CARE, PLACE AND ARCHITECTURE:
A CRITICAL READING OF
CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ'S
ARCHITECTURAL INTERPRETATION OF
MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

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For Marnel

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Declaration

I declare that the thesis hereby submitted by me for the Philosophiae Doctor degree at the University of the Free State is my own independent work and has not previously been submitted by me at another university or faculty. I further more cede copyright of the thesis in favour of the University of the Free State.

Hendrik Andries Auret

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the qualitative aspects that others deride as mere academic matters. Especially during the months spent finalising this thesis when I was granted a large amount of 'flexibility'.

Finally, to my saviour God, the source of all creativity, who has taught me what it means to hold something close and keep it safe. To my family and friends, who have supported me, and never (openly) doubted that I would finish this thesis. To my son, Andries, and my daughter, Heili, you may not yet know it, but you have opened my world to new realms of care. To my wonderful wife, Marnel, who has shared this journey from the start. You have probably had your fill of all things philosophical, and yet you continue to listen attentively. Your quiet confidence has carried me through this. I love you and I am deeply grateful. This thesis is dedicated to you.

Abstract

This thesis questions the theoretical contribution of the renowned 20th century Norwegian architect and theorist, Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000), by considering the cogency of his pioneering architectural 'translation' of the prominent German philosopher, Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) writings. It is argued that Norberg-Schulz neglected one of the key aspects of Heidegger's philosophical contributions; the temporal nature of *Dasein*'s concerned being-in-the-world as care (*Sorge*).

Heidegger's concept of care simultaneously acknowledged the way human dwellers are 'concerned about' their mortal existence, and how they cultivate their world by 'taking care'. Instead of referring to Heidegger's formulation of lived temporality (as Norberg-Schulz did when describing the emplaced nature of lived spatiality), Norberg-Schulz relied on his mentor, the Swiss historian and architecture critic, Sigfried Giedion's (1888-1968), understanding of time as 'continuity and change'. Norberg-Schulz's failure to develop the temporal implications of Heidegger's ontological concept of care, constitutes the principal omission that prevents the fruition of Norberg-Schulz's ultimate aim; transforming his "art of place" (*stedskunst*) into the "*art of the experience of living*" (2000b: 356) (*livskunst*).

As an alternative, it is proposed that Norberg-Schulz's art of place be elaborated upon (and re-interpreted) in terms of a new approach grounded in Heidegger's understanding of concerned being-in-the-world; the art of care. The main contribution of this thesis consists in composing the art of care as the phenomenological 'ground' enabling the architectural *poiesis* of *Dasein*'s concerned (ecstatic) temporality. By grafting the art of care into the art of place, new possibilities are revealed within Norberg-Schulz's *oeuvre*. In the marriage of the art of care and the art of place dwells the potential for appreciating and designing works of architecture as *livskunst*. *Livskunst* celebrates building as the care-full *poiesis* of human being-in-the-world. Secondary aims include formulating a comprehensive understanding of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution and describing the difficulties that ensue from engaging with time as continuity and change.

The conceptual development of the art of care calls for a form of critical reading based on Heidegger's account of the hermeneutic "circle". Since Heidegger believed that *Dasein* is a "circular being", grounded in the circular "structure of care" (1927a: 315), this hermeneutic approach offers the most appropriate way to engage with *Dasein'*s emplaced existence within regions of concern.

Keywords: *architecture, art of care, art of place, art of the experience of living, care, continuity, change, Christian Norberg-Schulz, Martin Heidegger, phenomenology, place.*

Hierdie tesis ondersoek die geldigheid van die gevierde 20ste eeuse Noorweegse argitek en teoretikus, Christiaan Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000), se teoretiese nalatenskap, deur die oortuigingskrag van sy baanbrekende argitektoniese interpretasie van die Duitse filosoof, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), se geskrewe werke te bevraagteken. Daar word aangevoer dat Norberg-Schulz nagelaat het om een van die kernaspekte van Heidegger se denke, naamlik die tydskarakter van Dasein se besorgde wees-in-die-wêreld as die wese van sorg, aan te spreek.

Heidegger se konsep van Sorge dui gelyktydig op die manier waarop bewoners besorgd is oor hul steflike bestaan, en die manier waarop hulle sorg vir hul wêreld. Eerder as om Heidegger se formulering van sorgsame geleefde tyd argitektonies te ontwikkel ('n benadering wat Norberg-Schulz wel gevolg het toe hy die pleksverskanste aard van geleefde ruimte beskryf het), het Norberg-Schulz tyd verstaan as 'n wisselwerking tussen kontinuïteit en verandering; 'n idee wat gespruit het uit die werk van sy mentor, die Switserse historikus en argitektuurkritikus, Sigfried Giedion (1888-1968). Norberg-Schulz se geringskatting van die tydsimplikasies van Heidegger se ontologiese konsep van Sorge het sy uiteindelike doel, dat plekkuns (stedskunst) leefkuns (livskunst) word (2000b: 356), laat skipbreuk ly.

As alternatief beoog hierdie tesis om Norberg-Schulz se plekkuns uit te brei (en te herinterpreteer) aan die hand van sorgkuns; 'n nuwe benadering geskoei op Heidegger se begrip van sorgsame wees-in-die-wêreld. Die oorspronklike bydra van hierdie tesis behels die formulering van sorgkuns as die fenomenologiese fondasie vir die argitekturele maak (poiesis) van Dasein se sorgsame (ekstatiese) tydsgebondenheid. Sorgkuns ontbloot nuwe denkrigtings binne plekkuns. Die verwewing van sorgkuns en plekkuns bewaar die moontlikheid om argitektoniese werke te waardeer en ontwerp as leefkuns. Leefkuns vier bouwerk as die sorgvuldige poiesis van menslike wees-in-die-wêreld. Sekondêre oogmerke sluit in die formulering van 'n omvattende waardering van Norberg-Schulz se teoretiese bydra en die beskrywing van die problematiese implikasies wat voortspruit uit die begrip van tyd as kontinuïteit en verandering.

Die konsepsuele ontwikkeling van sorgkuns vereis 'n vorm van kritiese vertolking geskoei op Heidegger se begrip van die 'hermeneutiese sirkel'. Aangesien Heidegger geglo het dat Dasein se wese (bewussyn) 'n sirkelgang is, en aangesien hy ook die struktuur van sorg as 'n sirkelgang beskryf het (1927a: 315), bied die hermeneutiese benadering die mees gepaste manier om Dasein se pleksverskanste bestaan binne oorde van sorg te ondersoek.

Preface

For many years the Department of Architecture at the University of the Free State (UFS, Bloemfontein, South Africa) has applied the ideas of Christian Norberg-Schulz and his architectural translation of Martin Heidegger's influential philosophy. As a student at this department, I was taught to understand architecture as the 'respectful making of meaningful place'. At the time of my undergraduate and postgraduate studies at the UFS (2001-2005) the university was in the midst of the nationwide transformation from the *Apartheid* system (during which the university was a predominantly white and Afrikaans institution), to the multi-cultural (and multi-lingual) 'open' democratic society which has been in the making since 1994. This was a process of reconciliation which posed (and continues to pose) hard questions. In architectural terms, the quest for a truly South African architecture became all-consuming; a way of building which draws on the multitude of vernacular building traditions, celebrates the rich biodiversity of the country, and not only sympathises with, but actually relieves the various forms of poverty associated with one of the most unequal societies in the world.

Amid the range of cultural heritages acknowledged in the post-liberation reality, it is understandable that Norberg-Schulz's theory of place played (and continues to play) an important role in the theoretical approach followed at the Department of Architecture at the UFS. Norberg-Schulz's concept of *genius loci*, promised a form of 'stability' capable of uniting all those inhabiting a place through works of architecture based on shared meanings; works inspired by an inclusive 'voice of place' which could 'speak' across cultural and linguistic divides. The idea that co-habitation could be translated into works of architecture that reveal the meanings of the place, continues to promise a way towards building works of architecture able to express the life of the place.

It is against this background that I, while attending the 2004 UIA (International Union of Architects) conference in Istanbul, was particularly moved by the unifying role that the Ottoman Külliyes played in the (predominantly informal) urban fabric of that city. In South Africa the need for urban centres in the marginalised informal settlements (a product of *Apartheid* policy which endures as an economic reality) remains problematic. The original aim of this study was to investigate the virtues of architectural ensembles (especially the Ottoman Külliye typology which was developed in Bursa and brought to fruition in the works of Sinan) as meaningful places.

Initially, the principal challenge I faced was to develop an adequate architectural 'language' to describe the qualities of these ensembles. In an effort to understand

ensembles as places and in order to find a language that could express their qualitative effect, a more in-depth study of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution was considered essential. Four important aspects became clear during this preliminary reading: Firstly, the scope of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution proved much more expansive than I had anticipated. Secondly, despite the wide-ranging nature of Norberg-Schulz's work, it seemed that even he lacked an adequate language to describe the way these ensembles 'engaged' with, or 'moved' inhabitants; how they, as Le Corbusier said, "touched my heart" (1923: 195). Surprisingly, it also became apparent that, at present, there exists no comprehensive English publication dedicated to an holistic understanding of Norberg-Schulz's voluminous theoretical contributions. Lastly, it seemed that those who follow his theoretical approach have rarely ventured into the Heideggarian primary source material to interrogate the validity of Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation. The result is that Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution remains, to a large extent, both unquestioned and underappreciated.

Rather than questioning a particular built typology (like the Ottoman Külliye), the preliminary investigation inspired two new aims; to formulate an holistic understanding of the theoretical contribution of Norberg-Schulz and to consider the cogency of his architectural 'translation' of Martin Heidegger's philosophy. It is these considerations that guided the subsequent study of Norberg-Schulz theoretical project.

The challenge posed by relying on translations
Neither Martin Heidegger nor Christian Norberg-Schulz was primarily a poet, but they engaged language poetically. For each, their mother tongues contained 'embedded knowledge' that could be accessed and applied. It is, therefore, unfortunate that this author is neither able to engage directly with the German Heideggarian source material, nor the Norwegian writings of Norberg-Schulz. Furthermore, there are still texts by Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz that are not available in English. While I gained valuable insights into the deep meanings of certain concepts used by Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz (e.g. German words like *Gelassenheit* and Norwegian words like *livskunst*) by speaking Afrikaans (a Germanic language) as mother tongue, it is only through the immersive study of various sources (and commentaries in the case of Heidegger) that some concepts (like Heidegger's concept of *Ereignis*) became accessible.

All translations are in a sense interpretations. Therefore, when a particular 'Afrikaans interpretation' plays a significant role in the arguments presented in this thesis this is indicated in the footnotes. In order to counter the risks involved in relying on translated

works it was decided to engage in a holistic study of both Norberg-Schulz and Heidegger's writings. It is assumed that the available translations, when engaged as a whole, will lead to a more appropriate interpretation of Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz's written contributions.

Preserving the chronology of works

Another challenge presented by this study involves making apparent the chronology of the works and lectures by Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz. In some instances, considerable lengths of time elapsed between Heidegger's completion of a manuscript (or a lecture course) and its publication date. In order to clarify the development of Heidegger's thought, the 'dates' used as in-text references in this thesis refer to the year in which Heidegger completed manuscripts (when this differed significantly from the date a work was first published) or delivered lecture courses. For instance Heidegger's 1925 lecture series, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, was first published in German in 1979 and in English in 1985.[1]

Similarly, some of Norberg-Schulz's works were referenced in terms of the date of their first publication or delivery. For instance, the essay, *Order and variation in the environment*, was first published in English in 2008, but originally published in 1966 (in Norwegian). While this 40 year interlude is not the rule for Norberg-Schulz's works, there are still many articles that have not been translated into English.

In order to clarify the range of works by Heidegger (Figure 1) and Norberg-Schulz (Figure 2) used in this study, Figure 1 and Figure 2 have been compiled to indicate the date that will be referred to in the text, the title of the work, the acronym used (if applicable), as well as relevant information on the circumstances surrounding the original delivery of the lecture, or the publication of the book or article. Additionally, it will be indicated (where appropriate) which translation or version (in bold) has been referred to. In Heidegger's case reference is also made to where material can be found in his *oeuvre*, or *Gesamtausgabe* (GA).

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[1] This approach to dating has also been applied to other 'iconic' works like Gaston Bachelard's, *The Poetics of Space* (originally published in 1958).

YEAR	TITLE (Heidegger)		DESCRIPTION
1922	*Phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle: initiation into phenomenological research*	PIA	Winter semester lecture course (1921-1922, Freiburg). **Rojcewicz, R. (2001)** (GA 61).
1924	*The concept of time*		Regarded as "*The First Draft of* Being and Time", which Heidegger prepared in 1924, but which was not published at the time ('Translator's Preface' in Heidegger, 1924). First published in German in 2004. **Farin, I. (2011)** (GA 64).
1925	*History of the concept of time: Prolegomena*	HCT	Summer semester lecture course (1925, Marburg). **Kisiel, T. (1992)** (GA 20).
1927a	*Being and time*	BT	Heidegger's *magnum opus* first published in 1927. **Stambaugh, J. (revised 2010)** (GA 2).
1927b	*The basic problems of phenomenology*		Summer semester lecture course (1927, Marburg). **Hofstadter, A. (1988)** (GA 24).
1929	*What is metaphysics?*		Inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg (24/07/1929) (Krell, 2008: 90). **Krell, D.F. (in Krell, D.F. 2008)** (GA 9).
1930a	*On the essence of truth.*		Heidegger "thought out and delivered" the content of this article in 1930, but it was only printed in 1943 (Heidegger, 1947a: 231). **Sallis, J. (in Krell, D.F. 2008)** (GA 9).
1930b	*The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: world, finitude, solitude.*		Winter semester lecture course (1929-1930, Freiburg). **McNeill, W. & Walker, N. (1995)** (GA 29/30).
1934	*Why do I stay in the provinces?*		An essay first published in 1934. **Sheenan, T. (in Sheenan, T. 1981)** (GA 13)
1935	*Introduction to metaphysics*	IM	Summer semester lecture course (1935, Freiburg). **Fried, G. & Polt, R. (2000)** (GA 40).
1936a	*The origin of the work of art*	OWA	Hofstadter's translation is based on the text first published in *Holzwege* (Klosterman, 1950) which was based on "three lectures at the Freies Deutsches Hochstift in Frankfurt a. M. on November 17 and 24 and December 4, 1936" (Heidegger in Hofstadter, 2001: xxiii-xiv). The Addendum was written in 1956. A first (substantially shorter) version of this lecture was delivered in 1935 and a translation (by Veith) is available in Figal, 2009: 130-150. **Hofstadter, A. (in Hofstadter, A. 2001)** (GA 5).
1936b	*Hölderlin and the essence of poetry*		Lecture delivered on 2 April 1936. **Veith, J. (in Figal, G. 2009)** (GA 4).
1938a	*Contributions to philosophy: from enowning*		Originally composed as a private contemplation (1936-1938), and was only published in German in 1989. The first English translation appeared in (1999). **Emad, P. & Maly, K. (1999)** (GA 65).

YEAR	TITLE (Heidegger)		DESCRIPTION
1938b	*Contributions to philosophy (of the event)*	CtP	This study predominantly refers to the new translation of CtP. **Rojcewicz, R. & Vallega-Neu, D. (2012)** (GA 65).
1938c	*The age of the world picture*		Lecture delivered on 09/06/1938, originally entitled "The Establishing by Metaphysics of the Modern world Picture" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 286). **Haynes, K. & Young, J. and modified by Veith, J. (in Figal, G. 2009)** (GA 5).
1944	*Logos and language.*		An excerpt from Heidegger's 1944 Summer semester course entitled, *Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos* (Freiburg). **Veith, J. (in Figal, G. 2009)** (GA 55).
1945	*Country path conversations*		Davis's translation was "based on a set of manuscripts which Heidegger wrote in 1944-1945" (Translator's Foreword in Heidegger, 1945: vii). **Davis, B.W. (2010)** (GA 77).
1946	*What are poets for?*		Hofstadter's translation is based on the text first published in *Holzwege* (Klosterman, 1950), of which Heidegger remarked: "The lecture was delivered to a very small group in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of R.M. Rilke's death (died December 29, 1926)" (Heidegger in Hofstadter, 2001: xxiv). **Hofstadter, A. (in Hofstadter, A. 2001)** (GA 5).
1947a	*Letter on humanism*	LoH	This article is a revised version of Heidegger's response to a letter Jean Beaufret addressed to him (10/11/1946). It was first published in 1947 (Krell, 2008: 214). **Capuzzi, F.A. in collaboration with Gray, J.G. (in Krell, D.F. 2008)** (GA 9).
1947b	*The thinker as poet.*		Poems written by Heidegger in 1947 and published in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954) (Hofstadter, 2001: xxiii). **Hofstadter, A. (in Hofstadter, A. 2001)** (GA 13).
1950a	*The thing*		Hofstadter's translation is based on the text first published in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullinger: Neske, 1954), which Heidegger described as "Lecture, given at the Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Kunsten, on June 6, 1950" (Heidegger in Hofstadter, 2001: xxv). **Hofstadter, A. (in Hofstadter, A. 2001)** (GA 7).
1950b	*Language*		Hofstadter's translation is based on the text first published in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullinger: Neske, 1959), of which Heidegger remarked: "The lecture was given on October 7, 1950, at Bühlerhöhe in memory of Max Kommerell and was repeated on February 14, 1951 at the Würtembergische Bibliotheksgesellschaft in Stuttgart" (Heidegger in Hofstadter, 2001: xxv). **Hofstadter, A. (in Hofstadter, A. 2001)** (GA 12).

YEAR	TITLE (Heidegger)		DESCRIPTION
1951a	*Building dwelling thinking*	**BDT**	Hofstadter's translation is based on the text first published in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullinger: Neske, 1954), of which Heidegger remarked: "Lecture, given on August 5, 1951, in the course of the *Darmstadt Colloquiem II*" (Heidegger in Hofstadter, 2001: xxiv). **Hofstadter, A. (in Hofstadter, A. 2001)** (GA 7).
1951b	*… Poetically man dwells …*		Hofstadter's translation is based on the text first published in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullinger: Neske, 1954), of which Heidegger remarked: "Lecture, given on October 6, 1951, at Bühlerhöhe" (Heidegger in Hofstadter, 2001: xxv). **Hofstadter, A. (in Hofstadter, A. 2001)** (GA 7).
1952	*What is called thinking?*		Winter and summer semester lecture series (1951-1952, Freiburg) **Gray, J.G. (2004)** (GA 8).
1953	*The question concerning technology*		A lecture delivered on 18/11/1953 to the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts. First published in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullinger: Neske, 1954) (Krell, 2008: 308-309). **Lovitt, W. (in Krell, D.F. 2008)** (GA 7).
1955	*The language of Johann Peter Hebel*		An essay written in 1955. **Veith, J. (in Figal, G. 2009)** (GA 13)
1957a	*The onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics*		Lecture delivered on 24/02/1957 (Todtnauberg) (Stambaugh, 2002: 21). **Stambaugh. J. (in Stambaugh. J. 2002)** (GA 11).
1957b	*The principle of identity*		Lecture delivered on 27/06/1957 (Freiburg) (Stambaugh, 2002: 21). **Stambaugh. J. (in Stambaugh. J. 2002)** (GA 11).
1957c	*Hebel–friend of the house*		An essay written in 1957. **Foltz, B.V. and Heim, M.(1983)** (GA 13).
1959	*The way to language*		Lecture delivered in January 1959 (Krell, 2008: 394). First published in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullinger: Neske, 1959). **Krell, D.F. (in Krell, D. F. 2008)** (GA 12).
1962	*Time and being*		A lecture (1962) that first appeared in English as part of *On Time and Being* (1972) **Stambaugh. J. (in Stambaugh. J. 1972)** (GA 14).
1964	*The end of philosophy and the task of thinking.*		A lecture (1964) that first appeared in English as part of *On Time and Being* (1972) **Stambaugh. J. (in Krell, D.F. 2008)** (GA 14).
1969	*Art and space*		An essay written in 1969. **Seibert, C.H. and modified by Veith, J. (in Figal, G. 2009)** (GA 13).

Figure 1: Works by Martin Heidegger used in this thesis

YEAR	TITLE (Norberg-Schulz)		DESCRIPTION
1962a	*Alberti's last intentions*	**ALI**	An essay first published in Italian in 1962 (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251) and included in a compilation of essays by Norberg-Schulz entitled, *Architecture: Meaning and Place* (1986d). This volume was first published by Electra Spa (Milan) in 1986. **1988, New York: Rizzoli. Hereafter referred to as AMP.**
1962b	*Italiesin: sommerbolig i Porto Ercole i Italia*		Article (Norwegian) in *Byggekunst*, 1962 (6).
1963	***Intentions in architecture***	**IiA**	Norberg-Schulz's first book and the product of his doctoral studies (1963, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget). **1965, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.**
1966a	*Order and variation in the environment*	**OVE**	First published in 1966 as *Orden og variasjon i omgivelsene*. **Anderson, M.A. (2008).**
1966b	*Meaning in architecture*	**MiA**	Lecture delivered at Cambridge University in 1966 (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP.**
1967a	*Borromini and the Bohemian Baroque*		Lecture delivered "at the Accademia di San Luca in Rome 1967, and published in Italian in *Studi sul Borromini*, Rome 1967" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP**.
1967b	*Pluralism in architecture*		Journal article.
1968	*Less or more?*		Journal article.
1969	*The concept of place*	**CP**	First published in Italian in 1969 (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP**.
1969	***Stav og laft i Norge: Early wooden architecture in Norway***		Written in collaboration with Gunnar Bugge, and first published in 1969. **1990, Oslo: Norsk arkitekturforlag**.
1971	***Existence, space and architecture***	**ESA**	Book published by Praeger (1971).
1972	***Late Baroque and Rococo architecture***		Originally published in 1972 (Italian edition). **1985, New York: Rizzoli**
1974	***Meaning in western architecture***	**MiWA**	Originally published in Italian in 1974. **Norberg-Schulz, A.M. (1978).**
1975a	***On the Search for Lost Architecture: the works of Paolo Portoghesi and Vittorio Gigliotti 1959-1975***		Book published by Officina Edizioni (1975).
1975b	*Ørkentanken*		Article (Norwegian) in *Byggekunst*, 1975(3).
1978	*Timber buildings in Europe*	**TBE**	This article is "a shortened version of the introduction to *Wooden Houses in Europe*, Y. Futagawa, Tokyo 1978" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP.**
1979a	*Introduction*	**iAMP**	This article is "a shortened version of a lecture given at the University of Dallas on March 2, 1979" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). For a discussion of the significance of the omitted text see subsection 6.5.3 **AMP.**

YEAR	TITLE (Norberg-Schulz)		DESCRIPTION
1979b	***Genius loci: towards a phenomenology of architecture***	**GL**	Originally published in Italian in 1979. **1980, New York: Rizzoli.**
1979c	*Kahn, Heidegger and the language of architecture*	**KHLA**	The 'version' of this essay presented in AMP is severely condensed (when compared to the version published in Oppositions 18); therefore this thesis will refer to the 1979 version.
1980a	*Towards an authentic architecture*	**TAA**	The article Norberg-Schulz contributed to the 1980 exhibition at the Venice Biennale entitled, "The Presence of the Past". **AMP.**
1980b	*Behrens House*	**BH**	This article contains "the introductory text to a booklet published in Italian in Rome 1980" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP.**
1980c	*Bauhaus*	**B**	This article was "published in Italian as the introductory text to a booklet, Rome 1980" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP.**
1981a	*The vision of Paolo Porthoghesi*	**VPP**	This article "was published as an introduction to *The Sympathy for things*, Objects and Furnishings designed by Paulo Porthoghesi (G. Priori, ed.), Rome 1981" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP.**
1981b	*The earth and sky of Jörn [sic] Utzon*	**ESJU**	This article "was published as an introduction to 'Jörn [*sic*] Utzon, Church at Bagsvaerd near Copenhagen, Denmark 1973-76,' Y. Futugawa, Global Architecture, 61, Tokyo 1981" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP.**
1983a	*Heidegger's thinking on architecture*	**HTA**	This article was first published in Perspecta 20, 1983. **AMP.**
1983b	*Current architecture (review)*		A book review of Charles Jencks and William Chaitkin's book, *Current Architecture* (1982).
1984a	***The concept of dwelling: on the way to figurative architecture***	**CoD**	Originally published in Italian in 1984. **1985, New York: Rizzoli.**
1984b	*Tugendhat House*	**TH**	This article was first published as "the introductory text to a booklet in Italian and English published in Rome 1984" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP.**
1985a	*On the way to figurative architecture*	**WFA**	This article is a reworked version of a lecture presented in San Francisco (12 July 1985), and was first "published in Norwegian in Byggekunst, Oslo 1985" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986d: 251). **AMP.**
1985b	*On the way to a figurative architecture*		A transcription of the lecture mentioned above (12 July 1985, San Francisco) (transcription by Auret, H.A.) (see appendix B).
1986a	*Schröder House*	**SH**	Essay published for the first time in **AMP.**
1986b	*The places of Ricardo Bofill*	**PRB**	Essay published for the first time in **AMP.**

YEAR	TITLE (Norberg-Schulz)		DESCRIPTION
1986c	*Modern Norwegian architecture*		Book published by Norwegian University Press.
1986d	*Architecture: Meaning and Place*		A collection of essays written between 1962 and 1986 (when the book was first published in Italy). These essays have been referenced as individual works in order to reveal the chronological development of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical approach.
1987	*New world architecture*	NWA	A book consisting of "three lectures presented at the Architectural League of New York on November 3, 5, and 10, 1987. These talks are the first J. Clawson Mills lectures on American Architecture and Landscape" (Norberg-Schulz, 1987: 2). **1988, New York: Princeton Architectural Press.**
1988	*Michael Graves and the language of architecture*	MGLA	Introduction to Michael Graves's book, *Michael Graves: buildings and projects, 1982-1989* (1990). The manuscript is dated 1988 (NAM 7).
1989	*Order and change in architecture*	OCA	A lecture presented at Texas A&M University on April 13, 1989. **1991, College Station: Texas A&M University Press.**
1989	*The voice of architecture*	VoA	The 'discussion' between Norberg-Schulz, Kenneth Frampton, and Karsten Harries at Texas A&M University on April 13, 1989, (following the lecture OCA) published as, *The Voice of Architecture*. **1991, College Station: Texas A&M University Press.**
1991a	*The language of architecture*		Journal article.
1991b	*The new tradition*		Journal article.
1992	*Research project: places in Norway.*		Research proposal by Norberg-Schulz, C. & Vagstein, A.M. published in 1992.
1992	*Life takes place*		Journal article.
1993	*Nightlands: Nordic building*	NL	Originally published in Norwegian in 1993. **McQuillan, T. (1996).**
1995a	*Stedskunst*		Published in Norwegian in 1995. Has not been translated into English.
1995b	*The backbone of freedom*		Introduction to the book, *Steel, structure and architecture* (1995), by Eggen, A.P. & Sandaker, B.N.
2000a	*Principles of Modern Architecture*	PMA	Norberg-Schulz described this book as "a thoroughly revised edition of *Roots of Modern Architecture,* published in Tokio in 1988 (manuscript 1983)" (2000b: 7).
2000b	*Architecture: presence, language, place*	PLP	The original Norwegian manuscript was written c. 1996 (NAM 4), but the book was first published (posthumously) in 2000. **Shugaar, A. (2000).**

Figure 2: Works by Christian Norberg-Schulz used in this thesis

Literary conventions

Unless otherwise indicated, all figures, drawings and photographs are the work of the author.

Pagination

In-text references to *Being and Time* are based on the pagination used in the original German edition (which have been included in subsequent editions and translations). In all other cases, where the original pagination of Heidegger's writings was included in a new edition, I cite the original pagination followed by the pagination of the particular translation being used (Author name, date: 'previous pagination'/'particular edition pagination') (e.g. Heidegger, 1938b: 188-189/148).

Regarding the capitalisation of the term 'Being'

In contrast to some recent translations of Heidegger's work (Stambaugh, 2010; Davis, 2010; Rojcewicz & Vallega-Neu, 2012) this thesis will capitalise the word 'Being' when referring to the 'concept of Being'. The main argument against capitalisation is that, in German, all nouns are capitalised, and that the act of capitalising 'Being' (in English) carries too many connections with a "transcendent Being" (Stambaugh, 2010: xxiv).

However, the German words Heidegger used for Being, *Sein* (Afr: *wees*), and a being, *Seiend* (Afr: *wese*), are different (and thus differentiated) in German, thereby safeguarding the 'ontological difference' between Being and being. In many translations this approach is also adopted in instances where a special significance is bestowed on other everyday terms (e.g. 'Moment', the 'Same', and the 'Open'). Not capitalising Being, necessitates (in some cases) referring to the 'being of the being', rather than just 'Being'. Heidegger's philosophy often engaged with the 'problematic' aspects of the divine; for instance, as one of the elements of the fourfold and when referring to the 'last god' (Chapter VII in CtP). To ignore these mysterious allusions, as somehow misguided or bothersome, seems like a "levelling down" (Heidegger, 1938b: 493-494/388) of the strange 'holding sway' of Being. In direct quotations the lack of capitalisation will be observed.

Glossary of terms

Both Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz employed particular interpretations of certain terms. Heidegger, especially, aimed to reach beyond the grasp of the metaphysical impositions placed on 'Western languages' (Heidegger, 1957a: 73). Over the years various 'standardised translations' for Heidegger's German have been established. In some cases it is also helpful to refer to the Norwegian roots of Norberg-Schulz's terms to gain a deeper understanding of his interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy. For these reasons an extensive glossary of terms has been compiled.

Abbreviations used for languages:

- Afr - Afrikaans
- G - German
- Gr - Greek
- N - Norwegian

***Ab-grund* (G) (abyss):** Heidegger's discussion of the abyss suggests that every revelation – every epoch named, and thing uncovered – implies a wealth of hiddenness, which implies that marginalised aspects are forgotten. In every foundation there is potential for revelation, but also loss. Heidegger understood this "shakeable foundation" – a "ground that gives way" (Kisiel, 2010: 28) – as an abyss; not only as 'void', but as "a withholding that holds sway throughout the history of metaphysics" (Warnek, 2010: 163); a 'supporting-withdrawing' (Mitchell, 2010: 212). That is why some Heidegger translators propose that the neologism *Ab-grund* must be translated as "grounding abyss" (Dahlstrom, 2010: 120). However, instead of reverting to cumbersome translations, I (as an Afrikaans speaker who also hears the various echoes contained in the German term) have opted to use Heidegger's term unfiltered.[2] Since Heidegger reverted to a neologism (which 'estranges' the term from its normal use), it is safe to assume that the richness of the term will be apparent. The nature of this 'grounding abyss' can most appropriately be understood in terms of poetry, because it is poets – as those who are "more venturesome"

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[2] I have followed the same approach with other German terms, like *Andenken*, *Ereignis*, and *Gelassenheit*, and Norwegian terms, like *livskunst* and *stedskunst*. In addition to the fact that some English translations are cumbersome (in PLP *livskunst* is translated as 'the art of the experience of living'), I also reverted to the original term when I felt that a particular English term failed to grasp the nuances of the concept (e.g. 'releasement' for *Gelassenheit*).

– who are able to "reach sooner over the abyss" (Heidegger, 1946: 115-116) and disclose the "situation" (Heidegger, 1927a: 299) (see *Aletheia, Lichtung*, Situation).

***Aletheia* (Gr):** The interaction between *Grund* and *Ab-grund* (see *Ab-grund*) is evident in Heidegger's interpretation of the Greek concept of *aletheia*. Heidegger argued that people "thoughtlessly translate" *aletheia* as 'truth' (Heidegger, 1935: 78/107), which is implied to mean "correctness" (1935: 142/199). Heidegger challenged this notion of *aletheia* by proposing that the word should rather be translated as "unconcealment" (1935: 78/107). This term recognises the "interplay of … hiddenness [*lethe*] and unhiddenness [*aletheia*]" (Dahlstrom, 2010: 117). *Dasein*, the one who is there as 'disclosive openness' (see *Dasein,* Resoluteness), is able to interpret this 'interplay' as the event of the clearing (see *Lichtung*) of truth, in which things can "present themselves as they are" (Dahlstrom, 2010: 121). *Dasein*, as the being of care (see Care), is the guardian (see Safeguarding) of "the openness of self-concealing" (Heidegger, 1938b: 294-295/232) in the clearing as *aletheia*. Ultimately, what is guarded is the mystery and wonder of Being.

Always already: Heidegger's term used to describe the way dwellers 'always already' find themselves in a certain mood (attuned in a certain way) with a certain past, and are always already 'mortal' in the sense that they have 'always already' been born. The term is emblematic of the peculiar way Heidegger viewed human existence as "thrownness". *Dasein* has 'always already' been 'thrown' "into its there" (its world) in a peculiar way (Heidegger, 1927a: 135). Before *Dasein* has time to engage in any aspect of being-in-the-world, it is 'always already' concerned (see thrownness, facticity, Being-in-the world, care).

***Andenken* (G):** Heidegger posited *Andenken* – a form of reflective thinking, or *Besinnung* – against the "calculative thinking" (Heidegger, 1959: 420) characterising the mind-set of modern technology (see *Gestell*). *Andenken* offers a way towards poetic contemplation – understood as *Sorgen* and *Sinnen* (Heidegger, 1947a: 224) – or "inceptual thinking" (Heidegger, 1938b: 56-60/46-48); a "thoughtful re-trieval" (Heidegger, 1935: 146/204) that calls *Dasein* to gratitude, rather than the rational need for order and the illusion of complete unconcealment (see *Aletheia*).

Art: Heidegger defined art as the "setting-into-work of truth"; a process that implies guardianship as "creative preserving" (1936a: 69) (see *Aletheia, Ab-grund,* Safeguarding, *Poiesis*).

Art of place (N: *stedskunst*): Norberg-Schulz maintained that the "existential purpose of building (architecture) is … to uncover the meanings potentially present in the [place]"

(1979b: 18). Architecture must set the 'meanings' of place into works of architecture and reveal the 'truth' of the place (1979b: 170) (see Place). As a 'setting-into-work' (see Art) of the "truth" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 6) of place, architecture can be understood as the "art of place" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 11).

Art of care: This thesis proposes a way to engage architecture as the art of care; the setting-into-work (see Art) of the truth of '*Dasein* as care'. The art of care principally aims to engage with the fourfold totality (see Fourfold) of *Dasein*'s concerned dwelling (see Dwelling) in a spatio-temporal situation (see Care). The goal of this thesis is to develop the art of care as the resolute – understood as an act of perduring-letting-be (see Resoluteness) – and concerned (Afr: *sorgsame*) measure-taking (see Measuring) which draws place and life into contiguity and inspires the care-full making (see *Poiesis*) – through architectural *livskunst* (see Art of the experience of living) – of *Dasein*'s emplaced being-in-the-world as care (*Sorge*).

Art of the experience of living (N: *livskunst*): The ultimate goal of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution was to let the art of place – through his "phenomenology of presence" (2000b: 311) – be transformed into the "art of the experience of living" (2000b: 356) (see Phenomenology of Presence, Presence); a translated term for the Norwegian word Norberg-Schulz used, *livskunst* (Norberg-Schulz, 1995: 183). Norberg-Schulz envisioned the art of the experience of living as a way to recover the relationship between "thought" and "feeling" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 7) by reinstating architecture as the "concrete [response]" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 24) to *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world; or as Norberg-Schulz often called it, the fact that "life takes place" (1979b: 6; 1984a: 75; 2000b: 27).

Authenticity: Heidegger believed that there is an authentic (*eigentlich*) and inauthentic (*uneigentlich*) way to exist in the world. In German the effect of these words lies in '*eigen*', *Dasein*'s ability to 'own' (appropriate) the being of this *Dasein* as "*mine*" (King, 2001: 40). However, in terms of Norberg-Schulz's concept of *livskunst* (see Art of the experience of living) it can be argued that the way to authenticity (Afr: *lewensegtheid*) can appropriately be understood as an approach that is true to the (concerned) life of the place (see *Ereignis*).

Being: Heidegger introduced *Being and Time* (1927a) with a statement by Plato admitting that even those "who used to think [they] understood" what is meant by Being "have now become perplexed" (Plato cited in Heidegger, 1927a: 1). The concept of Being remained the elusive fulcrum of Heidegger's philosophical questioning. As a concept it "resists every

attempt at definition". However, this does not mean that Being can be conveniently forgotten as "the most universal and the emptiest concept" (Heidegger, 1927a: 2), neither does it necessitate turning to the 'description of beings', which would imply a purely 'ontic', rather than 'ontological', and therefore 'metaphysical' approach (see Ontological difference, Metaphysics). Instead, studying Being implies questioning that which is accepted as self-evident, by remaining engaged with that which has become opaque in its nearness. As the Heidegger scholar and translator, Richard Polt, remarked: "Nothing could be more obvious than Being – and nothing could be harder to clarify" (1999: 26).

Being-in-the-world: "Being-in-the-world" is the term Heidegger coined to describe the "fundamental constitution of Dasein" (Heidegger, 1927a: 52). *Dasein* is 'always already' in a world full of cares and things to be taken care of (see Always already, Care, Thing). The most significant philosophical implication of Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world, as a "*unified* phenomenon" (Heidegger, 1927a: 53), is that it overcame the Cartesian division between subject and object.

Being of the intentional: In his 1925 lecture course Heidegger proposed that "what phenomenology took to be intentionality and how it took it is fragmentary, a phenomenon regarded merely from the outside" (1925: 419-420/303). In order to engage with what intentionality means – in order to reveal the way *Dasein* finds meaning in being-in-the-world – Heidegger proposed that philosophers needed to acknowledge "*the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional*" (1925: 178-180/129). Heidegger proposed 'care' as "*the term for the being of Dasein*"; a term which illuminates *Dasein* as "*an entity for which, intimately involved in its being-in-the-world, this very being is at issue*" (1925: 406-408/294) (see Care).

Beyng: The translators of *Contributions to Philosophy (of the event)* (1938b), Richard Rojcewicz & Daniela Vallega-Neu, coined the term 'beyng' to differentiate between Heidegger's use of the word *Seyn* (in CtP) and the term he used in BT, *Sein* (translated as 'being'). *Seyn* is an "archaic form" (Note by the translators: Heidegger, 1938b, p. 6) of *Sein*, which Heidegger used to indicate that he was trying to think of Being in a fundamentally new way.

Care (*Sorge*) (G): Care is the word used to translate Heidegger's German term *Sorge*, designating the "existential meaning" of the Being of *Dasein* (Heidegger, 1927a: 41). In general terms, the fact that *Dasein* is, 'always already', in the world as care constitutes the presupposition for meaningful interaction with the 'world', the 'self' and the 'other' (see Always already, *Dasein*). According to the Heidegger scholar and translator, David Ferrell

Krell, care is the "name for the structural whole of existence in all its modes and for the broadest and most basic possibilities of discovery and disclosure of self and world". Furthermore, Krell proposed that care is the "all-inclusive name for [*Dasein*'s] concern for other people, preoccupations with things, and awareness of [*Dasein*'s] proper Being. It expresses the movement of my life out of a past, into a future, through the present" (Krell, 2008: 223). That is why Heidegger argued that the "*meaning of authentic care*" is "*temporality*" (1927a: 326). Heidegger used 'care' to designate both *Dasein*'s concerns (Afr: *sorge*) (G: *Sorge*) and capacity for cultivation, or taking-care (Afr: *sorg*) (G: *sorgen*). *Dasein* cares about things (Afr: *besorg*) and takes care of other people (Afr: *versorg*). In authentic 'being-in-the-world' amid care, *Dasein* is solicitous (Afr: *sorgsaam*). While making things (see *Poiesis*) in a way that is "filled with care" (see Care-full) *Dasein* is thorough (Afr: *sorgvuldig*). All these senses of care are steeped in Heidegger's formulation of ecstatic temporality (see Ek-sistence) as expressed in the 'structure' that Heidegger ascribed to care: "being-ahead-of-oneself-already-being-in (a world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)" (1927a: 317). In his later writings, Heidegger expanded the meaning of care by envisioning it as the way in which *Dasein* 'shelters' or 'safeguards' the truth (see Safeguarding).

Care-full: By spelling the term care-full in a 'strange' way, I have tried to capture the implications of the Afrikaans word *sorgvuldig* (see *Sorgvuldig*); a word which denotes both that something is made in a way that is 'attentive' (Afr: *sorgsaam*) and with (painstaking) precision.

***Dasein* (G):** Heidegger defined *Dasein* as the "being [who] is concerned *about* its very being". There is a "concerned" relationship between Being and this being (Heidegger, 1927a: 12). But *Dasein* is also the one that 'discloses the there' by taking-care. *Dasein* is therefore both the one who is concerned, and the one who takes care (see Care). As care, *Dasein* is – in the sense that *Dasein* is open (see Resoluteness) to the question of Being – a being that "brings its there along with it" as its "disclosedness" (1927a: 133). By being the openness (see *Lichtung*) that gives disclosedness, *Dasein* is "ontically distinguished" by the fact that it "*is* ontological" (Heidegger, 1927a: 12) (see *Aletheia*, Care, Ontological difference).

Dwelling, dwelling poetically: Norberg-Schulz appropriated Heidegger's concept of dwelling as the "total man-place relationship" (1979b: 19). Heidegger saw dwelling as a fourfold (see Fourfold) appropriative event (see *Ereignis*) inspired by the "sparing and preserving" (1951a: 147) enacted by *Dasein* who, as the being of care (see Care), 'takes care' of its situation (1951a: 149). The act of taking care must be understood in its full

ontological sense, i.e. not only as cultivation, but also in terms of a mortal being engaged in a region of concern (see Place). Instead of primarily understanding the world 'rationally' or in a 'calculative' way (see *Andenken*), this mortal being care-fully engages its world through poetic "measure-taking" (1951b: 219) (see Measuring). By acknowledging the way *Dasein* cultivates its relationship with its place as a concerned mortal appreciation, the possibility identified by the German poet, Friedrich Hōlderlin (1770-1843), that *Dasein* may dwell "poetically" (Hōlderlin cited in Heidegger, 1951b: 214), can be brought to fruition.

Ek-sistence: In *Being and Time*, Heidegger described *Dasein*'s temporal existence as an ecstatic interaction between "structural moments" (1927a: 335) of care: understanding, attunement, falling prey and discourse. He contrasted this ecstatic interaction with the "vulgar understanding" of time as "a pure succession of nows, without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatic character of primordial temporality is leveled down" (1927a: 329). In order to express the "ecstatic character" of being-in-the-world, John Sallis translated Heidegger's use of the German word, *Existenz*, with the term "ek-sistence" (Note by the translator: Heidegger, 1930a: 126); a neologism which succinctly denotes the way *Dasein*, as a guardian (see Safeguarding), is the one "standing out into the truth of Being" (1947a: 230). Heidegger was not so much concerned with what has traditionally been understood as the "actuality" of "existence", but tried to engage with *Dasein*'s disclosive 'standing out' as "ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being" as "care for Being" (1947a: 245-246) (see Care, *Ereignis*).

***Ereignis* (G) (event of appropriation) (enowning):** *Ereignis* is a term Heidegger introduced to designate the 'event' or 'happening' that "gives" Being and "gives" time (Heidegger, 1962: 19). Malpas (2006: 215-216) argued that, for Heidegger, the term's significance depended on three associations. Firstly, in ordinary German usage the term refers to an event or happening (see Situation). Secondly, due to its similarity with the adjective *eigen*, the word also reminds of *Dasein*'s ability to 'own' things; not in the sense of possession, but in the sense of making something one's own through appropriation (making something belong) and associating oneself with something else (belonging to something), and to do this in a way that is authentic (see Authenticity). Thirdly, Heidegger associated the word with its etymological roots in the term *eräugen*, designating the ability to "see or to be evident", which reminds of Heidegger's discussion (in BT) of the "Moment" (*Augenblick*) that "brings existence to the situation and discloses the authentic 'there'" (Heidegger, 1927a: 347) (see Facticity). Thus Heidegger's formulation of *Ereignis* unites the concepts of "event/happening", "gathering/belonging" (see Thing), and

"disclosing/revealing" (see *Aletheia*) (Malpas, 2006: 216). That is why *Ereignis* is, in most cases, translated as either the "event of appropriation", or by the neologism "enowning" (Polt, 1999: 146-147). In Heidegger's later writings *Ereignis* served as a way to describe the concerned relationship between Being and *Dasein*; the way in which "man and Being are appropriated to each other" in the "openness of a clearing" (1957b: 31) (see *Lichtung*). *Ereignis*, as a happening, also relates the dynamic interaction ("mirroring") between the members of the fourfold (see Fourfold) in which earth, sky, mortals and divine "appropriates their own presencing into simple belonging to one another" (1950a: 177). Norberg-Schulz described *Ereignis* as the event (the taking place) in which "something finds its appropriateness" (2000b: 72).

Facticity: The 'factic life' or 'facticity' refers to the German word *Faktizität,* which Heidegger used to indicate "the way in which every *Dasein* actually is". Furthermore, facticity "implies that an 'innerworldly' being has being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the being of those beings which it encounters within its own world" (Heidegger, 1927a: 56). To be such a being, a being which is concerned about the concrete 'fact' (and facts) of its own being, is to be *Dasein*, the being of care (see Care, Situation), thrown into a world of concern (see Thrownness). In CtP Heidegger tried to engage with *Dasein*'s factical situation as the "builder and steward of [the site of the moment]"; a "temporal-spatial playing field wherein beings can again be beings" (1938b: 242-243/191). *Dasein* has access to the 'event' (see *Ereignis*) of the 'site of the moment' by being the concerned mortal; the one for whom time ecstatically (see Ek-sistence) arises as significant 'moments', rather than temporal progress amid a "pure succession of nows" (Heidegger, 1927a: 329).

Fourfold: The fourfold is one of Heidegger's most enigmatic constructs. Heidegger's fourfold consist of the interaction between 'earth', 'sky', 'mortals', and the 'divine', unified in a "simple onefold of their self-unified fourfold"; a "mirroring" appropriation (see *Ereignis*) in which the four are "betrothed" to each other (1950a: 176-178). The members allude to the temporal (mortal-divine) and spatial (earth-sky) significance of being-in-the-world amid things, and negate the differentiation between subject, object and world. The interactive, though unified, nature of the fourfold reveals "the utter relationality of worldly existence" (Mitchell, 2010: 208); a radical contextualism in which "[t]he elements of the fourfold each articulate a limit of the thing that opens it on to relations. The limits of the fourfold serve to weave the thing into place [which allows the thing to be] contextualized within the world" (Mitchell, 2010: 215) (see Thing).

***Gelassenheit* (G):** see Resoluteness.

Gestell (G) (enframing) of technics: The *Gestell* of technics is Heidegger's overarching term for the manner in which modern *Dasein*'s way of being is dominated by the 'efficiency' of modern technology (or technics), and the accompanying mind-set of self-assertion. Technics is unable to let truth be, because it desires "exclusive mastery" through "manipulation". It is devoid of poetry and "[reduces] man and beings to a sort of 'standing reserve' or stockpile in service to … technological purposes" (Krell, 2008: 309). In this *Gestell* of efficiency, *Dasein* is no longer a caretaker, but a manipulative user. In contrast to this *Gestell*, Heidegger pointed to *Dasein*'s ability to understand and appropriate without 'ordering' or 'using up' (even if used efficiently); a human capacity he described in terms of the interaction between resoluteness and *Gelassenheit* (see Resoluteness).

Guardianship: (see Safeguarding)

Hermeneutics, hermeneutic circle: In BT Heidegger argued that the "hermeneutic situatedness" (1927a: 310) of *Dasein* – designating "the vital original reality given to human beings to live before they come to think about it" (Kisiel, 2010: 18) – is imbued by a distinctive circularity. *Dasein* understands things it has always already projected, relates to things in a way that is always already under the sway of a certain attunement and history, and always already cares about its Being in ways that make Being meaningful. While this circularity seems to fall short of the "loftiest rigor of scientific investigation", it is, in fact, derived from the very Being of *Dasein*. Rather than trying to "overcome" this unresolving circularity, Heidegger believed that the real challenge lay in deciding how to "[leap] into this 'circle'" as a being of care between birth and death (1927a: 315-316). Thus the hermeneutic situation aims to acknowledge the "historically situated I" rather than the "theoretical I" (Kisiel, 2010: 19). Heidegger's early work on hermeneutics was significantly elaborated upon by one of his students, the German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), (see subsection 2.1.2 and 2.2.1).

Historicity (G: *Geschichtlichkeit*): In contrast to modern attempts at presenting history as a "sequence of events", Heidegger tried to engage with the "fundamentally historical nature of human existence" (Polt, 1999: 100-103). He proposed that something like *Geschichte* (see History) is made 'accessible' (to historiology) by *Dasein*'s historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), rather than historiology itself (1927a: 375), and that only *Dasein* as the being of care (see Care), can "be historical in the ground of its existence" (Heidegger, 1927a: 385). Heidegger believed that "[t]he science of history can *never institute* the historical relation to history" (Heidegger, 1935: 33/46). Instead, he argued that *Dasein* "*is*

not 'temporal' because it 'is in history,' … on the contrary, it exists and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being" (Heidegger, 1927a: 376).

History (G: *Geschichte*): Heidegger developed an ontological appreciation (see Ontological difference) of history as the "essential occurrence of beyng itself" (1938b: 31-32/27). History, in the eyes of Heidegger, is not merely past events, but the way in which "the world is originally opened up for us by our relationship to our future and our past" (Polt, 1999: 103); a disclosure, made available to *Dasein* as the being of care, in which the "*occurrence of history is the occurrence of being-in-the-world*" (Heidegger, 1927a: 388).

Historiology (G: *Historie*): Heidegger saw *Historie* (translated in some cases, as in Stambaugh's translation of BT, as 'historiography') as the misguided attempt, brought "into proper dominance" by the modern calculating mind-set, to "order the past … as background [for the] present, [and] spread the present out into an eternity" (1938b: 491-494/387-388). He argued that historiology offers a "vulgar interpretation of the history of Dasein" (1927a: 376); the self-willing "objectification of the ontic events of history" (Warnek, 2010: 162) which presents human beings as those "who [have] made progress" (1938b: 493-494/388). In other words, historiology, as a metaphysical form of *logos* dedicated to "assertion" (1935: 142/199), aims at "mastery" and is "grounded on the subject-object relation" (1938b: 493-495/388-389) (see Being-in-the-world).

***Lichtung* (G) (clearing):** Heidegger's clearing is open to 'representational misreading'.[3] While Heidegger's *Lichtung* is like a clearing in a forest, in the sense that it implies a lightening (not necessarily a complete openness) that "allows for light but also supposes the density and darkness of the surrounding forest [while signalling] human handiwork" (Dahlstrom, 2010: 119), it should not be envisioned as a fixed reality. Heidegger's *Lichtung* is "the event, the time-space that enables things to come into the open" as truth; a truth envisioned not as 'correctness' (see *Aletheia*, *Ereignis*), but as "the un-grounded ground" (Dahlstrom, 2010: 120) (see *Ab-grund*).

***Livskunst* (N):** see Art of the experience of living.

Measuring: The term 'measuring' (or 'measure-taking') describes *Dasein*'s poetic making sense, or 'gauging', of its situation (see Hermeneutics) within the fourfold. Heidegger saw measuring as "what is poetic in dwelling", in that it points to the way *Dasein* must listen to

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[3] In this sense, Heidegger's 'strange' use of some German terms (e.g. *Abgrund* as *Ab-grund*) plays a clarifying role.

the claim of Being, and dedicate itself to the 'truth' of this claim as the being of care. Thus concerned measuring differs from the imposition of the human (or technological) will (see *Gestell* of technics), since it describes an event of care-full engagement (see *Ereignis*) during which *Dasein* "first receives the measure for the breadth of … being" (Heidegger, 1951b: 219) (see Fourfold, Situation, Regioning, Place).

Metaphysics: Richard Polt pointed out that, in Heidegger's work, the metaphysical "sometimes [refers] to a tradition that needs to be overcome, and sometimes … to genuine thinking about Being" (1999: 123). In this thesis, the term metaphysics will be used to refer to the 'forgetting of Being' in the Western tradition; a situation which obscures the role of Being as "the unrecognized yet enduring impulse for metaphysical questioning" (Heidegger, 1935: 15/20). Heidegger challenged the metaphysical determination of Being as "constant presence" (1935: 148/207) in order to arrive at "a more originary, rigorous thinking that belongs to Being" (1935: 94/130). In this sense it is primarily the metaphysical "restrictions of Being" – "Being and becoming; Being and seeming; Being and thinking; Being and the ought" – which must be identified and overcome (Heidegger, 1935: 71/98). The French Philosopher, Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), developed Heidegger's questioning of the metaphysical in terms of what he called the "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida, 1967: 167). In order to differentiate Heidegger's initial enquiry from the work of Derrida I will refer to the position questioned by Heidegger as the 'metaphysics of constant presence'.

Moment, the: see Facticity.

Ontological difference: Richard Polt defined Heidegger's interpretation of 'ontology' as "a philosophical investigation of Being", and the 'ontical' as the focus on "particular facts about entities, without regard to their Being" (Polt, 1999: 34). The difference between beings (an ontic focus) and Being (an ontological focus) constitutes the ontological difference, which Heidegger saw as the "originary division" (1935: 156/218-219). The exclusive focus on the ontic sustains the metaphysical forgetting of Being (see Metaphysics, Being).

Open (the): Heidegger appropriated the term, "the open" from the Austrian poet, Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926) (Heidegger, 1946: 103-138). But while the Open in Rilke's work (according to Heidegger) implies the act of human "objectification" (1946: 110) of all that "man places before himself [*sic*]" (1946: 107), thereby turning the Open into an "obstructed Open" (1946: 113), Heidegger's Open refers to the interaction between Dasein's open stance as perduring-letting-be (see Resoluteness) and the clearing of

Being (see *Lichtung*); a concerned being-in-the-world (see Being-in-the-world). This interaction happens as a regioning difference (see Ontological difference, Regioning) that mankind belongs to (1946: 119). In the Open, the regioning of the "unconcealing overwhelming" of Being and the "[concealing] arrival" of beings (Heidegger, 1957a: 64-65) takes place as an "event of appropriation" (Heidegger, 1957b: 36) (see *Ereignis*).

Phenomenology of Presence: Norberg-Schulz used phenomenology as a method to gain "access to the structures and the meanings of the world of life" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 21). Essentially, Norberg-Schulz argued that the 'art of place', steeped in the phenomenological understanding of the world as fourfold, had to build (make or *poiesis*) human presence as *livskunst* (see Presence, Art of Place, Art of the experience of living, *Poiesis*). Norberg-Schulz presented his precognitive 'phenomenology of presence' as a way to oppose "scientific abstractions" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 19-20) (see Precognition).

Perduring-letting-be: see Resoluteness.

Precognition: Precognition is a term Norberg-Schulz used in his later writings to designate the way human beings are able to poetically grasp (or recognise) a situation as a whole, rather than having to 'construct' it schematically from the individual experiences arranged according to *schemata*. Norberg-Schulz described precognition as "that which allows for the possibility of seeing something as something [and thereby allows for] the comprehension of the structure of the surroundings" (1993: 75). He proposed that precognition can be used to describe *Dasein*'s particular "way of being" which "conditions knowledge obtained through the senses" (2000b: 62).

Presence: This thesis interrogates the potential ways in which human presence, or human life, can be expressed architecturally. Simply by referring to the three 'mother tongues' holding sway over this thesis there arise three fundamental aspects, latent in the concept of 'presence', which must be engaged with. Heidegger's German described presence as '*Anwesenheit*', a term encapsulating the interaction between Being and beings (Afr: *wese* and *wees*) (see Ontological difference) within a situation. In Norwegian, Norberg-Schulz described presence as *tilstedeværelse*. Imbedded in this term is the syllable *sted*, or place. Thus the Norwegian term reveals the emplaced (spatial) character of presence and contributed to Norberg-Schulz's ability to grasp the 'making of human presence' as the 'making of place'. In Afrikaans, presence is described by the term '*teenwoordigheid*', implying that inhabitants are present by being 'brought to word'; by being able to poetically express their closeness through the words spoken. The interaction of these diverse, but complementary, appropriations (originating in particular regions of

concern) suggests that, if architecture is to engage in the 'making of human presence', it needs to engage with the multifarious being-in-the-world of *Dasein* as concerned mortal.

Place: Heidegger proposed that "spaces receive their being from locations and not from 'space'" (1951a: 152). This implies that architectural space can also be understood as an interpretation derived from the particularities of its place. Norberg-Schulz regarded place as the "concrete manifestation of the world of life" as a totality. Additionally, he proposed that place, in historical terms, served as "that obvious presence [*Räumlichkeit* or spatiality] that transmitted identity to its inhabitants" (2000b: 28) (see Presence). A close reading of the difference between Norberg-Schulz and Heidegger's interpretations of the way dwellers relate to places points to the possibility of understanding place, in terms of the art of care, as a region (or regioning) of concern (see Region, Regioning).

***Poiesis* (Gr):** The act of making as poetic revealing and safeguarding (see *Aletheia*, Safeguarding). Heidegger referred to the artistic making of things as an act of "setting-into-work" (1936a: 69); a concept Norberg-Schulz equated with the idea of architectural "concretization" (1979b: 65).

Region: Initially, Norberg-Schulz interpreted the region in terms of his mentor, Sigfried Giedion's, call for a "new regionalism" (Giedion, 1958: 138). In later works Norberg-Schulz interpreted Heidegger's word for the region, '*die Gegend*', as a defined "space" (1989: 48), drawing on his work describing place as an "existential space" (1971: 12). However, Heidegger's concept of the region is intimately connected with the idea of the Open (*das Offene*) (see Open) as an "open-region" (*Gegnet*) engaged in the event of "regioning" (*das Gegnen*) (see Regioning); a dynamic lived reality described as an "abiding expanse", or "*verweilende Weite*" (Heidegger, 1945: 114/74 & Davis, 2010: xiv). Thus Heidegger's region is more than an 'existential space', since it also engages with the temporality of *Dasein* and the way *Dasein* appropriates the region as a care-saturated event. Understanding Norberg-Schulz's concept of place in terms of Heidegger's formulation of the region as an 'abiding expanse', will lead to a more robust understanding of place as a 'region of concern' (see Place).

Regioning: a neologism used (by Bret Davis) to translate the dynamic nature of what Heidegger implied with the German term '*das Gegnen*' (Heidegger, 1945: 112-114/73). The word 'regioning' refers to the dynamic event of appropriation (see *Ereignis*) governing the interaction between the being of care and Being. The possibility of this interaction is held open by the resolute disclosedness of *Dasein* (see Resoluteness), carefully engaging with its world, or region (which Heidegger described with the German term *Gegend*).

Therefore, regioning illuminates the concept of place in terms of the concerned engagement of *Dasein* with its world; ecstatically appropriating its situation as a region of concern (see Ek-sistence, Measuring, Region, Place). In contrast to the way Norberg-Schulz approached the region as a continuity enduring between earth and sky subjected to intermittent temporal changes, the concept of 'the Open' (the region of concern) (see *Lichtung*, Open) implies the ecstatic appropriation of place as a fourfold regioning (see Fourfold).

Resoluteness (G: *Entschlossenheit*): A term used by Heidegger to emphasise *Dasein's* ability to be open (see Open) to something (Afr: *On-gesloten-heid*). In BT resoluteness implied "letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness to the they" (see They). Consequently, resoluteness is 'disclosive'. In disclosiveness, *Dasein* is receptive and "frees itself for its world". In resoluteness, *Dasein* owns up to reality and is able to "discover" (or reveal) what Heidegger calls the "situation" (a spatio-temporal region of concern) (see Situation, Hermeneutics). Heidegger approached resoluteness as "*the authenticity of care itself, cared for in care and possible as care*", which enables *Dasein* to concretely reveal the "there" as a "situation" (Heidegger, 1927a: 298-301). In the light of Heidegger's later writings, and his focus on *Gelassenheit* (designating *Dasein's* ability to appropriate while letting things be), this thesis amalgamates the interaction between 'resoluteness' and '*Gelassenheit*' with the term 'perduring-letting-be'.

Safeguarding: Safeguarding ("sparing" or "sheltering") refers to the act of taking something "under our care". Heidegger proposed that *Dasein's* concerned, mortal "safeguarding" of the fourfold constitutes "*the fundamental character of dwelling*" (Heidegger, 1951a: 147-149) (see Measuring, *Poiesis*).

Same, the: Heidegger engaged with sameness as "belonging together" (1957b: 28-29). For Norberg-Schulz this implied the possibility of uniting continuity and change as a situation in which a place "*remains the same even if it is never identical*" (2000b: 356). However, Heidegger argued that his particular interpretation of 'sameness' was 'unique', and 'strange' (1957b: 36), and 'active' (1957b: 39); a 'sameness' that can only happen as an "event of appropriation" (1957b: 36) (see *Ereignis*). Therefore the way towards the same is always already grounded in the concerned Being of the intentional (see Being of the intentional).

Site of the moment: see Facticity.

Situation: The (hermeneutic) situation points to the simultaneous 'spatiality' and temporality of *Dasein's* being-in-the-world. The situation is "the there disclosed in

resoluteness", called forth by the "call of care" (Heidegger, 1927a: 299-300). *Dasein's* being-in-the-world is always already situational as a fourfold regioning (see Care, Fourfold, Hermeneutics, Regioning, Resoluteness).

Sorge (G): see Care

Sorgsaamheid (Afr): An Afrikaans word that literally means 'care-along/with-ness', and succinctly describes what it means to be amid our cares (see Care), involved in a region of concern (see Place, Region, Regioning).

Sorgvuldigheid (Afr): A word which alludes to the potential of care to illuminate and make comprehensible the implications of 'poetic precision'; an act of *poiesis* 'filled with' and 'amid' care that dignifies *Dasein*'s concern. *Sorgvuldigheid* empathises with the gifts of traditional craftsmanship, without succumbing to nostalgia, because one can be *sorgvuldig* (as a way of engaging with the spatio-temporal nature of concerned regioning) only within *Dasein*'s own temporality. *Sorgvuldigheid* can, therefore, be seen as the poetic concretisation of *Dasein*'s *sorgsaamheid* (which implies being with or amid care as a common temporal reality); a fundamental attentiveness which characterises Heidegger's understanding of being-in-the-world as care (see Care).

Stedskunst (N): see Art of place.

Thing: Heidegger tried to invoke the mysterious influence things have on us in order to undermine the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. Heidegger described a thing as a "gathering-appropriating staying of the fourfold" which resonates with (and rings out into) its world. As Heidegger put it: "The thing things" (1950a: 170-172). When *Dasein* makes things (including buildings as architectural things) the challenge is for the mortal to gather the fourfold in an authentic thing as an appropriation of the fourfold situation (see Authenticity, *Ereignis,* Fourfold, Situation). Gathering is akin to *Dasein*'s concerned measuring and the granting of things can only be appreciated by a being of concern.

They, the: The term, 'the they' (*das Man*) describe, as a collective, the other individuals that share *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world. Heidegger saw this 'group' as a kind of 'levelled down averageness', which corresponds to *Dasein*'s usual absorption in the world (Heidegger, 1927a: 126-130).

Thrownness (G: *Geworfenheit*): Heidegger proposed that *Dasein* is 'thrown' into the world. Therefore thrownness is linked with *Dasein*'s 'attunement' and refers to the fact that *Dasein* is always already engaged with its world in a particular way (1927a: 135) (see Always already, Facticity).

1 Introduction

This thesis interrogates and aims to augment the theoretical contribution of the Norwegian architect, theorist, and architectural historian, Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000), by considering the cogency of his ground-breaking architectural interpretation of the writings of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Inspired by Heidegger's understanding of existence as 'being-in-the-world', Norberg-Schulz formulated an approach to architecture which can be summarised as the "art of place" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 221). Norberg-Schulz's ultimate aim, expressed in the closing pages of his last book (published posthumously), *Architecture: Presence, Language, Place* (PLP), was to explain how the "art of place" (designated in Norwegian by the term, *stedskunst*[1]) could become the "art of the experience of living" (*livskunst*) (2000b: 356).

I will argue that there is a fundamental discrepancy between Heidegger's philosophy and Norberg-Schulz's interpretation. The most general assumption underpinning Norberg-Schulz's approach is that life takes place between earth and sky; a predominantly spatial interaction. However, in *Being and Time* (1927a), Heidegger suggested an equally fundamental fact characterising human 'betweenness'; being between birth and death. It is the temporal nature of existence which mediates human interaction within the Heideggarian 'fourfold'. Heidegger's acknowledgement of the role of lived temporality does not imply that he neglected the spatial dimension of existence. Heidegger understood the 'ecstatic' nature of our lived spatio-temporal reality by referring to the way the human being 'is' being-in-the-world, as care (*Sorge*). He believed that 'care', or 'concern', saturates the human being and constitutes the "existential meaning" of its Being[2] (1927a: 41). Heidegger's interpretation of *Sorge* recognised both the concerned nature of human existence and the fact that humans are the ones who 'cultivate' or 'take care' of things. Care, by describing the way a human being is "concerned about its very being" (1927a: 12), engages with the 'ground' of what makes existence meaningful.

In contrast, Norberg-Schulz, following his mentor, the Swiss historian and architecture critic, Sigfried Giedion (1888-1968), understood time as 'continuity and change'. He thereby neglected the ecstatic nature of human care. This thesis argues that Norberg-

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[1] Both Norberg-Schulz's last books, *Stedskunst* (1995a: 183), which has not been translated into English, and his Norwegian manuscript for what was translated and published as PLP (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 4, original Norwegian manuscript of PLP, 1996: 299) culminated in the idea of *stedskunst* becoming *livskunst*.

[2] The term 'Being', when used in an ontological sense, is capitalised in this thesis. See the Preface for a discussion of the reasons for and against capitalisation.

Schulz's neglect of Heideggarian care constitutes the principal shortcoming that prevented the fruition of his ultimate goal; appreciating and designing works of architecture as *livskunst* (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 356). The proposed study will present and develop the 'art of care' as the poetic measure-taking which draws *stedskunst* and *livskunst* into contiguity. By grafting the art of care into Norberg-Schulz's art of place, it might be possible to propose a way towards understanding architecture as *livskunst*.

1.1 Martin Heidegger and Christian Norberg-Schulz

Martin Heidegger is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. The German philosopher, Günther Figal (b. 1949), a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau and noted author, described Heidegger's "immense" influence as follows: "Thousands of treatises have been and are being written about him; the conferences, seminars, and lectures on his philosophy are countless" (Figal, 2009: 2). The significance and influence of Heidegger's thought has endured and diversified.

The renowned American philosopher, Robert Mugerauer, who has long engaged with the relationship between the built environment and Heidegger's philosophy, proposed that "it is a testimony to the depth and importance of Heidegger's thinking that there continue to be new phases to interpreting him" (2008: 3). In *Heidegger and Homecoming: The Leitmotif in the Later Writings* (2008) Mugerauer proposed that Heidegger's ideas are still directly relevant to some of our most pressing contemporary challenges. Dilemmas as diverse as the "existential problems of each individual person", the potential confrontations facing the world in terms of "massive forced emigration-immigration and refugee displacement", combined with the reliance on "technologies consuming and controlling life itself", and even the ensuing threat of "ecological disasters on a global scale", can be considered in terms of Heidegger's philosophy (2008: xv).

One of the first, and arguably still the most influential 'architectural translation' of Heidegger's philosophy, was conducted by Christian Norberg-Schulz. Mugerauer described Norberg-Schulz as "a very sensitive reader of Heidegger's German" (2008: 579), and the Greek architect Pavlos Lefas (b. 1955) adjudged Norberg-Schulz's contribution to be one characterised by "rare insight" (2009: 131). To these voices of approval, the Norwegian architect, Gro Lauvland, added that Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution is "both radical and even more important today than [when] it was written" (Lauvland, 2009: 38). Significantly, the veracity of Norberg-Schulz's place-bound interpretation has recently been corroborated (indirectly) by the Australian philosopher,

Jeff Malpas (b. 1958), in his excellent study of the role of place in Heidegger's philosophy entitled, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (2006). Malpas followed a line of questioning which echoes Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of the prominence of place in Heidegger's writings and argued that "Heidegger's work provides us with perhaps the most important and sustained inquiry into place to be found in the history of Western thought" (Malpas, 2006: 3).

Both Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz have had a significant influence in their respective fields. However, while Heidegger's works have been the subject of exhaustive questioning, Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy—although it has been widely applied in architectural theory and design—has not received the same close scrutiny it deserves. In the face of the impending ecological crisis, stemming from mankind's exploitation of natural resources harboured in the very places we inhabit, this is an oversight which needs to be addressed. Lauvland (2009: 37) argued that Norberg-Schulz's place theory, which ascribed significance to nature as a gift to be 'respected', thereby implying that the world is not free for our consumption, is highly appropriate to contemporary challenges. Ultimately, Norberg-Schulz provided an alternative way of expressing the bond between dweller and world; not built on domination, but on "belonging" (Lauvland, 2009: 42).

This thesis, while acknowledging and reappraising the contribution of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project, contends that he neglected an important aspect of Heidegger's thought that limited the potential of his theory to provide guidance for architects engaged in the contemporary realities described by Lauvland and Mugerauer.

The following subsections will sketch an outline of the personal *milieu* holding sway over Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz's work.

1.1.1 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976)

Martin Heidegger was born on 26 September 1889 in the rural German town of Messkirch (in Baden-Württemberg). In 1911 he enrolled as a student of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg and by 1919 he was made a Research Assistant to the founder of the philosophical school of Phenomenology, the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1939). Husserl presented phenomenology as a method aimed at "the description of phenomena" and tried to explain how this revelation occurs as a product of human intentionality (Polt, 1999: 14). In the years that followed, Heidegger began to lose his unquestioning admiration of Husserl's work and shifted the focus of his own

phenomenological investigations towards the writings of another German philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). In summary, it can be said that, during the years preceding his fame, Heidegger struggled to achieve a "creative combination" of the "systematic rigour" of Husserl's phenomenology and the "sensitivity to concrete existence" that characterised Dilthey's work, in order to arrive at a "phenomenology of historical life" (Polt, 1999: 16). In 1923, Heidegger left Freiburg and was appointed lecturer at the University of Marburg (Lahn) where he refined his own interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology. In 1927 he published the results of his research in a book that is widely reckoned[3] to be one of the most influential works of philosophy of the 20th century; *Being and Time*.

Central to Heidegger's philosophy in *Being and Time* is the question of 'Being'.[4] What it means to 'is' (to be, or exist), and why the fact that we are 'here' matters to us. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger argued that people are temporally and spatially 'in' the world. Humans are 'being-in-the-world'; neither as scientifically detached or 'rational' operators, nor as subjects dealing with 'pure' objects, but concerned beings living 'amid' things which matter to them. In fact, Heidegger argued that, because "in its being this being is concerned *about* its very being" (1927a: 12), our "existential meaning is care" (1927a: 41). It is this designation of *Dasein*—the person who 'is' 'there' as a 'being of care'—that forms the core of this study's augmentation of Norberg-Schulz's art of place.

Being and Time brought Heidegger worldwide renown and in 1928 he returned to the University of Freiburg as the successor to his mentor. In the politically tumultuous spring of 1933, at the comparatively young age of 43, Heidegger was elected as the rector of the University of Freiburg. Two weeks later he officially became a member of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (commonly referred to as the Nazi party). Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazi's would mar his reputation for the rest of his life and remains a point of contention for philosophers.[5] It must be noted that when the National Socialists tried to force their agenda on the new rector, he resigned his post only one year after his appointment (1934), but retained his party membership to the end of the war. Heidegger's

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[3] In his assessment of Heidegger's philosophy, the literary critic, George Steiner (b. 1929) asserted that "in the history of Western thought, [there is] no other work like *Sein und Zeit*" (1989: 76). The American philosopher and Heidegger scholar, David Farrell Krell (b. 1944), put it even more strongly by describing BT as "a truly epoch-making work of twentieth-century European philosophy". He continued: "To this day it brooks no comparison in terms of influence on Continental science and letters or genuine philosophical achievement" (2008: 17).

[4] This thesis will, when referring to the concept of 'Being', capitalise the word Being to differentiate it from actual beings (refer to the Preface for a more detailed discussion).

[5] For a summary of the typical views held on this subject see Polt, 1999: 152-164.

initial attraction to the Führer's revolution, the events leading up to his appointment as rector, the way he tried to preserve the 'integrity' of the movement while in office, the events surrounding his resignation, and his testimony before the denazification committee, involves a complex series of events, letters and conversations which have been closely scrutinised in other publications.[6]

Recently, a new (and particularly harsh) light has been cast on Heidegger's political life by the publication of his 'Black Notebooks' (a name which refers to the colour of his notebooks). These meditative works reveal the extent of Heidegger's "embarrassing political entanglements" (Wolin, 2014). In "National Socialism, World Jewry, and the History of Being: Heidegger's Black Notebooks" (2014) the historian, Richard Wolin, argued that Heidegger's thinking was deeply tainted by anti-Semitism, racism, and an inability to acknowledge the horrific consequences of Nazi rule. In a way, Wolin suggested that Heidegger buried his head in the sands of his 'history of Being'; a self-composed history giving substance to a troubling ideology. This is the dangerous undercurrent of Heidegger's thinking; the danger manifested by not acknowledging (or conveniently forgetting) that such a danger is there. This is why Polt proposed that it is "a blessing that Heidegger's life makes it impossible for us to be completely comfortable with his writings" (1999: 164). Acknowledging the danger in Heidegger's thought guards against uncritical discipleship. Maybe, as Heidegger (following Hölderlin) argued in a different context,[7] it is precisely in continuously questioning the "danger" that one may resolutely take a stance for the "saving power" (1953: 333-334).

This thesis (especially in subsections 6.4.8 and 6.6.6) proposes an approach to multicultural pluralism which does not divide and categorise, but aims to question identity and rootedness in terms of the ecstatic nature of *Sorge*. Despite the questions raised by Heidegger's political affiliations, the troubling nature of his political life actually corroborates the legitimacy of his philosophical reflection on human life as care. It is

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[6] The German philosopher and author, Rüdiger Safranski (b. 1945), wrote one of the most balanced accounts of Heidegger's intellectual life entitled, *Martin Heidegger: between Good an Evil* (2002). Safranski discussed the nuances of these events, as a dialogue between "and beyond good and evil" (2002: x). He interweaved the intricacies of Heidegger's initial devotion to the 'revolution' (2002: 225-247), his attitude towards the Jews (2002: 248-263), his "struggle for the purity of the movement" (2002: 264-275), his "departure from the political scene" (2002: 276-290), and his eventual defense before the denazification committee (2002: 332-352), with multiple references to Heidegger's wider philosophical ideas. More concise versions of Heidegger's life have been presented by Krell (2008: 3-35) and Figal (2009: 1-32). See Figal's "chronology of Heidegger's life" (Figal, 2009: 334-340).

[7] Heidegger was referring to *poiesis* as the 'saving power' which could question the false certainties offered by modern technology.

impossible to accept Heidegger's philosophy unquestioningly; people are unable to avoid taking a stance. Things and actions matter to us. We are beings of care, living amid concern-full things, empathetically inhabiting a concrete world.

During the 1930s Heidegger's thoughts underwent what has been called a 'turn'. The extent and nature of this 'turn' is, however, still a disputed matter among philosophers.[8] Heidegger's later works seem even more expansive in scope than the luminous beacon that *Being and Time* has come to stand for. Yet, each investigation was guided by the question of Being. In the context of this study, it is proposed that, in his later work, Heidegger did not 'turn away from care', but significantly expanded its scope in terms of poetry, language, thought, technology, and questions of identity (see Chapter 5).

Towards the end of the Second World War Heidegger was deployed as part of the *Volkssturm*. After the war he was banned from teaching due to his Nazi involvement, but the teaching ban was rescinded only 4 years later (in 1949). During the winter semester of 1951-1952 Heidegger delivered the lecture course later published as *What is Called Thinking?* He retired from the university that same year, but spent the following years (c.1951-1969) delivering numerous seminars and publishing various influential works. During Heidegger's last years he focused on organising his philosophical contribution (*Gesamtausgabe*), which has still not been published in its entirety. Heidegger died aged 86, on 26 May 1976, and was buried in the town of his birth.

1.1.2 Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000)

Christian Norberg-Schulz left the architectural profession a voluminous investigation of the phenomenology of place as legacy. He was one of the first architectural theorists to introduce architectural audiences to the thinking of Martin Heidegger.

Christian Norberg-Schulz was born on 23 May 1926 in Oslo, Norway. After completing his secondary education in 1945 he was chosen to attend the *Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule* (ETH) in Zurich (Ellefsen, 2009: 117),[9] where he was "among a select circle" that attended "regular meetings" at the home of Sigfried Giedion (Postiglione, 2004: 282), who had an immense influence on the young Norwegian. Giedion's belief that modern architecture had to be imbued with a "new monumentality" (Giedion, 1958: 25) and a "new

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[8] See, for instance, Thomas Sheehan's essay, "The Turn" (2010), as a recent discussion of the difference between the 'turn' (*Kehre*) as an event, and the deeper significance of the turn as the "[oscillating] bond between *Dasein* and *Sein*" (Sheehan, 2010: 82).

[9] According to Ellefsen, Norberg-Schulz formed "part of a Norwegian quota of [about 150] students admitted to the ETH" (2009: 119).

regionalism" (1958: 138), as ways to "bridge the fatal gulf between the greatly developed powers of thinking and greatly retarded powers of feeling" (1958: vi), became a cornerstone of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical approach.

After graduation, Norberg-Schulz displayed a marked interest in modern architecture. On various occasions he partnered (c.1951-1956) with the pioneering Norwegian modernist architect, Arne Korsmo (1900-1968) and played an important role as co-founder of the Norwegian CIAM delegation known as PAGON (Progressive Architects Group Oslo Norway) in 1950 (Postiglione, 2004: 284). Despite his close involvement with Norway's top modern architects, Norberg-Schulz's conception of modernism was always more comprehensive than the Functionalist devaluation that characterised modern architecture in the years that followed. Norberg-Schulz believed that the intentions guiding the modern pioneers had to be augmented by "a more profound understanding of spatiality as a 'taking place' of life" (Norberg-Schulz, 1980c: 176). In later years he acknowledged that while "such an understanding" had already been formulated by Heidegger, he was (at the time) unaware of the implications of Heidegger's work and relied, "in the meantime", on "psychology and sociology for help" (Norberg-Schulz, 1980c: 176-177).

Between 1952 and 1953, as a Smith-Mundt Fulbright scholar at Harvard University, Norberg-Schulz studied the writings of the German-born art theorist and perceptual psychologist, Rudolf Arnheim (1904-2007) (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 154). Arnheim's focus on *Gestalt* theories and the psychology of perception, combined with Giedion's belief in systematisation, can be seen as key sources of inspiration for Norberg-Schulz's first major publication, *Intentions in Architecture* (IiA) (1963). While IiA brought Norberg-Schulz international attention, and formed the core of his Ph.D. thesis (awarded in 1964 by the Norwegian State Polytechnic, Trondheim) (Postiglione, 2004: 282), he ultimately conceded that his "research in the fields of psychology, sociology, and static mechanics … did not yield the hoped-for results" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 15).

In the wake of IiA, Norberg-Schulz's theoretical approach undertook a transformation inspired by reading *Mensch und Raum* (1963) by the German philosopher, Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1903-1991). Bollnow's work introduced Norberg-Schulz to Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* and allowed him to recognise the "possibility of defining the existential foundations of architecture" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 15). Norberg-Schulz's second major theoretical work, *Existence, Space and Architecture* (ESA) (1971), can be seen as a transitional work that still acknowledged certain aspects of his psychological research, while bearing witness to his preliminary forays into Heideggarian phenomenology.

In recent years, there have been scholars who have aimed to recast Norberg-Schulz's turn to phenomenology in visual terms. So, for instance, the American architect, artist and theorist, Jorge Otero-Pailos (b. 1971), argued that when Norberg-Schulz (in 1973 when he was a visiting professor at MIT)[10] met with Rudolf Arnheim and the photographer, designer and writer, György Kepes (1906-2001), these "visual thinkers" not only had a significant influence on the graphic quality of Norberg-Schulz's later publications, but that their visual approach underpinned Norberg-Schulz's theoretical position as a whole (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 174-177). However, Norberg-Schulz himself derided these visual studies as "interesting, but ... of no assistance to students when it came to design" (2000b: 9). Rather than fortifying what Otero-Pailos presented as Norberg-Schulz's "obsession with visual thinking" (2010: 161), his involvement with these visual thinkers contributed to steering Norberg-Schulz in a different direction.[11]

Besides being a writer, Norberg-Schulz was also an influential teacher and editor. In 1963, he was appointment as lecturer at the Oslo School of Architecture (AHO). Along with various international commitments[12] he continued teaching at the AHO until 1994[13], when he chose to retire due to illness (Postiglione, 2004: 282). From 1963 to 1978 Norberg-Schulz also served as editor of the Norwegian architecture journal *Byggekunst* (The Art of Building). During these years Norberg-Schulz published prodigiously in Norway (Ellefsen, 2009: 116-117). His writings included "international reports" of his travels that, according to a former student of Norberg-Schulz (currently the Rector of AHO), Karl Otto Ellefsen (b. 1948) can "be read as works through which [Norberg-Schulz] gradually develop[ed] his concept of uniqueness of place" (2009: 139). Norberg-Schulz's understanding of the concreteness of place (already prominent in his 1969 article, "The Concept of Place") proved a fruitful way to advance the ideas presented in ESA (1971) and culminated in the publication of *Genius Loci* (GL) in 1979.

GL was a ground-breaking work that pioneered the phenomenological approach to architectural design. Deeply indebted to the philosophical writings of Martin Heidegger, GL

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[10] It should also be pointed out that the American urban planner, Kevin Lynch (1918-1984), whose book, *The Image of the City* (1960), had a significant influence on Norberg-Schulz, also lectured at MIT from 1948 to 1978 (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 174).

[11] A more detailed discussion of Otero-Pailos's claims are presented in subsection 3.2.3.

[12] Norberg-Schulz was a visiting lecturer at Yale (1965), Cambridge University (1966, 1968, 1969), MIT (1973, 1974), the University of Dallas (1978, 1979), and the University of Cincinnati (1980) (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 17, *Curriculum Vitae,* n.d.: 1-3).

[13] In 1966 Norberg-Schulz was appointed as full professor at the AHO and served as Dean of the school from 1976-1977 and again from 1984-1986 (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 17, *Curriculum Vitae,* n.d.: 1-3).

proposed that meaningful places are always already "potentially present in the given environment" and should be "revealed" by means of works of architecture. In GL Norberg-Schulz, therefore, argued that works of architecture have an "existential purpose" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 18).

The next challenge was to find a way to concretise (build) the "existential space" of inhabitants (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 12), and thereby embody the mysterious *genius loci* (spirit of the place). In the wake of his participation in the 1980 Venice Biennale, Norberg-Schulz became convinced that the answer could be found in the linguistic concerns brought to the fore in postmodern architecture. According to Norberg-Schulz, the "goal" of Postmodernism was to allow individual interpretations to be expressed by means of "timeless" principles that constitute a "language of architecture" (Norberg-Schulz, 1988: 14). Specifically, Norberg-Schulz identified a correspondence between the 20th century American architect, Louis Kahn's "fragmentary and somewhat obscure philosophy", and Heidegger's "systematic investigations" into language. By synthesising and interpreting these positions, Norberg-Schulz formulated a 'language of architecture' (Norberg-Schulz, 1989: 46-47). In his 1984 book, *The Concept of Dwelling* (CoD), Norberg-Schulz aimed to expand his concept of place, by focusing on the potential of the 'language of architecture' to constitute a 'figurative' approach, allowing inhabitants to "*dwell poetically*" (1984a: 30).

This thesis argues that 'figurative architecture' was Norberg-Schulz's answer to Giedion's call for a 'new monumentality', and that he posited the concept of 'place' as a way towards Giedion's 'new regionalism'. Despite Norberg-Schulz's efforts to present Postmodernism as "a revival of the language of architecture in order to recover the dimension of meaning", the movement effectively degenerated into "a new kind of arbitrary historicism" (Norberg-Schulz, 1989: 59). Due to his involvement with the main architectural proponents of Postmodernism (e.g. Robert Venturi, Michael Graves, and Charles Jencks), Norberg-Schulz "paid for [his] postmodern 'interlude' with a certain isolation that marked his work from the late 1980s to the end of the 1990s" (Postiglione, 2004: 285).

During the last decade of his life, inspired by a renewed appreciation for the concept of place, Norberg-Schulz returned to the "qualitative modernism" that he saw as "the primary objective of the pioneers of the movement" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 15). Simultaneously, he also attempted a much more penetrating interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy. The results of these illuminating years of research were published in PLP (2000b). The integration of these different approaches and influences in Norberg-Schulz's work are presented in Figure 3. Norberg-Schulz died aged 73, on 28 March 2000 and was buried in the city of his birth.

Figure 3 — Christian Norberg-Schulz: influences and interactions (timeline, 1949–2000)

Central column (key works, projects and intellectual influences):

Siegfried Giedion:
The 'new monumentality' and 'regionalism', the 'needle hole of Modern Art', 'Continuity and Change', 'Thought and Feeling'

Rudolf Arnheim: Gestalt Theory

1953-1955: PLANETVEIEN 14

1955-1960: STABEKK CATHOLIC CHURCH

1959-1962: ITALIESIN

IIA:
Child Psychology (Piaget), Gestalt Theory + Perception of the Whole
Phenomenological Turn:
Bollnow: Mensch und Raum (Heidegger, Lynch, Bachelard, Kahn, Sedlmayr)
Yale: The work of Louis Kahn
Venturi: Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture

1969: SLEMDALSVINGEN 55

Existence, Space and Architecture: Transition

MIT: Kevin Lynch, Rudolf Arnheim, György Kepes
The importance of the "image" and "visual thinking". [3]
Norberg-Schulz begins in earnest to study Heidegger's Poetry, Language, Thought. [4]

Kahn – Heidegger – The Language of Architecture (GL)
Postmodern Influence: Graves, Venturi, Bofill
Charles Jencks – The Language of Post-Modern Architecture (1977)

Michael Graves: A Case for Figurative Architecture

The Concept of Dwelling
1984: SLEMDALSVINGEN 57

Disenchantment with Postmodern architecture

Riema Pietila: Pre-cognitive knowledge

Minnesjord

A more substantial interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy + re-reading of 'qualitative modernism'

The Art of Place (Stedskunst)

1998: RISVEIEN 6

Horizontal band labels:
PSYCHOLOGY + SOCIOLOGY (GIEDION, PIAGET & GESTALT) — PHENOMENOLOGY OF PLACE — FIGURATIVE ARCH. + LANGUAGE OF ARCH. — PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRESENCE

Transition 1: Existential space
Transition 2: The turn towards language
Transition 3: Return to place

Right column (publications by year):
- 1951: First published article: China and the modern architecture [5]
- Intentions in Architecture (IiA) (1963; 1968)
- Order and Variation in the Environment (OVE) (1966; 2008)
- Meaning in Architecture (MiA) (1966 [lecture] 1969 in Meaning in Architecture; 1988 AMP)
- The Concept of Place (TCP) (1969; 1988 AMP)
- Existence, Space and Architecture (ESA) (1971)
- Late Baroque and Rococo Architecture (LBR) (1972; 1985)
- Meaning in Western Architecture (MIWA) (1974; 1978)
- The Phenomenon of Place (1976; 1996 Nesbitt)
- Kahn, Heidegger and the Language of Architecture (KHLA) (1978 [LI; 1979])
- Introduction (to AMP) (iAMP) (1979 [LI; 1988 AMP])
- Genius Loci (GL) (1979; 1980)
- Towards an Authentic Architecture (TAA) (1980)
- Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture (HTA) (1983; 1988 AMP)
- The Concept of Dwelling (CoD) (1984; 1985)
- On the Way to Figurative Architecture (WFA) (1985; 1988 AMP) * Original Transcription (tWFA)
- New World Architecture (NWA) (1987 [LI; 1988])
- Michael Graves and the Language of Architecture (MGLA) (1990)
- Order and Change in Architecture (OCA) (1991)
- The Voice of Architecture (VOA) (1991)
- Nightlands: Nordic Building (NL) (1993)
- Principles of Modern Architecture (PMA) (2000); Architecture: Presence, Language, and Place (PLP) (2000)

Left column (career and biographical events):
- 1949: Graduate from Swiss Federal Polytechnic under Giedion [1]
- 1950: co-founder of PAGON [1]
- 1951-1956: Architectural practice with Arno Korsmo (Oslo) [1]; Teaching assistant for Arno Korsmo [2]
- 1952-53: Fulbright scholar at Harvard University under Gropius (Spent time at the Illinois Institute of Technology under Mies) [1]
- 1953-55: Planetveien complex with Arno Korsmo
- Competition collaborations with Jørn Utzon (none successful) [2]
- 1956-1958: Studies conducted in Rome [1]
- 1958-1960: Architectural practice (Oslo) [1]
- 1960-1963: Studies conducted in Rome [1]
- 1963-1966: Appointed Chairman of Oslo Architect's Association [1]
- 1963-1978: Chief Editor of Byggekunst (The Art of Building) [1]
- 1963: Appointed as lecturer at the AHO [2]
- 1964: Awarded Doctor technicae in architecture (Trondheim) [1]
- 1965: Visiting critic at Yale University [1]
- 1966: Visiting lecturer at Cambridge University [1]
- 1966-94: Appointed Professor of History and Theory at AHO [1]
- 1968: Visiting Lecturer at Cambridge University [1]
- 1969: Visiting Lecturer at Cambridge University [1]
- 1969-1973: External examiner at Essex University [1]
- 1973: Visiting lecturer at MIT [1]
- 1974: Visiting professor at MIT [1]
- 1975: Consultant for Sudanese government (Khartoum) [1]
- 1976: Board member, Int. lab. of arch. & urban design (Urbino) [1]
- 1976-1977: Appointed as Dean (AHO) [1]
- 1978: Doctor Honoris causae, Hanover University (Germany) [1]
- 1978 & 1979: Visiting professor at University of Dallas [1]
- 1980: Member of organising committee: Venice Biennale [1]
- 1980: Visiting lecturer at University of Cincinnati [1]
- 1983: Honorary Award, American Institute of Architects [1]
- 1984-1986: Appointed as Dean (AHO) [1]
- 1986: Knight of the order of St. Olav of the King of Norway [1]
- 1987: Jean Tschumi Prize for arch. education and criticism [1]
- 1988: Commander of the order of the Italian Republic [1]
- 1988: Honorary Fellow of the Royal Institute of British Architects [1]
- 1992-1994: Research fellow of the Norwegian Research Council [1]
- 1994: Retire from his teaching position at AHO [1]
- 1994: Grand Officer of the Order of the Italian Republic [1]
- 1995: Gold Medal of the French Académie d'Architecture [1]
- 1996: 'Fritt Ord's Honour' [1]
- 1998: Norsk Form's Honour [1]
- 28 March 2000: Norberg-Schulz dies in Oslo

Figure 3: Christian Norberg-Schulz: influences and interactions. 1: The dates and events in the left hand column are largely based on Norberg-Schulz's *Curriculum Vitae* (NAM 17), 2: Postiglione, 2004: 282, 3: Otero-Pailos, 2010: 174, 4: Otero-Pailos, 2010: 171 & 287, 5: Ellefsen, 2010: 116.

1.2 Research questions and objectives

The following section discusses the research questions which inspired the objectives of this thesis. The questions are grouped under three themes: the extent and limits of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution (subsection 1.2.1), the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy (subsection 1.2.2), and the architectural significance of this divergence, which will be presented in terms of the art of care (subsection 1.2.3). These themes are guided by an over-arching question: How can works of architecture be appreciated and designed as *livskunst*? In subsection 1.2.4 these themes are re-interpreted as the research objectives of this thesis.

1.2.1 Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy

The preliminary investigation, mentioned in the Preface, inquired why works of architecture have meaning and can be appreciated as meaningful places. This initial line of questioning sparked interest into whether Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution offers a cogent architectural 'translation' of Martin Heidegger's philosophy. In order to investigate the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation, it was important to formulate a holistic understanding of his theoretical contribution. At present, there exists no English publication dedicated to a comprehensive understanding of Norberg-Schulz's voluminous contribution to architectural theory.[14] In order to achieve this goal, extensive literature reviews of Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz's writings were conducted.

Initially it appeared as if Norberg-Schulz neglected the concept of 'time' by focusing on 'spatiality'. This assumption was motivated by the realisation that Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* envisioned the concretisation of *Dasein*'s "existential space" (1971: 12) or "spatiality" (2000a: 10). In terms of Heidegger's fourfold,[15] *stedskunst* focused on articulating the difference between earth and sky, but neglected the interaction between the mortal and the divine. If architecture is to become *livskunst*, then it has to engage equally with all the elements of the fourfold.

However, a more detailed study of the influence other thinkers had on Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's work, revealed that Norberg-Schulz fully acknowledged the influence of time (he was, after all, also an architectural historian); just not Heidegger's account of human temporality. The range of influences, including the Swiss historian and

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[14] There is, however, a wide range of notable articles, book reviews, chapters in books, and Ph.D. theses, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.

[15] See Glossary: Fourfold.

architecture critic, Sigfried Giedion (1888-1968) who mentored Norberg-Schulz at the ETH between 1945 and 1949, the French philosopher, Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), the German philosopher, Otto Friedrich Bollnow[16] (1903-1991), the perceptual studies of Rudolf Arnheim (1904-2007) and György Kepes (1906-2001), the American Urbanist, Kevin Lynch (1918-1984), the Austrian art historian, Hans Sedlmayr (1896-1984), the American architects, Robert Venturi (b. 1925) and Michael Graves (1934-2015), and the Italian architects Paulo Porthoghesi (b. 1931) and Vittorio Gigliotti (b. 1921), will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. These protagonists influenced the way Norberg-Schulz engaged with Heidegger's work, but the key to understanding the difference between Heidegger's philosophy and Norberg-Schulz's interpretation rests with Giedion's understanding of time.

In order to understand the significance of Giedion's influence, it is first necessary to mention *livskunst*. On several occasions Norberg-Schulz pointed out that the importance of a phenomenological understanding of place is illustrated in everyday language when people say that life "takes place" (1979b: 6; 1984a: 75; 2000b: 27). If architecture could concretise this 'taking place' in an authentic way, then it would be 'true to life' and constitute "the art of the experience of living" (2000b: 356).[17] Essentially, the notion of architecture as *livskunst*, aspired to the idea that works of architecture are able to concretise human life (or presence), within a particular place. In Heideggarian terms, this implies that architecture (as an art) has the capacity to meaningfully 'set-into-work' the 'taking place' of human 'being-in-the-world'[18] and necessitates the following question: What should dwellers[19] demand from architecture, if it is to manifest the taking place of human life?

In *The Ethical Function of Architecture* (1997) the German-American philosopher, Karsten Harries (b. 1937), proposed that works of architecture need to safeguard human life against two fundamental "terrors": the "terror of space" and the "terror of time" (1997: 226). This thesis considers Norberg-Schulz's theory of place a persuasive response to the 'terror of space'. However, in terms of the 'terror of time', it argues that there is a fundamental difference between Heidegger's philosophy and Norberg-Schulz's interpretation.

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[16] Bollnow's seminal work, *Mensch und Raum* (1963), only appeared in English translation in 2011. Bollnow's influence on Norberg-Schulz's work is discussed in subsections 4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 6.3.2, and 6.3.4.

[17] See Glossary: Authenticity.

[18] See Glossary: *Poiesis*, Art of the experience of living (*livskunst*), and Being-in-the-world.

[19] See Glossary: Dwelling.

Understanding architecture as a safeguard against the 'terror of time' and the 'terror of space' makes it easier to differentiate between Heidegger's philosophy and Norberg-Schulz's interpretation. While Norberg-Schulz obviously devoted more attention to the spatial aspects of architecture, he did not neglect the 'terror of time', but relied on Giedion's understanding of time as "continuity and change" (Giedion, 1941: 859). While 'continuity and change' allowed Norberg-Schulz to describe the way the 'spirit of the place' changes yet endures, this thesis argues that it is insufficient to describe the lived reality of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world.

The preliminary literature review, therefore, revealed that Norberg-Schulz's architectural translation of Heidegger's philosophy is based on a conspicuous omission; Norberg-Schulz relied on Giedion's understanding of time as continuity and change, while Heidegger proposed that dwellers engage with time as care (*Sorge*). What is the significance of this omission?

1.2.2 Heidegger's concept of care

The significance of Norberg-Schulz's omission can be gauged by establishing the difference between Heidegger's understanding of time as 'ecstatic concern' and Norberg-Schulz's reliance on 'continuity and change'. What is the difference between 'care' and 'continuity and change', and what is the significance of this difference? Answering this question necessitates asking two further questions:

- What influence did Giedion's understanding of time as continuity and change have on Norberg-Schulz's work?
- What are the implications and significance of Heidegger's concept of care?

In order to answer the first question, the various instances where continuity and change influenced Norberg-Schulz's theoretical position must be investigated. However, it is also important to state that Norberg-Schulz did not completely omit the 'idea of care'. In fact, it can be argued that the Heideggarian concept of care must have been known to Norberg-Schulz. It is mentioned in his study notes and in a lecture to students at the University of Dallas (02/03/1979) he even stated that "dwelling is care's institution" (NAM 22: 11). Additionally, subsection 4.6.3 explains the way Norberg-Schulz developed his 'language of architecture' in terms of the 'aspects' Heidegger discussed as the "structural moments" of care (1927a: 335). However, despite proposing that "care for the unity of place is the job of architects" (2000b: 354), Norberg-Schulz never discussed 'care' in the temporal (ontological) sense described by Heidegger in BT.

In terms of the second question, it is essential to investigate the significance of the concept of care in Heidegger's *oeuvre* by tracing its development from the formative stages of his work, through the transitions in CtP (to a focus on *Ereignis*) to the significance of care in his later work. In his early work, Heidegger's thought underwent two fundamental shifts that culminated in his conceptualisation of *Dasein* as care. Firstly, Heidegger moved from Husserl's "intentionality" that described mankind as "eternal out-towards" (Heidegger, 1925: 180-181/130) to *Dasein* as "concerned being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 1925: 213-215/159); secondly, he moved from understanding care (ontically) in terms of the 'life' of this being (Heidegger, 1922: 69-70) to 'care' understood ontologically.[20] In *Being and Time* Heidegger developed 'care' as the "existential meaning" of the 'Being' of *Dasein* (Heidegger, 1927a: 41), and "temporality" as the "meaning of authentic care" (Heidegger, 1927a: 326). As beings of care, people are 'concerned by' and 'engaged in' their individual (in terms of the 'self'), shared (in terms of the 'other') and contextual (as a 'world') Situations. As care, *Dasein* is being-in-the-world. In this thesis it is argued that Heidegger's later work, inaugurated by his focus on *Ereignis* in CtP (1938), reveals and expands the scope of *Dasein* as care. Care infiltrates the whole of Heidegger's philosophy and offers a fertile field of concepts that can be used to interrogate Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*.

With regards to the difference between 'care' and 'continuity and change', it will be shown that the concept of care can be used as a 'filter' to re-interpret Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution, and offer a way to augment *stedskunst* with an understanding of architecture as the art of care. The difference between care and continuity and change can be excavated by engaging with the metaphysical underpinnings of continuity and change. The assumptions governing the understanding of time as 'continuity and change' are derived from the metaphysical "restriction of Being", which Heidegger discussed as "Being and becoming". It is proposed that Norberg-Schulz, by subscribing to these assumptions, exposed his theoretical position to being infiltrated by the other 'metaphysical restrictions'; "Being and seeming", "Being and thinking" and "Being and the ought" (Heidegger, 1935: 71/98)

In the light of the metaphysical restrictions discussed by Heidegger, the significance of the difference between care and continuity and change can be made apparent by arguing that care (in Norberg-Schulz's work), under the sway of continuity and change (as a derivation of 'Being and becoming'), was transformed from the way *Dasein* dwells in the world, to the metaphysical "ought" (Heidegger, 1935: 149/210); a "special attitude" (Heidegger, 1927a:

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[20] See Glossary: Ontological difference.

193-194). Thus care becomes 'ontic' rather than 'ontological'; an interpretation that stands in direct opposition to Heidegger's conception of care. There is a significant difference between care and continuity and change, which needs to be addressed if Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* is to become *livskunst*.

1.2.3 The art of care as a way towards appreciating architecture as *livskunst*

In section 1.1 it was pointed out that several authors admired the sensitivity of Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's work. This thesis proposes that the art of place provides a valuable contribution to architectural theory and has the potential to provide ways of safeguarding dwellers against the terror of space. However, in terms of *Dasein*'s lived temporality, this thesis suggests that 'continuity and change' be substituted with the art of care.

In terms of *livskunst*, space is always already place and time is always already care. If works of architecture are to be appreciated and designed as *livskunst*—the setting-into-work of *Dasein*'s concerned way of being-in-the-world—then architects will have to engage with the art of care in concert with the art of place. This necessitates the following question: What is the effect of grafting the art of care into Norberg-Schulz's art of place?

In order to answer this question, this thesis presents the art of care as a way to interrogate Norberg-Schulz's art of place. The questioning, launched via the art of care, proposes different 'readings' of Heidegger's philosophy that augments Norberg-Schulz's art of place. From this interrogation the architectural significance of the art of care is made apparent. For instance, in terms of Norberg-Schulz's highly problematic formulation of human identity (which depends predominantly on the identity of place) and his 'language of architecture' (functioning as an agent of continuity and change), it is argued (in Chapter 6) that Norberg-Schulz's approach is grounded in the metaphysical and must be re-interpreted in terms of care. Furthermore, the art of care reveals the potential for understanding place itself in a more humane way. Continuity and change does not explain the intimate entanglement of lived time. Dwellers are involved in the continuity and change of their places, as care. Far from diminishing the role of place, the art of care reveals the meaning of lived place as a 'region of concern'.[21]

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[21] In Afrikaans the 'environment' is designated by the term *omgewing*. The word alludes to the verb '*omgee*' which implies being concerned about something. This succinctly illustrates what this thesis, by means of the art of care, aims to reveal as a central truth underpinning the art of place; that 'place' only becomes a lived concrete reality when it is engaged as a spatio-temporal region of concern (Afr: *oord van sorg*).

Therefore the art of care acknowledges architecture as the 'making of place', but suggests that place is more than an 'existential space' (or even an 'ecological system'); for dwellers—as beings of care—a place is a region of concern. Heidegger argued that, within this region of concern, people dwell as poetic measure-takers (1951b: 219). *Dasein*'s acts of measuring are ecstatic and unique. Measuring describes the way dwellers, amid their cares, appropriate their world; the concerned building (usually described as design) that precedes building (as an act of construction). This realisation reveals the significance of the seemingly impossible architectural challenge Heidegger posed in "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951a). In this influential essay he claimed that "*only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build*" (1951a: 157). It is our ecstatic measuring of the place as a region of concern, which makes something like architecture possible.

As a form of 'art', care describes the poetic measure-taking which draws place and life into nearness and inspires the care-full making of *Dasein*'s *Sorge*. Instead of presenting architecture in terms of inter-epoch continuity and change, the art of care seeks to engage with the intra-epoch nature of dwelling; the sparing way people dwell in their emplaced moments. Therefore, the interaction between life and place can most appropriately be described as an ecstatic relationship of care between concerned 'ways of life' and places as 'regions of concern'. This is the gift of understanding 'time' as 'lived time'. In contrast to the interaction of 'timeless' continuities and 'temporal' change, 'lived time' acknowledges the way people live ecstatically within time as care; attuned to histories and memories, projecting certain designs into the future and revealing particular instances as wonder-saturated moments.

In order to gauge the architectural significance of the art of care, Chapter 6 investigates the implications of acknowledging the concerned nature of *Dasein*'s dwelling. Several important characteristics of the art of care, like 'concerned measuring', 'captivated obedience', 'hesitant restraint', 'parsimonious attentiveness', the 'mute listening respect capable of bearing silence' and 'unique emplacement', are elaborated and explained as alternatives to the metaphysics of continuity and change. Architecture as *livskunst* should aim to concretise both the spatial and temporal existence of *Dasein* as care in an authentic and meaningful way. The augmentation of Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*, by means of the art of care, can be summarised as follows:

- Norberg-Schulz proposed the 'setting-into-work' of *Dasein*'s existential spatiality, concretely manifested in place, i.e. *poiesis* as the art of place, thereby addressing the 'terror of space'.
- The art of care proposes the 'setting-into-work' of *Dasein*'s existential temporality, concretely manifested in the situation, i.e. *poiesis* as the art of care, thereby addressing the 'terror of time'.

While Norberg-Schulz admirably interpreted the place-bound nature of lived spatiality, he effectively overlooked the Heideggarian basis of lived temporality. This thesis proposes the 'art of care' as the temporal link between Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* and the *livskunst* he envisioned. The art of care and the art of place are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the ability to meaningfully concretise the interaction between life and place depends on their interaction. In the marriage of the art of care as a safeguard against the terror of time, and the art of place as a safeguard against the terror of space, dwells the potential for works of architecture to articulate being-in-the-world as *livskunst*.

1.2.4 Research objectives

The questions discussed in the previous three subsections are gathered in the three main objectives of this thesis:

- Formulating a holistic appraisal of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution (illustrating the influence of continuity and change);
- determining the implications and significance of Heidegger's concept of care, in order to illustrate the difference between 'care' and 'continuity and change'; and
- critically engaging the elements of Norberg-Schulz's art of place that depend on the interaction between continuity and change, thereby defining the limits and significance of understanding architecture as the art of care.

Ultimately, these objectives suggest a way to re-interpret (as reading and interrogation) Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution, in order to propose a way beyond the art of place, towards appreciating and designing architecture as *livskunst*. This thesis springs from the notion that life 'takes place' as care and that dwellers design and make things as concerned mortals. It argues that the art of care reveals the concept of place as a spatio-temporal region of concern. If architects desire to understand the making of meaningful place as *livskunst*, in all its spatial and temporal abundance, they not only need to engage with place, but also with the Heideggarian concept of care.

1.3 Original contribution

The contribution of this thesis is derived from the research questions and objectives discussed above, and can be summarised as follows:

- Articulating the holistic significance of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project and questioning its cogency as an architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy;
- identifying the most important weakness in Norberg-Schulz's architectural 'translation' of Martin Heidegger's philosophy and revealing the influence that this oversight had on Norberg-Schulz's project as a whole; and
- formulating the art of care as a way to augment Norberg-Schulz's art of place, thereby overcoming the difficulties arising from architecturally engaging with time as continuity and change and suggesting a way towards appreciating and designing architecture as *livskunst*.

1.4 Overview and structure of the thesis

This thesis is composed of an introductory suite, comprising an introduction (Chapter 1), a discussion of the methodology employed (Chapter 2) and a literature review (Chapter 3). These chapters are followed by Chapters 4, 5, and 6, which present the main argument and contribution of this thesis. Chapter 7 discusses the conclusions that can be drawn from this study and identifies future research directions stemming from these conclusions. There are also three appendices that relate to the work done in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The current section will discuss the content and structuring of these parts in greater detail.

This introduction is followed by Chapter 2, which describes the methodology and research design followed in this thesis. Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive survey of the reception of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution in architectural (and, to a lesser extent, philosophical) circles. Chapter 3 argues that Norberg-Schulz's contribution has been largely unquestioned in terms of the cogency of his architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, and under-appreciated in terms of the guidance his theory of place can provide to contemporary architects engaged in ecological design. In response to the 'lack of appreciation', Chapter 3 proposes a more comprehensive reading of Norberg-Schulz's work, while in response to the 'lack of questioning' it points to the need for interrogating the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophical project.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 constitute an integrated response to the process of reading and questioning proposed in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 4 presents the results of a comprehensive reading of Norberg-Schulz's *oeuvre* (referring to both published work and unpublished archival sources) in order to come to a holistic understanding of his theoretical project. Chapter 4 also identifies the chief divergence between Heidegger's philosophy and Norberg-Schulz's interpretation as the difference between understanding time as 'ecstatic care' or 'continuity and change'.

Chapter 5 presents a focused study of Heidegger's concept of care. By gathering the aspects and implications of Heideggarian care, Chapter 5 serves as the 'filter' through which Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution can be questioned.

Chapter 6 interrogates Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution (Chapter 4), by systematically engaging with the assumptions and interpretations underpinning Norberg-Schulz's work. To achieve this, Chapter 6 follows the same outline (numbering structure) used to organise Chapter 4. The four 'phases' used to categorise Norberg-Schulz's work in Chapter 4 (sections 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, and 4.8) are interrogated in sections 6.2, 6.4, 6.6, and 6.8, and the three 'transitions' (sections 4.3, 4.5, and 4.7) are interrogated in sections 6.3, 6.5, and 6.7. This approach is extended to the subsections. For instance, subsection 4.4.4 discusses Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's concept of the thing, while subsection 6.4.4 interrogates this interpretation by arguing that things (including architectural things) are made by concerned mortals. Therefore, while chapters 4 and 6 can be read independently, it is also possible to read 4 and 6 as a dialogue.

The result is a graft composed of numerous connections. This interconnectivity reveals that the art of care and the art of place can hardly be separated. Rather, they 'happen' as a total *livskunst*; simultaneously limiting each other and making the other meaningful. The gift of *livskunst* is always already the gift of the interaction between the art of place and the art of care. In this sense, Chapter 6 represents a further 'hermeneutic interpretation' (circling) of Chapter 4, viewed through the lens of Chapter 5. Therefore, acknowledging the art of care as that which makes the art of place meaningful while being limited by the art of place, proposes a way towards appreciating and designing works of architecture as *livskunst*.

Chapter 7 will present the conclusions which can be drawn from this study. As such, it will evaluate the architectural significance of the art of care as a way towards the *poiesis* of 'being-in-the-world'. Furthermore, Chapter 7 will indicate possible directions for future

study; specifically engaging with the 'tyranny of efficiency' and the 'tyranny of lived experience' (see subsection 1.6).

The bibliography is followed by three appendices: Appendix A presents an amalgamated index of Norberg-Schulz's writings (1962-2000). It reveals the theoretical relationships and disjunctions between 31 separate sources, by chronologically listing the instances in which Norberg-Schulz discussed particular theoretical themes in his writings. Appendix B consists of a transcription of a lecture Norberg-Schulz delivered in San Francisco (12 July 1985), which was published (in condensed form) as "On the Way to Figurative Architecture" (1985a). The transcription makes it possible to compare Norberg-Schulz's ideas when voiced more freely (in the lecture) with his much more 'composed' essay. Appendix C presents several of Norberg-Schulz's built works and aligns these works with the theoretical phases of his work (identified in Chapter 4). Furthermore, Appendix C includes photographs of Heidegger's Todtnauberg hut and his 'town house' in Freiburg.

1.5 Assumptions and limitations

The most fundamental assumptions underpinning this thesis are the possibility of translating Martin Heidegger's philosophy into architectural terms and the validity that such a theory of architecture will have.

While this study aims to develop a holistic understanding of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project, its main contribution consists in investigating the architectural significance of grafting Heidegger's concept of care into Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*. However, the full extent of Heidegger's philosophical contribution is still not available (even in German). Future editions of his *Gesamtausgabe* will probably call for the continued evolution of a scholarly appreciation and interpretation of Heidegger's philosophical contribution. My linguistic limitations, with regards to Norberg-Schulz's Norwegian writings and Heidegger's German works, have been discussed in the Preface.

It may be argued that categorising Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution in terms of 'four phases' and 'three transitions' and then systematically interrogating these phases and transitions in terms of the concept of care, implies submitting his work to the process of 'ordering' which Heidegger dismissed as "calculative thinking" (1959: 420); a kind of thinking that tries to rationalise, order and thereby control (as a form of domination) the qualities and things of the world. For instance, the diagram which aims to gather the implications of Chapter 4 into one 'image' (see section 4.9) seems especially reductive. In many ways the categorisation of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution represents the

kind of approach Heidegger was most opposed to and yet it is exactly this kind of thinking, in Norberg-Schulz's own approach, that this study uncovers. Therefore, the 'categorisation' of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project already serves as an admission of the susceptibility of human understanding to eliminate uncertainties by imposing 'systems of order' on the evanescence, or fragility, of mortal bodies of knowledge. This susceptibility is aptly illustrated by Norberg-Schulz's demand for strong architectural figures that offer dwellers a "*strong Gestalt*" (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 66)—a remaining continuity—to identify with. While working within this structure, Chapter 6 mitigates against this desire for certainty by engaging with the impenetrability and ecstatic unpredictability of human care.[22]

It is, therefore, important to acknowledge that a study of this nature is always already influenced by the concerns of any author. Consequently, this thesis can neither claim to present an 'absolute' interpretation of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution nor of architectural phenomenology in general. Instead, this project is envisioned as another hermeneutic circling, aimed at appreciating and questioning anew the work of Heidegger, in view of Norberg-Schulz's earlier interpretation.[23] This is one of the reasons why the present study has mostly remained within the interaction between Heidegger's philosophy and Norberg-Schulz's interpretation—hereafter referred to as the 'H:N-S dialogue'—and only rarely ventured into the more recent work of, for instance, Jeff Malpas. In terms of Norberg-Schulz's wider influences (see subsection 1.2.1), these discussions were mostly used to illuminate his motivations for interpreting Heidegger's writings in particular ways.

1.6 Relevance

Norberg-Schulz's theory of place still offers a great deal of guidance to architects and his contribution deserves close scrutiny. The art of care offers a way to augment Norberg-Schulz's art of place in order to engage with some of the most pressing matters facing contemporary architecture:

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[22] See also the footnote in section 6.9 which engages with this issue.

[23] Richard Polt provided a more detailed discussion (grounded in Heidegger's philosophy) of how any study is always guilty of "opening up certain dimensions of life at the same time as they close off others" (Polt, 1999: 8-9). The Preface sketches the particular perspective from which this study was approached.

- The architectural response to the ecological and humanitarian crisis represented by climate change, interpreted here as the tyranny of efficiency; and
- the architectural response to this 'efficient mind-set', which displays a more general inability to engage with the way life takes place, interpreted here as the tyranny of lived experience.

Both the tyranny of efficiency and the tyranny of lived experience masquerade as solutions to the ecological crisis. The first appears to serve as a way to safeguard human habitats from destruction, while the second appears to stimulate human relationships with particular environments. Illuminated by Heidegger's philosophy, both approaches are revealed as potential tyrannies, subject to the all-consuming "challenging-forth" of the *Gestell* of modern technology[24] and the calculative mind-set which serves it (Heidegger, 1953: 332).

1.6.1 The tyranny of efficiency

Finding appropriate ways to understand the importance of the natural environment and the nature of humankind's relationship with this environment has never been more relevant. Norberg-Schulz believed that "the ecological crisis ... can only be solved with an authentic phenomenological understanding of place [which] takes its inspiration from the taking place of life" (2000b: 88).

In contrast to the 'concerned measure-taking' of *Dasein*, Heidegger posited the *Gestell* of modern technology. He acknowledged that modern technology still offered revelatory instances, but claimed that it no longer revealed the world as *poiesis* (poetic making as an act of concerned revelation). Instead, *poiesis* has been replaced by a demand for "maximum yield at minimum expense"; thus revealing the modern condition as a "setting-upon" in search of 'efficiency' (Heidegger, 1953: 318-324).

Caring for the world is not a matter of efficiency. However, rather than considering the possibility of living in the world as care, it is precisely the quest for efficiency that has become the foundation of contemporary architecture's response to the demand for sustainability. Ultimately, the art of care aims to suggest a way towards an ecological approach to architecture that does not merely rely on the 'efficiencies' that characterise modern technology, but seeks to engage with the way people live in the world as care.

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[24] See Glossary: *Gestell* (enframing) of technics.

1.6.2 The tyranny of lived experience

Already in CtP (1938b), Heidegger warned that the "hunt for lived experiences" merely serves to masque (as an "extreme opposite") the way the *Gestell* of modern technology has extended its dominance over *Dasein* (1938b: 123-129/98-101). The contemporary phenomenological approach seems poised to participate in and contribute to this 'hunt'.[25]

Otero-Pailos, in his study of the origins and future of architectural phenomenology, proposed that 'lived experience', as a "transhistorical origin", was one of the principal 'themes' driving the initial allure of architectural phenomenology (2010: xxxiii). Otero-Pailos concluded that contemporary "architectural phenomenology undergirds the sensualist neo-modernist fantasy of an essential experiential origin to architecture" (2010: 262). During the writing of this thesis—which proposes ways of understanding architecture as *livskunst*—being aware of the latent danger embodied by the tyranny of lived experience and the propensity of architectural phenomenology to accept the value of lived experience unquestioningly, served as a valuable reminder of the delicate complexity of the field of enquiry.

One of the ways the potential tyranny of lived experience becomes visible is in the way the 'stranger' is received in established places. The contemporary relationship between dwellers and places is far removed from the traditional identities of nation states and places viewed in isolation; a fluid situation oversimplified by Norberg-Schulz. Norberg-Schulz proposed that "human identity presupposes the identity of place" and that people—in order to dwell—have to "belong" to a place (1979b: 22). However, the 'obvious correspondence' (between dweller and place) that shaped the prejudices of the past, is no longer sustainable. The contemporary reality is much more opaque. Places are filled with 'multiple voices' brought together by mass-urbanisation, economic and political pressures and, in the future the projected influx of 'ecological refugees'; those displaced by the effects of climate change. The art of care proposes that approaching architecture in terms of the being of the intentional is the appropriate way to open inhabitants to the wonder of emplaced multiplicity and invites the stranger's dedication to this shared wonder. In view of a rapidly urbanising and multi-cultural world, Norberg-Schulz's approach warrants questioning in order for his theoretical contribution to remain relevant.

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[25] For instance, the writings of some of the most noted contemporary architectural phenomenologists, like Steven Holl's focus on "experiential phenomena" (Holl, 2009: 16), Juhani Pallasmaa's engagement with the 'architectural image' as an "experiential singularity" (Pallasmaa, 2011: 55), and Alberto Pérez-Gómez's belief in the need for architecture to "[engage] a lived world of experience" (Pérez-Gómez, 2009: 26), insist on the fundamental value of the 'phenomenological experience' of architectural space.

This chapter has introduced Heidegger's philosophy and Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation thereof. It has identified the research questions and objectives with which this thesis engages, pointed towards the original contribution envisioned, and discussed the structure of this document. Despite the assumptions and limitations that underpin this thesis, it has been argued that the art of care has significant contemporary relevance for understanding the potential of architecture to resist the tyranny of efficiency and lived experience. This thesis contends that, while Norberg-Schulz was a thoughtful interpreter of Heidegger's philosophy, his understanding of time as continuity and change fails to explain the intimate entanglement of lived temporality and obscures the concerned nature of dwelling.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will be used to present and question the implications of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical approach, propose a more authentic way of interpreting *Dasein*'s lived temporality and then graft this approach into Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*. However, appropriately engaging in Norberg-Schulz and Heidegger's writings calls for a research methodology inspired by Heidegger's philosophy itself; a hermeneutic approach focused on understanding research as an act of perduring-letting-be.

2 Methodology as the 'perduring-letting-be' of research

This chapter identifies the theoretical context guiding this thesis (section 2.1), discusses the limitations of a 'research methodology' based on 'logical argumentation' within the context of this study (subsection 2.1.1), and proposes a more appropriate approach to the process of theory-building envisioned in this thesis; a hermeneutic questioning (contemplative *Besinnung*) in line with the concerned nature of architectural *poiesis*, envisioned as care-full making within a region of concern (subsection 2.1.2).[26] This thesis, by engaging in the act of research as a process rooted in the concerned being of *Dasein*, instead of methodological progress, envisions a research design that appropriately engages the matters gathered as a dialogue (section 2.2) unfolding amid hermeneutic circling; a perduring-letting-be[27] of the event of research.

2.1 Theoretical context

The system of inquiry followed in this thesis is reflected in the description of that which is usually termed a 'theoretical framework' as a 'theoretical context'; a context engaged as a region of concern. In particular, this study functions within the theoretical context circumscribed by Christian Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Martin Heidegger's philosophy; a dialogic region of concern that has been designated the H:N-S dialogue.

In more general terms, acknowledging the contextual nature of *Dasein*'s way of life implies acknowledging that there are meaningful relationships between people and their places (a concrete situatedness). The same kinds of relationships exist between researcher and field of enquiry. To gain access to the nature of this relationship—to interpret and creatively engage within this field of inquiry—it is necessary to appreciate the qualitative aspects of existence. If the possibility of appreciating and designing architecture as *livskunst*, based on a qualitative total understanding of our everyday life-world, is to be taken seriously, then a quantitative study would fail to recognise the exact qualities with which this type of research aims to engage.

In their discussion of methodologies appropriate to the field of architecture, *Architectural Research Methods* (2002), the American architects, Linda Groat and David Wang, proposed that this approach shares the "ontological and epistemological assumptions"

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[26] See Glossary: *Andenken*, Care (*Sorge*).

[27] See Glossary: Resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*).

that places it within the realm of "naturalism", or more specifically, the "phenomenological" or "hermeneutic" paradigms (2002: 32-33). However, within the hermeneutic paradigm, this thesis not only needs to be understood in terms of 'ontological assumptions', but inquires about the foundation making these assumptions possible. Rather than investigating human intentions, this study tries to engage with what Heidegger called "*the question of the being of the intentional*" (1925: 178-180/129). While the belief that such questioning is valid betrays a particular 'ontological stance' (alluded to in the Preface), the questioning put forward in this thesis, rather than only being grounded in a particular ontology, is ontological by nature.

The ontological nature of this study suggests that rather than following specific (or a combination of) 'research methods and strategies' aiming at 'correctness', this thesis enters the realm of the hermeneutic circle. Engaging with the hermeneutic circle offers little hope for establishing certainty. Instead, it celebrates the resolute fragility, the doubt-acknowledging inconclusiveness, and mysterious, wonder-filled, absorption of what Heidegger called "concerned being-in-the-world" (1925: 213-215/159). It is argued that while engaging with the hermeneutic circle eschews the calculated certainties of Positivism, it is appropriate to the way human beings exist in the world.

In contrast to what Heidegger described as "calculative thinking" (1959: 420), aiming at 'categorisation' open to 'assertion' (Heidegger, 1938b: 63-64/51), this thesis tries to engage more 'inceptually' with *Dasein*'s concerned existence through a kind of thinking grounded in the reflective nature of *'Besinnung'*; the poetic appropriation of the meaningfulness of *Dasein*'s here, that evades the attempt at domination implied by categorisation and ordering. The meaning of places cannot be made 'manageable'. Their wonder lies in poetic moments of disclosure, granted to those willing to endure the silence that pervades dwelling near the "source" (Heidegger, 1946: 118). As Heidegger said: "The laws of bearing silence are higher than those of any logic" (1938b: 78-80/63). Inceptual thinking tries to engage with the characteristic "withholding" and "uncertainties" of the abyss,[28] by acknowledging the wonder that anything like Being occurs at all. In perduring silent uncertainty, experienced as the ability to "await", "receive", and "save" (Heidegger, 1951a: 148), the mortal engages the mystery of this event[29] by being open to the equally mysterious possibility of creatively 'letting-be' that which is. In this "rigorousness of restraint" (Heidegger, 1938b: 64-65/52) lies the 'precision' of "inceptual thinking" as the "creative withstanding of the abyss" (1938b: 35-36/30) in a way that is appropriate to

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[28] See Glossary: *Ab-grund*.

[29] See Glossary: *Ereignis*.

human life (1938b: 63-65/51-52), i.e. a way of thinking appropriate to our concerned mortal being-in-the-world.

It is this kind of thinking, as perduring-letting-be,[30] that grounds this theory-building thesis in the 'hermeneutic circle'; a dialogic (instead of logical) engagement within a field of inquiry that acknowledges truth as the revelatory act of hiding-revealing *aletheia*,[31] rather than the "dominance of correctness" (Heidegger, 1938b: 358-359/283); a wilfulness that views *logos* as "assertion" and measures the "correctness of logos" as correspondence to the archetypal "ideal" (Heidegger, 1935: 140-143/196-201). The hermeneutic approach happens as a 'process' amid concerned being-in-the-world, rather than providing 'progress towards truth' implied by the 'rational', 'categorising', 'systematic', 'innovative', and ultimately 'testable' nature that Groat & Wang ascribed to the 'strategy' of "logical argumentation" (2002: 301-340).

2.1.1 The limitations of logical argumentation and Heidegger's hermeneutic circle

Logical argumentation aims at understanding "some aspect of the cosmos in a systematically rational manner" and thereby "gives clarity" to a group of "disparate elements under a general heading" (Groat & Wang, 2002: 301). This method is characterised by "broad systematic applicability", "paradigmatic innovation", and "*a-priori* argumentation", which enables logical argumentation to explain diverse phenomena through progressive categorisation. The main reason to use this method is its ability to "uncover reality at a deeper level than what is seen on the empirical surface of things" (2002: 308-309).

However, while this 'strategy'[32] appears to grant access to a deeper engagement with *Dasein*'s lived reality, engaging with Heidegger's philosophy (and especially his concept of care) will demand a different approach; a kind of "inceptual thinking" (Heidegger, 1938b: 56-60/46-48) grounded in the hermeneutic "circle".[33] This approach reflects Heidegger's belief that *Dasein* is a "circular being", grounded in the circular "structure of care" (1927a: 315). According to the distinguished philosopher and Heidegger scholar, Theodore Kisiel, the hermeneutic circle sets the "situated I"—the "I" that is being-in-the-world—against the

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[30] See Glossary: Resoluteness (also see subsection 5.5.2).

[31] See Glossary: *Aletheia.*

[32] Logical argumentation was used by David Wang in his own thesis (Groat & Wang, 2002: 60-62), which also aimed to re-interpret Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution (see subsection 3.2.4).

[33] See Glossary: *Andenken*, Hermeneutics.

Cartesian thinking being, or "theoretical I", in an effort to describe the "hermeneutic situation of factic life itself" (Kisiel, 2010: 18-20).[34] Kisiel argued that only *Dasein* as care is able to "[meet things] on the path of care and [experience them] as meaningful" (2010: 21). Consequently, *"only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless"* (Heidegger, 1927a: 151). Accordingly*,* Heidegger's hermeneutic approach toward human facticity—grounded in the 'circular structure of care'—is the appropriate way to understand *Dasein's* "hermeneutical situation" (Heidegger, 1927a: 310-311).

In Heideggarian terms, the hermeneutic approach is profoundly humanitarian. In his essay, "Letter on Humanism" (1947a) (LoH), Heidegger proposed that humanism is grounded in "meditating [*Sinnen*] and caring [*Sorgen*]" (1947a: 224). *Sorgen* engages with the concerned 'being of the intentional' and Sinnen[35] describes the 'reflective thinking' characteristic of hermeneutics. One of the most influential attempts to develop Heidegger's 'hermeneutics of facticity', was conducted by Heidegger's former student, the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). In recent years there have been efforts to apply the hermeneutic approach to architectural design. One of the most notable attempts was presented in the essay by Adrian Snodgrass and Richard Coyne, "Is Designing Hermeneutical?" (1997).

The arguments presented in this essay point towards the possibility of grounding the process of architectural theory-building in the nature of architectural design. While architectural design may seem like a cumulative 'step-driven' (even logical) process akin to the notion of continuity and change, the reality is that design happens as a dialogue; sometimes brooding on similar themes with very little 'progress', only to be catapulted into new possibilities through the revelation brought by a single line. Design is ecstatic – the act of a concerned mortal – in the same way that life is ecstatic. Grounding the research project within the hermeneutics of design is therefore homologeous with the impetus driving this thesis, since it shows that the theoretical perspective advocated – relying on the art of care instead of the seeming 'progress' offered by continuity and change – is closely aligned with the way architects actually engage in the design process.

2.1.2 The possibility of grounding research within the hermeneutics of design

When engaging with issues of architectural design, the so-called certainties of logic become elusive. For instance, after initially engaging with the promised systematic

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[34] See Glossary: Facticity.

[35] In Afrikaans, *Besinning*. See Glossary: *Andenken*.

certainties of perceptual psychology (specifically in the work of Albers and Kepes), Norberg-Schulz came to the conclusion that this kind of approach "was of no assistance to students when it came to design" (2000b: 9). Design is neither formula-based, nor logically derived. Instead, design is a hermeneutic act of concerned engagement.

In their essay, Snodgrass & Coyne persuasively argued that design can best be described as a 'hermeneutic dialogue', rather than "any model based on logical sequences of operations" (1997: 86). The hermeneutic process eschews the methodological, because the "operation of the hermeneutic circle is not the employment of a method", but is "embedded in all thought and in all action" (1997: 80). The difference between a methodological approach and a dialogical approach is that the methodological "inquirer controls and manipulates; in dialectic the subject matter of the discussion poses questions to which the inquirer responds" (Snodgrass & Coyne, 1997: 78). This difference, therefore, echoes the difference between 'calculative thinking' and the dialogue of 'listening' and 'response' characterising the 'perduring-letting-be'[36] of Heidegger's 'inceptual thinking' (see section 2.1).

Following Snodgrass & Coyne, it is possible to argue that the act of theory-building, based on the nature of architectural design, is not methodological, but a dialogical "process of interrogation and appropriation" (Snodgrass & Coyne, 1997: 77); a process of reading and questioning, rather than progress towards 'objective solutions' (1997: 84). In terms of this process, it is important to point out that during "authentic dialogue the positions of both partners are transformed" (1997: 77). Gadamer proposed that "in the process of understanding, a real fusion of horizons occurs" (1960: 306); a fusion that represents "being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were" (1960: 370-371). It is in this sense that designing and theory-building can be understood as interpretive engagement.

Whether conversing with a text or architecturally engaging a place as a region of concern, both the text and the region are (in each moment) understood as a projected whole, while particular aspects are continuously gathered into the dialogue as contributing parts. Thus the projected whole is ecstatic, dynamic and open to new interpretations. It is not as if parts are randomly gathered, or the whole is given as a static (always already gathered) object. Instead, gathering is engaged care-fully; in such a way that the region of concern implies a constant 'regioning', or fusion and re-fusion of horizons, between projected future and the active process of building that gathers the whole. Therefore, all

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[36] See Glossary: Resoluteness.

architectural design continuously re-measures place as transformed place, and all understanding of place implies an ecstatic re-measuring guided by the hermeneutic "reciprocity of questioning" (Snodgrass & Coyne, 1997: 78), that lets "theory and practice coalesce in the act of interpretation" (1997: 87). Does this mean that the abdication of intentionality, in favour of the concerned nature of the hermeneutic circle, will trap designers in an "endless cycle of interpretations"? Not only does the hermeneutic circle imply this possibility, in fact, it reveals that "we are already in it" (1997: 75). *Dasein* is always already engaged in the hermeneutic circle, because *Dasein* always already exists as the being of care.[37]

Snodgrass & Coyne illustrate that architectural design, as a "human activity", aims at expressing "understanding rather than knowledge and that understanding arises not by the use of method" (1997: 72), but amid 'hermeneutic dialogues' constituting an interpretive "cycle of anticipation and revision" (1997: 73). However, Heidegger went one step further by embarking from the position that human "understanding and more so the way of enacting understanding, interpretation, are determined by the kind of being of Dasein, by care" (1925: 413-415/299).[38] In contrast to "calculative planning" (Heidegger, 1938b: 494-495/389), Heidegger posited concerned mortal "measure-taking" (1951b: 219), i.e. being-in-the-world as one who has been born and will die, one who is concerned about this situation, one who measures all other aspects of being-in-the-world as a being who is open to this reality and one whose *poiesis* (creative engagement) reflects this process of mortal measure-taking. While Snodgrass & Coyne proposed that design "builds up the artefact and edifies the designer" (1997: 83), this thesis engages with architectural design as that measure-taking, which builds place as a region of concern (and thereby augments Norberg-Schulz's art of place) and edifies the concerned mortality of the dweller (the art of care).

In a sense this differentiation is also neglected by Glen Hill's thoughtful commentary (1997) on Snodgrass & Coyne's article. Hill criticised Snodgrass & Coyne's interpretation of design as the "absorbed engagement in a conversation" (1997: 12) (in contrast to the "deliberative and intentional aspects" ascribed to design by "rationalist models"), as an approach that comes dangerously close to a situation in which "design itself becomes 'flattened' and indistinguishable from any other human activity" (1997: 13). However, in

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[37] See Glossary: Always already.

[38] In fact, Gadamer pointed out that his two main 'applications'—"understanding a text and reaching an understanding in a conversation"—share the way in which both activities are "concerned with a subject matter that is placed before them" (1960: 370). Hermeneutic interpretation is only accessible to the kind of being that is in the world as care.

terms of understanding architecture as *livskunst*, this is exactly the type of horizon-fusing role design is expected to play. Not as a 'flattening' of design, but as the humble acknowledgement of the value of those kinds of understanding that dwell nearby (in the everydayness of existence), and the 'wonder' that may be experienced amid concerned being-in-the-world.

In contrast to positivist assumptions regarding the establishment of objective measures to assess the validity of research, attempts to verify the 'findings' derived from hermeneutic questioning is a self-defeating venture, since it implies engaging inappropriately with the dialogic nature of this kind of inquiry. Hermeneutic interpretations cannot be 'tested' in the same way traditional hypotheses can be accepted or refuted with certainty. In the words of Snodgrass & Coyne:

> The hermeneutical anticipation, by contrast [to scientific hypotheses], feeds back into the particularities of the situation. The anticipation is either "fulfilled" or "disappointed"; if fulfilled it enriches the particularities, which then play back to enrich the anticipations; and if disappointed it likewise places the particularities in a new light, opening up new expectations and triggering further projections. In either case, whether the projection is fulfilled or disappointed, the horizon is enlarged (Snodgrass & Coyne, 1997: 88).

This thesis contends that the possibility of abdicating the 'certainties' offered by the 'precision of logic', rests in the ability to call upon the poetic precision of *sorgvuldigheid*[39]; a concept which builds on what the Swiss architect, Peter Zumthor (b. 1943), recognised in Calvino's[40] assurance that "The poet of the vague can only be the poet of precision!" (Calvino in Zumthor, 2010a: 30). His belief in the ways 'precision' and 'vagueness' are able to co-exist, led Zumthor to assert "that richness and multiplicity emanate from the things themselves if we observe them attentively and give them their due" (2010a: 31). However, even the prospect of something like 'attentive observation' depends on the concerned measure-taking of the 'being of the intentional'. Once the dependence on the 'certainties' of methods has been abdicated, then it will be possible to care-fully engage the act of research, as a dialogical process of reading and questioning.

2.2 A dialogical research design

Snodgrass & Coyne's essay argued that the "design process … is firmly embedded in a human situation [and can therefore] more appropriately [be] studied in terms of

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[39] See Glossary: *Sorgvuldigheid*.
[40] The Italian writer, Italo Calvino (1923-1985).

hermeneutic structures than of the natural sciences" (1997: 92). This thesis contends that understanding the situation as a 'human situation', requires entering the realm of the 'being of the intentional'. Acknowledging the concerned engagement required by this field of inquiry, discloses the kind of critical engagement followed in this thesis; a hermeneutic reading and questioning that, in contrast with the positivist aspirations for measurable 'theoretical progress', describes the perduring-letting-be of research as a horizon-fusing 'process'.

This section uses the hermeneutic approach in order to re-appropriate more 'traditional' types of research. Firstly, what is normally described as the literature review is represented as an interpretive dialogue of reading and questioning, and explained in terms of the amalgamated index (presented in Appendix A). Secondly, in the light of this dialogic approach the archival work itself is revealed as an immersive experience. Thereafter, the site visits conducted during the course of this thesis will be re-interpreted as acts of memorialising and reading. The hermeneutic approach offers appropriate ways towards the "resolute repetition" (Heidegger, 1927a: 392) of established research traditions within the particular region of concern in which this thesis engages.

2.2.1 The interpretation of literature

Groat & Wang described a literature review as a process during which material of "conceptual relevance" is "arranged into a coherent system" (2002: 46). While their approach describes the process followed in cases where the literature study is used to identify ways to "[expand] an existing concept or theory" (Groat & Wang, 2002: 51), the hermeneutic mind-set not only engages systematically with the literature in general, but tries to hermeneutically engage with the 'abundance' and 'lack' of text. It is not only that the text contains abundant possibilities for interpretation, but that any such interpretation obscures other possibilities. The understanding of a text, therefore, always already implies interpretive involvement. Gadamer summarised the interaction between understanding, interpretation and language as follows: "*language is the universal medium in which understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting*". Therefore, no understanding is entirely subjective or absolute, but always involves an interpretive "fusion of horizons" (1960: 390). To engage with a text, is to engage in such a 'conversation'. In the words of Gadamer: "Like conversation, interpretation is a circle closed by the dialectic of question and answer" (1960: 391).

In terms of Norberg-Schulz's work, the amalgamated index (Appendix A) offers a glimpse into the hermeneutics of what appears to be an example of rigorous systematisation.

Firstly, any index implies that certain concepts are selected as 'significant' (when they fall within the region of concern). Next, it must be decided which attributes qualify a term that is referred to as a 'reference'. Will all instances where a term is mentioned be included or only dedicated discussions of that term? In this instance, it was decided to attempt to include all instances where a concept was mentioned, since even an 'insignificant mention' in a 'significant context' contributes to the conversation. However, a key influence in deciding to amalgamate different indexes was the belief that it is possible to illustrate the development (or culling) of certain interpretive nuances surrounding concepts used by Norberg-Schulz. Seeing the 'history' of a term and following its elaboration or eventual dismissal, invites the reader to become part of the hermeneutic dialogue within Norberg-Schulz's work. The meaning of each term is transformed with each reference, not merely as the artificial construction of *schemata*, but also (and more profoundly) in poetic moments of significance. Therefore, certain instances, interpreted as more or less significant, were differentiated from 'casual mentions' with different colours, by being underlined, or by being printed in bold. Whether these judgements correspond to the expectations of the reader is significant in the sense that even the act of critique (of what was deemed significant or not) already implies engagement in the conversation.

The immersive approach to interpreting texts followed in this thesis, therefore, goes beyond the significance Groat & Wang attributed to the 'literature study' by implying a form of "interpretivism" (Groat & Wang, 2002: 186). What is neglected by a systematic approach to literature studies is that a creature of concern encounters a text in a unique context of care that underpins all interpretation and understanding. Only by acknowledging the unique 'fusion of horizons' accessible to *Dasein* as concerned being-in-the-world, can a unique relationship with certain texts come to light. While Groat & Wang point to this fact by asserting that engaging with written material requires "imagination and creativity" (2002: 52), this thesis aims to acknowledge the way in which the 'image' is influenced by care and the way *Dasein* can only 'create' as a mortal. Thus a peculiar brand of 'interpretivism' emerges that tries to engage with the way lived situatedness can be translated into works of architecture, by care-fully re-engaging with Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution and the way he interpreted (or neglected) the implications (ascribed by Heidegger) to *Dasein*'s "concerned being-in-the-world" (1925: 213-215/159).

2.2.2 Study trip: the archive as immersive process

This study aims to present a thorough exposition of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution (and how it has been received in architectural circles) as the fruit of an immersive interpretation of Norberg-Schulz's written contribution (described in the previous section as hermeneutic engagement). In order to enhance the persuasiveness of this interpretation, the literature study has been augmented by a study of Norberg-Schulz's manuscripts, lecture notes, personal notes and correspondence kept in the archives of the Norwegian National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design (Oslo). The act of engaging with the vast amount of information kept in this archive represents an immersive process in its own right.

2.2.3 Study trip: site visits and case studies

From a phenomenological perspective, studying the particular ways phenomena are embedded in the world of life offers a fertile (and direct) way to understand reality. If certain "principles" are observed or experienced in "multiple sources", then case studies can become a source of "evidence" (Groat & Wang, 2002: 352). Initially, this study aimed to engage with Heidegger's Todtnauberg hut and Norberg-Schulz's architectural works as "intrinsic" and "instrumental" case studies (Groat & Wang, 2002: 355). In Oslo several architectural works by Norberg-Schulz, like Planetveien 14, the Stabekk Catholic Church, and his house at Slemdalsvingen 55, were visited, and in Germany Heidegger's Todtnauberg hut and his Freiburg town house were visited.

The first-hand experience of these multifaceted places opened various avenues of dialogue within the interpretive study mentioned above. For instance, Otero-Pailos mentioned that Norberg-Schulz "famously began his lecture term on the history of architecture with a visit to Oslo's Folk Museum" (2006: 11). To visit this open air collection of vernacular works of architecture (gathered from various parts of Norway), is to catch a more telling glimpse of Norberg-Schulz's world and added another layer of understanding to the investigation. In addition, informal discussions with a former colleague of Norberg-Schulz and with others who have engaged with his theoretical contribution have proven valuable in trying to understand the *milieu* within which Norberg-Schulz worked.

Norberg-Schulz's architectural work represents a largely overlooked aspect of his contribution. Otero-Pailos suggested that this is because Norberg-Schulz's work raises some uncomfortable questions about his "understanding of architecture as a chiefly visual phenomenon" (2006: 10). What do these works reveal about Norberg-Schulz's intentions

and architectural ambitions? Engaging Norberg-Schulz's architectural works within the more ambitious perspective of his theoretical contribution represents an important strategy to limit superficial interpretations of his work.

In a similar way, the Todtnauberg hut reveals many aspects of Heidegger's understanding of what it means to build. Yet, it is also easy to misinterpret if not grounded in a more sophisticated phenomenological 'reading' suggested by the hermeneutic approach. In *Heidegger's hut* (2006) Adam Sharr admirably discussed most of the quantitative aspects of this place of refuge, but there remain many 'qualities' open to interpretation. In a certain sense, Norberg-Schulz's architectural translation of Heidegger's philosophy discloses some important facets regarding the allure of this mountain sanctuary, while simultaneously proving inadequate to explain the peculiar hold that the hut had on its most famous inhabitant.

The need to first develop an appreciation of the back-ground of these built works in order to guard against superficial interpretation, but more importantly in order to preserve the possibility of a more nuanced reading[41] of these places, led to the decision to resist analysing these places (in the traditional sense) as case studies. Simultaneously, it was felt that a more comprehensive hermeneutic reading of these places as memorialising events fell beyond the scope of this study. As an interim solution, the significant places visited in the course of this study are catalogued in Appendix C, but not subjected to extensive analyses.

