

Key structures in philosophical discourse

A universal semantics of kernel phrases

Dionne van Reenen

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Supervisor: Professor P.J. Visagie

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Acknowledgements

I began my association with the Philosophy Department at the University of the Free State in 2009. Prior to this, I had completed a Diploma in Ballet at the Music Faculty at the University of Cape Town. After leaving the performing arts, I completed my Undergraduate and Honours degrees in Philosophy and Logic at the University of South Africa, where I experienced all areas of philosophical study as extremely enriching, particularly those of Philosophy of Mind and Knowledge. Not really knowing where I wanted to go in terms of furthering this interest, when time came for a change, I approached the UFS in Bloemfontein and was introduced to a system of philosophy which can be described as a compilation of correlated theories known as *Discourse Archaeology*. This was to form the background for my research into one particular area known as *Key theory* which drew my attention from the beginning, and continues to be a strong stimulus in all my academic work.

To Professor Johann Visagie, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude for opening his invaluable corpus of work to me, as well as his generous and patient guidance during this undertaking. I would like to thank J.C. van der Merwe, Helen Cawood, Stephen Pitchers and Dirnel Casaleggio at the Philosophy Department for opening their doors so willingly to an outsider and for being so gracious. Thank you to Debbie Watkins for proofreading and continual dialogue. And, finally, without the essential support and care provided by my husband, Lou van Reenen; our five children, Daniel, Jade, Alyssa, Caitlin and Courtney; my mother, Jacky Duggan; my family and friends; this project would not have materialized. I am forever indebted to these treasured relationships.

1. Overview: The Discourse Archaeology model

Initially, I knew nothing about Prof. Johann Visagie's *Discourse Archaeology*, and very little about philosophical systematics, let alone *Key theory* or *Logosemantics*, but as I became more familiar with the different theories, and with Key theory in particular, it became increasingly apparent to me that I was beginning to spot what one may term *key structures* everywhere, no matter which text I was reading (including those outside Philosophy). This led me to be in agreement with Visagie – a selection of themes and phrases seem to recur in varying texts in all branches and movements in Philosophy and, considering the ubiquity thereof, it seems reasonable to conclude that they have not appeared by accident or been selected at random. They might form a set of elements that presuppose a kind of 'universal semantics' employed in philosophical discourse. A question arose: could these universals be readily identifiable and can they be formulated in such a way that they may be used to broaden and deepen our philosophical inquiry and critique? Learning to apply this model has not only helped me to clarify what the discourse in question was actually asserting, but navigated me towards a more precise description as well as a more pointed analysis, both of which, in my opinion, are essential skills in any philosophical enterprise.

It is imperative to understand something about the conceptual architecture of discourse, and whether there is anything unique or special about the concepts one employs when one engages in philosophical discourse. How are these concepts related? What does this say about how discourses invoke readers to make particular inferences and accept distinctive commitments? The focus of this investigation then, is on the organization of abstract concepts involved in constructing and interpreting a special kind of discourse, namely theoretical

discourse, and the knowledge it represents. While the aim in *Discourse Archaeology* is to limit the discursive elements to the simplest sets possible, this is done in order to accomplish a complexity in application so that one may broaden the scope of an analysis to cover an entire ontological model, assumed (by the analyst) to be normative. This approach, I believe, provides the potential for a more thorough inquiry of what exactly is at play when one examines any given theoretical discourse.

Key theory emerged during preliminary formulations of part of the much larger enterprise of *Discourse Archaeology* (hereafter DA). The DA project was initially developed by Visagie in the early 1980s as a collaborative, ambitious effort to remodel and integrate analytical work by, particularly, Chomsky, Ricoeur, Eco, Dooyeweerd, Foucault and Habermas. The goal was to discover whether ground-structures really existed in Philosophy (taken as theoretical discourse) and, if so, to find as many as possible and determine what some of their inter-relationships might be. The ground-structures that emerged over time were the so-called Key theory; a figurative semiotics; a socio-cultural systematics of macro schemes of thought as visualized in the work of Foucault; and an ideology theory, somewhat along the lines of neo-Marxist Critical Theory. DA provides various mechanisms that lead the analyst to specific layers contained in a given text and endeavours to come up with the most exacting models possible in order not only to penetrate these layers, but also to subject them to an extensive critique. According to Visagie (2001: 87): "What philosophy-as-archaeology does, is not so much to argue for some or other "grand narrative" that is of foundational importance for (large segments of) the world around us, but rather to investigate the structures and systems, patterns and relationships, from which discourse – also the discourse of grand narratives – originates." Although some of the various theories are currently utilized in the Philosophy Department as a set of theoretical tools for pedagogical, descriptive, evaluative

and critical purposes, further research and development continues to generate much thought and debate. It is in this context that the present work began to take shape.

