the Moi presidency. The chapter unpacks the rise of victimhood drawing on the concepts of vulnerable community and a threatened community of place and discusses its linkage to the production of victimhood-oriented nationalism.

Chapter 4 examines the Kalenjin Redress as a set of events that emerge after Crisis. It focuses on some prominent discourses related to the Kalenjin re-formation activity that was produced mainly by the Kass FM radio. The chapter examines further the linkage between the re-formation activity and what may be viewed as honour nationhood in radio programmes focusing

on reforming ‘Kalenjinness’ and selected activities in the co-presences related to the Kass FM radio.

Chapter 5 discusses the Kalenjin stage of Reintegration which witnesses the events culminating from the Redress stage. The chapter examines the selected activities in the texts that depict the Kalenjin nation in reintegration action with the rest of Kenya. It considers the significance of these documented activities in the production of what may be viewed as Kalenjin ethics of entanglement.

Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. It makes concluding remarks on the meaning of the Kalenjin nationhood as a trans-mediated form and unpacks the meaning of ‘Kalenjinness’ in the ironical context of the changing ethos.

CHAPTER 2: PRODUCING THE KALENJIN SHIFT: THE ENDING OF THE MOI PRESIDENCY AS BREACH OF ETHOS

2.1: Introduction

The chapter examines the dramatic origins of the shifting imaginaries on the Kalenjin nation. It focuses on how the departure of Daniel Moi from power, which is incorporated in the regime change from KANU[1] to NARC[2] in 2002, constitutes what I consider as a Breach of ethos. Breach refers to an event that shakes the "current social order" and, as a result, cripples the normal flow of activities in an inter-subjective collective (Turner, 1974: 36; McFarland, 2004: 1253). An inter-subjective collective stands for a group with shared histories and living such as a family, an institution, an ethnic or a religious group, or a country. The significance of Breach originates from how in an inter-subjective group, individuals are "systematized" by the shared histories and modes of living to handle emerging issues predictably (Turner, 1974: 36), meaning that the members of a group are steered to operate in regulated ways. Turner (1974: 38) indicates that the "systematized" pattern of life in a group is exposed remarkably when a disastrous event occurs in the sense that the result is confusion and anguish. Thus, Breach describes an event in which continuity of everyday life in a collective is suddenly undermined. The significance of Breach in social drama is that it initiates a series of actions by which social drama is realised. An example is how, in McFarland (2004), students' revolt against the school administration which demobilises the school activities and initiates a series of actions to return the school life to normalcy. In this case, there is an emergent issue by which the students' systematised sense of living in the school is undermined in such a way that the living is momentarily halted. The rise of the issue constitutes Breach owing to how it sets in anguish among the students and confusion in the entire school and a chain of events such as protests, dispute resolution and restructuring the way of life in the school

The above definitions offer two features of Breach which found this chapter. The first one is that Breach is a violation of social relations. A social relation stands for an established link between a group and another group, or between the group and an individual, which satisfy the parties' sense of normalcy. A school, for example, is established as a reciprocal action between

[1] The Kenya Africa National Union — Kenya's ruling party from independence until 2002. (The footnotes must start again at number 1 for each chapter. You need to re-format the footnotes).
[2] National Alliance for Rainbow Coalition is the coalition party that took over from KANU in 2002.

teachers and the students whereby the teachers derive occupation while the students gain knowledge. Similarly, a group-individual relation, such as a community, is set as an association between the leader of the community and the community members where the leader offers direction and representation in exchange for honour. Thus, the revolting of the students or the passing on of a community leader is disastrous because it interrupts the reciprocal relationship of a satisfying life. The connection between Daniel Moi, who was Kenya's president between 1978 and 2002, and the Kalenjin group is considered here as an example of an individual-group- social relation. Moi and the Kalenjin were connected by Moi's promise of privileges to the community while the community assured Moi of political support. The privilege here refers to the favours in public policy and development projects as well as security and jobs, which an ethnic group gets for belonging in 'the ethnic group of the president'. All the four presidential regimes since independence under Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta, bear an aspect of favouring the 'ethnic group of the president'. Thus, the rise of Moi to become the second president in the country ushered a sense of a privileged living to the Kalenjin. Reciprocally, the group consolidated behind Moi to establish an ethnic base for Moi which was crucial to Moi given a political environment in which ethnic groups count significantly in reinforcing political power. Therefore, I examine in the chapter the ending of the Moi presidency as a Kalenjin Breach since it arguably interrupted the group's derivation of privilege.

The second element is that Breach potentially generates a series of actions aimed at returning living to normalcy. In the examples of a school and a community, the dissatisfaction of the students and the incapacitation of the community leader constitute the beginnings of calamities but also the processes of handling the calamities. However, I suggest that a social relation not only needs to have been satisfying to the affected party to command a series of actions when it is disturbed. It also needs to have been 'lived' by the group intensively. The intensity here refers to the frequency of the relationship. Thus, I observe that the seriousness of demobilisation in the examples of the student's protest or the gloom over incapacitation of the community leader relate respectively to the intensity by which the flouted school norm or the leadership of the community leader was experienced before. In light of this, I examine the Kalenjin Breach in the ending of the Moi presidency as a function of a 'lived' privilege. The ending of the Moi presidency is considered as a calamitous moment to the Kalenjin in relation to how the Moi-Kalenjin relation regularised the Kalenjin sense of privilege. Regularisation

supposes surprise as another element that needs to be examined here. A significant Breach relates to suddenness. A highly regularised social relation implies that the parties do not foresee its disruption. As a result, I assess in the chapter how the ending of the Moi presidency was unforeseeable to the Kalenjin to constitute a significant event in their living.

The term, ethos, refers here to the context by which people affiliate themselves to a community. Hence, 'Breach of ethos,' stands for the disruption of the living in a collective that affects mainly the individual's concept of belonging to the community. The major assumption in the chapter is that the end of the Moi presidency was calamitous to the Kalenjin mainly because it disrupted the group's ethos. The group, despite the umbrella ethnic tag, was united by no other means than Moi's rise to the presidency given that the group brought together culturally distinct ethnic groups. In this way, the end of the Moi presidency, where his preferred successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, was defeated unexpectedly, conceptually ushered to the Kalenjin loss of ethos. The emphasis here is that the Kalenjin ethos was pegged on the Moi presidency rather than Moi the person which implies that the group was united to tap benefits from power and not for the unity sake. This is evident in how Moi failed to unite the Kalenjin in his retirement because he was disconnected from power as a result of the defeat of Uhuru Kenyatta. It should be noted here that Moi had promised the Kalenjin that he was going to rule the country virtually if Uhuru became the president which compelled the Kalenjin to vote for Uhuru unanimously. Thus, the non-fulfilment of the Uhuru presidency signified the ending of Moi's power and, therefore, Moi's incapacity to mobilise the Kalenjin into solidarity. Hence, the subsequent parts of the chapter examine the interplay of power and ethos and how the interplay culminates to Breach.

The first part of the chapter introduces the texts that carry how power and ethos interact to produce Breach. In the second section, the chapter examines surprise and trauma in the texts I refer to as the KANU downfall[3] stories as understandings of the production of Breach. The objective here is to assess the dramatic trajectories by which the end of the Moi presidency as a traumatic experience to the Kalenjin was built. The third section of the chapter assesses how the Moi-Kalenjin social relation was appealing to the Kalenjin group. This is to determine how the

[3] This term, 'KANU downfall,' which stands for 'the ending of the Moi presidency,' is under focus in the rise of the Kalenjin Breach. The term underscores that the ending of the Moi presidency alone does not capture the full catastrophe of the event to the Kalenjin group. This is because Moi was set to retire in 2002 in accordance with the 1991 electoral law, which prevented any person from occupying the presidency for more than two terms. Thus, to overcome this huddle, Moi and the Kalenjin political planners resorted to the party as the vehicle of maintaining the Kalenjin supremacy in Kenya's politics. Accordingly, it is the defeat of KANU that represents the catastrophic ending of the Moi presidency to the Kalenjin people.

Moi ethos was, in Turner's (1974) term, "systematized" in the Moi presidency such that the Kalenjin entered what I refer to as composure period in reference to how the sense of living as solidarity was stable, making it difficult for them to visualise an end of such life. The 'composure' accounts are examined together with what I refer to as 'distress' accounts which feature the Kalenjin contemplations on the Kalenjin ethos as the Moi presidency ends. The chapter draws mainly on Edensor (2002), Alexander (2004), Iwata (2008) and Murray (2019) which offer perspectives on regularisation as social action.

2.2: The KANU downfall and the meta-commentary accounts: a review of texts

I conceive that the violation and regularisation of the social relation between the Kalenjin and the Moi presidency are represented by three historical episodes that I refer to as the KANU downfall, the Kalenjin composure, and the Kalenjin distress. The KANU downfall stands for the experiences of loss by the KANU supporters and how the loss transposes mainly as a Kalenjin problem. The term, Kalenjin composure, is used here to refer to the Kalenjin perceptions of 'Kalenjinness' when the nation was at its apex. I consider that the apex relates to the 1980s when Moi had just become the president and when there was least opposition against his government. Thus, the Kalenjin were, conceivably, at the apex of composure in the decade because their collective sense as the 'ethnic group of the president' was thriving. It is a period across which it was most satisfying to be a Kalenjin. This should be contrasted from the years before the 1980s and in the 1990s when, respectively, the group had not fully formed into a community and when the opposition against Moi/KANU erupted. The term, Kalenjin distress, refers to the Kalenjin perceptions of 'Kalenjinness' when the groups ethos had crumbled in relation to the end of the Moi presidency. Thus, I consider that the Kalenjin Breach relates to the dramatic interlink between the end of the Moi presidency, as a life-changing event in the Kalenjin nation, and the subjective conceptions of nationhood within the social situations of sensing privilege and sensing the loss of privilege.

The KANU downfall experience considered in the chapter is twofold. It comprises the KANU defeat in the 2002 elections and the mounting opposition against KANU in 1991 which ushered in the multiparty political system in the country. The 2002 account refers to the ending of the promise Moi made to the Kalenjin concerning safety in Uhuru Kenyatta's government. Uhuru is a Gikuyu but was preferred by Moi because he was the son of the founding president who appointed Moi as his vice president. Conceivably, Moi banked on the long-term relationship

with the Kenyatta family to consider that Uhuru would safeguard Moi's and, by extension, the Kalenjin interests if he became the president. As such, the KANU downfall was disastrous to the Kalenjin because it emptied the bet on Uhuru to sustain the Kalenjin privilege. The 1991 account entails the acceptance of Moi to repeal Section 2(A) of the constitution in 1991, which had been introduced in 1982 to make Kenya a single-party state. Politicians, the clergy and university academics, led by figures such as Charles Rubia, Kenneth Matiba, and Jaramogi Odinga, had engaged the government in protests in 1990 which attracted the attention of the international community. The international community responded by holding back financial aid and forced Moi to concede to the demands in 1991. In this respect, I consider the 1991 history as an aborted Kalenjin Breach. The Kalenjin sense of privilege had in effect been shaken in 1991 because Moi's acceptance of multiparty politics and the mounting opposition indicated a possible defeat of KANU. However, the Kalenjin sense of privilege was restored when Moi defeated the opposition in the 1992 and 1997 elections. Thus, Moi overcame the multiparty trouble and triumphed over the possible means of taking power away from him. Moi was competent to ensure that KANU wins in 2002 when his term was going to end. Thus, a wider view of the Kalenjin Breach is based on the rise of dissent against the Moi regime in 1991 and the defeat of Moi in 2002 as the precursor and the climax respectively. The most significant KANU downfall stories examined in the chapter are journalese narratives, "How young operatives saved the Moi presidency" (Some, 2016) and "How Kibaki men humiliated Moi on last State House Day," (Some, 2018).

"How young operatives" recollects the experience of Moi's sudden acceptance in 1991 to reintroduce the multiparty system within KANU. The story focuses on the emergence of a lobby youth group known as Youth for KANU92 (YK92) as a product of confusion and a sense of loss within KANU following the sudden change of politics in the country that disfavoured KANU. The YK92 was formed to drum support for KANU among the youth in the upcoming first multiparty elections in 1992. The constitutional shift implied that Kenya was entering competitive politics when the popularity of KANU was significantly low after influential politicians from the more populous ethnic groups, such as the Gikuyu, Luhya and Luo, had either defected or were already thrown out of the party. This is alluded to in the narrator's remarks that the 'influential Kanu politicians were abandoning the party like a house on fire and joining the opposition" (Some, 2016, paragraph 17). In addition, "How young operatives" utilises the

testimony of those who conceived the idea of YK92 to deal with the restlessness in KANU over the fear of losing to the opposition. The prominent mode of remembering the moment is about loss and the urgency of saving KANU, which required the conceptions of 'operatives' to save Moi's presidency as the title of the story suggests. The regime required extraordinary persons and arrangements to beat the opposition, which indicates a previous lack of strategy and foresight in KANU. Thus, the importance of "How young operatives" is linked to its depiction of a surprise, within KANU, at the introduction of competitive politics, and a revisit to the origins of confusion and loss.

"How Kibaki men" carries what I refer to as the climax of the Kalenjin Breach. It documents the humiliations suffered by KANU and Moi over the 2002 political defeat on the 30 December 2002 during the ceremony of the handing over of power from KANU/Moi to NARC. The story features the testimonies of Mr. Lee Njiru who had been Moi's long-serving personal aide and other notable persons from KANU and NARC who participated actively during the transition. The importance of the story is that it conveys that the crushing defeat affected Moi more than it did to Uhuru Kenyatta, the presidential candidate. This is depicted in the narrator's reasoning that the event "marked the beginning of tribulations for Mr. Moi whose rule had come to a dramatic end at the hands of Mr. Kibaki" (Some, 2018, in summary). This supposes that the actual loser in the KANU downfall was Moi and not Uhuru. Moi had invested immensely in what came to be known as the 'Uhuru Project' which came from his refusal to follow the democratic procedures in the selection of the party's candidate. Moi had single-handedly picked Uhuru who had never shown any presidential ambitions and was considered politically inexperienced. Accordingly, the other KANU personalities[4] who were interested in succeeding Moi were angered, ditched KANU and proclaimed support to the opposition candidate, Mwai Kibaki, in protest. This suggests that Moi was more concerned with continuing to exercise power even after the ending of his presidency. Thus, "How Kibaki men" is valued here since it relates to the making of the knowledge about the Uhuru project as Moi's strategy of remaining in power. It documents twists in the Uhuru project which led to the crushing defeat.

A noteworthy documentation of the Kalenjin composure is a Kalenjin popular song from the period known as *"Emenyon"* which means "Our country" (Topotuk, 1980, in Tum, 2018)

[4] Raila Odinga, George Saitoti and Kalonzo Musyoka, are examples of top officials who left KANU for the opposition after Moi single-handedly picked Uhuru Kenyatta as KANUs flagbearer.

sung by a Kalenjin legendary singer Kipchamba Arap Topotuk. *"Emenyon"* imitates a musical genre in Kenya known as *Nyayo* songs. This category of music was commonly played in the then Voice of Kenya (VoK) radio and performed live during national events in the first decade of the Moi presidency (the late 1970s and 1980s) to extoll '*Nyayo*ism.' '*Nyayo*' is a Kiswahili word for 'footsteps' and, hence, '*Nyayo*ism' is a philosophy of walking in a predecessor's footsteps. The philosophy was developed by Moi upon replacing Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 to underscore the continuance of the founding KANU ideologies. It was a political promise that sought to emulate Jomo Kenyatta in leadership style which, conceivably, was a way of endearing Jomo Kenyatta's followers to support the Moi presidency. Hence, '*Nyayo*' music advanced KANUs popular ideas such as hard work, equality and unity as initiated by Jomo Kenyatta.

"Emenyon" performs the '*Nyayo*' spirit through the theme of collective ownership of land across the country. The song is centred on the idea of 'possessing Kenya,' which proclaims the ethnic co-location in the 'country as co-ownership of the country's resources. This renders the song an inherently historical text because the concept of co-location as co-ownership alludes to a notable contentious issue, which was championed by Jomo Kenyatta after independence as an ideology on ownership of land. This refers to the African Socialism ideology, which means that the transference of land ownership from the "traditional African forms of solidarity," which were entirely ethnic, to the state (Speich (2009: 450). This shows a system of rejecting communal ownership in favour of individual ownership. The government, via the ideology, intended to issue land on a need-basis rather than a community basis. As such, the so-called 'ancestral homelands' that were vigorously claimed in the pre-colonial era were overrun. The disruption affected Kenya's ethnic groups in different ways. On one side, the larger ethnic groups such as the Gikuyu whose 'ancestral land' was diminishing stood to gain from the ideology since it opened avenues for them to acquire lands outside their ethnic homelands. On the other, the less populous communities, such as the Kalenjin group, Maasai and Mijikenda, whose pieces of 'ancestral land' were still expansive, would lose because they were required to surrender some of their lands for the benefit of the others. The value of the song, *"Emenyon,"* here is that it subverts African Socialism. There is a covert manner in which *"Emenyon"* reverses the idea of 'possessing Kenya' from the national to the Kalenjin-ethnic, such that it performs the Kalenjin advantage in the Moi presidency to gain from the concept of co-location as co-ownership. Thus, I assess in the chapter how the subversion represents the making of the

Kalenjin composure in the context of being the 'ethnic group of the president' and that of the political calmness in the period.

The Kalenjin distress is articulated in a discussion in the Kalenjin Forum and Gotabgaa Forum Facebook groups tagged "Kalenjin unity." The Kalenjin Forum and Gotabgaa Forum Facebook groups, which are some of the leading internet sites of Kalenjin interaction, carry adequate commentary on this issue in that, firstly, they draw membership from the Kalenjin community. The Kalenjin Forum has 196,000 members while the Gotabgaa Forum has 110,000.[5] Secondly, the forums host thousands of updates and corresponding comments, as well as videos, photos and memes, in which members engage in timely debates and discussions on the community. The discourses include political propaganda, urban legends, invectives, myths and imagined histories. Performing on Facebook, which broadly falls into virtual performance, has certain privileges over the physical theatre performance. According to Giannachi (2004: 5-6), virtual reality frees the roles of being either an actor or audience. It enables fluidity in which the actor instantaneously becomes the audience and the audience becomes the actor through the feedback activity such as commenting. It is considered here that such fluidity is more revealing because it offers a wider view of peoples' choices of space, objects and action in speaking to others. Virtual performances are also more revealing because of the feature of anonymity that engenders what I refer to as extravagant discourses and the remarks and actions which are not limited by fears such as offending others, inappropriateness or senselessness.

In the discussion, the concept, "Kalenjin unity," is narrowed to the question of the value of the kingpins as a mode of consolidating the community. A kingpin is a personage in an ethnic group tasked with speaking for and representing the group in political matters. The person directs the group during major political decisions, such as elections and referendums, and represents the groups aspiration to clinch the presidency. Kingpins are also mostly presidential aspirants. However, the kingpin can also create alliances with an 'other' with this strategic alliance creating chances for the kingpin to be appointed onto a major position in government if the ally wins. The kingpin may also lead the community to revolt from supporting the government or a course if

[5] These November 2021 statistics are significant in mapping the Kalenjin community's position considering that the Kenya-national Facebook groups and pages of media houses, in the entire Kenyan nation (about 50 million) hardly have more that 5 million members or followers. Examples include the Kenya Political Forum (1 million), NTV Kenya (3.4 million), and Citizen TV Kenya (4.2 million). This shows a 10%, or less, community representation in the sites. The Kalenjin population is 6.3 million, according to the 2019 national census (Orinde, 2020), and thus, the Kalenjin Forum and *Gotaabgaa* Forum sites reflect a 2-3% representation which is ideal given that most people in the rural areas are either illiterate or not connected to the internet.

there is a feeling that the community is short-changed or being threatened. Accordingly, what is interrogated in the tagged discussion is who, between the kingpin and the group, exploits the other.

The interrogation emanates from the Kalenjin political trajectories spearheaded by William Ruto and Gideon Moi that began soon after the elections in 2013 but heightened in the 2016 senate by-election campaigns in Kericho County. This was necessitated by the appointment of Charles Keter as the Cabinet Secretary for Energy and petroleum. William Ruto is Kenya's deputy president in the government for the period 2013-2022 as the deputy leader of the ruling Jubilee party while Gideon Moi is the son of the retired president Moi and the current chair of the KANU party. The two are the leading contenders for Kenya's presidency in 2022 from the Kalenjin ethnic group which also means that they are the leading contenders for the Kalenjin kingpin position. As a result, the Kericho campaigns offered an arena for the contenders to display their might to the Kalenjin nation because the top contestants in the by-elections were the ruling Jubilees Aaron Cheruiyot and KANUs Paul Sang. The uniqueness of the concerns of the campaign is how it became a moment for testing the second regime of the Kalenjin kingpin after the retired Moi. Consequently, the event stirred plenty of views across the Kalenjin nation in support or against either Gideon Moi or William Ruto and also stirred views on the value of the institution to the community's plight. The juncture may be viewed as the community's first moment of rethinking 'Kalenjinness' as a kingpin-directed identity after the retired Moi. I take this as rethinking Breach because concepts on the fitness of Gideon Moi or William Ruto to lead the Kalenjin group bear a recourse to Moi's tenure in the position.

A prominent untitled post in the discussion, which I refer to as, "Nothing like pure Kalenjin" (Gotabgaa Forum, 2016a; Kalenjin Forum, 2016a), judges the kingpin institution using the Moi example. The significance of the post is that it makes a bold announcement of the Kalenjin nationhood as counterfeit. This stems from the speaker's connection with the formation of the KANU and KADU[6] political parties and the rise of the coalition ethnicities in Kenya, which are the Luhya, Mijikenda and Kalenjin, and the labelling of 'Kalenjin' as 'a political term.' As such, the speaker reasons that Kalenjin and related ethnicities are contexts of

[6] The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). This is the party that was formed in 1960 as a union of the less populous ethnic groups, such as the Kalenjin groups, Luhya groups, Maasai and Somalis, and the Coastal groups such as Mijikenda, owing to the fear of being marginalised by the Gikuyu and the Luo (Willis and Gona, 2013; Maxon and Ofcansky, 2014: 158).

exploiting communities by the kingpins. That is, it is the kingpin who gains and not the communities and, therefore, the post announces that the groupings should be terminated. Here, I am interested in the representation of the idea of counterfeit on kingpins and the attendant reactions in the comments section as modes by which the Kalenjin recollect the ending of the Moi presidency as a catastrophic event. The reason is that the announcement of the counterfeit concept establishes a direct questioning and answering of the Kalenjin sense of community. The task here is to determine from the questioning and answering the Kalenjin desire for community amid the sensibility to lack of ethos as representations of cultural trauma which in the thesis stands for the dramatic premise of trans-mediation in the Kalenjin nation.

2.3: KANU downfall as cultural trauma: the example of remembering as narrating surprise in the KANU downfall accounts

This section examines the stories, "How young operatives" and "How Kibaki men" as viewpoints about the making of the Kalenjin Breach in the 2002 KANU downfall. It focuses on the example of the surprise trope on the basis that the Breach is a function of cultural trauma. This position is derived from Alexander's (2004) perspectives on cultural trauma and Iwata's (2008) on surprise. Alexander (2004) discusses cultural trauma as a commonplace phenomenon that, nonetheless, requires serious attention because it is both a scientific and social concept. The term, cultural trauma, is defined as the socio-psychological situation in a collective following subjection to,

> a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways (Alexander, 2004: 1).

This connects with the social drama notion of Breach in the sense that both entail the disruption of a group's sense of living in an unforeseen and devastating way. However, the idea of cultural trauma offers a better understanding of Breach events because it states that collective traumas are not naturally occurring but socially constructed conditions (Alexander, 2004: 8). It avers that the extent to which a disruptive event affects a group relates to how the group derived their mode of living before the event. Thus, I focus on "How young operatives" and "How Kibaki men" represent the cultural trauma constructed by the Kalenjin during the downfall of KANU.

I examine the construction element from a retrospective point of view. Here, I focus on remembering the KANU downfall as an act of repentance. This indicates that the construction of trauma is understood as a process of 'courting trouble,' which is failing to notice that the modes of satisfying a sense of living are unsafe. Thus, the retrospective point of view refers to the frame of discovering and admitting shame over failing to foresee trouble. An important point here is that I treat the narratives, "How young operatives" and "How Kibaki men" as meta-narratives of a grander narrative that focuses on the Kalenjin nation and Moi/KANUs entrance into a symbiotic relationship that ended tragically in the KANU downfall. Another point is that "How young operatives" and "How Kibaki men" are retrospective stories featuring KANU adherents and opposition figures recalling the twists by which the relationship turned tragic to KANU adherents. In light of this, I examine the construction of cultural trauma by focusing on the idea of surprise as a representation of the ending of the mutuality narrative of the Kalenjin and Moi/KANU.

The connection between surprise in the Kalenjin-Moi/KANU narrative and the stories, "How young operatives" and "How young operatives," is derived from Iwata's (2008) arguments on surprise as a retrospection-compelling experience. Iwata (2008) examines suspense and surprise as the readers' modes of experiencing the interesting aspects of a story. The concepts are argued as the constituents of the fictional force that carry the reader in the train of the story. Suspense, which concerns the need to know what will happen next, is described as a "process-oriented" interest (Iwata, 2008: 254). This implies that suspense establishes a linear derivation of pleasure to the reader. It simply carries the reader along with the story, depicting the next episodes as worth reading, but the experience is terminated at the end of the story. Surprise, which is the sudden happening of an expected event, is contrasted as an "effect-oriented" interest (Iwata, 2008: 254). Surprise establishes end-positioned interestingness by disrupting the train of events that suspense has sustained. As a result, the aspect that raises the significance of surprise over suspense is that suspense does not cause a "mental commotion" as a surprise does. The term, mental commotion, conceives of the requirement of a reader facing an unexpected turn of events to "renew or reassess their understanding and gain some learning from the story" (Iwata, 2008: 254). This entails being taken aback by an occurrence that requires the reader to connect ends in the previous episodes. Thus, a surprise is the most effective experience in a story-reading event because it compels the reader to revisit the story and determine the contexts of going

wrong in expectation. As a result, “How young operatives” and “How Kibaki men” are considered here as the retrospective stories of the Kalenjin ‘reading experiences’ of the Kalenjin-Moi/KANU relationship because they depict remembering the KANU downfall as attempts at reassessing the twists that resulted in a disruptive ending. Thus, they represent the creative circumstances by which the Kalenjin were trapped into the aura interestingness of the Moi presidency story and, hence, as the modes by which the traumatic effect of the KANU defeat was constructed. I suggest that the circumstances are best understood from the representations of the co-incidence between KANU and the Kalenjin, and the Kalenjin’s overestimation of Moi and KANU.

An appropriate way to begin assessing the construction element in the KANU downfall trauma is to trace the manner in which KANU downfall transposes as Kalenjin trauma. Here, I establish how a national party problem transfigured into an ethnic loss of collective bearing. In “How young operatives,” the formation of the Youth for KANU92 (YK92), which is the youth unit that campaigned for KANU after the introduction of multiparty politics, was the most significant initiative by KANU seeking to save itself from a highly speculated defeat. The YK92 was successful because it appealed to the youth who were likely to be dissociated from their ethnic affiliations in voting through promises such as university loans and jobs. This is conveyed in the narrator’s statement that,

> Excitement about the new outfit spread quickly and when they met on Wednesday, the sons and daughters of who-is-who in Kenya’s politics were in attendance.
> They were led by President Moi’s children, Gideon, Jonathan and June, as well as their cousin Kiprono Kittony, son of Maendeleo ya Wanawake chair lady Zipporah Kittony. All of them brought friends along (“How young operatives,” paragraph 31-32)

However, the notion of countrywide excitement over the establishment is subverted by the identity of the named key conveners, the idea of bringing friends along and the narrator’s wording of the establishment as an outfit. Gideon, Jonathan, June and Kiprono Kittony are Kalenjins which means that the YK92 was more crucial to the Kalenjin than any other ethnic group in the country. The Kalenjin centre in the YK92 is further evident in its formation. The movement was mooted in a casual meeting-for-a-drink event in a hotel in Nairobi consisting of five young men, Fred Kiptanui, Sammy Kogo, Victor Kebenei, Joe Mwangale and Joe Kimkung. Four of them, except Joe Mwangale, were from the Kalenjin ethnic group and, all besides Fred

Kiptanui, are from families that were very close to Moi. The meeting, as reasoned by Kimkung ("How young operatives," paragraph 40), was convened to share worries on the imminent 'death' of KANU. The conception and launch of YK92 indicate that the Kalenjin were the most worried about the 'death'of KANU. The narrator in the story notes that, in the end, YK92 succeeded significantly in the Kalenjin and Luhya ethnic groups. Moi focused on the Luhya because it was the second most populous ethnic group in the country after the Gikuyu, and "was not committed to any one particular politician" ("How young operatives," paragraph 78). The Gikuyu and the Luo were firmly behind Kenneth Matiba and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga respectively. Thus, YK92s success is arguably evident in its winning of the Luhya support given the ethnic groups with a serious presidential contender rallied behind their 'own.' Certainly, the difference between the Luhya and the Kalenjin support of KANU is that the Luhyas was the result of political persuasion due to the appeal of the YK92 crusade and not any worries about the 'death'of KANU. In contrast, the Kalenjin supported KANU to save their 'own' and themselves. This leads to the meaning of the metaphors, 'bringing friends' and 'outfit.' I argue here that the idea of bringing friends relate to enlisting the support of other friendly ethnic groups to relieve the Kalenjin woes. The Kalenjin power brokers knew that some other ethnic groups could be lured into KANU such as the Luhya who did not have a significant presidential contender. Ultimately, the concept, outfit, sums the strategy in which YK92 was made to appear a national appearance in terms of ethnic composition, while on the contrary, it was a Kalenjin political activity.

The centre of the KANU downfall trauma in the Kalenjin nation is also implied in "How young operatives." This relates to the contemptuous reception that Moi received at Uhuru Park which was the venue of the handing-over ceremony. Moi's long-serving aide, Mr. Njiru, testifies that,

> Having lived at State House, we thought everyone loved us, but we found out that we were shunned and hated (Some, 2018, paragraph 69).

Mr. Njiru is not Kalenjin but Embu. However, his voice, as an aide, represents Moi and KANUs adherents. In this respect, the subject of the confession, 'everyone loved us' against the fact that 'we were shunned and hated,' denotes the KANU top fraternity, which refers to the officials and appointees such as the party officials and the ministers. This fraternity was not entirely Kalenjin.

Moi's government, despite being dominated by the Kalenjin, comprised appointees from other ethnic groups. For example, the vice president during the 2002 elections was Musalia Mudavadi, a Luhya, while the minister for internal security, which is the most revered ministry in the country, was Julius Sunkuli who was a Maasai. Musalia Mudavadi and Julius Sunkuli were voted out in their constituencies in the very elections in which KANU was defeated. Thus, what is striking here is how a government that was bearing a significant national outlook attracted unanimous support only from the Kalenjin whereas the rest of the country including those from which the top government appointees came from rejecting it. This indicates national filtering of the KANU privilege to the Kalenjin group. Thus, Mr. Njiru's discovery that what seemed to be love was hate signifies that no other ethnic community in Kenya derived a meaningful privilege than the Kalenjin despite the appearance that the regime was 'national.' The balance that the KANU woes were Kalenjins' is further depicted in the foregrounding of the Kabarak home in the narrator's description of Moi's final journey from the state house that,

> Moi left for State House where he was given his last military salute and boarded a Kenya Air force helicopter which flew him to his Kabarak home ("How young operatives," paragraph 69).

It should be noted here that Moi has a private home in Nairobi known as the Kabarnet Gardens apart from the rural Kabarak home which is in the Rift Valley. The narrator's emphasis on the Kabarak direction, and not Kabarnet Gardens, symbolises a shift of the sense of homeliness and belonging. The narration displays a direction of Moi's homeliness and belonging from the national space to the regional and, hence, the ethnic, which shows a transfiguration of Moi and KANU from being national 'properties' to the rural Kalenjin community. As such, the Moi/KANU trauma co-incidentally degenerated into Kalenjin's at the KANU downfall.

The 'Kalenjinisation' of the Moi/KANU woes echoes Alexander's (2004) concept of cultural crisis in cultural trauma. Alexander (2004: 10) states that the significant aspect under which trauma becomes universal in a group is when it emerges as a cultural crisis. A cultural crisis, here, refers to an injury to the cultural identity of the people, defined by Alexander (2004: 10), as "the sturdiness of the collectivities." This conveys the concepts which a collective draw on to assume oneness and continuity. The sentiments cited above show the Kalenjin conveners of the YK92 are only those who were connected to Moi and his family, arguably, on shared business and job privileges. The ordinary Kalenjins were not involved yet they partook the

KANU woes by voting remarkably for KANU in the 1992 elections in what may be termed as panic voting. This refers to high turnouts, one direction voting, accompanied by intimidation of those who express contrary opinions. I argue that this behaviour signifies how Moi symbolised oneness and continuity in the group which the Kalenjin modelled into a sense of privilege in controlling the Rift Valley. Thus, the cultural crises that the Kalenjin face in the KANU downfall are concerned with the concept of Moi and KANU as the basis on which the Kalenjin identity was made.

As a result, surprise in "How young operatives" and "How Kibaki men" is linked with the revelation of a fall of ethos. The fall relates to the derisive recollection of the twists in the victory of the opposition against KANU over the multiparty law in 1991 and the defeat of KANU in 2002. The derision in "How young operatives" is depicted in the above-noted segment through a contrasting image where, on the one hand, the launch of the YK92 symbolises a moment of 'excitement', while on the other hand, in Kimkung's somber recollection of the events that occurred on the final day of Moi's presidency connotes the death of KANU. Finally, derision is also conveyed in "How young operatives," through the Moi and his elites' discovery that they were hated by the majority of the Kenyan citizens. The ridiculous sense of knowing things within KANU accounts for further derision: for instance, Munyao notes that "Moi never saw defeat coming" ("How young operatives," paragraph 30). It means that the people around him, who ordinarily, would be giving him the needed information, were either incapacitated or did not fulfil their roles. Thus, the sarcasm in the examples of 'excitement' and being loved, symbolise a Kalenjin retrospective assessment of the Kalenjin-Moi/KANU symbiotic narrative. It depicts a sensation of disgrace on founding ethos on weak grounds and the discovery of an overrated sense of Moi as the community's provider of a long-term sense of solidarity.

A further interesting aspect here is the concept of an overrated figure of Moi. The concept conceptualises the traps in which the Kalenjin were induced into over-relying on Moi as a sense of cultural identity. They represent the idea of being 'duped' in a story that I have highlighted, drawing on Iwata (2008), as falling into the fantastic force that veils the outcome of the story. Thus, to be 'duped' fictionally is to brew an unwelcome and unforeseen experience which, in turn, produces cultural trauma. As a result, I examine the treatment of two remarkable senses of a glorified sense of Moi in the stories, "How young operatives" and "How young operatives." I also determine whether there is a link with some concepts in the stories that uncover the basis of

the glorification. This way, I unpack the way in which the Kalenjin nation were victims of an unreal but compelling circumstance in the flow of their relationship with Moi and the construction of trauma.

The first sense is conveyed in "How young operatives" in the episode about the sudden concession by Moi over the demand to repeal the law for multiparty democracy. The narrator states that,

> A month earlier, on December 3, 1991, President Daniel Arap Moi had jolted the political scene during a Kanu national delegates meeting in Kasarani.
> Bowing to pressure from the Opposition and Western donors who had withdrawn financial aid, Moi had announced that he was consenting to a repeal of Section 2A of the Constitution that made Kenya a one-party state.
> Most of the speakers at the meeting in Kasarani had spoken passionately against introduction of multiparty politics and the Presidents surprise position left them lost and bewildered.
> ("How young operatives," paragraph 8)

The second one is depicted in "How Kibaki men" in the recall of the entry of Moi to Uhuru Park which was the venue of the handing-over ceremony. The narrator states that,

> Mr. Moi's motorcade had to cut through a humongous, murderously charged crowd chanting in Kiswahili: 'Yote yawezekana bila Moi' (all is possible without Moi) to access the dais where dignitaries were seated ("How young operatives," paragraph 24).

The above-noted scenes depict an exaggerated sense of the political strength and intelligence of Moi. The first scene shows Moi was predictably not going to accept a position that jeopardises KANUs grip on power. The narrator indicates that there was a KANU national delegates meeting in which most speakers spoke "passionately against the introduction of multiparty politics" ("How young operatives," paragraph 6). Thus, Moi was characteristically either going to convince the donors using his cunning skills to release the aid or sacrifice on the aid to safeguard his grip on power. Thus, the sudden acceptance violated the concept of an unbeatable Moi. This surprising end shows how the people, mainly in KANU, were 'duped' into thinking that Moi was going to rule forever owing to his political prowess.

The deflation of the image of political hardiness is repeated in the second scene via the anti-Moi chant, '*Yote yawezekana bila Moi*' (all is possible without Moi). The 'epiphanic' tone, in which the chanters appear to have experienced a divine manifestation, indicates a sensation of liberation from a long-standing and oppressive belief that Moi was insurmountable. The surprise

component then lies in the way Moi went against the expectation of the delegates to announce the new position on the country's politics which images giving up a fight. Moi was, therefore, revealed in these scenes as submissive, feeble and clueless. The revelation traumatised the Kalenjin and devalued the concept by which the Kalenjin nation imagined themselves as a community.

Imagination here bears upon Anderson (1983) concept of communality as the invention of connectedness where members of a community do not know nor do they have a passion to associate with each other until concepts are produced in the group to spotlight connectedness. Alexander (2004: 9) fashions the imagined sense of connectedness as imaginative representation. This refers to the attachment of the meanings of connectedness to practical realities of life such as livelihood and security. In this case, a reversal of an imaginative representation that bears negatively upon these realities traumatises the community more significantly. Reflexively, the negation of Moi's insightfulness and invincibility to submissiveness, feebleness and cluelessness traumatises the Kalenjin because it shatters their means of fulfilling life collectively. The reversal destroys the logic in the established relationship with Moi. Deeply, it reveals a sense of imprudence to the community in deriving ethos because the ethos is rendered as a vulnerable kind. This leads to the question of why sensibility to risk was not revealed promptly.

Two metaphors in "How young operatives" and "How Kibaki men" indicate the unreal but compelling circumstance by which the imprudence of the Moi ethos in the Kalenjin nation was remarkably withheld. They comprise the popular epithets on KANU and Moi from the 1980s to 2002. One is the conception of KANU as '*Baba na Mama*' (Kiswahili for 'father and mother') which is deployed in the narrator's expression in "How young operatives" that,

> The baba na mama party had lost popularity on the streets and by all indications Moi seemed headed for a crushing defeat ("How young operatives," paragraph 9)

The other is the narrative depiction of Moi as a 'professor of politics' which is discharged in "How Kibaki men" in the expression that,

> Addressing a gathering at State House late last year, Deputy President William Ruto alluded to how quickly Mr. Moi was deserted after it became apparent that the self-declared 'professor' of Kenyan politics had no more tricks left to save Kanu from the jaws of defeat ("How young operatives," paragraph 78).

The notion, '*Baba na mama*,' originated from how KANU had become pervasive in spheres of life in the 1980s as the country's single party. The party membership card, for example, was a necessity in accessing government services. As a result, it produced a view in the Kenyan public that KANU was the sole provider in every political problem. For instance, Mwai Kibaki, who later rose to become Kenya's third president, had once remarked that "dislodging Kanu from power was like "cutting a *mugumo* (fig tree) with a razor blade" (Mutua, 2013). The massiveness of the *mugumo* (fig tree), compared with the diminutiveness of a razor blade, intones resigning to the permanence of KANU. Thus, the '*baba na mama*' concept is an expression of surprise and ridicule in that in entails an oxymoron that connects pervasiveness and 'crushing defeat.' It was hard to envisage a KANU downfall and is ridiculous in the sense that the party suddenly emerged as lacking ideas to keep itself against the opposition.

The history of the epithet, 'professor of politics,' is linked to how Moi overcame major political challenges. The first case relates to his rise from being the vice president and president upon the death of President Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. At this time, some Gikuyu elite, popularly known as the 'Kiambu Mafia,' plotted to change the constitution to block his succession in the presidency from being 'automatic,' but Moi overcame the hurdle. The other case concerns the multiparty elections of 1993 and 1997 in which the more populous ethnic groups abandoned KANU for the opposition, but Moi finally won the elections. Thus, the 'professor of politics' imagining is about the broad bestowal of political intelligence to Moi. As a result, Ruto's reasoning in the second segment above that Moi, the 'professor' of Kenyan politics had exhausted all his tricks expresses that the long-standing concept about the invincibility of Moi was unfounded. Similarly, Munyao, who was Kibaki's close ally and an organiser of the handing-over ceremony, testifies that the planning of the handing over ceremony was hurried because "nobody was sure what Moi was up to" ("How young operatives," paragraph 34). The sentiment shows that, politically, Moi always held several 'plan Bs' such as declining to hand over power or letting the military to take over. It should be noted here that Moi's political mysteriousness was a well-established discourse. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, for instance, remarked during the politics of succeeding Jomo Kenyatta that "Moi is like a giraffe, he sees very far" (Kagwanja, 2016: 2). In this case, the all-powerfulness and all-knowingness imagining relate to the advantage symbolised by the height of a giraffe which enables it to view and plan ahead of its enemies. The mysteriousness is also alluded to in Lynch (2008: 19) and Shilaho

(2018: 44; 51) that Moi projected a "big man" character through regularised habits such as attending church every Sunday and surprises such as sacking ministers as well as appointing them without prior information. In this case, the 'big man' character entails the difficulty to understand and predict Moi witnessed by those who were close to him that served him with fear rather than loyalty. Accordingly, I argue that it is the perceived and usually subjective instances of all-powerfulness and all-knowingness that constructed a mystifying image of Moi's political power to the Kenyan public.

Further significance is mediated in the construction of the Kalenjin trauma in the KANU downfall reflected in the imaginings, '*baba na mama*' and 'professor of politics.' Alexander's (2004: 9) concept of cultural trauma as an "imaginative process of representation" resonates here. This refers to peoples' derivation of security and power in belonging to a collective identity from emotional and cultural concepts. In this case, people are more secure and exert more power when they belong to a sturdy collective identity in inspiring awe among 'others.' This is true, more so, in establishments, such as countries with several identity groups, who compete for power, recognition or control over certain spaces and resources. Ethnicity in Kenya, for example, plays a crucial role in the jostling for the presidency in the sense that the ethnic group of the president derives security and capacity to achieve goals. Accordingly,

> Traumatic status is attributed to real or imagined phenomena, not because of their actual harmfulness or their objective abruptness, but because these phenomena are believed to have abruptly, and harmfully, affected collective identity (Alexander, 2004: 9-10),

This indicates that what traumatises the people is not the real losses that an event introduces but what the event unveils about the meaning of collective identity in relation to sturdiness. A distinction should be made here between the Kalenjin conveners of the YK92, in "How young operatives," and the ordinary members of the community about the meaning of the Moi presidency. The conveners, described as mainly comprising sons and daughters of the elite, arguably envisaged material losses in the KANU downfall since they accessed privileges such as ease of doing business. However, I argue that the ordinary Kalenjin people, who did not access any material favour as a result of their ethnicity, imagined loss related to the meaning of their collective identity. Moi's ethos was largely symbolic in the sense that his presidency was the group's pan-communalising logic that produced a major ethnic group in the country. Consequently, the '*baba na mama*' and the 'professor of politics' imaginings assigned a sense of

perpetuity to this symbolism and might. Thus, the revelation of the emptiness of the Moi/KANU strength constituted the Kalenjin cultural trauma because it mocked the Kalenjin sense of association. It conveyed loss and confusion about the pan-community living in the group.