2.3 Towards the resolute repetition of research methodologies

The structure of this thesis (described in section 1.4) springs from the dialogical approach described in this chapter. The initial interpretation of Norberg-Schulz's architectural translation of Heidegger's philosophical writings, and the ensuing questioning of this interpretation in terms of Heidegger's ontological understanding of concerned being-in-the-world, can be seen as a hermeneutic circle in which this study enters the H:N-S dialogue. The aim is neither to disprove nor defend Norberg-Schulz's position, but to re-interpret and augment his approach; to enlarge the horizon of his contribution.

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[41] In a recent book, *Reading Architecture and Culture: Researching Buildings, Spaces, and Documents* (2012), Adam Sharr made the case for architects' abilities to conduct a "close reading of buildings as cultural artefacts" as a research method. Sharr proposed that "architects have a distinctive capacity to read the anatomy of buildings and the nuances of their details, [and are therefore] well placed to put their abilities to forensic use, deducing cultural insights from architectural fabric" (2012: 2).

In the light of the proposed hermeneutic approach, the concept of 'grafting' provides a succinct description of the process followed. The French horticulturalist, Charles Baltet (1830-1908) (1878: 1) defined grafting as "an operation which consists in uniting a plant, or a portion of a plant [the graft], to another which will support it [the stock], and furnish it with a part of the [nutrients] necessary for its growth". The main advantage of grafting is that the "stock" and the "graft" are brought into an "intimate union" (Baltet, 1878: 1) that allows the grafted plant to possess a hardy (disease resistant) root system that is acclimatised to the soil, supporting a plant that, even though it might prove to be more fragile, bears the desired fruit. The result is a resilient hybrid (a symbiosis), which will be better suited to the situation than either the graft or the stock independently; a process which mirrors the horizon-fusing capabilities Gadamer ascribed to the act of interpretation.

Norberg-Schulz's belief that the architectural implementation of the life-world can more appropriately be envisioned as an act of "translation", rather than "discovery" (2000b: 143), is even more significant when seen in terms of the hermeneutics of facticity and the possibility of appreciating architecture as *livskunst*. Gadamer entangled the way we understand conversations, textual interpretation and acts of translation by revealing the reciprocal processes governing these interactions (1960: 389). If architecture is, as this thesis proposes, a care-full translation (through *poiesis*) of a region of concern, then understanding the nature of the process of translation, and the reciprocities involved, is essential.

Gadamer asserted that the "situation of the translator and that of the interpreter are fundamentally the same" and that "[e]very translation that takes its task seriously is at once clearer and flatter than the original" (1960: 388-389). While acknowledging the nature of translation as interpretation, this thesis contends (following Heidegger) that all interpretation is rooted in care (Heidegger, 1925: 413-415/299). Relying on the art of care, this thesis questions the value of 'clarity' and the extent of the 'flatness' that works of architecture, as translations of the life of the place, are subjected to. If the act of translation is seen as care-full *poiesis* and the place is seen as a region of concern, then the need for 'clarity'—expressed by Norberg-Schulz as the need for a "strong place" (1979b: 179)—will give way to the appreciation of the "frailties of things" (Heidegger, 1946: 127), and the seemingly unavoidable flatness of interpretation may be brought closer to the abundance of being-in-the-world.

It has been argued that re-interpreting the roles ascribed to traditional methodologies in terms of the concerned being of *Dasein*, can lead to more nuanced ways of engaging with the proposed field of enquiry. To engage architecture as *livskunst* is to engage the

potential of architecture as a form of humanism and implies engaging with Heidegger's understanding of *Sorgen* and *Sinnen*; neither as an ordering, nor an imposition, but aiming at the perduring-letting-be of research. The next chapter will aim to engage previous interpretations of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical work in this spirit. Heidegger memorably concluded his lecture, "The Question Concerning Technology" (1953), by contending that "questioning is the piety of thought" (1953: 341). When our ability to think, interpret and translate are seen as instances of perduring-letting-be, they become acts of care-full *poiesis*, edifying the gratitude befitting mortal being-in-the-world.

3 Literature review

The previous chapter argued that a dialogical approach represents the most appropriate way to investigate the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy. In order to engage dialogically in the 'interpretive horizon' of Norberg-Schulz's work, this thesis interprets three distinct subsets of text. While Chapter 4 is composed of a comprehensive literature review of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution and Chapter 5 consists of a focused literature review of Heidegger's concept of care, this chapter will discuss previous attempts at interpreting the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's approach.

Among the scholars who have commented on Norberg-Schulz's work, the most fundamental distinction exists between those who believe that dwelling is a lost art obliterated by the modern condition (subsection 3.1.1) and those who see dwelling as a possible, but counter-*Gestell*, relationship between dwellers and their places (subsection 3.1.2). While the position of the first group is fundamentally irreconcilable with the ideas discussed in this thesis, the second group alludes to many themes relevant to this thesis and will be discussed in terms of seven broad conceptual regions: the veracity and appropriateness of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy (subsection 3.2.1), the interaction between human identity and the identity of place (subsection 3.2.2), the recent criticism of Norberg-Schulz's reliance on visual aids (subsection 3.2.3), interpretations of the way Norberg-Schulz engaged with the human subject (subsection 3.2.4), architectural history (subsection 3.2.5), and time (subsection 3.2.6). Ultimately, this chapter points to the need for questioning the metaphysical underpinnings of Norberg-Schulz's project by referring to care (*Sorge*) as the 'ground of dwelling' (subsection 3.2.7). The last section (3.3) considers alternative approaches that refer to concepts related to care (like 'love' and 'sympathy') without necessarily engaging in the H:N-S dialogue.

By drawing on prior research, this chapter argues that Norberg-Schulz's work is today both under-appreciated and unquestioned; under-appreciated in the sense that a holistic study of his theoretical work is still outstanding, and unquestioned in the sense that the fundamental difference between his concept of *stedskunst* and Heidegger's 'being-in-the-world' has remained obscure. In order to address the heart of this divergence, it is essential to engage with the influence that 'continuity and change' had on Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project and determine the possible ways in which a reliance on Heidegger's concept of care will be able to augment Norberg-Schulz's position.

3.1 The possibility of dwelling

For many architects, Norberg-Schulz remains their first and most significant encounter with Heidegger's philosophy. Often they accept his interpretation without venturing into the Heideggarian source material to question the validity of his 'translation'. The result is that countless possibilities in Heidegger's philosophy remain unexplored in terms of their architectural application. Despite the lack of in-depth questioning, the validity of Norberg-Schulz's approach is not a matter of consensus. In fact, since Norberg-Schulz published his treatises, many different approaches have been devised for the study of his work, which can be divided into two opposing paradigms of thought:

- Paradigm 1: those who argue that the translation of Heidegger's writings into a philosophy of architecture constitutes a fundamentally unacceptable and misguided approach.
- Paradigm 2: those who see the translation of Heidegger's thoughts into a philosophy of architecture as a legitimate exercise that can cast new light on architecture as an expression of being-in-the-world.

3.1.1 Paradigm 1: the inability to dwell

In "Eupalinos or Architecture" (1980) the Italian philosopher **Massimo Cacciari**[42] (b. 1944) argued that to "reduce [Heidegger's writings] to a 'philosophy of architecture'" should be condemned as a "vulgar, idiotically rationalistic way of reading [his work]". The problem of dwelling is not primarily concerned with "the form of building", but "lies in the fact that [the human] spirit may no longer dwell" (Cacciari 1980: 395). Cacciari and Norberg-Schulz's interpretations of Heidegger's writings are fundamentally irreconcilable.

In *Architecture and Modernity: a Critique* **Hilde Heynen** (1999: 19) contrasted Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Martin Heidegger's writings with that of Cacciari. Heynen argued that Norberg-Schulz relied on a "nostalgic" and "utopian" reading of Heidegger, which did not acknowledge the 'homelessness' characterising contemporary society as a "fundamental condition". Instead, Norberg-Schulz presented this radical break with the traditional as "an incidental loss that can be redressed by a better understanding of the relation between architecture and dwelling" (Heynen, 1999: 20). Heynen offers a succinct summary of Cacciari's thoughts on the ability of architecture to facilitate dwelling:

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[42] Due to the large number of authors discussed in this section, the names of key commentators have been printed in bold, in order to clearly indicate the interrelationship of ideas.

As a result of the reduction of the relationship between man and world, as a result of the forgetfulness of being, poetical dwelling has become impossible, and therefore poetic architecture has also become impossible. Real dwelling no longer exists, and authentic building has also disappeared. The only thing left over for architecture is to reveal the impossibility of poetical dwelling through an architecture of empty signs. Only an architecture that reflects the impossibility of dwelling can still lay claim to any form of authenticity (Heynen, 1999: 21).

According to Heynen (1999: 25), Norberg-Schulz neglected the very real "dilemmas", "conflicts" and "ambiguities" which characterise modern life. However, this does not necessarily mean that the nihilist line of thought propagated by Cacciari, claiming that dwelling is essentially impossible in our times, is more appropriate.[43] In order to distinguish between these diverging lines of thought, this thesis suggests that the way 'dwelling' is interpreted and envisioned is essential.

At times in Norberg-Schulz's writings, the combined focus on creating a strong place or *Gestalt*,[44] and the link established between 'concretisation' and dwelling[45] make it seem as if the act of building leads to dwelling. This is indeed a more 'romantic' way of engaging with the act of building, and stands in contrast to Heidegger's assertion that dwelling is a prerequisite for building (1951a: 157). Cacciari, in a way much closer to Heidegger, asserted that "dwelling is not the result of building", but then adds that it "is that which building produces into presence" (1980: 394). In BDT, Heidegger did say that the act of building implies "a distinctive letting-dwell" (1951a:156), but the distinctiveness of this act lies in the fact that it is an event of appropriation[46] calling mortals "to take [their world] under [their] care" (1951a: 149). This kind of 'taking care' has not been made impossible by the contemporary world, but is accessible as concerned measure-taking.[47] Therefore, while it is clear that Heidegger did not imply that 'good buildings' could somehow guarantee dwelling, he did hold open the possibility that mortals could "learn" dwelling as a concerned act of measuring (1951a: 159).

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[43] Elie Haddad described Norberg-Schulz's neglect of this 'impossibility' as a symptom of his propensity for visualisation: "what seems to be the problem [for Norberg-Schulz] is simply the inability of the modern house to look like a house, and not, as Heidegger had alluded to, the inability of modern man to dwell" (2010: 96). The veracity of this line of critique is discussed in subsection 3.2.3 (see subsection 3.2.1 for a brief discussion of Haddad's interpretation of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution).

[44] Norberg-Schulz, 1978: 112; 1979b: 179; 1984a: 66; 2000a: 66.

[45] Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 23; 1984a: 17; 1985a: 241; 2000a: 114.

[46] See Glossary: *Ereignis*.

[47] See Glossary: Measuring.

If Norberg-Schulz is read carefully, then it becomes clear that the "meaningful relationship" implied by concerned measuring is the kind of dwelling he hoped to give a voice through works of architecture.[48] Consequently, it can be argued that Norberg-Schulz's approach has merit as a legitimate interpretation that, through a further 'fusion of horizons', can be brought closer to Heidegger's philosophical project.[49] Indeed, if *livskunst* truly was his goal, then the art of care presents a most promising way towards it. However, this thesis argues that Norberg-Schulz failed to actualise these possibilities by neglecting the concerned nature of human temporality in favour of understanding time as continuity and change. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that it was his insistence on the certainties of continuity and change, which tainted Norberg-Schulz's work with many of the tendencies that triggered such fierce criticism from reviewers like the American architectural historian, **Linda Krause**.

In her stinging review of Norberg-Schulz's collection of essays, AMP (1986d), Krause described Norberg-Schulz as a "nineteenth-century romantic", who longs for "medieval order, hierarchy and unchallenged authority", in search of an "authenticity [which] is exclusive rather than inclusive" (1991: 198-199). In parallel with asking whether dwelling is possible in our age, it is the question of whether 'authenticity' is possible (or desirable), which establishes another fault line in interpreting the persuasiveness of Norberg-Schulz's contribution. In Krause's reading, authenticity is derided as "exclusive", "romantic", or "hierarchical" and bestowed by "unquestionable authority" (1991: 199).

However, authenticity can also be viewed in terms of 'being true to the concerned nature of human existence'; an approach which actually agrees with Krause's call for "engaging architecture in all its varied forms and divergent meanings" (Krause, 1991: 198). Rather than merely deriding Norberg-Schulz's work as "romanticism", the art of care acknowledges works of architecture as unique appropriations in response to concerned measuring, in order to question the "reliance on ideologies that preclude critical enquiry" (Krause, 1991: 198). By being open to the wonder embodied in the future-motivated nature of ecstatic care, architects will be less prone to idealising the past. Acknowledging the link between 'authenticity'[50] and 'architecture as the art of care' (thereby embedding works of architecture in the concerned reality of the being of the intentional) will assuage the allure of "romantic nostalgia" (Krause, 1991: 199), by enticing architects to

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[48] Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 19; 1984b: 13; 1986b: 216; 1989: 57.

[49] The indirect corroboration of Norberg-Schulz's place-driven interpretation of Heidegger by Jeff Malpas has been mentioned in this regard (section 1.1).

[50] See Glossary: Authenticity.

acknowledge the ecstatic possibilities that always already lie dormant in *Dasein*'s temporal being.

Dismissing the possibility of 'learning to dwell' (Heidegger, 1951a: 159) is a perilous position in a time threatened by ecological disaster. Instead of representing a sober acknowledgement of the 'fact' that contemporary "listening is just silence" (Cacciari, 1980: 396), Cacciari did not consider that the creative "bearing of silence" (Heidegger, 1938b: 77-81/62-64) may be the most authentic contemporary way of dwelling.

While Norberg-Schulz's assumptions and interpretations are not above questioning, it can be argued that he established a valuable platform for architecturally interpreting Heidegger's philosophy. Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* forms an important part of the wider story of architectural phenomenology; a growing dialogue currently engaged in the process of appropriation.

3.1.2 Paradigm 2: the story of phenomenology in architecture

Architectural phenomenology, as a field of study that recognises the value of different interpretations, gathers what may seem like a cacophony of interests, assumptions and intentions. **Groat & Wang** proposed that the 'interpretivist' approach (springing from the phenomenological understanding of hermeneutics) aims "to recover the primordial unity between the experiencing subject and the context experienced, and make that unity … the source of design activity" (2002: 190). To value this interaction is to acknowledge that any activity is 'always already' in dialogue with *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world.

In *Architecture's Historical Turn: Phenomenology and the Rise of the Postmodern* (2010) the American architect, artist and theorist, **Jorge Otero-Pailos**, discussed the origins and future of architectural phenomenology in general.[51] By focusing on the way architectural phenomenology recast the conventional approach to architectural history in terms of "a certain kind of experience, at once of the moment and timeless" (2010: xxiii), which was intended to reveal the "deeper structuring reality" (2010: xxxiii) behind history, Otero-Pailos criticised the way architectural phenomenology was used to "[weave] together sensory experience and architectural history" (2010: xxxiii). The result was that architectural phenomenologists made 'history' accessible to 'experience' by "[superimposing] phenomenological notions of experience and history onto an existing

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[51] In Chapter 4 of *Architecture's Historical Turn: Phenomenology and the Rise of the Postmodern* Otero-Pailos situated, and harshly critiqued, the contribution of Norberg-Schulz within the historical development of architectural phenomenology. The veracity of Otero-Pailos's interpretation of Norberg-Schulz's contribution is discussed in subsection 3.2.3.

architectural discourse in a way that made the philosophy seem like a natural extension, or even a clarification, of long-established architectural ideas" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 12).

Otero-Pailos's book has rapidly evoked a series of critical reviews by the American researcher, **Bryan Norwood** (2011), the Mexican-born architect, **Juan Manuel Heredia** (2011), the Canadian architect, **Graham Livesey** (2011), the American environment-behaviour researcher, **David Seamon** (2012) and the French architect, **Benoît Jacquet** (2012). In his review, Livesey pointed out that 'architectural phenomenology' represents a much wider field of study than implied by Otero-Pailos, that it included "many thematic preoccupations beyond the notion of experience" (2011: 93-94) and that Otero-Pailos, "by concluding his study around 1980 … misses the most important period in phenomenology's and architectural history's influence on recent architecture" (2011: 95). This call for a wider reading is echoed by Seamon (2012). In fact, Seamon pointed out that Otero-Pailos "is much more intent on highlighting the broader professional and societal failures and misfires of [architectural phenomenology]" (2012: 5) than engaging with contemporary contributions; "the much quieter voice [in which] phenomenological research continued to speak" (2012: 6).

It is these 'quieter voices', specifically (in this thesis) those of **Robert Mugerauer**, **Jeff Malpas**, **Peter Zumthor**, **Juhani Pallasmaa** and **Karsten Harries**, that reveal the validity of Juan Manuel Heredia's assertion that, "[Otero-Pailos's] polygraphic method generates … a straw-man. Besides a loosely defined notion of experience, the authors analyzed can have as much in common as with their alleged competitors. The relation with phenomenology itself is even weaker" (Heredia, 2011: 184). Instead of an "unprejudiced account of [architectural phenomenology's] history" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: xv), Seamon added that Otero-Pailos's approach represents "an arbitrary, selective effort to brand [architectural phenomenology] as the dominant but flawed conceptual vehicle via which American architectural programs gained academic and intellectual currency" (2012: 5). Jacquet affirmed that contemporary architectural phenomenology, far from being "intellectually suspect" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: xiv), has managed to retain its "historical momentum" in architectural circles, since it "relates well to architects' 'interdisciplinary' minds and their desire to bring together sensitivity and sensibility to the applied, real-world processes of design and construction" (Jacquet, 2012: 8).

The vibrancy of the range of voices engaging in the phenomenological 'dialogue' [52] has, in recent years, been displayed in several 'general introductions' written in an attempt to present the ways in which Heidegger's ideas (amongst others) have been appropriated by architects. In *Heidegger for Architects* (2007) **Sharr**[53] engaged with the architectural relevance of Heidegger's philosophy. Disappointingly, this book considers Heidegger's architectural significance by referring to only three of his essays: "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951), "The Thing" (1950), and "… Poetically, Man Dwells …" (1951). While Sharr aimed to provide an 'introductory text' for architects, the study of Heidegger's applicability to architecture benefits from much broader engagement with his writings.

One of the most interesting recent texts on the architectural significance of Heidegger's philosophy is the book, *Dwelling and architecture: From Heidegger to Koolhaas* (2009), by **Pavlos Lefas**. The book provides a thought-provoking introduction to Heidegger's ideas and an even-handed discussion of the ways his thinking has influenced contemporary architecture. While the concept of care is mentioned regularly (2009: 19, 21, 40, 77, 85, 98, 115), Lefas never elaborated it in terms of its ontological significance as the temporal Being of the intentional.

The architectural historian, **Branko Mitrović**, in Chapter 6 (pp. 116-141) of *Philosophy for Architects* (2011) presented a more general approach to the implications of Heidegger's writings for contemporary architectural theory. Mitrović traced the rise of phenomenology from the philosopher Franz Brentano (1938-1917) to his most famous student, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), to the re-interpretation of Husserl's work by his student, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and the further engagement in Heidegger's work that, re-interpreted, gave rise to Hans-Georg Gadamer's (1900-2002) take on hermeneutics.

In terms of Heidegger's influence, Mitrović argued that for phenomenologists, like Heidegger, the "disinterested" search for what "remains present in spite of all change" represents a way of thinking in which "the world becomes dead for us" (2011: 122). Contrary to this position, Heidegger's elaboration of concerned being-in-the-world engages with the interwovenness of existence and context. Mitrović described the concept of care mainly in terms of "one of its manifestations", namely "the care not to be different", and the resulting slide towards conformist "averageness" (2011: 123). Thus he presented

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[52] M. Reza Shirazi proposed that the contemporary 'situation' in architectural phenomenology, instead of standing for a "school", "circle", or "movement", represents a "dialogue" engaged in a "process rather than a product" (2012: 13).

[53] Adam Sharr is currently Professor of Architecture at Newcastle University (Newcastle upon Tyne), and the editor-in-chief of the journal, *arq: Architectural Research Quarterly*.

care as an "exceptionally thoughtfully articulated critique of modern mass society" (2011: 124), which, of course, relates to Norberg-Schulz's arguments for architecture as place-making. However, Mitrović (in his discussion of Norberg-Schulz's contribution on pages 137-140) did not consider the way in which Norberg-Schulz's approach, by engaging time in terms of continuity and change (rather than care), was left exposed to the same 'deadening' search for 'a stability that remains', which Heidegger's phenomenology transcended.

Furthermore, Mitrović (similar to Sharr) limited the "significance" (or appropriateness) of Heidegger's philosophy in "contemporary architectural theory" to BDT. While Mitrović acknowledged that Heidegger's essay reveals the way "the important qualities of a place are the result of human relationships to the place" (2011: 131), he nevertheless neglected the important role that the concept of care (mainly developed prior to BDT), as the being of the intentional, played in this relationship. In a sense it is understandable that Mitrović's lucid and succinct presentation of the 'relevant facts' would shy away from what he described as some of the more "vague" (2011: 128) aspects of Heidegger's work, but this thesis proposes that it is precisely the ontological significance of care that can be used to augment Norberg-Schulz's approach.

Recently, **Mohammadreza Shirazi**'s doctoral thesis, "Architectural Theory and Practice, and the Question of Phenomenology" (2009), has been published (in revised form) under the title *Towards an Articulated Phenomenological Interpretation of Architecture: Phenomenal Phenomenology* (2014). While Shirazi's thesis is not chiefly concerned with the contribution of Norberg-Schulz, but aimed to clarify the contemporary theoretical position held by architectural phenomenology, he did write a section (2009: 53-93) on Norberg-Schulz in which he made harsh claims about Norberg-Schulz's work that should be questioned.

Essentially, Shirazi derided Norberg-Schulz's approach as an "exterior phenomenology" (2009: 92). Shirazi arrived at this conclusion by merely counting and comparing the number of photographs in GL depicting the "interior" and "exterior" of buildings (without specifying how he differentiated between these two categories). He found that the photographs of exteriors far outweigh those depicting interiors (2009: 86), and proclaimed that "Norberg-Schulz's … 'genius loci' [represents a] 'phenomenology from without' [which] rarely knocks on the door and enters the inside" (2009: 83).

However, in terms of a more comprehensive reading, this view is problematic. Norberg-Schulz's various descriptions of the characteristics and significance of the interior as an

"enclosure",[54] which implies that all places are 'insides' (1971: 25), actually presented a sophisticated appreciation of interiority. Shirazi's assertion that "all the explanations of cities and buildings are exterior explanations, and the interior explanations are rare" (2009: 86), neglects the dialogue between interior and exterior implied by Norberg-Schulz.[55] Despite acknowledging Norberg-Schulz's "brilliant interpretation" (2009: 93) of the Tugendhat house as a possible exception, Shirazi failed to acknowledge numerous other instances in which Norberg-Schulz focused on describing the interiors of buildings. His essays, "Alberti's Last Intentions" (1962a), "Borromini and the Bohemian Baroque" (1967a), "Behrens House" (1980b), his discussion of furniture in his essay "The Vision of Paolo Pothoghesi" (1981a), the chapter describing the intimate interiority of the house in COD (1984a: 89-110) and his lecture on "The interior as Imago Mundi" (NAM 9, 25/11/1989) are just some examples that bear witness to the inadequacy of Shirazi's critique.

A much more coherent attempt to understand Norberg-Schulz's contribution is offered by *An Eye For Place. Christian Norberg-Schulz: Architect, Historian and Editor* (2009), edited by **Gro Lauvland**, **Karl Otto Ellefsen** and **Mari Hvattum**. While this book does not aim to provide a holistic formulation of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project, it does collect a range of illuminating essays documenting several interpretations of Norberg-Schulz's contemporary relevance. The majority of the essays included in this collection will be discussed individually in the following section.

3.2 The reception of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution

In a recent essay entitled, "The Critical Reception of Christian Norberg-Schulz's writings on Heidegger and Place" (2013), Rowan Wilken, a senior lecturer at Swinburne University of Technology (Melbourne), who specialises in the influence of new technologies on human interaction with places, catalogued and analysed the way critics responded to Norberg-Schulz's writings in terms of "reception theory" (2013: 341-342). For the most part, Wilken focused on the reception of GL (2013: 340), by referring to a wide range of interpretations by Gunila Jivén & Peter Larkham, Harris Forusz, Jorge Otero-Pailos, Harriet Edquist, Linda Krause, David Seamon, Timothy Gould, and Elie Haddad.[56] He grouped these interpretations under the headings of "The Use of Historical Evidence" (2013: 346-347), "Criticism of the Re-use of Heideggerian Concepts and Terms" (2013:

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[54] Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 19-20, 30-31; 1979b: 23; 1980a: 184.

[55] Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 33; 1971: 25; 1979b: 130; 1981a: 212; 1984a: 26.

[56] The interpretations of these authors will be discussed in the following sections.

348) and "Criticism of Prose and Tone" (2013: 348-349) and then used these critical reactions to explain the reason for Norberg-Schulz's continued relevance in architectural theory, i.e. why his theoretical contribution has remained a matter of contention.

Firstly, Wilken suggested that Norberg-Schulz, as one of the prime examples of an architect who attempted to translate philosophy into architectural theory, represents a "limit case", or "cautionary tale concerning the difficulties and possible pitfalls associated with the incorporation of theory into architecture" (2013: 350). Secondly, Wilken added that the critical engagement with Norberg-Schulz may be emblematic of the debate surrounding "the fate of phenomenology in architecture" (2013: 351); a question also developed by Otero-Pailos and Norwood (see subsection 3.2.3). However, even though translation always implies an act of interpretation, and even though it is difficult to assess the validity of different interpretations, this does not detract from the importance of Norberg-Schulz's contribution. Within the hermeneutic framework, questioning describes the way people engage in the act of understanding. In fact, a theory which elicits many critical responses may merely point to the significance of the region of concern addressed.

In this sense it is indeed, as Wilken pointed out, a "familiar move" to claim that any interpretation of Heidegger is a "misreading of Heidegger" (2013: 351).[57] In Norberg-Schulz's case, this tendency is exacerbated by the volume and scope of his textual contribution, coupled with the subtle shift in his thinking from a reliance on the psychology of perception in *Intentions in Architecture* (IiA) (1963) to the introduction of existential philosophy in *Existence, Space and Architecture* (ESA) (1971) and his subsequent search for a phenomenological approach to architecture, which makes it difficult to clearly express the implications of his work. Add to this the fact that translators sometimes interpreted concepts differently (both Norberg-Schulz's Norwegian and Heidegger's German) and it becomes clear that a comprehensive understanding of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project is elusive. As an example we need look no further than his last book, *Architecture: Presence, Language, Place* (PLP) (2000b), which was first translated from Norwegian to Italian and then from the Italian to English.[58] The translator of PLP (from Italian to English), Antony Shugaar, provided a telling glimpse into this aspect of Norberg-Schulz's work:

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[57] Following Snoddgrass & Coyne's argument (see subsection 2.1.2), it is possible to argue that, within the hermeneutic tradition, the idea of a misinterpretation, is not entirely negative, but merely implies the need for further engagement in the dialogue.

[58] The roundabout way in which PLP was translated is reflected in the various disparities between the words Norberg-Schulz employed (in earlier books) to describe certain concepts and the terms eventually used (see also the introduction to Appendix A).

> Norberg-Schulz's initial message is ... not the easiest sort of reading. He juggles and interweaves architectural concepts with such tropes of nature as waterfalls and caverns, sea sides and mountain tops. He invents terms and assigns meanings and then choreographs his language into parade ground drills, making words mean what he chooses … (from the *note by the translator*, 2000b: 4).

Indeed, Norberg-Schulz's work is characterised by a remarkable 'chiselling' of concepts. For instance, are the "immediate awareness of the phenomenal world" (1963: 27), the "way of life" (1963: 51), the conception of "existential space [as] a psychological concept" (1971: 37), the "life-world" in *Genius Loci* (1979b: 6) and the "world of life ... full of things and events" in PLP (2000b: 19) all variations of the same concept? If not, then how do they differ? Or are they (like Norberg-Schulz described in IiA) "intentional possibilities" that others, guided by their "attitude" (1963: 31-34), must choose between? When approaching this kind of study it is clear that the role of 'language' in Norberg-Schulz's work must be recognised and that the 'incremental development' of these concepts must be excavated. This is a task that demands immersion. Many ideas are restated over the course of Norberg-Schulz's long writing career. The oversimplification of these concepts detracts from his 'nuanced positions' and has, in some case, led to confusion.

Take for instance, Otero-Pailos's assertion that Norberg-Schulz renamed "topologies" (as used in IiA) as "existential spaces" in ESA (2010: 165). In fact, the definition Norberg-Schulz used for 'topology' in IiA (1963: 44) is exactly the same as the definition used in ESA (1971: 18). Otero-Pailos (2010: 173) ventured even further astray, by suggesting that Norberg-Schulz, when writing *Genius Loci* (GL) (1979), began referring to "topologies" (and therefore by extension also the concept of existential space) as "*genius loci*". Yet, the *genius loci*, in Norberg-Schulz's work, denoted a much more general concept. As Bryan Norwood, in his review of Otero-Pailos's book, pointed out:

> Genius loci is not a replacement for existential space, it is one-half of existential space. The focus of schemata in *Intentions* [*in Architecture*] covers the other half ... and topology is merely the more originary half (the other being geometry) of architectural schematization (Norwood, 2011: 5).

But even this 'correction' is insufficient. The influence and implications of terms like '*schemata*' waxes and wanes and embodies different implications in Norberg-Schulz's earlier and later work. In trying to reach a holistic understanding of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution, it is important to acknowledge that Norberg-Schulz incrementally clarified concepts in his writing. The selection of Norberg-Schulz's 'writings' engaged in this study covers almost 40 years of academic involvement. Simultaneously, it must be

pointed out that Norberg-Schulz's belief in systematisation led to a dense gathering of terms and concepts that may seem similar, but can occupy vastly different 'regions' within his theoretical approach.

Consequently, to engage with the nuances of Norberg-Schulz's works and understand them in relation to Heidegger's philosophy, calls for participation in a hermeneutic dialogue that not only tries to understand the reception of his work, or identify 'misreadings', but engages with the horizon-fusing opportunities presented by 'creatively participating' (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 185; Heidegger, 1936a: 75) in Norberg-Schulz's project. Despite the wide influence that Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* has had, his work is, in a fundamental sense (as has already been stated in the introduction to this chapter), both under-appreciated and unquestioned.

3.2.1 Norberg-Schulz and Heidegger

In his essay, "Works and environments: Christian Norberg-Schulz as communicator and participant in the development of Norwegian architecture in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s" (2009), **Karl Otto Ellefsen** sketched a remarkable picture of the wide-ranging influence Norberg-Schulz had as critic, editor, and theorist[59] in Norway:

> [Norberg-Schulz's] position was based on sound theoretical scholarship, an extensive knowledge of international architecture that he systematically maintained, a conscious terminology in a language that made it possible to discuss architecture as an autonomous discipline, his seemingly unstoppable energy, productivity and publishing activities, and his predilection for strong statements and love of debate (Ellefsen, 2009: 116).

Ellefsen limited his discussion of Norberg-Schulz's contributions to the 1950s, '60s and '70s[60] and thereby traced many of the influences that led up to Norberg-Schulz's most prominent interpretations of Heidegger's philosophy, rather than engaging in the persuasiveness of this interpretation. In section 1.1 it was pointed out that scholars like **Robert Mugerauer**, **Pavlos Levas**, and **Gro Lauvland** have acknowledged Norberg-

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[59] In "The Heaven, the Earth and the Optic Array: Norberg-Schulz's Place Phenomenology and its Degree of Operationability" (2008) **Akkelies van Nes**, currently an assistant professor at the Department of Urbanism, TU-Delft, added that Norberg-Schulz played an important role in the preservation of Norway's built heritage, and participated in efforts to create an appreciation for context-sensitive design at local government level (2008: 127-128).

[60] Ellefsen paid particular attention to the numerous essays Norberg-Schulz published in *Byggekunst* (of which many have not been translated into English). Norberg-Schulz was editor of *Byggekunst* from 1963-1978.

Schulz as a thoughtful interpreter of Heidegger's philosophy. However, there have also been many who criticised Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's writings without rejecting outright the possibility of a Heideggarian approach to architecture.

Otero-Pailos claimed that "Norberg-Schulz used Heidegger as a theoretical mask to add philosophical credibility to the visual project of modernism, at the precise moment modernism seemed destined to die" (2010: 176). The American architectural historian, **Linda Krause**, in her review of AMP, expressed the same antagonism towards Norberg-Schulz's approach. Krause asserted that "we are given a series of solemn statements that sound more profound than they are, and are more obtuse than they sound" (1991: 198). She added, sarcastically, that in the writings of Norberg-Schulz it seems as if "only those activities cited by postwar German existentialists and phenomenologists are legitimate" (1991: 197). In "Christian Norberg-Schulz's Phenomenological Project in Architecture" **Elie Haddad** (currently the Dean of the School of Architecture and Design at the Lebanese American University) argued that Norberg-Schulz's engagement with Heidegger's philosophy "did not go beyond the surface, satisfying himself with the later works of Heidegger, without attempting to answer some of the problematic issues raised by its critics" (2010: 98). Furthermore, Haddad asserted that Norberg-Schulz's "desire to translate phenomenological discourse into a tool for the generation of architectural forms that recreate a semblance of meaningful environments" (2010: 98) constituted the greatest weakness of his theoretical contribution.

Aside from the veracity of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation, it must also be asked if Heidegger's thinking is actually appropriate to the field of architecture. In his authoritative *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (1997) the American philosopher, **Edward Casey** (b. 1939), uncovered the "hidden history of place" (1997: xv) in the writings of a wide range of philosophers. His discussion of Heidegger's engagement with the concept of place as the "very scene of Being's disclosure" (1997: 244)—after Heidegger initially suppressed the concept of place in favour of temporality—led him to assert that "the circuitous and digressive character of Heidegger's path over more than four decades should not blind us to the fact that he ends by giving the most suggestive and sustained treatment of place in this century" (Casey, 1997: 284). If architecture is to be considered as a place-making activity, then Heidegger's philosophy offers fertile ground for discussion.

In "Complicating Heidegger and the Truth of Architecture" (2011) the American philosopher, **Travis Anderson**, added his voice in support of the architectural application of Heidegger's writings. Anderson pointed out that architectural beauty 'differs' from the

beauty of other art forms and has "long frustrated philosophical efforts to understand it as an art by using the same criteria applied to other, less elemental or useful creations" (2011: 70). Therefore, Heidegger's discussion, in OWA, of the characteristic shared by all works of art as a "sensuous, thingly nature" (2011: 72), opened the door for a new way of engaging with works of architecture; as something which is "significantly different from both practical things and other works of art" (2011: 78).

Consequently, Anderson proposed that Heidegger's engagement with the concept of thing needs to be 'complicated' (2011: 69) in order to acknowledge the difference between works of architecture and other works of art, and the divergence between 'works' and Heidegger's earlier distinction (in BT) between 'ready to hand' and 'present to hand' things (2011: 72-75). This differentiation led Anderson to conclude that "artworks in general are ontologically prior to both elemental things and practical things [and] that the place and truth of architecture is prior still" (2011: 70).

This thesis aims to engage in the 'ecstatic simultaneity' of the 'life-care-place totality' and, therefore, finds little affinity with what is implied by the 'ontological priority' of different categories of things. However, Andersons's proposal, "that, in consequence of that primordial priority, the truth of architecture, together with all three fundamental divisions of objects in Heidegger's ontology, should be rethought beginning with their (and our) elemental nature" (2011: 70), points to the region of inquiry addressed by this thesis; questioning the architectural implications of the concerned nature of human dwelling.

A few words need to be said in terms of Anderson's discussion of the relationship between care and dwelling. Anderson proposed that Heidegger saw 'dwelling' as a more "basic and habitual" aspect of being-in-the-world than 'care'. In contrast, this thesis argues that something like dwelling is made possible by the concerned being of *Dasein*. Dwelling does not supplant care. Instead, dwelling springs from it. A more comprehensive discussion of the relationship between dwelling and care is offered in subsection 6.6.2.

In the aforegoing it has been shown that, while there are numerous voices in favour of applying Heidegger's philosophy to the design and *poiesis* of works of architecture, and while many view Heidegger's philosophy as a valuable way to engaging with architectural matters, there are also many who criticise Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy. This thesis aims to conduct a more holistic questioning of Norberg-Schulz's engagement with Heidegger's philosophy. While it is argued that Norberg-Schulz neglected a key aspect of Heidegger's works and that this omission had an insidious

ripple effect in his work, it must also be acknowledged that he contributed significantly to the architectural appropriation of Heidegger's writings.

3.2.2 Identity and the concept of place

Norberg-Schulz's conception of place formed part of a much wider (and earlier) dialogue examining the merits of rootedness and human belonging. Important pioneering efforts include the work of the geographers Yi-Fu Tuan (b.1930) and Edward Relph (b. 1944), and the environment-behaviour studies of David Seamon.

Tuan (1971; 1977; 1979) and Relph (1976), while not comprehensively engaging in architectural matters, offer a glimpse into the way other fields (in this case geography) also started acknowledging the concept of place during the 1970s. **Yi-Fu Tuan** was one of the early proponents of understanding any place as "a unique ensemble of traits that merits study in its own right" (1979: 409). Instead of exclusively understanding place in spatial terms, Tuan tried to interpret place as "a reality to be clarified and understood from the perspectives of the people who have given it meaning" (1979: 387).

In *Place and Placelessness* (1976) **Edward Relph** investigated "place as a phenomenon of the geography of the lived-world of our everyday experiences" (1976: 6) and even briefly referred to human "rootedness" in terms of Heidegger's concept of care (1976: 37-39). However, Relph did not try to focus on Heidegger's ontological conceptualisation of ecstatic care, but aimed to present a wide range of perspectives engaging with the concept of place. Furthermore, while often referring to Norberg-Schulz's writings (IiA, MiA and ESA) Relph refrained from engaging critically with Norberg-Schulz's ideas. In view of Heidegger's understanding of care, it can be argued that a future in which "places simply do not matter" (1976: 147), i.e. what Relph described as a situation of 'placelessness'[61] is inconceivable for a 'being of care' and would imply a radical transformation; not only in the way humans relate to their world, but in human nature itself.

David Seamon has also participated in the phenomenological discourse since the 1970s; specifically the relationships between people and their places and how this "larger environmental dynamic … sustains and is sustained by an attachment to and a sense of place" (Seamon, 2007: iii-02). His 'environment-behaviour research' tried to gauge "why places are important to people" by engaging with "the multifaceted ways in which people make attentive contact with their world" (2007: iii-03-04). While Seamon described the

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[61] The same argument can be made in terms of Norberg-Schulz's assertions regarding the "loss of place" (1979b: 189-190).

ways people "encounter" places and how this contributes to their "lived place structure" (2007: iii-11), his work relied more on the work of the French phenomenological philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961)[62] than Heidegger and aimed to engage the way people's bodily interaction within the "space-time routines" of their places—a kind of "place ballet" (Seamon, 1980: 159) encompassing various "body and place choreographies" (1980: 157)—can be analysed in terms of the "lived ability of the body to move intelligently" (2007: iii-07). In questioning the "unquestioned ease" (2007: iii-07) of our bodily engagement with places, Seamon engaged with the hidden richness of our everyday bodily intentionality, without necessarily venturing into Heidegger's 'question of the being of the intentional'.

In the wake of these influential figures, the concept of place and the role it plays in the identity of dwellers has been continuously reinterpreted. In more recent years, the nature of the relationship between the place and the dweller has received widespread attention.

In "Sense of Place, Authenticity and Character: a Commentary" (2003) the urbanists, **Gunila Jivén** and **Peter Larkham**, discussed two fundamental 'confusions' that have incrementally crept into the way design professionals engage with places. They argued that concepts like 'character', '*genius loci*', 'sense of place' and 'appearance' are employed "indiscriminately and interchangeably" (2003: 74). This confusion, sprouting from the uncritical appropriation of 'precise' theoretical concepts (2003: 67-68) has, for instance, led to the idea that "*genius loci* and 'character' can be created through appropriate design and planning" (2003: 74), rather than acknowledging that Norberg-Schulz's formulation of *genius loci* represents a complex reality constituted, according to Jivén & Larkham, by the interaction between "four thematic levels": "the topography of the earth's surface; the cosmological light conditions and the sky as natural conditions; buildings [and the] symbolic and existential meanings in the cultural landscape" (2003: 70). Jivén & Larkham proposed that relying on Norberg-Schulz's more precise terms will mitigate against superficial attempts at fabricating "a sense of place through using elements of historical forms" (2003: 78).

However, despite mentioning Heidegger (2003: 71), Jivén & Larkham never questioned the veracity of Norberg-Schulz's concept of *genius loci* as an interpretation of Heidegger's fourfold. Despite the fact that this oversight undermines their proposal for dealing with this confusion, namely that "designers need to develop more theoretically informed

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[62] Merleau-Ponty was strongly influenced by Heidegger, but aimed to elaborate Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* with a more '(human) body-centered' interpretation of being-in-the-world.

conceptions of sense of place, authenticity and character" (2003: 79), their more precise definition of what is implied by these terms did lead them to question whether something like a *genius loci* can be "created by professional intervention" (2003: 77), or whether "these characteristics emerge from individual and community perception, values and experience" (2003: 74).

Jivén & Larkham proposed that it is the latter which plays the most important role and that recognising the way people and place engage to let the character of the place emerge has confused and obscured the issue of 'authenticity'. While Jivén & Larkham proposed that designs "should be informed to a much greater extent by the views of the people directly involved" (2003: 79), and thereby suggest the need for engaging with the concerned temporal relationship between mortals and places, they ultimately understand this relationship (and the way it gives a voice to the *genius loci*) in terms of the abstract concepts of continuity and change. In this sense their call for a "broad interpretation of authenticity that would allow for an evolutionary process of change in urban and architectural form" (2003: 78) neglects the very relationships of concern that make authentic *poiesis*, as 'a form of making inspired by the life of the place', possible.

The art of care proposes that the way people relate to places and the creative participation of people in places must be understood in terms of the ecstatic nature of care. This approach suggests re-evaluating what is implied by Norberg-Schulz's formulation of the *genius loci* in terms of Heidegger's fourfold.

This need to re-evaluate the nature of the *genius loci* in terms of the lived situation is echoed in "The Place is not a Post-Card: The Problem of *Genius Loci*" (2009) by the Mexican born architectural theorist, **Alberto Pérez-Gómez** (b. 1949). In this article Pérez-Gómez discussed the contemporary implications of *genius loci*. Despite mentioning the initial (positive) influence Norberg-Schulz had on him (2009: 26-27), he ultimately concluded that Norberg-Schulz's attempts to systematically identify certain 'qualities' on abstract 'levels', in order to create meaningful places were "delusional" (2009: 33).

In contrast, Pérez-Gómez argued that "[h]istory and 'context' are never simply given like unchanging objects" (2009: 29). Instead, history should be understood as "our full inheritance" and context should be interpreted as a "situation". In this sense, history becomes interwoven with our "own desires" and context emerges as the situational "world of the work" (2009: 28-29). By understanding context and history in such a dynamic and holistic way, it becomes clear that "tradition" cannot be explained in terms of the "development of architecture as progressive organic change", but should rather be seen

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as "the work of enlightened individuals whose highly personal and imaginative synthesis were never 'contextual' in the modern narrow sense of the word", but the "result of the individual architect's broad and deep cultural roots in his/her own space/time" (2009: 30). Thus architecture represents a "work of the ethical imagination" (2009: 31), rooted in "the architect's responsible, personal imagination, through compassion for the other, as a project for the common good" (Pérez-Gómez, 2009: 34).

While Pérez-Gómez, did not refer to the ontological significance of the concept of care,[63] his critique of Norberg-Schulz points in the same direction indicated by this thesis. However, instead of seeing Norberg-Schulz's project as 'delusional', this thesis proposes that the way toward understanding the potential poetic responses of those who are resolutely open to their world and intimately immersed in their situations, lies dormant in Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* and can be revealed by referring to Heidegger's ontological elaboration of the concept of care.

The relationship between the identity of the place and the identity of the dweller has been rendered contentious by its political overtones. In "The Spirit of Place in a Multicultural Society" the Norwegian architect, **Ole Møystad**, systematically illustrated the contradiction between Norberg-Schulz's formulation of the correspondence between human identity and place identity and the realities of our "increasingly multicultural and mobile society" (2005: par. 44). While Møystad proficiently described this contradiction in Norberg-Schulz's work, he did not offer any significant solutions or proposals. Møystad's contribution is discussed more comprehensively in subsection 6.4.8, but essentially he is also troubled by the omission identified by **Branko Mitrović**: "Norberg-Schulz never explains what happens with the individuals who attempt to live outside the locality with which they are identified, but we are left certain that his is not a particularly cosmopolitan worldview" (Mitrović, 2011: 141).

In the past, the concept of place has played a mixed role in this regard. It has certainly (both as a physical and mentally constructed entity) played its part in the history of human conflict.[64] However, **Jeff Malpas**[65] has argued that place is not necessarily the root of these conflicts. Instead, he proposed that "[i]t is not the focus on place that turns out to be

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[63] Pérez-Gómez (2008) has formulated his own interpretation of the relationship between the place and dwellers as one which is, to use the title of his book, *Built upon Love* (2008) (see section 3.3).

[64] Møystad's essay referred to several 'place conflicts' that happened while Norberg-Schulz formulated his theory of place, and commented on his silence in this regard.

[65] The influence of Malpas is also discussed in subsections 6.3.6, 6.3.7, 6.4.2, 6.4.8, and 6.6.6.

politically problematic, … but rather the tendency to view the human as completely determined by something that is internal to it and prior to its worldly engagement (whether that be in terms of race, 'soul,' or some other notion)" (Malpas, 2012: 154-155). Norberg-Schulz's belief, that "human identity presupposes the identity of place" (1979b: 22), therefore mitigated against the politically problematic aspects Malpas identified, by rooting human identity within a context instead of some 'internal characteristic'. However, Norberg-Schulz went one step further by aiming to completely de-politicise the concept of place. Norberg-Schulz believed that "politics is usually very superficial" (Norberg-Schulz in Frampton, Harries and Norberg-Schulz, 1989: 68) and that "political and economical changes—not to say revolutions—do not help" (1979a: 11).

The influence of political forceson the potential of Norberg-Schulz's approach to create place identity was pondered by the Czech cultural historian, **Vladimír Czumalo** (b. 1954). In "Architecture and Identity" (2012) Czumalo revisited some of the claims Norberg-Schulz made about Prague in GL. Norberg-Schulz wrote that residents of the new neighbourhoods "go to old Prague to get a confirmation of their identity" (1979b: 109). This implies that "historical buildings take on the role of symbolic figures on which cultural memory is founded, and contact with them is an act of ritual communication" (Czumalo, 2012: 48). Czumalo pointed out that, in the years following Czech independence, "architecture has not been a topic of interest to the political class" (2012: 52). This lack of interest has been reflected in the fact that the new 'identity of the place' has not been represented in works of architecture and, consequently, "historic architecture has been entrusted with many functions normally performed by new buildings which are specially built for such purposes" (2012: 50).

Instead of seeing this situation as an illustration of the inability of works of architecture to 'keep' a particular identity, Czumalo proposed that buildings cannot be expected to fulfill their memorialising function independently. Czumalo concluded: "We have the right to expect architecture to create an environment in which we can find our collective identity. However, we cannot blame architecture for loss of identity, or demand that the state create it for us. This is what architecture cannot do by itself" (2012: 52).

The reality is that buildings and people form part of a reciprocal relationship in which the shared identity of the place is continuously appropriated and re-appropriated as a region of concern, by a being of care. If one reads Norberg-Schulz carefully, then it is not only that the buildings of Prague possess a 'fixed identity', but that people 'confirm' an identity which they always already presuppose amid their relationship with the place. Contrary to Norberg-Schulz's search for a 'stability', which could endure amid changes, a more

humane approach would question the Moment[66] in which *Dasein* ecstatically reaches beyond the known parameters to re-envision the place as it could be. In this way it may become possible to formulate a more robust understanding of the relationship between identity of place and identity of dwellers, by questioning the concept of identity and the concept of place in terms of the being of the intentional (see subsections 4.4.8, 5.5.7, and 6.4.8).

While Norberg-Schulz tried to understand the relationship between dweller and place in terms of continuity and change, the British architect, **Richard Weston** (b. 1953), questioned the legitimacy of this approach. In his interpretation of Jørn Utzon's houses on the island of Majorca, two buildings which were also used by Norberg-Schulz to illustrate the relationship between place and dwellers, Weston pointed out that this relationship is more "messy" than merely invoking "a quality that inheres in specific locations" (Weston, 2003: 112-113). Weston's interpretation is discussed more comprehensively in subsection 6.7.3, but the important realisation is that dwellers and place always already engage in a concerned regioning interaction, which suggests that architects need to re-interpret the concept of place in terms of human care.

One attempt to architecturally engage with the concept of care was presented by the Italian philosopher, **Silvano Petrosino**. In "Building and Caring: The Implacable Challenge of Dwelling" (2008) Petrosino discussed the twofold nature of Heideggerian care in terms of dwelling: firstly, "dwelling as care" (2008: 128) refers to *Dasein*'s 'elusive' way of being that is always already "dwelled in by what assails [us], by the anxiety of an excess/otherness that [we are] quite incapable of numbering, ordering and placing under control" (2008: 129). Against this form of "cherishing", Petrosino posited "care as dwelling", referring to *Dasein*'s interactive creative translation (*poiesis*), or "cultivating" (2008: 128). However, Petrosino hardly engaged with the temporal implications Heidegger ascribed to care and did not engage with Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution.[67]

This thesis proposes that the concept of place can most appropriately be engaged as a 'region of concern'. While the concept was originally derived from the concerned way people engage with their environments as reciprocal regioning (see subsection 6.4.2), it is evidently related to the understanding of place, formulated by **Tuan**, as a "field of care" (Tuan, 1977: 164). The difference is that Tuan's conception of 'fields of care' places much greater emphasis on 'experiential' or 'sensory' aspects. Tuan located the possibility for

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[66] See Glossary: Moment.

[67] Petrosino's article is also discussed in subsection 6.7.1.

fields of care in the way people "know a place subconsciously, through touch and remembered fragrances, unaided by the discriminating eye" (Tuan, 1979: 411). In contrast to this formulation, the concept of 'region of concern' proposed by this thesis, is sceptical about the trustworthiness of what 'lived experience' has become (amid the *Gestell* of modern technology) and seeks a way towards a 'humanistic perspective' based on Heidegger's ontological exposition of the concept of care.

3.2.3 Norberg-Schulz and the certainty of visual perception

Recently, there have been attempts, most notably by **Otero-Pailos**, to portray Norberg-Schulz as a proponent of "visual diagramming" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: xxix). Otero-Pailos focused on analysing Norberg-Schulz's method of graphic representation, especially the moments of intersection between his theory and the photographs he took to 'illustrate' this theory. Otero-Pailos argued that "Norberg-Schulz passed off his photographs as universally valid visions of a timeless natural order that modern architects were invited to return to, in order to escape history" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 146). Consequently, "Norberg-Schulz's 'spirit of place' was less a path to preserving 'rooted building' than an expeditious aesthetic enabling multinational corporate architecture firms to compete with local architects" (2010: 23-24). The reason Otero-Pailos blamed Norberg-Schulz's theory for this tendency was that "the theory of genius loci created a place of exception where modern architects could appear tolerant of all historical cultures while acting out their prejudice against theories of history that demanded practice to be historically accountable" (2010: 181).

Otero-Pailos's claims were elaborated by the Flemish writer, **Christophe Van Gerrewey**. In "Christian Norberg-Schulz (1926-2000): Architecture Protected by Phenomenology" (2012), Van Gerrewey provocatively singled out one of the unquestioned moments depicted in Otero-Pailos's book, a photograph (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 160) of Norberg-Schulz standing—"hands stretched out towards the sky, as if he is about to receive someone or something" (Van Gerreway, 2012: 29)—on the platform crowning Bofill's Pyramid monument at Le Perthus (France). Van Gerrewey pointed to Norberg-Schulz's flattering description of this place as a "historical moment [which] tells us what being in the world implies" (Norberg-Schulz, 1986b: 220), and argued that the photograph depicts a moment in which Norberg-Schulz "without any shred of embarrassment or irony, [was] trying to feel the *genius loci*, the spirit of the place" (2012: 33).

While Van Gerrewey seems empathetic to Norberg-Schulz's attempts to engage with the place, he questioned the "completely systematic nature of [Norberg-Schulz's] writings, and

… the idealist, utopian and healing powers he [ascribed] to architecture" (2012: 33-34). It is the attempt at "systematic clarification" of the "individual experience of the … beholder of architecture" (2012: 35) that led Norberg-Schulz to "neglect obstinate phenomena" that do not fit in with his 'picture' of the experience (Van Gerrewey, 2012: 38). This is where Van Gerrewey finds common ground with Otero-Pailos, because this 'neglect' implies that Norberg-Schulz had "cunningly chosen" those images which "exclude or replace historic and contemporary phenomena" in order to clearly present "existential meanings" (Van Gerrewey, 2012: 41).

Returning to the Pyramid, Van Gerreway used pictures showing the everydayness of the bordering highway, roadside restaurant and customs office (all of which are 'creatively absent' in Norberg-Schulz's photos), to illustrate just how much of the historical reality Norberg-Schulz "did not *want* to see" (2012: 43). In this sense, Norberg-Schulz's interpretation needed to exclude the very place (in all its messy unfathomableness) he claimed architecture had to reveal. In contrast to Norberg-Schulz's exclusionary tactics Van Gerrewey proposed that our appreciation of architecture needs to engage with the "full situation" (2012: 45). Ultimately, Van Gerrewey reached the surprising conclusion that Norberg-Schulz tried to "protect architecture from the real world", because he "did not *believe* enough in the power of it" (2012: 45). The man standing on top of the pyramid, arms open towards the sky, was selectively envisioning a more conducive (albeit general) set of circumstances in order to 'protect architecture'.

Rowan Wilken also engaged in this line of critique, by referring to two images Norberg-Schulz used to illustrate "visual chaos" in Norway (1979b: 188) and the U.S.A (1979b: 190). Wilken argued that "images that are used in support of Norberg-Schulz's thesis can also be (re) read against the grain, so to speak, to offer different interpretations, different 'receptions'" (2013: 346). While Norberg-Schulz's choice of images certainly displays the "numerous cultural and aesthetic assumptions and prejudices that inform these choices and visual preferences" (Wilken, 2013: 346), it is proposed that, instead of superficially characterising Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project as one built on "visual perceptual" and "pattern recognition" (Otero-Pailos, 2006: 15), it is more revealing to question the way in which the misleading choice (presented by Norberg-Schulz) between 'chaos' and 'monotony' rests on a more fundamental misinterpretation of the nature of Heidegger's fourfold (subsection 6.8.2).

While the works of Otero-Pailos, Van Gerrewey and Wilken revealed the incongruity between Norberg-Schulz's photographic images, as "timeless mechanisms" (Van Gerreway, 2012: 37), and the complex happening of the historical reality depicted in these

images, they do not engage persuasively with the way Norberg-Schulz claimed to understand time as the progress of continuity and change. For all its shortcomings (discussed in subsection 3.1.2), Otero-Pailos's book represents a valuable contribution in that it reveals the "historic visual context" (2010: 251) underpinning Norberg-Schulz's writings. However, to reduce Norberg-Schulz's theoretical position to a search for visual patterns neglects the fact that the 'image' Norberg-Schulz had in mind "does not depict a situation, but if anything interprets it" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 221) and that he believed that "a picture is not necessarily an image".[68] Ultimately, Otero-Pailos created his own 'world picture' through which he tried to recast Norberg-Schulz's contribution.

This view is corroborated by **Bryan Norwood**. In his review of Otero-Pailos's book, Norwood argued that "Otero-Pailos's reduction of [Norberg-Schulz's] argument to a simple plea for copying the natural order in a concretized, man-made environment misses the double relativity to man and world that Norberg-Schulz [set] up" (2011: 5). In contrast to Norwood's description of this 'double relativity' as an interaction between "subjective schemata" and the "independent genius loci" (2011: 4-5), this thesis investigates the ontological nature of the interaction as a relationship of care between mortals and regions of concern; between art of place and art of care. As such, the art of care, which is derived from the temporal historicity Heidegger ascribed to *Dasein*'s existence, represents an appropriate alternative, against which Norberg-Schulz's conception of time (as continuity and change) can be interrogated.

Otero-Pailos went in search of the 'visual underpinnings' of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project to expose "a universal and ahistorical subject who learned through picturing, irrespective of the local topography he or she confronted" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 179). It has been argued that this represents a misreading[69] which neglected the way Norberg-Schulz saw place, not as a 'lived picture', but an intimate "totality" of belonging.[70] Even though Norberg-Schulz's understanding of the nature of this totality shifted throughout his career (as in any hermeneutic dialogue), to reduce the art of place to a matter of perception is to

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[68] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 6, manuscript, "Learning from the past: the architectural image", 1981: 5.

[69] In a letter addressed to Frances Lincoln of Studio Vista Limited (the company which first published ESA in Great Britain), Norberg-Schulz mentioned that "I would like to have the pictures of modern (contemporary) buildings large, to make the book look 'up to date'. In general the illustrations have the same importance, and I leave the layout to your intelligent designer" (NAM 1, letter from Norberg-Schulz to Frances Lincoln, 06/06/1970). These are hardly the words of one 'obsessed' with creating "a pure, original aesthetic" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 182) or a "masterfully arranged photo-essay" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 166).

[70] Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 34; 1971: 99; 1979b: 18-19; 1984b: 166; 2000a: 13.

disregard Norberg-Schulz's calls for respecting the place, his deep appreciation for architecture's ability to "*praise existence*" (1979b: 185) and the way he understood the architectural image.[71] Norberg-Schulz was always on the way to appreciating architecture as *livskunst*; not as a "visual project" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 176), but as an "existential foothold" edifying the "total man-place relationship" (1979b: 19). However, Otero-Pailos's critique links with another important study that questioned the nature of Norberg-Schulz's engagement with the 'subject' inhabiting and building works of architecture.

3.2.4 Norberg-Schulz and the subject

One of the most informative studies dealing with the shortcomings of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution was conducted by the American architect, **David Wang** (b. 1954). In his doctoral dissertation, "A Cognitive-Aesthetic Theory of Dwelling" (1997), Wang presented an interpretation of Kant's aesthetic philosophy that tried to "[explain] why people feel a 'sense of place' and how [this] explanation [can] be more robust than the [phenomenological] theory put forth by … Christian Norberg-Schulz" (Groat & Wang; 2002: 62). Wang aimed to "[develop] a more robust theory of dwelling" by studying the "positive-subjective feelings of attachment to physical environments" (1997: 1) usually associated with dwelling. He based his 'Cognitive Aesthetic Theory' on three claims:

3.2.4.1 Wang's first claim

Firstly, Wang claimed that the "positive-subjective feelings of attachment to physical places are rooted in the operations of the experiencing subject" (Wang, 1997: 1). Wang accused Norberg-Schulz of neglecting the "human subjective condition" (Wang, 1997: 166) because he "[assumed] that the material-physical environment is the primary instrumental factor in the generation of positive subjective feelings" (Wang, 1997: 146). Wang argued that this assumption makes it seem as if "physical forms can guarantee dwelling" (Wang, 1997: 166) and left the "experiencing subject" empty, or "vacant" (1997:

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[71] See subsection 4.5.1 for a discussion of Norberg-Schulz's differentiation between 'ideal' and 'immanent' images, and his non-representational understanding of the image derived from Gadamer.

1-2).[72] In his study Wang proposed a "subject-based, as opposed to an object-centered, theory of dwelling" (1997: 359).

3.2.4.2 Wang's second claim

Claim 2 suggested that the "Critical Philosophy" of the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), could provide a more robust "way by which positive-subjective feelings of belonging to physical places may be explained" (Wang, 1997: 5). By focusing on the Kantian understanding of the "internal workings of the cognitive apparatus" (Wang, 1997: 126), Wang aimed to arrive at "an objective reading of [dwelling]" (Wang, 1997: 124). The core of his argument hinged on the Kantian (according to Wang) assumption that "aesthetic pleasure is the source of the positive-subjective feelings of attachment to physical environments [which constitutes human dwelling]" (Wang, 1997: 8).

Wang tried to unite this conception of the 'pleasure of dwelling' with Heidegger's thought, by referring to a comment made by one of Heidegger's translators, David F. Krell, in his introduction to "Building Dwelling Thinking": "*Wohnen* means to reside or stay, to dwell at peace, to be content; it is related to words that mean to grow accustomed to, or feel at home in, a place. It is also tied to the German word for 'delight,' *Wonne*" (2008: 345).

While there is a linguistic connection between 'dwelling' and 'delight', 'residing', 'contentment', and 'peace', the choice to connect 'dwelling' primarily with 'pleasure' seems superficial when compared to the sophistication of Heidegger's formulation of '*Dasein* as care' (*Sorge*). For instance, Heidegger's discussion of the "Black Forest farmhouse" not only referred to the 'pleasurable aspects' of "community table" and "childbed", but also to a "coffin" (Heidegger, 1951a: 158). *Sorge* can accommodate this duality between the (pleasurable) things we 'care for' and our 'cares', while 'pleasure', as the motivating force behind dwelling, seems one-dimensional at best.

However, could it not be argued that our understanding of pleasure itself is superficial? In *How Pleasure Works* (2010) **Paul Bloom**, professor of Psychology at Yale University, presented the latest psychological research on human pleasure. Bloom argued that pleasure is indeed "deep", but for different reasons than those propagated by Wang. Bloom asserted that our enjoyment "derives from what we think [something] is", rather

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[72] This critique of Norberg-Schulz's work is related to the question of Norberg-Schulz's view on the relationship between dweller and place (see subsection 3.2.2). Mitrović added that "it remains unclear whose meanings Norberg-Schulz is reporting" (2011: 140). Norberg-Schulz's preference for discussing epoch-defining 'stabilities' (like the 'spirit of the place', or the 'spirit (space concept) of the time'), rather than individual concerns, is symptomatic of his focus on the abstract relation between continuity and change, instead of Heidegger's formulation of 'ecstatic care'.

than how things "appear to our senses" (Bloom, 2010: xii). To focus on "aesthetic pleasure" solely as a response to our "universal cognitive apparatus" denies the fact that we cannot trust our senses, due to the importance of what we believe about our circumstances. We care about things and their "histories" (Bloom, 2010: 209). In any case, Wang's focus on 'aesthetic pleasure' is far removed from Heidegger's conception of our intimately entangled "being-in-the-world". Heidegger said as much in the "Epilogue" to his 1935 lecture "The Origin of the Work of Art":

> Aesthetics takes the work of art as an object, the object of *aisthesis*, of sensuous apprehension in the [wide] sense. Today we call this apprehension [lived] experience. The way in which man experiences art is supposed to give information about its essence. [Lived experience] is the source that is standard not only for art appreciation and enjoyment, but also for artistic creation. Everything is an experience. Yet perhaps [lived] experience is the element in which art dies. The dying occurs so slowly that it takes a few centuries (Heidegger, 1936a: 77).

In *The Ethical Function of Architecture* (1997) **Karsten Harries** mirrored the above-mentioned concerns by stating that the aesthetic approach represents a type of "distanced beholding" (1997: 17) that frees us from our "usual cares and concerns" (Harries, 1997: 19). Harries argued that "aesthetic perfection" will not lead us to a broader conception of dwelling (as Wang claims), but "renders talk of the requirements of dwelling … simply irrelevant" (1997: 24).

3.2.4.3 Wang's third claim

The criticism levelled at Wang's second claim also applies to his third claim. Wang proposed that it is the "universality of pleasure, and the reason for it (membership in nature), that must be seen as the source of the quest for dwelling" (1997: 192). It is this "quest for dwelling" that serves as the "motivating force behind all of architecture" (Wang, 1997: 360). Wang's third claim is therefore even more deeply embedded in the aesthetic considerations dismissed in subsection 3.2.4.2.

3.2.4.4 Similarities and differences between this thesis and Wang's thesis

This thesis also engages critically with Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of the human subject, but in a fundamentally different way; Wang proposed a solution outside the H:N-S dialogue, while this thesis remains within that dialogue and investigates the ontological implications of Heidegger's formulation of *Dasein* as care. The fact that this approach is rooted in the H:N-S dialogue safeguards the possibility of augmenting Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* in terms of the art of care.

Furthermore, while Wang focused on the 'positive-subjective feelings of belonging' as the 'basis for dwelling', this thesis interprets Heidegger's formulation of dwelling in terms of care and argues that this conception of *Dasein* represents a more authentic 'dweller' than Wang's formulation of 'subjects' in need of aesthetic pleasure. Finally, it should be noted that Wang's dissertation was submitted before Norberg-Schulz's final book (PLP) was published (2000b). Therefore Wang could not assess whether Norberg-Schulz (during the last phase of his work) addressed the aspects Wang blamed for the separation between architectural and philosophical phenomenology.

This thesis questions the 'primacy of experience' by studying the Being of the intentional, rather than engaging in the supposed 'visual tendencies' of Norberg-Schulz's books, or by reverting to other interpretations (outside the H:N-S dialogue) of human cognition. To frame the question of dwelling in terms of the pleasure a perceiving subject derives from an aesthetic object, rather than concerned being-in-the-world, is to neglect the attentive reciprocity implied by Heidegger's concept of care.

3.2.5 Norberg-Schulz and history

Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world radically re-envisioned the relationship between *Dasein* and history as "historicity" (1927a: 385-397). Historicity engages with history in terms of *Dasein* as ecstatic care, rather than with any "sequence of events" (Polt, 1999: 103); the difference between time as a "timeline" and time as "temporality" (Polt, 1999: 106). By acknowledging *Dasein*'s historicity—the realisation that the being of care can itself have a history because it is temporal (1927a: 376)—this thesis fundamentally questions Norberg-Schulz's approach to history.

Norberg-Schulz's books on *Baroque Architecture* (first published in Italian in 1971), *Late Baroque and Rococo Architecture* (first published in Italian in 1972) and his sweeping *Meaning in Western Architecture* (which meanders from the pyramids to 'Pluralism'), bear testament to the scope of his study of architectural history. However, in recent years, Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of history has been met by an upwelling of critique.

Otero-Pailos's critique of (what he interpreted as) the way Norberg-Schulz "theorized the history of architecture as the recurrence of visual patterns" (2010: 146), thereby "stripping architecture's origin of all historic ground" (2010: 182), and "[opening] historical buildings (modern or otherwise) to the designer in a non-historical way" (2010: 176), is discussed in subsection 3.2.3. Others have also voiced their uneasiness over Norberg-Schulz's engagement with architectural history.

The Norwegian architect, **Mari Hvattum**, proposed that Norberg-Schulz's "history writing did not set out to account for past events. Rather, it sought to capture hidden principles of development; principles that would allow past, present and future to be understood with greater clarity" (2009: 108). This sentiment was echoed by **Branko Mitrović**, who argued that Norberg-Schulz engaged in the writing of architectural history in order "to write about the meaning of architectural works" (2011: 139).

One possible explanation for Norberg-Schulz's "negation of history" was offered by the Norwegian architect, **Thordis Arrhenius**. Arrhenius proposed that this 'negation' was built on the assumption that "there is a permanence about meaning which would allow a trans-historical access to the meanings of previous periods" (2009: 105). Another instance of this line of critique is offered by **Clarence Burton Sheffield** in his review of Norberg-Schulz's book, NL (1993). Sheffield argued that the book's conclusions "insofar as it renounces time in favour of place and 'qualitative identity,' … seek to be transhistorical" (1998: 151). Sheffield pointed out the problematic nature of this "one-sided" approach in the light of the "indispensable importance of time and the temporal mode in both Heidegger (*Being and Time*, 1927) and Giedion (*Space, Time and Architecture*, 1941)" (1998: 153-154, note 5), but did not differentiate between the two approaches.

Within the wider arc of Norberg-Schulz's theorising presented here, it can be argued that, while Norberg-Schulz's conclusions in NL aim to be 'transhistorical', he did not neglect *both* Heidegger and Giedion's understanding of time. Instead (and particularly in NL and PLP) he was attempting to develop Giedion's conception of time into an understanding that unifies continuity and change. His reliance on Giedion's understanding of time led him to neglect Heidegger's understanding of *Dasein*'s temporal existence.

While these authors identify the strange denial of history which characterises Norberg-Schulz's work, they failed to question the ontological assumptions that underpinned the way Norberg-Schulz understood history (and time) as continuity and change. This process of questioning represents the core task of this thesis. A discussion of the influence continuity and change had on Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project, and the influence an understanding of time as ecstatic care could have on his project, is a key theme of Chapter 6 (subsection 6.3.10 engages with the specific challenges presented by Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of history). Fundamental to the way Norberg-Schulz engaged with history is the way he understood time.

3.2.6 Dwelling and time

In *The Ethical Function of Architecture* (1997) **Karsten Harries** asserted that it is essential for architects to acknowledge that "time is as intimately involved in our experience of architecture as space" (1997: 223). In "Space, Place, Memory and Imagination: the Temporal Dimension of Existential Space" (2007) the Finnish architect and theorist, **Juhani Pallasmaa** (b. 1936), tried to address what Harries described as the need for architecture to safeguard *Dasein* from the "terror of time" (1997: 226). In his essay, Pallasmaa pointed out that "our existential and lived reality is a thick, layered and constantly oscillating condition". In the same way that architects aim to turn "limitless space" into "distinct places of human significance", they must also "make endless time tolerable by giving duration its human measure" (Pallasmaa, 2007: 189).

As a way towards reaching this goal, Pallasmaa (appropriating Merleau-Ponty's statement regarding Cēzanne's paintings)[73] proposed that "the task of architecture" is to "make visible how the world touches us" (2007: 193). Pallasmaa thereby pointed to the region of questioning that lies at the heart of this thesis. Why is it easier for architects to think in terms of the "material existence" of architecture, instead of the "life and human situation that take place" there? (2007: 190). While Pallasmaa looked for this "human measure" in our "recollections [as] situational and spatialized memories" (2007: 192)[74], this thesis engages the problem by concentrating on the concerned relationship between the 'being of the intentional' and its situational world.

Yi-Fu Tuan also alluded to the importance of the interaction between time and place.[75] For instance, he suggested that place may be nothing more than "pauses" experienced as

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[73] Pallasmaa, like Seamon, prefers the work of Merleau-Ponty to Heidegger, and focuses on the bodily experience of places, rather than the question of Being itself. In an interview with Peter Mackeith, Pallasmaa asserted that "Merleau-Ponty is free of the cultural conservatism I sense in Heidegger's perspective; the Black Forest hut of Heidegger directs architecture backwards, I think, whereas Merleau-Ponty points my thoughts forward" (2005: 18).

[74] In other essays, like "Melancholy and Time" (1995), and "Hapticity and Time" (2000), Pallasmaa also tried to engage with time. His proposals include a reliance on the human imagination, as "our mind's capacity to transcend the actuality of time" (1995: 311), reverting to "slowness" (1995: 319), and the acknowledgement of the "multi-sensory" nature of our experiences (2000: 322). While Pallasmaa's ideas on the interactions between time and architecture, especially his ideas about "fragile architecture" (2000: 327-330), are illuminating, he did not engage significantly in the H:N-S dialogue. It is interesting to note that Heidegger contrasted the idea of recognising the "frailties of things" with the making of "calculated objects" (1946: 127). This differentiation is discussed in subsection 6.4.4 and section 6.9.

[75] See, for instance, Tuan's chapter entitled "Time and Place" in *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (1977: 179-198).

an "image of place" (Tuan, 1977: 161). However, Tuan did not engage in the H:N-S dialogue and even when speaking of "fields of care" he mainly engaged with the idea that "time is needed to accumulate experience and build up care" (1979: 421), rather than interpreting the ontological significance of "temporality … as the meaning of authentic care" (Heidegger, 1927a: 326). In fact, the way Norberg-Schulz understood time (as continuity and change) has rarely been questioned. The only instance where this matter has been investigated appears to be a recent (2012) essay by the Norwegian architect, **Gro Lauvland**.[76]

In this essay, "The 'Recurrence' of the Baroque in Architecture: Giedion and Norberg-Schulz's Different Approaches to Constancy and Change" (2012), Lauvland displayed her comprehensive grasp of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution by alluding to the deep significance of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Giedion's understanding of continuity and change. Lauvland argued that "the whole place theory [may] be regarded as an effort to delve deeper into and solve the problems that Giedion merely identified through his focus on the relationship between 'constancy and change'" (2012: 432). Furthermore, Lauvland proposed that Norberg-Schulz sought to re-interpret this relationship in terms of his phenomenological appreciation for dweller's "historical being" (2012: 429).[77] Lauvland revealed the way Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* spans two interpretations (or "themes") of continuity and change: "The first theme, based on experience and reading, deals with the historicity of architecture, changes in architectural praxis over time. The second is based on philosophical phenomenology, and has to do with what characterizes our presence as human beings; what is constant in the relation between man and the environment" (2012: 433). Thereby Norberg-Schulz "[made] it evident that a phenomenological approach can open out on to a new understanding of place and architecture in which what is changing and what is constant are combined on a basis of architectural attentiveness that includes the experiences of living and building" (2012: 433).

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[76] The relationship between Giedion's notion of continuity and change, and Norberg-Schulz's appropriation of this idea, is also pointed out by Van Nes (2008: 114), but not studied or questioned to any significant extent. Ellefsen pointed out the importance of Giedion's writings as a "programme for Norberg-Schulz's work" (2009: 122), but did not focus on the concept of continuity and change.

[77] Lauvland also made this point in an earlier essay (2009: 38-39), in which she pointed out that Norberg-Schulz's attempts to re-interpret continuity and change in terms of 'historical being' led to certain 'tensions' between "a pre-modern understanding of *what is given us* and a modern understanding of man as historical being" (2009: 37). It is the nature of this 'modern understanding' that is being questioned here.

In the context of this study it is important to point out that Lauvland recognised the fundamental "attentiveness" (2012: 430, 432, 433) needed to meaningfully engage with the place. However, despite mentioning *Dasein*'s 'historicity', Lauvland did not engage with the temporal implications Heidegger ascribed to concerned being-in-the-world. Thus the main discrepancy between continuity and change and ecstatic care remains intact.

Lauvland is less concerned with the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger than with developing his work in terms of other thinkers. In "Place and the Importance of Praxis" (2009)[78] Lauvland turned to the work of Heidegger's influential former student, Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), and the Danish philsosopher, Knud E. Løgstrup (1905-1981), to formulate a more nuanced view of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution (Lauvland, 2009: 39-42). Therefore, while Lauvland admirably illustrates the central position of continuity and change in Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project, and while she points to the ways Norberg-Schulz tried to re-interpret this concept, she did not question the metaphysical underpinnings of this endeavour, or whether it contributes or detracts from the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's architectural translation of Heidegger's philosophy.

3.2.7 Norberg-Schulz and the metaphysics of constant presence

In order to establish the difference between understanding time as continuity and change and Heidegger's formulation of human temporality, and in order to investigate the architectural implications of understanding temporality as ecstatic care, this thesis engages with Heidegger's discussion of the 'metaphysics of constant presence'[79] and questions the metaphysical assumptions underpinning Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*. There have been others who have also tried to engage with the metaphysical divergence between Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz's approaches.

Otero-Pailos relied on Heidegger's discussion of metaphysics in his essay, "The Age of the World Picture" (1938c), in order to criticise the way Norberg-Schulz "simultaneously [associated] the clarity of his verbal arguments with the ability to turn them into images

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[78] This article "sketches the conclusions of [her 2007] Ph.D.-thesis … *Verk og vilkår. Christian Norberg-Schulz' stedsteori i et arkitekturfilosofisk perspektiv* [Works and conditions. Christian Norberg-Schulz's theory of place seen from the perspective of a philosophy of architecture.]" (Lauvland, 2009: 43).

[79] Heidegger's critique of metaphysics was re-interpreted and questioned by Jacques Derrida in terms of what he called the "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida, 1967: 167). While Derrida's work is certainly pertinent to the arguments presented in this thesis, I have chosen to focus on Heidegger's initial enquiry as developed in *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935). See Glossary: Metaphysics.

and defend Heidegger, who offered a powerful critique of the picture as modernity's dominant intellectual paradigm" (2010: 169). While Otero-Pailos pointed to Norberg-Schulz's tendency to understand "topologies as timeless, invariant, and invisible source codes for all meaning in architecture" (2010: 173), thereby engaging with the restriction of Being in terms of "seeming" (Heidegger, 1935: 75/103), he failed to trace the a-temporal nature of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project to the more fundamental restriction of Being in terms of "becoming" (Heidegger, 1935: 73/100).

Both Otero-Pailos and **Norwood** are critical of the metaphysical implications sprouting from the role ascribed to "experience" (Norwood, 2011: 7; Otero-Pailos, 2010: 262) in architectural phenomenology. By assuming the "subject who experiences architecture", architectural phenomenology has resuscitated the subject-object dichotomy, rather than engaging in the total relationship Heidegger described as being-in-the-world. The result is that architectural phenomenology is still under the sway of the metaphysics of constant presence (Norwood, 2011: 7).

Instead of focusing on the methods of graphic presentation used by Norberg-Schulz (like Otero-Pailos), Norwood pointed to the wider metaphysical problematic and argued that the "real shortcoming" of Norberg-Schulz's project is his "failure to understand Heidegger on the derivative nature of presence from a more primary absence" (Norwood, 2011: 5). Thus, instead of "[making] architecture ahistorical in relation to *Historie*", Norberg-Schulz perpetuated "Modernism's ahistoricism in respect to *Geschichte*" (Norwood, 2011: 6).[80] In other words, Norberg-Schulz's failure to engage with history as "the essential occurrence of beyng" (Heidegger, 1938b: 31-32/27) is the root cause of his tendency to deal with "history as a represented object" (Norwood, 2011: 6). However, Norwood's interpretation still neglected Heidegger's assertion that something like *Geschichte* is made accessible (to *Historie*) by *Dasein*'s historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), rather than *Historie* itself (1927a: 375), and that only a being that is care, can "be historical in the ground of its existence" (Heidegger, 1927a: 385).

Norberg-Schulz's neglect of Heidegger's concept of *Geschichte*, while symptomatic of his failure to "follow Heidegger in his regress from truth to untruth …, from presence to absence" (Norwood, 2011: 6), is grounded in Norberg-Schulz's neglect of the ecstatic temporal nature of concerned existence that Heidegger ascribed to *Dasein*'s being-in-the-

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[80] See Glossary: Historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), History (*Geschichte*), and Historiology (*Historie*).

world. It is his reliance on continuity and change, grounded in 'Being and becoming',[81] which most fundamentally limits the persuasiveness of Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophical writings.

3.3 The need for engaging with the ground of dwelling

This chapter referred to authors who have searched for ways to question the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy (e.g. Otero-Pailos, Norwood, Krause, Møystad, Van Gerrewey, Sheffield, Wang and Hvattum). It has also discussed the related ideas of Petrosino, Tuan, Relph and Seamon, and engaged with those who seek to expand on Norberg-Schulz's work (like Lauvland). In response to those who have criticised the application of Heidegger's philosophy to architectural theory (like Cacciari) a case has been made for a more comprehensive engagement with Heidegger's writings by referring to the work of Malpas, Harries, Casey and Anderson. While this discussion identified various themes connecting Norberg-Schulz and Heidegger's work (like place, dwelling, identity, the status of the subject and the role played by visual representation), an effort was also made to identify the most significant point of divergence between Norberg-Schulz and Heidegger (in terms of their approach to time and history) and propose a way to reveal the implications of this difference—between ecstatic care and continuity and change—by referring to Heidegger's views on the metaphysics of constant presence. In response to the works engaged in this literature review, it has been argued that none offer an in-depth investigation of the architectural implications of Heidegger's ontological concept of care and that such an understanding may have a significant and positive influence on the way architects approach architectural *poiesis*.

In closing, it must be pointed out that the art of care forms part of a wider body of work engaged in the study of the qualitative associations people form with particular places. In recent years there have been a range of alternative approaches (that originated outside the H:N-S dialogue) which focused on the idea that works of architecture, as products of human dedication to place, are expressions of 'love'. **Pérez-Gómez**, in *Built upon Love: Architectural Longing after Ethics and Aesthetics* (2008), focused on exploring the concept of love in its original guises of *erōs* and *philia* in an effort to "find points of contact between poetics and ethics"; between the seductiveness of architectural form and the wish to "provide a better place for society" (2008: 4). While Pérez-Gómez regularly referred to

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[81] Heidegger saw the distinction between Being and becoming as the "division and opposition [that] stands at the inception of the questioning of Being" (1935: 73/100).

Heidegger, he tried to engage with the idea of love as something which is "crucial to our humanity", rather than engaging with 'Heidegger's humanism' grounded in *Sorgen* (care) and *Sinnen* (reflective or 'meditative' thinking) (Heidegger, 1947a: 224).

However, in the final pages of his book, Pérez-Gómez arrived at a conclusion directly related to the aims of this thesis. He proposed that architects need to investigate Heidegger's concept of *Gelassenheit*[82] and thereby acknowledge, accept and appreciate the "ephemeral mortal condition" that they inhabit. This will allow architects to re-engage with the idea that they are "*makers* bound by history", rather than apologists for the "utopias of progress and universal civilization" (Pérez-Gómez, 2008: 213). This thesis studies the aforementioned possibility by referring to the concerned nature of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world, as the "anticipatory decidedness" (Heidegger, 1938b: 35-36/30) that makes something like *Gelassenheit* possible.

In contemplating the relevance of Pérez-Gómez's architecture of love, it is useful to also engage with a source closer to Norberg-Schulz's own work. Towards the end of **Bollnow**'s *Human Space* (1963)[83] there is a decidedly poetic turn towards the "space of loving togetherness" (1963: 241). In a thought-provoking move, Bollnow posited the Swiss psychiatrist, **Ludwig Binswanger**'s (1881-1966), "spatiality of love" against Heidegger's "spatiality of circumspect concern" by referring to the possibility of the "'limitless' increase of individual space through the surrender of individual space" to the one we love (1963: 242-243). Ultimately, Bollnow proposed that "the world of concern is 'resolved' in the 'home' of love" (1963: 244). Love seems to present the same capacity as care to create meaningful place; a fact alluded to by **Tuan** when he called the stirring engagement with places "*topophilia*" (1974: 93).

In *The Sympathy of Things: Ruskin and Ecological Design* (2011) the Dutch architect, **Lars Spuybroek** (b. 1959), approached **Pérez-Gómez**'s call for a new "quest for beauty" (2008: 214) from the perspective of 'sympathy'—"what things feel when they shape each other" (Spuybroek, 2011: 9)—rather than 'love'. Essentially, he discussed a more 'picturesque' or 'romantic' take on care—whose twofold structure Spuybroek described as something "utterly Ruskinian" (2011: 173)—viewed through the lense of the contemporary democratisation of digital design, prototyping and fabrication brought about by the new possibilities of "code" and "modulated fabrication" (2011: 61). Spuybroek proposed that ideas like 'sympathy' and 'care' are now, in an era already experimenting with hyper-

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[82] See Glossary: Resoluteness.
[83] See subsections 4.3.2 and 4.3.4.

individualisation, more appropriate than ever. It is as if the rationalist hiatus in feeling, brought about by the way design and construction were dominated by the rational need for mass-production, industrialisation and standardisation, is in the process of being replaced by liberated, individualised "wild things" (2011: 265).

The alternatives provided by **Pérez-Gómez**, **Spuybroek**, **Bollnow** (following **Binswanger**) and **Tuan** all aim to engage with the unique and meaningful relationship between *Dasein* and *Da*; between dweller and place. However, from a Heideggarian perspective, presenting *Dasein's* concerned being-in-the-world in a kind of superlative form as 'love', or in a contemporary romantic sense as 'sympathy', carries with it the danger of seeing Heideggarian care as a "special attitude" (Heidegger, 1927a: 193) derived from the "ought" (1935: 149-152/210-214); the idea that one 'ought to care about one's place' instead of living amid the deep realisation that one 'always already is care'.

In Heidegger's ontological project, care is the 'being of the intentional', which makes *Gelassenheit* (Pérez-Gómez), 'loving togetherness' (Binswanger and Bollnow), and something like "affective ties with the material world" (Tuan, 1974: 93) possible. Furthermore, *Sorge* is always already a unified entanglement of care and concern that cannot be separated (as Spuybroek often suggested).[84] Care illuminates *Dasein*'s relationship with its world in the dual sense of "absorption" and "devotion" (Heidegger, 1925: 419-420/303). Is it not time that dwellers are invited to dwell not as 'one ought to dwell', but to "dwell humanly" (Heidegger, 1951b: 227); is it not time that the way humans live, as beings of care, inspire the way architects envision the *poiesis* of dwelling?

A more promising attempt to acknowledge the implications of *Dasein*'s concerned way of dwelling can be found in the work of **Peter Zumthor**. His book, *Atmospheres* (2010b), is essentially one great hymn of praise to what Norberg-Schulz designated as the "unifying imprint" of the "local atmosphere" (2000b: 225). In *Atmospheres,* Zumthor persistently questions what we "mean when we speak of architectural quality" (2010b: 11). He proposed that "quality architecture … is when a building manages to move me. What on earth is it that moves me? How can I get it into my own work?" (2010b: 11). Understanding architecture as the art of care offers an appropriate way to engage with these questions within the H:N-S dialogue.

The art of care forms part of an expanding body of work engaging with the nature of the relationship between dweller and place. This thesis, as a hermeneutic reading and

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[84] Spuybroek even proposed that he "would reject concern in favor of care every time" (2011: 257).

questioning focusing on the ontological implications of Heidegger's concept of care, engages both critically and appreciatively with the implications of Norberg-Schulz's writings. While his interpretation of Heidegger's work is deep and thoughtful, it is also based on a fundamental oversight. Instead of understanding *Dasein*'s lived time as ecstatic care, Norberg-Schulz relied on Giedion's understanding of time as continuity and change. The concept of continuity and change, grounded in the metaphysical distinction between "Being and becoming" (Heidegger, 1935: 73/100), had far-reaching implications in Norberg-Schulz's writings and held sway over his interpretations of place, architectural history and the way *Dasein* engages in the fourfold world as a mortal.

The study of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution has perpetuated this omission and thereby preserved the neglect of Heidegger's "*question of the being of the intentional*" (1925: 178-180/129). Consequently, the understanding of architecture, in terms of Norberg-Schulz's art of place, still disregards the implications springing from the mortal "sparing" (Heidegger, 1951a: 147) that characterise *Dasein*'s "concerned being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 1925: 213-215/159); the way *Dasein* makes things within its fourfold world and the ground of dwelling. This thesis aims to reveal the implications of Norberg-Schulz's neglect of the temporal significance Heidegger ascribed to the concept of care and proposes grafting an alternative (but complementary) approach, the art of care, into Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*. Instead of understanding time as continuity and change, this thesis proposes that time, as lived by *Dasein*, is always already care.

The next chapter presents a comprehensive investigation of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project in order to illustrate the far-reaching influence that continuity and change had on his work. Works of architecture as the *poiesis* of human dwelling—the life-care-place totality of human being-in-the-world—are works of *livskunst*. In order to engage with the being of care's existence between earth and sky, and birth and death, architects will have to engage with the concerned nature of human existence.

4 Christian Norberg-Schulz and the art of place

In the previous chapters I have argued that Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, especially in terms of the temporal aspects of the life-world, was based on a fundamental oversight. Norberg-Schulz (following Giedion) viewed time in terms of continuity and change and thereby neglected the concerned nature of human existence which Heidegger saw as the primary characteristic of lived time.

In order to test the veracity of this claim, the following chapter will attempt a holistic reading of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution; a comprehensive historical reconstruction of his work to identify key aspects guiding his thought and trace the different ways in which he interpreted these concepts. In order to clarify these developments, Norberg-Schulz's written works (including both published and archival material) will be discussed in relation to four 'phases' and the 'transitions' between them. In each case the 'progression' from one stage to the next, as well as significant influences that led to these transitions, will be deliberated relative to earlier works.

In line with the recommendations of the Literature Review, special reference will be made to the influence exerted by Heidegger's philosophy and Giedion's concept of continuity and change. It will be shown that Norberg-Schulz's focus shifted from studying the intentionality of human perception to a phenomenological appreciation of life in place and works of architecture as figurative translations of the qualities of these places. In the last phase of his work he tried to present an even more challenging vision of architecture as the art of place. However, it will also be shown that all four phases of his work were under the sway of Giedion's understanding of time as continuity and change. From the interaction between changing perceptions and enduring *schemata*, to the way place remains despite changing interpretations; from the figure as a temporal interpretation of an enduring archetype, to his attempts (characteristic of the final phase of his work) to unify continuity and change in "ways of being", which are "always the same without being identical" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 75).

Chapter 2 identified the importance of engaging in Norberg-Schulz's work as a dialogue; a hermeneutic process of reading and questioning with the goal of fusing the 'horizons' of his art of place with those of the art of care. Keeping this goal in mind, the 'results' of the chronological study will be gathered in a diagram presenting the most significant aspects of Norberg-Schulz's art of place.[85] The final section of this chapter will propose a

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[85] See Glossary: Art of place.

supplementary approach (grounded in Heideggarian care), which can be grafted into the art of place. Ultimately, the goal is not to dismiss or verify the value of Norberg-Schulz's art of place, but to identify the weakest aspect of his architectural interpretation of Heideggarian being-in-the-world, and then supplant this facet of his work with an approach more appropriate to the concerned Being of the intentional.

4.1 Introduction

Christian Norberg-Schulz left the architectural profession a voluminous legacy dedicated to the phenomenological appreciation of place. As one of the first architectural theorists to introduce the thinking of Martin Heidegger to architectural audiences, his search for a concrete way of understanding the concept of place in architectural terms represents a significant contribution in terms of its sophistication and impact. Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heideggarian spatiality—describing the way *Dasein* lives in place between earth and sky, in contrast to the 'loss of place' characterising modern existence—is important and illuminating.[86]

4.1.1 The loss of place

Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution aimed to provide a way towards meaningful architectural responses to the "loss of place"; an expression designating the loss of that which used to bestow character and coherence to life as a totality. The loss of coherence, was a symptom of settlements' lack of "enclosure and density" culminating in the loss of the "figure-ground relationship" between settlements (as figures) and the surrounding environment. If settlements no longer served as figures, then the environment became unrecognisable as ground (1979b: 189). Norberg-Schulz understood the loss of coherence as a loss of imageability[87] leading to "environmental chaos"[88] and believed that coherence could be regained by providing "orientation" (1979b: 19).

The loss of place also implied a loss of character; the replacement of mankind's qualitative understanding of a poetic world with the "poverty of stimuli" brought on by the

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[86] It has been pointed out (section 1.1) that the veracity of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of the way Heidegger understood the emplaced nature of human life has been 'corroborated' (at least in terms of the importance of the concept of place in Heidegger's writings) by the work of Malpas (2006; 2012) and Mugerauer (2008).

[87] A concept Norberg-Schulz appropriated from Kevin Lynch (1960: 9).

[88] During the first phase of Norberg-Schulz's work (primarily occupied by his study of the psychology of perception) the 'loss of coherence' was primarily experienced as "visual chaos" (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 89).

exclusive reliance on a rational understanding. Consequently, the existential "range of moods" was reduced and provided "scarce possibilities for identification" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 189-191). Norberg-Schulz viewed the loss of character as a particularly devastating loss, because people are "related to the 'character' of things" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 168). When faced with nothing meaningful to identify with, the relationship between life and place is subjected to a growing sense of "alienation" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 168) and "monotony" (Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 37). Norberg-Schulz saw 'monotony' (the product of the loss of character) and 'chaos' (the product of the loss of coherence) as problems which could be addressed by referring to the work of his mentor, Sigfried Giedion.

4.1.2 Sigfried Giedion and the new tradition

The most enduring influence on Norberg-Schulz's work can be attributed to his formative years (between 1945 and 1949) under the tutelage of Giedion. As one of the foremost historians of the 'new tradition' (and the first secretary-general of the CIAM[89]), Giedion wielded considerable influence in modernist circles. He imbued in the young Norberg-Schulz an appreciation for modern architecture as a primarily "artistic" movement intended to heal the "split of thought and feeling" (Norberg-Schulz, 1980a: 185).

Giedion believed modern architecture, at its core, aspired to provide a "means for a more dignified life" (Giedion, 1958: 36). Therefore, it was fitting that modern architecture initially tried to re-interpret the individual dwelling. However, the aspirations of modern architecture extended beyond the private realm. The "second stage of the development of modern architecture" depended on the "humanization of urban life" and aimed at "[restoring] the contact between the individual and community" (1958: 126). Despite Giedion's advocacy of modern architecture, he had to admit that there was "something lacking" (1958: 32) in modernist buildings. Consequently, he proposed that the first and second stages of modern architecture had to be augmented by a 'third' and 'fourth' stage: a "new monumentality" (1958: 25) and a "new regionalism" (1958: 138). Both new monumentality and new regionalism demanded 'something more' than a functionalist approach; they depended on "an inspired architectural imagination" (1958: 32).

Norberg-Schulz believed that these four stages promised a way to (in the words of Giedion) "bridge the fatal gulf between the greatly developed powers of thinking and

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[89] The *Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne*, or International Congresses of Modern Architecture (1928-1959), was an influential organisation dedicated to promoting the standing of modern architecture.

greatly retarded powers of feeling" (Giedion, 1958: vi). Norberg-Schulz interpreted Gideon's reliance on 'feeling' to mean "an authentic relationship to a meaningful environment" (Norberg-Schulz, 1980a: 187). In order to reconcile thought and feeling, the 'new tradition' had to solve the "problem of meaning" in architecture (Norberg-Schulz, 1980a: 186-187); the challenge of concretely expressing a way of life. For Gideon, human life could be understood as a "tension between constancy and change" and the "richness of life [consisted] in their right amalgamation" (Giedion, 1962: 8).

Monumentality and regionalism, understood in terms of continuity and change, played a formative and enduring role in Norberg-Schulz's efforts to deepen the concerns of modern architecture. He embodied the aspirations of the new regionalism in his 'art of place' and monumentality served as the foundation for his 'figurative architecture', but his first foray into the problem of meaning in architecture was based on the 'psychology of perception' and culminated in the publication of *Intentions in Architecture* (IiA) in 1963. The next section will discuss the approach propagated in IiA in order to later (in section 4.3) show how these ideas were transformed by Heidegger's philosophy.

4.2 Phase 1: intentionality, perception and the life-situation

Norberg-Schulz's first major theoretical work, IiA (1963), was the product of his studies at Harvard University between 1952 and 1953. In this early work he argued that the modern movement had not solved the architectural 'loss of meaning' that resulted from the "devaluation of forms" characterising 19th century Eclecticism (1963: 17). Rather than creating a new style, modernism shied away from any stylistic references and could only offer a "lack of style" (1963: 159). Norberg-Schulz argued that "a style is the first prerequisite for meaningful individual solutions" (1963: 159) because then the 'individual solution' could form part of a general "symbol-system" (1963: 58).

In answer to these 'shortcomings', Norberg-Schulz aimed to formulate a 'theory of architecture' as a way to reconquer the forgotten "semantic relations" (1963: 107) and propose a "*new visual order* as a substitute for the 'devaluated' styles" (1963: 21); a way beyond the "empty forms and unsatisfied needs" (1963: 107) that hindered modernism's ability to "[architecturally express] the way of life of the society" (1963: 21). The inability to express a way of life[90] perpetuated the 'loss of meaning' and resulted in what Norberg-Schulz saw as the "visual chaos" (1963: 24) characterising the modern built environment.

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[90] The relationship between architecture and a 'way of life' became even more important in Norberg-Schulz's later work.

However, Norberg-Schulz's criticism of modern architecture did not imply that he hoped to return to the styles of the past. As a firm believer in Giedion's notion of 'continuity and change', Norberg-Schulz proposed that any "change" had to "conserve" if it wanted to be meaningful. Similarly, "conservation" had to "allow for changes" if it wanted to remain alive (1963: 160). Norberg-Schulz found a clear expression for his approach in the words of A.N. Whitehead: "the art of progress is to preserve order amid change, and change amid order" (Whitehead cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 82). While modern architecture lacked a "visual order" and disregarded the "semantic relations", it made it possible to appreciate the fact that "historical continuity" implies more than "borrowed motives and ideals". Norberg-Schulz saw it as "the only *true* tradition of the present" (1963: 206).

4.2.1 The purposes and effects of architecture

The architectural expression of a shared way of life relies on an understanding of "the relationship between buildings and those who use them" (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 24). That such a relationship exists implies that buildings have an 'effect' on inhabitants and that inhabitants expect buildings to fulfill some 'purpose'. Norberg-Schulz believed that architecture has a purpose: it must translate a way of life into built form. He also believed that architecture has an effect: it influences the way people experience the environment. Architecture's purpose and effect involves translating a "practical-psychological-social-cultural situation" into a built form, with the capacity to "order and improve our relations with the environment" (1963: 22-23). Norberg-Schulz understood this interaction between humans and their environment as "the relation between building task and architectural solution" (1963: 23). A work of architecture, by ordering the situation, "controls and regulates the relations between man and his environment" (1963: 109). Norberg-Schulz believed that this relationship could "[explain] the architectural intention" (1963: 107) and reveal the 'purposes' and 'effects' of architecture.

In IiA, Norberg-Schulz tried to understand this relationship by investigating the way in which people perceive the world in psychological terms. Perception offered Norberg-Schulz a way to contest the "visual chaos" of modern architecture (1963: 177) because it revealed how the everyday experience of works of architecture, amid the "changing situations of daily life" (1963: 22-23) influences users. Perception allows inhabitants to "find [their] way" and "understand" things by granting "immediate awareness of the phenomenal world" (1963: 27). Norberg-Schulz hoped that perception could offer a way to understand what architecture 'means' to inhabitants.

4.2.2 The psychology of perception

In IiA Norberg-Schulz relied heavily on the studies of the Hungarian-American psychologist, Egon Brunswik (1903-1955), and the Swiss child psychologist, Jean Piaget (1896-1980). He hoped that the psychology of perception could provide an 'objective' way to explain the building task and identify the "relevant means" needed to address this task (1963: 199). Brunswik's work was of particular importance to Norberg-Schulz's arguments in IiA because he focused on the "[integration of] the organism with its environment" (1963: 32). Norberg-Schulz relied on Piaget's work to explain how human perception of the environment is systematically developed and internalised by means of "*schemata*". *Schemata* is a term used to describe typical (acquired) mental structures that provide fleeting experiences with a measure of stability. People learn how things typically *are* or react and measure their experiences against these expectations. *Schemata* provide the 'constancy' that enables people to experience the changing environment as meaningful (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 41).

The seemingly rational act of perception does not necessarily lead to similar experiences. A perceived object is composed of numerous "properties" or "phenomena". Phenomena do not 'exist' in the same way that objects exist, but are involved as all the 'possible experiences' the object offers. The seemingly 'absolute' object is, therefore, actually composed of 'known' and 'unknown' phenomena (1963: 28-29), constituting "intentional possibilities" within (what Brunswik designated as) a "coherence-system" (Brunswik cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 34). A coherence-system is an assembly of "the relevant aspects of the situation" and their 'interactions'. Within a coherence-system perception plays an active role. Human perception is guided by the person's "attitude", which influences perception by selecting the "intended pole" (one of the intentional possibilities) that will dominate the experience. Norberg-Schulz used Brunswik's term, "intention", to describe the "active character of the act of perception". The 'content' of human perception is predetermined by our intentions (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 31-34).

From a scientific perspective, perception is therefore "unreliable" (1963: 28); a dynamic interaction between a prejudiced organism and a fluctuating environment open to divergent readings (1963: 32). Instead of observing the "pure objects" of science, people perceive an "intermediary object" constituted by the "intentional possibilities" accessible to their "intentions". An intermediate object is not a rational perception, but an "interpretation" within a "coherence-system" of possibilities. Brunswik's understanding of perception thus denied the certainty of "naive realism" (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 34-36).

Norberg-Schulz believed that people attain their intentions during "socialization" (1963: 36-37). Socialisation necessitates 'adjustment' to a "common standard" and by conforming to this 'standard' the individual is made part of a "common world". Belonging to a "common world" instils a sense of "security" in the individual. Norberg-Schulz believed that it is only because people participate in a shared world that their interactions are meaningful. In a shared world interactions (changes) can be 'measured' against a collective "symbol system" of "expectations" and "typical reactions" (*schemata* offering a sense of continuity). This implies that people within the same society possess a shared intentionality grounded in typical reactions to typical situations and typical expectations of how others will react to similar situations (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 38-41).

Schematisation implies a level of societal 'inertia', but human *schemata* are not absolute. During everyday interactions people constantly face 'new situations' that render their existing *schemata* "obsolete" by not providing sufficient 'intentional depth' to allow an appropriate response. Subsequently, people modify their system of expectations and the corresponding 'typical' behaviour. While the formation of *schemata* depends on a "similarity between phenomena", it cannot be equated to scientific objectivity. Instead of understanding the world in rational ways, people perceive objects in terms of the intentional depth allowed by their *schemata* (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 41-43).

If architecture aims at expressing a way of life, then a one-sided reliance on the methods of 'scientific description' will be insufficient. By means of a theory of architecture (based on the psychology of perception) Norberg-Schulz hoped to provide a way for architects to "control [their] perceptions" (1963: 193), determine the building task "on an objective basis", and then 'solve' the task with "relevant means" (1963: 199) by studying the 'systems' which underlie human intentionality.

4.2.3 Architecture as a symbol-system

Norberg-Schulz argued that both "description" (1963: 53) and "expression" (1963: 73) depend on ordered "systems" of "classification" that may be used to "describe the world". In order to study "human actions and products" (like architecture) in relation to the environment, people need appropriate "systems of interrelated concepts" and "dimensions" of comparison (1963: 53-55). For these systems and dimensions to become 'common' (and therefore meaningful) "conventional signs" are needed to express the "common agreement" implied by socialisation (1963: 55). The "sign complexes" enabling the socialisation process are called "symbol-systems" (1963: 38). Symbolisation entails the "representation of a state of affairs in other media by means of structural similarity"

(1963: 57) and allows architects to "translate" a "way of life" into an "architectural frame" (1963: 16). Understood in these terms, architecture is a symbol-system.

Norberg-Schulz asserted that contemporary symbol-systems are dominated by a scientific understanding of the world, even though science represents only one kind of symbol-system. Since the human way of life is characterised much more relevantly by the 'impure' *schemata* of perception, Norberg-Schulz proposed that architects need artistic, or "non-descriptive symbol-systems", to supplement the scientific understanding of the world and arrive at a relevant theory of architecture (1963: 62-63). Thus architecture would not only be rational, but creative within a relevant tradition of expectations.

In IiA Norberg-Schulz defined the work of art as "a concretization of an intermediary object" (1963: 68) and summarised the difference between art and science as follows: "science describes facts, art 'expresses' values" (1963: 68). Norberg-Schulz believed that art can only be meaningful within a 'style'. Style provides art (which would otherwise merely be an expressive symbol-system) with a "probability-structure". Within a style there are "expectations". If these expectations are not addressed by the work, then the experience will be distorted. It is this "structural similarity" (or "correspondence") between the "content" and the "artistic symbol", that enables art to "concretize a content (an intermediary object) in another medium" (1963: 70-71).

Works of architecture have to concretise tasks in a different medium and are, therefore, artistic in nature. While it is artistic, architecture is also more intimately involved in everyday life than other forms of art. The work of architecture simultaneously needs to serve as a practical (everyday) solution to problems and act as artistic symbolisation of this everyday life. Modernism had offered no new styles or forms of continuity and Functionalism merely offered practicality. Rather than offering a new synthetic approach that could marry the advantages of technological progress and the vigour of modern art, modern architecture merely entrenched the split between thought and feeling: "The public of our day accept science as unintelligible, *but* necessary, and rejects modern art as unintelligible *and* unnecessary. The result is what Gideon has brilliantly named 'the split of thought and feeling'" (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 81).

Norberg-Schulz intended to address this 'split' by formulating a theoretical approach that could indicate which intentional possibilities were concretised in a work and thereby "[explain] the architectural intention" (1963: 107). In order to reveal the intentions of a particular work of architecture, such a theory would have to include adequate "dimensions

of comparison which make possible the description (analysis) of any architectural totality (intermediate object)" (1963: 102).

4.2.4 The dimensions of architecture: task, form and technics

In IiA Norberg-Schulz identified three dimensions of architecture: building task, technics, and form (Figure 5). These dimensions interact within the architectural symbol-system. The ability to interact implies that there are relationships between the dimensions. Norberg-Schulz studied these connections semantically and formulated the "architectural totality" (that must be underpinned by theory) as "a building task realised technically within a style" (1963: 104-105).

Figure 4 (left): Arnheim's square diagram (diagram by the author after Norberg-Schulz, 1963: figure 7)

Figure 5 (right): The triangular totality of task, form, and technics.

Otero-Pailos asserted that Norberg-Schulz was deeply dissatisfied with this triangular architectural totality because a triangle failed to provide either "a stable gathering center [or a] point of synthesis like a square" (2010: 159). Otero-Pailos argued that Norberg-Schulz desired a unifying device that could emulate the perceptual "synthesis" offered by Arnheim's square diagram (2010: 155) (Figure 4); a persistent search, which provides proof of Norberg-Schulz's "obsession with visual thinking" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 161). In order to investigate these claims the development of Norberg-Schulz's 'triangle of dimensions' (into a 'fourfold gathering') will be returned to (in later sections) as a touchstone illuminating his theoretical aspirations.

4.2.5 The semantical relations within the triad

In IiA Norberg-Schulz argued that the architectural 'totality' depends upon the semantical relations between the dimensions. These relations (in architectural terms) are instituted as

a 'structural similarity' between tasks and forms. A task has a "structure", a work of architecture "frames" the task and, consequently, architectural forms should have a "structural similarity" to the task. Over time characteristic similarities are repeated and become common or "conventional" by means of "abstraction", thereby coming to stand for a tradition of known or typical relations. On the basis of conventional uses and structural similarity a situation (and the way of life that unfolds there) can be 'appropriately' enframed by the technical realisation of an architectural solution (1963: 167-172). Seen in this way, the architectural totality can be described (most appropriately) as an intermediate object.

4.2.6 The architectural totality as an intermediate object

As an intermediate object, "the work of architecture … concretizes a coherence system of poles [possibilities]" and thereby transcends "[scientific] description". Instead of envisioning a pure solution, by being part of a symbol-system, it "unifies [the relevant] aspects [of the situation] in a new meaningful whole" (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 179). While building traditions (as symbol-systems) constitute continuity, the "practical-psychological-social-cultural situation" (1963: 23) continuously changes demanding new interpretations of traditional architectural *schemata*. Architecture, therefore, functions both as a force of change and is a proponent of continuity: a "relativistic-totality" (1963: 34) that provides a dynamic order that corresponds to, and participates in, the way of life.

Norberg-Schulz contended that architects had to find appropriate ways to engage with the building task. He hoped that his 'general theory of architecture' could provide a clear understanding of the building task (by offering a 'structure' for 'analyses'). Thus works could engage with the appropriate (changing) 'intentional possibilities' and serve as meaningful (enduring) solutions. Ultimately, IiA made the case that architecture is a "synthetic activity" that fulfills "instrumental *and* artistic" purposes. As a "synthetic activity" architecture "must adapt itself to the way of life as a whole" (1963: 188).

4.2.7 Beyond the psychology of intentionality

In IiA Norberg-Schulz tried to explain how the 'intentionality' of perception could reveal a work of architecture as an "intermediary object" (1963: 179); an intention-driven 'interpretation' dictated by choices between "intentional possibilities", rather than the 'scientific observation' of "pure objects" (1963: 33-34). However, his study of perception "did not yield the hoped-for results" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 15) because it still operated within the Cartesian division between 'perceiving subjects' and 'perceived objects'. In the

years following the publication of IiA the limitations of a theory of architecture based on the psychology of perception became apparent to Norberg-Schulz. In later years he stated that "the decade between 1960 and 1970 were years of change when modern architecture died and was reborn".[91] It was a time during which Norberg-Schulz changed course from a focus on human intentionality to a phenomenological understanding of the way human life takes place between earth and sky.

4.3 Transition 1: from intentions to existential space

In IiA Norberg-Schulz aimed to formulate an 'objective' theory allowing architects to create a relevant and "suitable [architectural] frame" (Norberg-Schulz, 1966a: 255) for society's way of life. Architecture, as a synthetic activity, aimed at providing a "psychological foothold" (1966a: 255). The following section will investigate the shortcomings of the psychology of perception as a foundation for creating works of architecture. As a first step towards tracing the development of Norberg-Schulz's transition from the psychology of perception to understanding architecture in terms of existential space, subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 will evaluate the applicability of two of the main architectural implications formulated in IiA: that works of architecture 'order' the environment and that works of architecture can only be meaningful within a common system.

4.3.1 Order and variation

Norberg-Schulz argued that a variation free of order would result in "arbitrary and meaningless fancy which tends to destroy the existing architectural system" i.e. chaos. Alternatively, order not enlivened by variation would "[merely repeat] known (banal) cliches" (1963: 187), i.e. monotony. As an example of how architects have (in the past) responded to this need, Norberg-Schulz referred to the work of the famous Italian Renaissance architect, Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472). In "Alberti's Last Intentions" (1962a) Norberg-Schulz argued that Alberti, in contrast to Filippo Brunelleschi's (1377-1446) "uniform addition" (1962a: 55) (e.g. Santo Spirito, Florence), employed proportional "variations on the same theme" (1962a: 59), resulting in a much more "flexible" and "fertile" whole (e.g. Sant' Andrea, Mantua). By unifying variations in an ordered "system", Alberti achieved a whole characterised by "unity in plurality" (1962a: 60).

In "Order and Variation in the Environment" (1966a) (OVE) Norberg-Schulz proposed a similar (but more expansive and concrete) approach able to present "landscape,

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[91] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 8, manuscript, "The Years of Change", c. 1985: 18.

settlements and buildings [as] dependent variables" interacting in the "same whole"; a "visual order" based on "'timeless' principles" subject to contemporary variations, rather than the repetition of "motifs" (1966a: 265). Norberg-Schulz asserted that the creation of such an environment depends on the use of "comprehensible forms" (1966a: 266) that possess an adequate capacity to convey the complexities of life and can, consequently, be perceived as meaningful.

4.3.2 Meaning

The rational approach propagated by Functionalism failed to acknowledge the 'meanings' of the environment. In contrast, Norberg-Schulz suggested that the inconsistency of human 'attitudes' and the 'fluctuating nature of the situation' made the premise of rational observation highly questionable. Instead of 'isolated observations', human life is characterised by "total" experiences. Perception "grasps complex wholes" and it follows that experiences attained by actual perception are not analytical but "synthetic" (Norberg-Schulz, 1966b: 19). Therefore, the architectural totality would remain incomprehensible to an approach dominated by one 'orientation'. Architecture not only had to be "functional", but also "meaningful" (1966b: 22). The demand for meaning necessitated the "differentiation and humanization" of Functionalism (1966b: 23).

It should be pointed out that the arguments presented in Norberg-Schulz's article, "Meaning in Architecture" (1966b) (MiA), are strikingly similar to the conclusions made by the German philosopher, Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1903-1991). In *Human Space* (1963) Bollnow argued that "[even] for the human being living today, space is by no means homogenous, rather every place is laden with special meanings" (1963: 67). By "staying" in places inhabitants get to know them. Ultimately, this implies that, by means of actions in, and interactions with, the environment, "space is structured as a totality of places and areas that belong together" (Bollnow, 1963: 195).

Norberg-Schulz pointed to the same Aristotelian conception of qualitative "human space" in contrast to the "homogenous mathematical conception of space". He used the same quote by the German author, Erich Kästner (1899-1974), to describe the enduring difference between 'up' and 'down' and also mentioned the 'tensions' between "vertical" and "horizontal", "arrival" and "departure" (1966b: 23-24). Norberg-Schulz later acknowledged Bollnow as a major influence, yet in the essay reproduced in *Architecture: Meaning and Place*, he failed to mention Bollnow by name. Instead, Norberg-Schulz tried to realign (and systematise) Bollnow's phenomenological argument with his own theory of perception by stating that "only when space becomes a system of meaningful places,

does it become alive to us" (1966b: 24). However, in terms of Bollnow's argument this process requires no 'systematisation', but simply means that people need to "be at home in a particular place" (Bollnow, 1963: 121). Dwellers are not primarily in need of a "psychological foothold" (Norberg-Schulz, 1966a: 255). Instead, the problem of meaning is 'lived' within a concrete world.

This change in approach is evident in the way aspects which dominated the discussion in IiA, like the need for 'communication' by means of a 'common symbol-system', was slowly being replaced by a concern for places able to house the happening of human life. It is *in* place, rather than through perception, that the concreteness of life truly finds a foothold. In the same year that OVE and MiA (as a lecture) first appeared (1966), a highly influential book was published that exposed the shortcomings of any theory solely relying on the psychology of perception.

4.3.3 The complexity and contradictions of life

Norberg-Schulz aimed to create architecture that could meaningfully engage with all the 'intentional possibilities' of the situation. In a way his idea of understanding works of architecture as intermediate objects gathering intentional possibilities foreshadowed Robert Venturi's conception of the "difficult whole" (Venturi, 1966: 103); a concept Venturi developed in his groundbreaking work, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (1966). In this luminous work Venturi criticised modern architecture for clinging to the "easy unity of exclusion" rather than the "difficult unity of inclusion" (1966: 16).

In an article entitled, "Less or More?" (1968), Norberg-Schulz enthusiastically endorsed Venturi's book and aligned his work in IiA with its main ideas. Norberg-Schulz argued that there are three main correlations between their works: Venturi's idea of the "difficult unity of inclusion rather than the easy unity of exclusion" was comparable to what Norberg-Schulz envisioned as "the concretization of an intermediary object". Secondly, Venturi's "levels of significance" was related to his "concept of 'formal levels'" (which would later become environmental levels). Lastly, both focused on the role "conventional elements" are able to play in contemporary times (1968: 258).

Despite these similarities, even though IiA tried to offer a "unified theory of [architecture]" it was still based on theories of perception. It must be noted that Venturi's work also ascribed much importance to visual considerations: "Instead [of superficial complexity] the variety inherent in the ambiguity of visual perception must once more be acknowledged and exploited" (Venturi, 1966: 19). However, in later work Norberg-Schulz confessed that,

while the "visual foundations" (that he was taught by Josef Albers and György Kepes) were "interesting", they actually represented a "gross simplification ... of the nature of human existence" (2000b: 9-10).[92]

Ultimately, IiA neglected the distinction between "creating and perceiving architecture" (1963: 189). The psychology of perception treats man as an 'observer' with 'intentions'. Nevertheless, people are involved in the world and participate in complex and contradictory ways. Focusing on how this situation is perceived will not reveal that which is *most true* of human life. While IiA served to formulate many of the problems that Norberg-Schulz aimed to solve, it was in many ways a theoretical dead-end. After the publication of IiA, Norberg-Schulz's thought undertook a turn away from the psychology of perception. His efforts at expanding and adapting his theory of architecture were significantly influenced by various works which will be discussed in subsections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5.

4.3.4 Lynch, Bollnow and Sedlmayr: the levels of imageability and dwelling

In his groundbreaking book, *The Image of the City* (1960), Lynch revealed the results of his investigation into the effect that the 'visual quality' of the city had on the inhabitants' ability to 'belong to' and find 'security' in an urban environment. Lynch focused on the "visual quality of [Boston, Los Angeles, and Jersey City] by studying the mental image of that city which is held by its citizens" (Lynch, 1960: 2). His study revealed five aspects that could provide coherence within the urban fabric: "paths", "edges", "districts", "nodes" and "landmarks" (1960: 46-47).

One of the main methods he used involved asking participants to draw a "map" of an area they were familiar with. What surprised the researchers was the fact that, despite distortions, these maps possessed a high degree of sequential continuity. People would draw maps in which "directions were twisted, distances stretched or compressed [and] large forms so changed from their accurate scale projection as to be at first unrecognizable", while the "sequence was usually correct" (1960: 87).

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[92] Norberg-Schulz also refererred to his disappointment with this visual approach in a manuscript entitled "The Teaching of Form in Architecture" (dated April 1988) (NAM 7: 1) and in a lecture delivered at Høvikodden in April 1988 entitled "The problem of Form in Modern Architecture": "When in 1952-53 I followed the Bauhaus-inspired courses of György Kepes and Josef Albers at the MIT, I realized that their approach, in spite of the fascination it offered, … tended to degenerate into an arbitrary play with effects" (NAM 9: 4). Venturi, in fact, cited both Albers (1966: 20) and Kepes (1966: 82) in *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*.

The ability of inhabitants to structure and represent their environment coherently led Lynch to propose that inhabitants rely on a "generalized mental picture of the exterior physical world", an "environmental image". Lynch proposed that the "environmental image is the result of a two-way process between the observer and his environment" (1960: 6). This 'image' serves as a complex spatial *schema* that consolidates the inhabitants' "immediate experiences" of the city into a "framework" of "past experiences". As a solution to the "disorientation" (1960: 4) caused by visual disorder, Lynch argued that the "legibility" (1960: 2) of cities had to be improved in terms of the aspects mentioned above in order to offer "a truly imageable environment" (1960: 96). This would enable people to recognise the environment as "a true place" (1960: 92).

However, Lynch's conception of cities was still firmly based on the "perceptual pattern and symbolic processes of the human being" (Lynch, 1960: 95). His point of departure is the way in which the city is "perceived by its inhabitants" (1960: 3). It is significant to consider that the study was done in collaboration with Kepes (1960: v), the same person whose "systematic presentation of 'visual foundations'" offered, according to Norberg-Schulz, "no assistance to students when it came to design" (2000b: 9). In fact, Lynch described inhabitants individually as "observers" (1960: 9) and collectively as an "audience" (1960: 120). If Norberg-Schulz wanted to find a way to move beyond the "simplification" of the lived situation by perceptual studies, then why did Lynch's study have such a lasting influence on his work? The answer can be found in Otto Friedrich Bollnow's book on the actuality of human spatiality, *Mensch und Raum*, which was published in German in 1963.

It has been argued (subsection 4.3.2) that Bollnow's book played a seminal role in Norberg-Schulz's turn from a reliance on perception psychology to his later architectural 'translation' of Heidegger's philosophical works. In fact, Norberg-Schulz credited Bollnow as the one who opened his own eyes to the possibilities of Heidegger's understanding of human spatiality (2000b: 15).[93] Yet *Mensch und Raum* was only translated and published in English in 2011 (as *Human Space*) and has received little attention as one of Norberg-Schulz's major inspirations. In *Human Space,* Bollnow argued that "experienced space is not ... anything psychological, anything merely experienced or pictured or even imagined: it is the actual concrete space in which our life takes place" (1963: 20).

Within "qualitative space" mankind's "foothold" (dwelling) constitutes a "centre". From it the "system of spatial relationships is structured ... outwards" (Bollnow, 1963: 57).

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[93] The limitations of reading Heidegger (and Lynch) through the eyes of Bollnow will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Mankind's 'centrality' within space is confirmed by the "horizon" that moves along with us; therefore the concrete experience of space presents a curious marriage of the 'centrality' of bodily presence in any space with the remembered (and imagined) centres falling beyond the current horizon. Dwellers have a 'foothold' and a 'horizon'; centre-bound and horizon-bound. This implies that, besides the centre, mankind's experience of space is also structured by means of 'paths' facilitating movement (1963: 72-75). Along paths dwellers "depart" towards the "horizon" (1963: 72) or "return" homewards (1963: 94). Between 'departure' and 'return', life is a path. To allow departure and return, the centre must include ways of crossing the "threshold" (1963: 150) like "doors" and "windows" (1963: 147). This implies that spatial experience is demarcated by means of edges and ways of crossing them. Paths "open up" (1963: 95) the "wider world" (1963: 79) and form a "network" (1963: 97) that connects 'centres' while demarcating the surface into recognisable areas.

Despite eschewing 'psychological' methods, Bollnow thus confirmed the veracity of Lynch's concepts of node, edge, and path and implied the possibility of districts (1963: 69). In a way, Bollnow's philosophy gave Norberg-Schulz 'permission' to appropriate these concepts. Lynch's fifth concept facilitating coherence, 'landmark', corresponded to Giedion's demand for a 'new monumentality' and, as such, was beyond reproach in Norberg-Schulz's eyes.

While the work of Bollnow and Lynch allowed Norberg-Schulz to move beyond the perceptual theory developed in IiA, the work of the Austrian art historian, Hans Sedlmayr (1896-1984), provided a methodological strategy that had a significant influence on Norberg-Schulz's work; a "method of 'structural analysis' (*Strukturanalyse*)" which described the hierarchies inherent in the work of art (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 69).

> In the individual work of art, regardless of its level of internal unity and consistency, not everything is related equally closely to everything else, but there are different levels of interdependence, of meaningful necessity, and of relative contingency (just as there are in the structure of the "larger world"). Typical complexes of relations develop, each of which can be understood as arising from *one* central structural principle. Furthermore, these complexes stand in a determinable structural relation to one another, whereby certain complexes typically presuppose others and are in this sense positioned "over" them (Sedlmayr, 1931: 168).

In the eyes of Norberg-Schulz, Sedlmayr's 'method' suggested that "the same work of art may have several 'formal levels' governed by *different* structural principles, and that each level may have a dual or plural structure" (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 69-70). It should also be

pointed out that the 'dual nature' of Sedlmayr's structuralist approach was grounded in his attempt to unite (what he called) the "two histories of art"; the first focused on describing the 'facts' about works (like their author and background) without necessarily "understanding the work of art as such" (1931: 134-135), and the second aimed to "investigate the properties of works and their internal organization and structure" (1931: 139). Sedlmayr's work offered Norberg-Schulz a way to approach architecture as a "synthetic activity" (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 188), a way that could deal with the traditional historiological 'facts' of the work, while leaving open the possibility of interpreting the internal (and intentional) structure that grants insight into the existential constitution of the whole.

Norberg-Schulz's application of Sedlmayr's structuralist approach to the 'larger world' will be discussed in subsection 4.3.7. By structuring the environmental whole—our "existential space" (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 14-16)—in terms of "environmental levels" (1971: 27) and the "elements" (1971: 17) structuring these levels, Norberg-Schulz hoped to gain access to the lived "difficult whole" described by Venturi (1966: 103).[94]

4.3.5 Norberg-Schulz's amalgamated approach to place and existential space

The work of Bollnow, Lynch and Venturi revealed weaknesses in Norberg-Schulz's reliance on the psychology of perception. Deriving a theory of architecture from the visual interaction between observer and environment perpetuated the division between subject and object. In "The Concept of Place" (CP) (1969) Norberg-Schulz formulated a question which aimed to overcome this division and thereby introduced the next phase of his work: "What do we have to demand from the environment, in order that man may call himself human?" (Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 27).

In CP Norberg-Schulz amalgamated Piaget, Lynch and Bollnow's work into his concept of 'existential space'. Piaget's studies illustrated that children's conception of space was based on an "egocentric" understanding of "space as a system of places" and Lynch showed that this 'gradual' image-construction also holds true for adults. Norberg-Schulz believed that, while existential space is unique to each individual, it also comprises "general structures" described by the "perceptual laws" of *Gestalt* psychology which exist autonomously. Bollnow's exposition of 'human space' re-interpreted these "abstract"

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[94] It should be pointed out that Venturi, in *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, also relied extensively on "contradictory levels of meaning and use" embodied by the idea of "both-and" (1966: 23-33) and the "contradictory levels" embodied by the "double-functioning element" (1966: 34-40).

principles in terms of the "structures of concrete [existence]" and thereby enabled Norberg-Schulz to connect the "concept of space" with the "human actions" needed to "[free] a place for settlement" (Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 29).

For Norberg-Schulz the concept of 'existential space' implied that *life interprets itself as space, in taking possession of the environment*". This act of 'interpretation' "happens simultaneously through physical *orientation* and through a more profound *identification*" (Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 31). The very fact that people build at all convinced Norberg-Schulz that "natural space usually does not suffice to concretize man's existential space", but requires "interaction" (1969: 32). Through interaction with the environment people build up "an image of the environmental structure" – a "system of places" – serving as an "existential space". Norberg-Schulz's thesis was that, if architecture wanted to enframe a way of life, then "architectural space" should "correspond" to "existential space" (1969: 37). In answer to his question, Norberg-Schulz proposed, that "in order that man may call himself human", the environment "ought to possess an 'imageable structure' which offers rich possibilities of identification" (1969: 37). Norberg-Schulz described his understanding of how people adapt to a particular environment by concretising the general structure of existential space in a book that paved the way for his transition to phenomenology, *Existence, Space and Architecture* (1971) (ESA).

4.3.6 Architecture and existential space

In ESA Norberg-Schulz formulated a more coherent, though still amalgamated, approach to human spatiality. Essentially the years following IiA convinced him that people will fail to build their "intentions" if they cannot find a way to "understand" their spatiality in terms of a particular "space concept" (1971: 9). Norberg-Schulz argued that existing theories of space were inadequate, because they were either based on 'thought', thereby displacing mankind by "discussing abstract geometry", or 'perception' that "[reduced] space and architecture to impressions, sensations and studies of 'effects'". Rather than relying on 'geometry' or 'perception', Norberg-Schulz based his theory of space on an understanding of "space as an existential dimension, [denoting the total] relation between man and his environment". People constantly perceive and abstractly represent space, but Norberg-Schulz envisioned a space concept which simultaneously provided order and meaning (1971: 12-14).

Norberg-Schulz suggested that the "primitive total experience" has been fragmented into five specialised 'space concepts' (Figure 6): pragmatic, perceptual, existential, cognitive and logical space. These 'space concepts' form part of a system in which the level of

abstraction grows from pragmatic space to logical space. Whereas pragmatic space is reminiscent of Heidegger's concept of "being-to-hand" (where we have knowledge of things through 'absorbed' use), abstract space points to a Cartesian understanding of "logical relations". Therefore, the system is "controlled from the top, while its vital energy rises up from the bottom". However, people also have the capacity to 'create' space. In addition to the abstraction of the "highest" levels (cognitive and abstract space), Norberg-Schulz proposed "expressive space" and a corresponding abstract construct describing mankind's spatial expression (in the same way that abstract space describes cognitive space) and called it "aesthetic space". In architectural terms expressive space was intended to represent "architectural space" and aesthetic space the "theory of architectural space" (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 9-11).

control   **logical space —— theory of architectural space**

GROWING ABSTRACTION   **cognitive space — architectural space**

existential space —··—··—··:

perceptual space

vital energy   **pragmatic space**

Figure 6: Norberg-Schulz's specialised space constructs.

In ESA Norberg-Schulz still (in part) relied on the psychology of "space perception" to show that we perceive "different worlds which are a product of our motivations and past experiences" (1971: 10). He re-interpreted the concept of *schemata* (developed in IiA) in order to illustrate how the existence of spatial *schemata* differentiates between "immediate perceptual space" and "existential space" (1971: 11). Existential space is more "stable" than perceptual space because it is gradually composed of new experiences ('variations') that are "assimilated" into more enduring *schemata*. Immediate perceptions are thereby gathered into "meaningful totalities" (experiences) assimilated into "typical" responses (*schemata*) to stimuli. People's "*space schemata*" therefore possess a measure of "invariance". It is these spatial *schemata* that support people's 'environmental image' and constitute their "existential space" (1971: 11). Norberg-Schulz proposed that "the *experience* (perception) of space ... consists in the tension between one's immediate situation and existential space" (1971: 34).

In IiA (1963: 23) the architect was expected to "translate" the building task presented by the "situation" into architecture, but in ESA Norberg-Schulz declared that architectural

space should represent "a concretization of man's existential space" (1971: 12). Existential space, therefore, is based neither on 'abstract geometry' nor the 'immediate impressions' of perception, but describes the relationship between people (and their stable but changing *schemata*) and the spatial structure of their environment (1971: 14) as a stable yet changing "image" (1971: 17); a correspondence preserved by means of architectural space.

4.3.7 The elements and levels of existential space

In order to understand existential space, the interaction between an inhabitant's *schemata* and an inhabitant's environment had to be investigated (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 37). In IiA Norberg-Schulz had discussed the concept of *schemata* extensively, but how could the order of the environment be studied objectively?

Norberg-Schulz believed that the environment is "structured *in advance*"; all environments possess a particular topology which suggests routes and places for settlement while presenting challenges. Human environments, as given structures, thereby "define our possibilities". Consequently, people are "*conditioned*" by the environmental structure they inhabit (1966b: 24). In order to gain access to this 'inner structure', Norberg-Schulz appropriated Sedlmayr's method of structural analysis (subsection 4.3.4); an approach centered on the idea that the environment (as a totality) can be divided into "formal levels" subject to "different principles of organization" (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 69). In this way any environment could be analysed in structural terms. Norberg-Schulz proposed three 'elements' which could be used to order the 'levels' of the environment; centre, path and domain.

Norberg-Schulz's concept of centre represented a "common", relatively "invariant" enclosure providing an "inside", or place, where inhabitants gather their possessions, memories and experiences (1971: 18-20). Places contain "directions" that embody "qualitative values". Directions characterised by "continuity" become "paths" (1971: 20-22). By traversing man's environment, paths divide the world into "domains" which serve as a "relatively unstructured" context for the inhabited areas (1971: 23). Thus the inhabited world, as an interaction between figural places (centres) and the paths that join them, set against the background of domains, becomes accessible, recognisable and comprehensible.

It has been argued (subsection 4.3.5) that the concepts of centre, path and domain are 'amalgamated concepts' derived from the work of Bollnow and Lynch. In ESA, Norberg-

Schulz used them as general "elementary organizational *schemata*" (1971: 18) able to describe the "topological" structure of any particular environment (1971: 29). The fact that Norberg-Schulz viewed the environmental structure as a 'topological' reality indicated his belief that that it does not depend on "permanent distances, angles and areas, but [that] it is based upon [*Gestalt*] relations such as proximity, separation, succession, closure (inside-outside) and continuity" (1971: 18). Proximity leads to a "concentration of masses", while "enclosure" defines "a space which is separated from the surroundings as a particular place" (1971: 39). Paths are recognised by means of the "Gestalt principle of continuity, and on a certain similarity of the mass or space elements" outlining its course (1971: 50). Domains are defined by "closure and similarity" (1971: 57).[95] While these elements may be 'suggested' by the natural topology, they still need to be 'realised' by inhabitants. Only when these elements are implemented do they express human interaction with, and understanding of, the environment. Norberg-Schulz proposed that these elements interact on different "environmental levels" (1971: 27).

The most "comprehensive" level is the geographical level. This level bestows a "broad identity" on the inhabitants of a region or country and is of "political" and "cultural importance" (1971: 27-28). The landscape level has its own "structure" imbued with a "characteristic identity" (*genius loci*) with which people have to "come to terms". Collectively, this "character" and "natural structure" forms the "background" of mankind's "environmental image" (1971: 28-29). Works of architecture, by imposing a man-made order on the landscape, provide a place for the interaction between person and environment and thereby facilitate orientation and identification. The resulting "structured whole" constitutes an urban place that has a "higher density than its surroundings" resulting in a particular figure-ground relationship (1971: 75). Within the public urban level, people establish a private realm. While the landscape is "domain-dominated" and the city is "path-dominated", the house is "place-dominated" (1971: 31). The house provides the location for the most intimate level of existential space. Its "character" is determined by the things that serve as "foci" in the house (1971: 31-32). Norberg-Schulz subdivided the "level of things" in terms of "objects-for-use" determined by the "size of the hand" and "furniture" determined by the "size of the body" (1971: 27).

Significantly, Norberg-Schulz proposed that the relationship between "the system of levels, the different *schemata* developed on each level, and the interactions of levels constitute the structure of existential space" (1971: 27). His formulation of existential

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[95] Subsection 4.8.2 presents a more general discussion of Norberg-Schulz's engagement with the *Gestalt* principles.

space therefore presents a marriage of Sedlmayr's systematic structuralist approach and the 'contradictions' of 'human space' that emerged from his study of Bollnow, Venturi and Lynch's work; an understanding composed in an 'objective' systematic way, yet infused with qualitative contradictions, constituting a hybrid totality which is both structured and concrete. Ultimately, all these relations are gathered in the 'history' of an environment as the unrelenting advancement of 'continuity and change'. Existential space provided Norberg-Schulz with a way to engage with the contradictions characterising the intimate relationship between beings and their world, which his understanding of the 'psychology of perception' could not accommodate.

4.3.8 Representation and adaptation

The most important reason Norberg-Schulz established these "environmental levels" is that he believed they could "represent each other" (1971: 32). By making architects aware of these levels he hoped to enable them to interpret and concretise the contents of one level on another.

> A representation from the top [environment] towards the bottom [buildings and things] of the hierarchy means that the higher levels are 'concretized' by the lower. In other words, man 'receives' the environment and makes it focus in concrete buildings and things. The things thereby 'articulate' the environment and make its character precise (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 32).

By interpreting the environment mankind made the lived environment "known". However, for the relationship between people and their environment to become a true interaction, the process of representation must also be active in the opposite direction (1971: 32).

> A representation from the bottom [buildings and things] towards the top [environment] means that man 'projects' himself into the environment. He communicates something to the environment, which in turn unifies his 'things' in a larger meaningful context (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 32-33).

The concept of environmental levels, therefore, reveals that the "interaction between man and the environment" is born out of "two complementary processes which are directed inwards and outwards" (1971: 33). Searching "outwards" dwellers find the "depth of distance" in which nature "contains" everything in a landscape, not only physically but also spiritually as a "general imprint".[96] Venturing "inwards" dwellers find the "depth of nearness" in which things "focus" everything in a "figure", not only physically but also

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[96] The nature of this 'general imprint', which Norberg-Schulz later discussed as the *genius loci* (or spirit of the place), will be discussed in subsection 4.3.11.

spiritually as a "gathering" (1971: 32). The interaction between "outward projection" and "inward concretization" constitutes mankind's "adaptation" (Figure 7) to the environment (1971: 33). Adaptation (a concept Norberg-Schulz appropriated from Piaget) implies that people have the ability to "accommodate" their environment (be shaped by it), but that they do not "submit passively" to their surroundings. They also shape, or "assimilate". By deciding the extent and nature of their assimilation, while at the same time accommodating "conditions" of the place, adaptation reveals both the human character and the nature of the environment (1971: 11).

ADAPTATION

landscape **domain-dominated**

city **path-dominated**

house **center-dominated**

thing **foci**

ASSIMILATE — man receives and concretizes

Representation (top to bottom) Environment is articulated by means of things

ACCOMMODATE — man projects himself into the environment

Representation (bottom to top) things unified in a meaningfule environment

Figure 7: The interaction between the levels of existential space that constitute adaptation.

The topology of a natural place may suggest adaptations, but people are free to decide how 'accommodative' or 'assimilative' they want to approach the situation. Norberg-Schulz proposed that, since choices are based on 'values', which reveal the "intentions" behind actions, 'interpretations' can be seen as "meaningful choices". Consequently, the 'forms' (expressions) resulting from interpretations, represent 'meaningful' acts of engagement (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 38-39). This interaction between the inhabitant's *schemata* and the habitat's 'structure' must be concretised as architectural space. In the words of Norberg-Schulz: "Man's relation to architectural space therefore consists, on the one hand, in trying to integrate its structure into his personal *schemata*, and on the other in translating his schemata into concrete architectural structures" (1971: 37).

Norberg-Schulz's insistence on the "structural similarity" between the *schemata* of the inhabitant and the structure of the environment implies that "[c]reating architectural space ... means integrating an intended form of life in the environment" (1971: 39). In order to

explain this correspondence between architectural and existential space, Norberg-Schulz relied on the concept of an architectural 'field'.

4.3.9 The field, existential space and Venturi's 'difficult whole'

Norberg-Schulz appropriated the concept of 'field' from the Italian architect, Paulo Porthoghesi (b. 1931), who used the term "*campo*" (Porthoghesi in Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 59). In ESA the concept of "field" designated a "dynamic totality" (1971: 65) where centres, paths and domains interact systematically as "forces" (1971: 59). In fact, Porthoghesi's plan for *Casa Andreis* offers a very apt explanation of the main argument Norberg-Schulz presented in ESA: different elements (foci that exert "forces") are identified (by humans possessing *schemata*) within an interaction of 'levels'. The spatial implications of these elements (the forces exerted within the 'fields') are integrated and made more precise by means of a 'geometrical structure'. The interaction between the elements in the landscape and the *schemata* of the inhabitant (who desires to order the landscape) results in a structural system (constituting an existential space) which can be expressed in terms of actual building tasks. The interaction of the typical structures of experience (*schemata*), the ordering elements that structure the levels of the environment (centre, domain and path) and the interaction of the levels constitute a very complex 'layered' spatiality.

Norberg-Schulz believed that this complex spatial system (grounded in Sedlmayr's structural approach) 'explained' Venturi's concept of the "difficult whole" (Venturi cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 99): "Firstly, we have to accept the fact of architectural levels, and realize that each of them need a defined identity. Secondly we should remember that this identity is based on simple topological relationships" (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 103). Norberg-Schulz understood the difficult whole in terms of relatively 'simple' elements interacting (on different levels) in a variety of ways that result in a complexity reflecting the multifarious nature of existence.

While this formulation of existential space provided a much more concrete understanding of the relationship between the building task and the space in which the way of life unfolds, Norberg-Schulz's reliance on 'fields' proved insufficient to capture the depth of concrete human belonging. In many ways, ESA served as a bridge between the methods relying on the 'psychology of perception' and the 'phenomenological methods' that characterised his later work. In this regard, it is important to remember that Norberg-Schulz did not view ESA as a 'completed project'. Even before ESA was published, in a letter written to his publishers (Studio Vista Ltd.), dated 20/12/1970 (NAM 1), Norberg-

Schulz indicated that he was planning a course focusing on "Expression and Character in Architecture", which would form a "natural sequel" to his focus on the organisational aspects of existential space in ESA. It appears that already in 1971 Norberg-Schulz was convinced that the human need for meaning could not be solved through psychology, but was of an existential nature. In a handwritten document he stated the following:

> The human problem is an identity problem
> The identity problem is existential: it can
> not be isolated as a "psychological" ("inner") or a "milieu" ("outer") problem,
> but is a 'being-in-the-world' problem ...
> Genius loci is an expression of an achieved identity[97]
> (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23, handwritten document, 04/10/1971).

In the years following the publication of ESA, Norberg-Schulz started engaging with the concept of *genius loci*, even though he still seemed hesitant to embark on a full-scale study of its implications. Instead, he relied on his concept of existential space as a theoretical basis to conduct a study of architectural history culminating in the publication of *Meaning in Western Architecture* (1974) (MiWA).

4.3.10 Architectural history as the search for an existential foothold

In MiWA, Norberg-Schulz tested his theory of space by applying it to "historical movements" (1974: 388) from ancient Egypt to the 'pluralism' that characterised contemporary architecture. Norberg-Schulz systematically explored each epoch in terms of 'landscape', 'settlement morphology' and 'articulation' in order to ascertain the 'space concept' that determined how the architectural tradition 'translated' the experienced 'existential meanings' characterised the way of life. The resulting historic study of "architecture as a concretization of existential space" revealed the "spatial properties of the work or group of works" and provided a "structural analysis of the various environmental layers" in terms of the "interaction" of centres, paths and domains (1974: 434). In MiWA Norberg-Schulz showed how the search for architecture as a 'solution' to the tasks set by the way of life can be 'made concrete' by understanding architecture as

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[97] "*Menneskets problem er et identitetsproblem.*
Identitetsproblemet er eksistensielt: det kan
ikke isoleres som et "psykisk" ("indre") eller et "miljo" ("ytre") problem,
men er et 'in-der-Welt-sein' problem …
Genius loci er et uttrykk for oppnådd identitet"
(Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23, handwritten document in original Norwegian, 04/10/1971). Translation by author. I am indebted to Dr Gro Lauvland, who offered insights and valuable guidance in the translation of this passage from Norwegian to English.

an "existential foothold" (1974: 428), in contrast to his earlier idea of a "psychological foothold" (1966a: 255). The assumption underpinning Norberg-Schulz's work in MiWA was that "architectural history describes how man found 'spatial footholds' under different conditions" (1974: 434).

Establishing an 'existential foothold' depends on architecture's ability to translate experienced meanings into general symbolic forms that convey the "concrete structure of man's environment". Norberg-Schulz believed that, in order to gain access to the 'existential meanings' of 'daily life', inhabitants have to "reach beyond the individual situation". This is made possible by the human ability to "generalize", enabling inhabitants to "[recognise] similarities and relationships" that possess a level of "invariance in space and time" and then translating these enduring spatial relationships "into spatial forms" (1974: 5). In MiWA, architectural history came to stand for "the growth of accessible meanings" (1974: 433) and architecture was presented as the "structuring" of the world. Architectural structuring allowed inhabitants to generalise existing situations, extract experienced meanings, and gain an "existential foothold" by building these meanings (1974: 431). Consequently, works of architecture, as products of human structuring, could facilitate orientation and identification and sustain the possibility of meaningful existence.

It could be argued that Norberg-Schulz's reliance on generalisation was a remnant of the "easy unity of exclusion" (Venturi, 1966: 16) which marked the 'international' aspirations of modernism, but Norberg-Schulz's understanding of the interaction between general and particular actually represented a decidedly qualitative approach. Norberg-Schulz's essay, "Timber Buildings in Europe" (1978) (TBE), included a discussion of Norwegian farm buildings, which offers an illuminating glimpse into the way Norberg-Schulz understood the concept of generalisation.

Norberg-Schulz explained that Norwegian farms are typically made up of a grouping of "small buildings". The most significant is the "*stue*" (dwelling house) and the "*stabbur*" (loft). The dwelling constitutes an answer to the particular (everyday) demands of "living", while the loft, as a "treasury", serves a more "symbolic" function; "a manifestation of the reward gained through the hard labour of daily life" (1978: 116-120). The Norwegian farm ensemble, therefore, portrays the way that both the 'general' and the 'particular' can be rooted in a way of life. In this example, the interaction between the changing everydayness of the dwelling and the symbolic continuity passed from one generation to the next, i.e. the interaction between everyday life and a general symbolic explanation are rooted in a concrete Norwegian situation. Therefore, Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of the

interaction between particular and general is much closer to Venturi's inclusive "difficult whole" (Venturi, 1966: 103), than the 'exclusive' tendencies of internationalism.