In developing the critical potential for DA, Visagie was looking to link, and develop, the best available ground-structural models of the socio-cultural world and the humanities, as well as the natural sciences. The idea is not to form a haphazard pastiche of the original work of others, but a comprehensive, coherent system which is broad enough to cover discourse across disciplines. The ‘faculties’ and ‘departments’ briefly set out below contextualize the interconnected set of sub theories that make up DA as discussed in *Discourse archaeology, anthropology, spirituality. A post-humanist critique* (2006). This particular approach to DA is known as ‘the university model’ and could be termed ‘the standard model’ among other approaches and on-going work therein.

- **(I) Beliefs and Ethics faculty:**

- 1. Belief theory**

Belief theory deals primarily with the fundamental question of what *ultimately* makes things what they are – what laws or principles ultimately influence one’s theories about reality. They are the kinds of universally characterized antecedents that one selects as possibly including original commands, laws or principles, overarching norms, transcending conditions and ultimate boundaries. These commitments are seldom explicit in theoretical discourse. They are mostly implicit at the deepest

originating levels that discourse presupposes. Religions and religious texts are well-stocked with illustrations of these kinds of ultra-normative concepts generated by such a capacity, but may be generated from components of DA itself. Secular credos also provide exemplars of these ‘highest stakes’ such as Humanity’s Progress or Freedom, Scientific Knowledge, Democracy, and so on. This sub-theory recognizes how one *theorizes* about something and simultaneously *believes* in it.

2. Postural theory

Postural theory forms an integrated model which deals with the most basic characteristics of the human condition. Here, one addresses the central point at issue of what one is and what one should do in order to live meaningfully and ethically. The answers will, in all likelihood, depend on deep beliefs as understood above. The postural model distinguishes the ‘dark postures’ of *suffering*, *meaninglessness* and *guilt*; they are recognized as things one may experience, but they may not be outputs in that they may not be directed from oneself to others. The ‘lighter’ postures are the complex formed between the everyday archetypical activities of creative *work*, *rest*, *contemplation*, *letting go*, *humility*, *taking care*, *peace*, *joy* and *hope*ⁱ. Besides light and dark postures, there is also the ‘grey posture’ that manifests in the daily nitty-gritty duties that one is obligated to do, but they do not contribute directly to the realization of one’s goals. Postures may be experienced and acted out between two opposites that are central to posturality: the ‘fullness’ of success and the ‘emptiness’ of failure. None of the postures are allowed to dominate the other in the modelⁱⁱⁱ.

3. Life Histories theory

Here DA deals with the problem of ‘how the general normative considerations of the postural model can find concrete expression in the

organization of individual lives within a specific cultural and social context' (2006: 20). This can be the recognition of the individual time-line or biographical path of someone's life project or individual goals which serve to give a kind of fullness of meaning to a subject's lifestyle, career, preferences, routine, by means of actualizing his/her potential. This may also occur as members of a collective, or institution, or group, so recognized by Habermas: 'An individual life history or an intersubjectively shared form of life is the horizon within which participants can critically appropriate their past with a view to existing possibilities of action' (1993: 23).

- (II) **Cognitive faculty:**

4. Key theory

Logocentric hierarchies of conceptualization that feature in the kernel formulas of everyday and theoretical discourse take the configuration of the epistemically recognized Key theory which forms the focal point of this study. The objective of Key theory is to concentrate on the deconstruction of these core hierarchies.

5. Figurative Semiotics theory

This sub-theory look at of all forms of figuration (contained in the essence of partial identification relationships between concepts – i.e. *X is Y or X as Y* – which may, *or may not*, be based on similarity). This may include: signs, symbols, image schemas, frames, models, metaphors, metonymies, synecdoches, personifications, analogies, parables, narratives and relevantly similar figurative constructs as they inform

meaning in the discourse that DA studies by process of the imagination and conceptual construction. This theory will feature prominently in the discussion below.