The ending of the Moi presidency in "How young operatives" and "How Kibaki men" displays the interlink between surprise and trauma as the violation of a regularised norm on security and the ability to achieve goals. The Moi/KANU story familiarised the Kenyan people with all-knowingness and all-powerfulness via projections such as the 'professor of politics' and the '*Baba na Mama*' concepts which signified the Kenyan people the immortality of Moi/KANUs all-knowingness and all-powerfulness respectively. This translated to might among the Kalenjin group in the context of Kenya's ethnically competitive politics where the strength of the president enhances the sense of privilege to the ethnic group they are associated with. Accordingly, the violation of the 'professor of politics' and the '*Baba na Mama*' pieces of knowledge disrupts the sense of privilege assigned to the Kalenjin due to Moi's presidency. In this case, the disruption, as Alexander (2004: 9-10) notes, does not have to bear upon the material life of the members of the victim group but on the groups sense of might among the 'others.' Thus, the stories, "How young operatives" and "How young operatives," reveal a state of national surprise in Moi's acquiescence to multiparty politics in 1991, and KANUs defeat in 2002 but, within the Kalenjin group, it reveals a traumatising surprise arising from how the negation of Moi's political strength harms the sense by which the Kalenjin appreciate themselves as a collective.

2.4: Moi ethos as a negotiated breakthrough: a view from the Kalenjin 'composure' and 'distress' accounts

The section examines a Kalenjin popular song, *"Emenyon,"* and a Facebook discussion, "Kalenjin Unity," as examples of the Kalenjin 'composure' and 'distress' accounts. Here, I am interested in the Kalenjin subjective establishment and disestablishment of sense of nationhood in the Moi figure. I postulate that the subjectivity is best examined as a function of what I call a negotiated breakthrough. The term, negotiated breakthrough, is used here to refer to an important discovery in life whose profiting entails making compromises. The term conceptualises arriving at an extremely useful means of fulfilling life which, nonetheless, collides with some of the existing senses of living, hence, requiring sacrificing certain elements of life to fully tap from the opening. The preceding section indicates that the Moi ethos was fundamentally inefficient as a

means of establishing an ethnic community, yet it sustained the Kalenjin group for a considerable length of time owing to how it opened a suitable means of securing collective interests. This alludes to a major process by which the Kalenjin people negotiated significantly between securing collective interests and the consciousness about the ethnic difference in the group. Thus, I am interested in how the Kalenjin perceives the happening of the Moi presidency as a texture of the Kalenjin subjective negotiation of the 'self' in the context of collective needs and opportunities. The song, *"Emenyon,"* and the Facebook discussion text, "Kalenjin Unity," constitute this texture because they speak subjectively to the Kalenjin group on being the ethnic group of the president.

The negotiation is examined in relation to the aspect of suspense in Iwata's (2008) dyad, suspense-surprise, which offers that suspense is the raw material for surprise. In this case, surprise is the story's orienting of interest on effect, which is rousing the reader by the outcome of a story, while suspense, is about orienting interest on the process which is the skill in delaying the outcome (Iwata, 2008: 254). The previous section argues that the dramatic making of the KANU downfall among the Kalenjin relates to the surprising revelation of the false impressions of the all-powerfulness and the all-knowingness of Moi. Thus, suspense needs to be examined as the means by which a norm is constructed in such a way that it does not reveal its flaws promptly. Here, I posit that the idea of suspense as the Kalenjin masking of flaws in fulfilling life is embedded in the Kalenjin subjectivity in negotiating the breakthrough emerging from the Moi presidency. This way, I postulate that suspense is dramatically constructed like surprise and, hence, I determine in the section whether the Kalenjin suspense in masking and, hence, delaying the traumatic ending of the Moi ethos, is a function of historical circumstances.

Negotiating over a breakthrough as constructing suspense draws further on Edensor (2002) and Murray (2019). Edensor (2002) discusses the performative construction of nations and communities as a function of, among other ways, the use of "improvisational knowledge." The term refers to the production of ideas on the living using spontaneous understandings. The pieces of knowledge are improvisatory given that they only need to be meaningful within the people's milieu. Improvisatory modes of fulfilling life are viewed here as modes of constructing suspense because narrowed improvisation makes things appear settled and which could only be delaying repercussions.

This is echoed in Murray (2019) which examines the concepts of knowing and unknowing reality. The main proposal in the work is that free-from-error knowledge, such as scientifically-informed reasoning, is not the only means of fulfilling life. Unknowing, which is generating an understanding despite being conscious about lacking knowledge, is also a form of knowing things. It is a way of living in which lack of meaning in situations is dealt with by assigning meaning creatively. Murray (2019) describes the assigning of meaning as a "meaning-making principle." The meaning-making principle conceives of a midway, and a more practical way of fulfiling life, between the Freudian (1920) reality and pleasure principles in gratifying needs. The reality principle calls for the deferment of pleasure to address a challenging reality. The pleasure principle prioritises pleasure against addressing the toughness of life. According to Murray (2019: 140), dilemmas of this nature are overcome by the meaning-making principle which refers to "our need for things to make sense, or feel like they make sense, or appear to make sense." This implies that the meaning-making principle is a frame of not being bothered by the consequence of satisfying the demands of the toughness of life at the expense of pleasing oneself or satisfying pleasure at the expense of dealing with the harsh reality of life. The principle entails incorporating the pleasure and the reality principles into each other. This entails making acts of pleasure seem to address the toughness of life and making acts of dealing with the toughness of life appear as forms of pleasure. Thus, like improvisatory means of fulfilling life, the meaning-making principle builds suspense in the sense of living in that it masks and, hence, postpones problems rather than resolving them. The postponement of problems through improvisation and meaning-making is conveyed in the complementary view of the 'composure' and the 'distress' accounts. The pleasure with 'Kalenjinness' in *"Emenyon"* is accompanied by the production of senses that justify its value, which is questioned boldly in the "Kalenjin Unity" discussion. This indicates a dramatic passage from suspense to surprise. To this end, I evaluate this passage by examining the situational improvisation of sense on 'Kalenjinness' in *"Emenyon"* and how the improvisation backfires in the "Kalenjin Unity" discussion.

The song, *"Emenyon,"* improvises the sense of 'Kalenjinness' in many ways. Significant here is how it invents a Gikuyu ideal for emulation and actualises the Kalenjin autochthony. The term, Gikuyu ideal, refers to the view that the Gikuyu is the most admirable ethnic community in the country perceivably for having advanced in life owing to producing the first president and maximising on being the 'ethnic group of the president' to fulfil their lives. Gikuyu is Kenya's

largest ethnic group whose importance here is that the first president of the country, Jomo Kenyatta, comes from the community. As a result, the community was Kenya's first of ethnic group of the president which I argue previously as the group that benefits most in a regime. *"Emenyon"* reflects sensibility to the Gikuyu ideal via undertones of assigning the Gikuyu the responsibility for fashioning the idea of the ethnic group of the president, and inducting the Kalenjin towards the Gikuyu character. This is depicted in the song in several ways. Significant here is the idea of African Socialism.

African Socialism is one of the major political pillars deployed by the Jomo Kenyatta regime. As highlighted in the second part of this chapter, the ideology was modelled from the African communal way of ownership of land; however, it was not centred on ethnicities but on the Kenyan nation as that community. Earlier, I have highlighted that the Kalenjin are among the communities that opposed African Socialism because it potentially required them to cede their land to the more populous ethnic groups. The song, *"Emenyon,"* reflects this objection before taking recourse to it as a way of mimicking the Gikuyu. The objection and recourse are depicted in how the singer's scope of audience is nationalistic in the first stanza but turns into ethnic from the second stanza:

Emenyon Emenyon Emetab Kenya	Our country our country our country Kenya
Ongeboisien bet ak kemoi	Let us work day and night
Emenyon Emenyon Emetab Kenya	Our country our country our country Kenya
Ongeboisien bet ak kemoi	Let us work day and night
Kikole asis wee biikab Kolenjin	Asis (God or Sun) has said, people of Kalenjin
Kai kangany kulkul ochut sumat	Just when I open my armpit, join the bandwagon
Kikole asis wee biikab Kolenjin	Asis (God or Sun) has said, people of Kalenjin
Kai kangany kulkul ochut sumat	Just when I open my armpit, join the bandwagon

(Topotuk, 1980, stanza 1,2, in Tum, 2018)

The flow in the stanzas shows a sharp change of the scope of the audience from "*Emenyon Emenyon Emetab* Kenya" (Our country our country our country Kenya) in stanza 1 to "*biikab Kolenjin*" (people of Kalenjin) from stanza 2. As such, the possessive 'our' in *"Emenyon"* (Our country) is arguably nationalistic while its meaning in the second stanza is ethnic. I argue that the change signifies a turn in the concept of African Socialism among the Kalenjin. The singer in

stanza 1 projects a lamentation over the passing of the automatic possession of land via the idea of ancestral land. This is insinuated in the singer's familiarisation of the people in stanza 1 with working day and night as the new means of survival which, in my view, is a proclamation of a beginning of hard life. This relates to African Socialism in the sense that the ideology introduced scrambling as a means of acquiring land so that it is only those who are tough and smart who succeed over the others.

However, this negative sense of the nationalised possession of land in the country is transfigured in the second stanza to pleasure as the possessive 'our' shifts to refer to the 'people of Kalenjin.' This indicates a sensation of breakthrough among the Kalenjin whose profiting requires a change of attitude towards some worldviews. Arguably, the singer redirects the Kalenjin community to embrace African Socialism because it favours the ethnic group of the president. The redirection in the song begins with assigning the Gikuyu the ownership of African Socialism which is followed by purging the ideology of evil and seizing it. This is depicted in the second stanza where the singer presupposes a Kalenjin breakthrough that was fashioned by the Gikuyu using the imagery of *Asis* (God) 'opening the armpit.' To 'open the armpit' is a Kalenjin idiomatic expression that symbolises attempts to keep a treasurable item intended for a specific person from the view of others. Thus, opening an armpit for someone means gifting them, and, equally, closing the armpit for another means either declining to gift them or ending the process of gifting. Thus, the coincidence of 'opening the armpit' to the Kalenjin and the rise of Moi to the presidency signifies the beginning of privilege to the Kalenjin and an ending of the privilege among the Gikuyu. Furthermore, the singer connects the divine gifting of the Kalenjin with the need to 'jump on the bandwagon' which figures an instruction to join the league of a group that has advanced. Thus, the marvel at the Gikuyu is based on the view that they supported the Kenyatta presidency and utilised African Socialism to acquire property and, hence, the Kalenjin should emulate them.

The Kalenjin seizing of African Socialism as a Gikuyu exemplar is depicted in the singers thinking that,

Leu yon bire mpiret bororiosiekab Kinya	It looks like the other tribes are playing a ballgame
Chi ne kimolyol, igosu	He who is clueless, open your eyes

(Topotuk, 1980, stanza 4, in Tum, 2018)

The segment above frames the concept of 'playing a game' as a form of wisdom in the sense that the singer challenges the Kalenjin to arise because others are already doing the activity. Arguably, the concept of a game here figures skill and, hence, the Kalenjin are being reminded of lacking a skill that others have. In the context of the procedures by which land was accessed within African Socialism, this skill alludes to the cooperative programme known as the Land Buying Companies (LBCs) that was used to acquire land in Rift Valley and was embraced mainly by the Gikuyu. The LBCs were created from an agreement made by the British government, on behalf of the departing settler farmers, and Kenya's government, which paved way for the settler farmlands to be sold Africans (Kanyinga, 2009: 330). As a result, the Gikuyu maximised on the programme, and, in contrast, the native ethnic groups to Rift Valley such as the Kalenjins and the Maasai ignored the LBC programme, agitating that the land in Rift Valley was rightfully theirs, a strategy that did not bear fruit. Therefore, the singer's detection of skill about 'the tribes of Kenya' refers to the insight and cooperativeness which the Gikuyu demonstrated in embracing the LBCs that the Kalenjin disregarded. Thus, the notion of 'jumping on the bandwagon' means abandoning the idea of cultural difference and creating a community in the interest of cooperation to secure access to land. The LBC concept in the context of being the ethnic group of the president is conveyed in the singer's advice to the Kalenjin which states:

Ongogiich emet wee biikab Kolenjin	Let us tighten the country, people of Kalenjin
Kotom koger kulkul asista	Before the Sun closes the armpit

(Topotuk, 1980, stanza 3, in Tum, 2018)

This relates to the image '*giich*,' meaning to 'tighten,' which pictures the act of pressing closely to prevent movement or permeability or to tighten a lid of a container and prevent leakage. I argue that the idea of tightening *emet* alludes to taking advantage of the Moi-the presidency to block other ethnic groups from acquiring land in the Rift Valley. The concept of advantage figures an opinion that the Gikuyu's LBCs were supported with favour by the Jomo Kenyatta regime. The imagery represents a sensibility to how African Socialism ideology initiated the intrusion into the Rift Valley. Hence, the action of tightening the country represents innovating African Socialism to the Kalenjin advantage of appropriating the Rift Valley via the Moi presidency which is implied in the second line, '*kotom koger kulkul asista*' (before the Sun

closes the armpit), meaning before the ending of the Kalenjin-presidency. The instruction is that the presidency should be exploited fully before it ends. The noted imageries imply that the Kalenjin nation was invented as opportunistic solidarity to consolidate control of the Rift Valley and to afford Moi a formidable ethnic support base. They indicate a negotiation between cultural inequality and the benefits of being from the president's ethnic group. This entailed the meaning-making principle because the idea of cultural inequality is suppressed by the benefits of being the ethnic group of the president. Nonetheless, cultural equality is imagined as an automatic happening under the circumstance of being the ethnic group of the president. The negotiation involved making sense with the Kalenjin nation that lacks cultural equality.
Hence, an appropriate way to illustrate this kind of negotiation is to view the songs concept of valorising solidarity and how cultural equality shall develop naturally.

The term, actualising the Kalenjin autochthony, as another mode of improvising 'Kalenjinness' in *"Emenyon,"* refers here to the manufacture of 'traditional' meanings that qualify the indisputability of the Kalenjin oneness. The song engages in this activity as a part of appropriating the Gikuyu ideal of co-operativeness to the Kalenjin. One of the salient actions in the song is spotlighting of a divine favour and a timeless past that presume a once-unitary Kalenjin community. The once-unitary Kalenjin notion supposes that the Kalenjin constituent groups' cultures are compatible. This is symbolised in the imagery of 'opening' and 'closing' 'the armpit.' I argue that the imagery also produces the effect that the Moi presidency was preordained for the entire Kalenjin group, which presupposes that God recognises the Kalenjin as a whole rather than as subunits. The collective communion with God and the idea of a timeless past is shown in the bipartisan engagement in the act of 'opening the armpit' between '*biikap Kalenjin*' and *Asis*. In this instance, the *Asis* party functions as the authenticator of Kalenjin oneness because it associates itself with the Kalenjin people to constitute a bilateral communion.

Further to this, the oracular premise, '*Kikole*' (had said), intensifies the Kalenjin wholeness by inviting attention to a past in which the Kalenjin people were a unit. As a result, the imagination of a divine favour that presumes a Kalenjin oneness and a timeless past during which the divinity communed with the Kalenjin people as a unit resolves the complication of kindred separateness via composing the logic that *biikab kolenjin* enjoy a collective entitlement to the divine favour. This connects with the shared problem among *biikab kolenjin* over the land issues in Rift Valley under the policy of African Socialism. The significance of this action is that

it relates to Edensor's (2002: 48; 126) view that a "glorious past" and "divine origin" are universes of generating nationalising narratives that mask the unappealing conditions of the present. The action capitalises on the unquestionability of divinity and the past because they are either revered or are unreachable. Thus, what is endorsed by these parameters is taken as the determinants of truth.

The once-unitary Kalenjin concept fits into the domain of meaning-making principle because it suppresses cultural inequality. Suppression here emphasises forcibly stamping out and the consciousness that stamping out completely is not possible. The incompletion of stamping out the Kalenjin cultural inequality is evident from the singer's reference of the Kalenjin as '*biikab kalenjin*' (people of Kalenjin) instead of 'Kalenjin.' The action reflects acknowledging difference because it fails to refer to the community with a name that declares its identity in totality. For instance, each subgroup, such as the Kipsigis or the Nandi, or any other regular ethnic group in Kenya, instantly declares their identity in the singular and plural. A person from the Nandi or the Kipsigis, in that case, is referred to as '*Nondindet*' and '*Kipsigisindet*' respectively and the plural for each case is '*Nandiek*' and '*Kipsigisiek*.' In contrast, the 'Kalenjin' name does not conform to this norm. Instead, a singular Kalenjin person is known as '*chitab Kalenjin*' (the person of Kalenjin) and the plural as '*biikab Kalenjin*' (people of Kalenjin). Thus, the complication with the Kalenjin, as an ethnic group that imitates the Gikuyu, is that there was no fixed relationship between Moi and the entire Kalenjin group the way Jomo Kenyatta and the Gikuyu were. Moi was, for no other reason, a '*Tugenindet*' or '*Tugeniot*' (A Tugen) firstly and a '*chitab Kalenjin*' (the person of Kalenjin) secondly. This indicates a cultural circumstance that required improvisation of cultural oneness to create a sense-making relationship between the pan-ethnicity and Moi.

In sum, *"Emenyon"* illustrates that the Kalenjin nation is being improvised by the meaning-making principles of endorsing the convenience of the Moi ethos. It is inspired by the urgent need to create an ethnic group for Moi that imitates the Gikuyu in the Kenyatta-Gikuyu relationship. The song performs rhetoric that exploits the compelling worldviews which exist across the Kalenjin group — mainly, the divine favour that presumes a Kalenjin oneness and a timeless past during which the divinity communed with the Kalenjin people as a unit and the marvel of the Gikuyu character. The rhetoric intends to appeal to the Kalenjin kindred groups to abandon the subgroups for the Kalenjin identity. Thus, I argue that the Kalenjin Breach relates to

how the traditions were concocted, meaning that they only made sense as long as the reciprocity between the Kalenjin group and Moi ethos survived. This set ground for a disruptive impact in the ending of the Moi presidency in that the traditions could not sustain the community on their own. The attendant cultural improvisations could not stand on their own when the Moi-ethos was disrupted.

Thus, the ending of the Moi presidency may be viewed as a breach of promise how the presidency promised the Kalenjin nation consolidating control of land in Rift Valley and privileged access to jobs and services from the government. In return, the promise produced the Kalenjin ethnic totality that supplied Moi with a political 'stronghold' to entrench his presidency. Subsequently, the groups cultural trauma relates to exposure and abandonment. Exposure relates to the removal of the veil that displayed the community as a singular ethnic reality. The disturbing nature of the exposure relates to the fear of disintegration and the dishonour of appearing among the perceived antagonist ethnic groups as unreal and therefore inconsequential in political reckonings. Abandonment refers to the mood arising from 'being left unprotected 'from the threats posed by the antagonist ethnic groups.

The discussion text, "Kalenjin unity," which represents here the 'distress' accounts, tracks down the origin of the Kalenjin trauma to the improvisation of 'Kalenjinness' over the political relationship between Moi and the group. The most significant theme in this retrospection is the kingpin ethos. I highlight in the first part of this chapter that a kingpin is an informal but powerful head person and political representative of an ethnic community. Thus, the term, kingpin ethos, refers here to the use of an individual's representativeness to consolidate a community. Ultimately, the starting point of every conversation on the idea of the kingpin ethos in the Kalenjin is the Moi ethos as the first and the most significant kingpin of the community. Accordingly, I value the text, "Kalenjin unity," for being centred on retrospect over the (im)prudence of imagining 'Kalenjinness' under the figure of Moi. Hence, the aim here is to determine how the improvisational nature of the Kalenjin ethos in the formative period produces trauma. In the assessment, I consider Iwata's (2008: 136) view that the intensity of surprise in "reading stories" depends on the sustainment of suspense so that the higher the sustainment, the more intense the surprise. Further to this, Iwata (2008: 254) notes that the measure of this intensity is the magnitude of "mental commotion" which I highlight at the beginning of this chapter as the re-channelling of the "reader" to recall the story in an attempt to trace where they

failed to foresee the outcome of the story. Accordingly, I relate the idea of Kalenjin unity among the Kalenjin people as a story whose reading entailed sustained suspense to examine the Kalenjin retrospective view of themselves as a community.

A post in the discussion, I refer to as 'Nothing like pure Kalenjin,' significantly conveys the review. The post criticises 'Kalenjinness' as a counterfeit identity reasoning that it is founded on the kingpin ethos. It states that,

> *NOTHING LIKE PURE KALENJIN OR KALENJIN*
> *First, Kalenjin is not a tribe, but a community. There's nothing like sub tribe whatsoever. Kalenjin is a political term for political greedy, like Abaluhya and Mijikenda were coined by KADU leadership to bring onboard smaller tribes to counter the then luo/Gikuyu KANU of bigger tribes. Kalenjin like Abaluhya and Mijikenda are several small communities coined together... People been politically brainwashed by political class to feel that we are one while we totally different.*
> *Let me explain further take for example the kipsigis it is a tribe, with distinct cultural heritage and practice. Same to nandi, saboat, marakwet, keiyo same to My tugen tribe has its own cultural heritage and practice. We share a commonality in some basic pronounced words, names and maybe fewer culture but we not whatsoever subtribe to anything we different as day and night, those calling themselves subtribe may deny this reason they want to portray their tribe as pure Kalenjin while we don't have a tribe called Kalenjin.*
> *Nothing called subtribe, we different, we share no common culture nor heritage, even language we totally different from pokot to kipsigis, saboat to nandi, keiyo to marakwet, ogiek to tugen etc*
>
> (THERE IS NOTHING LIKE PURE KALENJIN OR KALENJIN
> First, Kalenjin is not a tribe, but a community. There's nothing like subtribe whatsoever. Kalenjin is a political term for the politically greedy. Similarly, the Abaluhya and Mijikenda were coined by KADU leadership to bring on board smaller tribes to counter the then Luo and Gikuyu big tribes housed in KANU. The Kalenjin, like Abaluhya and Mijikenda, are groups of several small communities joined together. People been politically brainwashed by political class to feel that we are one while we are totally different.
> Let me explain further. Take for example the Kipsigis. It is a tribe with distinct cultural heritage and practice. The same case applies to the Nandi, Saboat, Marakwet, Keiyo and likewise to My Tugen tribe. Each one has its own cultural heritage and practice. We share a commonality in some spoken basic words, names and may be fewer cultural practices, but we are not, whatsoever, a subtribe to anything. We are as different as day and night. Those calling themselves subtribe may deny this reason because they want to portray their tribe as pure Kalenjin while we don't have a tribe called Kalenjin.
> Nothing called subtribe; we are different. We share no common culture nor heritage. Even in language, we are totally different from Pokot to Kipsigis, Saboat to Nandi, Keiyo to Marakwet, Ogiek to Tugen etc.
> (Gotabgaa Forum, 2016a)

The action word in the post above is 'brainwashing' and the speaker uses it to describe the way the Kalenjin nation imagine that they belong to a singular ethnic actuality despite being 'totally different.' The imagery of brainwashing implies that the Kalenjin group is an identity that is mediated by the undercurrents of exploitation. The sense of brainwashing as exploitation is expressed in the speaker's attitude that the Kalenjin community was 'coined,' which pictures the act of forming (such as) a device, and therefore, assigns the community the instrumentality of social capital for the politicians. The figuration portrays that brainwashing relies upon the gullibility of people falling for presumptive ideas and, hence, the making of the Kalenjin nation is deceptive. The post may be viewed as accusing the Kalenjin nation of irrational belonging to the community. This links with the concept of improvisational knowledge in the sense that the 'irrational' belonging to the community is functionally a form of rationality, which is a way of making situations make sense when the reality does not reveal itself or is unpleasant.

This connects with the nature of the Kalenjin nation in "Nothing like pure Kalenjin" as a grouping that is magnificent and vague at the same time. It is magnificent because the speaker notes that it is borne from the desire to afford a formidable ethnic base for KADU to face off with KANU that already has more populous groups — the Gikuyu and the Luo. It is also vague because the new ethnicities are founded merely on the enlargement logic that fails to critically consider the 'distinct cultural heritage and practice' among the small ethnicities pulled together as the building blocks for the mega ethnicities Thus, the counterfeit claim can be described as an accusation of the Kalenjin subjects of belonging to the community under the pleasure principle at the expense the reality. However, I argue that a more accurate understanding of the accusation is the idea of the meaning-making principle. The idea of 'Kalenjinness' made sense at the juncture owing to the pleasure associated with being the ethnic group of the president. The reality that the groups interrelation was unstable was overcome with the production of new meanings such as the once-unitary concept. As a result, the post illustrates the ending of the groups magnificence which unveils the community as lacking a lasting sense of affinity.

One of the contributions that seem to be countering 'Nothing like pure Kalenjin,' which depict the intersection of magnificence and vagueness about the Kalenjin union and the kingpin institution, is documented in an untitled post from the Gotabgaa Forum which laments about the near-end situation of the Kalenjin nation when Moi retired, and the role of William Ruto in the nation. A section of the post states that:

> When Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi retired in 2002,
> he did not hand over the Kalenjin community to
> another young Kalenjin leader. Instead, he took
> it with him to retirement in Kabarak. This was
> unwise and selfish of him, how could he take a
> whole community to personal retirement… BUT a young
> man by the name of William Samoei Ruto could
> not sit down and see a promising community
> perish from the limelight, he stood up and took the
> community from retirement and put it back
> where it belonged in this sphere of community
> influence in Kenya. He defied all odds,
> singlehandedly saved a whole community a reality that
> Mr Moi hasn't come to term with for a decade now
> (Gotabgaa Forum, 2016b: lines 1-14)

The sentiment expresses a narrow escape visualisation of the Kalenjin community in the Moi retirement event. One can view Moi's failure to name the community's successor after his retirement as alluding to retiring the community from existence. The narrow escape projection, which is a feeling that danger has barely been avoided, reveals an attitude about the community as a highly treasured aspect of life. This is further depicted in the speaker's judgments that 'retiring' the community was unwise and selfish and that the rescuing effort saved the community from perishing from the limelight. Notable reasoning here that illustrates the speaker's idea of treasure in the community is the notion of 'limelight' presence which should be understood as the presence of the community in the political arena of the country as an active contestant. In this case, an active contestant means one that produces a presidential candidate or plays a crucial role in supporting a candidate from another ethnic group as a bloc. This way, 'retiring' the community suggests Kalenjins relegation of political involvement to other communities on the basis that the Kalenjin have had their share of the presidency. Thus, the limelight imagining endorses the Kalenjin union and the kingpin institution based on serious political contestation at the national level, which relates more to William Ruto than Gideon Moi because the former is associated with energising the community in national politics while the latter, as the son of the retired Moi, is associated with the near-end political situation of the community and has also not demonstrated serious interest as a presidential contender. Consequently, the sentiment imagines the sense of the Kalenjin union within the active

participation in the national politics — an individual who promotes the chances of the community securing national positions such as the presidency. Consequently, this post demonstrates the post-Moi consciousness about the vagueness of the Kalenjin community which is displayed by the admission that it is only the kingpin who can sustain the community.

A contrary sentiment from the *Kalenjin Forum* redeploys the value of the Kalenjin union via the concept of an apolitical association. It states that:

> Kalenjin Unity is paramount, but not when the principals view themselves superior than the flock. Our success seed should be judged based on development and value added to our people. We sometimes place too much attention/emphasis on political positions than the gains. The fact remains, our unity will not be gained when there is chest thumbing, lack of political goodwill, imposing of leaders to the people and dictatorial tendencies exhibited by the so-called Kingpin [sic] (Kalenjin Forum, 2016b).

The redeployment relates to the proclamation of an idea of edge about the Kalenjin unity which figures being at the extreme margins of crumbling. The discussion depicts the edge of the Kalenjin community as a gainful union to the members and also as an exploitation device for the political class. The gainfulness relates to the view of the group as 'flock,' which presupposes the risk of being left scattered and alone, and the importance of shepherding. In this case, the risk regards the competitive seizure of economic interests, such as land by ethnic communities, and hence, the shepherd refers to the political person who fights for the groups interests. The exploitation relates to the notion of self-interest among the kingpins which is evident from the speaker's observation that there are no gains for the community if the kingpin aims to fight for 'political positions.' The speaker's observations allude to the state appointments, such as that of ministers, which are given to individuals based on their ethnic communities. Exploitation also relates to the imposition of local leaders by the kingpin. This interlinks with how the Jubilee election primaries were marred with claims of rigging in favour of Aron Cheruiyot as William Rutos preferred. As a result, the sentiment can be viewed as countering the Ruto-based Kalenjin union due to manipulation, which depicts the sense of Kalenjin nationhood as departing from active political kingpins to what the speaker visualises as assuring the community of 'development and value-added to our people.'

Accordingly, "Nothing like pure Kalenjin" and the contributions above show the making of sense of the Kalenjin union and kingpin institution as an ambivalent action. Firstly, the

examples show that the sense of the Kalenjin union and the kingpin institution is both dysfunctional and functional. On the one hand, "Nothing like pure Kalenjin" depicts a dysfunctional sense of the Kalenjin union from the counterfeit perspective through which the community is portrayed as a device for exploitation by the kingpin institution as metaphorically indicated through the idea of 'coining' the community and the KADU context. The counter-avowals, on the other hand, perform a functional sense of nationhood via the value of 'limelight' presence and the concept of being a 'flock' and in need of being shepherded. Secondly, they show that the functional perspective is ambivalent owing to the personalities that contest for the kingpin position. The first avowal, for instance, improvises functionality on political activism visualised as a 'limelight' presence while the second one is on the apolitical sense of togetherness and development. As a result, the conceptions of the Kalenjin ideal relate to the political inclination towards either William Ruto or Gideon Moi and, hence, the sense-making principle of the Kalenjin union is produced by how the unity either promotes or undermines the chances of the preferred person becoming the kingpin. Thus, the supporters of William Ruto play up the notion of 'limelight' presence because Ruto had already demonstrated remarkable presence in national politics by rising to that position of the country's deputy president. On the contrary, the supporters of Gideon Moi play up the notion of togetherness and development because Gideon Moi has been active in local development issues within the Kalenjin. Accordingly, the divergences illustrate the nature of the Kalenjin nationhood as an improvisational knowledge from the way it makes sense to individuals and situations subjectively. This resonates with Anderson's (1983: 9) analogy of nations to the "tombs of Unknown Soldiers" which "are either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them" but are made to make sense as symbols of nationhood via improvised narratives. In this case, ambivalence relates to how the narratives are improvised from subjective contexts and make sense from different and even conflicting perspectives.

Subsequently, the interlink between the 'composures' and the 'distress' accounts illustrate a passage from assigning meaning to losing meaning. This resonates with the interaction between suspense and surprise in the analogy of reading a story where a highly sustained suspense is produced a more intense surprise at the end. The accounts analysed show that the Kalenjin played a role in the delay of the discovery that the Moi ethos was inadequate to consolidate the community via repressing the truths about the cultural difference with the

collective privilege as the ethnic support base for Moi. However, the analyses above demonstrate that the failure does not reveal itself as a flaw. Rather, it emerges as a situationally making sense because the relationship with Moi as a collective was securing their interests.

2.5: Conclusion

In conclusion, I argue that the production of the Kalenjin shift, consequent to the ending of the Moi-presidency, is a narrative of the pleasure and reality of improvisational knowledge. In this case, improvisational knowledge refers to the joint making of sense of ethos vis-à-vis the desires and the realities about the collective living. It emerges from the selected narratives and the metadrama that the sense-making action of the Kalenjin ethos is flawed from the way meaningfulness is contextualised on temporality and subjectivity such as 'owning' the presidency as an ethnic group when in antagonism with other groups over resources like land or being affiliated to a specific kingpin and not the other. Thus, the Kalenjin narrative of the performance process entails the culmination of surprise and trauma in the event of the Ending of the Moi-presidency as a result of the revelation of the temporal and the subjective limits of making sense of the Kalenjin ethos. The argument stems from three observations.

Firstly, the Kalenjin nation constructed surprise through excessive overestimation of Moi's political power related to safeguarding his presidency and the continuance of KANU. As a result, the Kalenjin did not foresee an ending of KANUs grip on power such that the dramatic ending presented them with confusion. Similarly, the nation constructed trauma through overreliance on the Moi-presidency to overcome the political challenges related to protecting the territory of Rift Valley. Hence, the downfall event presented a hitch to the means of satisfying the living which, by extension, was a disruption of the meaningfulness of the groups ethos. The sense-making action of the events is exemplified by the improvisational imaginings such the '*Baba na Mama*' and the 'professor of politics' notions on KANU and Moi, respectively, which approved the Kalenjin ethos in 'owning' the Moi presidency as a fortification of Rift Valley homeland. Thus, surprise and trauma concern the limits of the Moi 'protection' ethos which sets the post-Moi Kalenjin nation in search of new consolidating principles.

Secondly, the Kalenjin Breach presents itself as a breach of promise. This refers to the way the Kalenjin pan-ethnicity formed as a '*Nyayo*' community. In this case, '*Nyayo*' refers to the Moi regimes use of the concept of walking in the Jomo Kenyatta's footsteps in order to further the unity of the country, which was translated within the Kalenjin as passing along the

reciprocal benefiting between the president and their ethnic group. The translated knowledge is that the presidency requires formidable ethnic support that is reciprocated by economic favours, which in the Kenyatta-Gikuyu era, reflects the enablement of the community to acquire chunks of land in the Rift Valley region. Thus, the Kalenjin pan-ethnic idea as a '*Nyayo*' community consider the idea of the Gikuyu model that was improvised on two senses. The first one is that the Kenyatta-Gikuyu mutualism was significantly beneficial to the community, signifying to the Kalenjin group that establishing a link with the Moi presidency was a magnificent venture. The second one is that the Gikuyu are numerically large, which enabled the community to effectively buttress the Kenyatta presidency. Hence, the Kalenjin idea relates to the logic of establishing an enlarged ethnic buttress for Moi in the model of the Kenyatta-Gikuyu mutualism. As a result, the ending of the Moi presidency occasioned a breach of promise of benefiting as the presidents ethnic group that disturbed the Kalenjin from the way the ending of the Moi presidency was surprising and humiliating.

Finally, the post-Moi homegrown self-understandings of 'Kalenjinness,' as evident in the "Kalenjin unity" discussion text, shows that the concept of Kalenjin oneness is an ambivalent knowledge improvisation. There is huge thinking across the Kalenjin that the ethnic oneness is morally sound; however, the rationalisation action to the moral soundness is subjective and situational. This is evidenced by the discordant concepts of the essence of the Kalenjin union, fashioned by the characters of the leading contenders of the kingpin institution union in the community such as William Ruto and Gideon Moi. Thus, the Kalenjin union makes sense as long as it is improvisational to the aspirations of the preferred kingpin, which indicates that the Kalenjin ethos is not yet formed but is in the process of formation and, hence, Kalenjin the ethos is a situational and subjective improvisational knowledge.

CHAPTER 3: CRISIS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF VICTIMHOOD NATIONALISM

3.1: Introduction

The chapter examines the immediate social situation of the Kalenjin nation consequent to the downfall of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime. It focuses on an encounter of the Crisis phase in Turner's (1980) social drama as per the conceptual framework of this thesis. The chapter uses the phase, Crisis, as a context of understanding the rise of what I regard as crisis-based nationalism among the Kalenjin. Crisis is defined here as a stage in social drama where the conflict produced by Breach widens into open antagonism between the protagonist group and the other groups in the surrounding (Turner, 1980: 150; Visacovsky, 2017: 8). The previous chapter indicates that the catastrophic ending of the KANU regime affected the Kenyan public in a bi-sectional way, witnessing the traumatisation of Kalenjin, on the one hand, and the jubilation of the majority of Kenyans on the other. Consequently, the chapter takes the Kalenjin Crisis as an eruption of conflict from the jubilation and trauma. It conceives the Kalenjin group inter-acting with 'the rest of Kenya[1]' as the distressed faction, which is the group that feels side-lined and endangered for their link with the KANU regime. Hence, the chapter aims to assess the role of estrangement Crisis in the Kalenjin group in revitalising nationhood.

The significance of the period that follows immediately after the KANU downfall is that it coincides with a notable victimhood activity in the Kalenjin nation that reflects the concept of Crisis. Here, the term, victimhood, draws on Jacoby (2015: 513) and Noor et al (2017: 121) to refer to the activity of sensing and communicating the opinion that a group, which is constituent to a larger group, is being victimised by the majority. In this case, the Kalenjin victimhood examined in the chapter conceptualises the Kalenjin perception that the rest of Kenya and also the state at some later junctures conspire to 'punish' them over the group's association with Moi. I focus on the Kalenjin projections of anguish over the crises' consequent, firstly, to the political challenges against Moi and KANU in the early 1990s and, secondly, to the downfall itself in the election defeat in the year 2002.

The first wave relates to the Kalenjin perceptions of cruelty in the desertion of KANU by other ethnic groups despite a belief that Moi and the Kalenjin have been kind to them that led to

[1] The term, 'rest of Kenya,' is used to refer to the most populous ethnic groups, the Gikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kamba and Abagusi, that opposed and ditched KANU for opposition parties. It is also used to conceptualise the political climate after the defeat of KANU in 2002 in which the state is on one side while the majority of the Kalenjin imagination is on the other and estranged side.

ethnic violence in which the Kalenjin evicted the pro-opposition ethnic groups from the Rift Valley region in 1991-2. This is depicted in a sample of anecdotes from an investigative story, the Akiwumi Commission (1999a; 1999b), on Kenya's ethnic clashes since 1991, which I designate in the chapter as "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies." The second wave relates to the perceptions of persecution by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) regime just after the 2002 transition, which led to the demand for secession of the Rift Valley place. The story is rendered in Mugonyi and Ronos (2003) story, titled, "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki," from the *Daily Nation*. The Kalenjin concept of victimhood is also portrayed in a Facebook discussion text, named here as "Know the troublemaker" (Kalenjin Forum, 2017)[2],which I consider as an instance of Turner's (1980: 154) and Bells (2006: 2) "manifest performance" that refers to the display of the scenes featuring the people reflecting on the social drama issues within the modes of everyday life and interaction. As a result, the chapter focuses on how the temporal layers of the Kalenjin victimhood activity, which are represented by the stories, morph into multiple imaginings of the nation. Under focus here are two of those imaginings considered in the chapter as imagining a vulnerable community in "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki," and imagining a threatened community of place in the Kalenjin Forum discussion text, "Know the troublemaker."

The chapter approaches the Kalenjin Crisis from the perspective of siege mentality. It seeks to establish that the Kalenjin anguishes over KANU downfall was a function of siege mentality that is understood here from the perspectives Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992); Kim (2016) and Mbembe (2019). Siege mentality is used in Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992) and Kim (2016) to refer to perceptions of estrangement and helplessness while in the midst of 'others' who are perceived as dangerous. Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992) use the concept as an understanding of how Israel manages the Middle Eastern conflict. It argues that the Israelis "harbour[s] a belief that the world has negative behavioural intentions towards them" Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992: 251). This suggests that the conflicts in the region are not necessarily consequences of facing inward aggression, but outward aggression based on the perception that those who surround Israel are likely to attack them. Kim (2016) applies the term to examine how Kim Jong-un Regimes Foreign Policies in North Korea affect negatively on the country's economy. The argument is

[2] The Kalenjin Forum is a public group, which means that the posts are in the public domain and may be accessed by anyone and used for research without permission from the administrator(s).

that some policies, such as excessive militarisation of the citizens, drain the country's resources because they are discharged as modes of 'preparing for the worst' and thus reflect the state of imagining imminent harm (Kim, 2016: 224). Mbembe (2019) does not refer directly to siege mentality but discusses the idea of enmity as a major characteristic of communities in the world presently. Mbembe (2019: 9, 42) argues that communities are no more cemented by cultural equality than the sense of 'others' as potential enemies. Thus, the idea of otherness in this perspective concerns enmity. The 'other' is always unsafe to co-exist with. This amounts to a siege mentality in the sense in which it invites measures of getting ready to deal with possible attacks. Conceivably, siege mentality relates to the Kalenjin at the ending of the Moi-presidency because KANU downfall hurt the Kalenjin while it excited the ethnic groups such as the Gikuyu and the Luo who have historically been antagonistic to the Kalenjin. This means that the KANU downfall incident set the Kalenjin and the groups into a renewed antagonism. Thus, the intention here is to examine how the post-KANU-downfall Kalenjin victimhood nationalism relates to the performance of siege mentality and the concept of 'enemy.'

3.2: "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies," "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" and "Know the troublemaker": an overview

"The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" is a sample of investigative stories from the Akiwumi Report of 1999 which narrate the relationship between the 1992 ethnic clashes in the country and the '*Majimbo*ism' movement. The rallies rose as a result of the introduction of the multiparty system in 1991 and, for that reason, are linked in the narrative to the causation of the ethnic clashes. *Majimbo* is a Kiswahili word for regions that featured significantly in the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) party manifesto in the early 1960s that agitated for federalism government structure, or '*Majimbo*ism.' However, the deep concept of '*Majimbo*ism' is the emphasis of the "sanctity of tribal lands" (Kanyinga, 2009: 329, Lynch, 2016: 50) as opposed to the ideology of African Socialism which I highlight in the previous chapter as the policy of equating all ethnic groups access to land in all the regions of the country, which appeared to favour the groups whose ancestral land was getting smaller and disfavoured those whose land was expansive such as the Kalenjin. Thus, '*Majimbo*ism' counters the equal access of regions by citizens as it describes ethnicities in the country as either 'owners' of, or 'guests,' in given regions. In allusion to this, "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" narrates how the Kalenjins revival of '*Majimbo*ism' is connected to the groups subjective emotions as a result of the mounting

opposition against KANU which signalled the coming to an end of KANU. In the story, the emotions are depicted in the legitimating narratives by speakers such as Timothy Mibei and Willy Kamuren, who view the Rift Valley entrant ethnic groups support of the opposition as a violation of the Kalenjins kindness to host them and should, therefore, leave the place (Akiwumi Report 1999a: 49, 50). The significance of the story is in its depiction of politics of fear and aggression against others which bear links with victimhood and the concept of open antagonism in the Crisis phase of social drama.

"MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" is a journalese story about the Kalenjin nation's agitation in the first few months of the National Rainbow Coalition Party's (NARC) reign in power in early 2003. It is a recount of a gathering attended by 14 Kalenjin Members of Parliament (MPs) in the home of the then Bomet Member of Parliament, Nick Salat, to celebrate his election victory. The guest MPs are all Kalenjin and comprise John Serut (Mt Elgon), Musa Sirma (Eldama Ravine), Joseph Lagat (Keiyo North), John Koech (Chepalungu), Gideon Moi (Baringo Central), Charles Keter (Belgut), Samuel Moroto (Kapenguria), David Koros (Eldoret East), Antony Kimetto (Sotik), Moses Cheboi (Kuresoi), Sammy Koech (Konoin), Sammy Ruto (Kipkelion), and Paul Sang (Buret). The story narrates how the meeting turns from celebrating Nick Salat's win to an outcry over perceived persecution of the Kalenjin community by the NARC regime because of their linkage with Moi/KANU. The climax of the outcry witnesses a proclamation to secede the "Rift Valley"[3] from Kenya, which is initiated by the host, Nick Salat. Both the persecution and secession ideas are projected by the speakers using ongoing events, such as the halting of land allocation services in Rift Valley and sacking of the top Kalenjin civil servants, to express a connection between NARCs public policy and the isolation of the Kalenjin from the rest of Kenya. Thus, the significance of "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" lies in the undertones of the politics of fear in the context of having been separated from power. The interest here is in how the

[3] The term, 'Rift Valley' is used in the chapter in the specific sense of the 'Kalenjin Rift Valley' and not the administrative region known as the Rift Valley, which runs from the Turkana County in the north and Kajiado in the south. It does not also refer to the strip of physical landscape along which the Great Rift Valley is situated, although this physical feature constitutes the major idea of naming the region. The specificity of 'Rift Valley' here as 'the Kalenjin Rift Valley' is to acknowledge that Kalenjin are not the only claimants of the ancestry of place in the Rift Valley. The Maasai, Samburu and the Turkana are also included even though they occupy different sections from the Kalenjins. The term also transcends the administrative boundary (in the western part) of the former Rift Valley province to accommodate the Sabaot subgroup of the Kalenjin who inhabit the Western administrative region that is predominantly in Luhya region.

expression of anguish and antagonism is crippled by the estrangement both from the other ethnic groups and from the state.

"Know the troublemaker" is a discussion text from the Kalenjin Forum featuring a post that uses the ethnic clashing patterns among various ethnic groups in the western part of the country to label the Kalenjin as the violent 'type' of an ethnic group. The speaker in the principal post to the discussion presupposes that the Kalenjin are harmful people given that they have clashed at least once with all the neighbouring ethnic groups in contrast to how the neighbouring ethnic groups have not clashed with one another (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, post). This is followed by comments which refute or endorse the labelling narrative. The significant feature of the discussion regards how the labeller can be construed as a non-Kalenjin which complicates the Kalenjin Forum as an exclusive[4] site for the Kalenjin ethnic group. The 'alienness' of the labeller in the post is not stated. However, it is implied by the second-person deixis and the condemnatory attitude in speaking to and about the Kalenjin which depict detachedness from the community. Here, the meaning of detachedness as an inter-ethnic characteristic requires an understanding of the background from which the discussion emanates.

The discussion is part of a post-2013-elections trending conversation about the suitability of the Deputy President, William Ruto, to succeed Uhuru Kenyatta as president in 2022 because the 2013 elections ushered the last term of Uhuru Kenyatta. Largely, such conversations entail ethnic analyses according to which (dis)approving a candidate involves (dis)approving the ethnic group that they belong to via resorting to certain (dis)qualifying stereotypes. Accordingly, the posts condemnatory remarking on the Kalenjin signifies the personas disapproval of William Ruto as an unsuitable candidate because he is a Kalenjin, which suggests that the persona comes from an 'other' ethnic group that disapproves of a Kalenjin presidency. The situation is reflected in one of the comments which mention Raila Odinga, another presidential contender and a Luo, in the instruction:

> *Chukulia ujinga zako raila*
> (Take your silliness to Raila)
> (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, Comment 36a).

[4] The case of an 'outsider' labeller appears here to contradict the description of the Kalenjin Forum in Chapter 1 as an exclusive co-presence site for the Kalenjin. Even so, the condition does not prevent members of the other ethnic communities from joining the group. The commonest way of such entries is when an entrant uses a pseudo-name that sounds Kalenjin or non-ethnic names such as the Christian ones which do not specify a person as a member of an ethnic group.

The allusion to Raila Odinga reveals that the commenter recognises the labeller as either a Luo or a member of another ethnic group that support Raila Odinga. In my view, the basis of this recognition is that Kenya's ethnicised politics establishes metonymies between political figures and ethnic groups such that a sentiment that identifies with a certain political following stands also to identify the speaker ethnically.

The above recognition of an outsider and the assault by which they are received by the insiders lead to another important background to this discussion. This is an emerging social media verbal event I distinguish as a 'mobbing game' to stand for a verbal contest that uses mobbing. 'Mobbing' refers to organised bullying, which is a concerted effort of intimidating someone (Duffy and Sperry, 2012: 4). In this light, a mobbing game establishes the exchange of mockeries in a way that is more amusing than inflicting harm.[5] As such, the idea of mobbing game conceptualises an event in Facebook community groups and Twitter hashtags in which someone mocks a character of another (often rival) group, or a significant figure in the group, which is followed by 'ganging up' in the victim group in defence of the community via a stream of counter mockeries. An example is the popular warring exchange of slurs, commonly known as 'beefs,' between the Kenyan, South African and Nigerian communities on Twitter via supremacy hashtags (Mose, 2018: 417). Here, the combatants derive pleasure in the concerted effort of discharging stereotypes about the opponent nation, which, in this way, succeeds in establishing a cordial relationship between the 'warring' countries than diplomatic rows.

This chapter is driven by the setting of the supremacy battles as public-space activities, such as in the hashtag conversations on Twitter and the national and international groups and pages on Facebook. The irony here is that the Kalenjin Forum, which hosts the discussion, "Know the troublemaker," is defined as an exclusive site for the Kalenjin community. This presents a performance of an inter-ethnic context in a biased space whose richness in terms of examining country-based ethnic nationalism is located in its prolificacy. Prolificacy conceives of

[5] Mobbing is inherently a form of hate speech but, in this thesis, the idea of a game embraces the notion of "counterspeech" spearheaded by Richards and Calvert (2002) as a remedy against the traumatising aspect of mobbing. Here 'counterspeech' is defined as the direct reactions, mainly from the victims of hate, which contradict a 'hate' remark and in that way minimising its harm (Richards and Calvert, 2002: 585). The notion conceives of an opportunity of a violated group to either refute a negative remark about them or avenge with a reciprocal remark. Thus, mobbing and the attendant 'counterspeech' constitute a game when the field of expression (as a form of freedom) is level. The level of expression refers to the capacity of both the offensive and the defensive groups to 'combat' fairly such as presence in the field of expression and the capacity of the field of expression to offer a limitless space by which each group can vent their feelings.

an intensified Kalenjin participation in the counter speech action in response to an assault that emanates from a 'private' space. The expected outpouring of the Kalenjin responses is valued in the chapter in the sense that they expose pieces of knowledge and attitudes about the 'self' in the context of the 'other,' which are regarded here as layers under which tones of sensing and communicating victimhood are embedded.

3.3: Imagining a vulnerable community in "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki"

This section analyses the narratives, "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki," as exemplar narratives of the Kalenjin Crisis, and assess the resurgence of 'Kalenjinness' within a strand of victimhood nationalism I consider as imagining a vulnerable community. Here, vulnerability nationalism refers to the public action of imagining and publicising the Kalenjin group as a vulnerable community. The understanding of a vulnerable community draws on Handmers (2003: 57) concept of a "vulnerable group" which states that a particular group is vulnerable if the "people are assumed to have little resilience or coping capacity within the ambit of public policy." This perspective offers that victimhood in vulnerability is the sensing of an oppressive public policy and disadvantage. Hence, the idea of the Kalenjin as a vulnerable group entails the group's imagination of marginalisation and the inability to withstand the marginalisation. An oppressive public policy here refers to the distribution of government plans and actions that disfavour a certain group while disadvantage stands for the helplessness of the group to endure or challenge the policy.

Still, I find it necessary to amend the concept of oppressive public policy to stigma — the resentment towards a group due to perceptible a peculiar characteristic. This decentres the source of estrangement from the state to the society and underscores that the society is inseparable from the state in the making of vulnerable communities because the state is an outcome of the wider society. Thus, the alienating characteristic of a regime towards a group reflects an overarching resentment from the larger population towards that group. Hence, the idea of 'vulnerable community' in the chapter stands for a group of people who are a victim of both stigma and disadvantage, and, so, the section aims to identify the Kalenjin sensations of stigma and disadvantage as bases of imagining vulnerability.

"The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" relate to the Kalenjin imagination of stigma and disadvantage via the '*Nyayo*' trope. The previous chapter highlighted

that *Nyayo* (Kiswahili for 'footsteps') is a slogan that Moi used to proclaim the philosophy of continuance of the system of ruling after succeeding Jomo Kenyatta as the president. The slogan reflects Moi's will to advance the independence promises, such as to end the country's unique difficulties, namely, poverty, ignorance and disease, as well as to improve on Jomo Kenyatta's attainments such as peace, stability and national unity, made by KANU. However, the *Nyayo* philosophy also bears a negative sub-current in that it also signifies a continuance of the elements of bad governance from the Jomo Kenyatta's regime. Lynch (2011: 105, 112) shows that the disapproving sense of *Nyayo* is based on the view that the Jomo Kenyatta regime was not a perfect model to emulate owing to its 'excesses' mainly for favouring the Gikuyu ethnic group. Hence, '*Nyayo*ism' connotes the inheritance of the Gikuyu favour in the Jomo Kenyatta presidency to the Kalenjin in the Moi regime as the 'tribes' of the president. This is evident in "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" in the narration that,

> Mr. Sirma asked President Kibaki to protect the Kalenjin as Mr. Moi did the Kikuyu community on taking over from Mzee Kenyatta (Mugonyi and Rono, 2003, paragraph 13)

Mr. Sirma can be viewed here as apathetic to the preferential privileging of ethnic groups in a democracy. This stems from the way he projects the idea of favouring the ethnic group of the president as a given practice that originates from the past (Jomo Kenyatta regime). In this case, the *Nyayo* spirit is understood by the speaker as the furtherance of the habit of bestowing favour to the ethnic group of the president. However, Mr Sirma's remark reveals a stage of difficulty as a member of the ethnic group of the immediate former president as conveyed by the desire for the Kalenjin to be protected by Kibaki in appreciation of Moi's protection of the Gikuyu. In this way, the protection motif signifies a rupture of repressed resentment of the passing ethnic group of the president among the rest of Kenyans. Thus, the favour in *Nyayo* also carries hatred and a sense of disgrace which remain subdued as long as the victim group enjoys power. In this case, the peculiarity of the Kalenjin resentment as the ethnic group of the president is borne from the popular view, as Lynch (2011: 105, 112) notes, that Moi escalated the benefitting system and was more blatant than Jomo Kenyatta.

The status of the Kalenjin as an ethnic group of the president links with two historical accounts represented by "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" respectively. The duality stems from the nature of the KANU downfall highlighted in the

previous chapter, which features the 1991 juncture when the single-party state ended and the post-2002 juncture when Moi departed from the presidency. Accordingly, the status of the Kalenjin as the ethnic group of the president calls for the consideration of power in terms of incumbency and post-incumbency. Thus, the first task here is to assess how "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" compare as representations of the Kalenjin *Nyayo* vulnerability in the contexts of incumbency and post-incumbency. The objective is to establish the different shades of the Kalenjin Crisis in that the stories recount the foreboding in 1991 that the Moi presidency could end soon and the situation after the end itself immediately after 2002. The second task is to identify the senses by which the Kalenjin imagine vulnerability both in the "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" stories as the *Nyayo* victim group. Of importance here is how *Nyayo* is converted by the Kalenjin into a context of vulnerability.

"The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" convey the Kalenjin voice in varying tones. The Kalenjin voice here refers to opinions that are representative to the Kalenjin community owing to how they are projected collectively via the pronoun 'we.' An example of the variance is depicted in Willy Kamuren while cautioning the pro-opposition ethnic groups in the Rift Valley in "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" against opposing KANU that,

> […] Let them keep quiet or else we are ready for introduction of *Majimbo*ism whereby every person will be required to go back to his motherland.
> Once we introduce *Majimbo* in Rift Valley, all outsiders who acquired our land will have to move and then leave the same land to our children (Akiwumi Commission, 1999a, 50)

and Musa Sirma's warning in "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" that,

> If this government continues sacking our people, we can declare Rift Valley a state. They are not fighting us because we are in Opposition but because we are Kalenjin. (Mugonyi and Rono, 2003, paragraph 14)

The tone in Willy Kamuren's sentiment is more potent than Musa Sirma's even though both express dissatisfaction with the manner in which the rest of Kenya treat them as inhabitants of the Rift Valley. Potency here describes the energy deployed to confront the perceived maltreatment. Willy Kamuren projects the idea of '*Majimbo*ism' while Musa Sirma employs self-determination. Here, I argue that '*Majimbo*ism' figures power because it relies on the states

support to push for the change of the government system. This is alluded to by the mood in which Willy Kamuren cautions the entrants in the Rift Valley that the Kalenjin leaders shall 'introduce *Majimbo*ism,' implying that the change of the government system does not require a great deal of effort among the leaders. Power is also alluded to in the eviction sense of the idea of '*Majimbo*ism' in which mass relocation of people requires the involvement of the state. This contrasts with the self-determination idea in the second case, which signifies exhaustion of the means of pressuring the state to address a demand because separatist clamours signify the precedence of dialogue that has failed. Self-Determination Studies, for instance, offers that secession is not a need by itself but an expression of unresponsive politics and a cry to be heard (Wehner, 2020: 34). Thus, I argue that withholding the Rift Valley, in this case, is defeatist in the sense in which it proclaims a disregarded state of the Kalenjin grievances. This indicates that the Kalenjin here sense losing the fight against protecting their modes of livelihood and is crying out for help.

Hence, the difference in the sensing of vulnerability between "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" only concerns the moods of expression developed by the levels of coping capacity which entails the linkage between the Moi-presidency and incumbency. It is a variance of forcefulness, as a function of the state support, and helplessness, due to being stripped of the support, in the two stories respectively. Thus, both stories imagining of vulnerability projects the sense of victimisation on the grounds of being from the ethnic group of Moi. The consistency of victimhood against different levels of coping capacity resonates with the perspective in Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992: 252) that siege mentality is an "accessible" cognitive condition. Here, accessibility refers to how the condition may be calmed by circumstances such as state favours but may not be erased but continues to subtly shape the modes of knowing and relating with others in the victim group.

The Kalenjin imagination of vulnerability in the "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" is depicted in several ways. Relevant here is abandonment and the Rift Valley disadvantage.

Abandonment refers here to the emotional insecurity from the sensation of being undesired by others in the surroundings. The term is employed to describe a community's feeling when suddenly the other communities who associated with them form other alliances without them. In the Kenyan context, the alliances are mainly political and are determined by the

alliances made by kingpins to form political parties or coalitions of parties. Accordingly, abandonment constitutes vulnerability in the sense in which the abandoned group feel marginalised and prone to maltreatment and the incapacity to cope with the maltreatment. A notable sensation of abandonment emanates from the narration of the testimony of Chief Jonathan Kibaibaii Rogony on the role of politics in the rise of the violence documented in "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies." The narration states that,

> In his evidence Chief Jonathan Kibaibaii Rogony of Kamasian Location, in Kipkelion Division, of Kericho District, stated that he believed that because H.E. the President had crossed from Kadu to Kanu with all his followers and since then remained in Kanu, the Kalenjin leaders assumed that only Kanu would be supported in their areas, and other political parties were unwelcomed. The *Majimbo* rallies appeared to be intended to pass a message. (Akiwumi Commission, 1999b: 10)

In the remark, abandonment bears on to the construction of a binary of political finalities. This stands for the syllogism that arrives at an absolute conclusion only on the basic appearance of things such as: if A is not a B, then it is C. Chief Jonathan Kibaibaii Rogony in the remark similarly reasons that if other groups have left KANU, then KANU has transfigured to 'Kadu[6]' because KADU was the party which the Kalenjin were initially associated with before they crossed to KANU. In this way, the binary signifies a sense of being singly left behind by others in forging political futures. The speaker reasons that evicting the non-Kalenjin inhabitants from the Rift Valley is justified from the perspective that the mass exit from KANU symbolised the groups retracting the *Nyayo* spirit in which the entire country was to be united under Moi. In this case, the idea of KADU is deployed as a metaphor for *Majimbo*, which is the centring of ownership of lands by ethnic communities, which renders the pro-opposition persons 'unwelcome' in the region.

I argue that the creation of geographies of political parties along ethnic lines signifies abandonment via the mood of counter-exclusion. Counter-exclusion here refers to rejecting others perceived to have already rejected us. The mood is conveyed by how the speaker feels that KANU has been ditched in all parts of the country except among the Kalenjin. The

[6] The Kalenjin 'belonged' to KADU based on the pre-independence ethnic alignments to political parties because the party prioritised *Majimbo*ism against KANU's African Socialism. Notwithstanding, there is a possibility that the speaker's concept of KADU actually referred to the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA) party that was formed by Moi, which merged with parties from other ethnic groups and regions, such as the Coast African Political Union (CAPU), Baluhya Political Union (BPU), Masai United Front (MUF), and the Somali National Front SNF) that supported the idea of *Majimbo*ism and participated the formation of KADU in 1960. The Kalenjin sense of 'belonging' to the party also relates to Moi's significant position as a leader in the group as the party's chairman.

disadvantaging circumstance of the abandonment stems from how other ethnic groups have the privilege of exploring political opportunities in the multiparty dispensation through establishing alliances with one another while excluding the Kalenjin. An instance of this situation is how some of the first opposition parties depicted ethnic alliances such as the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy—Kenya (FORD Kenya) for the Luo, Abagusii and the Luhya, while the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru and Kamba had the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy—Asili (FORD Asili). This shows how the other ethnic groups can associate with one another while the Kalenjin cannot. The link between the KADU notion and eviction violence arguable relates to a siege mentality in the sense that siege mentality is produced by trauma and discharged by aggression (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992; Bilewicz and Liu, 2020: 126). This opinion indicates that certain conflicts need not spring from actual infringement from outside; rather, a mere sense of catastrophe within a collective can lead to a view that others in the surroundings are dangerous and could take advantage of the catastrophe to strike. In this respect, the formation of political alliances by other ethnic groups in the country without the Kalenjin does not necessarily imply that the Kalenjin were unwelcome in the alliances. It only means that the other ethnic groups considered the Kalenjin to have secured their belonging in KANU. This view is supported by how NARC was not entirely without Kalenjin persons. Kipruto Kirwa, for example, is one of the Kalenjins who agitated for the removal of KANU from power by campaigning for Mwai Kibaki and was thereafter appointed the minister for agriculture in the NARC government.

This sense of abandonment is also depicted in the story, "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki." The abandonment treated here relates to the perception of persecution related to the sacking of the Kalenjin people from top government jobs at the start of the Kibaki regime. Key to the depiction of this abandonment is Salat and Sirma's remark that,

> *Majimbo* is the only solution in this country because every government position now is going to Mt Kenya Region. This is the only way open to the Kalenjin community to take care of their people.
> (Mugonyi and Rono, 2003, paragraph 4)

Abandonment here is registered by the rhetoric of systematicity which is the reasoning that noted harm was deliberate. The speaker pictures an opposition pitting the Kalenjin on one side and 'Mt Kenya' on the other. 'Mt. Kenya' is a popular metaphor for the Gikuyu, Meru and Embu ethnic groups in Kenya because they inhabit the region surrounding Mt. Kenya. As a result, Kenyans

consider the group as the ethnic group of the president in the NARC regime because President Mwai Kibaki is a Gikuyu. I argue here that the allusive significance of 'Mt. Kenya' in the abandonment embodies the 'rest of Kenya' such that the sacking exercise features the Kalenjin on one side and the rest of Kenya on the other. The argument stems from what I call the satisfaction index,[7] which stands for the extent to which ethnic groups were satisfied with NARCs reorganisation actions when the party assumed office, which entailed, among others, changing the top civil service.

It should also be noted that the favour of the Gikuyu, Meru and Embu ethnic groups in the reorganisation of the civil service was felt across the country. Notably, there was a remarkable satisfaction across the country's ethnic communities that NARC was more promising than KANU and, therefore, the reorganisation was conceived for the good of the country. Thus, the Kalenjin resistance to the exercise suggests that the NARC agenda affected them in a uniquely traumatising way. The other KANU allies of the Kalenjin, such as the Maasai, Samburu and Turkana, were affected significantly by the reorganisation but did not stage a resistance. Thus, the Kalenjin sense of abandonment is arguably about the view that the reorganisation exercise is targeting them, which bears links with the "hypervigilance" characteristic of siege mentality, which is the heightened wariness over the actions of others (Bilewicz and Liu, 2020: 124). For instance, it circumvents the view of the possibility that the Kalenjin had exceedingly dominated the civil service upon which it was inevitable to carry out the reorganisation exercise without sacking more Kalenjins than any other ethnic group.

The term, Rift Valley disadvantage, refers here to the risk of being the predominant inhabitants of the Rift Valley. The Rift Valley has been the most desired place to own land in Kenya especially after independence owing to how it was previously occupied by the white settlers. Thus, the risk with being the major inhabitants is about the influx of people into the region which threatens the adequacy of resources among the locals. More important here is the perception related to the *Nyayo* stigma that Moi favoured the Kalenjin excessively in the distribution of the former white settler pieces of land in the region. A major sensation of this

[7] The idea, satisfaction index, may not be measured numerically because it refers simply to overt behaviour. It excludes the possibility that the silence of the other ethnic groups means the satisfaction. It can mean that the groups acquiesced due to an inability to resist or to forbear trouble. However, I argue that it is a significant idea in the sense that the Kalenjin projections of victimhood were not supported by the other ethnic groups. Thus, the Kalenjin are argued here as the most dissatisfied group in the government reorganisation under the NARC regime.

stigma is portrayed in "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" through the narrator's reflection on the connection between the *Majimbo* rallies and the start of the ethnic clashes. The 1980s, which I call in Chapter 2, the composure period of the Moi regime, was also the most satisfying moment for the Kalenjin in that the community succeeded in consolidating large sections in the Rift Valley. Incidentally, the decade was also the moment in history in which Kenya was a one-party state. Thus, the rise of multiparty politics in the 1990s subjectively means to the Kalenjin the rise of risk over land in their territory. The reflection states that,

> The Kalenjin viewed multipartyism as a veiled attempt to dislodge from office their own as President of Kenya. The predominance of prominent Kalenjin politicians in those rallies is clear testimony that they felt they would lose a great deal if multipartyism was re-introduced in Kenya, and hence their unequivocal remarks at those rallies that they would forcibly evict those who supported multipartyism. (Akiwumi Commission, 1999b: 10)

The sentiment shows the Kalenjin connection of the multiparty system with violence through the 'misunderstanding' trope. The term, misunderstanding, refers here to lacking clear distinction of signs about the multiparty system and engaging in violence as falling for the wrong signs. I argue here that the 'misunderstanding' functions as a euphemism for sharply differing in understanding with the others. This is because "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" is part of a Report that accuses the Kalenjin politicians of fanning violence, which means that the narrator's angle is to show that the politicians mislead the community into thinking that multiparty politics was dangerous for them. That may be valid as far as the law is concerned. However, I argue from the siege mentality perspective that the idea of misleading is also a form of leadership within the Kalenjin political worldview. According to Bilewicz and Liu (2020: 126), a group that has been traumatised enters a "conspiracy mentality" which refers to attributions of events to "malevolent plots and secret alliances" (Bilewicz and Liu, 2020: 126). The mentality is about the fear of what might happen to 'us' when 'others' seem to be in alliance. Accordingly, the trouble that the politicians are facing embraces the fear of groupings of ethnic groups into parties, which simulate exclusive forums of discussing 'enemies.'

Conspiracy mentality and the idea of parties as forums for imagining inter-ethnic differences, and discussing an 'otherred' group, is clearer from another narrator's characterisation of the 1991-1992 violence in "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies." It states that,

> Tribal clashes in the Rift Valley Province started on 29th October 1991, at a farm known as Miteitei, situated in the heart of Tinderet Division, in Nandi District, pitting the Nandi, a Kalenjin tribe, against the Gikuyu, the Kamba, the Luhya, the Kisii, and the Luo.
> […] The attacks were barbaric, callous and calculated to drive out the targeted groups from their farms, to cripple them economically and to psychologically traumatise them. (Akiwumi Commission, 1999b: 2)

The major element assigned to the violence is a resolve to evict the pro-opposition ethnic groups living within the Rift Valley. This is evidenced by the attacker's focus on making the victims feel bad about living in the Rift Valley aggression of closing up space which is ensuring that the homeland is secure from foreignness. Arguably, the aggressors perceive risk in being exposed to the 'enemies' within their area of refuge. Kim (2016: 225) offers a similar scenario in North Koreas self-isolation from the world and an emphasis on self-reliance which sprung from a lack of trust for the world economies such as the US, South Korea and China. I argue that the similarity between North Koreas self-isolation and self-reliance, and Kalenjins eviction violence is the fear over the disadvantage of being excessively known by others who are perceivably dangerous. As victims, they would rather be on their own and suffer the consequences such as economic losses than be 'destroyed' by 'enemies.' Thus, the idea of misunderstanding the multiparty system as a subjective understanding signifies the Kalenjin sensation of risk as the principal inhabitants of the Rift Valley. The trope displays a contextual encounter of a possible loss of control over the Rift Valley in the sense in which the Rift Valley has been rendered a lone KANU zone, surrounded by the perceivably antagonistic communities.

The Rift Valley disadvantage is alluded to in "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" in various ways. The disadvantage relates significantly to a projection of a Kalenjin persecution claim during the NARC regime. The persecution claim and the Rift Valley disadvantage connects via the championing of the opinion that the Kalenjin community is under persecution — conceived here as the sensation of a systematic but "illegitimate infliction of sufficiently severe harm" (Rempell 2013: 343) — because of being the indigenous inhabitants of the Rift Valley. The importance of the persecution trope as a signal of victimhood is that it is imagined and performed via the idea of systematicity (Billig, 1995: 15; Jeffery and Candea, 2006: 291 and Rempell 2013: 343). The proponents must display that harm is deliberate in relation to an identifiable oppressor, victim and action. Here, I posit that the Kalenjin sense of persecution over the Rift Valley as

vulnerability is carried by the narratives of the systematic and illegitimate nature of the harm from the state. This is best exemplified in the narrator's report which states that,

> Gideon Moi accused the Government of marginalising the Kalenjin community.
> "They have revoked title deeds and stopped settlement schemes for the landless in the Rift Valley but not in other provinces,"
> Mr Moi repeated his last week's statement in Kericho that the people of Rift Valley could demand that even multi-national companies which had acquired titles genuinely return the land.
> "We've already been in touch with foreign investors and cautioned them the people from the province will do this if the Government does not respect title deeds," Mr. Moi added.
> "If the Government is waging war on private property, what is the consequence?" he asked (Mugonyi and Rono, 2003: paragraph 20-22).

Gideon Moi's tone of expressing the Kalenjin troubles is best summed here as crying out. I use the term to refer to amplifying one's grief to the 'world' to elicit sympathy hoping to compel the persecutor to honour one's grievances. The 'world' here refers to the individuals, the media, civil society and the international community outside the community who are likely to intervene to address the raised grievances. Here, the significance of crying-out as rhetoric is that it is a defeatist mood, which means that the victim has reached an extreme margin of crumbling unless external help is offered.

The prominent lamentation narrative of Gideon Moi in the report above projects that the state colludes with the other ethnic groups to dispossess the Kalenjin of the pieces of land in the Rift Valley. For example, he points out that the state does not respect title deeds and private land,[8] which means the government would use unlawful means to change the possession of the pieces of land. In this case, Gideon Moi invokes the notion of ethnic cleansing (which is the state-backed elimination of ethnic identity in an area) to represent the Kalenjin predicament in the 'world.' This is because a government that does not respect the title deeds of a particular community does not want the community to exist in the country. Accordingly, the idea of ethnic

[8] The dispossession refers to the land in the Rift Valle defined as either private, communal or public. Private land here means one that is owned individually and where a title deed has been issued; however, the huge pieces of land that are currently occupied by foreigners (commonly known as multinational companies) as private land are generally considered as community land, which means that the community expects to inherit them upon the ending of the leasehold. In contrast, public land is owned by the state, and the state has the discretion to issue it to any person or group. The multinational companies' pieces of land in question refer to the farming estates (mainly tea) in Kericho, Bomet, Nandi, Nakuru, Baringo and Uasin Gishu counties. Accordingly, the dispossessing notion, concerning t the intention of the state to change the status of the multinational companies' pieces of land from private to public, suggests that the government could be planning to issue the pieces of land to another ethnic community.

cleansing typifies the Kalenjin narrative of systematicity of harm by demonstrating the extreme sense of insecurity among the Kalenjins as a minority in the political landscape of the country. Arguably, this sense of insecurity would be insignificant if the Kalenjin occupied marginal regions such as the northern and the north-eastern parts. The uniqueness of the Rift Valley, such as a leading destination for settlement in the country, a contested space in relation to ownership and the hailing place of the immediate former president, amplifies the sense of harm in the ethnic cleansing narrative. This resonates with what Bar-Tal and Antebis (1992: 252) notes about siege mentality as a "high confidence" belief system. This refers to the production of rationalities that cement fear. In Gideon Moi's case, the revocation of the Kalenjin title deeds is a rational basis for imagining the beginning of ethnic cleansing.

To conclude this section, I argue that the Kalenjin imagining of a vulnerable community in "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki," assist in expressing estrangement and the notion of conspiracy. Estrangement describes the state, in the stories, in which the KANU downfall isolates the community from the others as the group that does not welcome the ending of the regime. This relates to the abandonment trope in the stories related to the other ethnic groups that were establishing political alliances without the Kalenjin, a move that leads to the eviction in the Rift Valley and the idea of secession. Eviction and the idea of secession, in this case, represent estrangement in the sense that they are produced by the feeling of severed ties and the disadvantage of 'owning' the Rift Valley. Here, the disadvantage connects with the place as the most desired in terms of land and the hardship of sustaining the 'ownership' which had been assuaged by the Moi-presidency. The notion of conspiracy is about the perception by the Kalenjin that the other ethnic communities, and also the state in a later point, were planning to harm the group by dispossessing them of pieces of land in the Rift Valley, as vengeance for having benefitted inequitably from the *Nyayo* system of the Moi-rule. Accordingly, the idea of a vulnerable community is produced by the coaction of estrangement, conspiracy and the disadvantage of 'owning' the Rift Valley. The performance of vulnerable community victimhood relates to the action of crying-out, which is the reaching out to others, the state and the international community so that they can notice the suffering of the group. Thus, vulnerability imagining mobilises the Kalenjin nationhood via the concept of besiegement, which is the view that the others and the state are likely to betray them and, therefore, they must regroup as a mode of preparing for the worst.

3.4: Imagining a threatened community of place in the Kalenjin Forum discussion text, "Know the troublemaker"

The section examines a variant context of performing Kalenjin victimhood, considered here as a threatened community of place, through an analysis of a Kalenjin Forum Facebook discussion text, "Know the troublemaker" (Kalenjin Forum, 2017). The discussion text is set as a sequel to the Kalenjin Crisis in an exclusively Kalenjin co-presence site. Therefore, the discussion is considered here as a meta-commentary on the idea of vulnerability victimhood examined in the foregoing section. A meta-commentary action here is the transportation of issues across time and space within a collective and adapting the issues into the people's everyday experiences and understandings. As such, the text shows a reworking of victimhood related mainly to 'owning'the 'Rift Valley' from open violent displacement to covert dispossession. The foregoing section, for instance, indicates that the Kalenjin Crisis relates to the fear of being ejected from the Rift Valley space as evident from the projections of the eviction violence and the secession clamours. This section explores the emergence of a covert displacement, summed here as infiltration to conceptualise the gradual entry into Rift Valley by other ethnic groups through individualised movements such as buying land from willing Kalenjin sellers.

A historical situation that relates to the shifting nature of the Kalenjin vulnerability from seizure to infiltration embraces the nonfulfillment of the Kalenjin expectation of a forceful takeover of their land, which unfolded as the NARC government progressed after the year 2002. The government mentioned plans to revoke some title deeds and possess the multinational companies' pieces of land in the Rift Valley as noted in the previous section. However, the story, "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" (Mugonyi and Rono, 2003: paragraph 20-22) shows that this did not take place even by the year 2007 when the Kalenjin were involved in further violence[9] with others over the Rift Valley place. Nevertheless, there has been a continued rise of the non-Kalenjin settlers in the region even though there has never been a forceful takeover which is accompanied by Kalenjin undertones of fear of loss of control of the Rift Valley. The 2007

[9] The 2007-8 Post-Election Violence erupted after the 2007 presidential elections when Raila Odinga alleged that the results were manipulated in favour of the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki. The violence started as a political contestation of the results but escalated especially in the Rift Valley to land issues. The violence in the Rift Valley resembled the violent evictions of 1992 in which the Kalenjin appeared to be targeting the non-Kalenjins who inhabit the Rift Valley.

violence, for instance, depicts these undertones as alluded to in the violences popular mobilising code, '*madoadoa*' (Kiswahili for 'spots'), which was used by the Kalenjin to refer to the entrants during the warfare (Jenkins, 2012: 591). The categorisation of the entrants as 'spots' in the region presupposes a changing face of the 'Rift Valley' because it equates the entrants to 'impurities,' and suggests that the community imagines the risk of losing control over the region and even identity. Thus, the section aims to assess the idea of infiltration as a revitalisation of the Kalenjin siege mentality, and its linkage to the production of nationalism of a threatened community of place. The venture draws mainly on Bar-Tal and Antebis (1992: 252) view that "siege mentality is not an inherited disposition or a stable trait," which means that the condition should be examined along changing times and circumstances that, in this case, relate to the shift from the fear of seizure to infiltration.

A community of place here derives from what McKnight et al (2017) define as a geographically bounded social community, which conceives of a sense of community that is attached to a place. According to Edensor (2002: 58), attachment to places performs communal identity at the level at which it symbolises domesticity, which refers to when the people consider the places as the homeland. What McKnight et al (2017) and Edensor (2002) do not incorporate in the concept of homeland is the emerging situation occasioned by the spread of digital connectivity in which the physical homeland substitutes with the virtual homeland as exemplified by the community groups and pages in Facebook. To put this into perspective, I briefly explain some special meaning which the idea of homeland bears in Kenya, which also links with how the virtual community sites are managed — and constitutes the context in which this thesis approaches the notions, community of place and threat.

The term, homeland, entails two understandings in Kenya, which I call here 'hailing place' and 'trans-homeland.' The hailing place refers to where one's ethnic group are native to and exercise more influence than the others. A trans-homeland, in contrast, refers to the acquired homes outside ones hailing place. It should be noted here that the trans-homeland phenomenon in Kenya started with the African Socialism policy, discussed in the previous chapter, which secured the right of citizens to settle in every part of the country irrespective of ethnicity. As a result, African Socialism resulted in a dispersal of Kenya's ethnic groups in search of new lands for settlement mainly on the former white settler pieces of land, which were away from original homelands.

Kenyas 2010 Constitution, which emphasises the promotion of County economies, has subtly revitalised the spirit of African Socialism in that the Counties compete to spur economic growth through attracting investors. These investors largely come from different regions and ethnicities, and they not only come to do business but also settle as inhabitants in the host Counties. A striking feature about the trans-homeland phenomenon is that a member of an ethnic group who has established a home in any other part of the country is always conscious of their hailing place even if they have been in the new homes for a long time or descend from earlier migrants. A Gikuyu living in a place such as Kericho County, for instance, will introduce themselves double-consciously: as living in Kericho but hailing from a certain County in the Central region of Kenya where the Gikuyu predominate. Here, the aspect that differentiates the hailing place from the trans-homeland is not necessarily where one spends much of their time or has invested more resources, but where they derive homeliness.

A virtual community site remarkably reflects the above-noted treatment of hailing places and trans-homelands. The sense is that a community site in Kenya is established to connect the members of the community who live at home and the diasporas. More so, membership in the virtual groups is defined by the very concepts that delineate the community in the physical sense as evident in the use of the actual or epithetical community and territorial names to designate the groups and pages. In this light, the Kalenjin Forum and Gotabgaa[10] Forums are argued in this thesis as the Kalenjins major virtual sites given that the names are derived from the actual and epithetical names of the Kalenjin. In this regard, the virtual community site resolves the problem in which the members of a community who live in the diasporas are required to travel home regularly to connect.

Therefore, a hailing place in the physical and virtual senses is homelier than the trans-homelands because it is predominated by ones 'tribespeople' and, hence, provides a context for reinforcing ethnic identity.[11] Thus, the loss of identity, as a result of being dispersed among

[10] '*Gotabgaa*' is a Kalenjin word meaning 'the home house," which creates the image that the members are drawn into the group to experience homeliness. As such, the group appeals to nostalgia to mobilise the Kalenjin community to a co-presence.

[11] Some measures of promoting ethnic cohesion in the country have also produced a negative impact on ethnic identities. For instance, it has become commonly unacceptable to introduce oneself using ethnic categories, such as saying, 'I am a Kalenjin…or a Gikuyu,' because it suggests a disconnection from others and, hence a form of negative ethnicity. Nonetheless, one can still proclaim their ethnicity by stating where they hail from as in saying, 'I come from Kiambu,' which signals that the person is a Gikuyu, or 'I come from Kericho,' which means, 'I am a Kipsigis Kalenjin.' Thus, positive ethnicity is currently performed via the metaphor of the hailing place.

others in the trans-homelands, is recovered by the concept of hailing from a place. In this section, I suppose that the threat to the control of a hailing place and identity is experienced when strangers exceed the predominant inhabitants both in numbers or influence. Accordingly, a threatened community of place is experienced when the group's hailing place is being infiltrated significantly. Here, the difference between the threat in the physical and virtual hailing place is that one is real and the other is symbolic. The threat in the physical hailing place is real in the sense that it entails displacement that is difficult to reverse because when people have settled in a territory seeking to eject them amounts to eviction violence. The threat in the virtual hailing place is symbolic because it only prompts the members to feelings of being infiltrated. A virtual site that experiences infiltration can simply 'unmember' strangers or close the group and establish another one with more stringent membership rules.

"Know the troublemaker" documents this risk through two of its characteristics. The first one is about the labelling narrative as a mapping of the Kalenjin hailing place with the external and internal presence of 'others,' and as a context of sensing a threat to place-based identity. The second one is enshrined in the spatial setting of the Kalenjin Forum, as an exclusive site for the Kalenjin, and the incident of a non-Kalenjin labeller, which symbolise intrusion. Labelling here visualises how the initial post in the discussion projects a deductive narrative that proclaims the Kalenjin as the clear perpetrators of ethnic violence in the western part of the country where Kenya's ethnic violence has mostly occurred. This narrative blames the Kalenjin as the most violent ethnic group in the country. The principal post to the discussion states that,

> *Kisii-Luo share border but no cross-border conflicts. Time and again you see kalenjin-kisii conflicts in sotik, Luo-kalenjin conflicts in kericho and nandi borders. Luhyas border Luo, Teso, Buganda in Uganda with no border conflicts but you hear of Luhya-kalenjin cross border wars along uasingishu gishu kakamega border, vihiga nandi border, bungoma and mt elgon borders. Pokots vs kalenjin across elgeyo marakwet and baringo/west pokot. Masaai border samburu, kamba and Gikuyu but no border conflicts but masaai and kalenjin at each other across their borders. Gikuyu border meru, aembu, kamba, massai with no conflicts but watch the south rift; Gikuyu-kalenjin every soon in nakuru, molo, kuresoi njoro etc.*
> *If you are a father with 5children with one child having fought each of the four but the other four have never raised a hand at each other, u don't need rocket science kujua mchokozi*
>
> (The Abagusii and the Luo share a border but there are no cross-border conflicts. Time and again, you see Kalenjin-Abagusii conflicts in Sotik, and Luo-Kalenjin conflicts in Kericho and Nandi borders. The Luhyas border Luo, Teso and Buganda in Uganda but there are no border conflicts. You only hear of Luhya-Kalenjin cross-border wars along Uasin Gishu-Kakamega border,

> Vihiga-Nandi border, and Bungoma and Mt. Elgon borders. Also, Pokots versus Kalenjin across Elgeyo Marakwet and Baringo/West Pokot borders. The Masaai border Samburu, Kamba and Gikuyu but no border conflicts except Masaai and Kalenjin at each other across their borders. Gikuyu borders Meru, Aembu, Kamba, Maasai but there are no conflicts. But watch the South Rift; Gikuyu-Kalenjin every time in Nakuru, Molo, Kuresoi, Njoro etc.
>
> If you are a father with 5 children, with one child having fought each of the four, but the other four have never raised a hand at each other, you dont need rocket science to know the troublemaker)" (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, post).

A prominent feature in this narrative is the construction of a violent profile using the idea of notoriety. The sense of notoriety here is inventive because it does not provide the larger picture of the violence, bearing in mind that other aspects such as politics and historical injustices come into play in land-based conflicts. Notwithstanding, profiling a community inventively may not necessarily denote a threat to existence in that community — until it signifies disadvantage. Thus, I examine apparent links between disadvantage, and sensing infiltration and threatened homeliness in the discussion.

3.4.1: Trans-homelands, unequal mobility and the idea of infiltration

This subsection examines the nature of infiltration as an imagination of disadvantage to the Kalenjin community in "Know the troublemaker." This intention arises, firstly, from the fact that infiltration is a universal phenomenon in Kenya as a result of the widespread search for trans-homelands in the country, and, secondly, because infiltration refers to the acquisition of land on mutual agreement between the issuer and the acquirer. Hence, there is no community in the country which claims to have no inhabitants from other ethnic groups in their hailing places. Nonetheless, there is a significant sensation of disadvantage among Kalenjin participants in the discussion text concerning the trans-homeland distribution and mobility across Kenya's ethnic homelands, which allows a consideration of the Kalenjin experiences about place-based victimhood because the trans-homeland mobility bears undercurrents of power (Bélanger and Silvey, 2020: 3426). Hence, I demonstrate this sensation by analysing the unequal mobility trope, which is a prominent allusion in the discussion. Unequal mobility here stands for an ethnic communitys perception of disadvantage in the distribution of the trans-homelands. It is a view of imbalance between the outward and the inward flows of land seeking activity, thereby, safeguarding the hailing places of others while threatening others.

Some of the outstanding comments to the "Know the troublemaker" narrative that depict unequal mobility and how it disfavours the Kalenjin are:

> It must be noted that these clashes always take place inside their land. Many communities have moved to live with Kalenjins, but Kalenjins have not gone to live outside their land except Maasai land and this is because they share some cultural backgrounds (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 21).

> *ata simba hulinda teritory yake! r.v is cosmolitan than any province in Kenya. n dats a fact! followed by coast, so follow ua roots*
> (Even the lion secures its territory! Rift Valley is more cosmopolitan than any other province in Kenya. And that is a fact! The Coast province comes second, so, follow your roots). (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 12)

A notable feature in the remarks above is the mood of permitting and sensing danger. Permitting here refers to the acceptance of 'others' to their territory as inhabitants while sensing danger stands for the perception that the entrants are becoming a threat to existence. The first comment projects that the violence takes place 'inside' the Kalenjin space, which implies that the Kalenjin are not in conflict with 'neighbours,' as the labelling narrative suggests, but with 'guests.' The second comment suggests that the Rift Valley is the most cosmopolitan region in the country and thus, drawing on the anima imagery of territoriality, should be protected. I observe that the idea of protecting a cosmopolitan region supposes the notion of regulating the entrants against exceeding the dominance and influence of the hosts. It also relates to the comment illustrated in the foregoing subsection in which the speaker assigns blame to the migrants on the view that the conflict between the Kalenjin and 'others' relates to the trooping of the 'others' around the Kalenjin territory in search of land because the Kalenjin are generous (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 30). Thus, the remarks portray that the problem with the Kalenjin is not the presence of entrants in their place but the density of presence and migration towards their place and, hence, the threat of excessive entry. I argue that this dilemma is best understood as an activity of majoritarian nationalism, which stands for the politics of fear of the minority by the majority, which is the reawakening of the majority to the view that the minority is a threat (Anand, 2011: 18). In this case, the dominant view is that migrants are welcome within the levels in which they do not seem to endanger the welfare state of the host (Koefoed, 2015: 228). As a result, I suggest that the idea of endangering the welfare state of the host in the discussion text reflects the modes in which the Kalenjin persona assigns blame to the migrant.