How can the generalisations of contemporary architecture attain the complex coherence that characterised earlier building traditions? Inspired by the idea that "any meaning is necessarily revealed in a particular place" (1974: 430), Norberg-Schulz proposed a solution summarised by the term "*genius loci*" (1974: 391), a concept that allowed him to concretely approach what Louis Kahn described as "a world within a world" (Kahn cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1974: 391).

4.3.11 Early conceptions of the *genius loci*

Even though Norberg-Schulz (in ESA) largely neglected the importance of 'character' in favour of 'spatial organisation',[98] it seems as if he had already grasped the importance of the interaction of the *genius loci,* architectural space, and existential space within the concreteness of a lived human reality: "Architectural space as a concretization of existential space [is the key that allows architects to concretize] man's being in the world" (1971: 68-69). Despite these assertions, the full impact of the *genius loci* remained obscure in ESA. It is in MiWA that Norberg-Schulz began to take decisive steps towards a deeper understanding of the *genius loci*.

In MiWA Norberg-Schulz argued that a 'proper understanding' of both "character" and "spatial structure" is needed to engage with the *genius loci*. The "spatial structure" can be understood in "abstract" ways, but it will only prove "relevant if it concretizes the spatial implications of a character by means of structural similarity, and thus establishes a meaningful definition of places, paths and domains". In order to understand the concrete relationship between inhabitant and environment, Norberg-Schulz united the interaction between "spatial structure" and "character" in the "inclusive concept of *genius loci*". By subjecting architecture to the *genius loci*, works could be interpreted both in terms of "circumstantially determined meanings, as well as the general symbolizations of a cultural tradition" (1974: 422-424).

Already in 1975 Norberg-Schulz distinguished between "Ørkenen" (desert) (1975b: 80), "*Skogen*" (forest) (1975b: 81) and "*det klassiske landskap*" (the classical landscape) (1975b: 82) as a way to understand the "*kvalitative egenskapene*" (qualitative properties) (1975b: 80) of landscapes. This became the archetypal landscapes (cosmic, romantic and

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[98] It has been pointed out (subsection 4.3.9) that Norberg-Schulz (after writing ESA) planned to discuss the character of the place in a future publication.

classical) used (in GL) to convey the idea of a typical *genius loci* demarcating the spatial structure and environmental character of these landscapes.

The *genius loci* presents "a synthesis between 'being somewhere' and symbolic openness"; a rooted 'order' made alive by interpretive 'freedom' (Norberg-Schulz, 1974: 421). While the work of Lynch, Bollnow, Piaget and Sedlmayr offered Norberg-Schulz valuable ways to proceed beyond the confines of the psychology of perception, it was Heidegger's philosophy of 'being-in-the-world' that provided him with a "concrete basis for the understanding of the relationship between ourselves and our environment" (1974: 425). Heidegger's philosophy brought the 'subject' and 'object' into contiguity and discredited the uncertainty (Cartesian doubt) that the supposed 'rationality' of cognition was continuously struggling to overcome. People live amid things, entangled in a situation in which they participate concretely.

4.3.12 Towards a poetic understanding of architecture

In the early 1970s[99] Norberg-Schulz embarked on a study of Heidegger's work. It is especially *Poetry, Language, Thought* (originally published in 1971) (PLT)[100] which played a decisive role. In these essays Heidegger discussed the ways in which 'poetry' serves as "the creative source of the humanness of the dwelling life of man" (Hofstadter, 2001: xv). The most fundamental aim Norberg-Schulz formulated in IiA was to create architecture that relevantly translates a way of life. Heidegger argued that any way of life is grounded in poetics. Only a poetic mindset can grasp the authentic depth that makes existence meaningful.

PLT also discussed Heidegger's understanding of art as the "setting-into-work of truth" (Heidegger, 1936a: 74). Norberg-Schulz (in IiA) defined art as the "concretization of an intermediate object" (1963: 68), a "semantic" problem (1963: 71). However, in his

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[99] While Otero-Pailos claimed that Norberg-Schulz's "first sustained consideration of Heidegger occurred in the spring of 1974" (due to the fact that his copy of *Poetry, Language Thought* is signed "Boston 1974") (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 173 & 287), it can be argued that Norberg-Schulz's interest in Heidegger's phenomenology occurred much earlier. ESA (1971) already included various references to Heidegger's work, and the Norberg-Schulz archives (The National Museum–Architecture in Oslo) include a manuscript entitled *Ordnung und Wandel: Heidegger und die Architektur* (Order and change: Heidegger and Architecture) which is dated 1970 (NAM 6).

[100] PLT is a collection of essays that Heidegger wrote between 1936 and 1951.

"Introduction"[101] to AMP Norberg-Schulz displayed a much more concrete understanding of the architectural totality by stating that "architecture matters" (1979a: 16). Architecture is meaningful and it possesses materiality. Norberg-Schulz's study of architectural history, illuminated by a Heideggarian sensibility, now pointed to the fact that, historically, "human life was intimately related to things and places". The world, therefore, did not primarily become 'common' by means of a symbol-system. Symbol-systems resulted from common "experiences" in a "world [characterised by] qualities and meanings" (1979a: 11). If Heidegger was right about the nature of art, then architecture had to be approached as a "setting-into-work of truth" (Heidegger, 1936a: 69).

Norberg-Schulz proposed that architecture's "share of the truth" is encapsulated in the concept of "place" (1979c: 6). Place is the concrete, qualitative commonality that underlies a way of life. Furthermore, he united the 'spatial structure' and 'character' of the place in the concept of *genius loci*. Consequently, for architecture to artistically provide orientation and identification, it had to be understood as the setting-into-work of the *genius loci* of the place.

Norberg-Schulz's book on the work of Paulo Porthoghesi and Vittorio Gigliotti entitled *On the Search for Lost Architecture* (1975a), provides an early indication of the change in Norberg-Schulz's approach. While ESA tried to understand Porthoghesi's architecture in terms of 'fields', Norberg-Schulz now aimed at a much more concrete understanding of architecture as a source of poetic revelation enabling "poetic statement" (1975a: 88).

> Together, spatial structure and character make up a *place* in the true sense of the word, and we may conclude that the purpose of architecture is the creation of such places. Our language expresses this basic fact beautifully when we say that human actions "take place". Only when man belongs to a place we may say that he "dwells" (Norberg-Schulz, 1975a: 30).

Works of architecture thus constitute the *poiesis* of place. In a later article also on the work of Porthoghesi, entitled "The Vision of Paolo Porthoghesi" (1981a) (VPP), Norberg-Schulz made it clear that "Porthoghesi's interest in place and history" teaches us that works of architecture are always "rooted" in a place with a specific history and tradition (1981a: 214).

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[101] This "Introduction" was actually a condensed version of a lecture Norberg-Schulz presented at the University of Dallas (02/03/1979) (NAM 22). The significance of the difference between the 'full text' (lecture notes) and the 'condensed version' is discussed in subsection 6.5.3.

The memories of Paolo Porthoghesi and Vittorio Gigliotti
are the dense, organized spaces
and significant environmental characters
of Rome and Salerno.
And the lessons of Michelangelo and Borromini,
of Guarini and Modern Architecture.
Their works are therefore simultaneously new and old.
They revive lost architecture
and create places
for human life (Norberg-Schulz, 1975a: 7).

This is not to say that Porthoghesi and Gigliotti where merely imitating an established architectural language. Rather, what makes their "belonging" meaningful (according to Norberg-Schulz) was that their works where both 'new and old'. They reinterpreted the 'dense, organized spaces' (spatial organisation) and the 'significant environmental characters', thereby concretely interacting with the established *genius loci* in new and revelatory ways; hermeneutic interpretations of a 'lost architecture' desiring places which allow life to 'take place' in new, yet strangely familiar, ways; a celebration of 'continuity and change'.

Norberg-Schulz believed that the way towards such an architectural approach lay ensconced in Heidegger's phenomenology of 'being-in-the-world'; an approach which aimed at a poetic "rediscovery of the world as a totality of interacting, concrete qualities" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979a: 16). It is the wish to 'rediscover' (and architecturally express) the way human's dwell amid this totality, as emplaced existence, which can be seen as the motivating force behind Norberg-Schulz's groundbreaking book, *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture* (GL) (1979).

In GL Norberg-Schulz (inspired by Heidegger[102]) developed a phenomenology of place engaging with the "truth" (1979b: 6) where works of architecture had to "set-into-work" (Heidegger in Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 65). Ultimately, the new "space concept" necessary for people to "carry out [their] intentions" (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 9) was nothing inherently 'spatial', but required understanding 'existential space' as 'place'. This section discussed Norberg-Schulz's move from the psychology of perception towards a phenomenological approach. Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, as a way to

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[102] In his preface to GL, Norberg-Schulz acknowledged that the way towards "understanding architecture as a concrete phenomenon" had been opened by "Heidegger's essays on language and aesthetics" in PLT (1979b: 5).

appreciate place as a phenomenological concept and study the role of architecture in the making of places, constitutes the second phase of his theoretical writings.

4.4 Phase 2: the phenomenological understanding of place

This section will discuss the implications of Norberg-Schulz's change in focus from "space" to "place", and from "perception" to "being-in-the-world"[103]. Norberg-Schulz described this transition as a shift "from sensation to participation".[104] He believed that the "loss of place" stemmed from mankind's misplaced reliance on the "abstractions" of science. These abstractions provide quantitative "data" about the world, but do not provide a relevant understanding of the qualitative "content"[105] of existence (1979b: 6). In contrast to understanding the world in rational (scientific) terms, Norberg-Schulz aimed at formulating a poetic understanding of place.

4.4.1 Poetry and the life-world

In the opening chapter of GL, Norberg-Schulz turned to 'poetry' as a way to "concretize those totalities which elude science" (1979b: 8). Norberg-Schulz's analysis of the poem, "A Winter Evening",[106] by the Austrian poet, Georg Trakl (1887-1914), revealed four insights that guided his attempt to formulate a phenomenological understanding of place.

Firstly, the poem revealed how to respond to the fact that "every situation is local as well as general". While science takes an instance and aims to create general "laws" that can be applied to other situations, poetry tries to reveal how the "general" illuminates the particular "concrete things" (e.g. a building). Secondly, the poem distinguished between "inside" and "outside", the "departure" and "return" of the "wanderer", and (by referring to the "falling snow") the existence of something "above" (sky) and something "below" (earth). Norberg-Schulz saw these categories as an indication of the spatial nature governing the "structure of *places*" (1979b: 10). The spatial structuring of place, as an aspect of poetic understanding, allows for the possibility of orientation.

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[103] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23, undated handwritten document filed with notes from 1982-1983.

[104] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture notes, "The Problem of Form in Modern Architecture", 04/1988: 11.

[105] The Norwegian word for 'content' is *innhold* (Afrikaans: *inhoud*). *Innhold* alludes to the 'in' of being-in-the-world, but also implies the act of 'holding' or 'keeping' something (as an act of preservation).

[106] Heidegger analysed this poem in his essay, "Language" (1950b).

Thirdly, the poem also suggested that "nature forms an extended comprehensive totality" filled with "natural things" that embody the "character" of the environment, thereby bestowing a particular "identity" (1979b: 10) on the surroundings, which allows for the possibility of identification. Lastly, Norberg-Schulz used Trakl's poem to differentiate between "natural and man-made phenomena". While Norberg-Schulz believed that "natural space is never enough to concretize man's existential space" (1971: 79), he also valued "natural elements" as the "primary components of the given" (1979b: 10). Understanding buildings in terms of the interaction between a 'poetic understanding' and a 'given world', revealed architecture as a form of 'creative participation' that "belongs to poetry" (1979b: 23).

The following sections will discuss ways GL integrated aspects of thought and feeling by relying on a poetic approach. Norberg-Schulz believed that modern architecture—aiming at "design for life"—tried to satisfy the "demand for meaning", but lacked an "adequate understanding of the life-world" (1980a: 197). He, therefore, proposed augmenting Giedion's 'new tradition' with a phenomenological understanding of place.

4.4.2 Place, life-world, and *genius loci*

In his later writings Norberg-Schulz described the breakthrough achieved in GL, as a move from a conception of "place perceived and reacted upon" to an understanding of a "place received with a spirit understood". Like Heidegger, Norberg-Schulz wanted to move beyond an understanding of "perception based on a subject-object relationship" to an existential understanding of architecture engaged with *Dasein* as participant (2000b: 10).

In GL Norberg-Schulz argued that "our everyday life-world consists of concrete [interrelated] phenomena [given as] 'content' of our existence" which are united in "comprehensive phenomena" (like a landscape) serving as "environment". The concept of "place" served as a "concrete term [to describe this] environment". While Functionalism ignored the reality of "place as a concrete 'here' having its particular identity", Norberg-Schulz tried to engage with the way human life unfolds in place. He understood place as a "qualitative, 'total' phenomenon ... made up of concrete things" (1979b: 6-8).

Norberg-Schulz proposed that what is most true about place is that it constitutes a "living reality" (1979b: 18) offering identification and orientation. In poetic terms, place is a dynamic whole that allows mankind (through 'thought') to construct a spatially understood world and (through 'feelings') to associate emotionally with the 'atmosphere' of the place. Norberg-Schulz, therefore, aimed to achieve a poetic synthesis in which place is intimately

entangled with the way of life. While the spatial structure of the place still corresponded to the interaction of place, path and domain (formulated in ESA), Norberg-Schulz elaborated this idea in terms of a 'character' describing 'how' these places, paths and domains concretely exist.

Another remnant of ESA, is the idea that the interaction of the character and structure of places must be understood on different "environmental levels" (1979b: 16). There are, however, clear adjustments that differentiate his phenomenological approach. The natural environment was now understood as something "given" (1979b: 6), rather than something requiring "taking possession" (1971: 23). Furthermore, this world was given with a structure and a character; an inherently meaningful world. The concepts of 'place' and '*genius loci*' enabled Norberg-Schulz to elaborate the triangular architectural totality formulated in IiA into a fourfold interaction (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Place, task, technics, form, and the *genius loci* as a unifying atmosphere. The diagram draws on Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Arnheim's structural analysis of a square (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: figure 7).

The concept of '*genius loci*' served as the 'unifying agent' which brought the different elements into a meaningful synthesis. Is this 'square diagram' merely an expression of Norberg-Schulz's "obsession with visual thinking", as Otero-Pailos (2010: 161) claimed? In IiA Norberg-Schulz actually discussed the nature of this square. It is illuminating to note that while he certainly dwelt on the visual aspects of the square, he valued Arnheim's "structural skeleton" because it did not have "a uniform character". Rather than "Euclidian", the square is "topological" (1963: 46). If something as seemingly 'homogenous' and 'rational' as a square diagram contains qualitatively different 'places' of significance, then *Dasein*'s lived places should also be understood qualitatively.

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Norberg-Schulz believed that the *genius loci* – the "spirit of place" – constitutes the "'opposite' man has to come to terms with in order to dwell" (1979b: 10-11). This given reality must be 'gathered' and 'explained' in man-made things. Architecturally, inhabitants had to 'translate' their understanding and experience of the given spatial structure and character of place (the "spatiality of the life-world") into a transformed place – a "built form" (1980a: 195) – that acts as a mediator between the spatiality of the world and mankind's way of life. Therefore, "place" constituted both "the point of departure and the goal" of Norberg-Schulz's environmental phenomenology. "[A]t the outset place is presented as a given, spontaneously experienced totality, at the end it appears as a structured [understood] world" (1979b: 18). Buildings, or acts of building, safeguard the inhabitant's relationship with the place. Norberg-Schulz interpreted Heidegger's concept of "dwelling" (Heidegger, 1951a: 144) as "the total man-place relationship [in which mankind] is simultaneously located in space and exposed to a certain environmental character" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 19). Dwelling describes the nature of the 'dynamic' yet 'rooted' interaction between humans and the environment that Norberg-Schulz (in ESA) envisioned as 'existential space'. Norberg-Schulz argued that people, throughout history, experienced this relationship in 'mythological' terms (1979b: 23).

4.4.3 Cultivating a mythical understanding of place

In order to "dwell between heaven and earth" inhabitants have to comprehend the "meanings" embodied in the *genius loci*. Every landscape has a "spatial structure" that "admits certain actions" and a "character" that "embodies meanings". Therefore, the landscape is not experienced as "a flux of phenomena". Rather, it is characterised by a structural continuity that (in pre-modern times) came to stand for "mythologies" which gave a sense of stability to the act of dwelling (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 23).

Norberg-Schulz identified "five basic modes of mythical understanding" (1979b: 24): Firstly, dwellers related (natural) "forces" to concrete "things" (1979b: 24), thereby establishing "sacred" places (e.g. a sacred mountain). Secondly, dwellers generalised an abstract "cosmic order from the flux of occurrences" which rendered environments comprehensible as a "local geographical structure" in which "directions" were imbued with "qualities" (e.g. the significance ascribed to east and west, and downstream and upstream in ancient Egypt) (1979b: 28). Thirdly, the anthropomorphic description of "natural places" in terms of "basic human traits" enabled the association of particular landscapes with a specific "personality" (e.g. the Ancient Greek understanding of places in terms of 'gods') (1979b: 28). The fourth mythical way to understand nature was focused on more

"intangible" phenomena that aspired to represent the conception of 'divinity' in terms of mankind's environment (e.g. the 'symbolism of light' in the Christian tradition) (1979b: 31-32). Finally, Norberg-Schulz pointed to the way environments change over time (e.g. the difference between morning and noon, and from one season to the next) and how these temporal changes play a formative role in the perceived character of places (1979b: 32).

> Thing, order, character, light and time are the basic categories of concrete natural understanding. Whereas thing and order, are spatial (in a concrete qualitative sense), character and light refer to the general atmosphere of a place. We may also point out that "thing" and "character" (in the sense here used) are dimensions of the earth, whereas "order" and "light" are determined by the sky. Time, finally, is the dimension of constancy and change, and makes space and character parts of a living reality, which at any moment is given as a particular place, as a *genius loci* (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 32).

Within the interaction between thing, order, character and light, Norberg-Schulz envisioned the *genius loci* as a unifying force that, in accordance with temporal continuity and change, holds sway over inhabitants and their places and determines their "essence" (1979b: 18). Furthermore, the *genius loci* consists of "all the meanings which are gathered by a place" (1979b: 18) and thereby "denotes what a thing *is*" (1979b: 170). Norberg-Schulz claimed he did not envision the *genius loci* as a static or fixed Platonic "essence" (1980a: 196), but as a "living reality" (1979b: 18). Therefore, the "identity of place [must be interpreted] in ever new ways [and does not subsist in merely copying] old models" (1979b: 182).

Norberg-Schulz superimposed this mythical way of understanding the world on Heidegger's concept of the fourfold.[107] Heidegger envisioned the fourfold as the interaction between the "earth", "sky", "mortals" and the "divine". Humans, as mortals, belong to the fourfold in that they "dwell" between earth and sky and "await" the divine. This fourfold – the world that is given – is not composed of separate entities, but is constituted by a "simple oneness" (Heidegger, 1951a: 147-148). In the hands of Norberg-Schulz (1979b: 170), 'things' came to stand for 'earth', 'order' for 'sky', 'character' for 'mortals', and 'light' became an expression of the 'divine'. Norberg-Schulz understood time as the force that regulates the progression from one form of understanding (epoch) to the next. His interpretation of the fourfold, therefore, described the interaction between the enduring *genius loci* and the temporal interpretations of this totality; an interaction grounded in 'continuity and change'. In GL Norberg-Schulz proposed a marriage between

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[107] See Glossary: Fourfold.

mankind's mythological understanding of place and Heidegger's phenomenological understanding of the world as 'fourfold' (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Merging Heidegger's concept of the fourfold and Norberg-Schulz's mythological understanding of place.

4.4.4 Thing, work and inhabited landscape: a mythical understanding of architecture

The scientific conception of the world is ruled by the idea that things are 'objects', which people as 'subjects' perceive and study. Heidegger argued that things[108] are much more significant; they are "near us" (1950a: 164) as 'gatherings of the fourfold' (1950a: 171). Norberg-Schulz's investigation of things in ESA concentrated on the idea that, in contrast to the 'extension' of the landscape, "in things everything is focused" (1971: 32).

In "The Thing" (1950a) Heidegger referred to a 'jug' to illustrate how this 'focusing' happens. Heidegger argued that the "jugness of the jug" resides in the "gift of the outpouring". For instance, if this 'gift' is wine, Heidegger proposed that the jug be understood as a gathering of the rays of the sun on the vine married with the "nourishment" of the earth. Earth and sky are "betrothed" in the gift. The gift can also quench the thirst of "mortals" and can "at times [be] given for consecration" (Heidegger 1950a: 170): "In the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, divinities and mortals dwell *together all at once* ... [in] the simple singlefoldness of the four" (Heidegger, 1950a: 171). The meaning of the jug resides in "gathering" and "appropriately staying the fourfold" (1950a: 170-171).

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[108] See Glossary: Thing.

Norberg-Schulz proposed that a work of architecture should also be seen as a 'thing-like' act of gathering[109]. Consequently, the "meaning" of works of architecture depends on the "world" the work gathers and reveals (1979a: 37). Buildings bring the world 'near' as an 'inhabited landscape'. Ultimately, 'the world' becomes 'our world'. Norberg-Schulz envisioned the 'inhabited landscape' as a *place* providing 'identification', 'orientation', and 'togetherness' (1979c: 44); a landscape made to correspond with the habits and rituals of people inhabiting their habitat. Through building, the way of life is made to correspond to the given properties of the landscape and the landscape is made to correspond to the demands of life. By establishing the way mankind "[belongs] to a concrete place" inhabitants are invited to "*be at peace in a protected place*" (1979b: 22-23).

A building, as a gathering thing, "brings the inhabited landscape close to man, so that he may experience his existence as meaningful". By understanding architecture as a thing, Norberg-Schulz, therefore, illustrated that architectural meaning is "not a problem of communication. Meaning in architecture is accomplished when the work of architecture reveals the spatiality of the life-world" (1980a: 197). A building, understood as a thing, is meaningful, not because it forms part of a 'symbol-system', but because it can gather the life-world and thereby disclose "life in its various aspects" (1979b: 169). When inhabitants are able to "read" these "revealings" they "dwell poetically" (1979b: 169-170).

In his later work, Norberg-Schulz (1984a: 17) argued that Heidegger, by choosing to refer to a jug (a man-made thing) went "beyond the things that are given in nature". A man-made thing is a "work" whereby man "intentionally gathers a world". A thing, therefore, represents a particular "interpretation" of the "meanings [which] are inherent in the world"; of the *genius loci* (1979b: 170). Man-made things not only mirror "natural meanings", but create 'new meanings' (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 169). People, by making things, become 'creative participants' who poetically reveal the world of life. Building gathers the world into works of architecture that "uncover", "illuminate", and "keep" (1979a: 18) the *genius loci* through an act of "poetical revelation" (1984a: 17-18).

A building is not only a 'thing', but also a 'work'; an interpretation that "speaks" for the thing. In the work the understood world is given "presence" (Norberg-Schulz, 1983a: 44). In CoD (1984a: 135) Norberg-Schulz explained that this is the meaning of the phrase by

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[109] The essence of gathering is expressed poignantly by the Afrikaans word for gathering, *bymekaarmaak*. Literally translated this word would mean 'making-together': a concept that reveals the poetic aspirations, in the sense of *poiesis*, encapsulated in the act of gathering.

the Austrian poet, Rainer Maria Rilke[110] (1875-1926): "The things trust us for rescue". We are the ones who are able to make works and reveal the 'thingness' of things. In architectural terms this means that buildings not only gather the inhabited landscape, but also make it "known". Buildings reveal and safeguard the hidden meaning (the "truth") of the place (Norberg-Schulz, 1983a: 44).

Norberg-Schulz proposed that works are meaningful because they gather the content of an inherently meaningful world: "meaning implies that the small things are understood as condensations of the large world and that the world is explained by the things" (Norberg-Schulz, 1981a: 212). As a work, buildings should not only be seen as 'objects' contained in places, but, as Heidegger said, "things themselves are places and do not merely belong in a place" (Heidegger, 1969: 308). Consequently, the "meaning of architectural concretization" subsists in the ability to "set a place into work, in the sense of concrete building" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 65-66). The building, as a thing and a work, brings a 'transformed place' to presence. Norberg-Schulz believed that human "inventions" will only be "meaningful" if they "have formal properties which are structurally similar to ... natural structures" (1979b: 169); a poetically expressed correspondence.

4.4.5 Structural similarity: *Stimmung* and *Übereinstimmung*

In IiA Norberg-Schulz discussed 'structural similarity' as the source of the 'semantical relations' between task and forms. But his understanding of architecture as a (Heideggarian) thing led to a deeper understanding of the structural similarities that unite a way of life with the life-world. In GL he tried to decipher the structural similarities that make human existence in space meaningful. In accordance with the 'principles' extracted from Trakl's poem, Norberg-Schulz initially treated natural and man-made places separately in order to illustrate how "natural place", can be concretised in 'man-made things' (1979b: 10). In spatial terms Norberg-Schulz proposed that "the boundaries of both [man-made and natural] space are moreover to be defined in terms of 'floor' [earth], 'wall' [horizon], and 'ceiling' [sky]. Natural and man-made space may thus *represent* each other reciprocally" (1979b: 169).

In terms of the possibility for establishing correspondence between the character of the place and the built work, Norberg-Schulz argued that any place has a "*Stimmung*"

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[110] Rilke's work is quoted in GL (1979b: 185-186), and extensively discussed by Heidegger in "What are poets for?" (1946). Norberg-Schulz even mused over the possibility that Heidegger was "a little jealous of Rilke, because Rilke says many of the same things in a much better way" (Norberg-Schulz in Frampton, Harries & Norberg-Schulz, 1989: 64).

(atmosphere)[111] that must be concretised in a corresponding 'built character'. He proposed that the correspondence ("*Übereinstimmung*") between the dweller's "attitude" and the "qualities" of the place "ought to form the basis of our being-in-the-world" (1979b: 185). Therefore, the dweller must 'answer' the "voice" (*Stimmung*) of the place in a 'poetic speaking' which is revelatory (of the particular temporal intention) while corresponding to the enduring "vocation" (or destiny) of the place (1979b: 136). Norberg-Schulz proposed that 'answering' happens as 'gathering' and that 'gathering' operates in three ways: visualisation, complementation and symbolisation (1979b: 17).[112]

Through 'visualisation', works aim to express and order the "spatiality (order and character) of the environment", while 'complementation' augments the 'shortcomings' of the given "spatiality". Symbolisation implies "[moving] an 'understood world' from one location to another" (1980a: 196). Through visualisation, complementation and symbolisation, *Dasein* interprets the situation. Since interpretations are grounded in the "values" (1979b: 170) of inhabitants, Norberg-Schulz asserted that any interpretation of the place constitutes an "*imago mundi*" able to reveal the "world" of the inhabitant (1979b: 17). Inhabitants have to "respect" the place enough to "listen" to and "understand" its *genius loci*. When such an understanding of the natural things is expressed in corresponding man-made things, then these things are imbued with meaning: "they come close, the world becomes a world [an *imago mundi*] and man finds his identity" (1980a: 196). In GL, Norberg-Schulz identified three 'archetypes' that illustrate how the *genius loci* of the place has traditionally found its 'vocation' through a corresponding architectural gathering.

4.4.6 Archetypes of the relationship between man-made and natural places

In order to illustrate how dwellers, through visualisation, complementation and symbolisation historically built places corresponding to natural places, Norberg-Schulz formulated a remarkable proposition: firstly, he used the phenomenological method to

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[111] Norberg-Schulz's position derives from Bollnow's assertion (following Binswanger) that "every concrete space ... has a particular character of mood" (Bollnow, 1963: 216). Ultimately, this approach stems from Heidegger's formulation of 'attunement' (see subsection 5.3.4).

[112] In an earlier version of the first chapter of GL (published as "The Phenomenon of Place" in 1976) the triad of gathering described here—visualisation, complementation and symbolisation—was described as separate elements (visualisation, symbolisation and gathering) and excluded the relation of symbolisation. In a later manuscript of GL (NAM 5: 11) the original was amended to state that "all the three relationships" are, in fact, forms of gathering. This interpretation conforms to Heidegger's assertion that all things are 'gatherings of the fourfold' (1950a: 171).

classify landscapes based on their "spirit". He then analysed these landscapes by referring to the way they housed the interplay of the elements of the fourfold. Finally, by referring to the way the ground 'is' in relation to the sky and the way that the forces of nature and the character of the inhabitants interact with each other, he identified three archetypal natural landscapes: the "romantic" (e.g. the Nordic forest), "cosmic" (e.g. the desert), and "classical" landscapes (e.g. the landscapes of the 'classical world', like Greece). Additionally, Norberg-Schulz identified a fourth amalgamated landscape, the "complex" landscape (e.g. the "fertile desert" of the French Campagne district), as a "synthesis [of] cosmic, romantic and classical properties" (1979b: 42-48).

These archetypal landscapes become 'meaningful' when their way of being is understood and gathered in works of architecture. In order to illustrate how mankind's relationship with nature can be concretised architecturally, Norberg-Schulz (1979b: 69-78) formulated romantic, cosmic and classical architecture as archetypal responses to the *genius loci* of archetypal landscapes. Complex architecture represented a 'synthesis' of these approaches. The three archetypes illustrate the 'obvious' ways in which man-made places may represent natural places. Therefore, these archetypal examples endorsed the idea that buildings are 'things' which "gather the properties of the place and bring them close to man" (1979b: 23).

Norberg-Schulz proposed that this obvious relationship (seen in the light of Heidegger's bridge-analogy) reveals the profound possibility that "the existential purpose of building (architecture) is ... to make a site become a place" (1979b: 18). As things, buildings gather the "meanings potentially present in the site" in a way that expresses man's "form of life as a totality" (1979b:170), while simultaneously revealing the 'way of being' of the *genius loci*. Works of architecture should accommodate and respect the 'meaning' of the place and simultaneously assimilate these meanings into an 'identity' or 'image'. In GL Norberg-Schulz, therefore, implied that the 'concretisation of existential space by means of architectural space' (envisioned in ESA), had to happen as the poetic revelation of places, through acts of building, creating images of a comprehended world.

Norberg-Schulz no longer hoped to establish a correspondence between life and place through semantic relations. The approach propagated in GL is much more poetic. Essentially, it depends on a respectful listening to the voice of the place, sympathetically expressed in works speaking in answer to the *Stimmung* of the place. Buildings, therefore, have the capacity to show both how the understanding of the *genius loci* has shaped the way of life and how the natural world has been shaped into a habitable place; an interaction between life and the *genius loci* of the place.

4.4.7 *Poiesis* and technics

In subsection 4.4.6 it was argued that Norberg-Schulz (in GL) portrayed the act of building as a deed of revelation. Does this undermine the role of building as a form of technology? In "The Question Concerning Technology" (1953) Heidegger argued that the 'essence of technology' does not reside in the efficiency of modern production, but in the implications embodied in the original Greek term "*techne*". Technology, as 'manufacturing', constitutes a "challenging-forth" that reduces nature and man to "standing-reserve". Technology, as *techne*, constitutes a "bringing-forth" that restores to man and nature their authenticity; a skilled form of "*poiesis*". As *techne*, technology is "something poetic" (Heidegger, 1953: 318-322). To understand building as an act of revelation, therefore, does not undermine the role of technology, but reveals its authentic meaning.

In GL Norberg-Schulz applied this understanding of technology by stating that the "character" of a place is determined by "how things are made". Here "technical realization" is no longer merely seen as a "means of solving the building task" (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 161), but as a form of "*poiesis*" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 15). The act of building, as a revelatory making of the *genius loci*, poetically reveals the place. Consequently, "the *genius loci* becomes manifest as location, spatial configuration and characterizing articulation", which enables the 'transformed place' to "know 'what it wants to be' relative to the natural environment" (1979b: 180). Architectural *poiesis*, understood in a Heideggarian way, designates the artistic way in which buildings (as things) gather and authentically "set-into-work" the truth of place. This is what it means to "concretize" existential space (1979b: 65).

4.4.8 Human identity and the preservation of the *genius loci*

Architecture, as a form of *techne*, should aim to reveal the identity of the place. Norberg-Schulz believed that "human identity presupposes the identity of place" and that people, in order to dwell, have to "belong" to a place (1979b: 22). Therefore, it is imperative that works of architecture, as expressions of this identity, should "respect" the spirit of place and contribute to its ability to serve as a source of 'continuity' in the environment; a *stabilitas loci* (1979b: 180). By respecting the *stabilitas loci*, it is possible to "preserve" (1979b: 180) the identity of the place, despite the "historical forces" (economic, practical, cultural and social) impinging on the 'life-situation'. Norberg-Schulz framed this possibility as the preservation of 'continuity' amid 'change' in the form of a "living tradition" able to offer "ever new" interpretations of the "identity of the place". By expressing 'change' in terms of a *stabilitas loci* progress becomes "meaningful" (1979b: 182). Safeguarding the

genius loci, therefore, depends on the ability of architects to "concretize its essence in ever new historical contexts" as the "self-realization" of "what was there as possibilities at the outset" (1979b: 18). In his discussion of Prague (1979b: 78-111), Norberg-Schulz argued that the identity of the place has a much more enduring influence on human behaviour than 'economic' or 'political' forces.

> Prague is different and still the same. [Despite changing circumstances it still allows] orientation and identification which goes beyond the security or threat offered by the immediate economic or political system. From the new residential neighbourhoods people go to old Prague to get a confirmation of their identity (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 109).

When architecture allows people to identify with and orientate amid the things of the "life-world" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 6) in such a way that the things are not only preserved but illuminated in new ways, then architecture, as a 'living tradition', brings both the historical and contemporary world "close". Therefore, "to respect the *genius loci*" does not imply the stagnation of human development, but aims to express anew the "rooted" nature of life within a meaningful "history" (Norberg-Schulz, 1980a: 196). Norberg-Schulz thereby implied that architecture should not merely ennoble bygone times, but must "grow out of daily life" (1979b: 194) so that "the world [unceasingly] becomes a world and man [continuously] finds his identity" (1980a: 196). The "freedom" that marks contemporary times – when applied within a living tradition – will, therefore, not degenerate into "an arbitrary play", but because it "serves life", it will manifest itself as "creative participation" (1979b: 182).

4.4.9 Creative participation and architectural authenticity

Norberg-Schulz envisioned creative participation as *Dasein*'s way to poetically reveal "the basic [existential] meanings under ever new historical circumstances" (1979b: 185). In BDT Heidegger argued that poetic revelation happens *via* a "double space-making" engagement (Heidegger, 1951a: 156). Firstly, architecture must 'give' space for the 'actions' of the fourfold. Heidegger designated this process with the German word "*Einräumen*". Secondly, the space must be defined or "enclosed" by means of a "boundary". This implies that the "character" of the place must be "embodied" in a thing. Heidegger designated this process with the German word "*Einrichten*". The "provision of space" and the "embodiment of character" constitute the 'double space-making' that brings the place to presence (Norberg-Schulz, 1980a: 194).

Dasein, through 'creative participation', sets the voice of the place (the general "theme") into a work serving as an interpretation (a particular "variation") of what it means to be 'there' (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 184). The things made by *Dasein*, serve as temporal interpretations of the environment. Between earth and sky, things and mortals are entangled in an intimate interaction; if things (works of architecture) are reduced to 'objects', people are reduced to 'subjects' and if things are seen as commodities, then mankind is merely a consumer; however, if things are 'seen' as creative gatherings of the given world, then dwellers participate meaningfully as the interpreters of the fourfold. As an interpreter the dweller sings[113] the praise of "existence" (1979b: 185).

Norberg-Schulz's poetic approach aimed to show that "meaningful, authentic architecture does not consist in a combination of codified 'signs' or 'archetypal elements,' but in the revelation of the spatiality of the life-world" (1980a: 200). Architecture is 'authentic' when it is 'true' to 'life' and 'revelatory' as the *poiesis* of the *genius loci*. Works of architecture, by admitting the 'spatial structure' of existential space provide orientation and, by embodying the 'character' of existential space, make identification possible. In places offering identification and orientation, people will be able to dwell.

> The making of places we call architecture. Through building man gives meanings concrete presence, and he gathers buildings to visualize and symbolize his form of life as a totality. Thus his everyday lifeworld [*sic*] becomes a meaningful home where he can dwell (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 170).

Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of architecture as the art of place is grounded in the belief that it is possible to translate the meanings of the life-world into a place (a 'home') that expresses dwelling. Architecture, as place-making, represents an act of creative translation. In the years following the publication of GL, Norberg-Schulz focused his attention on how acts of translation could be rendered common and meaningful. He proposed that the answer resides in the 'language of architecture'.

4.5 Transition 2: the turn towards language

Heidegger's understanding of 'language' had a growing influence on Norberg-Schulz. In the following section this transformation (subsection 4.5.2) will be used as a backdrop to explain the nature of Norberg-Schulz's affiliation with Postmodernism, his aspirations for the movement (subsection 4.5.3) and his concern for architecture's figurative role as an *imago mundi* (subsection 4.5.1).

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[113] Norberg-Schulz was here referring to Rilke's *Ninth Elegy* and the *Sonnets to Orpheus*.

Norberg-Schulz believed that, while even the most abstract works of modernism were 'figurative', they were hard to 'name' and 'remember'. Consequently, these works "evade memory [and] fade away" (Norberg-Schulz, 1985b: 20:00). Norberg-Schulz proposed that works of architecture had to offer 'something more' than a characteristic spatiality: they had to possess figural quality. In a lecture in San Francisco (12/06/1985) he asked:

> Is it enough to understand architecture in terms of up and down [space] and outside and inside [built form]? ... I think it is not enough. ... [C]ertain forms … stand out as very particular shapes which have re-occurred over and over again throughout historic variations. ... The dome is one. The arch is one. The gable is one. ... [These forms] somehow [express] basic facts about being in space; being between earth and sky (Norberg-Schulz, 1985b: 01:05:00).

By revealing what it means to be between earth and sky, these figural things, serve as an *imago mundi*. This is what modern architecture lacked. In a manuscript for a lecture delivered at the University of Dallas (02/03/1979) entitled, "Education for What is Real" (NAM 22), Norberg-Schulz described this modern lack as "the loss of the image".

> The loss of the image implies the loss of the thing as a "gathering of world". ... Today we are no longer able to read the language of things. They become mere objects of consumption, and thus they die. When things die, the world is lost. ... Man is conditioned by things, as they bring a world close. ... Thus the loss of things brings about a loss of ourselves. Man can only exist as *Dasein*, that is, as being-in-the-world, which also includes being-with-others. When his access to the world through imagery is blocked, he loses his identity as well as his meaningful relationship to others. ... Thus man becomes truly alienated: from the world, from himself, and from his fellow men. Finally the sacred is lost. The sacred is no longer revealed to a man who only quantifies and measures. ... Together these five losses make up a loss of dwelling, as a belonging to and a participation in a meaningful totality (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 22: 4-5).

The loss of image, therefore, had far reaching consequences. What was needed was a better understanding of the architectural image and how it relates to those recurring figures which offers continuity amid change.

4.5.1 Imagination and the common image

In a manuscript entitled, "Architectural Communication in History" (NAM 6, 1975), Norberg-Schulz claimed that "Western architectural theory from the beginning considered the building an *imago mundi* or image of the world". The nature of this image has not always been understood in the same way. Norberg-Schulz proposed there are two approaches: the "immanent" image that aims to "reveal the world as it is", and the "ideal"

image that 'represents' the world as a "[reflection] an ideal concept". The most important difference between the two 'versions' is that the immanent image "presents" the world by bringing the "hidden aspects" of the phenomena of the world to light (as a form of *aletheia*), while the ideal image (in the Platonic sense) divided the world into phenomena which signify "transcendent 'ideas'". The ideal image, therefore, functioned as a general "tool" distanced from everyday life, while the immanent image brought to presence the "contents" of daily life. Since the ideal image, as a representation, had lost its revelatory involvement in everyday life, Norberg-Schulz argued that the ideal image should actually be understood as a symbol (NAM 6, 1975: 2-3).

Norberg-Schulz argued that both symbol and image enrich a work of architecture in different ways: "a mere symbol would remain an abstraction, without reference to what is immediately given, whereas the image runs the risk of missing the general insight offered by conceptualization" (NAM 6, 1975: 4). Therefore, a work of architecture has to find a way to address both the general and the particular aspects of the place. In order to differentiate between a sign, a symbol and an image, Norberg-Schulz relied on the work of one of Heidegger's most famous students; the German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002).

> While the sign has an indicative function and the symbol a substitutive one, the image is something apart. It may also be substitutive, but it is first and foremost something new, which is to say, it does not represent like a symbol something that is found elsewhere; rather it bears within itself its own significance .... Might we perhaps say that the work of architecture is image? Gadamer thinks it is; inasmuch as it is an intelligible form, it makes present a unity (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 109).[114]

The image, therefore, functions as something that 'brings into presence' a particular 'significance' that participates in the interaction of the world as an agent (a work) of revelation. While signs and symbols refer to something else, an image is something in itself. Modern architecture had lost the ability to serve as an image. Giedion argued that what was needed in order to establish the 'new monumentality' (and thereby recover the architectural image) was "imagination" (1958: 154-199).

In the same way that ideal and immanent images are interdependent, Norberg-Schulz proposed that a general understanding must be related to everyday life. It has to be set-into-work in a location as an expression of what it means to be under this sky and live on

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[114] While the quoted passage is from Norberg-Schulz's last work (2000b), he had already referenced Gadamer's interpretation in the manuscript quoted above (NAM6, "Architectural communication in History", 1975: 10).

this particular earth; an embodied image revealing the "understood world" (Norberg-Schulz, 1981b: 228) of the dweller. Thus architects had to imaginatively engage with the general and the particular in such a way that "the general becomes alive at the same time as the particular becomes meaningful".[115]

Norberg-Schulz believed that mankind's general understanding has historically been stabilised in types (or archetypes). In a handwritten document (NAM 23, 14/03/1980) he wrote that a type "is a (gathering) thing which gathers a common existential situation" as a "concrete variation"; a figural "interpretation" of "basic existential structures" serving as "epochal" images designating a "way of life". It is this act of interpretation that Norberg-Schulz understood as the necessary human involvement bestowing figural quality on a thing.

Norberg-Schulz (following Giedion) proposed that translating a "particular place" into an image depends on receiving a "poetic vision" (1981b: 230); an "imagined figure" (1984a: 118) serving as a guide to making. In a handwritten document, Norberg-Schulz indicated that he understood this 'vision' as a poetic alternative to "scientific description". In order to "keep" this vision, it must be "set-into-work"[116] (NAM 23, n.d.). However, if the resulting figure is to serve as a shared image, the architect cannot imagine the figure arbitrarily.

In a manuscript entitled, "The Years of Change" (NAM 8), Norberg-Schulz stressed that "imagination means neither invention nor systematic order, but the creation of 'things that remind'" (NAM 8: 20). Figural quality, therefore, depends on the respectful, yet creative, interpretation of "a form which is of general value"; a form which can be 'recognised' due to its "*strong Gestalt*" (1984a: 66). Imagined visions, stabilised in types and interpreted through embodiment and admittance as figures, constitute what Norberg-Schulz understood (following Giedion) as the 'new monumentality' (see subsection 4.1.2).

The work of architecture, serving as a "poetic interpretation of the ancient theme of the meeting of earth and sky" (1981a: 209), preserves 'memories' while being open to particular situations. Making an architectural *imago mundi* is a poetic act of translation which engages with the general and the particular. In order to facilitate this act of translation and restore architecture's ability to serve as a poetic image of the world, Norberg-Schulz proposed a language of architecture. He believed that at the start of the

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[115] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 8, manuscript, "The Years of Change": 20-21.
[116] This idea derives from Heidegger's poetic statement: "Only image formed keeps the vision. Yet image formed rests in the poem" (1947b: 7).

1980s there were two main theoretical approaches to the study of language: semiotics and phenomenology.

4.5.2 From semiotics to phenomenology

In IiA, Norberg-Schulz investigated "language" as a semantic "symbol system" (1963: 57-59), but in later years he came to the conclusion that semiology could not provide access to the concrete depth open to architecture. In TAA, Norberg-Schulz (1980a: 189-190) argued that "semiology is not really concerned with *meaning*, but only discusses certain mechanisms of communication". Instead of understanding architecture as a 'sign', Norberg-Schulz maintained that architecture is a concrete thing which gathers the world into meaningful totalities by translating the environmental *Stimmung* into a corresponding built form. This act of translation is not based on semiological correspondence, but can be understood in terms of Heidegger's formulation of language as the 'House of Being'[117]. In a handwritten document (undated, but included in a folder of notes from 1980) Norberg-Schulz summarised the difference between the two approaches:

Semiology		Phenomenology
culture = communication	-	culture = care
systems of signs	-	works
semiosis (denotation, connotation)	-	*Darstellung* (disclosure)
experience (habit) (empiricism)	-	Being-in-the-world
code (convention) (rule)	-	archetype (origin)
relativism	-	essentialism (truth)
arbitrariness	-	authenticity
sign	-	image
system	-	Gestalt (*Gebild*)
nothing	-	Being
succession	-	simultaneity
sense-data (atomistic)	-	thing (organic)
situation	-	place (world)
perception	-	*Anscheining*[*Anscheinend*]-*Andenken*
logic	-	poetic
reference	-	insight
transitoriness	-	"*was bleibet aber …*" [Hölderlin]
denotation	-	illumination
analogy	-	gathering
index, icon, symbol (Pierce)	-	figure, image, complement
(Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23)		

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[117] Norberg-Schulz's copy of Heidegger's *Basic Writings* (signed "Dallas, april [*sic*] 1978") contains a note in the back cover "s.199 (language, House of Being)"; referring to the passage in "Letter on Humanism" in which Heidegger described language as the "house of the truth of Being" (Archive of the National Museum of Architecture, Oslo).

Norberg-Schulz proposed that the difference between the two approaches boils down to the following: "whereas semiology tends to be relativistic, phenomenology wants to found architecture on the general structures of man's being in the world".[118] In a letter to Sir Colin St. John Wilson (dated 15/01/1980) Norberg-Schulz asserted that "the language of architecture reflects the structure of our being-in-the-world, and it is therefore existentially founded. Only when we realise this, we may win semiotic relativism, and arrive at a true understanding of how architecture 'speaks'" (NAM 1: 1).

4.5.3 The rise of Postmodern Architecture

The ideas underpinning postmodern architecture (referred to as Postmodernism) had been brewing in the minds of many architects ever since the publication of Robert Venturi's, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (1966), but the Venice Biennale proved to be the event that catapulted these concerns to international attention. Norberg-Schulz believed Postmodernism to be a response to the 'non-figural' ideology of modern architecture, which aimed to reclaim the figural dimension of architecture by means of a "demand for images".[119]

Norberg-Schulz served on the 'advisory commission' of the Biennale and contributed an exhibit (NAM 1) and an essay entitled, "Towards an Authentic Architecture" (TAA) (1980a). In this essay Norberg-Schulz identified two shortcomings of modernism: "environmental monotony" and "visual chaos". He saw monotony as a product of the lack of character (because all places are "alike") which led to the loss of the '*genius loci*' and chaos as a manifestation of the lack of coherence which made it difficult to develop an "environmental image" (1980a: 181). According to Norberg-Schulz this loss of character and spatial organisation culminated in a loss of identification and orientation and suggested that, while 'chaos' and 'monotony' seem like contradictions, they originate from the same 'loss of place'.

Despite these failures, Norberg-Schulz still believed that the "new tradition" was "basically sound", since it served as an image of the openness of the modern world (1980a: 190). Yet, the 'loss of place' illustrated that the modern movement lacked something. Norberg-Schulz understood Postmodernism as a response to this lack. However, he also saw remnants of modernism's 'weaknesses' lurking in the work of the main proponents of Postmodernism. Norberg-Schulz argued that both Robert Venturi's approach, which

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[118] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 6, manuscript, Architectural Communication in History: 12.

[119] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 6, manuscript, "Learning from the Past: The Architectural Image", 03/1981: 1.

"easily degenerates into a new kind of superficial play with forms", and the Italian architect Aldo Rossi's "sterile schematism" of "ideal images", driven to their conclusion would lead to 'chaos' and 'monotony' (1980a: 181-183). In order to safeguard Postmodernism from repeating the mistakes of modernism, Norberg-Schulz proposed that "a deeper understanding of that everyday life-world" (1980a: 190) and a 'language' which could translate this understanding into works of architecture, was needed.

The Biennale positively influenced Norberg-Schulz's view of Postmodernism. In a manuscript entitled, "The Biennale in Venice, Meaning and Prospect" (NAM 18, 14/10/1980), Norberg-Schulz remarked that the participants shared a renewed interest in "architecture as a frame to human life" (NAM 18: 3). Conforming to Giedion's belief in constancy and change, Norberg-Schulz argued that "any form of life comprises invariant as well as temporal traits" and therefore the "basic problem is ... to embody the general in the given, historical situation". If Postmodernism desired to present an authentic solution, which does not succumb to either 'monotony' or 'chaos', it had to put forward a "synthesis of temporal complexity and general typology" (NAM 18: 6). Norberg-Schulz's involvement in the Venice Biennale both affirmed his belief that architecture needed a common language and expanded his understanding of the role of this language as a basis for 'figurative architecture'.

The figurative approach found great resonance with postmodern architects. However, Norberg-Schulz's theoretical approach should not be seen as an endorsement of the superficial play of forms that characterised the later works of Postmodernism. At worst, his endorsement of Postmodernism could be seen as opportunistic and maybe even misguided (in the sense that he believed he could dictate the 'true meaning' of a relativistic movement), but the following section will argue that Norberg-Schulz's 'figurative architecture' derived from his understanding of Heidegger's philosophy and had very little to do with what Postmodernism eventually became. Moreover, the ultimate goal of figurative architecture was the revitalisation of the 'new tradition'[120] in accordance with Giedion's call for a 'new monumentality'.

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[120] In his review of Charles Jencks's book, *Current Architecture* (1983b), Norberg-Schulz claimed that "[Jencks] admits that Post-Modernism 'evolves from Modernism,' and that it therefore is 'half Modern and half 'something else'". This affirmed Norberg-Schulz's belief that "Modern architecture is not dead after all, but rather developing into something more complete and meaningful" (1983b: 91).

4.6 Phase 3: figurative architecture

The following section will discuss Norberg-Schulz's application of Heidegger's understanding of language. It will argue that Norberg-Schulz composed his language of architecture as a way to translate the *genius loci* into figurative works of architecture; an attempt to expand on his concept of place (which echoed Giedion's 'new regionalism') with a figurative approach (which echoed Giedion's call for a 'new monumentality'). In concert, the acknowledgement of the peculiarities of place and the figurative way to express these peculiarities could facilitate an architectural approach capable of recognising the pluralist nature of the contemporary, without bowing to the subjective allure of superficial eclecticism or the abstraction implied by Internationalism.

Norberg-Schulz's conception of 'figurative architecture' was significantly influenced by the work of the American architect, Michael Graves (1934-2015). In his influential "A Case for Figurative Architecture" (1982) Graves contrasted the "utilitarian" approach to architecture with what he called the "poetic form of architecture". He proposed that poetic architecture "incorporates the three-dimensional expression of the myths and rituals of society" into "poetic forms", which are "sensitive to the figurative, associative, and anthropomorphic attitudes of a culture" (Graves, 1982: 86-87). Norberg-Schulz felt that Graves's approach could aid the figurative development of modern architecture because it offered a way of comprehending types in a manner that had "absorbed the teaching of Modern Art" (Norberg-Schulz, 1985b: 01:25:00).

In a lecture in San Francisco (12/06/1985) Norberg-Schulz compared two 'inventories' of forms: the first,a drawing by Le Corbusier (Figure 10),was a gathering of "platonic solids" proposing that figures can be "reduced [to] geometry". Norberg-Schulz argued that this approach was too "abstract" (1985b: 01:30:00). Consequently, when Le Corbusier applied these figures in his own works (e.g. Ronchamp) the results were "too special" and failed to serve as a common language that could be applied to other instances (1985b: 01:20:00). The second 'inventory',a drawing by Graves (Figure 11),implied the use of an "integrated and versatile language" (Norberg-Schulz, 1988: 10).

Figure 10 (left): Le Corbusier's ideal figures (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 84).

Figure 11 (right): Graves's figurative language (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 134).

Norberg-Schulz argued that Graves's figures, in contrast to those of Le Corbusier, were emplaced, situational and involved in the concrete nature of their surroundings. Furthermore, these figures represent 'nameable'[121] and 'memorable' things. Consequently, they could be "interpreted in ever new ways without losing their original meaning" (1988: 11), and imply that "the meanings of the totality man-nature [i.e. dwelling] are mediated by the architectural figures" (1985a: 245). Norberg-Schulz contemplated the role of the figure in his next major work, *The Concept of Dwelling* (CoD) (1984a).

4.6.1 The shared and poetic nature of creative participation

Norberg-Schulz introduced CoD with an interpretation of a short story by the Norwegian writer, Tarjei Vesaas (1897-1970). In this story a young Norwegian, Knut, in a moment of revelation, suddenly understands his place as "a precious gift" (1984a: 9-12). Norberg-Schulz argued that Knut's story reveals the way mankind's understanding of any place is bestowed as a poetic disclosure and that this understanding must be interpreted creatively (within a common identity) by building that which has been disclosed. Through creative participation, flowing from an authentic understanding of the place, *Dasein* can "contribute [meaningfully] to its history" (1979b: 202). In turn, *Dasein* receives an "existential foothold" (1979b: 185). In CoD Norberg-Schulz tried to show that gaining an existential foothold is not just a private endeavour. In Knut's story the "houses belong together, like members of a family" (1984a: 12).

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[121] The term 'nameable object' was introduced by Leon Krier (Norberg-Schulz, 1991a: 103).

Knut's story illustrates that poetic understanding resists the 'analysis' and 'schematisation' of the world. It is received as a 'gift' and, in a sense, as a whole; a poetic revelation which allows inhabitants to grasp their place in the world. This understanding has to be safeguarded. Norberg-Schulz ascribed a "twofold nature" to dwelling, encompassing both the ability to "[understand] the given things (natural or man-made) [and the capacity to make] works which keep and 'explain' what has been understood" (1984a: 17). Therefore, understanding determines making and making concretises understanding. In contrast to 'rational analysis', Norberg-Schulz (1984a: 71) proposed that understanding a situation poetically "makes it possible for man to translate his practical and theoretical understanding into a concrete image and to perceive its meaning". It is this poetic understanding – given as a "poetic vision" (Norberg-Schulz, 1981b: 230) – that must be translated into a figure serving as a 'built image' of the relationship between life and place.

Norberg-Schulz (1983a: 48) argued that the vision is given through a particular way of thinking that Heidegger called '*Andenken*'.[122] *Andenken* happens as receptive 'listening'[123] and envisions (by remembering) creative 'responding' (Norberg-Schulz, 1983a: 46). The implementation of a particular interpretation need not lead to (subjective) chaos, but can be made 'common' by means of a shared language of architecture.

In obedience to the calling voice of the place and by resorting to the shared language of architecture inhabitants will be able to express ('say') what they have heard as a temporal variation on a general theme. This is what Norberg-Schulz implied when he argued that inhabitants not only dwell in the "manifestations" (the buildings and urban spaces) of their "circumstantial understanding". They dwell, first of all, in the language of architecture; in the way they understand the world, in the way they are attuned to, and tuned by the character of the place, and in the way they apply their understanding and attunement to interpret the shared memories of their being-with. It is dwelling in the language of architecture, "which makes all [other circumstantial forms of dwelling] possible" (1984a: 130-133).

Knut's story implies that access to a shared language of architecture enables people to build their personal understanding in a way 'sympathetic' to surrounding dwellings and landscape. Thus the built work not only "sings" of a personal understanding, but also has

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[122] See Glossary: *Andenken*. Also see subsection 5.4.3.

[123] In a manuscript entitled, "The Teaching of Form in Architecture" (NAM 7, April 1988), Norberg-Schulz pointed out that Paul Klee, in contrast to the approach propagated by other instructors at the Bauhaus, believed that "creativity does not consist in the ability to invent something 'new', but in the ability to listen to what is given ..." (NAM 7:3).

the capacity to give voice to the 'collective vision' (identity) of the place (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 12).

4.6.2 Dwelling and the architectural figure

Norberg-Schulz understood dwelling as the "insoluble unity of life and place" (1984a: 13). In CoD he investigated this meaningful relationship in terms of four shared "modes of dwelling" (Figure 12) designating the relationship between basic "forms of human togetherness" and the environment – settlements, urban space, institution and house – in which these tasks of society take place (1984a: 7-13).

Modes of dwelling	Places of dwelling	Basic forms of human togetherness (being-with)
Natural	Settlement	Arrival and settling
Collective	Urban space	Meeting and choice
Public	Institution	Meeting, agreement and explanation
Private	House	withdrawal

Figure 12: Norberg-Schulz's categorisation of dwelling in CoD (compiled by the author).

Norberg-Schulz's categorisation of dwelling aimed to relate the 'environmental levels' he developed in ESA to the way 'figures' are used within society (1985b: 40:00). With the modes of dwelling Norberg-Schulz tried to merge the way people orientate themselves in terms of organisational elements (centre, path and domain) with the way they identify with embodied figures (the way figures stand, rise and open). What distinguished 'figurative architecture' as a development of ESA and GL is that Norberg-Schulz (in CoD) discussed orientation and identification in terms of architectural figures.

Norberg-Schulz proposed that buildings are able to serve as "objects of human identification because they embody existential meanings". *Dasein*'s identification with other ways of being "comprises a rapport between man's own body and the bodily form of the object". In the same way that humans "stand on the earth" and "rise towards the sky" a thing also "stands" and "rises". Therefore, people are able to relate their 'way of being' with the 'way of being' of the thing in a "physiognomic" sense (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 19).

The concept of orientation "implies structuring the environment into domains by means of paths and centres" (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 24). Norberg-Schulz envisioned 'structuring' as a form of "spatial composition" intended to set being-in-the-world into "spatial figures" (1984a: 25). Consequently, orientation implies understanding spaces as "a set of interrelated, meaningful places [consisting] of distinct spatial figures" (1984a: 126).

A figure has both a horizontal and a vertical 'content'. This might seem obvious, but the qualitative distinction between 'up', 'down', 'forwards' and 'backwards' is ignored by the mathematical conception of space (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 29). The distinction between the horizontal and the vertical, therefore, carries great significance. The horizontal relates to the 'earth' (1984a: 29). Since *Dasein's* life-world takes place on the same plane as the horizontal extension of the earth, the vertical is "experienced as the line of tension"; an "*axis mundi*" (1984a: 23). Consequently, the "vertical" relates to the "sky" (1984a: 29). Norberg-Schulz proposed that, due to the stable nature of the interaction of earth and sky, there exist typical gatherings of our "memories of being between earth and sky" (1985a: 243).

Over the course of history these typical reactions became known as types. The relative constancy of these responses to being between earth and sky, combined with the invariance of the place, constitutes *Dasein's* "*stabilitas loci*" (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 29). Norberg-Schulz subscribed to an epochal understanding of architectural history which tried to understand the world in terms of the way 'constancies' support changing 'traditions' (1984a: 29). This interaction between general enduring types and circumstantial interpretations (as built figures) can be understood as a hermeneutic process by which the basic "memories" of dwelling are appropriated through the respectful figural adaptation of types gathered and stabilised amid epochal changes. Ultimately, Norberg-Schulz understood figures as "manifestations of dwelling" (1985a: 243) used to re-imagine basic typical memories of being-in-the-world. Figures, as temporal interpretations of timeless continuities, have the capacity to serve as "images of human existence" (1985a: 237).

A figure, therefore, reveals a shared way of being between a particular earth and sky as an interpretation of how this has typically happened in the past. In order to translate the *genius loci* of the place, as well as the typical responses of the past, Norberg-Schulz formulated a language of architecture composed of general aspects that could be applied to each situation as a way to envision architectural solutions which were common and significant; meaningful and creative.

4.6.3 The origins of the language of architecture and its gifts

In "Kahn, Heidegger and the Language of Architecture" (KHLA) (1979) Norberg-Schulz used Heidegger's philosophy (which he related to certain terms used by Kahn to describe architecture) to construct a 'language of architecture'. Norberg-Schulz used Heidegger's concept of 'being-in-the-world' as his point of departure and pointed out that being-in-the-

world can be analysed in terms of the 'existential structures' that describe mankind's interaction within the fourfold: 'understanding' (*Verstehen*), 'mood' (*Befindlichkeit*),[124] 'being-with' (*Mitsein*) and 'discourse' (*Rede*) (1979c: 36). He then related Heidegger's "modes of being-in" (understanding, mood, and being-with) to his spatial "structures of being-in" (orientation, identification and meeting). These "structures of being-in" correspond to the "spatial world structures" (order, character, togetherness), which mirror the aspects Norberg-Schulz envisioned as the "three basic structural components" of architecture; topology, morphology and typology. The correspondence between the 'structural components' and the 'modes of being-in' served as an 'existential basis' for what Norberg-Schulz called the 'language of architecture' (1979c: 42).

Norberg-Schulz (following Heidegger) claimed that 'understanding' refers to "something much more complex than mere cognition, and comprises practical as well as intellectual aspects" (1979c: 36). The "spatial implication" of understanding may be called "orientation" and refers to the ability to "come to terms with the [spatial] order of the environment". Norberg-Schulz investigated "spatial order" under the heading of "topology" (1979c: 42). 'Mood' referred to the "immediate [state-of-mind] which is the primordial relation between man and his environment" (1979c: 36). In spatial terms, mood "implies that man identifies with a given environmental character" (1980a: 193). Norberg-Schulz investigated the "character" of "built structure" under the heading of "morphology" (1979c: 42-43). 'Being-with' referred to the "structures of social intercourse and association" which reveal our world as "shared" (1979c: 36). The architectural implications of "being-with" consist in the fact that we "[share our] spatiality with others" (1980a: 26). Norberg-Schulz investigated architectural being-with under the heading of "typology" (1979c: 43-44).

Norberg-Schulz proposed that his language of architecture, as a means to 'express' the 'spatial aspects' of topology, typology and morphology, corresponded to Heidegger's fourth 'existential structure', "discourse". Norberg-Schulz envisioned the language of architecture as the 'structure' that facilitates creative and meaningful acts of gathering and interpretation (by being grounded in common memories); a way to "translate lived reality into built form" (1979c: 44) as a gathering of the fourfold. Essentially, Norberg-Schulz saw gathering as an act of "place-making" focused on building the relationship between the environment and the way of life (including the habits, rituals, beliefs and values of

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[124] *Befindlichkeit* is translated as "attunement" by Joan Stambaugh in her 2010 translation of *Being and Time*. The word "attunement" (in comparison to mood) also captures the way in which our 'tuning' (*Gestimmtheit*) interacts with the 'atmosphere' (*Stimmung*) of the place.

inhabitants), as an "inhabited landscape" (1979c: 44). The implications and subject matter of Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture can be summarised as follows:

TOPOLOGY	MORPHOLOGY	TYPOLOGY
Where?	How?	What?
Understanding (G: *Verstehen*)	Mood (G: *Befindlichkeit*)	Being-with (G: *Mitsein*)
Orientation	Identification	Memory
Plan (N: *Grunnriss*)	Elevation (N: *Opriss*)	Outline (*Gestalt*) (N: *Omriss*)
Spatial order	Built form	Figure (type/archetype)
Spatial organisation	Formal articulation	Interpretation
"Grasps [the] spatial interrelationship [between things]"	"Intends the qualities of things"	"The given wholes [that possess] form as well as space [and] manifest dwelling"[125]
Organisation	Building	Thinging[126]
Admittance: admits the (predominantly horizontal) actions of life to take place (rhythm-dominated).	Embodiment: embodies (in a predominantly vertical way) the memories of the meeting of earth and sky (tension-dominated).	Admittance and embodiment manifested as a nameable/memorable work/figure (*imago mundi*) (an interpreted thing)
Studies spatial structuring (organisation) i.t.o. centre (enclosure), path (row) and domain (group).	Studies character of built form (i.t.o. standing, rising and opening) and boundaries (floor, wall and ceiling/roof).	Studies how general memories of being-with are stored in types and interpreted as particular figures.
Order	Character	Togetherness

Figure 13: The subject matter of topology, morphology and typology (compiled by the author).

From the figure above it can be argued that the language of architecture was envisioned not only as a way to 'translate' the given 'spatiality' (Norberg-Schulz, 1980a: 195), but also had the capacity to interpret typical historical 'memories' of interacting with the *genius loci* (gathered as archetypes) into concrete figurative works. Since typical responses depend on interpretations of how living in a place is, the language of architecture cannot be grasped independently of architecture as the making of places. Rather than replacing the concept of *genius loci*, Norberg-Schulz's understanding of figurative architecture

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[125] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 19, manuscript, "The Historical Basis of Architectural Education", 1985: 4-7.

[126] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 21, handwritten document, "The Language of Architecture", 30/04/1989.

expanded the possible ways to interpret the *genius loci*, while acknowledging previous (or common) interpretations of the spirit of place.

Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture is hard to define in concrete terms. Perhaps the most informative way to understand its nature is by investigating its 'gifts'[127] as ways to address the 'losses' resulting from the 'loss of the image' (see section 4.5).

Firstly, the language of architecture ensures that interpretations are not only grounded in personal inventions (subjective relativism), but as an expression which is shared. It is important to point out that types do not exist as 'something'. They exist as possibilities which have remained open for interpretation. Through admittance and embodiment (figural interpretation) the type is set-into-work as "something more"[128] (1963: 188 & 1984a: 7), but not "something else" (1983a: 48); a recognisable figure which is both 'memorable' and 'nameable'. Such figures are images of existence, because they serve as interpretations of being-in-the-world expressing a shared understanding of the world. Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture, by substituting 'invention' for 'interpretation', therefore aimed to restore to architecture the imaginative ability to serve as an *imago mundi*: places which, through "variety" and "unity" (1984a: 55), are able to overcome the dangers of 'chaos' and 'monotony'.

In a handwritten document (NAM 23, 25/04/1986) entitled, "A basis for Architectural Education" Norberg-Schulz claimed that "when the spatial organization, built form and typological constitution of a place (building) satisfies man's need for orientation, identification and memory, he dwells, and gains his identity". By restoring man's relation to the things, by creating images which reveal man's understanding of his environment and by giving to man an identity in relation to an understood world, the language of architecture holds open the possibility for modern man to 'dwell poetically'. This kind of dwelling opens the dweller to the sacred aspects of the world. The gift of dwelling, therefore, resides in the language of architecture; both in a particular sense, as the commitment to a local language and in a general sense, by obediently promoting an imaginative, rather than an inventive approach.

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[127] The idea that the environment is in a deep sense given to the dweller and that things are 'grantings' (as well as "gatherings") (Heidegger, 1950a: 169-171), display the grateful acceptance, as a 'letting-be' (1951a: 149), that accompanies dwelling, in contrast to the "ordering" and "challenging-forth" (1953: 321-323) of the modern mind-set. In a similar way, the language of architecture can also be understood as a way of thinking which gives certain ways to appropriate.

[128] Already in IiA Norberg-Schulz expressed his enduring belief that "architecture ... is something 'more' than a purely practical tool, and that this 'more' is essential to human life" (1963: 188).

4.6.4 Translating the *genius loci* by means of a language of architecture

Norberg-Schulz designated the 'timeless structure' of place—what Heidegger described as the "essence" and Kahn understood as "order" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979c: 29)—as the *genius loci* (1979c: 46). Architecture must translate (understood in terms of Heidegger's concept of setting-into-work) this general atmosphere into a built image through the place-making *poiesis* of *Dasein*. In CoD Norberg-Schulz discussed setting-into-work as a dual process: firstly, setting-into-work "means that a mode of dwelling is translated into a typological entity by means of the basic principles of built form [embodiment] and organized space [admittance]". Secondly, this 'type' (typological entity) must be "modified in accordance with the circumstances of the here and now". Thereby the general understanding of the "whole" is presented as "a local and temporal interpretation of the timeless" (1984a: 29); an artistic way for a work of architecture to 'speak' of its 'thereness'. Similar to language, architecture is not only communicative, but revelatory.

Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy can be understood as an elaborate hermeneutic circle: a place manifests the spatiality of the interaction of the fourfold that constitutes the *genius loci*. In order to dwell in a place, dwellers gather the inherent meanings of the place, interpret them, and set the understood truth of the place (imagined as a poetic vision) into work through admittance and embodiment. Setting-into-work (*poiesis* or building) is facilitated and rendered meaningful by the language of architecture, which is based on typical memories of existential experiences between earth and sky. This shared understanding is concretely experienced and preserved as a figure (a built interpretation of a type). The figure – a gathering of the understood meanings of the place – serves as a concrete image of the world that reveals and keeps man's understanding of the place, but by means of the figure the place has been changed. Certain contents have been revealed, while others have been hidden. Gradually the interaction of the elements of the fourfold, which constitute the *genius loci*, will begin to be understood in a new way. The result is a transformed place that manifests the spatiality of the interaction of the fourfold in a new way … thus instigating a new hermeneutic circling.

On the one hand the particular lived reality of *Dasein*, on the other the general atmosphere (*genius* loci) which, while offering a measure of stability, is gradually changed by each new figural interpretation. The relationship between lived reality and the *genius loci* is, therefore, presented as an interaction between 'continuity and change'. A figure serves as an image of a particular (emplaced) meeting between *Dasein* and *genius loci*.

The place is the "gathering middle" in which man must answer[129] the *Stimmung* (or voice)[130] of place in an architectural image of *Übereinstimmung*. Norberg-Schulz's phenomenological understanding of place proposed a way for *Dasein* to "'rediscover' the world" in terms of its *genius loci,* while his language of architecture envisioned a way for *Dasein* to 'say' what had been revealed (1979c: 46).

4.6.5 The 'new spatiality' and the language of architecture

Instead of dismissing modernism, Norberg-Schulz envisioned Postmodernism as a development of the modern movement. Figurative architecture aimed to "make architecture intelligible and thereby human [by studying the] figures, archetypes, and their interpretations [which] keep and explain our existence" (Norberg-Schulz, 1985a: 238). Norberg-Schulz believed that this would represent a "return to 'meaning in architecture'" (1985a: 233), but this 'return' had to be contemporary rather than nostalgic. Despite his involvement with Postmodernism, he believed that "we need the achievements of modern art and architecture" (1985a: 245).

During the 1980s Norberg-Schulz wrote a series of articles portraying his epochal interpretation of the events leading up to the advent of modernism. In *Late Baroque and Rococo Architecture* (1972) Norberg-Schulz argued that the Late Baroque and Rococo presented a "unified" position between the "*esprit de système*" (spirit of the system) of the Baroque and the "*esprit systématique*" (systemic spirit) of the Enlightenment (1972: 6-8). The Enlightenment was marked by the 'devaluation of the styles'; a devaluation which forced modern Architecture, in the words of Giedion, "to begin anew ... as if nothing had ever been done before" (1958: 26). As precursor to the modern movement's search for a 'new dwelling', the Enlightenment was followed by an epoch of transitional works that abandoned the devalued styles and aimed to interpret the "contents of a new epoch", while remaining "locally rooted" (1980a: 198). Norberg-Schulz considered Art Nouveau[131]

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[129] The word 'answering' is insufficient to convey the full implication of Heidegger's intentions, but can be explained more appropriately by the Afrikaans word '*gehoorsaam*'. *Gehoorsaam* indicates not only a 'response' to what people hear (*hoor*), but also a measure of 'obedience'. The suffix '*saam*' indicates that the nature of this obedience is rooted in togetherness. If architects can, communally, obey the general voice of the place, then works will appear as 'variations' on a single 'theme' that 'belong' (*hoort*) to the place.

[130] The term *Stimmung*, refers to the atmosphere of the place, but can also be understood as the 'voice' of the place (through its linguistic connection—in German—with the word for voice, or *Stimme*), which again links it to *Dasein*'s attunement (see subsections 4.6.3 and 4.4.5).

[131] In "Behrens House" (1980b) Norberg-Schulz discussed this transitional movement by referring to a house Peter Behrens built for himself in Darmstadt.

a "happy moment of transition" that was able to unite the "vitalistic intentions" of the local movements with the "already felt wish for rational order of the coming Functionalism" (1980b: 140).

The extent of Art Nouveau's influence was, however, curtailed by the rationalistic demands of the modern age, which challenged architects with a host of tasks having no traditional expression. Norberg-Schulz viewed the task of modern architecture as the conquest of "beauty" (1980b: 140) in this new time. He identified two modern approaches that failed to provide appropriate solutions; describing the one as 'universalism', evident in the *De Stijl* movement[132], and the other as a form of 'unique' 'expressionism', which followed in the wake of Le Corbusier's Ronchamp. While the first lacked a sense of emplaced "content" (1986a: 151), the second lacked a shared "typological quality".[133]

Norberg-Schulz saw the works of Mies van der Rohe as an early attempt to address these deficiencies in a way true to "our time" (1984b: 166). The 'promise' of this new way of understanding space was first 'manifested' in Gropius's *Bauhaus* building in Dessau (1925-1926). The *Bauhaus* building advanced the idea that "space [had] become the primary fact of this new architecture, and built form [served only] to define the spatial pattern, rather than being an end in itself". Instead of being understood as a "preconceived object" the building was "transformed into an interaction of forces". The phenomenological promise of the *Bauhaus* building, therefore, resided in the dissolution of the subject-object relationship. Unfortunately, this promise remained unfulfilled, because "the intention [driving the design] was a return to elementary architectural facts", rather than a phenomenological desire to integrate the 'structures of life' into a spatial approach. Consequently, the 'forgetting' of being-in-the-world persisted in architecture (Norberg-Schulz, 1980c: 170).

In contrast to this missed opportunity, Norberg-Schulz believed Mies van der Rohe's architectural implementation of the modern spatial concept provided a way forward. Norberg-Schulz argued that Van der Rohe's approach could express the 'freedom' embodying globalisation – 'our freedom' – by means of the 'free plan', while 'our order' was manifested in the "logic, regularity and technological efficiency" of "clear construction". The "significance" of modern architecture resided in the fusion of the 'new freedom' and the 'new order' in a 'new space' (1984b: 166). However, the promise of this 'new spatiality' remained unfulfilled.

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[132] Norberg-Schulz discussed the influence of De Stijl in "Schröder House" (1986a).

[133] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 8, "The Years of Change", c. 1985: 5.

Norberg-Schulz proposed that the 'new spatiality' lacked three things. Firstly, it lacked "those images man needs to identify fully with his environment" (1984c: 166). Secondly, because of its attempt to reconquer the most general (universal) aspects, it lacked access to the "local and regional aspects" (1980c: 178) that dominate everyday life. Thirdly, the new spatiality needed "a more profound understanding of spatiality as a 'taking place' of life" (1980c: 176). Norberg-Schulz believed that Postmodernism could address the lack of images by means of a shared 'language', which could replace the 'devalued styles'. His figurative approach was a step in this direction; a step he believed was compatible with the new spatiality because the free plan "possesses the capacity to receive such images" (1984b: 166). In order to address the second lack, Norberg-Schulz believed that the 'new regionalism' could be achieved by a renewed appreciation of the spirit of place. The third lack could be addressed by a phenomenological understanding of what it means for life to 'take place'.

> Today we know that such an understanding was coming forth during the twenties; in 1926, the year of the inauguration of the Bauhaus, the philosopher Martin Heidegger in fact finished his book "Being and Time" (*Sein und Zeit*), which takes men's being-in-the-world (*Dasein*) as its point of departure and discusses its structures (Norberg-Schulz, 1980c: 176-177).

Heidegger's philosophy was the key that enabled Norberg-Schulz to understand architecture as the authentic (true to life) translation of *Dasein*'s existential spatiality. Architecture is not a sign, but a setting-into-work of what Heidegger called Dasein's *Eigentlichkeit* (1927a: 42-43); how humans truly *are* in the world. Authentic architecture[134] aims to set-into-work that which is most 'own' to us. Therefore authentic architecture aims to "serve life" (1980c: 177).

Figurative architecture hoped to augment modern architecture's original intentions. Norberg-Schulz tried to divert the development of the new tradition away from the "abstract diagrams of functionalism" (1984a: 128), while simultaneously avoiding the dangers he saw in Venturi and Rossi's approaches. The goal of figurative architecture was to re-establish the meaningful relationship between built works (as expressions of a way of life) and the *genius loci*; a relationship, which figuratively houses our shared participation, is housed in language and allows mankind to dwell poetically. As such, Norberg-Schulz envisioned figurative architecture as a way to preserve, through respectful interpretation, the unity of life and place within our 'own time'.

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[134] See Glossary: Authenticity.

4.6.6 Pluralism, place, and the language of architecture

Norberg-Schulz understood the contemporary world as an 'open' world marked by the pluralistic "dissolution of the ethnic domains of the past" (1987: 59). In response to this 'new world' Giedion proposed architects had to "start from zero" (NAM 9, April 1988:1), and Kahn suggested engaging with "Volume Zero" (Kahn cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1987: 54). Norberg-Schulz believed that the 'creativity' implied in Kahn and Giedion's demands for new beginnings "becomes incomprehensible if not founded on something already known".[135] 'Our time' demanded a different approach.

Nowhere else, has this 'open world' manifested itself more forcefully than in the 'New World'. Norberg-Schulz believed the New World offered valuable guidance to contemporary architects. In a handwritten document entitled, "America" (dated 06/06/1987) (NAM 23), the extent of his admiration becomes clear:

> The immediate experience of the new world … a liberation from the products of time - customs, identities; one is suddenly oneself, accepted as such: "we will call you Chris"! In Europe one is either "Italian", "German" or "French" or even "Roman" ...; in America one is suddenly none of all that, one is suddenly "nothing"; that is: oneself, one is somehow isolated, and still part of a society based on mutual help (and competition!). ... individuals, who are in the same "situation" (not of the same "origin"), that is, everything is centred on the present, with a possible future as a guideline. This determines the American dynamism, vitality: every moment is alive! (NAM 23, 06/06/1987: 1).

In *New World Architecture* (NWA) (1987), Norberg-Schulz proposed that it is possible to attain an existential foothold in a fragmented, open world, but that this foothold depends on conditions: firstly, "pluralistic fragmentation does not impede the development of a generally understood language of architecture but, rather, demands its formation" (1987: 59). Language resists the degenerating of architectural 'eclecticism' (implied by pluralism) into a "play with effects" (1987: 61). Furthermore, the need for a language "proves that man does not proceed from zero when he is allowed a new start" (1987: 57). Forms do not lose their meanings when transformed from one cultural domain (or from one epoch) to another. Forms have a general meaning dictated by how they reveal the relationship between earth and sky that must be interpreted in each new situation (rather than being

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[135] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, manuscript, "The Problem of Form in Modern Architecture", 04/1988: 7.

'invented from zero'). Norberg-Schulz, therefore, proposed "the meeting of essence and situation".[136]

In the same way Norberg-Schulz's concept of *genius loci* "freed the concept of place from the extremes of idealism and relativism, and made it part of living reality" (1980a: 196). The language of architecture aimed to free 'gathering' from the extremes of imitation (neglecting change) and invention (neglecting continuity) and designers from nostalgia while safeguarding their memories. Thus Heideggarian being-in-the-world, in terms of Norberg-Schulz's figurative approach, "[implied] to reveal what is general and eternal through the historical moment" (1986b: 220). This freed his interpretation of place from the Old World focus on ethnicity. Places could now be understood as "islands of meaning" (Norberg-Schulz, 1987: 9); defined cultural locations that accommodate different choices between qualities, made common through their reliance on the same language

In the same way that Norberg-Schulz envisioned the *genius loci* of the place as a continuity which 'set limits to creativity' (by implying 'respectful interpretation', rather than 'subjective innovation'), the typical memories preserved in the language of architecture placed limits on 'creative participation'. It is exactly these 'limits' that were (at the time) subject to the fiercest attacks by what Norberg-Schulz saw as two inauthentic 'faces' obscuring the potential of Postmodernism: 'historicist relativism' and 'deconstructive nihilism'. One focused on personal (subjective) meanings excavated from the past, while the other argued against all meaning. Norberg-Schulz's understanding of the pluralist condition represented a targeted reaction against two interpretations of the new open world which he saw as deeply flawed.[137]

Despite having to admit that the practitioners of Postmodernism "often failed in [their] quest for meaning, reducing the use of 'known' forms to a superficial play",[138] Norberg-Schulz still maintained that an authentic postmodern approach was possible. In a manuscript entitled, "The Two Faces of Postmodernism" (NAM 7, 1988), Norberg-Schulz defended Postmodernism and stated that "an unbiased study of the history of the architecture of our century ... shows that the Post-modern [*sic*] quest for meaning offers the only true answer to the shortcomings which were realized by Modernism itself" (NAM 7: 11). Rather than disrupting the modern project, "the authentic face of Postmodernism"

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[136] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23, handwritten document, 10/07/1986.

[137] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 7, lecture notes, "The Language of Architecture", 21/09/1988: 1.

[138] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, manuscript, "The Problem of Form in Modern Architecture", 04/1988: 8.

represents a significant figurative development which "expresses the nature and the meaning of our being between earth and sky" (NAM 7: 12).[139]

However, in the months that followed, Norberg-Schulz furnished the original manuscript with an alternative ending[140] which omitted the possibility of an 'authentic face of Postmodernism' and re-focused the article on the authentic use of the 'language of architecture'. This can be interpreted as an attempt to separate his formulation of the 'language of architecture' from what 'Postmodernism' had become and spoke of his general disillusionment with the movement.

4.6.7 Norberg-Schulz's disillusion with Postmodernism and beyond

Despite Norberg-Schulz's attempt to 'guide' the way proponents of the new movement appropriated historical figures (by relying on his language of architecture), its acolytes seized on architectural history with all the eclectic freedom promised by the open world. It is interesting to note Norberg-Schulz's initial reaction to Postmodernism, expressed in an interview with Bill Marvel (then a staff writer at the *Dallas Times Herald*):

> I don't feel that post-modernism is necessarily a way out. ... Too much of it is just arbitrary playing with forms. Evidently there's a need for more variety, for a link with the past, for elements with a human content. But all that can very easily degenerate into play with motifs that don't mean very much (Norberg-Schulz cited in Marvel, 1979: 8).

In hindsight, it seems clear that Norberg-Schulz remained a staunch apologist of 'authentic postmodernism' for a good while longer than was auspicious. The first outright (official) instance of him refuting the aims of Postmodernism is probably contained in a lecture presented at the University of Oulu entitled, "The Interior as Imago Mundi" (25/11/1989). He opened with the following statement:

> The need for a refounding of architecture is indeed urgent. After the failure of Functionalism, "isms" have appeared at an ever quicker pace: Neo-expressionism, Structuralism, Neo-rationalism, Post-modernism, and, at this moment, Deconstructionism. But none of these currents were able to satisfy man's need for a meaningful environment, either because they only aim at arbitrary effects (Neo-expressionism), or end up with sterile schematism (Structuralism), abstract "types" (Neo-rationalism), linguistic jokes (Post-modernism), or pure nihilism

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[139] This manuscript was published in *Architectural Design* (1988, nr. 7/8, pp. 10-15).

[140] He presented this version as a lecture at the University of Oulu (21/09/1988) under the title, "The Language of Architecture" (NAM 7). In 1991 Norberg-Schulz published the notes for this lecture in DATUTOP 14 under the same name.

(Deconstructionism). A return to the univocal systems of the past, however, is certainly not possible, nor is a revival of the Modernist dream of a new utopia. Today we have to accept plurality, and even the collapse of traditional values. Where, then, may we find a "foundation" that allows for change and mutual understanding? (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, 25/11/1989: 1).

In the years following his rejection of what Postmodernism became, Norberg-Schulz undertook what may be called a series of 'returnings' in his search for an appropriate 'foundation'. These years where challenging and yet he had the vigour to return critically to many of his old ideas. These returnings should not be framed as a 'nostalgic' reaction. Rather, they constitute a hermeneutic re-interpretation (another spiral) of what these ideas might imply within the contemporary world. In IiA Norberg-Schulz wrote that "[o]ne of the most beautiful experiences is to meet an elderly person who is still willing to receive impressions, and who does not reject everything that does not fit in with the essence of his or her previous experience" (1963: 42). Even after the disappointment of Postmodernism, he remained open to "the conquest of truth as that [which] we have always known, but shall never own" (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, 25/11/1989: 11).

4.7 Transition 3: a returning

The transition from the 1980s to the 1990s was a tumultuous time in Norberg-Schulz's private and professional life. At the start of the '90s Norberg-Schulz was diagnosed with cancer. His failing health limited his ability to travel and eventually claimed his life. He did, however, use the time to embark on a more formal level of research. In fact, in the years following his disillusionment with what Postmodernism had become (which must have tested his belief in the value of 'figurative approaches') he developed some of his most challenging ideas. This section will focus on his renewed engagement with Heidegger's philosophy (subsection 4.7.1), his interpretation of the ways in which 'life takes place' (subsection 4.7.2), the implications of 'new regionalism' in the Nordic world (subsection 4.7.3) and the prospects of poetic modernism (subsection 4.7.4).

4.7.1 A renewed focus on Heidegger's philosophy

Following his disillusionment with Postmodernism, Norberg-Schulz tried to find a way beyond figurative architecture, through an emboldened interpretation of Heidegger's

philosophy.[141] The implications of this new interpretation are contained in a series of lectures he delivered at the end of the 1980s. Firstly, a lecture entitled "Order and Change in Architecture" (OCA) (1989) presented at Texas A&M University on April 13, 1989, and the following 'discussion' between Norberg-Schulz, Kenneth Frampton and Karsten Harries, published as "The Voice of Architecture" (VoA) (1989). It is also helpful to refer to a modified version of OCA presented by Norberg-Schulz in Brussels (13/10/1989) entitled "Architecture as Gathering and Embodiment" (NAM 9). In this 'version', clarifying (handwritten) notes are added and some claims are crossed out. The concepts introduced in these talks culminated in his lecture, "The Interior as Imago Mundi" (NAM 9).

Figurative architecture demanded the existence of 'archetypes'. During the mid-1980s, Norberg-Schulz was convinced that archetypes are "basic interhuman figures" (1985a: 237) which "remain constant during history [and] have general validity" (1984a: 129). However, towards the end of the 1980s Norberg-Schulz realised that archetypes implied the same as the 'fixed ideal' he had been trying to avoid. Therefore, (in OCA) he returned to the 'language' he formulated in KHLA (1979c) and augmented this approach by introducing 'new' Heideggarian concepts, like *Ab-grund*, *Vorverständnis, Seinsweise*, *Gegend,* and *Erstaunen,* in order to "[clarify] the problem of constancy and change" (1989: 56). He thereby tried to discard many of the 'problematic' assumptions underpinning figurative architecture, without dismissing the language of architecture as a whole.

In VoA (1989), Norberg-Schulz mentioned that he had "just received volume sixty-five of [Heidegger's] collected works" (Frampton et al., 1989: 64). With 'volume sixty-five' he was, of course, referring to Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* 65, later translated and published in English as, *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* (2012) (CtP).[142] In CtP concepts like *Ab-grund*, and especially the mysterious term *Ereignis*[143] were given pride of place (see section 5.4). It is interesting to note that, due to the 'incompleteness'[144] of Heidegger's published *oeuvre*, Norberg-Schulz felt that "[Heidegger's] work is still not clear to us"

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[141] During these years the controversy around Heidegger's involvement with the Nazi Party escalated. In 1987 a book by the Chilean historian and a former student of Heidegger, Victor Farias (b. 1940), was released, *Heidegger and Nazism*, in which he cited 'incriminating' documents suggesting the extent of Heidegger's Nazi involvement. Norberg-Schulz defended Heidegger's philosophical contribution. He even engaged in 'debates' published in the Norwegian press (NAM 17). In a draft of a letter to Robert Mugerauer Norberg-Schulz wrote: "Heidegger was a German; that is all" (NAM 16, n.d.).

[142] *Contributions* was originally composed as a private contemplation and only published (in German) in 1989.

[143] See Glossary: *Ab-grund* and *Ereignis*.

[144] The publication of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* has not been completed.

(Frampton et al., 1989: 64). His return to Heidegger's philosophy was, therefore, not only appropriate, but inevitable.

In OCA, Norberg-Schulz grounded his search for a new ('non-archetypal') foundation for architecture in a new understanding of the *Gestalt* quality of the figure grounded in the term '*eidos*,' the word the Ancient Greeks used to describe "the look of a thing, that stands forth into the open" (1989: 54). However, Norberg-Schulz was not referring to anything 'perceptual' in nature. In his lecture "Architecture as Gathering and Embodiment" he asserted that "*Eidos* and *Gestalt* ... are here not to be understood as the 'look' of a particular thing, but rather as a 'mode of Being,' or *Seinsweise*".[145] The thing is not perceived, but recognised.

Norberg-Schulz's attempt to engage with the way people recognise ways of being, represents a crucial turning point in his understanding of the architectural figure. No longer is the figure derived from an interpretation of an ideal type, but type itself has been re-interpreted. It is not the archetype which is recognised, but the way of being as a 'mode of Being'. In his lecture, "The Interior as Imago Mundi", Norberg-Schulz further clarified why the replacement of 'archetypes' with a phenomenological understanding of '*Seinsweise*' could lead to the 'refounding' of architecture.

> The substitution of ideal form or archetype with the concept of "mode of being-in-the-world" (*Seinsweise*) offers the foundation for an open and pluralistic theory of architecture. The traditional constancy hypotheses have been abandoned, without falling into the traps of relativism or nihilism ... (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, 25/11/1989: 10-11).

The more radical approach proposed in this lecture aimed at creating "a foundation which comprises order *and* change. Only such a foundation may allow for *meaning*, because meanings are neither static nor arbitrary".[146] Meanings change, but are grounded in that which remains. How is it possible to recognise that which remains?

> ... the essences or general properties of the world are not known as a result of experience [or perceived], but are "given" through [Heidegger's concept of] "pre-cognition" or *Vorverständnis*, that also comprises man's own nature. As *modes* of being-in-the-world these essences do not *exist*, in the sense of having concrete presence, but are only "grasped" through their infinite manifestations ... As a *mode*, the essence is not an ideal form, but rather a structure of relations to other essences (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, 25/11/1989: 9-10).

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[145] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture, "Architecture as Gathering and Embodiment", 13/10/1989: 12.

[146] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture, "The Interior as Imago Mundi", 25/11/1989: 8.

Precognition allows inhabitants to recognise that which remains; a 'memory' given poetically, rather than being 'constructed' schematically. In his lecture, "Architecture as Gathering and Embodiment", Norberg-Schulz added that 'memory' does not "refer to empirical memory, but rather to what is 'seen in advance'".[147] This is how we should respectfully 'return to the things' since the recognised way of being, as a "nameable object", houses the "content of human memory". As in the story of Knut (see subsection 4.6.1), the 'world' is suddenly revealed as an unearned gift that opens mankind to 'wonder' and 'mystery' (1989: 56-57).

Mystery and wonder reside in the fact that the truth of place can only be revealed 'partially', since some relations (particular interactions) remain hidden while others are brought to light. Simultaneously, the bringing to light of some relationships obscures other (previously understood) relationships. What we reveal is therefore a 'choice', rather than being dictated by an 'absolute archetype'. Norberg-Schulz understood this 'new foundation' as an "*Abgrund* or abyss, out of which forms appear and into which they disappear again".[148] The way of being, recognised over the rim of the abyss, unites order and change in the Same[149]; "that which is always there but needs ever new interpretations" (Norberg-Schulz in Frampton et al., 1989: 61). Architects should, like poets "who reach sooner into the abyss" (Heidegger, 1946: 116), recognise and relate to the way of being of the things (forms) that appear over the edge of the abyss through pre-cognition, amid a remaining order-change interaction, stabilised in the *genius loci*.

This new approach signalled a deliberate return to the way architects respond to the voice of the place. The respect for the *genius loci* (called for in GL) is, therefore, given a more elaborate (Heideggarian) interpretation in terms of the abyss. We dwell in the world as "guardians of what is present and through cultivation reveal the essence of the place" (1989: 47). For Norberg-Schulz the most important aspect of 'guardianship' was that "man has to protect the possibility of disclosure". This 'disclosure', understood in Heideggarian terms, happens as art (Norberg-Schulz, 1989: 57). In the years that followed, Norberg-Schulz described architecture as the 'art of place'.

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[147] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture, "Architecture as Gathering and Embodiment", 13/10/1989: 13.

[148] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture, "The Interior as Imago Mundi", 25/11/1989: 10-11.

[149] See Glossary: Same, the.

4.7.2 A return to place

Towards the end of the 1980s Norberg-Schulz wrote the poem published as *Minnesjord* (1991).[150] *Minnesjord* was another turning point; a unique work in Norberg-Schulz's *oeuvre*. In an interview (conducted by Gro Lauvland) Norberg-Schulz's Norwegian publisher, Gordon Hølmebakk, proposed that *Minnesjord* was "an exceptional case, so unlike the rest of [Norberg-Schulz's] writing that it warrants special consideration. [Norberg-Schulz] made no secret of the fact that he was particularly fond of this book" (Hølmebakk, 2009: 155). The manuscript of *Minnesjord* (NAM 12) was even written in free verse; a poem expressing both a deep commitment to a particular place and a return to the poetic contemplation of place in general. Here Norberg-Schulz became the "praising singer" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 185) of the world closest to him. Unfortunately, the published book (which has not been translated into English) was presented in 'prose form', rather than the more poetic format used in the manuscript.

Norberg-Schulz's renewed interest in the concept of place strongly manifested in the new phase his career entered into during the early '90s; a path predominantly dedicated to research. In a series of handwritten documents (dated 31/01/1992), meant as part of a research proposal, Norberg-Schulz wrote: "From January 1st [presumably 1992] I am no longer a teacher, but a senior researcher. I have myself chosen this position, in order to develop a line of thought, which has interested me for several years. In short: the problem of *place*" (NAM 21, 31/01/1992: 1). In order to re-engage with this 'problem', Norberg-Schulz returned to what he saw as the most basic aspects of the lived situation; the fact that "life takes place" and that architecture, as "place-making", constitutes the human response to this happening (NAM 21, 31/01/1992: 1). He saw his contribution as a study of "the relation between life and place" (NAM 21, 31/01/1992: 1), guided by the 'hypothesis' that this 'totality' can only be understood in terms of 'identity'. In order to solve the 'loss of place' and allow life to take place authentically, Norberg-Schulz believed

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[150] Already in a letter dated 21/12/1989, Gordon Hølmebakk, expressed his admiration of the manuscript Norberg-Schulz had sent him "*Sjelden dette å sitte med ting i hånden hvorom man med hel overbevisning kan si: dette er nytt, og dette er godt* [Rarely does one sit with something in your hands of which one with full conviction may say: this is new and this is good]" (NAM 12). Translation by author. I am indebted to Dr Gro Lauvland, who offered insights and valuable guidance in the translation of this passage from Norwegian to English.

architects had to "re-establish the identity of place" as their guiding principle (NAM 21, 31/01/1992: 2).[151] This assertion raised certain questions in Norberg-Schulz's mind:

> What does "identity" mean in this context? How is identity related to time (history, change)? (Is it possible to maintain identity in a time of incessant change? On the other hand: all organisms change while they remain the same) ... (how does a place "live" (in time)) (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 21, 31/01/1992: 2).

The interaction between 'identity' and 'time' served as a common thread linking a set of questions with which Norberg-Schulz had long been preoccupied. In this new phase he hoped to find a way to unify continuity and change in the 'Same'.[152] In broader terms, he hoped that this approach would result in "a new and more relevant understanding of history" (NAM 21, 31/01/1992: 2). Already in the foreword of the first edition of *Space, Time and Architecture* (dated June 1940), Giedion had stated that he viewed "history not as a compilation of facts, but an insight into a moving process of life" (1941: vi). The goal Norberg-Schulz envisioned for his research project was 'refounding' architecture by calling for "closeness to life" (1993: 175); an understanding of architecture as *livskunst*.

> Early one morning many years ago, I realized the meaning of place. I was standing in the aisle of an Oslo bound train after spending a year in Italy. The forests of Østfold raced by, simple fir trees and a ground cover of moss and heather, and suddenly I felt with my entire being what it would be like to walk under those trees: I know this. This is part of me! ... The experience of the train taught me that what we are, is what we have experienced from childhood. We Norwegians *are* that thick forest with its soft undergrowth, the rugged coast with spray splashing over rocks and islands, the open moors and roaring waterfalls. We are also snowflakes, light summer nights, spring and autumn leaves. All this lies deep inside us, even those of us who have grown up in the city, and our lives find their place once we have the ability to give these experiences form in our settlements and homes (Norberg-Schulz, 1992: 24-25).

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[151] In the context of this thesis it is pertinent to acknowledge the work of the Spanish sociologist, Manuel Castells (b. 1942). In his urban studies Castells focused on the ways in which the interaction between identity and information technology shapes the postmodern conception of space and time. Castells criticised the postmodern urban condition as a "space of flows", indicating that our conception of space is dictated by "flows of information" (Castells in Susser, 2002: 315), within "timeless time". Timeless time refers to a conception of temporality born from the distortion of lived human time by the "instant financial transactions in the electronic markets". In response to these technology-driven interpretations, Castells proposed an alternative conception of space and time as a "space of places" characterised by the "glacial time [of] ecological processes" (Castells in Susser, 2002: 403) able to resist the "socio-technical structures" (Castells in Susser, 2002: 315) that impinge on lived notions of space and time.

[152] See Glossary: Same.

Not only do people have to devote themselves to the place, but, in a mysterious and unearned way, the place is also given, or entrusted to them. The idea that our "lives find their place" (Norberg-Schulz, 1992: 24-25) is worlds removed from ESA's formulation of life "taking possession" and "structuring" places (1971: 23) and reveals the (hidden) nature of 'life taking place' as a letting-be (in terms of Heidegger's concept of *Gelassenheit*). Life 'finding' a place is the appropriate way in which life 'owns' a place, because this kind of owning derives from the invitation of the individual to first let the place take ownership of life; an approach emblematic of those who have come to know, respect and love a particular place. That which is 'known and loved' underpins the 'friendship' and 'understanding' that characterises dwelling. If the implications of this seemingly simple statement could be grasped, then architecture could be refounded as *livskunst*. The poet, dwelling near the source and 'reaching earlier' over the edge of the abyss, finds only as much as can be recognised.

The return to place compelled Norberg-Schulz to look anew at how things *are* in his place: the world most intimately known to him. Along with his doctoral candidate, Anne-Marit Vagstein, he aimed at formulating a qualitative method[153] which could be used to phenomenologically analyse Norwegian places and counter the "disintegration of traditional settlement patterns as well as a loss of character" (Norberg-Schulz & Vagstein, 1992: 23). His renewed engagement with the Scandinavian vernacular culminated in the publication of *Nightlands: Nordic Building* (1993) (NL), in which he elaborated his care for the Nordic world, celebrated in his poetic ode to *Minnesjord*, in a more structured way.

4.7.3 Homecoming: returning to the 'new regionalism'

In response to failure of the International Style to acknowledge regional differences, Giedion proposed 'new regionalism'. Giedion saw the first signs of this 'new regionalism' in the Nordic world (particularly in the work of the Danish architect, Jørn Utzon).[154] In NL Norberg-Schulz expanded this appreciation by studying Nordic regionalism as an example of how to develop a deeper understanding of the way buildings are rooted in places; a way beyond the 'isms'. Norberg-Schulz's return to "The Regional" (1993: 175), therefore,

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[153] This method is still being prescribed by the Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage (see: http://www.riksantikvaren.no/?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=3297).

[154] In the fifth edition of *Space, Time and Architecture* Giedion added a new chapter entitled, *Jørn Utzon and the Third Generation* (1941: v).

focused on the deeper significance of Giedion's 'new regionalism'; that the totality of life and place interact within a given 'region' (what Heidegger called the *Gegend*).[155]

In NL (1993) Norberg-Schulz portrayed 'The Regional' as a dynamic 'gathering middle' of life and place. Life engaged in place through "creative conservation" (*skapende bevaring*)[156] aiming to "[preserve] the given through new interpretation" (Norberg-Schulz, 1993: 22). As a gathering, 'The Regional' does not imply that something is exclusively place-bound, but ascribes a wider significance to how the dwellers' unfolding lives gather the world. In his discussion of Gunnar Asplund and Sigurd Lewerentz's woodland cemetery (constructed in phases between 1917 and 1940 in Stockholm, Sweden) Norberg-Schulz put it as follows: "all achieves nearness, while referring beyond itself" (1993: 161). The rooted work somehow extends beyond its physical domain to become part of a wider 'regioning'.[157]

The concept of place, understood as a region and approached from *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world, acknowledges that, over time, the way in which dwellers use their places becomes customary. In architectural terms the customary way of building is described as a 'building tradition'. With the term 'building tradition', Norberg-Schulz aimed to designate how a 'way of building' reveals "human use of the given" (1993: 51). Therefore, the "building tradition expresses the unity of life and place" (1993: 51), the 'structure of place' and the 'structure of life', into interpreted contiguity. While a building tradition is based on what is customary, any "true tradition consists in something more than the repetition of types". Norberg-Schulz proposed that the "characters [of the building tradition] must engage in time and place and thereby unite permanence and change" (1993: 175). Rather than a formula, a building tradition should develop into a 'language of form': "It is this language of form that remains through the vicissitudes of temporal change, not as cumulative prototypes [i.e. not as archetypes] but as a more deeply founded attitude about space, form, and gestalt [*sic*]" (1993: 70).

Norberg-Schulz, by understanding building traditions as 'languages of form', based on a 'more deeply founded attitude', revealed the true potential of Giedion's 'new tradition'; a way to draw works of architecture into "true closeness to life" by expressing a way of life

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[155] Heidegger, 1945: 112-114/73-74. See subsection 6.7.3. See also Glossary: Region, Regioning.

[156] Norberg-Schulz used the Norwegian term '*skapende bevaring*' (Afr: *skeppende of kreatiewe bewaring*) which closely resembles Heidegger's definition of art as the concealing/revealing "creative preserving [*schaffende Bewahrung*] of truth" (Heidegger, 1936a: 69).

[157] See Glossary: Regioning.

which is *own* to our time, yet based on the 'timeless present' (1993: 175). The building tradition, by being rooted in a region, becomes a place-guided form of understanding that expresses the interaction of life and place. Life understands and uses building and place. Place houses life and building and all is appropriated and housed in language 'as a more deeply founded attitude'.

> Architecture, in other words, is a form of understanding. As such, it consists in explanation of the unity of life and place, in order that we may understand where we are, how we are, what we are. When successful, architecture becomes the art of building and thereby a representation of an inhabited landscape (Norberg-Schulz, 1993: 197).

The identity or structure of place (as the *genius loci*), the structure of life (as a way of life interacting with the identity of the place) and the building tradition (as a 'language of forms' aiming at revealing what is given and how it is understood) constitutes the 'regioning' of the particular and the general which remains. Despite pluralism, the possibility of "The Regional" (Norberg-Schulz, 1993: 175) is held open by the fact that "the understanding that constitutes our being in the world" and the "identity" of the "given place" remains. In fact, even the possibility of characterising our time as 'pluralist' implies that the contemporary situation has an 'identity' (1993: 175-176). Norberg-Schulz understood the "The Nordic" (1993: 1) as a continuation of Gideon's 'new tradition'. For him, Nordic architecture proved that "a modern architecture with roots in the place is possible" (1993: 175) if it is based on the "basic [timeless or universal] principles of architecture" (1993: 188).

Against his affirmation of the 'new tradition' Norberg-Schulz placed what he saw as "the general insecurity of our age"; the belief that "immediate stimulation and consumption are more relevant than continuity and meaning" (1993: 175). While the forces of change are rewarded in the contemporary world, Norberg-Schulz believed that "change does not exclude that the origins remain" (1993: 197). At heart, NL was an attempt to show how a concerted effort to appropriately and relevantly re-interpret the constancies of any region can give birth to an authentic contemporary architectural approach, free from the quantitative measuring of Functionalism, but not yielding to the 'immediate stimulation' of the 'isms'.

Norberg-Schulz's 'new regionalism' is underpinned by the wish to engage authentically with the *genius loci*. The problem of pluralism is not a problem of recognisable figures, but of a shared place interpreted by dwellers. To interact with the *genius loci* is to search for what is inherent in the region and then to translate and reveal this inherent truth in

commonly recognisable built form and organised space. This approach is succinctly illustrated by an anecdote, relayed by Norberg-Schulz, concerning Danish architect, Jørn Utzon's (1918-2008), house on the island of Mallorca:

> After the house was finished, he [Utzon] was given a book on the local building style by a Mallorcan colleague. The dedication reads: "To Jorn utzon who show us our own stone [*sic*]. Thanks" (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 17, manuscript, "Jørn Utzon and the Importance of the Primitive": 4).

Norberg-Schulz contended that Utzon's ability to create works that belong to and reveal the essence of the place, resides in his acknowledgement of the place and the people's way of life as "primitive things" which remain (NAM 17: 1). This did not mean that Utzon was some kind of mystic divorced from his time. Norberg Schulz believed that Utzon's sensitivity to place and life affirmed him as "a modern architect in the true sense of the term" (NAM 17: 5). Norberg-Schulz investigated the potential of the modern regional approach in his reworked version of *Roots of Modern Architecture* (originally published in 1988) entitled, *The Principles of Modern Architecture* (PMA) (2000a).

4.7.4 The return to poetic modernism

In PMA Norberg-Schulz reiterated his belief in the artistic intentions of the modern pioneers as "the only valid current of the twentieth century" (2000a: 7), since it envisioned a "new form of understanding" aimed at "[helping] man feel at home in the new world" (2000a: 9). Contrary to the 'closed systems' of the past, Norberg-Schulz argued that the new world was built on radically new "spatio-temporal structures" (2000a: 10); a "new place" (2000a: 19) characterised by a "multitude of interacting characters" (2000a: 46), and the "interaction of equivalent (albeit dissimilar) zones" (2000a: 23). Norberg-Schulz proposed that modern architecture presented two new 'principles' to address this challenge: the 'free plan', constituting a new approach to 'spatial organisation' (admittance) and the 'open form', as a new approach to 'formal articulation' (embodiment).

The 'free plan' (pioneered by Le Corbusier) responds primarily to the "simultaneity" of modern space and "implies a relationship of interaction between the various spatial zones of the interior as well as between inside and outside" (2000a: 33). Following modern art, the free plan traded the centre-bound spatial "symmetries" of the past for the "interaction of equivalent (albeit dissimilar) zones" (2000a: 23). As such, the free plan should be understood as "the spatial organization of a multitude of interacting places" (2000a: 33). The 'open form' responds primarily to the "multitude of interacting characters" embodied in modern form giving (2000a: 46). Following modern art, the open form traded the classical

idea of "perspective" for the interaction between "simultaneous viewpoints" whereby several aspects of the thing were unified into one image (2000a: 13). The resulting "non-figurative" approach (2000a: 13) represented a "built embodiment of a multitude of interacting characters" (2000a: 46).

The free plan and the open form thus offered new expressions of the "spatiality" of the "new place" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000a: 10) and confirmed Norberg-Schulz's view that architecture, as an artistic pursuit, must propose ways to build the "space conception" of the epoch in order to establish appropriate places where human life can meaningfully take place. Norberg-Schulz proposed that when the building tasks (belonging to a particular way of life) are interpreted in terms of a poetic 'vision', rather than trying to schematically analyse them (as in IiA), then the 'moment' (2000a: 16) can be visualised and complemented in a work of architecture as a form of understanding. Thus "architecture belongs to life" (2000a: 6) as a poetic revelation of the 'spatio-temporal conception' of the world in "lived space" (2000a: 16). The imaginative manifestation of the vision takes place by means of "three systems of images: *language*, which consists of basic Gestalten [*sic*]; *style*, which is a temporal choice among these; and *tradition*, which implies a local adaptation" (2000a: 102).

Language, tradition, and style make manifest the "particular 'vision' of the world" as a "set of images which are capable of variation and reinterpretation" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000a: 119). Through the free plan and the open form "[modern] architecture [spoke] in space and form" (2000a: 55), but because modern architects neglected the role of language, tradition and style they could not find a common way to endow their poetic vision (the new conception of space) with the "quality of image" (2000a: 57). Thus the images they managed to create failed to "become part of life here and now" (2000a: 119).

Norberg-Schulz felt that modern architects ultimately failed to relate their understanding of modern spatiality with the modern way of life. He maintained that the principles of modernism (the free plan and the open form) could express the nature of the 'new place', but had to be augmented with an appreciation for language, style and tradition, whereby appropriate 'visions' could be concretised while safeguarding the traditional understanding (and memories) given to *Dasein*. Thus architecture remained the setting-into-work of the truth of place, amid the interaction between "constancy and change" (2000a: 122-123).

Ultimately, Norberg-Schulz hoped to show that augmenting (what he saw as) the "qualitative modernism" (2000b: 15) of the pioneers of modern architecture with a phenomenological understanding of the unity of life and place could serve the needs of

contemporary life as *livskunst*. During the following years[158] he tried to advance this notion of *livskunst*—an authentic setting-into-work (within the new tradition) of the way human life takes place within the region—on the grounds of his more rigorous interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy.

4.8 Phase 4: the art of place

The implications of Norberg-Schulz's 'returnings' (see section 4.7) were expressed in his last book, PLP (2000b). This section will discuss the aspects and insights that (during the last phase of his work) contributed towards the ultimate (and in some sense original) aim of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project; the possibility that works of architecture can artistically express the dweller-place totality as *livskunst*.

4.8.1 Precognition, the way of wonder and the art of place

Norberg-Schulz's early conception of intentionality viewed human understanding as something 'built up' and formalised in *schemata* that first hypothesise, and then prove or disprove certain aspects of the world, through repeated experience, but the explanation offered by *schemata* failed to describe how people, in the first place, create 'categories' of perception and understanding. If an interpretation cannot be understood as being derived from a 'known form' then the interpretation is meaningless to those unaware of the 'convention'. Consequently, Norberg-Schulz tried, in the years following his disillusion with postmodernism, to understand the recognition of forms and places in a more fundamental way.

Norberg-Schulz proposed that people first understand things in terms of their inherent precognitive ability to identify a 'way of being' (which remains). In order to trace the currents underlying Norberg-Schulz's focus on precognitive understanding, it is necessary to embark from the questions which sprung from his own experience of places. In a handwritten meditation, Norberg-Schulz tentatively engaged with what happens when people are faced with a new place and how these possibilities are related to identity:

> When I ask, "Who are you?", what do you answer?
> What do you think before answering?
> You certainly look back. ...
> We are our memories.
> Our memories are our world ...

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[158] Norberg-Schulz described PLP as a book "written in the spirit of the new tradition" (2000b: 17).

(The world I have "understood".)
But then there is a "breakthrough":
Memories appear which I never "had".
Déjà-vu.
Do the ancestors speak?
Or did "I" myself live before?
Are'nt [*sic*] my experiences conditioned by
what I already "am".
I choose and react, because I already am.
Memories before memories
("Rome before Rome")
(Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23, handwritten document, 05/08/1985).

What inhabits the mysterious 'breakthrough' moment when people 'for the first time' engage with a particular world and somehow understand it? Five years later, Norberg-Schulz wrote the following:

Prague gives a strong sense of déjà-vu ... An experience of re-discovery and belonging, rather than surprise and novelty. To walk around and to feel: this I *know*, this is a place where things speak "my" language ... How is that to be understood? It is not necessary to turn to mysticism to answer the question; it is not necessary to believe in rebirth or the transmigration of souls. It simply suffices to say: Prague is a *true city* … and I recognize this fact immediately because I somehow *know* what a city is. But how can I "know" a city in advance? Well, it is a fact that human beings know most things in advance. Children do not confuse "fish and fowl", although they may not yet know their names. And, strangely enough, we also "know" what a city is (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 1, handwritten document, 13/08/1990).

From these excerpts, it can be argued that Norberg-Schulz, in the last phase of his work, tried to approach human knowledge of the world in terms of the way people 'are'. This is the most telling pivot away from *schemata*, towards a complete reliance on Heideggarian being-in-the-world. Heidegger proposed that *Dasein*'s participatory recognition (what Norberg-Schulz referred to as our feeling of déjà-vu) occurs as precognition. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927b), Heidegger addressed the problem of perception in terms of *Vorverständnis*:

World is not something subsequent that we calculate as a result from the sum of all beings. The world comes not afterward but beforehand, in the strict sense of the word. Beforehand: that which is unveiled and understood already in advance in every existent *Dasein* before any apprehending of this or that being, beforehand as that which stands forth as always already unveiled to us (Heidegger, 1927b: 165/234-235).

It is this idea of *Vorverständnis* which Norberg-Schulz (in Norwegian he relied on the term *forforstaelse*) appropriated in order to describe how Knut 'suddenly' understands his place as a whole, or how he himself, a Norwegian architect, could feel as if he understood Prague. In architectural terms Norberg-Schulz first realised the merits of this precognitive approach in the work of the Finnish architect, Reima Pietilä (1923-1993).

> [Pietilä] started developing ideas for his student union building *Dipoli* in Otaniemi by "walking, zigzagging across the shield rock of the building site, achieving a tactile memory of the understanding of the rock form". Thus he obtained what he calls a "pre-cognitive knowledge" of the site [in an effort to grasp] what is *there*, as objects of human identification: trees, rocks, clouds and light (Norberg-Schulz, 1989: 44-45).

Norberg-Schulz hoped to apply precognition as a source of 'qualitative understanding'; a way to respectfully engage with the *genius loci* and recognise the things revealed and concealed over the rim of the abyss. In NL Norberg-Schulz described precognition as "that which allows for the possibility of seeing something as something [and thereby] allows for the comprehension of the structure of the surroundings" (1993: 75). Precognition describes *Dasein*'s particular "way of being" which "conditions knowledge obtained through the senses" (2000b: 62). It stands against both the "atomism" of "scientification" and the immediate "experience" of "egocentricity" (2000b: 75) as the "'timeless' structure of the human constitution" (1993: 204). Existence is deeper than *schemata*. Norberg-Schulz proposed that these depths are made manifest through precognition; a poetic comprehension (vision) into the happening of a way of being given to the mortal living amid the mirroring of the fourfold. The gifts of precognition will be discussed in the following sections.

4.8.2 *Gestalt* phenomenology and the architectural image

Norberg-Schulz's dependence on the *Gestalt* principles sprouted from his belief that a poetic approach to architecture should proceed from the totality to the parts. In IiA Norberg-Schulz relied on the *Gestalt* theory to show that people "experience the environment as consisting of objects or 'wholes'" (1963: 34) and that "the relationships between the elements are usually more important than the elements themselves" (1963: 146). In ESA (1971) he tried to frame architectural orientation in terms of human existence by pointing out the correspondence between Piaget's investigation of the child's understanding of space and *Gestalt* psychology. In GL (1979b) Norberg-Schulz formulated the concept of *genius loci* describing the characteristic totality which precedes

the parts. His figurative approach proposed a way to 'express' these things as a "temporal interpretation" of "timeless … archetypes" (1984a: 29).

In an effort to move beyond the reliance on archetypes (see subsection 4.7.1), Norberg-Schulz (in PLP) tried to approach 'that which remains' in the figure and enables the recognition of the type in terms of Heidegger's formulation of the 'ontological difference' (Heidegger, 1927a: 6).[159] Norberg-Schulz envisioned the *Gestalt* quality of the thing as 'the Being of the being' (which he saw as an enduring continuity), while the figure represented 'the being itself' (a temporal interpretation derived from enduring continuities), which could be recognised precognitively as a way of being. By understanding figures as ways of being, Norberg-Schulz envisioned "open and liberating forms … which [are] always the same without being identical" (2000b: 75), thereby uniting the interaction between continuity and change in 'type' – understood as a "nexus between figure and *Gestalt*" (2000b: 134) – constituting the 'same'. Norberg-Schulz called this approach "*Gestalt* phenomenology" (2000b: 141). Type was no longer seen as an "interpretation" of a static "archetype" (1984a: 129), but as an "open multiplicity of possibilities with a shared way of being" (2000b: 134). Since *Dasein*'s engagement with the world was now revealed in terms of the way *Dasein* 'is', a precognitive being, *Gestalt* phenomenology promised "a proper understanding of *Gestalt* and of the figure closer to life" (2000b: 137).

In Norberg-Schulz's formulation, "type is more concrete than the *Gestalt*, but unlike the figure it contemplates also variations of possibility" (2000b: 156). It is this concrete, but variable, 'sameness' that enables language to name the type even though it "does not exist" (1984a: 129). "If there were no types, works would be unique and insignificant and the *Gestalten* [*sic*] would remain unknown" (2000b: 156). As a named way of being, types are recognisable, because they assign a "name" to "typical possibilities" (2000b: 137) and illustrate the fact that "it is through language that precognition occurs" (2000b: 111), since language is the "source [of the] 'contents' of precognition" (2000b: 138). Therefore, "the typical that lasts over time and space [is] simply that which is emanated when something is recognised [and named] as such" (2000b: 134).

Together, *Gestalt* (as the Being of the being) and the figure (as the being itself) determine the "typical" and the typical is always "the same" (an interactive and intimate 'onefold') without being "identical" (2000b: 133-134). Consequently, Norberg-Schulz believed that "only the *Gestalt* theory succeeds in clarifying how precognition works" (2000b: 135) because it deals with how figures preserve their 'identities' in the 'same' despite variations

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[159] See Glossary: Ontological difference.

of temporal interpretation (2000b: 137). *Gestalt* phenomenology, grounded in *Dasein*'s precognitive ability to understanding the world as an interactive mirroring of ways of being, therefore, represented "a 'foundation' which allows for change".[160] Ultimately, Norberg-Schulz saw *Gestalt* theory as a series of "principles that liberate" rather than "static rules" (2000b: 198) and *Gestalt* phenomenology as a way to "understand the interaction of ways of being on the interior of the totality" (2000b: 88).

Gestalt phenomenology also inspired Norberg-Schulz to consider a more significant interpretation of the role of the architectural image. He suggested that the goal of works of architecture, based on this new foundation, is to "manifest ways of being [by gathering and assembling] a world into an articulate image" (2000b: 98). To build an image is neither a "[depiction] of an existing situation" (2000b: 221) nor an innovative "discovery" (2000b: 143). Rather, the image is an interpretive 'translation' of the interaction between the members of the fourfold (2000b: 143). Thus the architectural image "assembles a world", but also extends its reach "beyond its component parts" as an "expression of presence" (2000b: 11), revealing *Dasein*'s understood spatiality. When a 'total situation' is made present by an image, then that which is "concealed and fluctuating concretizes itself and clarifies itself". As an interpretation, the image, therefore, serves as a "bridge between a given environment and the life that takes place there". (2000b: 221-223).

4.8.3 Presence, interaction, and the art of place

In terms of *Gestalt* phenomenology, any place constitutes an open interaction of the revealing and concealing of ways of being. Norberg-Schulz envisioned this as the nature of the contemporary place:

> … an unarrestable interaction among qualitative phenomena, which are veiled and unveiled, and which are continually being rooted and unrooted and detoured. And it is precisely this dynamic that my research is aimed at explaining, with the goal of establishing significant points of reference in a world that tends to break up and dissolve into scattered fragments (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 16).

Therefore, the 'happening' (*Ereignis*) of 'taking place' is an interactive reality. The fact that *Dasein* participates in this interaction describes 'presence' in a much more concrete way than "visual [approaches]" aiming at the 'perception' of "sensory data" (2000b: 128). *Dasein*, as presence, is being-in-(the interaction which constitutes)-the-world (Figure 14).

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[160] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, manuscript, "The Interior as Imago Mundi", 25/11/1989: 1.

Figure 14: In the last phase of Norberg-Schulz's work the interactions between the elements constituting the square (the dotted lines) became the object of investigation (diagram by the author).

Norberg-Schulz believed that "presence is inevitably the same even when it is not identical" (2000b: 312). Historically, works of architecture served as a "concrete response" to the "obvious presence" of the place (2000b: 28), but architects, by adopting the abstract "Cartesian mindset", divorced "architecture from the world of life" (2000b: 23) and abdicated their disclosive role in this 'vital' situation (2000b: 24). In response, Norberg-Schulz aimed to re-establish the relationship between architecture and the "world of life" by proposing a "phenomenology of presence" (2000b: 311),[161] derived from the fact that 'life takes place'. This expression succinctly reveals *Dasein*'s 'situation' as a gathering of the "totality of life and place" (2000b: 128); a 'whole' constituted by the "interaction … between earth and sky, the use made by man and the divine order" (2000b: 311).

In terms of Heidegger's formulation of art as the "setting-into-work of truth" (1936a: 69), truth as a revealing and concealing in terms of *aletheia* and Norberg-Schulz's formulation of presence as the interactive 'totality of life and place', architecture, as the art of place, implies 'the truth revealed and concealed in the taking place of life between earth and sky setting itself into work'. Architecture, as the art of place, envisions the setting-into-work of *Dasein*'s presence.

Norberg-Schulz interpreted "presence" (2000b: 27) – his word for Heidegger's concept of "*Raumlichkeit*"[162] – as "the space of everyday living in which each thing has its own place, and all of these 'places' collaborate in the creation of that environmental whole that allows life to take place" (2000b: 27). It is tempting to understand 'spatiality' simply as space, but

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[161] See Glossary: Phenomenology of Presence, Presence.
[162] Heidegger, 1927a: 101-113 & 367-369.

with the concept of 'presence', Norberg-Schulz indicated that what he had in mind, when claiming that architecture "keeps the spatiality of the world" (2000a: 101), was a holistic understanding of *Dasein*'s interaction with the world. Thus 'presence' denoted a way to express 'spatiality' in terms of the unity of life and place. Already in a handwritten document dated 27/11/1980 Norberg-Schulz had asserted:

> Architecture speaks about the <u>spatiality</u> of existence. (Geviert World).
> "Spatiality" ≠ "Space"!
> Spatiality comprises things and Dasein (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23).

In terms of the 'phenomenology of presence', the *genius loci*, described (in GL) as the way of being of the place, was ascribed a more active role. In a manuscript from 1992 entitled "Prague, Place and Spirit" (NAM 7), Norberg-Schulz explained Prague as "a place that never seems monotonous or static, but everchanging within the horizon of the genius loci" (NAM 7: 15). Thus, in any place, the *genius loci* acts as the horizon of *Dasein*'s interpretation. New forms of understanding appear above the rim of the horizon while others are forgotten in the same way as Heidegger's 'abyss'.

> This revelation happens as an historical process, whereby given place and human life are interrelated in ever new ways. When the process becomes the self-realization of the possibilities inherent in the origin [the *genius loci*], the place gains true identity, and each generation of inhabitants may experience a corresponding identity (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 7, 1992: 16).

As both horizon and origin, the *genius loci* reveals "how human life is a taking place during the course of time" (NAM 7, 1992: 17). In order to safeguard the continuity of *Dasein*'s understood spatiality, presence must continuously be re-interpreted within the 'horizon' designated by the *genius loci*. The *genius loci* unites historic continuity and change in the same horizon.

In his interpretation of Prague, Norberg-Schulz also mentioned the 'self-realisation' of the place. With the term 'self-realisation', Norberg-Schulz referred to the ability of a place to "live in its essence" (2000b: 56). Self-realisation cannot be enforced. Rather, it must be allowed to happen. The concept of self-realisation refers back to Norberg-Schulz's belief, expressed in MiA, that places are "structured in advance" (1966b: 24). By revealing this structure the art of place implies the self-realisation of that which has always been latent in the place. *Dasein* must "accept things as they are"[163] and "care for what exists" by

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[163] This possibility of 'letting the place be' was derived from Heidegger's concept of *Gelassenheit* which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

means of "works of clarification" (2000b: 56). Thus the role of the architect is to let the place "achieve itself in history" (2000b: 208). In PLP Norberg-Schulz described this interactive 'letting' in terms of three dimensions.

4.8.4 The dimensions of presence

Norberg-Schulz proposed that *Dasein* interacts with place in three ways: firstly, *Dasein* "makes use" (2000b: chapter 1), secondly, *Dasein* "comprehends" (2000b: chapter 2) and thirdly, *Dasein* "implements" (2000b: chapter 3) "use" and "comprehension" by means of the "language of architecture" (2000b: chapters 4-6). Use, comprehension and implementation are the three "dimensions of presence" (2000b: 125) and their interaction will be discussed in this section.

In PLP Norberg-Schulz designated *Dasein*'s participation in the world of life with the term 'use'; a collective term employed to "[indicate] that life takes place, both as an event and as an action" in terms of "the structures of being in the world" (2000b: 14). Norberg-Schulz was adamant that 'use' describes a "complex process [which] cannot be reduced to motor behaviour, sensory impression, emotional experience, or logical understanding; rather it embraces all these various dimensions" (2000b: 59). In contrast with the tenets of Functionalism, Norberg-Schulz formulated the concept of use precognitively to show that "architecture is not a result of the actions of man, but rather it renders concrete the world that makes those actions possible" (2000b: 45). Therefore, use indicates the "way in which place shares in the way of life" and refers to "both the user and that which is used"; thereby corroborating the "unity of life and place" (2000b: 59) as "basic life-situations" (Norberg-Schulz, 1992: 24).

Norberg-Schulz called these 'life-situations', like "arrival, encounter, meeting ... clarification ... retreat and isolation", "moments of use" (2000b: 39). They indicate the interaction between the 'environmental levels' (formulated in ESA), the modes of dwelling (formulated in CoD) and "architectural typologies" (2000b: 45). In short, the moments of use describe 'totalities of lived experiences' within interactive presence. These totalities are rendered understandable by referring them to the general "aspects of use" which are present in each moment: "memory", "identification" and "orientation". Norberg-Schulz proposed that "these aspects constitute that generic precognition that underlies the foundation of presence, while moments actualize it" (2000b: 125). Together, the moments and the aspects, as understood totalities of lived experience, describe the concrete reality of dwelling and enable "a meaningful use of place" (2000b: 86); *Dasein*'s "spontaneous

use of what emerges from an adequate comprehension of place" (2000b: 45). Through precognition, *Dasein* can make "understanding use" (1993: 75).

In contrast to the Cartesian separation between things and inhabitants (culminating in the separation between thought and feeling), *Dasein*'s engagement in the world as use, through the accumulation of moments of use, becomes a "thickening" and an "interweaving" of interactions in which *Dasein* is deeply involved (2000b: 42). Access to these depths is given precognitively as a poetic vision; a "total comprehension" which "erupts from 'silence' and which is the source of all things" (2000b: 337). Silence is achieved only through 'listening'[164]; understood as an open expectancy grounded in the realisation that each place has its own voice (*Stimmung*), and that it is "the proper task of man to comprehend that identity and take care of it" (2000b: 55). This, in fact, is the "fundamental goal of the art of place": to cultivate such an open (awaiting) attitude that will "allow quiet to predominate, in order for the implementation of presence to become feasible" (2000b: 229). Implementation happens as a 'speaking' (answer) bounded by language. Norberg-Schulz proposed that "the comprehension of the world as interaction of ways of being is the necessary prerequisite to a healing of the fracture between thought and feeling" (2000b: 312).

In architectural terms, 'speaking' implies *poiesis*, i.e. a poetic implementation: "use always involves an implementation of an interpretive nature, which adapts the place to its utilization" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 45). It has already been pointed out that *Dasein*'s use depends on the ability to listen and precognitively comprehend the situation as moments. The interaction of the moments and aspects of use holds open the possibility for 'understanding use', but use guided by the *genius loci*, as interpretive horizon, will result in "respectful use" (2000b: 51), an approach Norberg-Schulz previously described as "creative conservation" (1993: 22; 2000a: 98).[165]

Use, comprehension and implementation, envisions architecture as the *poiesis* (poetic implementation) of a poetic vision, precognitively received through the "phenomenological comprehension" (2000b: 47) of a particular place, circumscribed by an interpretive horizon and 'made dense' through the accumulation of moments of use. Thus architecture is the (interpretive) implementation of *Dasein*'s presence (being-in-the-world). The result of architecture – transformed place – exists as a "comprehended landscape where man takes his place between earth and sky, making respectful use of it and inhabiting it

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[164] Heidegger understood listening as that which is "constitutive for discourse" since it constitutes "the existential being-open of Dasein" (1927a: 163).
[165] See subsection 4.7.3.

poetically". Thus, through architecture, "every place is ... endowed with spatial organization, characteristic form and conditioning images" (2000b: 51) and *Dasein* is given the opportunity to 'dwell poetically'.[166]

4.8.5 The structure of implementation: the language of architecture

The *poiesis* of presence is facilitated and made common by the "structure of implementation" i.e. what Norberg-Schulz previously defined as the language of architecture (2000b: 125). While the former incarnations of this language were based on the interpretation of archetypes, Norberg-Schulz now tried to understand language in terms of the open interaction characterising *Dasein*'s presence, designating the total relationship between life and place. He called the architectural manifestation of this totality the "art of place" (2000b: 217). Implementation (building as the art of place) "makes evident comprehension and use" (2000b: 172) as an 'ordered' totality of life and place by being guided by the 'structure of implementation'.

The question that this new interpretation of the language of architecture had to answer was how 'orientation' and 'identification' could "make possible a significant use of the place" (2000b: 312) and thereby render *Dasein*'s interaction with the world meaningful. Norberg-Schulz believed that this dialogue between use and place played out continuously as an historic interaction between "three [architectural] systems of images": language, custom and style (2000a: 102) (see subsection 4.7.4). These 'systems' constitute the "results attained by the art of place" (2000b: 226). Despite epochal variations, custom, style and language describe how mankind has 'always' used the place. Norberg-Schulz hoped that a contemporary interpretation of these systems would reveal an approach to implementation that is "closer to life" and could replace the 'isms' (2000b: 92).

4.8.6 The results of the art of place: language, style and tradition

During his postmodern period Norberg-Schulz defined language as something that is "archetypal", style as a "temporal choice" and tradition as a "local adaptation". Both style and tradition resulted in types which he understood as "variations on archetypes".[167] In NL and PMA he devoted renewed consideration to the potential of 'building traditions' and 'styles', but in PLP Norberg-Schulz acknowledged that "it is illusory to think that we can once again base the art of place upon custom and style" (2000b: 310). The reason for the

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[166] See Glossary: Dwelling, dwelling poetically.

[167] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23, handwritten document, 08/02/1985.

irretrievable loss of custom and style is their dissociation. Together, style and culture could appropriately manifest a way of life. Apart, they became either prone to "provincialism", the stifling nostalgia resulting from the unthought repetition of known solutions, or "abstractism", the irrelevant assimilation of stylistic elements in compositions (2000b: 303).

Alternatively, Norberg-Schulz proposed a contemporary approach – his "phenomenology of presence" (2000b: 311) – which does not depend on "custom and style", but is aimed to "reconquer the original things" through a phenomenological understanding of "place and language" (2000b: 226) rooted in the interaction of the fourfold. Norberg-Schulz's exposition of this new 'way', formulated in the closing pages of PLP and based on the terms "imprint", "composition" and "identifying intervention" (2000b: 353-354), is somewhat speculative. However, his suggestions can be elaborated upon by referring to the Norwegian words he used to describe these ideas. In the manuscript he referred to the imprint as "*preg*", composition as "*komposisjon*" and the identifying intervention as an "*identitetsskapende inngrep*".[168]

In the face of contemporary understanding designating place as a "pluralistic situation", Norberg-Schulz proposed that custom be regrounded in "respect" for the "imprint" or "preg" of the place (2000b: 353). While this word refers to the 'impression' a place evokes, it also draws attention to how the place 'touches' or 'moves' us and thus represents what is appropriate to the place in terms of the place and the life of the place.

Instead of relying on the "repetition" of known ideas, style should be engaged anew as a process of "composition" (2000b: 353). It is obviously easy to translate the Norwegian "*komposisjon*" with the English 'composition', but it must be remembered that what is here proposed is not the mere formal ordering of elements in larger works. Rather, it must be remembered that 'to compose' is also a form of address: a 'speaking' in response to the speaking (within the pregnant silence) of the place. Architectural speaking as the art of place is an answer to the voice of the place. Norberg-Schulz envisioned his language of architecture as a means to facilitate such speaking.

Norberg-Schulz called the result of *Dasein*'s *komposisjon* in answer to the *preg* of the place an "identifying intervention"; an involvement capable of "structuring the environmental interaction and allowing it therefore to make itself present" (2000b: 354). The Norwegian term, "*identitetsskapende inngrep*", implies that intervention is grounded in comprehension, or literally, grasping something. The word "*identitetsskapende*" reminds of

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[168] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 4, original Norwegian manuscript of PLP, 1996: 298.

the possibility earlier expressed as *Dasein*'s '*skapende bevaring*' (Norwegian) or "creative conservation" (1993: 22). In effect, composition resulting from the respectful listening to the imprint of the place is the precondition for creative conservation and results in an 'identity-creating intervention' which conserves what *Dasein* has grasped. According to Norberg-Schulz the 'identifying intervention' can, therefore, be seen as an "exposition of the world" (2000b: 354) that speaks of both life and place.

The recognition that even contemporary interpretations should be rooted in what previous interpretations have left unsaid (i.e. the latent potential which has always been 'sayable')[169] reveals that the aim of Norberg-Schulz's phenomenology of presence was the "self-realization" (2000b: 353) of the possibilities allowed by the place. In fact, the Norwegian word Norberg-Schulz used for 'presence', *tilstedeværelse* (Norberg-Schulz, 1995a: 5), safeguards at its heart the Norwegian word for place, namely *sted*.[170] Therefore, the demand inherent in imprint, composition and intervention is that those intentions which underlay the formation of customs (the way life and place touch each other) and style (temporal answering) must once again become a respectful speaking amid the speaking of place; a new sensitivity towards place and language aiming to reveal the place as a "totality" that allows both "personal choice" and "reciprocal respect" (2000b: 354).

Through respectfully listening to the 'imprint' of the place, through creatively conserving 'composition' and through understanding the resulting works as identifying interventions, custom and style can be envisioned anew. Both custom and style (the results of the art of place) are rooted in what should be the goal of architects: "care for the unity of place" (2000b: 354).

4.8.7 The art of place and the authentic art of the experience of living

Despite the difference in approach between his earliest and later writings, Norberg-Schulz's work was characterised by the enduring conviction that architecture should appropriately understand and interpret the "way of life" or "life-situation" of the place (1963: 51; 1979b: 5; 1984a: 71; 2000b: 20). It was his belief in the interaction of life and place as a 'totality' (2000b: 221) that inspired the enigmatic possibility mentioned in the concluding paragraph of his PLP; if architecture is to set-into-work the unity of life and place as a lived spatiality, then the ultimate goal of the "art of place [is to] become the art

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[169] For a discussion of the way Heidegger formulated language as a 'speaking' which enables *Dasein* to 'say' (anything at all), see subsection 5.5.6.

[170] See Glossary: Presence.

of the experience of living" (2000b: 356). To use Norberg-Schulz's more succinct Norwegian terms; "*stedskunst*" must become "*livskunst*" (1995a: 183).

Norberg-Schulz stated that *stedskunst* is grounded in three main characteristics: firstly, it is "hierarchical by its totality parts structure" (2000b: 221). This implies that *stedskunst* deals in a series of whole-part relationships participating in a "hierarchy of place from the encompassing landscape down to the simple house" demarcating the 'wholeness' lost with the 'loss of place' (Norberg-Schulz, 1992: 24). Secondly, *stedskunst* is "collective in its implementation" (2000b: 221). This implies that appropriate and relevant architectural making depends on a common language of architecture bound by the *genius loci* of the place as a 'horizon of interpretation'; a dialogue between general principles and particular interpretations. Thirdly, *stedskunst* is "historic in its content" (2000b: 221). Norberg-Schulz understood history (following Giedion) as "permanence and change"; a situation oscillating between an enduring spirit of place and the "[temporal] positions typical of the period". Far from promoting 'temporal subjectivity', Norberg-Schulz envisioned the possibility that these time-bound interpretations merely continued revealing aspects of the place which previous interpretations had failed to uncover. *Stedskunst* is always on its way towards the 'self-realisation' of the place as a dialogue between 'continuities which remain' and 'meaningful choices'. Therefore, *stedskunst* aspires towards the "art of totality". It demands nothing other than making present the "totality" as the "experience of living" (2000b: 221).

Stedskunst has as its aim *livskunst*: an aim which is also a source. *Livskunst* is both the "silence" from which "vision erupts" (2000b: 337) and the 'amicable silence' holding sway in the wake of appropriate building as disclosure. Norberg-Schulz understood *livskunst* – the art of the 'totality of life' or 'presence' – as a process of continuity and change (1971: 99; 2000b: 10). Initially he saw continuity and change as oscillating forces, but in later works he tried to unite these aspects into a dynamic 'same'. In an article dealing with Pietilä's precognitive approach he mentioned that "[Pietilä's] way was the way of life, and therefore it was always the *same*" (NAM 7, Way of Wonder: 1). The concept of *Livskunst*, as understood by Norberg-Schulz, implies that to unite continuity and change in the same, is to unite them in life.

Livskunst seems like a rare form of art indeed, or is it so prevalent that it is hardly noticed? Whether *livskunst* has been relegated to forgotten everydayness, or whether it is truly a rare moment, needs further deliberation. But Norberg-Schulz was quite clear on what he saw as the 'missing element' that prevents contemporary architecture from engaging with stillness. In contrast to 'rational thinking', Norberg-Schulz envisioned the 'precognition of

ways of being' as the profound (but lacking) "phenomenological understanding" (2000b: 92, 229 & 356) that would enable architects to engage respectfully with the interaction of ways of being in a fourfold world, fill the "vague projections [of *stedskunst*] with a qualitative content" and ultimately allow *stedskunst* to become *livskunst* (2000b: 356).

4.9 Synthesis: the art of place

This section aims to synthesise the most important aspects of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution (and their interaction) in diagrammatic form (Figure 15). The 'format' of the diagram is based on two images which guided much of Norberg-Schulz's thought. Both images are embedded within the diagram. Firstly, the rigid structural skeleton attributed to the art critic Rudolf Arnheim (Figure 7 in IiA and included in *The Concept of Dwelling* (CoD) (1984a: 125)). In Arnheim's diagram a central node 'gathers' the four corners into an enduring stable unity. The second image is Alexander Dornier's *Self-mutating Energies* (reproduced in Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 356) which illustrates the dynamic way that places change (as a self-realisation) (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 356). The composite nature of the diagram therefore illustrates Norberg-Schulz's belief in 'continuity and change' by merging Arnheim's diagram (an archetypal kind of *stabilitas loci*) with the (changing) interpretations of this stability.

The diagram is intended as a dynamic theoretical 'gathering' of concepts, aimed at revealing the cumulative depth and multifaceted nature of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution. It discourages imagining the interaction of these concepts in a strictly chronological way. Although the diagram can be used as a lucid way to illustrate the processes involved in, for instance, acquiring an existential foothold, all these concepts are simultaneously linked as occurrences of being-in-the-world. The diagram aims to move beyond 'static representation' and includes various 'hermeneutic circles' which can be 'read' in different ways.

It is, for instance, possible to see the 'horizontal' dynamic between the 'natural place with a *genius loci* as a way of being' (left) and the 'way of life of the place' (right). Similarly the diagonal relations between the 'given place' (bottom left) and the 'transformed place' (top right) and between 'building an existential foothold' (bottom right) and the resulting 'built history composed of various footholds' (top left). As such, the difference between recognising (natural) things and appreciating (man-made) interpretations becomes apparent. These horizontal and diagonal movements happen amid *Dasein*'s 'creative participation' (accommodation-assimilation; listening-responding etc.) (bottom horizontal)

which aims at the formation of an 'identity' and the 'exposition' of the place (continuity – change; *stabilitas loci* – interpretation etc.) (top horizontal).

Natural Dwelling | Collective Dwelling | Public Dwelling | Private Dwelling
Settlement | Urban Space | Institution | House with things (abode)
URBAN LEVEL | HOUSE + THINGS
Places + Paths + Domains | Places + Paths + Domains

ENVIRONMENTAL LEVELS

RECOGNITION and WONDER
categorise and appreciate the given interpretations

IMPLEMENTATION
Make a work to keep and explain that which has been understood

Identifying intervention: belonging and explanantion
IDENTITY & EXPOSITION

Memory concretised as art remains
Meaningful built history as gathering
ARCH. HISTORY OF EXISTENTIAL FOOTHOLDS
"History ... as a growth of accessible meanings" (Norberg-Schulz, 1974: 433)

CONTINUITY — CHANGE
CUSTOM as IMPRINT — STYLE as COMPOSITION
LOCAL ADAPTATION — TEMPORAL CHOICE
COMMON / SHARED — INDIVICUAL FREEDOM
STABILITAS LOCI — INTERPRETATION

Poetic image through *poiesis*
Meaningful manmade place
TRANSFORMED PLACE
(poetic potential poetically revealed as imago mundi in inhabited landscape)

common and individual comprehension of living

Phenomenological Understanding of the ARTIFICIAL UNITIES in terms of mirroring

Divine (*Light*) | Sky (*Order*)
Ways of Being
Earth (*Thing*) | Man (*Character*)
STIMMUNG

PLACE
genius loci experienced primarily as an atmosphere

Respectful use / Creative conservation

LANGUAGE OF ARCHITECTURE
Translate particular lived experience (and our understanding of the place) into a built environment

Translation, *poiesis* and setting-into-work

ÜBEREINSTIMMUNG
LIFE
genius loci experienced primarily as a way of life

LIFE TAKES PLACE AS A MEANINGFUL INTERACTION 'self-realising' EXISTENTIAL SPACE UNITY OF LIFE AND PLACE = DWELLING POETICALLY

PRECOGNITION
Divine (*Light*) | Sky (*Order*)
Ways of Being
Earth (*Thing*) | Man (*Character*)

Phenomenological Understanding of the NATURAL UNITIES in terms of mirroring

POETIC VISION
Envision the building task (rooted in a way of life) imaginatively in response to the 'stillness' of the place

Comprehension and imagination

ANDENKEN

common and individual comprehension of place

Meaningful natural place
GIVEN PLACE
(poetic potential given)
Poetic understanding

ACCOMMODATION — ASSIMILATION
RESPECT — EXPRESSION
RECEIVE — PROJECT INTO
SEEING — MAKING
LISTENING — ANSWER / RESPONSE

Creative (poetic) Participation
ADAPTATION

Meaningful building as gathering
EXISTENTIAL FOOTHOLD
Identification Orientation Memory

COMPREHENSION
Understand the given things

RECOGNITION and WONDER
categorise and appreciate the given things

ENVIRONMENTAL LEVELS

Places + Paths + Domains
GEOGRAPHY LEVEL | LANDSCAPE LEVEL
More comprehensive geographical regions and travel | *Dasein*'s interaction with the natural environment
Dasein is a wanderer | *Dasein* envisions act of settlement

Figure 15: The theoretical project of Christian Norberg-Schulz. The diagram includes references to Arnheim's structural diagram of the square (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 125) and Alexander Dornier's *Self-mutating Energies* (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 356).