6. Epistemic theory

The various types of knowledge are analysed in a model that integrates forms of both theoretical knowledge and practical everyday knowledge. The basic distinction between these epistemic phenomena is investigated in order to show the fundamental machinery they share. This theory will also be discussed in further detail below.

- (III) **Socio-cultural faculty:**

7. Ideology theory

The conceptual starting point of Ideology Theory is that of domination in two separate but closely linked worlds – the world of ideological formations and their “hypernormative” discourses and the world of social relations of domination. In the first instance, when a value or goal is elevated to a hypernormative position in discourse, it dominates, infiltrates or distorts other values/goals/norms to such an extent that they begin to lose their unique status in a given formation of meaning and become definable in terms of the hypernorm, or lost completely therein, in extreme cases. In the second instance, domination is analysed in the more familiar context of tension between e.g. races, classes or genders, etc. Both instances imply a negative use of ideology in the context of a ‘two-level model’ (Visagie, 1995: 4) which serves to explore the network

of ideologies and how they interact with one another in what Visagie has termed ‘the ideological topography of modernity’ (Visagie, 2001: 201).^{iv}

8. Macro-motives theory

This theory assumes that from the time of the Greek, Semitic and Eastern religions, there have been large segments of Reality in philosophical discourse that have not only caught one’s attention, but enjoyed one’s admiration and respect. The theory terms these “macro-motives” (see Visagie, 1996) and lists them as *Nature*, *Knowledge*, *Power* (also manifesting as *Culture and History*), *Personhood* and *Society* (and possibly *Humanity* becoming a kind of macro power relating to Personhood). Moreover, the same motive (e.g. knowledge) can be expressed differently in different ideologies of e.g. Enlightenment, Scholastic, and Humanist. The aim in the theory is to balance these macro realities in relation to one another in theoretical projects rather than play them off against each other or be unduly beguiled by them in discourse. (Macro-motives typically form the subjects of Key formulas as seen in the developments below.)

9. Life-world theory

One considers in this instance the specifically social forms of life - the manner in which whole life-worlds form distinctive collective entities such as the structures of family, state or university (in which the life projects of individuals/groups may in an ideal setting come to expression). A life-world may be seen as the ‘ever-present context’ (2006: 20) which provides for the individual pursuit of meaning within a collectively valid ethic of, say, institutions or organizations in a specifically *non-ideologized* form. This theory can be described as the normative counterpart to the previous two in this faculty. What is displaced in ideologies and macro-motives can enjoy balanced interactions here^v.

10. Rationality theory

Rationality theory wishes to avoid the susceptibility to overvalue either the structural side of the world (Rationalism), or its correlate, the factual-individual side (Irrationalism/Anti-rationalism). Rationalism revolves around the co-called 'scientific approach', which is understood as an emphasis on universality, constancy, structure, system, logical analysis and theory; while Anti-rationalism's interests lie in 'trans-scientific truths', individuality, contingency, fact, event, life versus theory focusing on historical, ethical and aesthetic dimensions. Balancing what might emerge as subjective and objective priorities, filling in their weaknesses, and including both in analysis is the motivation of this sub-theory.

11. Creativity theory

Creativity and work are of different categories, which may be constructed by linking the concepts of creativity and work to numerous areas of socio-cultural differentiation, and to the different aspects of the world or different sub-theories producing such constructs as scientific work, artistic work, legal work, caring work, etc., which are linked to the specific life-worlds in which they are practiced. The norms, values and goals and conditions are specific to that life-world and are related to how individuals might pursue creative and meaningful work within those life-worlds. (The Marxist critique of work is validated by this theory, but the ideological remnants are filtered out as demanded by Ideology theory above.)