These modes are depicted in the reactions by the Kalenjin participants that rationalise their role in the violence and judge the migrants as the cause of violence. An example invokes the hostility of 'others' and the threat associated with being surrounded by migrants:

> *Because kalenjin land is like Israel, surrounded by hostile neighbors. We have a right to defend ourselves*
> ([We fight] Because Kalenjin land is like Israel's. It is surrounded by hostile neighbours. We have a right to defend ourselves) (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 27)

Here, an inter-textual analogy of the uniqueness of Israel and the conflict[12] with the Palestinians who inhabit areas within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and whose kin live in the surrounding countries, such as Syria, Jordan and Egypt is invoked. In this case, the speaker presupposes that the familiar information that the Israelis are the aggressors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be understood from how the Israelis are located in the middle of the larger Arab world and, at the same time, host some of the Palestinians inside Israel. As such, the speaker reasons that the Israeli aggression against the Palestinians is justified because they are defending themselves. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict connects with the Kalenjin position in the Rift Valley spates of violence in that the post, "Know the troublemaker," maps the Kalenjin encircled by their antagonists. In addition, the Kalenjin and the Israeli compare by the manner in which the dispute is land and is situated in the Kalenjin and the Israeli territories which imply that the mobility that causes conflict in both cases is inward. Thus, I argue that the sense of victimhood here is a sensation of the inward presence of 'others' and the victims' outward absence. Thus, the speaker here views the migrant as a reminder of the imbalanced exchange of 'guests' presence between the Kalenjin and the other ethnic groups and, hence, as a signal of the particularity of the Kalenjin hailing place as the most endangered. As a result, the conditions of majority siege mentality and the desire for the enemy engender the construction of danger about

[12] The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has polarised the world into those who support the Israelis on one hand and those on the side of the Palestinians on the other. Accordingly, conversations on the conflict are likely to offend certain persons. The participant under focus here arguably supports the Israelis against the Palestinians as noted in their justification of Israeli aggression on the Palestinians under the principle of self defence. This bias does not reflect the position of this thesis but is only used as an illustration of the utility of popular emotive bases to persuade others about victimhood. I use the term, popular emotive base, to refer to the widely accepted side taken on emotive issue within a group. In such a case, members of the group resort to justifying their arguments based on anything that resonates with their kind of truth. It should be noted here that the favour of the Israelis against the Palestinians is common among the Christians. In this light, the fact that Christians are the majority in Kenya implies that support for the Israelis against the Palestinians is a popular analogy. Therefore, the participant in the post can be viewed as justifying victimhood via an appeal to what most of the Kenyans would agree to in an emotive sense.

the migrant, which I consider here as relating to the concept of overstepping the guest line such as seeking recognition and exercising influence within. This claim is exemplified in the comment mentioned in the previous subsection which accuses the migrants of "stealing our chickens, goats, then despising us here and there" (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 16). In the example, the Kalenjin legitimate, in the inventive sense, the risk about the entrants to coexistence. Thus, the enmity of the 'guest' must be imagined even if the condition is nonexistent (Koefoed, 2015: 228; Mbembe, 2019: 43).

Other accusations of the 'guest' as an 'enemy' include the comment which states that,

> *All this tribes hav a problm wth one community... Stay away from kalenjins borders.*
> (All tribes have a problem with another community. Stay away from Kalenjin borders.) (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 23)

A further comment raises the concern that,

> *Why Shd Our Fights Bother You? And What Is Ignorance According to You, mchokozi Ni Yule Anayeacha Kwao Na Kuhamia Kwetu, that Is the One We Fight.Even Israelites Stayed in Egypt for Long But Finally Had To Leave.*
> (Why should our fights bother you? And who is an ignorant person according to you? The offender is he who leaves their home and move to ours. That is the one we fight. Even Israelites stayed in Egypt for long but finally, they had to leave.) (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 25)

The two remarks depict a self-exoneration activity that foregrounds the idea of boundary in the aggregate view that the violence is caused by those who cross the boundaries of homelands in search of new homes. This view subverts the idea of the Kalenjin as the troublemaker to the idea of the migrant troublemaker. The second comment, for instance, criticises the concern over what the speaker calls 'our fights,' which refers to the conflicts within the territory. This way, the speaker proclaims that internal issues of a place should not bother the outsiders which I argue is a mode of justifying internal cleansing to afford Mbembe's (2019: 43) notion of an enclosure whose function is to avert the presence of 'others' in the refuge area. In this case, boundary is the most significant notion in conceptualising security. Thus, the Kalenjin is mobilised into a threatened community of place via broken boundaries that only allow inward flows. This resonates with Mbembe's (2019: 42) notion of the role of imagining a "terrifying object" in the construction of the community in which a community mobilises via an imagination of some danger that can only be subdued by the concept of an exclusionary community. Hence, the idea

of shifting homes constitutes the terrifying object of the Kalenjin because it translates into the risk of being surpassed on their homeland and losing the ethnic dominance in the region.

In sum, I argue that the Kalenjin threat about infiltration, in the context of trans-homelands, should be understood from the idea of unequal mobility. This describes the state in which certain ethnic groups are disfavoured in the movement while others gain significantly. Here, the Kalenjin consider themselves as disadvantaged in the movement because they have not migrated to the hailing places of others as much as the others have migrated into their hailing place. The Facebook discussion texts show the prominent sensing of the disadvantage as projecting trouble with the migrant. It conveys that the Kalenjin conceives the migrant as the violent troublemaker in the Rift Valley. This also supposes that there would never be ethnic clashes in the country if ethnic groups remained in their hailing places. The criticism of the trans-homeland movement as a display of vulnerability relates to victimhood because it relives a similar crisis from the past: The African Socialism policy on land through which the Kalenjin lost sections of the Rift Valley to migrants while others such as the Gikuyu benefited from it. As a result, the concept of the migrant as the offender represents the fear of the return of African Socialism, which imaginably combines with infiltration to threaten the Kalenjin claim of 'ownership' of the place. This, in turn, threatens the hailing place communal identity of the Kalenjin.

3.4.2: The 'outsider' labeller as an allegory of threatened homeliness

This subsection examines the irony of the Kalenjin Forum as an exclusive space for the Kalenjin ethnic group and the incident of an 'outsider' labeller, which is the appearance that the speaker in the principal post is not a member of the group, and its likeness to threatened domesticity of the groups hailing place. The Kalenjin Forum is an exclusively Kalenjin site intended for the members of the community to share ideas and entertain themselves which renders the Forum a virtual home for the Kalenjin community. Thus, I suggest that the settings of the Kalenjin Forum as an exclusive space for the Kalenjin ethnic group and the incident of an 'outsider' labeller are the contexts through which the labelling narrative performs disadvantage. First of all, there is a need here to establish the allegorical relationship between the Kalenjin Forum and the Kalenjin territory in the Rift Valley to justify the consideration that a threat to the Forum transposes as a threat to the Rift Valley.

The Kalenjin Forum is one of the leading internet co-presence sites for the Kalenjin people. The aspect that favours the site to the community is the way it offers a sense of home to the community. 'Home' is conceptualised here as "a place of comfort" "where the body is relaxed and unselfconscious" (Edensor, 2002: 57). I suggest here that the homeliness of a community virtual site is best estimated by how it brings about what Oakeshott (1962: 196-98) calls a "conversation event," which refers to an assembly in which,

> Thoughts of different species take wing and play round one another, responding to each other's movements and provoking one another to fresh exertions. […] Every entrant is taken at its face-value and everything is permitted which can get itself accepted into the flow of speculation. And voices which speak in conversation do not compose a hierarchy.

This view conceptualises a free-from-stringency interaction produced by the consciousness that the assembly is levelled and secure. This resonates with the perspective on collective victimhood that a group experiencing victimhood sense the breaking of collective "belonging, trust and self-enhancement" (Bilewicz and Liu, 2020: 122). The three elements allude to the idea of conversation event in the sense in which belonging denotes intra-group cordialness while trust indicates the feeling that no one is exposed to danger by interaction and self-enhancement as benefitting mutually from interacting

The free-from-stringency situation is hinted in the Kalenjin Forums slogan which states:

> *Obwa kekasakas tukul ak ketiigei kou teren*
> (Come you all so that we all listen and listen and support ourselves like pots)
> (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, about)

The need for belonging is alluded to in the slogan by the affiliating voice which pertains to the invitation in the plural sense for a 'listening and listening' activity that suggests a boundless interaction and bearing upon each other. Trust is conveyed by the invitation rendered in the Kalenjin language, which excludes the non-Kalenjin in the forum because a language barrier symbolises what Mbembe (2019: 43) refers to as "security barriers," which stands for the modes by which communities exclude 'others' to derive homely spaces such as walls, checkpoints, enclosures and watchtowers in the modern society. Self-enhancement is conveyed by the idea of supporting each other like pots, which conveys a call for cooperation as a means of improving living of each member of the community. These aspects indicate that a conversation event that

specifies the community and defines inter-community difference by enmity, is conceptually private. The aspects presuppose the country's public spaces, such as workplaces and public gatherings, as insecure for subjective conversations owing to how it is filled with a conversational event differs from the interactions in the public spaces such as work and political arenas because public spaces are full of rigidities of expression arising from the pitfalls of offending others. Thus, the Kalenjin Forum is to the Kalenjin community an escape from those rigidities in that it offers moments for open but secure discussions even on censored subjects such as the other ethnic groups and the government openly.

The significance of the desire to discuss 'others' as an ingredient of homeliness resonates with Mbembe's (2019: 43) concepts of "excess of presence" and "having an enemy at one's disposal." The 'excess of presence' refers to the discomfort arising from being mingled as friends and enemies. 'Having an enemy at one's disposal' refers to knowing in advance the possible moves of the 'enemy.' In this case, the Kalenjin Forum conceptually resolves the trouble of having the enemy within the limits of presence by simulating a conversational sanctuary through which the enmity of 'others' is subdued via an internal exchange of knowledge about them. As a result, the idea of home is analogised by the conversational sanctuaries in the way the sanctuaries reproduce a co-presence site for the members of the community, linking both the local dwellers and those living in the trans-homelands to converse unrestrained. This is evident from the way migrants usually pay holiday-like visits to their places of origin as a way of refreshing themselves. In this light, trans-homelands are conceived by the community members as public spaces stifled with suspicion and the pitfalls of becoming offensive to the 'others.' Consequently, the incident of an 'outsider' labeller in the Kalenjin Forum symbolises a disruption of the sanctuary condition of the Kalenjin hailing place in that it portrays a sneaky intrusion. A 'sneaky intrusion' here stands for an infiltration that is unnoticed at the beginning but alarms the host community when it reaches a level at which the entrants surpass the host community. In this way, sneaky intrusion conveys an advancement of the 'enemy' from the surrounding to the centre, which threatens the conception of the Forum as a Kalenjin resource for subduing the 'enemy.'

Enmity in the post is not depicted as a state of affairs but as a fantastic concept. This refers to how it does not necessarily exist but is constructed as an existential good. The discussion text depicts creativity and competing production of pieces of knowledge about each

other as ‘enemies’ between the Kalenjin and the other ethnic groups. The fantastic aspect of the exchange is exemplified by a mobbing action cued to defame each other through innovation. This refers to how slandering the other does not have to be based on verifiable ideas but should typically be compelling to a listener who does not know the historical facts about the issues mentioned in the defamation.

An instance of the action is from the statement in the principal post, “you dont need rocket science to know the troublemaker” (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, line 11-12). The statement is deployed by the labeller to supplement the analogy that when a particular child in the family is notorious for fighting with others, he or she is the absolute troublemaker, which alludes that the Kalenjin are the indisputable offenders in the country’s ethnic violence. Here, the metaphor, ‘rocket science,’ which signifies complicatedness, triggers a view that the ethnic violence question in Kenya is too easy to grasp owing to how the speaker locates the question within the non-rocket-science domain. This projects a narrow perspective of Kenya’s ethnic violence and, hence, a narrowed production of the troublemaker narrative about the Kalenjin. This is because the analogy can yield various possibilities such as how the child could also be facing constant provocation from the siblings or has a unique psychosocial condition that drives them to fight, and even the possibility that the information about the child is inaccurate. Thus, the “Know the troublemaker” narrative is inventive given that it succeeds chiefly through framed characterisation of the Kalenjin. The inventiveness is acknowledged, for instance, in the following comments:

> […] You are equally lying, find out border issues between Meru’s and their neighbours, don't choose to ignore (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 15)

> *Maasai-kisii(nyangusu)?? Masai-Gikuyu(naivasha)??*
> What about the Maasai-Abagusii violence spot in Nyangusu? What about the Maasai-Gikuyu violence spot in Naivasha (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 7b)

The responses above reveal cues of strategic exaggeration in engaging with the troublemaker label. The commenters detect how the labelling ignores other notable violence spots in the rest of the country such as among the Meru, Maasai, Gikuyu and Abagusii ethnic groups, and their neighbours. I argue that this exchange of framed ‘truths’ is symbolic of inventing the enmity of each other as evidenced by how the desire to profile the ‘other’ innovates on lies and ignorance.

As a result, the discussion reveals prompts to innovating on lies and ignorance as an ideal technique of imagining the enmity of the 'other,' which is depicted by defensive framing of 'truths' by the Kalenjin participants. This refers to countering the troublemaker narrative via imitating its inventive quality. One comment, for example, states to the principal troublemaker narrator to:

> *Read history, nandis are warlike, hatupendi upuzi, upuzi ya kutuibia kuku, Mara mbuzi, Mara madharau kidogo kidogo, we're very poor in arguing, we fight first*
> (Read history. The Nandi[13] are warlike. We do not like senselessness — senselessness of stealing our chickens, goats, then despising us here and there. We are very poor in arguing; we fight first.)
> (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 16)

The comment above frames the difficulty of co-existence between the Kalenjin and the neighbouring ethnic groups via overstating the repulsion between the parties. The overstatement is conveyed by the juxtaposing characterisation in which the neighbouring groups are presented as petty thieves and disdainful, and the Kalenjin as poor arguers and quick to fight. The inventiveness of the characterisation is that the traits, petty stealing, disdainfulness, inability to argue and quick temper are not unusual or unique to any community to make a group dangerous to coexistence with. Further to this, character framing is noted in the way it claims to draw the understanding from history books. This reflects the 'rocket science' labelling technique because it employs fabrication to generate knowledge that incompatibility of the Kalenjin with the neighbouring communities is intellectually documented and an already concluded case. Thus, the mocking techniques in both the troublemaker accusation and the counter-accusation replies above indicate that the successful contender is the most inventive in framing the dreadfulness of the other. The inter-action suggests determining the other as the 'enemy' is a necessary condition of inter-community relation which must be imagined if it does not emerge promptly.

The noted fantasy with enmity as a mode of inter-community living voices interlinks with Mbembe's (2019) notion of "desire for an enemy" and the mobbing drama. The notion, "desire for an enemy," is defined as stopping to rely on others and turning back to the 'self' for protection from imagined "external danger" (Mbembe, 2019: 43). This can be viewed as the discovery of the inability of the mingling of communities (in a mega-community) to secure the

[13] The Nandi is a sub group of the Kalenjin and, hence, the term is representative of the entire group in the sense (noted in the previous chapter) that self-identity is double in the group, interchanging both the sub group category and the umbrella term, Kalenjin.

interests of specific communities, and the need to strengthen 'our' community to provide the security needs which were initially obtained from coexisting with others. As such, a community walling itself from others, conceptualised by Edensor (2002: 58) and Mbembe (2019: 43) as limiting forms of otherness, is not necessarily about the dangerous condition of the 'others,' but as a mode of consolidating the community to serve itself in security matters. This fantasy with the enmity 'other' links with how the mobbing action entails the participants generating ideas of enmity with the opponent and the way the 'winner' is felt by excellence in framing the other (Mose, 2018: 418).

To this end, I establish how the competition links with victimhood in terms of presenting a disadvantage to the Kalenjin group as per the analytic framework of the chapter. In this way, I explore the indications related to the sneaky intrusion that the Kalenjin position in contesting the enmity of the 'others' is unfavourable. The approach, sneaky intrusion, is valued here in the sense in which it symbolises exposure — which I define as the trouble of having an omnipresent 'enemy' — considered here as undermining collective security through what (Mbembe, 2019: 43) notes as mastering the moves of the 'enemy.'

I suggest that exposure in a duelling discussion like "Know the troublemaker" relates to the depictions of humiliation. Here, humiliation stands for both shame, the wish that the information should not have been known by others, and anger, the feeling of hate for those who hold the adverse information. Humiliation in the discussion is depicted in several responses to the troublemaker narrative, three of which are examined here. The first one is an exchange between two Kalenjin and two non-Kalenjin participants:

Commenter 11a:	*So what mende ii* (So what? You, cockroach!)
Commenter 5b:	Look at your comments You guys have a problem what's the inferiority all about? Style up
Commenter 11b:	Style up first! Nonsense
Commenter 5c:	Surely, why why?

(Kalenjin Forum, 2017)

In the dialogue, the commenters, 11a and 11b, are arguably Kalenjin owing to how they are defensive over the troublemaker labelling. Commenters, 5b and 5c, speak from the non-Kalenjin perspective in that they drive commenters, 11a and 11b, to respond to the troublemaker question. The Kalenjin comments indicate an ad hominem tone in responding to the troublemaker question

which refers to evading an argument by attacking the proponent of the argument. I argue that ad hominem expresses humiliation because it aims at suppressing a remark by steering the proponent of the argument to an abusing contest rather than dealing with the argument. The above expressions of evading the Kalenjin role in the country's violence reveal that the Kalenjin acknowledge playing the leading role in the violence but are humiliated by the realisation that they are deeply known by 'others.' The realisation indicates an imbalance in accessing information about the other to innovate into defamation between the Kalenjin and the 'others.' The Kalenjin are known beyond what is honourable and, therefore, they stand to be defeated in contesting enmity of the 'others,' which means that the Kalenjin are disadvantaged in expressing a peaceable image about themselves to the rest of Kenya.

A further examination of the Kalenjin of humiliation in the contest indicates a link with the labeller's inclusion of the "Baringo-West Pokot border" in the list of the spots that identify the Kalenjin conflicts with the neighbours (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, post, line 3). The inclusion presupposes that the Pokot, a subgroup of the Kalenjin, is a non-Kalenjin group. The Pokot are well known for and associated with the practice of raiding neighbouring ethnic groups including the other Kalenjin subgroups for cattle. Raiding has been a key pre-colonial cultural practice among the Kalenjin as well as the other pastoralist ethnic groups in Kenya. However, the Pokot who occupy one of the remotest and underdeveloped parts of Kenya, have not entirely abandoned the practice. It is also worth noting that raiding is customarily inter-ethnic only. Thus, to claim that an ethnic group raids another is to claim that the ethnic groups in question are separate from the other.

Nonetheless, it should also be noted that the Kalenjin subgroups have raided each other before the formation of the Kalenjin ethnicity in the 1940s (Kipkorir, 1973: 2). Soon after, all forms of internal aggressions in the Kalenjin solidarity were rendered as taboo as a measure of actualising the pan-ethnicity. There have also been cases in which the Pokot raiding the neighbouring Tugen and Marakwet Kalenjin subgroups which portrays a contravention of the pan-ethnic ethos. This constitutes a major setback to the in-group spirit which is shaming from the external view because it depicts the group as unstable and insecure. Thus, the insinuation of the Pokot separateness in the duelling humiliates the Kalenjin from how it degrades the Kalenjin as an insignificant grouping due to the ease to crumble. The insinuation intrudes into the in-

group efforts to tame the Pokot. The sense of intrusion is evident in the discussions most repeated remark which refutes the Pokot separateness as shown in the following:

> Commenter 6: "*POKOT are Kalenjins...The Kalenjin terrorists mkicheza tunawatuma haki mtaama*"
> (POKOT are Kalenjins. The Kalenjin terrorists, which, if you joke, we will send to you and I swear you will move)
>
> Commenter 14: "*FOOLISH.....pokot verses kalenjin.....Ndo gani hio*"
> (FOOLISH! Pokot versus Kalenjin? That refers to which one?)
>
> Commenter 18: "*Total fool ,,,,,aty pokot vs Kalenjin*"
> (Total fool. Did you just say Pokot versus Kalenjin?)
>
> Commenter 20: "Hi point of correction pokots are also Kalenjins"
> (Hey, a point of correction. The Pokot are also Kalenjin)

The prominent feature in the responses above is covering up the Pokot problem. Comments 14 and 18, for instance, dismiss the separateness as an issue that has never been heard in the group while comment 20 derails the discussion by repairing the Pokot as Kalenjin. Comment 6 goes further to celebrate the Pokot as a Kalenjin resource for protecting the entire group against encroachers into their space. I suggest that these sarcastic moves are based on humiliation from the fact that they are deployed to 'tame' the Pokot within the group while creating an impression to the external world that the Kalenjin solidarity is intact. The sarcasm arises from how acknowledging the Pokot separateness potentially engenders a sense of Pokot otherness in the Forum which threatens the unity of the entire Kalenjin group the image of the group in the eyes of the 'enemies.' Consequently, I argue that the Kalenjin is humiliated here through the discovery that the 'enemies' already know about the Pokot separateness as the group's weak point and are utilising the hint to defame the Kalenjin. In this case, the Kalenjin vulnerability is shown in the susceptibility to fragmentation and how the group can be easily dominated owing to the vagueness of their ethos.

Finally, it is established here that the Kalenjin humiliation in the discussion relates to the exposure of the negative character of the Kalenjin persona. This is depicted in the comment which states that,

> *Wakalejiga waliuza mashamba on realising that other communities are sub passing them in population they start fighting back, who told them to sell their land si ni pombe, wawache ujinga na kutafuta namna ya kununua mashamba. War will not assist us my friends*
>
> (Foolish Kalenjin sold lands. However, on realising that other communities are surpassing them in population, they start to fight back. Who told them to sell their land? Isn't it alcohol? Let them stop foolishness and look for ways of buying lands. War will not assist us, my friends). (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 32)

The comment displays a character about the Kalenjin as indecisive and wavering between willingness and unwillingness to co-exist with others. This relates to the view that the Kalenjin sell land willingly and then get alarmed by the rising numbers of entrants. Here, the weakness that the commenter exposes about the Kalenjin is that they are indifferent to the value of their land as they sell the land merely for alcohol. The indecisive character is indirectly affirmed by a Kalenjin respondent to the comment above, which states that,

> *kalenjin are generus, all tribe wako on eye warching a space in our border, this goes conflicx*
> (Kalenjins are generous. All your tribes are eye-alert watching our space across the border. This is the cause of conflict). (Kalenjin Forum, 2017, comment 30)

The speaker attempts to refute the Kalenjin tendency to give away treasured possessions by displacing indifference with generosity. The speaker above projects a feeling that the present troubles were caused by the previous acts of kindness. The speaker acknowledges that generosity is the reason why Kenyans search for trans-homelands in the Kalenjin space more than anywhere else. This thought indicates kindness as the context in which the Kalenjin have been known adversely by their opponents in the region and, as a result, the opponents have been exploiting the weaknesses to their disadvantage. The risk is that the 'others' can decide to overwhelm the community through a vigorous activity of buying of land by taking advantage of the knowledge about their generosity and being indecisive. Ultimately, the humiliation which the negative character labelling inflicts on the Kalenjin ushers the group to victimhood of openness and generosity.

The examples above locate the Kalenjin disadvantage in the humiliation duel within being known adversely by others in own space. The understanding of the interchange above as a threatening context of exposure is clearer from Mbembe's (2019: 48-49) concept of "nanoracism," defined as the "desire to stigmatize and, in particular, to inflict violence, to injure

and humiliate, to sully those not considered to be one of us" (Mbembe, 2019: 58). The concept is crucial here because it represents the mode of desiring the enemy in modern society. It shows that a desirable enemy is the one who is has been defeated and, hence, the gratifying nature of 'nanoracism.' The interchanges portray competition to subdue via intimidation. I argue that threat here entails a group's inability to cope with the forcefulness of the 'other' in the 'nanoracism' challenge. The coping inequality is hinted in the appearance that the Kalenjin are overcome in the challenge from the way the Kalenjin participants deploy abuses against the 'outsiders' questions. This shows humiliation as a result of unfavourable exposure. In this case, humiliation is a feeling that the 'outsiders' already bear deeper and adverse pieces of knowledge about the 'insiders.' Some of the sensations of exposure humiliation are illustrated below to demonstrate the role of intrusion in threatening the Kalenjin strength in the enmity contest.

In sum, the 'outsider' labeller in the Kalenjin Forum and the aspersions on the Kalenjin community fashions victimhood mentality via what can be called defilement of the enclave. The Kalenjin Forum as a Kalenjin 'enclave' refers to the way the site is intended for the conversation events of the members of the community and, therefore, to assure the Kalenjin the sense of homeliness. Defilement, accordingly, is represented by the intrusive arraignment of the community in their space. This produces an image of a threat to the community in the context of competing pieces of knowledge between ethnic groups on constructing the other as the 'enemy.' The discussion text, for instance, shows that the Kalenjin community is overcome in the duelling about the idea of the troublemaker through the gains to the community's internal flaws by the non-Kalenjins. This signifies a disadvantaging situation among the Kalenjin that relates to how the enclave no longer offers the sense of homeliness. Victimhood mentality as a nationalist frame corresponds with what Mbembe (2019: 30) refers to as "narcissistic bonds," which is the preference to only those who are worthy of us. Mbembe (2019: 43) notes that the walls, fences and enclosures that characterise the modern way of living with one another are not necessarily made because those within the enclosures are bad but because they feel that the outsiders do not appreciate them. Thus, the outsider labeller in the discussion text above represents an infringement of the limits by which those who like us should reach, which stirs collective consciousness via the idea of the need to secure the 'home' from intrusion.

3.5: Conclusion

I conclude that the Kalenjin Crisis social drama is a performance of shades of victimhood differentiated by junctures of experienced estrangement associated with the '*Nyayo*' stigma. That is Kenyans consider the Kalenjin as having benefited as the ethnic group of the president during the Moi regime. As a result, the Kalenjin Crisis entails the victimhood projections from the community when the Moi-presidency was destabilised in 1991 via the introduction of the multi-party politics that led to the toppling of Moi. The crisis in the destabilisation equates to the crisis in the actual defeat of KANU in 2002 because both situations constituted senses of stigma and disadvantage, which led to imaginings of the Kalenjin as a vulnerable community. The imaginings that are evident in "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki" project concerns over the fear of seizure of the Rift Valley by other ethnic groups and the state as vengeance on the community over the '*Nyayo*' privilege. However, the commencement of the NARC regime signalled a 'no-intention' position over the seizure. As a result, the victimhood imagining on vulnerability transfigures into a threatened community of place in "Know the troublemaker." Here, the threat which replaces seizure is infiltration through the migration of the non-Kalenjins into the Rift Valley via the sale of land by the Kalenjins. Infiltration relates to threat in the sense that it depicts a stealthy but gradual displacement of the Kalenjin from their place. Thus, the media story, "Know the troublemaker," indicates how the Kalenjin viewed themselves as threatened with loss of the homeland which morphs into an activity of fighting against infiltration. Accordingly, I argue that the victimhood contexts of a vulnerable community and a threatened community of place trans-mediate Kalenjin nationhood. It also mobilises a siege mentality in which the Kalenjin viewed themselves as surrounded by the dangerous others and so had to prepare against imagined retaliation.

CHAPTER 4: THE KALENJIN REDRESS AND HONOUR NATIONALISM

4.1: Introduction

The chapter focuses on the events in the projects inspired by the Kass FM radio, the Kass Marathon and Emo Society, in its examination of the Redress stage of the post-Moi Kalenjin nationhood. It also determines how this stage links with the emergence of what I consider as honour nationalism. To achieve these, the introduction section defines the concepts, 'Redress,' honour, and honour nationalism. This is followed by a description of the Kass FM radio and how it inspires the establishments of community projects that relate to the Kalenjin Redress, honour, and honour nationalism. The remaining part of the chapter examines the Kalenjin Redress as musing on the idea of honour and how the musing trans-mediates Kalenjin nationhood from victimhood, noted in the previous chapter, to honour.

Redress in social drama describes the rise of mechanisms in a collective, such as dispute resolution, personal advice, legal mediation or a public ritual to limit the threatening effects of a crisis (Turner, 1980: 152). The stage is a culmination of the Crisis experience that the previous chapter presented as a setting of the collective whose life has been disrupted into conflict with the others around them and, eventually, alienation of the collective. Thus, Redress stems from a contemplation on the possibility that the 'others' in the alienation are not necessarily at fault. Instead, the stage witnesses a perception that the 'self' could be blameworthy for the rise of the Crisis and the eventual estrangement. Thus, Redress represents the beginning of the second part of the human plot characteristic of social drama. The human plot is the expectation that a disturbed group typically starts with anguishing and ends with finding ways or returning to normalcy (Turner, 1980: 140; Schechner, 1988: 166). Accordingly, finding ways to return to normalcy involves members of a collective engaging in an open-minded conversation, implied in activities like dispute resolution, personal advice, legal mediation or a public ritual, to resolve the rise of the disturbance. The activities indicate sensing of impropriety in the collective that needs to be rectified via telling each other the truth even if it hurts. Hence, I consider here that Redress entails an open reexamination of life in a collective to limit the impact of the Crisis and forestall its occurrence in the future.

The previous chapter indicates that the Kalenjin Crisis stands, with regards to the ending of the Moi-presidency, as a disruption of ethos that entailed privilege above the other ethnic

groups in the country. The Kalenjin, as discussed in the previous chapter, senses resentment from 'the rest of Kenya,' which comprises the Kibaki regime[1] and the other ethnic groups in the country, through perceptions of vulnerability and threat to the homeland. Furthermore, the Kalenjin projection of vulnerability and threat to their homeland is marked by estrangement whereby they separate themselves from the rest of Kenya and in that way disadvantage them in charting their course of life. The chapter, for instance, shows how the group senses exclusion in the processes of forging political alliances with other ethnic groups that lead to the rise to power, which implies that the group risks being relegated perennially to the opposition. These highlights indicate that thereafter Crisis, the Kalenjin community is faced with the need to evaluate themselves retrospectively on the circumstances by which they were disadvantaged and finally earned a negative recognition. Therefore, in this chapter, I examine the depictions of self-evaluative mechanisms used by the Kalenjin to resolve this disadvantage stemming from the anguishing over the ending of the Moi-presidency, and how the actions morph into honour nationalism.

Honour, in the chapter, refers to the mode of "living well" in order to "flourish" as a member of an identity group (Appiah's (2010: I; 32). This perspective recognises the relationship between group membership and flourishing as good living. Good living here refers to the popular principles and activities of fulfilling life. What is crucial in the definition is how good living is an individual task but also a reflection of one's social environment. This means that flourishing is a sum of individual choices and the perception of 'others' around them. This duality is signified by the idea of membership. On the one hand, the image 'member' as a mode of relationship in an identity group suggests individuality in the sense that it figures personal entity, which is a person who, despite composing a group, can make their choices on fulfilling life. On the other, 'member' also denotes the sense of being caught up among others and, hence, the inability to act alone; or an obligation to observe and be observed by others in fulfilling life.

The chapter also draws on the perspective that honour is a process of designating social value upon an individual (or sub-group) by a group (Oprisko, 2012: 5). Here, honour is specified as a process rather than an end. It concerns the action of deciding who, and in what

[1] This refers to the political grouping and leadership led by President Mwai Kibaki that took over power from Moi and his Kenya African National Union (KANU) party in 2002-2013. The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was Kibakis party in the first term in 2002-2007. Kibaki ditched NARC in 2007 and ran for his second term using the Party of National Unity (PNU).

circumstances, someone is awarded social value. The end of honour, according to Oprisko, (2012: 6), is about either "prestige," which is the excellence in being 'good,' or 'shame' which is the excellence in being 'bad.' The concepts, prestige and shame, indicate exceptionality and a socially bound environment as the major contexts in which honour takes place. Firstly, there should be an individual engaging in an activity through which a trait is produced. Secondly, there should be 'others' and a sense of group. The group stands for the space or society within which an individual derives prestige or shame. One, for example, does not ordinarily earn prestige or shame where they are less known. The concept of 'others' refers to those who are familiar with each other and, hence, have the interest and capacity to judge the individual.

The chapter is premised on the linkage between honour and Redress in the definitions above which embraces an interlink between 'individual' and 'group' mentalities. The 'individual' mentality represents a subjective and independent way of thinking about life; the thinking in which the self is considered as the most important in devising strategies about life. In contrast, the 'group' mentality stands for the thinking in which the community supersedes the self. It is expected that a subject of 'group' mentality adheres strictly to the community's customary principles while the subject of 'individual' mentality is not bound by them and easily breaks customs. Thus, honour links with Redress as a process of interlinking the 'individual' and 'group' mentalities. This is because Redress is a process of mobilising individuals in the community into a new and unified way of approaching life. In the same way, the definitions above characterise honour as a function of overlapping the 'individual' and the 'group' consciousness. To this end, there is a special usage of the concepts, 'individual' and 'group' in the chapter that depicts this interlink in considering the Kalenjin honour.

In the chapter, an 'individual' bears two meanings. The first one is about the Kalenjin person — the member who constitutes the Kalenjin community. Commonly, the Kalenjin person bears a Kalenjin name, speaks the Kalenjin language, knows themselves, and is also known, as a Kalenjin. This individual, despite belonging to the group, can think and fulfil life without being constrained by the above senses of 'Kalenjinness.' Thus, 'Kalenjinness' is not an all-binding identity compared to citizenship which constrains fulfilling life such as how declining 'Kenyanness' curtails access to fundamental services such as education and jobs in Kenya. Rather, a Kalenjin person can choose to conform or not to conform to the group's norms and still fulfil their lives. In this light, a Kalenjin person can either be a social individual of the group's

customs or self-reliant. The social individual puts the communal principles above theirs. They always consider communal opinion in what they do. In contrast, the self-reliant individual prefers their principles over the group. To the self-reliant, group identity is superficial so that the concepts of success or failure in life are associated chiefly with the personal principles taken.

The second meaning of 'individual' in the chapter refers to the Kalenjin community as a member of the Kenya society which hosts forty-four[2] ethnic communities. Here, I figure that a community constitutes a 'self' like a person in deriving senses of good living. Like the person, an ethnic group is caught up with others in a social environment such as a country but, still, they exercise their individuality in various ways. For example, ethnic groups in Kenya can be categorised along with traditional ways of life either as progressive or conservative. The progressive groups are those that have abandoned their cultural traditions for modern ways of life and, hence, viewed here as equivalent to the 'social individual.' The view here is that the 'world,' which refers to an expanded sphere of being peers with 'others' such as a country, continent or the entire globe, is the focal point in deriving senses of good living. The conservative groups, in contrast, resist foreign concepts. Hence, they are viewed here as equivalences of the 'self-reliant' types of individuals. They are known for retaining most of their cultural traditions despite the force of modernity. Accordingly, the conservative group's category prefers indigenous concepts of honour.

The two senses of the Kalenjin individuality indicate that imagining Kalenjin honour is faced with two challenges. Firstly, there is a challenge, related to the Kalenjin person, of transfiguring the social individual to abandon the customary way of life if the customs are connected to shame, or unifying the self-reliant individuals if shame relates to disunity. Secondly, there is a challenge, related to the Kalenjin community, on whether the community should relinquish the attributes, which bind them and distinguish them from 'others' or not if the attributes are shaming. I consider that the challenges link with Appiah's (2010) notion of "honour code" and Oprisko's (2012) "honour system." The terms interchangeably refer to the set of principles on deriving value in a shared social environment. They are mainly about the concepts of good living, prestige and shame. According to Appiah (2010: i), not every desirable

[2] The number of ethnic groups in Kenyan rose to 44 with the admission of the Asians, who mainly originated from India and Pakistan, as one of the countrys distinct ethnic group.

value is always good to both an individual and the others. It can be fulfilling to an individual but deplorable to others. This suggests that honour systems are of individual and group kinds.

Oprisko (2012: 113, 120) distinguishes the personal honour systems as "dignity" and the group as "honourableness." Dignity is about conceiving value as a process of self-judgment. Dignity and honourableness do not need judgment from others. Here, dignity applies to the self-reliant Kalenjin person, or Kalenjin community when it resists change. This is because the self-reliant Kalenjin person who values own principles is likely to defend them even if they appear ineffective. In the same way, the Kalenjin community resisting change defends their individuality for its sake. This way, individuality supersedes being dignified. Dignity does not need one to be good among others. Even deplorable things are defended in the realm of dignity as long as the 'individual' cherishes them. However, dignity also applies to the social Kalenjin individual in the context in which the Kalenjin community renews identity through imitating 'others.' This member will view that the renewal is an affront to the community's dignity through the loss of losing originality. In contrast, honourableness is the conception that value is derived from an external judgment which suggests an acceptance to be subjected to the opinion of 'others' is more important than cherishing things. This applies to the social Kalenjin individual at the community level given that they ratify ideas from the popular concepts in the community. It is also applicable to the Kalenjin community in the context of emulating the other communities in the country who are considered exemplars of good living and prestige. Honourableness, therefore, concerns sacrificing their ideals and accepting to be judged by others.

As a result, the chapter considers the Kalenjin Redress as an engagement with three competing but crossable honour systems — the 'Kalenjin-person,' the 'Kalenjin-community' and the Kenyan. The 'Kalenjin-person' honour system refers to the set of 'rules' of life at the personal level in the Kalenjin community. The individual is conscious about the community 'rules' of life but is also aware of the freedoms that can be turned into opportunities for fulfilment. They can be a social individual, a liberal or both. The 'Kalenjin-community' honour system describes the 'rules' of life which are universal to the Kalenjin and distinguish the community from others. They mainly concern cultural traditions and worldviews which are unique to the group. The Kenyan honour system refers to the 'rules' of life which are shared across the country as the ideal forms. The 'rules' are national in nature although it is possible to associate some of them with the ways of life of certain ethnic communities. Largely, the 'rules'

are derived from the spheres of modernity such as academia, public intellectualism, Christianity and contacts with parts of the world considered as exemplars of modern civilisation.

Of interest here is how devising the 'Kalenjin-community' honour system involves manipulating the personal honour systems in the community into a 'uniform' Kalenjin honour system — using the exemplars of the Kenyan honour system. Apparently, at play is a logic that "we may both gain and lose honour through the successes and failures of those with whom we share an identity" (Appiah, 2010: 32). This is a perception that the positive or negative judgment of an individual member of the community by 'others' leads to the judgment of the entire community. As a result, inappropriate public behaviour of a singular Kalenjin is likely to be viewed by 'others' as a Kalenjin shame rather than being the individual. Put differently, the other Kalenjin members shall feel embarrassed by the person. The same is also true about commendable behaviour. The community earns praise from the individual's deed if it is morally admirable. Oprisko (2012: 49) pictures the interlink between the individual and their group as "corporatising individuals," which refers to requiring an individual to display the character of the corporate body that 'he or she' represents rather than the personal. A company's agent, for example, is expected to depict the company in the public favourably. Thus, the positive or negative image that the company earns depends on this individual. Thus, the Kalenjin Redress is examined here as a process of creating a 'corporate' Kalenjin honour system and initiating the Kalenjin persons to it.

The action of corporatising the Kalenjin honour system poses several complications which the chapter seeks to address. Significant here is how the action involves confronting certain age-old[3] cultural traditions and worldviews. Indeed, the derivation of the repackaging concepts from 'others' in the Kenyan society implies that the Kalenjin even imitate those ethnic groups that could be their enemies. Thus, the process of creating an externally regulated honour system entails destroying the independence and, hence, the dignity of the community. This sounds like an undesirable move. Nonetheless, the Kass FM activity, which I introduce in the next section, depicts the move as the most prudent idea at the Kalenjin Redress. Accordingly, the

[3] I am aware I have mentioned earlier that the Kalenjin individual groups are also separate cultures. Even so, there are several common cultural traditions and 'established' ones which are regularised to look like age-old traditions. A case in point is the Koitalel narrative of a Kalenjin umbrella jurisdiction which 'establishes' that the Kalenjin had never been separate at any given time in history. The term, age-old, is preferred here because it clarifies the magnitude with which the community holds onto the established traditions as dating far back in history.

chapter examines the meaning of this irony that concerns the Kalenjin displacement of dignity with honourableness.

In the chapter, honour nationalism refers to a condition in which nationhood is defined by honour. The connection between nationalism and honour relates to how group honour homogenises individuals. This resonates with the dual nature of a nation as a 'fraternity' of submitting to a horizontal sameness (Anderson, 1991: 4). Here, I equate the idea of horizontal sameness with the noted action of creating a uniform Kalenjin honour system. Homogenising individuals also resonates with the concept of a nation as a product of observing other nations (Billig, 1995: 61). Here, a nation develops values for their people from observing values in other nations. In the chapter, I equate this to the notion of ethnic communities caught up together in a 'country' social environment. As a result, the ethnic groups constitute peers. The idea of peers suggests competition and reflexivity. Competition refers to the contestation of resources and power while reflexivity concerns the observance of the others in the process of competition, to learn lessons aimed at rising above the others. Accordingly, honour nationalism is examined here as the action of devising an ideal Kalenjin honour system to compete favourably in the Kenyan arena.

4.2: Kass FM radio, Redress and the texture of the Kalenjin honour nationalism

Kass FM is the prominent radio and the first to broadcast in the Kalenjin language[4] after the relaxation of the laws on airwaves by the Kibaki regime upon taking power in 2002. As a result, there is a remarkable connection between the radio and the post-Moi transformation of the Kalenjin nation. Simatei (2008: 3) indicates that Kass FM encountered the challenge concerning the Kalenjin as a fragmented ethnic group in a broadcasting terrain that requires a homogenous audience for a viable radio business. This necessitated an urgent need to homogenise the Kalenjin. According to Simatei (2009: 2-3), the prominent activity in the homogenising endeavour entailed "reworking and repackaging cultural symbols, historical pasts and folkloric themes" via radio programmes. This suggests that the Kalenjin community needed to be re-imagined entirely to afford a new sense of 'Kalenjinness' in which the constituent cultural, historical and folkloric identities are replaced by a new uniform Kalenjin identity.

[4] The term, 'Kalenjin language' refers to a combination of the mutual language intelligibilities from the groups that constitute the Kalenjin.