These 'horizontal and diagonal processes' happen across hierarchical levels which range from 'geography' to 'things'. All these levels are either envisioned or ordered in terms of 'places, paths and domains'. The left (vertical) column refers predominantly to *Dasein*'s

comprehension of place (a precognitive understanding of ways of being), while the right column focuses more on the implementation of this understanding (primarily by means of *Andenken* and the language of architecture). The goal is the concretisation of the *Stimmung* into a work of *Übereinstimming,* the *poiesis* of the poetic vision. The bottom half of the diagram is concerned more with *Dasein*'s relationship with the natural world, while the top half engages more directly with the man-made world. The interaction between all these elements and *Dasein*'s comprehension and implementation of these aspects, are mitigated through the 'filter' of 'respectful use as creative conservation', which constitutes the central dynamic interaction characterising *Dasein*'s presence amid the fourfold.

It is possible to envision various scales of hermeneutic circles 'through' (or even 'around') this central interaction. Various 'dual-interactions' (like the interaction between the given place and the transformed place) can been indicated, but one could also envision the 'simultaneous' processes of 'receiving' the environment and 'projecting' into it (originally discussed in ESA), with the interaction between 'local adaptation' to what is received and the 'temporal choices' which mark *Dasein*'s 'projection'. Thus 'projection-receiving', is seen in connection with 'adaptation-choice' and connects earlier ideas with the interaction between later ideas like 'imprint-composition' (first discussed in PLP). The most comprehensive scale could, for instance, 'circle' from natural place 'around' the diagram and end in a new conception of place (in which architectural history also plays a role). Thus the diagram also engages with the 'self-realisation' of place in which "place is the point of departure as well as the goal" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 18).

The interaction between old and new terms in Norberg-Schulz's work (which at different times described similar effects) becomes apparent in the diagram. However, it is also clear that many of the terms in his earlier works have been supplanted. The establishment of *schemata* through perception has, for instance, been replaced with a precognitive understanding of the world and the reliance on archetypes has been exchanged for a more 'open' poetic interpretation. Throughout, the co-dependence of life and place, and the phenomenological understanding of this unity, are emphasised. The complex 'revealing and concealing of truth' inherent in the simplicity of the phrase 'life takes place' thereby becomes apparent.

Any diagrammatic visualisation of a thinker's thought is incapable of revealing the full scope and range of subjects addressed, but the hope is that this presentation, by focusing on the dynamic nature of presence Norberg-Schulz envisioned amid that which remains, can summarise many of the implications of his theoretical contribution. The previous sections have elucidated several of the shifts that occurred across four phases and three

transitions. One can, for instance, point to the way an image (or *imago mundi* top right) was first understood in terms of a perceiving subject (IiA), then as the description of existential space (ESA), then mythologically interpreted in terms of the place (GL), then understood in terms of archetypal meanings (CoD) and finally seen as the bridge between the way of life and the place (PLP). Obviously, the diagram cannot hope to show all these nuances, but hopefully a term's relation to what is given and its being between history (the eventual fate of the image) and making (striving towards the envisioned image) is brought to the fore. By being understood in terms of the interaction denoting *Dasein*'s presence, the image is 'kept alive' rather than being 'idealised' as an archetype. In fact, all the noted aspects remain open to new interpretations arising from the multi-faceted interaction that characterises poetic dwelling.

Dasein is the one who lives in place. Ultimately, Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution amounts to the still undervalued phenomenological understanding of how life takes place amid a natural and built environment. This is a reality which is so near, that inhabitants habitually fail to acknowledge its mysterious, yet illuminating possibilities. If anything, Norberg-Schulz revealed to architects that architectural space can only be meaningful if designed with *Dasein*'s emplaced presence in mind: a using, comprehending and implementing presence amid the continuity and change of life in place.

4.10 The need for an art of care

Is Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy persuasive and relevant? Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution looms large over late 20th century architecture. His work is exceptional due to the persistence of his attempt to breach the division between 'theory' and the 'concrete reality' in which architecture is made and used. There are instances where his work is simultaneously ambitious and hesitant, characterised by a profound ability to oscillate between the intimacy of particular moments and vast generalities. His work was ground-breaking, but he saw it merely as a 'beginning'. In a manuscript entitled, "*Et faglig testamente*" [A Professional Testament],[171] he described his legacy as follows:

> My professional testament is therefore that we must base the subject [the architectural profession] and the teaching of this [phenomenological understanding of architecture] on a *historically founded understanding of the basic principles of architecture*, where modern architecture's interpretation of these plays a major role. At the same time we must develop an *understanding of place* that allows the

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[171] This manuscript was later published in *Norsk Arkitekturårbok* (Oslo, 1996).

principles to be manifested as an expression of our presence ... But we are only at the beginning when it comes to an understanding of architecture's role in presence. Theoretical research is therefore necessary for us to arrive at a foundation for the *creative conservation* of the environment that can bring to presence meaningful fellowship (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 19).[172]

Does his phenomenology of presence allow *stedskunst* to become *livskunst*? The problem Norberg-Schulz identified in PLP remains: "the development of science and the infinite possibilities of technology are still not enough to allow us to take proper care of the environment in which we live our lives" (2000b: 33). Can Norberg-Schulz's phenomenology of presence equip architects to take proper care of places in the face of these developments, or is there a dimension left unexplored?

Norberg-Schulz contributed the most sustained and far-reaching architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, but there is an all-embracing difference between their conceptions of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world. The most basic assumption underpinning Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* is that the "most stable factor" (2000b: 85) governing *Dasein*'s existence is the interaction of earth and sky. In addition to this 'interaction', Heidegger proposed a similar, and equally fundamental, 'between-ness'; Being between birth and death. It is possible to argue that, for architecture, the interaction of earth and sky is more significant, but if *stedskunst* is to become *livskunst*, then *Dasein*'s temporal being between birth and death needs to be acknowledged.

Norberg-Schulz's approach to the temporal unfolding of *Dasein*'s existence between birth and death was based on his mentor, Sigfried Giedion's, understanding of life as a "tension between constancy and change" (1962: 8). In his own work, Norberg-Schulz perpetuated Giedion's understanding of "time [as] the dimension of constancy and change" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 32). Understanding time as continuity and change is at odds with Heidegger's position. In the same way that 'lived spatiality' is something more than 'mathematical space' arranged around x, y and z axes, 'lived time' implies something more than 'continuity and change'.

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[172] "*Mitt faglige testamente går derfor ut på at vi må basere faget og undervisningen i dette på en <u>historisk fundert forståelse av arkitekturens grunnprinsipper</u>, der den moderne arkitekturens tolkning av disse spiller en hovedrolle. Samtidig må vi utvikle den <u>stedsforståelse</u> som muliggjør at prinsippene kan manifestere seg som uttrykk for vår tilstedeværelse ... Men vi står ennå ved begynnelsen når det gjelder å forstå arkitekturens rolle i tilstedeværelsen. Teoretisk forskning er således nødvendig for at vi skal få et grunnlag for den <u>skapende bevaring</u> av omgivelsene som kan gjøre tilstedeværelsen til et meningsfylt fellesskap*" (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 19, original Norwegian, "*Et faglig testamente*"). Translation by author. I am indebted to Dr Gro Lauvland, who offered insights and valuable guidance in the translation of this passage from Norwegian to English.

In BT Heidegger set out from the position that *Dasein* participates temporally in the world as care. If, as Norberg-Schulz argued, "care for the unity of place is the job of architects" (2000b: 354), then a deeper understanding of what care (in a Heideggarian sense) implies is imperative. In fact, Norberg-Schulz described his reason for developing a "qualitative understanding" as the basis for the art of place as follows: "so that we may learn to respect the places of others and take better care of our own" (2000b: 17). This seems to be a goal that resided too near to his heart for him to recognise. In the words of Heidegger: "What is ontically nearest and familiar is ontologically the farthest, unrecognized and constantly overlooked in its ontological significance" (1927a: 43).

Norberg-Schulz ascribed great importance to the everyday figure of speech: "life takes place".[173] He saw it as confirmation of the intertwined nature of life and place; but what draws life and place into contiguity? The *imago mundi* might be the "bridge" between life and place (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 221), but what is it that draws the "destiny of the people" (Norberg-Schulz, 1983a: 41) and the "vocation" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 136) of the place into nearness? Why is *Dasein*'s life so eminently 'historical' in the first place? In BT the answer was expressed with one word; *Sorge*. Heidegger proposed that *Sorge*, or care, "is the ontological term for the wholeness of the structural totality of Dasein" (1927a: 252). The 'phenomenological understanding' needed for *stedskunst* to become *livskunst* must be founded on the fact that *Dasein* 'is' being-in-the-world as care.

The following chapters will argue that continuity and change are insufficient to describe the temporal reality of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world. Chapter 5 will present a focused exposition of the significance and development of the concept of care within Heidegger's writings. Chapter 6 will propose that, in order for *stedskunst* to become *livskunst*, Norberg-Schulz's position must be elaborated in terms of the temporal implications of Heidegger's concept of care. The term 'art of care'[174] will be used to indicate the role of care in the 'setting-into-work' of the *Dasein*'s temporal existence. The ultimate aim of this thesis involves grafting the art of care into the art of place, as a way towards *livskunst*.

Dasein does not participate in Heidegger's fourfold as a 'respectful user', but as a concerned mortal; one capable of sparing and guarding. If architects desire to understand the making of meaningful place, in all its spatial and temporal abundance, they not only need to engage with place, but also with care. Works of architecture need to address both 'taking place' and 'taking care' if they are to become *livskunst*. Life 'takes place' as care.

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[173] Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 30; 1980a: 190; 1983a: 48; 1992: 24; 2000a: 6.
[174] See Glossary: Art of care.

5 Heidegger's concept of care

The previous chapter presented a holistic appreciation of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution (from the early 1960s to his death in 2000) and discussed his architectural writings in terms of four phases and three transitional periods. An effort was made to illustrate the enduring influence that Giedion's concept of continuity and change exerted on these phases. In the final section (4.10) of Chapter 4 it was suggested that continuity and change is, from a Heideggarian perspective, unable to account for the richness and intricacies of *Dasein*'s temporal being-in-the-world. If understanding architecture as *livskunst* was Norberg-Schulz's ultimate goal, then a more humane way of dealing with *Dasein*'s mortal reality is needed. The following chapter will argue that such an understanding can be gained by engaging with one of the foundational aspects of Heidegger's philosophical project; the concept of care (*Sorge*).

In contrast to the wide-ranging discussion of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution presented in Chapter 4, this chapter will focus on tracing the development of Martin Heidegger's concept of care from its origins in his early work, to the significant role it played in *Being and Time* (1927) (BT), followed by its subsequent interpretation in his later work. In addition to building on the introductory remarks concerning Heidegger's life and philosophical legacy (see section 1.1), attention will be paid to the influential role care played in Heidegger's understanding of *Ereignis*, *Gelassenheit*, thinking, poetry, technology, language, identity (and difference) and *poiesis*. The investigation aims to establish a theoretical basis for the art of care and illustrate that the art of care has the potential to significantly and appropriately augment Norberg-Schulz's art of place. As such, this chapter can be seen as a historical reconstruction of Heidegger's concept of care with systematic intent.

5.1 Introduction: Heidegger's questions

Heidegger formulated mankind's existence as concerned participation in a world of concern. He called this intimate entanglement "being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 1927a: 53). Us, the entangled ones, he called *Dasein*: the ones who are 'concerned' about being 'there' (Heidegger, 1927a: 12). According to the Heidegger scholar and translator, Richard Polt (b. 1964) (1999: 4), the core of Heidegger's relentless questioning of Being[175] can be summarised in three questions:

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[175] See the Preface for a discussion of why 'Being' has been capitalised.

1. "Why is there something rather than nothing?"
2. "What does it mean to be?"
3. "What is it about *our* condition that lets Being have a meaning for us?"

Question 1 does not represent a "search for a cause", but should rather be seen as a wonder-infused "act of celebration". What calls for 'celebration'? Simply put, question 1 liberates mankind from 'Cartesian doubt' and is an invitation to appreciate the "[amazing] fact that anything exists at all", rather than taking it for granted (Polt, 1999: 2).

Question 2 ponders what it means that these familiar things exist. While question 1 enquired about 'beings', question 2 engages with 'Being', Heidegger's main field of enquiry. Polt, in terms of these questions described Being as "*the difference it makes that there is something rather than nothing*" (1999: 2-3). The way humans, as the kind of beings that we are, are able to appreciate that there is something, rather than nothing, implies that we are somehow 'open' to meaning.

This leads to the third question. Polt argued that, once the "wonder that there is something rather than nothing" has been recognised and once the "difference this makes" has been made question-worthy, it remains to be shown how these aspects of existence can "make a difference to *us*" as beings (1999: 4). What is it about being human that drives us not only to relate to other beings, but also dream of possible futures, reflect on past occurrences and search for 'meaning' in the present?

In BT Heidegger embarked on his investigation into Being by designating "this being [*Seiende*], which we ourselves in each case are and which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its being" as *Dasein* (1927a: 7).[176] The German word "*da*" is a complex word signifying both that someone is 'there', or 'here', or various other conditions. "*Sein*" is the German equivalent for "to be" (Inwood, 1999: 42). However, Heidegger had a particular understanding of what 'to be there' implied. He proposed that *Dasein* means the 'disclosedness', or 'clearing' ('*Lichtung*'), that accompanies its being 'there' (1927a: 133).[177] The fact that *Dasein* is 'there in the world' has 'spatial implications', but to reduce 'being-in' to spatiality would miss the deeper truth about *Dasein*: "Dasein is a being that

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[176] See Glossary: *Dasein*.

[177] In Afrikaans the term *Dasein* can be described as *"om 'daar' te 'wees'"* or could be interpreted even more literally as *'daar[bewus]syn'*.

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does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned *about* its very being" (1927a: 12). [178]

Heidegger believed that 'concern', or 'care' (*Sorge*), saturates the being of *Dasein* and constitutes the "existential meaning" of its Being (1927a: 41). His interpretation of *Sorge* pointed both to the concerned nature of *Dasein* and to the fact that *Dasein* is the one who 'cultivates' or 'takes care' of things. Heidegger's provisional answer to Polt's third question, and his point of departure in BT, is that "Dasein itself is to be made visible as *care*" (1927a: 57). Being, for *Dasein*, is always already meaningful, because *Dasein* is the being of care. In order to understand the full significance of Heidegger's ontological formulation of the concept of care in BT, it is necessary to explore the origin of care in Heidegger's writings.

5.2 The origin of care in Heidegger's writings

In his 1925 lecture course, *History of the Concept of Time: Prologomena* (HCT), Heidegger explicitly stated his move away from Husserl's formulation of intentionality to his interpretation of *Dasein* as care. Heidegger declared that "what phenomenology took to be intentionality, and how it took it is fragmentary, a phenomenon regarded merely from the outside" (1925: 419-420/303) due to "*the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional*" (1925: 178-180/129).

According to the American philosopher and noted Heidegger scholar, Hubert Dreyfuss (b. 1929), (1993: 17), it is not just that Heidegger wanted to "undermine the Cartesian tradition of the priority of knowledge over practice" or that the "detached subject" must become "involved". Rather, Heidegger argued that "*neither* practical activity *nor* contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient subject with its intentional content and an independent object" (1993: 19). Both "theoretical" and "practical" intentionality presupposes a division between subject and object that Heidegger could not accommodate. Heidegger, according to Dreyfuss (1993: 19), was looking for the "sort of experience [that] makes both kinds of intentionality possible".

Dreyfuss argued that the main difference between Husserl's "intentionality" and Heidegger's "more primordial intentionality" is that in Husserl's case "the mind … is thinking about something", while Heidegger's formulation focused on "the embodied person going about his or her business". For Husserl, "mental content is directed toward an object under an aspect", while Heidegger was not merely concerned with "acts of

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[178] See Glossary: Ontological difference.

consciousness, but human activity in general" (Dreyfuss, 1993: 32-33). Heidegger tried to engage with *Dasein* in its everyday situation, thereby eliminating the distinction between subject and object, while Husserl essentially tried to present the relationship between the being and the world in spite of the differentiation between subject and object. *Dasein* lives as one engaged in the "demands of the situation" (Dreyfuss, 1993: 24). This 'situation' denotes the varied manifold abundance of existence and, therefore, 'being-in' means more than "a spatial in-one-another", but should be seen as "*the* constitution of the being of Dasein, in which every way of being of this entity is grounded" (Heidegger, 1925: 213-215/159).

> 'In' comes from *innan*, which means to dwell, *habitare*: '*ann*' means: I am accustomed, I am familiar with, I take care of something … Dwelling is also taken here as taking care of something in intimate familiarity, being-involved-with [*Sein-bei*] (Heidegger, 1925: 212-213/158).

The above implies that *Dasein*, in 'intimate familiarity', in 'being-involved-with', absorbed in the 'accustomed' and, ultimately, as a being of care, dwells in a world of concern. Heidegger contended that intentionality made mankind into "an eternal out-towards" (1925: 180-181/130) – always understood in terms of something else – while his conception of care revealed *Dasein* as the being of an always already "concerned being-in-the-world" (1925: 213-215/159). The concept of care, therefore, describes the 'way of being of the intentional'. In the closing pages of HCT Heidegger revealed when he first came into contact with the concept of care:

> It was seven years ago, while I was investigating [the structures of *Dasein* as a self-interpreting and self-articulating entity] in conjunction with my attempts to arrive at the ontological foundations of Augustinian anthropology, that I first came across the phenomenon of care. Of course, Augustine and ancient Christian anthropology in general did not know the phenomenon explicitly, nor even directly as a term, although *cura*, care, already played a role in Seneca as well as in the New Testament, as is well-known. Later, however, I came across a self-interpretation of Dasein in an old fable, in which Dasein sees itself as care [here Heidegger is referring to the well-known *cura* fable of Hyginus which is also quoted in BT] ... In this naive interpretation of Dasein, we observe the astonishing fact that here the view is directed toward Dasein and that along with body and spirit something like 'care' is seen as that phenomenon which is attributed to this entity as long as it lives, to wit, as Dasein, which we have regarded here as being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1925: 417-420/302-303).

Heidegger also referred to the relationship between care and living in his winter semester lecture course of 1921-22 (published as *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* -

PIA). In this early lecture course Heidegger interpreted caring in terms of *Dasein*'s ability "to care for and about something; to live from [on the basis of] something, caring for it". Furthermore, "what we care for and about … is equivalent to what is meaningful" (1922: 68). It is, therefore, not 'cognition', but 'caring' that establishes "specific worlds of care" (1922: 70-71). However, in PIA Heidegger had not yet developed care in its 'temporal' sense.

Heidegger advanced his temporal interpretation of care in *The Concept of Time* (CoT). This article served as a 'first draft' of *Being and Time* and provided a preliminary formulation of "*Dasein* as care" (1924: 13). In CoT Heidegger presented "taking care of or being concerned about something … as the most usual and common mode of this being". Care describes that which is "nearest" to us (1924: 24). Furthermore, "authentic temporalness" provided Heidegger with the "guiding principle for a temporal interpretation of being-in" (1924: 51) and lead to an early formulation of the "hermeneutic situation" as "the ontological condition for every interpretation" (1924: 92).[179]

The preliminary work discussed in this section illustrated two fundamental developments in Heidegger's early work: firstly, Heidegger's move from Husserl's intentionality to *Dasein* as care and, secondly, the move from care understood in terms of 'life', to care understood ontologically in terms of Being (in relation to a temporal 'hermeneutic situation'). These fundamental realisations culminated in the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927.

5.3 The concept of care in *Being and Time*

In BT Heidegger employed 'care' to address various aspects of the world and, ultimately, the being of *Dasein*. The following section will present the main applications and implications of the concept of care developed in BT.

5.3.1 Care, reality, and meaningful things

Heidegger's mature conception of *Dasein* as care acknowledged "the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being". This realisation reveals the "concerned relation" between 'Being' and 'this being' (1927a: 12) and led Heidegger to assert that the "existential meaning" of the "being of *Dasein*" is 'care' (1927a: 41). Heidegger, therefore, proposed to reveal *Dasein* "as *care*" (1927a: 57). Simultaneously, care grants access to the world of things, because "in taking care", *Dasein* "brings something near" (1927a: 107)

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[179] See Glossary: Situation.

and "reveals [*entdeckt*] the being toward which it is".[180] Thus *Dasein*, being amid the things of the world as care, gains access to the 'truth' of its world not as 'correspondence', but as a concerned 'disclosure' of its facticity (1927a: 219-220).[181]

It is "in taking care" as the being of care – i.e. as 'thrown attunement', 'understanding projection' and as the one 'absorbed' in the world (1927a: 221-222)[182] – that *Dasein* "discovers innerworldly beings". However, *Dasein*'s concerned immersion in the world not only leads to the 'discovery' of things, but also their 'distortion'. With each new discovery, the "previously discovered sinks back again into … concealment" (1927a: 222). In accordance with the hiding/revealing nature implied by the Greek concept of *aletheia*,[183] *Dasein*, carefully engaging with things, is "equiprimordially in truth and untruth" (1927a: 223). The tension governing the interaction between 'truth' and 'untruth' is emblematic of the way *Dasein* always already encounters "something resistant in the world" (1927a: 211); the concrete problem of 'reality'.

Care provides access to reality by drawing it near. Only as long as there is care – "as long as *Dasein* is" – can there be "an understanding of being" and a 'discovery' of "innerworldly beings" (Heidegger, 1927a: 212). Polt summarised the interdependence of Being and *Dasein* (in terms of things) as follows: "Real *things* are independent of us, but what it *means* to be real depends on us". It is, therefore, possible to say that "care … provides the context that gives meaning to reality" (Polt, 1999: 82). Magda King, one of the early[184] interpreters of BT, argued that if we could not "let [things] touch us, concern us, [or] be relevant to us" then meaningful 'discovery' would be impossible (2001: 72). If meaning is "that in which the intelligibility of something keeps itself" (Heidegger, 1927a: 324), then meaning "enables us to understand things as the things they are" (King, 2001: 7). The discovery of the meaning of reality depends on the concerned nature of *Dasein*.

Heidegger, by developing the concept of care, therefore, "[achieved] insight into the concrete constitution of existence [and a new appreciation of] the entanglement of *Dasein*" (1927a: 231). He believed that the best way to approach this entangled situation was to engage with the temporal nature of everydayness as "being 'between' birth and death",

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[180] In accordance with the dual implication of *Sorge* as 'care' and 'taking care' (see section 5.1).

[181] See Glossary: Facticity.

[182] These aspects, constituting the 'structure' of care, will be discussed in subsection 5.3.2.

[183] See subsection 5.5.1.

[184] The first version of her 'guide' to BT was published in 1964.

because "as long as Dasein exists, it must always … *not yet be* something" (1927a: 233); a 'not yet' which can only be understood in temporal terms.

5.3.2 Temporality and the structure of care

In BT Heidegger developed the temporal implications of care. He defined care as "being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)" (1927a: 192); a convoluted term appropriate to *Dasein*'s entangled existence. This definition sprouts from Heidegger's formulation of the "structural moments" (1927a: 335) of care: understanding (*Verstehen*), attunement (*Befindlichkeit*), falling prey (*Verfallen*) and discourse (*Rede*).

Attunement describes the way *Dasein* is "always already" (1927a: 137) 'thrown' into the world in a certain way; the "mood" (1927a: 135) *Dasein* is already in. Attunement is, therefore, grounded in 'already-being-in', i.e. *Dasein*'s past. Understanding entails "projecting toward a potentiality-of-being" (1927a: 336). Understanding, therefore, denotes 'being-ahead-of-oneself' and refers to *Dasein*'s future. Falling prey to the prevailing 'moods' and 'understandings' of the ones sharing *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world, describes *Dasein*'s usual "absorbed" (1927a: 175) forgetfulness of being. This is not, however, a 'negative' (in moralistic terms) aspect of *Dasein*'s being. In fact, falling prey confirms *Dasein*'s concerned involvement in its 'there', because "Dasein *can* fall prey only because it is concerned with understanding, attuned being-in-the-world" (Heidegger 1927a: 179). Amid the things of the world, *Dasein* is "being-together-with" and falling prey, therefore, "has its existential meaning in the present" (1927a: 346). The interaction of understanding, attunement and falling prey make up "the complete disclosedness of the there" and is "articulated by discourse" (1927a: 349). This does not mean that these 'moments' exist separately or follow each other chronologically. Instead, Heidegger argued that *Dasein*, in everyday being-in-the-world, experiences these aspects as a unified structure of care that he called the "ecstatic unity of temporality" (1927a: 350); a unity he described as follows: "Every understanding has its mood. Every attunement understands. Attuned understanding has the characteristic of entanglement. Entangled, attuned understanding articulates itself with regard to its intelligibility in discourse" (1927a: 335).

The ecstatic nature of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world, by being able to encompass the concerned nature of *Dasein*'s future, present and past, led Heidegger to conclude that "the primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality" (1927a: 327). While care "provides the context that gives meaning to reality" it is "time [that] provides the context

that gives meaning to all modes of Being" (Polt, 1999; 82) and "temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care" (1927a: 326).

> [There is] an interpenetration between care and temporality. While temporality is to make understandable the articulated unity of care, it is only through and as care that temporality itself becomes accessible and understandable. They mutually illuminate and define each other (King, 2001: 220).

Time and care and the 'structural moments of care' (normally described as past, present and future) thus combine to form one meaningful meaning-disclosing totality. The "ecstatic unity of temporality" (Heidegger, 1927a: 350) discloses the 'there' (1927a: 364) and "has something like a horizon", (1927a: 365) which provided Heidegger with the 'foundation' to formulate the "historicity of *Dasein*" (1927a: 397). How is this possible if *Dasein,* as 'being-ahead-of-itself', contains a "constant unfinished quality" which is "always still outstanding"? How, in the face of this 'unfinishedness'[185], is it possible to "discern the ontological wholeness of being of *Dasein*" (1927a: 236) and engage authentically in the meaning of temporality?

5.3.3 Care and the situation

Heidegger believed that there is an authentic (*eigentlich*) and inauthentic (*uneigentlich*) way to be in the world.[186] In German the "impact" of these words lies in '*eigen*', our ability to 'own'[187] the being of this *Dasein* as "mine"; as how we truly take ourselves to be (King, 2001: 40).

> Dasein is my own, to be always in this or that way. It has somehow always already decided in which way Dasein is always my own. The being which is concerned in its being about its being is related to its being as its ownmost possibility. Dasein *is* always its possibility … it *can* "choose" itself in its being, it can win itself, it can lose itself, or it can never and only "apparently" win itself. It can only have lost itself and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself (Heidegger, 1927a: 42).

The insight that proved truly revealing in Heidegger's investigation of '*eigen*' is that *Dasein* is fundamentally inauthentic. For the most part *Dasein* lives as the 'forgetting of Being'

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[185] Heidegger referred to the German word *Unabgeschlossenheit* to describe *Dasein*'s incompleteness.

[186] See Glossary: Authenticity.

[187] Dasein's ability to 'enown' (*eigen*) being can be described in Afrikaans as *'n toe-eiening van hoe ons eintlik is*.

(Heidegger, 1927a: 21), fallen to the world of 'the They'.[188] Heidegger called the averageness characterising *Dasein*'s 'indifferent absorption' in the world, "everydayness" (1927a: 16-17). Everydayness is 'indifferent', not because it is without care, but because "the difference between an owned and disowned self does not come to light" (King, 2001: 41-42). However, *Dasein* is never "irretrievably lost in inauthenticity" (Inwood, 1999: 24) because of *Dasein's* concern for its own being. In order to understand the scope of authenticity and inauthenticity, Heidegger turned to two conditions that *Dasein*'s being as care "contains equiprimordially" (1927a: 306): death and guilt.

The possibility of death holds sway over all mortal life. *Dasein*, by "being-ahead-of-itself" (as care), is always already concerned about the possibility of death and therefore, ontologically, it can be argued that "dying is grounded in care" (1927a: 252). Consequently, *Dasein* has no more authentic possibility than "being-towards-death" (1927a: 251). Furthermore, every *Dasein* will die 'individually' and 'uniquely', therefore death is *Dasein*'s "ownmost, nonrelational, and insuperable possibility" (1927a: 250). While every *Dasein* will die 'authentically', it is possible for *Dasein* to react 'inauthentically' to death by means of the "everyday, entangled evasion *of* death" (1927a: 259). This raises an important question: what does authentic 'being-towards-death' entail? Heidegger proposed that *Dasein* must "anticipate" death (thereby accepting mortality). In anticipation, the acknowledgement of finitude sets *Dasein* free from the "illusions of the they" (1927a: 266) and it becomes "ontologically possible for *Dasein* to be a whole" (King, 2001: 162). This 'possibility' must somehow be realised in *Dasein's* "own being". *Dasein's* care must somehow reveal "his everyday lostness [and call] him back" to authenticity. This calling takes place as *Dasein*'s 'conscience' (King, 2001: 163); but why does *Dasein* experience a conscience? Or put another way, why is *Dasein* 'always already' guilty?

In order to understand guilt, Heidegger referred to "what everyday *Dasein* 'says' about [guilt]" (Heidegger, 1927a: 281). Absorbed in everydayness, "[we] associate guilt with *causing* something that we should *not* have caused or with *not* causing something that we *should* have caused" (Polt, 1999: 89) and, therefore, we "have debts" which we are "responsible for" in our being (1927a: 281-282). *Dasein*'s 'indebtedness' and 'responsibility' are "determined by a *not*" (1927a: 283). This formulation of guilt corresponds to the structure of care. We "have a past" (an attunement) which we cannot control. *Dasein* is "brought into its there *not* of its own accord" (Heidegger, 1927a: 284). This "*not*-ness" also pervades everydayness. In present existence we must choose certain possibilities and *not* others. Furthermore, we 'project' certain possibilities into the future

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[188]See Glossary: They.

that are "*not* other possibilities" (Polt, 1999: 89). It is clear that "beings whose being is care can not only burden themselves with factical guilt, but ... are guilty in the ground of their being" (1927a: 286).

In the same way that death (and anxiety) forces *Dasein* to be either authentic or inauthentic, guilt can lead to inauthenticity if, for instance, *Dasein* "takes refuge in the They and forgets about its essential guilt" (Inwood, 1999: 39). It is important to acknowledge the fact that *Dasein* is always already guilty, for only then would *Dasein*'s conscience be able to call *Dasein* out of inauthenticity. Heidegger proposed that the call of conscience both emanates from *Dasein* (who is "anxious in thrownness … about its potentiality-of-being") and summons *Dasein* "to its ownmost potentiality-of-being". Fundamentally, the 'call of conscience' is, therefore, concerned about the Being of this being and thereby "reveals itself as the call of care" (1927a: 277-278). The 'call of care' then calls *Dasein* (who is guilty because the meaning of its being is care) to 'own' its possibilities authentically. Heidegger (1927a: 298) called the authentic response to the unfinished nature of being-in-the-world – *Dasein*'s "authentic being a self" – 'resoluteness'.[189]

Heidegger interpreted resoluteness to mean "letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness to the They", thereby allowing *Dasein* to be 'open' to "authentic truth" and available "for its world". In resoluteness *Dasein* can own up to reality and reveal the 'situation'. Heidegger's 'situation' included the "spatiality" of being-in-the-world, but was fundamentally grounded in temporality. Resolute disclosure (inspired by the "call of care") opens the there to "the authenticity of care itself, cared for in care and possible as care" (Heidegger, 1927a: 298-301), "which concretizes itself in a resolutely grasped 'situation'" (King, 2001: 200). Heidegger's concept of resoluteness held open the possibility that *Dasein*'s care (which encapsulates *Dasein*'s temporality) could concretise a situation (which also encapsulates *Dasein*'s spatiality).

If the authentic reaction to death is "anticipation" and the authentic reaction to guilt is "resoluteness", then authentic *Dasein* must be characterised by "anticipatory resoluteness" as its "ownmost authentic possibility" (Heidegger, 1927a: 302). 'Anticipatory resoluteness' can respond to the "equiprimordiality of death and guilt" and reveal *Dasein's*

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[189] In answer to *Dasein*'s *Unabgeschlossenheit* (Afr: *onafgeslotenheid*) Heidegger therefore proposed a stance of *Entschlossenheit*. The German term (translated as resoluteness), literally means *'on-gesloten-heid'* in Afrikaans, but is probably closer to *'onverskrokkenheid'*, which describes a kind of bold undauntedness enabling *Dasein* to (fearlessly) be 'open' to the world. See Glossary: Resoluteness.

"ownmost possibility" as care (1927a: 306-307). In anticipatory resoluteness *Dasein* "gains its authentic and whole certainty" (1927a: 308); an authentic "self" capable of taking a stance within each unique and authentic situation.[190]

5.3.4 Care, the self, and the other

In Section 64 of BT Heidegger proposed how this self can "hold together" within the situation. In contrast to the idea of an 'isolated subject', Heidegger argued that "in saying-I, *Dasein*, expresses itself as being-in-the-world". The 'I' is, in fact, "already-being-in-the-world" and is always already concerned about its being. Therefore, *Dasein* as care, provides an ecstatic "constancy of the self" that "[clarifies] the persistence of the subject" and reveals that "care already contains the phenomenon of self" (1927a: 317-322): "one is, after all, what one takes care of" (1927a: 322).

The structure of care, therefore, "includes the phenomenon of selfhood" as a "constancy of self"; a constancy that is not an oscillation between continuity and change, but an ecstatic simultaneity of "anticipatory resoluteness" (1927a: 322-323). This does not necessarily cast *Dasein* back into the role of an isolated individual. In fact, Steiner proposed that resoluteness engages the self in the 'social responsibility' of the situation. Therefore, 'care for the self' does not exclude 'care for the other'. In fact, interpreting the self as care opens the way to a more authentic relationship centered on "involvement" (1989: 108-109). Heidegger discussed the possibility of engaging authentically with the other in terms of Being-with, or *Mitsein*. Against the indifference that so often threatens to separate the self from *Mitsein*, Heidegger posited *Fürsorge* (1927a: 121). *Dasein* as the being of care (the one capable of *Fürsorge*), far from experiencing the world primarily as an isolated subject (or ego), is always already in a world which is inhabited by others.

It is, therefore, possible to say that in authenticity, the self as care takes a stance (or finds its identity[191]) in a resolutely disclosed situation that is, spatially and temporally, a concretisation of *Dasein*'s care, but also intricately involved with the concerns of others. Consequently, *Dasein* "can never become timeless, placeless or radically indifferent" (Polt, 1999: 79), because *Dasein* dwells in the situation as care.

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[190] Afr: *Ons potensiaal (as die wese wat hier is) om te wees 'wie' en 'hoe' en 'wat' ons eintlik is; in die werklikheid (en 'waarheid') van die 'waar' en 'wanneer' van ons beleefde situasie*.

[191] In a later article, "The Principle of Identity" (1957b), Heidegger discussed *Dasein*'s identity ('constancy of self') in terms of '*Ereignis*'. See subsection 5.5.7.

5.3.5 The nature of care

Heidegger was adamant that care should not be seen as "melancholy", "distress" or "the cares of life" (1927a: 57). Care does not designate a "special attitude", because it "lies 'before' every factical 'attitude' and 'position'". Even the potential to engage in either "theory" or "praxis" can only be "possibilities of being for a being whose being [is] care" (1927a: 193). Care is prior to any 'ethics' and cannot be restricted to a particular act or intention. Rather, "[these ways of being] are ontically possible only because Dasein, *ontologically* understood, is care" (1927a: 57). Care describes the way *Dasein* always already is in the world, explains why existence can be meaningful for a being like *Dasein*, and calls *Dasein* to engage resolutely with the abundance of Being. It is the 'whole' of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world from which all 'parts' spring.

In summary, it is possible to say *Dasein* is the one who is concerned about being there. Simultaneously, *Dasein* is also the one that discloses the there by taking-care. *Dasein* is concerned taking-care. Care – the gathering of *Dasein*'s concern and taking-care – is the meaning of the being of *Dasein* and temporality is the meaning of care. *Dasein*, as care, draws things close in order to reveal them in their nearness to the self, and simultaneously reveals the world as a meaningful temporal reality shared with others. This revelation challenges *Dasein*'s ability to authentically make existence *Dasein*'s own. Resoluteness in the face of death – the authenticity of care – reveals *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world as a situation in which the mortal self must take a stance amid others. The situation is both spatial and temporal (and shared), but primordially it can be interpreted as a concretisation of *Dasein*'s care, because *Dasein* is fundamentally concerned by and intimately engaged in the situation. As care, *Dasein* is being-in-the-world.

5.4 The turn

During the 1930s Heidegger's thinking underwent what has been called a 'turn'. This study will argue that (at least in terms of the concept of care) Heidegger's later writings reveal and expand the true scope of *Dasein* as care,[192] and that many of Heidegger's later concepts (like the thing and the work of art) are unjustly deprived of their significance by not being understood in terms of care. Care is a fundamental part of Heidegger's thought, and its manifold facets are enmeshed in various aspects of his later work.

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[192] It should be mentioned that Norberg-Schulz considered Heidegger's later thought a development that "brings us a step further on the way", rather than a "new departure" (n. 42, 1983a: 247).

However, there was a new focus to Heidegger's work, illustrated by his attempt to rethink the metaphysical understanding of Being. In a lecture course elaborating on the question of metaphysics, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935) (IM), Heidegger proposed that "the [metaphysical] concept of Being that has been accepted up to now does not suffice to name everything that 'is'" and, therefore, Being must be "experienced anew, from the bottom up and in the full breadth of its possible essence, if we want to set our historical *Dasein* to work as historical" (1935: 218/155). The aim of Heidegger's fundamental "questioning" was to shift the focus from "the understanding of Being [as] a present-at-hand fact", to "Being [as a] fundamental happening" (1935: 215/153). Heidegger tried to understand this happening, or emergence, of Being in terms of *Ereignis*.[193]

The term *Ereignis* usually refers to an 'event' (a 'happening'), but for Heidegger the term's significance is much wider. Jeff Malpas succinctly described the range of meanings Heidegger associated with the term in three 'interactions': "event/happening", "gathering/belonging" and "disclosing/revealing" (2006: 216). 'Gathering/belonging' refers to the similarity between the word *Ereignis* to the adjective '*eigen*'[194]. *Eigen* signifies the instance of 'belonging' (or owning) and points to both "an event that is my own" *and* "Being's own way of occurring". *Ereignis* therefore involves both an 'event/happening' and a 'gathering/belonging' owning. That is why *Ereignis* is in most cases translated as the "event of appropriation" or by the neologism "enowning" (Polt, 1999: 146-147). However, there is a third way in which *Ereignis* can be 'heard'; "'eräugen' meaning to see or to be evident", which points back to the 'Moment', or "*Augenblick* [the blink of an eye], in which being-there grasps its existential situation" (Malpas, 2006: 215). It is in this moment (happening) of 'disclosing/revealing' that "things come to presence" (Malpas, 2006: 216) in a way that is 'own', or 'unique'[195] to them. Driven to its most extreme conclusion, this implies that *Ereignis* must also grant access to the nature of Being and time.

In his later essay, "Time and Being" (1962) (TB), Heidegger tried to explain the deep (relational) significance of *Ereignis*: "What determines both, time and Being, … what lets the two matters belong together, what brings the two into their own and, even more, maintains and holds them in their belonging together … is Appropriation" (1962: 19). It is in this "disclosive happening of belonging" (Malpas, 2006: 218) that 'Being' and 'time' find

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[193] See Glossary: *Ereignis*.

[194] *Ereignis* therefore has strong ties with Heidegger's ideas on authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) and 'owning' the situation.

[195] The 'uniqueness' of the event of appropriation will be discussed (in terms of identity) in subsection 5.5.7

their appropriateness. Therefore, *Ereignis* is the "source of Being and time, as well as their interconnection", not as a "cause", but as the "very event of giving". Thereby designating "Being's own way of happening, of giving itself to us", while simultaneously encapsulating the way *Dasein's* temporal existence 'owns' this giving as a concerned appropriation of Being (Polt, 1999: 146).[196] *Ereignis* aims to engage with the total relationship between *Dasein* and Being: "[*Dasein* has 'access' to Being in its] belonging to Being. Being itself, however, belongs to us; for only with us can Being be present as Being …" (Heidegger, 1957b: 32-33). Man and Being are each other's "concern" (1957b: 33) and, therefore, *Ereignis* is the "owning in which man and Being are delivered over to each other" (1957b: 36-37). Heidegger's 'turn' is, therefore, not merely a "change in focus from *Dasein* to Being" (Polt, 1999: 118), but views the two as a "happening-alongside" that elaborates the significance to be gleaned from our being-in-the-world.[197] This implies that Heidegger's 'turn' does not turn away from '*Dasein* as care', but promises to reveal the full appropriateness of care.

In the "Addendum" (1956) to his 1936 essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art" (OWA), Heidegger confirmed his commitment to the concept of care: "Art is considered neither an area of cultural achievement nor an appearance of spirit; it belongs to the *disclosure of appropriation* [*Ereignis*] by way of which the 'meaning of Being' (cf. *Being and Time*) can alone be defined" (1936a: 85). In BT Heidegger defined the 'meaning' of *Dasein*'s disclosive being-in-the-world as care, but in later years, he tried to explain how this disclosive capability is given amid *Ereignis*. Heidegger's first attempt to define 'care' in terms of '*Ereignis*' was formulated in a 'secret' manuscript he wrote between 1936 and 1938, but was only published in German in 1989 and in English in 1999 under the title, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* (CtP).[198]

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[196] In Afrikaans the 'event of appropriation' can be understood as an '*oomblik of geleentheid van toe-eiening*'. *Oomblik (of oogwink) verwys na die woord 'er-äugnen' (in terme van Augenblick) wat Heidegger sien as die stam van 'er-eignen', maar die woord geleentheid verwys beter na Ereignis as n 'geleende gebeurtenis wat gelate ontbloot word'. Toe-eiening verwys na die potensiaal wat Dasein altyd het, in die geleentheid van die tyd, om dinge sy eie te maak.*

[197] The nature of this 'relationship' will be discussed in subsection 5.5.7.

[198] This thesis will primarily refer to the latest translation of CtP by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu entitled, *Contributions to Philosophy (from the Event)* (2012).

5.5 The concept of care in Heidegger's later writings

The previous sections illustrated Heidegger's initial engagement with the concept of care, the role it played in BT and the potential to enlarge its 'scope' in terms of *Ereignis*. The following section will trace the evolution of the concept of care (and resoluteness) in Heidegger's later writings and reveal its relationship with thinking, poetry, technology, language, identity and *poiesis*. It will be argued that care (grounded in restraint and elaborated as guardianship) plays a fundamental role in these later concepts.

5.5.1 The concept of care in *Contributions to Philosophy*

In CtP Heidegger embarked from the position that "Beyng essentially occurs as the event [*Ereignis*]" (1938b: 25/28-30).[199] He proposed that engaging with Beyng as care means "to become the one who grounds and preserves the truth of beyng". This eliminates the danger of understanding 'care' as something we do as a 'good deed' every now and then. Care does not merely refer to certain actions. Heidegger's *Sorge* is that care which is "for the sake of beyng". Care describes a way of being amid the happening of Being and identifies *Dasein* as "seeker, preserver, steward" (Heidegger, 1938b, p. 15-16/15-18). *Dasein* dwells in the world as care.

In terms of *Ereignis*, Being is "an event in which the 'there' opens up, so that beings can first become accessible to *Dasein*" (Polt, 1999; 149). This revelation of beings matters to us, because *Dasein*'s being is care; but how is '*Dasein* as care' qualified to be the sheltering guardian of truth? Simply put, *Dasein* is qualified as "shelterer", by being capable of (and grounded in) "creating" as a way to "allow" truth (1938b: 249/314-315); by creating, *Dasein* shelters the Being of the thing. One of the most revelatory examples of 'creating' is the work of art.

In OWA Heidegger explored art as "truth setting itself into work" (1936a: 38) and claimed that "[t]ruth, as the clearing and concealing of what is, happens in being composed" (1936a: 70); but art also "belongs to the *disclosure of appropriation*" (1936a: 85). In CtP, Heidegger argued that what "was conceived as 'instituting' [the composition of truth in the work of art] is already the *consequence* of the *sheltering* which properly preserves the cleared-concealed" (1938b: 71-72/57). The happening of the creating of truth is grounded in *Dasein*'s sheltering, therefore art should also be understood as the "creative preserving of [the becoming and happening of] truth in the work" (Heidegger, 1936a: 69).

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[199] See Glossary: Beyng

It is exactly this preserving which first allows beings *to be* … The *sheltering* is itself carried out in and as Da-*sein*. That happens, and gains and loses history, in the steadfast care-taking [*Be-sorgung*] which in advance pertains to the event though scarcely has knowledge of the event (Heidegger, 1938b: 71-72/57).

Truth, as the interaction between the *aletheia* (revealing) and *lethe* (hiddenness) of beings, is grounded in creative sheltering.[200] *Dasein* is the shelterer that creates as the being of care. Care is the stance – the 'steadfast care-taking' – which 'in advance pertains to the event' and enables *Dasein* to be ready to act as the preservation of the happening of Being. In terms of the event (*Ereignis*), *Dasein* (as care) thereby becomes a guardian that through 'concerned creation'[201] opens up the 'there' and lets truth happen and Being unfold. Setting-truth-into-work does not only pertain to art, but to all 'works' of 'creation', to all makings, to all *poiesis*. In *poiesis Dasein* appropriates the truth of Being and opens up the there. Yet this letting-happen (this emergence of Being) is always already accompanied by a withdrawal of truth. This is the nature of care as sheltering. Our care 'keeps' (*bergen*) within a fundamental dialogue of 'unconcealment' (*Unverborgenheit*) (*aletheia*) and 'concealment' (*verbergen*) (*lethe*) that mirrors the way that "truth is un-truth, insofar as there belongs to it the reservoir of the not-yet-uncovered, the un-uncovered, in the sense of concealment" (Heidegger, 1936a: 58).

In CtP Heidegger revealed *Dasein* as the creative 'shelterer' of the emergence and withdrawing of the truth of the happening of Being. It is important to mention that this task must still be approached "decisively" (1938b: 16/17-18), i.e. resolutely, but that the scope of *Dasein*'s resoluteness has also been extended. *Dasein* is not only called to resolutely and persistently reveal truth, but, as "stewards of ... the stillness of the passing by of the last god" (1938b: 16/17-18), *Dasein* is also (even more fundamentally) called to await, listen for and let be Being. It is 'listening' that provides the 'ground' for *Dasein*'s resolute 'response'. This interpretation of *Dasein*'s resoluteness is already evident in Heidegger's essay, "On the Essence of Truth" (1930a) (OET), in which he stated that "the essence of truth is freedom" (1930a: 123) and that "freedom … reveals itself as letting beings be" (1930a: 125).

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[200] See Glossary: *Aletheia.*

[201] In OWA the term "creative preserving" (Heidegger, 1936a: 69) is used to indicate the "letting happen of the advent of truth" (1936a: 70).

5.5.2 Resoluteness as 'perduring-letting-be'

The expanded conception of resoluteness, the way in which *Dasein* as care reveals the situation, contains both an active (as originally developed in BT) and a more passive aspect (revealed in terms of *Ereignis*). This dual character of resoluteness can be defined by referring to two terms: the active character of resoluteness corresponds to 'perdurance' and the more passive character to Heidegger's interpretation of *Gelassenheit*.

Perdurance (*Austrag*) is the "unconcealing keeping in concealment" (1957a: 65) that holds Being and being "apart" yet "facing each other". In this "tension of perdurance" – in this "difference" – Heidegger saw a "circling of Being and beings around each other" (1957a: 68-69) that essentially mirror the "circling … structure of care" constituting the "circular being of *Dasein*" (1927a: 315). This 'held apart between' must be perdured and describes the way in which *Dasein* (as care) 'determinedly' takes a stance ("stands out" from the They and the things of the world) "with an intensity that never lets up" and somehow bears the happening of existence; "In the perdurance of the difference of Overwhelming and Arrival reigns clearing"[202] (Stambaugh, 2002: 17). Perdurance celebrates *Dasein*'s resolute dedication to the situation.

The German term *Gelassenheit* (usually translated as "releasement")[203] speaks of *Dasein's* fundamental ability to 'let-be'. In contrast to the mind-set characterising modern technology, a condition that seeks to manipulate all things and therefore cannot let beings be,[204] *Dasein* is capable of a less wilful approach, more appropriate to its Being (as care). *Gelassenheit* recognises that "[while] our way of Being allows the everyday world to happen, [it] does not make it happen" (Polt, 1999: 58). This 'letting-be' seems more passive than perdurance, but "it does not refer to neglect and indifference". Rather, *Gelassenheit* describes the appropriate way to "engage oneself with beings" (Heidegger, 1930a: 125). Therefore, resolute *Gelassenheit* displays Dasein's care as an active, but restrained, 'listening' and 'waiting' openness to Being. By waiting and listening as

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[202] The significance of the interaction between "Overwhelming" and "Arrival" is discussed in subsection 5.5.7.

[203] The term 'releasement' is used because it mirrors the implication of *Gelassenheit*, i.e. letting-be, but there really seems to be no truly appropriate (or succinct) word in English to translate the composed acquiescence with which concern can be perdured and let-be. The Afrikaans terms *gelatenheid* is valuable in this regard.

[204] Heidegger's interpretation of modern technology is discussed in subsection 5.5.4.

'caretaker of the stillness', *Dasein* is fundamentally anticipating 'hearing'[205] and 'responding' in a perduring way (Heidegger, 1950b: 207).

Resoluteness, both persistently and intensely takes a stand, holds open the 'possibility of disclosure' and, in restrained anticipation, let's beings be (stand) as they are. Perduring-letting-be is a way that is both kind and resolute. It implies both the "enduring of Da-*sein*" in "anticipatory decidedness for the truth of being" and the "restraint of Dasein"[206] as "adherence in the 'there' ... which carries out what is assigned" (1938b: 30/35-36). Care, as perduring-letting-be, therefore signifies *Dasein*'s 'dedication to' and 'devoted lingering in'[207] the there. Both 'perdurance' and 'letting-be' are fruits of the concerned 'being of the intentional'.

Dasein cares in 'taking a stance' in the same way that 'listening' and 'waiting' is persistently anticipatory. *Dasein* is 'caretaker of the truth of being' both in perdurance and letting-be; a resoluteness that concretises the situation in *poiesis*. In resoluteness, *Dasein* must receive and heed the 'granting'[208] and 'happening' of Being. This constitutes *Dasein*'s appropriate response to *Ereignis*. In his "Letter on Humanism" (1947a) (LH), Heidegger succinctly and memorably described the implications of the meeting of '*Dasein* as care' (developed in BT) and 'care understood in terms of *Ereignis*':

> Man is … "thrown" from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. Man does not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing of Being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of Being. But for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his essence that corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of Being. Man is the shepherd of Being. It is in this direction alone that *Being and Time* is thinking when ecstatic existence is experienced as "care" (Heidegger, 1947a: 234).

As a 'shepherd' it is clear that "man is not the lord of beings" (1947a: 245). In thrown finitude mankind cannot make demands of Being. Lawrence Hatab (2000: 199) pointed out that this realisation reveals that "what is worthy and meaningful in life is not the

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[205] The ability to 'hear' here implies both the Afrikaans *hoor* (hearing) and *gehoorsaam* ('listening to' or obeying).

[206] See subsection 5.5.6 for further discussion of the ties between care and restraint.

[207] In Afrikaans one could argue that care denotes both an '*afwagtende onverskrokkenheid*' and a '*vertoewende verkleefdheid*': both an undaunted awaiting and an involved abiding.

[208] See subsection 5.5.5.

product of an autonomous subject, but is in some deep sense given". *Dasein* can merely accept the 'granting' of things. The only appropriate response to what has always already been given is gratitude. In ecstatic perduring-letting-be, *Dasein*, must wait, listen and respond (answer) thankfully to the happening of Being, that "rules the destiny of being" (Heidegger, 1947a: 238). Richard Polt described this attitude well: "Being is neither a resource, nor something we can make and manipulate; it is an event that must be gratefully appreciated" (Polt, 1999: 173).

Ecstatic perduring-letting-be enables *Dasein* to await this 'granting'. Stillness holds sway. *Dasein*, the one concerned about its future, projects possibilities into this potentiality, hesitantly, but persistently and gratefully engaging with its place as a spatio-temporal 'region of concern'.[209] In concerned perduring-letting-be, *Dasein* thankfully acknowledges all that has been given, a perduring thankfulness which can be described as 'dwelling gratefully'. *Dasein*'s *poiesis* safeguards the received granting. In his later work Heidegger identified two fundamental ways (both rooted in care) to approach the 'source' of happening and dwell gratefully as resolute perduring-letting-be: *Denken* ('to think') and *Dichten* ('to create poetry').

5.5.3 Thinking poetry thankfully

Heidegger understood poetry and thought as the "medium of the ontological 'letting-be'" (Steiner, 1989: 128). Both poetry and thinking express the potential of *Gelassenheit*. Poets (Mugerauer, 2008: 371) and thinkers (Gray, 2004: xii) must "wait" and "listen" and then "say what they hear". *Gelassenheit* is not a call to passivity, but it does imply that thinking and poetry is not a product of *Dasein*'s will. What comes to light in poetry and thinking is, rather, the relationship between *Dasein* and Being.

Heidegger, in contrast to the general conception of thinking as a 'logical' or 'rational' activity, envisioned a way of thinking that is "involved" (1952: 127), "grateful" (1952: 139), "astonished" (1952: 182), "modestly persistent", yet "unavoidable" (1952: 159), a concerned "questioning" of (1952: 185) and commemorative "devotion" to (1952: 148) the

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[209] The term 'region of concern' corresponds to the Afrikaans word for environment: *omgewing*. In Chapter 6 it will be argued that Norberg-Schulz's concept of 'place', in terms of *Dasein* as care, must be engaged as a 'region of concern'. There is an illuminating link between the Afrikaans words used to describe the environment (*omgewing*), that which is given (*gegee*), and *Dasein*'s care for something (*omgee*). *Dasein* must *omgee* (care) for its *omgewing* (place) which has been *gegee* (given). In listening-obeying gratitude *Dasein* must 'give-care' in answer to what has been 'given'. See Glossary: Region, Regioning.

fact "that being is" (1952: 197). He called this way of thinking, *Andenken*.[210] In fact, Heidegger called 'rational-logical' thinking "a reduction and an impoverishment of the word [thinking] that beggar the imagination" (1952: 139). A succinct summary of Heidegger's understanding of thinking is provided in the introduction to *What is Called Thinking?* by the American philosopher, J. Glenn Gray (1913-1977):

> [Heidegger] desires a thinking that is at once receptive in the sense of a listening and attending to what things convey to us and active in the sense that we respond to their call. Only when we are really immersed in what is to be thought can we reveal truly the nature of anything no matter how commonplace it may be, and only then can we avoid our habitual ways of grasping it as it is for us, *i.e.*, subjectively. The call of thought is thus the call to be attentive to things as they are, to let them be as they are, and to think them and ourselves together. … Heidegger is persuaded that man is naturally inclined to think and Being desires to be thought truly (Gray, 2004: xiv-xv).

Although, authentic thinking, as an activity which is both 'receptive' and 'responsive', can be seen as a form of perduring-letting-be, how is *Dasein* able to draw close to things through thinking? Heidegger proposed that the answer lay in what he defined as "original thanking" (1952: 141), a thankfulness that responds to the granting of Being. According to Heidegger, "thanking" and "thinking" can be united in the Old English noun for thought: "*thanc*". The ability to '*thanc*' describes a kind of "grateful thought and the expressing of such a thought" (1952: 139). '*Thancing*' is true to, and acknowledges, the authentic nature of *Dasein* as the being of care.

> The *thanc*, the heart's core, is the gathering of all that concerns us, all that we care for, all that touches us insofar as we are, as human beings. What touches us in the sense that it defines and determines out nature, what we care for, we might call contiguous or contact (Heidegger, 1952: 144).

Heidegger posited that the 'grateful gathering of thought' refers to what has, in the past, been denoted by the term 'memory'. Memory, not in the modern sense of 'recalling', but as the "incessant concentration on [what is] gathered in contiguity", the gathering of "what is at once present and past and to come" (Heidegger, 1952: 145). Memory thought 'ecstatically' and rooted in care. Originally, the word memory stood for a "steadfast intimate concentration upon the things that essentially speak to us in every thoughtful meditation", an "abiding" near the things (1952: 140). *Dasein*'s memory is a "thinking back" which is saturated by *Dasein*'s thankful "devotion" to its "highest and […] most

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[210] See Glossary: *Andenken*.

lasting gift", "our essential nature" which makes us "what we are". *Dasein*'s "nature" – the way of being "given to us" – is "thinking" (1952: 142). What is here implied by "thinking" is displayed in the '*thanc*', "the gathering of all that concerns us" (Heidegger, 1952: 144) – that which BT designated as '*Sorge*' – by which *Dasein* as care is memorialised and our ability to fully and truly be-in-the-world as 'concerned thinking' is confirmed.

In *Dasein*'s thinking and thanking, in the *thanc*, our being as care gathers "what we care for" and being-in-the-world touches us and allows us to "dwell where all recalling thought is gathered" in memory (Heidegger, 1952: 143). In thinking, *Dasein* dwells thoughtfully. Indeed, our thought is always "in need of memory" (1952: 138), in need of contiguousness and dependent on care. Steiner concluded that the act of thought is not an act of will, but a "grateful acquiescence in [the happening of] Being". He continued, "Inevitably, jubilantly such acquiescence is a giving of thanks for that which has been placed in our custody, for the light in the clearing. But even more than the thinker, it is the great artist and poet who are the true celebrants" (1989: 131).

5.5.4 Poets and technology

What qualifies the poet as a 'true celebrant'? Heidegger (following Hölderlin) proposed that the answer lay in recognising contemporary society as a particularly "destitute time" (1946: 89) dominated by the efficiency of modern technology. Heidegger argued that the technological age depends on a "calculative" demand for practicality (1946: 127; 1951b: 226; 1959: 420), a way of thinking devoid of poetry. Technology is unable to let truth be, since it desires "manipulation" and "exclusive mastery". It does not wish to "let something be shown", but "[reduces] man and beings to a 'standing reserve' … in service to … technological purposes" (Krell, 2008: 309). Heidegger called this dangerous situation the *"Gestell"* (1953: 325) (often translated with the word 'enframing') of modern technology.[211]

Heidegger was not critical of technology *per se*. Technology, when understood in its original Greek sense of *techne*, is a vital "way of revealing". Both the "craftsman" and "artist" employed *techne* as a "bringing forth" (a moment of *aletheia*) by means of *poiesis* (1953: 318). That this conception of technology, as something poetic, strikes modern beings as strange illustrates what is disturbing in modern technology. Modern technology is still a revealing, but no longer as the resolute perduring-letting-be of *poiesis*. Modern technology, by "challenging" and "setting upon", reveals beings as "stockpile" and *Dasein* as "human resource". The letting-be of *poiesis* has been replaced by a demand for

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[211] See Glossary: *Gestell*.

"maximum yield at minimum expense": a "challenging-forth" in search not of "truth", but of "efficiency" (1953: 319-323).

Dasein, existing in the *Gestell* of efficiency, is no longer a 'caretaker', but a 'user'; from acts of *Bewahrung* (caretaking/safeguarding) to acts of *Verwahrlost* (neglecting/forgetting) of the truth. By means of "machination", *Dasein* is no longer the 'shepherd', but aims to be 'master', but this is an empty mastery because, as the mere "orderer of the standing-reserve", that which is unconcealed no longer "concerns" man (1953: 332).

> As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man, ... man [no longer inhabiting a world that is his *Sorge*] is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, [in this situation] he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve (Heidegger, 1953: 332).

Heidegger condemned modern technology as the "unconditional establishment" of the "fury of self-assertion". This is the dark, "self-reliant" side of resoluteness where mankind tries to establish its will by "producing". In the *Gestell* of technology the "world becomes without healing, unholy" and man is doomed to destitution, standing before, but never allowed to enter, the "obstructed Open"[212] where truth is revealed: "By building the world up technically as an object, man deliberately and completely blocks his path, already obstructed, into the Open" (Heidegger, 1946: 113-115).

Is this modern man's destiny? In this "age of the world's night" there must be someone who can "experience and endure [the] abyss of the world" (Heidegger, 1946: 90); mortals who are able to "reach sooner into the abyss of the destitute and its destituteness"? (1946: 115-116). We are in need of "more venturesome ones", whose "willing is different in nature" because they "will more strongly in that they are more willing". Those concerned ones who are able to 'answer' in a way which is not 'self-reliant', but grateful, truthful and careful. Those who do not "[entrench themselves] in purposeful self-assertion" and thereby block access to the 'Open' (1946: 116-117). To create in this manner is devoid of self-reliant 'willing'. Rather, the *poiesis* of the "more venturesome ones" are grounded in, and retrieved from, a 'source' outside them. Therefore, their efforts at making are not a wilful 'taking' that 'stockpiles', but an abiding 'acceptance' that 'gives' (1946: 117-118).

> The more venturesome daring of the willing exercise of the will manufactures nothing. It receives, and gives what it has received. The more venturesome daring

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[212] The nature of this disclosive 'Open' (*Lichtung*) is discussed in subsection 5.5.6.

accomplishes, but it does not produce. Only a daring that becomes more daring by being willing can accomplish in receiving (Heidegger, 1946: 118).

These "more venturesome ones" are the "poets in a destitute time" (1946: 139). Already in his lecture, "What is Metaphysics?" (1929), Heidegger had claimed that "the anxiety of those who are daring ... stands ... in secret alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing" (1929: 106). In IM Heidegger posited "that all willing should be grounded in letting" (1935: 16/23), thereby indicating his move towards a more poetic stance. The way in which poets 'create' corresponds to the "saving power" Heidegger ascribes to '*poiesis*' (1953: 339-340) and the way in which poets 'receive' and 'answer' is characterised by perduring-letting-be. The source has been described as *Ereignis*, but in what way is it possible for poets to 'stay near the source'? Already in BT (1927a: 54) Heidegger had designated this "staying near" (*verweilen*) as "dwelling".[213]

5.5.5 Dwelling, the fourfold, and care

In his influential essay, "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951a) (BDT), Heidegger declared that "the fundamental character of dwelling is … sparing and preserving" (1951a: 147). He went on to explain how humans can only dwell by sparing (safeguarding) the "simple oneness of the four" in the "fourfold"[214] (1951a: 148). Sparing can be seen as a form of poetic "measure-taking"[215] that is not "calculating" (like the *Gestell* of technics), but poetic, and therefore able to "[let] the earth be as earth" (1951b: 224-226) and let *Dasein* "dwell poetically". Of great importance to this thesis is Heidegger's assertion that sparing "means to take under our care" (1951a: 149).

> In saving the earth, in receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating mortals, dwelling occurs as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold. To spare and preserve means: to take under our care, to look after the fourfold in its presencing. What we take under our care must be kept safe. But if dwelling preserves the fourfold, where does it keep the fourfold's nature? … Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which we mortals stay: in things (Heidegger, 1951a: 149).

Dasein preserves the fourfold in the *poiesis* of things, in letting things be by allowing things to 'thing'.[216] *Dasein* is more willing (poetic) by being willing to listen to the call of

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[213] See Glossary: Dwelling.

[214] The elements of the fourfold - earth, sky, mortals, and divine - have already been discussed in subsection 4.4.3 See Glossary: Fourfold.

[215] See Glossary: Measuring.

[216] See Glossary: Thing.

these things. As the being of care, *Dasein* draws near things and reveals them as a "gift" (Heidegger, 1950a: 170). This is the foundational "allowing to happen" – a 'granting' (rooted in the granting of *Ereignis*) – which can not be enforced, but only accepted and let be, that allows the thing to be a 'gathering'. In architectural terms, if this 'gathering' is to be authentic, and for *Dasein*'s dwelling to be poetic, works of architecture (as things) must be true to and acknowledge the authentic nature of *Dasein* as the being of care: a form of making derived from and sustained by "[letting] ourselves be concerned by the thing's worlding being" (1950a: 178).

5.5.6 Language, the *Lichtung*, and stillness

It can be argued that both thinking and poetry is a letting-be rooted in care, but what is perduring about poetry and thinking? Heidegger answered that our dwelling is perduring when we answer the 'call of being' (that which 'calls' for thinking) by saying "what must be said" (1946: 139). How can this "saying" be achieved? Heidegger believed that "the more venturesome dare the saying … with language" (1946: 130 & 137).

Language, understood poetically and thoughtfully, is not primarily a means of 'communication' that can be subjected to the "calculative orderability of saying" (Heidegger, 1959: 421) demanded by the common 'standards' of 'efficient communication'. Language is beyond all such challenges (and challenging). *Dasein* is not the 'orderer' of this speaking and language is not subject to *Dasein*'s investigations. Rather, "every language is historical" (1959: 422) in that it 'says' and 'shows' as an 'owning' – a spoken event – that "[grants] for the first time something like a 'There is / It gives'" (1959: 415). Therefore, *Dasein* can never "step outside [language] in order to look it over circumspectly" (1959: 423). Consequently, language remains "mysterious" and "pervasive" (1947a: 263).

How can *Dasein* gain access to this mystery? Heidegger believed that *Dasein* "must first [before speaking] let himself be claimed again by Being, taking the risk that under this claim he will seldom have much to say" (1947a: 223). There is a hesitance required, a form of restraint. Indeed, *"*mortals speak insofar as they listen … to the bidding call of stillness" (1950b: 206-207). The perdurance of saying is, therefore, united with letting-be because *Dasein*'s "saying", as "responding", can only be authentic (and belong) as "hearing"[217], born from "receptive listening" enabled by "restraint" (1950b: 207). Restraint

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[217] Expressed succinctly in Afrikaans by saying: '*Ons hoor* (hear) *en hoort* (belong)*, want ons is gehoorsaam* (obedient)'. The relation between these words are lost in translation.

(*Verhaltenheit*) is "the origin of stillness" (1938b: 30/35-36), since it literally 'halts' speaking and makes possible "keeping silent" (1938b: 29/34-35). "Language speaks in the peal of stillness" (1950b: 205).

Heidegger saw restraint – the "creative withstanding in the abyss" – as the "ground of care [that] first grounds care as the steadfastness that withstands the 'there'" (1938b: 34-36/29-30). It is not that restraint is 'prior' to care, rather care (engaged in terms of guardianship, sparing and seeking) posited against the 'challenging-forth' of technology, is revealed particularly luminously in restraint. Similarly, it is only as care that *Dasein* can let language be, experiencing the wonder and mysterious disclosure language grants. *Dasein*, as one who is capable of language, is called to gratefully dwell in the mysterious granting of language as the "house of Being" (Heidegger, 1959: 424). This is not some far off place. Language is "where we are already" (1950b: 188): "those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home" (1947a: 217). While *Dasein*'s speaking happens in language, this 'saying' is (merely and momentously) a concerned "answering" (1959: 425) to "a call which issues from the nature of things, from being itself" (Gray, 2004: xi); calling *Dasein* to the wonders of an ecstatic existence always already concerned with "learning to live in the speaking of language" (1950b: 207). Language ceases to engage as language when subjected to the efficiency demanded by communication: "Language is a medium in which Being takes hold of us, appropriates us, and allows us and all beings to come into our own" (Polt, 1999: 178).

Dasein's poetry and thinking, therefore, involve 'awaiting' and 'listening' to the call of Being, concretised in a faithful 'answering', a humble restraint – the perduring-letting-be of "creative withstanding" (Heidegger, 1938b: 35-36/30) – which overwhelms in its abundance. Poets and thinkers, the ones who have realised that "existence is ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of Being", are able to hear this call by dwelling near the 'source'. This is the nature of *Dasein*'s "guardianship [and] care for Being" (1947a: 246).

Both poets (as more venturesome) and thinkers (as those who remember) are granted access to the "free sphere" (the 'Open') in which dwelling takes place as care. This 'Open' – the clearing that Heidegger called the *Lichtung* – is the "[free openness] for everything that becomes present and absent" (Heidegger, 1964: 442). This "freedom" is the authenticity of "letting beings be" (Heidegger, 1930a: 125), the *Lichtung* of perduring-letting-be in freedom happening as "truth" (1930a: 123). Ultimately, this openness given to poets and thinkers can be seen as the 'clearing of the truth of Being'. Already in BT Heidegger had alluded to the possibility that poetry promises the "disclosing of existence" (1927a: 162). The only appropriate response to this granting is thankfulness. In the words

of Heidegger: "Every thinking that is on the trail of something is a poetizing, and all poetry a thinking. Each coheres with the other on the basis of the saying that has already pledged itself to the unsaid, the saying whose thinking is a thanking" (1959: 425).

At the "quiet heart" of Heidegger's *Lichtung* is a "place of stillness from which alone the possibility of the belonging together of Being and thinking … can arise" (1964: 445). This is the place of appropriation where *Dasein* can find its appropriateness. How does Being (as *Ereignis*) appropriate us and appropriately bring us into the authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*)[218] that constitutes the core of identity? Heidegger located this core in the "belonging together of Being and thinking [in the] clearing" (1964: 445). This "belonging together" is a "coherence that is prior to identity" (Polt, 2006: 35), an "ownness", a "unity with itself" (Stambaugh, 2002: 11), which 'belongs' to every being.

5.5.7 Identity and difference

In two lectures delivered in 1957, Heidegger investigated *Dasein's* authentic ownness as the "relation of man and Being". Not the "components" (Being or man), but the "relation as relation" (Stambaugh, 2002: 8). This relationship (or difference) is more original than that which is related and, therefore, "identity is [the] belonging-together" of "thinking" (*Dasein*) and "Being". Thinking and Being are not the same (identical) and are therefore "held apart", but simultaneously they are "held together … in the Same"[219] (Stambaugh, 2002: 12-13). How is it possible to experience the 'between' of this 'relationship' (Sameness) and give thought to the "of" inhabiting the "Being of beings" and the "beings of Being"? (1957a: 61). According to Heidegger we must "enter into" the "event of appropriation". In terms of identity this event of appropriation reveals a "strange ownership" and a "strange appropriation" that happens "uniquely" (1957b: 36). This is not some general or abstract formulation of identity. Heidegger proposed that the event of appropriation "speaks to us directly from the very nearness of that neighbourhood in which we already reside" (1957b: 37).

> The event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, [and] achieve their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them (Heidegger, 1957b: 37).

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[218] In Afrikaans one could ask: "Hoe kan ons wees soos ons eintlik is, en in ons eintlikheid wees?"

[219] In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger pointed out that to be the same "means what belongs together" (1952: 241). See Glossary: Same.

The doctrine of metaphysics represents identity as a fundamental characteristic of Being. Now it becomes clear that Being belongs with thinking to an identity whose active essence stems from that letting belong together which we call the appropriation. The essence of identity is a property of the event of appropriation (Heidegger, 1957b: 39).

Metaphysics[220] either thinks of beings as "what is grounded [in Being]" i.e. "onto-logic", or of Being in terms of the "highest being", i.e. "theo-logic", but both approaches leave the "difference ... unthought" (1957a: 70-71). Heidegger proposed that "the appropriation appropriates man and Being to the essential togetherness", to "where we are belongers" in the "Same" (1957b: 37-39). In this way "thinking sees the constellation of Being and man in terms of that which joins the two" (1957b: 40). However, this unification in the 'Same', which constitutes identity, does not mean that Being and thinking are "identical". For it is exactly "in the same" that "the difference appears". The 'difference' does not dissipate. Rather, by studying the "relation as relation", Heidegger also freed himself to resolutely approach the "difference as difference" (1957a: 45-47).

In "The Principle of Identity" (1957b) Heidegger suggested that Being can only become present in the sense that it "concerns man through the claim [*Anspruch*] it makes on him" (1957b: 31). Being makes a claim on *Dasein* by calling to the being of care. *Dasein*, as the one capable of restraint and, by implication, hearing is open to hear the calling, able to respond 'speakingly' to the speaking of Being. Only in *Dasein* can Being be present[221], become word and be spoken. Thus the relationship between Being and being can be seen as a poetic closeness founded on the difference between Being and beings which is "[always] already there" (1957a: 62-63). How can we gain insight into this difference?

Heidegger proposed that the realisation of this difference dawns in a "sudden moment [*Augenblickes eines Andenkens*]" (1957a: 67 & 135) – literally in the blink of an eye – as a "reciprocal reflection" (1957a: 69). He described this moment as a mirroring in which

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[220] Heidegger's interpretation of Western metaphysics will be discussed in Chapter 6. See Glossary: Metaphysics.

[221] The relation between '*wees*' (Being), '*wese*' (being), '*aanwesigheid'* (presence), '*teenwoordigheid'* (presence but including the bringing to presence of language in the word or '*woord*'), '*aanspraak*' (claim), '*spreek*' (speaking), '*seggenskap*' (saying), '*woord*' (word), and '*antwoord*' (answer) is particularly telling in Afrikaans: *Slegs (en hierdie slegs dui op 'n oorvloedigheid) in hierdie wese kan Wees aanwesig wees, want ons spreek n woord in antwoord op die aanspraak. Net by ons word die aanspraak spraaksaam. Ons is vatbaar vir taal, want taal wys vir die eerste keer hoe die ding en sy wêreld geskei en tog een is. So leef ons digby die seggenskap en bring Wees tot teenwoordigheid. Ons hoor en is woordig waar ons hoort. Wees en wese hoort digby.*

"Being shows itself as unconcealing overwhelming" (*entbergende Überkommnis*) and beings find themselves (always already) in a 'situation' of "arrival that keeps itself concealed" (*bergenden Ankunft*) (1957a: 64-65). Being discloses by overwhelming, while the moment of arrival in the 'revealing overcoming' is hidden from the being.[222] In the same way beings are always already care, and always already attuned, the 'granting disclosure' of Being is always already granted. In arrival and overcoming, beings and Being are brought into in a strange 'perdurance'[223]—a holding out in which "one comes over the other [and] one arrives in the other" (1957a: 69)—which relate and differentiate them in the 'Same' (1957a: 65).

> That differentiation alone grants and holds apart the "between," in which the overwhelming and arrival are held toward one another, are borne away from and toward each other. The difference of Being and beings, as the differentiation of overwhelming and arrival, is the perdurance [*entbergend-bergende Austrag*] of the two in *unconcealing keeping in concealment*. Within this perdurance there prevails a clearing of what veils and closes itself off … (Heidegger, 1957a: 65).

The perdurance of the difference between Being's "unconcealing overwhelming" and the "concealing arrival" of beings 'lets be' the prevailing (as revealing and concealing) of the clearing (*Lichtung*).[224] The clearing, as the open (reciprocal) interaction between Being and beings 'lets be' the "possibility of the belonging-together of Being and thinking" (Heidegger, 1964: 445) that constitutes *Dasein*'s identity as an appropriative event (*Ereignis*). The clearing alludes to the instance – the happening – in which *Dasein* stands out (resolutely and ecstatically) as the one who safeguards the "site of the moment" (Heidegger, 1938b: 322-323/255), a fusion of temporal concerns and spatial situatedness. The interaction between Being and beings (and beings and Being) describes the happening-appropriation that reigns in the "quiet heart" (1964: 445) of the clearing; a letting-be of the "circling of Being and beings around each other" that reveals identity as the perdurance of this concerned relationship (1957a: 69-70). At heart, this is a perdurance of *Ereignis*; "an owning in which man and Being are delivered over to each other" (1957b: 36).

Thus *Dasein's* ability to act as *Lichtung* (a clearing), proposed in *Being and Time* (1927a: 133), is confirmed; a *Lichtung* that reveals the 'happening-granting' of Being and the

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[222] The 'coming-to-be' relationship between arrival (*aankom*) and overcoming (*oorkom*) is much more pronounced in Afrikaans: *Die oomblik as ons aankom, is ons altyd alreeds oorkom deur n sekere bewuswording.*

[223] See Glossary: Resoluteness.

[224] See Glossary: *Lichtung*

appropriating-receiving of *Dasein* as "openness" (1938b: 329-330/261). Being and beings are related/differentiated through an ecstatic remaining,[225] which, as circling proximity, is experienced as belonging amid. This remaining belonging is 'own' to the being that is capable of restraint. It brings *Dasein* to the type of identity to which it can belong. Heidegger's thinking of the "relation as relation" and the "difference as difference" allows thinking of identity in terms of care and upholds his former assertion that "one is … what one takes care of" (1927a: 322).

5.5.8 The saving power of *poiesis*

In Heideggarian terms, contemporary man is neither a poet nor a thinker, but 'technics' (Stambaugh, 2002: 13). This is a general assertion, but it succinctly explains Heidegger's belief that *Dasein* needs an alternative identity (not based on the *Gestell* of technics). Heidegger's proposal for an "appropriate recovery" (1957b: 37) was twofold:

Firstly, what is needed is a new way to think about the problem. Heidegger proposed that we convert the "dominance of the frame" into the "more original" (letting-be) of the event of appropriation (1957b: 37). The predicament that, according to Heidegger, faces this "step back" can be found in "language", since "Western languages are languages of metaphysical thinking" (1957b: 37). To remedy this concern Heidegger proposed a "transformation of language" in terms of "venturesome" poetry and "remembering" thinking (discussed in subsections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4) (1959: 425).

Secondly, instead of understanding revealing as the "challenging-forth" propagated by modern technology, we are in need of a new way to "let-be" revealing as "bringing forth" that corresponds to the original sense of '*poiesis*' that used to designate '*techne*'. Heidegger proposed a conception of *poiesis* focusing on the "safekeeping of the essence of truth" (Heidegger, 1953: 338-339). *Poiesis*, by being rooted in truth, acknowledged *Dasein*'s "freedom" and "letting-be" and (1930a: 123-125), by being understood as a safekeeping, is grounded in care.

In *poiesis*, things are *Dasein*'s concern and *Dasein* extends the willingness to listen to the saying of things, drawing them into 'contiguity'. *Dasein* no longer measures in terms of 'efficiency' alone, but in terms of care. Through *poiesis* – the keeping of what is granted – *Dasein* is confirmed as a caretaker. This is not some anti-technological reaction, but a

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[225] The vague term 'ecstatic remaining' aims at portraying what could in Afrikaans be described as the '*aanhoudende (i.t.v. vasberade) uitgestrektheid (i.t.v. blootstelling, weerloosheid, of oop wees vir iets) wat toenemend toenader*'.

recalling of the true nature of *techne*, where *Dasein* may experience the nearness in passing of the "irresistibility of ordering" and the "restraint of the saving power" (Heidegger, 1953: 338).

The root of *poiesis* is 'concerned creation', the gift of the art of care. The art of care is grounded in Heidegger's formulation of *Dasein* as care and can be enacted concretely as the 'care-full'[226] *poiesis* of *Dasein*'s *Sorge*, characterised by both the resolute letting-be of sheltering restraint and the resolute concretisation of the situation in perdurance. In *poiesis*, *Dasein* is made more willing by being willing to listen to the saying of things. *Poiesis* reveals *Dasein* as caretaker. In *poiesis Dasein* is thankful for the abundant granting of Being. In 'thinking poetry thankfully' *Dasein* is its authentic appropriateness (*Eigentlichkeit*) able to dwell poetically, thoughtfully and thankfully in its identity.

Dasein is the one that discloses the there, by dwelling near the source as sparing mortality, and then making in response to what is given there; the one who is capable of perduring-letting-be, grounded in enduring restraint and capable of listening to the saying of language. *Dasein* is the being of care, the one who spares and safeguards, the concerned creator and caretaker, making care-fully in a way that is true to life. *Dasein* as care is the possible site for the unfolding of *livskunst*.

5.6 Being-in-the-world as care

Dasein makes as the being of care. *Dasein*'s identity depends on what it takes into care. Only as care, capable of 'restraint', can *Dasein* listen and respond to the speaking of language. Only as the concerned sparing mortal – the 'shepherd of Being' who dwells in the 'house of Being' – can *Dasein* 'let the earth be' and escape the stock-pile for which the 'orderers' are destined. Always already existing as care, *Dasein* thinks thankfully and poetically, the preserver of the happening of Being. In answer to the call of care, *Dasein* can choose to be resolute, so perduringly resolute, that it can let-be. As care *Dasein* acknowledges mortality, anticipates it and takes a stand in the face of the wonder of it all. In taking a stand the world (the gathering of the fourfold) is rendered close and meaningful, an entangled existence which comes home to where *Being and Time* first reached over the *Ab-grund,* a reaching leap which revealed *Dasein* as the being of care.

It has been shown that care played an enduring and significant role in Heidegger's work. Care is inextricably intertwined with *Dasein*'s spatio-temporal being-in-the-world. Care is

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[226] See Glossary: Care-full.

the foundational presupposition that makes *Dasein*'s particular way of life possible. While Norberg-Schulz interpreted lived space in terms of the Heideggarian notion of place, Chapter 4 showed that Norberg-Schulz, rather than engaging with the interaction between lived time and care, relied on Giedion's formulation of time as continuity and change. In the next chapter Norberg-Schulz's neglect of the ontological nature and temporal implications of Heidegger's concept of care will be thoroughly questioned. Norberg-Schulz proposed that "meaning is the fundamental human need" (1979b: 23), but meaning is only possible for the being of care. If the "existential purpose of building (architecture) is ... to uncover the meanings potentially present in the given environment" (1979b: 18), then only the being of care is capable of architecture.

6 The art of care

Chapter 4 described the profound and multi-faceted influence of Martin Heidegger's philosophy on Christian Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution. However, it was also proposed that there is a fundamental difference between their conceptions of *Dasein*'s temporal being-in-the-world. Norberg-Schulz (following Giedion) understood human life as an interaction between remaining continuities and changing interpretations, while Heidegger described life as 'ecstatic care'.[227]

In this chapter the implications of Norberg-Schulz's "*neglect of the question of the being of the intentional*" (Heidegger, 1925: 178-180/129) will be discussed and the characteristics of the proposed way of questioning this oversight, the art of care, will be formulated. I will argue that the presuppositions stemming from Heidegger's concept of care are compatible with, and necessary for, an authentic art of place.[228]

In addition, I will try to illustrate the difference between continuity and change and ecstatic care, by referring to the metaphysical assumptions embodied in the concept of continuity and change. Norberg-Schulz's approach to temporality springs from the "restriction" of Being in terms of "becoming", a differentiation which Heidegger saw as the origin of a 'sequence of restrictions' limiting the capacity of western metaphysics to engage *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world in ontological[229] terms (Heidegger, 1935: 71-72/98-100). The art of care will be proposed as a way to overcome these assumptions and reveal the architectural significance of Heidegger's ontological understanding of human care.

In order to thoroughly question the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy and show the alternative interpretation made possible by the art of care, Chapter 6 will follow a numbering system which corresponds to the one employed in Chapter 4. For example, if subsection 4.4.7 discussed the link between '*Poiesis* and technics' in the work of Norberg-Schulz, then subsection 6.4.7 will re-interpret Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of *poiesis* (in this case, by referring to '*Poiesis*, machination and care-full making'). This direct juxtaposition (constituting a new 'hermeneutic circle') will systematically (in terms of each phase and transition) reveal the 'hidden but suppressed', role of care in Norberg-Schulz's work.

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[227] See Glossary: Care (*Sorge*), Ek-sistence.
[228] See Glossary: Art of place.
[229] See Glossary: Ontological difference.

In order to establish the nature of the art of care and illustrate how this alternative approach may be used to augment Norberg-Schulz's position, this chapter will question *stedskunst* in terms of Heidegger's concept of care. The art of care will be used to strip the art of place of the influence of continuity and change and propose a way beyond the art of place, towards *livskunst*.[230]

6.1 Introduction

The intention of this study is not to propose that Norberg-Schulz was unaware of the importance of care. In fact, he expressed the significance of care on several occasions: he stated that "authentic architecture is an architecture of care" (1980a: 196), described the *genius loci* as a "guardian spirit" (1979b: 18) and believed that "care for the unity of place is the job of architects" (2000b: 354). Rather than engaging with *Dasein*'s ecstatic existence (life) as care, Norberg-Schulz explained care in terms of continuity and change.

It has been pointed out (section 4.1) that Malpas lent credence to Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy by substantiating the importance of place in Heidegger's philosophy. In fact, Malpas suggested that "the understanding of time that is at issue in the articulation of the 'there,' with all its associations to care, disclosedness and situation already draw upon a notion of place". Essentially, Malpas engaged with whether it is more appropriate to think of "place as time", or of "time as 'place'" (2006: 103). However, it is important to point out that the proposed route towards *livskunst* does not fixate on the primacy of either place or time, but rather their lived entanglement.

In contrast to Heidegger's ecstatic interpretation of lived time as care, continuity and change is a product of what he called the "vulgar understanding" of time as a "pure succession of nows" (Heidegger, 1927a: 329). Ecstatic temporality allows for the fact that *Dasein* can understand the situation as a particular "Moment"[231] reaching ecstatically into the future and the past in order to reveal – in the "ecstatic unity of temporality" (Heidegger, 1927a: 350) – the significance of the 'there' (Heidegger, 1927a: 364) as a meaningful situation encountered by a concerned being-in-the-world. This is the gift of understanding 'time' as 'lived time'. Lived time is not primarily the interaction of 'timeless' continuities and 'temporal' change. Time is the "horizon of the understanding of being" (1927a: 17) and

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[230] See Glossary: Art of care, Art of the experience of living.
[231] See Glossary: Facticity.

Dasein lives ecstatically within time as care, attuned to histories and memories, projecting designs into the future and revealing particular instances as wonder-saturated moments.

Heidegger argued that *Dasein* can only authentically be, by "being-toward-death" (1927a: 251-259), by being temporal. This extends to *Dasein*'s ability to make things authentically. In his essay on the German poet, Johann Peter Hebel (1760-1826), Heidegger stated that *Dasein*'s "sojourn" is as much between "earth and sky" as it is between "birth and death" (1957c: 93). *Dasein*'s place cannot be understood as *either* space or time. The union of space and time is true of every moment of life. Already in *Being and Time* Heidegger mentioned that space and time are 'coupled' in "something like a *region*" (1927a: 368). Later he defined this "open-region" as an "abiding expanse". Any place is both 'expansive' and implies 'abiding' (Heidegger, 1945: 114/74).

The art of care represents a way of engaging with Heideggarian temporality, mirroring the way Norberg-Schulz engaged with Heideggarian spatiality. It is not a question of whether spatiality or temporality poses the most important problem. *Dasein*'s life is entangled with both; a state of affairs emphasised by Karsten Harries who insisted that architects have to address both the "terror of space" and the "terror of time" (Harries, 1997: 226). In order for works of architecture to become *livskunst*, it is imperative that both the 'terror of time' and the 'terror of space' be addressed.

6.1.1 The loss of care

One of the key questions posed by the art of care is whether or not the 'loss of place' is fundamentally rooted in the perceived indifference of contemporary building. Norberg-Schulz described the culmination of the loss of place as an all-infusing sense of "alienation" (1979b: 168). Yet, Polt (following Heidegger) argued that the reason for alienation is that "we thoughtlessly understand beings merely as present-at-hand objects to be described mathematically and controlled technologically" (1999: 132). Consequently, *Dasein*'s relation with Being has become "confused and groundless and passionless for so long that … we have an inkling of only a small portion of the power of poetic saying" (Heidegger, 1935: 82/113).

The art of care proposes that the loss of place is a loss of 'nearness' and that nearness (or bringing close) depends on *Dasein*'s ability to poetically engage with the world as the being of care (Heidegger, 1927a: 107). Even Norberg-Schulz alluded to this fact when he pointed out that the loss of orientation and identification has culminated in the "loss of

dwelling and care" (1979a: 12).[232] The reconquering of *Dasein*'s ability to architecturally engage with the world as 'emplaced care' – bringing that which is of concern into a lived region of concern – is the essential understanding needed to approach the design of works of architecture as a form of *livskunst*.

6.1.2 Giedion's understanding of time and the marginalisation of Heideggarian temporality in Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project

Sigfried Giedion's understanding of time, as 'constancy and change', had a lasting influence on Norberg-Schulz. Already in IiA Norberg-Schulz had proposed that any "change" had to "conserve" if it wanted to be meaningful and that "conservation" had to "allow for changes" if it wanted to remain alive (1963: 160). In ESA (1971: 99) he proposed that "life is both 'constancy and change'" and in GL (1979b: 182) continuity and change described the preservation of the *genius loci* as the oscillation between "ever new" interpretations and the enduring "identity" of the place. During his 'postmodern years' Norberg-Schulz relied on continuity and change to describe the architectural 'figure' as a temporal interpretation of a remaining "archetype" (1984a: 129), a timeless (general) "theme" subject to epoch-bound "variation" (1979b: 184). In later work it seemed to dawn on Norberg-Schulz that *Dasein*'s lived time is much more than "the order of phenomenal succession and change",[233] or "types of 'now'".[234] In a handwritten document (NAM 21: 31/01/1992), in which Norberg-Schulz set out the aims of his future research, he posed the question of time anew: "How does a place 'live' (in time)"? The envisioned "result" was "refounding architecture" on a "new and more relevant understanding of history" able to secure "closeness to life".

In his later work, Norberg-Schulz tried to synthesise 'closeness to life' by uniting continuity and change in a "new foundation".[235] However, ecstatic temporality differs from the 'carrying-on' of continuity and change. In ecstatic temporality *Dasein* is always already endowed with a mood, dealing with the happening of moments and engaged in a projected (aspirational) future, a reality much more nuanced than continuity or change. Therefore, if architecture is to become *livskunst* (true to life) – a building in relation to how

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[232] In subsection 6.5.3 this period in Norberg-Schulz's career (c. 1978-1980), during which he repeatedly considered (but eventually rejected) grounding the loss of place in the loss of care, is discussed in more detail.

[233] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 17, lecture notes, "MAN MADE PLACE", n.d.: 4.

[234] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23, untitled handwritten document, n.d. (but filed amid notes dating from 1986).

[235] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture notes, "The Interior as Imago Mundi", 25/11/1989: 1 & 10-11.

the place 'lives in time' and *Dasein* engages in this reality – then the art of place is in need of a foundation that no longer even considers the possibility of continuity and change, but is grounded in *Dasein*'s lived temporality as ecstatic care.

Giedion arrived at his understanding of 'constancy and change' by referring to modern art. In his seminal work, *Space, Time and Architecture: the Growth of a New Tradition* (1941), he argued that "time" achieved its "spatial significance" by means of the "spatial research" embodied in Cubist painting. Giedion saw Cubism as the way artists (in the early 20th century) realised that the "classic conceptions of space and volumes are limited and one-sided" (1941: 435). In an effort to transcend the "single point of reference" (1941: 437), artists "dissected" objects in order to see them "simultaneously from all sides". This new "simultaneous" conception of space engaged the "spectator" as "participant" in the "space" portrayed by the artwork and so activated the dimension of time (1941: 436). Rather than just being able to understand time "realistically" or "subjectively", time was united with space as "space-time". This union is, of course, true of every moment of our lives. What is also true is that the nature of this unity is not a matter of consensus. Giedion believed that the lived simultaneity of space and time coincides with the way "the tendency to change and the desire for continuity lives side by side [within] human nature" (1941: 859).

By formulating this union of "constancy and change" Giedion tried to bring the structure of "life itself" (as something that occurs in the tension between constancy and change) to bear on works of architecture: "Like life itself, [the human habitat] exists in a tension between continuity and change" (1941: 861), but is the "dynamic field" (1941: 862) of space-time best understood as an oscillation between continuity and change? If the reason Giedion applied continuity and change to the built environment is that it mirrors 'life itself', then the question should be whether life happens (takes place) as continuity and change. Heidegger's work testifies to the fact that temporal being-in-the-world is much more varied and ambiguous.

'Life itself' is not a question of continuity and change, but a fundamental act of engagement by a concerned being, temporally and spatially living in a spatio-temporal reality. If dwellers are not beings of continuity and change, but of care, then (if architecture as *livskunst* is the desired outcome) the built environment must be studied in terms of care. What Norberg-Schulz contributed in terms of formulating an architectural understanding of 'space' as 'place', must now be achieved for 'time' as 'care', leading to a conception of the world as a 'life-care-place' totality.

Furthermore, it is possible to argue that the art of care is not foreign to Giedion's thought. It lies dormant precisely in the aspects that most fascinated Norberg-Schulz: the 'new monumentality' and the 'new regionalism'. In *Architecture, You and Me* (1958) Giedion proposed that the new regionalism should be based on the realisation that "first and foremost, before making any plans, [the modern architect] must make a careful—one might also say a reverent—study of the way of life (the climate of living) of the place" (Gieidon, 1958: 145). Heidegger's conceptualisation of *Dasein* as care revealed the full temporal significance of this 'careful reverence' and promises a way towards authentic (true to life) regionalism and monumentality. Furthermore, both new monumentality and new regionalism presuppose what Giedion called the "humanization of urban life" (1958: 125). As an example of the need for 'humanisation' Giedion offered his recollection of a festival in Zurich, marking the "six hundredth anniversary of the entrance of Zurich into the Swiss Confederation" (1958: 129) in 1951:

> We had been very much afraid that the medieval core of Zurich had been altogether destroyed. Suddenly we discovered that something still remains and that—given the opportunity—people will dance and put on plays in these open spaces. Everybody was astonished at the spontaneity of the public. To be actor and spectator in one person is what is wanted! Clearly the public is ready. The question is whether *we* are! Let us not wait for a structurally well-defined society to arise. Let us ask what there is that lives in the bare and naked man, who is not just a symbol but is you and me (Giedion, 1958: 129-130).

While Giedion's account is coloured by the perceptual bias that understood man as 'spectator' or 'actor' (an approach that would manifest itself strongly in IiA), he was essentially asking the right question: what is it that characterises the fact that *Dasein* is 'alive'? The wonder of cubist painting was not only that it revealed the "many-sidedness" (Giedion, 1941: 435) of modern space, or even that it engaged in the lived "simultaneity" of "space-time" (Giedion, 1941: 444), but that these works revealed that *Dasein* was capable of understanding this simultaneity, precisely because of the ecstatic temporal beings which we, as care, always already are. In his foreword (dated December 1961) to the 4th edition of *Space, Time and Architecture*, Giedion asserted that he saw the interaction between continuity and change as the main challenge that contemporary architecture had to resolve:

> The question which at present comes everywhere to the fore and which cuts increasingly deeper into the marrow of this century, is the relation between constancy and change … we are concerned to know what can be changed and what can not be changed in human nature without disturbing its equipoise … The artist shows that an inner affinity exists between the expressions of primeval man and

contemporary man with his longings to become aware of his buried depths (Giedion, 1941: x).

Giedion hoped to find that which unites contemporary architects with their primitive predecessors, a correlation or truth that endured despite the interaction of continuity and change; except *Dasein* does not live as continuity and change. *Dasein* exists as a mortal. Not even buildings can absolutely safeguard against such change. No 'ideal' can be more 'constant' than the certainty of death. Life takes place as care. Therefore, if *livskunst* is the goal, then continuity and change is an inadequate foundation for architecture.

Norberg-Schulz, despite systematically drawing closer to Heidegger's philosophical project, never completely broke his ties with continuity and change. While the art of place provided a convincing answer to the 'terror of space', it neglected the temporal 'being of the intentional', leaving *Dasein* exposed to the terror of time. The art of care aims to address this lack. Heidegger described the being of the intentional as care. In the words of Steiner: "*Sorge* is a concern with, a caring for, an answerability to, the presentness and mystery of Being itself …" (1989: 100). Works of architecture, constituting *Dasein*'s 'answering', must be understood as works of care.

The following sections, in an effort to approach this 'mystery', will graft the implications of Heideggarian care into Norberg-Schulz's art of place. Step by step the implications of continuity and change will be supplanted by the potential of understanding lived time as care. Ultimately, it will be argued that the art of care and the art of place belong together as safeguards against the 'terrors' of time and space. Together, they promise a way towards understanding architecture as *livskunst*.

6.2 Phase 1: intentionality and care

The following section will reveal the 'ontic' nature of Norberg-Schulz's early work in terms of what Heidegger (1935: 71/98) described as the metaphysical "restrictions" traditionally applied to Being. It will be shown that the way Norberg-Schulz engaged with the "practical-psychological-social-cultural situation" (1963: 23), while seeming to point to the concerned way *Dasein* engages with the world in ecstatic simultaneity, was actually characterised by what Heidegger derided as "metaphysics" (1935: 14/19), a set of prejudices and assumptions that have coloured modern *Dasein*'s understanding of Being.

Heidegger discussed the core problem surrounding metaphysics in his 1935 lecture course, *Introduction to Metaphysics* (IM). In IM Heidegger argued that the original Greek

sense of Being, *phusis*, denoting Being as "the emerging-abiding sway" (1935: 11/15), has been forgotten. Instead, due to our "bustling and chasing after beings" (1935: 28/39), our need for "correctness" and "categories" (1935: 142/99-200) and our wilful "calculation" (1935: 148/207) desiring exploitability, we have been ensnared in a world characterised by "unchained technology and … the rootless organization of the average man" (1935: 28/40). We have turned Being into something that is "present-at-hand" (1935: 149/209), 'objects' standing against our own 'subjectivity'. This stance negates both the mysterious "overwhelming coming-to-presence" (1935: 47/64) of Being and *Dasein*'s ability to disclose that which is "Here" (1935: 156/219): a 'levelling out' (1935: 143/201) that demotes all care to indifference. Heidegger argued that the rise of metaphysics subjected the 'Greek inception' (in terms of philosophical thought) to four "restrictions": "Being and becoming; Being and seeming; Being and thinking; Being and the ought" (1935: 71/98).

The art of care proposes that continuity and change is a derivation of the metaphysical differentiation between 'Being and becoming'. The relationship between something which remains (Being) and something that 'becomes' aims at "progress",[236] but Heidegger stressed that the historical Being of *Dasein* is not the same as 'progress' since the "perspective of progress" offers revelation "merely in terms of degree" (Heidegger, 1938c: 209); a reversion to schematisation and abstraction, instead of the poetic ek-stasis, the inception, received in the Moment.[237] A more appropriate way to understand *Dasein*'s being in history is 'preservation', or 'safeguarding'.[238]

Heidegger described the 'preservation' of the "inception" (the event where truth comes to presence) as the "thoughtful retrieval [that retrieves] more originally in its originality" (1935: 146/204). Preservation is not the 'respectful progress' propagated by Norberg-Schulz; the creative progress that aims at guarding some valuable[239] parts (establishing a continuity), while creatively submitting the rest to change (making the work relevant). Rather, preservation implies engaging "more originally, and with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity that a genuine inception brings with it" (Heidegger, 1935: 29-30/41). Against the promise of engaging with this 'strangeness' stands the "most familiar"

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[236] It should be pointed out that Norberg-Schulz often quoted the English philosopher and mathematician, Alfred North Whitehead's (1861-1947,) assertion that the interaction between continuity and change represents the "art of progress" (Whitehead cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 82; 1979b: 182; 1989: 59; 2000a: 98).

[237] See Glossary: Ek-sistence, Facticity.

[238] See Glossary: Safeguarding.

[239] Refer to the discussion on 'value' in subsection 6.2.6.

distinction: the metaphysical oscillation between Being, which is seen as something transcending time, and time-bound becoming.

The duality of 'Being and becoming' assumes that "what becomes is not yet [and that] what is, no longer needs to become" (Heidegger, 1935: 73/101). Thus 'what is' acquires continuity amid the change of becoming. In opposition to the restriction of becoming, Being is understood as "constant presence" (1935: 154/216). When set against 'constant presence', becoming can be calculated as "change" or "motion" (1935: 148-149/208). Thus Being is given a meaning in terms of becoming (something other than Being) which, when people try to think about Being, urges them to think as calculation. It is not that Being and becoming should be thought anew or united in some sense. In CtP Heidegger clearly argued that "being as event" is not to be thought of "being as 'becoming'", since this would once again demand an "understanding of being as beingness" and consequently also the event would become a mere "object instead of letting its essential occurrence (and only this) speak for itself" (1938b: 371/471-472). Rather, when thinking of Being, this thinking should be grounded in the understanding that "Being is [always already] the gatheredness of this conflicting unrest [between Being and becoming]" (1935: 102/143). When thinking of Being, *Dasein* must, therefore, think in a way true to its ecstatic temporal nature, rather than relying on the metaphysical imposition of becoming on Being.

6.2.1 Access to the purposes and effects of architecture

Norberg-Schulz's attempt to account for the effect of architecture in terms of perception assumed that people primarily gather meaning from what they perceive and that this gathered "information" (1963: 28) will imbue intentions with a measure of 'appropriateness' resulting in "visual order" (1963: 21). These assumptions can be compared with a 'building analogy' Heidegger considered in IM, but was never discussed by Norberg-Schulz.

In an effort to think "how it stands with Being", Heidegger used the example of a "high school building" as "a being" that "is". Heidegger pointed out that the building "stands there even if we do not observe it" and that its Being is not "identical for everybody". In fact, he went so far as to suggest that one can "smell the Being of such buildings … much more directly and truly than it could be communicated by any description or inspection". Similarly, we always hear and touch "more" than the accumulation of visual sensations can reveal. Therefore, "Being does not consist in our observing beings" (1935: 25-26/35-36). Furthermore, Heidegger questioned (now in terms of the "portal of an early

Romanesque church") who has, most appropriately, access to the being of such an architectural being: "To the art historian who visits and photographs it on an excursion, or to the abbot who passes through the portal with his monks for a religious celebration, or to the children who play in its shadow on a summer's day?" (1935: 26-27/37).

Whether using the work of architecture as experts, participants, or merely incidentally, whether we try and engage with the building through sight, touch, smell or indeed any other bodily ability, Heidegger believed that when "we want to lay hold of Being it is always as if we were reaching into a void" (1935: 27/38). It is not that our experience of buildings are insignificant, but that if we want to approach the Being of the building—if we want to engage with Kahn's questioning of its "unmeasurable qualities" (Kahn in Lobell: 48)—then we have to free ourselves from the metaphysical distinctions we have fallen prey to. The division between Being and becoming has been pointed out, but in terms of the subject matter of IiA, it is the division between 'seeming and Being' that is essential.

6.2.2 The psychology of perception and seeming

The core motivation behind Norberg-Schulz's focus on perception was grounded in the belief that "naïve realism" was a "fundamental misunderstanding" (1963: 31) and implied that, if architects could base their perceptions of buildings on a "general theory" (which acknowledged the intentionality of perception), they could relevantly address the "continuous change" embodied in contemporary "pluralistic culture" (1967b: 244). However, Heidegger's discussion of the 'high school building' (subsection 6.2.1) suggests that perception alone cannot grant access to the essential unfolding of Being. Norberg-Schulz's attempts to reveal the architectural implications of the psychology of perceptions enmeshed the metaphysics of 'Being and becoming' with 'Being and seeming'.

Firstly, the idea that 'attitudes' are grounded in socially acquired but evolving *schemata* –a constancy modified incrementally through experiences – represents one of the original manifestation of continuity and change in Norberg-Schulz's work. Secondly, while Norberg-Schulz's focus on how 'attitude' influences perception is similar to the way Heidegger described the way attunement 'always already' relates *Dasein* to its situation, Norberg-Schulz approached our inability to perceive 'pure objects' within the metaphysical distinction between 'Being and seeming'.

In IM, Heidegger proposed that our relationship with seeming is much more nuanced than an inability to perceive 'correctly'. In the German word for 'seeming', *Schein*, Heidegger found three distinct implications: Firstly, seeming is the "luster and glow" (literally, as the

sun shines or *scheint*) of something that 'is'. Secondly, seeming means "appearing" in the sense that a thing, which in its concreteness 'is', always manifests itself as something that is present. Thirdly, seeming is also mere 'semblance' (literally the sun appears, or *scheint*, to be moving across the sky).[240] Heidegger argued that both the first and third implications are rooted in the 'coming-to-appearance' ("*Vor-schein*") of beings in Being (1935: 76/105): "Being means appearing. Appearing does not mean something derivative, which from time to time meets up with Being. Being essentially unfolds *as* appearing" (1935: 77/107). In metaphysical thinking, 'seeming' is reduced to "mere seeming" (1935: 80/111), against which Being, that which actually is, can then be measured in terms of the truthfulness of the correspondence between what 'seems' (or what has been said as *logos*) and what 'is'.

In the face of that which only seems to be, Being becomes "enduring prototype [archetype], the always identical" (Heidegger, 1935: 154/216). When set against 'constant presence', 'seeming' can be calculated (proven) as "logical incorrectness" (1935: 149/209). Thus Being is given a meaning in terms of seeming (something other than Being) which, when people try to think about Being, urges them to think as calculation.

Instead of understanding works of architecture as intermediary objects, architects are in need of being re-awakened to how the Being of things engages with (or 'moves') *Dasein*. Heidegger proposed that the ground for this re-awakening lay in the recovery of truth as 'unconcealment' (or *alētheia*) instead of viewing truth as "correctness" (1935: 144/201). Understanding truth as *alētheia* recognises Being as the mysterious interplay between "emergent shining" (1935: 139), a revealing "luminosity" (1938b: 331-332/263), and "withold[ing] concealedness" (1936a: 52). *Alētheia* is not a 'final answer' for Heidegger. Rather, it is the transition that enables the "regress from correctness to openness", from "[aletheia] to *Da-sein*" (1938b: 329-330/261). This is what is needed to proceed beyond the 'ought'. However, in order to recognise the implications of this 'ought', the way contemporary "thinking extends its dominance … over Being" (1935: 149/209) must first be clarified.

6.2.3 Symbol-systems and the dominance of metaphysical thinking

The reason Norberg-Schulz originally tried to formulate a theory of architecture was that he desired an "objective" and "common" way to describe architecture, similar to the way science describes the world through "hypothesis" which can be measured against

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[240] In Afrikaans it is helpful to think about the way that the sun '*skyn*' (shines); '*oënskynlik*' (seemingly) it moves across the sky, but in both instances it '*kom te voorskyn*' (appears) as the sun.

"practical experiences" (1963: 54). Rather than questioning the dominance of science, Norberg-Schulz aimed to ground the artistic pursuits of architecture in a structure resembling science, a "non-descriptive symbol system" (1963:63). Despite being 'non-representational', it still aimed to provide a systematic and "efficient" (1963: 54) tool of description aiming to facilitate 'corresponding' expressions.

Essentially, Heidegger enquired about *Dasein*'s ability to gain 'access' to Being in spite of the domination of science, while Norberg-Schulz envisioned a way for *Dasein*'s art to attain 'correctness' (scientific legitimacy) and reliability. In contrast to Norberg-Schulz's attempt to order architecture by means of a 'general theory', Heidegger claimed that philosophy is 'distorted' when it tries to "[order] the whole of beings into overviews and systems" (1935: 8/11).

Being, when posited against *thinking* as a rational activity, is thought as something "present-at-hand"; some kind of object (Heidegger, 1935: 154/216). When set against such a 'present-at-hand object', 'thinking' becomes calculation and categorisation (1935: 142/199-200). In Heidegger's words, "*phusis* becomes the *idea* (*paradeigma*), truth becomes correctness. Logos becomes the assertion, the locus of truth as correctness, the origin of the categories, the basic principle that determines the possibilities of Being" (1935: 144/201-202). Thus Being is given a meaning in terms of thinking (something other than Being) which, when people try to think about Being, urges them to think as calculation.

Norberg-Schulz's search for a 'symbol-system' has to be understood as an attempt to provide what modern architecture failed to offer: "visual order" (1963: 21). To mandate such a 'system' from scientific thought is to ask "too little" of science, because it does not "demand what is authentic" (Heidegger, 1935: 81/113). To demand the authentic is to envision "a more originary, rigorous thinking that belongs to Being [*sic*]" (1935: 94/130). This thinking (which Heidegger later defined as *Andenken*)[241] will be able to resist the urge to think of Being as an object.

6.2.4 The dimensions and the Being of architecture

Otero-Pailos, referring to Heidegger's "The Age of the World Picture" (1938c) also criticised Norberg-Schulz's metaphysical "understanding of *aletheia* as a strictly visual and ahistorical phenomenon" (2010: 173); however the 'problem' is much broader and more nuanced than Otero-Pailos's conflation of 'world picture' and 'enframing' with

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[241] See Glossary: *Andenken*.

'photography' suggests. The art of care proposes that Norberg-Schulz's metaphysical thinking is grounded in the failure to differentiate between 'intentions' and the 'being of the intentional', rather than any 'visual preconceptions'. In Norberg-Schulz's later works the role of vision and perception became marginal, while the distinction between 'Being and becoming' (continuity and change) loomed ever larger.

What was the nature of Norberg-Schulz's questioning of intentionality? Le Corbusier memorably ascribed to works of architecture the ability to "touch [the dweller's] heart" (1923: 141). What establishes this contiguity between built work and inhabitant? Le Corbusier sought the origin of this 'friendship' in the ability to "perceive [the designer's] intentions" (Le Corbusier, 1923: 141). It can therefore be argued that Norberg-Schulz's investigation into the 'intentions' that underlie architecture was firmly grounded in the artistic aspirations of the pioneers of modernism.

It has been pointed out (section 5.2) that Heidegger's questioning of intentionality was also inspired by previous interpretations of the concept by a 'master' in his field (Husserl). However, while Heidegger tried to understand what lay beyond intentionality (the 'being of the intentional'), Norberg-Schulz focused on intentionality itself and thereby perpetuated the neglect of the Being of the intentional. During this phase of his work, Norberg-Schulz also neglected asking about the 'being of architecture'. Instead, he placed 'restrictions' against architecture and tried to define it in terms of the building task, form and technics.

Norberg-Schulz aimed to base his investigation of building tasks on "a full understanding of general human needs".[242] However, when architecture is defined in terms of building tasks, it becomes an act of calculation—population density, the amount of ventilation needed per square meter, or even the stylistic rules that will allow a 'feeling of uniformity' (but not monotony)—instead of engaging with the ways the situation concerns *Dasein*. Norberg-Schulz's own argument kept this possibility open. He argued that the task of architecture is to provide a 'solution' to the "aspects of the environment which concern us" (1963: 109) and thereby reveal our meaningful interaction with the situation. Essentially, Norberg-Schulz described the problematic surrounding concerned being-in-the-world, but within a metaphysical framework. Rather than approaching 'our concerns' in terms of continuity and change, concerned involvement must be thought ecstatically.

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[242] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 6, lecture notes, "INTENTION AND METHOD IN ARCHITECTURE" [*sic*], 04/04/1967: 5.

Norberg-Schulz's theoretical approach to form aimed to "[put at architect's disposal] an open 'universe' of formal systems which may satisfy any conceivable content".[243] However, when architecture is defined in terms of 'form systems', it becomes something to 'look at' rather than inhabit; a situation in which the appropriateness of the system can be calculation. Even if Norberg-Schulz's aim was to create "relevant forms", a study of form as "the articulation and characterization of masses and spaces" (Norberg-Schulz, 1968: 257) still reveals a marked neglect of the being of the intentional. The idea that "form only has a meaning within a system of forms", or understanding "style [as a] statistical ensemble [determined by] information theory" (1963: 156), is grounded in the division between 'thinking and Being'.

When architecture is defined in terms of technics, it risks becoming a mere product of technology. In his later work Heidegger discussed technology as a "challenging-forth" (1953: 321) that aims at calculating what can be "unlocked" (1953: 322) from beings. If architecture is to play a relevant and appropriate part in solving the ecological crisis stemming from climate change, then its relationship with technology must be questioned.

The way Norberg-Schulz posited technics, the role of form, and the identification of building tasks against 'architecture itself' alludes to the fact that he (in IiA) was still trying to explain beings without reaching into the depths of their Being. When the world is merely 'observable' (rather than lived concretely), then the resulting architecture, while aiming to engage with the surrounding world, will not be able to approach the richness envisioned by *livskunst*. This 'removal from life' is most evident in the way Norberg-Schulz (in IiA) presented the role of language.

6.2.5 Language as the assertion of correctness

Norberg-Schulz envisioned using his "theory of architectural semantics" to describe "the basic relationships between content and form".[244] Using semantics as a way to ensure the 'structural similarity' between forms, tasks, and the way these forms are technically realised, display the fact that (in IiA) Norberg-Schulz understood language merely as an efficient means of communication.

Heidegger believed that understanding language as a means of communication constituted a fundamental misrepresentation and marginalisation of the original

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[243] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 6, lecture notes, "INTENTION AND METHOD IN ARCHITECTURE" [*sic*], 04/04/1967: 5.

[244] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 6, lecture notes, "INTENTION AND METHOD IN ARCHITECTURE" [*sic*], 04/04/1967: 5.

understanding of language as *logos*; the disclosive "struggle [that serves as] the grounding ground of historical human Dasein in the midst of beings as a whole" (1935: 128/179). When dwellers are able to "stand and act in logos, in gathering, [then they] are the gatherers" (1935: 132/183). Metaphysical thinking shirks this responsibility in favour of "assertion [as the] locus of truth in the sense of correctness" (1935: 142/199). Assertion describes the scientific propensity to state the properties of things in a way that can be verified and shown to correspond with what is 'present-at-hand'. In this way language is dominated by metaphysical thinking by becoming a way to arrive at a "de-cision [as a] division" (1935: 84/116) between 'that which seems' and 'that which is'. The 'gatheredness' of Being is therefore lost and truth is no longer seen as *alētheia*, but as "the correctness of logos" (1935: 142/199). The ground for this forgetting of language is mankind's "destroyed relation to Being" (1935: 39/54).

Heidegger argued that metaphysical thinking degraded language into "an indispensable but masterless, arbitrarily applicable means of communication, as indifferent as a means of public transportation, such as a streetcar, which everyone gets on and off" (1935: 38-39/53). In short, modern man uses language carelessly. Metaphysics has managed to stifle the disclosive capabilities of language. People use language as a mere tool. The mysterious hold that it has over them, or the power it wields, is no longer something that they view as questionable. Consequently, they have become indifferent to the wonder that language 'is' at all.

6.2.6 The intermediate object and 'the ought'

It must be acknowledged that Norberg-Schulz (in IiA) tried to overcome the 'calculative' hold that science had on architecture. However, he still lacked a concept of 'truth' outside 'objective correspondence'. Thus he could only engage with the "work of art as a concretization of an intermediate object" (1963: 68); thereby demoting 'art' to 'correspondence'.

On 4 April 1967 Norberg-Schulz delivered a lecture[245] at the RIBA[246], in which he tried to elaborate on the way that the intentional object is grounded in values. Since "values make us choose between alternatives", our choices are "meaningful" and our "actions intentional" (1967b: 244). When architectural forms are the result of "systems of values"

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[245] Norberg-Schulz's lecture notes are entitled, "INTENTION AND METHOD IN ARCHITECTURE (Towards an Architecture of Pluralism)" (NAM 6). A somewhat shortened version of this lecture was published in RIBA Journal as "Pluralism in Architecture" (1967b).

[246] The Royal Institute of British Architects.

they become "expressive" and can be understood as "higher objects" (1967b: 244-245). However, Heidegger believed that the importance humans place on 'values' is merely another 'restriction' placed in opposition to Being.

In contrast to 'the ought', Being becomes "what lies at hand in each case as what ought to be and has not yet been actualized, or already has been actualized" (Heidegger, 1935: 154/216). Thus the ought is "[set] *above* Being [as something] that Being never yet is, but always ought to be" (1935: 150/211). The ought describes an "archetype of the prototypes" (1935: 150/211); a 'validity' that aims at "constant presence" (1935: 154/216) by providing an ultimate "measure" (1935: 150/210) against which ideas can be tested. When set against the ought as 'constant presence', the validity of assertions can be calculated. Thus Being is given a meaning in terms of the ought (something other than Being) which, when people try to think about Being, urges them to think as calculation.

The ought, therefore, describes the route towards creating 'archetypes' as 'fixed ideals': a 'finishedness' or 'closedness' that is fundamentally incompatible with the unfinished nature Heidegger ascribed to *Dasein* as mortal. For Heidegger, *Dasein*'s greatest potentiality is to 'be the openness' (the *Lichtung*)[247] in which Being can come to presence. It is precisely *as* the "deepest clearing" that "Being 'needs' Dasein" (1938b: 342-343/271). Beyond the ought, *aletheia*[248] has the potential to become *Dasein* by moving from "correctness to openness" (1938b: 329-330/261). When the "constant de-cision" no longer characterises "history" (1935: 84/116), then the authentic "[restoration of] the historical Dasein of human beings" once again becomes a possibility. Beyond the ought, people, rather than being 'asserters', act as "shelterers" (1938b: 387-392/306-310) of the revealing-concealing nature of truth as a moment of clearing.

While Norberg-Schulz's metaphysical mindset limited his ability to deal with the artistic nature of works of architecture, Heidegger's understanding of truth enabled him to formulate a far more significant role for art than the 'concretisation of an intermediate object'. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1936a) Heidegger defined art both as "truth setting itself into work" (1936a: 38) and the "creative preserving of [the becoming and happening of] truth in the work" (1936a: 69).

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[247] See Glossary: *Lichtung* (clearing).
[248] See Glossary: *Alētheia.*

6.2.7 The metaphysics of Norberg-Schulz's approach to intentionality

Heidegger believed that *Dasein* acting as 'shelterer' could reveal "[t]ime-space [as] the gathering embrace that captivates and transports at once … and whose essential occurrence becomes historical in the grounding of the 'there' by Da-*sein*" (1938b: 386-387/305). In this historical reality beyond metaphysics, *Dasein* will be "transformed into the builder and steward" (1938b: 242-243/191) of the "site of the moment" (1938b: 322-323/255), the *Lichtung* facilitating the disclosure of that which is "Here [*sic*]" (1935: 156/219). The thinking engaging with this situation will be "historical" (rather than "system"-based) (1938b: 242-243/191) and "ecstatic" (1938b: 240-242/190) (rather than falling into the prescriptions of 'being and becoming'). Instead of subscribing to archetypal 'oughts', *Dasein* will engage as concerned "seeker" (1938b: 294-295/232), actively engaging in "truth as the temporal-spatial playing field wherein beings can again be beings" (1938b: 242-243/191). Simultaneously, when *Dasein* takes a stand as preserver, Being comes into its own as the mysterious "overwhelming coming-to-presence" (1935: 47/64). The concerned and disclosive nature of *Dasein* as concerned sheltering preserver, especially when contrasted with "the old differentiation [of] being and becoming", denotes something that "metaphysics could never know" (1938b: 471-472/371).

Heidegger concluded that, through the restrictions metaphysics placed on Being, "Being is delimited against an Other" (1935: 152/214). This 'Other' acquires a mysterious thing-like quality by virtue of its influence. Becoming, seeming, thinking and the ought are therefore not "nothing". By distinguishing Being in terms of these things, metaphysics failed to "name everything that 'is'". Thus the matter of Being must be approached "anew", in order to transform Being (which metaphysics has "encircled" through "restrictions") "into the encompassing circle and ground for all beings". In contrast to the dominating restrictions of metaphysics, Heidegger proposed 'restraint' and 'releasement' as cornerstones of his thinking; a thinking focused on the "originary division" (the 'ontological difference') between beings and Being which is much more fundamental than the oppositions perpetuated by metaphysics (Heidegger, 1935: 155-156/218-219).

From the above it can be argued that the deeper reason why Norberg-Schulz's study of intentionality "did not yield the hoped-for results" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 15) is that intentionality still neglected the 'being of the intentional'. *Dasein* is not primarily an intentional being, a subject intending aspects of an object. Rather, *Dasein* is intentional in the world 'as care'. Norberg-Schulz's attempt to formulate a theory which could describe how architecture participates in the life of the intentional, in the situation, ultimately failed because his approach maintained the traditional restrictions against Being. Richard Polt

succinctly described the problematic behind this approach: "Before theory ever comes along, the world is opened up for us by 'life', which is situated and historical" (1999: 12).

In conclusion, it might seem as if these considerations are far removed from the concerns of architecture, but the design of any building constitutes the inception of its Being. How architects understand this inception, must be questioned in all its involved complexity; as being-in-the-world. Only by being aware of the distorted thinking characterising metaphysical traditions may *Dasein* (as care), in the face of all the tempting possibilities of "calculation", be able to practice "the most reticent restraint"; aiming at safeguarding "creativity" from "deteriorating into a sheer, insatiable riot of blind drives" (Heidegger, 1938b: 247-249/195-196). The art of care embarks from the stance that the creative revelation of the situation depends on acknowledging the fact that human life flows from care and that human participation implies concerned acts of perduring-letting-be. The art of care aims to find the source of architecture's ability to 'touch our heart' by reaching beyond 'perceiving intentions' and focusing on the 'Being of the intentional'.

6.3 Transition 1: care as a way beyond intentionality

The following section will interrogate the aspects that motivated Norberg-Schulz to attempt a move beyond the metaphysical dualities mentioned in the previous chapter. In particular, the influence of the work of Bachelard, Bollnow, Lynch, Sedlmayr and Venturi will be examined. It will be shown that Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of these influential contributors 'coloured' his interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy in significant ways and culminated in a series of assumptions that underpinned his understanding of existential space, and how *Dasein* historically participates within it. To a large extent, these assumptions maintained the metaphysical nature of Norberg-Schulz's investigation.

6.3.1 Order and variation

In this transitional phase Norberg-Schulz saw continuity and change as the way towards 'visual order'. The challenge was to determine the enduring order against which change could be affected. In IiA Norberg-Schulz argued that "it would be inexpedient to introduce the relationship [between the work of architecture and] the environment as a new basic category" (1963: 103). Yet, only a few years later, he claimed that it is exactly this environment, and the way mankind engages with it as a "system of places" (Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 31), that constitutes the enduring continuity providing order to the lived situation. Norberg-Schulz saw this approach as a return to the "obvious" (1966a: 265) relationships between vernacular buildings and their environments that had governed

architecture in the past. Order and variation can certainly be observed in many traditional settlements, but is order and variation constitutive or consequential?

In *Architecture without Architects* (1964), which brings together a wide range of vernacular responses to environments, Bernard Rudofsky emphasised the "humaneness" of vernacular building as the essential characteristic which elicits "some response in us" (1964: preface). This suggests that there is a fundamental humanity which underlies order and variation that allows contemporary dwellers to engage with these remote settlements. In the light of this 'humaneness' it is possible to return to the question Norberg-Schulz asked in CP: "What do we have to demand from the environment, in order that man may call himself *human*?" (1969: 27). There is a deeper question grounding this line of questioning: Is it the environment which enables people to call themselves human, or are they human and, if given the chance to engage with a place, they create humane settlements? The art of care suggests that, if architecture is to engage authentically with those humane aspects of the vernacular that still 'touch our hearts', then architecture must be inspired by the being of the intentional. In is only when grounded in care, that identification and orientation are both possible and meaningful.

Norberg-Schulz engaged with the problem of order and variation because he believed their interaction (as continuity and change) held the key to the creation of meaningful environments. All settlements are, seen from a compositional perspective, ensembles of built forms and spatial organisations. However, to equate order and variation (in compositional terms) with the idea of lived time (thereby reducing time to continuity and change) is to reduce architecture, as a humane response to the Being of the intentional and its relationship with the place, to an act of ordering composition.

6.3.2 Meaning and the being of care

In MiA Norberg-Schulz drew a much more pronounced distinction between the meanings accessible to the world of science and the ability of art to convey meaning. He essentially embarked from a particularly Heideggarian position by contrasting the subject-object rationality of science, which forces man to place himself "critically opposite" the world, to the idea of "belonging" (1966b: 17) to a world (Heideggarian being-in-the-world). It has been mentioned (see subsection 4.3.3) that this position initially stemmed from the influence of Bollnow (see subsection 6.3.4), rather than any direct engagement with Heidegger's philosophy.

Norberg-Schulz believed that architecture can provide 'meaningful places' by "[concretising] higher objects or 'values' [as a] visual expression to ideas which *mean* something to man because they 'order' reality". This idea of ordering the world through concretised values has the capacity to 'mean something' because "only by recognizing their mutual dependence [within an order] do things become meaningful" (1966b: 22). Thus when things are brought into relationship with (or ordered by) meaningful ideas they become meaningful. The meaning of things is therefore contextual.

Heidegger also ascribed to this contextual interpretation of meaning, but he did not ground these contextual meanings within the metaphysical division between *Being and the ought* (values) or in any *idea*. His understanding of meaning was grounded in the way beings are 'intelligible' in their Being to the being of care. Heidegger proposed that only *Dasein* as the caretaker of the "site of the moment" (1938b: 322-323/255) has access to meaning (see subsection 5.3.1 and 5.5.7). In this *Lichtung* Being comes to light amid the being-in-the-world of *Dasein* as ecstatic care.

Meaning erupts from the ecstatic nature of *Dasein*'s concerned being-in-the-world. Only one who is concerned can reach out of his everyday absorption and establish a 'closeness' that discloses things within their interrelationships. *Dasein* (especially in terms of the importance Heidegger would later ascribe to *Gelassenheit*) does not impose order, but discloses it from what is given. Meaning is not 'achieved' through the establishment of an order, but (as Norberg-Schulz later recognised) by "[uncovering] the meanings potentially present in the given environment" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 18). Meaning emanates from concerned "interpretation" (Heidegger, 1927a: 148), rather than "assertion" (Heidegger, 1935: 142/199). Meaning is given amid care. Consequently, "[w]hat we care for and about, what caring adheres to, can be defined as meaningfulness" and therefore "to be an object" no longer means being placed against a subject, but signifies "to be met on the path of care and experienced as meaningful" (Kisiel, 2010: 21).

When something manmade touches our hearts, we essentially enter into the meaningful ecstatic concern (the humaneness) of the maker. Far from denying the ordering capacity of works of architecture the art of care suggests that meaning is not the result of order (as a form of correctness), but rather, concerned being-in-the-world makes possible the disclosure of order from what is given. In the words of Steiner (commenting on Heidegger's work): "It is *Sorge* that makes human existence meaningful" (1989: 101).

6.3.3 Complexity, contradiction and 'easy plurality'

Venturi's work on the complexities and contradictions of modern life motivated Norberg-Schulz to move beyond the confines of perception. If architecture had to concretise the contradiction-infused contemporary pluralism, then Venturi wanted architects to engage with the "everyday landscape" (1966: 104). While there are parallels between Venturi's emphasis on the "vulgar and disdained" realities of the "typical main street" (1966: 104-105) and Heidegger's emphasis on how our fallen "absorption" and "entanglement" in the world is "a positive possibility" (1927a: 175-176), it must be pointed out that Venturi also subscribed to the differentiation between 'Being and becoming'.

In his Preface to *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture*, Venturi referred to the following words by T.S. Eliot: "This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as the temporal and of the timeless and temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional [while being] conscious of his place in time, of his own contemporaneity" (Eliot cited in Venturi, 1966: 13). Venturi used these words to justify his belief that much of what happens in different epochs is essentially relating to variations of the 'same' things and behaviours. Essentially he stressed the possibility of continuity, while acknowledging the changes – the complexities and contradictions – characterising the contemporary.

It has been argued (subsection 6.2.6) that the role Norberg-Schulz ascribed to art in IiA, as the concretisation of intermediate objects, fell short of expounding the richness achieved by Heidegger's formulation of art. Rather than making up for this shortfall, Norberg-Schulz's appropriation of Venturi's "complex and elusive order of the difficult whole" (1966: 103) was one of the key elements which led him to neglect the more fertile possibilities offered by Heideggarian care. Against the intentional observer (even one who is open to 'ambiguity'), the art of care proposes concerned engagement. Against the prescriptive division between the temporal and the timeless, the art of care offers ecstatic temporality. While *Complexity and Contradiction* succeeded in challenging modernism's 'either-or', with its vision of complexity as 'both-and', the art of care goes much further; it envisions existence and the making of things in terms of "being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)" (Heidegger, 1927a: 192). Therefore, to say that the dualities of 'both-and' describe the complexity and contradiction of life is itself an 'easy plurality'. This is the seed of postmodernism's demise. As Venturi himself stated: "Where simplicity cannot work, simpleness results" (1966: 17).

6.3.4 Questions regarding the influence of Lynch and Bollnow

In *Human Space* Bollnow reacted against philosophers' neglect of human spatiality in favour of human temporality (as formulated by Heidegger). Bollnow aimed to address this imbalance by formulating a "coherent systematic interpretation [of] the concrete space experienced and lived by humans" (Bollnow, 1963: 15-17). The parallels between Bollnow's 'human space' and Norberg-Schulz's study of place as a 'lived totality' are numerous:

Firstly, Bollnow's study of the "concrete human being" desiring a "foothold" in space (1963: 57) is the true inspiration[249] behind Norberg-Schulz's discussion of the "elements of existential space" in ESA (1971: 20-26). Secondly, Bollnow (referring to the work of Cassirer) studied the "mythological geography" of the world in order to show that each "location" has "its own special character" (1963: 63). In the same way Norberg-Schulz proposed a "mythological understanding" of place (in GL) in order to expose the "spirit of place" (1979b: 23-32). Furthermore, Bollnow argued that, since space has a "character" and contains "directions", *Dasein* can "orientate" (1963: 61) in and "identify" (1963: 283) with space. This is exactly what *Dasein* has to achieve, according to Norberg-Schulz, in order to "belong" to a place and dwell in it (1984a: 15-25). It is also important to note that Bollnow pointed to the way "[*Dasein* acquires] a particular nature only in unity with a specific space" (1963: 275). This is the main assumption grounding Norberg-Schulz's assertion that "human identity presupposes the identity of place" (1979b: 22). There are other similarities or trails of thought, like Bollnow's investigations of the "*imago mundi*" (1963: 60) that clearly illustrate the remarkable influence his thinking had on Norberg-Schulz, but fall beyond the scope of this discussion.

The main difference between their approaches is that Bollnow saw space (*Raum*) as the "given location" and place (*Ort*) as that "which comes into being in such a space" (1963: 38), while Norberg-Schulz (at least since GL) subscribed to Heidegger's belief that "spaces receive their being from locations and not from 'space'" (Heidegger, 1951a: 152). From the similarities listed here, it can be argued that Norberg-Schulz, at least initially, read Heidegger through the eyes of Bollnow. It is also proposed that some of Bollnow's interpretations endured in his work without being tested against Heidegger's thought.

For instance, Bollnow defined dwelling as "the way in which we own an individual space in our lives" (1963: 267). What does Bollnow's formulation of dwelling demand from dwellers? According to Bollnow (1963: 288) the realisation of our spatial existence

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[249] See subsection 4.3.2 and 4.3.4.

"demands […] the entire effort of our existence", yet he neglected the reason (according to Heidegger) that *Dasein* spends him/herself; that is, *Dasein*'s care for his/her own Being.[250] Bollnow believed that "man remains unsheltered in time" while space offers "protection" (1963: 281). This is a fundamentally different position from the one held by Heidegger: "Dasein can *be* spatial only as care" (1927a: 367).

Ultimately, in the same way that Bollnow limited himself to *Dasein's* spatiality, Norberg-Schulz seems to have disregarded Heidegger's fundamental achievement in *Being and Time*; the formulation of human temporality as the "meaning of authentic care" (1927a: 326) and care as the "ground" of the being-in-the-world of *Dasein* (1927a: 278). Consequently, in the work of Norberg-Schulz, 'taking place' eclipsed 'taking care'. While Bollnow clearly stated his intent to focus on spatiality, Norberg-Schulz claimed to address the 'totality' of being-in-the-world, while neglecting what Heidegger saw as foundational to the meaningful interpretation of this totality.

In concert with Bollnow, Norberg-Schulz relied on the more 'evidence-based' work of Kevin Lynch. Already in OVE (1966a)*,* and still in PLP (2000b), Norberg-Schulz relied on Kevin Lynch's research in *The Image of the City* (1960) to back up his own claims regarding the capacity of architecture to establish an "environmental image" (Lynch, 1960: 4). Norberg-Schulz, under the sway of his *Gestalt* convictions, argued that people are in need of "strong places" (1979b: 179) that are able to serve as "powerful images" (1984a: 88). While this interpretation holds true for Lynch's study of historical Boston, there is an alternative implied in Lynch's study of Jersey City.

Initially, Lynch's description of the "formlessness" of Jersey City seems to confirm the expected link between 'visual coherence' and a strong 'environmental image'. Yet the research showed that residents found other ways to relate to the place (1960: 25-26). While "none of the respondents had anything like a comprehensive view of the city" and while the city merely seemed like "a place on the edge of something else" (1960: 29), residents were able to "seize upon and elaborate" individual phenomena in the "seemingly chaotic set of surroundings … by shifting their attention from physical appearance to other aspects" (1960: 32). One comment by Lynch seems particularly luminous when seen in light of the art of care: "The fact that the Medical Center [in Jersey City] has a small

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[250] Bollnow, building on the work of the Swiss psychiatrist, Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966), proposed "the space of loving togetherness" (1963: 241-244) as an alternative to care; an approach devoid of the temporal implications of Heidegger's concept of care (see section 3.3).

landscaped plot in front of it seems to be as important an identifying characteristic as its great bulk and skyline silhouette" (1960: 32).

Despite containing vague pointers towards the way in which residents engage with the 'other aspects', Lynch's study was focused on "the effects of physical form" (1960: 157). There seems to be no important reason why the presence of a 'small landscape plot' could rival the influence of a large building. However, from the perspective of the art of care this observation confirms that 'expressions of care' have great significance in what is generally perceived as indifferent environments. People are "deeply attached" (1960: 123) to the landscapes they live in, not by "imagery", but by the fact that these landscapes somehow matter to them: when a guide makes a "long detour" in his "approach [to a] sacred place" (1960: 130), or when "African tribes [group] themselves into sectors which [point] towards their own territories" (1960: 129), it is not exclusively a matter of "orientation" stemming from the "role of form" (1960: 133). These examples reveal *Dasein*'s caring nature. The problem with Lynch's methodology is not the inadequate[251] sample size (1960: 152), but his disregard for the difference between 'describable places' and 'meaningful places'. The ease and efficiency of navigating along highways[252] should remind us that places can be 'describable' without being especially 'meaningful'.

The importance of the art of care is also affirmed by Lynch's acknowledgement (in his 'directions for future study') of "city perception" as a "time phenomenon" (1960: 158) and provides corroboration for engaging with the ecstatic temporal nature of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world. Norberg-Schulz did not engage with these aspects of Lynch's study, but from the above it can be argued that Heidegger's formulation of care is indispensable to understanding how places are able to serve as images. Without care a place may be 'describable', but only 'amid care' do places become meaningful.

6.3.5 Existential space and the influence of Bachelard and Piaget

There are two other influential figures whose significance must be considered: Gaston Bachelard and Jean Piaget. In ESA Norberg-Schulz listed Bachelard's *The Poetics of Space* (1958) as one of the "fundamental studies on space … published by philosophers" (1971: 15). Yet it seems as if Norberg-Schulz merely used *The Poetics of Space* as a 'book of ideas', rather than engaging with the foundational insight of Bachelard's book. For

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[251] Lynch and his team interviewed 30 individuals in Boston and only 15 in both Jersey City and Los Angeles. Lynch also acknowledged the "unbalanced" nature of the sample composition in terms of age, class and occupation (1960: 152).

[252] See Bollnow's discussion of "Man on the road" (1963: 101-106).

instance, Norberg-Schulz used it in ESA to add weight to ideas like "verticality", "concentration", "cellars", and "attics" (1971: 21) and to point to the importance of "things" like "cupboards" (1971: 32). In GL, Bachelard's writings were simply applied to expand Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of the "forest" as vast "wilderness" (1979b: 25). In a certain sense this fragmentary approach is understandable due to the way Bachelard compiled the book. It seems like a "chest" (discussed in Chapter 3 of *The Poetics of Space*) filled with a scattering of fragments; a "store of daydreams of intimacy" that is at once secretive and revelatory (Bachelard, 1958: 78).

However, despite its fragmentary appearance, there is a deeper message conveyed throughout. In the "dialectics of outside and inside" (discussed in Chapter 9 of *The Poetics of Space*) Bachelard saw a "being [which] wants to be both visible and hidden" (1958: 222). Inspired by the frequency of "opening" and "closing", Bachelard made an illuminating statement that gathers all the 'fragments' into one revelatory force: "man is half-open being" (1958: 222)

This is the deeper message that permeates *The Poetics of Space*: spatiality is not easy to reveal, nor is it as 'obvious' as the between of earth and sky seems. The poetic potential of space is imbued with the still, breathless hesitance holding sway in the moment before those who are "more daring by a breath" utter their 'venturesome' words (Heidegger, 1946: 137); a being-in-the-world imbued with the "precarious", yet "confident" (Bachelard, 1958: 102-103), incompleteness which colour *Dasein*'s mortal engagement with space and time. *Dasein*, as 'half-open being', draws near things as the disclosure of the there (1927a: 133), but also the "self-concealing" of the "abyssal ground" (1938b: 379-380/300). In this 'thrownness'[253] there is no 'Being and becoming'; only the simultaneous "withholding" (1938b: 379-380/300) of what could possibly be held, and the "giving" of what can never be demanded. Modern 'calculative thinking' aims at strong figures and coherent systems, thereby obscuring the "frailties of things" (Heidegger, 1946: 127) by demanding certainty and unmitigated possession. The art of care envisions a re-appraisal of the vulnerabilities, frailties and precariousness of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world.

ESA opened with a picture of a child playing on a beach. The child has nestled itself in between two rocks and built a wall of sand for protection. The caption reads: "A child 'concretizes' its existential space" (1971: 6). Even though (in his later works) Norberg-Schulz's interest in child psychology waned, his appropriation of Piaget's work reveals some of the essential aspirations driving his theoretical work. In lecture notes entitled

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[253] See Glossary: Thrownness (*Geworfenheit*).

"Meaning, History and Architecture" (NAM9, 05/1980) Norberg-Schulz restated his belief that child psychology confirms the essentiality of the human need to understand the enduring "'structures' of the world" to which they belong (05/1980: 2). The point being that only within such an understanding of what remains can meaningful changes be affected.

Recently, Otero-Pailos condemned Norberg-Schulz's reliance on child psychology by stating that Norberg-Schulz "remained blind to the deceitful logic that equated the child's development with the (adult) architect's creative capacity" (2010: 158). While it is true that Norberg-Schulz continued to rely on 'child psychology' to present "topological order" as more "original" than geometry (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 51), his interest in child psychology, especially in his later work, actually held a much deeper significance.

In a handwritten document (undated, but filed in a folder of notes from 1995) Norberg-Schulz stated that "as children we get acquainted with a particular, concrete environment consisting of things which possess identity and character [and therefore] originally … the world is a world of qualities and meanings", but our systems of education teach us to "analyze and quantify, and our world becomes ever more abstract … and even the architects themselves often think of their own work in terms of material efficiency" (NAM 22, n.d).

Norberg-Schulz saw quantitative education as a product of the ills Heidegger ascribed to the modern technological mindset. While it would be idealistic to believe that people can somehow discard their experience and engage the world with 'childlike innocence', the art of care proposes that people can be taught to engage more attentively with their spatiality; an attentiveness which holds open the way towards 'wonder'.

6.3.6 Architecture, existential space and care

In ESA Norberg-Schulz argued that, for people to concretise their 'intentions', they had to acquire a "space concept" (1971: 9). Norberg-Schulz's approach towards intentionality is therefore very different from Heidegger's. When Heidegger tried to think beyond intentionality he realised that he had to think intentionality, as a concept, more 'inceptually'. When Norberg-Schulz tried to think beyond intentionality (in ESA) he essentially abandoned intentionality in order to think of architecture in terms of *Dasein*'s understanding of existential space. While his interpretation of existential space is based on Heidegger's exposition of spatiality, the matter is much more nuanced than Norberg-Schulz implied.

In BT Heidegger rejected the primacy of the Cartesian concept of space as a "three-dimensional multiplicity of possible positions initially given which is then filled out with objectively present things" (1927a: 103). He called this approach "insideness" (1927a: 101). Rather than viewing "Dasein in a spatial container", Heidegger wanted to focus on "the kind of spatiality which is essential for Dasein". Against insideness, he proposed "being in space" (1927a: 101). Heidegger argued that things are not merely "objectively present" in everydayness. Rather, they have the "character of nearness" (1927a: 102), because they are placed in a "region", in a surrounding "totality of relevance". Things (in their spatiality) always already matter to *Dasein* as the one who is always already concerned. While *Dasein* has access to spatiality due to the fact that "Dasein itself is 'spatial'", Heidegger believed that *Dasein*'s spatiality can only be "understood in terms of the kind of being of this being" (1927a: 104). In contrast to understanding *Dasein*'s being in space as "objective presence" (1927a: 104), Heidegger proposed the concepts of "de-distancing" and "directionality" (1927a: 105).

De-distancing signifies a kind of 'everyday qualitative measuring', which describes *Dasein*'s experience of "remoteness". This differs from scientific distance in the sense that things which are quantitatively near can be (qualitatively) far from our minds[254], while quantitatively remote things can occupy our minds as 'things of concern'. Furthermore, in everydayness we think of the remoteness of things in terms of "estimation"[255] (1927a: 106). The character of *Dasein*'s estimations is not governed by the 'correctness' of "measured distance", neither should it be seen as an arbitrary guess. Rather, *Dasein*'s estimation happens as "heedful being toward" which possesses its own kind of everyday "definiteness". De-distancing, in contrast to the 'truth' of scientific 'accuracy', therefore "let's beings be encountered in nearness" (1927a: 105-106). In de-distancing *Dasein* acquires a definiteness which is 'together-with' rather than 'opposed-to'.