12. Legal theory

Currently, this theory, together with Moral theory, remains an 'empty department' as no single legal (or moral) theory has been assumed to form the general structure. At the time of writing this text, the staff at the Philosophy department worked with a kind of kernel structure following

the Habermasian view of law revolving around the dual imperatives of Human Rights and concerns of the state in democratic procedure. This formulation is of special interest in a key-theoretical perspective since the proposed reading of this kernel duality is that the two elements stand in a reciprocal key relation to one another (the meaning of which will become apparent as readers proceed in the present investigation. One could possibly use the various sub-theories to generate moral, ethical and legal models which I have done with some success in teaching possibly valid models to students. It is an approach I find extremely useful and creative and will demonstrate how to form a moral complex in what follows when applying Key theory).

13. Aesthetic theory

Currently this remains a totally 'empty department', with discussions and debates surrounding the possible essence of the aesthetic department not resulting in any formal consensus. (I have suggested the essence of aesthetics as that of *value*, Visagie has suggested *style*, and still others *taste*, *beauty*, *creation* and *skill*, or, for Habermas, *sincerity*. Hopefully, further work in this area will be fruitful).

14. Communication theory

In becoming aware of the communicative origins and chosen strategies, four models of specifically theorizing, (see Visagie, 2006 & van der Merwe, 2007) have emerged as:

- (i) *combat*, which deals with attack and defence of theory;
- (ii) *consensus*, which entails the ideal of open discussion with an antecedent (but counterfactual?) attitude of openness and acceptance of the strongest argument;

- (iii) *compromise*, which implies a kind of experimental willingness to engage in negotiating anything on the table;
- (iv) *co-optation*, proposing a realistic and ideal approach where theorists give full recognition to their own creativity as well as that of the other in a collaborative and creative development of theory.

Visagie would have that this department ground the socio-cultural faculty, (and I surmise Habermas would as well, since he has done extensive study in this area and it seems especially compatible with democratic procedures).

- (IV) **Nature faculty:**

15. Nature theory

From the best available, most impressive and super-paradigmatic theories in the special sciences, three stand out: Evolution theory, Relativity theory, and Quantum theory. Together with Evolution theory, there is the corresponding theory of Deep Geology in which evolutionary history took place. Any comprehensive assembly of archaeological models should take account of this bio-physical genealogy (and pre-history of Nature).^{vi} In the DA framework, these theories are assumed to be normative compliments to the other departmental models. The philosopher does not typically inhabit this department, but s/he should engage with it.

- (V) **Philosophical faculty:**

16. Time theory

Except for the direct link of Time with General Relativity theory above, and the obvious philosophical importance (historically) of Time, the latter has an ontological status that embraces all previous departments. The whole of reality, as well as the unifying theme of which, might produce differentiated forms of time like, e.g. a physical-spatial aspect which addresses the irreversibility of time; a psychological aspect which might entail accounting for one's experience of time as past, present, future. This suggests that time is not something separate from reality or a conceptual add-on, but a medium through which, and in which, reality and all its parts co-exist. 'Conversely, it is alone through the medium of reality and its parts that time, as we experience exists' (2006: 93). Tensed time and chronological time form the kernel distinction here.

17. Truth theory

Visagie comments that in terms of forming a nucleus of a theory, one may look for agreement and correspondence in a theory, which leads analysts to the problems surrounding the subjectivity and objectivity of truth. There needs to be insight regarding the 'paradigmatic dynamics of truth' (2006: 95) and elements of truth present in any theory must be recognized insofar as they are to be accommodated on various levels of discourse while the analyst engages in responsible critique of an untrue state of affairs, contradictions, ideological difficulties, opposing models, and so on, whether one is critiquing on an epistemological level or a socio-cultural one. While Truth theory has the same philosophical importance of Time theory above, it is ontologically deeper, in that all theory presupposes a notion of truth.

18. Anthropology theory

Anthropology Theory is another unifying theme in DA because everything that is known is known from a human perspective. Visagie suggests that all fields of knowledge are excavated with a view to pronouncing what one can know about oneself, one's own nature and existence, and the world. The human mind provides a 'point of convergence for a whole spectrum of disciplines' (2006: 102). Thinkers can know, scientifically, that the mind filters and permeates its 'Reality' (going back to the Kantian revolution) and today, programmatically, as is argued by cognitive science. What this entails is some sort of limit on what minds can know in such areas as well as what rules minds might provide in order to govern such a knowing process. Finally, Visagie mentions the 'anthropic principle' in current Physics which roughly states that 'the universe is the way it is, otherwise we would not be here to ask the very question itself' (*ibid*).