In my view, the Kass FM succeeds in the re-imagination initiative through what I refer to as the Kass FM 'offspring.' The Kass Media Group (the company that owns the radio) established various arms such as the Kass *Nite*, the Kass Marathon, and the football league named Chairman's Cup. There are other initiatives, outside the arms of the Kass Media Group, which were inspired by the homogenisation concern of the radio. They include popular music and community-based projects such as the *Emo* society and the Kalenjin dictionary project — the *Samburtaab Ng'aleekaab Kaleenchin: Kalenjin Dictionary* by Kibnyaanko Seroney, which were charged with finding more essential pieces of ethos for the Kalenjin community. The significant characteristic of the Kass FM offspring is that they produce and publicise new concepts on living that are based on a unified Kalenjin community. Thus, the chapter singles out the Kass FM sphere as a representative of the Kalenjin imagination of honour because it undertakes a cultural repackaging of the community. Here, cultural repackaging connects with honour given that honour is a "cultural mindset" (Novin and Oyserman, 2016: 1). A cultural mindset describes how an individual's way of life reflects the cultural values of the group they belong. Accordingly, to depict a recognisable cultural identity is to assent to the honour system of the cultural identity group. Therefore, it is expected here that the Kalenjin peoples fashioning of cultural identity is a way of re-imagining their honour.

Arguably, the Kass FM slogan, '*Kimnatet naet*,' which translates to, 'Knowledge is power,' carries the sum of the radios fashioning concept of the Kalenjin cultural identity. The slogan, which is intended to market the radio station across the Kalenjin nation, also announces to the radios value, which it is granting to the Kalenjin nation. The radio station stands out as a powerful medium for collecting and disseminating this knowledge. In addition, Kass FM promises the Kalenjin access to information and, hence, empowerment of the community. Thus, the slogan unveils the Kass FM Redress concept via the idea of discovery of value. A discovery of value suggests a troubling past and present which the value is going to address. This signifies that there has been something wrong with the Kalenjin nation concerning knowledge matters and this led to the founding of the Kass FM in 2003. The wrong things are represented in this thesis by the notion, Breach, which denotes the over-reliance on the Moi-presidency for unity and protection, and Crisis which describes the agonising arising from the ending of the Moi-presidency. Hence, I observe here that '*Kimnatet naet*'is a presupposition of the Kalenjin guilt of ignorance in handling the Moi-presidency. It suggests, for instance, that, the allegiance to the

Moi ethos, discussed in Chapter 2, and victimhood, in Chapter 3, indicate that the Kalenjin people acted inappropriately. By extension, it conceives of fulfilling life as a community in Kenya without 'owning' the presidency. Hence, the concept, '*Kimnatet naet*,' is used in the chapter as an outline of the imagination of new Kalenjin honour from how it involves purging the 'self' of wrong things.

Several texts related to the Kass FM 'offspring' carry the '*Kimnatet naet*' trope. The most significant text that depicts the relationship between honour and nationhood is the video text of the stations popular song, "*Biikab Kalenjin*" (The people of Kalenjin) (Rotich, 2005), hereafter referred to as "The people of Kalenjin." There are also video texts of two untitled popular sermons from the Emo society whose key wordings are "*kiboochin ano bororietab Kalenjin*" (Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?) (Kosgey, 2007) and "*Kosu*" (Awake) (Kosgey, 2006) and, hence, I refer to them in the chapter as "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" and "Awake" respectively. These texts reflect the moralising characteristic which is reflected by the 'preacherly' voice of the textual personas. The characteristic is similar to the epistle poems in the sense that it stipulates the 'reader' of the 'letter' in the text and establishes a relationship between the writer and the reader (Dowling, 1991: 3). This depicts a communication in which the speaker understands the uniqueness of their audience, and attaches themselves to their welfare. The importance of understanding and attachment is regarded here as the constitution of an open-minded engagement of flaws which is the key action on Redress. An open-minded engagement conceptualises interactive admonition of the 'self' and the co-operation in the group to be reprimanded, which, in this case, is facilitated by the setting of understanding and attachment. The lack of this condition is depicted in the 'outsider' in Chapter 3, who accuses the Kalenjin of causing violence in the country, which, as a result, turns the interaction into mobbing. The example shows that flaws in a violent interaction are not spelt out because the audience is transported into a resistance against the accusations. In contrast, a 'preacherly' setting composes tolerance among the audience and, hence, allows the admonisher to unwrap the flaws exhaustively.

"The people of Kalenjin" is a prominent song that extolls the moral of improving the welfare of the Kalenjin community through reflexive counselling. This characteristic resulted in the adoption of the song as the signature tune to the Kass FM radio morning programme "*Kass, len nee emet*?" (Kass, what does the country say?). The "Kass, *len nee emet*?" is aired in the

morning every day and, thus, the most significant programme on the radio. This is because morning time radio programmes, which feature topical call-in talk shows from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m., are the most listened to on Kenya's radios (Kinyuru, 2018: 19). The high listenership arises from the reality that most of the people would be engaging in activities, such as taking breakfast or sitting in a vehicle on way to work, which enables listening. The morning programmes are used to promote the core values that bind the radio and the listener community; hence, one way of encountering the core values of a radio station in Kenya is by listening to the dominant programme in the morning. Thus, the function of the "The people of Kalenjin" music as the tune signature of Kass FM/s "*Kass, len nee emet*?" programme distinguishes the music as the kernel of the radios Kalenjin re-formation concept. By extension, the song arguably sums the "*Kimnatet naet*" moral given that "Kass, *len nee emet*?" programme represents the most significant moment in which the radio interacts with the Kalenjin community.

The sermons, "Awake" and "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank? "constitute part of the body of the sermons delivered by Rev Jackson Kosgey in Nairobi and the Rift Valley from 2006 to the early 2010s in an attempt to mobilise the community to advance themselves economically, spiritually and culturally as per the values of Emo Society. Rev Jackson Kosgey, a Kalenjin and a popular Christian preacher and public intellectual in Kenya, is one of the key founders of the Emo Society. The Emo Community Development Society, which is commonly called the Emo Society or simply Emo, is a community-based socio-economic association and Christian fellowship founded in 2001 that seeks to unite the Kalenjin[5] people drawing on a yearning 'to be together,' as symbolised by the name '*emo*' which, in Kalenjin language,[6] means 'nostalgia' or 'longing for.' The prominence of this organisation is reflected in the way the suspected perpetrators of the 2007-8 post-election violence (PEV) in Kenya mentioned in their prosecution at the International Criminal Court (ICC) that it is this forum that produces an alleged scheme to

[5] The significance of the 'Kalenjin' centre in the society is indicated by its core aim, which is "empowering communities living in the Rift Valley" (Emo Society, 2020: About Us). It should be noted here that the concept, 'Rift Valley,' designates the 'Kalenjin Rift Valley' in the Kenyan discourse and, hence, excludes the other ethnic groups in the region. The exclusion is further depicted by the derivation of the society's name from, '*emo*,' (the longing to see each other) which bears an impression that the society is an exclusive Kalenjin medium of longing and connection.

[6] The idea of a Kalenjin language is used here to refer to an imagined standard variety from the similarity between the languages of the Kalenjin sub-groups. The imagination is demonstrated by the concept of the 'Union' Kalenjin, which is used in the common Kalenjin Bible version, and Kipnyaanko Seroney's Kalenjin dictionary, *Samburtaab Ng'aleekaab Kaleenchin* (The *Somburto* of the Kalenjin Words). The examples resort to playing up the widely used linguistic forms across the languages. Rephrase the highlighted

drive away non-Kalenjins from the Rift Valley (Abdi, et al., 2013: 194). As a result, there was a notable outcry from the Kalenjin politicians and public intellectuals that the indictment of the Emo was equivalent to indicting the Kalenjin community (Ngetich, 2013). Nonetheless, Emo has been holding fellowships, cultural, education and economic events in Kenya's major places in Nairobi and the Rift Valley since its inception. The most successful cultural event is the *Tumndo ne leel*. Other significant events in the Society include sermons, music, and inspirational talks. Accordingly, Emo is an ideal space for observing the Kalenjin trans-mediation dramas because it represents the community in the post-Moi dispensation the ending of the Moi-presidency event.

This way, Emo is considered here as a meta-theatre of the Kass FMs re-formation concept owing to the way it imagines a new sense of community. This is reflected in its core activities, such as the Christian spiritual fellowship, economic empowerment, and modernisation of culture, which are unfamiliar in mobilising an African ethnic community. The activities hint at a desire by the Kass FM to modernise the Kalenjin ethos to resemble those of a corporate organisation or a nation-state. This bears semblance with the observation that honour, as systems of 'individuals' intersecting with external worlds, changes 'ground' with time because the world is changing (Appiah, 2010: 84). Here, 'ground' refers to how a system of honour makes sense to the subjects. Thus, foreign Emo activities are arguably examples of the indications that the Kalenjin honour system is changing. They constitute the new 'grounds' of the Kalenjin identity which relates to the new concepts in which the community should conduct themselves among 'others.'

The sermon, "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" was delivered at the Africa Gospel Church (AGC) in Bomet, in the Rift Valley, on 24 February 2007. It is centred on the message of self-love as a way of improving life in the modern world. The sermon draws on the Bible scripture in Jeremiah 2:13 that states that,

> My people have committed two sins:
> They have forsaken me,
> the spring of living water,
> and have dug their own cisterns,
> broken cisterns that cannot hold water
> (New International Version, 2020)

The relevance of the scripture to the idea of honour concerns how it assigns shame to the addressee in the irony in which God has placed large bodies of water next to the addressee but

the addressee fails to see the bodies of water. Instead, the addressee is toiling elsewhere in search of the commodity. The preacher uses this analogy to describe the conspicuous levels of poverty in the Kalenjin community despite the abundant opportunities, such as schools, markets, and land, which can uplift the people's standard of living. Accordingly, the sermon deliberates on this irony and points out some of Kalenjin 'shames' attributable to the irony, such as self-effacement, fear of others, limited dreams, indifference to change, and rigidity, as the new sense of immorality in the Kalenjin life. A story highlighting one of these senses of shame is told in the sermon about the popular visits of community delegations to Moi at his Kabarak home when he was the president. In those visits, communities would air their needs to be addressed by the president. In the story, a Kalenjin delegation were asked to state what they needed but they did not have any specific item in mind and, so, they answered, 'Anything,' and were each given 20,000 shillings. Thereafter, a Gikuyu delegation came and were asked what they needed. They answered that their companies and co-operative societies needed revamping and were given 500 million shillings. Here, the preacher blames the Kalenjin community for lacking vision in life. Significant here is how the blame is arising by itself, rather, it is produced from the view of the Gikuyu. Accordingly, the speaker establishes a ranking system of ethnic groups in fulfiling life in which the Kalenjin ranks poorly. As a result, the significance of the "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" resides in how it manipulates the Kalenjin-community honour system by observing the 'others' deemed exemplary in the Kenyan society.

"Awake" was delivered to a Kalenjin gathering at Milimani Africa Inland Church (AIC) in Nairobi on 4 March 2006. It is themed on the idea of awakening which is anchored on the Bible scripture in Ephesians 5:14 that states that,

> This is why it is said:
> Wake up, sleeper,
> rise from the dead,
> and Christ will shine on you.
> (New International Version, 2020)

This scripture links to re-forming the Kalenjin via honour in its assigning of 'sleeping' metaphor to the Kalenjin community. Sleeping is used in the sermon to figure the Kalenjin people as victims of what I call a cultural identity defect. This describes the situation in which ones suffering is not a function of deprivation or disadvantage but faulty mindsets shaped by cultural

identity. An example is a needy man who finds a job as a cook but declines it because it is morally wrong for a man to cook in their culture. Thus, the metaphor of sleeping in the sermon alludes to the disadvantage of the Kalenjin community in fulfilling life owing to their indifference to the new opportunities around them. As a result, the sermon depicts an engagement with a fundamental question on morality in life. The question concerns choice on the competing urgencies over in life — between safeguarding moral values and uplifting standards of living.

4.3: "The people of Kalenjin" as an expression of interlink between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour systems

Examined here is the way the song, "The people of Kalenjin," expresses an intersection between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour system. This bears on the representation of the Kalenjin community as the 'individual' and the Kenyan society as the 'group' as per distinction illustrated in the foregoing section. Accordingly, the section, firstly, assesses the separateness between the two honour systems. This is to determine the extent to which the Kalenjin community and the Kenyan society are different worlds in terms of honour. Secondly, the section assesses the interaction between the two honour systems as a function of entanglement. The term is used here as the condition of being involuntarily involved with each other and twisted together into an unbreakable form of relationship (Nuttall, 2009: 1). This describes 'individual' membership of binding groups, such as family, ethnicity and nationality, where one has not expressed interest to join the group but finds themselves inextricable from the group. The notion of 'country' in Africa maps a society of multiple ethnic communities. The entanglement here regards living within boundaries that lump unrelated, often antagonistic, groups into a unitary society. Accordingly, the idea of entanglement foregrounds the fact that the lumped communities have to devise modes of associating with each other while aware of the unbreakable connections with the other.

The notions on separateness and entanglement relate to the way the song expresses an interface between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour systems, which I examine in the first part of the section. I assess in the second part of the section how the Kenyan honour system affects the Kalenjin system. This stems from Appiah's (2010) and Oprisko's (2012) perspective embraced in the foregoing section that the 'group' is more eminent than the 'individual' in honour in that an individual derives honour from the concepts of others. This includes the self-

reliant individual who focuses on their principles since the principles are learned from others. Thus, I am interested here in how the Kenyan honour system sways the Kalenjin system.

4.3.1: Singing an interface between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour systems

The term, interface, here refers to the special relationship between two divergent worldviews. It describes a juxtaposition of two isolated but reciprocal worlds. I use this as a metaphor for the separateness and, notwithstanding, a special relationship between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour systems. The idea, 'interface,' is to be understood here in the context of enhancing life. The Kalenjin establishment of a special relationship with the Kenyan societys worldviews is a strategy of enhancing their lives. To this end, an interface bears two notions on which the subsection is organised. The first one is particularity which refers to the sensibility of difference. The idea of particularity recognises parties in an interface as sensing individuality and contrasts from the 'other.' The second is reciprocity which is employed here as the 'individual' partner valuing the relationship with the 'group' partner. This suggests that the 'individual' partner benefits from being interlinked an external honour. The sense is that the 'group' is more supreme in honour than the 'individual' because it is wider and richer in concepts. However, it is also important to note here that a group is an abstract entity in the interlink. A group does not desire, plan and execute actions to enhance life, instead, it is represented by individuals. As a result, the individual invents and associates with the group primarily for their benefit. Accordingly, it is reasonable here to examine how the Kalenjin community, as an 'individual' ethnic group in Kenya, imagines benefit in the noted interface with Kenya's national sense of honour.

The particularity of the Kalenjin honour system is expressed in the song, "The people of Kalenjin," by the tone in which the song portrays an open-minded community conversation on a flawed 'self.' I highlight in the previous section that an open-minded conversation guarantees the co-operation of the members of a collective to be reprimanded and is mainly effected through the establishment of an in-group mentality. Here, I present an open-minded community conversation on a flawed 'self' being accused while being assured of the elements of being an in-grouper, 'belonging, trust and self-enhancement,' as outlined by Bilewicz and Liu (2020: 122). There is a sense of security when those who fault us are only those who mean well to our community. Thus, an open-minded faulting event regards an activity in which blame is directed towards the

self without the anxiety about falling out in the group. This is effected in the opening stanza, which represents a run-up to the reprimanding action, in which the singer states that,

Biikab Kalenjin ooo	People of Kalenjin oo
Biikap Kalenjin ooyaa	People of Kalenjin ooyaa
Biikab kutinyon oo	People of our 'mouth' oo
Biikab kutinyon Kalenjin oo	People of our 'mouth' oo
Nen osom acheerak agenge	Let me beg to encourage you once
Nen osomok acherak, kutinyon, borienyon	Let me beg to encourage you, our 'mouth,' our nation

(Rotich, 2005, stanza 5)

The in-group relationship in this segment is carried by the moves to compose a Kalenjin community 'listener.' This refers to the setting of a Kalenjin presence that ratifies reprimanding. The significant move here is conveyed by the beseeching trope and the metaphor of '*kutinyon*' (our mouth) as discussed below.

The beseeching action is depicted in the appeal for permission to enlighten the community in the line, "*Nen osom acheerak agenge*" (Let me beg to encourage[7] you once). The begging tone and the frame of encouraging, which is the atmosphere of not intending to initiate a forceful change, hints at the existence of a hostile listener, which arguably relates to the nature of admonition as a requirement to change values. The sensing of hostility indicates that the values involved are those which the Kalenjin have pride in and a sensibility to an infringement of dignity. Oprisko (2012: 7, 43) conceives "dignity" as the mindset that "we are what we feel we must be, fearing to be anything else." The conception shows that dignity is a value that does not need to make sense to anyone even the cherisher. It concerns the fear of what might happen if the sense of dignity is undermined. Thus, the dignity of a community is defended mainly for the fear of losing identity. It should be noted here that ethnic identities in Kenya are not simply cultural categories but also solidarities that are used for protecting resources and accessing power given that the political establishments in the country such as political parties and devolved units of government and representation are largely ethnic. Thus, Kenya's ethnic groups spotlighting of

[7] 'Encouraging' suggests inspiring courage in persons who are expected to demonstrate heroism such as warriors and circumcision candidates. It invokes the frame of warriors given that the Kalenjin nation is addressed as '*boriet*.' This term, as used in the Kipsigis dialect in which the song is rendered, is interchangeable with '*bororiet*,' the prototype term for a nation; otherwise, '*boriet*' typically refers to a war regiment. Men from the over 50 Kipsigis clans were organised into four war regiments (*boriosiek*), *kebeni, ngetunyo, kipkaikek and Kasanet*. Thus, the use of 'encouraging' in the context of 'warriors' projects an image of one speaking to a highly respectable audience.

heritage has a huge bearing on strengthening solidarity for survival in that an ethnic group solidarity derives a higher sense of security and quicker access to power due to regulated ingroup mentality. Therefore, affecting an ethnic identity's sense of heritage means threatening their solidarity and, hence, their mode of survival in the country. In this light, the begging tone and the frame of encouragement are allusions to the singer's sensation of the threatening pitfall. The begging tone and the frame represent an amicable window through which the Kalenjin identity can be challenged in a dignified way. They indicate that the Kalenjin people feel dignified when reprimanded within an atmosphere of the worthiness of respect and maximise on it to initiate change on them.

Similarly, the metaphor, '*Kutinyon*' (our mouth) depicts the composition of an in-group relationship. '*Kutinyon*' is an internal code name for the Kalenjin that emphasises familiarity and affection from the mutuality of language imaged by the relationship between the mouth and speaking. I argue here that the metaphor also acclaims the value of language in problem resolution in the Kalenjin community. '*Kutinyon*' relives pasts in which the group have resolved problems through the logic of a shared language. The shared language here refers to the fact that there is a huge extent to which the Kalenjin people can understand each other. It should be noted, for instance, that the initial problem of facing the more populous ethnic groups, such as the Gikuyu and the Luo, was resolved via the formation of a comradeship in which belonging depended on the understanding of the expression, '*Kaalenjin*' (I tell you). Thus, '*Kutinyon*' is a form of consciousness that language has played a critical role in the imagination and sustenance of the Kalenjin identity. By extension, the metaphor is an appreciation that every Kalenjin problem has a solution as long as there is a mutuality of language in the group. This, in my view, is an appreciation of the group's dignity because it touches on the groups lifeline and ability to safeguard shared interests via the unity of understanding each other's problems. In this way, the metaphor reflects that the Kalenjin people would have been doomed severally in the past but were rescued by reaching to each other via language. Therefore, the song, "The people of Kalenjin," composes a Kalenjin community 'listener' from both the sensibility to history and being worthy of respect.

I argue that the composition of the Kalenjin 'listener' for reprimanding reservation constitutes the initiation of the Kalenjin individual honour. Initiation here refers to the formal admission of the Kalenjin persons into the Kalenjin identity. The logic is that the transformation

of the Kalenjin community must begin with assembling the 'minds' of the members. In this case, a pre-set assembly of 'minds' guarantees unison over proposed concepts of change. This entails targeting the self-reliant members who do not commit themselves to the structures of the community. It also targets the individuals from the constituent groups of the Kalenjin community who commit themselves to the structures of their respective constituent groups. The initiation of the Kalenjin 'individuality' relates to initiating a Kalenjin honour system, which is the formal recognition of the presence of a Kalenjin honour system, from the perspective, that,

> Because your honour attaches to you as a person of some specific social identity, we need to know what kind of person you are before we can see what forms of honour are available to you. (Appiah, 2010: 32)

The argument indicates that (re)forming an honour system of a group requires a show of commitment by the members. For example, the rites of passage, such as circumcision, are concepts by which members of a community demonstrate their commitment. These rites entail evocations, such as shared prosperity and shared fears, which define the community. The song symbolises this initiation by ritualising change. The term, ritualising change, refers here to effecting change by being faithful to the existing structures. This should be contrasted with confrontational mechanisms of change, involving explicit pointing of faults. A ritualised change here conceives of embedding change within the procedures of the target group. In this way, a ritualised change does not erode the individuality of the target group's honour system.

The case of a Kenyan honour system is expressed by the singer's sensibility to a co-present network with others in a wider but bounded space. The Kenyan honour system, as noted earlier, refers to a sum of what is universally accepted across the country as the ideal sense of honour. Thus, each ethnic community possesses their 'individual' honour systems but there is an external system that applies across the country. The Kalenjin consciousness about a Kenyan honour system is depicted in the singer's statement that,

Len nee emet oo?	What does the country say oo?
Len nee emet, borienyon?	What does the country say, our nation?
Ongetiigee oo	Let us prop each other oo
Ongetiigee, borienyon	Let us prop each other, our nation
Kou teren oo yaa	Like pots oo
Kou teren, kutinyon, borienyon oo	Like pots, our mouth, our nation oo

(Rotich, 2005, stanza 5)

Here, there is an allegorical narrative that the statement above produces which I visualise as,

> There is an '*emet*' (country) that is filled with interesting things. The Kalenjin groups are expected to know about these, but they do not know. The things remind the singer of a need for his community to support one another like pots.

First, I discuss the entity of a 'Kenyan society' from the idea of '*emet*' as an allegoric form of an honour system. Second, I asses the significance of the '*emet*' and why there is need for the Kalenjin to support one another like pots. Thereafter, I explore the co-presence of the Kalenjin group and the '*emet*' as the interlink of honour systems.

The song depicts '*emet*' as both remote and near. Firstly, on the one hand, '*emet*' translates to 'country'[8] and, as such alludes to 'Kenya,' which locates the singer and his people in one space. On the other hand, the singer refers to '*emet*' in the third person while addressing the Kalenjin, which indicates that it is external to the Kalenjin. Secondly, the Kalenjin lack of knowledge about the interesting things in the '*emet*' despite the expectation that they should know also shows that the '*emet*' is both accessible and hidden. These ironies convey that the relationship between the Kalenjin and the '*emet*' bears on both adjacency and social distance. Adjacency here refers to the spatial proximity to each other that unveils the '*emet*' as a 'neighbour' to the Kalenjin. Social distance refers to the limited interaction between the Kalenjin group and the '*emet*.' As a result, the Kenyan society is defined as the 'rest of Kenya' and the Kenyan society consisting of other ethnic groups, excluding the Kalenjin. In my view, adjacency here represents how the Kalenjin space is portioned, alongside 'others' from Kenya while social distance regards how ethnic groups in the country relate with each other in the country as potential enemies, as argued in the previous chapter. Thus, the co-presence of adjacency and social distance means that ethnic groups do not know each other adequately because they occupy separate spaces and do not divulge issues externally for fear of harm from the 'others.' Accordingly, the Kenyan society as an honour system refers to the popular senses of good living which are found within Kenya but foreign to the Kalenjin.

[8] The word, '*emet*' literally translates to 'country' or 'territory,' however, its animated use in the song shows that it refers to the 'country.' Here, I note that 'country' or 'territory,' are both land spaces but a country is animate because it refers to a space with people while 'territory' refers only to the land. In the song, for example, the '*emet*' is personified as noted in the rhetorical question, 'What does the country say?'

The idea of the '*emet*' that is filled with interesting things resonates with what Oprisko (2012: 137; 159) calls "exemplar par excellence." This refers to the most desired sense of honour system. The self-reliant individuals consider themselves as their exemplar par excellence while the social individuals search for exemplars par excellence externally. Thus, the Kenyan-society honour system as an exemplar par excellence to the Kalenjin group holds the view that good living is the most ideal in the Kenyan society.

Even so, the notion of the Kalenjin honour system observing exemplars par excellence poses a challenge in the interface in that it entails drawing ideas from the antagonistic communities. Gikuyu, for instance, surfaces regularly as the exemplar community yet it is the community that also tops those perceived by the Kalenjin as a risk. This renders the interface between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour systems as paradoxically imitative and combative. It is imitative given the exaltation of the exemplariness of the 'others' in that the desire to be updated with what takes place in the '*emet*' suggests the potential of the '*emet*' to offer valuable lessons in fulfilling life. It is combative given the possibility that what the 'others' are doing, or their advancement, could be harmful to the community.

The above-noted imitative and combative sense of the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour systems interlinks to what I call ethnic community-based entrepreneurship. This describes an emerging competition among Kenya's ethnic groups to establish world-class ethnic community-based businesses. This is reflected in the singers conjoining of the counsel to the Kalenjin community to keep updated on the '*emet*' with the concept of propping one another like pots (Rotich, 2005, stanza 4). I argue that the imagery of the pots propping symbolises the spirit of economic cooperation since the traditional clay pot is a round-bottomed object that cannot stand on a flat surface unless propped by other objects. Nevertheless, the lack of objects to prop the pot can be resolved by placing several pots next to each other to lean on each other. Thus, 'propping one another like pots' expresses the idea of economic cooperation with the propping, painting the image of pooling resources for the common benefit. Significant activity in ethnic community-based entrepreneurship in Kenya concerns social investment, which is "the flow of resources — either market or non-market generated — that fulfils the funding needs of organisations that primarily create social or environmental value" (Nicholls, 2008: 3. It is about establishing a business that is social in nature. Firstly, it should be defined through its beneficiation to a particular community and, secondly, it should be innovative to attract the participation of a

community. Hence, an ethnic community-based social investment is an unveiling of an investment opportunity that is beneficial to a certain ethnic group. As a result, the singer's concept of the cooperative spirit, as a lesson from observing the '*emet*,' relates to the Kalenjin discovery of an exemplar par excellence in ethnic community-based social investment existing in the Kenyan society. Arguably, it is a detection of 'other' ethnic group(s) in Kenya that have excelled in ethnic community-based entrepreneurship which, by extension, accuses the Kalenjin of lagging in development.

In sum, the interface between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour systems displays the Kalenjin transacting attraction and rivalry. This describes the borrowing of concepts from 'others' while reserving individuality. The investment wing of the Emo Society sums up this transaction. The establishment of Emo Society reflects a building society known as Equity Building Society (EBS) that was founded in the 1980s and contributed to the founding of one of the largest banks in Kenya, the Equity Bank. The significance of the emulation here is that EBS was predominantly Gikuyu business and, as such, the rise of Equity Bank from EBS, has elevated the status of the Gikuyu as achievers in establishing ethnic community-based world-class businesses. As a result, the Emo's Sacco concept, which was started in 2013, is nuanced on the EBS background to the Equity Bank. Here, attraction and rivalry between the Emo and the EBS lie in the characteristic of contesting the successes of others. The contest depicts the Kalenjin using the EBS model to enhance their status. This shows a sensation that the Gikuyu holds lessons to the Kalenjin on excelling. However, it is combative in the sense that it seeks to outdo the Gikuyu achievements. This is noted in the singer's instruction of the Kalenjin to adopt a cooperative spirit through via the idiom of the pots. The logic is not to acknowledge openly that the Kalenjin should emulate the Gikuyu but to rouse the Kalenjin community silently to realise the need for the emulation. The silence here indicates that the borrower considers the achiever as a threat. Hence, the emulation should be understood here as seizing ideas and a strategy of subduing the 'others.'

4.3.2: Towards a 'Kenyan' Kalenjin honour system: an example of the motion motif

Further analysis of the music text, "The people of Kalenjin," considers how the Kenyan honour system sways the Kalenjin system in the noted interface between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan honour models. This venture stems from a motif of motion that is prominent in the video

text of the song. The motif is about how objects are patterned to be either in motion or in a fixed state. Here, I am interested in the symbolic relationship between motion and fixity and the shifting honour system. As a result, the idea of motion and fixity offers a practical dimension on how to understand the interconnection between the individual and the group in honour. In this case, fixity is considered here to represent dignity in the sense that dignity entails the defence of existing values for fear of new forms. Movement is considered to represent honourableness because honourableness denotes stepping out of existing values in favour of new forms. The motion motif is depicted in the songs video text in several ways. Two of them are examined here.

The first one is a juxtaposition of the following scenes:

> A street in the city centre of Nairobi. This is evident from the modern and neat scene that has a view of the Hilton hotel building in the background. The street is new and bears clear street names at the flanks and a city clock while the sidewalks are paved and decorated. The clip portrays a typical working hour as many cars and people are moving in different directions in a hasty but orderly way. Finally, the cars are modern and new with everyone fine-looking in their various work clothes and not idling around (Rotich, 2005, time 0:54).

> A typical rural Kalenjin home where three old women are sitting in front of a homestead while dressed in traditional Kalenjin headgear, '*nariet*' made from strips of leather sewn cowrie shells that are popularly used during ceremonies such as after undergoing an initiation ceremony. (Rotich, 2005, time 1: 20).

The difference in motion between the scenes is conveyed by the 'business' trope. Business, here, refers to a serious concern in livelihoods to maximise wealth where 'wealth' denotes accumulating proceeds above what is enough for subsistence. The city scene depicts business as a way of life through the action of haste. Haste is depicted as a major concern for the city as the inhabitants are rushing about and the omnipresence of the city clock, cars and street lights, which aid in keeping time. Haste reveals people who seek to use the available time to achieve more profits or boost wages. In contrast, the rural scene shows a pastoral life marked by relaxation and humility symbolised by the women resting, the simple homestead behind them and their dressing. Furthermore, there is a lack of modern means of saving time such as clocks, which indicates a lack of strain and anxiety to create wealth. Rather, traditionalism, which is conveyed through dressing in the traditional attire, is a significant concern for the people. These characteristics indicate that life in rural areas is limited to fulfilling subsistence and maintaining cultural traditions.

I argue that the juxtaposition effects a contrast between the Kenyan and Kalenjin ways of life since the scenes accompany the remark that,

Wendi taa emet oo	The country is moving forward oo
Wendi taa emet, kutinyon	The country is moving forward, our 'mouth'
Ongerwai ak biik oo	Let us run with the people
Ongerwai ak biik kutinyon	Let us run with the people, our 'mouth'

(Rotich, 2003, stanza 5)

The instruction of the Kalenjin to 'run' because the '*emet*'[9] 'is moving forward' assigns the community with the backwardness and the Kenyan society with progress. This is evident in the inscription of magnificence on the city in contrast to the offensive image of rurality. The state-of-the-art buildings, modern cars and streets, and fine-looking persons symbolise economic excellence which is contrasted from the rural view in which there is little activity that hints of dull life. Thus, the singer reprimands the Kalenjin for lagging in business culture while considering that the city is the ideal place for practising the business culture.

Arguably, the singer's identification of the Kalenjin with the backwardness of rurality, and 'others' with the progress of the city life, connects with some famous remarks within the Kalenjin community on the existence of poverty in the post-Moi era. One such remark by one of the most influential Kalenjin thinkers, Donald Kipkorir, broadcasted on Twitter, states that,

> Kalenjins have been President or Deputy for 41 out of 55 years of Kenya's life… That we have no REAL Kalenjin Billionaires that can be listed of FORBES, No Kalenjin Banks, No Industries and Destroyed Agriculture and Now Ghost dams… We can't blame outsiders! Look on the mirror! (Kipkorir, 2019)

The other is from a research report by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), the University of London, which argues that Eldoret city, the symbolic 'headquarters of the Kalenjin, was developed by the non-Kalenjins such as the Gikuyu and the Luhya as noted in the statement that,

> […] most Kalenjin associated urban life with a range of dangers, and preferred to stay in rural areas, where they kept cattle. Although Eldoret is considered to be Kenyas main Kalenjin city,

[9] The word, '*biik*', which translates to 'people,' is another metaphor of the '*emet*' in the exclusive sense and thus, it stands for 'the other people in Kenya that are not us.'

> urbanization has been a process of mingling, in which the Kalenjin only began to play an important role in the 2000s. (Badoux, 2018: 9)

The first remark unveils an ethnic group's economic prestige as a function of business and modernity, figured as having world-class billionaires, banks and industries that are hosted by the city. The second remark reveals the problem with the Kalenjin based on their resistance against city life. As a result, the Kalenjin shame is indicated as the fixedness to the agrarian livelihood, which is portrayed in the first remark as no longer a profitable livelihood. The fixedness is conveyed through reference to the Kalenjin failure to maximise on the '41' and '55' years in which they have held power via the presidency and the deputy presidency, respectively. Hence, the linkage of the Kalenjin with rurality in the music clips is a conception of an outdated honour system in the community.

The singers counsel here is that the Kalenjin must loosen their grip on the traditional livelihoods — which are largely agrarian — and explore the cities. I argue that the disparity of livelihood between the Kalenjin and 'others' bears on Oprisko's (2012) perspective on honour as submission to reality. "Reality" is employed to refer to the "what we wish the world to be, but the world as it is" (Oprisko, 2012: 42) This projects that human desires are often in conflict with situations and, hence, honour is an activity of adjusting desires to conform with situational reality. Reality applies to the polarity of dignity and honourableness from the perspective that our conscience demands us to follow certain principles as much as our identity group demands. Thus, dignity and honourableness are divergent realities that are balanced through adjusting to what is more meaningful in fulfilling in life. The rural scene above shows the Kalenjin people as submitting to the demands of dignity through their satisfaction with modest life based on the maintenance of traditional values. Thus, traditional ways of life are more important to the Kalenjin than being wealthy. In addition, the Kalenjin, do not mind suffering, as long as the livelihoods are situated within the community's cultural traditions. In contrast, the city scene depicts stepping out of the traditions and submitting to honourableness. The noted inscription of magnificence on the city shows a valorisation of material reality over the cultural reality and, accordingly, cultural traditions may be overstepped as long as a chosen way of life leads to accumulating wealth and, hence, uplifting the standard of living. In this light, the counsel to move from the rural way of life to the city way should be understood as displacing the Kalenjin mindset on the cultural reality with material reality in order to redress the Kalenjin problems.

The second way in which the motion motif conveys a shift of the Kalenjin honour system to the Kenyan system is depicted in the following scene:

> A graduation ceremony in a tertiary institution. The depicted characters are wearing academic gowns without the caps which shows, in the Kenyan situation, that they are not earning degrees but lower awards such as diplomas and certificates. The mood is festive with pieces of decorative flowers, papers and other materials being thrown to the sky. In the end, an aeroplane is ascending the sky. (Rotich, 2005, time 3: 09)

Here graduation is linked with the images of mobility and achievement in education based on how graduation events are signs of shifting from one level of academic achievement to the next. In this light, a graduation event can either be fixative or progressive. Here, fixative graduation conceives a celebration of an end in one's education goal such as earning qualifications to find a job. In contrast, progressive graduation refers to celebrating a qualification as a step to further studies and, hence, an aim for higher returns such as lucrative employment. The scene above is arguably fixative graduation given the there is a clip of an ascending aeroplane that succeeds the graduation clip which accompanies the remark stating that,

Ongisomesan lagokyok	Let us educate our children
Ongisomesan lagokyok	Let us educate our children
Koit yeite biik oo	To reach where people reach oo
Koit yeite biik, kutinyon	To reach where people reach, our mouth
Si kesoitaen ooyaa	So that we use it to see ooya
Si kesoitaen, borienyon woi wee	So that we use it to see, our nation, woi wee

(Rotich, 2005: stanza 6)

Here, I argue that the singers requiring the Kalenjin to educate their children to the levels which '*biik*' (people) reach, and the descending aeroplane, indicates a criticism on the graduation event as too low to be celebrated. The aeroplane symbolises education mobility to overseas higher institutions of learning and, therefore, the singer's plea to the Kalenjin to educate their children to where 'others' reach is criticism of the Kalenjin for failing to advance adequately in education. Arguably, the depiction of lower achievements in the graduation scene signifies satisfaction with modest educational qualifications. Hence, the singer here differentiates the Kalenjin and '*biik*' (which embodies the idea of the rest of Kenya given that the country maps the limits of an education system and the space within which people compete over education) by the concepts of fixative or progressive education goals. In this way, the singer assigns the rest of Kenya the

prestige of education mobility and achievement and the Kalenjin with the shame of wallowing in poor levels of education.

The noted character of wallowing suggests that the Kalenjin honour system validates self-effacement. I use the term, self-effacement, to refer to the preoccupation with humility and modesty, defined in Miller and Madanin (2013: 1141), as attending to the needs of the others before the self, taking a modest portion of a resource and leaving the rest to others, and making oneself inconspicuous. It is a way of living in which to be good is to display selflessness and to refrain from the desire for things considered as more than enough for basic life. In this light, the singer's characterisation of the Kalenjin with poor levels of education, such as failure to facilitate their children to overseas studies, should be viewed as an accusation over self-effacement in the Kalenjin honour system. The accusation on self-connects with the popular perceptions about the Kalenjin people on preferences in life. An example how the athletes from the community, who constitute those who earn remarkable sums of money in the community, show odd investment priorities as depicted in the remark that,

> With farming forming the bedrock of the Kalenjin culture, it is little surprise its people have such a close association with the land and its animals.
> This is also true of the Kalenjin athletes […] many of whom have invested in owning a farm while simultaneously maintaining their athletics career (NN Running Team, 2019)

The remark above supports the singer's position in conveying that self-effacement is a fundamental honour code among the Kalenjin people that needs to be changed. The perceptions suggest that interest in higher education and maximising wealth is not a priority in the community. The oddity implies that the mode of deriving honour in the Kalenjin entails avoiding possessions (other than land and cattle) or positions that are prone to misunderstanding for pride. In this case, land and cattle are not part of those possessions because they are not extraordinary possessions across the community. I argue that the understanding of this oddity lies in the different honour systems pitting the rest of Kenya with honourableness, which is being free to exploit any opening to improve living, and the Kalenjin with the preoccupation with dignity, which is guarding excessively against the sense of being respectable within the community. Hence, the song, "People of Kalenjin," is an example of discourses emerging in the Kalenjin post-Crisis stage which initiate the community to a journey towards the Kenyan national system.

In sum, the motion motif represents a manifesto for changing ground for the Kalenjin honour system as redressing the Kalenjin sense of living. This is unveiled as 'Kenyanising' the Kalenjin worldview which is a process requiring the members of the Kalenjin community to embrace what 'others' in the Kenyan society do. The motif is a programme of borrowing ways of life from 'others' who are perceived to have succeeded. The motif succeeds by juxtaposing the archetypes of the Kalenjin ways of life with those of 'others' in such a way that the Kalenjin ways are assigned shame while those of 'others' are assigned prestige. The most prominent archetypes are backwardness and self-effacement among the Kalenjin which are contrasted with the association of progress and self-regard.

In summary, I note that "The people of Kalenjin" unpacks the Kass FMs concept, '*Kimnatet naet*' (Knowledge is power), as the ability to detect the weaknesses of the 'self' through the lens of 'others.' The concept, therefore, represents the discovery that the individuality of the Kalenjin honour system is inadequate to afford the community decent life. Rather, decent life is represented as a function of expanding an honour system to a wider sphere in search of more effective concepts on a decent life. Kenya emerges as the ideal sphere as a result of shared ideas such as education, livelihoods and challenges. Thus, the chances of success or failure in another ethnic community in the country are the same in the Kalenjin community. Even so, the song portrays sections of the Kenyan society who have excelled in attaining a decent life while the Kalenjin have not despite the shared chances of success or failure. Thus, the song accuses the Kalenjin 'dignity,' which is the reverence of cultural traditions without the concern on whether the traditions uplift the standard of living or not, as the cause of failure to attain decent life. At the same time, it is an idealisation of 'honourableness' evident in a swift embracing of new ideas. This concerns the apparent relationship between decent life and modernity exemplified by the city livelihoods and education. Thus, the song avers that it is honourable to overstep the cultural traditions and attain a high standard of living than to revere the traditions and lead a poor life.

4.4: The sermons, "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" and "Awake," as expressions of moral revolution

The section examines the significance of the Emo sermons, "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" and "Awake" in redressing the Kalenjin nation from the perspective of a moral revolution. Moral revolution refers here to "a rapid transformation in moral behaviour" (Appiah,

2010: I). Moral behaviour should be understood here as "to act according to one's moral values and standards" (Talwar, 2011). It is about transferring the principles of good living into action and thus a demonstration of one's moral worth. From these perspectives, moral behaviours lie with the individual and as such one's moral worth can be offensive to an 'other.' Thus, what is considered morally sound by a person or community can turn out to be unacceptable to another person or community. In addition, moral behaviours are temporal, meaning that the concepts of what is morally sound within a person or community change and even retract themselves from the others and at different times. The American Civil war (1861-1865), for example, shows that the White enslaving community in the North turned into proponents of abolitionism. Thus, slavery was produced and destroyed by the American White community as a form of good living, which implies that enslaving shifted from being an acceptable moral behaviour to offensive moral behaviour. Accordingly, moral revolution here stands for a collective perception and action that result in a far-reaching erosion of offensive moral behaviour.

The centrality of perception in the definitions above suggests that moral revolution entails the presence of 'universally' accepted concepts by which individual's moral behaviours are judged. This links with the premise of the chapter that 'individual' honour systems are regulated by certain universals in a wider group. The previous section notes that part of the Kalenjin Redress is dealing with some of the community's highly cherished traditional cultural values which deny the people access to decent forms of living. As such, the previous chapter suggests that what distinguishes the Kalenjin community in Kenya is also what hinders them from attaining decent life. In this case, backwardness and self-effacement are noted as the most remarkable elements of the Kalenjin cultural identity defect. In this chapter, I explore how the defects are redressed. The sermons, "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" and "Awake," depict this action in several ways. Examined here, owing to its prominence, is what I consider as 'de-roling' action.

I invoke the term, 'de-roling' from psycho-theatre studies where it refers to the process of separating an individual from the character of a role played earlier to reintegrate the individual into reality (Lassken, 2017: 167). Role-playing refers to a 'state of being' an 'other' as a result of the specialised codes of conduct, practices and responsibilities (Lassken, 2017: 166). The value of 'de-roling' is that it prevents the confusion between "fictional" behaviour and reality (Lassken, 2017: 167. A soldier, for example, who has not been 'de-roled' may encounter

challenges adjusting to civilian life after retirement or loss of job because of the discordance between the 'soldier' role and the reality in the civil world. I invoke the term in my focus on the act of detaching persons from their cultural identity traits. This stems from the consideration that culture is a role-playing condition such that to claim a cultural identity is to play certain roles that are unique to that identity. The previous section demonstrates that everyday life habits are connected to culture and, hence, people's strategies for satisfying life vary in accordance to how they have been socialised into different cultures. In this case, I regard the act of socialising individuals as a process of immersing them into identity roles and, hence, 'de-roling"' as extracting the individuals from the roles.