Dasein "dwells in de-distancing" (1927a: 108) by taking its capacity for de-distancing 'along with it' while engaged in everyday being-in-the-world. Simultaneously, *Dasein* 'takes along' its directionality; its capacity for "orientation". For instance, the concept of 'right' and 'left' are always bound to *Dasein*'s own position. Thus, in everydayness, *Dasein* is spatial as 'directional de-distancing', but directional de-distancing is "guided beforehand by the circumspection [*Umsicht*] of heedfulness [*Besorgen* in the original German text]"

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[254] In BT Heidegger referred to a person wearing spectacles (1927a: 107).
[255] In BT Heidegger referred to the everyday use of the expression "a stone's throw" (1927a: 105).

(1927a: 108).[256] Therefore *Dasein*'s everyday spatial being together-with beings happens as the being of care. That is why Heidegger stated that "Dasein can *be* spatial only as care" (1927a: 367). What Heidegger said in BT is therefore actually the inverse of what Norberg-Schulz claimed in ESA. Does this mean that Norberg-Schulz's art of place is irreconcilable with Heidegger's philosophy as a whole?

Recently, Heidegger's insistence on the primacy of temporality in BT has come under close scrutiny in the work the philosopher Jeff Malpas (2006; 2012). In *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (2006) Malpas comprehensively revealed the inconsistencies of Heidegger's approach toward spatiality in BT. Far from dismissing Heidegger's conclusions, Malpas showed that BT is merely 'on the way' towards the more appropriate understanding of spatiality as place, in which space and time "a form of unity that retains its irreducible complexity, but whose elements exhibit a reciprocal interdependence" (Malpas, 2012: 18). Therefore Malpas described place as a hermeneutic unity; "the temporalizing of space and the spatializing of time in the single gatheredness of place" (2012: 19). The 'kind of spatiality' essential to *Dasein* is place.

It is true that Heidegger was (as Malpas put it) "constantly seduced by the idea that it is time that plays the crucial role in the happening of world" (2012: 59), but it is also in Heidegger's own work that the possibility of place in all its complex unity arises. It has been pointed out that, in his later work, Heidegger intended to understand *Dasein*'s place as an "abiding expanse" (1945: 114/74); a phrase used by Davis to translate Heidegger's German term "*verweilende Weite*" (2010: xiv). Any place is always already (primordially) spatial and temporal. The art of care aims to understand how to architecturally interact with and within this 'abiding expanse'.

The work of Malpas implies that Norberg-Schulz's art of place is actually a highly cogent interpretation of Heidegger's mature understanding of spatial being-in-the-world. In ESA, Norberg-Schulz's concept of existential space was still founded (to a large extent) on the metaphysical approaches he formulated in IiA. The problem is, therefore, not primarily that Norberg-Schulz wanted to 'achieve' intentionality through a rethinking of space, but that his thinking itself was metaphysical. In fact, in ESA the concept of place merely served as one of the 'elements' of existential space.

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[256] In Afrikaans the care-infused nature of the phrase 'the circumspection of heedfulness' is apparent in translation: '*die omsigtigheid van besorgdheid*'.

6.3.7 Existential space as a system of elements and levels

In ESA Norberg-Schulz essentially formulated a method for the structural analysis of meaningful places. The problematic aspect (from a Heideggarian perspective) of this approach is the systematic nature of the thinking attempted. The art of care contends that Norberg-Schulz's systematisation of existential space, inspired by his interpretation of Sedlmayr's structuralist approach (see subsection 4.3.7) into the interaction between environmental 'levels' (on which 'elements' interact) and the *schemata* of inhabitants, provides an insufficient basis for embodying and admitting the rich multiplicity of life. Essentially, ESA tried to understand existential aspects through metaphysical thinking: a Structuralist attempt to 'make manageable' the qualities of the environment.

Interestingly, Sedlmayr's Structuralist method was originally aimed at establishing "a *new appreciation of methodological self-consciousness* [which would] promote 'life,' even in scholarship" (Sedlmayr, 1931: 176). In fact, the American art critic, Roger Kimball, in his Introduction to the 2007 edition of Sedlmayr's, *Art in Crisis: the Lost Centre* (originally published in German in 1948), noted that the essential message of this book is that art must be "grounded in a measure beyond art" (2007: xxii). Sedlmayr opened the first chapter of *Art in Crisis* with the words of the German art historian, Hubert Schrade (1900-1967) which illustrates what Sedlmayr envisioned as the appropriate ground for art beyond art: "For the task set us is nothing less than life itself as it struggles to find expression in concrete form" (Schrade cited in Sedlmayr, 1948: 9). Thus, more than simply sharing a structuralist methodology, there is a correspondence between Norberg-Schulz's efforts to understand architecture as *livskunst* and Sedlmayr's hope to ground art in 'life itself'.

However, in later years Norberg-Schulz admitted that the allure of Structuralism had side-tracked the investigation carried out in ESA. In a manuscript entitled, "The Years of Change" (NAM 8, c. 1985),[257] he acknowledged that Structuralism, by focusing on explaining the world as "systems of relationships" could not address the problem of meaning since "open-ended systems allow for neither orientation nor identification, and deprive the world of its concrete identity" (NAM 8, c. 1985: 13).[258] Systematic thinking

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[257] The manuscript itself is undated, but in the text Norberg-Schulz stated that Sea Ranch (constructed c. 1965 by Moore, Lyndon, Turnbull and Whitaker) "after twenty years of life … remains [an] essential contribution" (NAM 8, c. 1985: 17).

[258] As example of this failure Norberg-Schulz cited Yona Friedman's work (NAM 8, c. 1985: 13). Yet, in ESA, it is precisely the same elements in Friedman's work that he praised because he "gives identity to the levels of landscape, settlement and house at the same time as he realizes a general and open infrastructure with a great capacity" (1971: 109).

cannot describe the abundance of the concrete world: "When the concrete things are lost in the network of relativistic systems, the world dissolves and complete human alienation results" (NAM 8, c. 1985: 13-14). *Dasein*'s being-in the concrete world will always be able to identify more nuanced *levels*, more kinds of *paths* and *domains*, than hierarchic systems can hope to predict. Ultimately, structuralism offered a "mechanistic view of life and expression" (NAM 8, c. 1985: 14). The result being that whenever the 'difficulty' of the place (totality) is inspected, it is as if the whole 'unravels' precisely during the process which is meant to illuminate the situation in its multiplicity.

A more fruitful way to investigate the elusive unity constituting places becomes evident in the work of Malpas. Malpas proposed a hermeneutic approach where the dynamic interaction between parts and whole always already bestows relevance on both the parts and the whole. This approach still recognises "the way any place encompasses other places within it while also being encompassed by other places" (Malpas, 2012: 49), but discards the hierarchical systematisation of the environment for an approach which is more interactive. The hermeneutic circle simultaneously acknowledges the urge to understand the part, and the wonder and immediacy experienced while participating in the whole, in such a way that part and whole are united in "a form of unity that retains its irreducible complexity, but whose elements exhibit a reciprocal interdependence" (Malpas, 2012: 18).

Hermeneutic unity differs from the idea of "unity in plurality" (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 114); in short, the difference between understanding a place as a 'system of places', or in terms of the 'fourfold'. The one represents a systematic investigation requiring the division of the whole into elements and levels meant to interact, the other a wonder-saturated amazement at the "vital original reality given to human beings to live before they come to think about it" (Kisiel, 2010: 18). Heidegger's fourfold is not a system, but a simultaneously ecstatic and contained oneness; a continuous revealing and concealing of aspects arising from concerned involvement, indicating the appropriateness of Bachelard's description of *Dasein* as "half-open being" (1958: 222). The hermeneutic understanding of the interaction which occurs in places (as proposed by Malpas) offers a much more authentic approach than the metaphysical 'systems thinking' employed in ESA.

6.3.8 Representation and adaptation: taking care and taking possession

In ESA Norberg-Schulz envisioned a system in which levels could be creatively interpreted and applied on other levels. For example, the landscape could be represented on the urban level, while the urban level established a physical presence which imbues

the landscape (now transformed) with new characteristics. While this approach is persuasive from an analytic standpoint, it carries little relevance for engaging poetically in the world of life. Being-in-the-world implies that these levels are always already entangled with each other.

Despite Norberg-Schulz's reliance on systematisation, the inherent possibilities of architectural 'adaptation', as an interaction of 'givenness' and 'explanation', remains promising. Ultimately, it could be interpreted as a way towards the marriage of the Being of places and the type of being *Dasein* is. If the systematic approach could be replaced by a hermeneutic approach then all the levels and elements could be acknowledged within their interacting interdependence. This would eliminate the implied need for the 'correct interpretation of the interaction of elements on every level'. Instead, the designer would be free to engage with the concerning aspects of the dynamic totality which is always already there.

There is a further obstacle posed by the approach followed in ESA. Within Norberg-Schulz's 'system', the choices between which elements are important and whether levels need to be represented, i.e. *Dasein*'s interpretations, were still grounded in values derived from the metaphysical reliance on the 'ought'. The ought implies that *Dasein* is "convinced that the world *ought to have* a certain structure" (Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 38). It is the drive behind 'taking possession'.

In ESA the phrase 'taking possession' is used more often than 'taking place' (in contrast to Norberg-Schulz's later work). There is a significant difference implied in the choice of terms. 'Taking possession' is imbued with the conviction that *Dasein* must impose a representation of one level on another, which ultimately aims to enforce a complex order mandating the whole. 'Taking place' is grounded in the realisation that *Dasein* does not impose an order, but should rather disclose the inherent order of the environment. Taking place and taking possession therefore reveal two contrasting mindsets: a mindset of '*Gelassenheit*' which lets the place take place in a way that is true to the situation, and a calculating mindset that aims at possession and the imposition of systems of exploitation. As Heidegger said: "The ought must assert its claims" (1935: 151/212). In ESA 'the ought' can be seen as emblematic of Norberg-Schulz's attempt to 'manufacture' the 'difficult whole' by imposing a complex hierarchical systematisation on lived reality. Especially in times threatened by ecological disaster, the implications of 'taking possession' offer bleak prospects.

The art of care offers an alternative. Taking place, when understood in terms of care, shuns 'possession' in favour of 'guardianship' and thereby owns up to the situation. Rather than demanding (or expecting) a specific ought which would 'qualify' *Dasein* as the guardian, guardianship is the most appropriate (authentic) way for the being of care to exist. The difference between taking care and taking possession is the difference between imposing a gift (if such a thing is possible) and gratefully accepting one. Care is the difference between indifferent imposition and sheltering, letting-be.[259]

It might be asserted that care implies the same 'system of choices' as values, but Heidegger was clear that care implies no such connotations.[260] In everyday language care has been levelled-out to become 'the doing of things which one ought to do'. Heidegger saw care as something standing prior to any morality. What care implies is neither "posited by me nor ... confined to an isolated ego" (Heidegger, 1935: 22/31). Care beckons *Dasein* to engage with the world in the concerned relation that always already governs *Dasein*'s relationship with Being. Care can prescribe no 'oughts'. The burden of care is that *Dasein* should remember the way it is, as mortal, in a world of concern. Drawing near the place as 'care taking care' presents a particular circularity most at home in the hermeneutic situation.

6.3.9 The difficult whole and the hermeneutic situation

The art of care is irreconcilable with the approach proposed in ESA. Even Norberg-Schulz's appropriation of the 'field' concept was ordered by the "level-hierarchy" of "taking possession" (1971: 33). In contrast to relying on 'the typical structures of experience (*schemata*)', the art of care proposes engaging with *Dasein*'s "concerned being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 1925: 159/213-215) as ecstatic care. In contrast to imposing 'ordering elements that structure the levels of the environment (centre, domain, path)', the art of care proposes the letting-be of the inherent order of the environment. In contrast to 'the hierarchic interaction of levels constituting a 'layered spatiality', the art of care proposes being open to the nuanced complexity of lived reality which always already demarcates, characterises and renders accessible the places given to *Dasein*. To approach the difficulty of the lived difficult whole, and engage architecturally with it as *livskunst*, demands a hermeneutic understanding of both life and place and their interaction (from the perspective of the mortal) as care. In his next book, *Meaning in Western Architecture* (MiWA) (1974), Norberg-Schulz employed his understanding of existential spatiality

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[259] See subsection 5.5.6.
[260] See subsection 5.3.5.

(developed in ESA) to reveal the 'existential footholds' *Dasein* 'accomplished' during different epochs of history.

6.3.10 Architectural history and ecstatic temporality

The following subsection aims at differentiating between the temporal approach embodied in Norberg-Schulz's art of place and the temporality propagated by the art of care. Norberg-Schulz's historical study in MiWA was based on the assumption that understanding the world in terms of a 'space conception', and then building edifices expressing a particular space concept, will supply *Dasein* with an existential foothold. However, in BDT Heidegger argued that building depends on already possessing an existential foothold, on already being able to dwell as the "sparing" "preservation" of which only *Dasein* as care is capable(1951a: 147). *Dasein*, as disclosive being-in-the-world, always already builds the existential foothold acquired, rather than building in order to obtain a foothold. Buildings therefore merely "give form" to the dwelling which is already present, as "a distinctive letting-dwell" (1951a: 156-157).

Norberg-Schulz acknowledged that "true spatial identity without integrating the dimension of time is an impossibility", but then continued, "[t]o integrate time is a problem of architectural character and articulation" (1974: 412). The attempt to address temporality (and, by extension, architectural history) in terms of articulation, reveals a great deal about the assumptions underpinning Norberg-Schulz's understanding of being-in-the-world. Norberg-Schulz saw architectural articulation as a revelation of temporal "variations" and "adaptations" (1978: 114); a temporal "interpretation" of an "archetype" (1984a: 129), i.e. as continuity and change.

While the art of place proposed that "making is an aspect of articulation" (1979b: 66), the art of care understands articulation itself, the ability to articulate, as a way of being not governed by continuity and change, but fundamentally rooted in care. The art of care argues that all articulation derives from concerned making, characteristic of the being of the intentional. Therefore articulation may be a means to define the place and let it emerge, but built articulations are not merely variations. They happen as particular manifestations of care engaging ecstatically with the character of the place.

The main drive behind Heidegger's questioning of the metaphysical assumptions underpinning historiology[261] was his desire to "restore the historical Dasein of human beings" (1935: 32/44). This historical nature of existence represents a key outcome of BT.

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[261] See Glossary: Historiology (*Historie*).

Heidegger's concept of 'historicity' leaves no room for interpretations of life based on continuity and change. Against the 'constant presence' implied by the metaphysical division between 'Being and becoming', historicity promotes an ecstatic view of *Dasein*'s temporal being-in-the-world as existence "[stretched] along between birth and death" within a "connection of life" (1927a: 373).

In contrast, continuity and change offers a false 'simplicity' by interpreting life as a "pure succession of nows". Ecstatic care reveals the superficiality of understanding lived time as the one-way journey of a remaining self, 'hopping along' constantly changing "momentary realities of experiences that succeed each other and disappear". Instead, "the 'between' of birth and death already lies *in the being* of Dasein" since "as care, Dasein *is* the 'between'" (Heidegger, 1927a: 373-374). *Dasein* is always already living and dying. Each moment of dying is possible because *Dasein* has always already been born. The art of care contends that *Dasein*, as disclosive making present of the there[262], ecstatically stands out from this continuity in moments of poetic density with a "peculiar weight" (1927a: 406). It is not that these 'weighty situations' interrupt the 'stretched along' (1927a: 373) nature of care and follow one another as signs of progress. Rather, it is care itself, in the gatheredness of the ecstasies characterising the moment, that makes it possible to experience any moment as 'significant' (1927a: 414) and 'datable' (1927a: 407). Therefore continuity is not the 'stringing-along' of moments which "[remain] *the same even if it is never identical*" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 356) and change is more than the incremental interpretation of enduring continuities.

In fact, Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of continuity and change represents a thoroughly abstract way of understanding time on a par with the Carthesian understanding of space. So abstract (one might say 'artificial') are the 'elements' of continuity and change that they cannot be defined independently; a closed system in which the one cannot become evident without the other (except as monotony or chaos).[263] Since *Dasein* is being-in-the-world as care, history essentially occurs as care. Everything that has been, everything that is and every intention for the future is engaged by *Dasein* in concern.

Norberg-Schulz persisted with Giedion's concepts of continuity and change because he believed that such an approach could overcome "the traditional constancy hypothesis" while avoiding "the traps of relativism and nihilism"[264]. With continuity and change

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[262] See Glossary: *Alētheia* and Situation.

[263] In subsection 6.8.2 I argue that monotony and chaos are, in fact, misleading choices.

[264] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture notes, "The Interior as Imago Mundi", 25/11/1989: 10-11.

Norberg-Schulz tried to toe the line between the 'platonic idea' and 'subjective experience', but continuity and change merely became a succession of experiences, schematised into a way of being, which then had to propose new interpretations of archetypal (historical) continuities. In contrast, Heidegger posited that life is not historical because of history, but rather, something like history exists because of the kind of being that *Dasein* is. As he put it: "*this being* [*Dasein*] *is not 'temporal' because it 'is in history,' … on the contrary, it exists and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being*" (1927a: 376).

The latent idea sustaining continuity and change is the concept of 'progress'; both the idea that history is the progression of continuity and change, and that progress is made as change amid and inspired by continuity. It has been mentioned that Heidegger called this approach to history "historiology" and argued that it presents man as "one who has made progress". Historiology thereby sustains "the illusion that [*Dasein*] can gain complete mastery over all reality"; a metaphysical approach which aims at categorising both things and *Dasein* "as the orderable, the producible, and the establishable" (1938b: 493-494/388).[265]

This might seem like an unfair categorisation of Norberg-Schulz's approach. For the most part Norberg-Schulz interpreted Heidegger's words with great sensitivity. In fact, the words of A.N. Whitehead which Norberg-Schulz often used to justify his belief in continuity and change – "The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and change amid order"[266] – reveal a hybridisation of Heidegger's position (the temporality of *Dasein* as care) and Norberg-Schulz's own metaphysical stance (the temporality of *Dasein* as an interaction of continuity and change). Unfortunately, this kind of hybridity is so ingrained in modern thinking (so constitutive of the metaphysical mindset) that its infiltration – almost undetectably, yet undeniably – creates a gulf between Heidegger's understanding of being-in-the-world and the way of life (in concert with place) which Norberg-Schulz envisioned as the basis of *livskunst*.

The art of care dismisses the progress-driven rebranding of time as a product of calculative thinking. Instead, the art of care aims to engage with *Dasein*'s temporal being-in-the-world as care, enacted through 'preservation'. Progress and preservation imply two contrasting ways of thinking. Progress depends on a metaphysical mindset where thinking is "the representing of something in its generality" leading to the "acquisition of

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[265] See Glossary: Historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), History (*Geschichte*), and Historiology (*Historie*).

[266] Whitehead in Norberg-Schulz, 1963: 82; 1979b: 182; 1989: 59; 2000a: 98.

'categories'" derived from the 'origin' (or inception). Heidegger saw this approach as a degeneration of thinking (and language) into the mere "assertion" (1938b: 63-64/51) of the "correctness" of the "system" which, by seeking the "*highest generality*", constitutes the "ground of the subject-object relation" (1938b: 315-317/250). Rather than understanding place in terms of care, Norberg-Schulz relied on *Dasein*'s ability to 'generalise' in order to explain how *Dasein* appropriates the particular situation. In contrast, Heidegger proposed "inceptual thinking" (Heidegger, 1938b: 56-60/46-48) rooted in preservation. Preservation (as Heidegger understood it) aims at "[thoughtfully] re-trieving [the inception] more originally in its originality" (1935: 146/204). The art of care, as preservation, thinks 'inceptually', an "un-systematic" way of thinking characterised by the "rigorousness of restraint" rather than "claims to certainty" (1938b: 64-65/52).

> For [inceptual] thinking no longer possesses the advantages of a "system" … In place of systematics and deduction, there now stands historical preparedness for the truth of beyng. Such preparedness above all requires that this truth itself already create, out of its scarcely resonating essence, the basic traits of its site (Da-sein). The human subject must be transformed into the builder and steward of that site (Heidegger, 1938b: 242-243/191).

Progress implies the "leveling down" of history into categories (epochs) of "intelligibility" (1938b: 493-494/388); Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance. Through what these categories imply—"mastery", "orderable", and "calculation" (1938b: 493-494/388)—they are revealed as inappropriate to express what is nearest to *Dasein*. Rather, Heidegger proposed that "*history* [must be considered] *independently of any notion of becoming*". That we think nothing of the 'mastery' implied by the historiological project, reveals the extent to which our "calculative bustling about with the present" has rendered our historicity as unworthy of questioning (1938b: 493-494/388). The only 'gain' resulting from the generalisation and categorisation of historical aspects (into a select group of canonical works which 'prove' the original generalisations) is a 'false certainty', which disregards the revealing-concealing nature of truth. In this sense generalisation detracts from the wonder that anything was built and preserved at all.

Understanding time as continuity and change displays a similar 'poverty'. From one moment to the next experiences are strung along in a temporal parade in which "lived experiences become objects of lived experiences [and life is transformed] into the calculable whirl of an empty self-circling [striving to make itself] credible as 'closeness to life'" (Heidegger, 1938b: 494-495/389). This beguiling, but never actualised, wish of

'closeness to life'—which bestowed the appearance of humanism to the proclamations of the modern pioneers—represents one of the elements the art of care hopes to overcome.

The Norwegian farm buildings (discussed in section 4.3.10) can now be interpreted anew. The fact that the *stue* and the *stabbur* represent 'more enduring' (general) and 'more everyday' (particular) aspects of life, is not what is 'most true' of them. The most appropriate way (in terms of *livskunst*) to understand these buildings, is to think of them as expressions of care contributing to the historicity of being-in-the-world. In a book less occupied with his search for a 'general theory' of architecture, *Stav og laft I Norge: Early Wooden Architecture in Norway* (originally published in 1969), Norberg-Schulz mentioned that the built heritage of Norway reveals "what we have to know and love in order to build in this country" (Bugge & Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 7). A built heritage is always already engulfed in a *milieu* of concern. To engage with the concern embodied in these buildings is not a matter of generalisation, but of being prepared to let places engage us.

However, it must be acknowledged that the differentiation between the general and the particular has its merits. Heidegger himself used the general aspects of earth, sky, mortals and divinities to explain the rich particularity of every situation, but the interaction between the general and the particular should not be confused with the appropriateness of continuity and change as a way to understand *Dasein*'s temporal reality. Instead, building should be seen as a form of preservation grounded in the "*occurrence of being-in-the-world*" as the "*occurrence of history*" (Heidegger, 1927a: 388). Understood this way, buildings no longer reside in the between of 'old and new',[267] but can be ecstatically imagined in terms of the future: "History as happening is determined from the future, takes over what has been, and acts and endures its way through the *present*". Thus architecture is freed from the grip of continuity and change, and "opens … up to possibilities not yet asked about, futures to come" (Heidegger, 1935: 34/47). Engaging with the life-world as ecstatic care offers the kind of imagining most compellingly and intimately able to concretise our dwelling.

Heidegger understood *Dasein*'s historicity in terms of preservation: "History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up into their unconcealment and conserved in it only when this conservation is conceived on the basis of questioning regarding beings as such" (1930a: 126). In the ecstatic care of *Dasein* a lightening-clearing holds sway which acknowledges the wonder that any beings *are* and allows the careful questioning of

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[267] Norberg-Schulz often proclaimed that buildings should be both "new and old" (1963: 160; 1979b: 18; 1980a: 196; 2000a: 102).

these beings. It is this capacity of *Dasein* to sustain wonder, which enables it to serve as the "builder and steward of [the site of the moment]" (Heidegger, 1938b: 242-243/191). Continuity and change, even in the hybridised form propagated by Norberg-Schulz, neglects the ecstatic temporal nature of the sparing preserving way *Dasein is* in 'dwellingly' disclosing and safeguarding the *there*.

6.3.11 The metaphysical nature of Norberg-Schulz's early grasp of the *genius loci*

Norberg-Schulz's early formulation of the *genius loci* was greatly influence by his understanding of time as a progression amid continuity and change. In lecture notes entitled, "Meaning, History and Architecture" (NAM 9, 05/1980), Norberg-Schulz summarised his conception of the *genius loci* and how it is related to the *stabilitas loci*:

> A continuously changing world would make human development impossible. Stabilitas loci, is in fact an ancient concept, as is the genius loci which constitutes the "content" of this stabilitas. The term genius loci, or "spirit of place", means that a true place possesses an identity. It is this identity which is the object of human identification. … The genius corresponds to what the place is. We should not, however, understand the genius as an "essence" in the Platonic sense, but define it in terms of the world it gathers, that is, as a focus [where] an "understood" world is "kept" and expressed. Thereby we free the concept of place from the extremes of idealism and relativism, and make it part of living reality (NAM9, 05/1980: 2-3).

The *genius loci*, understood as the 'content' of the 'continuity' (a spirit that 'keeps' an inherent character in place), constitutes the identity of the place and bestows an enduring historical identity on the inhabitants. It thereby instills a sense of continuity on the changing human society. In response, the society aims to protect this stability in order to ensure 'development'. Consequently, the identity of place itself becomes an 'object of identification', akin to something which can be 'owned' by a particular group of subjects. Therefore, while eschewing the interpretation of the *genius loci* as a 'Platonic essence', Norberg-Schulz's understanding of the *genius loci* was firmly established within the metaphysical interaction between continuity, change and historical progress.

However, there is a possibility of understanding the *genius loci* in terms of preservation. This possibility is kept open by Norberg-Schulz's description of the *genius loci* as a 'gathering' and a "guardian spirit" (1979b: 18). Both 'gathering' (Heidegger, 1944: 250-251) and 'guardianship' (Heidegger, 1938b: 17-18/16) share strong connections with the temporal understanding of *Dasein* as care. In subsection 6.4.3 the potential of these connections will be explored in greater detail.

6.3.12 The perpetuation of the metaphysical mindset and the promise of poetics

In this section it has been shown that the influence of Bachelard, Bollnow, Lynch, Piaget, Sedlmayr and Venturi had a significant influence on Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy and initiated a series of assumptions that underpinned his understanding of existential space, and how *Dasein* participates historically within it. It has been implied that these assumptions, to a large extent, sustained the metaphysical nature of Norberg-Schulz's investigation.

Norberg-Schulz, by continuing to explain intentionality in terms of 'values' (subsection 6.3.8), perpetuated the influence of 'the ought'. In terms of the 'Being-thinking' duality he, by attempting the systematic categorisation of existential space (subsection 6.3.7), maintained the vulnerability of his work to the influence of calculative thinking. Similarly, it has been contended that the assumptions underpinning the 'Being-seeming' duality had been sustained in Norberg-Schulz's work despite his rejection of the psychology of perception. Instead, these assumptions had merely taken a new form. While Norberg-Schulz had shifted his focus from 'architecture as an intermediate object' to 'architecture as a concretisation of existential space', the resulting 'space concepts' used to 'categorise' architectural history (subsection 6.3.10) were based on the correlation between the 'archetypical solutions' governing that epoch. These archetypes endure and then change. Consequently, works are either studied or neglected based on whether they correspond with (or seem like) the ideal space concept.[268] Certain buildings are, therefore, seen as works which contribute to 'historical progress', while others fall outside this system of archetypal understandings. Norberg-Schulz's reliance on values in order to make choices meaningful, his formulation of existential space in terms of systematic characterisation, and his idealisation of archetypal space concepts which demote building to what they seem to represent within historical progress share the same foundation; the distinction between continuity and change, *Being and becoming*.

It has been pointed out (see subsection 4.3.12) that it was Heidegger's criticism of the traditional 'subject-object relation' that ultimately convinced Norberg-Schulz to search for the meaning of architecture in everyday being-in-the-world. *Dasein*'s 'structuring' of the

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[268] Otero-Pailos reproduced a page of one of Norberg-Schulz's journal entries (dated 05/04/1950) showing a graph inspired by Giedion's teachings. The graph plots the divergence and convergence of thinking and feeling across temporal epochs. Outside the resulting "rhombuses" the left-over spaces are "filled with artistic expressions 'without historical direction'" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 147-149). This 'system' therefore recognised the works which fall within a particular conception of historical progress (as continuity and change), while others are deemed irrelevant.

world is not a matter of systematisation or of 'taking posession'. Rather, it depends on the "poetic ability ... to take the measure of the world" (Hofstadter, 2001: xiii-xiv). In an essay entitled, "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (1936b), Heidegger asserted that "human existence is 'poetic' in its ground" (1936b: 124)

> To "dwell poetically" means to stand in the presence of the gods and to be struck by the essential nearness of things. Existence [*Dasein*] is "poetic" in its ground, which simultaneously means that, as founded (grounded), it is not something earned, but is rather a gift (Heidegger, 1936b: 124).

The concreteness and authenticity of 'existential meanings' can only be revealed poetically. To try and understand existential meanings 'systematically', and architecture as a 'symbol-system', is to remain trapped within the abstract dichotomy of subject and object. *Dasein* is a disclosive participating maker and architecture, as an act of *poiesis,* serves as a concrete 'making' able to let-be a way of life.

Dasein, stubbornly refusing the Cartesian claim that space must be understood as an endless extension, engages concretely with spatiality as place. The art of care (as a way to augment Norberg-Schulz's art of place) aims to show that, while *Dasein* always already engages with space as a place, the being of the intentional plays a significant role in the appropriation of this place. Poetically understanding existential space as a place encountered by a being engaged in concerned gathering (regioning), and understanding the *genius loci* in terms of guardianship, keeps open the possibility of uniting the art of place and the art of care as *livskunst*.

6.4 Phase 2: care and place

The following section will evaluate the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's poetic understanding of place in terms of Heidegger's philosophical approach. Despite the widely held belief that GL represents the most persuasive architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, and even though it signified a radical departure from the 'systematic thinking' which characterised Norberg-Schulz's early work, it will be argued that the text itself still harboured a range of metaphysical assumptions. The following subsections will aim to identify the problematic inconsistencies characterising this phase of Norberg-Schulz's work. In each case, an attempt will be made to propose ways in which the art of care can restore the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's larger project.

6.4.1 Care and Norberg-Schulz's poetic understanding of the world

In subsection 4.4.1 Norberg-Schulz's re-interpretation of Heidegger's reading of Trakl's poem was discussed in terms of four guidelines Norberg-Schulz established for a poetic approach. Do these 'guidelines' represent a cogent appropriation of Heidegger's original interpretation of Trakl's poem?

In terms of the first guideline suggested by Norberg-Schulz, the problematic implications of understanding the world as an interaction between general and particular was discussed in subsection 6.3.10. Norberg-Schulz's differentiation between the way science understands the particular in order to generalise—in contrast to the way poetry embarks from the general in order to understand the particular—neglects the possibility (proposed by Malpas, and discussed in subsection 6.3.7) that a poetic approach could appreciate the situation in its hermeneutic simultaneity, thereby always already engaging both the part and the whole.

In GL Norberg-Schulz tried to understand the nature of place in qualitative terms. While Heidegger, in his discussion of Trakl's poem, did not refer directly to the 'spatial structure' or 'character' of the place the way *Dasein*, through language, gathers the fourfold as a "world" (1950b: 196-197), indicates the kind of place Heidegger envisioned; a place that has a particular (characteristic) spatiality between earth and sky, engaged by the mortal and the divine. In Norberg-Schulz's interpretation, it is exactly the concerned way *Dasein* engages with the space and character of the world that was neglected by his second guideline. Mankind participates in the 'appropriate staying' of the fourfold as "mortals [who] are capable of dying" (1950b: 198). How would Norberg-Schulz's phenomenology of architecture be affected if *Dasein*'s finitude, implied by Trakl in the "long tolls [of] the vesper bell" (Norberg-Schulz; 1979b: 8), was acknowledged? The interaction between the place and its concerned mortal inhabitants will be discussed in subsection 6.4.2.

Thirdly, Norberg-Schulz relied on the distinction between the natural and the manmade in order to explain the interaction (and desired correspondence) between the "meanings potentially present in the place" (1979b: 18) and works of architecture as manmade things. Heidegger described this distinction as the interaction between the "world in its worlding" and the "things in their thinging" (1950b: 200).[269] Therefore, it is possible to argue that Norberg-Schulz's distinction between the 'natural' and the 'manmade' is grounded in Heidegger's distinction between the "bearing of things" and the "granting of

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[269] See Glossary: Thing.

world" (1950b: 202). The nature and the possibility of 'correspondence' are grounded in understanding the nature of *Dasein*'s mortality and will be discussed in subsection 6.4.5.

Finally, it should be pointed out that Norberg-Schulz's advocacy for a "strong place" with a "strong Gestalt" (1979b: 179 & 206) ultimately submitted his work to a counter-poetic stance. Instead of resorting to the way care, grounded in restraint, allows *Dasein* to let the place be, Norberg-Schulz continually succumbed to the 'ordering' and 'structuring' Heidegger ascribed to calculative thinking. In fact, Venturi pointed to the poetic possibility Norberg-Schulz neglected: "A goal of poetry can be unity of expression over resolution of content" (Venturi, 1966: 102). In subsection 6.4.9 the poetic nature of *Dasein*'s 'creative participation' will be discussed in greater detail.

It has been indicated that the poetic guidelines Norberg-Schulz identified in GL, while indicating a progression from the systematic thinking characterising his earlier work, must also be understood in terms of the Being of the intentional. Only this kind of thinking will safeguard against the metaphysical tendency to order, categorise, and generalise the particularities of places. For the being of care, place is always already a unique gatheredness, not strong or weak, but *there*.

6.4.2 The life-care-place totality

The primacy Heidegger ascribed to temporality over spatiality (especially in BT) was tempered in his later work by the realisation that being-in-the-world is always already both spatial and temporal; an "abiding expanse" (Heidegger, 1945: 114/74). Norberg-Schulz claimed to engage with this "insoluble unity of life and place" (1984a: 13). In handwritten notes for a lecture entitled "Meaning, History and Architecture" (NAM9) Norberg-Schulz argued that dwelling places a responsibility on both the inhabitant and the place:

> … it is impossible to talk about life without reference to a place. Place is intrinsic to life. One of the conditions for a meaningful life is therefore the sense of place … When man possesses such a sense of place, we may say that he "dwells". [Dwelling] means that we <u>identify</u> with a place, and thereby gain an existential foothold. Dwelling in this sense demands something from <u>us</u> and from our <u>places</u>. <u>We</u> have to be "open" to the environmental qualities, and the <u>places</u> have to offer possibilities of identification (NAM 9, 30-31/05/1980: 1-2).

Thus *Dasein* must be 'open'[270] to the character of the place and places must 'offer possibilities'. The above quote illustrates Norberg-Schulz's appreciation for the lived

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[270] See Glossary: Open, the.

nature of dwelling as the "total man-place totality" (1979a: 19); a totality in which *space* is always already place between earth and sky, time participates as continuity and change, and their interaction can be characterised (in Heideggarian terms) as a 'fourfold' in which *Dasein* participates creatively as respectful use. Heidegger's writings on dwelling clearly stated that *Dasein* participates as a concerned "mortal" (1951a: 148-149) and that time is always already care between birth and death. The art of care proposes that Norberg-Schulz's 'life-place totality' can be more appropriately understood (from a Heideggarian perspective) as a life-care-place totality; a whole in which care draws life and place into contiguity, life is emplaced (mortal) care, and place is a lived (spatio-temporal) 'region of concern'.[271]

In this sense the "terror of space" is addressed by the art of place, while *Dasein* is safeguarded from the "terror of time" (Harries, 1997: 226) by means of the art of care. *Dasein* is not only located and exposed to a characteristic spatiality, but actively engages with the realities of the place as care.[272]

Malpas has characterised his own approach as "topography"; an approach which "takes the idea of place or *topos* as the focus for the understanding of the human, the understanding of the world and the understanding of the philosophical" (2012: 43). The art of care proposes an approach rooted in the active engagement of *Dasein* in *topos* as care. The need to understand being-in-the-world not only from the perspective of place, but as a life-care-place totality, is confirmed by the way *Dasein* engages in the fourfold. Even Malpas acknowledged the "special relation" (2006: 275) between earth and sky (which is primarily spatial) and between mortals and gods (which is primarily temporal); two relations within 'the relation' denoting "clear axes" (Malpas, 2006: 232). In terms of Heidegger's concept of place as an "abiding expanse" (1945: 114/74), *Dasein* 'abides' in place as care and measures its 'expansiveness' through taking care. To insist on the fourfold is to insist on the participation of *Dasein* as mortal. In the fourfold *Ereignis* of place the mortal participates (dwells) as 'emplaced care' within an 'abiding expanse'. *Livskunst* is always already engaged with the concerned relationship between Being and the being of care.

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[271] The relation between 'environment' (Afr: *omgewing*), 'giving' (Afr: *gee*), and 'caring for' (Afr: *omgee*) was pointed out in subsection 5.5.3.

[272] It is at this point in GL, that Norberg-Schulz returned to his reliance on the systematic orientation *Dasein* may achieve in terms of a "good environmental image" (following Lynch), the child psychology of Piaget, and the idea of "perceptual schemata which determine all future experiences", in order to explain *Dasein*'s engagement in the "man-place totality" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 19-21).

If place is understood not only as a 'concrete reality',[273] but as the 'regioning disclosed by care',[274] then *Dasein* can be envisioned as presence 'stretched along' both temporally (between birth and death) and spatially (between earth and sky) within a region of emplaced care; a region to which *Dasein* belongs as care, appropriates by taking care, and discloses carefully. The unity of being-in-the-world does not simply imply that place is derived from care, or that care is always emplaced, but that care and place are enmeshed within the hermeneutic simultaneity of life. Rather than life being 'structured' as space-time, *Dasein* lives as place-care.

Life takes place as care in a place delimited by care. This 'tautology' engages with two questions: Could any place have meaning if it were not disclosed by the being always already living as care? Is the fact that this being identifies with spaces and delimits them as places (as regions of concern) not the most persuasive confirmation of the concerned way in which *Dasein* 'is' being-in-the-world? These questions indicate the hermeneutic circularity in which 'place as a region of concern' and '*Dasein* as care' engage appropriately. While concern is contextual, context is gathered care-fully. For architecture, as *livskunst*, space is always already place and time is always already care. *Dasein*'s "hermeneutic situatedness" (Malpas, 2012: 16)[275] is therefore always already composed of the interaction between the Being of the intentional, and the place itself, as a life-situation.

The art of care proposes (in concert with Norberg-Schulz's art of place) an understanding of *Dasein*, as emplaced care, engaged in a regioning interaction of life and place that reaches towards *livskunst*. The art of care is fundamentally concerned with the way *Dasein*'s life is drawn close to the situation in which life takes place. This is a relationship crucial to architecture as a work of *Dasein*. It is not that the place must be derived from temporality as care, but that care in all its ecstatic temporality illuminates the concept of place (as developed by Norberg-Schulz) in a fundamentally new way: as a spatio-temporal region of concern. The art of place, re-interpreted through the art of care, envisions architectural *livskunst* as the concerned (*sorgsame*) and care-full (*sorgvuldige*) setting-into-work (*poiesis*) of the life-care-place totality.

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[273] In other words, to venture beyond the metaphysical designation of place as "the whole of entities present" (Heidegger, 1950b: 199).

[274] See Glossary: Regioning and *Alētheia*.

[275] Note that Malpas presented Heidegger's "hermeneutic situation" (1924: 92) as a more 'emplaced' 'hermeneutic situatedness'.

6.4.3 The way held open by the *genius loci* amid the mythical understanding of place

Norberg-Schulz's neglect of the Being of the intentional is most conspicuous in his appropriation of the Heideggarian fourfold. In subsection 4.4.3 it was indicated that Norberg-Schulz interpreted the divine as "light", mortals as "character", sky as "order", and the earth as "thing". Norberg-Schulz understood these aspects in terms of a "fifth dimension" describing time, which he saw (following Giedion) as "the dimension of continuity and change". The interaction of the four, mitigated by the temporal interaction of continuity and change, constituted an all-embracing 'way of Being' designating the whole as an emplaced "living reality", or *genius loci* (1979b: 32). Norberg-Schulz's 'model' differs significantly form Heidegger's formulation. Presenting the *genius loci* as an encompassing way of Being holding sway over the fourfold, and introducing time as a 'fifth element', denounced the "simple oneness of the four" (Heidegger, 1951a: 148).

Does this mean that the *genius loci* represents an inappropriate way of engaging with the place? The art of care maintains that the possibility for the unification of the art of place and the art of care are held open by understanding the *genius loci* as a "guardian spirit" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 18) gathering all that is of concern to *Dasein*. The *genius loci* need not be viewed as an 'external' result of the interaction of the four over time, but, in concert with the being of the intentional, offers an alternative that also makes the conception of time as continuity and change redundant. To gain access to this alternative it is necessary to invoke the most mysterious region of Heidegger's fourfold, the divine.

If the *genius loci* is truly understood as a 'guardian spirit',[276] rather than an 'enduring continuity' then it, along with the concerned mortal, constitutes an 'axis of care' bisecting the 'axis of place' (holding sway between earth and sky). This axis of care constitutes a direct relationship between the being of care entrusted with guardianship and the guardian spirit; a hermeneutic regioning in which the whole of the guardian spirit influences the concerned mortal's understanding of the elements constituting the place, while the elements constituting the place are carefully gathered by the mortal in order to constitute the expansiveness of the whole.

In Heidegger's work, the divine does not only, as Norberg-Schulz suggested (while interpreting the divine as 'light'), stand for the "most general phenomenon" (1979b: 32) of the place, but participates in a much more dynamic and specific way, as the ones who

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[276] Norberg-Schulz referred to the *genius loci* as a "guardian spirit" (1979b: 18) in general terms, but it seems that he never explicitly engaged with the relationship between guardianship and the temporality of care, as formulated by Heidegger (subsection 5.5.1).

"announce the proper destinings that govern the world and the affairs of mortals within it" (Malpas, 2006: 275).[277] To renounce the concerned nature of *Dasein* is to make the gods passive. To renounce their guarding holding sway of the divine is to grant the right of wilful ordering to *Dasein*. It can, therefore, be argued that the relationship between the 'concerned mortal' and the 'guardian spirit' is a very appropriate way of understanding the relationship between care and place. Place is both gathered under the protection of the guardian spirit and gathered through the concerned *indwelling* of the mortal. There is a mysterious 'speaking' guarding place (between earth and sky), which makes it clear that the gathering itself is somehow influenced by a wider significance. This is not a relationship governed by continuity and change. Rather, if *livskunst* is the goal, then the external imposition of continuity and change must be overcome from within.[278]

Mortals, as the concerned ones, are able to "await the divinities as divinities" (Heidegger, 1951a: 148). This is the proper way for *Dasein* to await the voice of the place – the speaking of the guardian spirit – and corroborates the interpretation of the *genius loci* as the divine. It is only because *Dasein* is care, that it can be expected to await this speaking, and it is only in hearing this speaking that *Dasein* will be able to 'make' (*poiesis*) in a way appropriate to the speaking of the place. Thus it is always already as a concerned mortal that *Dasein* makes things.

6.4.4 The architectural thing as a work of the concerned mortal

All architectural interpretation and creation, all *poiesis* of things, are always already entwined with the being of the intentional. While Norberg-Schulz's formulation of architecture as a thing is both valuable and appropriate, his (repeated) interpretation of Heidegger's discussion of 'things', like the Greek temple,[279] the bridge,[280] and the jug[281],

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[277] In BT, Heidegger described 'destiny' (*Geschick*) in terms of 'fate' (*Schicksal*) and *Dasein*'s 'historicity' (*Geschichtlichkeit)*, as "the occurrence of the community of a people". The fact that this is a happening (*Ereignis*) which is "inherited and yet …chosen" points to the active, yet passive, (discussed in subsection 5.5.2 as an interaction between resoluteness and *Gelassenheit*) way in which destiny happens as a 'destining', which is not only appropriated by *Dasein* but also, mysteriously, bestowed by Being (1927a: 384-385).

[278] Heidegger's understanding of the divine intentionally shied away from the gods of religion, and yet Norberg-Schulz (in GL) defined mankind's existential challenge in terms of Genesis (1979b: 23). Years later, in a handwritten document entitled "Jerusalem 26/11/1987" (NAM 23) Norberg-Schulz wrote: "Genesis: God created a world and asked man to take care of it. place and care [*sic*]".

[279] Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 198; 1979c: 40; 1983a: 39 & 45; 1984a: 112; 1989: 50 & 54; 2000a: 90.

[280] Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 26; 1979b: 18 & 170; 1983a: 42; 1986b: 215; 1988: 8 & 13; 1989: 47.

was 'prejudiced' in the sense that he emphasised the aspect of 'gathering' and neglected the nature of the thing as a 'granting'.

In his famous essay, OWA, Heidegger discussed a 'Greek temple' as a 'work of art' (1936a: 40-42). Norberg-Schulz used the temple image to show that buildings, as works of art, could uncover the latent possibilities of the world "through human action", "illuminate" the situation as one which is understood by *Dasein*; and finally, "keep" this understanding in built form as a way to safeguard the truth revealed in the work (1979b: 18); but what lies at the heart of keeping? Heidegger proposed that keeping represents a 'taking into care'; a sheltering or safeguarding (1936a: 54). The temple 'keeps' its world as something which has been made by the caretaking of *Dasein* as preserver. If the temple is an image of anything, it is primarily an expression of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world as care.

Lest the idea arises that architecture only serves as a work of art in traditionally 'symbolic' or 'sacred' works (like temples), Heidegger, in BDT, discussed the nature of building by referring to a structure usually understood in utilitarian terms, a bridge. The bridge is not only a way to cross the river; it unites the banks and enables mortals to cross, but it also "lets the stream run its course" (1951a: 150). Grounded on earth and spanning towards the dome of the sky, the bridge connects and lets be. It reminds of the "last bridge" which will eventually bring *Dasein* out of this *da* and before the "haleness of the divinities" (1951a: 151). Thus the bridge is a gathering of the fourfold. But what is the nature of gathering?

In "Logos and Language" (1944) Heidegger stated that "[g]athering is not an arbitrary grasping [but an] attentive taking-in [which] gets its breadth and narrowness from what it has to preserve and care for" (Heidegger, 1944: 250-251). The act of gathering is always a gathering of that which concerns us. *Dasein*, through living, gathers a world of concern. Gathering is grounded in the sparing mortality which characterises *Dasein*'s dwelling. The thing is a gathering, but gathering is determined by, and becomes meaningful through care. Therefore both gathering and keeping are 'acts of granting', grounded in, care.

The thing's 'identity' depends on its 'granting'. As Heidegger said when discussing a 'jug' as an example of a granting: "the gift of the outpouring is what makes the jug a jug" (1950a: 170). If things must be understood as a 'granting', and if architecture is to be understood as a thing, then the ultimate goal of architecture, as a thing, is our gratitude. *Dasein*'s gratitude for the "gift of the outpouring" (Heidegger 1950a: 170) alludes to 'something more' than gathering. It enables the admiration of the "frailties of things"

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281 Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 168-170; 1980a: 190a. 1983a: 42; 1984a: 17; 1988: 13.

(Heidegger, 1946: 127). The jug is a gathering, but it is also a granting "appropriately staying" (Heidegger, 1950a: 171) the fourfold. A thing understood as a gift is a thing gratefully cared for.

It is only when the thing is understood as a granting that it is possible to move beyond indifference and understand the thing in terms of the being of the intentional. When Rilke intoned that "the things trust us for rescue" (Rilke cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 135) he was pointing to the 'characteristic' that 'equipped' us for this task. Rather than being 'knowledgeable' or 'good at interpretation', the ones who 'rescue' are described as "the most transient of all" (Rilke, 2011: 173). The ones who, aware of their fragility, are best equipped to value and take care of the granting of things. In GL Norberg-Schulz (in keeping with his premise that people are in need of places) translated this description of *Dasein* as "the most fugitive" (1979b: 186). However, rather than indicating the loss of place, the German source text "*den Vergänglichsten*" ("the most transient") (Rilke, 2011: 172-173) denotes the fleeting (mortal) nature of existence. It is as mortal care that *Dasein* gathers, makes and draws near. Things do not primarily keep *Dasein*'s 'understanding'. Understanding is always already grounded in a context of care (Heidegger, 1925: 413-415/299); emplaced in a region of concern.

Things are not only meaningful because they gather the significant aspects of their world in a place. In terms of the art of care the place is gathered into a totality ecstatically emerging from the emplaced dialogue between the care of *Dasein* and the speaking of the guardian spirit, the granting of the thing between earth and sky. A thing is a granting gathering which stays the "ringing" out of the fourfold engaged in "the round dance of appropriating" (Heidegger, 1950a: 178). As a "staying" (Heidegger, 1950a: 171) of this 'appropriative totality', in which mortal mirrors sky, mirrors earth, mirrors divine, the thing aids our capacity to "save", "receive" and "await" the other members of the fourfold (Heidegger, 1951a: 148). This explains why buildings are able to gather the surroundings into an inhabited landscape. Not primarily because of their built corporality, or ordering capacity, but because they are (primarily) works of care. As an act of mortal making and appropriation, the thing reminds of our participation in the fourfold. In turn, it is the care evident in *Dasein*'s historicity, gathered in the 'granting' of manmade things, which transforms physical reality (between earth an sky) into a region of concern, appropriate for habitation by the being of care.

6.4.5 Structural similarity and poetic obedience

The art of place contends that the place has a *Stimmung*, which attunes *Dasein* and bestows identity. The fugitive ones seeking dwelling must build in a way which corresponds to this *Stimmung*, i.e. create works of *Übereinstimming* (see subsection 4.4.5). While this sounds like a respectful way of engaging with the environment, the assumptions underpinning this approach are decidedly metaphysical. Representing the truth of the place through 'correspondence' is grounded in the assumed ability to gauge the extent or "correctness" (Heidegger, 1935: 144/201) of the correspondence between temporal interpretations and an enduring truth.

In GL there exists a struggle between the idea of truth as a revealing of what is "potentially present" in the place (1979b: 18) and truth as correspondence to "archetypal natural places" (1979b: 42) between 'revelatory letting-be' and 'correspondence as correctness'. The need to establish a correspondence between a building and the truth of the place, neglects the being of the intentional and reduces the *genius loci* to an *idea* governing the 'correctness' of interpretations.

The art of care removes the 'burden of correctness' from care-full making. Firstly, it acknowledges that a place has a voice speaking in the 'destining' of the guardian spirit. Secondly, it proposes that *Dasein*, as the being of care, can stay near the source and await the revelations of the guardian spirit. Thus the possibility of building the 'voice of the place' does not rest in the need for correctness, but in the 'resolute abdication' of the being of care displaying the willingness to stay near the speaking of the place.

Dasein as care takes a stand amid the voice of the place as perduring-letting-be; obedient in restraint, yet "free" in letting-be (Heidegger, 1930a: 127-129).[282] Thus the truth conveyed by the voice of the place is neither interpreted as "imperishable and eternal", nor subject to the "arbitrariness [of] human caprice" (Heidegger, 1930a: 123-124). Instead of calculating the 'happening of truth' in a place as a correspondence between the building and the spirit of the place, the art of care proposes accepting and appreciating the truth of the place through interpretive acts of care gathered in a region of concern. The concerned mortal, ecstatically emplaced in a spatio-temporal region of concern, engages with the voice of the place in poetic obedience.

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[282] See Glossary: Resoluteness.

6.4.6 Archetypes of the relationship between manmade and natural place

One of the most memorable and influential aspects of GL was the idea that there are 'archetypal landscapes' and corresponding 'archetypal ways of building'. However, this approach harbours the metaphysical notion that all places and all buildings are mere semblances of "always identical … enduring prototype[s]" (Heidegger, 1935: 154/216). In these archetypes the *genius loci* becomes an ideal, the truth of the place is presented as something enduring and the work, if it seems to correspond to the archetype, is experienced as 'truthful'.

Norberg-Schulz's archetypal interpretations have value in that they indicate the way in which the fourfold holds sway over all aspects of the place as a "simple oneness" (Heidegger, 1950a: 178), but to describe places as archetypes demotes all particularities to 'seeming'. While Norberg-Schulz's formulation inspired many architects to try and understand how their place 'is', it presented this 'isness' in terms of an 'archetypal identity' which "*remains the same even if it is never identical*" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 356). Furthermore, it was the envisioned "correspondence between man and his environment" which inspired Norberg-Schulz's belief that "human identity presupposes the identity of place"[283] (1979b: 22). Therefore, the structural similarity between the archetypal aspects of the landscape and the archetypal built reactions became a way to assure dwelling and bestow identity. Heidegger's understanding of dwelling (see subsection 5.5.5) and identity (see subsection 5.5.7), rather than being based on correspondence, presupposed a relationship of concern.

6.4.7 *Poiesis*, machination and care-full making

It has been argued (see subsection 6.4.4) that *Dasein* creates things as a concerned mortal. Care reveals many possibilities (and lurking dangers) characterising the interaction between *poiesis* and *livskunst*. The poetic approach to making (subsection 5.5.8) stands in stark contrast to Heidegger's understanding of technological making (subsection 5.5.4). Heidegger believed that modern technology reduces the being of care to two extremes. Firstly, technology, as a system of ordering, turns *Dasein* into the 'orderer' of the environment and, secondly, technology, as a system of calculation, turns lived reality into a mock rendition of experience.

The transformation of modern humans into 'orderers' (Heidegger, 1953: 332)—an illusion obscuring the fact that technology (as a striving towards efficiency) aims at relegating

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[283] The problematic surrounding this correspondence will be discussed in subsection 6.4.8.

mankind to 'stock'—was discussed in subsection 5.5.4. The art of care maintains that the reconciliation of the assumptions underpinning ordering (as structuring), and *Dasein*'s gathering as concerned mortal, is questionable.

One of the aspects architectural phenomenology is currently associated with is the creation of 'experience' (Otero-Pailos, 2010: xxxiii). David Wang and Sarah Wagner, in their attempt to produce a "map of phenomenology", argued that Norberg-Schulz's phenomenology focused on the creation of "phenomenological experiences [in] special places". They then criticised this approach as a "translation" of Heidegger which is not "quite right", since Heidegger "describes the immediate phenomenological experiences of all persons, regardless of locale" (Wagner & Wang, 2007: 11).

However, being-in-the-world does not 'experience' regardless of 'locale', but precisely in terms of the way in which the place 'matters' to *Dasein*. While Norberg-Schulz often (in his early work) reduced being-in-the world to experience[284], the art of care proposes that this reduction is not solely rooted in his appreciation for 'special places', but in his misinterpretation of what a place is in relation to the Being of the intentional. Places can only ever become 'special' in terms of the unique relationship of concern. The claim that Heidegger's work is related to "immediate phenomenological experiences" (Wagner & Wang, 2007: 11) also needs clarification. In BT Heidegger argued that *Dasein* can only have "'experiences' … because the there is already disclosed in attunement" (1927a: 136), i.e. experiences are experienced in ecstatic care. Therefore 'experience' is not a suitable 'tool' for the "ontological analysis" of *Dasein* (1927a: 181), because that which *Dasein* experiences as 'life' is always already "grounded in care" (1927a: 194).

The unsuitability of 'experience' as a 'ground' for the revelation of being-in-the-world is magnified by Heidegger's assertion that "lived experience" shares a deep, but hidden, connection with "machination" (1938b: 85). In fact, Heidegger believed that the goal of the contemporary focus on 'lived experience' is to render machination "innocuous" (Heidegger, 1938b: 108-110/86-87). The effects of machination are "cloaked" by three

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[284] In MiWA Norberg-Schulz argued that buildings had to "communicate experienced existential meanings [which] constitute … an existential space" (1974: 429). This approach is rooted in the assumption that "perceptual *schemata* … determine all future experiences" (1979b: 21), thereby reducing "architectural history" to nothing more than "a collection of cultural experiences" (1979c: 180). Norberg-Schulz later distanced himself from this position—in CoD he argued that "the life-world does not consist of sensations, but is immediately given as a world of characteristic meaningful things, which do not have to be 'constructed' through individual experience" (1984a: 16)—but, judging by Wang and Wagner's 'classification', the notion of lived experience endures in interpretations of his work.

tendencies: "calculation" presenting 'experimentation' as 'objective experience', "speed" obscuring the importance of "waiting" through the manufactured need for 'novel experiences', and the "massive dissemination" of data obscuring the worth of "the rare and the unique". The common characteristic shared by these tendencies is the "denuding of every disposition" which ultimately makes "meaning" impossible by categorising all distinctiveness under the "common" (Heidegger, 1938b: 119-124/95-98).

The result of this 'cloaking' is that *Dasein*'s attunement[285] is estranged from being there by being presented as 'lived experience'. This estrangement happens concomitantly with the Cartesian reduction of understanding to calculating assertion. Thus the potential for *livskunst* (in our time) is obscured by the fact that life itself is transformed into "the calculable whirl of an empty self-circling [which aims at making] this capacity credible as 'closeness to life'"; a mere 'assertion' of 'closeness to life', grounded in the metaphysics of constant presence, rather than care (Heidegger, 1938b: 494-495/389). In turn, taking care becomes ordering, the 'unproductiveness' of restraint is transformed into imposition, sheltering becomes domination, and care itself becomes a "hunt for lived experiences" (Heidegger, 1938b: 123-124/98). Heidegger's astute observation is that "machination explicitly draws back behind that which seems to be its extreme opposite and yet which completely and utterly remains under its domination" (Heidegger, 1938b: 126-127/101). In the contemporary world machination and commercialised experience 'challenge' the perduring-letting-be of concerned being-in-the-world by masquerading as "closeness to life" (Heidegger, 1938b: 494-495/389). Thus the 'phenomenological' focus on lived experience carries within itself the potential negation of the being of the intentional.

In terms of architectural *making* it has often been argued that the yearning for a craft-sensibility is tinged with nostalgic irrelevance in the face of technology. Yet the drive behind what was engaging in craftsmanship, care made care-fully[286], need not be eliminated by the technological. In Zumthor's 'poetics of precision' (2010a: 30), and in the adaptable "sympathy" slumbering in the new digital technologies described by Lars Spuybroek (2011: 9), resides the promise of a renewed emphasis on care as the catalyst for awakening the poetic saving power Heidegger ascribed to *techne*.

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[285] The relationship between "attunement", "*Gestimmtheit*", "*Stimmung*" and "experience" is also discussed in Heidegger's essay, *On the Essence of Truth* (1930a: 128-129).

[286] In Afrikaans: '*sorge gemaak in sorgvuldigheid*'.

6.4.8 Identity, care and the preservation of the *genius loci*

Norberg-Schulz proposed that places offer an enduring identity, against which "a particular kind of human identity" (variations on this theme) becomes evident (1979b: 185). In a multicultural world, the idea that 'identity is dictated by place' is problematic. The contradiction between "Norberg-Schulz's concept of place" and the "demands of an increasingly mobile and multicultural society" was explored by the Norwegian architect, Ole Møystad in "The Spirit of Place in a Multicultural Society".[287]

The main problem Møystad identified was that if "meaning […] can be captured, or uncovered, like a place can be found or captured [then] whoever is the master of, or in control of a place, is also in control of meaning" (Møystad, 2005: par. 27).[288] In Norberg-Schulz's defence, his goal was for everyone to "live poetically" (1993: ix). However, Norberg-Schulz's assertion that "works of architecture cannot be explained as expressions of social relations or as links in the stylistic chain, but they can only achieve their true significance in interaction with a place whose identity remains despite change" (1993: viii) reveals the hidden problematic residing in continuity and change. If identity is predominantly and indissolubly tied to a particular identity of place, then any foreign identity must either be assimilated or remain as a threat to the existing identity. As Møystad pointed out within his Norwegian context: "In a mobile and multicultural world Tamils in Balsfjord and Pakistanis in Oslo East will, if defined in the terms of Place Analysis, threaten the meaningful existence of the local Balsfjord fishermen or the native Oslo resident" (Møystad, 2005: par. 45).

Norberg-Schulz, who so staunchly argued against the homogenisation of space, ultimately relied on a homogenised 'spirit of place' constituting a unified identity that holds sway over all inhabitants. People have strong connections to place, but identity is not 'determined' by place alone. The art of care proposes that the temporal understanding of *Dasein* as care harbours the reason for mankind's strong connections to place. This 'reason' is true of all people and does not demand a homogenous identity of place. Human identity, understood in terms of the art of care indeed rests in place, but rather than understanding place as a

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[287] Møystad originally wrote his article between 2004 and 2005, but his thoughts gain significance when seen in the light of the recent (2011) terrorist attacks in Oslo by Anders Behring Breivik, whose actions were motivated by his hatred of 'multiculturalism'.

[288] It is interesting to note that, while Norberg-Schulz often referred to the vernacular, he never mentioned (not even in *Nightlands*) the demands of the Sami People (a nation indigenous to Norway) that "implicate[s] up to 40% of the Norwegian land surface" (Møystad, 2005: par. 41).

particular spatiality, the art of care engages with place as a region of concern. If place is understood not as a physically (or even politically) defined domain that determines the individual, but as a region of concern – a reciprocal regioning of life and place drawn close in care – then many of the objections associated with the art of place can be overcome. Malpas lucidly argued that the concept of place, adequately formulated, is not inherently "conservative", but intends "the opening up of place as the proper site for the questioning of ourselves, our world, and our locatedness within it" (2012: 153-154).

The art of care aims at describing the lived reciprocity between place as a region of concern and the mortal existence of the being of care. As such, it addresses Norberg-Schulz's neglect of the Being of the intentional. In order to mitigate against the implied political 'extremes' of place, the human should neither be "assumed in advance" (Malpas, 2012: 156) through analysis of the place, nor can people be presented as context-free subjects.

In GL Norberg-Schulz proposed that "the *identity* of a place is determined by location, general spatial configuration and characterizing articulation" (1979b: 179). If the location is understood as a region of concern, spatial organisation is understood as concerned gathering rather than dominating ordering, and characterising articulation is attempted through care-full making, then the identity of place will be 'owned' (in the sense of *Ereignis*) amid concerned taking care, rather than as a continuous yet changing 'property' of the place. Instead of fixating on "strong places" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 179) of assertion, *Dasein*'s interaction with place will then be characterised by 'reverent hesitance'.

Norberg-Schulz's understanding of "care for the place" (1980a: 196) was grounded in continuity and change as a way to preserve the *genius loci* while allowing for progress. The art of care contends that human identity is not a function of place as continuity and change, but a perduring-letting-be of the voice emanating from the source; an ecstatic circling between Being and the being of care in which identity is not only 'bestowed', but 'enacted'. Therefore the concept of identity, formulated in terms of care, discards the idea of archetypal places and even subjective change. Instead it envisions "progress" in a fundamentally different way: as the ecstatic interaction between an open, perduring and above all care-infused being overcome by the "excess" of Being housed in the place (Heidegger, 1957b: 31).

Heidegger viewed the 'event of appropriation' as a happening primarily disclosive of the relation between Being and *Dasein* (subsection 5.5.7). Norberg-Schulz essentially tried to

appropriate this relatedness to describe the interaction between life and place. In turn, I propose that this is a relationship between place and care. The assumption being that the relationship between place and care is similar to the relationship Heidegger envisioned between Being and *Dasein*; a relationship in which Being extends its "strange ownership" (*seltsames Vereignen*) over *Dasein* and *Dasein* lets be a "strange appropriation" (*seltsames Zueignen*) of Being (Heidegger, 1957b: 36 & 100). If belonging in Being is the same as belonging in the full complexity of fourfold place, then the lived situation is characterised both by the way the place holds sway over the way of life and by the way life appropriates the place as its own. This is not a 'general' occurrence and it is not reducible to continuity and change. The place *Dasein* 'identifies' with is a 'unique' "event of appropriation" (Heidegger, 1957b: 36) and, therefore, the 'drawing near' of place and care is best understood as a reciprocal regioning.

Both the terror of time and the terror of space are potentially terrifying, because they harbour within them the potential of the terrible[289]. The art of care, by representing the relationship between a particular spatiality and a temporal being as an intimate entanglement of 'hesitant reverence' and 'overwhelming abundance', rather than a conflict of interests, recasts the terror of time and the terror of space as an encircling regioning of place and care.

6.4.9 Creative participation and architectural authenticity

The art of care proposes that creative participation should be grounded in ecstatic care and maintains that the Being of the intentional is inceptual to the 'gravity' exerted by the spirit of the place. If *Dasein* could not engage with the place as care, or be moved by its overwhelming abundance, then all places would remain meaningless. Norberg-Schulz tried to express this ability in terms of "identification", but even identification was understood in terms of "correspondence" between "*schemata*" and the 'characteristic spatiality' of the inhabited world (1979b: 21). Even in his later work, identification remained an aspect of the interaction between continuity and change.

Creative preservation as continuity and change (subject to 'Being and Becoming') aims at guarding what is valued (subject to 'the ought'), in the same way that *Gestalt* psychology

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[289] Møystad listed the Civil War in Lebanon (Møystad, 2005: par 39), Radco Mladic's ethnic cleansing of Srebrenica (Møystad, 2005: par. 43) and the genocide in Rwanda (Møystad, 2005: par 40) as examples of 'place conflicts' which occurred while Norberg-Schulz was composing his works. In this regard, Heidegger's involvement in the Nazi party is particularly disturbing. Malpas proposed that the "inadequacy" of Heidegger's early conception of place is one of the contributing factors to his Nazi involvement (2012: 155).

aims to establish the aspects which can be 'changed' without undermining the recognisability of the figure, i.e. what can be changed without the particular instance no longer appearing like it corresponds to the archetype (subject to 'Being and seeming'). While GL attempted to break with metaphysical thinking and 'leap'[290] into the question of Being, the idea that creative preservation had to safeguard things like "*primary* structural properties" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 180) pandered to the 'certainties' of calculative thinking. Norberg-Schulz's reliance on a metaphysical idea of time kept him from appropriately describing the spatio-temporal regioning integrating place and the concerned participation of the mortal. Furthermore, in the following two sections it will be argued that the metaphysical implications of continuity and change also undermined Norberg-Schulz's attempts to create a language of architecture.

Creative participation as care desires *livskunst* in which lived space is always already place (a region of concern), and lived time is always already care. The life-care-place totality describes the dynamic hermeneutic regioning of life taking place as care in a place delimited by care. Architecture as *livskunst* involves both the art of care and the art of place: a dialogue between the being of the intentional (the concerned mortal) and the being of the place (the guardian spirit) constituting a lived situation (being-in-the-world).

Throughout this section it has been argued that the potential of Norberg-Schulz's art of place can be unlocked by grounding the poetic understanding of place in the art of care. The art of care emphasises the fact that *Dasein*, when creatively participating as the "praising singer" (an image Norberg-Schulz (1979b: 185) appropriated from Rilke) praises as a "novice" (Rilke, 2011: 173). Therefore, *Dasein*'s creative participation is steeped in humility, fragility and restraint. The art of care maintains that the lived situation can only be revealed creatively through care as concerned perduring-letting-be. It aims to find the source of architecture's ability to 'touch the dweller's heart' by reaching beyond 'structural correspondence' and the 'ordering of space', focusing on the relationship between the 'being of the intentional' and the 'being of the place'.

Dasein, as the being of care, gathers all that is of concern within a spatio-temporal region of concern; a regioning which stands out (ecstatically) from being-in-the-world, between both 'earth and sky' and 'birth and death'. Life takes place as regioning concern. Against the 'strong places' propagated by Norberg-Schulz stands the fragile mortal conception of place based on acceptance rather than taking, on revelation rather than imposition.

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[290] Heidegger described this 'leap' (*Sprung*) as an 'origin' (*Ursprung*) (1936a: 75). Only by attempting such a leap, is it possible to understand that "Being itself … belongs to us", since "only with us can Being be present as Being" (Heidegger, 1957b: 32-33).

6.5 Transition 2: language, authenticity and the potential of care

The following section will investigate Norberg-Schulz's understanding of the architectural image and question the merits of his interpretation of Heidegger's concept of language. In an effort to show the potential influence of the concept of care, this section will also catalogue the references to care which permeated the fringes of Norberg-Schulz thought during this time. It will be argued that Norberg-Schulz suppressed this potential and ultimately transformed the concept of care into his language of architecture.

6.5.1 The metaphysics of image and ideal

Norberg-Schulz's insistence on defining the figure as a particular interpretation of an archetype, serving as a creative (yet recognisable) image, is a restatement of the metaphysical interpretation of "Being as idea" (Heidegger, 1935: 137/192). Heidegger believed this to be an assumption which "rules over all Western thinking" (1935: 137/192), whereby the 'being of the thing' is interpreted as a particular 'becoming' in relation to an archetypal *idea*. The result of this kind of thinking is that the "idea rises up as the sole and definitive interpretation of Being" (1935: 139/194). Consequently, the idea "constitutes *what* [the being] is … and beings themselves, which previously held sway, sink to the level of … that which really should not be and really *is* not either" (1935: 140/196). Thus Being becomes the idea ("prototype"), the idea becomes the "ideal" (archetype), and things become "a seeming which now means a defect", because the "correctness" of the thing's resemblance can be assessed. Thus *aletheia* ("truth as unconcealment") becomes "correctness" and *logos* (originally understood as "the opening up of beings [happening] as gathering") comes to stand for an act of "assertion" (1935: 140-142/197-199).

However, Norberg-Schulz (in HTA) argued that the art of place aims at 'presenting' rather than 'representing', i.e. bringing "into presence" by establishing a 'closeness' between *Dasein* and its world (1983a: 44-46). In Norberg-Schulz's formulation, 'seeming' is not a 'defect', but a positive place-specific aspect of a figure. Thus *stedskunst* harbours the potential of letting interpretations 'speak' as moments of 'emplaced care'. Unfortunately, Norberg-Schulz's insistence on understanding things as temporal interpretations of timeless archetypes distorted this prospect and culminated in the "fall" Heidegger predicted: "all opening up of beings must be directed toward equaling the prototype, resembling the archetype, directing itself according to the idea" (1935: 141/197).

There exists an irreconcilable discrepancy between the art of care, describing the ecstatic interaction between *genius loci* and mortal inhabitant, and Norberg-Schulz's language of

architecture, which aimed at creating common temporal interpretations of the timeless. Any 'language' proposing that a figure (in order to be meaningful) must be derived from an archetype is grounded in the metaphysical distinction between 'Being and seeming'. Thus it will not function as a revelatory language which "preserves in each case the being that has been opened up", but falls under the sway of "logos as assertion", which demotes "truth" to the "correctness of logos" (Heidegger, 1935: 141-142/198-199).

Imagination limited by 'correctness' can only lead to 'assertion'. Thus imagination itself becomes a means of progress engaging in 'calculation'. This was not Norberg-Schulz's intention, but, judged as an interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, these are the problematic assumptions underpinning his language of architecture. Heidegger proposed a fundamentally different way of being-in-the-world; a concerned engagement or measuring much more in tune with *Gelassenheit*.

Furthermore, Heidegger understood memory as "a constant concentrated abiding with something, not just with something that has passed, but in the same way with what is present and with what may come. What is past, present, and to come appears in the oneness of its own *present* being" (1952: 140).[291] Thus memory is an ecstatic opening towards a source of concern. The art of care dismisses the idea that memory primarily serves as an aspect of recognition and proposes that imagination, if rooted in memory (as Norberg-Schulz suggested), not only engages meaningfully with the typical, but signifies "an occurrence of the *clearing* itself" (Heidegger: 1938b: 311-313/247).

6.5.2 Phenomenology, semiotics and role of care

The previous subsection aimed to show that, while Norberg-Schulz aimed to follow a phenomenological approach to language, his application of Heidegger's concept of language is problematic. While the idea that the place must be translated by means of some form of language seems to provide a way towards setting-into-work the life-place totality, the art of care proclaims the need to understand place as a region of concern and life as emplaced care. Heidegger's concept of language engaged with the speaking of a concerned *mortal*, rather than providing a 'correct translation' of the place and its history.

However, it has been pointed out that Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture was founded on his interpretation of the structures of care (subsection 4.6.3). Unfortunately, it is precisely the instances where Norberg-Schulz tried hardest to engage with the concept of care, which came to stand for those aspects of his work which is most irreconcilable

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[291] See subsection 5.5.3.

with the art of care. The shortcomings of Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture, as an interpretation of Heidegger's concept of care, will be discussed in subsection 6.6.3.

In proposing the art of care, I am not suggesting that Norberg-Schulz was unaware of Heidegger's concept of care. In fact, a close study of Norberg-Schulz's lectures and writings of this period (especially between 1978 and 1980) reveal several attempts to engage with the concept of care. The following section will catalogue some of these instances as a platform to question the nature of the relationship between Heidegger's concept of care and Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture.

6.5.3 Norberg-Schulz's 'Postmodernism' and the potential of care

In the context of this study, it was surprising to find that Norberg-Schulz's transition towards the language of architecture was interspersed with attempts to appropriate the concept of care as a part of his approach. In a handwritten document (NAM 23, 27/10/1978) Norberg-Schulz proposed: "To participate means in arch. [*sic*] terms to understand and care for the common place". This statement was echoed in the article he contributed to the Venice Biennale (TAA) in which he stated that "[a]n authentic architecture is an architecture of care" (1980a: 196). In a different handwritten document (NAM 23, 05/03/1980), Norberg-Schulz described his approach as a middle ground between Venturi and Rossi's one-sided approaches: a "third 'integral' approach" based on "a total view of [the] man-world [relationship]". Norberg-Schulz claimed that his integral approach was evident in the work of Utzon, van Eyck, Pietilä and Porthoghesi, which he described as the "architecture of care". Furthermore, in a handwritten document (NAM 23, 25/11/1980) Norberg-Schulz wrote: "An authentic life means to live with things (care for things)". The document included the following table:

			Opposite … split of thought and feeling!
Identity	"Having a world"	(Understanding) (memory)	Abstraction Stimulus
Visualisation	"Keeping a world"	(Incarnation) (Discourse)	Measurement Self-expression
Participation	"Sharing a world"	(Use) (Being-with)	Objectivity, Egoism, Isolation
Authentic life	"Caring for a world"	(Care, Love) Faith (Interpretation)	Alienation (split)

Figure 16: Having, keeping, sharing and caring (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23, hand-drawn table, 25/11/1980) (hand-drawn table replicated by author).

In addition to these 'private attempts', there is at least one public attempt to engage the concept of care. In a lecture entitled "Education for what is Real"[292] Norberg-Schulz voiced his strongest support for the concept of care. He proposed that the "loss of dwelling" has culminated in a "loss of care" (NAM 22, 02/03/1979: 5) and that it is this lack of care that represented the main challenge to architectural education: "The basic aim of education today is … to give back to young people *the poetic dimension*, that is, to open [them] up again for the unmeasurable, and thereby to lay a basis for care and love … as the basis for a creative participation in the world" (NAM 22, 02/03/1979: 6). This seems like a wholesale acknowledgement of the importance of the concept of care, and yet it is exactly the strongest endorsements of care which were excluded from later publications (which drew on the content of this lecture). Therefore, the lecture notes actually point to the suppression of the concept of care in Norberg-Schulz's work. For instance, the concluding words of the lecture closely match the ending of CoD (compare below) with one significant difference: the lecture describes care as the ground ('institution') of dwelling, while CoD (which was published 5 years later) merely referred to care as an action involved in dwelling.

> What we in general need, is a *rediscovery of the world*; not of its abstract structures, but of its concrete qualities. What we also need, is *respect* and *care*. We do not improve our situation through great "plans", but by *taking care* of what is closest to us, that is, of things. "The things trust us for rescue", Rilke says. But we can only rescue the things if we have first taken them into our hearts. When that happens, we "dwell", in the true sense of the word. *Dwelling is care's institution* (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 22, lecture notes, 02/03/1979: 11).

> What we need, in general, is a rediscovery of the world in the sense of respect and care. We do not improve our situation through great "plans," but by taking care of what is closest to us, that is, of things. "The things trust us for rescue," Rilke says. But we can only rescue the things if we first have taken them into our hearts. When that happens, we *dwell*, in the true sense of the word (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 135).

While Norberg-Schulz believed that architecture had to engage with mankind's existential condition, the temporal implications of care contradicted Giedion's epochal understanding of time as continuity and change. Norberg-Schulz, therefore, tried to appropriate the 'aspects' of care into a structure – the language of architecture – which could translate mankind's existential space without engaging the temporal implications of these aspects. Once he had incorporated (what he saw as) the 'important' implications of care into his

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[292] The lecture notes is marked "Lecture at the University of Dallas March, 2, 1979" (NAM 22: 11) and was published in summarised form as the "Introduction" to *Architecture: Meaning and Place* (1979a) (see subsection 4.3.13).

language of architecture, he ignored the other aspects of Heidegger's formulation. Effectively, care had been replaced with the language of architecture; a theoretical position which also had pedogigical impact. In a manuscript entitled "Learning from the past: The Architectural image" (NAM 6, March 1981: 17) Norberg-Schulz wrote: "The task of the architect is to reveal spatiality by means of the language of architecture. Architectural education primarily ought to be the teaching of the language of architecture".

The move from care to language was a move from the concerned relationship between inhabitants and their place to the creative, yet common, interpretation of established archetypes. Rather than developing the idea of care as ecstatic temporality, Norberg-Schulz used the structure of care to formulate a language of architecture functioning within the metaphysical parameters of continuity and change. Consequently, the language of architecture transformed the concept of care into a "special attitude" or "act" – a "willing", a "wishing", a "predilection", an "urge" – which had lost its disclosive character (Heidegger, 1927a: 193-194). The language of architecture transformed care into 'the ought' (Heidegger, 1935: 149-152/210-214).

6.6 Phase 3: the failings and potential of the language of architecture

The following section will question the merits of Norberg-Schulz's 'language of architecture' and the main assumptions underpinning 'figurative architecture'. While Norberg-Schulz's conception of architecture as an *imago mundi*, and his references to Heidegger's concept of language, offered a valuable alternative to 'semiotic' readings, it will be argued that his architectural application of these ways of thinking ultimately neglected 'the being of the intentional'. It is only when speech is seen as the "speech of mortals [resting] in its relation to the speaking of language" (Heidegger, 1950b: 205-206) that the nature of language, as a way to dwell in the life-care-place totality, becomes clear. In contrast to Norberg-Schulz's 'language of architecture', this section will present an alternative approach inspired by the concept of care and illustrate the worth of this approach by referring to Norberg-Schulz's engagement with the challenges of 'pluralism'.

6.6.1 Creative participation and concerned measure-taking

The way Knut suddenly understood his place (subsection 4.6.1) echoes Norberg-Schulz's recollection[293] of an encounter "in Jerash (Jordan) where the *genius loci* of the desert made itself present", i.e. as a revealed gift from the guardian spirit. Can such poetic revelations be described in terms of continuity and change? Heidegger asserted that all 'understanding' is rooted in the ecstatic nature of *Dasein* as care (see subsection 6.8.1). Rather than presenting this relationship as an interaction between a changing understanding and an enduring continuity (implied by Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture), the art of care suggests that revelation is grounded in the concerned relationship between *Dasein* and its region of concern; an approach which aims to engage with the poetic intensity experienced during, and resulting from, moments of revelation.

Firstly, the art of care proposes that the 'poetic vision' should be understood as that which emanates from the imaginative 'measuring' of the world. Heidegger believed that "the taking of measure is what is poetic in dwelling" (1951b: 219). 'Measuring' is the building that precedes building and reveals the true nature of listening. This is the meaning behind the seemingly impossible architectural challenge Heidegger posed in BDT: "*Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build*" (1951a: 157). Measuring, understood as concerned listening, is the prerequisite for "authentic building" because people are "capable of such building only if [they] already [build] in the sense of the poetic taking of measure" (Heidegger, 1951b: 225-226). It is *Dasein*'s ecstatic measuring of the place as a region of concern, standing out of the 'now' through the concerned envisioning of a transformed future, that "gauges the between [and] brings the two, heaven and earth, to one another" (Heidegger, 1951b: 219).

In contrast to poetic measure-taking, it is the "curious excess of frantic measuring and calculating" required by technological (rational) domination, which stands in the way of poetic dwelling (Heidegger, 1951b: 225-226). This is the root of the contemporary 'forgetting' of being and must be challenged by the 'remembering thinking' of *Andenken* (see subsection 5.5.3); a way to both gain a poetic understanding and translate this understanding into made things. Not through structuring, neither through the interpretation of archetypes, but by being open to the speaking of the place, an attitude Heidegger described as *Gelassenheit*, or letting-be (see subsection 5.5.2). The root of creative participation is therefore man's obedient measure-taking that first characterises dwelling

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[293] This event was mentioned in the manuscript of *Genius Loci* (NAM 5: 4), but omitted from the published version. It was also referred to by Otero-Pailos (2010: 179).

and then informs the building of dwellings. Dwelling precedes and is the goal of building, and it is as much the consequence of thinking (*Andenken*) as it inspires it.

Measure-taking, *Dasein*'s willingness to abide near the source, is characterised by compassion, dedication and sympathy, but always already grounded in care. Instead of trying to 'formulate a language', the art of care describes an alternative way, which can be indicated by pointing to a different short story by Tarjei Vesaas (who also engaged with the possibility of 'belonging') entitled, "Just Walking Up to Fetch the Churn" (first published in Norwegian in 1968). In this story, Vesaas described a person engaged in an everyday situation, who is unexpectedly overcome by a deep realisation: "You are a part of this. You are meant to be here. The strong awareness of being part of it all. In wonderment you walk on the hillside, in a morning shower of strangeness, just to fetch the milk churn" (Vesaas, 2003: 158).

The person engaged in 'everydayness' is overwhelmed by an unalienable, simultaneously strange and wonderful, sense of belonging. That which was 'familiar' is recast and experienced anew. This is not a matter of simple continuity and change. In the course of walking to the road the character is engaged in multifarious ways; with the 'moment' of the "warm embrace" of the sun's first rays, childhood memories (of the "cardamom-scented air in a pre-Christmas house") and ancient cultural memories (of the ballad of "Bendik's maid"), a "girl on the road" treading with "wide-eyed … wonderment", the blossoming of the flowers which is yet to come, and the enduring presence of the "song about scents" (Vesaas, 2003: 157-159). In this lived moment the ecstatic abundance of care, in which dense instants of revelation are always tinged with a sense of loss, is made evident.

The art of care proposes that, to acknowledge the way *Dasein* concern-fully engages with the world, is to engage with that which is nearest to *Dasein*. This kind of relationship "doesn't take much" (Vesaas, 2003: 156) because its possibility is always already *there* for the being of care; making itself present as the desert 'revealed' itself to Norberg-Schulz, as the woods were 'illuminated' for Knut, and as the hillside was 'discovered' amid a simple task, as a region of concern.

6.6.2 Dwelling and the 'appropriate staying' of 'emplaced care' in things

Norberg-Schulz used the term 'dwelling' to designate the "meaningful relationship between man and a given environment" (1984a: 13), but what is dwelling *like*? In BDT Heidegger stated that "*the fundamental character of dwelling is … sparing and preserving*" (1951a: 147) and that sparing "means ... to take [the fourfold] under our care" (1951a:

149). The need for the recognition of *Dasein* as a sparing mortal is echoed in the second image Heidegger used (in BDT) to illustrate how building and dwelling interact: "a farmhouse in the Black Forest" (1951a: 157-158). Amid the "life images" in Heidegger's farmhouse (like the "altar", "community table", and "childbed") there is also a "coffin" (Heidegger, 1951a: 158). *Dasein* 'spares' the world as a 'mortal' (1951a: 148), not as continuity and change, but as ecstatic care always already between both earth and sky *and* birth and death.

Norberg-Schulz's effort to relate dwelling (as orientation and identification) to the figures of society (in CoD) merely elaborated on the systematic (calculating) approach followed in ESA. The art of care suggests that, to understand identification in terms of 'physiognomy' implies succumbing to the metaphysical distinction between 'Being and seeming', and to understand orientation as 'structuring' is to succumb to the certainties promised by calculative thinking. The art of care will aim at understanding identification and orientation as aspects of Heideggarian care (see subsection 6.6.3).

One of the more promising avenues opened by Heidegger is his description of the thing as an "appropriate staying" of the fourfold (1950a: 170-171). For architecture to serve as an 'appropriate staying' it must translate the understood 'meanings' of the fourfold into a built work. In the previous subsection it was proposed that *Dasein*'s 'understanding' can be engaged more appropriately as 'concerned measure-taking'. Consequently, 'appropriate staying' will be enacted as 'acceptance' (letting-be), rather than 'taking possession'. For things to engage as 'appropriate stayings' of dwelling, it must be acknowledged that the 'understanding' which they are expected to 'keep', is grounded in care.

The sparing and preservation implied by Heidegger's concept of dwelling points to a kind of parsimonious attentiveness; a form of considerate frugality far removed from the efficiency-driven aspects of the modern calculative mindset. The art of care understands dwelling as emplaced care, and the making of things as an 'appropriate staying' enacted care-fully by concerned mortals. *Livskunst* is not concerned with the supposed 'continuity and change' characterising *inter-epochal* dwelling as progress (or the way archetypes 'change but remain' amid this progression), but endeavours to 'appropriately stay' the *intra-epochal* emplaced care (everyday dwelling) of *Dasein* through mortal acts of *poiesis* imbued with parsimonious attentiveness.

6.6.3 The language of architecture and the ecstasies of care

Subsection 4.6.3 discussed the way Norberg-Schulz derived his 'language of architecture' from the spatial implications of Heidegger's 'structural moments of care' (subsection 5.3.2). Despite appropriating these 'structural moments', Norberg-Schulz presented the interaction between a particular spatiality and the language of architecture as the discourse between a "local and temporal" reality, and a "general" (1984a: 29) "structure of implementation" (2000a: 125); a "timeless ground on which [temporal] revelation occurs" (1984a: 111). Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture, therefore, appropriated the ecstasies of care into a structure negating the exact aspects in which Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world is grounded (see Figure 17).

Norberg-Schulz used the 'ecstasies of care' as aspects of Being denoting the most general (that which is most continuous) aspects of the world. These general aspects then had to be re-interpreted and built as local variations of the language of architecture. This would ensure that, despite the changes implied by interpretation, the archetype would remain recognisable. Thus the most general and the most particular would be gathered in a unique place between earth and sky, but Heidegger argued that seeing Being as the "most universal" makes the questioning of Being "superfluous" and "sanctions its neglect" (1927a: 2).

> It is said that "being" is the most universal and the emptiest concept. As such it resists every attempt at definition. Nor does this most universal and thus indefinable concept need any definition. Everybody uses it constantly and also already understands what is meant by it. … [Being] has become obvious (Heidegger, 1927a: 2).

Norberg-Schulz often described place and the built expression of being-in-the-world as an "obvious" relationship (1966a: 265; 1984a: 94; 2000b: 28). However, Heidegger argued that Being, far from being the most general concept, is engaged with that which is most peculiar and 'strangely unique' (*seltsam*) to *Dasein* (1957b: 36). Indeed, Heidegger proposed that the "*being [Seiende] that we ourselves in each instance are is ontologically farthest from us*" (1927a: 311). Far from being the most obvious, Heidegger believed that what *Dasein* is most concerned about and devoted to, its Being, has become "most obscure" (1927a: 3), a mystery defying categorisation and calculation.

	Being-already-in-the-world (always already concerned)	*Being-ahead-of-itself* (concerned about the future)	*Being-together-with* (amid) (usual way of concerned existence)	*Dasein*'s being-in-the-world as care must be "said" or "set-into-work"
"the meaning of authentic CARE" (Heidegger, 1927a: 326)				
ECSTATIC TEMPORALITY	**PAST** Always already found in a world (mood). _Thrownness_	**FUTURE** *Projecting* possibilities Leading to interpretations enabling understanding	**PRESENT** Absorbed in the everyday (Being-with). _Fallenness_	
INAUTHENTIC	Idle talk (1927a: 167-170)	Curiosity (1927a: 170-173)	Ambiguity (1927a: 173-175)	
THE MODES OF BEING-IN	***Befindlichkeit*** (attunement)	***Verstehen*** (understanding)	***Verfallen*** (falling prey)	MARTIN HEIDEGGER
‹‹‹‹‹‹	disconnect created by continuity and change		››››››	
	Aufriss (elevation) (HTA 46b) (HTA 48b) → **FIGURE** (embodied Gestalt) ← *Grundriss* (plan) (HTA 46b) (HTA 48b)		**TYPE**	
THE TWO ASPECTS OF SPATIALITY AS A LOCATION (equi-primordial)	**Embodiment/** Installment (*Einrichten*) (Norberg-Schulz, 1983a: 45)	**Admittance** (*Einraumen*) (Norberg-Schulz, 1983a: 45)	*Andenken* (Thought as remembering) (Norberg-Schulz, 1983a: 42-44)	CAPACITY TO DIS-CLOSE A THING AS A GATHERING (of fourfold)
QUESTIONS ANSWERED	HOW?	WHERE?	WHAT?	
KAHN'S TERMS (cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1979c: 36)	"well-being"	"learning"	"meeting"	LOUIS I. KAHN
MODES OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD	Identification	Orientation	Memory	
DIMENSIONS OF ARCHITECTURE (Norberg-Schulz, 1979c: 42-43)	"formal articulation" BUILT FORM	"organization of space" SPATIAL ORGANIZATION	"type" NAMEABLE OBJECTS, GESTALTEN, EIDOS OF THINGS	CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ
LANGUAGE OF ARCHITECTURE	**Morphology**	**Topology**	**Typology**	*Dasein*'s being-in-the-world (existential space) must be concretised amid continuity and change

Figure 17: The disconnection between Norberg-Schulz's formulation of the language of architecture and Martin Heidegger's temporal modes of 'being-in' (compiled by the author).

It can, therefore, be argued that Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture, while based on the ecstasies of care, ultimately 'functioned' as a general 'metalanguage', satisfied with unifying the "features that all languages share" (Lysaker, 2010: 199); an approach

engaging with language as a "human construct", rather than engaging with language as a "deeper 'Saying'" (Polt, 1999: 178). Any attempt to understand Being as that which is 'most general', and language as a structuring of those qualities, will not reveal "how language claims us" (Lysaker, 2010: 199). Therefore, Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture will not be able to explain how architecture 'touches our hearts'. If care describes the origin and true nature of the language of architecture, then the implications of this language must be envisioned as an act of concerned measure-taking grounded in listening obedience. Only in this way will architects gain access to that which is 'closest', rather than that which appears to be the 'most general'.

Care is the appropriate region from which the mortal, as a mortal, translates its world. Is it possible to re-interpret Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture and thereby formulate a more appropriate 'language' to translate the life-care-place totality? In the previous subsection the possibility of understanding identification and orientation as aspects of care was mentioned. According to Heidegger, it is not a matter of trying to think of these matters as care, as they are always already matters of care: "The full disclosedness of the there is grounded in care. This clearedness first makes possible any illumination or throwing light, any perceiving, 'seeing,' or having of something" (Heidegger, 1927a: 351). Topology is not primarily a matter of spatial arrangement, but an anticipation of engaging with things, not as an 'ordering', but as a true imagining of letting-be. Similarly, attunement cannot be 'enforced' or 'manufactured', but always already "imposes itself on everything" (Heidegger, 1930b: 99-100/66). Finally, *Dasein* can never escape completely from the "flattened down" "averageness", the typical, of society ("*the they*") (Heidegger: 1927a: 127). Therefore, *Dasein*'s translation (discourse) is always already 'attuned', busy 'projecting' and in some sense influenced by 'the they'. The art of care, aiming at authentic architecture – *livskunst* true to life – is constantly engaged, at odds, and under the sway of *Dasein*'s own 'inauthenticity'.

Dasein is in the world as care; taking the measure of the world between earth and sky and birth and death, rather than 'enforcing' views of topology, morphology and typology. The art of care proposes that the awareness of this way of being, that we are always already captivated by 'the sway', rather than rational and objective, should instill *Dasein*'s acts of translation with a measure of resolute hesitance. If Heidegger was correct in asserting that "humanism [is] meditating and caring" (1947a: 224)[294] then reflecting on the nature and

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[294] The term 'meditating' is a translation of the German 'Sinnen'. It is helpful, in an Afrikaans context, to think of Heidegger's humanism in terms of an interaction between *besinning* and *sorge*.

'limitations' of *Sorge* will lead to a more humane approach to architecture, rooted in care rather than continuity and change.

The art of care argues that an 'epochal understanding' can only be established 'in retrospect' (measured against previous continuities) and thereby negates the existence of poetic (revelatory) 'moments' which ecstatically reach towards the truth of Being. As such, continuity and change is unable to grasp the poetic disclosure which is foundational to Heidegger's concept of *Dasein*. Consequently, it will also fail to truly engage with the disclosive nature of Heidegger's concept of language and tend to devolve into structuring. *Dasein* (as care) transcends the restrictions of the epochal by acknowledging the limitations of being-in-the-world, precisely because these 'limits' – always projecting, always attuned, and always absorbed – describe the "ecstasy" of "the *Moment* [*Augenblick*]" (1927a: 338). It is in the Moment – both moments of poetic intensity (as described in Vesaas's stories),[295] but also moments of hesitation and uncertainty – that "existence [is brought] to the situation and discloses the authentic 'there'" (Heidegger, 1927a: 347). In the 'ek-stasis' of the moment—poetically "[reaching] sooner into the abyss" (Heidegger, 1946: 115), while having the hesitant reverence to not "*resist straightaway* but *to let resonate*" (Heidegger, 1930b: 122-124/82)—language comes to the fore.

Already in BT Heidegger had argued that "discourse is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality" (1927a: 349). In LoH Heidegger proposed that language, as the happening of the 'nearness' between Being and *Dasein*, is the "house of Being" in which *Dasein* "[guards] the truth of Being" (1947a: 237) and Being is allowed to extend its "unobtrusive governance" (1947a: 236). This kind of understanding of language offers no 'systems' or 'categories' or causal list of 'losses'. Instead, it maintains that *Dasein* needs to dwell in order to 'translate' (build). Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture was an "assertion" (Heidegger, 1935: 142/199) of the 'where', 'how' and 'what' of architecture. The art of care, aware of the 'lived limits' of being-in-the-world, engages with architecture much more humbly (though still resolutely) and remains open to questioning the 'why' of architecture. It is this kind of dwelling which makes all other kinds possible.

6.6.4 Translation, captivation and obedience

The means of translation proposed by Norberg-Schulz, first *schemata* and then the language of architecture, functioned as stabilities incrementally changed by new

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[295] See subsections 6.6.1 and 4.6.1.

experiences, which could engage with ways of being in new (but not subjectively invented) ways, i.e. both the means of translation and the act of translation happened as 'continuity and change'. The art of care proposes that both the possibility of translation and the aspects subject to translation must be understood in terms of ecstatic care. However, if continuity and change can no longer be relied on, would this not imply a reversion to subjectivism in architecture? Heidegger argued that this position is contrary to the way works (as disclosive happenings of truth) are appropriated by the being of care: "Preserving the work does not reduce people to their private experiences, but brings them into affiliation with the truth happening in the work. Thus it grounds being for and with one another as the historical standing-out of human existence in reference to unconcealedness" (Heidegger, 1936a: 66). Richard Polt called this shared appreciation a "mysterious solidarity" (1999: 136). The art of care proposes to describe this solidarity as 'captivated obedience'.[296]

The art of place and the language of architecture were intended as structures providing certain limits to creative participation. Both require obedience, but instead of being obedient to a system, the art of care suggests that the 'wonder' of a work of art lies in its ability to let the world arise as a captivating moment of ek-sistence.[297] Answering the voice of the place, the speaking of the divine, demands humility and restraint; both are grounded in *Dasein*'s care for its own belonging (the self),[298] for its own place (the world of the self),[299] and for its interaction with those sharing the same situation (the other).[300] To be obedient (see subsection 5.5.6) therefore establishes the ground for implementing concerned measuring.

Concerned measuring does not imply a passive reluctance to engage and obedience is not a matter of indifference. Rather, humility is the most resolute action open to *Dasein* inhabiting the *Gestell* of modern technology (subsection 5.5.4). It demands the courage to let (in terms of *Gelassenheit*) the place emerge in its open regioning, free from preconceptions claiming to be general or timeless, but utterly engaged in the ecstatic temporality characterising life. It is as care, that *Dasein* will be able to translate the

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[296] The term, captivated obedience, is derived from the implications (restraint, belonging, listening, obedience, and commonality) embodied in the Afrikaans word '*gehoorsaamheid*' (see subsections 5.5.2 and 5.5.6).

[297] See Glossary: Ek-sistence.

[298] Designated in Afrikaans by the term '*hoort*'.

[299] By acquiescing to hear (Afr: '*hoor*') the speaking of the divine in the place.

[300] Integrated in the fact that *Dasein*'s togetherness, the fact that people are '*saam' (Afr.)*, implies a measure of shared obedience (Afr: 'gehoorsaamheid').

"*hermeneutic situation of factic life itself*" in a way that is both 'disclosive' and 'meaningful' (Kisiel, 2010: 20-21). Instead of insisting on a "*strong Gestalt*" (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 66), a "strong place" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 179), or a "powerful image" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000a: 58), the art of care intends 'captivated obedience'—as a reciprocal relationship between *Dasein*'s 'reverent hesitance' and the 'overwhelming abundance' of the place—as grounds for concerned measure-taking.

6.6.5 The 'new spatiality' and appropriation

Norberg-Schulz's 'mythologising' of the events leading up to modernism—how the movement's inception was grounded in recognising the modern realities of life, and its growing inauthenticity in the face of demands made by a rational epoch—mirrors (to a certain extent) Heidegger's mythology of Being.[301] It has been argued that the 'closeness to life' proclaimed by modernism was a 'false closeness' (subsection 6.3.10) and that it motivated Norberg-Schulz[302] to attempt a form of *Livskunst*, while 'neglecting the being of the intentional'.

In *Genius Historiae: Christian Norberg-Schulz in a historiographic perspective* (2009) the Norwegian architectural historian, Mari Hvattum (b. 1966), succinctly expressed the historical context of Norberg-Schulz's 'neglect' in the following question: "But who is actually the patient here? Is it the alienated modern individual, as Giedion hints, or is it history itself? In *Roots* [*of Modern Architecture* (1988)], it seems as though history itself is the object of concern" (2009: 114). Norberg-Schulz's focus on 'history', rather than the 'alienated individual', is symptomatic of his understanding of time as continuity and change, rather than ecstatic care. The art of care contends that re-grounding the art of place in an understanding of *Dasein* as care will result in a more authentic approach to 'closeness to life'.

Instead of demanding a 'common systematic language', the art of care envisions architecture informed by the way the world is appropriated, by the way *Dasein* 'is'. Perhaps the biggest failure of modern architecture was not a 'lack of image', but the 'perceived indifference' it displayed towards the cares and concerned nature of dwellers. Often the inception of modern architecture is called a "heroic"[303] epoch; a statement trying

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[301] Richard Polt (1999: 133) characterised Heidegger's mythologising of the inception of Western thought as "a mystical beginning followed by a decline" with "dire consequences".

[302] In PLP Norberg-Schulz described "*Design for life*" as the "interrupted purpose of modernism" (2000b: 27).

[303] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, "Chicago: Vision and Image", 29/06/1981: 7.

to describe the resolute artistic aspirations of those involved. Resoluteness does not demand purifying isolation from the 'fallenness' of society, nor does it propose the imposition of an ideal order on this reality. Resolute authenticity, does not "[hover] over entangled everydayness" (Heidegger, 1927a: 179), but engages care-fully in the situation.

6.6.6 Pluralism, dwelling gratefully, and the art of care

The figurative approach, aiming to establish common images of *Dasein*'s understood spatiality, is grounded in the premise that dwellers will be able to recognise figures as interpretations of types, and that these types and the way they have been changed will be known to them. But the contemporary reality is much more opaque. Places are filled with 'multiple voices' brought together by mass-urbanisation, economic and political pressures, and in the future, the projected influx of 'ecological refugees', those displaced by the effects of climate change. The art of care proposes that the multicultural challenge is not a problem of an enduring identity, but the challenge of how to invite 'strangers' to dedicate themselves to the place.

Following Heidegger, it is possible to suggest that what the stranger lacks, and what the established ones have, is the sense of belonging to the place through 'dwelling' (1951a: 155). It is the established ones who hold the key to the dedication of the stranger. They know the voice of the place, and yet it is precisely the 'established' nature of a way of life that harbours the danger of indifference; a mindset intensified by, and grounded in, the "frantic measuring" (Heidegger, 1951b: 226) of the "challenging-forth" (Heidegger, 1953: 321) of modern understanding. Would it not be more fruitful to measure the capacity of the stranger to arrive, participate creatively, and belong to the place in a way appropriate to both the stranger and the established one?

One of the key ways to motivate this change in mindset is to question the nature of dwelling poetically. Norberg-Schulz interpreted 'poetic dwelling' as the goal of the art of place.[304] For him it was buildings which drew place and life into contiguity, but for Heidegger, dwelling does not merely result from building. Dwelling precedes, enables and is the goal of building. Dwelling enables people to listen to the voice of place, imbues their building with vocation, and gives a voice to human existence. Therefore, poetic dwelling is not a goal, it is the means.

Poetic dwelling describes the way humans engage with the world through *poiesis*. What do buildings give, when they give a voice to *Dasein*'s existence? They acknowledge and

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[304] Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 23; 1983a: 48; 1984a: 30; 1989: 48.

dignify *Dasein*'s care. Since the place and its things are given, and since *Dasein*'s concerned way of being is given, any implementation (setting-into-work) of that which is given should, primarily, also be understood 'as given'. The appropriate response to that which has always already been given, is gratitude. Dwelling poetically is grounded in thankfulness. This was made evident in explaining the connection Heidegger established between *Andenken*, and the *thanc* (see subsection 5.5.3). When seeing our gratitude, *Dasein*'s grateful response to what has been given, rise up in the buildings before us, we receive an unexpected consolation; the edification of our care-full translation of the gift of place as a region of concern.

The dark side of Norberg-Schulz's 'islands of meaning' is reservations (and all other forms of isolated development), gentrification and class and racial division. It is doubtful if any systematic 'language of architecture' will be able to unify the 'separate lives' of these islands. Yet, according to Malpas, these emplaced tensions do not subtract from the validity of place-bound theories:

> It is precisely the way in which place encompasses both the singular and the multiple that it can indeed allow both the foreign as well as the familiar to appear within it; that it can allow a genuine encounter, both with oneself and with others. It is this placed encounter that is surely the proper source of wonder (Malpas, 2012: 64-65).

The art of care proposes that approaching architecture in terms of the being of the intentional is the appropriate way to open inhabitants to the wonder of emplaced multiplicity and invite the stranger's dedication to this shared wonder. Potentially, architecture as the art of care can motivate the celebration of the creativity and renewal brought by the stranger, while simultaneously edifying the care of the established ones, and allowing them to gratefully engage with the gifts of dwelling. The art of care first draws life and place into contiguity and enables the life of the place to extend "kindness" (Heidegger, 1951b: 226) in response to the arrival of the stranger.

6.6.7 Postmodernism and indifference

Heidegger stated that care ecstatically stands against the "leveling down" (1938b: 493-494/388) of Being: "Overnight, everything that is original is flattened down as something long since known. Everything won through struggle becomes something manageable. Every mystery loses its power" (Heidegger, 1927a: 127). Care, reawakens this mystery and opens *Dasein* to the wonder of Being; a sense of wonder that is inclusive, yet specific enough to serve as the foundation for shared dwelling.

Postmodernism tried to address the perceived indifference of functionalism through inclusive, but ultimately subjective, forms of self-expression. The art of care suggests that 'subjectivity' still panders to 'easy pluralism' (subsection 6.3.3) and thus implies a 'levelling down' of existence. The true 'complexity and contradiction' of emplaced care can most appropriately be understood in light of the overwhelming abundance of "being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)" (Heidegger, 1927a: 192). It has been argued that this approach involves the translation of *Dasein*'s emplaced care as a concerned measuring of the world, realised through care-full making (a fusion of reverent hesitance and captivated obedience in the perduring-letting-be of the overwhelming abundance of the situation), disclosing the wonder of an 'appropriate staying', and thereby expressing the dweller's gratitude in the face of the gift of Being. Translating *Dasein*'s lived situation is a matter of language, but not of systematisation. The "rational living" of the scientific mindset not only needs to become 'poetic', but fundamentally, the beings aspiring towards the poetic must "first *become* mortals" (Heidegger, 1950a: 176). Thus, dwelling as measure-taking, dwelling as *poiesis*, and dwelling as gratitude, are all housed in the 'sparing preservation' characterising mortal being-in-the-world as care.

This section has revealed the metaphysical underpinnings of Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture and proposed an alternative approach to translating grounded in measuring, making and gratitude. It has been argued that the art of care transcends 'subjective relativism' by aiming at the solidarity sprouting from 'captivated obedience' and, as reverent hesitance, represents an alternative to the imposition of a 'systematic language' on multicultural society.

6.7 Transition 3: a returning

This section will question the potential of Norberg-Schulz's 'returnings' (which characterised his transition from 'figurative architecture' to a renewed appreciation for place) to engage with Heidegger's concept of care. It will be argued that his reappraisals of Heidegger's philosophy, the concept of place, Nordic regionalism, and 'qualitative modernism' engaged with aspects associated with care, but that Norberg-Schulz chose to re-interpret continuity and change, rather than questioning the metaphysical assumptions underpinning his own approach.

6.7.1 Heidegger's concept of guardianship

In subsection 4.7.1 it was argued that Norberg-Schulz tried to move beyond 'figurative architecture', while preserving his 'language of architecture', by re-engaging with Heidegger's (then recently published) book, CtP. This subsection will focus on the concept of guardianship as developed by Heidegger (subsection 5.5.1).[305]

It is possible to argue that the attempt to identify architectural archetypes (with any measure of finality) is a self-defeating venture. By requiring the author to assert which archetypes are 'more archetypal', it forces the author to express his/her own will over an artificial construct. This also happened to Norberg-Schulz. Eventually he had no alternative but to conclude that "there is only one language of architecture: the classical one" (1988: 12).[306] Shackling the built richness of the world under Eurocentric classicism represented the ebb of Norberg-Schulz's thought. Heidegger proposed an alternative; being a poet implies "willing more strongly than any self-assertion" (1946: 118), thereby 'letting be' that which is, while poetically engaging with what is given as a guardian.

Architects, as guardians, are called to interact with the "guardian spirit" (see subsection 6.4.3). In CtP Heidegger asserted that guardianship (translated as 'stewardship' in the 2012 translation) constituted "what care means as the basic trait of Dasein" (1938a: 16-18/13). Norberg-Schulz, however, tried to explain 'guardianship' exclusively in terms of "cultivation" (1989: 47). In terms of the twofold nature of *Dasein*'s care, 'cultivation' only partly explains the capacity of *Dasein* to act as a guardian.

In "Building and Caring: The Implacable Challenge of Dwelling" (2008) Silvano Petrosino argued that it is essential to avoid a one-sided understanding of care: "a 'building' in which the urgency of 'caring for' eclipses the invitation to 'cultivate,' or in which the impetus to 'cultivate' loses sight of the need 'to care for'". Care cannot be reduced to either 'cultivation' or 'cherishing', because a focus on either one of these aspects "ends up simplifying what is complex, making sclerotic what is living, making uniform what is essentially differentiated, thereby letting slip the irreducible drama that qualifies the 'way in which mortals are on the earth'" (2008: 129). Guardianship, rooted in the twofold nature of care, is the ground for an appropriate response to the guardian spirit.

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[305] Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of another term focused on in CtP, *Ab-grund* (abyss), will be discussed in subsection 6.8.1.

[306] In a handwritten document (dated 13/12/1988, and therefore written at about the same time as MGLA) Norberg-Schulz wrote: "There is only one language: the Classical and it's 'negation,' i.e. the 'Anti-classical' = Gothic. The Modern also belongs to this one language, being both Classical and Anti-Classical. (There can be only one language! as there is only one world.) [*sic*]" (NAM 23).

Norberg-Schulz's contribution is marked by repeated attempts to explain the relationship between *Dasein* and nature. In IiA this relationship was guided by 'intentionality', in ESA Norberg-Schulz relied on Piaget's formulation of 'adaptation', in GL he tried to understand dwelling as 'creative participation', and in his interpretation of Knut's story (in CoD) he portrayed dwelling as 'listening' and 'responding'. Guardianship, sprouting from ecstatic care, could have served as ground for all these 'ways'. However, Norberg-Schulz's dedication to continuity and change led to an oversimplified view of guardianship as 'cultivation'. Rather than engaging with the possibilities of ecstatic care, Norberg-Schulz tried to understand continuity and change in terms of precognition (see subsection 6.8.1).

6.7.2 The return to place and care

Sammen har trærne det godt.	Together the trees have it good.
Sammen gir de skogen dens liv.	Together they give the forest its life.
Et miljø av former og farger,	An environment of shape and colour,
av holdninger og karakterer,	of attitude(s) and character(s),
av bevegelse, lys og lyd.	of motion, light and sound.
Det er denne helheten vi kjenner,	It is this totality that we know,
og det er den som krever vår omsorg. [307]	it is the one that requires our care. [308]

The extract above, from Norberg-Schulz's manuscript for what would eventually be published as *Minnesjord* (1991), indicates the care-infused nature of the art of place. The goal of the art of place and the art of care – the poetic co-existence of the place and a way of life – is reciprocal, but Norberg-Schulz's commitment to 'continuity and change' kept him from developing the temporal implications of *Dasein*'s concerned (ecstatic) being-in-the-world. There is some evidence to suggest that he was aware of this short-coming and tried to address it.

Toward the late 1980s Norberg-Schulz started work on a new book. His renewed appreciation for place, and his growing suspicion of figurative architecture, can be illustrated especially well by referring to a series of 'draft indexes' he composed during this time. The evolution of these draft indexes (also where headings are crossed out in favour of new headings) display Norberg-Schulz's gradual dismissal of architecture understood as the interpretation of archetypes by means of a general language, in favour of architecture understood as an 'answer' to life taking place, interpreted by means of an

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[307] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 12, a stanza from the manuscript of Minnesjord written in free verse, Chapter 3, Skog [Forest].

[308] Translation by author. I am indebted to Dr Gro Lauvland, who offered insights and valuable guidance in the translation of this passage from Norwegian to English.

appropriate language, in service of the 'art of place'. Thus Norberg-Schulz again viewed the language of architecture as a 'means' to reveal the life and the spirit of the place, rather than being an end in itself. Besides the changing title, Figure 18 shows how his reliance on 'archetypes' (NAM 23, 01/11/1988) was superseded by the introduction of the '*eidos'* (NAM 21, 30/04/1989) and how his understanding of *eidos* was then broadened to encompass the interaction between the way in which "Architecture speaks" and "life 'takes place'" (NAM 23, 21/11/1990). In the last version (NAM 21, 10/02/1992) terms, like 'use', and the need for an alternative to the 'isms', are introduced. Ultimately, these indexes informed the writing of Nightlands (1993) and culminated in the publication of the Norwegian book, *Stedskunst* (1995).

	01/11/1988 (NAM 23)	30/04/1989 (NAM 21)	20/11/1990 (NAM 21)	10/02/1992 (NAM 21)
Title	The Language of Architecture	The Language of Architecture	("*Arkitektur som stedskunst*") Architecture: The art of Place (The Language of Architecture)	*Arkitektur som STEDSKUNST* [Architecture: The Art of Place]
Introduction	From "function" ("method") to language	The Need for Language (Regrounding)		*Stedstap fremmedgjöring* [Alienation and the loss of place], *Status quaestionis* [the situation] *Målsetting ('tingene selv')* [Goal (the things themselves)]
Ch. 1	Architecture as phenomenon	World: Phenomenon (*eidos*) ("Arch. speaks")	Architecture (phenomenon: "Arch speaks". Varieties of place.) Place (as given) "City use"	~~Sted~~ [~~Place~~] *Bruk* [Use]
Ch. 2	Architecture as gathering (of a world)	World: Gathering and embodiment ("The inhabited landscape")	World (Life "takes place": orientation, Identification, Memory. "Landscape") (Environment)	~~Verden~~ [~~world~~] *Forståelse* [Comprehension]
Ch. 3	Architecture as language (Theory)	World: Language (expression, "naming," "dimensions")	Language (Gathering. Space, Form, Type)	*~~Arkitektur~~* [~~Architecture~~] *Iverksettelse* [Implementation]

	01/11/1988 (NAM 23)	30/04/1989 (NAM 21)	20/11/1990 (NAM 21)	10/02/1992 (NAM 21)
Ch. 4	Topology (*Einräumen*, Orientation) (exterior interior) Archetypes of space + varieties (e.g. "organizations")	Dimensions: Topology (organization)	Topology Space, organization	~~4.~~ 6. *Morfologi* [Morphology] *Oppriss* [Elevation]
Ch. 5	Morphology (*Verkörperung*, Identification) (boundary) Archetypes of building (structure) + varieties (e.g. walls)	Dimensions: Morphology (building)	Morphology (embodiment, elevation, making, built form)	*Topologi* [Topology] *Grunnriss* [Plan]
Ch. 6	Typology ("*Sinnbild*" [German: Symbol], Memory) (volumes) Archetypes of figures + varieties (e.g. "towers") (interiors!)	Dimensions: Typology (thinging)	Typology (nameable object, Gestalt, (building tasks))	~~6.~~ 4. *Typologi* [Typology] *Omriss* [Outline]
Ch. 7	Architecture as ~~place~~ "something" (task) (work) ("The Work of Architecture") (House, Institution, Settlement)	Totalities: Outside (urban space, landmark (tower etc.))	Style (Mode of being-in-space, Motif, Theme) Time	*Språk* [Language]
Ch. 8	Architecture as place/locality (tradition) (*Byggeskikk* [Building Style])	Totalities: Threshold (wall, gate, window)	Work (Exterior-Interior, building tasks)	~~*Verk*~~ [Work] *Sted* [Place]
Ch. 9	Architecture as history/style (time) (Constancy and change)	Totalities: Inside (Rotunda, Cloister, Basilica…Inglenook)	Place (explained as art) (as totality of tasks in time as constancy and change)	*Stedskunst* [The Art of Place] *Tid* [Time]
Ch. 10		Language (basic, style) (Classicism)		
Ch. 11		Adaptation and Change (Classical, anti-classical)		

	01/11/1988 (NAM 23)	30/04/1989 (NAM 21)	20/11/1990 (NAM 21)	10/02/1992 (NAM 21)
Ch. 12		Language today (The Problem of Modernism)		
Conclusion	Language today (Classical….etc.)	On the Way to Language (Regrounding)		*Dagens ark-situasjon ("ismer")* [The architectural situation today ("isms")]. *Stedsutvikling* [place development]. *Helhetssyn* [Holistic approach]. ("Islands of meaning").

Figure 18: Draft indexes showing the evolution of Norberg-Schulz's book project that was eventually published as *Stedskunst* (1995) (compiled by the author).

In 1995 *Stedskunst* (The Art of Place) was published in Norwegian, but rather than translating this version into English, Norberg-Schulz wrote a new manuscript (in Norwegian) between 1994 and 1996. This manuscript was also entitled *Stedskunst*, but when it was translated (first into Italian and then from the Italian into English) the resulting work was called *Architecture: Presence Language Place* (PLP) (2000b). While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to speculate over the differences in approach between *Stedskunst* and PLP, it is significant to point out the following: the chapter headings of the first section of *Stedskunst* (comprising three chapters) and the last section (also comprising three chapters) correspond to the first and the last sections of PLP. In addition to the six chapters of *Stedskunst*, PLP also contained a 'middle section' comprising three chapters (as planned in the draft index dated 10/02/1992) dedicated to the language of architecture. The most significant aspect, however, is that both *Stedskunst* and PLP end with the same enigmatic expectation: that "the art of place [*stedskunst*] will become the *art of the experience of living* [*livskunst*]" through the cultivation of a "phenomenological understanding" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 356).

The four draft indexes also illustrate Norberg-Schulz's attempts to understand the architectural nature of time in terms of "constancy and change" (NAM 23, 01/11/1988), "adaptation and change" (NAM 21, 30/04/1989), and "style" (NAM 21, 20/11/1990). In a handwritten outline (NAM 21, 17/02/1992), elaborating on the index dated 10/02/1992, Norberg-Schulz included a chapter entitled "*Tid* [Time]" with a subheading "*Arkitektur som*

omsorg [Architecture as care]". This chapter was, however, never written. Instead, Norberg-Schulz attempted to, in Heidegger's words, "bridge the gap [between the 'temporal' and the 'timeless']" (1927a: 18) by trying to unite place and life in an identity fusing continuity and change in the 'same' [309] (subsection 6.8.1). While Norberg-Schulz was aware of the problematic surrounding continuity and change, and considered engaging with Heidegger's temporal concept of care, he chose to re-interpret continuity and change, rather than engaging the being of the intentional.

6.7.3 The 'new regionalism' and regioning

Norberg-Schulz described his return to the 'region' as a way to engage with what Heidegger described as the *Gegend,* the appropriate place for "life [to] occur" (1989: 48). The art of care contends that Heidegger's '*Gegend*' is not primarily a matter of the 'admittance' and 'embodiment' of the (remaining, yet changing) spatial qualities of this region (Norberg-Schulz, 1989: 48-50), but of the interaction between life and place as a 'regioning' (*das Gegnen*) (Heidegger, 1945: 112-114/73)[310], a reciprocal disclosive opening, which reveals lived place as a region of concern.[311] Regioning describes the interactive nature of Heideggarian being-in-the-world; drawing that which is distant into *Dasein*'s region of concern and revealing anew that which is always already closest. *Dasein* participates in regioning as a concerned mortal, capable of *poiesis*.

Norberg-Schulz saw Utzon's houses on the island of Majorca as works which indicate that "timelessness is not a property of things that are outside time, it applies to what is permanently valid". These buildings engage with the "primitive things" like the "place with its topography, its vegetation, its light, its coherence, and people, with their need to meet other people, to shop, to live in every sense of the word". In Norberg-Schulz's eyes Utzon's works constituted the epitome of how, when architects build in a way that is true to the region, their work will be appropriately "old and new" amid continuity (serving as standard) and change (enacted through interpretation).[312] Yet it is exactly Norberg-Schulz's insistence on this 'timeless essence' that the architect and author, Richard Weston, criticised in his own discussion of Utzon's work in Majorca.

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[309] See Glossary: Same.

[310] The nature of this reciprocal regioning is discussed in section 6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.8, and 6.4.9.

[311] See Glossary: Regioning.

[312] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 17, manuscript, "Jorn [*sic*] Utzon and the importance of the primitive": 1.

> Architectural accounts of place [including] the phenomenological approach of Christian Norberg-Schulz (who discussed Can Lis [Utzon's first home on the island of Majorca] at length) … tend to treat it as if it were a quality that inheres in specific locations and can be discovered through insight and analysis. This is a convenient but dangerous shorthand. 'Sense of place' is necessarily a function of people's relationships with specific locations, not a property of them, and for many people it may well have as much to do with intangible memories, associations, scents or other qualities, which do not register visually or loom large on most architects' agendas. 'Place', as commonly understood in architecture, partakes too much of the inertia of the physical, and readily lapses into that sentimentality and preciousness that can attend so many well-intentioned efforts at environmental preservation. Seen as a gift from the past to be preserved, a concern with qualities of 'place' all too easily invites us to dismiss the messy realities of daily life (Weston, 2003: 112-113).

Weston essentially criticised the assumption that significant places are somehow imbued with an enduring continuity, when in fact places are experienced by *Dasein,* who habitually gets absorbed in the 'messy realities' of place. This is not because *Dasein* is inherently fond of 'messy situations', but because the situation is the place where the manifold nature of *Dasein*'s concern is manifested.

The deepening of the relationship between architecture and environment depends upon care engaging in the regioning of life and place. In contrast to the 'artificial distinction' between continuity and change, the art of care proposes that it is 'as a regioning' that life, care and place engage in the clearing identity[313] of the "same" (Heidegger, 1957b: 26). This is precisely why an architectural understanding of the temporal implications of care, guarding the region of concern, is necessary.

6.7.4 Poetic modernism and care

Norberg-Schulz viewed the work of the modern pioneers as inherently artistic and poetic. He interpreted Le Corbusier's *five point plan* as an attempt to engage in new ways with the earth (*pilotis*), the sky (roof gardens) and the horizon (horizontal strip windows), while interpreting the modern 'space concept' in terms of 'open forms' inserted into the 'free plan' (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 107). In this sense Norberg-Schulz 'mythologised' the five point plan as a poetic reaction to the fourfold, artistically engaging with the earth and the sky in terms of the spirit holding sway over that time.[314]

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[313] See subsection 5.4.5.

[314] This approach also governed Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Arno Korsmo's work. Norberg-Schulz described Korsmo as a "poet [envisioning and creating] the symbols necessary to give life meaning" (1986c: 152).

In contrast to the claims made (at the time) by the deconstructivist movement, Norberg-Schulz believed that the modern tradition could address the nature of the new place by acknowledging that the "care for and expression of the identity of place is still imperative, both from an ecological and a human point".[315] Norberg-Schulz argued that a phenomenological understanding of the artistic intentions of the modern pioneers reveal that deconstruction is not a continuation of the new tradition, but "[a]n incredible degeneration of architectural understanding" (2000a: 111). Instead of acknowledging the significance of the new place, the works of deconstruction created a situation in which "care is superceded by 'madness and play'".[316]

In an introductory piece entitled, "The Backbone of Freedom" (1995b), Norberg-Schulz referred to an assertion by Mies van der Rohe; a simple image which reveals the potential to view care as the authentic ground of architecture as a form of art: "architecture begins when you place two bricks carefully one on top of the other" (Van der Rohe cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1995b: 14). The references to the pioneering attempts by Le Corbusier and Van der Rohe show that the proponents of the 'new tradition' not only hoped to create an artistic movement, but that the idea of care also played a role. What was lacking was an understanding of what care, as the Being of the intentional, implied in ontological terms.

Norberg-Schulz believed that "the true objective of art is to preserve and visualize a way of life" (1986c: 85), but if Heidegger was correct, then life (and the setting-into-work of a way of life) takes place as care. It is care that first breathes life into architecture and makes it meaningful, relevant and appropriate. Norberg-Schulz made architects attentive to the importance of place, but neglected the Being of the intentional as the force which draws life and place into contiguity. Instead of engaging with Heidegger's concept of care, he asserted that the "systems of images" that had to be integrated into modernism – language, style, and tradition[317] – function as aspects of "constancy and change" (2000a: 102 & 123).

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[315] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture notes, "The Problem of Form in Modern Architecture", 04/1988: 9-10.

[316] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture notes, "Architecture as Gathering and Embodiment", 13/10/1989: 15.

[317] In section 6.8.6 language, style, and tradition will be discussed in terms of the temporality appropriate to the being of the intentional.

6.8 Phase 4: a way towards *livskunst*

In the previous section it was shown that Norberg-Schulz's 'returnings' offered various opportunities to engage with the concept of care, but that his insistence on understanding time as continuity and change undermined his ability to engage with the ecstatic nature of care. In PLP Norberg-Schulz proposed that "care for the unity of place is the job of architects" (2000b: 354). While it has been argued that his conception of care was obscured by the metaphysics of 'Being and becoming' (thereby subjecting care to the realm of 'the ought') it is also hard to think of an approach which harbours within itself such potential for architecturally incorporating the full promise of Heidegger's understanding of the being of the intentional. The following section will aim to integrate the progress made in PLP towards understanding architecture as an art of care with the elements characterising Heidegger's concept of care.

6.8.1 Precognition and the art of care

Norberg-Schulz proposed that architecture had to be re-grounded on "a foundation which [unites] order and change [by substituting the] archetype with the concept of 'mode of being-in-the-world (*Seinsweise*)".[318] In an article published two years later he even proposed that Giedion's 'New Tradition' "lost its momentum because the contradiction between continuity and change was never solved" (1991b: 94). Norberg-Schulz understood *Seinsweise* (a concept he attributed to Heidegger) as a "dynamic" unification of "the contradiction between continuity and change" (1991b: 95) which is "always the same without being identical". These ways of being are not 'perceived', but are 'recognised' through 'precognition' (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 75). Precognition was discussed in subsection 4.8.1 as the way Norberg-Schulz hoped to 'fill' the 'being of the intentional'. However, Norberg-Schulz still viewed precognition in terms of continuity and change. In a manuscript entitled, "The Way of Reima Pietilä" Norberg-Schulz relayed the following anecdote:

> In autumn 1963, Reima Pietilä presented his Dipoli-project to the members of the Oslo Architects' Association. To demonstrate his ideas he made drawings with coloured pens directly on glass plates. When these "slides" where put on the projector, the heat from the bulb made the colours dissolve and mix in front of the eyes of the spectators. The effect was certainly not intended by Pietilä himself, but better than any words it illustrated the birth of a new architecture; an architecture which is alive like nature, preserving its identity through temporal change and through local adaptation (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 8, 02/05/1988: 3).

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[318] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 9, lecture notes, "The Interior as Imago Mundi", 25/11/1989: 8-11.

In previous subsections (6.3.7, 6.3.10, 6.6.1, 6.6.4, 6.6.6, and 6.6.7) it was proposed that the recognition of ways of being is a process which opens *Dasein* to 'wonder' at that which is revealed and concealed above the rim of the abyss, and that, as wonder-saturated inhabitants, dwellers are called to be 'guardians' of the disclosure of truth. In the light of Norberg-Schulz's remarks on Pietilä, it can be argued that Norberg-Schulz viewed *Dasein*'s guardianship as a way to create architecture able to 'preserve its identity amid temporal change and local adaptation', i.e. as a "synthesis of 'constant and change'" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 11). Norberg-Schulz staunchly believed that the route towards the "invalidation of the conflict between continuity and change" depended on *Dasein*'s ability to comprehend things as "ways of being" (2000b: 75). Therefore, he viewed precognition as the "general foundation of the art of place" (2000b: 62).

The art of care suggests that Norberg-Schulz was right to propose that *Dasein*'s comprehension of the world is determined by the way *Dasein* 'is', but *Dasein* is not primarily a precognitive being. Rather, precognition sprouts from the fact that this being is 'concerned in its very being'. Heidegger believed that any 'understanding' (including precognition) depended on care. For *Dasein*, "understanding is ... a way of primary being toward something, toward the world and toward itself" and therefore "understanding and more so the way of enacting understanding, interpretation, are determined by [the] being of Dasein, by care" (Heidegger, 1925: 413-415/299).[319] Dwellers know places both by 'reaching', but fundamentally by letting the place 'touch' them, an interaction between *Gelassenheit* and perdurance (subsection 5.5.2). *Dasein* is the kind of being who can be touched by places, and who reaches to be touched by places, because *Dasein* is the being of care.

Livskunst reaches beyond the artificial confines of continuity and change. It has been argued (subsection 6.3.10) that continuity and change are concepts which depend on each other for definition and can, strictly speaking, not be separated and remain intelligible. Consequently, their 'unification' is rather meaningless. Care is more appropriate to life than the attempt to 'remain' between continuity and change. Care is the "qualitative content" that the art of place 'lacked' (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 356). As such, it indicates the appropriate way towards *livskunst*.

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[319] In a manuscript written as an ode to Pietilä, "The Way of Wonder", Norberg-Schulz alluded to the possibility that precognition is grounded in something like care: "[precognition is] the understanding that springs out of wondering love", since (and here he referred to the words of Augustine) "nothing is understood if it has not been loved before" (NAM 7, 1994: 1).

6.8.2 Gestalt phenomenology and the art of care

Subsection 4.8.2 discussed Norberg-Schulz's differentiation between the *Gestalt* way of being and the figure as an 'ontological difference' mitigated by the type (as that which remains). In the light of the extended discussion of the merits of continuity and change, it can be argued that Norberg-Schulz still saw the 'way of being' as a source of continuity, the figure as an intentional interpretation and the type as a kind of identity (the same) that preserved historical continuity and the ability of *Dasein* to recognise the 'origin' of a figure. The interaction between a type, a way of being and a figure may indeed describe a way to analyse architectural elements, but again, only as continuity and change. Therefore this method of analysis will not be able to explain the relationship between the thing and *Dasein*, or the way *Dasein* makes things as a concerned mortal. Norberg-Schulz's interpretation the ideal, the archetype, and the way of being, and the difference between *schemata* and identity, can all be characterised in terms of continuity and change. Ultimately, these terms are grounded in the same assumption; creative participation as the temporal interpretation of an enduring stability.

Norberg-Schulz presented the alternative to continuity and change as a choice between a 'static archetype' (monotony) and 'arbitrary self-expression' (chaos), but this is a misleading proposition. Consider Heidegger's concept of *Ereignis*. Norberg-Schulz asserted that *Ereignis* implies the way "something finds its appropriateness (*das Eigene*), or its identity" amid the mirroring of the fourfold. The "whole" of mirroring (the totality of the world that has been gathered) constitutes the "way of being and the very meaning of things" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 72). Therefore, in accordance with the expectations of *Gestalt* psychology, identity derives from the 'whole' and is "determined by the way of being between earth and sky" (2000b: 85). Norberg-Schulz believed that, amid the interaction of the fourfold, their "unity [established between the four participants] changes continually, while maintaining characteristics of endurance" (2000b: 72). He therefore understood the interaction between the members of the fourfold as a process of continuity and change.

However, Heidegger did not merely intend *Ereignis* as a type of accumulative identity-forming. *Ereignis* also alludes to the potential for "eräugnen", a "moment of vision", or "*Augenblick*" in which the world as a whole is poetically given (Malpas, 2006: 215). It has been argued that the possibility of disclosure depends on concerned measure-taking (aiming at an 'appropriate staying') that gathering is care-governed and that the place of the event can be best circumscribed as a region of care. Heidegger was adamant that *Dasein* participates in the fourfold as concerned mortal. Therefore the *Ereignis* of the

fourfold, from the perspective of the mortal, happens amid care. Only by recognising the ecstatic nature of *Dasein*'s interaction in the fourfold will it be possible to understand the architectural figure in a way "closer to life" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 137).

Ereignis involves neither continuity and change, nor a choice between monotony and chaos. Instead, it alludes to the way 'life takes place' for the concerned mortal. The goal of architecture is to dignify this emplaced care through acts of parsimonious attentiveness which allow for grateful dwelling; a process that requires the continuous appropriation of the wonder that always already is the interaction between life and place.

6.8.3 Presence, interaction, and the ecstatic nature of care

Norberg-Schulz understood *Dasein*'s participation in the interaction of the fourfold as 'presence'.[320] That Norberg-Schulz wanted to approach this interaction in spatial terms is indicative of his neglect of the temporal being of the intentional.[321] If architecture as *livskunst* aims to set-into-work the presence (*Anwesenheit*) of *Dasein*, then Norberg-Schulz's spatial focus must be augmented in terms of the temporal being of the intentional.

During the last phase of his work, Norberg-Schulz came to see the *genius loci* as a 'horizon of interpretation' that bestowed 'commonality' to the works of a region. His conception of the self-realisation of place leans heavily on this understanding of the *genius loci*. If an act of building is continuously guided by the 'whole', then the outcome is latent in every instance of the process itself as a continuous striving towards the renewal of that which persists as the same, or as Norberg-Schulz explained (speaking about Paris): "a totality that has realized itself over the course of history, maintaining its identity and becoming always new" (2000b: 211). Therefore, his concept of the self-realisation of the place is built on the assumption of an ultimate continuity which limits all change to the artificial realm holding sway between origin and inevitable cause.

In a very real sense, Norberg-Schulz, in PLP, came closest to the implications of Heidegger's thought regarding *Dasein*'s concerned being-in-the world. He tried to interpret Heidegger's concepts of *Ereignis* (2000b: 72), and *Gelassenheit* (2000b: 56), and sought to understand the interaction between figure and *Gestalt* in terms of the 'ontological difference' (2000b: 134). Yet his insistence on understanding these aspects in terms of

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[320] The translator of PLP opted to designate Heidegger's concept of *Räumlichkeit* (usually referred to as 'spatiality') as 'presence'. In contrast, Heidegger's translators used the word 'presence' when referring to *Anwesenheit*.

[321] See also the discussion on Bollnow's influence (subsection 6.3.4).

continuity and change also constitutes his most stubborn rejection of Heideggarian temporality. The art of care proposes to understand the life-care-place totality in the full ecstatic regioning of the fourfold; a regioning which denies the possibility of exclusively relying on 'solid foundations'.

In CtP Heidegger defined the *abyss* not only as a type of 'horizon' (that Dasein can envision), but as an "abyssal ground [*Ab-grund*]" designating "an original yawning open in hesitant self-witholding" (1938b: 380-382/301).[322] Essentially, Heidegger's *Ab-grund* indicates a disclosure without certainty; weak, fragile and all but unreachable except for *Dasein*. *Dasein* can reach beyond the *Ab-grund* as the one able to experience presence as restraint and *ek-stasis*[323]: always already extending beyond the 'smooth uniformity' of time, by being "captivated [die Berückung]" and "transported [die Entrückung]"[324] by a peculiar "remembering expectation" (1938b: 383-384/303). *Dasein* lives ecstatically, engaging the world uniquely. The *genius loci*, as *Ab-grund* (rather than horizon), offers no 'strong *Gestalt* or image' enforcing the self-realisation of place.

The art of care acknowledges the fragility of this ground. The *genius loci* is merely one of the elements of the fourfold (see subsection 6.4.3). As guardian spirit it shares a privileged relation with the being of care, but nevertheless forms an equally binding union with the other aspects. All are united in and all acting as living forces; the *genius loci* reveals and conceals amid earth and sky, and as a mortal, *Dasein* appropriates and forgets amid earth and sky. Additionally, all engage as *Ab-grund* to all; each constituting an abyss that must be "experienced and endured" (Heidegger, 1946: 90) and eventually 'reached over'. It is the poets who are called to "reach sooner", letting be what emerges (Heidegger, 1946: 115). The poet has to interpret 'more inceptually', rather than seeking a derivation of a self-realising continuity.

The abundance of *Dasein*'s presence, rather than being subjected to the artificial rigours of continuity and change, must be experienced ecstatically. The art of care proposes that the life-care-place totality is characterised by an ecstatic fourfold interaction, revealed in moments wavering between poetic abundance and scarcity, but always amid care.

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[322] See Glossary: *Ab-grund*.

[323] See Glossary: Ek-stasis.

[324] In Afrikaans it is possible to express the ecstatic nature of '*die Berückung*' and '*die Entrückung*' by stating that lived time proceeds '*met rukke en stote*' i.e. irregularly. Furthermore, a moving experience may be described in the sense that it "ruk" ('jerks' or 'tugs') your heart.

6.8.4 The dimensions of presence and care

In PLP Norberg-Schulz explained *Dasein*'s participation in presence in three ways: comprehension (or understanding), implementation (the enacting of understanding through interpretation) and use. It has been pointed out (in subsection 6.8.1) that Heidegger believed understanding and interpretation to be grounded in care. Similarly, *Dasein* does not primarily participate in Heidegger's fourfold as a user. *Dasein* participates as the one who is between birth and death, a "mortal" (1951a: 148). Use (even 'respectful use') fails to grasp the 'sparing' 'mortality' which defines the concerned dwelling of Heidegger's *Dasein*.

Dasein dwells in the fourfold as mortal. Heidegger proposed: "The time remains destitute ... because mortals are hardly aware and capable even of their own mortality. Mortals have not yet come into ownership of their own nature" (1946: 94). To leave vacant the being of the intentional, will result in an incomplete understanding of the significance of architecture as a thing in the world. *Dasein* understands its world as care, implements care-fully and participates as concerned mortal.

It must be pointed out that Norberg-Schulz envisioned the "moments of use" (2000b: 35) as a way to "[link] time and place" (2000b: 57). Heidegger, however, was adamant that the "Moment's authentic making present of the situation" could only be "maintained in the future that has been" (1927a: 410). This 'future that has been' neither refers to the 'continuity' (offset against 'change') of place nor the self-realisation of the place, but implies the ecstatic 'repetition' [325] appropriate to *Dasein*: "*only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially **having-been**, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be **in the Moment** for 'its time*'" (Heidegger, 1927a: 385). To be in the moment and to make appropriate use of the moment, is a capability safeguarded in the ecstatic being of *Dasein* as care.

The art of care, in contrast to Norberg-Schulz's reliance on the idea of 'respectful use', engages with *Dasein*'s 'sparing mortality' as concerned being-in-the-world, Furthermore, rather than relying on 'precognitive understanding', the art of care acknowledges thinking (Heideggarian *Andenken*) as the grateful "gathering of ... all that we care for" (Heidegger, 1951-1952: 144). Only in the marriage of the art of care and the art of place can architecture implement being-in-the-world as *livskunst*, because authentic (true to life) implementation rests on *Dasein*'s concerned measure-taking (and care-full *poiesis*) of the life-care-place totality. The art of care abides in sparing, draws the world into contiguity

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[325] See subsection 6.8.6.

through grateful thought and makes care-fully. Therefore building, dwelling and thinking are rooted in care. If *stedskunst* is to become *livskunst*, architects will have to acknowledge the temporal being of the intentional.

6.8.5 The implementation of stillness

Section 6.6 proposed an amalgamation of measuring, making and gratitude as an alternative to Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture; an approach capable of acknowledging the being of the intentional. In the following subsection these aspects will be augmented by referring to what Norberg-Schulz described as the foundation allowing "the implementation of presence to become feasible": quiet (2000b: 229).

Norberg-Schulz attributed the concept to both Heidegger and Kahn (2000b: 229). Louis Kahn described silence as "the unmeasurable, desire to be, desire to express, the source of new need" (Kahn cited in Lobell, 2008: 20). Kahn therefore saw silence as a source: "A great building, in my opinion, must begin with the unmeasurable, must go through measurable means when it is being designed, and in the end must be unmeasurable" (Kahn cited in Lobell, 2008: 48). In contrast, Heidegger approached silence as the resolute commitment to measuring itself: "Language is grounded in silence. Silence is the most concealed holding to the measure" (Heidegger, 1938b: 510/401).

Heidegger saw silence as the fruit of restraint (*Verhaltenheit*) holding open the possibility for a relationship (*Verhältnis*) between *Dasein* and language composed of two fundamental moves: "hearing [which] holds back with its own saying" (1950b: 207) and "saying [that restrains itself by resting in] propriation" (1959: 424). *Dasein*'s speaking can thus be understood as a "responding … attuned to … restraint that reserves itself" (1950b: 207). *Dasein* dwells in the concerned relationship between listening and saying: "Language speaks. Man speaks in that he responds to language. This responding is a hearing. It hears because it listens to the command of stillness" (1950b: 207). Therefore awaiting in stillness, the desire to speak into this quiet, and the speaking which constitutes *Dasein*'s response, is not fundamentally unmeasurable, but in its deepest sense "relational" (1959: 425); an awaiting that "bears silence" (1938b: 78-81/63-64).

Dasein is capable of 'bearing silence' because, as the being of care, it is not only "steward" and "preserver", but also "seeker" (1938b: 17-18/16). Seeking a way towards saying, *Dasein* can let be (bear) silence in anticipation. The *Gelassenheit* characterising *Dasein*'s silent awaiting (seeking) is a "restrained enduring" (1945: 144-145/94) that has been described as perduring-letting-be (subsection 5.5.2). The letting-be of *silence*

signifies *Dasein*'s dedication to language. It is through the silent acknowledgement of being bound to the measure that what is made (or built), *Dasein*'s 'sayings', are instilled with a peaceful appropriateness.

In contrast to Kahn's interpretation, Heidegger proposed that succumbing to the 'hold' of language, rather than implying an abdication to the unmeasurable, or the compliant submission to the generic, signifies a way for *Dasein* to live (as Heidegger said of Hebel) "listeningly" (1955: 297). In terms of measuring, making, gratitude, and silence, the art of care proposes that the grateful acceptance of that which has been made in response to concerned measuring is the adoration of the silence emanating from the letting-be of *Dasein*. It is the reverent restraining care which *Dasein* is, that allows the place to find its appropriateness amid *Dasein*'s care-full building. *Dasein*'s perduring restraint imbues the art of care with a hesitance, a remaining mute in listening reverence, that characterises poetic willingness. Care is the ground of respect. Thus care, in contrast to wilful self-assertion, makes possible the poetic humility that allows "quiet" to hold sway.

6.8.6 Re-interpreting language, style, and tradition in terms of care

Norberg-Schulz valued the traditional. It is, therefore, understandable that he would be attracted to Heidegger's conception of *Dasein* as concerned absorption in a world; one who is always already entangled (*Verfängnis*) in a tradition. However, despite the apparent correspondence between Heidegger's conception of tradition and Norberg-Schulz's attempt to ground his new interpretation of language, custom, and style in "care for the unity of place" (2000b: 354), Norberg-Schulz understood care (cultivation) in terms of continuity and change.

Already in GL Norberg-Schulz had proposed that a "*living tradition*" serves life as a progression regulated by continuity and change (1979b: 182). Similarly, In PLP, he presented 'care for the unity of place' as a self-realising progression towards a life-place totality, which "remains the same even if it is never identical" (2000b: 356). Consequently, Norberg-Schulz's concepts of imprint, composition and identifying intervention (subsection 4.8.6) was still subject to continuity and change. For the art of place to "once again become more authentic than it once was" (2000b: 312), tradition, style, and language, has to be rooted in ecstatic care.

Heidegger believed that an appropriate response to 'the Moment' was only available to a being engaged ecstatically in the situation (subsection 6.8.4) and happens as a "resolute repetition" (1927a: 392), which "neither abandons itself to the past, nor does it aim at

progress" (1927a: 386). While *Dasein* is always already absorbed in the "available stock of interpretations" (Polt, 1999: 91), ecstatically being-in-the-world also safeguards the poetic possibility of extending beyond these limitations. Richard Polt summarised Heidegger's formulation of tradition (in terms of care) as follows: "care is revealed most fully in authentic temporality, which involves resolutely facing up to mortality and repeating one's heritage in a moment of vision" (Polt, 1999: 108). The art of care maintains that there is a significant difference between a tradition interpreting care as 'progress' amid continuity and change and a tradition grounded in Heidegger's ecstatic understanding of care.

The ecstatic interpretation of care is open to fragility. Its timelessness is not given as an 'ideal', but preserved through the mortal stance which safeguards the perdurance of regioning. Architecture can never escape building traditions, but that is only because traditions are rooted in the being of *Dasein* as care. In later years Heidegger rephrased his understanding of tradition in terms of *Gelassenheit*: "Whatever and however we may try to think, we think within the sphere of tradition. Tradition prevails when it frees us from thinking back to thinking forward, which is no longer [engaged as a self-willing act of] planning" (1957b: 41). Seeing tradition as the perdurance of thinking forward capable of 'letting-be' (by resisting the lure of 'planning' and 'progress') is to think of tradition as the perduring-letting-be appropriate to the being of care. More than changing interpretations of enduring continuities, *Dasein*'s participation, informed by tradition, is a form of guardianship.