19. Uniqueness and Coherence principle

The overarching principle (an *a priori* intuition) recognizes the uniqueness of what an analyst understands each department to be as well as what kind of exclusive perspective and depth they can bring to theory formulation. The coherence principle ensures that all departments hang together in order to bring balance between departments as well as recognize the possible presence of each department in every other department to ensure the required scope for complex interrelated analysis.

- (VI) **Meta-faculty**:

20. Protology theory


In Proto theory or Protology, DA's relationship with other theories or disciplines is considered. Sub-theories relationships with DA itself are also considered. An internal look at the sub-theories themselves, their content, internal and external connections, similarities and differences in operations and structure, as well as on-going evaluation of DA itself are all accommodated here. It is explicitly stated in Proto theory that each and every set in every department (as well as the departments themselves) is open. Therefore, one could describe the function of DA as an open set in that it is a non-representational, non-referential, post-humanist (Visagie, 2006: 6) approach in which the components interact in a non-deterministic framework in order to access the complexity of reality by means of internal and external exchange.

Further, Visagie has considered methodological heuristics which consists in prescriptions unique to DA in terms of how the theory is applied, how problematic facets are to be solved, what changes can be accommodated in the progression of the theory, and how its continuing discoursed is to be formed. Visagie mentions here an 'exit theory' (2006: 109) which connects DA to the empirical reality with which is confronted. From these considerations, one may see that such refinement of DA is continual and on-going with mostly open sets. It appears that the DA approach is not typical in Philosophy as it is currently practiced, so it might take some effort on the part of a reader to get orientated in the material, as well as to utilize the theory to 'do' and teach Philosophy. The expectation is that DA can bring something of significance to the discipline, which Visagie and I hope others will also find fruitful for reading and analysis.

For this study, a particular sub-theory, Key theory, has been abstracted from DA in order to deal with themes contained in theoretical discourse, and its

interrelations with some of the other sub-theories that are taken to be influential in discourse formulation are considered. In effect, one may move between the levels of critique provided by DA. Earlier on, in my efforts to piece together DA, I asked Prof. Johann Visagie for a rough visual representation to help me understand the 'big picture', so to speak. He provided me with the informal illustration below, which may serve as a useful map for those who are not familiar with the systematics of DA and how it may function for interpretation.

I think it is important, at this initial stage in the discussion, to clarify some confusion that has emerged among those who might not be all that familiar with DA: Key theory is located in the 'Cognitive faculty' as one will see below. This is *one* approach to formulating critique contained in any given ontological study, but it is not the only approach and it forms only *part* of the entire model (i.e. Department 4, 5 and 6). It should not be assumed that this study covers all approaches contained in DA in their required depth, as that would not accurately represent the model. Looking at philosophical theories through the lenses of the Cognitive faculty, and Key theory predominantly, serves to bring a perspective of analysis which will primarily determine what might be argued as normative in theoretical frameworks, but ultimately relativizes this perspective against other departments and faculties in the model in order to reach a fully propagative analysis.



A note on terminology:

The terms *logocentrism* and *logocentric semantics* were introduced by deconstructionists in the previous century to denote, in Western philosophy, a preoccupation with securing a central or original truth of all meanings. The Philosophy Department at UFS uses both *Logosemantics* and *Key theory* in the literature. For the rest of this study, *Key theory* will be used with reference to the work of P.J. Visagie, as it seems to be most appropriate in an effort to piece together a comprehensive, systematic theory. This is in opposition to submitting more informal speculations about the phenomenon of *logocentrism* as it occurs in Western philosophy. The fact that *logocentrism* occurs in philosophical discourse is not disputed here. The more crucial question is: how and why does it occur, and further, what might analysts do with these ‘structures for human conceptualization’ in one’s attempt to understand how one approaches knowledge of, and about, one’s world?

(Further, where necessary, I will refer to the departments as determined in the model above with short explanations, but the reader may have to refer to the Overview from time to time. Not all analysts using DA do so in precisely the same manner, but all recognize and utilise the departmental distinctions and nexuses that occur between them in description and/or analysis. I maintain it is unavoidable, in a logically refined system such as DA, to operate in any one department in unmitigated isolation. Cross-referencing is practically part of the game-plan.)