'De-roling' links with honour in the sense that honour is a role played, which is a mindset that is taken up to implement a good living. This relates to how 'de-roling' reminds certain individuals that the behaviour they think is morally acceptable is externally offensive and thus, implies re-claiming the individuals from the honour roles previously taken up. Reflexively, Appiah (2012) notes that it is the idea of honour that sustained for centuries the renowned moral practices of the past. The practices include the British duels, which is a fighting game in which to win is to kill the opponent, the Chinese foot-binding, which is the breaking and shrinking women's feet as a way of enhancing beauty, and slavery in the British Empire. Of interest here is that it is also honour by which the practices were brought down. The rise-and-fall of the practices shows that people took up roles and later relinquished them. In my view, this should be understood as a change of honour roles. Initially, the people were required by honour to duel, bind feet or enslave others, and, thereafter, they were required by the changing sense of honour to shun duelling, binding feet or enslaving others. Thus, the requirement for people to shun practices embodies 'de-roling' action given that it involves purging the adherents of the old concepts on good living. Similarly, the Kalenjin moral behaviours on backwardness and self-effacement under focus here have been associated with good living in the Kalenjin community. The previous section indicates, for instance, that it is traditionally honourable among the Kalenjin world to resist change and be self-effacing. However, the practices, in the post-Moi dispensation and from the Kenya national perspective are forms of shame. In this light, I examine the 'de-roling' action as perceiving and detaching the Kalenjin people from forms of shame. I suggest that an appropriate way is to identify the actions of attaching shame on forms of practices and thus, people are expected to shun practices that have been labelled with shame.

'De-roling' on backwardness is portrayed in the sermons in several ways; however, the most significant one concerns a critique on the political kingpin institution in "Awake." I highlight the term, kingpin, in chapter 2, as a prominent person in an ethnic group who acts as a groups mobilising figure, political guide and representative in government. It should be recalled here that the institution is significant in the understanding of the rise of the Kalenjin Breach on which this thesis is framed. The departure of Moi from the presidency was disruptive to the Kalenjin in that the Moi kingpin position and presidency had been ensuring a 'good' life to the community through protection and representation. This shows the importance of the kingpin institution in the Kalenjin living. This is further evident in how the post-Moi era witnesses a struggle for the community's kingpin position between William Ruto and Gideon Moi that tore the community into political factions as people began to associate with either of the two. "Awake" conveys that the kingpin institution has socialised the Kalenjin persona into a kingpin-dependency condition. I use the term to refer to the mindset that the sense of living in the community depends on the kingpin and that, without the kingpin, the community crumbles.

Kingpin-dependency is depicted in the speaker's caution to the Kalenjin top politicians against self-importance in "Awake." The speaker states that,

Meleen kenyisiek chon kileen	Do not think that the years when it was said
Tom kemwaa achek ko kamwa ngo?	If we have not said, then who has said?
Forget it this is information age	Forget it this is an information age
Kotom ketar ngalek en Nairobi	Before a decision is finalised in Nairobi
Ko kikogas biik chemiten Kapsowar	People have already heard it in Kapsowar

("Awake", time 13, 25)

Here, kingpin dependency is assigned shame via the analogy between the kingpin institution to information deficit. A section preceding this segment proclaims that the present era is an 'information age,' which, arguably, is an allusion to 'the digital age,' which is the rise of information technology that connects people across the world and transmits information efficiently (Wessels, 2017: 125). Thus, the proclamation reveals that the role of the kingpin institution has been severely undermined by the digital mediums of connectedness and thus, a Kenyan community that entertains the kingpin institution in the digital age is backward.

I argue that the above opinion 'de-roles' the Kalenjin people from this condition in two ways. The first one is enshrined in attaching the shame of backwardness among the kingpins, conveyed in the speaker's supposition that people who revere leaders with an information deficit

should be ashamed of themselves. The speaker juxtaposes the images of 'Kapsowar' and 'Nairobi' in the lines from the segment above, '*Kotom ketar ngalek en Nairobi, Ko kikogas biik chemiten Kapsowar*' (Before a decision is finalised in Nairobi, People have already heard it in Kapsowar). Kapsowar is a town in the northernmost part of the Kalenjin Rift Valley that is difficult to access via road because of rough terrain and, thus, it represents the remotest places in the Kalenjin territory. More so, it represents the Kalenjin quarters which are deficient in information when juxtaposed with 'Nairobi,' the capital, which creates the concepts of margins and the centre in the pre-digital-age communication flow. Here, Nairobi is associated with the kingpins because exercising 'representation' entails being located mainly in the capital city as the centre of the government. However, it is also a criticism of the kingpins for exploiting the community to enrich themselves. The linkage between the kingpins and 'Nairobi' is to suggest that they have amassed wealth enough to live in the capital city as the most luxurious place in the country. Therefore, the juxtaposition conveys the irony in which those who live in 'Nairobi' exercise influence on those who live in the rural areas using the pre-digital-age communication mentality.

Accordingly, the idea of the 'information age' confronts the Kapsowar-Nairobi distinction by playing up the availability of modern high-speed transmission technologies through which 'Kapsowar' and 'Nairobi' are presently levelled in communication flows. Similarly, the speaker's parody of the kingpins, '*Tom kemwaa achek ko kamwa ngo*' (If we have not said, then who has said?), shows that the kingpins are not conversant with the disruption of the Kapsowar-Nairobi distinction. This is because the kingpins hold the view that they possess specialised power to speak about fundamental issues in the community. Arguably, the power alludes to the characteristic ability of the kingpins to reach and draw huge gatherings in the public places of the community manually, and, hence, the monopoly of swaying the opinion on the issues. Thus, the speaker here detaches the Kalenjin from the kingpin dependency by depicting that the kingpins lack perceptiveness. Ironically, the kingpins do not realise that their power to connect the community has been outstripped by the digital connectedness of the people. As a result, the Kalenjin people are reminded of the shame of relying on leaders who are exploitative and lack perceptiveness.

The second way in which attaching information deficit to the notion of the kingpins 'de-roles' the Kalenjin people is expressed in the speaker's labelling of the group with the

backwardness of hesitance. The term, hesitance, refers to the inability to use emerging opportunities to change lives positively which relates to the Kalenjin people's inability to use digital connectivity fully in order to mobilise themselves to overcome the exploitation of the kingpins. This is shaming given that the Kalenjin people can network across the margins and enhance themselves without an individual mediator; however, the rising contestation for the kingpin position in the community shows that the Kalenjin people continue to acclaim the institution. This irony is depicted in the speaker's attribution of the "*asikari chonjo*" (a soldier at attention) trait to the "*chitab Kolenjin*" (the Kalenjin man) (Kosgey, 2006, time 15: 40). The critique uses militaristic metaphors in the depiction of the Kalenjin persona one who "*Konye instructions agoi rani*" (waits for commands till now) (Kosgey, 2006, time 15: 48), which shows a disposition to rely on others for ideas on how to enhance life despite the explosion of the digital networks in the country. I argue here that the display of the '*asikari chonjo*' trait succeeds in detaching the Kalenjin from the kingpin dependency by indicating that the trait does not relate to the lack of digital connectivity in the community nor lack of information on the exploitation by the kingpins. Instead, it indicates that the irony concerns the Kalenjin people bearing the concept of good living as submitting to autocracy, which is the favouring to be governed by an individual and a top-down exercising of influence.

'De-roling' the Kalenjin people from kingpin dependency via the notion of backwardness, resonates with Appiah's (2012: 89) view that honour is both a problem and a solution. Here, honour poses itself as a problem by setting mentalities 'ignorantly' which entails how honour produces moral principles that satisfy only the immediate situation. Thus, moral principles are cherished in the immediate setting but become problems when the setting changes. Consequently, it is also the idea of honour that is used to resolve the 'ignorance' of the mindsets. The Kalenjin kingpin dependency should be understood in the same way since it was a very useful means of securing the quality of living in the community when Moi rose to become the president but faces sharp criticism in the post-Moi era owing to how it resembles hero-worshipping. Questions in the Kalenjin group have emerged to interrogate the morality of being organised under an individual such as the view that the members of a kingpin-centred community are like '*asikari chonjo*' (soldiers) whose functions are dictated by a superior. I argue that these questions represent a revolution on the mobilising moral in the Kalenjin nation given that digital connectivity presently allows communities to connect without the aid of an

individual. Accordingly, the speaker's attributing the Kalenjin with kingpin dependency is an attempt to the Kalenjin group to the honour of modernity.

'De-roling' on self-effacement is linked with the projection of the poor quality of life in the Kalenjin community in "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" This relates to the notion of digging "broken cisterns" when there is plenty of water around, in the cited Bible scripture, Jeremiah 2: 13. I highlight in the second section of this chapter that the verse analogises the Kalenjin moral problem as the submission to values that do not uplift standards of living. Poor quality of life in the Kalenjin community is conveyed in the parable of Arap Muige in the sermon which in my summary expresses that,

> An old man, Muige, invites his son, Arap Muige, and slaughters a goat for him. Arap Muige has come with his son (The old Muiges grandson). During the meal, Arap Muige is the one that is cutting the goat meat into pieces and serving the group under the instruction of the old Muige. Arap Muige serves his son first giving him the fatty part of the goat which is the most preferred kind of meat in the Kalenjin eating culture. Old Muige interrupts Arap Muige saying, '*Tilchiingei ye akwai*' (Cut yourself the fatty part), and '*yeikoitilchigei ye akwai ii, igochi tiondo*' (after you have cut yourself the fatty part, give the remainder to the 'animal'). The 'animal' is used by Muige to refer to the grandson reasoning that a child is notionally an 'animal' because he is not known if he is the biological son or not. ("Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?", time 0:16:15-0:21:00)

There are two character roles in the story which illustrate the divergent perspectives on the morality of self-effacement. The first one is represented by Arap Muige through serving his son first and offering him the best piece of the meat as a show of good manners. This shows that Arap Muiges moral disposition is self-effacement, which is the view that it is bad manners to attend to oneself before others. The second one is represented by the Old Muige instructing Arap Muige to to serve himself first and offer himself the best. This way, the Old Muiges moral disposition is that being well-mannered can be tampered with in gratifying crucial needs such as feeding. Thus, from the character roles, two moral dispositions are produced which I intend to interpret as honour 'roles.' They are pure self-effacement and liberal self-effacement.

Pure self-effacement connects with the concept of self-effacement as an invariable code even in life-threatening circumstances while liberal self-effacement is the view that self-effacement should be overstepped in life-threatening circumstances. These dispositions are used by the speaker to distinguish the Kalenjin people. According to the speaker, Arap Muiges pure

self-effacement represents the Kalenjin people and, arguably, the Old Muiges liberal self-effacement represents the ideal 'others.' The assigning of pure self-effacement to the Kalenjin as 'de-roling' is best understood from Appiah's (2010: 11) concept of "recognition respect."

Recognition respect refers to the respect earned for being noted with living well. Living well, here, concerns following the moral rules in a society. Thus, one does not need to work to achieve this respect, which means that it is always given as long as one does not fail to uphold the rules. Examples here include civility, abidance by the law and observance of customs. In this light, recognition respect is promptly accessed but what is struggled for is guarding against losing them. Here, recognition respect should be contrasted from 'appraisal respect' which refers to deriving respect from excelling over others in a deed or quality. One must shine above others to achieve respect. Examples include being the top achievers in a certain education field or a certain business sector which are forms of appraisal respect because they are aimed at getting rewards. Arap Muige's moral disposition is, arguably, a case of recognition respect because his serving others first and offering them the best is motivated by the fear in which acting to the contrary leads to disrespect. It is not motivated by the desire to be rewarded for feeding others first but one to be recognised as a good-mannered person.

I argue that the Old Muige's objection of pure self-effacement is a criticism of recognition respect for lacking self-regard. Self-regard here refers to the keenness to attend to personal needs and desire the best for the self. The criticism is conveyed in the side taken by Old Muige on an interesting question on the idea of honour that the objection gesture elicits: should one risk their life to maintain a moral value or save their life first? Put differently, is maintaining good manners more important than overstepping the manners to gratify ones needs? The parable answers this question through the 'animal' model of relations in the remarks: '*Tilchiingei ye akwai*' (Cut yourself the fatty part), and '*yeikoitilchigei ye akwai ii, igochi tiondo*' (after you have cut yourself the fatty part, give the remainder to the 'animal'). Here, the metaphor, 'animal,' stands for a relation whose true blood tie is not known. This, when used in the context of a 'son', means that the self is more important in attending to because even close relatives are strangers from us. Therefore, Old Muige proclaims the senselessness of risking life to maintain recognition respect because people are not inherently indebted to one another. In addition, it is clear that people should not be guilty of not tending others as a result of tending themselves. By extension, this proclamation subverts self-effacement into shame through the linking of the poor

quality of life in the Kalenjin community with over-empathising with others. In contrast, the role played by Old Muige, that the 'others' who have excelled in life have risen above recognition respect to appraisal respect, amends the idea of self-regard from being a form of bad manners to a moral value.

In sum, the 'de-roling' action in "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" and "Awake," performs Kalenjin moral revolution through what Appiah (2010: 85) calls "recruiting honour to the side of morality." The distinction between morality and honour is that morality represents the values of conduct in a system while honour represents the rating of the values outside the system. Thus, the idea of recruiting honour to the side of morality involves situating morality within honour frames. Morality bears on the idea of role in 'living an identity' which refers to adhering to the moral character of identity. Accordingly, recruiting honour to the side of morality concerns detaching the Kalenjin from their moral roles which do not fulfil life in the most desired ways in Kenya such as excelling in education and business. The significant mechanism in the 'de-roling' action is inverting the honour concepts of the Kalenjin prominent moral principles, which are kingpin dependency and lacking self-regard. This involves the demonstration that kingpin dependency and lacking self-regard were forms of honourableness in the past but have become forms of Kalenjin dishonour as members of the Kenyan society in the present era.

4.5: Conclusion

I conclude that the Kalenjin Redress in the selected texts performs honour nationalism in the way imagining honour relates to a social enterprise. A social enterprise should be understood here from the entrepreneurship studies where it describes a venture of mobilising a group to address a "long-standing problem" (Trivedi and Stokols, 2011: 5-6). A long-standing problem is that which affects significantly on the people and is considered to have existed for a substantial length of time. A venture signals an ambitious undertaking that seeks to establish or remove a community value considered as a means of enhancing life in the community. Thus, the context in which imagining honour relates to honour nationalism concerns the ambitious undertaking in a group to resolve a long-standing honour problem.

The chapter notes that the major Kalenjin long-standing honour problem, discovered in the post-victimhood stage, relates to the groups honour system as an 'ignorant' form by the standards of the Kenyan national honour system. 'Ignorance' refers to the individualistic nature

of the groups honour systems in the sense that the systems focus on the internal and immediate situations of the groups. The world comprising of the 'other' groups, and the future, do not constitute significant factors in the group's honour systems. Thus, the problem with the 'ignorance' of groups honour systems is how they are unable to withstand the encounters with the world and the changing times. Accordingly, the chapter notes that the Kalenjin honour problem bears upon the cultural identity defect which is the difficulty by the Kalenjin people to afford decent lives in the present times in the Kenyan system owing to their traditional honour inclinations. The most prominent inclinations noted in the selected texts are resistance to change in leadership thought such as the continued devotion to the kingpin dependency and the overreliance on recognition respect which is the satisfaction in keeping rules rather than enhancing life.

Hence, the chapter submits that the Kalenjin Redress relates to confronting the Kalenjin cultural identity shortcomings through social enterprise. The action morphs into honour nationalism through the involvement of radical mobilisation of the group which is the stirring of the community consciousness into a common course. The chapter argues that the prominent stirring actions in the selected texts are the initiation of the Kalenjin individuality and the appraisal of the Kenyan national honour system. The initiation witnesses the transformation of the Kalenjin divergent ways of life into a homogenous and modernised form based on a corporate sense of honour in the community. This is the logic that an individual Kalenjin persons shame is also the community's and, hence, the Kalenjin individuals must display amid other Kenyans a favourable Kalenjin 'corporate' honour. The appraisal of the Kenyan honour system is noted as a response to the revelation that Kenya's communities presently compete via modernistic concepts of honour such as ethnic community-based entrepreneurship in the cities. It is an imitative and combative appraisal in the sense that it borrows from the exemplars par excellence in Kenya, such as the Gikuyu, who also happens to be the antagonistic group to the Kalenjin group. Thus, the post-victimhood concept of the Kalenjin honour, as a social enterprise, is nationalistic in the sense in which it considers the competition with 'others' over power. Power regards the concept in the Kenyan system that succeeding in ethnic community-based entrepreneurship, for example, leads to the prestige of exercising influence over others. Therefore, honour is conceptualised by the Kalenjin to champion the interests of the community as a contestant of power in the Kenyan space.

CHAPTER 5: PERFORMING ETHICS OF ENTANGLEMENT AS REINTEGRATION

5.1: Introduction

The chapter examines what I consider as the final action in the Kalenjin trans-mediation social drama attendant to the ending of the Moi-presidency, which is the Reintegration. The first part of the chapter defines the terms Reintegration and ethics of entanglement. The second part introduces the selected texts which portray the Kalenjin Reintegration as performing the ethics of entanglement. The final part of the chapter examines the Reintegration action in the selected texts and how the action trans-mediates the Kalenjin nation.

Reintegration stage refers to the strategies of returning life in a group to normalcy following the redress of the circumstances by which the groups life was disrupted and culminated into a crisis. McFarland (2004: 1291) indicates that Reintegration strategies are those actions that negotiate a resolution to orient combatants created in the Crisis into allies. Thus, Reintegration is social drama entails mending relations between the victim group and antagonists following the disruption of the victim groups living. In this light, I consider that the strategies of returning the Kalenjin life to normalcy witnesses revitalising the cordial inter-ethnic living with the rest of Kenya. The previous chapter indicates that the end of the Kalenjin Crisis witnesses an intention to suppress the community's traditional honour system in favour of the country's national honour system. Of interest here is how reviving cordial relationship entails restraining the previously held notions of enmity about others to allow cordial relationship. Thus, this chapter addresses how the Kalenjin nation confronts the in-between state of antagonism and cordialness and, as a result, re-imagine 'Kalenjinness.' I consider that dealing with this dilemma is a case of performing ethics of entanglement.

Entanglement is understood here from Nuttal's (2009) perspective. In Chapter 1, I introduce the notion of entanglement as an understanding of being caught up inextricably with those who are not like us or those who do not approve of us amid the need to live peacefully (Nuttall, 2009: 1). The definition pinpoints the unbreakable network of difference and sameness. In this case, the desire to be separate interacts with the condition of being combined with 'others.' Thus, entanglement, here, describes the situation in which an 'individual,' whether a person or community, is caught up between the desire to be different and the forceful co-presence with a 'group' in a space. To be assembled inflexibly with 'others' in a space means

that the different ways of life of each 'individual' shall eventually be combined into a more or less homogenised form because of borrowing.

In this chapter, I draw on Nuttal's (2009) notion of racial entanglement, which is refers to being caught up as citizens of different races, to postulate a case of ethno-nationality entanglement in Kenya. This describes the situation in which the ethnic nations[1] in Kenya are assembled intractably by the concept of the nation state, and depict a relatively smooth co-existence, against a background of significant inter-group tensions. Thus, the chapter examines the Kalenjin nations Reintegration as dealing with ethno-nationality entanglement which, in this light, may be viewed as performing ethics of ethno-nationality entanglement.

The concept, performance of ethics, is derived from Appiah (2005). The work tackles the question about the best form of living in a cosmopolitan situation and argues that rooted cosmopolitanism, which bears moralising identity, are the most practicable. First of all, cosmopolitanism is defined as both the idea that all human beings are indebted to each other "even from those we disagree with," and the value constituted when all human beings relate with each other like members of a single community (Appiah, 2005: 3). Thus, cosmopolitanism is an imagination of a single community from constituent communities in a region co-existing with each other. Cosmopolitanism proposes sacrificing individual identities in a multi-cultural environment in favour of a mega identity for smooth living. Appiah (2005) mends cosmopolitanism by postulating that a mega identity is not a necessary prerequisite of a smooth co-existence. The work argues that cultural identities can practice rooted cosmopolitanism which is the mingling of cultures that appreciate each other without complete integration (Appiah, 2005: 240). Thus, rooted cosmopolitanism describes living a doubled identity — the super identity combined from the multi-cultural situation and one's original identity or 'roots.' It is a skill of accepting 'others' as entangled in co-existence without forgetting one's difference. Appiah (2005: xv) argues that this skill is a performance of ethics of identity, and defines 'ethics' as the concepts of good living. This suggests that deriving the best living in entanglement

[1] I suggest that ethnicities in the post-independence era should be understood as nations because they are not mobilised by the traditional senses of ethnicity such as culture and instead, seize the ideas that the nation-states employ to imagine themselves as autonomies. As a result, the significance of solidarity in the groups is political; it relates more to strategising on recognition, autonomy and control. Conceivably, the nationalised mobilisation is responsible for the transition in 2010 to the devolved system of government in which the County boundaries overlap with the ethnic patterns of settlement. Therefore, the mobilisation and organisation of the Counties, except in the cosmopolitan ones like Nairobi, overlaps with mobilising and organising the ethnic groups represented by the Counties.

requires two faces: a face that embraces a sense of a mega community and another one that reverses the individual community.

Therefore, the idea that rooted cosmopolitanism embodies ethical skillfulness breaks the notion of permanence in a mega identity. The idea implies that mega-identity, such as civic nationality, is an attitude that is assumed to ease co-presence with multiple others but can abandoned when such challenges are absent, for instance, when members of one ethnic, racial or religious identity are alone. It resembles the duality of public and private living in which individuals display honourable behaviours while in public but switch back to individualistic ways of living, which may be offensive to others, when alone. Accordingly, the chapter focuses on the strategy by which the Kalenjin group ease co-existing with the other forty-three ethnic groups by performing ethics of identity. In this way, the horizon of entanglement is represented by the country whose significance is that the African country was partitioned via colonial agreements without bearing the interests of the local communities. As a result, the communities were amalgamated randomly into abstract enclosures. Therefore, Kenya's sense of entanglement relates to how civic nationhood competes with the distinct cultural identities within. Thus, being a Kenyan is being entangled with others and requires ethnic communities to practice both the national and the ethnic identities to make the best of living with each other. Accordingly, I am concerned with how the Kalenjin group displays to others sameness and cordialness while assuring themselves difference and self-regard.

An appropriate way to examine rooted cosmopolitanism is to draw on an exemplary project and the most suitable here is Afropolitanism. The concept, Afropolitanism, is a proposal for the understanding of Africa — the continent and the people — "as being part of the world rather than being apart" (Mbembe and Balakrishnan, 2016: 29). The prominent idea here is being 'part' which figures a duality of sameness and difference in that the word signifies being inextricable from a larger part but still maintains a sense of being autonomous from the larger system. Afropolitanism relates to rooted cosmopolitanism in two ways. On the one hand, it clears the concepts, such as the colonial notions of Europe as the producer of civilisation and Africa as the consumer, that define Africa as the 'other' counterpart of the world, and the postcolonial

notions like Afrocentrism[2] that proclaim the uniqueness of Africa as a fixed condition. On the other hand, Afropolitanism maintains that 'being part of' does not undervalue the individuality of the 'part' and, in that way, reflect Africa as a recognisable category of humanity. Ferguson (2006: 27-28), for example, notes that Africa continues to resist globalisation by remaining a unique discursive category in the world such as how it distinguishes itself in matters such as property ownership and governance. Additionally, an African continues to recognise themselves and be recognised by others as 'African' despite becoming a 'citizen of the world' which is about the capacity to lead lives in any part of the world and in ways that are similar to any nationality in the world (Eze, 2014: 242). This way, Afropolitanism redefines entanglement with the rest of the world through the ethic of being 'worldly.' This refers to displaying the 'self' to the world as the same as them while subtly displaying to the 'self' difference from the world. It is a display to the world that an African knows how to live well with others and performs tasks like any other global citizen. However, it is also a display to Africans of a new way of benefitting from the world such as getting jobs and business opportunities across the world because the notions elevate the African to an equal platform with the 'others.'

The Afropolitan idea may be appropriated to the Kalenjin post-redress activity in that authenticity is a social construct. There is no such thing as the authentic Kalenjin person, identity or culture. A Kalenjin presently dresses in the Western way as most Kenyans do. They are presently found in the nation's cities and foreign countries. They inter-marry with others and, as a result, there are presently Kalenjins of European, Asian and Other-African descents. Furthermore, some Kalenjins presently do not speak any of the Kalenjin languages. At the same time, there are Kalenjins from the neighbouring ethnic groups such as the Abagusii who became Kalenjin through assimilation.[3] Nonetheless, the concepts of Kalenjin identity and culture continue to exist among the Kalenjins and the rest of Kenya. Accordingly, I suggest that the Kalenjin Reintegration relates to rooted cosmopolitanism noted as an activity of oscillating between the Kalenjin identity and the Kenyan super-cultural identity. Thus, there is a way in

[2] 'Afrocentrism' argues for an engagement with rest of the world that draws on views and sensibilities located and seeking to create a radically 'other' Africa in order to rectify the wrong perceptions that are dependent on Europe (Balakrishnan, 2017, p. 2).

[3] Some clans in the Kalenjin, especially those located in the regions that border with the Abagusii ethnic group that include Bomet and Kericho Counties, have clans, like the *Motoborik, Babasik, Kapbecherek,* and *Kapmago*, which are believed to have descended from persons of the Abagusii community who were assimilated into the Kalenjin. This is compelling since the place names where these clans dominate, such as *Keneni* (hilltop), *Mosubeti* (a place with plenty of water) and *Chingondi* (sheep), are Abagusii names.

which the Kalenjin nation displays sameness to the Kenyan community while displaying to themselves differently.

Accordingly, the major ethics of entanglement I deduce from Afropolitanism are ethic of difference and ethic of benefitting. The ethic of difference refers here to the skill of displaying sameness to the 'others' while communicating to the 'self' difference. The ethic of benefitting is about projecting a sense of equality and fairness in living together, while communicating to the 'self' an opportunity for profiting from the presence of the 'others.'

5.2: The Kass Marathon, the Kalenjin Nights, and the texture of Kalenjin cosmopolitanism: an overview

The noted Kalenjin cosmopolitanism and its performance are depicted in the Kalenjin sociocultural events held after 2010.[4] Prominent here are the Kass Marathon and the Kalenjin Nights, described here below.

The Kass Marathon is an international marathon that is held annually in Eldoret in the Rift Valley. It should be noted here that the athletes who excel in the middle- and long-distance races in Kenya and the world are mainly from the Kalenjin community especially those who live near Eldoret. In this light, the Kass Marathon is interesting here in that symbolises 'homing' the excellence in the world long-distance races. As such, the Marathon offers an experience of running, and spectating running, a vicinity in which athletics is a way of life. This is indicated, for instance, in the remark on how the Kass Media Group was inspired to found the Marathon in the statement that,

> […] in the rift, running is a way of life, running is a religion of sorts, running is a commitment, a commitment that inspired Kass media group to breathes life into the creation of Kass marathon (Kass Marathon, 2019)

The imagery, 'breathing life,' supposes that athletics is a major resource among the Rift Valley but its potential has not been maximised. Indeed, the local athletes, who do not find connection and financial support to participate in the external races, shall benefit from such localised events. However, the idea of breathing life also deploys Kalenjin cosmopolitanism in the sense that Kenya and the world are being invited to the Kalenjin space which transfigures the marathon into

[4] I consider the year 2010 as an appropriate year to mark the onset of the Kalenjin Reintegration because the previous chapter indicates that the Redress action relates to the activities from the mid and end of the 2000s. The consideration is that the effects of Redress begin to be reflected in the community's cultural spaces by this time.

a context of opening up to the others. This connects with Reintegration since the invitation implies a past in which the Kalenjin have not willingly invited 'others' to their space. The action, breathing life, further conveys the self-insulation sensibility by imagining that 'homing' athletics regenerates the Kalenjin life. Even so, how much does the Kalenjin lose or gain as a community?

The imagination resonates with the Afropolitanism facet of being an African strategy of benefitting. Here the African displays to the world that they can live well and perform tasks like any other person in any part of the world and thus elevates their status to being equals in world matters. In this light, Afropolitanism emancipates the African by setting the ground for a self-enhancement activity. This refers to the strategy of building self-esteem which is the desire for people to be positive and satisfied with themselves (Sedikides and Strube, 1995: 1330). Accordingly, the significance of the idea of breathing life to the Kalenjin, as opening up to the world through hosting the Kass Marathon, symbolises the Kalenjin entrance into a self-enhancement stage. The initiative aims to repair the negative images the Kalenjin group have earned from self-insulation trends such as backwardness and self-efficacy held in the past. Thus, Kalenjin cosmopolitanism is examined here as a self-enhancement concept as it relates to departing from being viewed through notions of otherness. Nonetheless, the self-enhancement action requires an ethical context since it entails practising self-regard, which undermines the very sense of inviting the world to the community. Indeed, the Kalenjin in the Marathon do not show off the concepts of power over others in the Marathon. Rather, they are covered up with gestures of warmth in the event. I examine this action in the Marathon documentaries such as "Kass Marathon Profile" (Kass Marathon, 2011) and "2018 Kass Marathon Promo" (KassFM International, 2018); and the Kass-Marathon-themed performances such as Nation TV (NTV) comedy programme known as the Churchill Show.

The "Kass Marathon Profile" is a promotion that was circulated in Kenya's leading TV stations in 2011 and various digital platforms to announce the year's event and to highlight its significance. It narrates the wisdom in the founding of the Marathon and highlights its significance in producing millionaires (from how winners are rewarded with Ksh. 1.5 million) and establishing an opportunity for business since the marathon attracts huge crowds from the country and abroad. The promotion carries a dual voice in the communication of the value of the Marathon. It communicates the Marathon, on the one hand, as an event in which the entire country (and the international community) stands to benefit. On the other hand, there are nuances

in the promotion that the benefit is intended for the Kalenjin nation. This indicates a state of being caught up between establishing a value for the community and the impossibility of actualising the value without the participation of 'others.' Thus, I am interested here in the way in which the Kalenjin imagine self-centred benefitting as a function of co-operating with 'others.'

The "2018 Kass Marathon Promo" is a Kass TV[5] and digital production spotlighting the 2018 event and the achievements of the previous events. The promotion announces the year's event while celebrating the achievements of the Marathon. The key achievement is about discovering talents in the margins. This is communicated to mean the search for talented athletes in the rural villages who would ordinarily be unable to travel to the capital city where the other pre-existing Marathons, such as the StanChat and the Nairobi Marathon, are held. This is supported by the mentioning of athletes such as Geoffrey Mutai who had never participated in any Marathon but, with the participation and winning in the Kass Marathon, eventually won the New York and Berlin Marathons (KassFM International, 2018, time 1:02). The promo gives more details of the duality of voice noted in "Kass Marathon Profile" in which the Kalenjin are communicated to subjectively on the benefits of the Marathon. Thus, I intend to determine how the promo succeeds in carrying out the special communication to the Kalenjin community without endangering the (inter)national aspect of the Marathon.

The Churchill Show features comedians from various walks of life and communities whose performances centre on making fun of the popular pieces of knowledge and ways of life among Kenyans. The Kalenjin comedians in the show, such a Jemutai David (The student) and Duncan, engage in comic descriptions of the Kalenjin people in the context of athletics. The most relevant descriptions are the clips, "How Kenyan athletes behave when they tour abroad" (David, The Student, 2017) and "Kalenjin men go straight to the point" (Duncan, 2017). "How Kenyan athletes behave when they tour abroad" shows the Kalenjin athletes who have won events and now have huge sums of money and how they can visit any expensive entertainment places in foreign cities. However, the athletes do not understand some of the entertainment activities, such as saunas, and, as a result, fail to enjoy the pleasures from the entertainment activities. "Kalenjin men go straight to the point" describes a romantic scene featuring a Kalenjin

[5] The Kass TV is a sequel broadcasting platform of the Kass FM, established in 2006, which broadcasts mainly in the Kalenjin language.

man reconciling with his woman after a previous quarrel. The man is confronted in the reconciliation bid by his inability to speak romantically. However, he succeeds by showing the woman a medal he won from a recent athletics event. This elates the woman arguably because the medal implies the possession of huge sums of money. As a result, these clips assign the Kalenjin people the absurdity of achievement and indifference. They demonstrate that the Kalenjin people achieve much but do not know how to appreciate the achievement. The interesting aspect of this depiction is that they are deployed by the Kalenjin actors to a Kenyan audience. This highlights the actors' appearance as they attempt to pacify the senses of backwardness and self-effacement, noted in the previous chapter, through the notion of achievement despite lack of knowledge and creativity. The Kalenjin here seem to be conscious that rectifying the negative image about their identity requires the participation of 'others' which links with entanglement as conceiving the best modes of fulfilling life as an 'individual' and the knowledge that the others are involved in the fulfilment

The Kalenjin Nights showcases the Kalenjin brands of what Ogude (2012: 147) refers to as "theme nights." Theme nights are popular music and dance festivals that rose in the early 2000s in some discotheques, entertainment halls and restaurants in Kenya's major urban places. The principal activity in the events regards showcasing pieces of ethnic heritage. According to Ogude (2012: 158), the emergence of theme nights in Kenya is associated with the contestation over urban spaces. A typical moment of a theme night involves the live performance of music, displays of cuisine and fashion from the participating community. The most significant hotel in the partnership is the Carnivore in Nairobi. The Carnivore is one of the most popular restaurants and entertainment centres in the city and it specialises in the all-you-can-eat meats that include rare varieties such as crocodile and ostrich. However, the popularity of the Carnivore has, since the mid-2000s, shifted after being the first in the city to offer the Nights event. The Carnivore developed a once-a-year programme of Nights across the country featuring ethnic cultures, such as *Kililimbi* Night (Kamba), *Mulembe* Night (Lughya), *Ramogi* Night (Luo), *Mugiithi* Night (Kikuyu) and *Kass* and *Kitwek* Night (Kalenjin) (Ogude, 2012: 149).

The Nights programme depicts a logic of ethnic communities performing for each other and reflects how, in these performances, an ethnic group would be the centre of interest in a Night. For example, it means that the entertainment focus of a *Kililimbi* Night shall be the display of the Kamba community. As a result, a Night attracts two categories of clients. The first

one is the ethnic comprises of the members of the ethnic group being displayed in the Night. They may not be regular clients in the restaurant but will, on this day, be present both to meet one another and to relive 'home' and more importantly to cheer the performers in showcasing to the 'others' their ethnic identity. The second category comprise the regular clients who attend the Nights to sample various cultural flavours across the country. This category does attend the Night just for the fun of diversity. Thus, the significance of the Kalenjin Nights in this chapter is that the duality of presence — the Kalenjin and the world. I argue that the fulfilment of the Kalenjin group in the event concerns the experience of being appreciated by the world. This indicates how the Kalenjin valuation of the 'self' involves the participation of the 'others' and at the same time underscores that the efficacy of the Kalenjin nation in Kenya is caught up in the existence of other nations in the country.

The duality of presence in the Kalenjin Nights — the Kalenjin and the world — characterises the performers as 'Kalenjin cosmopolitans.' The term, Kalenjin cosmopolitanism, refers here to the Kalenjin consciousness and the willingness to work with a Kenyan community that appreciates all cultures. Hereafter, I refer to this community as the 'Kenya cosmopolitan' to underscore how they transcend ethnic identity to imagine a singular community that combines all the ethnic groups in Kenya. The 'Kalenjin cosmopolitan' differs from the 'Kenya cosmopolitan' in that the Kalenjin assent to being part of a single Kenyan community is unresolved owing to how the Kalenjin audience dominate a given Kalenjin Night event. As a result, I suggest that this entanglement in the Kalenjin cosmopolitanism is best understood from the popular pieces of music that are commonly played in the event. This is because it is expected that the Kalenjin artists are conversant with the need to please the Kalenjin clients and, at the same time, attract the admiration of the Kalenjin by 'others.' Thus, the artists are caught up, in the process of pleasing the Kalenjin community in the event, with the need to depict the Kalenjin positively. I argue that to depict a community positively via art entails being both authentic and creative. Authenticity stands for the expectation of the Kalenjin artists to showcase the Kalenjin culture as it is, without making alterations whatsoever. In addition, creativity concerns the sensibility that the authentic forms may not be as pleasing as the productions from other communities by the popular musical standards in the country. This requires artists to improve authentic forms with popular forms. In this way, entanglement in the Kalenjin Nights witnesses the need to be authentic while being caught up with the need to entertain in resonance with the popular flavours

in the country. Accordingly, I explore the depiction of the entanglement trope in the Kalenjin Nights popular music as a symbolic example of how the Kalenjin community perform Kalenjin cosmopolitanism. A suitable example is the song, "Samantha," by Keneni International (2015).

The song, "Samantha," is about a man who has fallen in love with a woman known as Samantha through Facebook but they have not met because Samantha lives far away. The song expresses the sweetness of having met Samantha but laments how distance reverses love from being sweet to torment. "Samantha" connects with the idea of entanglement through the depiction of an encounter of two divergent ways of constituting a love affair. The first one is the Kalenjin traditional way of entering into a relationship through physical meetings and the endorsement of the parents. The second one is about Facebook as an emerging popular space for finding a partner. Accordingly, I am interested in how both ways unpack the idea of being caught up between submitting to the Kalenjin authenticity and submitting to the popular standards of doing things

5.3: Kalenjin cosmopolitanism as an ethic of self-enhancement: translating from athletics values in the Kass Marathon

This section focuses on the ethic of self-enhancement as another example of dealing with entanglement via rooted cosmopolitanism. It uses the example of athletics values in the Kass Marathon in its examination of the Kalenjin cosmopolitanism as an ethic of self-enhancement. Self-enhancement, introduced in the second section of this chapter, refers to the motivation to improve self-esteem or to earn prominence (Sedikides and Strube 1995: 1330). It stems from a sensation of self-dissatisfaction and aims at being viewed with prestige. This way, self-enhancement is a public 'drama' because it involves displaying imaginatively to others the newness of the 'self' as purged of shameful pasts. I consider self-enhancement as both a creative and offensive public 'drama.' It is creative since it ushers the individual, whether a person or a community, into a new lease of life. Thereafter self-enhancement becomes a sense of value and authority to exercise influence. However, self-enhancement can be offensive because the 'dramas' involved can be also viewed as displays of pride or duping others.

The previous chapter shows that the Kalenjin Redress entails the reconstruction of honour as a result of revealed improprieties, noted prominently being self-efficacy and backwardness. I am interested here in how the Kalenjin employ self-enhancement to address the impropriety examples of self-efficacy and backwardness. The significance of the concern here is that the

action involves the Kalenjin showcasing themselves to the rest of Kenya as cleared from the shameful past. Thus, I am interested in how a showcasing action circumvents the pitfalls of transmitting out self-regard. I examine self-enhancement from the intersection between Afropolitanism and rooted cosmopolitanism, evaluated by Eze (2014: 243) as negotiating otherness. This refers to the interaction between a previously alienated group and the larger group for the alienated group to change the negative perceptions that the larger group have had about them. As a result, I consider the way self-enhancement relates with the negotiation of otherness because showcasing honour while circumventing self-regard involves communicating to 'others' co-operation, and subjective strategy to the 'self.'

The section considers the guiding principles of excellence peculiar to athletics and their role in the constitution of the Kass Sports and Entertainment, which is the Kass Media Group arm that manages the Marathon (Kass Marathon, 2020). I am interested in how the Kass Marathon athletics values, which are conveyed in the Marathon discourses, such as speeches, promos and performances, sketch self-enhancement as the roadmap for Kalenjin cosmopolitanism. The Kass Marathon displays several athletics values such as teamwork, work ethic, championship, sportsmanship and patience. However, the section focuses on individualised teamwork and championship because they are related to self-effacement and backwardness, which are the significant Kalenjin senses of self-dissatisfaction in the pre- Reintegration stage.

I begin with examining the athletic value of individualised teamwork as symbolic to the event of inter-nationalising the Kalenjin as depicted in the documentaries, "Kass Marathon Profile" (KassFM International, 2011) and "2018 Kass Marathon Promo" (KassFM International, 2018). The term, 'inter-nationalising' conceptualises positioning a nation within a network of other nations bearing mutual interests. It conceives of positioning the Kalenjin nation within the network of the Kenyan ethnic nations and the international community through business. The documentaries, "Kass Marathon Profile" and "2018 Kass Marathon Promo," are considered here because they illustrate the Kalenjin nations imagining and branding of athletics as an inter-national Kalenjin business. This is carried in the double-consciousness of the 'world' and the Kalenjin nation in conceiving the public of the Marathon. In principle, the Marathon is configured as a world event — which figures the Kenyan and the international community public. However, it subtly assigns preference to the Kalenjin nation as the strategic public. The "Kass Marathon Profile," for instance, highlights how the Marathon constitutes a significant

space for the rest of Kenya and the international community to advertise their businesses but the business banners displayed beside the track and the finishing line of the Marathon comprise companies that are owned by Kalenjins such as of Transnational Bank and Amaco Insurance. Similarly, the prominent success story in the "2018 Kass Marathon Promo" publicises discovering athletics talents in which most of those discovered are Kalenjins. Thus, the documentaries convey a link between athletics and inter-nationalising the Kalenjin from how they convey athletics as a business concept that thrives on being connected with others. This resonates with Appiah's (2010: 216) figuration of the convenience of cosmopolitanism as a creation of a "global village" in the sense in which a business concept requires a seamless flow of people during production and consumption. The Marathon, in this case, is considered here as an image of a 'global village' of doing business that has been brought near home and, hence, a concept of benefiting the Kalenjin community.

Individualised teamwork refers in the sub-section to the way athletics stands out as an individualised sport and at the same time bears a special way in which teamwork is involved. Individuality in athletics sums the ability to prepare and succeed in athletics based on self-reliance. It is practicable for athletes to train and participate in competitions individually. For instance, Julius Yego, Kenya's first gold medalist in the 2015 World Championship "taught himself to throw the javelin by watching YouTube" (The BBC News, 2015). This contrasts with games such as football in which training and competing depend on the teamed activity. Thus, the uniqueness of athletics here concerns the production of greatness from personhood rather than being in league with others except in the teamed events such as the relay. As such, the performance of an individual in athletics is not contingent upon an 'other' from the same group. In contrast, the football category of sports entails composite success or failure from how the poor performance of some members of the team shatters the success of the entire team even that of the most performing player. The value of individualism in athletics is conveyed in "2018 Kass Marathon Promo" via the narrator's remark that,

> Kass Marathon has led to the discovery of talented athletes
>
> From Geoffrey Mutai, the former champion of New York and Berlin Marathons
>
> Weldon Kirui who won the Los Angeles Marathon
>
> Valerie Jemeli Ayabei who is also the winner of Valencia Marathon, Barcelona Marathon

> And held a podium finish at Berlin Marathon
>
> […]
>
> On the 18th of November 2018, another talent will be discovered
>
> (KassFM International, 2018, time 00:20)

The remark displays an athletics event as a search for persons with athletics itself as a way of improving individual lives. This is evidenced in the pun in the idea of 'discovering' which pictures encountering people who are already prepared for competition, which suggests that the people prepared themselves individually. This way, the marathon is portrayed as a strategy of rewarding individual means to preparedness such as resoluteness, discipline and practice. The individual approach to serving the community is illuminated by the Marathons slogan, '*Jitolee, jijenge*,' (a Kiswahili expression for 'dedicate yourself, build yourself') which specifies that the Marathon serves the community through empowering individuals rather than groups.