Norberg-Schulz's interpretations of language, tradition and style can be re-interpreted in terms of guardianship. Primarily, the impression of the place – the way the place touches us – must be engaged in a way open to the wonder of captivated obedience. Secondly, the act of 'composition' is no longer bounded by ordering, but by the hesitant reverence, both as resoluteness and humble restraint, of concerned measure-taking. Finally, the 'identifying intervention' must be characterised by what has been described as *sorgvuldigheid*, or care-full *poiesis* (subsection 5.5.8). *Sorgvuldigheid* implies the poetic concretisation of *Dasein*'s *sorgsaamheid* (concerned being-in-the-world). Making a work of architecture in a way that is *sorgvuldig* dignifies the restraint of *Dasein* as the being of care and "fatefully" holds open the possibility for "resolute repetition" (Heidegger, 1927a: 392) true to the 'historicity' (see subsection 6.3.10) of *Dasein*.

6.8.7 *Livskunst* and the holding sway of quiet

The art of care describes *Dasein*'s poetic measure-taking and the way it draws place and life into contiguity through the concerned *poiesis* (setting-into-work) of *Dasein*'s *Sorge*. The art of care provides an alternative to Norberg-Schulz's 'precognitive unification of continuity and change as ways of being'; an approach that acknowledges the sparing mortality characterising *Dasein*'s dwelling. Indeed, Heidegger believed that care is "the phenomenon from which we can … understand the various ways of being as ways of *being*" (1925: 408-409/295).

In contrast to the characteristics Norberg-Schulz ascribed to the art of place—hierarchy, a collective rootedness based on continuities which remain, and history as continuity and change (2000b: 221)—the art of care aims to be hermeneutic, made common through captivated obedience and ecstatically determined by the historicity appropriate to the being of the intentional. Furthermore, it is proposed that understanding the way care draws life and place into contiguity constitutes the profound (but lacking) "phenomenological understanding" (Norberg-Schulz, 2000b: 92, 229 & 356) that prevents contemporary architects from approaching the 'stillness' of the place. It has been argued that this 'drawing near' happens as a reciprocal interaction of reverent hesitance (of life as care) and the overwhelming abundance of place, made common in the wonder of captivated obedience, and envisioned as unique emplacement. To envision architecture as the gift of captivated obedience is to draw near *livskunst* and implies submitting to the sway of parsimonious attentiveness.

Despite his neglect of the being of the intentional, Norberg-Schulz himself identified one of the most telling instances of what architecture as art of care could look like. In "The Way of Wonder" (NAM 7, 1994) he described the lines drawn by Pietilä (in his sketches) as "searching rather than determined" (NAM 7, 1994: 5). To paraphrase Heidegger's characterisation of Hebel's language (subsection 6.8.5), Pietilä drew 'listeningly' hesitant lines gratefully accepting the poetic gifts which *Dasein* will never be able to enforce through effort, regulate through efficiency, or order through calculation.

Now it is possible to present *livskunst* as a response to the ways "abandonment of being cloaks itself" (Heidegger, 1938b: 119-124/95-98).[326] Against 'calculation' the art of care posits concerned measuring made common in the wonder of captivated obedience. To engage with place as a region of concern is to be open to the guardian spirit (subsection 6.4.3). Against 'speed' the art of care posits hesitant restraint and parsimonious

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[326] See subsection 6.4.7.

attentiveness. To engage with place as an 'abiding expanse' is to practice the mute listening respect capable of 'bearing silence' (subsection 6.8.5) and dwell 'sparingly'. Against 'the massive' the art of care posits the identifying appropriation of unique emplacement (subsection 6.4.8). To engage with place as a unique fourfold *Ab-grund* (subsection 6.8.3) is to allow the mysterious overcoming (as an overwhelming abundance) of Being to uniquely and intimately hold sway over the arrival of *Dasein* and its poetic participation.

This is the potential of the art of place augmented by the art of care; to celebrate and sparingly build the distinctiveness of all regions of concern in a way appropriate to, and informed by, the being of the intentional. In contrast to the "hunt for lived experiences" (Heidegger, 1938b: 123-124/98), the art of care resists the 'challenging-forth of machination' by poetically drawing near life as lived by the Being of the intentional. For *Dasein*, as the being of care, it is always already an option to engage its situation as a guardian, "seeker", "preserver", and "steward of the stillness of the passing of the last god" (Heidegger, 1938b: 294-295/232)

Life takes place as care and *Dasein* is always already emplaced in a region of concern. *Dasein*, capable of concerned measuring, dwells amid a regioning fourfold interaction. It is only as care that the mortal can participate creatively in this interaction. That is why the challenge Heidegger presented to *Dasein* is "ever [learning] to dwell" (Heidegger, 1951a: 159), rather than 'ever learning to build'. *Poiesis*, rather than being the measure, flows from concerned measure-taking.

The poetic is fleeting. Stillness can no more be concretised conclusively, than the source of any stream can be pinpointed. It *is* always already, or *not* at all. In the work of the concerned mortal, ringing out at certain moments amid the "ringing" (Heidegger, 1950a: 178) out of the fourfold, dwellers may experience a 'bearing of silence'.[327] Maybe, amid the holding sway of quiet, a realisation dawns; what seemed distinct—what seemed to endure as place and life—has been united in an open and dynamic *livskunst*.

6.9 Synthesis: grafting the art of care into the art of place

In this chapter is has been argued that Norberg-Schulz, by understanding time as continuity and change, perpetuated "*the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional*" (Heidegger, 1925: 178-180/129). The following section will argue that, in terms

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[327] Discussed in subsection 6.8.5 (Heidegger, 1938b: 78-81/63-64).

of the metaphysical restrictions identified by Heidegger, the art of care has the potential to renew Norberg-Schulz's art of place.

Norberg-Schulz failed to associate his poetic approach with the ecstatic temporality characterising Heidegger's *Dasein*. Consequently, Norberg-Schulz still saw precognitive comprehension as a way to understand the "[initial] act of transferring the individual phenomenon to a category" (2000b: 62). Norberg-Schulz's thinking, therefore, still involved an act of categorisation (or schematisation) under the sway of the calculative demand to "order everything that comes to presence into a technical inventory" (Heidegger, 1959: 420).

In contrast to the manipulative "frantic measuring and calculating" of calculative thinking, Heidegger posited *Dasein*'s concerned measure-taking that can "[let] the earth be as earth" (1951b: 224-226). Not desiring the imposition of order, neither the domination of progress, the art of care engages in thinking as anticipatory awaiting, ready for the drawing near of that which is of concern. It is this kind of grateful thinking which guides the art of care, when faced with the other distinctions.

In terms of the distinction between 'Being and seeming', it has been proposed that comparing places or figures to archetypes demotes all particularities to 'mere seeming'. It has also been argued that Norberg-Schulz's attempt to replace his reliance on archetypes with ways of being, did not address the deep-seated problematic embodied in his language of architecture. Furthermore, Norberg-Schulz's language transformed the 'ecstasies of care' into categories designating what *Dasein* ought to value in order to translate lived spatiality into appropriate built form. Thus the 'ecstasies of care' was made into possible approaches amongst others, rather than the way *Dasein* always already is in the world. If all traditions are seen as a mere semblance of an archetypal language, and all beings merely interact as a derivation from a way of being, then the 'truthfulness' of their interaction can be 'calculated' (in terms of correspondence) and 'asserted'.

Instead of a language of assertion, the art of care proposes the engaged reading of the place, grounded in concerned measure-taking, poetic making and gratefully bearing silence; an approach rooted in the perduring-letting-be of the place appropriate to the being of care. Beyond 'the ought', the art of care proposes a return to disclosive openness, rather than correctness; a language grounded in 'seeking' rather than categorisation. Such a language, built on *Dasein*'s concerned measure-taking, will be characterised by reverent hesitance and made common in shared captivation. This kind of language would encourage 'listening participation' and engage with the way architecture

can touch the dweller's heart. In Heideggarian terms care (*Sorge*) does not, primarily, refer to a 'moral stance' or a 'set of values'. Rather, it draws place and life into contiguity and thereby sustains the poetic measure-taking which gauges all that the concerned engage.

Instead of insisting on the certainties offered by what appears constant to the calculating mindset, the art of care is grounded in the ecstatic temporality particular to the being of the intentional, free from the confines created by setting Being against becoming. The art of care represents a more humane measure, a submission to care with liberating potential. To free the thing from the tyranny of continuity and change, implies allowing ecstatic restraint to engage the 'frailties' and 'mystery' of the fourfold *Ab-grund* characterising the gathering of all things. To free history from the tyranny (false certainty) of continuity and change, brings to bear an approach acknowledging the concerned intra-epoch historicity of *Dasein*, rather than the artificial inter-epoch categorisations of continuity and change. To free tradition from continuity and change is to foster an ecstatic relationship with tradition, resolutely questioned and attentively repeated. To free creative participation from the tyranny of continuity and change, allows mortal making to poetically engage in the full "being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)" (Heidegger, 1927a: 192) characterising concerned being-in-the-world. To free the identity of place from the tyranny of continuity and change, is to allow for any unique 'appropriation' and 'ownership' to take hold of the region of concern and to 'let be' the relationship between any being of care and the place it belongs to as a unique emplacement. To free the *genius loci* from the tyranny of continuity and change, is to allow the divine to pass by the place bringing to pass the pregnant stillness which precedes all disclosing.

While the art of place proposed engaging with the concreteness of lived space as place, the art of care proposes engaging with the concreteness of lived time as care.[328] In this sense the dweller will be able to find a tentative, yet resolute, foothold in the life-care-place totality through *poiesis*. Simultaneously, *Dasein*'s mortal works of architectural *poiesis* is presented as the poetic drawing close of 'care' and 'taking care' in a region of concern, as a listening response to the claim of presence. In Heideggarian terms, only the way held open by the art of care grants access to *livskunst,* care-fully expressing the shared wonder of being-in-the-world.

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[328] Initially I tried to create a new 'diagram' illustrating the grafting of the art of care into the art of place (as an alternative 'filter' to that of respectful use). However, it became clear that this would merely re-instate the false sense of certainty, which so often imposes itself on the frailties characterising the region of concern.

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6.10 Architecture as *livskunst*

One of the most important characteristics of *livskunst* is that it emerges out of life, rather than being a theory trying to order life. Faced with the question of why works of architecture can touch our hearts, Norberg-Schulz answered that buildings "make a stability manifest [that] seems to resist the flux of time".[329] In contrast, *livskunst* proposes that, rather than any characteristic of architecture, it is the concerned nature of the Being of the intentional that allows works to touch its heart in response to the fourfold regioning of the place. To paraphrase Le Corbusier: 'Care enters in. That is architecture'. Works of architecture do not 'touch us' because we "perceive [the architect's] intentions" (Le Corbusier, 1923: 141), but because *Dasein*, the being of care, is open to being touched.

In terms of Norberg-Schulz's formulation of architecture as the 'making of meaningful place', the art of care reveals that 'making' is always already imbued with care-fullness (*sorgvuldigheid*), that 'meaning' only matters to a being of care, and that 'place' designates not only a characteristic spatiality, but a spatio-temporal region of concern. *Livskunst* envisions works of architecture as mortal acts of care-full *poiesis*, grounded in the way *Dasein* always already lives in the world as emplaced concern, open to the overwhelming abundance of the place, but also capable of reverently and resolutely appropriating this place as a unique region of concern. *Livskunst* celebrates the spatio-temporal regioning of concerned being-in-the-world and alludes to the captivated obedience which remains an artistic possibility for architectural *poeisis*. In an undated handwritten document (NAM 23) Norberg-Schulz outlined his grasp of the life-place totality as follows:

> Life takes place.
> Place is intrinsic to life.
> Life demands an appropriate place.
> Place means to be between earth and sky
> (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 23).

The art of care, envisioning a way towards understanding works of architecture in terms of the life-care-place totality, proposes the following supplement:

> Life means to be between birth and death as care.
> Care is intrinsic to making places appropriate to life.
> Place and life are drawn close in care.
> Life takes place as care.

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[329] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 8, manuscript, "Architecture", n.d.: 10.

Norberg-Schulz was a thoughtful interpreter of Heidegger's philosophy, but continuity and change, even when united in precognitive ways of being, does not explain the intimate entanglement of lived time and fails to address the Being of the intentional; the person who ecstatically reaches into the future, is attuned by the past, and care-fully engaged in the moment. Life 'takes place' as care and *Dasein* makes things as a concerned mortal. Care persuades *Dasein* to await and anticipate the 'speaking' of the place and, therefore, the art of care reveals the art of place as meaningful. The art of care draws *Dasein*'s lived situation into contiguity with its 'there' (its place) not, primarily, as an 'existential spatiality', but as a spatio-temporal region of concern, located between earth and sky, taking place between birth and death.

7 Conclusion

Martin Heidegger proposed that the Being of the intentional – the way we, as *Dasein*, are in the world – is care (*Sorge*). In this thesis I have argued that Christian Norberg-Schulz, who is widely acknowledged to be one of the most prolific architectural interpreters of Heidegger's philosophy, neglected this key aspect of being-in-the-world. Norberg-Schulz thoughtfully used Heidegger's philosophy to reveal architecture as the art of place, building as the making of places between earth and sky. However, instead of engaging with Heidegger's concept of ecstatic care (which Heidegger used to explain the concerned nature of *Dasein*'s lived time), Norberg-Schulz understood time (and life) as continuity and change, an approach propagated by his mentor, Sigfried Giedion.[330]

Continuity and change represents an abstraction of human temporality. In the same way that Norberg-Schulz (inspired by Heidegger) rejected 'mathematical space' structured around an x, y and z axis in favour of 'place' (designating the way humans live in space), continuity and change must be replaced with an understanding of *Dasein*'s lived temporal reality as the being of care. As such, continuity and change stands in direct opposition to Norberg-Schulz's ultimate goal – that architecture be understood and practised as *livskunst*.[331] While his art of place serves as an authentic (true to life) safeguard against what Harries (1997: 226) called the "terror of space", continuity and change, as an abstract (removed from life) construct fails to offer relief from the "terror of time".

Heidegger's concept of care describes the concerned nature of human life and is able to provide a much more robust defence against the terror of time. I have proposed that *livskunst* always already envisions 'space' as 'place' and 'time' as 'care'. In order to study the architectural significance of the concept of care, the 'art of care' was introduced as a term which could be used to question and augment Norberg-Schulz's art of place (*stedskunst*). By augmenting Norberg-Schulz's art of place in terms of the art of care, a process of grafting intended to supplant 'continuity and change' with 'ecstatic care', this thesis aims to offer a way towards appreciating and designing architecture as *livskunst*.

One of the most important ways in which care has augmented the concept of place has been to suggest that place is not only a topological structure between earth and sky, but a region of concern determined by *Dasein*'s concerned measure-taking. Rather than an

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[330] In addition to continuity and change, this thesis has also mentioned Norberg-Schulz's appropriation of other aspects of Giedion's writings, like the need for a 'new monumentality' and a 'new regionalism' in service of the 'new tradition'.

[331] See Glossary: Art of the experience of living.

enduring continuity (which can be 'owned' by certain ethnic or political groupings), place thus becomes accessible as an ecstatic appropriation. This is not to say that the life-place totality Norberg-Schulz equated with dwelling is somehow 'wrong', or that care somehow robs the place of its concreteness, but it does suggest that the concerned nature of our dwelling, the way people live in place, can most appropriately be described as a life-care-place totality.

In a general sense, the study of Heidegger's concept of care and of place as a region of concern, engages with the presuppositions of any architectural *poiesis* (referring to both construction and design). It should be noted that care not only provides an alternative set of presuppositions for architectural design, but also suggests an appropriate 'method' for engaging with these matters, not as a 'methodology', but as a way towards concerned measuring appropriate to the being of care (see Chapter 2). Care also points to the precision and attentiveness which forms a fundamental part of the unique implementation (construction and documentation) of the design itself. Thus the concept of care has broad applicability in the 'region' which the *Gestell* of modernity has labelled the 'construction industry'.

In many ways the calculative nature of the construction industry facilitates "*the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional*" (Heidegger, 1925: 178-180/129). *Sorge* (as presupposition) and *sorgvuldigheid* (as the ground of concerned *poiesis*) point to the potential of understanding architecture as the art of care. The art of care liberates the particularities of the art of place, without relying on structuralist generalities or ideal archetypes. As the 'being of the intentional', the concept of care hopes to acknowledge the architectural implications of the way people always already live in the world. As such, the art of care can be seen as a way towards an authentic (true to life) humanistic approach to architecture.[332] That is, if we are able to transcend the modern tendency to make care into the metaphysical 'ought', the idea that one ought to care rather than acknowledging that we are always already care.

The art of care is not the product of 'learning to care'. It does not aim to inspire people to, somehow, 'care more'. Instead, the concept of care proclaims that we, as beings of care, are always already concerned about our world. Care makes something like 'history', 'memory' and 'meaning' accessible to *Dasein*. If we are to be true to the way we live in the world as care, then *livskunst* first of all implies that we resolutely reclaim and creatively

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[332] Heidegger's definition of humanism as *Sorgen* (care) and *Sinnen* (reflective thinking appropriate to the being of care) has been referred to in subsections 2.1.1 and 6.6.3. See Glossary: *Andenken.*

repeat the way we authentically are. The realm of care is beyond the subjective, the objective, the common and the idiosyncratic; beyond the 'easy pluralities' of art and science, thought and feeling, and continuity and change.

Works of architecture, as *livskunst*, express human presence (life) by giving concrete presence to *Dasein*'s emplaced concern. I have tried to understand human presence not only in a spatial sense, but also in terms of the linguistic triptych of situatedness, being-in-the-world, and being capable of speaking in answer to the speaking of the place.[333] Rather than an enduring spatial stability, *livskunst* aims at revealing the dynamic contiguity reigning between the 'Being of the intentional' and its 'region of concern'; a concerned regioning which presupposes the meaningful experience of the place, and its meaningful appropriation in works of architecture. Thus *livskunst* consists in building the reciprocal relationship between a being of ecstatic concern, capable of the *poiesis* of its *Sorge* (as reverent hesitance) and the holding sway of the place in all its overwhelming abundance. If *Dasein* wishes to participate in this interaction in a way that is authentic, then *Dasein* can only engage its situation as a mortal, as the one who is between earth and sky, but just as significantly, between birth and death. Only to the being of care, does the meaningful appreciation and *poiesis* of architecture (as *livskunst*) become accessible.

This chapter will give an overview of the insights and conclusions derived from engaging with the research objectives (section 7.1), succinctly summarise the original contribution made (subsection 7.1.4) and return to the broader concerns identified in the literature review (section 7.2). Finally, this conclusion will reflect on the contemporary relevance of the art of care (section 7.3) and aim to synthesise the most significant implications of grafting the art of care into *stedskunst*, as a way towards *livskunst* (section 7.4).

7.1 Research objectives

The following section will provide an overview of the ways in which the research objectives (listed in subsection 1.2.4) have been addressed. Firstly, the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy will be discussed (subsection 7.1.1). Secondly, the difference between continuity and change and ecstatic care will be summarised (subsection 7.1.2). Finally, this section will catalogue the implications of grafting the art of care onto Norberg-Schulz's art of place (subsection 7.1.3) and point to the original contribution made by this thesis (subsection 7.1.4).

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[333] See Glossary: Presence.

7.1.1 Norberg-Schulz's art of place and the role of continuity and change

In terms of the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, it has been shown that his approach to time, instead of being based on Heidegger's exposition of *Dasein*'s lived time, was grounded in an understanding of time as continuity and change and that this approach was derived from his mentor, Giedion. Figure 19 summarises the influence of Giedion's concept of continuity and change on Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* as a list of interacting dualities. During the last phase of his work Norberg-Schulz tried to unite continuity and change in 'the same' an approach indicated by adding a central mediating column.

CONTINUITY		CHANGE
Theme, order		Variation
Timeless continuity		Temporal interpretation
General		Particular (circumstantial)
Stabilitas loci		Temporal choices
Timeless general language of architecture		Local particular language of architecture
Space concept		Spatial interpretation
The basic principles of architecture		Particular works
Schemata and typical expectations		Particular events
Existential space as a general structure		The immediacy of the situation
Genius loci		Respectful interpretation
Arnheim's square diagram		Dornier's self-mutating-energies
Imitation (neglects change)		Invention (neglects continuity)
Monotony (lacks change, only continuity)		Chaos (lack of continuity, constant change)
Remains	The same	Never identical
Image remains as typical *imago mundi.*	The architectural image as identifying intervention.	The image is open to variation, re-interpretation and personal choices.
Tradition supported by the constancies (imprint) of the place.	Building tradition (custom) as a respectful interpretation of the imprint of the place.	The tradition is open to local adaptation and creative participation.
Remains as a possibility	Style as composition	Subject to choice and local interpretation
Archetype (*Gestalt*)	Stabilised in memories (type)	Figure (work)

Figure 19: The manifestations of continuity and change in Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*.

Chapters 4 and 6 discussed the various instances in which the interaction between continuity and change had a significant influence on the way Norberg-Schulz interpreted

the life-place totality. These chapters also indicated that Norberg-Schulz's fusion of Giedion's concept of continuity and change and Heidegger's formulation of being-in-the-world was influenced by the way Norberg-Schulz appropriated the spatial focus in Bollnow's *Human Space*, the 'easy plurality' implied by Venturi's *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* and the neglect of the difference between describable and meaningful places dormant in Lynch's *The Image of the City*. Furthermore, I have proposed that Norberg-Schulz failed to engage with the core contribution of Bachelard's *Poetics of Space* and that his reliance on Sedlmayr's structuralist method of analysis obscured the poetic possibilities implied by the ecstatic Moment.[334] Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of these works emboldened his understanding of time (and human life) as continuity and change and contributed to his neglect of the Being of the intentional.

Heidegger approached the concept of time on an ontological level. Rather than merely accepting the idea of 'human intentionality', Heidegger questioned the Being of the intentional and concluded that *Dasein* is, fundamentally, a being of care. Norberg-Schulz also started by questioning the idea of human intentionality. However, after realising that his interpretation of intentionality (in *Intentions in Architecture*) could not describe the concrete richness of the life-place totality, Norberg-Schulz substituted his interpretation of intentionality with a conception of human spatiality (understood in terms of continuity and change) without questioning the ontological implications of intentionality. In the following subsection it will be shown that there is a comprehensive difference between understanding the life-place totality in terms of continuity and change and what is implied by Heidegger's assertion that *Dasein* dwells in the world as care.

7.1.2 The difference between Heideggarian care and continuity and change

Heidegger believed that there are two fundamentally different ways of engaging with the world; his own approach, which sought to understand the ontological aspects of existence in terms of Being (and thus attempted to engage with the Being of the intentional rather than the idea of intentionality) and the metaphysical tradition[335] which, in ontic terms, defined Being in terms of 'something else'. The metaphysical tradition "restricted" Being in terms of 'becoming', 'seeming', 'thinking' and 'the ought' (Heidegger, 1935: 71-72/98-100); a sequence of restrictions which, when people think about Being, urges them to think in a calculative way.[336] Calculation stands against care, manifesting the way in which the

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[334] See Glossary: Ek-sistence, Facticity.
[335] See Glossary: Metaphysics.
[336] See sections 6.2, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, and 6.2.6.

Gestell of modernity has challenged the concerned nature of *Dasein*. In the previous subsection (7.1.1) it was pointed out that continuity and change had far-reaching manifestations in Norberg-Schulz's work, but now it can also be argued that the conceptual interaction between continuity and change is grounded in the differentiation between Being and becoming. I have argued that this distinction also introduced the other metaphysical 'restrictions' into Norberg-Schulz's work. Consequently, there is a significant discrepancy between Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* and Heideggarian being-in-the-world.

Heidegger's concept of care envisions human life as the concerned reciprocity between the being of care and its place, ecstatically revealed as a poetic whole (a region of concern). In contrast, the differentiation between Being and becoming construes life as an abstract progression from one 'now' (change) to the next, an incremental revelation, against a background of things which seem (referring to the differentiation between Being and seeming) to remain. The differentiation between Being (as a remaining continuity) and seeming is manifested in the metaphysical tendency to calculate (referring to the differentiation of Being and thinking) the 'correctness' of the correspondence between that which endures as an ideal and that which seems like the ideal. When Being is posited against thinking, thinking becomes calculation and categorisation, a way of ordering and structuring which aims at 'assertion' rather than 'revelation'. Such a way of thinking is no longer open to wonder. Instead, it substitutes the careful measure-taking of that which is with the way things 'ought' to be and the way one 'ought' to think. When subjected to 'the ought', care becomes the way one ought to be; a "special attitude" (Heidegger, 1927a: 193). Thus the way we always already exist in the world as a concerned mortal is obscured by the way we ought to live, and the possibility of *livskunst*—born from the reciprocal relationship between the concerned measure-taking of the being of care and the abundance of the place which 'is'—becomes a "hunt for lived experiences" (Heidegger, 1938b: 123-124/98). This 'condition' will be discussed in subsection 7.3.2 as the tyranny of lived experience.[337]

The metaphysical assumptions governing the differentiation between Being and becoming thus had far-reaching implications in Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*. Despite engaging with various aspects of Heideggarian phenomenology, remnants of calculative thinking can be seen in Norberg-Schulz's attempts at categorisation, structuring and ordering the life-world. In terms of the differentiation between Being and seeming, Norberg-Schulz's

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[337] The sequence of events depicted in this paragraph is based on Heidegger's explanation of the interrelated nature of the different metaphysical restriction of Being (Heidegger, 1935: 71-157/98-221). Also see sections 6.2, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.6, and 6.2.7.

language of architecture remained adamant that built figures had to correspond to 'something' (be it an archetype, *eidos* or way of being) which remains, and thus represented a language of assertion rather than revelation. Care, as something one ought to do, remained a concept that implied cultivation rather than the concerned Being of the intentional (see subsection 6.7.1). In addition to arguing that care (as an ontological concept) was neglected, it has been suggested that the concept of care was actively suppressed in favour of the abstract parameters of continuity and change (subsection 6.5.3). In terms of architectural history, *stedskunst* remained entrenched in the notion of inter-epochal progress favoured by historiology,[338] rather than engaging with the everyday historicity of *Dasein*, thereby neglecting the significance of intra-epochal moments of revelation. Especially in terms of architectural design, it is significant that continuity and change cannot engage the ecstatic moment of poetic revelation, the moment in which the whole is given in a fundamentally new and inspired way.

If architecture is to function as *livskunst*, dwellers should demand that works of architecture manifest the way life 'takes place', by acting as a safeguard against the "terror of time" and the "terror of space" (Harries, 1997: 226). In contrast to Norberg-Schulz's attempts to describe how works of architecture concretises the way life 'takes place', *Dasein*'s concerned way of being-in-the-world implies that time is not merely a matter of continuity and change. Instead, lived time is characterised by instances of significance and poetic disclosure, in which meaning takes hold of us, as moments of concern. Therefore, I have proposed that Norberg-Schulz's understanding of space as place should be augmented by an understanding of time as care.

In terms of the difference between the ontological implications of care and the metaphysical assumptions underpinning continuity and change, the significance of Heidegger's concept of care has been made clear. In chapter 6 the capacity of Heidegger's concept of care to engage *Dasein*'s lived temporality was appropriated as the art of care[339] and was used to re-interpret and augment Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*.

7.1.3 Grafting the art of care into Norberg-Schulz's art of place

Norberg-Schulz's reliance on continuity and change had a far-reaching and enduring influence on his work. Consequently, the art of care reveals a wide range of unexplored possibilities in *stedskunst*. Figure 20 illustrates these alternative possibilities by comparing

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[338] See Glossary: Historiology.

[339] The set of presuppositions constituting the art of care will be discussed in section 7.2.

the implications of understanding time in terms of continuity and change with the alternatives unlocked by engaging *Dasein*'s 'temporal situatedness' in terms of care.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE	ECSTATIC CARE
Time and life understood as continuity and change.	Time and life understood in terms of the art of care derived from Heidegger's concept of ecstatic concern.
Inter-epochal progress (6.6.3) from one 'space concept' (4.3.10) to the next.	Intra-epochal moments standing out from Being (ek-stasis) (6.6.2, 6.8.3 and 6.9).
Historiology (3.2.7 and 6.3.10)	*Dasein*'s historicity (5.3.2 and 6.3.10)
Metaphysics of Being and becoming (incremental change amid continuities) (6.2).	Temporality appropriate to the ecstatic unfolding of human life (5.3.2).
Metaphysics of Being and seeming (the interaction between the archetype and the figure, and the role of the language of architecture) (6.2.2).	Making understood as an emplaced mortal act inspired by concerned measure-taking and steeped in gratitude (6.4.4) and guardianship.
Metaphysics of calculative thinking (a structuring-ordering imposition) (6.2.3).	The poetic potential of thinking as restraint and *Gelassenheit*; being a seeker rather than an asserter (5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.6).
Metaphysics of the ought (care as a special attitude) (6.2.6).	*Dasein* always already lives in places as care; the life-care-place totality (6.4.2).
Dwelling as 'respectful use' (4.8.4).	Dwelling as 'sparing mortality' (6.6.2).
The goal of creating a strong image, figure, *Gestalt*, or place (6.8.3).	The possibility of gaining access to the uncertainty and loss embodied by the *Ab-grund*, thereby acknowledging the fragility of things (6.3.5).
Care principally regarded in terms of cultivation (4.7.1).	Care as cultivation and concern (6.7.1).
Self-realisation (4.8.3)	Preservation as guardianship amid ecstatic moments of care (6.7.1 and 6.8.6).
Creative participation as the interpretation (change) of a remaining order (4.3.7, 4.3.8 and 4.4.8).	Creativity and *poiesis* as concerned mortal acts of perduring-letting-be (6.3.7 and 6.3.8).
The place and the *genius loci* as an enduring stability (4.4.3).	Place as a region of concern under the sway of the guardian spirit (6.4.3), and appropriated as a region of concern.
Precognitive phenomenological understanding (4.8.1).	Ecstatic being-in-the-world as care (the ground of understanding) (6.8.1).
Ontic	Ontological (1.2.2)

Figure 20: The difference between continuity and change and ecstatic care

The art of care offers an alternative to the metaphysical restrictions holding sway over Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*. In contrast to the differentiation between Being and becoming the art of care engages with temporality as ecstatic concern, open to the

abundance of the moment. In contrast to the assertive correspondence between ideal and thing embodied in the differentiation between Being and seeming, the art of care focuses on the possibility of mortal creativity (care-full mortal *poiesis*) grounded in concerned measure-taking, gratitude and silence. Concerned measure-taking alludes to the capacity of *Dasein* to resist the calculative thinking which the *Gestell* of modernity have posited over and against Being.

The art of care builds on Heidegger's attempt to formulate a more inceptual approach to thinking; a more poetic approach capable of restraint (which has been described as hesitant reverence) and sparing resoluteness (which has been described as parsimonious attentiveness). Amid the overwhelming abundance of the place, *Dasein* is called neither to 'assertion' (see subsection 6.2.5) nor 'wilfulness' (see subsection 5.5.4), but to the wonder of captivated obedience. Here the frailty of things, ringing[340] out as echoes of our own mortality, take the place of our subservience to 'the ought'. Care is the way *Dasein* always already lives in the world. As such, the art of care springs from the concerned nature of the Being of the intentional.

7.1.4 Original contribution

The original contribution of this thesis includes, firstly, identifying the fundamental difference between Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*, based on an understanding of time as continuity and change and Heidegger's formulation of human being-in-the-world as ecstatic care (see subsection 7.1.2). Secondly, in order to arrive at a more cogent architectural interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, it has been proposed that there is a need for augmenting Norberg-Schulz's art of place with an art of care (see subsection 7.1.1). Thirdly, this thesis gathered the presuppositions underpinning Heidegger's concept of care as the 'qualitative content' which could serve as foundation for such an architectural art of care. Finally, the most significant contribution of this thesis consists in composing the art of care – inspired by the above-mentioned set of presuppositions (to be discussed in section 7.2) – and using it as a means to reveal and question the metaphysical assumptions underpinning Norberg-Schulz's art of place. Essentially, the art of care has been grafted into Norberg-Schulz's art of place (see subsection 7.1.3) in order to suggest an alternative way towards designing and appreciating architecture as *livskunst* (to be discussed in section 7.4).

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[340] The idea that silence may 'ring out' sprouts from Heidegger's idea that the silent "mirror-play" of the fourfold rings out (Heidegger, 1950a: 178); a "resonating" (der Anklang) constituting "the counterplay to the interplay" (Heidegger, 1938b: 85). See subsection 6.4.4 and section 6.8.

The art of care stands in contrast to the assumptions embodied by the metaphysics of constant presence. Yet the challenge exerted by the art of care does not consist in offering another set of certainties and methods to replace the abstract assertions of continuity and change. Rather than a foundation, the art of care is most appropriately engaged in terms of Heidegger's *Lichtung* and *Ab-grund*[341]; a way of thinking about architectural design which not only celebrates the lightening-clearing capacity of building as an act of mortal *poiesis*, but also acknowledges the fact that this seemingly stable foundation is always already under the sway of a withholding silence. That which has been revealed is always already subjected to a covering and veiling which accompanies *Dasein*'s most resolute attempts at clarification. Accepting the limits of our ability to reveal our situation discloses the potential freedom of letting-be that which 'is'.

Section 6.9 summarised the potential of the art of care to emancipate the concepts of tradition, creative participation, *genius loci*, thing, history and dwelling from the implications of continuity and change. In the next section the ways which have been opened by grafting the art of care into the art of place will be discussed in terms of the recurring themes identified in the Literature Review.

7.2 Care and the broader themes identified in the literature

The seven themes identified in Chapter 3 (section 3.2) revealed the need to engage with Heidegger's concept of care. The following section will revert to these themes in order to illustrate the ways in which the concept of care has been used to augment the art of place within the H:N-S dialogue. The goal of re-interpreting these themes[342] in terms of care is to summarise the qualitative capacity of the presuppositions amalgamated in the art of care. The art of care reveals many new possibilities within Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* and points toward the possibility of appreciating and designing architecture as *livskunst*.

7.2.1 The metaphysical assumptions underpinning *stedskunst*

The way in which the art of care has been used to unmask the metaphysical underpinning of Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* and the alternative offered by the presuppositions underlying the art of care were discussed in subsection 7.1.3. In contrast to the abstractions

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[341] See Glossary: *Ab-grund*, *Lichtung*.

[342] The order in which these themes have been discussed represents an 'inversion' of the structure used in section 3.2. Section 3.2 started by discussing the cogency of Norberg-Schulz's reading of Heidegger, and ended by identifying the need for an investigation of the metaphysical implications underpinning the art of place, this section first enquires about Norberg-Schulz's metaphysical assumptions and ends with a discussion of his contribution.

offered by continuity and change, the seeming correspondence between the thing and the archetypal ideal, the categorisation implied by calculative thinking and the prescriptions of 'the ought', the art of care is rooted in human life as emplaced concern.

Fundamentally, the set of presuppositions gathered in the art of care engages with the way people are 'moved' by works of architecture, the possibility that *Dasein*'s heart may be 'touched' by a building. Instead of 'perceiving the intentions' of the designer (as Le Corbusier suggested) places and works touch *Dasein*'s heart because *Dasein* is open to the moment of vision. In the ecstatic instance of revelation *Dasein* is reminded of its own Being by buildings ringing out with the care we always already are.

However, care not only engages with the way we appreciate buildings, but with our capacity to design them. Norberg-Schulz suggested the language of architecture as a way to set-into-work the 'speaking' of the place. He based this language on the moments of care, but then subjected it to the strictures of continuity and change. His language of architecture thus became a general 'meta-language' which could be applied to the particularities of the place; a language of assertion. The 'correct application' of such a language could be judged in terms of the building's suitability to the topology, its references to typology and the correspondences between the natural topology and the building's morphology. The art of care has been used to re-interpret Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture.

In contrast to viewing language as an act of assertion, the art of care points toward the way *Dasein* engages the world, a world that matters to it, as emplaced care. Every moment of engagement implies measure-taking. Rather than quantification, Heidegger's idea of measuring is decidedly poetic and describes the ability to let-be, rather than an assertion aimed at structuring or ordering. In terms of architectural design, measuring implies the concerned envisioning of a region of concern as a work of care; not only as 'visualisation', 'complementation' and 'symbolisation' originally proposed by Norberg-Schulz, but as an ecstatic moment filled with poetic intensity. The art of care suggests that we are able to visualise, complement and symbolise, able to gather, because we are beings of care.

Latent in Norberg-Schulz's language of architecture is the idea that 'measure-taking' according to certain parameters – topology, typology and morphology – will result in an appropriate building. In contrast, the art of care calls for a more comprehensive appreciation of that which is given; an appreciation not only guided by that which is envisioned, but also by the way we are. By recognising human existence as emplaced concern we gratefully accept that which is. In this moment of acceptance *Dasein* is willing to listen to the silence of the place, a silence ringing forth from the letting-be of *Dasein*. Amid the ringing of

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reverent restraint *Dasein* is engaged in the appropriateness of the place. The grateful recognition of the appropriateness of the place is the spring of appropriation and the prerequisite for care-full building. The language of architecture can only be true to the concerned nature of *Dasein* by remaining mute. In listening reverence – a hesitance that awaits and trusts the poetic potential of the Being of the intentional – *Dasein* is able to compose and voice its concern as a care-full answer. Care is the spring of respect; a concerned measure-taking grounded in the restraint of poetic humility that gratefully allows the quiet abundance of the place to hold sway. The art of care, as an alternative to the language of architecture, holds open the way towards grateful dwelling.

7.2.2 The temporal nature of care as a way towards grateful dwelling

Norberg-Schulz, by neglecting the Being of the intentional, also failed to acknowledge the fundamental nature of *Dasein*'s participation in, and dwelling amid, the fourfold. Norberg-Schulz discussed the manifestations of dwelling as creative participation, creative conservation and respectful use. These are helpful and necessary aspects of dwelling poetically (i.e. dwelling as a maker), but Heidegger believed that the most foundational human characteristic which defines dwelling is our 'sparing mortality'. *Dasein* participates in the fourfold as a mortal, therefore everything *Dasein* makes as a gathering of the fourfold, every creative act, is imbued with our mortality and flows from our mortality. The sparing nature of mortal existence is grounded in our capacity to take things "under our care" (both as a physical act and as a mental appropriation), gratefully "sparing" them and keeping them safe (Heidegger, 1951a: 147-149).

The architectural implications of our sparing mortality have been summarised as our capacity for parsimonious attentiveness (see subsection 6.6.2), a concept derived from the way human creativity happens as an act of perduring letting-be[343] of our emplaced care. As beings of care, we perdure in our attentive parsimoniousness (a term appropriate to our capacity for 'sparing'), thereby granting a precision (*sorgvuldigheid*) to our makings. Simultaneously, we gratefully let-be (the silence of) that which 'is', by acknowledging the fragility of the ties of mortal care which draw our lives and places close (*sorgsaamheid*). Parsimonious attentiveness aims to suggest architectural ways to acknowledge the nature of our *poiesis* as acts of sparing mortality, a position which stands in stark contrast to the assumptions underpinning efficiency (see subsection 7.3.1).

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[343] See Glossary: Resoluteness.

Dwelling gratefully implies the interaction of concerned measuring, mortal making as parsimonious attentiveness and the capacity for sparing both the overwhelming abundance and the silence of the place. When we build in this way, our creations first ring forth with our gratitude and proclaim our mortal care, and then re-awaken us to the gifts of parsimonious attentiveness, a virtuous circle of gratitude appropriate to the concerned nature of *Dasein*.

7.2.3 History and historicity

One of the key aspects associated with dwelling is, as Norberg-Schulz's rightly pointed out, being at peace (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 22; Heidegger, 1951a: 147). The art of care suggests that this peacefulness not only implies that we are 'enclosed' in our own spatiality, in an "enclosure" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 22), but that we have somehow managed to make peace with our own temporality. Ontologically this means that we have made peace with the peculiar relationship between our 'concerned existence' and our 'history', which Heidegger called our "historicity" (1927a: 375). It has been argued that Norberg-Schulz, by understanding time in terms of continuity and change, neglected the ontological nature of *Dasein*'s historicity in favour of the ontic concerns of historiology.

In a certain sense, one can agree with Norberg-Schulz when he claimed that the inability to solve "the contradiction between continuity and change" was the reason the 'new tradition' faltered (Norberg-Schulz, 1991b: 94). However, it is a failure which he re-appropriated into his own work. Norberg-Schulz's theory of place carries within itself the potential of humanising our conception of spaces as places, but neglected the humanisation of human temporality. Even in the last phase of his work, by trying to unite continuity and change in Heidegger's 'idea' of "*Seinsweise*", or ways of being (Norberg-Schulz, 1991b: 94), rather than engaging with the particular *Seinsweise* of the being of care, Norberg-Schulz overlooked the possibility of humanising time and history in line with *Dasein*'s concerned existence.

The art of care is based on the idea that something like history is possible because of *Dasein*'s historicity. The fact that *Dasein* is open to temporality implies that we always already have the capacity to stand out (ecstatically) from our situation towards that which always already presents itself as a possibility, while simultaneously acknowledging that which has been. Heidegger's study of historicity also revealed that, for the most part, we exist as beings absorbed in the events of our situation. The ek-stasis of the poetic

Moment 'stands out' in contrast to this absorbtion[344] and reflects the way humans live as care. Therefore, the art of care opens the way towards the humanisation of *Dasein*'s lived time (as care) and lived history (as historicity).

7.2.4 The subject and the Being of the intentional

The mortal fragility and concerned involvement of *Dasein* as being-in-the-world stands in stark contrast to the Cartesian differentiation between subject and object. *Dasein* lives amid the fragility of things as a mortal. When we fail to acknowledge the "frailties of things" (Heidegger, 1946: 127) we harden our stance towards our own finitude, a position which closes us to the mortal wonder of emplaced concern.

By focusing on the need for a continuity which could imbue changes with meaning, Norberg-Schulz obscured the 'frailties of things' in favour of 'strong' (or 'imageable') places (1979b: 179), *Gestalten* (1984a: 66), and images (2000a: 66). This is not to dismiss the values of 'strong places'; places with a recognisable order and memorable spatial structure. In the Preface I mentioned that this thesis was initially inspired by the Ottoman Külliyes as examples of such strong places. Besides the fact that 'strong places' move us not because of their 'strength', but because we (as beings of care) are open to being 'moved' (see subsection 7.2.1), these Külliyes also point to the fact that the strongest places (like Süleymaniye Külliye) may not be those which possess the most ordered or recognisable *Gestalt* (like Fatih Külliye), but that there are other aspects which might play an even more significant role.

Norberg-Schulz believed that strong places are the outcome of the interaction between "location, general spatial configuration and characterizing articulation" (1979b: 179). In contrast, the art of care views the 'location' as a region of concern (see subsection 7.2.6), the 'spatial organisation' as instances of concerned gathering (rather than ordering) and the 'articulation of the form' as an instance of care-full making. Thus the 'strong identity' of certain places is the result of *Dasein*'s concern and cultivation (i.e. *Sorge*), rather than any continuous yet changing 'property' of the place. The art of care suggests that strong places are not primarily the result of a strong *Gestalt*. Rather, as guardians of the care of their inhabitants, their 'strong identity' may well reflect situations in which people have, for extended periods of time, invested their lives in similar concerns.

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[344] This ecstatic event has been illustrated by referring to two short stories by Tarjei Vesaas (subsections 4.6.1 and 6.6.1).

However, it is important to acknowledge that even in 'strong places' there are moments in which the place may be appropriated in fundamentally new ways, instances in which the place is revealed as a new region of concern. All lived places are imbued with the frailty of the mortal beings who appreciate its seeming 'stability'. In acknowledging the frailty of all mortal creations, the illusion of domination and ordering is replaced by the reverent hesitance holding sway in the moment before those who are "more daring by a breath" (Heidegger, 1946: 137) find words befitting their emplaced fragility.

What has been described as reverent hesitance acknowledges the way *Dasein* makes things as a mortal; an act of parsimonious attentiveness which rings out (proclaims) the fundamental 'incompleteness' (see subsection 7.2.5) characterising *Dasein*'s mortal engagement with space and time. The wish for strong figures and coherent systems is a product of modern 'calculative thinking' which obscures the fragility of things and mortals by demanding certainty and unmitigated possession; a false certainty which has found a foothold in the modern reliance on the visual.

7.2.5 The questionable role of visual perception

In contrast to Otero-Pailos's claims, I have argued that Norberg-Schulz's art of place, rather than being a "visual project" (2010: 176), represents an attempt at understanding the role architecture plays in the intimate relationship between life and place. However, Norberg-Schulz's belief in the value of 'strong places' with a 'strong *Gestalt*' (see subsection 7.2.4) reveals a measure of faith in the certainties offered by visual ordering; a belief in visual correspondence evident in his view that works of architecture represent *Dasein*'s 'obvious answer' to the "obvious presence" of the place (2000b: 28).

The art of care contends that understanding the place as an obvious reality between earth and sky, and the act of building as an equally obvious response to this reality, implies the same 'relegation to the obvious' that has underpinned the modern 'forgetting of Being' as that which appears "most universal" (Heidegger, 1927a: 3). Heidegger argued that our concerned awareness of Being actually represents that which is most peculiar and 'strangely unique' (*seltsam*) to *Dasein* (1957b: 36). What in contemporary times seem like the 'obvious (visual) correspondence' between dweller and place (for instance, when people look at vernacular architecture) masks the fact that places have always been filled with multiple voices.

The art of care contends that there is a fundamental 'humanity' (see subsection 6.3.1) underlying the compositional (or visual) aspects of continuity and change which opens

dwellers to the possibility of captivated obedience, the possibility that we may be united in admiring certain highly revelatory built interpretations. Therefore, it can be argued that what appears as the obvious progress of continuity and change is a consequence of our way of being in the world, rather than being constitutive of the way we live in place.

Dasein's concerned way of being in the world is far from obvious. Instead, it constitutes 'that which is nearest', that which allows for the possibility that things and places draw near us and matter to us. This constitutes a profound mystery; that which is most vulnerable and fragile – the everyday lived associations we have with places and things – elicits the most enduring wonder. To acknowledge the vulnerability of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world is to recognise that human spatiality is not 'obvious', but unique and rare, a fragile stance rather than an "existential foothold" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 19). The art of care can, therefore, be used as a way to reflect on the unique interaction between the overwhelming abundance of the place and the unfinished fragility of *Dasein*'s mortal existence, characterised by Heidegger as "being-toward-death" (1927a: 329).

In order to understand the relationship between life and place, architects not only need *stedskunst* as a way to illuminate the life-place totality as an existential space between earth and sky, but should also recognise the role of care and its connections to mortality and the divine. *Livskunst* engages with the vulnerable nature of *Dasein*'s life in contrast to that which seems to be general and eternal; space and time. However, the concerned nature of lived space (as place) and lived time (as care), a life-care-place totality, should remind us of the precariousness of that which can so easily appear obvious.

7.2.6 Identity, tradition, style and language

The art of care has been used to challenge the metaphysical underpinnings of Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst*. In contrast to the "hierarchical" nature of Norberg-Schulz's art of place, the art of care suggests a hermeneutic stance, inspired by the circularity of care taking care (2000b: 221). While Norberg-Schulz based his art of place on the "collective … implementation" (2000b: 221) of an enduring stability, the art of place depends on the ability of works of art to instil a sense of captivated obedience in dwellers. Most significantly, while the art of place is founded on an understanding of history as "permanence and change" (2000b: 221), the art of care is ecstatically determined by the historicity appropriate to the Being of the intentional.

I have argued that care draws life and place into contiguity as a dialogue of belonging and dedication; a sense of belonging, indicating a "strange ownership" (Heidegger, 1957b: 36)

and dedication, indicating a "strange appropriation" (Heidegger, 1957b: 36), that points beyond the certainties of the general and the particular, to where 'life in place' is revealed as a hermeneutic regioning of concern. The place, as an overwhelming abundance, and dwellers, as concerned measure-takers of this abundance, are engaged in a reciprocal regioning in which the identity of the place is ecstatically appropriated and re-appropriated as a region of concern. Works of architecture can be considered poetic expressions of this region of concern, mortal acts of making dignifying *Dasein*'s emplaced care. Amid this regioning, it is possible for people to be united in captivated obedience, both to the place and to the works which constitute its built heritage.

Understanding place as a dynamic regioning, inspired by the wonder that anything 'is' at all, provides a timely alternative to the idea of place as a physical domain (ultimately necessitating the 'militarisation' of place) inhabited by people with a similar identity derived from an enduring character of the place. Norberg-Schulz's belief in place as an enduring continuity, or identity, overlooked the capacity of political forces to recast the place and the life which takes place there. The art of care makes room for the political, in that it acknowledges the Being of the intentional and its role in the 'political appropriation' of the place. However, the goal of recognising the influence of the political is not to make works of architecture more 'politically responsible'. Instead, the art of care suggests that 'political implications' stem from our concerned existence. A work inspired by our care, will inevitably be infused with a certain political stance. To engage with the political, always already implies engaging with the concerned Being of the intentional.

The art of care also suggests that Norberg-Schulz's view of tradition and style and his interpretation of Heidegger's concept of language (as a language of architecture) can be approached in terms of guardianship. In the closing pages of PLP Norberg-Schulz re-interpreted custom and style in terms of "imprint", "composition" and "identifying intervention" (2000b: 353-354). Primarily, the impression of the place, the way the place touches us, sprouts from our openness to the wonder of emplaced concern. Places have meaning not because they are inherently meaningful, but because we are inherently open to meaning. We participate in the wonder of the place because we are open to wonder. Far from primarily being 'orderers' of the physical properties of the place, we compose the 'place' as a region of concern, a revelatory granting which we receive and guard gratefully. Instead of viewing the composition of a work of architecture as an act of ordering (the place) dictated by a language of architecture, the art of care sees architectural *poiesis* as an act of mortal making, conducted by one who participates in the regioning of the place as a region of concern through concerned measure-taking.

In contrast to the "challenging-forth" (Heidegger, 1953: 321) characterising the modern *Gestell*, the art of care suggests that receiving the imprint implies the willingness to safeguard the silence of the place, as a "bearing of silence" (Heidegger, 1938b: 77-81/62-64), and that composition can best be approached as an act of hesitant reverence. This implies that the language of architecture (also see subsection 7.2.1), re-interpreted in terms of guardianship, measuring, making, gratitude, and silence, consists in the grateful acceptance of that which has been given amid the guarding adoration of the silence echoing from the letting-be of *Dasein*.

Understanding the impression of the place and our guarding composition in terms of the being of care, implies that the 'identifying intervention', composed in response to the region of concern, will be a work of *sorgvuldigheid*, or care-full *poiesis* (subsection 5.5.8). *Sorgvuldigheid* implies the poetic concretisation of *Dasein*'s abiding *sorgsaamheid* (concerned being-in-the-world). Making a work of architecture in a way that is *sorgvuldig* dignifies the restraint of *Dasein* as the being of care, reveals the place as a region of concern and "fatefully" holds open the way towards tradition as a form of "resolute repetition" (Heidegger, 1927a: 392) true to *Dasein*'s concerned 'historicity'.

7.2.7 Norberg-Schulz, Heidegger and the art of care

Norberg-Schulz's art of place revealed the architectural significance of various important aspects of Heidegger's philosophy and offered a valuable interpretation of human life between earth and sky. However, in terms of the mortal nature of *Dasein*'s temporal existence (ringing forth from the fourfold interaction between earth, sky, mortal, and divine), Norberg-Schulz, by interpreting time and *Dasein*'s life as continuity and change (an abstract approach under the sway of the metaphysical distinction between Being and becoming), perpetuated the situation which Heidegger described as "*the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional*" (1925: 178-180/129). Heidegger's philosophy not only revealed the emplaced nature of our existence, but also claimed that the "*constant unfinished quality*" of mortal life in place, *Dasein*'s temporal existence, happens as care (Heidegger, 1927a: 236). *Dasein* lives (between birth and death) in place (between earth and sky) as care. If architecture is to be understood as *livskunst*, as Norberg-Schulz desired, then architects need to engage with the nature of both place and care.

Instead of constituting two isolated concepts, the concepts of care and place reveal compelling facts about each other. Place reveals the way in which care always already identifies with (and is drawn to) a concrete region between earth and sky (i.e. care is not only a 'subjective feeling'). Care reveals place not only as a concrete topological reality,

but as an appropriated region of concern (i.e. place is not only a defined topology which can be 'thought objectively'). The interaction of place and care thus constitutes a lived regioning. Care, as the Being of the intentional, always already transforms locations into regions of concern and thereby challenges the 'destitution' characteristic of the *Gestell* of modernity.

Vår oppgave er å forsta og tolke,	Our task is to understand and interpret,
dyrke og kultivere,	grow and cultivate,
fastholde og uttrykke.	keep and express.
Det er da vi bor,	It is then that we dwell,
og stedet blir vårt hjem. [345]	and place becomes home. [346]

In a "destitute time", wherein place remains lost, the poet is called "to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods" (Heidegger, 1946: 92). Norberg-Schulz envisioned the architect as one such a singing witness (1979b: 185), a poet devoted to the voice of the place. It is Heidegger's ecstatic concept of care itself which best describes Norberg-Schulz's contribution and its mystifying suppression in favour of the artificiality of continuity and change, indicates that even those who are most resolutely open to wonder may fall prey to the unquestioned trappings of the 'traditions' they are seeking to preserve.

This section has presented the main 'set of presuppositions' suggested by Heidegger's concept of care. Together, these presuppositions constitute the art of care. It has been argued that grafting the art of care into the art of place, holds open new possibilities in Norberg-Schulz's *stedskunst* and envisions a way towards designing and appreciating architecture as *livskunst*. However, the art of care, while formulated within the H:N-S dialogue, also points to alternative ways to address two of the most important challenges facing contemporary architectural design. The potential of positing the art of care against these challenges, identified in section 1.6 as the 'tyranny of efficiency' and the 'tyranny of lived experience', points towards the contemporary relevance of the art of care, and indicates two significant avenues for future research.

7.3 The contemporary relevance of the art of care

In terms of *livskunst*, it has been pointed out that, while Norberg-Schulz viewed continuity and change as a safeguard against 'chaos' and 'monotony' (see subsections 4.3.1, 4.5.3,

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[345] Norberg-Schulz, NAM 12, a stanza from the manuscript of Minnesjord written in free verse, Chapter 5, Dal [Valley].

[346] Translation by author. I am indebted to Dr Gro Lauvland, who offered insights and valuable guidance on the translation of this passage from Norwegian into English.

and 4.6.3), the choice he sketched between chaos and monotony is misleading (see subsection 6.8.2). It is a choice which obscures more pressing matters by oversimplifying two latent dangers entrenched in the contemporary technological worldview. Far more insidious than 'chaos' is the "[transformation of] 'life' into the calculable whirl of an empty self-circling" in search of "lived experience", masquerading as "closeness to life" (Heidegger, 1938b: 494-495/389). Far more concerning than 'monotony' is the "subservience to … the challenging-forth of enframing" that reduces *Dasein* to the "orderer of the standing-reserve" (Heidegger, 1953: 332) speaking the calculating "language of enframing", a language "challenged to correspond to the ubiquitous orderability of what is present" (Heidegger, 1959: 420).

The art of care challenges the tyranny of efficiency and the tyranny of lived experience, two terrors which have found a particularly strong foothold in the construction industry. Significantly, both strands of thought are also evident in contemporary architectural design, but are obscured by the fact that they have associated themselves with approaches masquerading as solutions to these exact challenges; the tyranny of lived experience in the work of architects focusing on the phenomenology of architectural experience and the tyranny of efficiency in the legitimate concerns of ecological design.

7.3.1 The tyranny of efficiency and parsimonious attentiveness

It has been pointed out that in his final book, *Architecture: Presence, Language, Place* (2000b), Norberg-Schulz proposed that "the ecological crisis ... can only be solved with an authentic phenomenological understanding of place [which] takes its inspiration from the taking place of life" (2000b: 88). In other words, ecological architecture must be informed and inspired by the way people live in places. I have argued that the most authentic (true to life) way to approach *Dasein*'s emplaced existence is to understand the relationship between life and place in terms of the concerned Being of the intentional. Heidegger posited *Dasein*'s capacity to engage with the world through acts of concerned measuring against the pervasiveness of technological calculation in search of efficiency (see subsections 1.6.1 and 5.5.4). Rather than engaging with the possibility of *Dasein* as care, it is precisely the quest for efficiency that has become the foundation of architecture's response to contemporary demands for sustainability.

It is not that efficiency itself is a problem. Efficiency is one of the most important challenges which face architects, but it should be seen as a 'result' instead of a 'source'. Too often, efficiency, rather than being understood as the result of *Dasein*'s parsimonious attentiveness, has become the latest justification for the modern calculative mindset. In

terms of the art of care, it can be argued that calculative being-in-the-world is diametrically opposed to dwelling as a sparing mortal. Under the sway of calculation, things become commodities, "calculated objects" (Heidegger, 1946: 127) to be used and discarded. Calculation reduces thinking to the ordering of facts, world to resource, measuring to quantification, and making to efficiency. Calculative thinking renders the being of care indifferent and impoverished.

As an example, it can be argued that the extent to which calculation holds sway within the construction industry is evident in a most unexpected source, *The Living Building Challenge 2.0* (LBC), a contemporary set of guidelines attempting to "[define] the most advanced measure of sustainability in the built environment". While it is true that the LBC is well-intentioned and could have considerable positive effects, it is still structured around "performance areas" (McLennan & Brukman, 2010: 7). Is a 'living building' the 'setting-into-work' envisioned by *livskunst*? Can any 'guidelines' address architectural indifference, if *Dasein* refuses to act as caretaker of the truth of Being? Or are these guidelines merely an example of the culmination of the efficiency-driven mindset, now masquerading as the solution to the legitimate concerns of ecological design?

Heidegger implied that such guidelines, as an approach under the sway of the calculating modern mindset, "at best come to the point of calling for an ethics of the technological world" (Heidegger, 1957b: 34). Amid such distorted calling, the claim of Being on the being of care is lost. Efficiency echoes the mindset structuring modern industrial practices. In contrast, the art of care could represent an important step towards formulating a more appropriate (true to life) architectural response to the ecological crisis, an appreciation of architecture as a form of *poiesis*, rather than 'efficient production'.

Heidegger's concept of dwelling advanced the notion of living *with* the place, in a way characterised by parsimonious attentiveness; a fourfold "sparing and preserving" (1951a: 147). The world will not be 'spared' through efficiency. For instance, Heidegger wrote "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951a) and "...Poetically Man Dwells ..." (1951b) in response to Germany's "housing shortage" after World War II. In this "climate of shortage" he did not turn to measures of 'efficiency', but to "building" as "poetic creation" (Heidegger, 1951b: 211-213). In *poiesis*, *Dasein* preserves what is granted, a caretaker measuring as a sparing mortal, rather than a calculative being. While efficiency may be the result of such measuring, it does not constitute or inspire the measuring (see subsection 5.5.8). The exclusive measurement (quantification) of 'sustainable architecture' in terms of 'efficiency' is not inevitable. Rather, it could be construed as an inauthentic approach,

indifferent to the plight of *Dasein* as the being of care and removed from the concerns of human life.

In one of his last works, "Art and Space" (1969), Heidegger succinctly re-iterated the appropriate interaction between places and things by stating that place "grants ... a dwelling for man in the midst of things" (Heidegger, 1969: 11/7) and "opens a region in which it gathers the things in their belonging together" (Heidegger, 1969: 10/6). We can choose to release the 'granting' of places through poetic revelation, or we can try to impose order by 'force'. The appropriateness of *Dasein*'s transformed places hangs in the balance. Heidegger described the reality of a world ruled by machination as a totality of "time, space, and force" (1938b: 123-124/98). The alternative offered by the art of care has been described as a life-care-place totality (see subsection 6.4.2).

The response of the construction industry to the looming ecological crisis has revealed the prescience of Heidegger's words and the persistence of the 'loss of place' has demonstrated our sustained inability to architecturally translate the interaction between the being of care and the guardian spirit of the place in an appropriate way. For the being of care, time is care, space is place, and life happens as the resolute letting-be of this concerned relationship. Efficiency, rather than being the force driving our preservation, should flow from the parsimonious attentiveness appropriate to the being of care. While efficiency is crucial to our continued existence, it is not constituent.

Following Norberg-Schulz, I have argued that, an ecological approach to architecture can most appropriately be inspired by the way human life takes place. However, instead of viewing life in terms of continuity and change, I propose the art of care as the most appropriate foundation for this kind of understanding. If architects are to engage with the ecological crisis, in a way that is true to the concerned nature of human life, then it is time to consider architecture as the art of care.

7.3.2 The tyranny of lived experience and captivated obedience

It has been pointed out (subsection 1.6.2) that some of the most noted contemporary architectural phenomenologists, like Steven Holl, Juhani Pallasmaa and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, stress the fundamental importance of understanding works of architecture in experiential terms. Furthermore, as Otero-Pailos pointed out, the experiential focus of architectural phenomenology is not a new 'trend', but one of the original themes responsible for the 'popularity' of the movement. While the focus on lived experience has great potential for creating more humane environments (especially when viewed against

the ideals of Functionalism), Heidegger believed that modern efforts at incorporating "*lived experience*" have been subverted by the *Gestell* of modern technology, or "machination" (1938b: 85). Heidegger's cautionary words may represent a serious indictment against the route followed by architectural phenomenology.

Has the architectural effort to make meaningful experiential space come under the sway of machination? First of all, it is our inability to question, or indeed the seeming unquestionability of the need for 'closeness to life', which should alert us to this possibility. Heidegger argued that the "[eradication of] question-worthiness" is a characteristic of the kind of calculative thinking which supports machination (1938b: 109-110/87). Thus the influence of machination is evident in the way we unquestioningly value lived experience. Under the sway of calculative thinking we become 'orderers' and 'users' of (objectified) experiences, rather than grateful participants (see subsection 5.5.4). Experience itself becomes commodity, a "standing-reserve" (Heidegger, 1953: 322). When "lived experiences become objects of lived experiences" (Heidegger, 1938b: 494-495/389) calculation reaches its zenith, and the concerned relationship implied by being-in-the-world is once again supplanted by the idea of an experiencing subject assessing the experiences offered by objects. We often overlook this "abandonment of being", because it is obscured by the modern tendency towards "*calculation*, *speed* and the *claim of the massive*" (Heidegger, 1938b: 119-124/95-98) (see subsection 6.4.7).

I have proposed (subsection 6.8.7) that the art of care, as a way towards *livskunst*, provides an alternative to the potential dangers Heidegger saw in 'lived experience'. In contrast to 'calculation', *livskunst* engages the situation as an act of concerned measuring (see subsection 6.6.1); a measure-taking open to the ringing unity of the fourfold and the particular nature of *Dasein*'s participation in this ringing as a mortal. In contrast to 'speed', *livskunst* celebrates the capacity of *Dasein* to abide in the place, let it be, and listen to its speaking. This way of engaging the place, as a form of *Gelassenheit*, is grounded in the hesitant restraint appropriate to the being of care (see subsections 5.5.6, 5.5.8, and 6.2.7). In contrast to the 'claim of the massive', *livskunst* acknowledges the reciprocal regioning (see subsection 6.4.8) conducted as a dialogue between the unique ("*seltsames Vereignen*") claim of Being and the unique appropriation ("*seltsames …Zueignen*") by a being of care; a resolute moment of listening, hearing and captivated obedience[347]

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[347] The concept of captivated obedience refers to the captivating (Afr: *bekoorlike*) way in which a place or a work of art may hold sway over the lives of dwellers. Hearing (Afr: *hoor*) the call of the place elicits willing obedience (Afr: *gehoorsaamheid*) and bestows a deep sense of belonging (Afr: *hoort*). Only the being of care, as listening restraint, is 'open' to this call (see subsections 5.5.6 and 6.6.4).

designating a rare "*belonging* together" ("Zusammen*gehören*") (Heidegger, 1957b: 36 &100).

Heidegger proposed that this rare moment of appropriative regioning "is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, [and] achieve their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them" (1957b: 37). The art of care suggests that works of architecture can be considered poetic expressions of this unique regioning; mortal acts of making able to dignify *Dasein*'s emplaced care (the interaction between a 'self' and its 'world'), while holding open the possibility for communal expressions (implying the interaction between the 'self' and the 'other') of captivated obedience. *Livskunst*, as the marriage of the art of care and the art of place, presents a way of making and appreciating architecture which is open to the distinctiveness of these emplaced moments, a way of building appropriate to the concerned Being of the intentional.

The capacity of *livskunst* to engage with these aspects of contemporary existence confirms the relevance of the art of care and offers promising avenues for future research. In contrast to the tyranny of efficiency *livskunst* is imbued with a parsimonious attentiveness acknowledging *Dasein*'s mortal capacity to create works that spare the fourfold and preserve *Dasein*'s own way of being. In contrast to the tyranny of lived experience, *livskunst* aims to overcome the "levelling down" (Heidegger, 1938b: 493-494/388) implied by calculative thinking, by being open to the 'vibrating' moments of appropriative perduring-letting-be in which Being and being reach towards each other. Understanding architecture as *livskunst* offers a way to celebrate *Dasein* as the disclosive moment of care pitted against the ways in which the "abandonment of Being cloaks itself" (1938b: 119-124/95-98) by masquerading as efficiency and lived experience.

7.4 Towards *livskunst*: the life-care-place totality

The life-care-place totality describes the reciprocal regioning between the being of care, capable of a "strange appropriation" (Heidegger, 1957b: 36) enacted as hesitant restraint, and the overwhelming abundance of the Being of the place, experienced as a "strange ownership" (Heidegger, 1957b: 36). In terms of the being of care, the identity of the place is ecstatically appropriated as a region of concern. This is not merely an 'obvious' relationship. In contrast to *Dasein*'s ability to both reveal and ground its 'there', in contrast to the *Lichtung* (clearing), the 'ground' falls away as an *Ab-grund* (abyss) which hides and conceals. The mere fact that this concerned relationship exists, should fill us with wonder at the strangeness holding sway over life as a revelatory event.

Norberg-Schulz rightly saw the clearing-concealing wonder of Heideggarian Being-in-the-world, our emplaced presence, as the source of *livskunst*. However, his conception of time as continuity and change could only access history and time as inter-epochal categorisation. *Dasein* does not live as continuity and change, but as ecstatic care. It is the goal of the art of care, as a gathering of the presuppositions inspired by Heidegger's concept of care, to grant access to the intra-epochal (everyday) nature of human presence as concerned engagement. Norberg-Schulz's art of place alludes to the overwhelming abundance of the place, but his reliance on continuity and change caused him to fixate on the 'certainties' supposedly offered by strong orders and structures. The art of care opens the way towards a different ground for mortal *poiesis*, reverent hesitance. In the marriage of the art of place and the art of care, life and place are drawn into contiguity, a concerned emplacement which harbours the capacity to create works eliciting moments of captivated obedience (see subsection 6.6.4).

Livskunst aspires to the gift of captivated obedience; works inspired by *Dasein*'s concerned measuring as a bearing and sustaining of silence, manifested through building as a sparing act of parsimonious attentiveness and experienced in fleeting moments of poetic revelation. In such moments the holding sway of quiet is proclaimed by buildings which ring out as the edification of *Dasein*'s emplaced concern. We cannot 'enforce' or 'legislate' care, but the concept of care opens new ways to comprehend the role buildings play in the taking place of human life.

Human life takes place as care in a place delimited by care. Care reveals the lived place as a region of concern. Works of architecture, understood as *livskunst*, care-fully shelter and dignify *Dasein*'s emplaced care. Therefore, the act of building engages both the art of care and the art of place. The art of care embodies the presuppositions, springing from the sparing, restrained, poetic, and ultimately grateful nature of our dwelling, which underpin our capacity for concerned measure-taking. In addition, they indicate ways to express our measuring as a form of hesitant reverence. The art of place acknowledges the holding sway of a guardian spirit over the place; an overwhelming abundance which *Dasein*, as revelatory openness safeguarding the "site of the moment" (Heidegger, 1938b: 380-382/301), appropriates as a region of concern. *Livskunst* envisions the building of this spatio-temporal lived reality as an act of perduring-letting-be. Of course, there are economic, political, material and technical constraints, but fundamentally, building is an act of care which happens in a region of concern.

Architecture is necessarily a deeply emplaced venture. Norberg-Schulz was one of the key contributors who awakened architects to the architectural implications of our spatial

existence between earth and sky. In contrast to the 'calculative (mathematical) conception' of spatial existence, Norberg-Schulz (following Heidegger) realised that human spatiality could best be described by the notion of place. However, instead of developing the architectural implications of Heidegger's conception of *Dasein*'s temporal existence – a betweenness which Heidegger enigmatically described as an interaction between mortals and the divine – Norberg-Schulz relied on Giedion's concept of continuity and change. It has been argued that this approach is grounded in metaphysical assumptions harbouring the trace of calculative thinking. Thus Norberg-Schulz's attempt to formulate architectural *livskunst* remained under the sway of the metaphysical restrictions which Heidegger saw as obstacles to entering the realm of disclosure.

In order to authentically (in a way that is true to life) "uncover the meanings potentially present in the given environment" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 18) the reliance on continuity and change needs to be supplanted by a Heideggarian understanding of *Dasein*'s temporal existence as care. The art of place is still relevant as a way to understand human lived spatiality. However, *stedskunst* needs to be augmented by the art of care. Only to the being of care can any place be disclosed as meaningful. In contrast to the 'calculative certainties' offered by understanding time as continuity and change, human temporality can best be described by the notion of care. Architecture is not only an emplaced venture; it also dignifies our concerned temporal existence. Architectural *livskunst* consists in building *Dasein*'s emplaced care.

Amid the precariousness and poetics of mortal being-in-the-world, works of architecture affirm *Dasein*'s capacity to translate its emplaced care in a way that celebrates both the *Lichtung* and the *Ab-grund*; an ecstatic appropriation of the reciprocal regioning between lived hesitant reverence and the wonder of overwhelming abundance. As such, architectural *livskunst* can be defined as the concerned (*sorgsame*) and care-full (*sorgvuldige*) *poiesis* of the life-care-place totality.

Works of architectural *livskunst* stand between heaven and earth as poetic proclamations of the ecstatic concern governing the relationships between mortal beings of care and the place as a region of concern under the sway of a guardian spirit; a fourfold regioning in which *Dasein*, the being of care, is always already between earth and sky, birth and death. Works of architecture have the capacity to dignify our care; emplaced moments of concern care-fully constructed in a way appropriate to the Being of the intentional. In these moments, fleeting but serving as a vanguard against forgetfulness, the constructs which seem to endure as care and place, are fused in the ecstatic openness and steadfast captivation of *livskunst*.

Appendix A: amalgamated index of Christian Norberg-Schulz's theoretical concepts

This thesis aims to study Norberg-Schulz's written contribution to architectural theory as a process of hermeneutic interpretation and re-interpretation of a multitude of theoretical concepts over the course of almost forty years (in the selection here presented). Some terms generally preserved their meaning (as first used) while Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of others underwent significant changes. For instance, Norberg-Schulz studied the psychology of perception with great devotion in his first book, *Intentions in Architecture* (1963), and later derided a reliance on visual perception as a "gross simplification … of the nature of human existence" (2000b: 9-10). Other terms, like 'precognition', were introduced fairly late (1989) in his career.

In addition to the challenging number of concepts and the way they evolved through hermeneutic questioning, a holistic appreciation of Norberg-Schulz's use of terminology is further hampered by the fact that most of his English publications either have no index or only contain a limited index of names and places. It has been argued (especially in section 3.2) that tracing the development of Norberg-Schulz's various theoretical concepts presents one of the main challenges that impede a holistic understanding of his theoretical contribution. For these reasons, it was decided to create an amalgamated index which could track the use and development of a large number of terms across a comprehensive range of publications.

In the selection presented here, only IiA and ESA contain an index of theoretical concepts. These indexes have been referred to, but for the most part I have either re-interpreted them (in the case of IiA) or significantly expanded them (in the case of ESA) during the preparation of the larger amalgamated index. It should also be pointed out that works focusing on particular phases of architectural history, like *Meaning in Western Architecture* (1974) and *Late Baroque and Rococo Architecture* (1972), or particular regions, like *Nightlands: Nordic Building* (1993), were not included since they represent 'theoretical applications' by Norberg-Schulz, rather than 'theory-building' works. The goal of the index was to engage with Norberg-Schulz's theoretical constructs, rather than all the applications of these ideas to particular works or epochs.

The amalgamated index illustrates the chronological development of various terms used by Norberg-Schulz and also alludes to the way in which certain concepts fell in and out of favour. It is hoped that this amalgamated index will enable future Norberg-Schulz scholars to study the evolution of particular aspects of his work and simultaneously

contribute to a holistic appreciation of the role played by these key terms in Norberg-Schulz's theoretical writings.

Works included

The works included in this amalgamated index are listed below and classified in the following way: the year in which a paper or book was first published (in any language) or the lecture delivered, the abbreviation used in the index, followed by the English title of article (in gray) or book (in black) with the publication date of the edition used to compile this index in parentheses.

1962: **ALI**   Alberti's Last Intentions (1988 AMP*)
1963: **IiA**   **Intentions in Architecture (1968)**
1966: **OVE**   Order and Variation in the Environment (2008)
1966: **MiA**   Meaning in Architecture (1988 AMP)
1967: **BBB**   Borromini and the Bohemian Baroque (1988 AMP)
1968: **SAG**   Space in Architecture after Guarini (1988 AMP)
1969: **CP**   The Concept of Place (1988 AMP)
1970: **CEV**   Centralization and Extension in Vittone's Sacred Works (1988 AMP)
1971: **ESA**   **Existence, Space and Architecture (1971)**
1978: **TBE**   Timber Buildings in Europe (1988 AMP)
1979: **GL**   **Genius Loci (1980)**
1979: **iAMP**   Introduction (to AMP) (1988 AMP)
1979: **KHLA**   Kahn, Heidegger and the Language of Architecture (1979)
1980: **TAA**   Towards an Authentic Architecture (1980) (1988 AMP)
1980: **BH**   Behrens House (1988 AMP)
1980: **B**   Bauhaus (1988 AMP)
1981: **VPP**   The Vision of Paolo Porthoghesi (1988 AMP)
1981: **ESJU**   The Earth and Sky of Jörn [*sic*] Utzon (1988 AMP)
1983: **HTA**   Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture (1988 AMP)
1984: **CoD**   **The Concept of Dwelling (1985)**
1984: **TH**   Tugendhat House (1988 AMP)
1985: **TCS**   The Testament of Carlo Scarpa (1988 AMP)
1985: **WFA**   On the Way to Figurative Architecture (1988 AMP)
1986: **SH**   Schröder House (1988 AMP)
1986: **PRB**   The Places of Ricardo Bofill (1988 AMP)
1987: **NWA**   **New World Architecture (1988)**
1988: **MGLA**   Michael Graves and the Language of Architecture (1990)
1989: **OCA**   Order and Change in Architecture (1991)
1989: **VoA**   The Voice of Architecture (1991)
2000: **PMA**   **Principles of Modern Architecture (2000)**
2000: **PLP**   **Architecture: Presence, Language, and Place (2000)**

*__AMP__ **Architecture: Meaning and Place**

Inclusion of concepts and key figures

One of the key difficulties in compiling this amalgamated index was to decide which concepts and people to include. In some cases a term would appear insignificant in earlier texts, while increasing in significance in later texts. Therefore, the process of indexing could not merely be approached chronologically. Instead, before compiling this index, the most significant works were studied as a whole and an attempt was made to establish a list of key terms in advance.

Most of Norberg-Schulz's books contain an index of names and places. Rather than duplicating these indexes, it was decided to focus on those individuals who had a significant influence on Norberg-Schulz's theoretical work. For instance, the heading 'Heidegger' includes a list of terms (like '*Ereignis*' and 'ontological difference') which Norberg-Schulz directly appropriated. In other cases, like Piaget (where the influence is less direct), there is merely a referral (e.g. *See also* assimilation) which indicates Norberg-Schulz's reliance on Piaget for this particular term. In addition, it was decided to include those individuals who Norberg-Schulz listed in PLP (2000b: 16) as people who had, according to him, an enduring influence on his work, and historical figures (both old masters, like Michelangelo, and modern masters, like Le Corbusier) to whom Norberg-Schulz continually referred. Furthermore, I have included individuals with contemporary relevance, like Frank Gehry and Zaha Hadid.

A further difficulty was presented by the inconsistencies in the translation of Norberg-Schulz's books, especially PLP (2000b), which employs various 'new words' for 'old concepts'. For instance, the term 'embodiment' is largely replaced with 'incarnation', and 'dwelling' with the word 'inhabiting'. In the index these synonyms are cross-referenced. The same approach was followed with words Norberg-Schulz used as synonyms, like 'understanding' and 'comprehension'. In cases where Norberg-Schulz continuously used a grouping of words to designate a particular effect, like 'standing', 'rising', 'opening' and 'closing' (or 'earth' and 'sky'), these terms are grouped together. Where a relationship is less obvious, the usual system of cross-referencing was employed (e.g. '*See also* take care' under the heading of 'care'). In instances where a term that has been cross-referenced refers to a sub-index, the main entry is indicated in brackets [e.g. *See also* work of architecture (work)].

Towards a qualitative analysis

In this amalgamated index an attempt has been made to augment the format of the 'traditional index' by indicating the qualitative importance of various references:

- 14a: The use of normal text refers to the 'mentioning' of a term in the text. Many of Norberg-Schulz's publications were published in a column format. The letter 'a' refers to a mention in the first column on page fourteen, while '14b' would indicate a mention in the second column and '14ab' would indicate two separate mentions in the first and second columns.

- 14<u>a</u>: If a reference is underlined, it implies that the entry is more substantial than just a casual mention.

- 14**<u>a</u>**: If a reference is underlined and in bold, it implies that the entry refers to significant information, or presents an in depth discussion of a term.

- 14**<u>a</u>**: A reference that is underlined, in bold and in red can be considered of seminal importance to the theoretical understanding of the term. Such instances may include either the origin of a term, the (re)definition of a term, or a revealing connection that the term has with other terms.

In instances where a whole chapter, article or book concerns a particular concept, the range of page numbers has been indicated. References of particular importance that are included in such a range of page numbers have been highlighted in square brackets (e.g. 37-68 [**39**, **42**, **43**]). One could argue that such a system is futile, since any classification already embodies a certain classifier bias. Why not only include the significant references and 'filter' the instances where terms are merely mentioned? The reason these 'mentions' were included was that they illustrate the 'context' in which Norberg-Schulz used particular words. Often they illuminate the relationships between terms or indicate a specific application of a term. More than merely a process of categorisation, an effort has, therefore, been made to approach a qualitative analysis.

It is also hoped that the index will have wider relevance than this study. While the index was used as a research tool for this particular thesis, and therefore contains certain biases related to the 'significance' of particular concepts (e.g. the concept of 'care'), every effort has been made to judge the 'merits' of particular usages of terms within the wider theoretical context of Norberg-Schulz's *oeuvre*.

Aalto, A. IiA: 13, 206. **MiA**: 22c. **GL**: 70, 195c, 196, 198b, 200. **TAA**: 199<u>b</u>. **B**: 178<u>ab</u>. **ESJU**: 230. **CoD**: 81c. **WFA**: 233b. **OCA**: 45. **PMA**: 19a, 26a, 29a<u>b</u>, 32a, 43ab, 44b, 45b, 53b, 56b, 61b, 68a, 84b, 89b, 90a, 93ab, 95b, 107b, 121a. **PLP**: 8, 93, 320, <u>324</u>, 330, 346.

absence PLP: 11, 103.

absolute CEV: 93ab. **GL**: 45b, 71. **TAA**: 189a. **TCS**: 231<u>a</u><u>b</u>c. **PMA**: 16a. **PLP**: 24, 67, 75, 115, 326.

absolutist GL: 76. **PMA**: 79a. **PLP**: 75, 103, 223.

abstract OVE: 264. .**MiA**: 20bc. **CP**: 29abc. **CEV**: 104c. **ESA**: 9a, 10b, 17b, 18a, 28a, 103b. **GL**: 5c, 6c, 8ab, 10a, 11, 23<u>a</u>, 137, 182b, 201. **iAMP**: 12, <u>13</u>. **KHLA**: 40a. **TAA**: 183b, 185c, 200. **VPP**: 214<u>b</u>. **HTA**: 42a, 48bc. **CoD**: <u>16</u>, 47, 50a, 63c, <u>64</u>, 66<u>b</u>, 71ab, 75<u>a</u>, 84, **112**, 117b, 124<u>a</u>, **128**, <u>129</u>, 133. **TH**: 156, 158b, 159. **TCS**: 231a. **WFA**: 233abc, 236, 237. **SH**: 148, 152. **PRB**: 220. **NWA**: 21, <u>22</u>, 53, 56, 60. **MGLA**: 7b, 9a, 11b. **OCA**: 44, 57. **VoA**: 71, 75. **PMA**: 12b, 13<u>b</u>, 14a, 25a, 45b, 46a, 118a. **PLP**: 12, <u>20</u>, 23, 25, 107, 214, 280, 293, 304, 305, 340.

abstraction, process of: IiA: 36, 49, **61**, **171**, 174. **GL:** 42c, 46, 72, 76, 169<u>a</u>, 170<u>a</u>. **TAA**: 190b, 195a. **CoD**: 29a. **PMA**: 13<u>b</u>, 41a, 78b, 114b, 123a. **PLP**: 12, 14, 26, 63, <u>65</u>, 67, 68, 69, 105, 113, 156, 185, 303.

accessible GL: 21b, 22. **HTA**: 46<u>c</u>.

accommodation ESA: 10b, 11ab, 27b, 33a. *See also* Piaget

Acropolis: GL: 56.

action(s) IiA: <u>53</u>, **88** (never indifferent), 109, 168, 169, 181. **OVE**: 256, 263. **MiA**: **23**, 26b. **CP**: 29<u>c</u>, 30, 31<u>b</u>, 36. **ESA**: 8, 9<u>a</u>b, 10b, 16b, 17b, 19b, 21b, 22b, 22a, 23b, 28b, 29b, 34b, 42, 72, 98a. **GL**: 6c, 8ac, 11, 14, 18<u>b</u>, 24. **NWA**: 10, 41, <u>45</u>. **OCA:** 43, 48. **TAA**: 190<u>b</u>, <u>192</u>. **B**: **168**. **ESJU**: 228. **HTA**: 48<u>a</u>. **CoD**: **15**, <u>20</u>, 23, 24, **25**, 51<u>b</u>, 53, 63<u>c</u>, 69b, 71a<u>bc</u>, 89b, **91**, **118**. **TCS**: 231ac. **NWA**: **10**, 30, 31, 33, 38, 41, <u>45</u>. **PMA**: 16<u>a</u>, 23a, 33a, 43a, 49<u>a</u>, 52b, 68a, 115<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 14, 28, 35, **45**, <u>127</u>, 140, 142, 170, 184, **189**, 201, 231.

adaptation (adjustment) **IiA**: **37**, 38, 79, 161, 186, 188. **CP**: 29b, 31a. **ESA**: **11<u>a</u>**. **TBE**: 114. **GL**: <u>172</u>, 180<u>ab</u>, 182a, 196, 198c (creative adaptation). **TAA**: 183b, 196c, 199b. **BH**: 134. **CoD**: 29<u>bc</u>, 63<u>b</u>. **TH**: 162<u>c</u>. **WFA**: 238. **NWA**: **12**, 31, <u>46</u>. **MGLA**: 13a. **PMA**: 32a, 61a, 62b, 78b, 89b, 94b, 98a, 102ab, 115b, 116a, 117a (situational adaptation), 118b. **PLP**: 12, 13, 45, <u>103</u>, 134, 152, 169, 179, **226**, 252, 264, 269, <u>273</u>, 285, 317, <u>354</u>. *See also* Piaget

addition ALI: 60a. **IiA**: 93, <u>97</u>, 141, 147, 163. **CoD**: 124abc. **MGLA**: 11<u>b</u>. **PMA**: 39ab. **PLP**: 198, <u>200</u>, 293, 294, 295, 297. *See also* division, fusion, integration, interpenetration

admittance (*Einräumen*) (admission) **CP**: 29c. **TAA**: **194**. **HTA**: **45**, 48<u>a</u>. **CoD**: **15**, **25**, **26**, 41<u>a</u>, <u>44</u>, 69<u>b</u>, 71<u>c</u>, 75<u>b</u>, **91**, 117a<u>b</u>, **118**, 124<u>a</u>, <u>126</u>. **OCA**: 48, **56** (allowance). **PLP**: <u>57</u>, <u>128</u>, 129, 138, **186**, **189**, <u>190</u>, <u>223</u>, <u>224</u>, 271, **275**, 300, 302, 311, 336.

adjectives GL: <u>16</u>. **PLP**: **127**, 176, <u>224</u>, <u>225</u>. *See also* preposition, substantive, verb

aediculae **GL**: 160. **PMA**: 33a, 57b. **PLP**: 266.

aesthetics IiA: 14, 17, 18, **67**, 68-72, <u>73</u>. **GL**: 54, 65.

affective ESA: 9a, 10b, 11a. **PLP**: 175.

agreement (accord) **IiA**: 56. **GL**: <u>184</u>. **CoD**: 7a, 13<u>b</u>, **42**, 60, 64, 71<u>a</u>, 88<u>b</u>, **91**. **WFA**: 241, 242. **PMA**: 61<u>a</u>, 85a, 111b, 113b, 117<u>a</u>, 118a. **PLP**: 36, 39, 44, 45, 87, 120, 190, 201. *See also* moments of use (use)

Albers, J. PLP: 9.

Alberti, L. B. ALI: 51-60. **IiA**: 88, 89, 91, 93, 114, 122, 124, 152, 153, 175, 186. **OVE**: 264. **ESA**: 31b, 62, 88, 100. **VPP**: 212a. **CoD**: 75c, <u>96</u>. **PMA**: 24a, 68a, 75b, 77a, 106a, 117b. **PLP**: 23, 102, 183, 293.

Alexander, C. CP: 27bc, 37b. **ESA**: 7a, 13a, 35b. **PLP**: 108, 109. *See also* patterns

alienation GL: 21a, 23b, 168b<u>c</u>, 180<u>b</u>, 192, 201. **iAMP**: 11a. **KHLA**: 46b. **TAA**: 181a, 189a. **ESJU**: 226. **HTA**: 46b. **HTA**: 46b. **CoD**: 69<u>c</u>, 88b, <u>105</u>. **SH**: **143**, <u>151</u>. **MGLA**: 10b. **PMA**: 12a, 75a, 123<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 25, 26, 28, 33, 34, 40, 43, 74, <u>75</u>, 79, 309.

ambiguity IiA: 34, 141, 150. **ESA**: 33b. **PLP**: <u>192</u>.

American influence NWA: 1-64. **MGLA**: 14a. **PMA**: 50ab, 51b, 53b, 58a, 94b. **PLP**: <u>211</u>, <u>213</u>, 217, 317.

analysis IiA: 23, 24, 30, 51, 100, <u>101</u>, 102, 113, **133**, 193, 209, 210-214, **215**, 218. **CoD**: 72. **TH**: 164b. **PRB**: **216**. **PMA**: 15b,

34, **35**, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 77, 86, 87, 95, 113, 114, 120, 131, 132, 146, 149, 150, 155, **190**, 193, 194, 200, 203, 204, 205, **229**, 262, 265, 271, 283, 303, 324, 336, 354. *See also* moments of use (use)

art liA: 20, 29, 58, 62, **66**, 67, **68**, 69, 70, **71**, **73**, 80, 105, **122**, 187. **OVE**: 265. **MiA**: 17, 20b. **TBE**: 109b. **GL**: 18c, 23a, **65**, 202. **iAMP**: 16a. **KHLA**: 31b, 35, 40a (Kahn) (Heidegger), 41a (and order) b, 43a, 46ab. **TAA**: 185a, 187, 190b. **BH**: 138a. **B**: 173, 174. **VPP**: 212b. **ESJU**: 225. **HTA**: 41, 44a. **CoD**: 29c, **112**. **WFA**: 236. **SH**: 143. **MGLA**: 8b. **OCA**: **57** (as 'means' of guarding). **VoA**: **64**, 66. **PMA**: 6, 10b, 12ab, 13a, 14b, 20a, 25a, 114ab, 122b. **PLP**: 7, 10, 11, 15, **39**, **55**, 56, **65**, 73, **93**, 101, **221**, 228, 274, 311. *See also* modern art (modern architecture)work of art (work)

- **art of Being PLP**: **356**.
- **art of building MiA**: 17a. **B**: 173. **HTA**: 39a, 46b. **SH**: **151**. **MGLA**: 10b. **OCA**: 53. **PMA**: 44a. **PLP**: **185**, 349.
- **art of place PLP**: **11**, 12, 13, **14**, **17**, **28**, 47, **55**, **56**, **62**, **88**, 125, 127, 129, 164, 172, 180, **185**, 193, 196, 204, **217**, **221**, **223**, 224, 225, 226, **228**, **229**, **231**, 236, 240, 252, 263, **269**, 273, 281, 296, **309**, **310**, **311**, 312, **313**, 317, 320, **324**, 334, 336, 338, 340, 351, 354, **356**.
- **art of dwelling GL**: 136c.
- **art of inclusion PMA**: 46a.
- **art as language KHLA**: 31b.
- **art of space (Zevi) liA**: 95, 96, 101. **SH**: 148, 152.
- **art of spatial organization PMA**: 16a.
- **art of the experience of living GL**: 23b, 69a. **B**: 177 (a new architecture which could serve life). **PLP**: 217, **221**, 223, 228, 231, 281, 294, 306, 313, **324**, 326, **330**, **356**. *See also* experience, life, Moholy-Nagy
- **art of totality PLP**: **221**. *See also* totality, whole

Art Deco BH: 140c.
Art Nouveau GL: 70. **TAA**: 198 (a true new art). **BH**: 140b. **VPP**: 214a. **PMA**: 25b, 26b, 37b, 39b, 40a, 92ab, 94a, 107a, 119a, 120a, 122a. **PLP**: 319, 320, 330.

articulation liA: 58, **106** (and content), 139, 151, **160**, 163, 164, 165, 166, 175, **181**, 184, 186. **BBB**: 71c. **SAG**: 89. **CP**: 34, 37c, **38**. **ESA**: 12a, 32b, 56, 68b, 91ab, 106a. **TBE**: **114**, 119. **GL**: 14, 15, **53**, **54**, 65, **66**, 69b, 73, **74**, 100, 102, 133, 135, 136c, 143, 153, 157, 158, 160, 163, 164a, **179**, 180b, 184, 190, 198b. **KHLA**: 42b, 43a. **TAA**: 195bc, 196a, 199a. **BH**: 128, 132, 136, 140a. **VPP**: 212a. **ESJU**: 224, 229c. **CoD**: **26**, 61, 71c, 84, 85, 108a, **129**, **130**. **TH**: 154b. **TCS**: 231bc. **SH**: 141a. **PRB**: 215c. **NWA**: **45**, 48, 50, 52, 54 (morphological connection), 55. **OCA**: 54. **PMA**: 6, 37b, 42b, 50a, 53b, 63a, 64ab, 77b, 104a, 105b, 107a. **PLP**: 96, 98, **181**, **182**, **183**, 184, **190**, 192, **194**, 200, 253, **264**, **274**.

artifact liA: 116. **VPP**: 212b.
l'Art pour l'Art (art for art's sake) **liA**: 19, 67, 68, 71, 133, 195, 198, 215, 219.
assimilation ESA: 10b, 27b, 33a. **PLP**: 134. *See also* Piaget
atmosphere ESA: 11ab, 96a. **GL**: 8a, 11, 14, 32, 39, 69, 180c. **BH**: 134. **ESJU**: 223bc. **CoD**: **19**, 25, 31c, 75b, 89ab. **TH**: 158b. **PMA**: 75a, 76a, 90a. **PLP**: **36**, **43**, 51, 53, 73, 79, **85**, 88, 100, 122, 132, **133**, **159**, **160**, **161**, 167, 205, **225**, 228, **229**, **279**, 298, 336, 344, **353**.
atomism liA: 29, 54, 105. **CoD**: 16. **PMA**: 14b, 20a, 123a. **PLP**: 13, 14, 24, 26, 29, 66, **68**, **69**, 70, 75, 89, 103, 105, 108, 111, 135, 140, 141, 142, 182, 274, 333.
attitude liA: **30**, **31**, 34, 41, 61, 62, **65**, 66, 81, 86, 87, 195, **196**. **ESA**: 36b, 39a, 50. **GL**: 168a, 185a. **TAA**: 184. **CoD**: 91. **OCA**: 57 (of fear).
authenticity iAMP: 13. **KHLA**: 41a. **TAA**: 187, 196c, 197, **198**, 199b, **200**. **B**: 175, **177**. **ESJU**: 230. **HTA**: 44a, 48b. **CoD**: 50b, 70, 88c, 99b. **OCA**: 56. **PMA**: 59, 86a, 89a, 91a, 98a, 103a, 110a, 113a, 122b, 127a. **PLP**: 28, 88, 171, 214, **312**, 334.
- **inauthenticity KHLA**: 41a.
axiality liA: 143, 145, 150, 159. **ESA**: 23a, 49b, 50, 52b, 89, 94. **GL**: 40b, 52ac, 58c, 149, 150, 151, 153, 160, 172. **B**: 169, 170. **ESJU**: 223bc. **CoD**: 23, 24, 27, 41c, 69a, 79, 81abc, 83, 99b, 102, 124ac. **NWA**: 27. **PMA**: 23a, 27a, 105a, 116b. **PLP**: 12, 77, 146, 149, 150, 197, 200, 326.

NWA: 10, 47. **MGLA**: 7a, 9b, 12a.
PMA: 17**a**b, 18a, 19b, 25a, 29a, 62a, 63b, 64a, 105b, 111b, 119**a**, 121a.
PLP: 54, <u>96</u>, 142, 143, 152, 176, 297, 302, 305, 349.

- **built thing HTA**: <u>45</u>. **PLP**: 53.
- **way of <u>building</u> GL:**180b. **PMA**: 90**b**. **PLP**: <u>266</u>.

Burckhardt, J. PLP: 16.
by-product IiA: 107, 180.
Byzantine ESA: 89. **CoD**: 37, 81b.

capacity IiA: <u>**58**</u>, <u>106</u>, 155, **<u>160</u>**, **<u>175</u>**, **<u>176</u>**, 177, <u>182</u>. **ESA**: 28b, 71, 106**a**, 109ab. **GL**: 18<u>b</u>. **CoD**: **<u>57</u>**.
capital (column) **CoD**: 118. **PLP**: **<u>141</u>**, <u>155</u>, 168, 176, 271, 274, 275. *See also* base, column, shaft
Capitilone square IiA: 172. **ESA**: 48, 49a. **GL**: <u>151</u>, <u>152</u>, <u>160</u>. **CoD**: 64, 69b. **PMA**: 118a. **PLP**: 183.
caput mundi **ESA**: 48. **GL**: 138b, 144, 150, 151, 164b. **CoD**: 22.
cardinal points CP: 33. **ESA**: 22a, 100. **GL:** 28a, 118c, 120, 136a, 148, 164c, 165, 168a. **CoD**: 23, 24, 75<u>b</u>. **PMA**: 16a, 23a, 69b, 116b. **PLP**: 74, 98, **<u>139</u>**, 140, 150, 173, 214)
cardo decomanus **ESA**: 22a. **GL**: 28b, 52c, 71, 138b, 143, 146, 147, 149, 150, 164c, 172. **CoD**: 42. **PLP**: 118, 206, 277.
care (concern) **IiA**: <u>109</u>. **MiA**: 22b. **CP**: 32. **ESA**: 114<u>b</u>. **GL**: 8a, 18<u>**b**</u>, 46, **<u>66</u>**, 198<u>a</u>. **iAMP**: 11**a**, **<u>12</u>** (careless), **<u>14</u>**, 16**<u>b</u>**. **TAA**: 196**c**, **<u>200</u>**. **CoD**: 9b, 13**a**, 31**b**, 48**b**, 75**a**, **<u>135</u>**. **OCA**: 43, 47, <u>**57**</u>, <u>59</u> (preservation). **PMA**: 75<u>b</u>. **PLP**: <u>87</u>, <u>280</u>, **<u>354</u>**. *See also* take care
Carnap, R. IiA: 29, 56, 57, 58, 59, 82.
categorization PLP: **<u>62</u>**, 70, <u>137</u>, 169, 288.
cathexis IiA: 65, 66, 68, 188.
ceiling IiA: 137. **OVE**: 262. **ESA**: 16a. **GL:** 13, 59, 169<u>b</u>. **KHLA**: 43**a**. **TAA**: 195<u>b</u>. **VPP**: 212**ab**. **ESJU**: 223a. **HTA**: 45. **CoD**: <u>59</u>, 63a<u>b</u>, 91, 117**c**, 124a. **TH**: 158a, 161. **PMA**: 41a, 49b, 116a, 117a. **PLP**: 146, 166, 192, 194, 216, 264, **<u>317</u>**.
centralization IiA: 136, 142, 145. **ESA**: 20a<u>b</u>, 26b, 62, 89, 94, 95. **GL**: 12, 17, 32<u>c</u>, 37, 58c, 59, 61, 161. **B**: 170. **CoD**: 79, 81abc, 83, 99b, <u>102</u>. **PMA**: 64a, 78b, 91b,

105b, 117b. **PLP**: <u>150</u>, 152, 159, 197, **<u>198</u>**, 224, 280, <u>297</u>.
centre (existential) **IiA**: 98. **MiA**: 24a. **CP**: 29b, 30, 31a, 36, 37a (here referred to as 'place'). **CEV**: 93abc, **<u>95</u>** (luminous center), 104abc. **ESA**: 16b, 18ab, 19ab, 23b, 33a, 35b, 39b, 40, 44, 46, 49a, 105ab. **GL**: 9, 12, <u>17</u> (gathering towards the centre), 25, 28a, 37, 40<u>**b**</u>, 56, 58ac, 59, <u>61</u>, 77, 97, 108c, 114, 120, 136a, 137, 138b, 152, 160, 172, 173, 176. **KHLA**: 32b, 37<u>**b**</u> (middle), 42b, 43a, 46a. **TAA**: 192, 195a, 196a. **BH**: 136. **VPP**: 201b. **ESJU**: 228, 229a. **CoD**: 17**c**, **<u>20</u>**, **<u>22</u>**, 23, **<u>24</u>**, 25, 27, 31ab (natural center), 33, 35 (manmade), 37, 42, 44, 47, 48a, 51**c**, <u>55</u>, 64, 69a, 71**c**, 81b<u>c</u>, 83, 85, 124a, 126. **WFA**: 245c. **PRB**: 215<u>b</u>, 220. **NWA**: 44. **MGLA**: 8b, 12a. **PMA**: 11a, 23<u>ab</u>, 32b, 61b, 63a, 76<u>a</u>, 78a, 79a, 83a, 89b, 103b, 105b, 106a, 117ab. **PLP**: **<u>42</u>**, 61, 74, 122, <u>135</u>, 139, <u>141</u>, 144, 146, **<u>150</u>**, <u>197</u>, **<u>201</u>**, **<u>203</u>**, **<u>204</u>**, <u>217</u>, 235, 262, 265, **<u>300</u>**, <u>354</u>. *See also* elements of existential space (elements)

- **centre, the loss of the** (Sedlmayr) **ESA**: 35b. **PMA**: 11a<u>b</u>.
- **centre of the world ESA**: 18b, 19a, 21a. **PLP**: 150.

chaos (visual chaos) **IiA**: 16, 20, 24, <u>45</u>, **<u>89</u>** (reason for chaos), 128, **<u>177</u>** (solution), 186, <u>201</u>, 204 (public and architects share the responsibility). **OVE**: 264. **CP**: 37c. **GL**: 58c. **TAA**: 181<u>a</u>, 183<u>c</u>, 187. **CoD**: 75<u>**a**</u>. **NWA**: 9. **PMA**: 34. **PLP**: <u>196</u>, 216, 321, 353.

- **chaotic form ESA**: 114a.
- **chaos, environmental GL**: 19.

change ALI: 60c. **IiA**: <u>39</u>, 74, **<u>82</u>**, 160, 186, <u>195</u>. **MiA**: 20<u>**b**</u>. **SAG**: 79. **ESA**: 37a (why change?), 88. **GL**: 18**<u>ab</u>**, 32a, <u>54</u>, 168a, 180b<u>**c**</u>, 182<u>**b**</u>. **KHLA**: 32<u>**b**</u>. **B**: 173. **VPP**: 214a. **ESJU**: 229a. **CoD**: 29<u>**c**</u>, 30<u>**b**</u>, 81<u>c</u>, 88b. **TH**: 166<u>a</u>. **NWA**: 27, 39, **<u>61</u>**. **OCA**: 44, **<u>45</u>**, 46, 56, **<u>59</u>**. **VoA**: 61. **PMA**: 11b, 37b, 61a, 91b, 98<u>**b**</u>, 101a, 102b, 123<u>**b**</u>. **PLP**: <u>10</u>, 11, 31, <u>54</u>, 55, 63, **<u>73</u>**, <u>87</u>, 127, 133, 174, 178, **<u>185</u>**, <u>196</u>, **<u>221</u>**, **<u>235</u>**, 269, 273, **<u>353</u>**, **<u>356</u>**. *See also* continuity and change (Giedion)
character IiA: 13 (unified), 20, **<u>95</u>**, **<u>96</u>**, <u>207</u>. **OVE**: 255, 257, 258, 259, 261, 263, **<u>264</u>**, 265. **MiA**: 26a. **BBB**: 61ab, 71c. **CP**: 31<u>**b**</u>c, 32, 37a. **ESA**: 19b, 22b, 24b, 27<u>**a**</u>, 31b, 32b, 33b, 34<u>**b**</u>, 45a, 51, 56, <u>58</u>, 69<u>**ab**</u>, 75b, 81b,

96a. **TBE**: 105c, 107, 108, 109**b**, 111, 112, 120. **GL**: 5b<u>c</u>, 8a<u>c</u> (*stimmung*), 9, 10<u>c</u>, **11**, <u>13</u>, **14**, **15**, <u>16</u>, 17, 18b<u>c</u>, **19**, 20, 21a, 24, 28**b** (myth), 32b, 34, 35, 42c, 51, **53**, <u>54</u>, 58b, **63**, <u>65</u>, **66**, 67, 69ab, 74, 81, <u>97</u>, 102, 104, 108ac, 113, 129, 130, 134, 135, 136a, 137, 138b, 140, 143, 153, 155, 160, **163**, 164bc, 166b, 168a<u>b</u>, 169**b**, 170b<u>c</u>, 179, 182b, 184, 189, 190, 194b, 195c, 196, 197, 198ac. **KHLA**: 32a, 41a, 42**ab**, 43**a**, 44a**b**. **TAA**: <u>194</u>, 195abc, 196a<u>b</u>, 200. **BH**: 125a, <u>128</u>, 131, 133-134, 140a. **B**: 167a. **VPP**: 207**b**, 212**a**. **ESJU**: 223c, 230. **HTA**: 46**a**, 48**a**. **CoD**: 9<u>c</u>, **19**, **27**, 31b, <u>34</u>, **44**, 45, 47, 48a<u>b</u>, <u>56</u>, 63**b**, 75**b**, 96, 99a, **118**, 120, <u>126</u>. **TH**: 158a. **WFA**: 245c. **PRB**: 215a, 222**a**. **NWA**: 9, 17(environmental), 46, 48, 49, 50, 56. **MGLA**: 8b (formal characterization). **PMA**: <u>6</u>, 16ab, 19a, 23b, 37a, 38b, 41a, 46**a**, 52b, 53b, 56ab, 75a, 76a<u>b</u>, 77**a**, 78a, 86a, 89ab, 90a, 91**b**, 92ab, 95**a**, 98a<u>b</u>, 101**b**, 104a, 105a, 106b, 115b, 116b, 117a, 121**a**. **PLP**: 10, 24, 31, 33, <u>43</u>, 45, 47, 51, 53, 66, 77, <u>78</u>, <u>88</u>, 101, **118**, 122, 138, **159**, **160**, 164, 169, **171**, <u>172</u>, <u>174</u>, 175, 179, 181, 182, 185, **186**, **189**, 192, <u>225</u>, <u>228</u>, 231, <u>235</u>, 244, 249, 264, **267**, 269, <u>271</u>, 273, 275, 279, 290, 298, 309.

- *Gestimmt* **PMA**: 90**a**, 92**a**.
- *Stimmung* **GL**: 8<u>c</u>, 21<u>a</u>, 71, 180<u>c</u>. **BH**: 128. **CoD**: **19**, **25**, **56**, 89**a**. **PMA**: 53a, 90**a**, 92a, 115<u>b</u>. *See also* vocation
- *Stimmungen* **PMA**: 115<u>b</u>.
- *Übereinstimmung* **GL**: 21<u>a</u>, 168a, 185<u>a</u>. **PMA**: 116**a**. *See also* correspondence

Charles bridge (Prague) MiA: 24b. **ESA**: 54ab. **GL**: 82, <u>86</u>, 92. **PLP**: <u>43</u>.
choice IiA: <u>34</u>. **OVE**: 256, 261, 263. **MiA**: 22a. **CEV**: 93a. **ESA**: 81b. **GL**: <u>27</u>, 40**b**, <u>192</u>. **VPP**: 212**b**. **CoD**: 13**a**bc, 42, 51ab**c**, <u>53</u>, 55, 60, 63**ab**c, 66a, 69a, 71ac, 75**b**, 91, <u>130</u>, 133. **TH**: 164**b**. **WFA**: <u>241</u>, **242**. **NWA**: <u>7</u>, 8, **9**, **12**, <u>18</u>, 30 (and identification), <u>43</u>, **59**, **60**, **61**. **MGLA**: 7a. **VoA**: **64**, **66**. **PMA**: 9b, 20**b**, 37**a**, 49b, 75**b**, 77b, 102**a**, 117b, 118b. **PLP**: <u>21</u>, <u>36</u>, 42, 88, 156, 201, **213**, 352, **354**.
Christianity (church architecture) **ESA**: 45b, 51, 89. **TBE**: 105a, 122. **GL**: 31, 45b, 54, 56, 77, 150, 151, 161, 172. **ESJU**: 224, 225, 226, 229a. **CoD**: 23, 64, 71ab, 72-81. **PMA**:

9a, 105ab, 117b. **PLP**: <u>39</u>, <u>101</u>, 103, 118, 120, 148, 149, 176, 192, 193, 269, <u>279</u>, 280, 281, 282, 283, 285, 289, 302.
chthonic (the underworld/earth) **GL**: 42c (chthonic landscape), 154, 164bc, 166a. **PMA**: 103b.
CIAM IiA: 13, 17. **PMA**: 6, 84**a**. **PLP**: <u>11</u>, 320, 352.
circumstantial GL: 170**b**, 180**a**, <u>184</u>, 195c, 198b. **KHLA**: <u>29</u>, 32<u>b</u>, 41**a**. **TAA**: 181c. **BH**: 140a. **CoD**: 29**b**, 51**c**, 99a, **129**, **130**. **WFA**: **243**. **OCA**: 45, 57. **VoA**: 75. **PMA**: 16ab, 20b, 23a, 24a, 37a, 59, 61b, 69**b**, 98b, 106**b**, 115b.
citizen of the world CP: 37c, 38. **ESA**: 114b.
<u>**city**</u> (level) **OVE**: 260. **CP**: 37c. **ESA**: 31ab, 81ab, 114a. **GL**: 56, <u>77</u>, 101, 102. **KHLA**: 31a, 44a. **TAA**: 195a. **CoD**: 51**abc**, **53**, 66b, 69**c**, 83. **NWA**: 10, 27-41 [**41**], **59**. **PMA**: 6, 18a<u>b</u>, 75-86 [77**a**, 85**a**], 111a, 115b, 117**b**, 118**a**b, 119ab, 120a, 122a, 123**b**, 127a. **PLP**: 35, 36, 95, 155, 201, 204, 211, 213, 244, 352, 353. *See also* modern city (modern architecture), urban space, urban level

- <u>**city**</u> form **GL**: 85**b**. **PLP**: 197, 198.
- <u>**city**</u> planning **IiA**: 103, 113, 114, 121, 129, 152, 153, 223. **OVE**: 260. **GL**: 87. **PMA**: 122**a**.
- <u>**city**</u> walls **GL**: 85c, 86, 87. **CoD**: 63a, <u>83</u>, 117**c**. **PMA**: 118a. **PLP**: 35, <u>36</u>, 47, 149, 201, 203, 204, **354**.

Civitas **IiA**: 118, 172. **CoD**: 42.
Civitas Dei **CoD**: 81a. **PLP**: 286.
clarification IiA: 183. **OVE**: 258. **GL**: 157. **PLP**: 26, <u>39</u>, 44, 56, **57**, **77**, 78, **82**, **87**, 88, 91, 96, 99, 101, 110, 111, 113, 119, 120, 122, 146, 150, 174, 175, **192**, 194, <u>196</u>, 197, 203, <u>204</u>, <u>208</u>, 211, 213, 221, 223, **229**, 271, 281, 298, 303, **324**, <u>328</u>, 354. *See also* moments of use (use)
clarity BBB: 76b. **CoD**: 79.
<u>**Classicism**</u> (neo) **IiA**: 146, 149. **BBB**: 61a. **ESA**: 103a. **GL**: 53, 54, 106, 140, 154, 164c, 198a. **BH**: 138c. **CoD**: 29**c**, 48a, **120**, 122, 133. **WFA**: 237, 238. **NWA**: **14**, <u>15</u> (American classicism), **25**, 46, 48, 49, 50, 61. **MGLA**: 12**b**. **VoA**: 71. **PMA**: 25a, 29b, 39b, 65a, 78ab, 92**a**, 102**b**, 105**a**, 106ab, 107a, 121a. **PLP**: 12, 13, 24, 25, 55, 65, 66, 92, 95, 100, 101, 118, 120, 168, <u>169</u>, <u>170</u>, 171, <u>172</u>, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 209, 233, 260,

269, **273**, <u>279</u>, 285, 288, 298, 303, 304, 305, 306, 319. *See also* classical language (language)

- **Classic orders IiA**: 17, 91, 92, 98, 145. **GL**: 53, 54, 58a, 106, 140, 157, 160, 163, 164a. **NWA**: 47. **PMA**: 104**ab**, 105a, 106b, 110b. **PLP**: 96, <u>168</u>, 183, **271**, **275**, 276, 277.

classification IiA: <u>31</u>, 53, 54, 66, 132. **iAMP**: 12. **PLP**: <u>127</u>.

clear construction IiA: 149, <u>164</u>, <u>166</u>, 206, 207. **MiA**: 17a. **TAA**: 186**b**, <u>200</u>. **B**: 176. **TH**: **154**, 166**c**. **SH**: **151**. **PMA**: 27a, 28a, 41**b**, 42b, 56**b**, 85a. **PLP**: 315, **321**, 333, **336**.

clearing (*Lichtung*) KHLA: 37**b**. **OCA**: 48, 49, **52**. **PLP**: 138. *See also* Heidegger

climate IiA: 21, 113, 118, 154. **GL**: 40a. **CoD**: 31**b**, 99c. **PMA**: 90a. **PLP**: 182, 239.

close (draw near) ESA: 30**a**. **GL**: **9**, 10b, 23**b**, **76**, 142, 157, 158, 164a. **iAMP**: 16**b**. **KHLA**: 37**a**, 44**a**. **TAA**: 196**b**, <u>197</u>. **BH**: 140**c**. **VPP**: 212**ab**. **ESJU**: 225 (bring God close). **HTA**: 44**c**, 48**ab**. **CoD**: 17**c**, 19, **35**, 48**b**c, 66a, 71c, 83, 94c, 108**c**, 117**b**, **135**. **OCA**: 47, **50**, 54, 56. **VoA**: 75. **PMA**: 75b, 95**a**, 115b, 116a. **PLP**: 17, 51, 53, 85 (vicinity), 92, 186. *See also* nearness

closed(ness) PMA: 37**b**, 45**b**, 46**a**, 61b, 76**b**, 127b.

closed perspective OVE: 262. **ESA**: 83.

closure (*Gestalt*) IiA: 44, 136, 140. **CP**: 29c. **ESA:** 18a, 20**b**, 22a, 29b, 39**b**, 57**b**, 78b, 88, 99b. **CoD**: 29a, 41c. **PLP**: 135, 138, 146, 150, 197, 201, <u>224</u>. *See also* enclosure

cluster IiA: 116, 140, 141, 147. **OVE**: 258, 259, 260. **ESA**: 30b, 39b, 45a, 57a, 75a, 78b, 79, 80a. **TBE**: 116. **GL**: 58b, **61**, 69c, 120, 125, 138b, 149, 173, 189, 197. **CoD**: 41**b**c, 66**a**, 99b. **PMA**: 91b. **PLP**: 197, **198**, 224, 225, 262.

code PRB: 222<u>c</u>. **OCA**: 53. **PLP**: 108.

cognition IiA: 65, 66, 188. **MiA**: 20c. **ESA**: 9ab, 10b, 28a.

coherence IiA: 166, 181. **OVE**: 258, 260. **B**: 178c. **TH**: 164a. **SH**: **151**. **NWA**: 17. **MGLA**: 9a. **PMA**: 23b, 28a, 32b, 37a, 77a, 79a, 83a. **PLP**: 34.

coherence-system IiA: **34**, 41, 43, <u>50</u>, 64, 107.

colour IiA: <u>135</u>, 142. **ESA:** 95. **GL**: 6c, 20, 35, 39, 67, 69a, 126, 136a. **KHLA**: 43b.

TAA: 195c. **BH**: 125a, 134. **VPP**: 211a. **ESJU**: 223c. **CoD**: <u>27</u>, 89c, 94c, 96. **WFA**: 233c. **SH**: 143, 147, 148. **PLP**: 53, 161, 167, 183, 192.

column IiA: 118, 149, 171. **PLP**: **141**, **155**, 168, 169, **174**, <u>275</u>. *See also* base, capital, shaft

common IiA: 20, 30, 38, 39, 43, **79**, 81, 170, 183, 186, 214. **ESA**: 39a. **GL: 65**, 180<u>a</u>, 182c, 190. **iAMP**: 11c. **TAA**: 185b, 196<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 7a, 9**c**, 13bc, 51<u>a</u>, 63<u>ac</u>, 66**b**, 69<u>b</u>, 71<u>a</u>, 88a**b**, 89<u>a</u>, 96, 108<u>c</u>, 111**c**, 133. **WFA**: 242, 245**c**. **NWA**: <u>9</u>, 10, 33, 46, **59**, <u>61</u>. **PMA**: 61<u>a</u>, 72**a**, 75**b**, 78a, 111b, 113ab. **PLP**: 75, 88, <u>127</u>, 140, 232, 263, 300, 334, 344, <u>350</u>. *See also* sharing

communication IiA: 38, **60**, 117, 129, 160. **OVE**: 260. **MiA**: 26a. **ESA**: 114<u>a</u>. **KHLA**: 37**b**. **TAA**: 189**a**, 190**a**, <u>197</u>. **VPP**: 214b. **CoD**: 111a. **OCA**: 53, 54. **PMA**: 64a, 113**b**, 114b. **PLP**: 349. *See also* language as communication (language)

community IiA: <u>17</u>, 109. **ESA**: 88. **GL**: 73, 115, 184 (communal life). **TAA**: 196**c**. **ESJU**: 226. **CoD**: 13c, <u>60</u>. **WFA**: <u>241</u>. **PMA**: 61<u>a</u>, 103<u>b</u>, 116**b**, 117a. **PLP**: <u>10</u>, 33, **36**, <u>40</u>, 164, <u>192</u>, 197, **229**, 313.

complementation SAG: 77c. **CEV**: 95. **GL**: **17**, 21a, **51**, <u>56</u>, 58<u>a</u>, 126, 170<u>c</u>, 182c. **TAA**: 196<u>a</u>b, 198. **VPP**: 212**b**. **CoD**: **33**, 34, 41b, 94c. **TH**: 164a. **PRB**: 222**b**. **PMA**: 76**b**, 90**ab**, 91b, 98a, 103**b**, 115**ab**, 116ab. **PLP**: <u>160</u>. *See also* symbolization (symbol), visualization

complexity CP: 37c. **ESA**: 33b, 68**b**, 69a, 99<u>b</u>, 105ab, 109a. **GL**: 6<u>c</u>, 23<u>a</u>, 69c, <u>125</u>, 169a, 200. **TAA**: 181a, 184. **B**: <u>174</u>, 175. **VPP**: 214a. **CoD**: 29<u>c</u>, 31b, 44, 51a, 108a, 126. **TH**: 164<u>b</u>. **NWA**: 9, 23. **PLP**: <u>27</u>, 67, 133, <u>189</u>. *See also* complexity and contradiction (Venturi)

composition GL: 71. **CoD**: 71c. **PMA**: 53a. **PLP**: 12, 77, 198, **274**, 300, 302, **353**, **354**.

comprehension OVE: 256, 257, 261, 263, 266 (comprehensible forms). **GL**: 70. **TCS**: 231a. **MGLA**: 7a. **PLP**: 14, 33, **44**, **45**, **55**, **56**, 58-89 [**62**, **72**, **75**, **85**, **86**, **87**], **91**, 118, **125**, **127**, 129, 144, **156**, **171**, **172**, 173, 185, 190, **191**, **197**, **217**, **225**, **226**, <u>231</u>, 263, **266**, 288, 300, <u>303</u>, 309, **312**, 320, **330**, 351, 353, <u>354</u>, <u>356</u>. *See also* phenomenological

335

destination OVE: 263 (square as destination). **PLP**: <u>27</u>, 28, 42, 43, 77, 95, 101, **144**, 148, 149, **150**, 155, <u>189</u>, **190**, **196**, <u>224</u>, 282, 303, 328, 336.

destiny GL: 195<u>a</u>. **HTA**: 39c, **41**. **CoD**: <u>114</u>, 117<u>a</u>. **OCA**: 43, 57. **PMA**: 105<u>ab</u>.

detail OVE: 262 (spontaneous detail). **BBB**: 61c. **GL**: <u>16</u>, 45a, 136c, 158, 180<u>a</u>. **BH**: 125a. **B**: 170. **ESJU**: 224. **SH**: 141a. **NWA**: 52, 53, 55. **MGLA**: 7a. **PMA**: 28b, 38a, 40a, 104a. **PLP**: 181, 184, <u>186</u>, 248, 326.

devaluation IiA: 17, 126, <u>**177**</u>. *See also* devaluation of symbols (symbolization), devaluation of form (form), devaluated modern motifs (motifs)

deviation IiA: 78, 157, 158.

devotion PMA: 123<u>b</u>. *See also* dedication

diagram (diagrammatical) HTA: 46<u>b</u>. **CoD**: **128**. **WFA**: 233a, 237. **MGLA**: 7a. **PMA**: 25<u>**a**</u>, 32<u>b</u>, 33a, 122<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 105. *See also* built diagram

dialect PLP: 226, 229.

dialogue VPP: 214b (creative d.).

<u>**Dientzenhofer's**</u> **BBB**: 76B. **CEV**: 95. **PMA**: 25a.

- <u>**Dientzenhofer, G. IiA**</u>: 172. **BBB**: 65. **SAG**: 79, 84, 89, 91.
- <u>**Dientzenhofer, C.**</u> **BBB**: 65, 68, 69, 70, 71a, 73a, 74, 76a. **SAG**: 79, 84, 89, 91. **ESA**: 63.
- <u>**Dientzenhofer, J.**</u> **BBB**: 71a. **SAG**: 89, 90.
- <u>**Dientzenhofer, K. I.**</u> **BBB**: 71ab<u>c</u>, 73<u>ab</u>. **SAG**: 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92. **CEV**: 95, 104ab. **ESA**: 63, 65. **PLP**: 215, 317.

different, but the same GL: 109. *See also* sameness

differentiation IiA: 18, 38, 111, 187.

dignity PMA: 62a, 64b. **PLP**: 102.

dimension IiA: <u>**54**</u>, 55, 102, 103, 127, <u>170</u>, 180, 184, <u>209</u>, 224.

direction MiA: 17b, 23 (Aristotelian conception) 24a (way), 24b. **ESA**: 10a, 16b, 20b, 21ab, 22ab, 25a, 31a, 49<u>**b**</u>, 63, 95. **GL**: 12, 13, 17, 32<u>c</u>, **37** (natural = direction; man-made = path), 56, 58bc, 147, 152, 169<u>**b**</u>, 172, 173. **VPP**: 207b, 209 (directing). **ESJU**: 229b. **CoD**: 23, 24, 69a, 81a<u>**c**</u>, 83, 84, <u>102</u>. **NWA**: 17, 44. **PMA**: 23a, 61b, 63a, 79a. **PLP**: 139, 148, <u>**198**</u>.

disclosure GL: 97. **iAMP**: 16a. **KHLA**: 37<u>**b**</u>, 40a, 41b, 42b, 46ab. **HTA**: 42<u>bc</u>, 44b<u>**c**</u>, 46b, 48<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 9a, 111<u>**b**</u>, 135. **OCA**: 54, 57. *See also* reveal

discourse KHLA: 36<u>**a**</u> (*Rede*) <u>b</u>, 37<u>**ab**</u>. **TAA**: **193**, **194**. **HTA**: 46<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 111<u>**abc**</u>, **130**. **NWA**: 53.

discovery GL: 97. **KHLA**: 32<u>b</u>, 35. **PRB**: **220**. **PLP**: 9, 36, <u>143</u>, 201. *See also* rediscovery, reveal

district (quarters) OVE: 260, <u>261</u>. **ESA**: 80a, 81ab. **GL:** 12, 19, 59, 69a, 189. **CoD**: 64, 66a. **PMA**: 85b. **PLP**:131, 190, 352. *See also* Lynch

divine GL: 8c, 28b, 31, 32a, **46**, 63, 77. **KHLA**: 36b. **ESJU**: 229c. **HTA**: 39<u>**c**</u>, 42a, 44b, 48a. **CoD**: 17<u>a</u>, 111<u>**b**</u>, 114, 117ab. **PMA**: 24a, 64b, 105b, 106b, 114b, 117b. **PLP**: 71, 72, 93, 98, 99, 101, 103, 106, 118, 120, 231, 281, 288, 293, 311, 319. *See also* fourfold

division IiA: <u>97</u>, 141, 147. **B**: 170. **CoD**: 124<u>ab</u>. **PLP**: 198. *See also* addition, fusion, integration, interpenetration

Domain (zones, qualitatively diverse interior zones, field of action, territory) **CP**: 29b, 31<u>a</u>, 36, 37a. **ESA**: 18a, 20a, 23<u>ab</u>, 24ab, 26ab, 27a, 31<u>**b**</u>, 33b, 39b, 43ab, 56, 57ab, 59ab, 68<u>b</u>, 74b, 81ab, 105ab. **GL**: 32<u>c</u>, 37, 40<u>**b**</u>, 52b, 59, <u>61</u>, 116b, 125, 130, 148. **B**: <u>174</u>. **HTA**: 48<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: <u>20</u>, <u>**24**</u>, <u>**25**</u>, 27, 44, 64, 66<u>**ab**</u>, 117<u>a</u>. **PMA**: 23ab, 24b, 27b, 32ab, 33b, 40b, 50a, 53b, 56ab, 61b, 63a, 64b. **PLP**: 28, 61, 77, 78, 82, 142, <u>**144**</u>, <u>**146**</u>, 149, 173, 189, 197, 198, 204, <u>224</u>, 324. *See also* elements of existential space (elements)

dome IiA: 17, 149. **GL**: 67, 165. **VPP**: 207a. **HTA**: 48<u>b</u>. **CoD**: <u>**37**</u>, 84, 85, 117<u>c</u>, **128**, 129. **WFA**: 233a. **PMA**: 110a, 117b. **PLP**: **150**, <u>152</u>, <u>159</u>, 170, 214.

domestic peace MiA: 26a. **ESA**: 88. **CoD**: 91. **PLP**: 155.

door ESA: 25b. **GL**: 13, 67, 177. **BH**: **127**, 138<u>**a**</u>, 140a. **CoD**: 57. **PLP**: 180, 347.

Dorner, A. IiA: 17, 20, <u>**36**</u>, 219. **PLP**: 17, 356.

drawing, act of PLP: <u>**14**</u>.

dreams (and wishes) **ESA**: 37a, 114a. **GL**: 200. **CoD**: 99a. **PMA**: 115<u>**a**</u>, 116b. **PLP**: 170.

<u>**dwelling, act of**</u> **CP**: 32, <u>33</u>. **ESA**: 16a<u>b</u>, 25<u>**a**</u>, 31ab, 32<u>b</u>, 36ab, 74b. **TBE**: 109<u>**b**</u>, 120.

GL: 5**c**, 6b, **9**, 10**b**, <u>11</u>, 18a, **19**, **20**, **22**, 23**a**b<u>c</u>, 40c, 42<u>c</u>, 46, 48, **50**, 113, 115, 118a, **126**, <u>128</u>, **129**, 133, 135, 136ab**c**, 166**c**, 168b, 170**a**b, 185**b**, 191. **iAMP**: 16<u>b</u>. **KHLA**: 36<u>b</u>, 41**a**, 46b. **TAA**: **197**. **BH**: 140<u>b</u>. **HTA**: 44a**c**, 48**c**. **CoD**: 7**ab**, 12**bc**, 13**a**bc, <u>15</u>, 17**ab**c, <u>18</u>, 19, <u>26</u>, 29**a**, 33, 51**a**, 63**a**, 70, 71**c**, **79**, 108a, 124c, **130**, **133**, **135**. **TH**: 159. **TCS**: **232**. **WFA**: **241**, 242, **243**. **PRB**: **216**. **NWA**: <u>22</u>, 25. **OCA**: 47, 48, 56, **57**. **VoA**: 64. **PMA**: 19**b**, 49a, 52b, 53a, 61**a**, 76b, 82a, 113**a**, 114**a**, 115**b**, 122**b**, 123**ab**. **PLP**: (dwelling translated as 'inhabiting'). *See also* Heidegger, inhabiting

- **<u>dwelling, a</u> GL**: 14, 136a. **KHLA**: 44a. **NWA**: 12. **PMA**: 28a, 54a, 85a, 118a. **PLP**: 19, 40, 320.
- **<u>dwelling, collective (mode)</u> CoD**: 7**a**, 13**bc**, 51**b**, 63**ab**, 66**ab**, 69bc, **132**. **WFA**: <u>242</u>. **PMA**: 85a (communal).
- **<u>dwelling, mode of</u> CoD**: 7**a**, 13**abc**, 29**ab**, 30**c**, <u>44</u>. **WFA**: 241, **242**.
- **<u>dwelling, natural (mode)</u> CoD**: 7**a**, 13**a**c, 48c.
- **<u>dwelling, neighbourly</u> PMA**: 90a, 116ab.
- **<u>dwelling poetically</u> GL**: 23**a**, 169**a**, 202. **KHLA**: 41a. **HTA**: 39a, 44**a**, 48**b**. **CoD**: 30**c**, 117**b**. **OCA**: **47**, <u>48</u>. **PLP**: **51**.
- **<u>dwelling, public (mode)</u> CoD**: 7**a**, 13**c**, 71-88 [71**b**], **130**. **WFA**: <u>242</u>. **PLP**: 164, 192, 313.
- **<u>dwelling, private (mode)</u> ESA**: 89. **CoD**: 7**a**, 13**c**, **130**. **WFA**: <u>242</u>. **PLP**: 39, 164, <u>192</u>, 313.
- **<u>dwelling, the new modernist</u>** (modern house) **IiA**: <u>186</u>. **GL**: 194**a**, 195**b**, 196. **TAA**: 185**b**, 186**a**. **CoD**: 108**c**. **NWA**: 10. **OCA**: 47. **PMA**: 9**a**, 17**a**b, 19**b**, 27b, 49-59 [49**a**, 50**a**, 53**b**, 57**ab**, 58**a**, **59**], 75b, 82a, 127**a**. **PLP**: 7, <u>313</u>, 315, 351. See also modern architecture (first phase, pioneers)
- **<u>dwelling, urban</u> GL**: 78**a**.
- **the <u>dwelling of presence</u> PLP**: **273**. *See also* style
- **true <u>dwelling</u> GL**: 21**a**, 23a. **HTA**: 46**c** (authentic). **PRB**: 222c.

dynamism GL: 61, 94, 104. **TAA**: 186b. **BH**: 125a. **B**: 167ac, 169, 170, 174, 175, 178c. **VPP**: 212**c**. **TH**: 159. **SH**: 142, 152.

NWA: **8**, 19, 36, 50. **PMA**: 11b, 18b, 23b, 29b, 63b, 72a, 78b, 79a, 89a. **PLP**: 14, 40, 63, 65, 92, 101, 107, 175, 197, **312**, 313, 348, 349, <u>354</u>.

earth & sky (heaven) **ESA**: 18b, 31b. **TBE**: 109**b**c. **GL**: 8**c**, **9**, 10**a**bc, 12, 13, 14, 23**c**, **24**, 25, 27, 32**b**, **39**, 40a (sky) <u>b</u>, 42abc, 45a**c**, **47**, 52ab, 58b, 63, **66**, 67, 70, 78ab, 81, <u>83</u>, 85bc, 100, <u>103</u>, 113, 115, 118c, 153, 155, 157, 164ab, **165** (sky), 168**c**, 169a, 170**a**b, 177, 182b, 190, 198a. **KHLA**: 36**b**, 37**a**, 42b, 43**ab**, 44a**b**. **TAA**: 190c, 192, 194, 195bc, 196ac, 198, 199ac. **BH**: 125b, 137, 138**a**. **B**: 168, 178b**c**. **VPP**: 207b, **209**, 212ab. **ESJU**: 223a, 224, **226**, **228**, 229c, **230**. **HTA**: 42ac, 44a**b**c, <u>45</u>, 48**a**. **CoD**: 9**c**, 17**a**c, **18**, **19**, 22, 23, <u>25</u>, **26**, 27, 29**a**, 30**c**, 31**b**c, 33, 34, 35, 37, 41a, 48**b**, 57, 59, 64, 69ab, 71c, 73, 75**a**b, 78, 83, **84**, 88**a**, **91**, 94c, <u>96</u>, 99a, 106, 108a, 111**bc**, **112**, 114, 117ab**c**, <u>118</u>, 119, **122**, **126**, 128, **129**, **130**, **135**. **TH**: 158a. **TCS**: 231ab**c**, <u>232</u>. **WFA**: 237, **243**. **SH**: 141bc. **PRB**: 218, 222**a**b. **NWA**: <u>36</u> (and the high-rise), 37, <u>40</u>. **MGLA**: 8b, 9a, 10ab, 11ab, 13b, 14a. **OCA**: 44, **47**, 50, 51, 52, 54, **56**. **PMA**: 12b, 14a, 15**b**, 16a, 17a, 23a, 27b, 28b, 29a, 37a, 38b, 39b, 41**a**, 42**b**, 43b, 49b, 51a, 53a, 64b, 68a, 72a, 76a, 90a, 91a, 95b, 98**ab**, 102a, 105ab, 106a, 107b, 110a, 111a, 114b, 115**a**, 116a, 117ab, 121a. **PLP**: 47, **51**, **53**, **55**, 66, 71, <u>72</u>, **75**, 77, 79, 82, **85**, 86, 87, 88, <u>91</u>, 93, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 106, 107, **110**, 111, 115, 116, 119, 122, **128**, 132, <u>133</u>, **134**, **137**, 138, 139, 140, <u>141</u>, 143, 144, 146, 150, 152, 155, <u>159</u>, <u>160</u>, <u>163</u>, 164, 165, <u>167</u>, 169, 170, 174, 175, 178, 180, 182, 183, <u>184</u>, **185**, **194**, 213, **214**, 215, 216, **217**, 223, 224, 231, 235, 237, 239, 252, 264, 273, 274, 277, 280, 281, 284, 286, 288, 293, 295, 298, 303, 311, 331, 347. *See also* fourfold

Eclecticism CoD: **135**. **NWA**: <u>56</u>, **60**, 61. **PMA**: **7**, 11b, 25**a**b, 45a, 94a, 127**a**.

ecological crisis (ecology) **GL**: <u>19</u>, 168c. **OCA**: **57**. **VoA**: 68. **PMA**: 127**a**. **PLP**: 27, 34, 59, 68, **88**. *See also* environmental crisis (environment), environmental exploitation (environment)

economical aspects IiA: 14, <u>15</u>, 21, 162, 164, 173, <u>184</u>, **188**. **GL**: 6a, 73, <u>109</u>, 169a,

19a, 20b, 29b, 37a, 38a, 45b, 53a, 61a, 76a, 86a, 89b, 90a, 91a, 103a, 111**b**, 116a, 117a, 123**b**. **PLP**: 8, 12, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 43, 45, 47, 53, 54, 56, 59, 71, 74, **75**, **85**, 86, 87, 92, 107, 110, **111**, 115, 122, **125**, **126**, 128, 131, 133, 135, 140, **144**, 146, 156, 159, 165, 166, 167, 172, 174, 179, 185, **189**, 190, 192, 200, 203, 204, 221, 223, 231, 240, 247, 266, 277, 312, 330, 344. *See also* environmental totality (totality)*,* modern environment (modern architecture)

- **environmental awareness iAMP**: 16a. **PMA**: 123**b**.
- **environmental character TBE**: 108. **GL**: 5b, 6c, 19, 42a, 109, 130. **KHLA**: 43**a**. **NWA**: 17. **PMA**: 91a.
- **environmental crisis GL**: 190, 191, 195c, 200. **iAMP**: 11ab**c**, 16c. **PMA**: 122a, 123**a**. **PLP**: 88. *See also* ecological crisis.
- **environmental determinism GL**: 23b.
- **environmental exploitation** (world/nature as resource) **liA**: 80. **iAMP**: **12**. **KHLA**: 46b. **PLP**: 34, **88**, 310. *See also* ecological crisis.
- **environmental levels ESA**: 27ab, 32**ab**, 39b, 69**a** (Sedlmayr), 75a, 96**b**, 100, 103**ab**, 114a. **GL**: 15, **16**, 32**b**, 37, 40c, 52**b**, 58b, 69a, 82. **TAA**: 196c, 197. **CoD**: **19**, 22, **25**, **26**, **27**, **45**, 50c, 66a, 124**c**. **PMA**: 77**a**, 120a. **PLP**: 86. *See also* geography, landscape, levels, urban level, house, thing
- **environmental order GL**: 18c.
- **environmental psychology PLP**: 59.
- **environmental scales GL**: **34**.
- **environmental system GL**: 97.
- **environmental whole PLP**: 27.

epoch (era, period) **CoD**: 29c, 41a, 48b, 50b, 70, 75c, 88b, 99a, 133. **TH**: 164**b**. **NWA**: 9, 52. **MGLA**: 12b, 13a. **PMA**: 13ab, 17a, 18a, 23a, 24a, 37a, 38ab, 39a, 49a, 62b, 79a, 117**b**, 118b. **PLP**: 55, 221, 269.

equivocality liA: 35, 176.

essence GL: 18**b**, 50, 63, 106, 195a. **KHLA**: **29**, 31a, 36**a**. **TAA**: 183b. **B**: 173. **CoD**: 29**b**, 45, 89**c**. **TCS**: 231a. **WFA**: **243**, 245**c**. **OCA**: **45**, **54**. **PMA**: 14a, 69**a**, 95**a**, 118a. **PLP**: 20, 61, 67, 68, 72, 75, 109, 310, 344.

- **of dwelling GL**: 23a.
- **of place GL**: 8a. **OCA**: **47**.
- **essential structure TCS**: 231**a**b, 232.
- **essentialist PMA**: 43b, 67b.

ethnicity NWA: 59. **MGLA**: 13a. **PLP**: **223**.

Euclid liA: 44, 46, 47, 48, 54, 55, 74, 96, 101, 105, 135, 140, 144, 172. **ESA**: 10a. **TAA**: 190c. **PMA**: 111b.

- **Euclidean** space **liA**: 172. **ESA**: 10a, 12ab, 13ab, 15a, 21a, 22b, 28a, 61, 62, 100.
- **Euclidean order GL:** 118c.

evaluation liA: 65, 66, 188.

event ESA: 9a, 10b, 22b, 88. **KHLA**: 37**b**, 41**b**. **PRB**: 220, 222**b**. **PMA**: 16b, 50a, 121**b**. **PLP**: 14, 19, **27**, 35, 71, 72, **85**, **125**, **127**, **128**, 138, **174**, 197, **312**, 319. *See also* Ereignis (Heidegger), happenings, occurrences

everydayness (daily life) **liA**: 32, 35, 46, 50, **61**, 126. **ESA**: 10b. **TBE**: 107, 120. **GL:** 6c, 8ab, 10c, 11, 15, 18c, 23ab, 40b, 78b, 136b, 164ab, 194a, 201. **iAMP**: 16a. **KHLA**: 36b, 41a, 46a. **TAA**: 184, 189a, 190b. **BH**: 138b, 140a. **ESJU**: 229b. **CoD**: 22, 29b, 71ab, 89**a**c, 94**c**, 105, 106, 108a, 110b, 133. **TCS**: 231a. **WFA**: 233bc. **SH**: 151. **NWA**: 60. **MGLA**: 10b. **PMA**: 12b, 13b, 39a, 49b, 90b. **PLP**: 7, 9, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, **26**, **28**, 31, 33, 35, 40, 45, 93, 98, 99, 125, 131, 134, 139, 146, 156, 237, 309, 310.

exclusion, architecture of **GL**: 194c, 195a. **PMA**: 92b.

existence liA: 28. **CEV**: 93b, 104c. **ESA**: 10b (existence impoverished), 14b, 15a, 16a, 17b, 31a, 34**a**, 35**b**, 103a, 114a. **TBE**: 122. **GL**: 5c, 6c, 23bc, 50, 136**a**, 152, 166c, 170b, 185**b**, 192, 194a, 198ab, 201. **iAMP**: 12. **KHLA**: 41a. **TAA**: 193, 197. **BH**: 138b. **VPP**: 212**b**. **ESJU**: 229a, **230**. **HTA**: 44**a**. **CoD**: 7**a**, 9c, 13**a**, 51**a**, 89a. **TCS**: 231a, 232. **WFA**: **237**, 238. **VoA**: 64. **PMA**: 16**a**, 113a. **PLP**: **10**, 11, 14, 15, 19, 20, 23, 31, 33, **44**, 54, 55, 93, 101, 105, 120, 134, **144**, 189.

- **existential foothold OVE**: **255** (psychological foothold). **ESA**: 17**b**, 22a, 23b, 29b, 36b, 114a. **TBE**: 105bc, 109b, 120. **GL**: 5**a**, 6**c**, 17, **19**, 23b, 42c, 52c, 108a, 136b, 164c, 182c, 185**b**. **TAA**: 190b, 196**b**. **CoD**: 13**b**, 17**a**, 72, 91, 108ab, 111**b**, **130**.

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88**<u>a</u>**, 91, 105, 108a, 110c, **<u>112</u>**, 117**<u>bc</u>**, <u>118</u>, **<u>122</u>**, **<u>126</u>**, **<u>128</u>**, **<u>129</u>**, **<u>130</u>**, **<u>133</u>**, **<u>135</u>**. **TH**: 158b. **WFA**: 233<u>bc</u>, **<u>236</u>**, **<u>237</u>**, **<u>238</u>**, **<u>243</u>**, 245a<u>bc</u>. **NWA**: **<u>45</u>**, 56. **MGLA**: 7ab, 8ab, 9ab, 10ab, 11ab, 12a, 13**<u>b</u>**. **OCA**: **<u>51</u>**. **PMA**: 13**<u>b</u>**, 41b, 43**<u>a</u>**, 61**<u>b</u>**, 67b, 83**<u>b</u>**. **PLP**: 29, 47, <u>51</u>, **<u>53</u>**, <u>54</u>, 73, **<u>75</u>**, 96, <u>107</u>, **<u>110</u>**, <u>111</u>, 114, 118, 122, 125, **<u>126</u>**, 127, **<u>128</u>**, **<u>129</u>**, **<u>131</u>**, **<u>133</u>**, **<u>134</u>**, 135, **<u>137</u>**, 138, 139, **<u>140</u>**, **<u>141</u>**, **<u>142</u>**, 144, 152, 155, **<u>156</u>**, **<u>159</u>**, 160, 165, 174, **<u>180</u>**, <u>181</u>, 183, 184, **<u>185</u>**, **<u>192</u>**, <u>194</u>, 196, 204, <u>217</u>, <u>221</u>, **<u>223</u>**, <u>231</u>, **<u>232</u>**, **<u>235</u>**, 236, 237, 239, 240, 244, 262, 265, 266, 273, <u>274</u>, **<u>302</u>**, 309, 333, 334, <u>336</u>, 337, 354.

- **<u>figural</u> character ESA**: 75**<u>b</u>**, 83. **GL**: 82, 85c, 115, 198**<u>c</u>**. **CoD**: 41**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: 24.
- **<u>figural</u> identity CoD**: 29**<u>a</u>**. **NWA**: 16, 17, 56. **MGLA**: 7a. **PLP**: 132, 135, 137.
- **<u>figural</u> quality TAA**: 199**<u>c</u>**. **CoD**: **<u>24</u>**, **<u>33</u>**, 35, **<u>44</u>**, **<u>45</u>**, 48a**<u>bc</u>**, 50a, 55, 63<u>bc</u>, 66**<u>b</u>**c, 70, 75**<u>b</u>**, 79, 83, **<u>84</u>**, 88a, 103, 105, 108**<u>c</u>**, 110<u>bc</u>, 117**<u>a</u>**, 118, **<u>120</u>**, **<u>126</u>**, **<u>130</u>**. **NWA**: 12, 13, 15, **<u>23</u>**, 24, 25, 34, **<u>40</u>**, 45, 52, 53, 55 (figural duality), 60. **MGLA**: 9b. **PMA**: 61b, 75a, 76<u>ab</u>, 77**<u>a</u>**, 78a, 84b, 118a. **PLP**: 24, <u>43</u>, 95, 122, 132, 135, 190, 333.
- **<u>figural</u> unity CoD**: 41a.
- **<u>figurative</u> architecture CoD**: 7**<u>a</u>**, 88**<u>c</u>**, **<u>128</u>**, <u>133</u>. **WFA**: 236, **<u>243</u>**, 245a. **MGLA**: 7b, 9a.
- **<u>figurative</u> excesses OCA**: <u>59</u>.
- **<u>figurative</u> theme CoD**: <u>122</u>.
- **<u>figure</u>/ground IiA**: <u>136</u>, 163. **ESA**: 23a. **OVE**: 257, 259. **CP**: 29c. **GL**: <u>12</u>, <u>48</u>, <u>125</u>, **<u>175</u>**, 189. **CoD**: 15, **<u>24</u>**, **<u>33</u>**. **PMA**: 83**<u>b</u>**. **PLP**: 31.
- **closed <u>figure</u> PMA**: 45**<u>b</u>**.
- **imageable <u>figure</u> WFA**: **<u>236</u>**. **PLP**: 96.
- **natural <u>figure</u> GL**: 125.
- **non-<u>figural</u> CoD**:7**<u>b</u>**, 88c. **WFA**: 233**<u>bc</u>**, 245a. **NWA**: 22. **MGLA**: 8a. **PMA**: 13**<u>b</u>**, 45b.
- **spatial <u>figure</u> CoD**: **<u>44</u>**, 63**<u>b</u>**c (form), 64, 66a, 69ab, <u>70</u>, 81**<u>c</u>**, <u>105</u>, 110b, **<u>126</u>**. **PLP**: 77, **<u>138</u>**, 140, 144, 194. *See also* spatiality
- **urban <u>figure</u> CoD**: 66<u>b</u>, 69a.

filter IiA: 113, 118, 169, 174.

firmness BH: 125a, 126, 136, **<u>137</u>**.
flexibility IiA: 114, 115, 116, 152, 165, 205, 206, 207. **PMA**: 23**<u>b</u>**. **PLP**: 271.
floor IiA: 137, 138. **OVE**: 262, 263. **ESA**: 16a. **GL**: <u>13</u>, 169<u>b</u>. **KHLA**: 43**<u>a</u>**. **TAA**: 195b. **VPP**: 212<u>ab</u>. **ESJU**: 223a. **HTA**: 45. **CoD**: <u>27</u>, **<u>59</u>**, 63a<u>b</u>, 91, 117**<u>c</u>**, 124a. **TH**: 158a, 161. **PMA**: 33a, 41a, 49b, 116ab, 117a. **PLP**: 163, 166, 192, 194, 196, 216, 264, **<u>317</u>**.
foci (focal points) CEV: 103, 104c. **ESA**: 32a, 53, 68ab, 96a. **GL**: 10bc, 12, 16 (focusing), 81, 86, 92, 104, 136a, 151, 160, <u>175</u>, 176, 190. **KHLA**: 32<u>b</u>, 46a. **TAA**: 182, 196a. **VPP**: 212**<u>b</u>**. **ESJU**: 229a. **CoD**: 63a, 66b, 69b, 128. **PMA**: 32<u>b</u>, 61b, 118a. **PLP**: 200.
focusing VPP: 207c, 212b.
forces (living forces of nature) **IiA**: 80, 125. **MiA**: 20**<u>a</u>**. **TBE**: 105a. **GL**: 23c, 24, 42bc, 45b, 48, 51, 54, 69b, <u>72</u>, 74, 78a, 85a, 98, 99, 103, 104, 108a, 136c, 160, 164b, 166a, 168a, 170**<u>a</u>**, 192, 194a. **CoD**: 31<u>b</u>, 69b, 89c. **PMA**: 29b, 103b, 104a, 120a. **PLP**: 79, 88, 172, 228, <u>235</u>, 279, **<u>296</u>**.

- **<u>forces</u>, historical GL**: 180a. See also history
- **<u>forces</u>, internal and external VPP**: 212<u>ab</u>, 214a. **PLP**: <u>165</u>, 189, 319, 348, 349.
- **<u>forces</u>, modern spatiality CoD**: 126. **PMA**: 32<u>b</u>.

forest GL: 25, 27.

- **Black <u>Forest</u> TBE**: <u>112</u>. **CoD**: 94<u>a</u>. **PLP**: 244.

form IiA: 18, 19, **<u>23</u>**, 37, 45, **<u>53</u>**, 58, **<u>61</u>**, **<u>88</u>** (form follows function), 89, 90, 94, <u>97</u>, 99, **<u>100</u>**, **<u>101</u>**, <u>102</u>, **<u>104</u>**, **<u>105</u>**, <u>106</u>, 131-160 [**<u>131</u>**, **<u>133</u>**, **<u>140</u>**, **<u>146</u>**], 148, 155, **<u>167</u>** (foreign forms), 168, **<u>169</u>**, 170, <u>173</u>, 174, **<u>176</u>**, **<u>177</u>**, <u>179</u>, 183, **<u>184</u>**, **<u>188</u>**, 196, 201, 205, 211. **OVE**: 256, 257, **<u>259</u>**, 261, 261, 264, 266. **MiA**: 22a, 26**<u>a</u>**. **BBB**: 61bc. **SAG**: 77c (plastic form). **CP**: 31b, 32, 37**<u>a</u>**. **ESA**: 38b, 39**<u>a</u>**, 83, 98b, 99**<u>a</u>**, 103. **TBE**: 109b, 112. **GL**: 6**<u>b</u>**, 14, 61, <u>65</u>, **<u>66</u>**, 69c, 71, 73, 74, 135, 136<u>b</u>, 163, 164a, 166c, 176, 184, 198a. **KHLA**: **<u>29</u>**, 31ab, 32**<u>a</u>**, 35, 42**<u>b</u>**, 43**<u>a</u>**, 46a. **TAA**: 181a, 184, 192, 195**<u>b</u>**, 196ac. **B**: 170, 173. **VPP**: 207a, 212a. **HTA**: 46**<u>a</u>**. **CoD**: 29**<u>c</u>**, 37, **<u>44</u>**, 48**<u>b</u>**, **<u>53</u>**, 63**<u>b</u>**c, 66bc, <u>72</u>, 75**<u>b</u>**, 83, <u>84</u>, 88abc, 110**<u>a</u>**, 117**<u>c</u>**, <u>119</u>, <u>122</u>, <u>133</u>.

NWA: 22, **53**. **MGLA**: 7**a**. **OCA**: 44, 45, 52, 53. **VoA**: 71. **PMA**: 15**ab**, 43b, 44b, 66b, 67b, 68a, 69a, 101**a**, 103**a**, 110b, 113a, 122**b**. **PLP**: 7, 9, 24, 34, 45, 55, 105, 106, 142.

furniture ESA: 27**a**, 31b, 32a. **VPP:** 207**b**, 211a, 212**bc**. **PLP:** 184.

fusion IiA: 97, 141. **COD:** 124b. **PLP:** 198. *See also* addition, division, integration, interpenetration

gable TBE: 105c, 107. **GL:** 65, 67, 70. **BH:** 125bc, 126, 137, 138**a**. **HTA:** 48b. **CoD:** 61, 85, 88**a**, 94abc, 99b, **106**, 108a, 110a. **MGLA:** 8b, 11a. **PMA:** 16b, 39a, 45a, 49b, 52a, 53b, 57a, 59, 78a, 116b. **PLP:** **171**.

Gadamer OCA: 54. **PLP:** 11, **109**, 208, 221.

garden architecture ESA: 52b, 74ab **GL:** 52b. **CoD:** 75**a**. **PMA:** 119b. **PLP:** 75, **77**, 78, 82, 119, 155, 156.

gathering ESA: 66 (collecting). **TBE:** 113a. **GL:** 5**b**, 6a, 9, 10b**c**, 16, **17**, 18**a**, 22, 23**ab**, 25, 46, **51**, 52b, 56, 58**a**, 69a, 77, 78a, 81, 82, 83, **92**, 99, 101, 104, 108ac, 118a, 136a, 143, 149, 160, 164b, 165, 166a**c**, 168**c**, 169**ab**, 170abc, 172, 176, 182c, 195**a**, 197, 200. **KHLA:** 37**ab**, 41a, 42**a**, 44**a**, 46**ab**. **TAA:** **192**, 195**c**, 196abc, **198**. **BH:** 140c. **VPP:** 207c. **HTA:** 42**b**, 44c, 48**a**. **CoD:**13bc, 17abc, 18, 19, **25**, **26**, 30a**b**, 31**ab**, 34, 41a, **44**, 47, 51ac, 56, 61, 69a, 70, 71a**bc**, 75**c**, 83, 88**c**, 89ac, 91, 94c, 99a, 102, 108a, 117abc, 135. **TH:** 158b. **WFA:** 236. **PRB:** 215ab. **MGLA:** 8b, 9a, 13b. **OCA:** 47, **48**, **49**, 50, 53, 56. **PMA:** 13ab, 14a, 20**ab**, 53a, 75b, 76**a**, 82**b**, 86a, 89b, 90a, 92b, 102**b**, 104a, 114**ab**, 116b, 118a, 123a**b**, 126a**b**. **PLP:** 36, 51, 98, **110**, **111**, 120, 122, 137, 141, 146, 152, 161, 174, 176, 194, 208, 265, 273, 274, 280, 353, 354. *See also* thing

- **gathering (unifying) middle iAMP:** 16a. **KHLA:** 37**b** (language), 40**a**, 44**b**, 46b. **HTA:** 46**b**. **CoD:** 48c, 135. **PMA:** 123**b**.

gate ESA: 58. **GL:** 129.

***gegend* HTA:** 48**a**. **OCA:** 47, 48.

Gehry, F. PMA: 111b. **PLP:** 347, 348, 350, 351.

general (vs particular or local) **CP:** 29c. **ESA:** 18ab, 29a, 35b, 88, 99a. **TBE:** 105c.

GL: 8**c**, 10**a**, 13, 32a, 50, 58b, 59, **65**, 72, 160, **170a,** 180a, 184, 195c, 200. **KHLA:** 29, 36**a**. **TAA:** 190b**c**, 194, 196a, 199**ab**. **BH:** 138**a**, 140**a**. **B:** 170. **ESJU:** 225, 228. **HTA:** 44**a**. **CoD:** 7**a**, 9b, 13c, 18, 25, 26, 29ab**c**, 30**b**, 51**c**, 70, 72, 75**ab**, 79, 88b, 108ab, 119, 129, **130**. **WFA:** **243**, 245**c**. **SH:** 151. **PRB:** **220**. **NWA:** **8**, 9, **14**, 25, 43, 54, 61. **MGLA:** 14b. **OCA:** 44, 45. **PMA:** 16a, 19a, 20b, 23a, 37**a**, 61ab, 69**b**, 86**a**, 98b, 104a, 106**b**, 115b, 116a, 118a, 121**b**. **PLP:** 61, 62, 63, 65, 118, 122, 146, 165, 269, 271, 273, 277, 288, 300, 304, 349, **351**, 354.

generalization IiA: 30, 36, 38. **PLP:** 70, 71, 88, **134**, 274, 285, 288, 300.

genius loci (spirit of place) **OVE:** 257 (the 'general character' of the landscape). **CP:** 32. **ESA:** 27ab, 28b, 32**b**, 68b, 69**a**. **GL:** 5**c**, 10**c**, 18a**bc**, 23**b**, 32**b**, 42ac, 45b, 46, 47, 58**ab**, 65, 69**b**, 73, 76, 77, 78**ab**, 81, **83**, 85a, **97**, 98, 101, 102, **103**, 104, 108abc, 109, 116**a**, 135, 137, 138**a**, 140, 142, 143, 144, 147, 151, 153, 54, 160, 164bc, 166ab**c**, 170a**b**, 179, 180abc, 182ab, 184, 196. **KHLA:** 44**b**, 46**a**. **TAA:** 181**a**, 196**bc**. **CoD:** 19, 48**b**, 50**bc**, 63**b**, 70, 88b. **WFA:** **243**. **PRB:** 222a**c**. **NWA:** 22, 41, 61. **OCA:** 44. **PMA:** 20**b**, 61a, 65b, 72**b**, 75**ab**, 76b, 89ab, 90**a**, 92a, 93b, 98a, 111b, 119**a**, 123**a**. **PLP:** **28**, 35, 44, **53**, 54, **55**, **85**, 87, **88**, 91, 133, 161, 163, **185**, 209, **225**, 263, 279, 290, 296, 300, 344, 346, 353, **354**.

spirit of natural place:
- **landscape, romantic GL:** 27, 42a-45a, 48, 155, 180a, 184. **CoD:** 48a. **PLP:** 86.
- **landscape, cosmic GL:** 24, 45a-45c, 42a, 48, 135, 180a, 184. **CoD:** 47, 48a, 69b, 81c. **PMA:** 103a.
- **landscape, classical GL:** 45c-47, 48, 146, 180a, 184. **CoD:** 48a. **PMA:** 103b. **PLP:** 86.
- **landscape, complex GL:** 47-48.

spirit of man-made place:
- **architecture, romantic GL:** 69b-71, 76, 78**a**, 169**a**, 177, 182c, 196, 200.
- **architecture, cosmic GL:** 69b, 71-73, 76, 78**a**, 169**a**, 177, 182c, 196.
- **architecture, classical GL:** 69b, 73-76, 78**a**, 169**a**, 177, 182c.
- **architecture, complex GL:** 69b, 76-78**a**.

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294, 296, 300, 309, 310, **311**, **312**, 328, <u>329</u>, 330, 331, 341. *See also* feelings, thought

- **zero** **WFA**: 233c. **NWA**: **43**, **45**, <u>57</u>. **VoA**: <u>61</u>.

gift (given) **MiA**: 20b. **TBE**: 109c. **GL**: 6<u>c</u>, 8a, 14, 18<u>ab</u>, 48, 160, 164ac, 168b<u>c</u>. **KHLA**: 32<u>**b**</u>, <u>35</u>, 36<u>a</u>. **TAA**: 181b, 183b, 190b. **B**: 169. **VPP**: 212<u>**b**</u>. **HTA**: <u>41</u>, 42b. **CoD**: 7<u>a</u>, 9<u>ac</u>, 12<u>ab</u>, 13ab, 16, 17b<u>c</u>, 29b, 41bc, 48<u>**b**</u>, 50<u>b</u>, 51c, 53, 70, <u>73</u>, 89a, 108a<u>c</u>, 111<u>**a**</u>, **129**. **TH**: 153a. **TCS**: 231a. **WFA**: 233<u>**c**</u>, 241. **PRB**: 215<u>b</u>, 222<u>**a**</u>. **NWA**: 32, 40. **MGLA**: 11a. **OCA**: 47. **PMA**: 14a<u>b</u>, 61a, 69b, 89ab, 90ab, 91a, 103<u>a</u>, 111<u>**b**</u>, 116a, 117a, 121a. **PLP**: 43, <u>54</u>, 70, 71, 85, 129, **185**, <u>209</u>, <u>221</u>, <u>223</u>, 231, 263, <u>264</u>, 265.

Gigliotti, V. **ESA**: 66, 109ab.

globalization (global) **TH**: 164<u>b</u>. **PMA**: 77a. **PLP**: 315, 326, 351, 353.

goal **IiA**: 64 (goal-object). **OVE**: 263. **MiA**: 24a. **CP**: 30. **CEV**: 103. **ESA**: 14<u>ab</u>, 19ab, 22b, 23a, 40, 46, 50, 53. **GL**: 56, 69a, 71, 124. **VPP**: 212b. **ESJU**: 229b<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 13<u>a</u>, <u>20</u>, 24, 31<u>ac</u>, 33, 37, 71bc, 79, 88a, 89a, 99b, 102, 103, <u>126</u>. **WFA**: 241. **PRB**: 222b. **NWA**: 27, 37. **PMA**: 66a, 68a, 72<u>a</u>, 76<u>**a**</u>, 117b. **PLP**: 42, 43, 69, 77, 78, 88, 148, **196**, 197, 200, 203, 208, 265.

Goethe **MiA**: 24b. **GL**: 18c, 98, 185b. **PLP**: 161, 235.

Gothic/Revival **IiA**: 99, 102, 124, 135, 136, 138, 139, 160, 164, 168, 174. **ESA**: 52a. **GL**: 76, 77. **BH**: 138c. **CoD**: 48a, 71a, 75c, 81b. **NWA**: 18, 50. **VoA**: 71. **PMA**: 38b, 65a, 78a, 105b, 106ab. **PLP**: 25, 55, 66, 100, 101, 169, <u>170</u>, 171, 172, 175, **176**, 178, 180, 181, 183, 209, 269, 283, 285, 286, 288, 289, 290, 293, 298, 305, 319.

gratification **IiA**: 39, 65, 66.

Graves, M. **CoD**: 88<u>c</u>. **WFA**: 245<u>abc</u>. **NWA**: 40, 55, 56. **MGLA**: 6-14. **VoA**: 72. **PMA**: 46<u>**b**</u>.

Greek architecture (art) **IiA**: 91, 96, 117, 120, 121, 125, 126, 142, 143, 146, 148, 149, 151, 180, 198. **ESA**: 61, 99b, 100. **TBE**: 107. **GL**: 28b, <u>31</u>, 45c, 53, 54, 74, 76, 140, 149, 153, 158, 163, 164a, 169b, 176. **CoD**: 22, 42, <u>73</u>, 124b. **WFA**: 237. **NWA**: 17, 28, 46. **PMA**: 23a, 77b, 78ab, 103b, 104<u>**ab**</u>, 105a, 117a. **PLP**: 12, 53, 66, 93, 98, 169, 174, 175, 275, 277, 279, 281, 302, 351.

green city **GL**: 191, 194c. **CoD**: 48<u>c</u>, 69c. **NWA**: 38. **PMA**: 18<u>ab</u>, 75a, 76<u>**b**</u>, 77<u>**a**</u>, 82b. **PLP**: 352.

grid **IiA**: 164, 165. **SAG**: 91. **ESA**: 26a. **GL**: 61, 71, 72, 73, 120, 135, 136b, 182<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 41c, 79, 81c. **TH**: 154, <u>156</u>, 158a, 162b. **NWA**: <u>27</u>, 28, 29, **30** (democratic), 31, 32, 33, <u>37</u>, <u>38</u>, 41, **59**. **PMA**: 28b, 63a, 67b, 103b, 117b. **PLP**: <u>211</u>, <u>213</u>, <u>217</u>, 353.

ground **IiA**: 136, 163. **ESA**: 23a, 24b, 27a, 28b, 58, 72, 74b, 75b, 83, 96b. **TBE**: 109a. **GL**: 12. **TAA**: 199c. **B**: 168. **ESJU**: 223a, 229c. **CoD**: 75<u>a</u>, 111<u>bc</u>, **129**. **TH**: 158a. **PMA**: 41a, 83<u>b</u>, 95b. *See also* figure/ground (figure)

Gropius **IiA**: 13, 19, 159, **219**, 220, 221. **GL:** 194c. **TAA**: 184, 185a, 199a. **B**: 167<u>a</u>, 169, 170, <u>174</u>, <u>176</u>, **177**, 178b. **NWA**: 22. **PMA**: 10b, 15ab, 27a, 42a, 54a, 67ab, 82a, 84a, 89ab. **PLP**: 328, 330.

grouping **IiA**: 97, 106, 116, 140, 146, 147, 154. **BBB**: 61c. **CP**: 32. **TBE**: 116. **GL:** <u>61</u>, 74, 189, 197. **CoD**: 41<u>**b**</u>. **PMA**: 66b. **PLP**: 146, 240, 262, 275. *See also* ensemble

Grundbegriffe **IiA**: 69, 95.

guardianship (guardian spirit) **GL**: 18b. **KHLA**: 44b. **TAA**: 196b. **OCA**: <u>47</u> (and cultivation), <u>**57**</u>. **VoA**: <u>**61**</u>. **PLP**: <u>119</u>.

Guarini, G. **BBB**: 61c, 63, 65, 68, 71abc, 73ab. **SAG**: 77-92. **CEV**: 94, 95, 96, 97, 104ab. **ESA:** 63, 65. **PMA**: 24b, 25a, 33a, 107b. **PLP**: 25, 182, 200, 215, 297, 317.

guiding elements **IiA**: 143. **ESA**: 56b, 95.

Habermas, J. **OCA**: 59. **PLP**: 9.

habit (*gewohnt*) **IiA**: 59, 120. **GL**: 23<u>**a**</u>. **HTA**: 42<u>c</u>, 44<u>c</u>, 46b. **PMA**: 61<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 263, <u>**300**</u>.

habitat **CP**: 27c. **GL**: <u>**22**</u>, 23a. **CoD**: 45, 48<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 190, 217.

Hadid, Z. **PLP**: 217, <u>351</u>.

hand **ESA**: 27a. **PLP**: 184, <u>185</u>.

happenings (occurrences) **IiA**: 175. **GL**: 166c. **KHLA**: 37<u>**b**</u>, 46b. **ESJU**: 229c. **HTA**: 46<u>a</u>, 48<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 72. **NWA**: <u>30</u>. **PMA**: 16<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: <u>72</u>, <u>127</u>, 129, 138, **176**, <u>194</u>, 197, 213, 266. *See also* event, *Ereignis* (Heidegger), occurrences

harbour **ESA**: 72.

Hebel (*Hebel der hausfreund*) **KHLA**: 44**a**.
BH: 140ab. **HTA**: 42a, 44c. **CoD**: 94c.
OCA: 47, **56**. **PMA**: 90a, 115b. **PLP**: 51.
Hegel, G.W.F. GL: 168a. **VoA**: 64.
<u>**Heidegger, M.**</u> **ESA**: 16a, 18b, 26b, 27b,
31ab, 34a, 35b, 36b, 114<u>**b**</u>. **GL**: 5b<u>**c**</u>, 6a,
8bc, 10ab, 12, 13, 15, 18a, 21b, **22**, 23<u>**a**</u>b,
165, 168<u>c</u>, 169<u>a</u>, 170<u>**a**</u>, 176, 198a. **iAMP**:
12, 14. **KHLA**: 29-46. **BH**: 140<u>a</u>. **B**: **176**,
177. **VPP**: 207a. **HTA**: <u>**39-48**</u>. **CoD**: 17abc,
18, 27, 30a, 89ab, 94<u>c</u>, 111<u>abc</u>, <u>112</u>, 117a,
120, 133. **PRB**: 215ab. **NWA**: 49, 54.
MGLA: 8b, 13<u>**b**</u>. **OCA**: 45, 46, 47, 49, 50,
52, 54, 56, 57, 59. **VoA**: 61, 63, 64, 67.
PMA: 13ab, 33b, 45b, 90ab, 114ab, 115ab,
123<u>a</u>**b**. **PLP**: **10**, <u>15</u>, <u>16</u>, 19, <u>27</u>, 44, 51, 53,
61, <u>70</u>, **71**, 72, 73, <u>110</u>, 111, 122, 126, 134,
139, 141, 150, 159, 166, 172, 221, 223, 224,
228, 231, 266, 303, 312, 334. *See also*
Being, clearing, dwelling, language &
Heidegger (language), language as the
house of Being (language), set-into-work

- **abyss OCA**: <u>**57**</u>.
- *aletheia* **KHLA**: 37<u>b</u>. **CoD**: 111<u>**b**</u>.
  PMA: 114<u>**a**</u>, 123<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: <u>**72**</u>, <u>87</u>, 92,
  174, 281.
- *Andenken* **HTA**: 42<u>**b**</u>, 44<u>**a**</u>, 46<u>c</u>, 48<u>c</u>
  (poetical *Andenken*). **PMA**: 123<u>**b**</u>. *See
  also* thought
- **bridge analogy ESA**: 26<u>**b**</u>, 53, 54ab.
  GL: 18<u>**a**</u>, 82, 170<u>b</u>. **BH**: 126, 137.
  HTA: 42b. **PRB**: 215<u>abc</u>. **MGLA**: 8b,
  13b. **OCA**: 47, 48, 53, 54. **PLP**: <u>110</u>,
  312.
- *Dasein* **KHLA**: 35. **B**: 168, 177.
  OCA: 45, 48, 56, 57. **PLP**: 10, 15, 16,
  19, 44, 70, 71, 108, 186.
- **earth (vs world) KHLA**: 40<u>**a**</u>. **HTA**:
  42c, 44ac, 46a.
- *Ereignis* **KHLA**: 37<u>**b**</u>. **OCA**: <u>**57**</u>. **PLP**:
  <u>**72**</u>, **127**, **176**, <u>266</u>, **312**. *See also*
  event, happenings, occurrences
- **Greek temple analogy GL**: 198a.
  KHLA: 40<u>a</u>b. **HTA**: 39ab<u>**c**</u>, 41, 42bc,
  44<u>c</u>, <u>45</u>, 46c, 48a. **CoD**: **112**, 117<u>b</u>.
  OCA: 50, 54. **VoA**: <u>**61**</u>. **PMA**: 90b,
  104a. **PLP**: <u>110</u>, 111.
- **Gelassenheit PLP**: <u>**57**</u>.
- **jug analogy GL**: 168<u>**c**</u>, 170<u>ab</u>. **TAA**:
  190<u>a</u>. **HTA**: 42b. **CoD**: 17<u>ac</u>. **MGLA**:
  13b. **PLP**: <u>110</u>.
- *lethe* **PLP**: 72.

- *logos* **PLP**: 111, <u>**126**</u>.
- **Ontological difference KHLA**: 37<u>**b**</u>.
  CoD: <u>**112**</u>. **PLP**: 71, <u>**134**</u>, <u>142</u>, 143,
  156, **303**, 334.
- *Raumlichkeit* **KHLA**: 42<u>**a**</u>. **PRB**:
  222<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: <u>**27**</u>, <u>29</u>, 44, <u>**45**</u>, 100, <u>**217**</u>.
  See also spatiality
- **rift** (*Riss*) (difference) **GL**: <u>9</u>. **KHLA**:
  37<u>b</u>, 40<u>**a**</u>. **HTA**: 46<u>**ab**</u>. **CoD**: <u>**112**</u>.

'here' GL: 6<u>c</u>, 8<u>**a**</u>, 15, 185<u>b</u>. **VPP**: 212<u>**a**</u>.
HTA: 42b, 44c. **CoD**: 29<u>bc</u>, 31<u>ab</u>, 41a, 48<u>b</u>,
51<u>**a**</u>, 53, 55, 56, 66<u>**c**</u>, 71b, 75<u>**a**</u>, 108b, 110c,
111<u>**c**</u>, 117<u>c</u>, <u>**129**</u>. **SH**: <u>**151**</u>. **PRB**: 222<u>c</u>.
NWA: 13, 16, 17, 43, 57. **MGLA**: 13b.
PMA: 16<u>**a**</u>, 37b, <u>**59**</u>, 76<u>**b**</u>, 89a<u>b</u>, 90<u>**b**</u>, 110a,
116a, 117a, 123<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: <u>12</u>, 156, 240.
heterogeneous TH: 154. **PMA**: 56b. **PLP**:
62, 67, 118, 120.
hidden GL: 18a, 83, 165. **HTA**: <u>**41**</u>, 44<u>**b**</u>.
CoD: 17<u>b</u>, 111b. **TH**: 154b, 158b. **VoA**: 63.
PMA: 102<u>**a**</u>, 104ab, 114a, 115<u>**a**</u>.
hierarchy IiA 21, 89, 106, 120, 151. **CP**:
31c, 37<u>b</u>. **ESA**: 30b, 98a. **GL**: 42a, 69a. **B**:
170. **CoD**: 57, 66b, 118. **PMA**: 11b, 23b,
77a. **PLP**: 42, <u>85</u>, 133, 137, 140, <u>**157**</u>, 189,
190, 201, 219, <u>**221**</u>.
<u>**history**</u> **IiA**: 18, 19, 23, <u>**24**</u>, <u>**183**</u>, <u>**184**</u>, <u>193</u>
(historical research), 199, <u>209</u>, 211-214, 219,
224. **OVE**: 260. **CP**: 32. **ESA**: 51, 52, 59<u>**a**</u>,
81b, 114<u>**a**</u>. **GL**: 6<u>**a**</u>, <u>11</u>, 18<u>b</u>, 42c, 86, 108ac,
136ac, 137, 168a, 180<u>**ac**</u>, 201, 202. **iAMP**:
16c. **KHLA**: 32<u>b</u>, 40<u>**a**</u>, 46<u>**a**</u>. **TAA**: 196ac.
VPP: 214<u>**b**</u>. **HTA**: 44<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 29<u>**c**</u>, 30<u>**b**</u>, <u>44</u>,
48<u>**b**</u>, 66c, 78, 85, 120, <u>**135**</u>. **PRB**: 215c, 220.
NWA: 8, <u>**9**</u>, 25, 41, 43, 49 (history as proof),
55, <u>**57**</u> (source), <u>**60**</u>. **MGLA**: 11ab, 14<u>**a**</u>.
OCA: <u>54</u>, 57. **PMA**: 82a, 84a, 85b, 94a,
102<u>**b**</u>, 103<u>**a**</u>, 107b, 110a, 115<u>**a**</u>, 119a, 121b
(history takes place), 122a. **PLP**: 16, 33, 34,
<u>55</u>, <u>56</u>, 62, <u>**87**</u>, 107, 143, 178, <u>**208**</u>, <u>211</u>, <u>**221**</u>,
251, 294, 302, <u>**353**</u>, 354. *See also* historical
forces (forces)

- **architectural** <u>**history**</u> **CoD**: 72, 79,
  81ac, 88b, 105, 119, 120. **NWA**: <u>**43**</u>,
  <u>49</u>. **PLP**: 7, 8, 12, 45, 93, <u>**193**</u>, <u>306</u>,
  313, 336.
- <u>**historical**</u> *milieu* **iAMP**: 11a. **PLP**:
  134.
- <u>**historical**</u> situation **GL**: <u>6a</u>, 18b.
  PLP: <u>264</u>.

historicism IiA 17, 18, 23. **GL**: 198b
(modern historicism)c. **CoD**: 99a, 119, <u>**135**</u>.

WFA: 233b. **MGLA**: 11ab, 14a. **OCA**: 59.
PMA: 39b, 46b, 89b, 107a, 113a, 119a.
PLP: 13, 25, 103, 105, 306, 310, 330.
Hölderlin ESJU: 230. **HTA**: 46c. **CoD**: 18,
19. **OCA**: 59. **PMA**: 114b. **PLP**: 109.
Holl, S. PLP: 351.
home MiA: 24a. **CP**: 29b, 31a, 34. **ESA**:
19ab, 20a, 22a, 31ab, 34ab, 88, 114a. **GL**:
20, 21b, 23c, 50, 77, 170b. **BH**: 140a. **CoD**:
9abc, 13c, 20. **PRB**: 215c (at home). **PLP**:
39, 40.
homo faber (the human as maker/creator)
PLP: 93.
homo quaerens (the human as seeker)
PLP: 61.
homo viator (the human as pilgrim; one who
is on the way) **GL**: 22. **CoD**: 13a. **WFA**:
241. **NWA**: 27. **PLP**: 28.
homogenous ESA: 10a. **GL**: 11. **CoD**:
124c. **TH**: 154. **PLP**: 74, 87, 174.
honesty MiA: 17a, 22b. **TAA**: 185b. **PMA**:
43b, 113a. **PLP**: 337.
hope GL: 136c.
horizon CP: 30. **ESA**: 23b. **GL**: 13. **TAA**:
190c, 195b. **VPP**: 212b. **ESJU**: 223a. **CoD**:
9c, 24, 27, 85, 91. **TCS**: 231ac. **PMA**: 49b,
72a, 116a, 117a. **PLP**: 85, 86, 107, 139,
303.

  ▪ **horizon of the moment PLP**: 40.
horizontal & vertical liA: 44, 47, 144. **MiA**:
24a (horizontal plan). **BBB**: 61b. **CP**: 30,
31ab. **CEV**: 93c, 94, 103, 104b. **ESA**: 16b,
21ab, 31ab, 42, 49b, 89, 91a, 94. **GL**: 10c,
12, 40b, 45b, 51, 52a, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73,
78b, 81, 85bc, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106,
118bc, 163, 165. **KHLA**: 43b. **TAA**: 192,
193, 195bc, 197. **BH**: 125a, 127, 133, 136.
B: 170. **ESJU**: 229a. **CoD**: 22, 23, 27, 29a,
33, 37, 59, 61, 69b, 75bc, 78, 84, 99b, 118,
130. **TCS**: 232. **SH**: 141abc, 147. **MGLA**:
7a. **PMA**: 11a, 18a, 23a, 26ab, 27ab, 28a,
29a, 37a, 40b, 72a, 103b, 105a, 116b. **PLP**:
53, 106, 128, 133, 139, 140, 146, 150, 152,
163, 189, 208, 216, 217, 252, 300, 317. *See
also* rhythm, tension
house (level) **ESA**: 27b, 30b, 31ab, 32ab,
86ab, 88, 98a. **TBE**: 105ac. **GL**: 6c, 8b, 9,
10b, 58a, 65, 116a, 128. **KHLA**: 44a. **VPP**:
207c, 212a. **CoD**: 7a, 9c, 12ab, 13c, 17b,
22, 26, 29a, 50c, 70, 88b, 89-110 [89c, 94a,
102, 106], 124c, 128. **WFA**: 242. **NWA**: 9,
10, 12-25 [22, 25]. **OCA**: 47, 54. **PMA**: 6,

17a, 49-59 [49ab, 59], 77a, 115b, 116ab,
117a, 118ab, 119a, 120a, 123b. **PLP**: 85,
155, 236, 237, 239, 240, 246, 252, 265, 267,
317, 321, 331. *See also* environmental levels
(environment)
housing shortage liA: 167, 168 (in
Norway). **MiA**: 18.
'how' liA: 88. **ESA**: 69b. **TBE**: 109c. **GL**:
6ab, 10c, 14, 19, 32c, 58bc, 63, 65, 66, 69b,
185b. **KHLA**: 31b, 41a, 42b, 43ab, 44a.
TAA: 195b, 197. **BH**: 140c. **VPP**: 212a
(link: articulation). **HTA**: 39c. **CoD**: 7a, 15,
26. **WFA**: 238. **NWA**: 45, 54. **OCA**: 51, 56,
59. **PMA**: 17a, 19b, 69b. **PLP**: 43, 44, 45,
53, 71, 125, 141, 186.
human being liA: 21. **CP**: 27c, 37c. **iAMP**:
11c. **KHLA**: 35. **TAA**: 183b, 196a. **HTA**:
39c, 42c, 44b. **CoD**: 13c, 30c, 42, 108c,
114. **WFA**: 238. **PRB**: 222c. **NWA**: 46.
PMA: 104ab, 105b, 106b, 114b, 115b, 117b.
PLP: 66, 69, 71, 77, 88, 106, 159, 173, 275,
280.

  ▪ **human architecture B**: 178a.
  ▪ **human body liA**: 89, 91. **ESA**: 27a.
    GL: 140, 150, 158. **VPP**: 212c. **CoD**:
    19. **WFA**: 236. **PLP**: 24, 140, 155,
    175, 184, 185, 186, 275.
  ▪ **human crisis iAMP**: 11c. **GL**: 191
  ▪ **human content B**: 177.
  ▪ **human domain TAA**: 195c.
  ▪ **human gesture BH**: 129.
  ▪ **human material iAMP**: 11a. **KHLA**:
    46b.
  ▪ **human nature KHLA**: 29. **PLP**: 62.
  ▪ **human product liA**: 22, 181..
  ▪ **human psyche PMA**: 115b.
  ▪ **human scale OVE**: 259, 262, 263.
    ESA: 30a, 81b, 83. **GL**: 34, 195b.
    ESJU: 223b. **CoD**: 63c. **PLP**: 184.
  ▪ **human system SH**: 148.
  ▪ **man's condition CP**: 30.
  ▪ **man's constitution ESA**: 27a.
  ▪ **manmade: OVE**: 265. **CoD**: 17a.
    NWA: 29.
  ▪ **man's task GL**: 170b. **KHLA**: 31b,
    35. **CoD**: 75a. **PMA**: 114a. **PLP**: 55,
    111, 119, 328.
  ▪ **man-nature totality WFA**: 245b.
humanization GL: 74, 78a, 83, 129, 142,
155, 160, 164a, 195b. **TAA**: 186a. **NWA**:
14, 45, 47, 49. **PMA**: 84a, 105a, 121a. **PLP**:
8, 119, 290, 294, 302, 306.

173, 192, 193, 204, **208**, **221**, **223**, 225, **232**, 263, 274, 294, **312**, **313**, 319.

- **image, artistic PMA**: 114b.
- **image, atemporal PMA**: 118a.
- **image, cosmological ESA**: 24a. **PLP**: 200, 225, 277, 296.
- **image, environmental ESA**: 7a, 11a, 13a, 15a, 26b, 27ab, 29b, 35b, 37a, 71, 86a, 114**a**. **GL**: 19. **TAA**: 181a, 195**b**. **CoD**: **20**, **24**, 66ab. **PMA**: 66a. *See also* image
- **image, mental GL**: 20.
- **image, spatial CoD**: 66a.
- **image-making PMA**: 115**a**.
- **imageability GL**: 20, 65, 73, 82, 94, 97, 125, 155, 189, 191. **CoD**: 71c, **84**, 103.
- **imageable form TBE**: 109c. **GL**: 157. **CoD**: 85. **PMA**: 85b, 101b (plastic image), 102**a**.
- **imageable order GL**: 157.
- **imageable space GL**: 157. **CoD**: **44**. **PMA**: 101b (spatial image), 102**a**.
- **Imageable structure CP**: 27b, 37**c**.
- **image making GL**: 125. **CoD**: 44, 66a.
- **built image PMA**: 120a, 123**a**.
- **false image TAA**: 190a.
- **materialized image HTA**: 48**b**.
- **non-representational image HTA**: 44b.
- **poetic image HTA**: 44**ab**.
- **representational image HTA**: 39c, 41, 42c, 44**b**.

imagination GL: 166a, 201. **iAMP**: 12. **TAA**: 186a. **CoD**: 118, **133**. **PMA**: 78b, 91**a**.
imago loci **CoD**: 47.
imago mundi **(image of the world) ESA**: 11b, 23b. **TBE**: 105bc. **GL**: 17, 23a. **TAA**: 196**a**. **VPP**: 212**b**, 214**b**. **ESJU**: 223**a**, 230. **CoD**: 24, 64, 71a, 83, 85, 94**a**. **TCS**: 231c, **232**. **PMA**: 16b, 39a, 50a, 59, 63a, 85**b**, 105b, 115**b**, 116a, 117ab, 119b, 120b, 123**b**. **PLP**: 11, 54, 66, **75**, 78, 144, 150, 155, 173, 176, 192, **221**, 239, 275, 290, 313, 352, 354.
imitation IiA: **39**, 40, 168. **GL**: 169b. **WFA**: 238. **PLP**: 65.
implementation CP: 31c. **PLP**: **45**, **61**, 90-123 [**91**, **92**, **93**, **108**, **122**], **125**, **127**, 129, 144, 156, **159**, 184, **185**, 190, 191, **194**, 196, 197, **217**, 221, 225, 229, **239**, 263, **266**, 275, 300, 330, **336**, 337, 349, 351.

imprint PLP: 13, 86, **159**, 161, **182**, 185, 186, 194, 203, 205, 206, 208, **225**, 226, 228, **229**, 231, **232**, 240, 246, 263, 266, **267**, 269, 290, 348, 349, **353**, **354**.
'in' GL: 169a.
incarnation GL: 170**c**. **ESJU**: 225, 226. **HTA**: 46a. *See also* embodiment, *Verkörperung*
indifference MiA: 20**c**. **iAMP**: 11**c**. **PLP**: 31, 348, 349.
individual IiA: 16, 38, 80, 89. **ESA**: 38ab, 39a. **GL**: 73, 114, 180**a**, 182**c**, 195**b**. **KHLA**: 42a, 43b. **SH**: 143. **NWA**: 7, 10, 13, 28, **32**, 34. **PLP**: 10, 15, 39, 45, **229**.
- **individual's role CP**: 38. **ESA**: 114b.
- **individuality GL**: 190, 195**bc**. **PMA**: 78a.

industrialization IiA: 15, 16, 168, **177**, 207. **PMA**: 13**a**, 51b. **PLP**: **310**.
information IiA: 60, 61, 70, 158.
inhabiting GL: **9**, 22. **CoD**: 17c. **TCS**: 232. **PRB**: 222a. **OCA**: 47. **PLP**: **45**, 140, 185 (co-habitation), 231, 263, 313, 337. *See also* dwelling, inhabited landscape (landscape)
inherent GL: 165, 170**a**.
innovation GL: 102. **NWA**: 43 (Stern). **PMA**: 113b. **PLP**: **226**.
inside & outside CP: 31c, 33, 34. **ESA**: 9a, 18a, 20ab, 25**ab**, 45a, 49**a**, 54a, 88, 94. **GL**: 8**c**, 9, 10abc, 12, 15, 23a, 42a, 58a, 59, 63, 67, 69bc, 104, **130**, 142, 144, 146, 152, 164a, 170**b**, 176, 182**c**, 194abc, 198c. **KHLA**: 42b, 43b. **TAA**: 195ab. **BH**: 127, 133. **VPP**: 212**b**. **ESJU**: 223c. **HTA**: 46**b**. **CoD**: 12**b**, 23, **26**, 27, 31**a**, 35, 69a, 71**c**, 78, 81b, 83, 91. **TH**: 153b, 158b. **TCS**: **232**. **SH**: 141c, 142, 143, 147. **MGLA**: 7a. **PMA**: 23b, 26ab, 27a, 32b, 33b, 34, 41b, 56a, 83**b**, 110a, 126a. **PLP**: 35, 39, 140, 155, 191 (within-without), **192**, **193**, 194, **217**, 240, 286.
insight CoD: 71**b**.
inspiration GL: 185**b**. **KHLA**: 31**b**, 32**b**, 35, 36**b**. **TAA**: **187**. **NWA**: 7. **PLP**: 336.
installment (*Einrichten*) **HTA**: **45**.
institution (public building) **IiA**: **40**, 118, 119, 172. **ESA**: 88. **GL**: 18c, **184**. **KHLA**: 31**ab**, 32**ab**, 35, 41**a**, 42**a**, 43b, 44a. **TAA**: 194, 195a, 200. **CoD**: 7**a**, 13**bc**, 17**b**, 22, 26, 29**a**, 63a, 70, 71-88 [71**a**, **83**], 94**a**, 99ab, 108a**b**, 128. **WFA**: **242**. **NWA**: 29, 44. **PMA**: 6, 18b, 19b, 43b, 61-72 [61**a**, 72**a**],

77a, 82b, 83a, 85a, 111**b**, 115b, 117**ab**, 118ab, 119a, 120a, 123**b**, 126a. **PLP**: 28, **39**, 53, 95, 96, 197, 203, 313, 334, 336, 352. *See also* Kahn

integrate ESA: 37b, 39b. **GL**: 71. **ESJU**: 225. **CoD**: 99a.

integration IiA: 32, 38, 81, 204. **OVE**: 258. **MiA**: 19. **BBB**: 61c. **SAG**: 82. **CP**: 36. **CEV**: 93b. **ESA**: 63, 65. **GL**: 94, 103. **BH**: 132, 133. **B**: 178a. **VPP**: 212a. **CoD**: 55, 124bc, 126. **MGLA**: 11**b**. **PMA**: 23b, 24b, 78ab, 106a. **PLP**: 198, 200, 286. *See also* addition, division, fusion, interpenetration

intention IiA: **31**, 34, 36, **37**, 41, 67, 73, 78, **107**, 183, 195, 196, 199, 218. **CP**: 31c. **ESA**: 9a, 36b, 38b, 39b. **GL**: 182ab. **KHLA**: 43a. **B**: 170. **ESJU**: 223a. **CoD**: 17a, 135. **PMA**: 102**b**, 105b, 115b. **PLP**: 14, 21, 70, 79, 134, 174, **185**, 265, 350.

  ▪ **intentional depth IiA**: 31, 35, 42, 80, 195, 196, 219. **ESA**: 38b.
  ▪ **intentional pole** (intentional possibility) **IiA**: **34**, 40, 50, 67, 179, 180, 183, 189.

interaction IiA: **36**, **189**. **MiA**: 20**a**, 26c. **CP**: 27b, 31ac, 32. **ESA**: 9a, 10**b**, 12b, 17**b**, 24b, 25**ab**, 27**ab**, 28b, 32**b**, 33ab, 37a, 59b, 71, 91a, 99b, 100, 103b, 109a. **GL**: 37, 42ac, 45a, 53, 136c, 176. **iAMP**: 16**b**. **TAA**: 190**b**. **BH**: 136, 138**a**. **B**: 167bc, 168, 169, **170**, 174, 175, 178a. **VPP**: 207b. **CoD**: 26, 30a, 99b. **TH**: 153b. **SH**: 141c, 142, 143 (interplay). **NWA**: 24. **PMA**: 10ab, 11ab, 19a, 23**b**, 25b, 29**b**, 32ab, 33**b**, 37b, 46**a**, 49ab, 50a, 53a, 62b, 64b, 77a, 85**a**, 93a, 120ab, 123**b**, 127**b**. **PLP**: **13**, 14, **16**, 34, 45, 59, 61, **88**, **92**, 122, 125, 126, **127**, **128**, **129**, 133, 137, **143**, **144**, 169, 170, 193, 196, 200, 209, **213**, **217**, **221**, **226**, 229, 231, 262, 264, 269, 309-357 [**311**, **312**, **324**, **326**, **334**, **353**, **354**, **356**].

    ▪ **interaction, human ESA**: 34b. **GL**: 136c.
    ▪ **interaction** (psychological process) **IiA**: **38**, 39, 111, 119, 123.

interdependence ESA: 91b.

interior decorator IiA: 204. **ESA**: 96b.

interior(s) TBE: 120. **GL**: 92, 102, 129, 130, 135, 152, 163, 190. **TAA**: 196c. **BH**: 127, 132, 138**a**, 140**a**. **B**: 168, 169. **VPP**: 207b, 209, 211a, 212**ab**. **ESJU**: 223c, 224, 228. **CoD**: 37, 53, 63a**b**, 69a, 78, **79**, 84, 85, 88a,

94c. **TH**: 158b. **SH**: 142, 143. **NWA**: 13. **PMA**: 17a, 42a, 49b, 50a, 53a, 64b, 104b. **PLP**: 40, 45, 101, 105, 106, 149, 150, 152, 155, **164**, 180, 182, 189, **190**, 191, 194, 224, 246, 249, 265, 280, 286, 297, 317, 336, 348. *See also* interior space (space)

  ▪ **interiority GL**: 114, 118c, 120, 130, 142, 153, 161. **PMA**: 52b, 105b. **PLP**: 88, **138**, **190**, **192**, **280**.

intermediary object IiA: 32, 33, **34**, **36**, 50, **61**, 68, 72, 87, 102, 170, **179**, 183, 184, 188, **198**. **ESA**: 38a. **GL**: 23a.

International(ism) Style IiA: 220. **MiA**: 17c. **GL**: 194**c**. **TAA**: 198, 199**a** (not reject). **VPP**: 214**b**. **CoD**: 81a. **PRB**: 222c. **NWA**: 22. **PMA**: 17a, 29b, 38a, 56b, 57a, 89a, 92b, 95b, 118**b**. **PLP**: 55, 172, 179, 351.

interpenetration IiA: 97, 141. **SAG**: 77abc, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85 (image), 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92. **CP**: 36. **CEV**: 95. **ESA**: 91b. **B**: 167b. **CoD**: 124b. **PMA**: 23b. *See also* addition, division, fusion, integration

  ▪ **double SAG**: 79
  ▪ **syncopated SAG**: 79, 89, **92**. **PLP**: 194.

interpretation IiA: **34**, 60. **MiA**: 22c. **SAG**: 89, 92. **CP**: 31**b**, 37**c** (and complex articulation). **GL**: 11, 18b, 65, 76, 97, 101, 108abc, 116**a**, 152, 153, 163, 166b, 168b, 169b, 170**b**, 172, 180**ab**, 182a. **iAMP**: 16c. **KHLA**: 32**b**. **TAA**: 189a, 190a, 196c, **198**, 199b. **BH**: 127, **134**, 137, 138c, 140b. **B**: 167c. **VPP**: **209** (poetic interpretation). **ESJU**: 223c, 229abc. **HTA**: 42c. **CoD**: 17ac, **20**, 29c, 31**b**, 41abc, 48**b**, **53**, 64, 69a, 72, 73, 75**bc**, 78, 81ac, 88a(figural)c, 94c, 99b, 110c, **129**, **135**. **TH**: 164b-166a. **TCS**: 231a. **WFA**: 233**b**, **238**, **243**, 245c. **SH**: 141a. **NWA**: 9, 13, 19, 21, 22, **33**, 37, 38, 41 (historical), **43**, 44, 45, **49**, 54, 56, **57**, 59, **60**, **61**. **MGLA**: 11a, 13b. **OCA**: **56**. **VoA**: 61 (and the same), **63** (reveal and hide). **PMA**: 20**b**, 23a, 24a, 29b, 32a, 33ab, 34, 37a, 40a, 41b, 42a, 45b, 51a, 59, 62ab, 76b, 77a, 82a, 86a, 90**a**, 95b, 98**b**, 102**ab**, 106ab, 110ab, 113b, 115**a**, 117**b**, 118b, 119a, 120a, 121a, 122a, 123**b**. **PLP**: 8, 21, **40**, **45**, **53**, 54, 55, 71, 77, **85**, 88, 92, 108, 120, 129, 140, 144, **156**, 165, 168, 169, 180, **185**, **193**, **221**, 223, **229**, 264, 266, 302, 337, **353**.

  ▪ **creative interpretation GL**: 198c.

Klee, P. PMA: 13b, 14b, 20a. **PLP**: 26, 126, 311.

knowledge IiA: 40, 64, 69, 82. **CoD**: **130**. **PLP**: 40, 43, 56, 61, 62, 63, 65, 71, 87, 92.

known ('know') IiA: 28, **37**, 196. **CP**: 29b, 30. **ESA**: 19a, 20, 22a, 29b, 32b. **GL**: 10c, 42a, 48, 52a, 69b, 142, 168a. **KHLA**: 44**a**, 46**a**. **BH**: 125b, 128, **136**. **ESJU**: 228. **HTA**: 44c. **CoD**: 9**b**, **22**, 51c, 66ab, 111**a**. **WFA**: 233ab, 236. **NWA**: 23, **60**. **PMA**: 9a, 44**a**, 49b, 113**b**, 114**b**, 120a. **PLP**: 40, 43, 73, 111, 226, 349. *See also* unknown

Knutsen, K. OVE: 258.

Kohn, Pederson, Fox NWA: 41.

Korsmo, A. PLP: 17.

Krier, L CoD: 50b. **MGLA**: 8a. **OCA**: 56.

Krier, R. CoD: 63b. **PMA**: 85b.

labyrinth GL: 61, 63, 71, 72, 113, 116a, 118c, 120. **CoD**: 69b. **PLP**: 213, 259, 260.

lack PMA: 115**a** (and interpretation). **PLP**: 330.

landmark ESA: 39b, 85a, 98b. **GL**: 12, 97, 125. **CoD**: 22, 35, 50a, 64, 66**b**, 83, 88**a**, 117c, 128. **NWA**: 10, 12. **PMA**: 61b, 62a, 65b, 68a, 85**ab**, 86a, 117a, 118a. **PLP**: 150. *See also* Lynch, monumentality

landscape (level) **IiA**: 20, 103, 142, 143, 168. **OVE**: 256, 257, 258, 259, 265. **MiA**: 24**b** (structured in advance). **CP**: 32. **ESA**: 22a, 27ab, 28ab, 29ab, 32ab, 70, 71, 72, 74ab, 75ab, 88, 96b. **TBE**: 109b, 111. **GL**: 6c, 10ab**c**, 11, 12, 14, 18ac, 23c, 32c, 34, 37, 40ab, **48**, 69a, 98, 118a, 142, 143, 157, 164a, 170a**b**, 172, 189, 198c. **KHLA**: 44**ab**. **TAA**: **192**, 199c. **HTA**: 44**c**, 48a. **CoD**: 7a, **19**, 31**b**, 33, 34, 45, 48**b**c, 71**c**, 73, 94a**b**c, 108**b**, 117**b**c. **PRB**: 215**b**, 222**b**. **OCA**: 47. **PMA**: 32b, 65b, 75**a**, 76**a**, 84b, 89b, 90**a**, 93a, 115b, 118a, 120b. **PLP**: 28, 31, 33, 35, 40, 43, 47, **51** (comprehended landscape), 54, 61, 74, 82, **85**, 86, **91**, 110, **111**, 114, 118, 129, 131, 149, 176, 182, 186, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 232, 237, 239, 240, 248, 249, 252, **263**, 265, **300**, 324, 331, 352, 353. *See also* environmental levels (environment)

- **landscape, cultural GL:** 10b, 40b, 52**b**, 69a, 77. **PLP**: **91**, 181, 236.
- **landscape, inhabited KHLA**: 44**ab**. **TAA**: 196**a**, **197**. **HTA**: 44**c**, 48**ab**. **CoD**: **19**, 29**b**, 35, 48**b**, 69a, 71**b**, 94**c**, 96, 108**c**, 117**ab**. **OCA**: **47**, 50, 53,

54, 56. **VoA**: 75. **PMA**: 90**a**, 115**b**, 116**a**. **PLP**: 51, 53, 61, 74, 85, 105, 110, 113, 115, **190**, 216, 263. *See also* inhabiting

Langer, S. K. IiA: 63, 80. **OVE**: 255, 256. **GL**: 23**b**. **PLP**: 223.

language, general (everyday, spoken, basic) **IiA**: **57**, **58**, 130. **GL**: **16**. **KHLA**: 37**b**. **TAA**: 190**c**. **HTA**: 48b. **CoD**: 29**b**c, 111**c**, 128, **129**, **130**, 133. **WFA**: 233**c**, **243**. **NWA**: 9. **MGLA**: 7a. **OCA**: 45-46, 53. **VoA**: 68, **71**. **PMA**: 102**a**. **PLP**: **19**, **21**, 55, 62, 65, 91, 92, **96**, 107, 108, **109**, **111**, 122, 124-129 [**125**, **126**, **127**], **138**, 142, 143, 167, **176**, 180, 192, 197, 226, 273, 275, 288, 315. *See also* art as language (art)

- **language & metaphor TAA**: 189b, 190**a**. **VPP**: 212**b**. **PMA**: 102b.
- **language & Heidegger KHLA**: 37**ab**, 40a, 41a**b**, 46b. **HTA**: 42**bc**, 44**ab**, 46**c**. **CoD**: 29**b**, 111**abc**. **NWA**: 49, 54. **MGLA**: 13b. **OCA**: **54**. **PMA**: 101**b**, 102**a**. **PLP**: 126. *See also* Heidegger
- **language & semiology TAA**: 190a. *See also* semiology
- **language as communication** (*compare with* 'saying') **IiA**: 32, 130. **ESA**: 9ab. **TAA**: 190**a**. **HTA**: 42**c**. **CoD**: 29**b**, 111**a**. **NWA**: 53. **OCA**: 54. **PMA**: 113**b**. **PLP**: 111. *See also* communication
- **language as revelation GL**: 169**a**. **CoD**: 29**b**, 111**a**. **PLP**: 111, 225.
- **language as the house of Being KHLA**: 37b, 41b. **HTA**: 44**a**, 46**c**. **CoD**: 29b, 111**abc**, **130**. **NWA**: 49, 54. **MGLA**: 13b. **OCA**: 54, 56. **PMA**: 101b, 122a. **PLP**: **111**, 122, **127**, 138. *See also* Heidegger
- **language, atemporal COD**: 29**c**. **PLP**: 55, 91.
- **language, classical NWA**: 14, 46, 47, 48, **49**, 51. **MGLA**: 12**b**, 14**b**. **PMA**: 38ab, 77b, 78a, 79a, 102**b**, 118b. **PLP**: 98, 103. *See also* Classicism
- **language, formal IiA**: **207**, 221. **PLP**: 12, 47, 54, 55, 92, 152, 171, 174, 260, 288, 290, 298, 300. *See also* style
- **language, pluralistic BBB**: 76c.
- **language, poetic TAA**: 190a. **OCA**: 54. **VoA**: **71**. **PLP**: 65.

- **language** of architecture **SAG**: 88. **GL**: 170b. **KHLA**: 37a, 41b, 42**a**, 43b, 44**a**, 46**a**. **TAA**: 195**c**, 196a, 199a, 200. **BH**: 140c. **CoD**: **26**, 29**abc**, 30a**c**, **72**, 111**c**, **120**, **133**. **WFA**: 233b, **238**, **242**, **243**, 245a**c**. **NWA**: 10, 32, 41, **45**, 52, 53, 55, (not principles), 56, **57**, **59**, **61**. **MGLA**: 8a, 14ab. **OCA**: 52, **56**. **PMA**: 52a, 86b, 90**b**, 98**ab**, 101**ab**, 102**ab**, 103**a**, 105a, 106**b**, 107b, 110ab, 113**b**, 116a, 118a, 122**a**, 123**a**. **PLP**: 103, **125**, **127**, 129, **217**, **223**, 225, **226**, 269, 277, 329, **336**, **354**. *See also* language of architecture (Le Corbusier)
- **language** of distinct architectural elements **NWA**: 56.
- **language** of essential architectural structures **KHLA**: 37a.
- **language** of forms **WFA**: 237. **NWA**: 43, 44. **MGLA**: 7b. **VoA**: 67. **PMA**: 11**b**, 17**a**, 20**b**, 92a, 113**b**, 118a. **PLP**: **273**, **274**.
- **language** of Functionalism **MiA**: 17b.
- **language** of images **PMA**: 101**a**.
- **language** of memories **NWA**: 55.
- **language** of symbolic forms (style) **GL**: **53**, 54. **PRB**: 222**c** (universal).
- **language** of the Renaissance **ALI**: 60a.
- **language** 'speaks' **PMA**: 102**a**, 103**a**, 110**b**, 115**a**. **PLP**: **111**.
- new 'vocabulary' **B**: 176.
- new 'grammer' **B**: 176. **CoD**: 88**c**. **TH**: **161**, 162a**c**, 164ab, 166a. **SH**: 143, 152. **NWA**: 20. **PMA**: 28a, 33b, 34, 45a**b**, 127b.

Late Baroque ESA: 65. **PMA**: 106b. **PLP**: 302.

law IiA: 54, 55, 56.

layman (client) **IiA**: 14, 22, 90, 198, 203, 204.

Le Corbusier IiA: 13, 17, 19, 92, 104, 114, 116, 126, 152, 206. **OVE**: 262, 264. **MiA**: 17a, 17c, 22bc, 26c. **CP**: 36. **ESA**: 94, 96a **GL**: 6**a**, 61, 76, 191, 194abc, 196, 197, 198a, 200. **KHLA**: 42a, 43**a**. **TAA**: 185b, 199a. **B**: 174, 177. **ESJU**: 225, 230. **CoD**: 23, **84** (almost right), 88c, 99c, 108c, 122. **TH**: 161. **WFA**: 233a. **NWA**: 43, 53. **OCA**: 44, 46, 52. **PMA**: 9a, 11b, 14b, 15a, 16ab, 17a, 18a,

26b, 28ab, 29ab, 32a, 33ab, 34, 38a, 40ab, 41ab, 42ab, 43a, 44b, 49a, 54ab, 55a, 56b, 58b, 61a, 62a, 66b, 67ab, 68a, 69**a**, 75a, 82ab, 83a**b**, 84ab, 85a, 89b, 101a, 107b, 127b. **PLP**: 7, 13, 26, 39, **107**, 179, 217, 223, 313, 315, 323, 326, 331, 333, 336, 338, 346, 349, 352.
- **Five point plan TAA**: 199**a**. **B**: 176. **NWA**: **43**, **53**. **OCA**: 44. **PMA**: 16**b**, 17**a**, 26b, 28b, 40ab, 41b, 42a. **PLP**: 7, 26, **107**, 179, 313, **315**, 320, **323**.
- **language** of architecture **OCA**: 52. *See also* language of architecture (language)
- ***modulor, le* IiA**: 92, 93. **OVE**: 264-265.
- 'touched my heart' **KHLA**: 43**a**. **TAA**: 199a. **OCA**: 52. **PMA**: 15a.

Leibniz CEV: 93a.

let be (*Gelassenheit* influence) **KHLA**: 32**a**, 41a (letting dwell), 46**b**. **B**: 178a. **PLP**: **56**, **337**.

levels IiA: 70, **99**, **150**, 184. *See also* environmental levels (environment)
- **levels** (intentional poles) **IiA**: 35.
- **levels, object IiA**: **29**, 30, 35, **181**.

Libeskind, D. PLP: 217.

life IiA: 13, 14, 16, **18**, 21, 22, 23, 31, **51**, 54, 55 (life & science), 60 (behaviour & forms of life), 67, 69, 78, 80, 126, 129 (social life), 168, 175, **185**, **188**, 193, 196, 205. **OVE**: **255**, 256, 261, 262, 263, **266**. **MiA**: 17a (and Meyer), 20a, 20**b** (life-situations to be concretized) c, 22c (lifelessness and politics), 23 (life should be varied), 24**ab** (how space becomes alive), 26a**b**c (architecture must adapt to life as whole). **CP**: 31**bc**, 37**a** (…is constancy and change), 37**b**. **CEV**: 93**b**. **ESA**: 10b, 19b, 25**b**, 27b, 28a, 30b, 31a, 33b, 35**a**, 39**b**, **71**, 81b, 96b, 99**a**, 114a. **TBE**: 105a. **GL**: 5a**c**, 6**c**, 8c, 9, 18**bc**, 25 (living reality), 27, 28**a**, **56**, **65**, 69a, 78b, 92, 102, 108a, 115, 116a, 118**b**, **128**, 129, 130, 136a, **142**, **160**, 161, 164b, 168ac, 169**a**, 170b, 182**c**, 194a, 195b**c**, 198a, 201, 202. **iAMP**: 11**c**, **13**, 16**c**. **KHLA**: 31**ab**, 32**b**, 41b, 44**ab**, 46a. **TAA**: 183b, **184**, 185**c**, 186**a**, **187**, 189a, 190**c**, **192**, 196**bc**. **BH**: 132, **134**, 138**bc**, 140**a**. **B**: 167c, 168, **169**, **170**, **173**, **174**, **175**, **176**, 177, 178a**b**. **VPP**: 212**b**. **ESJU**: 226, 229ab, 230. **HTA**: 41**a**, 42**b**, 44c, 48**a** (life-landscape). **CoD**: 7a,

141b. **PRB**: <u>216</u>. **PMA**: 20a, 66<u>**a**</u>, 114b. **PLP**: 24, 42, 45, 59.

longitudinality CEV: 94, 95. **ESA**: 26b, 62, 83. **GL**: 58c, 59, 61, 151, 153, 161. **CoD**: 81ab. **PMA**: 105b, 117b. **PLP**: 148, 152, 159, 280, <u>297</u>.

loneliness CoD: 88<u>b</u>. **SH**: 143.

L'Orange, H.P. IiA: 88, 123, 124, 149. **GL**: 140. **PLP**: 16, 65, 89, 98, 123.

loss GL: 8<u>a</u>, 182b, **190**. **KHLA**: 46b. **PMA**: 86a.

- **loss** of being **OCA**: 57.
- **loss** of belonging **CoD**: 88b. **PMA**: 12a. **PLP**: <u>33</u>.
- **loss** of built form **CoD**: <u>133</u>.
- **loss** of care **iAMP**: 11a, 12.
- **loss** of character **PLP**: 43.
- **loss** of coherence **PLP**:34, 309.
- **loss** of contact with reality **PMA**: 118b.
- **loss** of dwelling **iAMP**: 12.
- **loss** of expression **iAMP**: 11a.
- **loss** of fellowship (participation, community) **iAMP**: 11a, 12. **CoD**: 88<u>**b**</u>.
- **loss** of the free plan **TH**: 166a.
- **loss** of gathering center **CoD**: 48c.
- **loss** of history **PLP**: <u>33</u>.
- **loss** of home **iAMP**: 12.
- **loss** of identification **GL**: 168<u>c</u>. **PLP**: 197.
- **loss** of identity **GL**: 182<u>b</u>. **iAMP**: 12. **CoD**: 48<u>c</u>. **OCA**: 43. **PMA**: 75a. **PLP**: 31.
- **loss** of image **ESJU**: <u>226</u>. **PMA**: 110a, 120a, 122a<u>b</u>.
- **loss** of language **CoD**: <u>133</u>. **PLP**: 92, 93.
- **loss** of life **TH**: 166b. **PMA**: 76b, 110a. **PLP**: 68.
- **loss** of meaning **OCA**: 57.
- **loss** of meeting and choice **CoD**: 69c.
- **loss** of place **GL**: 23b, 27, 168c, <u>189</u>, **190**, 194b. **iAMP**: 11a, 12. **TAA**: 181<u>a</u>, **184**, **187**. **CoD**: 48<u>c</u>, 69c. **PMA**: 75a, 76<u>b</u>, 89a<u>b</u>, 110a, 118a. **PLP**: <u>28</u>, <u>31</u>, <u>33</u>, <u>34</u>, 44, **56**, **59**, 61, 74, <u>75</u>, 92, 105, <u>155</u>, <u>172</u>, **191**, <u>225</u>, **309**, 312.
- **loss** of poetic understanding **iAMP**: **13**. **PLP**: 67, 309.

- **loss** of sharing **PLP**: 59.
- **loss** of spatial figure **CoD**: <u>133</u>.
- **loss** of street form **OVE**: 262.
- **loss** of style **PLP**: 92, 93.
- **loss** of things **iAMP**: 11c, 12.
- **loss** of tradition **PLP**: 59, 91, 92, 93.
- **loss** of urban space **CoD**: 69c.
- **loss** of vision **PMA**: 20<u>a</u>.
- **loss** of world **iAMP**: 12. **CoD**: 48c. **PLP**: <u>63</u>.

lost , to be GL: 19, 20, 21b, 48. **CoD**: 23.

love GL: 31, <u>97</u>. **CoD**: <u>**91**</u>. **PMA**: 122<u>b</u>, 123<u>b</u>. **PLP**: **119**.

Lynch, K. OVE: <u>260</u>, 262. **CP**: 27b, 29b. **ESA**: 15ab, 18b, 23a, 24a, 30ab, 33b, 34b, 35b, 39b, 49b, 56, 57a, 80ab, 86a. **GL**: 12, <u>19</u>, **20**, 190, 201. **KHLA**: 41a. **CoD**: 20, 22, 44, 50a, 59, **64**, 69c. **NWA**: 27, 39. **PMA**: 85<u>b</u>, 118a. **PLP**: 16, <u>131</u>, 137, 148, 189, <u>190</u>, 197, 198, 201, 333, 352. *See also* district, edge, landmark, node, path

making GL: <u>15</u>, **65**, **66**, 69a, 170<u>**b**</u>, 185<u>**b**</u>. **KHLA**: 31<u>**b**</u>, 32<u>b</u>, 41a<u>b</u>, 44<u>**a**</u> (place-making), 46b. **TAA**: 194. **HTA**: <u>45</u>. **CoD**: 17<u>**b**</u>, 57. **VoA**: 66, 71. **PMA**: 91a, 101b.

magic IiA: 48, 80, 110, 111. **MiA**: 20c.

maintain PLP: 211. *See also* keep

mal **GL**: 17, 56.

manifestation (making manifest) **IiA**: 43, 50, **116**, 188. **GL**: 165, 169a, 176, 180b, 185<u>b</u>. **KHLA**: 41a<u>b</u>. **VPP**: 212<u>b</u>, 214<u>b</u>. **ESJU**: <u>**228**</u>, 229a. **HTA**: 42<u>b</u>, 48<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 29<u>ab</u>, 34, 48<u>b</u>, 122, <u>126</u>. **PMA**: 33<u>b</u>, 42a, 59, 69a, 104a. **PLP**: <u>12</u>, 15, 20, 28, 31, 56, 59, 65, 69, 71, **75**, 77, 88, 91, 101, 110, 111, 114, 122, 126, 133, 137, <u>140</u>, 143, 156, **<u>159</u>**, <u>160</u>, 163, 184, 185, 186, <u>221</u>, **223**, 267, 271, 273, 274, 303, 309, **<u>351</u>**.

manipulation OCA: 57.

Mannerism IiA: 140, 143, 150. **PMA**: 24b, 37a, 38b, 39a, 78b, 106a. **PLP**: 88, 169, 182, 200, 215, 294, 295, <u>296</u>, 298, <u>350</u>.

mass (massive structures) **IiA**: 86, 96, 97, 98, 105, <u>**133**</u>, <u>**134**</u>, 147, 162, <u>**163**</u>, 164, <u>166</u>, 205. **OVE**: 262, 263. **ESA**: 41a, 42, 44, 45b, 83, 98b, 99a. **GL**: 164a. **PMA**: 37a.

massive GL: 155.

material(ity) IiA: <u>102</u>, 106, <u>161</u>, 162, 163, 174. **GL:** 6<u>c</u>, 14, **<u>35</u>**, 67, 69a. **KHLA**: 32<u>a</u>, 43b. **ESJU**: 223c. **CoD**: 41a, 89c, 94<u>b</u>, 96.

WFA: 233c. **SH**: 151. **OCA**: 51. **PMA**: 34, 38a, 46**a**, 51b, 69a, 90a, 94b, 122a. **PLP**: 53, 85, 160, 161, 167, 171, 183, 192, 194, **326**, 349.

mathematics IiA: 55, 57, 58, 106. **PLP**: 7, 24, 27, 65, 67, 68, 88.

matter IiA: 82. *See also* spirit

meaning IiA: **23**, **38**, **39**, 42, 43, 50, 53, 57, **58**, **59**, 67, 69, **71**, **88**, 126 (meaning beyond the immediate situation), 155, 156, 159, **168**, 179, **183**, **184**, 196, 201. **OVE**: 255, 256. **MiA**: 17b, 22**c**, 24**ab**, 26abc. **CP**: **30**, 31**b**, 33. **ESA**: 9a, 11b, 13a, 24a, 38**b**, 39**a**b, 69a. **TBE**: 105c, 122. **GL**: 5a**bc**, 6a, 9, 10a**b**, 16, 17, 18**a**, 20, **21**, 23**b**c, 28a, 32**b**, 40b, **50**, 56, 58a, **65**, 69a, 74, 83, 101, 108ab, 114, 118b, 125, 126, 136ac, 160, 164b, 165, 166b**c**, 168abc, 169a**b**, 170**ab**, **176**, 180a, 182**b**, 184, 189, 192, 195a. **iAMP**: 11ac, 12. **KHLA**: 36**ab**, 37**a**, 41a, 46**a**. **TAA**: 181**a**c, 183abc, **184**, 185b, 187, 189a, 190a, **192**, 194, 196b, **197**, 198, 200. **BH**: **134**, 137, 140c. **B**: 168, 174. **VPP**: 212b**c**. **ESJU**: 223c, **228**, 229a, 230. **HTA**: 41, 48**b**. **CoD**: 7a, 9b, 13a, **15**, 16, 17**ab**, **19**, 22, 29**c**, 30**b**, 37, 41b, 51**c**, 63a, 71a**bc**, 72, 73, 85, 91, 110a, 117**ab**, **129**, 133. **TH**: **154**, 164b, 166a. **TCS**: 231c. **WFA**: 233a, **238**, 241, 245**a**. **SH**: 143. **PRB**: 215ac, **216**, **220**, 222**a**. **NWA**: 10, 15, 31, 34 (conventional), 36, 44, 49 (basic), 56, 61. **MGLA**: 11a, 12b, 13ab, 14a. **OCA**: 43, 45, 46, **49**, 52, 53, **54**, 56, 57, **59** (depends on preservation). **PMA**: 6, 13a**b**, 19**a**, 20b, 37a, **59**, 66**a**, 69a, 72a, 77a, 79a, 98**a**, 101**a**, 102**b**, 103**a**, 104ab, 106**b**, 107a, 110b, 111**b**, 113**ab**, 114**a**, 115**ab**, 118ab, 121a, 123b. **PLP**: 7, 9, 19, 20, 21, 39, **55**, **71**, 85, **86**, 93, 101, 107, 108, 109, **110**, **119**, 156, 165, 170, 173, **213**, 217, 221, **225**, 228, 274, 275, 330, 333.

- **archetypal meaning PMA**: 69a.
- **experienced meaning GL**: 17.
- **islands of meaning NWA**: **9**, 10, 37, 38, 40, **59**. **VoA**: 66. **PLP**: 213.

measurable KHLA: 46a. **TAA**: 185a. **ESJU**: 226. **CoD**: 133. **OCA**: 45. **VoA**: 71. **PMA**: 12**b**, 43b, 66b. **PLP**: 67, 92, 106. *See also* unmeasurable

measure iAMP: 12. **KHLA**: 40a (the world). **HTA**: 46**a**, 48c. **CoD**: 111**b**, **112**. **PMA**: 41**a**, 56**b**, 115**b**. **PLP**: 175, 223.

media NWA: 7. **PMA**: 10a**b**.

meeting OVE: 259, 266. **GL**: **66**, 83, 84, 85a, 99, 113, 136**a**, 152, 170**c**. **iAMP**: 13. **KHLA**: 37**b**, 42**ab** (earth and sky). **TAA**: 195**c**. **BH**: 127, 138**a**, 140a. **VPP**: 209, 212**a**. **CoD**: 7a, 13**b**, 22, **27**, **42**, 51**abc**, **53**, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 63**bc**, **64**, 66a, 69a**c**, 71a**b**, 75**b**, 88b**c**, **91**, 108**b**. **TCS**: 231**b**. **WFA**: 241, 242. **NWA**: 44-45 (meetinghouse vs traditional church). **PMA**: 75b, 76**ab**, 77**a**, 79b, 83**b**, 85ab, 86**a**, 117b. **PLP**: 34, 35, 36, 39, 95.

melting pot NWA: 7, **50**.

memory OVE: 265. **ESA:** 15a, 25a, 30b. **TAA**: 181c. **BH**: 140b. **VPP**: 212b. **HTA**: 44**ab**. **CoD**: 13**c**, 29**c**, 45, **47**, 71a, 89c, 99a, **129**, **133**. **WFA**: 233ac, **243**. **NWA**: **8**, 14, 23, 25, 33, 34, 43, 48, 51 (collage of memories), 54, 55, 59, 60. **MGLA**: 10a, 12b. **OCA**: 44, 45, **56** (source of poetry). **PMA**: 14a, 45b, 46b, 58b, 65b, 86a, 94a, 101**a**, 105a, 114b, 120a, 121a, 122a**b**. **PLP**: 8, 12, 25, 40, **42**, **43**, 44, 45, **55**, **57**, 87, 125, **156**, **217**, 228, 235, 266, 330.

- **memory, mother of the muses HTA**: 44**ab**. **CoD**: 29**c**. **WFA**: **243**. **OCA**: 56. **PMA**: 114**ab**. **PLP**: 55.
- **memory & recognize/remember OVE**: 255. **MiA**: 22c. **HTA**: 42**c**. **CoD**: 45, 63**c**, 66**bc**, 89**a**, 91 (*erinnerung*), 133. **WFA**: 233**c**, 236. **PRB**: **216**, 218. **NWA**: **9**, **45**, 60. **MGLA**: 10b. **OCA**: 47, **54**. **VoA**: 61, 63. **PMA**: 37a, 57**a**, 61b, 69a, 72a, 101**a**, 113b, 114a, 121a. **PLP**: 43. *See also* recognize

Merleau-Ponty, M. ESA: 15b, 16a. **CoD**: 16, 133. **WFA**: 233c. **PLP**: 10, 73.

Meyer, H. MiA: 17a. **TAA**: 185a. **PMA**: 9b, 10a, 15b. **PLP**: 7, 9, 105.

Meyer, L. B. (designed uncertainty) **IiA**: 70, 71, 156, 157, 176, 197.

Michelangelo IiA: 50, 90*,* 95, 96, 104, 124, 138, 139, 145, 153, 155, 172, 176, 183. **BBB**: 76ab. **ESA**: 46, 48, 62. **PLP**: 103, 169, 183, 200, 295, **350** (became a Roman architect).

microcosmos (small world) **IiA**: 107. **GL**: 17, 58, 51, 77, 98, 99, 169**a**. **KHLA**: 32b. **VPP**: **209**, 212b. **CoD**: 64, 71a, 91. **NWA**: 16, **47**. **PMA**: 49**b**, 55a, **59**, 75**b**, 78a. *See also imago mundi*

Middle Ages/Medieval MiA: 17b. **CEV**: 93a. **ESA**: 61. **TBE**: 114. **GL**: 53, 54, 70, 176. **CoD**: 106, 122. **NWA**: 7. **PMA**: 11a, 24a, 38b, 51b, 65a, 78ab, 105a, 106b. **PLP**: <u>66</u>, 102, 293.

milieu **IiA**: <u>17</u>, 119, 120.

minimum measure IiA: 17, 114.

mirroring (mirror-play) iAMP: <u>14</u>. **VPP**: 212<u>**a**</u>. **HTA**: 42<u>**a**</u>, 44<u>**b**</u>, 48<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 17<u>a</u>, <u>**19**</u>, 51a<u>**c**</u>, 111<u>**b**</u>, 117<u>a</u>. **OCA**: <u>49</u>, 57. **VoA**: 64. **PLP**: <u>**10**</u>, 70, <u>71</u>, <u>**72**</u>, 73, <u>75</u>, <u>**85**</u>, <u>87</u>, <u>88</u>, <u>91</u>, <u>**144**</u>, <u>**302**</u>.

mnemonic PMA: 59.

mobility CP: 27a, 37bc. **ESA**: 35ab, 114a **GL**: 19, 56, 180b. **NWA**: 17. **PMA**: 10ab, 11a, 12a, 120a, 123<u>b</u>. **PLP**: <u>269</u>, <u>**273**</u>.

model IiA: 219. **GL**: 52c, 138b, 200. **TAA**: 183ab. **SH**: <u>**151**</u>. **NWA**: <u>12</u>, 23. **PMA**: 18a, 28ab, 106<u>**b**</u>, 107a, 110<u>b</u>, 111a.

<u>**modern architecture**</u> (modernism, modernity, modern movement) **IiA**: 18, 20, <u>21</u>, 107 (the problem), <u>**126**</u>, 148, 149, 159, <u>**205**</u>, 206. **MiA**: 26b. **BBB**: 76c (Borromini, first modern architect). **SAG**: 91. **CP**: 27c, 33. **ESA**: 53, 65. **GL**: <u>**76**</u>, 137, 190, 191, 192, 194<u>a</u>bc, 195abc, 196, 198, <u>**201**</u>. **TAA**: 181<u>a</u>, 183<u>**c**</u>, <u>**184**</u>, 185<u>a</u>c, 186<u>a</u>b, <u>187</u>, 190<u>**b**</u>, <u>197</u>, <u>200</u>. **B**: <u>**177**</u>. **VPP**: 214a. **ESJU**: 229a, <u>**230**</u>. **CoD**: 50<u>c</u>, 64, 81<u>c</u>, 84, 88<u>bc</u>, <u>103</u>, 124c. **TH**: 164ab, 166a<u>c</u>. **WFA**: 233<u>a</u><u>**b**</u>(lack)<u>c</u>, <u>237</u>, 245<u>**bc**</u>. **PRB**: 215<u>c</u>. **NWA**: 18, 22, 25, 39, <u>**53**</u>, 54. **MGLA**: 8ab, 11b, 12a. **OCA**: <u>45</u>, 47, 52, <u>53</u>, 57, <u>**59**</u>. **PMA**: <u>**6**</u>, <u>**7**</u>, 9<u>a</u>b, 12a, 14<u>b</u>, 16b, 17b, 19a, 20a, 39a, 43b, 45b, 46a, 49<u>a</u>, 53b, 68b, 86b, 92a, 113<u>**ab**</u>, 116a, 118b, 120<u>**ab**</u>, 121a<u>**b**</u>, 122a<u>b</u>, 123a, 126b, 127<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: <u>**7**</u>, 8, <u>**9**</u>, <u>11</u>, 12, <u>**13**</u>, 14, 15, <u>17</u>, <u>25</u>, 26, <u>**27**</u>, <u>67</u>, 68, 88, 93, <u>**105**</u>, <u>106</u>, 172, 179, 189, 200, <u>**216**</u>, 269, 303, 304, 305, 306, <u>311</u>, 313, 315, 323, <u>324</u>, 330, 331, 333, 341, 352, 353, <u>354</u>. *See also* modern technology (technics)

- **Late-modern WFA**: 233a. **MGLA**: 7b, 10b, 11b, 12b, 14b. **PLP**: 213, 331.

- <u>**modern architecture (first phase, pioneers) GL**</u>: 192. **TAA**: 186<u>a</u>, <u>**198**</u>. **CoD**: 88c, 108<u>**c**</u>. **WFA**: 237. **PLP**: 8, 9, <u>15</u>, 106, <u>303</u>, 305, 310, 311, 315. *See also* new modernist dwelling (dwelling)

- <u>**modern architecture (second phase) MiA**</u>: 26b. **GL**: 195<u>c</u>. **TAA**: 186<u>**a**</u>, <u>198</u>. **CoD**: 88c. **PLP**: 8.

- <u>**modern architecture (third generation) ESJU**</u>: 229<u>a</u>. **PLP**: 229, 331.

- <u>**modern architecture (third phase) GL**</u>: 198bc, 200. **TAA**: 186<u>**a**</u>, 199<u>**b**</u>. **CoD**: 88c. *See also* new monumentality (Giedion)

- <u>**modern architecture (fourth phase) TAA**</u>: 186<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: 229. *See also* new regionalism (Giedion)

- <u>**modern architecture (orthodox) CP**</u>: 37b. **ESA**: 91b, 105b.

- <u>**modern architecture as art TAA**</u>: 185<u>**ac**</u>. **PMA**: 15ab. *See also* art

- <u>**modern art IiA**</u>: 27, <u>**48**</u>, <u>81</u>. **iAMP**: 14. **WFA**: 245<u>**b**</u>c. **PMA**: 12<u>a</u>b, 13<u>**b**</u>, 14<u>b</u>, 43a, 45a, 46<u>b</u>. **PLP**: <u>**10**</u>, <u>13</u>, 79, 330. *See also* art

- <u>**modern city MiA**</u>: 26a. **GL**: 194c. **CoD**: 48<u>**c**</u>. **PMA**: 18b, 75-86 [77<u>**a**</u>]. **PLP**: <u>352</u>. *See also* city

- <u>**modern environment GL**</u>: 180b, 190. **PLP**: <u>**309**</u>. *See also* environment

- <u>**modern epigones PMA**</u>: 83<u>**b**</u>.

- <u>**modern house**</u> *See* new modernist dwelling (dwelling)

- <u>**modern individualism IiA**</u>: 186.

- <u>**modern life GL**</u>: 180c. **B**: <u>**175**</u>. **SH**: 151. **PMA**: 10<u>b</u>, 33<u>**b**</u>, 57<u>b</u>, 63b, 113<u>**a**</u>.

- <u>**modern man IiA**</u>: 168 (industrialized). **ESA**: 24a. **GL**: 18c, 21a, 22, 192, 195a. **iAMP**: 12. **TAA**: 185a. **PMA**: 10<u>b</u>, 12a. **PLP**: <u>**79**</u>.

- <u>**modern music**</u> **B**: 176. *See also* musical analogy

- <u>**modern regionalism**</u> **TAA**: 199b. **PLP**: 93, 324. *See also* regionalism

- <u>**modern settlement GL**</u>: 194b. *See also* settlement (settle)

- <u>**modern society GL**</u>: 21a. **iAMP**: 11a. **CoD**: 69c. *See also* society

- <u>**modern thought MiA**</u>: 22a. **PLP**: 65. *See also* thought

- <u>**modern world CEV**</u>: 104c. **GL**: 73, 194a. **ESJU**: <u>226</u>. **NWA**: <u>**7**</u>, <u>**8**</u>, 10, <u>**59**</u>. **PMA**: 9a, 11a, 14b, 23b. **PLP**: 7. *See also* world

- <u>**modernism, qualitative PLP**</u>: <u>**15**</u>. *See also* qualitative

- **pre-modern** architecture **PMA**: 119**ab**, 120ab, 121**b**, 122**a**.

modify CP: 31c.

module IiA: 91, 144, 203.

Moholy-Nagy, L. (design for life) **IiA**: 20, 201, 220. **TAA**: 186a, **197**. **CoD**: 103 (life in space). **PMA**: **6**, 10b, 15a, 50a (live in space). **PLP**: 25, **26**, **27**. *See also* art of the experience of living (art), life

moment CoD: 29**c**, **129**. **PRB**: **220**. **PMA**: 16**b**, 121**b**. *See also* moments of use (use)

monotony IiA: 13, 14. **OVE**: 262, 264. **CP**: 37bc. **ESA**: 63, 83, 103a. **GL**: 189, 190, 195**a**. **TAA**: 181ab, 183**c**, 187. **TH**: 166a. **NWA**: 38, 53. **PMA**: 23b. **PLP**: 213, 353.

monumentality IiA: 17, 119, 176, **185**, 186. **OVE**: 263, 264. **ESA**: 70. **GL**: 113, 114, 134, 138b, 142, 143, 195**a**. **B**: 167a, 170. **ESJU**: 225. **CoD**: 108b. **PRB**: 215**c**. **NWA**: 12, 30, 41. **MGLA**: 9b, 10a. **OCA**: **43**. **PMA**: 6, 49**a**, 68b, 72**b**, 83ab, 106b, 111**b**, 121a. **PLP**: 11, 269, 271, **331**. *See also* landmark, new monumentality (Giedion)

mood (state of mind) **IiA**: 22. **MiA**: 20a. **GL**: 42b, 190. **KHLA**: 32a, 36**a**, 37a**b**, 42**a**, 43a**b**, 46b (reduced to sentimentality). **TAA**: **193**, **194**, 195**c**. **HTA**: 46**c**, 48**a**. **CoD**: 89**ab**, **91**, 108**a**, 111**a**. **NWA**: 17. **PMA**: 16a. **PLP**: 19, 161.

Moore, C. (MLTW) **GL**: 200. **TAA**: 199b. **CoD**: 103, 110b. **WFA**: 243, 245**c**. **NWA**: 23. **PMA**: 32a, 33a, 34, 57b, 58**a**, 86a, 94b. **PLP**: 340, 341.

morphology IiA: 159. **GL**: 138a. **KHLA**: 42**b**, 43**ab**. **TAA**: 195a**bc**. **CoD**: **26**, **27**, 29**b**, 48c, **56**, 63**b**, 69c, 91, 117**b**. **NWA**: 54. **MGLA**: 12a. **OCA**: 56. **VoA**: 75. **PLP**: 126, **127**, **129**, 140, 158-187 [**160**, **185**, **186**], **189**, 223, **224**, 249, 263, 266, 274, 275, 285, 295, 296, 300, 302, 312, 333, 341, 352.

Morris, C. IiA: 59, 61, 63, 68, 71, 73, 82, 101, 129, 133

mortals GL: 8c, 10b. **KHLA**: 36b, 37a, 41**a**, 44**b**. **HTA**: 42a. **CoD**: 17**a**, 18, 111**b**. **PLP**: 71, 72, **87**, 93, 98, 231, 281, **328**. *See also* fourfold

motifs ALI: 55. **OVE**: 260, 265. **ALI**: 55. **BBB**: 61a. **SAG**: 79. **CEV**: 103, 104b. **ESA**: 14**a** (Frey). **GL**: **15**, 67, 83, 106, 134, **177**, 179, 180ab, 182**bc**. **BH**: 125b, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 138bc. **B**: 167**a**, 170. **CoD**: 66**c**, 88**a**, 99a, 108a, 124c, 135. **NWA**:

34, 44, 56. **MGLA**: 9b. **VoA**: 72. **PMA**: 11b, 38a, 40a, 46a, 53a, 58b, 61b, 65a, 76a, 94a, 126a. **PLP**: **43**, 47, 51, 53, 96, 105, 107, **133**, 155, 163, 165, 174, 186, 226, 244, 274, 302.

- **devaluated** modern **motifs TAA**: 187.
- **figural motifs WFA**: 245**c**. **NWA**: 56.

motivation ESA: 10b.

motives IiA: 93, 94, **139**, 145, **149**, 152, 157, 159, 169, 180, **183** (and schemata), 186, **188**, 196, 206. **ESA**: 80a.

mountains GL: 25. **PRB**: 215ab, 216.

movement IiA: 87, 95, 197, 198. **CEV**: 93b, 94. **GL**: 152. **TAA**: 199c. **BH**: 125a. **B**: 167b, 168, 169, 170, 173, 178a. **CoD**: 23, 30**b**, 66a. **NWA**: **7**. **PMA**: 9b, 23a, 28b, 32b, 66a, 67**b**, 95b. **PLP**: 11, 189, 193, **194**, **196**, 336.

multifarious (between) IiA: 195. **GL**: 10**b**, 24, 50. **HTA**: 42a. **CoD**: 17b, 18, 25, 26, 29c. **OCA**: 47.

multiplicity GL: 69c, 70. **PLP**: 39, 47, 100, 203, **353**.

musical analogy IiA: 33, 43, 70, 71, 78, 85, 90, 91, 99, 138, 139, 145, 150, 153, 157, 159, 199. **BH**: 138**b**. **B**: 175, 176. **CoD**: 63a, 75c, 108a. **TH**: 162a. **WFA**: 233b, **236**. **NWA**: 51. **OCA**: 57. **VoA**: 72. **PMA**: 13b. **PLP**: 181, 274, 293, **302**. *See also* modern music (modern architecture)

mystery TBE: 105a. **GL**: 35, 69bc, 78b, 81, 92, 108a. **OCA**: **57**. **VoA**: 72. **PMA**: 93b.

mysticism MiA: 22b. **BBB**: 76b. **PLP**: 16, 72, 184.

myth/ology IiA: 80, 189. **MiA**: 20c. **GL**: 23c-32b. **ESJU**: 225. **PMA**: 93a. **PLP**: 139.

mythopoeic GL: 32b.

naïve realism IiA: **31**, **50**, 86, 199. **MiA**: 20a. **ESA**: 7a, 10b, 12ab, 13ab, 14a, 28a.

name (nameable obj.) IiA: 32, **56**, 88, 182, 184. **GL**: 42a, 69b. **KHLA**: 37**b**. **HTA**: 42**c**, 46**c**, 48**b**. **CoD**: 29**b**, 31**b**, **47**(place-names), 88**c**, 111**ac**, **128**, **129**. **TCS**: 231c. **WFA**: 233**c**, **237**, **243**. **NWA**: **9**, **23**, **25**, 53, 60. **MGLA**: 8a (Leon Krier), 10b, 11a, 13b. **OCA**: 47, 48, **54**, **56** ('content of human memory'), 57. **PLP**: 19, 53, **111**, **126**, 127, **129**, 131, 134, 137, 138, 140, 217.

- **place names WFA**: 241.

- **environmental _phenomenology_ GL**: 10a. **TAA**: 190**c**.
- **_phenomenology_ of architecture GL**: 5**c**, 8b, 58**b**, 170**c**, 175.
- **_phenomenology_ of character GL**: 14.
- **_phenomenology_ of natural place GL**: 23c.
- **_phenomenology_ of place GL**: 15.
- **_phenomenology_ of presence PLP**: **311**.
- **_phenomenology_ of space PLP**: 74.
- **_phenomenological_ understanding iAMP**: 14, 16c. **PMA**: 111**b**, 117**a**. **PLP**: 47, 69, **82**, 86, 87, **88**, **91**, 92, 105, **228**, **311**, 329, **331**, **356**. _See also_ comprehension, understanding

philosophy IiA: 80, 82. **ESA**: 15b. **CoD**: 51**b**. **PLP**: 61, 75.

physical control IiA: 111, 112, 113, 114, 169, 174, 185, 186.

physical _milieu_ IiA: 21, 88, 111, 169, 184, **118**, **173**, **201**. **PMA**: 9a. **PLP**: 44.

physiognomic (perception) IiA: 48. **CoD**: **19**. **PLP**: 73, 228.

physiology IiA: 32, 112.

Piaget, J. IiA: 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 53, 54, 55, 56, 74, 75, 76, 94, 106, 140, 141, 196. **CP**: 29abc, 31ab, 37b. **ESA**: 10b, 11a, 15b, 17ab, 18a, 27b, 33a, 35b. **GL**: 13, 20, 180b. **CoD**: 41**c**. **PLP**: 134, 135. _See also_ accommodation, adaptation, assimilation

picturesque TBE: 114. **B**: 167a. **NWA**: 18, 19, 50. **PMA**: 50b, 52a. **PLP**: 233.

Pietilä, R. GL: 200. **WFA**: 233b. **OCA**: 44, 45, 52. **PMA**: 34, 72a, 93a**b**. **PLP**: 14, 344, 346, 350.

pilgrimage ESA: 35a.

place (and place-making) IiA: 95, 168, 169, 222. **MiA**: 24**a** (space-place), 26ab. **CEV**: 93c. **CP**: 27ab, 29b, 30, 31a**b**c, 32, 33, 37ab, 38. **ESA**: 10a, 11b, 16**b**, 17ab, 18b, 19ab, 20a**b**, 22b, 23ab, 24ab, 25ab, 26ab, 27b, 28b, 29b (our place), 30b, 31a**b**, 33a, 35ab, 39b, 46, 48 (essence of place), 49a**b**, 51, 59b, 68b, 84, 114b. **TBE**: 108. **GL**: 5**c**, 6**bc**, 8ac (verb), 9, 10ab, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18a**b**c, 20, 21b, **22**, 23b, 25, 31, 32**b**, 37, 39, 40b, 42**b**, 45abc, 48, 52b, 58b, **65**, 74, 81, 82, 101, 106, 113, **114**, 128, **135**, 136**c**, 140, 150, 152, 164b, 169a, 170a**b**c, **175**, 176, 184, 189, 191, 194**b**, 195**c**, 197, 198**a**c,

200, 201, **202**. **iAMP**: 11**c**, 16**c**. **KHLA**: 37**a**, 41**a**, 44**b**, 46**a**b. **TAA**: 183b, 186a, 190**c**, **192**, **194**, 195a, 196a**b**c, 199b, 200. **B**: 167a. **VPP**: **212ab,** 214**b**. **ESJU**: 226, 230. **HTA**: 41, 42**b**, 44c, **45**, 46**a**b, 48**a**. **CoD**: 7**a**, 9a**bc** (permanent), 12**b**c, 13ab, 20, 24, **27**, 29**c**, 31a**b**, 33, 35, 41ac, 44, **45** (dwelling-place), **47** (place-names), 48**a**b, 51a**bc**, **55**, 56, 57, 60, 63**b**, 66ab, **70**, **73**, 75a**b**, 79, 89b, 96, 110**b**, 117**ab**, 124**c**, **126**, **129**, 133. **TH**: 154, 158a, 159. **TCS**: 231a. **WFA**: 241, 242, 245a. **SH**: 142, 148. **PRB**: 215a**b**, 216, **220**, 222a**c**. **NWA**: **7**, 9, **16**, 17, 21, 23 (memorable places), 24, 25, 41, 43, 49, 53. **MGLA**: 8b, 9a. **OCA**: 44, **47**, **49** (place-_Gegend_), 51, 52, 54, 56. **PMA**: **6**, 10**b**, 11a**b**, 16**a**, 18b, 19a**b**, 20**b**, 24b, 25**a**, 32a, 33a**b**, 37b, 41a, 45**b**, 46ab, 50a, 56b, 57a**b**, 58b, **59**, 63b, 65b, 75a**b**, 76**b**, 77ab, 78b, 79ab, 83ab, 84b, 85**b**, 89a**b**, 90a**b**, 91**a**, 92**a**, 94a, 101**b**, 102b, 103b, 104ab, 110**a**, 111ab, 113-127 [113**a**, 115**b**, 117**ab**, 121**b**, 123**ab**]. **PLP**: **8**, **11**, **12**, 13, 14, 17, **27**, **28**, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, **45**, **51**, **53**, **54**, 55, 56, 57, **59**, 61, 63, 65, 71, 72, 74, 79, **85**, 86, 87, **91**, 92, 93, 96, 99, 103, 105, 106, 114, 115, 122, 125, **129**, 131, 135, 138, **140**, 148, 152, 159, 165, 171, 172, 176, 181, 182, 184, **186**, 189, **190**, 191, 193, **194**, 196, 197, 201, **208**, **216**, **217**, 220-229 [**221**, **223**, **224**, **229**], 231, 232, 240, 244, 249, 252, 263, 265, **266**, 267, 269, 276, 277, 279, 280, 297, 298, 300, 302, 303, **311**, 315, 319, 320, 324, **326**, 337, 340, 344, 348, 351, 353, **354**, **356**. _See also_ lived place (life), location, take place, unity of life and place (life)

- **place analysis PLP**: **56**, 59, **356**. _See also_ analysis, qualitative analysis (qualitative), structural analysis (structure)
- **place, contemporary PMA**: 19**b**.
- **place, manmade GL**: 8c, 10abc, 13, **17**, 48, **50**, **56**, 58**a**b, 63, 69ab, 77, 125, 165, 170c, 189. **KHLA**: 46a. **PLP**: 43, 45, 86.
- **place, modern PMA**: 19b, 62b. **PLP**: 16.
- **place, natural GL**: 8c, 10abc, 13, **17**, 23**c**, 32**b**, 42**a**, 46, 50, 53, 69b, 77, 98, 108**c**, 116b, 144, 170c, 189. **KHLA**: 46a. **CoD**: 7**a**. **PMA**: 91b, 119b. **PLP**: 45, 85, 86, 191, 192, 211.

PLP: 28, 36, 39, 44, 47, 55, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 85, 87, 88, 96, 163, 172, 185, 225, 231, 240, 273, 294, 320, 326, 356.

- **quality, archetypal PMA**: 59.
- **quality, architectural OVE**: 255 (how to make the qualities visible). **MiA**: 17b. **PRB**: 222b. **NWA**: 31, 61. **MGLA**: 9a. **PLP**: 213.
- **quality, environmental OVE**: 256. **MiA**: 23. **GL**: 20. **PLP**: 39, 87.
- **quality, phenomenal MiA**: 23, 24b.
- **quality of place GL**: 136c. **PLP**: 33.
- **qualities of space MiA**: 23.
- **human quality GL**: 120.

quantitative ESA: 38b. **GL**: 8a, 24, 168a. **iAMP**: 12, 13. **KHLA**: 46b. **TAA**: 181a, 184, **197**. **B**: 174. **CoD**: 12b, 135. **WFA**: 236. **PMA**: 12b, 13b, 66b, 106b, 123a. **PLP**: 7, 10, 14, 16, 20, 26, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 92, 105, 108, 113.

quiet PLP: **196**, 197, **228**, **229**. *See also* silence

ratio liA: 94.

rationalism (neo) MiA: 17c. **BBB**: 76b. **ESA**: 39a. **GL**: 192, 198b. **TAA**: 181b, 183b, 184, 187, 189a, 198. **B**: 173, 174. **ESJU**: 228. **NWA**: 30. **OCA**: 45. **PMA**: 20a, 33b, 46ab, 51b, 111a. **PLP**: 23, 24, 26, 65, 66, 67, 92, 209, 310, 311, 329, 333, 341, 352.

reaction liA: 38.

reality liA: 19, 49, 53, 59, 64, **177**, **219**. **OVE**: 266. **MiA**: 17bc, 19, 20b. **CP**: 37b. **ESA**: 86a, 99a. **GL**: 5c, 18c, 23c, 50, 58b, 83, 164c, 168a, 169b, 170a, 192, 196. **KHLA**: 36a, 37**b**, 41ab, 44a, 46**ab**. **TAA**: 181c, 184, 190b, 198. **B**: 173. **ESJU**: 226. **CoD**: 16, 53, 83, 88a, 111a, 133. **WFA**: 233b**c**, 236, 237. **SH**: **151**. **NWA**: 21. **MGLA**: 7b, 14b. **PMA**: 13ab, 28a, 78b, 84b, 93**a**, 104a, 105b, 114ab, 122a. **PLP**: 11, 12, 14, 68, 69, 137, 184, **185**.

realistic TH: 164a. **PMA**: 51b.

realization OCA: 46.

reason MiA: 18. **iAMP**: 12. **TAA**: 183a. **PMA**: 12ab, 20a, 111a. **PLP**: 303, 310.

receive ESA: 32**b**. **GL**: 9, 16, 45c, 52a, 66, 197, 198a. **VPP**: 212bc. **SH**: 143.

recognize liA: **37**, 43, **94**. **CP**: 29a. **ESA**: 17a, 19b. **GL**: 166c. **PMA**: 110a. **PLP**: 36,

45, 53, 63, 69, 72, 75, **87**, 131, 133, **134**, 135, 137, 143. *See also* memory & recognize/remember (memory)

reconciliation GL: 31.

rediscovery iAMP: 16b. **KHLA**: 46a. **PLP**: 44, 120, **197**, **229**, 271, 303. *See also* discovery, moments of use (use), reveal

region GL: 108a, 176. **CoD**: 48b, 120. **OCA**: 51. **PMA**: 89b, 90b, 91b, 92a, 102b, 117b. **PLP**: 79, 86, 189, 226, 231, 269, 288, 319.

regionalism TBE: 108. **GL**: 194c, 196. **TAA**: 199b. **B**: 178**b**. **PMA**: 6, 56b, 72**b**, 86a, 89-98 [89**b**], 102**a**, 111**b**, 121a. **PLP**: 11, 26, 54, 55, 93, 172, 284, 324, 330, 331, 346. *See also* modern regionalism (modern architecture), new regionalism (Giedion)

regularity TH: 166a. **PLP**: 39.

relationship liA: **22**, 44, **58**, 59, 101, **105**, 117, 132, 140, 141-145, **146**, 148, **160**, **167**, **170**.**OVE**: 265 (landscape/ settlement/ buildings). **CEV**: 93b (way of life/ architectural environment). **CP**: 29a (subject/ object), 33 (inside/ outside), 37b. **ESA**: 14b, 18a (topology), 37b, 74b, 99a. **TBE**: 105c (given/ manmade/ character), 106 (linguistic). **GL**: 5b, 10c, 13, 17, 19, 21b, 58b, 69b, 94, 101, 103, 114, 118a, 136ab, 166c, 171, 175, 177, 201. **KHLA**: 32a (light/ structure), 36b, 41a (dwelling as a relationship). **BH**: 127 (environmental), 134, 137. **VPP**: 212**a**. **CoD**: 9**b**, 13**a**, 17c, 31a, 34, 41**b**, 48**b**, 55, 71**b** (poetic), 75**b**, 94**bc**, 108a, 120, 122. **WFA**: 241. **PMA**: 10**a**, 14ab, 23a, 33b, 110a, 114**a**, 122**b**. **PLP**: 7, 8, **10**, 12, **19**, 20, 21, 26, 27, 34, 40, **44**, 54, 91, 106, **110**, **111**, 120, 122, **131**, **139**, 137, 138, 140, 149, 155, 159, 171, 184, **185**, 231, 239, 303, 317.

relativism liA: 22, 34, 35, 176. **ESA**: 10a. **KHLA**: 41b. **TAA**: 196**b**. **CoD**: 16. **OCA**: 57. **VoA**: 63. **PLP**: 65, 143.

relevance liA: 86, 170, **181**, **184**, 195, 196, **199**. **TAA**: 194. **PLP**: 348, 351.

religion liA: 66, 67, 80. **MiA**: 20c. **BBB**: 76b. **KHLA**: 43b. **TAA**: 195b. **ESJU**: 226. **NWA**: 16. **PLP**: 74,

remain iAMP: 13. **BH**: 140b. **ESJU**: 230. **HTA**: 46c. **CoD**: 51b, 88b, 111**ab**. **TCS**: 231**a**, **232**. **OCA**: 56, 57. **PLP**: **85**, **87**, **127**, **134**, **185**. *See also* continuity and change (Giedion), sameness

- **persist PLP**: <u>20</u>, 181.
- **something lasting PLP**: <u>126</u>, **134**, 180, **<u>312</u>**.

Renaissance liA: 69, 70, 87, 91, 92, 95, 97, 101, 102, 114, 123, 124, 135, 136, 138, 146, 148, 154, 158, 172, 173, 197. **CEV**: 93bc. **ESA**: 61, 74a, 89. **GL**: 54, 106, 151, 163. **CoD**: 37, 75c, 78, 81b, 120, 124abc. **MGLA**: 7a, 11b. **PMA**: 24ab, 38b, 39a, 65b, 78b, 79a, 106ab, 110b. **PLP**: 12, 23, 77, 78, 79, 87, 101, 103, 172, 181, 200, 290, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298, 310, 311.

repetition GL: 61. **PLP**: <u>353</u>.

representation (environmental levels can represent each other) **liA**: <u>29</u> (representation given through us), **35**, 42, <u>51</u>, 76, 77, 85, 203. **ESA**: 32**<u>b</u>**, 33**<u>a</u>**, 99ab. **GL**: 5<u>a</u>, 169**<u>b</u>**. **KHLA**: 41**<u>a</u>** (beyond representation). **VPP**: 212<u>b</u>. **CoD**: <u>114</u> (vs present). **WFA**: 236. **NWA**: 16. **PMA**: 90b, 113**<u>b</u>**. **PLP**: 175.

reproduction liA: 74.

research liA: **<u>193</u>**, <u>209</u>, 210, 211.

respect liA: 23, <u>204</u> (for architecture). **GL**: **102**, **137**, 138a, 166<u>b</u>, 175, 179, 180<u>b</u>, 182**<u>b</u>**, 184, 195b (Giedion). **iAMP**: 16<u>b</u>. **TAA**: 196**<u>bc</u>**. **CoD**: 31<u>a</u>, 50<u>c</u>, 51<u>c</u>, 63<u>b</u>, **130**, **135**. **WFA**: **<u>243</u>**. **PRB**: 222<u>c</u>. **NWA**: <u>22</u>, <u>37</u>, 60. **PMA**: 29<u>a</u>, 72**<u>a</u>**, 75<u>b</u>, 122<u>b</u>. **PLP**: **10**, 14, **17**, **<u>56</u>**, <u>75</u>, 87, **88**, 209, 213, <u>303</u>, **353**, **354**.

response HTA: 44**<u>a</u>**, 46**<u>c</u>**. **PLP**: **35**, 61, <u>167</u>. *See also* answer

retinal pattern liA: 32, 45, 46.

reveal (make visible) **GL**: <u>15</u>, 28a, 160, 169**<u>a</u>**, 170<u>b</u>. **KHLA**: 35, 44b, 46a. **TAA**: **194**, **197**, **200**. **BH**: **134**, 138a(shows)<u>c</u>. **B**: 167a, 174. **ESJU**: **<u>226</u>** (by image), 229a. **HTA**: 41, 42<u>c</u>, 44<u>c</u>, 46<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 9a, 17b**<u>c</u>**, 30<u>c</u>, 31<u>bc</u>, 47, 48**<u>b</u>**, 51<u>b</u>, 55, 71c, 72, <u>79</u>, 83, 89**<u>c</u>**, 111**<u>a</u>b**, **112**, 117**<u>a</u>**, <u>130</u>. **TCS**: 231<u>a</u>. **PRB**: 215**<u>b</u>**, **220**, 222**<u>a</u>**. **MGLA**: 13b. **OCA**: 47, 50, 54, 57. **VoA**: 63. **PMA**: 13a, 15b, 90**<u>ab</u>**, 95**<u>a</u>**, 101b, 102**<u>a</u>**, 103a, 104ab, 105a, 106b, 110a, 113b, 114a**<u>b</u>**, 115b, 121**<u>b</u>**. **PLP**: 12, 16 (unveiled), <u>51</u>, 55, 59, 71, 72, **111**, **126**, 139, 326. *See also* disclosure, discover, expose, rediscover, unconceal, uncover.

<u>rhythm</u> liA: <u>153</u>, 183. **CP**: 31b. **ESA**: 35a. **TBE**: 111. **KHLA**: 43b. **GL**: 12, 13, 32ab, 56, 102, 128, 133, 134, 136b, 143, 168a. **TAA**: 195**<u>c</u>**. **B**: 170. **ESJU**: 223b. **CoD**: **<u>24</u>**, **<u>25</u>**, <u>59</u>, **<u>61</u>**, 75<u>c</u>, <u>78</u>, <u>118</u>, 124a. **TH**: 158a. **NWA**: 31, 32. **PMA**: 18a, 23<u>a</u>, 28ab, 37a.

PLP: **<u>53</u>**, 128, 133, 140, **<u>159</u>**, **<u>189</u>**, **<u>194</u>**, 215, **<u>217</u>**, **<u>224</u>**, 226, <u>232</u>, 274, 283, 286, 293, <u>302</u>, 326. *See also* horizontal & vertical

Riegl, A. liA: 94, 95. **PLP**: 16.

Rilke, R. M. ESA: 36a. **GL**: 6<u>c</u>, 15, 48. **iAMP**: 11c, 16b. **KHLA**: 46b. **CoD**: <u>135</u>. **WFA**: 233a. **OCA**: 51. **VoA**: **<u>64</u>**. **PMA**: 114a. **PLP**: 56, <u>134</u>, 159, 328.

ring ESA: 20a, 78b.

ring out PLP: **<u>353</u>**.

ritual MiA: 20c. **GL**: 32b. **CoD**: 71a.

role liA: 22, **<u>40</u>**, 118, **<u>171</u>**. **ESA**: 39a. **CoD**: 53, 89a.

roof TBE: 110, 111, 113, 117. **GL**: 67, 177. **TAA**: 195<u>b</u>, 199c. **CoD**: <u>27</u>, 94<u>bc</u>, 117c. **PMA**: 102a, 116a. **PLP**: 152, <u>163</u>, **<u>182</u>**, 183, 205, <u>236</u>, <u>237</u>, 239, 244, 246, 247, 248, 264.

Roman architecture liA: 117, 120, 123, 124, 126, 136, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 163, 164, 212. **ESA**: 61, 100. **TBE**: 107. **GL**: 52c, 72, 73, 74, 138b-166b, 172, 176. **CoD**: 22, 23, 24, 41c, 42, 105, 124bc. **NWA**: 46, 55, 56. **PMA**: 104<u>b</u>, 105<u>ab</u>, 110b, 117a. **PLP**: 12, 118, 160, 172, 174, <u>276</u>, <u>277</u>, 279, 281, 302.

Romanesque architecture liA: 104, 139. **PLP**: 170, 181, <u>282</u>, <u>283</u>, 284, 285, 286, 288.

'romantic' liA: 17, <u>184</u>, 186. **CP**: 27c. **ESA**: 15b. **CoD**: 122. **PMA**: 29b, 51b, 53a, 58a, 78a. **PLP**: 17.

rootedness CP: 37b (lack of roots). **GL**: 58<u>b</u>, 85a, 101, 108**<u>a</u>**, 114, 136c, **<u>142</u>**, 146, 169<u>a</u>, 170**<u>a</u>**, <u>201</u>. **TAA**: 196**<u>c</u>**, **198**, 199**<u>b</u>**. **VPP**: 214<u>b</u>. **CoD**: 41a, **<u>70</u>**. **NWA**: 17, 25, 46. **PMA**: 19a, 37b, 38a, 40b, 46a, 51a, 53b, 56b, 89b, 90b, 91b, 94b, 98a, 103a, 104a, 116b, 117b, 123<u>a</u>. **PLP**: 8, **<u>11</u>**, **<u>16</u>**, 34, 87, 92, 105, **<u>185</u>**, 239, 263, 303, **312**, <u>320</u>, 330.

row liA: 97, 106, 116, 141, 146, 147, 154. **OVE**: 259, 260. **ESA**: 78b. **TBE**: 116. **GL**: 69c, 172. **CoD**: 41<u>bc</u>, 66**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: 197, **<u>198</u>**, 224, 225, 262.

Rossi, A. GL: 198b. **TAA**: 181bc, 182, 183**<u>abc</u>**, 187, 189**<u>a</u>**. **WFA**: 233a, 243. **MGLA**: 8a, 14b. **OCA**: 45. **PMA**: 33b, 85b, 110b, 111**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: **<u>142</u>**, 333.

rule liA: 59, 133, 149.

Sacred (holy) **CP**: 31ab. **ESA**: 21a, 72. **GL**: 9, <u>27</u>, 28a, 32a, 101, 134, 161. **TAA**: 196a.

set-into-work CP: 32. **GL**: <u>65</u>, 103, 170<u style="color:red">**bc**</u>, 182a, 198a. **KHLA**: 40<u style="color:red">**a**</u>. **HTA**: 39<u>c</u>, <u>41</u>, 44<u style="color:red">**c**</u> (brought to word & set-into-work), 46<u style="color:red">**c**</u>. **CoD**: 13<u>a</u>, **<u>25</u>**, <u>26</u>, 29<u style="color:red">**bc**</u>, 30<u style="color:red">c</u>, 48<u>b</u>, 51<u>c</u>, 66<u style="color:red">**c**</u>, 78, 81c, 111<u style="color:red">**c**</u>, **<u>112</u>**, **<u style="color:red">126</u>**, **<u style="color:red">129</u>**. **TH**: 166<u>c</u>. **TCS**: 231a. **WFA**: 241, **<u>243</u>**. **SH**: 143, **<u style="color:red">151</u>**. **NWA**: 25, 54. **MGLA**: 11a, 13b. **OCA**: <u>54</u>. **PMA**: 10b, 11<u>**b**</u>, 24a, 41a, 43a, 44a, 50<u>a</u>, 61ab, 67b, 102<u>**a**</u>, 103b, 104a, 117b, 118b, 119<u>**a**</u>, 120ab, 122a. *See also* Heidegger.

settle CP: 38. **ESA**: 11b, 114<u>**b**</u>. **GL**: 18<u>**a**</u>, 45b, **<u>50</u>**, 170<u style="color:red">**bc**</u>. **VPP**: 212<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 13<u>**ab**</u>, 31<u>**ab**</u>, 48<u>b</u>, 66<u>a</u>, **<u style="color:red">112</u>**, 114. **WFA**: 241. **NWA**: 12. **PLP**: 128.

<u>**settlements**</u> **OVE**: 257, 258, 259, 264, 265, 266. **ESA**: 50, 75<u>b</u>. **GL**: 10b<u>c</u>, **11**, 12, 56, 58b, **<u>63</u>**, **<u>65</u>**, 69a, 75<u>**b**</u>, 76, 77, 170<u>bc</u>, 171, <u>172</u>,175, 180<u>**a**</u>, 189, 190, 194bc, 195<u>**a**</u>, 198c. **KHLA**: 44a, 46a. **TAA**: 196c. **CoD**: 7a, 13<u>**abc**</u>, 17<u>b</u>, 22, <u>26</u>, 29<u>**a**</u>, 31-50 [**<u>37</u>**, **<u>42</u>**, 48<u>**b**</u>], 61, 63a, 64, 66a<u>**b**</u>, 71a, 94c, 96, 108<u>b</u>. **WFA**: 241, <u>242</u>. **PMA**: 75<u>a</u>, 91b. **PLP**: 19, 28, 31, <u>35</u>, 36, 42, 61, 86, 91, 105, <u>127</u>, <u>129</u>, 131, 149, 181, 186, 198, <u>221</u>, 263, 331, 359. *See also* modern settlement (modern architecture)

- **<u>settlement</u> morphology GL**: <u>171</u>, <u>175</u>. **CoD**: 41<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 190.
- **<u>settlement</u> organization OVE**: 260. **ESA:** 78ab, 79ab. **GL**: 99, 116a, 118b, 138a. **PMA**: 91<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 190, 197, **<u>224</u>**, 262.
- urban **<u>settlements</u> GL:** 175.

shadow KHLA: 32a, 35, 41a. **PLP**: <u>**65**</u>, <u>174</u>, **<u>185</u>**.

shaft (column) PLP: **<u>141</u>**, <u>155</u>, 271, 274, 275. *See also* capital, column, base.

shape GL: 6c, 20, 153. **KHLA**: 40a. **B**: 170.

sharing ESA: 29b **GL:** 182c, 184. **iAMP**: 11<u style="color:red">**c**</u>. **KHLA**: 36<u>**b**</u>, 37<u style="color:red">**b**</u>. **TAA**: **<u>193</u>**, 196<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 9<u style="color:red">c</u>, 13<u style="color:red">c</u>, **<u style="color:red">42</u>**, 50<u style="color:red">c</u>, 51<u>a</u>, 63<u>b</u>, 71<u style="color:red">**bc**</u>, **<u style="color:red">79</u>**, 89<u style="color:red">c</u>, 108<u>b</u>, 111<u style="color:red">**c**</u>. **PMA**: 78a, 113<u>ab</u>, 116a. **PLP**: 17, 21, 36, 39, 40, 59, <u>61</u>, 66, 72, **<u style="color:red">75</u>**, 111, 122, <u>134</u>, **<u style="color:red">310</u>**, <u>354</u>. *See also* common

shelter GL: 5c, 8c, 48. **PMA**: 49a, 113a, 116ab. **PLP**: **<u>216</u>**, <u>267</u>.

sign IiA: 21, <u>38</u>, 53, <u>56</u>, **<u>59</u>**, **<u>60</u>**, 63, <u>170</u>, **<u style="color:red">171</u>**. **TAA**: 189<u>a</u>, 190a, 196<u>a</u>, **<u>200</u>**. **BH**: 140<u style="color:red">**c**</u>. **HTA**: 48<u style="color:red">c</u>. **CoD**: 111<u style="color:red">**ac**</u>. **TH**: 153b, 154. **WFA**: 236. **OCA**: 50, 53, 54. **PMA**: 55b, 56a, 65a, 101a, 102<u>b</u>, 110b, 113b, 114<u>b</u>,

120b, 121b. **PLP**: 9, 10, 11, 43, **<u>108</u>**, **<u>109</u>**, 111, <u>221</u>, 333, 353.

<u>**significance**</u> **B**: <u>169</u>. **VPP**: 212<u>c</u>. **HTA**: 48<u style="color:red">**c**</u>. **CoD**: 15, 99<u>**a**</u>. **TH**: 166<u style="color:red">**bc**</u>. **WFA**: 233<u>b</u>. **SH**: 143. **PRB**: 215b, 222<u>**a**</u>. **PMA**: 101<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: 12, 19, 21, 26, 27, <u>33</u>, 34, 35, 39, 42, 45, 105, **<u>109</u>**, 120, 125, <u>133</u>, **<u style="color:red">185</u>**, <u>331</u>, 336, **<u>351</u>**.

- **intersubjective <u>significance</u> PLP**: 11, **<u>351</u>**.

silence KHLA: 31<u>**ab**</u>, 32b, 40<u>a</u>, 41a. **PLP**: **<u>334</u>**, **<u style="color:red">337</u>**. *See also* Kahn, quiet

silhouette (outline, skyline) **GL**: 40<u>a</u>, 58b, 69c, 104, 108a. **KHLA**: 43<u>b</u>. **TAA**: 195b. **CoD**: 31a, 33, 34, <u style="color:red">**37**</u>, 41ab, 45, 48c, 57, 59, 117<u>b</u>. **PLP**: <u>53</u>, 73, **<u>75</u>**, 100, **<u>126</u>**, 135, <u>137</u>, 152, 171, 181, **<u>182</u>**, 189, 264, 271, **<u>336</u>**, <u>356</u>.

similarity (*Gestalt*) **IiA**: 38, <u>43</u>, 53, 94, **<u>142</u>**. **CP**: 29c. **ESA**: 17a, 23a, 35b, 39<u>**b**</u>, 50, 57<u>b</u>, 91b, 99a. **GL**: **<u>13</u>**, 169<u>b</u>. **CoD**: 41c, 66b. **PMA**: 78a. **PLP**: 192, 197, 223. *See also* isomorphism

simplicity ESA: 103<u>b</u>, 105a. **ESJU**: 223c, <u>225</u>, **<u>228</u>**. **PLP**: 353.

<u>**simultaneity**</u> **IiA**: 98, 154. **PMA**: 10ab, 16<u>**b**</u>, 19<u>b</u>, 23<u>b</u>, 29<u>**b**</u>, 33<u>**b**</u>, 38b, 45a<u>**b**</u>, 50<u>a</u>, 86a, 102a, 114<u>**a**</u>, 120a. **PLP**: <u>192</u>.

- **<u>simultaneity</u> of environmental characters PMA**: 42a, 43a.
- **<u>simultaneity</u> of spatial definitions PMA**: 44a.

Sinan ESA: 45b.

site GL: 18<u>a</u>, 99, 118a, 126, 136<u>c</u>, 137, **<u>148</u>**, 181<u>**a**</u>. **TAA**: 195c. **CoD**: 31<u>**b**</u>, 33, 41a<u>bc</u>, **<u>45</u>**, 50<u>b</u>, 88b, <u>102</u>. **TH**: 153a, <u>159</u>, 162<u>c</u>. **NWA**: 24. **PMA**: 50b, 55<u>**b**</u>, 56b, 84<u>**b**</u>, 89<u>**b**</u>, 91<u>ab</u>, 92<u>**ab**</u>, 95b, 103b, 115<u>**b**</u>, 116ab, 117a. **PLP**: 96, 106, **<u>138</u>**, **<u>139</u>**, **<u>190</u>** (*situs*), 317.

<u>**situation**</u> **IiA**: <u style="color:red">**21**</u>, 23, **<u>31</u>**, **<u>32</u>**, 33, **<u>34</u>**, 35, <u>42</u>, 43, 46, 48, <u>50</u>, **<u>61</u>**, <u>73</u>, 81, 154, **<u>195</u>**, 196, <u>197</u>. **MiA**: 20b. **CP**: 29<u>c</u>, 31c. **ESA**: 9a, 10<u>b</u>, 11a, 22b, 34a, 38<u>b</u>, 105a, 106a. **GL**: 5ab, 10<u>**a**</u>, <u>12</u>, 17, 47, **<u>50</u>**, 69b, 71, 116b, 136c, 166b, 170<u>**b**</u>, 172, **<u>175</u>**, <u>176</u>, 185a, 198<u style="color:red">**c**</u>. **iAMP**: 16<u>**b**</u>. **KHLA**: **<u>35</u>**, 36<u>**a**</u>. **TAA**: <u>193</u>, 196b. **ESJU**: 229a. **CoD**: 20, <u>25</u>, 42, 47, **<u>135</u>**. **PRB**: 215<u>**b**</u>, 218, 222<u>**a**</u>. **NWA**: **7**(new), 10, 55. **OCA**: 52. **PMA**: 13<u>**a**</u>, 19<u>**a**</u>, 24<u>**a**</u>, 28b, 29a, 37b, 55<u>**a**</u>, <u style="color:red">**59**</u>, 62b, 69b, 98<u>**a**</u>, 103a, 113b, 116<u>**a**</u>, 117a (situational adaptation), 121a. **PLP**: 45, 59, 67, <u>88</u>, 129,

144, 159, **185**, **189**, <u>221</u>, 223, 273. *See also* life-situation, situational character

- **cultural <u>situation</u> IiA**: <u>183</u>.
- **existential <u>situation</u> GL**: 50. **KHLA**: <u>35</u>. **ESJU**: 223**<u>a</u>**.
- **functional <u>situation</u> IiA**: 186.
- **geographical <u>situation</u> GL**: 118c, 138a.
- **global <u>situation</u> PMA**: 9b. **PLP**: **267**.
- **historical <u>situation</u> GL**: 118c, 180b. **PMA**: 106b. **PLP**: <u>54</u>.
- **immediate <u>situation</u> IiA**: 81, **126**. **CP**: **<u>30</u>**. **GL**: 17. **TAA**: 198. **PMA**: 23**<u>a</u>**, 37a, 98**<u>a</u>**, 102**<u>ab</u>**. **PLP**: <u>20</u>, 21.
- **individual <u>situation</u> IiA**: 73, 173, 186, 196. **CoD**: 66**<u>b</u>**, 88**<u>b</u>**.
- **local <u>situation</u> GL**: 108b. **TAA**: 199c. **PLP**:231, 285, 344.
- **natural <u>situation</u> GL**: 21a, 85b, 113, 118b, 136**<u>c</u>**, 164b. **PLP**: 185.
- **particular <u>situation</u> IiA**: 73.
- **social <u>situation</u> IiA**: <u>172</u>.
- **urban <u>situation</u> GL**: 194b.
- **vital <u>situation</u> PLP**: 24, **<u>108</u>**.

size IiA: 93, 103, 104.

sky *See* earth & sky

Smith, E.B. IiA: 88, 110, 124. **PLP**: 16, 57, 157.

<u>social</u> *milieu* **IiA**: 21, 112, 114, 118-123, **<u>172</u>**, 186. **MiA**: 20, 24a. **CP**: 30. **ESA**: 11ab, 15b, 24a, 27b, 30ab, 34a, 35a, 38a, 44. **GL**: 6a, 72, 73, 114, **129**, 168b, 169a, 170**<u>a</u>**, 182ab, 198c. **iAMP**: 11c, <u>13</u>. **KHLA**: 36**<u>b</u>**, 42a. **TAA**: 181a. **CoD**: 9**<u>c</u>**, 12**<u>b</u>**, 13**<u>b</u>**, 41**<u>a</u>**, 48**<u>b</u>**, 64, 69b, 71a, 96. **WFA**: 242. **OCA**: 57. **PMA**: <u>6</u>, 9a, 26a, 61a, 123a. **PLP**: 11, 27, 159, 171, 351.

- **<u>social</u> integration ESA**: 34a.
- **<u>socialization</u> IiA**: <u>37</u>, <u>38</u>, <u>41</u>, <u>78</u>, 79, 80. **ESA**: 30b. **PLP**: 155.

sociology IiA: 19, <u>63</u>, **<u>122</u>**, 130. **B**: 177. **CoD**: 13<u>c</u>. **PMA**: 123**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: **<u>15</u>**, 16.

society IiA: 15, 16, 17, <u>37</u>, **<u>40</u>**, 49, 111, 129, 186, <u>188</u>, <u>221</u>. **PLP**: **<u>197</u>**, 203, 211, 330. *See also* modern society (modern architecture)

'somebody' CoD: 51**<u>b</u>**, 71**<u>b</u>**.

'something' OVE: 256. **KHLA**: 36**<u>b</u>**, 41**<u>b</u>**. **B**: <u>175</u>. **HTA**: 39**<u>c</u>**. **CoD**: 30**<u>c</u>**, <u>35</u>, 51b, 71a, <u>72</u>, 88**<u>c</u>**, <u>114</u>, **<u>130</u>**. **WFA**: **<u>243</u>**, 245**<u>c</u>**. **NWA**: <u>9</u>, 60, 61. **MGLA**: 13b. **OCA**: 49, **<u>54</u>**, 57.

PMA: 61**<u>b</u>**, 118**<u>b</u>**, 119**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: 125, 127, 129, 131, 132, 134, 140, <u>143</u>, 348.

- **'<u>something</u> more' IiA**: <u>51</u>, 56, **188**. **OVE**: 255. **GL**: 5c, 116a. **BH**: **136**. **VPP**: 212**<u>abc</u>**. **ESJU**: <u>224</u>, 229**<u>c</u>**. **CoD**: 7a, <u>55</u>, 69a. **TH**: 166**<u>c</u>**. **OCA**: **<u>53</u>**. **PMA**: 16a, 19b, 62b, 75**<u>b</u>**, 127b. **PLP**: 33, <u>62</u>, <u>96</u>.
- **'<u>something</u> else'** (arch. as a sign) **OVE**: 255. **HTA**: 48c.

'somewhere' CoD: 51**<u>b</u>**, 71**<u>b</u>**, <u>79</u>. **WFA**: 245**<u>c</u>**.

sojourn PLP: 36, 44, 231. *See also* moments of use (use)

<u>Space</u> IiA: 19, 46 (space perception), 47, 48, 55, 69, 86, 90, <u>95</u>, <u>96</u>, <u>97</u>, 98, <u>100</u>, <u>101</u>, 103, 104, 105, <u>114</u>, **133**, **134**, 136, 144, 147, 182, 205. **OVE**: 262. **MiA**: 23, 24**<u>a</u>**, 26a**<u>b</u>**. **BBB**: 61**<u>b</u>**, 76b. **SAG**: 77c. **CP**: 29a**<u>bc</u>**, 31**<u>b</u>**, 37c. **ESA**: 7a, 9a, 10a, 12a, 14**<u>b</u>**, 16ab, 17ab, 31b, 34**<u>a</u>**, 35a, 40, 88, 98b, 99a. **GL**: 5**<u>b</u>**, 8c, 10**<u>c</u>**, **11**, **12**, 13, 15, <u>16</u>, 18**<u>b</u>**, **19**, 28**<u>a</u>**, 32**<u>b</u>**, 34, 40a, 56, 69b, 74, 84, 86, **94**, 118a, 136a, 150, <u>153</u>, <u>163</u>, 164a, 169**<u>b</u>**, 170**<u>c</u>**, 189, 194bc, 195c, 197. **KHLA**: 32a, 36b, 37**<u>a</u>**, 43b, 44**<u>a</u>**, 46**<u>a</u>**. **TAA**: 186**<u>b</u>**, 194, 195a, **197**, 199c. **B**: 167**<u>c</u>**, **168**, **170**, 177, 178**<u>a</u>**. **VPP**: 207**<u>b</u>**, 212**<u>abc</u>**. **ESJU**: 223a. **HTA**: 44**<u>c</u>**, **<u>45</u>**. **CoD**: 7**<u>a</u>**, 19, 22, **<u>24</u>**, **<u>25</u>**, <u>27</u>, 31b, 41c, <u>47</u>, 48**<u>b</u>**, 56, 63**<u>bc</u>**, 71a, 75**<u>ac</u>**, <u>83</u>, 91, 117**<u>b</u>**, **<u>126</u>**, <u>133</u>. **TCS**: 231ac, 232. **WFA**: 237, **<u>241</u>**, **<u>243</u>**. **SH**: 143, 147. **PRB**: 215a, 216. **NWA**: <u>17</u>, 19, 22, **<u>49</u>**, 53, 59, **<u>60</u>**. **MGLA**: 8b, 9a, 14b. **OCA**: <u>48</u>. **PMA**: 10**<u>a</u>**, 14**<u>a</u>**, 16**<u>ab</u>**, 17a, 23b, 24a, 26**<u>ab</u>**, 28b, 32ab, 33a, 41a, 43ab, 46**<u>a</u>**, 50**<u>ab</u>**, 52b, 55**<u>a</u>**, 61ab, 63a, 64a, 66a, 67**<u>b</u>**, 68b, 83**<u>b</u>**, 89**<u>b</u>**, 90**<u>a</u>**, 91b, 92a, 98b, 101**<u>b</u>**, 104a, 105b, 115**<u>a</u>**, 121a, 123**<u>b</u>**. **PLP**: 8, **11**, 31, 33, **<u>44</u>**, **<u>45</u>**, 47, <u>51</u>, <u>53</u>, <u>54</u>, <u>67</u>, <u>68</u>, 74, 96, 98, 100, <u>106</u>, 107, 114, 122, <u>125</u>, **<u>126</u>**, <u>127</u>, <u>128</u>, 133, 134, 138, <u>139</u>, 149, 165, 167, 180, <u>185</u>, **<u>186</u>**, **189**, <u>224</u>, 228, 237, 276, 280, 293, 317, 323, <u>336</u>. *See also* Euclidean space (Euclid)

- **<u>space</u>, abstract PMA**: 28ab, 42a. **PLP**: 44, 53, 216.
- **<u>space</u>, American NWA**: **<u>33</u>**.
- **<u>space</u>, architectural CP**: 31c, **<u>36</u>**, 37b. **ESA**: 7a, 11b, 12**<u>b</u>**, 13ab, 15ab, 37**<u>ab</u>**, 39a**<u>b</u>**, 59b, 69**<u>b</u>**, 114a. **KHLA**: 41b. **B**: 170. **PMA**: 33**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: 144.
- **<u>space</u> between ESA**: 83, 84.

- **space** perception **ESA**: 10b.
- **space**-time **ESA**: 10ab.
- world-**space** **KHLA**: 42b.
- total **space** (Mies) **TH**: 162c.

Spatiality **KHLA**: 36**b**, 42**ab**, 44**b**. **TAA**: 190c, **192**, 193, **194**, 195ab**c**, 196a, **197**, 199b, 200. **B**: 169, **176**. **VPP**: 212**b**. **ESJU**: 228, 229**a**. **HTA**: **45**, 46**b**, 48**ab**. **CoD**: 13**a**, 41**b**, 50**b**, 75**a**, 81ab, **91**, 117**ab**, **126**. **TH**: **156**. **WFA**: 236. **PRB**: 222**a**. **OCA**: **56**. **PMA**: 10**b**, 15**b**, 17**a**, 20**b**, 85**a**, 101**b**, 102**a**, 111b, 115**a**, 120a. **PLP**: 193, 200, 226, 276, 293. *See also Raumlichkeit* (Heidegger), spatial figure (figure)

- **communal spatiality PMA**: 61b.
- **modern spatiality PMA**: 17a.
- **new (open) spatiality B**: 167a, **174**, 177, 178b**c**. **TH**: **159**, 164**b**, 166**b**. **SH**: 151, 152.
- **spatial boundary KHLA**: 43a. **CoD**: **27**. **PLP**: 148.
- **spatial coherence PLP**: 36.
- **spatial composition CoD**: 81**c**, 124**b**, **126**. **TH**: 159, 162c. **PMA**: 27a, 28b.
- **spatial continuity PMA**: 26a.
- **spatial definition VPP**: 207**b**. **ESJU**: 223**a**.
- **spatial differentiation GL**: 76. **PMA**: 26a.
- **spatial direction GL**: 58c.
- **spatial domains B**: 178a.
- **spatial elements GL**: 125. **CoD**: 44, **122**, 124**a**. **PMA**: 24b, 63a, 77a, 106a. *See also* elements
- **spatial ensemble VPP**: 207c.
- **spatial experience PLP**: 107.
- **spatial expression B**: 173, 174.
- **spatial freedom VPP**: 214**a**. **TH**: 153c, 162ab. **PMA**: 29**a**, 55b.
- **spatial focus VPP**: 212c.
- **spatial grammar TH**: 162b.
- **spatial identity GL**: 59, 85c, 97. **PMA**: 23b, 32b.
- **spatial image PMA**: 61b, 104b, 120a.
- **spatial indeterminance CP**: 34.
- **spatial interaction KHLA**: 43b. **PLP**: 324. *See also* opening
- **spatial integration GL**: 184. **PMA**: 58b.
- **spatial layout VPP**: 212b.
- **spatial** *milieu* **PMA**: 23a.

- **spatial moment PLP**: 150.
- **spatial monotony TH**: 159.
- **spatial movement ESJU**: 223c.
- **spatial order KHLA**: 42b. **TAA**: 195**a**. **CoD**: 15, 25, 27. **TH**: 153b. **PLP**: 217, 266, 274.
- **spatial organization** (organized space) **GL**: 11, **53**, 61, 76, 125. **KHLA**: 42b. **TAA**: 195ab, 196a, 199a. **ESJU**: 229b. **CoD**: 7**a**, 20, 25, **26**, 27, 29**ab**, **33**, 34, 41**ab**, 44, **45**, 48c, 50**b**, 55, 66b, 71**c**, 79, 81**c**, 83, 88c, 103, 122, 124**a**, **126**. **WFA**: 243. **NWA**: 10, **45**, 54. **OCA**: 56. **PMA**: 6, 16**a**, 19**b**, 23**a**, 24a, 25a, 26a, 33a**b**, 37a, 51a, 55a, 69**b**, 83a, 93b, 94a, 104**b**, 106a, 107a, 119a. **PLP**: 12, 43, 51, **53**, 102, 118, 122, 126, 127, 129, **156**, **189**, 190, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 203, 206, **208**, 209, 213, 214, 215, **217**, 224, 225, 231, 288, 290, 293, 294, 297, 300, 302, 336. *See also* orientation, organization
- **spatial patterns GL**: 118c. **B**: 170.
- **spatial properties GL**: 58b, 94, 198a. **CoD**: 25. **PMA**: 63a, 69b, 91**b**.
- **spatial quality PRB**: 222**a**b.
- **spatial (inter)relationships GL**: 8a, 53, 182c. **CoD**: 15. **TH**: 156.
- **spatial structures CP**: 31**b**. **GL**: 19, 20, 21b, 28a, 52a, 59, 85**b**, **92**, **97**, 108a**c**, 118a, 149, 150, 164b, 179, 194b. **CoD**: 31**b**. **PMA**: 11a. **PLP**: 51, 138, 208.
- **spatial syncopation GL**: 94.
- **spatial system GL**: 73, 182a.
- **spatial theme CoD**: 81a.
- **spatial totality KHLA**: 44a. **PLP**: 319, 330 (spatial whole). *See also* totality
- **spatial unity PMA**: 26a.
- **spatial vision ESJU**: 223a. **PMA**: 10b.
- **spatiality of human life PMA**: 115**b**.

spirit IiA: 82. **B**: 173 (spirit and reality). *See also* matter

square (an urban) **OVE**: 260, 261, 263, 264. **MiA**: 26a. **ESA**: 80ab, 84, 85ab. **GL**: 56, 59, 69a, 122, 176, 189. **CoD**: 22, **55**, **60**, **61**, 63a**bc**, **64**, 66**a**b, 69**a**c. **NWA**: 10. **PMA**: 118a. **PLP**: 36, 39, 45, 47, 85, 131, 161, 196, **198**, 203, 204, 262.

square (figure) **IiA**: <u>46</u>. **CoD**: <u>122</u>. **PLP**: <u>137</u>, 290.

stabilitas loci **GL**: 18<u>**b**</u>, 180<u>**b**</u>. **CoD**: 29<u>**c**</u>, **129**. **PMA**: 102<u>**b**</u>, 113b. **PLP**: <u>10</u>, <u>31</u>, <u>54</u>, <u>127</u>, **133**, 178, <u>**181**</u>, **185**, **193**, 231, **232**, **235**, <u>263</u>, **266**.

stairs **ESA**: 55a, 56. **PRB**: 215b.

standard/standardization IiA: 39, 162, 164, 207. **PLP**: **155**.

standing, rising, opening, closing, extending, spanning

- **closing** **TAA**: 195<u>**b**</u>, <u>197</u>. **BH**: 140c. **VPP**: 209, 212a. **CoD**: 19, 25. **WFA**: <u>237</u>, 238. **PRB**: 222<u>a</u>. **NWA**: 51, **60**. **OCA**: 56. **PMA**: 15b, 16a, 37a, 61b, 102a, 117a. **PLP**: 53, 128, 159, 167, 337.

- **curving** **PLP**: 347.

- **extend** **TAA**: 190c, 195<u>**b**</u>, <u>197</u>. **BH**: 140c. **B**: 168, 169. **VPP**: 207a. **TH**: 166b. **SH**: 141bc. **VoA**: 71 (expanding). **PMA**: 15b, 16a, 37a, 41a, 61b, 102a, 117a, 119b. **PLP**: 53, 128.

- **opening** **GL**: <u>**177**</u>. **KHLA**: 43<u>**b**</u>. **TAA**: 195<u>**b**</u>, <u>197</u>. **BH**: 140c. **VPP**: 209, 212a. **CoD**: 19, 25, **26**, <u>72</u>, 75<u>**b**</u>, 117<u>**b**</u>, <u>128</u>. **WFA**: <u>237</u>, 238. **PRB**: 222<u>a</u>. **NWA**: 51, 53, <u>**60**</u>. **OCA**: 56. **PMA**: 15b, 16a, 37a, 61b, 102a, 117a, 119b. **PLP**: 53, 128, 159, 179, 337, 347.

- **rising** (towering) **TBE**: 109<u>c</u>. **GL**: 10c, 14, 58b, <u>**63**</u>, <u>**66**</u>, <u>**177**</u>, <u>179</u>. **KHLA**: 43<u>**b**</u>. **TAA**: 190c, 195<u>**b**</u>, <u>197</u>, 199a(Le Corbusier)b. **BH**: <u>136</u>, 137, 138a, 140c. **B**: 168, 169. **VPP**: 207ab, 212a. **HTA**: 41, 46a, 48<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 17<u>**b**</u>, 25, **26**, 34, 63a, 69b, <u>72</u>, 75<u>**b**</u>, 84, 117<u>**b**</u>, <u>128</u>, 130. **TH**: 166b. **WFA**: <u>237</u>, 238. **SH**: 141bc. **PRB**: 218, 222<u>a</u>. **NWA**: 51, 53, <u>**60**</u>. **MGLA**: 10a, 12<u>b</u>. **OCA**: 52, 56. **VoA**: 71. **PMA**: 15b, 16a, 37a, 61b, 102a, 117a, 119a. **PLP**: 128, 167, 337, 347.

- **spanning** **TH**: 166b.

- **standing** (resting) **TBE**: 109<u>c</u>. **GL**: 10c, 14, 58b, <u>**63**</u>, <u>**66**</u>, <u>**177**</u>, <u>179</u>. **KHLA**: 43<u>**b**</u>. **TAA**: 190c, 195<u>**b**</u>, <u>197</u>, 199<u>a</u>(Le Corbusier)b. **BH**: <u>136</u>, 137. **VPP**: 212a. **HTA**: 39c, 41, 46a, 48<u>**ab**</u>. **CoD**: 17<u>**b**</u>, 19, 25, **26**, 34, 37, 63a, 69b, <u>72</u>, 75<u>**b**</u>, 84, 114, 117a<u>**b**</u>, <u>128</u>, 129, 130.

TH: 158a, 166b. **WFA**: <u>237</u>, 238. **SH**: 141bc. **PRB**: 222<u>a</u>. **NWA**: 51, 53, <u>**60**</u>. **MGLA**: 10a, 12b. **OCA**: 51, 52, 56. **VoA**: 71. **PMA**: 15b, 16a, 37a, 41a, 42b, 61b, 102a, 104a, 117a, 119b. **PLP**: 128, 167, 179, 337, 347.

'standing there' **HTA**: 39c, 45, 46<u>**b**</u>, 48<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 75<u>**b**</u>, **114**, 117a. **TCS**: 231b. **OCA**: <u>50</u>, 52. **VoA**: 68. **PLP**: 110.