Teamwork in athletics exists in the moral support for one another in the athletics concept of 'team.' 'Team' in athletics refers to a group of athletes representing a region, institution or nationality together with the support persons such as coaches, sponsors and cheerers. Hence, athletics teamwork refers to moral support between the members of a 'team.' This is demonstrated by the collective emotions in the 'team' concerning the winning or losing by an individual in the narrator's remark in "Kass Marathon Profile" that,

> We collectively pride in several athletes who sweat their way
>
> Into instant millionaires every year
>
> (KassFM International, 2011, time 0:00:17)

The remark conveys a sense of indebtedness among the members of a 'team' concerning success or failure. This is evidenced in the collective point of view, 'we,' which is used by the speaker to map the scope of the success of the winning athletes. The point of view shows that the value of teamwork in athletics incorporates the consciousness that others are emotionally attached to the others activity. In this way, it implicates the community as the major beneficiary and, as such, supposes that the millions of shillings earned each year trickles to the community eventually. Accordingly, the concept of individualised teamwork in athletics conceives of the efficacy of both free will and fulfilment from togetherness.

I argue that the value of individualised teamwork in Kass Marathon should be understood as inter-nationalising the Kalenjin in the social capitalism sense. Social capital refers here to what Claridge (2017) calls "fettered" capitalism — capitalism that is "socially minded." In this case, capitalism refers to,

> [the] economic system based on private ownership of the means of production and their operation for profit. The key characteristics of capitalism include private property, capital accumulation, wage labour, voluntary exchange, a price system, and competitive markets.
> (Claridge, 2017)

Thus, social capitalism in this perspective figures the concealment of the notion of profiting in creating a property. This connects with the frame of individualism in the Marathon as noted in the slogan '*Jitolee, jijenge*,' ('dedicate yourself, build yourself') and the notion of 'instant millionaires' that relates to the idea of private 'operation for profit.' Nonetheless, the notion of operating for profit is reduced by the view of the millionaires as the pride of the community. Thus, social capitalism is a mode of reducing the excesses of the self-interest of capitalism, which relates to the collective feelings over the success or failure of individuals in athletics. The notion of social capitalism resonates with how Afropolitanism subtly aims to enable Africa to "exercise its weight among other forces in the world" (Mbembe and Balakrishnan, 2016: 33) by displaying to the world a 'social mind.' A social mind here is a portrayal of social engagement as a bilateral good. Hence, the appropriation of a social mind to the constitution of a bilateral force relates to social capitalism because the social mind promotes the acceptance of the given engagement among the 'other' party. Thus, I conceptualise the social capitalism of the Kass Marathon as a performance of the Kalenjin cosmopolitanism in Kenya because it entails the concealment of the Kalenjin 'private ownership' with the assignment of the inter(-)national character.

The documentaries, "Kass Marathon Profile" and "2018 Kass Marathon Promo," indeed convey Kalenjin social capitalism in the Kass Marathon in several ways. The most significant here is the commodification of 'Kalenjinness' and imagining the Kalenjin ownership of athletics sport in Kenya.

The term, commodification, here refers to the figuration of the monetary value on something — the discovery of something as sellable (Fleissner, 2006: 41). The commodification of 'Kalenjinness', in this context, conceives of the discovery that certain aspects that are

particular to the Kalenjin community can be monetised. The Kass Marathon specifies these aspects as the athletics prowess and Eldoret city. The particularity of athletics prowess to 'Kalenjinness' is evident in the striking excellence of the athletes from the Kalenjin community in Kenya and the world. Accordingly, athletics is widely considered as a Kalenjin affair that proclaims exceptionality to the Kalenjin people. Thus, the marketability of athletics prowess among the Kalenjin concerns the logic of tourism and the exchange of the exceptionality with money. Eldoret city is significant within the Kalenjin imaginaries due to its position as the Kalenjin 'capital' city because it is the largest urban centre in the region and located in the area where most of the prominent Kalenjin athletes hail from. This is conveyed, in the nickname of the city as 'the city of champions' which has led to the erection of the famous City of Champions Monument at the gateway point to the city from Nairobi as the cities emblem. The marketability of Eldoret city concerns the investment opportunities that arise as a result of business favourability that athletics adds to the city. The monetary concept of the Kalenjin athletics prowess and Eldoret city is conveyed in the narrator's reasoning in "Kass Marathon Profile" that the Marathon is an appreciation of a "homegrown talent" (KassFM International, 2011, time 0:00:30), and the remark in "2018 Kass Marathon Promo" that,

> Marathon is coming home
>
> Kass marathon 2018 is scheduled for 18th of November in Eldoret
>
> This is a unique event in which it draws together
>
> All athletics heroes and allows them to participate in an event
>
> That is of their own and homegrown
> (KassFM International, 2018, time 0:01)

The concept of home in 'homegrown talent,' and homing the marathon posits athletics in the region as a spontaneous ability. It also proclaims the uniqueness of the 'home' life of the Kalenjin people like athletes and, hence, the attractiveness of experiencing an athletics event in their place. Thus, I argue that the interesting aspect of 'home' relates to the expectation of an 'unprocessed' sight of running that is different from the sights of the popular athletes in stadiums and international cities. In this case, the 'processed' character of the stadium and international cities conceives undergoing systematic pieces of training, the use of equipment, and exposures. As a result, the demand for Eldoret city in terms of hosting facilities (such as hotels and shops)

and opportunity for advertising businesses, is configured by the idea of home about the Marathon. In this light, the commodification of 'Kalenjinness,' as self-enhancement concerns the display of genius in devising a business plan.

The commodification of 'Kalenjinness' resonates with Appiah's (2005: 6-7) notion of "plan for life" as a mode of living well in rooted cosmopolitanism that is "developing the capacity for autonomy" for wellbeing. It is a view that to co-exist smoothly relates to success in which individuals have planned their lives to succeed. The goodness with the 'plans for life' is that they produce role identities which refer to what different people in a cosmopolitan system "live-as" (Appiah, 2005: 16). They are identity-based specialised trades by which constituent groups in a system fulfil each other's lives through the exchange of the trades. Thus, the Kalenjin utilise Kass Marathon to construct their role identity in Kenya. They strategise to supply Kenya with the commodity of athletics with Eldoret city enabling them to construct value upon themselves amid 'other.'

Imagining the Kalenjin ownership of athletics in Kenya refers here to perceiving athletics as a Kalenjin brand of a commodity. This relates, firstly, to the publicisation in the Marathon to the effect that the best experience of athletics in Kenya is that which features the Kalenjin people and, secondly, to the instruction of the Kalenjin community to own the experience economically. The publicisation of the Marathon as the best athletics experience in Kenya is depicted in the remark on the "Kass Marathon Profile," by the then Athletics Kenya (AK) president, Isaiah Kiplagat, and a Kalenjin, who graced one of the certification events of the Marathon remarks that,

> We have all the sponsors who have come Eldoret to sponsor athletics
>
> We would like to congratulate and thank them all
>
> This is now a benchmark for all other marathon races in Kenya
>
> This is a benchmark
>
> If anybody can achieve what you have achieved today
>
> Then we can rate them in the same level.
>
> (KassFM International, 2011, time 0:12:58)

A sense of localising the ownership of athletics in the country in the remark above is depicted in the syllogism that connects the excellence of the Marathon, Eldoret and the many sponsors in the event. Arguably, the speaker rates the excellence of the Marathon by the remarkable number of sponsors as evidenced in premising the congratulation on the view of the many sponsors. I argue that the remarkable number of sponsors in the Kass Marathon, which could not be attained in the other Marathons which are yet to be certified, relates to the uniqueness of the Marathon as an Eldoret event as the 'home' of athletics. This reveals a view by the sponsors, who are mainly business-oriented, that they stand to make huge returns in Kass Marathon than any other In this way, Kass Marathon plays down the ranks of other athletics events in Kenya, such as the Stanchat and the Nairobi Marathons, and cast them as sub-versions of the Kalenjin brands. In addition, Kalenjins initial strategy of imagining the ownership of athletics in Kenya assigns themselves the expertise in the production of athletics.

The instruction of the Kalenjin community to own the experience of the athletic privilege is noted in the mobilisation to a business opportunity in the Marathon. The mobilisation is blanket, meaning that it appears to target the Kenyan and international community, but there is a way in which it speaks mainly to the Kalenjin nation. This is depicted in the narrator's remark in "Kass Marathon Profile," that,

> Starting at Kapsabet in Nandi County
>
> To Eldoret in Uasin Gishu County
>
> The races attract over 50,000 at the starting point
>
> 200,000 along the route
>
> And over 500,000 at the finishing point
>
> A massive advertising opportunity for the corporate fraternity
>
> (KassFM International, 2011: time 0:0:58)

The sentiment above speaks strongly to the Kalenjin nation via an inter-textual allusion to an event coinciding with the 2011 event. This is about the formation of the Sergoit Golf and Wildlife Resort which is a project aimed to establish a world-class sports tourism city in Eldoret leveraging on hosting the Kass Marathon in the city. The project is conceived on the availability of a 3000-acre land site situated in Sergoit near Eldoret town. Hence, it seeks to expand the

Marathon from being a competition-only event and a seasonal one to accommodate running for fun, taking advantage of the highland setting of the Eldoret area, and allowing participants to visit the city and the community any time. The Sergoit project stands to generate huge proceeds because it shall be the only one of its kind in the world after Mexico as a highland athletics facility (KTN News Kenya, 2018, time 0:03:56). Of interest here is how the Sergoit project subtly competes with the outsourcing of investors to exploit the emerging business opportunities. The project depicts a parallel but more vigorous community mobilisation targeting the Kalenjin community to seize the investment moments. For example, the ground-breaking ceremony of the project in 2012, covered on Citizen TV (2012), shows Gladys Sholley, a prominent Kalenjin lawyer and a key speaker at the event, encouraging the Kalenjin athletes to invest in the project because it is "their" project (Citizen TV, 2012, time 0:0:42). This indicates an idea among the Marathon organiser's that athletics in Kenya should not only bear the Kalenjin brand but its economic value should also be owned by the community.

The mobilisation of the Kalenjin to own athletics as a branded commodity resonates with Appiah's (2005: 216) concept of "fluidity of capital flows" as a value in cosmopolitanism. The fluidity of capital flows refers to the seamless flow of goods and services in the world as a result of globalised investment. The significant point here is that the flow of the nationalised[6] companies and branded products across the world, such as the BBC, Mercedes-Benz and Coca-Cola, also means the flow of the honour of the represented nationalities in the world. Similarly, I argue that the branding and consolidation of the Kalenjin ownership of athletics is a strategy of releasing the Kalenjin honour externally. It is an act of establishing a symbolic relationship between Athletics in Kenya and 'Kalenjinness' so that the identity 'self-enhances' in the process of the flows of athletics as capital in Kenya's network of ethnic nations.

Here, I turn to assess the athletics-themed comedies in the Churchill Live show, "How Kenyan athletes behave when they tour abroad" and 'Kalenjin men go straight to the point,' in the examination of the relationship between the athletic value of championship and self-enhancement. Championship refers here to the motivation to become a victor in a competitive event. It is a characteristic that gives athletics the significance of individuality. In the foregoing part, I argue that success in athletics is individual first before it is communal. Athletics is a contest of individuals to show their worth whether the worth is a talent, training or both talent

[6] They are 'nationalised' because they are symbolic to their countries of origin.

and training. The millions of cash that the Kass Marathon prepare for the winners gratify the individual interests first before trickling to the community in ways such as business opportunities in the athletics events and investment activities by the winners. This suggests that athletics events are a discovery of individuals worth which ordinarily would not be known.

The interesting thing here is that once the individual's worth is discovered publicly, the living of that individual changes remarkably. The individual starts to command respect in public besides the standard of living which is uplifted by the millions of cash pocketed. Thus, 'championship' is used here as a metaphor for self-enhancement that capitalises on public events to demonstrate one's worth to transform one's life. A public event, in this case, refers to a situation in which all those who matter to know one's worth are present. This connects with the concept of an honour system, discussed in the previous chapter, which means the extent to which one derives honour. In the chapter, I suggested that one gain or loses honour in a closed environment whereby one does not significantly feel shame in an inappropriate deed committed in a foreign space. The people who matter to know ones worth, in this light, regard the subjects of an honour system which, in this case, refers to the Kenyan society in the context of the Kalenjin individuality. Hence, a public event describes a situation in which the rest of Kenya is assembled.

The Churchill Live show fits into the concept of a Kenyan assembly because its shows are broadcast on NTV, which is one of the top national TV stations in Kenya. More so, the comedies mainly depict Kenya's common instances of living among various types of people where the most prominent typology is ethnicity. The performances feature satirical stereotypes in that the stories of the commonly known ways of living in certain ethnic groups either by actors from the ethnic groups being depicted or from the 'others.' Thus, Churchill Live constitutes a Kenyan assembly because the performances bear an inter-ethnic feature and it is 'live.' It is a programme that convenes the ethnic groups who deem it important to know each other's worth because they are entangled as Kenyans. The inter-ethnic feature refers to the selection of actors in such a way that, in a typical show, either an actor satirises an 'other' ethnic group or their ethnic group. The important thing here is that all of Kenya's ethnic groups are represented in the show by the actors from their groups or through depiction. The 'live' aspect signifies that the event is watched by the entire Kenyan nation as the programme is aired between 8 pm to 9 pm, which is the prime TV time in the country. The 'live' assembly of Kenya's ethnic communities

reveal that Kenyans can subvert difference into a laughing matter rather than a context of offending one another. This is evident in how the ethnic groups in the show ridicule themselves and yet laughter is effected rather than animosity. This suggests that there is a way in which Kenyans establishes the shared nature of being ridiculous as communities, gender and classes and how the 'sharability' unifies more than divides.

Of interest here is the reality that some actors depict their ethnic group ridiculously 'live' and in that make fun of themselves. The comedies, "How Kenyan athletes behave when they tour abroad" and "Kalenjin men go straight to the point," are examined here for this reason because they feature Kalenjin actors and, at the same time, engage in satirical stereotypes about the Kalenjin. Thus, my question here concerns how the Kalenjin depict themselves ridiculously in public and, still, derive a sense of marketing their worth. The major aspect of ridicule in the comedies is the conception that the Kalenjins are poor speakers of Kiswahili, English and Sheng owing to how the group prefer living in the rural areas and is excluded from 'others.' The popularity of the stereotype is supported in a remark from a popular Kenyan social site, *Hivisasa*, titled, "Most annoying stereotypes about Kalenjins," which states that,

> Most people say Kalenjins cannot speak queens English language or contemporary urban Kiswahili. It is said that Kalenjins date each other in colleges so as to pepper in their mother tongue. (Kiprono, 2019)

The stereotype above implies that parodying Kalenjin via accent would be offensive to the Kalenjin audiences because it reminds them of the shame of backwardness popularly assigned to them by the rest of Kenya. However, the performers in the comedies, "How Kenyan athletes behave when they tour abroad" and "Kalenjin men go straight to the point," incorporate this aspect in creating a humorous image of the Kalenjin community via rampant use of the Kalenjin 'bad' English, Kiswahili or Sheng. Nonetheless, they succeed in amusing the audience including the Kalenjin, revealing that there is a way in which shame is relieved by reliving it in the context of athletics. As a result, I delve into the stories in the comedies to examine the action of reliving as relieving.

I summarise the stories in the comedies, "How Kenyan athletes behave when they tour abroad" and "Kalenjin men go straight to the point," as follows:

> A team of Kenyan athletes are in Russia for an international event. They are given a day off to tour Moscow city. The first facility they visit is a Sauna. They have never seen a sauna before and, so, they ask their guide what it is. They are told that they are rooms which people enter naked and enjoy a steam bath. Then, they are invited to sample the saunas but they refuse, reasoning that they are not going to sweat doing anything when they have enough opportunities in athletics to sweat. The next place they visit is a club. They wear tracksuits and they are recognised immediately they enter. The DJ asks them to request for a piece of music to be played for them. They ask for Kenya's national anthem ("How Kenyan athletes behave when they tour abroad")

> An aetiology about the Kalenjin as unromantic people. The actor situates the aetiology on the statement 'we don't beat around the bush we hit the nail on the head' (Duncan, 2017, time 00:15). The qualifying story is about a Kalenjin man, James Paulo Kibitok and his woman, Jeptoo. They quarrelled before and they have not met to resolve the problem. Then, they meet. The girl tries to be sweet to him by calling him JP, for James Paulo but the man refuses, insisting that he should be called by his name as it is. Meanwhile, the man frequently uses the expression, '*kwerraa*,' which is a Kalenjin corruption of the Kiswahili, '*kwenda*,' communication of disapproval of someone's thinking or action. Finally, he resolves the past quarrel by asking Jeptoo to touch feel his chest and asks her what she feels. Jeptoo replies that it is a heartbeat. The man denounces her saying it is a gold medal. Jeptoo is happy ("Kalenjin men go straight to the point,")

The significant feature in the story that relates to the idea of reliving as relieving is the dramatic juxtaposition of shame and prestige. The first story depicts the inter-positioning of the Kalenjin athletes' naivety and the sense of achievement among the athletes for having been to international cities. The second story focuses on the timidity of Kibitok to act romantically towards Jeptoo to resolve a relationship problem and Kibitok's possession of a medal, signifying wealth, through which he calms Jeptoo despite his timidity. In my view, the juxtaposition depicts an act of subverted initiation.

Initiation is understood here as admitting an individual to a secret society or a peer group, through rites of determining readiness (Scott, 2009: 2) It is a requirement for an individual to demonstrate within the public view of the members of the admitting group that one deserves to be accepted. I use 'initiation' to describe the acceptance of the Kalenjin to ridicule themselves in Kenyas public as an avenue for self-enhancement. I argue that the Kalenjin nation is undergoing an initiation to be accepted among Kenyans as part of them rather than being apart from them. The definition above indicates that an individual must show readiness in an initiation which means that the individual undergoes certain tests in 'public' which, conceivably, are demanding. The depiction of the shames of inability to speak the national languages well, naivety and

timidity signify this demanding aspect of initiation because ideally the actors, as representatives of the community, are 'washing their dirty linen' in public. This indicates that they are admitting their dishonourable past in order to be accepted by the Kenyan society as noted by Scott (2009: 2) that initiation is a mark of an ending of a past 'journey' and a beginning of another. Thus, an initiate of a bad past is required to confess that past as a final mark towards being renewed. I argue that the initiation action in the stories is a mode of communicating to the Kenyan nation that we have a dishonourable past — we speak national languages badly, we are backward and timid — but we wish to relinquish the aspects be accepted into the group. This resonates with the Afropolitan acts of relinquishing the Afrocentric mentality. According to Balakrishnan (2018: 576), Afropolitanism is an ending of black nationalism, which is a depiction that 'blackness' is what defines Africans, because it disentangles blackness from Africa. In my view, this is a sacrificial act, which is a ceding of a fundamental emotion about 'Africanness' to be accepted by the world. Similarly, the Kalenjin nation cede the cherishing of a secluded life that leads to the inability to speak the national languages well and ignorance in the cities.

The idea of a subverted initiation regards the 'tampering' of the 'initiation' shame. This refers to the acts of lessening the effects of shame reminding the viewers of a dishonourable past as an initiation requirement. The acts refer to the counteractions of the implied shames — naivety and timidity with undertones of prestige through athletics. I argue here that athletics prowess defeats the magnitude of the 'initiation' shame via the play-up of 'championship' which I have argued as a contestation of self-worth. The actors in the comedies are engaging in a debate concerning the important elements of prestige in a person: between the inherent characteristics, such as language proficiency, civilisation and outgoingness, and material wealth. As a result, the stories defeat the element of inherent characteristics by alluding to the critical economic situation in the country. The rising cost of living and unemployment in the country are some of the grounds by which Kenyans would typically prefer to be wealthy than to possess qualities that do not address the hard economic situation. Thus, the 'bad' Kalenjin English, Kiswahili or Sheng is an announcement to the rest of Kenya about the change of honour system from inherent characteristics to wealth. This assigns prestige to the Kalenjin because, already, the group have commodified athletics and 'owned' the sport as an economic brand in the country. The monopoly of athletics prestige suggests that, despite the initiation into the Kenyan realm of sameness, the Kalenjin imagine difference through athletics prowess. This resonates with the

concept of difference in cosmopolitanism as shifting from cultural realities, which is the sense of community via shared cultural traditions, to identity realities, which is the sense of community via interests (Appiah, 2005: 118). In addition, the Kalenjin submit to Kenya cosmopolitanism in that the inter-ethnic differences are laughable and, in that way, allude to the cultural difference by which the ethnic groups have imagined difference with each other. However, the Kalenjin here find themselves in a different sense of otherness concerning the athletics prowess and how it changes lives in the community from the rest of Kenya. Therefore, the initiation noted in the stories are expressions of rooted cosmopolitanism because it admits the Kalenjin to the Kenyan group but withdraws them subtly on emerging forms of identity differentiation.

In sum, I argue that Kalenjin cosmopolitanism, as an ethic of self-enhancement in Kass Marathon, reiterates Ezes (2014: 243) concept of negotiating otherness which is the interaction between a previously alienated group in order to change the perceptions that the world has had about them. The Kalenjin, in this case, seek to show that their otherness is not necessarily about shame but prestige also. This is evident in the displays of magnificence about 'Kalenjinness' such as the business idea on athletics exceptionality and Eldoret city, and the possession of athletics-related material wealth. Thus, the value of Kalenjin cosmopolitanism is about how the enabling situation in each case relates to the context of togetherness as Kenyans and difference in terms of ethno-nationality. Kalenjin cosmopolitanism also resides in the co-present situation among Kenyas ethnic groups as well as a rivalry. Accordingly, I argue that Kass Marathon is an ethic of the Kalenjin rivalry with 'others.' It communicates to the world the economic value of the Kalenjin-oriented athletics but subtly conveys to the Kalenjin the idea of owning the economic value ahead of the world.

5.4: Kalenjin cosmopolitanism as an ethic of difference: the example of the Kenyan hip-hop in the Kalenjin Nights pop music

In this section, I examine Kalenjin cosmopolitanism in relation to the idea of entanglement and the concealment of difference as depicted in Kenyan hip-hop performed in the Kalenjin Nights Pop Music. I demonstrate in the foregoing section that entanglement conceptualises the condition of the Kalenjin as ensnared among Kenyan 'others.' This presents an aspect of entanglement of Kenyan hip-hop to the Kalenjin Nights pop music in that the Kalenjin Nights pop music seek to represent identity in the authentic sense but is caught up in the universality of Kenyan hip-hop. The ethical aspect of difference, here, concerns depicting

contentment in being homogenised with others into a singular community against the reality that homogeneity threatens the autonomy of constituent communities. Accordingly, I am interested here in how the Kalenjin community interacts with Kenya cosmopolitanism, which is the totality of the 'other' identities in Kenya. I submit that the ethic of difference relates to a duality in the Kalenjin cosmopolitan voice in the Kalenjin Nights Pop Music which orients itself to the Kenyan system while making huge reservations for the Kalenjin.

Here, the understanding of orienting oneself to the totality of others while making reservations for the 'self' is an act of what Nuttall (2009: 28) refers to as "transgression," and is defined as "what draws together" in differentiated identities such as race, ethnicity and nationality. This conceives of the justifications of overstepping the bounds of being one's identity. The act shows that, despite the compartmental nature of identities, slipping away occurs as a means of satisfying everyday life needs. The incapacity of the 'compartment' to fulfil the everyday life needs is supplemented by resorting to 'others' even those with whom we do not wish to associate. The parties in international trade, for example, are strangers, and even enemies, who are compelled by everyday life needs to transact business with one another. This renders the duality as the ideal way of life because it addresses both the need for a discrete identity and the fulfilment of everyday life.

Accordingly, the section aims to determine how Kalenjin cosmopolitanism is a mode of transgressing into Kenya cosmopolitanism. In line with this, the section compares the selected Kalenjin Nights pop music, considered here as indicative of Kalenjin cosmopolitanism, with some Kenyan hip-hop music, considered as typical to Kenya cosmopolitanism, to determine how the Kalenjin embrace the idea of being entangled with the 'others' in Kenya against the concern to retain their individuality. However, the categories, 'Kalenjin Nights pop music' and 'Kenyan hip-hop music,' are dimensional concepts and not representations of self-evident types. The line that separates each of them from what should not be included in the categories is unstable. Thus, I unveil briefly the understanding of the categories in the chapter and the point of connection by which I examine the entanglement between the Kalenjin and the Kenyan strands of cosmopolitanism.

Here, 'Kalenjin Nights pop music' is the type of music commonly played on the Kalenjin Nights because it fits into the uniqueness of the event. The previous section shows that the Kalenjin Nights are unique from other Kalenjin public entertainment events in that this one is

city-based and draws clientele from both the Kalenjin and the non-Kalenjins. Thus, the 'Kalenjin Nights pop music' is a figuration that there is a variety of music that both entertains the typical Kalenjin person and represents the Kalenjin community to the non-Kalenjin audience favourably. The music should comprise pieces that, apart from showcasing the Kalenjin culture authentically, should be viewed by others as 'great works' so that they earn the community respect. This suggests that the Kalenjin-Nights-oriented artists are compelled to explore the Kenya-national and even international styles that are popularly considered as 'great works' in order to enhance their forms.

As such, the Kalenjin Nights pop music is distinguished from the rest of the Kalenjin pop music in the way they are focused on displaying the Kalenjin skill of blending with the external pop forms. The musical texts are recognised as Kalenjin only through language and references to the particularity of the Kalenjin life while the musical elements, such as tune and rhythm, are exotic. For example, the Kalenjin music is traditionally slow in rhythm as evident in the pre-hip-hop productions by artists such as Kipchamba arap Tipotuk, Manori, Tumbalal, and Arap Laboso, which seek to be authentic to the folk forms. The present varieties, such as Diana Chelele, Faith Marende, Sweetstar, Keneni, Olessos Melodies, Rhino, Kaboom, Ben Bii and Brownny Jazz, in contrast, bear quick tempos resembling the Kamba ethnic group, the Congolese soukous, and the South African music such as Ntombi Marhumbini and Pamela Nkutha which were popular in Kenya in the 1980s and 90s. Thus, the category of the 'Kalenjin Nights pop music' is considered here as performing in a manner cohering to Kalenjin cosmopolitanism from the way they reflect an exotic sense of musical 'greatness' and, still, reroute meanings to the specificity of the Kalenjin community.

The 'Kenyan hip-hop music' here refers to the Kenya popular music that is typical to the Kenyan hip-hop culture expressed in styles in fashion, language, mannerism, music and dancing associated with the Kenyan street culture (Kidula, 2012: 173). Thus, Kenyan hip-hop is located in the nations hip-hop expressive culture. I suggest that the most significant texture of an expressive culture is the music medium since music presents, as a cultural performance, the "actor's repertoire of conventions, set pieces, gestures, quips, and gags constituting their verbal and gestural tradition" (Barber, 2005: 264). A cultural performance sums the society's ways of life by drawing on them as raw materials for the singing discourse given that the performance is intended to comment on those ways of life. Studies on the Kenyan hip-hop, such as Nyairo and

Ogude (2003), Wa-Mungai (2007) Ekdale and Tully (2014) and Kitata (2020), indicate that the distinguishing characteristics of the Kenyan hip-hop music genre are mainly the incorporation and use of Sheng (an urban language that blends Kiswahili, English and sometimes some ethnic languages), remixing of the foreign and local forms, and expression of a voice of resistance against Kenya's political and moral issues. I observe further that there is a need to distinguish between what I conceptualise as the 'Kenya-popular' and the 'Kenya-ethnic-popular' hip-hop music.

Here, I figure that certain hip-hop music is popular in the wider Kenyan public while others are popular within the ethnic spaces. I postulate that Kenya-popular hip-hop music should be understood as detribalised forms. This conceptualises how they convey 'Kenyanness' as an identity that is detached from the ethnic group. They succeed by treating issues that touch on the wider Kenyan public in the 'national' languages; Kiswahili, English and Sheng. They also deploy images that bear a national character such as the popular elements of the capital city and the trending social and political issues in the country. As a result, they may be measured by how they are commonly played in the 'national' radio and TV stations such as Nation TV (NTV) and Easy FM, Citizen TV and Radio, and Kenya Television Network (mages) and Radio Jambo. In contrast, the 'ethnic-popular' pieces are played mostly in the ethnic-language-based radio and TV stations because their horizons are focused on issues of the local society. Thus, the section is premised on the consideration that the hip-hop artists, such as King Kaka, Nameless, Jua Cali, Kaligraph Jones, Ethics, Size-8, Octopizzo and Nonini, as the typical examples of Kenyan hip-hop music because their works are significantly 'detribalised' forms. Accordingly, the distinction of the 'Kenya-popular' music establishes a facet of Kenyan hip-hop that matches Kenya cosmopolitanism. The facet affords a basis for examining the Kalenjin Nights pop music as inter-textual forms. Thus, I determine the ethic of entanglement by comparing the Kenya-popular hip-hop song, which is Octipizzo's (2020) "*Nikupate*" (I get you), and the Kalenjin Nights pop song, Keneni's "Samantha."

There are several Kenyan-popular hip-hop music features in the Kalenjin Nights pop music. Here, I focus on the Octipizzo's "*Nikupate*" and Keneni's "Samantha" submission to what I call the 'Kenyan speech.' I posit that human speeches can be linked to localities and popular cultures by idiom where 'idiom' refers to the mutual shortcuts of transmitting meaning (Wang, 2017). The idea of mutual shortcuts shows that meanings depend on an already

established connection between the speaker and the listener and, as such, an idiom is a communicative recourse to the shared figures of speech to convey meanings quickly. The shared figures of speech, by extension, discriminate speeches according to the peculiarities by which the speaker and the listener are connected because of the varied environments within which people draw figures of speech. This discriminative sense of idiom relates to a language in Kenya that began with the youth in the major urban places and institutions of learning which has become a significant form of interaction in multicultural situations. This is code-switching in Kenya's languages. Code-switching here refers to "the mixture of one or more linguistic varieties within a single conversation" (Abubakr et al, 2019: 57). It is a pooling of the most effective linguistic units, such as words, sentences or grammar, from the languages that one knows to afford successful communication. Thus, it is a tapping on the synergy of multiple fluencies to communicate successfully in that whenever the primary language fails, the other(s) intervene(s).

Ogechi (2002. p. 94) indicates that the typical Kenyan code-switching experience among speakers from different ethnicities is trilingual, featuring Kiswahili, English and Sheng, while speakers from the same ethnicity code-switch in the ethnic language, English, Kiswahili and Sheng. The thought of a cosmopolitan in Kenya before the 1980s, which relates mainly to education and exposure to urban life, is that they speak three languages. These are the ethnic language as 'mother tongue,' Kiswahili as lingua franca, and English as the language of the schools. This implies that they can code-switch in the three languages. However, Sheng has become Kenya's third 'national' language since the 1980s with some people being born into Sheng-speaking parents and, hence, use Sheng as their first language (Mazrui, 1995: 169). There is a debate on whether Sheng should be viewed as a distinct language, such as Bosire (2009); code-switching between Kiswahili, English and some vernacular languages such as Mazrui (1995); or a Kiswahili variant such as Githiora (2018). Here, I take the view that Sheng is a distinct language because it is compelling to note that the language does not simply draw words from the material languages and places them side by side to communicate. It also performs 'manipulations' such as inflecting borrowed forms into new shapes and meanings and also coining new words which do not relate either to Kiswahili, English or any other known language (Bosire, 2009: 79).

The addition of Sheng into the range of Kenya's national languages indicates that the 'Kenyan speech' is being proficient in code-switching in four languages, which are the ethnic

language, Kiswahili, English and Sheng. However, the 'Kenyan speech' splits in a similar way to the Kenyan popular music which bears the ethnic popular forms and the purely national forms. In this case, I suggest that there is a regular 'Kenyan speech' that entails the four languages and represents the unresolved attitude among Kenya's ethnic groups towards the idea of a singular community. In contrast, there is a higher 'Kenyan speech' that is mainly used by those who are already within the detribalised identity. These are persons who do not speak the ethnic language, conceivably, as a result of living in extreme cosmopolitan places or belonging to mixed parentage and, hence, are proficient only in Kiswahili, English and Sheng. Accordingly, I treat the 'Kenyan speech' as a definitive element of an archetypal Kenya cosmopolitanism from the dimension of being super-cultural — the speech is formed from the purely national languages. Therefore, the entanglement concern here entails how the Kalenjin deals with 'Kenyan speech' as an identity group that is also with protecting the individuality of their language.

Octipizzo's song, "*Nikupate*" (I get you), is an example of Kenya-popular hip-hop music that exemplifies the super-cosmopolitan 'Kenyan speech' in action. The song is about youth life and frustration in Nairobi's streets. It expresses a view that the ideal sense of life in the city regards the ability to make merry which the youth do not afford. The singer spotlights the pitfalls of living in Nairobi in deprivation and refers to issues such as losing women to those who have money and falling into drugs. This is depicted in the following segments in which the singer deploys the Kenyan speech (Kiswahili and Sheng are in italics. Sheng is underlined):

Nikivutanga <u>shada</u>,	When I smoke weed
nakuaga <u>niko rada</u>	I become extremely fine
Rada, sana hamwezi <u>niwai</u>	Extremely fine, you cannot beat me
Ooh Lord of mercy	Oh Lord of mercy
Ebu nipe huyo Mercy Mercy	Give me this Mercy Mercy
Kila siku niku-party	Every day is partying
Daily *zetu niku*-party party party	Each of our days is to party
Kwa <u>mresh</u> wangu nikupate	To my beauty, let me find you
Nikupate niku<u>kate</u> <u>kate</u>	Find you to 'cut' you 'cut' you
<u>Ka</u> uko <u>IG</u> basi follow me	If you are in IG then follow me'
<u>Ka</u> *uko <u>IG</u> basi* follow me	If you are in IG then follow me

(Octopizzo, 2020, stanza 3 and refrain)

Notably, the above segment is themed on the need to be understood. This refers to participation in immoral life, such as smoking marijuana, as a victim of circumstances rather than being a bad person. The need to be understood visualises that anyone would end up doing the testified life if placed in the same situation as the victim. It is a way of countering the habit of judging individuals basing perceived character traits and, hence, a consideration of the possibility that the individuals were forced by circumstances that are hard to overcome. The projection of the need to be understood is conveyed in the supplication for 'mercy' so that the songs persona can access the pleasurable forms of life without the aid of marijuana. The singer here communicates that society is harsh to the poor youths because it favours those who have money. The rhymes, 'mercy' and 'Mercy' conveys a crying out that the persona stands to lose his woman, Mercy, because society does not have mercy on the poor. The woman will be taken by someone else who has money. The risk of losing the woman is depicted in the songs video text (Octopizzo, 2020) in scenes of the persona and his woman in various intimate positions such as hugging and the presence of another man who pulls the woman away whenever the persona is inattentive. Thus, the segment above is an expression of the need to be understood over the use of drugs to calm himself given that the means by which the persona derives happiness amid deprivation, which is the presence of his woman, Mercy, is threatened by the possibility of losing her to those who have money.

I argue that the need to be understood, as a linguistic event, involves the determination of an audience. The audience must be proficient to understand the speech and, by extension, should also identify with the neediness of the speaker. Here, I postulate that there is an overlap between the linguistic understanding and the understanding of states such as neediness. The overlap is portrayed in the singer's strategy in the segment above of discriminating the audience via the Kenyan speech. It targets only those who are proficient in English, Kiswahili and Sheng. The exclusion of those who are proficient in the ethnic languages suggests that the persona contemplates that those who can understand him are those who are proficient in the higher 'Kenyan speech' which supposes the higher cosmopolitans. It shows the personas conviction that the higher cosmopolitans judge individuals analytically, considering the circumstances through which an immoral behaviour has been reached. I argue that this signifies the mapping of a new identity based on 'super-diversity.' Super-diversity refers to the interaction of forms of identity such as ethnicity with a circumstantial variable such as age, income and occupation (Vertovec,

2007: 1044). This is an indication of an interruption of the 'given' forms of identity by the 'qualified.' Ethnicity, for example, is 'given' because belonging is involuntary, which means that one finds themselves in the group. In contrast, age, income and occupations groups are 'qualified' because they are joined through attaining certain qualities. Hence, the interruption relates to how in an ethnic group there will be sub-identities constituted by issues such as professional sameness. Furthermore, the professionals in one ethnic group may find it more convenient to associate with the same professionals in another ethnic group than the members of their ethnic group who are not in the field. Accordingly, the singer's adoption of the super-cosmopolitans as those who will understand him signifies an imagination of a Kenyan super-cultural identity group in which association is based mainly on understanding each other. In this case, understanding each other is unveiled in the song as the similarity in being victims of deprivation in a society in which respect is derived from being rich.

The Kalenjin Nights pop song, Keneni's "Samantha," is an example of the Kalenjin Nights popular music that presupposes the idea of a super-cultural identity in publicising the notion of the need to be understood. This is evidenced in the narrative in "Samantha" detailing how the persona encountered Samantha and fell in love, depicted in code-switching featuring English, Kiswahili, Sheng and Kalenjin (Kalenjin, Kiswahili and Sheng are italicised. Kiswahili is emboldened and Sheng, underlined):

Kisirwan kolenjin hi	She wrote to me, hi
Kisirwan kolenjin hi	She wrote to me, hi
Ogeer buch omowolchi kiy	I saw it but I did not reply a thing
Ogeer buch omowolchi kiy	I saw it but I did not reply a thing
Kolenjin 'mambo vipi?'	She told me, 'how are things?'
Kolenjin 'mambo vipi?'	She told me, 'how are things?'
Olenji niko rada	I told her I am in an alert state'
Kiteban private number o	She asked me for my private number
Kiteban private number o	She asked me for my private number
Ogochi line two o	I gave her line two
Ogochi line two o	I gave her line two

(Keneni International, 2015: stanza 2)

Here, the need to be understood is expressed via the singers spotlighting of the unique circumstance by which the persona fell in love in a virtual space. Traditionally, entering into a

relationship entails knowing each other adequately and thus, includes several physical meetings. However, the internet has become a medium for these meetings. In this respect, the singer is arguably expressing the dilemma in which, on the one hand, he derives convenience in finding love on the social media platform, Facebook. On the other, he is not sure if the relationship will be fulfilled because the lovers are far from each other; hence, there is a challenge concerning the cost and effort of the physical meetings which they are required to have. The persona says, in another stanza, for example, that, the woman lives in Karandit, which is a remote village in Nakuru County, while he lives in the distant Bomet County (Keneni International, 2015: stanza 1). He also faces the challenge of convincing his people that the relationship shall be fulfilled, even though he expects resistance from his people who are likely to disapprove of the relationship. This mood is expressed by a 'pleading for innocence' tone in the segment above in which the narrative of falling in love shows the falling as an unavoidable event. The persona seeks to persuade his people that he should be left to continue with the relationship despite the oddness of proceeding with a love affair before seeing each other physically.

Nonetheless, the deployment of a Kalenjin version of the 'Kenyan speech' signifies that the singer identifies a special public in the Kalenjin group that understands his situation. He is imagining the magnificence of a super-cultural identity within the Kalenjin group which he identifies with through the experiences of falling in love and sustaining a virtual relationship. In this case, the sub-identity is unveiled as comprising the Kalenjins who bear the Kenyan cosmopolitan identity. They are Kalenjins who can speak, besides Kalenjin, the 'Kenyan speech' which implies the Kalenjins who are educated and exposed to urban life. Conceivably, this is a section of the community also transposes as the category that understand the reality and the challenges of virtual relationship and, hence, a desire for them to associate.

Comparatively, both the songs, "*Nikupate*" and "Samantha," imagine a sub-identity through projecting 'sectionality' in understanding one another. In this case, "*Nikupate*" imagines a section in Kenya comprising of the super-cosmopolitans while "Samantha" imagines a section of the Kalenjin community made up of cosmopolitans. In this way, the Kenyan hip-hop music and the Kalenjin Nights pop music portray sameness and, as result, indicate the Kalenjin as, in Mbembe and Balakrishnan's (2016: 29) terms, "being part" of the Kenyan society rather than "being apart from" it. The sameness shows that the Kalenjin surrender to the ideals in the Kenyan society as a way of improving things. In this case, improving things, firstly, concerns

enhancing their music to strike the non-Kalenjin audience in the Kalenjin Nights as great works. One of the musical techniques, then, is the use of the 'Kenyan speech' to express the experiences of modernity which "*Nikupate*" deploys via the depiction of the city life. This compares with the engagement in the world of information technology in "Samantha." The sameness gestures the Kalenjin people, who are largely rural-oriented, towards modernity and, as a result, facilitates their cultural productions to sell beyond their community and thereby boost income. Secondly, the sense of improving things concerns establishing publics of understanding each other's problems. This relates to the use of a Kenyan speech "*Nikupate*" which enables the persona to purge his frustration through communicating to an imaginatively particularised group that promises empathy over disturbing states. This compares with how "Samantha" imagines a section of the Kalenjin group that understand the reality and challenges of dealing with relationships over the internet. Both personas suppose that there is a section of the society, which is not proficient in certain realities and, thus, fail to judge fairly those who are faced with related challenges.

However, there is a striking difference between the songs, "*Nikupate*" and "Samantha," concerning how they surrender to the Kenya cosmopolitanism. "*Nikupate*" unveils the purely 'Kenyan' types of problems while "Samantha" modifies problems into Kalenjin sub-types. Put differently, "*Nikupate*" presents detribalised modes of identification while "Samantha" retribalises. For instance, the first stanza in "*Nikupate*" deploys the image, 'Gikomba' as a comparison of lightness of the room that the persona fancies as a venue of hosting his woman. Gikomba is a popular market for imported second-hand household items, such as clothes, in Nairobi. It is a space that is ordinarily filled with most of the desired items in life. Arguably, then, the Gikomba image 'Kenyanises' identification in the song by imaging a popular spot among the majority of Kenyans because that is where the prices of desired items are affordable. This fits into the discriminative concept of an idiom because the meaning of lightness is conveyed successfully via the establishment of a mutual understanding of the place. The persona and the underprivileged Kenyans understand the place as an impressive environment because it is filled with most of what one would like to buy. In contrast, Keneni (2015) plays an impure concept of Kenya cosmopolitanism. This relates to how the persona in the music locates his lover within the Kalenjin area, 'Karandit', despite his fluency in the 'Kenyan speech' and being a regular in Facebook. The 'Kenyan speech' and Facebook suggests a vast space across which one

can find a lover from any ethnic group but, still, the persona finds Samantha who is a Kalenjin. This shows the personas positioning of himself in Kenya cosmopolitanism via the 'Kenyan speech' and how Facebook does not erode the ethnic horizon within which a partner should be sought. The horizon indicates that the Kalenjin concept of Kenya cosmopolitanism should be re-routed to the ethnic group. Characteristically, Facebook and social media entail the creation of 'netizens,' which is an online community that is not based on a particular ethnic or national identity. However, the song, "Samantha" reroutes 'netizenship' to the ethnic by imagining Kalenjin 'netizenship.' This shows an act of Nuttal's (2009) transgression because the persona oversteps ambivalently from the Kalenjin ways of doing things. This entails the imports of the 'Kenyan speech' and the virtual relationship while constituting a local horizon within which the concepts of 'Kenyan speech' and virtual relationship apply.

In sum, the Kalenjin nation and the Kenyan society unite and also separate on the constitution of new cultural performances based on constructing identities of interest. "*Nikupate*" and "Samantha" indicate that what separates people while uniting others to constitute diversity is "not so much of cultures as of identities" but also a mode of identifying with each other by interests (Appiah, 2005: 118). 'Interests' here refers to the everyday-life basic needs and means of fulfiling life such as performing job or trade to sustain a family. As a result, interests, in Nuttall's (2009) terms, "transgresses" cultural limits because, without them, life is threatened. Thus, 'transgression' resolves the trouble of cosmopolitanism in the ways "*Nikupate*" and "Samantha" unite and separate.