'standing forth' **OCA**: <u>50</u>, <u>54</u>.

static mechanics **PLP**: 15.

status IiA: 118, 172. *See also* status symbol (symbol)

stave-church **TBE**: 109<u>b</u>, 120, 121ab, <u>122</u>. **GL**: 70. **PLP**: 252.

staying **HTA**: 44c. **PLP**: 24, 25, <u>**36**</u>, 43.

Stern, R. A. M. **NWA**: 15, 24, 25, <u>43</u>, 46, 56. **PMA**: 58a.

stone (rock, stone architecture) **GL**: 25, <u>27</u>. **HTA**: 48a. **CoD**: 31b, 75<u>**b**</u>. **PLP**: 114, 115, 172, 173, 174, 176, <u>232</u>, 252, 253, 255, 258, 259, 260, 264.

stranger (foreigner) **iAMP**: 11a. **CoD**: 133.

street **OVE**: 260, <u>261</u>, <u>262</u>, <u>263</u>. **MiA**: 26a. **ESA:** 80ab, 81b, <u>83</u>, 84. **GL**: 56, 59, 69a, 120, 122, 140, <u>184</u>, 189. **KHLA**: 31a, 44a. **CoD**: <u>**55**</u>, <u>**56**</u>, <u>57</u>, <u>59</u>, 60, 61, 63abc, <u>64</u>, 66<u>a</u>bc, 69ac. **NWA**: 27, 29, 31, 38, 39, 59. **PMA**: 63b, 118a. **PLP**: 34, 36, 45, 47, 85, 131, 146, 148, 149, <u>161</u>, 204, 352.

strife **KHLA**: 40a, 41a. **CoD**: <u>**112**</u>. *See also* rift (Heidegger)

strong entity (figure, *Gestalt*, identity) **ESA**: 46. **TBE**: 112. **GL**: 20, 71, 81, 82, 125, 135, <u>148</u>, 164c, <u>**179**</u>. **KHLA**: 43b. **CoD**: 66<u>**c**</u>, 88a<u>c</u>. **PMA**: 58b (powerful), 66a, 90a. **PLP**: 45, 135, <u>**141**</u>, <u>239</u>, <u>244</u>, 296. *See also* weak entity

<u>**Structure**</u> (structuring) **IiA**: <u>**16**</u>, 46 (square), <u>**53**</u>, 60, <u>**69**</u>, 70, <u>**71**</u>, <u>**72**</u>, 73, 99, 100, <u>**101**</u>, 107, 146-153, 154, <u>**155**</u>, <u>**161**</u>, <u>168</u>, <u>**170**</u>, <u>**176**</u>, 179, 181, <u>196</u>, 197, 199. **OVE**: 255. **MiA**: 24<u>**ab**</u>. **CP**: 27bc, 31b<u>c</u>, 36, 37ab, 37<u>**c**</u>. **ESA**: 10b, 11<u>**b**</u>, 14<u>b</u>, 15<u>a</u>, 17b, 19b, 23b, 27<u>**b**</u>, 28b, 29ab, 32a, 33b, 34a, 37<u>**b**</u>, 50, 68b, 69<u>**ab**</u>, 74b, 75a, 96<u>**b**</u>, 99<u>a</u>, 100, 105a, 109b, 114<u>**a**</u>. **TBE**: 105bc, 113<u>**a**</u>. **GL**: 6a, 8c, 10<u>**c**</u>, <u>**11**</u>, <u>13</u>, <u>15</u>, <u>16</u>, 17, 18<u>**ab**</u>, <u>19</u>, 20, 21a<u>**b**</u> (*schemata*), 23c, 32<u>**c**</u>, 42<u>**a**</u>, 45a, 48, 50, 52b, 58a, 61, <u>65</u>, 69ab, 73, 82, 83, 85<u>**b**</u>, 104, 108c, 113, 116a, 136ac, <u>137</u>, 157, 166a<u>**c**</u>, 169b, 170a, <u>**175**</u>, 180b, 189. **KHLA**: 31<u>**ab**</u>, 32a<u>**b**</u>, <u>**35**</u>, 36<u>**ab**</u>,

37**a**, 40a (figure), 41**b**, 42**a**b, 43a, 44**b**, 46a. **TAA**: 194, 195a, 196**b**. **BH**: 140a (architecture gives structure). **B**: 170, 178b. **VPP**: 212c. **ESJU**: 230. **HTA**: 48b. **CoD**: 18, 23, 24, 27, 29**b**, 88**c**. **TH**: 153b, 156, 162c, 166b. **TCS**: 231ac. **NWA**: 18, 34. **VoA**: 67. **PMA**: 19b, 38a, 41**b**, 42b, 43a**b**, 104a, 113a, 115a, 117b, 122ab, 127a. **PLP**: **11**, 14, 19, **27**, 44, 45, **51** (place-structure), 59, 62, 67, 72, 86, **122**, **127**, 131, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 149, **171**, 172, 192, 193, 194, 206, 210, 223, 224, **232**, 240, 244, 273, 275, 277, 313, 333, **334**, 336, 354. *See also* structures of life (life)

- **structural analysis liA**: **69**, **70**, 99, 100, 102, **107**, 180, 181. *See also* analysis, place analysis (place), qualitative analysis (qualitative)
- **structural correspondence GL**: 17. **PLP**: 108.
- **structural moment PLP**: 150.
- **structural properties PMA**: 76b, 77a. **PLP**: 34.
- **structural similarity liA**: 57, **71**, 72, 168, **169**, **170** (isomorphy), 172, **173**, 174, **179**. **TBE**: 105**c**. **ESA**: 17a, 39**b**, 99**a**. **GL**: 52c, 169**b**.
- **structural skeleton liA**: 46, 139, 145.
- **structure, archetypal KHLA**: 41b. **PMA**: 72**a**.
- **structure, environmental** (landscape) **CP**: 37b. **ESA**: 19b, 29a, 74b, 114a. **PRB**: 215**b**. **PMA**: 116a. **PLP**: 59, 88, 139, **141**.
- **structure, essential** (of the place) **PRB**: 215c, **220**.
- **structure, existential ESA**: 17b, 27**b**, 32**a**, 33b, 96b, 105a. **GL**: 160. **KHLA**: 32**b**, 37**b**, 41**ab**, 42**ab**, 44**b**, 46**a**. **TAA**: **193**, 196c. **B**: 177. **CoD**: 13**c**, 29**b**, 42. **NWA**: **61**. **PMA**: 23a, 61b, 69b, 101**b**, 102b, 104b. **PLP**: 28, 44, 45, 55, 71, 263. *See also* structures of life (life)
- **structure(s), general/basic ESA**: 99**a**. **PMA**: 20**b**, 23**a**, 61ab, 63a, 69b, 106b, 110a, 116**a**b, 117a**b**. **PLP**: 71, 164.
- **structure, geographical GL**: 28a.
- **structure, geometric GL**: 151. **PLP**: 206, 209, 214.

- **structure (Heideggerian understanding) TAA**: 190**b**c, 196a**b**.
- **structure, hierarchic PLP**: 42, 102, 137, 302.
- **structure, internal GL**: 58a. **PLP**: 353.
- **structure, local PLP**: 45, **128**, 164.
- **structure, natural GL**: 169b. **PMA**: 19b. **PLP**: 33, 138, 191.
- **structure, social CoD**: 41b.
- **structure, socio-political PMA**: 113a.
- **structure, spatio-temporal PMA**: 10**a**.
- **structure, temporal GL**: 56. **PMA**: 115**b**. **PLP**: 164.
- **structure, topological KHLA**: 42**b**. **PLP**: 197, 203, 209, 214.
- **structure, urban GL**: 85c, 122, 138a, 189. **NWA**: 39. **PLP**: 96, 182.
- **structure of Being GL**: 25. **HKLA**: 32**b**. **PRB**: **216**.
- **structure of being-in-the-world PMA**: 20**b**, 72**a**. **PLP**: **14**, 44.
- **structure of dwelling CoD**: 15.
- **structure of earth and sky PMA**: 115b.
- **structure of human actions PMA**: 68a.
- **structure of implementation PLP**: **125**.
- **structure of presence PLP**: 125, **311**, **329**, **334**.
- **structure of the situation PRB**: 218.
- **structure of the use of place PLP**: 29, 42, **141**, 146, 184, **185**, 274.
- **structure of the world of life PLP**: 21, **27**, 69.
- **structure of the world, timeless KHLA**: 32b. **CoD**: 17**a**, 18. **TCS**: **232**. **PMA**: 105**a**.
- **structure of things PLP**: 53.
- **structured space GL**: 28a. **CoD**: **126**. **PMA**: 105b, 115**a**.

Structuralism (structuralist) **WFA**: 236, 245b. **PMA**: 32**ab**, 84**b**, 85**a**b, 98a, 113a. **PLP**: 9, 92, 217, **333**, 353.
style liA: **17**, 65, **70**, **71**, 102, **104**, **106**, 131, 145, 149, **156**, 157, **158**, 159, 160, 173, 175, **176**, 182, 184 (formal language), **187** (style-type), 197. **GL**: **53**, **104**, 170**b**, 194c. **B**: 170. **CoD**: 29**c**, 48**b**, **120**. **OCA**: 52, 53. **PMA**: 11**b**, 13**b**, 17a, 20**b**, 37**a**, 38**a**, 53b,

58b, 61b, 89a, 92**a**, 102**ab**, 105b, 106a, 107**a**, 110a, 113**b**, 118**b**, 122**a**, 126a. **PLP**: 7, **12**, **13**, **14**, 51, 54, **55**, **56**, **92**, **96**, 120, 125, 142, 171, 203, **226**, 235, 263, 264, 268-307 [**269**, **271**, **273**, **274**, **288**, **300**, **302**, **303**], **309**, **310**, **311**, **312**, 319, 330, **353**. *See also* the dwelling of presence (dwelling), formal language (language).

- **confusion of style liA**: 17, **159**. **PLP**: 269.
- **lack of style liA**: **159**.
- **stylistic development liA**: 158, 159, 183
- **stylistic elements WFA**: 243. *See also* elements

subject (vs object) **TAA**: 193. **PMA**: 123**a**. **PLP**: 10, 19, **23**, 26, 44, 59, 63, 66, 67, 68, 70, 293.

subjectivism PLP:13, 19, 23, 24, 61, 63, 67, **70**, 306, **351** (subjective internationalism).

substance GL: 14, 73, 195a. **VPP**: 207**b**. **CoD**: 75**ab**. **TCS**: 231**b**. **WFA**: 233**c**. **SH**: 143, **151**. **PLP**: **127**, 129, 137, 138, 160, 224, 225, **336**, 340.

substantive (noun) **GL**: 16. **CoD**: **126**. **WFA**: 233**c**. **PLP**: 21, **127**, 137, 170, 176, 197. *See also* preposition, substantive, verb

suburb CoD: 99a. **PMA**: 79**b**.

succession liA: 44, 96, 98, 141, 145. **ESA**: 18a. **PMA**: 24b, 91b.

Sullivan, L. NWA: 35, 36, 37, 52, 60. **MGLA**: 12b. **OCA**: 43. **PMA**: 14b, 18a, 46a, 62a, 64a, 65a, 66ab. **PLP**: 25, 320.

surface liA: 95, 102, **133**, 134, **137**, 138, 147. **OVE**: 262. **ESA**: 83, 85a. **VPP**: 207a, 214a. **CoD**: 78.

surface relief GL: 34, 35, 37, 39, 40a, 84.

surprise OVE: 262, 266. **GL**: 97, 98, 102, 190. **BH**: 125b, 127. **CoD**: 81b. **MGLA**: 11b.

surroundings CP: 30.

symbol liA: 17, 56-59, 80, 170, 183, 202. **MiA**: 17a, 20c, 22a, 24a, 26c. **CP**: 31bc. **ESA**: 39**ab**. **TBE**: 120. **GL**: 5**a**, 8**c**, 18a, 53, 54, 56, 136**b**, 151, 165, 170**a**, 195a. **BH**: 138**ac**. **CoD**: 63**a**, 64, 66**b**, 71ab, 75b, 81a, 83, 108**a**. **WFA**: 233**b**. **SH**: 152. **PRB**: 215ac, 216, 220, 222b. **NWA**: 23, 44, 45. **OCA**: 43, 50, **54**. **PMA**: 12a, 25b, 59, 62ab, 67a, 101**a**, 107b, 121a. **PLP**: 8, 9, 10, 11, 45, 108, **109**, 155, 190, 221, **331**.

- **status symbol WFA**: 233b. **PLP**: 309. *See also* status
- **symbol, archetypal PMA**: 53b.
- **symbol, cosmic GL**: 120, 151.
- **symbol, devaluation of TAA**: 185a. **B**: 175. **WFA**: 233b. **NWA**: 22, 49, 52, 60 (degeneration). **PMA**: 11**b**, 12a, 14a, 25b, 89a, 107a, 113a, 119a. **PLP**: 67, 105, 306, 309, 310, 330.
- **symbol** *milieu* **liA**: 88, 112, 114, 122, 169, **173**, **186**, **201**, **210**.
- **symbol systems liA**: **38**, **53**, **57**, **58**, **59**, 60, **63**, **64**, **70**, **79**, 80, 81, 122, 125 (the first symbol-system), 149, 159, **171**,**186**, **188**. **MiA**: 20abc. **PMA**: 102**b**, 103a, 104b, 105a, 107a, 110a.
  - *descriptive s.s.* **MiA**: 20b.
  - *non-descriptive s.s.* **MiA**: 20b, 22b.
- **symbolization liA**: 18, **57**, 68, 77, 107, 125, **126**, 171. **MiA**: 20ac. **TBE**: 105c. **GL**: **17**, 18**ac**, **50**, **51**, 52a, 53, 56, 58ab, 136b, 160, 163, 164b, 169**b**, 170**abc**, 175. **TAA**: 186**a**, 196**a**. **BH**: 140a. **CoD**: 64, 124c. **PMA**: 90**b**, 101**a**, 106a. **PLP**: 13, 27. *See also* complementation, visualization

symmetry liA: 134, 143, 159, 171. **GL**: 149, 197, 198b. **CoD**: 63c, 69a, 81c, 84. **TH**: 158b. **PMA**: 23a**b**, 25**b**, 33b, 37a, 61b, 68ab, 83a. **PLP**: 24, 137, 152, 184, 276, 324.

sympathy GL: 185**b**. **VPP**: 214**b**. **CoD**: 126.

synaesthesia liA: 49.

syntactics liA: **58**, **59**.

system ALI: 60a. **liA**: **53**, **54**, 99, 156, 161, 197. **MiA**: 24b. **SAG**: 79, 87. **CP**: 37a. **CEV**: 93abc. **ESA:** 17a, 33b, 35b, 38b, 39a, 59**b**, 61, 63, 105b, 109ab, 114a. **GL**: 5a, 13, 42a, 46, 53, 71, 74, 97, 122, 136**a**, 151, 180a, 194b. **TAA**: 195a. **BH**: **134**. **B**: 170. **VPP**: 207b. **CoD**: 69a, 120. **TH**: 154, 162c. **SH**: 148. **NWA**: 7, 8, 9, 27, 41, 46, 50 (Gothic), 55. **VoA**: 66. **PMA**: 20b, 37b, 56a, 77**a**, 78ab, 85**a**, 90**b**. **PLP**: 12, 103, 108, **176**, 198, 206, 217, 277, 281, 300, 324, 333, **353**.

- **systematize SAG**: 77a. **CP**: 37a. **ESA**: 11b. **PLP**: 200, 290, 300.

- **systematic** meaning **GL**: 106.
- **system** of characters **GL**: 160.
- **system** of classical forms **PMA**: 106b.
- **system** of directions **GL**: 164c.
- **systems** of expectations **IiA**: <u>60</u>.
- **system** of images **PMA**: 102<u>**a**</u>.
- **systems** of meanings **GL**: 58a. **NWA**: <u>27</u>.
- **systems** of orientation **GL**: <u>19</u>.
- **system** of places **MiA**: 24<u>**a**</u>, 26ab. **CP**: 29<u>**b**</u>, 31abc, 37<u>b</u>. **ESA**: 35b, 114<u>**a**</u>. **GL**: <u>12</u>, 28<u>a</u>. **TAA**: 199<u>**c**</u> (Porthoghesi). **B**: 167c (system of 'static' places). **PMA**: 32b.
- **system** of relations **GL**: <u>16</u>, 166<u>c</u>.
- **system** of signs **PMA**: 114b. **PLP**: 109.
- **system** of spatial relations **GL**: 118a.
- **system** of types **PMA**: 102b.
- **system** of values **ESA**: 38b, 39a.
- **system**, absolute **GL**: 120, 138b, 172.
- **system**, closed **PMA**: 37<u>**a**</u>, 39a.
- **system**, figurative **CoD**: 135.
- **system**, geometrical **ESA**: 105b. **GL**: 138b, 149. **PLP**: 208, 213, 216.
- **system**, ideological **GL**: 118c.
- **system**, logical **MiA**: 20b. **SAG**: 77c. **GL**: 71.
- **system**, neutral coordinate (Functionalism) **MiA**: 26b. **PLP**: 67, 68, 189.
- **system**, open **PMA**: 32b.
- **system**, ordering **PMA**: 11b, 20<u>a</u>.
- **system**, political **PMA**: 90b.
- **system**, social **CoD**: 99<u>a</u>. **PMA**: 39a.
- **system**, structural: **TBE**: 109a. **TH**: 161. **PMA**: 69a. **PLP**: 246.
- **system**, stylistic **PMA**: 127b.
- weak **system** **GL**: 19.
- *esprit de **système*** **CEV**: 93<u>**a**</u>c (Baroque systematization)

table **GL**: 8b, 9.
take care **TAA**: 196<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 13a, 31<u>**b**</u>, 48<u>**b**</u>, 75<u>**a**</u>, **135**. **VoA**: <u>61</u>. **PLP**: **17**, **33**, **55**, **56**, 77, <u>228</u>. *See also* care
take part **ESA**: 52b. **TAA**: 196c. **CoD**: 51<u>**c**</u>, 63<u>c</u>. **PMA**: 43a.

take place **MiA**: 23, 24ab. **CP**: **30**, 31<u>**b**</u>. **ESA**: 19b, 30a, 71. **GL**: 6<u>**c**</u>, 8<u>**a**</u>, 9, 11, 18<u>b</u>c, 24, 40b, 92, 142, 164b, 168c, 169a. **iAMP**: 16c. **KHLA**: 40<u>**a**</u> (embodiment takes place in things), 44<u>b</u>, 46a. **TAA**: 181c, 190<u>**c**</u>, **192**, 196<u>**b**</u>, 199b. **BH**: 140<u>a</u>. **B**: 167<u>c</u>, **176**, 178ab. **VPP**: 212<u>b</u>. **ESJU**: 226, 229<u>c</u>. **HTA**: 42b, 44<u>**c**</u>, 48<u>**a**</u>. **CoD**: 13b, <u>23</u>, 25, 29<u>**c**</u>, 31<u>b</u>, 41<u>**a**</u>, 48<u>b</u>, 51b, 63c, 66b, 69b, 75<u>**ab**</u>, 89a, 110b, 117<u>b</u>, 126. **TCS**: 231<u>c</u>. **WFA**: 241, <u>242</u>. **NWA**: 9, 32. **MGLA**: 13b. **OCA**: 54. **PMA**: **<u>6</u>**, 16a, 17a, 18a, 41b, 43a, 49b, 50a, 57b, 61b, 76b, 90<u>**a**</u>, 91a, 95b, 101b, 104a, 111a, 113a, 115<u>**b**</u>, 116a, 121<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: 12, 14, **<u>27</u>**, **<u>28</u>**, 29, <u>33</u>, **<u>34</u>**, 35, 39, 44, 53, **<u>54</u>**, 55, 59, **<u>72</u>**, <u>73</u>, 82, <u>88</u>, 113, 114, **<u>125</u>**, <u>127</u>, **128**, **<u>141</u>**, 144, 146, 168, <u>170</u>, **186**, <u>189</u>, 192, 196, **208**, 213, 223, 224, 228, 253, <u>267</u>, 319. *See also* place
take possession **CP**: 31<u>**b**</u>. **ESA**: 23<u>b</u>, 33<u>a</u>, 35a, 42, 52b, 53, 74b (compare to respectful use). **CoD**: <u>91</u>. **PMA**: 9a, 43a. **PLP**: 203.
taste (personal taste) **IiA**: 16, 31, <u>66</u>, 159, 183, 184, 199. **PLP**: 61, <u>67</u>, 300, 310.
teamwork **IiA**: 155, 203, 204, 221.
techne **GL**: 15, 65. **KHLA**: 41<u>**b**</u>. **TAA**: 195<u>c</u>. **OCA**: **<u>56</u>**. **PMA**: 123<u>**a**</u>. **PLP**: **<u>171</u>**, 174, 179.
technique **TBE**: 109b, **<u>116</u>**, 119. **GL**: 115, 153. **TAA**: 195<u>c</u>. **CoD**: <u>119</u>. **NWA**: <u>8</u>. **PLP**: 239, 249.
<u>technics</u> **IiA**: 19, **102**, **104**, <u>105</u>, **106**, 161-166, 167, **174**, **177**, <u>179</u>, 185, 201. **CoD**: <u>119</u>. **PLP**: **<u>171</u>**, <u>172</u>, 181, **185**.
  - computer <u>technology</u> **PLP**: <u>14</u>, 69, <u>185</u>.
  - modern <u>technology</u> **MiA**: 20c, 22a. **OCA**: 57. **VoA**: 66, 67, 68.
  - <u>technical</u> element **IiA**: 102, 161, 162, 165.
  - <u>technical</u> order **IiA**: <u>162</u>.
  - <u>technical</u> system **IiA**: 102, 107, **<u>161</u>**, 162, **<u>166</u>**, 175, 177, 179, 205.
  - <u>technology</u> **IiA**: 80, 168, 205, 206. **ESA**: 65, 105b. **GL**: 6<u>**b**</u>, <u>15</u>, 18c, <u>65</u>. **iAMP**: 11b. **KHLA**: 32a, 41a<u>b</u>. **TAA**: 187. **TH**: 164<u>**b**</u>, 166<u>**b**</u>. **PMA**: 12a, 13a, 20a, 113a, 122<u>**b**</u>, 123<u>**a**</u>b. **PLP**: **<u>33</u>**, **<u>171</u>**, <u>310</u>, 353.
tectonics **VPP**: 212c. **OCA**: **<u>56</u>**. **VoA**: 71.
tension(s) (dichotomies) **CP**: 30, 31c, 37a (between fundamental structure and temporal whole). **ESA**: 22ab, 26b, 33<u>b</u>, 34a,

375

46, 51, 62, 88, 99a. **KHLA**: 41b, 43b. **GL**: 61. **TAA**: 195**c** (vertical). **BH**: 125ab, 137. **B**: **170**. **ESJU**: 223c. **CoD**: 23, **24**, **25**, 27, 59, **61**, 78, 84, 118, 124a. **PMA**: 23**a**, 32b, 37a, 106b. **PLP**: **53**, 128, 133, 139, 140, 152, **159**, 163, 165, 172, 173, 174, 180, 183, 184, 186, **194**, 215, 216, **217**, **224**, 226, 232, 274, 283, 286, 295, 302. *See also* horizontal & vertical

terminology **IiA**: 19, **23**, 100, 147, **214**.

territoriality **ESA**: 19b, 20a.

texture **IiA**: 102, **135**, 142. **ESA**: 24a, 29a, 56**b**, 58, 95. **GL**: 6c, **35**, 58c, 59, 67, 125, 126. **KHLA**: 43b. **TAA**: 195c. **CoD**: 27, 66b. **WFA**: 233c. **PLP**: 53.

- **texture, urban** **OVE**: 261. **CoD**: 66b, 69b.

theory **IiA**: 7, 23, **24**, **85**, **86**, **87**, 90, 101, 102, **108**, 180, 188, 189, 193, 201, 202, 203, 204, **209**, 210, **214**, **215**, 217, **218**, 222, 224. **MiA**: 26c. **GL**: 5c, 201. **iAMP**: 16c. **KHLA**: 29. **TAA**: 200. **PLP**: 9, 15, 21, 28, **59**, 87, 143, 197.

- **theory of architectural space** **ESA**: 11b.

theme **ALI**: 59. **IiA**: 71, 93, **94**, 129, 153, 172. **OVE**: 262, 264. **ESA**: 83, 85b. **TBE**: 108. **GL**: **83**, 98, 99, 101, 103, 134, 153, 163, 180**a**, 182**c**, **184**, 185a. **KHLA**: 36**a**. **BH**: 128, 133, 134, 138**a**, 140a. **VPP**: 207**a**, **209**. **ESJU**: 228, 229ab. **CoD**: 9b, 37, **56**, **57**, 61, 63a, 75**bc**, 81ab, 108**ab**, 117c. **TH**: 156, 164**b**. **PRB**: 215**c**, 218. **NWA**: 9, 13, 33, 47. **OCA**: 45. **VoA**: 72. **PMA**: 32a, 61a, 78a, 84b, 102**b**, 110**a**, 121a, 126a. **PLP**: 78, **140**, **180**, 203, **213**, 224, 263, 274, 302, **353** (thematic tonality).

- **cultural theme** **IiA**: 127.

'there' **HTA**: 39**c**. **CoD**: 48**b**, 63b, **114**. **OCA**: 44. **PMA**: 37b, **59**, 110a, 117a. **PLP**: 186. *See also* 'here'

thing (as a level and as a gathering) **IiA**: **29**, 37, 44 (vertical-horizontal), 46, 49 (emotional relation), 168. **OVE**: 258, 263 (things are comprehensible). **MiA**: 22**c**. **ESA**: 9a, 18**a**, 31b, 32ab, 75**a**, 96a. **GL**: 5**b**, 6**c**, 8a, 9, 10**bc**, 15, 16, 20, 21**b**, 23a, 24, 25, 27, 32b, 40b, 42a, 45c, 51, 53, 78b, 164ac, **165**, 166**c**, 168a**c**, 169**a**, 170**abc**, **176**, 185**b**, 186, 192, 198c, **201**. **iAMP**: 11**c** (indifference vs sympathy), **13**, **14**, 16**b**. **KHLA**: 31a, 36ab, 37**ab** (and world), 40**a**, 41ab, 44**ab**, 46ab.

TAA: 190abc, **192**, 193, 194, 195**c**, 196**ab**c, 197, 199**c**. **BH**: 138b. **B**: 173. **VPP**: 212**b** (chosen things)**c**, 214**b** (built thing). **ESJU**: 225, **226**, **230**. **HTA**: 39c, **41**, 42ab**c**, 44ab**c**, 46**ab**(image as a thing)**c**, 48a**c**. **CoD**: **15**, **16**, 17**abc**, 18, 19, **20**, 29**b**, 30a**bc**, 31a**c**, 44, 45, 47, 51**bc**, 71**b**, 75**a**, 88**c**, 89**a**, 91, 111**ab**, **112**, 117**ab**, **128**, **130**, 133, **135**. **WFA**: 233b**c**. **PRB**: **216**. **NWA**: **9**, 25, 43, **45**, 46, 49, 54, 60, **61**. **MGLA**: 10b, 13**b**, 14b. **OCA**: 45, 47, **49**, **50**, 53, 54, **56**, 57. **VoA**: 63, 67, 68, 71. **PMA**: 9a, 10a, 12b, 13**ab**, 14a**b**, 20**b**, 37a, 43a, 46b, 49a, 59, 69a, 76a, 90b, 95**a**, 102**a**, 104**a**, 106**b**, 114**a**, 115a, 122**b**, 123**ab**, 126**b**, 127b. **PLP**: **14**, 19, **20**, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 34, **53**, 55, 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 82, 91, 108, **109**, **110**, **111**, **127**, 131, 133, 137, **141**, **143**, 144, 167, 170, 183, 185, 186, 221, 235, 265, 334, 336, 351. *See also* environmental levels (environment), gathering

thought **IiA**: **62**. **MiA**: 20b, 22b. **BBB**: 76b. **ESA**: 14b, 28a. **VPP**: 207a. **HTA**: 42**b**, 48**c**. **CoD**: 135. **PMA**: 25**a**, 78b, 123**b**. **PLP**: **65**, 66, 67, 305, **310**, 311, 330. *See also Andenken* (Heidegger), thought and feeling (Giedion), modern thought (modern architecture)

threshold **ESA**: 25b (area of transition). **GL**: 8b, **9**, 13, 23**b**, 170**c**, 182c, 185**b**, 197. **KHLA**: 31b, 40a. **BH**: 127, 140a. **HTA**: 46**b**. **PLP**: 35, 101, 144, **149**, 152, 155, 182, 189, 190, 354.

time **IiA**: 176, 183, 224. **CP**: 29ab, 37**a** (temporal whole). **ESA**: 50. **GL**: 14, 18b, 32ab, 45a, 51, **56**, 168a, 180b, 200. **CoD**: 29**bc**, 30**b**, 48**b**, 72, 75**b**, 111**b**, **129**, **130**. **TCS**: 231**a**, **232**. **WFA**: 237, **241**, **243**, 245c. **PRB**: 216. **NWA**: 22, **43**, 49. **VoA**: 72 (understanding other times). **PMA**: 10**a**, 16**b**, 23a, 37a, 65b, 83a, 98**b**, 101**b**, 102**ab** (temporal intentions), 111a, 115b, 118**a**, 121a, 122a, 127a. **PLP**: 8, **11**, 20, 31, 45, **54**, **55**, 56, 57, **66**, 72, 73, **75**, 77, **87**, 91, 100, 122, 125, 127, 134, 152, 156, 180, 181, 185, 209, 223, 225, 228, 262, 263, 273, 330, 351.

- **temporal rhythms** **GL:** 32ab, 45a.
- **timeless** (atemporal) **OVE**: 255 (timeless principles), 260, **265**. **ESA**: 46. **KHLA**: 32**b**, 41a. **TAA**: 183b. **CoD**: 29**c**, 71**a**, 111**b**. **TH**: 164b.

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NWA: <u>49</u>, 50. **MGLA**: 14b. **PMA**: 20<u>b</u>, 61b, 118<u>a</u>, 121b (eternal). **PLP**: 55, 75, **<u>87</u>**, 120, 178, 205, 269, **<u>323</u>**, **<u>337</u>**. *See also* remain

togetherness ESA: 30b, 31a, 44, 68a, 98a. **GL**: 120. **KHLA**: 37**<u>b</u>**, 43**<u>b</u>**, 44**<u>a</u>**. **TAA**: **<u>194</u>**, 196<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 13**<u>b</u>**, 41**<u>a</u>**, **<u>42</u>**, 48**<u>a</u>**, 51<u>b</u>, <u>55</u>, <u>61</u>, 63c, 66<u>a</u>, 75<u>a</u>, 89<u>b</u>. **WFA**: 241, 242. **NWA**: 32, 47 (democratic). **PMA**: 19b, 61b, 62ab, 69<u>b</u>, 72a, 75<u>b</u>, 78a, 82b, 85a, 118a.

tool GL: 6<u>c</u>.

topography liA: 103. **ESA**: 22b, 81a. **TBE**: 109a. **GL**: 32c, 148. **TAA**: 195c. **CoD**: 9c, 31b, 33, 34, 42, 69b, 89c. **NWA**: 13, 29. **PMA**: 90a. **PLP**: 85, 204, 211.

topology liA: 21, **<u>44</u>**, 45, 115, 134, 135, 136, 139, 145, 147, 148, 169, 170, <u>185</u>, 196. **CP**: 37<u>a</u> (existential space is topological). **ESA**: 18**<u>ab</u>**, 25a, 29b, 30a, 49b, 52a, 85b, 86a, 88, 99b, 100, 103**<u>b</u>**, 105b. **GL**: 13, <u>16</u>, 17, 69c, 73, <u>97</u>, 102, 131, 136b, 200. **KHLA**: 42**<u>b</u>**. **TAA**: 195**<u>abc</u>**. **VPP**: 209. **CoD**: **<u>26</u>**, **<u>27</u>**, 29a**<u>b</u>**, 41**<u>ac</u>**, **<u>42</u>**, 44, 48c, 50**<u>bc</u>**, 56, 63**<u>bc</u>**, 64, 66ab, 69c, 79, 81c, 83, 124a. **NWA**: 29, 54. **MGLA**: 12a. **OCA**: **<u>56</u>**. **VoA**: 75. **PMA**: 32a, 33a, 34, 45b, 61b, 76b, 77a, 78a, 85a, 93b. **PLP**: <u>51</u>, **<u>53</u>**, <u>89</u>, <u>126</u>, **<u>127</u>**, **<u>129</u>**, <u>139</u>, 140, 146, 184, 188-219 [**<u>189</u>**, **<u>196</u>**, **<u>214</u>**, **<u>217</u>**, **<u>219</u>**], <u>223</u>, **<u>224</u>**, 274, 275, 276, 285, 296, 300, 312, 333, 341, 352, 353.

▪ *topos* **PLP**: 53, 63, 138.

totality liA: 19, 29, **<u>34</u>**, **<u>55</u>**, **<u>78</u>**, 87, **<u>105</u>**, **<u>107</u>**, 167, 169, 173, 180, **<u>181</u>**, 182, <u>184</u>, 186, 187, **<u>195</u>**, **<u>196</u>**, **<u>198</u>**, <u>202</u>, 221, 222. **SAG**: 77c. **CP**: <u>36</u>, 38. **ESA**: 7b, 33a, 65, 80a, 96b, 99a, 114b. **GL**: 6<u>c</u>, 8abc, 10b, 11, 15, 18<u>b</u>, 23b, 37, 40b, 45c, 46, 52b, 59, 69ab, 72, 108c, 125, 129, 136b, 137, 140, 149, 164b, 165, 166c, 169<u>a</u>, 170b. **iAMP**: 11a, 12, 16a<u>b</u>. **KHLA**: 36a. **TAA**: 190<u>c</u>. **BH**: 125c, 134, 140b. **B**: 169, 174. **HTA**: 41, 42ab. **CoD**: 15, 19, 31**<u>b</u>**, 44, 51**<u>bc</u>**, 53, 55, 63a, 108a, <u>119</u>, 124<u>b</u>. **TH**: <u>154</u>, 159, 166<u>a</u>. **TCS**: 231<u>b</u>. **WFA**: 233c, 236, 245**<u>a</u>**. **SH**: 143. **PRB**: 215a<u>b</u>. **OCA**: 47. **PMA**: 13**<u>a</u>**, 23b, 39a, 46a, 50b, 57**<u>b</u>**, 67a, 76<u>b</u>, 79a, 104a, 114a. **PLP**: 7, **<u>15</u>**, <u>19</u>, 24, <u>28</u>, **<u>31</u>**, 42, **<u>44</u>**, 55, <u>57</u>, 66, <u>69</u>, **<u>71</u>**, 75, 82, 87, 88, <u>96</u>, 102, 105, 108, **<u>109</u>**, **<u>110</u>**, 111, 118, <u>119</u>, 120, 122, 125, **<u>126</u>**, **<u>128</u>**, <u>133</u>, **<u>140</u>**, **<u>141</u>**, 144, <u>155</u>, 164, <u>165</u>, 181, 184, <u>185</u>, 186, 190, 192, <u>196</u>, 200, 201, 203, **<u>210</u>**, **<u>217</u>**, **<u>221</u>**, <u>224</u>, <u>225</u>, 226, 239, <u>273</u>,

274, 275, 279, <u>280</u>, 296, 300, 323, 338, 344, 352, **<u>354</u>**. *See also* art of totality (art), qualitative totality (qualitative), whole

tradition & building tradition liA: 23, 39, 59, 100, <u>159</u>, **<u>160</u>**, 168, <u>171</u>, 183,184 (negative), **<u>188</u>**, 206. **MiA**: 17b. **BBB**: 63. **CEV**: 104c. **GL:** 136c, 182b**<u>c</u>**. **B**: 170, 176. **CoD**: 29**<u>c</u>**, <u>133</u>. **SH**: 141a. **NWA**: 14, <u>22</u>, 23, 24, 38, 39, 41, 43, 54, **<u>61</u>**. **MGLA**: 7a, 10b, 14a. **OCA**: 45. **VoA**: 72. **PMA**: 82a, 90**<u>ab</u>**, 91ab, 92a, 93a, 94a, 98**<u>b</u>**, 102**<u>ab</u>**, 105a, 107a, 113**<u>b</u>**, 119**<u>a</u>**, 121a, 122**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: **<u>12</u>**, **<u>13</u>**, 25, <u>51</u>, **<u>54</u>**, **<u>55</u>**, 56, **<u>59</u>**, **<u>91</u>**, **<u>92</u>**, **<u>96</u>**, 103, 125, **<u>140</u>**, <u>141</u>, 142, **<u>171</u>**, **<u>226</u>**, 231, **<u>232</u>**, 233, 236, <u>240</u>, 246, 247, 248, **<u>249</u>**, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, <u>263</u>, **<u>264</u>**, 298, <u>309</u>, 330, 340, **<u>356</u>**. *See also* building, custom

▪ **tradition, living GL**: 182<u>bc</u>. **PMA**: 122<u>a</u>.

Trakl, G. GL: 8bc, 9, 10a, 13, 23a, 69a. **HTA**: 44a, 46b.

transform CoD: 31<u>b</u> (transform). **TCS**: 231b. **PMA**: 92**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: 115, **<u>185</u>**.

transient ESJU: 229b.

translate liA: **<u>16</u>**, **<u>23</u>**, <u>104</u>, 202. **ESA**: 15a, 37**<u>b</u>**. **TBE**: 121a. **GL**: <u>17</u>, **<u>51</u>**, <u>56</u>, <u>61</u>, 169<u>b</u>. **KHLA**: 31<u>a</u>, 43b, 44**<u>a</u>**. **TAA**: 195**<u>c</u>**, **<u>198</u>**. **ESJU**: **<u>230</u>**. **CoD**: 29<u>b</u>, 33, 71**<u>b</u>**. **NWA**: 20, 47. **PMA**: 91**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: 47, **<u>91</u>**, **<u>143</u>**, **<u>185</u>**.

tree TBE: 105b. **GL**: 9, 25.

<u>truth</u> liA: 64, 80. **MiA**: 22b. **CP**: 37a (and fundamental structures). **GL**: 6a<u>b</u>, 15, **<u>165</u>**, 170**<u>abc</u>**, 185**<u>b</u>**, 198a. **iAMP**: 12. **KHLA**: 37**<u>b</u>**, 40**<u>a</u>**, 41**<u>ab</u>**. **TAA**: 183b. **B**: 173 (true nature of things). **HTA**: 39**<u>c</u>**, 41, 44**<u>bc</u>**, 46**<u>ac</u>**, 48**<u>c</u>**. **CoD**: 9**<u>c</u>**, 51**<u>c</u>**, 73, 111**<u>bc</u>**, **<u>114</u>**. **MGLA**: 13b. **OCA**: 51, **<u>54</u>**, **<u>57</u>**. **PMA**: 104b, 105a, 114**<u>ab</u>**, 123**<u>a</u>**. **PLP**: <u>39</u>, **<u>65</u>**, 68, 73, **<u>171</u>**, 197.

▪ '**<u>truth</u>', scientific MiA**: 20b. **KHLA**: 46b. **PLP**: 23, 68.

Tschumi, B. OCA: 57. **PMA**: 34, 126<u>a</u>. **PLP**: 108, 217.

<u>typology</u> liA: 106, 134, 153, 157, 169, 173, **<u>187</u>**, **<u>207</u>**, <u>224</u>. **OVE**: 258, 261. **SAG**: 79, 88. **GL**: 69<u>a</u>, 138a, 143, 158, 165, 168**<u>a</u>**, 180ab, 198b (Rossi). **KHLA**: 42b, 43**<u>b</u>**, 44**<u>a</u>**. **TAA**: 181b, 183a<u>bc</u>, 195**<u>ac</u>**. **ESJU**: **<u>228</u>**. **HTA**: 48**<u>b</u>** (types of image). **CoD**: 9<u>b</u>, **<u>26</u>**, 29**<u>ab</u>**, 30<u>b</u>, **<u>44</u>**, <u>45</u>, 48c, 50**<u>b</u>**, 66**<u>bc</u>**, 75**<u>b</u>** (according to their kind), 88c, <u>96</u>, 103, 105, <u>126</u>, **<u>130</u>**, **<u>135</u>**. **WFA**: 233**<u>b</u>**, **<u>237</u>**, 238. **NWA**: 25, 32, 44, 53 (and modernism), 54, 56, 59,

120. **PRB**: 215c. **PMA**: 14a, 39a, 66a.

▪ **unified** and separated **KHLA**: 37<u>b</u>.

universal CP: 29b. **GL**: 136<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 135. **WFA**: 238. **NWA**: 7, 16. **PMA**: 69<u>b</u>, 104<u>a</u>, 107b. **PLP**: 54, 56, 61, 62, 63, **65**, 75, 77, 87, 95, 98, 101, **111**, 122, **129**, **156**, **269**.

unknown IiA: 29. **ESA**: 22a, 23a, 29b, 32b. **GL**: 118a. **BH**: 125b. **CoD**: 22, 66<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 40. *See also* known

unmeasurable iAMP: **13**. **KHLA**: 31<u>a</u>, 32a. **PMA**: 69b. **PLP**: 102, **334**. *See also* Kahn, measurable

up & down GL: 11. **KHLA**: 42b. **BH**: 138b. **ESJU**: 228. **CoD**: 75<u>ab</u>, 84, 119, 128. **TH**: 158a. **WFA**: <u>237</u>. **SH**: 141b. **PRB**: <u>220</u>. **MGLA**: 13a. **PMA**: 16a, 23a, 27b, 28b, 41a, 64b, 110a. **PLP**: 68, 176.

<u>urban</u> **level ESA**: 27b, 29b, 31ab, 81ab, 75b, 78ab, 79ab, 80ab. **GL**: 18c, 58ab, <u>59</u>, 77, 78a, 194<u>b</u>, 195a. **TBE**: <u>114</u>. **PMA**: 123<u style="color:red">b</u>. **PLP**: 156, 182. *See also* environmental levels (environment)

▪ **urban** design **GL**: 120. **PLP**: <u>61</u>, 353.

use IiA: <u>**195**</u> (and experience). **OVE**: 256. **CP**: 31c. **ESA**: 88. **GL**: 168a, 170<u>a</u>, 180c. **KHLA**: 36<u>b</u> (or involvement). **BH**: 134. **CoD**: 71<u>a</u>. **NWA**: 49. **PMA**: 61<u>b</u>, 67<u>a</u>, 69a. **PLP**: **10**, **14**, **28**, 30-57 [<u>**34**</u>, <u>**45**</u>, <u>**51**</u>], <u>**59**</u>, 69, 72, <u>**74**</u>, 75, **86**, 93, 96, 105, 110, 122, **125**, **128**, 131, 137, 138, <u>**143**</u>, 144, 150, 155, <u>156</u>, 159, 165, 171, <u>**172**</u>, 173, 180, 181, 184, <u>**189**</u>, <u>190</u>, **191**, 192, <u>193</u>, 201, 204, 215, <u>229</u>, 231, 239, 252, 262, <u>266</u>, 269, 271, 300, 302, <u>**303**</u>, <u>311</u>, <u>312</u>, 323, <u>**336**</u>, 351, 354.

▪ **aspects of** <u>use</u> **PLP**: <u style="color:red">**42**</u>, 43, 44, <u>**45**</u>, 87, <u>**93**</u>, 95, <u>**107**</u>, <u>**125**</u>, <u>**269**</u>, <u>**311**</u>.

▪ **moments of** <u>use</u> **PLP**: <u style="color:red">**35**</u>, 39, <u>**40**</u>, <u style="color:red">**42**</u>, 44, <u>**45**</u>, <u style="color:red">**57**</u>, 72, 87, 89, <u>**93**</u>, 95, 101, <u>**107**</u>, <u>110</u>, 120, 122, <u>**125**</u>, <u>156</u>, 166, 182, <u>189</u>, <u>**190**</u>, 197, 213, 214, <u>224</u>, 225, <u>**229**</u>, 240, 253, 271, 283, 300, 302, <u>**311**</u>, 321, 324, <u>**334**</u>. *See also* agreement, arrival & departure, clarification, encounter, rediscovery, sojourn

▪ **significant** <u>use</u> **PLP**: <u>**91**</u>, <u>**312**</u>.

utilitarian architecture IiA: <u>**185**</u>.

Utzon, J. OVE: 258. **GL**: 198<u>c</u>. **TAA**: 199b<u>c</u>. **B**: 178c. **ESJU**: 223-230 [<u>**230**</u>]. **WFA**: 233b. **OCA**: 44, 45, 52. **PMA**: 44a,

58<u>b</u>, 84b, 95b, 98a, 107b. **PLP**: 8, 14, 215, 216, 331, 340, 341, 349, <u>**350**</u>.

valley CoD: 31<u>c</u>. **PRB**: 215ab, 216, 218. **OCA**: 49. **PMA**: 49<u>b</u>. **PLP**: 86, 138.

values IiA: 14, <u>**39**</u>, 49, <u>**64**</u>, <u>**68**</u>, 71, 73, 88, <u>122</u>, 183, 186, 188, 202, <u style="color:red">**206**</u>. **OVE**: 255. **MiA**: 20a, 22<u>**c**</u> (concretizing values). **BBB**: 76bc. **CP**: 31<u>b</u>. **ESA**: 38<u>b</u>, 39<u>a</u>, 114<u>a</u>. **TBE**: 109c. **GL**: 8<u>c</u>, 18<u>a</u>, 163, 170b, 182c. **TAA**: 181<u>a</u>, 196<u>c</u>. **CoD**: 7a, 13<u>bc</u>, <u>**35**</u>, 41<u>a</u>, 66<u>b</u>, 71<u>a</u>, 88<u>b</u>. **TH**: 164b. **WFA**: 242. **NWA**: 14. **MGLA**: 13a. **OCA**: 57. **PMA**: 11b, 20<u>b</u>, 54a, 61a, 78a, 85a, 111b. **PLP**: 42.

Van der Rohe, L. M. IiA: 18, 94, 107, 114, 116, 135, 141, 143, 144, 145, 152, 154, 164, 166, 167, 173, 174, 175, 205, 206. **MiA**: 17a. **ESA**: 94, 103a. **GL**: <u>66</u>, 182a, 194bc, 195a. **TAA**: 185a, 186<u>ab</u>, 199a. **B**: 176, 177. **CoD**: 81c. **TH**: 153-166 [<u>**154**</u>, <u>**161**</u> (less is more), 164<u>a</u>, 166<u>ac</u>]. **NWA**: 22. **MGLA**: 7a. **PMA**: 9b, 10a, 15a, 26b, 28a, 29ab, 32a, 33ab, 34, 38a, 41ab, 42b, 45b, 46a, 54a, 55a, 68ab, 82a, 83b, 107b. **PLP**: <u>40</u>, 183, <u>217</u>, 315, 320, 321, 330, 338, 346, 349, <u>**350**</u>. *See also* clear construction

Van Eyck, A. ESA: 15b, 33b, 114a. **TAA**: 199b. **PMA**: 32b.

Van Gogh, V. HTA: 44b.

variation (vs theme) **ALI**: 55, 59. **IiA**: 14, 18, 46, <u>**153**</u>, 162, <u style="color:red">**187**</u>, <u style="color:red">**207**</u>. **OVE**: 256-265. **MiA**: 26b. **SAG**: 79. **CEV**: 93c, 96. **ESA**: 81b, 83, 85ab. **TBE**: <u>**108**</u>, <u>114</u> (and articulation). **GL**: 37, 69bc, 70, <u>**83**</u>, 98, 101, 102, 118c, 134, 153, 180<u>a</u>, 182c, <u>**184**</u>. **KHLA**: 36<u>a</u>. **TAA**: 183a. **BH**: 127, <u>128</u>, 131, 132, 133, 138<u>ab</u>, 140a. **VPP**: 207<u>a</u>, <u>**209**</u>. **ESJU**: <u>228</u>. **HTA**: 48<u>b</u>. **CoD**: 27, 29<u>b</u>, 37, 41b, 47, <u>**55**</u> (variety), <u>**56**</u>, <u>**57**</u>, 59, 61, 63a, 66c, 71<u>c</u>, 75c, <u>85</u>, 89b, 94bc, 108<u>ab</u>, 117c, <u>**128**</u>, 130. **TH**: 164<u>b</u>. **PRB**: 215c, 218. **NWA**: 12, 33, 38, 46, 47. **MGLA**: 8a. **PMA**: 24b, 61a, 66b, 68<u>b</u>, 78a, 79a, 84b, 102<u style="color:red">**b**</u>, 106ab, 110b, 115<u>b</u>, 116a, 119a, 121a. **PLP**: 12, 96, 156, <u>**174**</u>, <u>180</u>, <u>**181**</u>, <u>213</u>, <u>224</u>, 225, <u>226</u>, <u>240</u>, <u>246</u>, 249, 263, <u>273</u>, 274, <u>**302**</u>, 319.

vault VPP: 207a. **ESJU**: 223ab, 229c.

vedute **CoD**: <u>45</u>, 47, 50a, 66<u>b</u>.

vegetation TBE: 109a. **GL**: 25, <u>27</u>, <u>35</u>, 37, 39, 40a, 130, 136c. **HTA**: 48a. **CoD**: 9c, 31b, 75<u>**b**</u>, 89c. **PMA**: 90a. **PLP**: 85.

Venturi, R. CP: 34. **CEV**: 104c. **ESA**: 7a, 15b, 33b, 66, 88, 98b, 109a, 114a. **GL**: 14, 15, 63, 194c, 195c, 201. **TAA**: 181a<u>bc</u>, <u>182</u>, 183a<u>b</u>, <u>187</u>, 189<u>a</u>, 199b. **VPP**: 212<u>a</u>. **CoD**: 69a, 72, 110<u>a</u>, 130. **WFA**: 233a, 236, 245<u>c</u>. **NWA**: 23, 25, 39, 54, 55, 56, 60. **MGLA**: 13ab. **OCA**: 45. **PMA**: 37<u>b</u>, 38a, 44ab, 45ab, 46ab, 57a, 92b, 94ab, 110b, 111a. **PLP**: 16, 26, 143, 165, 168, 178, 264, 338, 350, 351. *See also* wall

- **both-and ESA**: 94. **GL**: 195c. **TAA**: 181b. **CoD**: 72, 130. **PMA**: 37<u>a</u>, 44b. **PLP**: <u>338</u>.
- **complexity and contradiction TAA**: 183c. **PMA**: 10a, 39a, 44ab, 78b. **PLP**: 26, 338. *See also* complexity, contradiction
- **decorated shed TAA**: 181c, 182, 189<u>a</u>. **NWA**: <u>40</u>, **55**. **VoA**: 67. **PMA**: 45<u>a</u>, 110b. **PLP**: 29.
- **difficult whole ESA**: 99<u>b</u>, 103<u>b</u>, 114a. **TAA**: 181b. **NWA**: **23**, **54**. **PMA**: 44b.
- **either-or ESA**: 45b. **GL**: 195c. **TAA**: 181b. **PMA**: 37a, 44b.

verb PLP: <u>**127**</u>. *See also* adjective, preposition, substantive

verkörpering **OCA**: <u>**51**</u>, 56. **PLP**: <u>57</u>, 129. *See also* embodiment, incarnation

vernacular ESA: 79b. **TBE**: 107, 108, 112, 116. **GL**: 16, 17, 58a, 99, 118c, 129, 136c, 149, 155, 157, 170b, 172, 173, 175. **CoD**: 41<u>c</u>, 94a<u>c</u>, 99a, 117c, 120. **NWA**: 14, **25**. **PMA**: 38<u>a</u>, 58b, 90<u>b</u>, 91<u>ab</u>, 92a, 94a, 102<u>a</u>, 116a. **PLP**: 7, <u>12</u>, <u>13</u>, <u>28</u>, 92, 101, 146, 174, 179, 214, 226, **231**, <u>239</u>, 240, 252, 253, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 262, **263**, 265, 266, <u>269</u>, <u>**271**</u>, **303**, <u>309</u>.

vertical *See* horizontal & vertical

<u>vision</u> **VPP**: 207<u>ac</u>, 211a, 212c, 214a<u>b</u>. **ESJU**: <u>230</u>. **HTA**: 44<u>b</u>, 48<u>c</u>. **CoD**: <u>118</u>. **NWA**: 16. **MGLA**: 7a. **PMA**: 13<u>a</u>, 14<u>b</u>, 18a, 20<u>a</u>, 23<u>a</u>, 24<u>a</u>, 63a, 72a, 77<u>a</u>, 82<u>a</u>, 101<u>b</u>, 113<u>b</u>, 114<u>a</u>, 119<u>a</u>, 122<u>b</u> (poetic vision). **PLP**: 92, **225**, 300, **337**.

<u>visual</u> **ESA**: 29b, 30<u>a</u>, 85b (visual experience). **GL**: 10a, 54, 114. **TAA**: 185c. **PLP**: <u>9</u>, 10, 13, **128**.

- <u>visual</u> **chaos ESA**: 75a.
- <u>visual</u> **image GL**: 114. **CoD**: 110<u>b</u>.
- <u>visual</u> **order IiA**: 13, 18, <u>21</u>, 24, 153, 173, **201**, 202, **207** (differentiated).
- <u>visual</u> **problems OVE**: 261.

- <u>visual</u> **training IiA**: 23, 42, 197, 199. **PLP**: 9.

vitality ESA: 11<u>b</u>. **BH**: 125ab, 138a. **PLP**: 12, <u>23</u>, 24.

Vitruvius IiA: 88, 91, 92, 102, 104, 217. **ESA**: 22a. **GL**: 54. **NWA**: 46. **PLP**: 21, 23, 92, 103, 277.

visualization TBE: 105c. **GL**: 5<u>c</u>, <u>**17**</u>, 18<u>a</u>, **51**, 52ab, <u>56</u>, 58<u>a</u>, 59, 67, 71, 77, 85a, 87, 106, 153, 157, 164b, 166a, 170a<u>b</u><u>**c**</u>, 173, <u>175</u>, 200. **iAMP**: 16c. **TAA**: 196<u>a</u>b, 198, 199b. **BH**: 140a. **B**: 168. **ESJU**: <u>228</u>, 230. **ESJU**: <u>228</u>, 230. **HTA**: <u>41</u>, 48<u>bc</u>. **CoD**: 25, 29<u>b</u>, 31 <u>**c**</u>, 34, 41abc, 48a, 56, <u>64</u>, 69abc, 70, 71a, 72, 75<u>a</u>, 83, 89ab, 94a<u>bc</u>, 96, 112, 117a, 124c. **TH**: 158<u>b</u>. **WFA**: <u>237</u>, **238**. **PRB**: 215<u>c</u>, <u>216</u>, 218, 222a<u>c</u>. **NWA**: 17. **MGLA**: 9a. **PMA**: 13b, 14<u>**b**</u>, 15<u>**b**</u>, 16<u>ab</u>, 19a, 28b, 37a, 49b, 61b, 66a, 69b, 77a, 85a, 86b, 90<u>**ab**</u>, 91b, 92b, 93a, 95b, 98a, 103b, 104a, 115<u>**ab**</u>, 116ab, 117a<u>b</u>, 118a, 120ab. **PLP**: <u>**126**</u>, 139, 275, 293. *See also* complementation, symbolization (symbol)

Vittone, B. SAG: 83. **CEV**: 93-104 [<u>96</u>, **101**, 104<u>**c**</u>]. **ESA**: 46.

vocation (of place) GL: 23b, 136<u>**c**</u>. **KHLA**: 40b (in Greek temple analogy).

Von Hildebrandt, L BBB: 71c, 73b. **SAG**: 84, 85. **CEV**: 95. **ESA**: 49a, 63, 74b.

vulnerable ESJU: 229b.

wall IiA: 137, 162. **ESA:** 88, 98b. **GL**: <u>13</u>, 14, <u>63</u>, <u>66</u>, 67, 164a, 169<u>b</u>, 189, 197. **KHLA**: 43<u>**ab**</u>. **TAA**: 181c, 195<u>b</u>c, 199b. **BH**: 138<u>a</u>. **B**: 167c, <u>169</u>. **VPP**: 207a, 212<u>**ab**</u>. **CoD**: 27, **59**, 61, 63<u>**b**</u>, 69a, 75c, 91, 94a<u>bc</u>, 96, 117<u>**bc**</u>, <u>118</u>, <u>119</u>, 124a. **TH**: 153a. **SH**: 147. **PRB**: 215a, 216. **PMA**: 26b, 33a, 41<u>**b**</u>, 42a, 49b, 51<u>a</u>, 102a, 116a, 117a. **PLP**: <u>165</u>, <u>166</u>, **167**, 170, 171, 174, 181, 182, <u>183</u>, 184, <u>189</u>, 192, 194, 217, <u>224</u>, 246, 248, 264, 265, **317**, 321, 326. *See also* Venturi

wander (er)(ing) GL: 8bc, 9, 22, 170b. **CoD**: 13<u>a</u>, 31ac, 108<u>bc</u>. **WFA**: 241.

water GL: <u>27</u>, 35, 37, 39, 42b, 52<u>**b**</u>, 128, 130. **HTA**: 48a. **CoD**: 31b, 75<u>**b**</u>. **PLP**: 77, 78, 82, 132.

weak entity GL: 190. **PLP**: <u>43</u>, **141**, 260, 333.

'what?' IiA: 88. **GL**: 18<u>a</u>. **KHLA**: 31b, 44a. **HTA**: 39<u>c</u>. **NWA**: 45, 54. **OCA**: 56, 59.

PMA: 17<u>a</u>, 19b, 20a, 69<u>b</u>. PLP: 63, 66, 71, 189.

'what we need' ESA: 103b, 105b. iAMP: 14, 16<u>b</u>. HKLA: 46a. PLP: <u>14</u>, <u>75</u>.

'where?' GL: <u>19</u>. CoD: 7<u>a</u>, <u>15</u>, 34. OCA: 56, 59. PMA: 19b, 20a. PLP: 63, 66.

'when'? PLP: 66.

'why?' IiA: 23. PLP: <u>75</u>.

Whitehead, A.N. IiA: <u>82</u>. GL: 182<u>bc</u>. OCA: <u>59</u>. PMA: 98<u>b</u>.

whole IiA: 34, 44, 99, **101**, 133, <u>169</u>, **179**, **196**, 204, 211. OVE: 263, 264 (visually perceived whole), 265. MiA: 19, 20<u>b</u>. BBB: 61c. CEV: 93b, 104c (difficult unity of inclusion). CP: 29b, 33, 37a, 38. ESA: 10b, 17b, 29b, 59<u>b</u>, 74b, 99a. GL: 18<u>a</u>, 42a, 45c, 52b (structured whole), 74, 77, 82, **94**, 140, <u>143</u>, 160, 163. KHLA: 35. TAA: 185a (whole personality of man). B: 167a, 173. CoD: <u>18</u>, 31<u>a</u>, 44, 60, 63a, 64, 66b, 120, 124b. TH: 156. NWA: 8, 10, 23, 28, 48. MGLA: 8a, 9a, 11ab. PMA: 12<u>b</u>, 24b, 28b, 86b, 90b, 98<u>a</u>, 126<u>a</u>. PLP: **10**, **11**, 27, **28**, <u>36</u>, 43, **69**, 120, 135, **141**, <u>159</u>, **189**, <u>197</u>, 226, **228**, 248, 275, 324, 330. *See also* art of totality (art), totality

will & willingness KHLA: 31<u>ab</u>, 35, 41.

window GL: 8c, 13, 67, 101, 177, **<u>179</u>**. CoD: 57, 75c, 88a, 117<u>c</u>. TH: 158b. PMA: 33a. PLP: **155**, <u>163</u>, 164, 166, 169, 180, 182, 205, <u>208</u>, 211, 347.

withdrawal CoD: 13<u>c</u>, 89<u>c</u>, 99a, 103, 108<u>b</u>. WFA: 242. PLP: 203.

Wittgenstein, L. IiA: 29, 34, 42, 50, 51, 57, 63, 105, 175. CoD: 51a, 91 (I am my world). PLP: 34, 40.

Wittkower, R. IiA: 69, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 100. ESA: 103. PLP: 16, 187.

Wölfflin, W. IiA: 23, 69, 95, 133. BBB: 61a. PLP: 16, 187.

wonder NWA: **<u>54</u>**. OCA: **<u>56</u>**. OCA: <u>54</u>, **<u>56</u>**, 57. PLP: 88 (amazement), 93 (astonishment).

wood/wooden buildings TBE:105-122. PMA: 95<u>b</u>. PLP: 176, <u>232</u>, 251, 252, 253, 259, 260, 264.

word HTA: 42<u>c</u>, 44<u>bc</u>. CoD: 111<u>bc</u>. OCA: <u>54</u>. PLP: **111**, 138.

<u>work</u> (and labour) TBE: <u>120</u>. GL: 9, **65**. HTA: 44<u>b</u>(the work discloses the thing)<u>c</u>, 48<u>c</u>. CoD: 17<u>ab</u>, <u>20</u>, **26**, 29<u>b</u>, 48<u>b</u>, 75<u>a</u>, 117<u>**a**</u>, **<u>130</u>**. NWA: 10, 16, 30, 34, 36. OCA:

<u>45</u>, **<u>54</u>**. PMA: 28a. PLP: <u>11</u>, 13, <u>55</u>, 65, **111**, 113, 122, 134, 139, 156, <u>159</u>, **174**, <u>185</u>, **190**, 215, <u>221</u>, 240, 248, 277, 279, 295, 317, <u>337</u>, 354.

- **<u>work</u> of architecture** IiA: 24, 105, 107, 131, **179**, 182. GL: 18<u>b</u>. KHLA: 32b, 36a, 37<u>a</u> (as a thing), 42a. TAA: **194**, 197. BH: 134, 136, 140<u>c</u>. HTA: 44<u>b</u>, 48<u>ab</u>. CoD: 17<u>**c**</u>, <u>19</u>, <u>25</u>, <u>26</u> (categories), 29<u>ab</u>, 30a<u>bc</u>, 51<u>c</u>, 69c, 71<u>b</u>, 75<u>a</u>, 94<u>a</u>, 111<u>c</u>, 117<u>a</u>. PRB: 222<u>a</u>. NWA: **<u>54</u>**. PMA: 16b, 98a, 102<u>a</u>, 104<u>a</u>. PLP: 109, <u>221</u>, 353. *See also* architecture

- **<u>work</u> of art** IiA: 20, **68**, 70, **73**. MiA: 22c. GL: 5<u>a</u>, 23<u>a</u>, 82, 185<u>b</u>, <u>202</u>. KHLA: 31<u>b</u>, 32<u>b</u>, 41<u>a</u>. TAA: **197**. BH: 125a, **134**, **136**, 140<u>a</u>c. ESJU: <u>226</u>, **228**, 230. HTA: 39<u>**c**</u> (a work of art presents), 44<u>b</u>. CoD: 17<u>bc</u>, 51<u>**c**</u>, 69c (city), 72, **112**, 117<u>**a**</u>. TCS: 231<u>a</u>. PRB: <u>216</u>, 222b. NWA: 16. PMA: 13<u>a</u>, 14a, 20a, 66<u>**b**</u>, 107b, 114<u>**ab**</u>. PLP: 65, 110, **111**, <u>221</u>, 310, 338. *See also* art

<u>world</u> IiA: **<u>37</u>**, **<u>56</u>**. OVE: 255 (organized world). ESA: 39<u>a</u>. TBE: 105c. GL: 5b, 6c, 8b, **9**, 10<u>bc</u>, 18<u>b</u>, 21<u>**b**</u>, 23<u>c</u>, 40<u>b</u>, 52a, 74, 77, 99, 116b, <u>135</u>, 165, 169a, 170<u>ab</u>. iAMP: 11a<u>c</u>, **12** (reduced to resource), 14, 16a<u>**bc**</u>. KHLA: 32<u>b</u>, <u>35</u>, 36<u>ab</u>, 37<u>ab</u> (thing), 40<u>**a**</u> (and earth), 41b, 42a, 44<u>ab</u>, 46a<u>b</u> (world as resource). TAA: 186b, 190bc, 192, 196<u>**ab**</u> (outer and inner world). BH: <u>136</u>, 137, 138b, 140ac. VPP: 212b<u>c</u>, 214<u>b</u>. ESJU: 224, 225, 226, <u>228</u>, 229c, 230. HTA: 39<u>**c**</u>, **41**, 42<u>abc</u>, 44<u>ac</u>, 46ab<u>c</u>, 48a<u>c</u>. CoD: 13b<u>c</u>, **16**, 17<u>abc</u>, **<u>18</u>**, **<u>19</u>**, <u>20</u>, 23, **<u>25</u>**, 29<u>b</u>, 31a<u>b</u>, 37, 41c, 42, 44, 47, 48a<u>c</u>, 51<u>**ac**</u>, 53, 60, 61, 63a, 66ab<u>**c**</u> (worlds), 69bc, 70, 71a<u>bc</u>, 75a<u>bc</u>, 79, 81ac, 83, 88a<u>c</u>, 89ab<u>**c**</u>, <u>91</u>, 99a, <u>106</u>, 108<u>ab</u>, 111<u>**abc**</u>, **<u>112</u>**, **<u>114</u>**, 117<u>**a**</u>, 119, 124<u>c</u>, <u>129</u>, <u>130</u>, 133. TCS: 231<u>**c**</u>, **232** (temporal world). WFA: 233bc, 242. SH: 141a, 147. PRB: 222<u>**a**</u>c. OCA: 45 (world within a world), 47, **<u>49</u>**, 50, 52, 54, 57. PMA: 10<u>b</u>, 11b, 13ab, 15b, 20b, 37b, 38b, 49a, 61a, 63b, 75b, 76a, 89b, 102<u>**ab**</u>, 103b, 104ab, 105ab, 111b, 113b, 114ab, 115<u>a</u>, 117ab, 118a, 122<u>**b**</u>, 123a. PLP: **<u>10</u>**, **11**, <u>19</u>, 31, **<u>33</u>**, **<u>34</u>**, 39, <u>42</u>, 44, **<u>45</u>**, 47, 62, **<u>72</u>**, <u>75</u>, 79, 82, <u>98</u>, **<u>110</u>**, **111**, 113, 115, 120, 122, 131, 137, **<u>140</u>**, **<u>144</u>**, 146,

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Appendix B: transcription of the lecture "On the Way to a Figurative Architecture"

The following is a transcription of a lecture delivered by Norberg-Schulz on 12/07/1985 in San Francisco which served as the basis for his later article *On the Way to Figurative Architecture*. The lecture was entitled "On the Way to a Figurative Architecture".[348] The indicated time signatures are based on the recording held in the SCI-Arc media archive. The recording can be accessed at http://sma.sciarc.edu/video/christian-norberg-schulz/. All the images included in this appendix are video stills from the recorded lecture.

[00:00-03:40] Opening remarks by Gerald Gast.

[03:40] Thank you Gerald. And thanks to all of you for the invitation to come here. I am always very happy to visit the United States. I think it is a necessary and valuable correction for us Europeans. Being Europeans we, more than you, belong to a kind of special—more limited—culture and I think we tend therefore also, to be more narrow-minded somehow. At least to look at things from one particular point of view, very easily and, to come here, things kind of explode. It is always a kind of frightening experience in a way, and very pleasant at the same time, but to come here and see how everything comes together, always creates a certain confusion in one's mind. I wondered always when I come here if what I'm working on is really valid, because it seems that here things are more complex … full of contradictions … almost to quote [Robert] Venturi. Anyhow, that is **[05:00]** also the inspiration we need, I think … and just walking around yesterday in downtown San Francisco I think I got a few ideas… which I will develop maybe the next time I come here [laughter].

Today I shall talk on a subject which I am working on at present, and I call it figurative architecture. And whatever is that you might ask? Well it is not very new. I have always, as Gerald suggested, been kind of following up the same problems. I started out many, many years ago with a book called *Intentions in Architecture* [1963]. And the basic task I put myself at that time was to try to explain meaning in architecture. What is meaningful architecture? Well you might say architecture is always meaningful somehow. I wanted though, to get into certain kinds of meaning. And my point of departure was, I think, very early experiences. Experiences I had during the time I was a student in Zurich, with Sigfried Giedion. And I mention that, because today I shall talk about an architecture and

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[348] NAM 15, conference program, "Place lost and recovered: resurgence of the figurative dimension in architecture", 1985:1.

an approach to architecture which Giedion might not have liked. I though think that there is a certain continuity present.

The point of departure comes out in Giedion's own works. Already in the 1940's he published a couple of articles. One had the title *On the New Regionalism* and I think was published originally in the *Architectural Record*. The other one was called, *The New Monumentality*. Both rather 'dangerous' subjects at that time. But Giedion wrote about that already in the 40's … during the war … quite incredible. So when I became his student just after the war, we heard about these ideas. We were taught modern art and architecture. And I stress the fact that we were taught modern art, because Giedion used to say: "You don't become an architect today, without having gone through the needle eye of modern art". And I still think that is right.

At the same time, however, he recognised that modern architecture needed a kind of development. And he wrote in 1944: "In countries where modern architecture has won the battle and been entrusted with monumental tasks involving more than functional problems, one cannot but observe that something is lacking in the buildings executed". And this 'something' he said is "an inspired architectural imagination able to satisfy [the] demand for monumentality". The term monumentality is explained with these words: "monumentality springs from the eternal need of people to create symbols for their activities and for their fate or destiny, for their beliefs and for their social convictions."

So, a new quest for meaning was somehow started at that time. And I think that that quest for meaning has been a very important prevalence throughout the post-war years. But at the beginning we didn't give so much importance to it. Perhaps we did somehow, but it was generally pushed aside. And practical problems became dominant. What Louis Kahn called the 'measurable' became dominant. But I never forgot these ideas of Giedion. And, studying at Harvard University, in 1952-53, I started to approach the problem of meaning, and the result was the book, *Intentions in Architecture* **[10:00]**.

My point of departure was psychology and, to some extent, sociology which I studied at Harvard. In the book, *Intentions in Architecture*, I already there talked about what I called the 'symbol-*milieu*'. That is, an environment consisting of symbolic forms which may satisfy this demand for so called monumentality. Well, how to do that though? How to make this become concrete was not so easy to say. I went on a few years later with another much smaller book called *Existence, Space and Architecture* [1971]. There the approach is somewhat different. Not basically different. I think the problem is the same. And still I used to a high extent psychology. But the very title *Existence, Space and*

Architecture indicates that the approach has become now concerned with man's existence. Well, what is that, compared with say, psychology?

Well, it is a wider term. It really relates to how we *are* in the world in a very complete sense. How we are in the world concretely, standing on the ground and moving about and being under a certain sky. Foggy, like here in San Francisco or sunny … like in some other places. And, of course, also being with others; being with other people. The social dimension is also important, of course, in these terms. So, I tried to understand space in this sense, not space in a mathematical sense, but space as lived space. And that is something different. Lived space is qualitative. It is not measurable.

Well, about that time also Louis Kahn came to the fore and we were—many of us, I almost said all of us—very interested in his work and his ideas. So that was another new source of inspiration. Kahn also, I think, is behind what I am trying to do today to some extent. When Kahn asked "what does a building want to be?" he intended that any building has to possess a kind of identity. It is not just a container. It is not just an abstract pattern. It doesn't only belong to that kind of approach which we in Europe called Structuralism, but it has to possess an identity. It has to be something. As Kahn himself said: "a rose wants to be a rose". So he somewhat suggests that the world we live in doesn't consist really of 'patterns', that patterns might be useful as tools, but that the world is more concrete. It consists not of atoms and molecules either, but really of the everyday things we are living with. It consists of trees and flowers, mountains, lakes, human beings, animals and certainly also buildings. And these are the kind of things which stand there and with which we have to come to terms.

Well, why do I then use the word 'figure' in connection with that? Well, because, the identity of the thing, I think, corresponds to its figural quality. There are many sayings in language which indicate that. You might … I'm not sure if you say in English that one makes a good figure? When a person has a 'nice figure', and so forth. Anyway we, with the word 'figure' intend the characteristic shape of something. Not really the typical shape, because a type is more abstract, more general, a figure is something more concrete … which stands in front of you as something. Maybe as something general; as a tree, or as a bottle or whatever, **[15:00]** but at the same time, as an individual tree or bottle.

Well, this approach to meaning returns to the world of everyday life. I want to stress that immediately that I think that is basic, because abstraction from everyday life has become, I think, the basic disease of our times. We learn to measure. We learn to look at

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quantities always. But qualities are forgotten. So meaning is first of all concerned with qualities. Well, evidently, also modern architecture in its early stage was concerned with meanings. But, meanings were somehow restricted. At least, the definition was somewhat restricted. Maybe not really in the thinking and works of the pioneers. I think they had a much wider scope than what came out later. I think it is right to say that modern architecture, at least the dominant kind of modern architecture, which is today often called late-modern architecture, somehow degenerated. And I still—and I want to stress that—believe in modern architecture. I believe in the teaching of the pioneers. But, anyhow, a certain development takes place, and, as Giedion suggested already, that kind of grew out of the modern movement itself; 'new regionalism' and 'new monumentality'. The need for giving architecture—and that is architecture of our time—roots somehow. And to make it expressive of human life. Well I shall try to illustrate my present approach with some examples.

May I have the first slide please?

Figure 21: Slides 1a (left) and 1b (right)

Well, the picture to the left you might recognise. I don't know though, in the United States things change so rapidly that maybe it doesn't look like that anymore. But I suppose that the building to the right, the customs house in your city is still standing there. Instead, the other building to the left may have disappeared for all that I know. I show that because it is a slide I took many, many years ago. It brings out what I would call the loss of figurative quality in late-modern architecture. The building to the right is a building which possesses an identity; we may like it or not. I was taught not to like such buildings. But anyhow, it possesses a kind of presence. It stands there and is something—good or bad—but it is something. Instead, the one to the left in a certain sense is nothing. It is just an abstract pattern. It has no presence … no substance. It is a kind of built diagram I should say.

Well, maybe such diagrams are necessary in our time. And we shall certainly not return to making just buildings like the one to the right hand. On the other hand we have to try to understand what this loss of figurative quality means.

The picture to the right here, which you might know, suggests that today attempts are made at the recovery of figurative quality. And these combinations, say, of a late-modern structure with a kind of postmodern structure though poses the problem. I'm not saying now that that is how we should do it. I am in general not using examples as models, but to illustrate a problem or a principle. So, don't misunderstand me please. Anyhow, what is attempted here is, though, somehow to relate **[20:00]** this building to an environment.

Here in the United States you talk about 'context'. Context means of course to relate to the surroundings; built surroundings or natural surroundings. But I think it also means something more general. It means in general to relate to the ground and to the sky. To make the buildings stand and rise in space again. Of course this can be approached in many different ways. Well, what then is this problem? Let me now try to approach it in a more systematic manner.

Figure 22: Slides 2a and 2b

First an indication about what we could call figurative and non-figurative architecture. I am not saying that this house to the right in Rotterdam is bad architecture. I think it is rather pleasant and fine house which certainly also belong to the good works of the modern movement. But somehow it is rather abstract. It lacks what you see in the houses to the left, or the buildings rather, to the left. It lacks the quality of elements or parts which you can name I should say. To the left there you can talk about every part and use the words of everyday language. You can say 'dome' … you can say 'door', 'window', 'staircase' or 'steps', 'parapet', maybe and so forth. All the elements there are concrete in the sense that they have names. They belong to the everyday world of human beings where

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everything has a name. Instead the building to the right, here, is difficult to look at in this way. What shall we call it? We cannot any longer use these old words; we try to invent new ones, maybe, and talk about the 'glass wall' for instance … which is composed of known words.

Another fact about it is that buildings like the one to the right, are not easy to remember. You might remember it and draw it for me probably when you looked at it, but many of them would look more or less the same. It would not be easy to distinguish one from the other. So, they kind of evade memory. They kind of fade away in a certain sense. And that is typical of so much modern art. This is not an attack on modern art. It is just one of the qualities of modern art; that it is not easily remembered.

Think of modern music for instance. Well there are certain elements in it that you can remember, but, say after Schoenberg, [Arnold Schoenberg (1874-1951)] music became very difficult to have that relationship to. The music of Anton Webern [1883-1945], for instance, I—although I studied music and always live with music—I have very strong difficulties in remembering the music of Webern, because it doesn't contain 'themes' or like they say 'melodies' which stand out as something you can grasp and keep. That is a parallel I think to what happened, in a certain sense in modern architecture.

In this context it is interesting to return to Giedion's talk about the 'new monumentality'. Because he took care to say that with the word 'monumentality', he didn't mean something big and impressive. He showed some examples against that. Showing an example from Stalinist Soviet Union, and another from Nazi Germany showing that they look more or less the same; a kind of 'false monumentality'. Instead, he said, the very word *monumentum* means something that reminds. **[25:00]** So what he aimed at was to return to, or reconquer, forms that remind him of something. That is again the historical dimension entered architecture, or at least one hopes that it might again enter architecture. So, of course that means to work with forms that can be remembered. You cannot remind of anything with forms which cannot be kept. The melody which can be sung, so to speak, or whistled.

Figure 23: Slides 3a and 3b

Well, the result we are facing, the late-modern architecture, which then really abstracts from this concrete reality—from what I here have called everyday life—certainly goes together with certain tendencies in modern art. That is, abstraction, that is, the departure from what is immediately given. And we all know why that happened. We know there were several reasons for it. One reason was what Giedion called the devaluation of symbols. So Giedion said we had, in modern art, to start all over again … from zero. As if nothing had ever been done before. And I am convinced that that was necessary and a stage in the development. But if that stage is just kept or if one develops that side of the problem, then the result might be a complete abstraction; an environment that really has no presence no substance anymore. Where the figurative quality is really lost. And in fact late-modern art was called non-figurative art. And I have introduced now the word figurative, because I want to oppose that; what I consider a degeneration of modern art. So our problem then is to try to understand reality in terms of concrete things, and also understand how certain figures, certain concrete shapes, may help us to come to terms with that reality.

Figure 24: Slides 4a and 4b

And then we might of course again return to psychology, to the development of the child. And just quickly point out that the child certainly builds up a world of things. The child doesn't build up a world of abstract relationships. The child doesn't measure. The child is, first of all, concerned with qualities. Qualities like soft and hard and warm and cold yes, but always related to concrete things. The quality of 'hard', as such, is not understood, but the rock is understood. And the sand. And the water. And then the world of things comes into being … and we belong to that and we live in it. In the past, of course, this world of things was a kind of simple world. It consisted of relatively few things and these things belonged to a certain place. So that it was a world you could really understand in the sense of standing under and among these things and participate in this world.

Today the world has become extremely complex and we live with things from many places, many times, and they are all mixing together. Yesterday, for instance, I had lunch eating Italian food though accompanied by the clarinet concerto of Mozart, and that is what happens today. And that is not necessarily wrong, I think … only to be able to live with that we have to understand and be more conscious of what things really are. Well, I can not develop that now. I can just indicate this problem …

Figure 25: Slides 5a and 5b

… and also indicate that of course our everyday world consists of larger things; not only of apples and lemons, but of mountains and valleys and trees **[30:00]** and lakes and so forth. As I said before, everything that has a name is part of this everyday world. Well then you might of course object that the meaning of these things change, that the word 'tree', so to speak, doesn't really mean anything; especially anything in particular. Trees are different and we react differently to them. Some people like them and some others not. Well that is certainly true. On the other hand, "a rose wants to be a rose", and wants to be understood as a rose. So I am against this total relativism which is often today being taught. I think that we ought to respect things and understand them on their terms. And, of course, relate them to our life today, so that our interpretation varies, but our interpretation is not something completely arbitrary. You say in English, for instance, 'neither fowl nor fish'. And that is a good saying I think it expresses that something has to be something. It has to be … if it is not 'fowl' nor 'fish', then it has to be something else; a tree … or a donkey.

Well, of course, to this world also then belongs the humans, and they have names too. And, their actions to some extent have names too, because the human life consists of situations which recur. So, also human beings and human life can be named and forms part of the everyday world. And, this life takes place we say. That was a word which I used as the point of departure for my lecture here two years ago. To take place. When something occurs we say that it takes place. Very important, I think, [a] very illuminating statement, because that means that life and place can not be separated.

When anything happens it takes place. And it's interesting to see that languages—different languages—have this expression. I cannot say all languages, because I don't know all languages. I only know that that expression is there in Italian, in French, in

German, in English and in the Scandinavian languages with slight variations. In English you say 'take place'. In German you say 'find place'. In Swedish you say, 'have place' and … well, slight differences. But basically it expresses this unity of life and place. So, when in the conference or the symposium we start today, in the title it is said 'the loss and recovery of place', then it means that place is part of the problem. When I talk about figurative architecture I am first of all concerned about how to recover place. Thinking of architecture in the term of place-making; as Donlyn Lyndon and others have defined it.


Figure 26: Slides 6a and 6b

Well, place as lived space does not correspond to measurable space or photographic space, say. These examples may illustrate that. This painting by Cézanne shows us how Cézanne has modified the motif. How he has modified space to bring out the qualitative aspects of it. On the left hand side here you see Cézanne's painting compared with a photograph of the motif. Taken from the very good book *Cézanne's Composition* by Erle Loran, an American. And as we see Cézanne has done certain rather important changes to the things which make up this environment. He has changed the hill in the background and the road leading into space first of all … and also some other changes if you look more carefully at it. And he has made that hill rise up in space, because what is the quality of a hill? What is, if I might use a dangerous word, the essence of a hill? **[35:00]**

Well, a hill of course, rises up in space. It is not a depression, it is not flat. It rises up, to say, along our way. And we, living in space, we experience that quality. The camera doesn't really grasp that. The hill might be so low that on the picture it doesn't look very interesting, [but] we feel when we are there that it is much more interesting than the photographic reproduction can show it. And we change it. So, therefore the painting or the work of art is always an interpretation. It tries to interpret what is there in a qualitative sense and not just depict it in an objective, measurable sense. And that is how I think we

ought to look at architecture too. We ought to understand architecture always as an interpretation, but not as an arbitrary invention; an interpretation of something which wants to be understood.


Figure 27: Slides 7a and 7b

Thus, architecture always also consist of things basically. Architecture is made up of things among other things. This sketch to the left by Leon Krier might illustrate the point of what is a thing. What does it want to be? Could this be a coffee pot? Or could this be a bottle? Bottles and coffee pots are not the same. Today we tend to mix up these things. It is fine that we drink French wine in other countries, but therefore we don't have to mix up coffee pots and bottles.

And when we look at Aldo Rossi's drawing to the right here, then he probably wants to tell us that the forms of architecture also ought to have this quality; this identity of the thing. They stand there, and have an identity. And architecture becomes then a universe of things or figures. We can say types, which are always interpreted in a certain way and therefore appear as a concrete figure. Types in a certain sense do not exist, but figures exist as interpretations of types. And this of course means that life—everyday life— possesses a kind of order—an intrinsic order—as I also said before; a complex order which in many ways change, but also where something remains. What remains and what changes? It's a difficult philosophical problem, and I shall not go into it more now. I shall just say that something certainly remains … and that is good, because then we can also today, to some extent, at least enjoy and understand the works of the past … of folk cultures or of high cultures from other parts of the world or other times.

Figure 28: Slides 8a and 8b

Well, another two drawings by Krier suggest then that the architectural universe of concrete things has to be understood in certain terms. It is not enough just to point out that architectural things are there. And he tries to do it in a little text he published recently in the *Architectural Design* in a special number dedicated to his work with three drawings of which I show the two.

The one to the left, the public institutions, which appear as very distinct shapes in the environment; distinct figures, having a very clear identity. And then, in the middle between these two, the simple domain of dwellings—of the private or communal dwellings—which then kind of constitute a more general background—a more general pattern—on which these public institutions stand forth. And when you combine them then **[40:00]**, what results, the *civitas*, is then like that.

Well, Krier is, I think quite right here, when it concerns settlements of the past. This was mostly true, it was like that. And, many old cities are still like that. The point of course may also be to introduce the importance or to make us note the importance of the spaces between these elements. The spaces where, for instance, public life takes place … or communal life takes place. But, though, in a very, I think, clear and interesting way he presents to us a basic fact of the lived environment, the question then arises whether this is possible today?

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Figure 29: Slide 9b (9a was not shown)

Or if it has basically changed? I think it has to some extent changed. Public buildings are no longer dominant as they were in the past. For instance, here in Bern. Public buildings are today maybe smaller, and the whole relationship between private and public is not the same as in the past. So, we cannot just take the Krier drawing as a model and say that is how we ought to build our cities today. The problems are more complex than that. But we can though learn something from that. We can also use this as a point of departure for thinking about the environment—the built environment—and its constituent parts.

I have tried to approach that problem now in a little book which is just out … that is … I don't know if this is yet in the bookstores, but I bought the first copy here, and there I try to approach the problem of meaning—the problem of the meaningful environment—in terms of dwelling. The book is here called *The Concept of Dwelling* and is published by Rizzoli in New York. Well, why do I do that? Well, going back to what I said before. In *Intentions in Architecture* I thought in terms of psychology, and in *Existence, Space and Architecture*, well, more or less the same, though going into a kind of different approach to psychological problems. In the *Concept of Dwelling* I go a little further without leaving that dimension behind. But, now trying to understand our being-in-the-world *in terms of dwelling* … and not just say that man dwells in the sense of belonging to a place … more or less … maybe moving around … leaving the place … returning to it, or adding a set of different places and so forth. But trying to relate that also to society … and then some interesting things come out, I think, which might be a good way of understanding the problem of meaning.

Figure 30: Slides 10a and 10b

Well, first of all let us look at two pictures which indicate that the forms or figures we are surrounded by are meaningful. To the left we have a tower which rises up in the forest. Well, what is that? Well, we will say that is a castle or a fortress … but, what *is* it in existential or human terms? Well, what should one answer? I would personally say, well, it is a place of arrival; a possible place of arrival. I passed by that tower driving a car once, and stopped and took a picture of it. I didn't approach it. I didn't go inside it, and still it was there as a possible place of arrival. It was a point in space; a goal, and it illustrates what a work of architecture ought to be; a possible place of arrival. And, at the same time, of course, of departure. Our lives is always related to places of departure and arrival **[45:00]**. We come there. We go there. We go somewhere to look at it … to meet people … to do a certain work. And, to allow that to happen, the place has to possess such a figural identity. You have to know that you arrive and experience that you arrive and it has to be a point in space. Well, certainly in the modern cities it is not as simple as that, but anyway, I think that is still valid basically.

The picture to the right instead shows us how such forms might have a more particular meaning. How they might become symbols. These are small objects which were put up outside Etruscan tombs. I do not know if Etruscans always did that, but at least in Cerveteri near Rome they did. And, for each man who was buried in the tomb, they put up such a small column; evidently a phallic symbol. And for each woman who was buried in the tomb they put up a little house. Very nice … very … quite illuminating to our problem. How a built form—how a thing—might mean something, and, kind of, stand there and tell us something we ought to know. Well how then, does this relate to dwelling? Well, I would say that there are evidently certain basic types which relate to different basic modes of dwelling. There are certain types and thus figures …

Figure 31: Slides 11a and 11b

… which are figures of private dwelling, figures of communal dwelling and figures of public dwelling. In my book I distinguish between three basic kinds of dwelling, or modes of dwelling as I say, and I think that may help us a little to understand the environment and also to plan it. As human beings we live with others. We meet others and we communicate with others … sometimes we agree with others. And then we also want to withdraw from others. We want also to be on our own and have, what we call, a private life. So also the function of withdrawal is essential; as the function of meeting is essential. And, the forms of withdrawal then is evidently connected with the private dwelling; with the house.

Today, of course, houses don't look like that. So I don't mean that we now return to these kinds of houses. We cannot do that. We can, though, keep the house alive somehow as a house. Even maybe keep alive the qualities—the basic figural qualities of the house—in a large apartment building. There are, I think basic figures of private dwelling … and the roof is one of them. The embracing protective roof which gives a sense of shelter. That has always been so. That doesn't mean that all houses have to possess such a roof … there are other ways of resolving the problem too.

Another form, another basic figure or type, which sets private dwelling into work—makes it a concrete fact—is the interior, the core, the large room around which the dwelling organises itself. The British architect, Baillie Scott [1865-1945] describes that very beautifully in his book *Houses and Gardens* which was published in London, I think, in 1903 or 4 or somewhere like that. Where he says that any house, any dwelling has to have a whole he says. This communal space in the middle which really constitutes a center and onto which all the other rooms kind of relate. So these are basic forms of

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private dwelling. You could mention the Pompeian atrium house as another example and so forth.

Well, showing Palladio's **[50:00]** rotunda to the right here, in connection with that peasant house from the black forest, I just want to indicate that that also somehow satisfies the basic forms of private dwelling. Although it is also 'something more' evidently, or at least interprets that in a kind of wider set of references than maybe the peasant house to the left does. I cannot go into that in detail now, but I just want to point out with these two examples that private dwelling has certain basic forms.


Figure 32: Slides 12a and 12b

And, then also the communal or collective dwelling as I call it in my book, also has certain basic forms. And what do I mean with that? Well, this is the function I call the 'meeting'; that human beings come together, and need to come together for obvious reasons. But the important point here is to understand that when we meet and come together, we do not necessarily have to come to an agreement. We are different and meeting really preserves our differences. If not, it wouldn't really be any meeting, in the sense that we meet others to learn from them. And if they were exactly alike then we wouldn't gain anything new. So, meeting is first of all based on dissimilarity and therefore the forms of meeting should be fairly free in a certain sense.

The Campo in Sienna is an enclosed space. It is a piazza, but it is not strictly symmetrical. It is not a space expressing a particular agreement I should say. It leaves you free somehow, because of its, what I would call, topological shape. Well it contains also elements expressing an agreement like the city hall with its tower. And the tower stands there to mark that here a community has its centre; where people meet and come together. So, space and built form here work together to express this function of meeting.

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Well, it is of course interesting to know that the City Hall also contain the city council where the members were elected in a really democratic way in the 14th century. That any male citizen had to take upon himself the duty of being a member of it, if he was elected.

Anyway, my point again is that there are forms of what I call communal dwelling. That is often forgotten today. Piazza's are made—or urban spaces—in a too special, in a too 'determined' way so that they are rather expressing a particular kind of agreement. Because there is a third basic mode of dwelling, which …


Figure 33: Slides 13a and 13b

… I have called public dwelling. I do not know if these words are chosen very well, but I think communal dwelling though, or rather collective dwelling expresses the fact of just a collection of people gathering, whereas public dwelling expresses the fact of common agreement. And common agreements have always been made visible, made manifest, in terms of public buildings, which, because they represent an agreement, and that is a particular understanding of the world, have to have a more precise, a more distinct, form than the forms of collective dwelling, and the piazza, and the street.

So when we enter then one of these public buildings—it might be a church or a mosque or a city hall or there might be other possibilities—we experience that here this common world to which a certain community belongs is explained to us. Here architecture becomes explanation I should say. It is no longer just a question of a functional container, but it is an explanation of a certain understanding of the world. It makes it become manifest. It stands there and therefore becomes also a goal **[55:00]** to those people who belong to this world.

Well, you might say that this is though again the past. Today we have many different worlds. We have almost as many worlds as there are human beings although we tend

though to still join up in groups and have certain agreements with a small or large number of other people. Well, certainly in the modern environment, in the modern city, we have many such buildings of different kinds, but they all serve as explanations. In a complex pluralistic society we will see that there are different interpretations of life which live together. But somehow they all though have to be expressed. If not, they fade away. They have to be kept in terms of built forms or figures which stand here. So that we can say, now we are here.


Figure 34: Slides 14a and 14b

Well, these were what I have called in my book the modes of dwelling. Well, we can then also look at the matter in a somewhat more general theoretical way, and say what is common then to the different forms which satisfy the modes of dwelling. And then we come back to the well-known concepts of space and built form. And that is necessary because when we have to understand and compare and distinguish between the figures which express the different kinds of dwelling, we need to think in terms of space and built form. And, of course, also there … there are some basic structures; some basic … I would rather call it qualities … which have been used over and over again throughout history in ever-new combinations. And basically these structures are the 'center' and the 'path'. I talked about that also two years ago and shall not repeat myself here now; I just want to remind of that. And that center and path have always been used in a meaningful way. Certainly not always, but at least mostly man has managed to use them in a meaningful way.

Like, for instance, here in the original Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, in the reconstruction of Kenneth Conant [1894-1984], where you see that the tomb is a centralised space; the tomb where life has come to an end of course has to be a space without direction, without dynamism. It has to be a static resting space, whereas the church is a longitudinal space. It is based on a path from one place to another … with a space which has a goal,

because it represents the path of life; what is before the tomb. And, as you all know, the baptistery in Christian churches was usually placed at the entrance; maybe in front of the entrance and was also a centralised structure. So you see from one static resting form which, so to speak, represents what is before life, you move along the path of life, and then the whole thing comes to a conclusion. This just to illustrate how spatial patterns, or forms, have been used meaningfully. And one could take any culture and find the same, or corresponding, things.

Figure 35: Slides 15a and 15b

Well, space of course then can be subject to composition and form very complex organisms of different kinds. To the left here you have Santo Spirito by Brunelleschi on the top, and you have Bramante's project for the cathedral in Pavia below. And you see how from this simple question of center and path, how complex organisms of directions and centers have been created through a particular kind of composition which has been denominated 'additive composition'. Instead, in Baroque architecture such organisms are set into motion somehow. They are not basically different; you still have centers and paths **[01:00:00]**; and you still have a certain symbolism which remains from there [left] to there [right]. But a new idea of the world has entered the picture; the idea of a dynamic open world as was expressed by Guarini in one of his philosophical works, where he says that throughout the world, throughout nature I think he says there goes an undulating movement; a movement of expansion and contraction.

And this dynamic interpretation then—that things are not static and just stand there, but really are dynamic and there is a kind of breathing in and out in the world so to speak—is then expressed in the plan of these buildings. Where each second element expands and contracts. This one expands and because of that, this one has to contract .. and the other one expands again. So that you get a kind of pulsating effect. That is actually the word

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use by Guarini. He said a pulsating movement goes through the whole of nature. And here you could add more of these elements if you wanted. These dotted lines indicate that they could go on; not everywhere, but along certain directions. You could add more elements and go on *ad infinitum*. It could become a city which pulsates if you want.

And in Rome, in Piazza Sant Ignazio that possibility is really built. There you have several spaces which interact in that way. It stops but it could have gone on. Well this just to indicate that of course the composition of space is a particular more abstract, but general problem which we can learn. And which we can then use according to our needs. But it somehow goes together with the question of figural quality. In both cases here the elements have a figural quality, and also the total organism made up has a figural quality. That is, it stands there as a certain thing you can grasp and remember.

Figure 36: Slides 16a and 16b

The other side on the medal then, the built form, as we all know, of course also has basic properties. And, strangely enough, although that is so evident and so basic, it was somehow forgotten—at least in much of late-modern architecture—that a form stands on the ground and rises up in space was neglected to some extent. There was no difference between up and down anymore. So, we ought to return to understand that. Not necessarily to make static forms which stand here. We could also make an inversion of that; that contradict it. But you can only contradict something if you first know what it is. So also the built form we have to recover somehow …

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
Figure 37: Slides 17a and 17b

… and understand that there is a difference between up and down. And throughout the history of architecture then we see how that has become a basic fact in architectural expression. I show now mostly examples from churches, but it is of course not my intention to give a lecture on church architecture I am talking about general facts. But these problems come out particularly clearly in certain churches.

And you see on the left here, Santa Sabina from the 5th century to St. Ivo from the 17th century that, well, basically there are always the two same spheres or domains, the earthly one and the heavenly one, which are interrelated. The earthly one down here being rather dark and having 'body' … having 'substance' through these anthropomorphic columns. The upper one being lighter and let us say, to some extent, dematerialised. And in Borromini's church the two are put in interaction. Again a kind of pulsating or at least interactive movement unites the two spheres here. **[01:05:00]** But basically they are still there; the pilasters down here, and the lighter dome of the sky up there. So that we still recognise the difference between up and down.

There is a quotation which I think I probably also used when I was here two years ago, but which illustrates that point. A German writer, Erich Kästner [1899-1974], said in one of his books that "even those who do not any longer believe in heaven and hell must though recognise the difference between down and up". And, many architects seem to have forgotten that. They design buildings which could be put upside down without seeming difference.

Figure 38: Slides 18a and 18b

Well there are, of course, then also, in the built form, the elements which make, let us say a horizontal movement present. Not just a rising up in space or standing in space, but also the horizontal movement of opening and closing which is just as important; of inside and outside. These we all know too … and still we tend to loose these figures which express that. When I went to school it was forbidden to design a window in the wall that is true. It was forbidden. And, well, I understand why. [There] was a certain logic in forbidding that, because we were working with the open plan—the free plan—and of course the window is a hole in the wall. You kind of stop the movement, and then you make a hole to look out over kind of … well, it does sound hard to combine [it with] the free plan at least in its kind of heroic interpretation. So, I understand why we did that, but, in doing that, we lost so very much.

We lost all these very sensitive little fine distinctions between the outside and the inside. The control over light. The possibility of looking out … and maybe looking in … or not looking out but letting light come in and so forth. And even to express the quality of light in its different modes. This is a very rich and fine example of a window in Venice where you see really … this is a kind of home around the window I should say. Closing opening combined with a balcony where you can go out and so forth. I don't have to explain it to you, it speaks for itself.

Figure 39: Slides 19a and 19b

Well, now I have, after already having talked about the modes of dwelling and just asserting that certain figures, which make the modes of dwelling manifest … exist …I said a few very general words about space and built form. Just to make us remember that we again have to think about that and to know what it means.

Then, is that enough? Is it enough to understand architecture in terms of up and down and outside and inside? As we know those in, during the modern movement, to some extent understood. I think it is not enough. I think what I started saying, talking about figurative elements, that certain forms appear as something more than just an element in a composition. They stand out as very particular shapes. Which have re-occurred over and over again throughout historic variations. And there are many such forms. The dome is one. The arch is one. The gable is one. And I just show this to illustrate that. I show this front of a little chapel which … is no longer existing actually. And still that front stands there with its pediment and its round window and its door and its arch over it … and is something. It stands there and means something in space although it doesn't serve any function any more. It somehow expresses basic facts about being in space; being between earth and sky.

And this theme then of the gable or pediment has been used in a very interesting way in this project by Olbrich [1867-1908]—a house which was built actually—the Three Gables House it was called, and it was standing in Darmstadt until the Second World War when it was destroyed by bombing **[01:10:00]**. Here Olbrich has joined three apartments in one house and, to give each of them an identity, he has made three variations of the gable. Here you are in a way in the middle of the two others. This one [Left] reminds us of the embracing, enclosing roof of the peasant house I showed you before. This one instead [middle] is a kind of classical resting form, it's a little more pointed than a classical

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pediment, but anyhow, it has not a particular vertical or horizontal direction. It doesn't really … well it embraces yes, but at the same time it just stands there in space. Whereas this pointed one [right] rises up dynamically towards the sky. And in the executed work it was even made more … let us say with curved shapes, more dynamic, with scrolls down here and then moving up. Very interesting way of showing what is an architectural figure.

These are three interpretations of a theme I should say. The type, the basic theme, is the gable. And the gable is interpreted in three different ways. And we all understand that these three interpretations are not just whims. They tell us something about possibilities of dwelling I should say. We might choose the one or the other, according to how we are, or how is the place we live in. In some places maybe this one would fit better [right]. In some places maybe that one would fit better [left]. And, in fact, when you travel around in Europe and look at peasant houses and urban houses from the past you find that certain solutions are selected … and are repeated although varied within certain limits. This can of course again be varied in many many different ways. And why? Well, I think usually because of the environment. The given natural environment, basically the place. The place demands a certain interpretation of the type. And of course also related then to human actions and so forth.

Figure 40: Slides 20a and 20b

Well, these basic forms then can take the shape say also [of] a complete little image of the world; an *imago mundi*. As this chapel in Göllersdorf in Austria—a four-poster—which here serves as a chapel. Charles Moore has used the four-poster to make a little bathroom for himself in Orinda and … putting a sunken bathtub between these four posts. So, it is a kind of basic figural form which can serve several purposes. And, I wouldn't say it is wrong to use it as a bathroom. You should just not use exactly that one probably for a bathroom.

Well, in any case, in all these cases where I go back to—as this illustrates—what I call the image of the world. All these forms I've shown; all these basic figures, be they details or larger wholes, they somehow express our being between earth and sky. And therefore I show this project by Boullee which illustrates that basic fact. Boullee called this the Temple of Reason. It should kind of substitute the cathedrals of the past and instead serve as an image of the understood world; about the time of the French revolution. And what did he do?

Well, he went down into the ground. He showed the earth as rocks, ravines, caves; what is under the surface on which we life. And over it he showed the dome of the sky. And between, human life, here represented by anthropomorphic columns standing there. So, in a kind of rather large nutshell he shows us what it means to be between earth and sky. And I think there are the basic facts which are behind the meaning of architectural forms. Architectural forms stand in space between earth and sky. And, according to how they behave—how they stand and rise **[01:15:00]**, how they open and close, how they form a whole—they become expressive of a certain understanding of this world; an understanding which is not completely different. Something remains, but always something changes.

Figure 41: Slides 21a and 21b

What then are these figures one could ask? And I shall just briefly say that there are many interpretations of that. In modern semiology it is said that all forms are signs. Then some of us say that forms are symbols. Well, I have talked about something slightly different. I think that the semiological theory is not really very fruitful in relation to works of architecture. When Bernini puts up this rock pier on the Montecitorio palace, it is not a sign certainly. It might be called a symbol, yes, it reminds you of something. It reminds you of the rocks around Rome in the ravines of the valleys around Rome and which were certainly present along the Tiber at the time of Bernini's. And which again appear in the

Trevi Fountain. It reminds us of a certain element of nature and of Roman nature. So it makes the building belong to its place in a certain sense. So it is, we could say, a symbol.

Figure 42: Slides 22a and 22b

And when we then also see how, for instance, Guiliano da Sangallo [1443-1516] applies pilasters, to that very, in a way, rough construction of the church in Prato [Santa Maria delle Carceri]. Then what does he do? Well, it is not a sign again. It is, it signifies maybe something, but it is first of all an image of an understood world. As is also this instrumentation of the Campidoglio in Rome by Michelangelo. Well, this is a different problem which I am going to treat in more detail at another occasion. I just want to point it out now, because so much is today written on semiology in connection with architecture.

I will just quote the German philosopher, Gadamer, who, in his very important book, *Truth and Method*, says: "the difference between image and sign has an ontological basis. The image is not limited to an indicative function, as is the sign, but forms by its own being part of what it represents. A symbol, also does not simply indicate, but presents when it represents. To represent means to bring into presence something which is absent". Bringing into presence something which is absent. Like in the last pictures Bernini and his followers brought into presence say, [going to the previous slides] … Roman nature. I here talked about something different. I talked about images. I call it figures to use kind of more concrete words. And an image, says Gadamer represents through itself; through the increase in meaning it brings about. That is, it brings an increase of meaning about by making an understood world visible. It makes a world we live in, and understood, and participate in visible. Fixing it and placing it in front of our eyes. And I think that explanatory function of architecture is still very important.

Figure 43: Slides 23a and 23b

Well, this just in parenthesis. Of course all we then do with these forms and figures depends upon where we are and how we are. But the types are there as possibilities. They do not exist in the stand of being there. They have to be taken from somewhere and placed in front of us as an interpretation. As, for instance, here in the Alhambra. Again archetypes are interpreted. It is all there. The earth and the sky. The column and the vault, but here it is interpreted … related to the light of the desert I should say. Here that light, which really penetrates **[01:20:00]** and makes matter so to speak dissolve. Well, one could say more about that, but I've already spoken too long so I have to go on to conclude.

Figure 44: Slides 24a and 24b

Well, back to our time. Although we have always been concerned with our time, because what I have been talking about I think is somehow timeless. But back to examples from our time. Well, this is again a church and so I have used churches as examples today to create a kind of continuity. It is a church designed by the German architect, Rudolf Schwarz [1897-1961] in Aachen [*Kirche St. Fronleichnam*] in Germany in the 1920's.

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And, I think it is a good work of architecture. I find it is very … it has very fine qualities to it. And it, though also, at the same time reminds you of these basic archetypes.

There is a difference between down and up here. The floor is solid stone, the benches are of dark wood. You rise up in this white space, from where light comes high up and then comes further down here at the alter … as if life (or light) there approaches the earth. And in the exterior you have a bell tower, yes, you have even a little gable up there (It is out of the [frame] … unfortunately shown here though you might recognise it) So, you see how even here basic types are behind … but they are almost not recognisable any more. They are, but almost, just, just like … well … almost nothing, but enough to give it meaning though. But of course this very ascetic architecture could not last in a way. This is again a complex problem, and as it degenerated, especially after the Second World [War], these memories though of the basic structures of being-in-the-world were really forgotten. As I showed you in the very first picture from New York. And, as a reaction to that we experienced then an attempt at recovery of these qualities again.


Figure 45: Slides 25a and 25b

And we experienced what we call Neo-expressionism. Where the forms became again, very strongly expressive which got a new presence again. And in Le Corbusier's Ronchamp, certainly, the archetypes are again somehow present. Again the difference between down and up, inside and outside, the hovering roof. Like a veil which has come down and rests on the thick massive walls and so forth. And even the more general shapes of the bell tower to the left, and so forth. But, these attempts, where too 'special', too unique. It is there in a way, but the interpretation is so unique that one couldn't go on. It did not open up the possibilities of a kind of new architectural language. Or, rather, a new interpretation of the language of architecture. So, somehow, this couldn't … well … it was not the solution.

Figure 46: Slides 26a and 26b

What then has happened afterwards? We all know. We know this quest for meaningful forms and we see how Louis Kahn then returned to identifiable forms. How he here uses again the triangle—but not abstractly—but now really as a kind of gable or pediment. And, the round window reminding of certain forms of the past. And also of something timeless. And that strange bell tower in the middle, different from anything we have ever seen before though also reminds us somehow. It is a different approach, I should say, there is a kind of qualitative change here I think and this is of course now not to criticise Le Corbusier's Ronchamp which is a wonderful work, but what I want to suggest is only that it is unique. Whereas here, something comes about **[01:25:00]**, and also here in the Kimbell Museum and in all the other works of Kahn, which opens up a path towards figurative architecture. It opens it up again. After that, many have tried to go on, and to kind of carry on that direction with more or less success.


Figure 47: Slides 27a and 27b

The Italian, Aldo Rossi—the Rome Aldo so to speak—he has tried to interpret this problem in terms of typology … strict typology. And as you have probably understood from my talk I think typology is necessary. There is no language of architecture without

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typology, but as I said before the types do not exist. They have to be interpreted and transformed into concrete figures. And that he doesn't do. He builds the types … and the result is a very abstract architecture. Abstract in a different way from the functional diagrams of late-modernism, but though very abstract to my mind.

Maybe you disagree with me, but that is, at least, how I see it. And when I visited this cemetery in Modena last summer, I personally found it was rather sterile. I, of course, when I took that picture tried to make it look as bad as possible [laughter]. Well, anyhow, I think the result is basically wrong here, and that is why I took the liberty to do that. I think that Rossi … well, he has pointed out to us the need for typology. But he hasn't understood that the type is an abstraction … and we have to make it concrete by building it here and now and giving it an interpretation in connection with this place and this time somehow.


Figure 48: Slides 28a and 28b

Well, Robert Venturi has approached similar problems, and he has gone maybe then in the opposite direction of Rossi. He has also worked with types, but then put, first of all emphasis on the variations; on the possibility of making figures out of a type. Here the gateway or eh, what we shall call it, has been, for instance, interpreted in very, very many ways. And he has a lot of fun doing that certainly, and I think it is rather charming and interesting what he does. But, beware one could say of just making architecture into a 'game' with such possible interpretations. Well, though, [when] he builds, I think he very often, and maybe mostly, succeeds in making a strong statement. That is, a building which knows 'what it wants to be.' Like this house which rises up like a kind of tower. At the same time with a protective and embracing roof with that large window letting light in. There are many basic forms present there. Interpreted in a way which we have never really seen like that before. It is, as he says himself 'new' and 'old' at the same time.

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Figure 49: Slides 29a and 29b

And then in the work of Michael Graves we also see similar attempts, and I show this example here, to suggest that I find Graves's work important, because he though somehow has absorbed the teaching of modern art, I think. I think he has basically gone through that 'needle eye of modern art' Giedion talked about. And therefore his works do not, they are not being trapped like those of Rossi in … in schematism. One could of course discuss that in detail. I cannot do it now as time is out. But I just wanted to, with these few words to suggest what I mean.

Figure 50: Slides 30a and 30b

And then in this drawing to the left where Graves—which Graves put as an introduction to his collected works—about three or four years ago when it was published. He makes then a drawing which is a kind of catalogue, so to speak, of architectural figures. Not just types it is already somehow interpreted. It is Graves's. And it is interpreted. And he puts up here everything that he thinks that he needs to make a meaningful environment.

Placing them within a landscape, which also consists of concrete figural shapes like the mountain **[01:30:00]**, like the plain, the valley, the trees and the cloud. So he aims evidently here at what we might call figurative architecture. And in fact the title he put on the text he wrote to this drawing he called *The Case for Figurative Architecture.* This doesn't mean that I necessarily think exactly in the same way, but I found that text very inspiring and, found that he there hinted about something essential at the present. And to the right here then again, and he writes under that drawing: Rome 1980. Instead, this is Rome maybe 1380 or 1280 or something. And you see it's surprisingly similar in a way. You see also at that time how man thought of his environment in terms of architectural things or figures which constituted a whole. Of course, here also shown as a kind of inventory, but basically though suggesting the same approach. The same and different, new and old.


Figure 51: Slides 31a and 31b

Well, there are dangers. There are two dangers; there is the danger of being too abstract. To the left we see Le Corbusier also, once, made a kind of similar drawing. And he then told us that what is hidden within these figural forms are the platonic solids. He reduced it to say geometry. And I think that is to go too far, and that was, I think, one of the failures of modern architecture; to think in too abstract terms, [but] Le Corbusier didn't do it in his own work. He was a great artist and he followed certainly his feelings, just as much as his intellect. But, the theory that we could reduce architecture to geometry was rather common, and his drawings supported it. And I think that is one danger.

The other danger is of course what happened in, for instance, in the Soviet Union under Stalin. That view may be kind of *pastiche*. And this balance then between abstraction and *pastiche* is very hard. It is very hard … very dangerous, but that is the balance which is

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asked from us today. To be able to do that. And, well, some try and some manage. I think it is a very good moment at the present. I think very much significant work is done. I shall not show any examples, because I don't want to say that one thing is better than the other or maybe they are and maybe I know it, but I though want to be silent about it [Laughter].

Anyway, that is, I think, needed from us. And just to conclude I would say that what I have tried here to explain as the figurative dimension of architecture I consider the common denominator of what is today called Postmodernism. We might like that word or not, but anyway it aims at again making an architecture which consists of concrete figures, which make up an environment, which allows life, everyday life, to take place.

Thank you **[01:34: 23]**.

Appendix C: *livskunst* and building

This appendix catalogues a selection of architectural projects by Christian Norberg-Schulz and two residences of Martin Heidegger. In addition to providing short descriptions of these buildings, the works of Norberg-Schulz have been used to reveal the way in which the four 'phases' characterising his theoretical work (identified in Chapter 4) manifested itself in his architectural works. The aim was not to present these works as in depth case studies (see subsection 2.2.3), but to advance the case for a more comprehensive approach to architecture as a form of *poiesis* celebrating the interaction between care and place. If care is the ground of understanding and interpretation, as Heidegger suggested (1925: 413-415/299), and architecture is "a form of understanding [aiming to explain] the unity of life and place", as Norberg-Schulz suggested (1993: 197), then architecture can most appropriately be practiced as the *poiesis* of emplaced care.

1 The philosopher and his places of work

1.1 Todtnauberg

Figure 52: The valley in which the town Todtnauberg is located. Heidegger's hut is embedded in the hillside towards the right (south-facing).

In the summer of 1922, the Heidegger family moved into a small dwelling that Heidegger referred to as "*die Hütte*" (the hut)*.* It was the start of what Norberg-Schulz described (in general terms) as an intimate "friendship" (1979b: 128). According to Adam Sharr (2006: 7) the small building proved to be "a constant dialogue partner for Heidegger from 1922 onward". The hut shared in the drafting of *Being and Time*, bridged his 'turn', and served as a backdrop to the retired thinker pondering the happening of Being.

Figure 53 (left): The hut seen from above.
Figure 54 (right): The well.

In a very real sense, Heidegger believed that "[philosophy] belongs right in the midst of the peasant's work" (Heidegger, 1934: 28). This small hut, embedded in the south-facing slope of the valley in which the small German town of Todtnauberg (Figure 52) is located, was Heidegger's "work-world"; a place exposed to "the great comings and goings of the seasons", yet "intimately rooted in and related to the life of the peasants" (Heidegger, 1934: 27-28). While the exact circumstances surrounding the design and building of the hut (Figure 53) remain unclear (Sharr, 2006: 49), Heidegger's attachment to this place tells the story of one who desired to understand the concreteness of existence.

It can even be argued that elements of the surroundings, like the well on the eastern side of the hut (Figure 54), sometimes showed a remarkable correspondence to his philosophical thoughts. For instance, Heidegger's later writings referred to the idea that the poet should patiently wait near the "source" (Afr: *bron*) in the hope of 'receiving' revelation (1946: 118). Rather than challenging the reality of the world by imposing ideas on the situation, the poet is one who recognises that all understanding is given from the source. Letting-be that which is given by the source, is the letting-be of Being and the happening of the Open.[349] It would be an oversimplification to say that Heidegger's mysterious 'source', which is also like an *Ab-grund*[350] in the sense that it dissipates amid attempts at classification, can literally be imagined as a well or a spring. Yet the spring, by alluding to the difficulty of pinpointing the moment a river becomes a river – where the spring or origin 'is' – bestows a deeper reality on Heidegger's thoughts.

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[349] See Glossary: The Open, *Ereignis*, and Resoluteness.
[350] See Glossary: *Ab-grund*.

Figure 55: The hut on the hillside overlooking Todtnauberg.

In *Heidegger's Hut* (2006) Adam Sharr presented a valuable and even-handed description of Heidegger's mountain sanctuary (Figure 55). The book offers a thorough physical depiction of the hut, historical evidence on the circumstances of its construction and reports on the impression that the hut made on some of the people who visited Heidegger there.

Figure 56 (left): Windows looking towards the fountain (east).
Figure 57 (middle): Roof and chimney.
Figure 58 (right): Windows towards the west.

The rustic materiality of the place (Figure 56, Figure 57 and Figure 58), its allusions to pastoralism and the way it shunned modern life, display Heidegger's distrust of the modern condition. In a way it concretises the way of thinking which inhabited it, but also points to the darker nostalgia that has so often made the concept of place into a political weapon. Maybe the best way to think about the hut is to take Heidegger at his word; a place "intimately rooted in and related to the life of the peasants" that rejects the superficiality of "aloof studies" by being open to "the vast nearness of the presence [*Wesen*] of all things" (Heidegger, 1934: 28).

1.2 The townhouse

While more charitable interpretations of Heidegger's attachment to his mountain retreat muse over the difficulty of engaging with the lived reality of the place, it must be pointed out that this hut was essentially a 'retreat' from an urbanity in which Heidegger, by being a university professor, had to partake. Heidegger also had a house in Freiburg. What is the most useful way to interpret the tension between Heidegger's "city life" and his "mountain life" (Sharr, 2006: 87)?

A quick comparison between the plans of the hut (Figure 61 and Figure 62) and the plans of his house in Freiburg (Figure 63) suggests that his Freiburg study alone comprised almost half the area of the whole Todtnauberg hut. In contrast to the image of the ascetic mountain hut and the thinker working in isolated diligence (Figure 64), Heidegger also lived an academic life accompanied and inspired by the works of many other thinkers (Figure 65).

Much like the hut, the town house (Figure 59) seems like any other traditional house in Freiburg. Instead of portraying Heidegger's mountain retreat (or townhouse) as somehow being inauthentic, the hut and town house can be interpreted as two ways of life engaging in a conversation. While the fountain at the bottom of Rötebuckweg (Figure 60) seems like a somewhat crude re-enactment, it actually serves as a reminder that there may be various 'sources' (some rural and some urban) that contemporary architecture should take into account. The wonder of the dialogic relationship between Heidegger's hut and house is that it displays the deeply emplaced nature of his thinking, and points to the possibility of applying this kind of thinking not only to the 'pastoral' *milieu*, but also to the urban.

Figure 59 (left): Heidegger's house in Rötebuckweg, Freiburg.
Figure 60 (right): The fountain at the start of Rötebuckweg.

First-Floor Plan

Ground-Floor Plan

Basement Plan

1. FRONT DOOR
2. STORM PORCH
3. *VORRAUM*
4. HEATING STOVE
5. COOKING STOVE
6. BED
7. BEDROOM
8. BEDS
9. WASHING TABLE
10. STUDY
11. DESK
12. TABLE
13. BED
14. EARTH CLOSET
15. DRYING ROOM

Figure 61 (left top): Plan of Heidegger's Todtnauberg hut (Sharr, 2006: 25).
Figure 62 (left bottom): A model of Heidegger's hut (Sharr, 2006: 27).
Figure 63 (right): Plans of Heidegger's house in Rötebuckweg, Freiburg (same scale as the plan of the hut) (Sharr, 2006: 92).

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
**Figure 64 (left): Heidegger at his desk in Todtnauberg. The windows above the desk look out over the well (Figure 54) (Digne Meller-Marcovicz in Sharr, 2006: 39).**
Figure 65 (right): Heidegger's desk in Freiburg (Digne Meller-Marcovicz in Sharr, 2006: 96).

2 Christian Norberg-Schulz

2.1 Student years (1945-1949) and early work (1949-1953)

The years spent at the *Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule* (ETH) in Zurich under the mentorship of Sigfried Giedion, laid the foundation for the 'questions' Norberg-Schulz spent his career answering. Indeed, Ellefsen pointed out that it seems as if Giedion's inquiry served as "a programme for Norberg-Schulz's work" (2009: 122). In his student projects, and in the built projects Norberg-Schulz completed before embarking on his academic career, the hand of Giedion is clearly discernible.

Norberg-Schulz's student project entitled "Seefeld, Zürich 1948" (Figure 66, Figure 67, Figure 68 and Figure 69) and his early project (1951) for a civic centre in Tveten (in collaboration with the Norwegian architects Odd Østbye and Håkon Mjelva) (Figure 70, Figure 71 and Figure 72), show a marked kinship with later modernist ensembles like the unbuilt project for the Back Bay Center (Boston, 1953) (Figure 73), which Giedion praised as "a well organized complex [which had the potential to be] the finest American urban center" (Giedion, 1941: 513).

Figure 66: Aerial view of a student project by Norberg-Schulz entitled "Seefeld, Zürich 1948" (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25)

Figure 67: A student project by Norberg-Schulz entitled "Seefeld, Zürich 1948" (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25)

Figure 68 (left): The auditorium (model) of a student project by Norberg-Schulz entitled "Seefeld, Zürich 1948" (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25)
Figure 69(right): Plan of the auditorium shown in Figure 68 (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25)

Figure 70 (left): An early project by Norberg-Schulz (with H. Mjelva & O. Østbye) (1951) entitled "CIVIC-CENTER 1951 TVETEN, OSLO" (*sic*) (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25).
Figure 71 (right): Aerial view (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25).

Figure 72 (left): Aerial view of civic center (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25).
Figure 73 (right): The project for the Back Bay Center in Boston (Gropius, 1941: 513).

These projects reveal the modernist roots of Norberg-Schulz's thinking which initially convinced him that "the modern movement is the only *true* tradition of the present" (1963: 206). Giedion's later calls for a "new monumentality" (1958: 25) and a "new regionalism"

(1958: 138) inspired Norberg-Schulz to propose a theory of place, as a response to the peculiarities of the region (in this thesis presented as the 'second phase' of Norberg-Schulz's thinking), and a figurative approach to building which searched for a way (via Postmodernism) to manifest the monumental aspects of architecture (in this thesis presented as the 'third phase' of Norberg-Schulz's thinking). When seen together, these projects reveal the constitutive role that Norberg-Schulz's modernist education played in the works completed during the first phase of his contribution.

2.2 Works from phase 1: the psychology of perception

2.2.1 Planetveien

Between 1953 and 1955 the young Norberg-Schulz, in collaboration with the older Norwegian architect, Arne Korsmo, designed and built three dwellings. Norberg-Schulz moved into Planetveien 14, Korsmo lived in Planetveien 12 and the third house (Planetveien 10) belonged to the original landowner. Gennaro Postiglione proposed that the modernist designs of these houses represented a Norwegian "manifesto of a new way of living" (2004: 285). In fact, Norberg-Schulz often discussed the nature of "private dwelling" (1984a: 13).[351] In his article, *Norberg-Schulz's House: The Modern Search for Home Through Visual Patterns* (2006), Jorge Otero-Pailos proposed that the design and building of these dwellings "had a considerable influence on Norberg-Schulz's thinking about architecture" (2006: 10).

> In the case of Norberg-Schulz, who was obsessed with the intellectual pursuit of 'being at home,' it is important to understand how his own residences served as laboratories for his experiments in 'dwelling,' and how these buildings functioned as filters through which he interpreted (and misinterpreted) theories such as Gestalt psychology, and much later phenomenology (Otero-Pailos, 2006: 17).

Figure 74: Planetveien 10 (left), 12 and 14 by Norberg-Schulz and Korsmo (1953-1955) (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25)

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[351] Norberg-Schulz, 1971: 19; 1979b: 170; 1984a: 9 & 89-110; 1993: 48-71; 2000b: 49-59.

Figure 75 (left): Plan of Planetveien 14 (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25).
Figure 76 (right top): Model of Planetveien 14 (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25).
Figure 77 (right bottom): Interior of living area (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25).

Figure 78 (left): Planetveien 14 seen from the south (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25).
Figure 79 (right): Planetveien and the natural (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 25).

Otero-Pailos argued that Planetveien 14 is nothing more than a "perceptual device" (2006: 15) that constitutes a modernist attempt at "visual organisation" (2006: 12). As such, the building reveals the "unstable foundations" (2006; 16) of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical contribution. Otero-Pailos further contends that this explains why Norberg-

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Schulz's "disciples" have been unwilling to engage meaningfully with the concrete reality of Planetveien 14 on a theoretical level (2006: 17).

Of course, this reading of the house fits well with Otero-Pailos's interpretation of Norberg-Schulz as one who failed to truly engage with the concreteness and historicity of the built environment due to his "obsession with visual thinking" (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 161). As proof of Norberg-Schulz's 'obsession', Otero-Pailos pointed out that the structural skeleton used in the main volume of the house (see the 9 columns in the main space of the living area of Planetveien 14, Figure 75) corresponds to the 'structural skeleton of the square' presented by Arnheim as part of his exploration of visual (see subsection 4.2.4). However, there are alternative ways to interpret this correspondence.

Norberg-Schulz believed that 'skeletal systems' revealed new possibilities for the technical dimension of architecture. Skeleton systems could act as order-creating features of architecture. In fact, Norberg-Schulz argued that "the architecture of the past has very often been a flight [*sic*] against the limitations of the massive systems", because the task "generally demanded a richer structure" than massive systems could accomplish (1963: 163). Skeleton systems could provide both "coherence" and "the articulation which previously was achieved by means of fictive members [that were applied to massive systems in order to make them appear skeletal]" (1963: 166). Therefore Norberg-Schulz used a skeletal system not only as a visual device, but as a 'technical order' able to regulate (via the form) the architectural solution to the building task. Even if the plan of Planetveien 14 was derived from Arnheim's diagram, it has been argued (subsection 4.4.2) that Norberg-Schulz, rather than merely being preoccupied with a rational "visual pattern" (Otero-Pailos, 2006: 16), valued the qualitative zones imbedded in Arnheim's diagram.

Figure 80 (left and right): Planetveien 14 today.

2.2.2 The Holy Mary Catholic church in Stabekk

Otero-Pailos presented the way Norberg-Schulz "obsessively framed" the central steel column in his photographs of Planetveien 14 as an example of Norberg-Schulz's preoccupation with presenting the world, and even his theoretical investigations, as a "visual pattern" (2006: 15-16). In the case of the Stabekk church,[352] the most significant 'visual revelation' is that which Norberg-Schulz left out of his images. The Stabekk church (located at the top of the site) included an old age home which consisted of living units cascading down the hill, with the reception area and dining hall on the lowest level. The grouping formed a semi-enclosed courtyard which, in the original drawings was presented as a sloped garden space.

However, what the original sketches (Figure 81 and Figure 82) neglect to show, and what has been 'edited out' of or rendered inconspicuous in the photographs Norberg-Schulz took of the completed building (Figure 83), is that there is a traditional house (currently the house in which the priest resides) located in the courtyard of the Miesian ensemble.

Figure 81: Street view of complex (c. 1955) (NAM 25).

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[352] Norberg-Schulz designed the Stabekk church in collaboration with Franz Wosak (Otero-Pailos, 2010: 161).

Figure 82: Aerial view of complex (c. 1955) (NAM 25).

Figure 83 (left and right): Photos by Norberg-Schulz of the completed project (NAM 13).

The house (Figure 84) stands in stark contrast to the 'clear construction' which has embraced it without accepting it. However, against the stark interior of the church (Figure 85) and the bare institutional featurelessness of the senior residences[353] (Figure 86), the house still seems like the element of that ensemble most at ease in the surrounding area, which has a much more traditional character than the new insertion (Figure 87).

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[353] While the church is still in use, the old age home has been closed down.

Figure 84 (left and right): The prominence of the traditional house on the site.

Figure 85 (left): Interior view of the church.
Figure 86 (right): Interior of what used to be the old age home.

Figure 87 (left and right): Traditional houses in the Stabekk area.

It is hard to say exactly how Norberg-Schulz felt about this building as an ensemble. Despite constructing a decidedly modernist interpretation of this project with his 'selective photography', the idea of a modern building with a work of traditional architecture at its

centre seems like an apt representation of the theories which he would later formulate. Indeed, already in IiA Norberg-Schulz said that "the meaningful new creation always belongs to tradition" (1963: 160). Maybe one can even read, in his photograph (Figure 88) of the church (taken during construction), a yearning for buildings which could approach the horizon with a more gentle curve, and 'open up' more generously to the gracious geometry of the sky; a more poetic way to house the everyday actions and makings of *Dasein* as an interaction with the divine. At any rate, the following building alludes to the fact that Norberg-Schulz agreed with Giedion, when he said that there was "something … lacking" (Giedion, 1958: 32) in the instances where architects put their faith in modernism.

Figure 88: The Stabekk church during construction (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 14).

2.2.3 Italiesin

Between 1959 and 1962 Norberg-Schulz built a summer residence in Porto Ercole (Italy). He called the house Italiesin; a play on Wright's Taliesin studio, which also had inclined steriotomic walls. Norberg-Schulz used Italiesin (Figure 89, Figure 90 and Figure 91) as an example to illustrate some of his theoretical ideas in IiA. The Norwegian architect, Pauline Gjøsteen (building on Otero-Pailos's critique), pointed out that the image used in IiA (Figure 92), depicts the building in its unfinished state and shows how Norberg-Schulz used photography to "increase the scale, emphasize massiveness, illude [*sic*] shell constructions and hide unfortunate details" (2010: 291); a structure uncluttered by the realities of living there.

Figure 89 (top left): Photograph by Norberg-Schulz depicting the relation of his summer house to the hilltop forts of Porto Ercole (Norberg-Schulz, 1962b: 165).
Figure 90 (bottom left): The terrace with view towards the sea (Norberg-Schulz, 1962b: 167).
Figure 91 (right): Plans of the ground (top) and first (bottom) floors (Norberg-Schulz, 1962b: 164-165).

It is true that Norberg-Schulz (in IiA) interpreted Italiesin in a decidedly structuralist way. He referred to the visual coherence of the building in order to argue that "any formal structure can be analyzed in terms of elements and relations" (1963: 148). Photographs of the completed building (Figure 93) show the way in which some of the complexities of human life (e.g. the windows on the upper level) started to challenge the principles of "strong gestalt" and "clear construction" (1963: 166) originally presented.

While Norberg-Schulz used the house to describe the clarity a structuralist approach could bestow, the morphology of the house reflects the sheer mass of the fortresses located on the surrounding hills (Figure 89). While this might merely represent a "visual relation between house and view" (Gjøsteen, 2010: 291), it is hard to see this project as somehow isolated from the emplaced theory of architecture which Norberg-Schulz formulated in later years. Instead, it seems much more likely that Italiesin already reflected Norberg-Schulz's appreciation of the *genius loci*.

Figure 92 (left): *Italiesin* during construction (Norberg-Schulz, 1963: figure 76).
Figure 93 (right): *Italiesin* after construction (Norberg-Schulz, 1962b: 166-167).

The architectural works from this phase of Norberg-Schulz's career, as Otero-Pailos pointed out, certainly bears a tendency towards structuralist visual systems; a tendency which still informed his early ideas of existential space as "*a system of meaningful places*" (1966b: 26). However, in the following years Norberg-Schulz tried to distance himself from this structuralist approach.

The publication of IiA, which coincided with Norberg-Schulz's appointment as lecturer at the Oslo School of Architecture (AHO) in 1963, his subsequent dedication to academia (he was appointed as a professor at AHO in 1966) and his withdrawal from professional practice inaugurated this transitional phase. Instead of focusing on the role visual structures played in rendering built volumes intelligible, Norberg-Schulz now tried to understand architecture in terms of Heideggarian being-in-the-world. For instance, the architectural 'image' Norberg-Schulz referred to in GL, CoD and (especially) PLP is very different from the 'visual images' he investigated under the guidance of the psychology of perception. It has, therefore, been argued (subsections 3.1.2 and 3.2.3) that Otero-Pailos's critique neglected important aspects of Norberg-Schulz's theoretical project. I have argued that the structural tendencies which remained in Norberg-Schulz's writings sprung from the much more profound difference between ecstatic care and continuity and change.

Being-in-the-world is 'relational' rather than 'cognitive'. It involves the lived interaction between work and way of being during which *Dasein* "explains" and "keeps" and "expresses" a particular "understanding" (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 17-18) of the world of life. As the gathering of such an understanding, the work is bestowed with meaning, and *Dasein*, as the maker and appropriator of such meanings, reveals a way to "*dwell poetically*" (Norberg-Schulz, 1984a: 30). This implies that *Dasein* cannot 'enforce'

meaning, but interprets that which is given. While Italiesin alludes to the fact that Norberg-Schulz may have intuitively tried to engage with the spirit of the place, his next residence, in contrast to the pictures he took of the Stabekk church (in which he marginalised the role of the traditional), showed a much deeper respect for the gifts of his 'own' place.

2.3 Phase 2: Slemdalsvingen 55 and the spirit of the place

In November of 1969, a year after Korsmo's death in 1968, Norberg-Schulz moved out of Planetveien 14.[354] Rather than building a new 'manifesto' and again imposing his (pioneering) will on the Norwegian landscape, he moved into an existing house built in the vernacular style. It is from one of the rooms in this house that he took the picture with which he introduced the ideas presented in *Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture* (1979b) (GL). The picture (Figure 94) celebrates the fact that he was now writing from his own place, from his own 'situatedness'. It can be interpreted as a turn away from the image as a 'visual device' towards the concept of architecture as an image expressing (in a non-scenographic way) *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world.

Figure 94 (left): View from inside Norberg-Schulz's house at Slemdalsvingen 55 towards the tower of the *Ris Kirke* in Oslo. The photograph is entitled (in deference to Trakl's poem) "A winter evening" (Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 7-8).
Figure 95 (right): View from the *Ris Kirke* towards Slemdalsvingen 55.

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[354] NAM 1, Letter to Mary Kling, 08/12/1969: 1. In this letter Norberg-Schulz gave his new address as Slemdalsveien 100, and in *Modern Norwegian Architecture*, he listed the house his son built next door as Slemdalsveien 100B (1986c: 149). The name of the street (and the numbering) has changed in recent years, since the houses are now listed as Slemdalsvingen 55 and 57.

Furthermore, when one looks back at this window from the church (Figure 95) and sees Norberg-Schulz's photograph in concert with the quote (from Franz Kafka's *The Trial*) he used to open GL: "Logic is doubtless unshakable, but it cannot withstand a man who wants to live" (Kafka cited in Norberg-Schulz, 1979b: 5), then it can be argued that the attempt to understand architecture in terms of visual structures had made way for a desire to understand architecture as a built response to the interaction between life and place. Slemdalsvingen 55 represented a new beginning for Norberg-Schulz that anticipated the words of Malpas: "to begin is to begin *in and from out of place*" (2012: 14).

Figure 96 (left): Southern façade of Norberg-Schulz's house in Slemdalsvingen 55.
Figure 97 (right): The house as seen from the backyard of Slemdalsvingen 57.

Norberg-Schulz's move from Planetveien 14 to Slemdalsvingen 55 coincided with the publication of a book he co-authored with Gunnar Bugge, *Stav og laft i Norge: Early wooden architecture in Norway* (1969). This book displays an admiration and appreciation for vernacular Norwegian architecture; a building tradition which Norberg-Schulz presented as a way to "inspire the architects of today to solve their problems with the same respect for nature, man and culture as the anonymous masters of the past" (Bugge & Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 5). In the interaction between the everydayness of the *stue* (Figure 101 and Figure 102), the symbolic significance of the *stabbur* (Figure 100 and Figure 103) and the humble yet dramatic verticality of Norwegian stave churches (Figure 98 and Figure 99), Norberg-Schulz saw echoes of the things "we have to know and love when we want to build and dwell in this country" (Bugge & Norberg-Schulz, 1969: 7). The images below (Figure 98, Figure 99, Figure 100, Figure 101, Figure 102 and Figure 103) were taken at the Norwegian folk museum which, according to Otero-Pailos, was the place Norberg-Schulz took his students at the start of the architectural history lecture series he presented at the AHO (2006: 11).

Figure 98 (left): The Gol Stave Church (dating from the 13th century) that was re-constructed at the Norwegian Museum of Cultural History (Oslo).
Figure 99 (right): Interior of the Gol Stave Church.

Figure 100 (left): An example of a traditional grain loft (*stabbur*).
Figure 101 (right): An example of a traditional farmhouse (*stue*).

Figure 102 (left): Interior of a traditional farmhouse.
Figure 103 (right): Ornamentation of a traditional loft.

Norberg-Schulz, in his attempt to recognise and acknowledge the particular qualities of his own place, was actually following the advice of Giedion, who suggested that the 'new regionalism' had to be based on a study of the "current [which] flows through [the architectural works of a region] and binds them together in time" (1958: 147). Norberg-Schulz presented this 'current', this stability, as the *genius loci*, but in order to meet Giedion's demand for a 'new monumentality', Norberg-Schulz also needed to engage the figurative aspects embodied by works of architecture. At the start of the 1980s, a new architectural movement rose to prominence which promised to engage the figural facets of architecture. Norberg-Schulz viewed Postmodernism as a way towards Giedion's new monumentality, a belief that soon found expression in one of his son's designs.

2.4 Phase 3: Slemdalsvingen 57 and figurative architecture

In the mid-'80s Norberg-Schulz subdivided the plot of Slemdalsvingen 55. On the new subdivision his son, Erik Norberg-Schulz, built a house for him and his family that mirrored the postmodern overtones which characterised his father's writings at the time. The house, completed in 1984, is filled with postmodern references, like the 'cropped pediment' over the entrance (Figure 106), the figurative fire-place (Figure 105) and the 'suspended pediment' constituting the sunroom (Figure 104). However, despite being arranged around a central *aediculae* (Figure 108), the interior displays a more 'open' (i.e. modern) interaction between different spaces and levels. In *Modern Norwegian Architecture* (1986c) Norberg-Schulz described Planetveien 57 as ''an interesting synthesis of 'classical', figural form and 'modern', open space" (1986c: 149).

Figure 104 (left): Southern façade of Slemdalsvingen 57.
Figure 105 (middle): Fire-place of Slemdalsvingen 57.
Figure 106 (right): Entrance of Slemdalsvingen 57.

Notwithstanding its agreeable interior spaces and the 'modern' way in which the different levels of the house communicate with each other, the house as a whole struggles to 'belong' to its surroundings. When viewing the houses of father and son next to each other (Figure 107) it can be argued that the new building is not 'own' to the place at all, but shows a marked longing for the 'classical space' of southern Europe with its white houses (and small windows), rather than the Nordic reality. In this sense the house speaks to the danger of relying on a general language of architecture (and international architectural trends), at the cost of the peculiarities of place.

Figure 107 (left): Slemdalsvingen 55 and 57 (Norberg-Schulz, NAM 14).
Figure 108 (right): Interior of Slemdalsvingen 57.

During the last phase of his work, Norberg-Schulz again focused his studies on how works of architecture could express the 'taking place' of life (1992: 24). However, Norberg-Schulz's return to the concept of 'taking place' was not merely a reversion to his earlier position, but was grounded in a 'new' interpretation of being-in-the-world that interpreted human life as "presence" (2000b: 311). This new approach was informed by the publication of Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy (of the event)* which revealed the significance of the concept of *Ereignis* in Heidegger's later writings.[355]

Norberg-Schulz also returned to his interpretation of architectural modernism. Instead of relying on figurative architecture, Norberg-Schulz now focused on the possibilities he saw

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[355] See Glossary: *Ereignis*.

in the work of Aalto, Pietilä, Fehn and Utzon; a 'modern regionalism' (2000b: 324) able to express the qualities of the "new place" (2000b: 113).

2.5 Phase 4: Risveien 6 and qualitative modernism

During the late 1980s Norberg-Schulz engaged in an extra-marital affair with his doctoral student Anne-Marit Vagstein. Norberg-Schulz dedicated *Minnesjord* (1991) to her and they had plans to build a house in "Risveien 6"; a new address created by further subdividing the stands of Slemdalsvingen 55 and 57 (Figure 109). The drawings for the proposed dwelling are dated "6/3/98, 13/3/98" (NAM 17), but the house was never built.

Figure 109: Slemdalsving 55 (A), Slemdalsvingen 57 (B), the proposed Risveien 6 (C) and the church tower (D) shown in Figure 94.

These drawings (Figure 110 and Figure 111), especially when seen in concert with Slemdalsvingen 55 and 57, illustrate the 'returnings' discussed in section 4.7. Allusions to archetypal figures (so prominent in Slemdalsvingen 57) have here been cast aside and the buildings more fragmented plan, while containing a 'strong' (symmetrical) centre, enabled a more dynamic arrangement of the façade. If anything, this design points to the "qualitative modernism" (2000b: 15) which Norberg-Schulz envisioned as a regional response to the place, while being guided by the "principles" (2000a: 7) of modernism.

Figure 110: Ground floor plan of Risveien 6 by Norberg-Schulz and Vagstein (NAM 17).

Figure 111: Elevation of Risveien 6 by Norberg-Schulz and Vagstein (NAM 17).

3 Conclusion

The buildings discussed in this appendix illustrate that both Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz had a deep appreciation for the places they lived in and that their dwellings, as built things, preserve a particular understanding of the world. In the potential reciprocity between urban and rural illustrated in Heidegger's dwellings and in the way Norberg-Schulz's projects mirrored his evolving theoretical appreciation of architecture, dwells a deep realisation. Works of architecture, as acts of preservation, are not only 'spatial places', but become guardians of the care of their inhabitants.

Norberg-Schulz dedicated the majority of his writings to studying the significance of places as the lived reality (existential space) between earth and sky, but if architecture is to become a celebration of the interaction between life and place, if architecture is to become *livskunst*, then a more significant understanding of the being of care is essential. It is care which draws life and place into contiguity. Therefore, envisioning architecture as *livskunst*, implies understanding architecture as the care-full *poiesis* of the life-care-place 'totality'; a fourfold totality which not only engages the predominantly spatial interaction between earth and sky, but also acknowledges the temporal interaction between mortal and divine as an ecstatic regioning of care.

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Archival material

The following represents a categorisation of the various boxes accessed at the Norberg-Schulz archive, which forms part of the collection of the Norwegian National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design (The National Museum—Architecture in Oslo) which has been used throughout the document.

[**Reference used in thesis document**: description on actual box at archive]

NAM 1:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 1; Fa: Korrespondensie, J: Klipp, Y: Annet/diverse
NAM 2:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 2; Fc: Ntatbøker/notater
NAM 3:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 3; Fd: Notater fra studietid på ETH, Ga: Bokmanuskripter
NAM 4:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 4; Ga: Bokmanuskripter
NAM 5:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 5; Ga: Bokmanuskripter, Gb: Artikkelmanuskripter
NAM 6:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 6; Gb: Artikkelmanuskripter 1967-1987
NAM 7:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 7; Gb: Artikkelmanuskripter 1988-1999
NAM 8:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 8; Gb: Artikkelmanuskripter u.å.
NAM 9:	NAM 2002:15 - Arkivstykke 9; Gc: Foredragmanuskripter, Gd: Bokanmelderser, Ge: Manuskripter relatert til AHO
NAM 10:	NAM 2002: 05 - Serie Gf, Tb, Tc
NAM 11:	NAM 2002: 05 - Serie Gg, Gh
NAM 12:	NAM 2002: 05 - Serie Gj, Gi
NAM 13:	NAM 2002: 15 - Uinventariserte fotografier
NAM 14:	NAM 2002: 15 - NAMF.04086 - NAMF.04103
NAM 15:	Dokumentsammlingen 1: Diverse brev til CNS (Aks. Fra A-M N-S)
NAM 16:	NAM 2003: 05 - Notater fra bøker
NAM 17:	NAM 2003: 05 - Boks 1; Diverse
NAM 18:	NAM 2003: 05 - Boks 2; Manuskripter
NAM 19:	NAM 2003: 05 - Boks 3; Manuskripter
NAM 20:	NAM 2003: 05 - Boks 4; Manuskripter
NAM 21:	NAM 2003: 05 - Boks 5; Notater 1992-1998
NAM 22:	NAM 2003: 05 - Boks 6; Notater 1989-1992
NAM 23:	NAM 2003: 05 - Diverse Notater
NAM 24:	NAM 2003: 05 - Fotografier
NAM 25:	Album marked as "EGNE ARBEIDER I: 1947-1956"
NAM 26:	Album marked as "EGNE ARBEIDER II: 1956-"