"*Nikupate*" and "Samantha" are united by the idea of 'transgression' as problem-solving. The persona in "*Nikupate*" seeks to calm the frustration of deprivation in a society that favours only the rich while, in "Samantha," the persona deals with the new reality of virtual relationships. Resonance as problem-solving resonates with what Appiah (2005: 151) calls the regularity of difference. This refers to a common pattern of events in the elements that differentiate one identity group from another. For example, the group which are differentiated from each 'other' by the occupation of different territories, but experience the same pattern of events such as drought, are bound to share ideas on dealing with the drought amid the difference. The reason is that they share, and, thus, are bound, by the regularity of the drought. Similarly, the elements of Kenya cosmopolitanism in "Samantha" are forms of being bound by the regularity of issues, such as a society that favours only the rich and emerging relationships realities, which are

prevalent in both the Kalenjin and the Kenyan worlds. Here, the Kenyan society, as the larger partner, dominates in streaming solutions to the shared problems which imply that the Kalenjin is bound to borrow from them.

However, "*Nikupate*" and "Samantha" are separated by the idea of super-cultural identity. This is the imagination of a cosmopolitan living in which equality and cohesion are prioritised. "*Nikupate*" offers a view that the constituent identities in a cosmopolitan system achieve good living if they cede their different cultures and adopt a neutral identity. However, "Samantha" shows that the Kalenjin, notwithstanding, subvert this domination through the institution of horizons such as the Kalenjin version of the 'Kenya speech' and the Kalenjin ethnic factor of a virtual relationship partner. Consequently, the streaming solutions are subtly reworked to communicate to the Kenyan collective conformity but covertly communicates to the Kalenjin the convenience of individuality.

5.5: Conclusion

In conclusion, the ethics of entanglement, which concern concealing, difference and self-enhancement, reintegrates the Kalenjin into the Kenyan community via the idea of partnership. This refers to the interdependence of ethnic communities to enhance their living. Partnership, here, does not entail the business concept of merging resources as it is the case in conventional business partnerships. Instead, it conceives of the transaction of resources between communities in such a way that the gains of each community are contingent upon the presence of the 'other.' This sense of partnership relates to performing ethics of entanglement since it is set on the lack of the privilege to choose 'like-minded' partners. It is also linked to a situation of being bound together by 'country' and, hence, a pressure to co-operate.

Accordingly, the logic of partnership in the Kalenjin Reintegration relates to repressing ethnic difference and favouring nationality since it facilitates inter-ethnic cooperation. That is, the Kalenjin is compelled to imagine the fixed co-presence with others as a way of life but, more importantly, as a capital (rather than inconvenience) for self-empowerment. I refer to the compulsory imagination of value on fixed partnership as "ethics" — the behavioural rightness before others in life (Appiah, 2005: xv) — since fixed partnership incorporates the ideas of business, which is gaining from the 'others,' and play, which is the skill of outdoing the 'other' in gaining. The prominent business ethic, for example, is fairness — the competition for customers by other means than hurting the reputation of the 'other.'

The Kass Marathon, for instance, illustrates the Kalenjin promoting the sense of internationality between themselves and the rest of Kenya and the world while devising the internationality as a mode of trading 'Kalenjinness' for money and honour. Similarly, the Kalenjin Nights show the Kalenjin navigating into the Kenyan popular culture and forms of identity as an enhanced sense of living but subtly routes the enhancements concepts to the Kalenjin nation. Hence, the Kalenjin cosmopolitan sense of Reintegration conceives of nationhood that identifies with the others, by being open to the others in terms of seamless flow of persons and cultures, while rejecting equal access of the profiting with 'others.' The Kalenjin performance of ethics of entanglement indeed conceives of the strategies of displaying warmth to the rest of Kenya for the benefit of the Kalenjin community.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING THE PRESENT 'KALENJINNESS' AS A TRANS-MEDIATED REALITY

So far, in this study, I have examined contemporary constructions of Kalenjin nationhood with the view that it is a re-constituted reality, which is the way the idea of being a Kalenjin, from its pan-ethnic formation in the 1940s, changed significantly at the start of the 2000s. I have explored how the change and the overall idea of 'Kalenjinness' may be examined from a literary and cultural perspective. I note the change to be a function of sensing both the lack of ethos and the value of the community and improvising pieces of knowledge to remake ethos. Thus, I argue that the imaginativeness in the Kalenjin trans-mediation lies in how the reworking of ethos invents new characteristics and meanings. The events examined in the study show the Kalenjin historical and cultural realities in construction, suggesting that historicity and identity are negotiable. The innovators seem to be concerned with the urgency of a mega ethnic form than loyalty to historical and cultural reality. This leaning resonates with Brubaker's (2004: 116) perspective that a nation is a claim on people's loyalty, attention and solidarity. In this case, a nation does not have to bear historical and cultural facts to make sense. The lack of authenticity is soothed by the politics of the same 'us' and different 'others.' This conveys nationalism as an activity of publicising the significance of oneness in order to achieve recognition by 'others' as a distinct entity with autonomy and control.

I have also assessed the relationship between the trans-mediation as social drama and how the different stages of the trans-mediation morph into varying forms of nationalism. The dramatic chain of histories and related meta-commentaries reveal a series of revitalising Kalenjin nationhood where 'Kalenjinness' is imagined anew in different junctures. The resonance of the selected media and cultural texts reflect four historical episodes of performing Kalenjin ethos which demonstrate notions of nationhood in the Kalenjin group since its formation in the 1940s. Each of these settings shows the Kalenjin discoursing and projecting interrelation opinions, either to the other ethnic communities in the country or the state, in an attempt to secure their living. I establish that the mechanism by which engaging in interrelation issues culminate into nationalism affirms the perspective that collective speaking to 'others' constitutes a subtle but significant action of speaking to the self (Billig, 1995 and Edensor, 2002). This means that the community's communicating to others an emerging issue that affects their living heightens the

sense of togetherness in that community except that the sense of togetherness is unique to each of the emerging issues.

Chapter 2 tackled the rise of Moi to be Kenya's president in 1978 amid the contentious ideology of African Socialism. African Socialism, which proclaimed equal access of land to all ethnic groups in the country irrespective of population and the pre-colonial notions of ownership, formed the Kalenjin context of sensing being dispossessed of land in the Rift Valley. In the chapter, I note that the ideology transfigures into advantage among the Kalenjin group when they view themselves as the 'ethnic group of the president,' whose significance relates to how the status is linked with privilege in the public policy of a regime. Hence, I assert that the Kalenjin Breach in relation to the end of the Moi presidency should be understood as a revelation of a flawed concept of a living.

The stories, "How young operatives saved the Moi-presidency" and "How Kibaki men humiliated Moi on last State House day," depict ways in which the Kalenjin nation derived a convenient living via a symbiotic relationship between themselves and Moi. The relationship witnesses the community offering a political support base for Moi and Moi protecting the group's interests which mainly entailed land in the Rift Valley region. The convenience of the relationship to the Kalenjin is that it promised the group a subjective notion about the '*Nyayo*' philosophy. This philosophy had first been adopted by Moi, after succeeding Jomo Kenyatta as the president, to ideally mean advancing Jomo Kenyattas style of leadership in the 'goodness' sense. However, the philosophy conveyed to the Kalenjin an opportunity of gaining over others. The subjective assigning of meanings to the Moi presidency in the song, "*Emenyon*" (Our country) reveals that the Kalenjin maximised on the perception that the Gikuyu gained hugely in getting pieces of the former settler land in the Rift Valley both as the 'ethnic group of the president' and also as a more populous community that overcame discontent from other ethnic groups. Thus, I argue that the Kalenjin united to imagine a Gikuyu model aimed at countering the gains by the Gikuyu in the land matters in the Rift Valley and to guarantee steadier support for the Moi regime.

I have maintained in Chapter 2 that the Kalenjin nationhood is mobilised anew in the sudden end of Moi's power via the performance of the 'Breach' social drama. Breach refers to the turbulence in a group consequent to a major component in the living having been disrupted. Here, I determined how the ending of the Moi-presidency event was the most significant

unsettling of the Kalenjin living. I argue that this relates to the capacity of the event to cause a cultural trauma, which is the sensibility that an incident has occurred in a group that affects horrendously in the living (Alexander, 2004), which rallies in-group mentality via a sense of shared hardship. Breach connects with the end of Moi's power among the Kalenjin owing to how the end infringes the notion of being the 'ethnic group of the president.' In this case, infringement resonates with the tenet that cultural trauma is not accidental but socially constructed (Alexander, 2004: 5). The magnitude by which a group is traumatised by an event depends on the scale on which the overriding condition in the event was 'lived' by the group. 'Living a condition' here refers to the choices and passions in deriving the best modes of fulfiling life. In this case, the Kalenjin nation constructed the trauma in the Moi-presidency by assuming the Moi presidency as a lifeline, which means that the Kalenjin constructed trauma through a flawed establishment of ethos. As a result, cultural trauma mobilises nationhood via a sense of collective loss and a need to change the aspects of togetherness to avert the occurrence of suffering in the future.

In Chapter 3, I have examined the sudden discontinuation of Moi's power, consequent to the introduction of multiparty politics in 1991 and the defeat of KANU in 2002, and its linkage with the performance of 'Crisis' social drama. Crisis is the stage when a group's sense of Breach permeates into the modes of relation with the other groups in the surrounding. I argue that the major action in the Kalenjin Crisis, depicted in the stories, "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki," and the discussion text, "Know the troublemaker," relates to victimhood nationalism. Victimhood nationalism refers to mobilising the nation by depicting the nation as undergoing victimisation. I submit that the performative element in these stages is the perception that the group is being targeted with harm over their connection with Moi. The stories and the discussion text illustrate that the Kalenjin sense and publicise that the resentment towards the Moi regime is being displaced to the Kalenjin community and that the blame disadvantages them significantly.

I note that the major imagining of victimhood in the stories, "The Rift Valley *Majimbo* rallies" and "MPs ultimatum to Kibaki," is a vulnerable community. Handmer (2003) offers that a vulnerable community is a group facing marginalisation with little capacity to cope with the trouble. The significance of the notions, marginalisation and coping incapacity, is that they render vulnerability a performed concept. I have established that the performance of

vulnerability resides in narratives of legitimation. It has emerged that the Kalenjin imagine vulnerability in relation mainly to the pieces of land in the Rift Valley that may be seized by the NARC regime to be re-distributed to the antagonistic ethnic groups as retaliation over the perceived privilege during the Moi regime. The Kalenjin view themselves as an easy target if the NARC regime and the antagonistic ethnic groups pursue them because they have been alienated by being the key supporters of KANU which lost power to NARC. The result is that the Kalenjin unity is summoned as a means to bear the risk of losing places in the Rift Valley.

Another imagining of victimhood is noted in Chapter 3 as a threatened community of place. Edensor (2002: 58) and McKnight et al (2017) indicate a link between a sense of community and geographical attachment to a place, which, together with the Kalenjin post-Crisis histories, hint that the Kalenjin imagine risk in the form of land purchases and the establishment of businesses being cast by other ethnic groups in the Rift Valley. The idea, community of place, captures the derivation of nationhood via the Rift Valley as a homeland. Infiltration, therefore, constitutes a threat to this sense of nationhood because a surpassing of the hosts by the immigrants proclaims the end of the hosts claim to the place as homeland. Thus, I affirm that the Kalenjin Crisis is a performance of a sensation of estrangement.

In Chapter 4, I assessed the post-victimhood rise of corrective measures in the Kalenjin group, in popular song, "*Biikab Kalenjin*," and the sermons, "Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?" and "Awake," from 'Redress' social drama and honour nationalism. Honour nationalism refers to the mechanism of revitalising oneness through devotion to self-enhancement. The idea, self-enhancement, refers to the desire to erase shame or build esteem. I argue that the Kalenjin Redress embraces dealing with estrangement and an incorrect 'self.' The Kalenjins pre-occupation with the community's honour after undergoing trauma from the ending of the Moi-residency was considered in the thesis as the event that enabled the constitution of honour nationalism. Drawing on Appiah (2010) and Oprisko (2012), the thesis found that fulfilment relates to the detection of the shames of backwardness and self-effacement amid other communities in Kenyan which culminates into a moral revolution to remove the shames. Moral revolution, which is the process of changing entirely the customs of good living, is argued in the thesis as nationalism since it portrays the character of a social enterprise. A social enterprise refers to an intensive initiative to change a social element in a community to improve life. Thus, moral revolution supposes nationalism as a social enterprise in the sense that it entails mobilising

the community. It involves what Billig (1995) calls 'waving' the nation to the citizens and in that way remind the citizens of connectedness through the idea of a nation. The 'waving' action in the Kalenjin is revealed as composing a new set of character traits of a Kalenjin persona. Accordingly, I argue in this chapter that the Kalenjin moral revolution morphs into nationalism because it creates a uniform living in the group. It sets members into a disposition defined by perceptions that they are connected in such a way that inappropriate behaviour by a member, such as self-effacement and naivety, earns the entire community shame.

Chapter 5 evaluated selected Kalenjin Nights music and the accounts of the Kass Marathon, and how they perform 'Reintegration' nationalism. The performance is proven here as practising ethics of entanglement. Ethics of entanglement, drawing on Appiah (2005) and Nuttal (2009), describes the balancing act of being caught up with 'others' and persisting on separateness. The significance of the idea of practising ethics of entanglement is that it constitutes resolving the dilemma of acceptance and rejection of sameness with the other ethnic groups via the metaphor of playing a game of coexistence. This refers to balancing between jostling for control of resources and appreciating the importance of the 'others' in fulfiling life. Thus, the Kalenjin Reintegration drama emerges as the game of co-existence. The thesis found that there are advantages as well as disadvantages of submitting either to ideals of the Kenya national community or to an ethnic way of life. The Kenyan communality promises an improved living because of the expanded space for sharing ideas and doing business. However, it destroys cultural authenticity. The thesis noted that ethnic living promises cultural honour but diminishes the honour on standards of living given that some of the cultural elements, such as ruralism and self-effacement, are responsible for the damage of quality of life in the Kalenjin community. Thus, while the Kalenjin prefer to lead a detached living from the rest of Kenya, the dilemma of honour in improved standards of living showed the need for Kalenjin cosmopolitanism. Therefore, I observed the idea of a Kalenjin community that co-exists and interacts freely with the other communities in Kenya but routes ideas from the interaction to the Kalenjin advantage.

Overall, I tested the assumption that 'Kalenjinness' lacks cultural integrity but manages a 'true' sense of nationhood and patriotism. The Kalenjin conversational texts examined indicated that there is a significant degree to which the Kalenjin people consciously submit to being Kalenjins more than their constituent identities. Thus, I determined what stimulates the Kalenjin pan-ethnic identity against their individualised identities. The thesis has established that the

Kalenjin confederation is revitalised by the agency of 'Kenya,' which refers to the powering of the Kalenjin nation and ethnic nationalism in Kenya by the nation-state. The thesis argues that the pervasiveness of ethnic identities in Kenya relates to the immutable utility of ethnicity in conceptualising the living. The ethnic group emerges as a regular concept in the country in defining spaces, distribution of resources and enterprising.

The thesis established the use of ethnicity as a mode of engaging with politics in Kenya is being overtaken by the utility for economic and cultural fulfilment. The utility for economic and cultural fulfilment refers to the use of the ethnic setting for imagining economic and cultural power. The thesis demonstrates the faulting of political aspects of the ethnic group such as the kingpin institution. Instead, the thesis notes privileging of the apolitical aspects related to economic and cultural institutions. The thesis established the convenience of the ethnic group as linked with business operations as noted in the ethnic-community-based entrepreneurship associations which draw members from an ethnic group in the formation of cooperative and partnership businesses. The Kass Marathon and the Emo investment programme, for instance, are revealed as concepts of establishing Kalenjin businesses in order to compete with similar initiatives in the country such as the Gikuyu's Equity Building Society (EBS) which has given rise to the Equity Bank. Also, the Kalenjin Nights and the Emo sermons demonstrate the use of cultural advancement to assert prestige over the other ethnic groups. Thus, the thesis submits that the Kalenjin pan-ethnic nationhood is stimulated by the rising ethnic competition in the country to accrue and economic and cultural power as a sign of social standing.

6.1: Limitations and recommendations for further research

This thesis has been limited to the relationship between social drama, the concepts, suspense and surprise, victimhood, honour and entanglement, and Kalenjin nationalism. As such, it has excluded several issues, methods and texts, which I recommend for further research.

Thematically, the thesis has not addressed the emerging issues such as economic development, international mobility and environment, which also seem to affect significantly on the Kalenjin nationhood. I mentioned in Chapter 4 that community-based economic investment is rising in Kenya to become a major frame by which identity is modelled and that, ethnic groups are in competition towards establishing hugest community-based businesses. Of interest here is how the Kalenjin nation can be viewed, among other groups in Kenya, as both a political community, as I have argued in the thesis, and an economic community. This calls for a study on

discourses, business speeches from the community and biographies of prominent business persons in order to unpack the nuances of re-imagining the community via economic frames.

There is also a rise in the participation of the Kalenjin diaspora in defining the destiny of the Kalenjin community back home. Kass FM radio and television, which I have highlighted as the Kalenjin leading radio, airs a programme where the Kalenjins in countries such as the US and Britain interact with the Kalenjins at home. In my view, there is a huge extent to which these diasporic Kalenjins sway the home community's social, political and economic worldviews. What is interesting here is the emerging shift of the power to counsel the community from the local voices, such as politicians, artist and preachers, which I have focused on in the thesis, to the diasporic. Hence, I recommend an examination of these dialogues alongside concepts of globalisation and public intellectualism.

Finally, the environment is an emerging concept in defining inter-ethnic relations and the contestations thereof. The Kalenjin sub-groups are spread across places in the Rift Valley region that are environmentally different. The northern parts, occupied by the Pokot, and where the sections of the Tugen and Marakwet inhabit, are semi-arid. In contrast, the central and the southern parts possess excellent climates for agriculture because of abundant rainfall and land fertility, although the regions also vary in terms of the viable agricultural activities. It is also interesting to note that the Ogiek subgroup live in the Mau Forest primarily as hunters and gatherers. These environmental differences, and how they define modes of living, tend to produce internal senses of difference in the Kalenjin community that seem to bind other subgroups while separating others. This can be achieved through analysing stories in the folk lore and oral archives, land reports, environmental legal cases and documentations of conservation projects from the communities.

The thesis has also remained within media and cultural texts viewed as rich in banal nationalism. This was motivated by how the presence in the Facebook groups, Christian crusades, music fetes, athletics and comic shows, enable senses of freedom of expressing notions of the 'self,' the 'other' and position in the nation. In this way, the thesis examined documentations of everyday life expressions such as Facebook posts and comments, popular songs, sermons, documentaries and comedies. The thesis also examined historical media and inquiry stories as bearers of the past events that inspire the events in the present, and notes in the process that, the major problem with the textuality of everyday life expressions and historical

documentations is communicative bias. Thus, it was noted that some Facebook participants are driven by emotions, such as anger or excitement, in their commentary on issues about ethnicity, identity and nation making. Others remark playfully and intentionally offer false statements on the existing conditions, which then affects the accuracy of opinions and, hence, the researcher may end up arguing from misinformation. Similarly, the newspaper and inquiry stories are affected by political inclinations with some authors presenting stories for certain political effects. As a result, I recommend a further study that includes interviews and testimonies focusing on the same area of research but this time seeking to unpack a more nuanced, objective and unbiased understanding.

Finally, the thesis has stopped at social drama analysis, which is the establishment of a pattern of a narrative of a performance process through interpreting symbols and signs in both the verbal and gestural acts that constitute the trans-mediation narrative of the Kalenjin nation. As such, the thesis has relied mainly on the researcher's perception of how the acts produce meanings. The approach is open to perception bias because the acts under focus have multiple meanings depending on the researchers. In addition, the theoretical perspectives, such as Billing (1995), Appiah (2005), Edensor (2002), Boje (2003), Mbembe (2019), which guided the interpretations, are contentious. The banal nationalism theory, for instance, is faulted for exaggeration on the activity of the mundane life and the dormancy of the national events in configuring the nation (Skey, 2009: 342). Thus, the understanding of Kalenjin nationalism is not complete without a dimensional reading of the acts and an exploration of those theories which refute what I have employed in this thesis. Accordingly, this thesis recommends a study that considers other theoretical perspectives that differ with the perspectives relied upon in this thesis.

Reference List

Abdi, A. Dwinell, J. Anderson, K. Liebert, J. and Pokharel, P. (2013)). ICC in the Year 2011: Atrocity crime litigation review for the year 2011. *Journal of International Human Rights*, 11(3), pp. 182-210.

Abubakr, S.N. Zana M. Hassan, Z.M. and Bekhal L. Muhedeen, B.L. (2017)). Code-switching as Identity Marker: A Sociolinguistic Study of Kurdish EFL University Students. *Journal of University of Human Development*, 5(3), pp. 57-63. DOI: 10.21928/juhd.v5n3y2019.

Agutu, N. (2020). Kikuyu, Luhya and Kalenjin make up almost half of Kenyan population. [online]. Available at: https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2020-02-21-kikuyu-luhya-and-kalenjin-make-up-almost-half-of-kenyan-population/

Akiwumi Commission, (1999a)). *Report of the judicial commission appointed to inquire into tribal clashes in Kenya*. [pdf] Nairobi: Government Printer. Available at: http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/ReportoftheJudicialCommissionAppointedtoInquireintoTribalClashesinKenya.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2016].

Akiwumi Commission, (1999b). *Report of the judicial commission appointed to inquire into tribal clashes in Kenya: Rift Valley*. [pdf] Nairobi: Daily Nation. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Akiwumi.Rift%20Valley.pdf [Accessed 5 September 2016].

Alexander, J.C. (2004). Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma. In J.C. Alexander, R. Eyerman, B. Giesen, N.J. Smelser, P. Sztompka. (Eds.). *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Anand, D. (2011). *Hindu nationalism in India and the politics of fear*. [e-book] New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: Google Books https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BYbFAAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP6&dq=Anand,+D.+2011+Hindu+nationalism+in+India+and+the+politics+of+fear&ots=o3HE2qBn9v&sig=DboJvs2JofYMwwAw9hz5cY9XgQA#v=onepage&q=Anand%2C%20D.%202011%20Hindu%20nationalism%20in%20India%20and%20the%20politics%20of%20fear&f=false [Accessed 9 June 2020].

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London & New York: Verso.

Appiah, K.A. (2005). *The ethics of identity*. [e-book] Princeton: Princeton University Press. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 6 January 2020].

Appiah, K.A. (2010). *The honor code: how moral revolutions happen*. [e-book] New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 6 January 2020].

Badoux, M. (2018). Eldoret, a city on the move: drivers, dynamics and challenges of rural to urban mobility. *Research and Evidence Facility REF research report*, [e-journal] Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute. Available at: https://www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/research-papers/file128406.pdf [Accessed 5 January 2020].

Balakrishnan, S. (2017). The Afropolitan Idea: New Perspectives on Cosmopolitanism in African Studies. *History Compass*, (15)2, pp. 1-11. DOI 10.1111/hic3.12362

Balakrishnan, S. (2018). Afropolitanism and the End of Black Nationalism. In: G. Delanty, ed. *International Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies*. 2nd edition. London and New York: Routledge 575-585. 2nd ed. 2018.

Bar-Tal, D. and Antebi, D. (1992). Siege mentality in Israel. *International Journal of Intercultural relations*, [e-journal]16, pp. 251-275.

Bauman, R. and Briggs, C.L. (1990) Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, [e-journal] 19, pp. 59-88.

Bélanger, D. and Silvey, R. (2020). An Im/mobility turn: power geometries of care and migration, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 46(16), pp. 3423-3440.

Bell, E. (2006). Social dramas and cultural performances: all the president's women. *Liminalities. A Journal of Performance Studies*, [e-journal] 2(1). Available at: http://liminalities.net/2-1/sdcp/sdcp-print.htm [Accessed 24 November 2019].

Bilewicz, M. and Liu, J. (2020). Collective victimhood as a form of adaptation: a world-systems perspective. In: J. Vollhardt, ed. *The Social Psychology of Collective Victimhood*. [e-book] New York: Oxford University Press, 120-140. Available at: https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0AfZDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA120&dq=Bilewicz,+M.+and+Liu,+J.+2020.+Collective+Victimhood+as+a+form+of+adaptation:+a+world-systems+perspective.+In:+J.+Vollhardt,+ed.+The+Social+Psychology+of+Collective+Vi

ctimhood&ots=e4vI0-k5sd&sig=kYiVx0cFVmhJ9oZ_KE4E1DXdngU#v=onepage&q=Bilewicz%2C%20M.%20and%20Liu%2C%20J.%2C%202020.%20Collective%20Victimhood%20as%20a%20form%20of%20adaptation%3A%20a%20world-systems%20perspective.%20In%3A%20J.%20Vollhardt%2C%20ed.%20The%20Social%20Psychology%20of%20Collective%20Victimhood&f=false [Accessed 24 November 2020].

Billig, M. (2002). *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Boje, D.M. (2003). Victor Turner's postmodern theory of social drama: implications for organization studies, *New Mexico State University*, [pdf]. Available at: https://business.nmsu.edu/~dboje/theatrics/7/victor_turner.htm [Accessed 20 April 2016].

Bosire, M. (2009). What makes a sheng word unique? Lexical manipulation in mixed languages. In: A. Ojo and L. Moshi, ed. *Selected Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference on African Linguistics*, [e-journal] Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings Project, pp. 77-85. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 6 November 2017].

Brubaker, R. (2004). In the name of the nation: reflections on nationalism and patriotism, *Citizenship Studies*, 8(2), pp. 115-127.

Butler, J. 1988. Performative acts and gender constitution: an essay in phenomenology and feminist theory, *Theatre Journal*, 40(4), pp. 519-531.

Citizen TV, (2012). *Sergoit golf resort launched*. [video online]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gu6r6LTU4Hg [Accessed 5 June 2017].

David, The Student, (2017). *How Kenyan athletes behave when they tour abroad*. [video online]. Available at: Churchill Show, 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_-m0iexq-ow [Accessed 5 June 2019].

Dowling, W. C. (1991). The epistolary moment: the poetics of the eighteenth-century verse epistle. [e-book] Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Available at: Churchill Show, 2017 https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jjAABAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Dowling,+W.+C.+1991+The+Epistolary+Moment:+The+Poetics+of+the+Eighteenth-

Century+Verse+Epistle,&ots=L29_McQAGe&sig=xZ8ChYiQuCMIoTgLSb-bddGa9W4#v=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed 20 June 2020].

Duffy, M. and Sperry, L. (2012). *Mobbing: causes, consequences and solutions*. [e-book] New York: Oxford University Press. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 6 November 2018].

Duncan, (2017). *Kalenjin men go straight to the point*. [video online]. Available at: Churchill Show, 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfCMvnuNEsc [Accessed 5 June 2019].

Edensor, T. (2002). *National identity, popular culture and everyday life*, [e-book] Berg: Oxford. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 6 November 2016].

Emo Society, (2020): *Emo Society: About Us*. [online]. Available at: http://www.emosto.org/about [Accessed 10 October 2020].

Eze, C. (2014). Rethinking African culture and identity: the Afropolitan model, *Journal of African Cultural Studies*. 26(2), pp. 234—247.

Ferguson. J. (2006) *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. [e-book] Durham and London. Duke University Press. Available at: Google Books https://books.google.dj/books?hl=en&lr=&id=qJUUA_MwMA4C&oi=fnd&pg=PP9&dq=Ferguson.+J.+Global+Shadows:+Africa+in+the+Neoliberal+World+Order&ots=oyB2K7Wat6&sig=9Xt6n7HswwYRps52OqYRg_mRjxM&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Ferguson.%2C%20J.%2C%20Global%20Shadows%3A%20Africa%20in%20the%20Neoliberal%20World%20Order&f=false [Accessed 9 June 2020].

Fleissner, P. (2006). Commodification, information, value and profit, *Poiesis Prax*, 4, pp. 39—53.

Giannachi, G. (2004). *Virtual theatres: an introduction*. [e-book] London and New York: Routledge. Available at: https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=RHuCAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Giannachi,+G.+2004.+Virtual+Theatres:+An+Introduction+&ots=vIrS_3t8PE&sig=WDw_K7Q9IvAd8pvWkI5K04mFmu0#v=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed 11 June 2020].

Githiora, C. (2018). *Sheng: rise of a kenyan swahili vernacular*, New York: Boydell & Brewer

Gotabgaa Forum, (2016a). *Nothing like pure Kalenjin*. [Facebook]. Not available. [Accessed 6 December 2017)

Gotabgaa Forum, (2016b). *When Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi retired in 2002*. [Facebook]. Available at https://www.facebook.com/groups/gotabgaaforum/permalink/805819219522196 [Accessed 6 December 2017]

Handmer, J. (2003). We are all vulnerable, *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, [e-journal] 18(3), pp. 55-60.

Iwata, Y. (2008). *Creating suspense and surprise in short literary fiction: a stylistic and narratological approach*. PhD. The University of Birmingham.

Jacoby, T. A. (2015). A Theory of victimhood: politics, conflict and the construction of victim-based identity. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 43(2), pp. 511—530.

Jeffery, L. and Candea, M. (2006). The Politics of victimhood. *History and Anthropology*, 17(4), pp. 287-296.

Jenkins, S. (2012). Ethnicity, violence, and the immigrant-guest metaphor in Kenya. *African Affairs*, 11(445) pp. 576—596. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 6 November 2019].

Kagwanja, P. (2016). Gerontocracy and the Uhuru succession politics in the Rift Valley, *API Research Note* [e-paper] 9. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 12 June 2020].

Kalenjin Forum, (2016a). *Nothing like pure Kalenjin*. [Facebook] [Accessed 6 December 2017)

Kalenjin Forum, (2016b). *Kalenjin Unity is paramount*. [Facebook] [Accessed 6 December 2017)

Kalenjin Forum, (2017). *Kisii-Luo share border but no cross-border conflicts*. [Facebook]. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/groups/543281239089188/search/?query=Kisii-Luo%20share%20border%20but%20no%20cross%20border%20conflicts.Time%20and%20again%20you%20see%20kalenjin&epa=SEARCH_BOX. [Accessed 4 October 2017)

Kanyinga, K. (2009). The legacy of the white highlands: Land rights, ethnicity and the post-2007 election violence in Kenya, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27(3), pp. 325-344.

Kass Marathon, (2020). *Kass Marathon 2019* [video online]. Available at: https://kassmarathon.com/ [Accessed 15 October 2019)

KassFM International, (2011). *Kass Marathon Profile*. [video online]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kxkBbQyDaMs [Accessed 12 June 2019].

KassFM International, (2018). *2018 Kass Marathon Promo*. [video online]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BCJWiZn5E-8 [Accessed 12 June 2019].

Keneni International, (2015). *Samantha*. [video online]. Available at: Jumba Junior 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RsYTEYiP_Gk [Accessed 12 June 2019].

Kidula, J.N. (2012). The local and global in Kenyan rap and hip hop culture. In: E. Charry. ed, *Hip Hop Africa: New African Music in a Globalizing World*. [e-book] Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 172. Available at https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=kwrwBLYM-8IC&oi=fnd&pg=PA171&dq=Kidula,+J.N.+2012+The+Local+and+Global+in+Kenyan+Rap+and+Hip+Hop+Culture+in+Charry,+E.+2012,+Eds,+Hip+Hop+Africa&ots=Ije3MdOpBa&sig=WBToPGyeRO141KBnCfZYh-bB2pk#v=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed 22 February 2020]

Kim, B. (2016). North Korea's siege mentality: a sociopolitical analysis of the Kim Jong-un regime's foreign policies, *Asian Perspective*, 40, pp. 223-244.

Kinyuru, M.J. (2018). *The influence of frequency modulation radio morning call-in shows on parental guidance among teenagers in selected churches in Nairobi county*, Kenya. PhD. Kenyatta University.

Kipkorir, B.K. (1973). *The Marakwet of Kenya: a preliminary study*, 2008 edition, Nairobi: EAEP.

Kipkorir, D. (2019). *Kalenjins have been President*. [Twitter]. Available at: https://twitter.com/DavidOcholah/status/1102161312539389954 [Accessed 18 January 2020]

Kiprono, N. (2019). Most annoying stereotypes about Kalenjins. *Hivisasa.com*, [online] Available at: https://hivisasa.com/posts/1115-most-annoying-stereotypes-about-the-kalenjins [Accessed 18 January 2020]

Kitata, M. (2020). Sexualising the performance, objectifying the performer: The twerk dance in Kenya, *Agenda*, DOI: 10.1080/10130950.2020.1773286

Koefoed, L.M. (2015). Majority and minority nationalism in the Danish post-welfare state, *Geografiska Annaler. Series B. Human Geography*, 97(3), pp. 223-232.

Kosgey, J. (2006). *Awake*. [video online]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=jackson+kosgei+ [Accessed 12 September 2017)

Kosgey, J. (2007. *Where does the Kalenjin nation rank?* [video online]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=11V-EhlnNus [Accessed 12 September 2017).

KTN News Kenya, (2018). *2019 Kass Marathon to be bigger as 21km race to be introduced*. [video online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJfEuYskjik&t=654s [Accessed 5 June 2017].

Lassken, S. (2017), Persona non grata: a systematic review of de-roling in drama therapy, *Drama Therapy Review*, 3(2), pp. 165-179.

Lomsky-Feder, E and Rapoport, T. (2001). Homecoming, immigration, and the national ethos: Russian-Jewish homecomers reading Zionism, *Anthropological Quarterly*. 74(1), pp. 1-14.

Lynch, G. (2008). Moi: the making of an African "big-man," *Journal of Eastern African Studies,* 2(1), pp. 18-4.

Lynch, G. (2011). *I say to you: ethnic politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya*. Chicago: Chicago UP.

Lynch, G. (2016). *Majimbo*ism and Kenyas moral economy of ethnic territoriality. In: B. Berman, A. Laliberté, S. Larin. ed. *The Moral Economies of Ethnic and Nationalist Claims*. Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press.

Mazrui, A. (1995). Slang and code switching: the case of Sheng in Kenya, *Afrikanistiche Arbeitspapiere*. 42, pp.168-179.

Mbembe, A. and Balakrishnan, S. (2016). Pan-African legacies, Afropolitan futures: a conversation with Achille Mbembe, *Transition*. 120, pp. 28-37.

Mbembe, A. (2019). *Necropolitics*. Translated from French by S. Corcoran. [e-book] Durham and London: Duke University Press. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 17 June 2020].

McFarland, D.A. (2004). Resistance as a social drama: a study of change-oriented encounters, *AJS*. 109(6), pp. 1249-1318.

McKnight, M.L. Sanders, S.R. Gibbs, B.G. and Brown, R.B. (2017). Communities of place? New evidence for the role of distance and population size in community attachment, *Rural Sociol*, 82, pp. 291-317.

Miller, R. L. and Madani, Y. (2013). Self-effacement. In: K. D. Keith. ed. *The encyclopedia of cross-cultural psychology Vol. III,* pp. 1141—1143. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Mose, C. (2018). Hash-tag otherring: translating culture on micro-blogging spaces in Africa. In: J. Ouédraogo, M. Diawara, and E.S. Macamo. ed. *Translation Revisited: Contesting the Sense of African Social Realities*. Newcastle: Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Pubslishing, pp. 412-428.

Mugonyi D. and Rono G. (2003). MPs ultimatum to Kibaki. *Nation Media*, 23 February. [online], Available at: https://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-294520-lprtdnz/index.html. [Accessed 17 June 2016].

Murray, T. (2019). Knowing and unknowing reality: a beginner's and expert's developmental guide to post-metaphysical thinking, *Integral Review*, 15(1), pp. 129-244.

Mutua, M. (2013). History will judge Kibaki as Kenya's best president. *Daily Nation*, 12 January. [online]. Available at: https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/History-will-judge-Kibaki-as-Kenyas-best-president/440808-1664060-ci61fcz/index.html [24 November 2018].

Nagel, J. (1994). Constructing ethnicity: creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture, *Social Problems*, 41, pp. 152-176.

Ngetich, J. (2003). Is the Kalenjins age-old tradition under trial at the International Criminal Court? *Standard Digital*, 22 September [online], Available at: https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000094038/is-the-kalenjin-s-age-old-tradition-under-trial-at-the-international-criminal-court [Accessed 17 June 2019].

Nicholls, A. (2008). The landscape of social investment: a holistic topology of opportunities and challenges, Working paper, *Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship*. [pdf] Oxford: Saïd Business School. Available at https://www.findevgateway.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/mfg-en-paper-the-landscape-of-social-investment-a-holistic-topology-of-opportunities-and-challenges-mar-2008.pdf [Accessed 17 June 2019].

Noor, M. Vollhardt, J. R. Mari, S. and Nadler, A. (2017). The social psychology of collective victimhood, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 47(2), pp. 121—134.

Novin, S. and Oyserman, D. (2016. Honor as cultural mindset: activated honor mindset affects subsequent judgment and attention in mindset-congruent ways, *Front. Psychol*, 7(1921), pp. 1-14.

Nuttall, S. (2009. *Entanglement: Literary and cultural reflections on post-apartheid*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Nyairo, J. and Ogude, J. (2003). Popular music and the negotiation of contemporary Kenyan identity: the example of Nairobi city ensemble, *Social Identities*, 9(3), pp. 383-400.

Oakeshott, M. (1962). The voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind. *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays.* [pdf] London: Methuen, pp. 197-247. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 17 June 2019].

Octopizzo, (2020a). Nikupate. [online]. Available at Genius Media Group 2020 https://genius.com/Octopizzo-nikupate-lyrics [Accessed 15 September 2020].

Octopizzo, (2020b). Nikupate (ItsNambaNaneTV) [video online]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2jitoGdnoIM&list=PL7vt4IwKiZSki9cOUfhc75K5aIEVqtuYs [Accessed 5 June 2017].

Ogechi, N.O. (2002). *Trilingual Codeswitching in Kenya — Evidence from Ekegusii, Kiswahili, English and Sheng*. PhD. Universität Hamburg

Ogude, J. (2012). The invention of traditional music in the city: exploring history and meaning in urban music in contemporary Kenya. *Research in African Literatures*. 43(4), pp. 147-165.

Oprisko, R.L. (2012). *Honor: a phenomenology*. [e-book] New York and London: Routledge. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 17 June 2019].

Orinde, H. (2020). Census report: Kenyas biggest ethnic communities listed. *Standard Digital*, 21 February [online]. Available at: https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2001361344/kenyas-biggest-ethnic-communities-listed [Accessed 2 October 2020].

Rempell, S. (2013). Defining persecution, *Utah Law Review*, 2010(1), pp. 283-344.

Richards, D. R. and Calvert, C. (2000). Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for "Bad" Speech, *BYU Law Review*, 200(2/1), pp. 553-586.

Rotich, M. (2005) Bikaab Kalenjin [video online] [Accessed 5 June 2020]

Sambu, K. (2011). *The Misiri legend explored: a linguistic inquiry into the Kalenjin people's oral tradition of ancient origin*. Nairobi: Nairobi University Press.

Schechner, R. (1988). *Performance theory*. 2003 ed. [e-book] London: Routledge. Available at: http://sduk.us/2016/krisis_testi/schechner_performance_theory.pdf [Accessed 18 December 2020].

Scott, T. (2009). Towards a definition of "initiation," *Sacred Web*. 23, pp. 127-137.

Sedikides, C. and Strube, M.J. 1995. The multiply motivated self. *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, 21(12), pp. 1330-1335.

Shilaho, W.K. (2018). *Political Power and Tribalism in Kenya*. Johanesburg: Palgrave Macmillan.

Simatei, P.T. (2008). Kalenjin popular music and the contestation of national space in Kenya. *CODESRIA 12th General Assembly*, 7-11 December 2008. [e-journal] Yaoundé: CODESRIA. Available at https://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/Peter_Simatei.pdf [accessed 13 May 2019].

Skey, M. (2009). The national in everyday life: A critical engagement with Michael Billig's thesis of *Banal Nationalism*, *The Sociological Review*, 57(2), pp. 331-346.

Some, K. (2016). How young operatives saved Moi's presidency. *Daily Nation*, 29 May. [online]. Available at https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Inside-story-of-infamous-lobby-that-defended-Moi/1950946-3224140-item-1-68tnkx/index.html [Accessed 1 June 2017].

Some, K. (2018). How Kibaki men humiliated Moi on last State House day. *Daily Nation*, 24 March. [online]. Available at: https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/How-Kibaki-team-humiliated-Moi/1950946-4356468-3923bkz/index.html [Accessed 24 September 2019].

Speich, D. (2009). The Kenyan style of African Socialism: developmental knowledge claims and the explanatory limits of the cold war, *Diplomatic History*. [e-journal] 33(3), pp. 449-466. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00780.x.

Talwar, V. (2011). Moral Behavior. In: S. Goldstein and J.A. Naglieri. eds. *Encyclopedia of Child Behavior and Development*. [online] Springer: Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-79061-9_1829

The BBC News, (2015). *Javelin star Julius Yego learned skill from YouTube videos*, [online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-34013686 [Accessed 24 November (2019].

Topotuk, K. (1980). *Emenyon*. [video online]. Available at: V. Tum, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=BA8lGqUTnPU [Accessed 17 July 2019].

Trivedi, C. and Stokols, D. (2011). Social Enterprises and Corporate Enterprises: Fundamental Differences and Defining Features. *Journal of Entrepreneurship*, [e-journal] 20 (1), pp. 1—32. DOI: 10.1177/097135571002000101

Tronstad, R. (2002). Could the world become a stage? theatricality and metaphorical structures. *SubStance*. [e-journal] 31(2,3), pp. 216-224. DOI: 10.1353/sub.2002.0043

Turner, V. (1974). *Dramas, fields, and metaphors*. [pdf] Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Available through: University of the Free State Library website https://www.ufs.ac.za/library [Accessed 17 June 2019].

Turner, V. (1980). Social dramas and stories about them. *Critical Inquiry*. 7(1), pp. 141-168.

Turner, V. (1987). The anthropology of performance. In: V. Turner *The anthropology of performance*. [e-journal] New York: PAJ. Available at: https://voidnetwork.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Anthropology-of-performance-by-Victor-Turner.pdf [Accessed 17 June 2019].

Vertovec. S. (2007). Super-diversity and its implications, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 30(6), pp. 1024-1054

Visacovsky, S.E. (2017). When time freezes: socio-anthropological research on social crises. *Iberoamericana*, *Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 46(1), pp. 6-16.

Wa-Mungai, M. (2007). Tusker project fame: ethnic states, popular flows. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1(3), pp. 338-358. DOI: 10.1080/17531050701625771

Wang, Y. (2017). On Cultural Connotations of English Idioms. *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research*, (121), pp. 156-159.

Wehner, B. (2020). *Freedom, peace, and secession new dimensions of democracy*. New York: Springer International Publishing.

Wessels, J. I. (2017). The digital age opens up new terrains for peace and conflict research. *Conflict and Society: Advances in Research*, 3, pp. 125—129. DOI:10.3167/arcs.2017.030110

Willis, J. and Gona, G. (2013). Tradition, Tribe, and State in Kenya: The Mijikenda Union, 1945—1980. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 55(2), pp. 448—473. DOI:10.1017/S0010417513000091

Zhao, S. (2003). Toward a taxonomy of copresence. *Presence*. 12(5), pp. 445-455.