2. Introduction to Key theory

The present study focuses on Key theory and some applications as it is discussed in the work of Visagie^{vii}. Viewing philosophical discourse from a Key theoretical (embedded in the larger DA) perspective presents a rather innovative, precise understanding of how this discourse is structured, as well as deconstructible if problematic claims are contained therein. Thus, one may work on two levels: the explanatory/descriptive and the evaluative/critical. Critique is a very important part of philosophical theories, but it is only part of a more expansive picture. As Visagie (2005: 14) states: ‘...the best kind of theory also brings with it the positive *moment* of ‘reconstruction’, which has to rely on *structural models* of some kind, however tentative.’ Structural models help to describe a state of affairs that often elude sufficient explanation in ordinary language. This is where his work has had the most impact for myself and I am sure many others. While providing a very effective means for deconstructive critique, there is also a clear opening ahead with a view to reformulate theories in a balanced and validating manner.

Due to the subsequent expansion of the DA project and complex additions to Key theory in particular, potential analysts now have a set of multifarious, interlocking sub-theories (some of which had to be borrowed from the special sciences). These may be used to form a holistic technique for ontological research that extends across every field of discourse and yet, Visagie has exercised stringent testing in order to maintain a measure of conceptual economy. While the uniqueness of every theory is recognized, the equally important aim is to interface them in a coherent way that balances opposing theories and approaches in the various disciplines, guarding against reductionism and selective perspectives that overemphasize some “aspects of

the world” (Chomsky), or elements of them, at the expense of others. Disciplines are not played off *against* one another, for it must be theoretically assumed that each brings its own depth to theory. Therefore the approach is that various sub-theories should preferably interplay *with* each other to add scope to analysis.

Visagie (2001: 87) makes a distinction between the structures in question as being, on the one hand, of a *cognitive-conceptual* nature and, on the other, of a *social* and *cultural* nature. My focus will lie mainly in the Cognitive faculty of DA, but socio-cultural (and other) references may be made when noting the imprints they leave on discourse. I will be taking an in-depth look at how Visagie has laid out the functions of Key theory in terms of the abstract relations between the various elements of *key structures* and examining whether they emerge in philosophical discourse with any potentially universal semantic relevance. There will also be an investigation into the possible links between this approach and a theory of figurative conceptualization as it has surfaced in the associated ventures of Cognitive Science and Philosophy in recent years. It is particularly interesting when one can gain some understanding of how individuals ‘figure’ about the world in terms of conceptual metaphors and related constructs. This type of study is not immediately concerned with what part of the brain is doing theorizing as such - that kind of examination belongs to the activities of neuroscientists - rather I am interested in what mental structures provide for the possibility of the mind theorizing in certain ways. The aim of developing Key theory as a potential universal semantics seeks to maximize the theory’s ability to represent discourse as accurately as possible while providing a system of constraint as well, which will determine what might, or might not, be validly stated about studying reality.

The present study does not aspire to work against the DA methodology, so reference to all twenty departments (listed in the Overview above) will occur throughout as this is essentially a *systematic model* of thought. This approach seems to be advantageous in the current academic climate in many institutions, for producing (not simply reproducing) explanations and evaluations. This could be seen as a deliberate move towards integrated approaches in all disciplines and away from one-dimensional models in order neither to narrow nor disregard any particular field of inquiry. This is an approach I endeavour to support in my own work - working with theories in an interrelated context, validating each element in its own right and not settling for defining any department in terms of another – resulting in some transcendence of disciplinary boundaries, if you will.

I remain committed to the principle that when one restricts oneself to theorizing through any particular disciplinary lens, one is bound to miss important elements and implications of the theory in question. To separate these conceptual instruments would be a mistake in my opinion, even in the most practical of life worlds. DA makes available this kind of broad-based, coherent understanding of philosophy in post-modern times, because many branches of expertise bear relevance in evaluation of any given problem. As a result of this approach, I have used examples of kernel phrases from a range of different philosophers' work in order to show different possibilities for universals that might arise from a broader application of Key theory, although the theory itself remains the main focus here.

3. The historical context of Key theory

As with any theory, Key theory did not develop *ex nihilo*. Visagie offers a point of departure:

“The basic premise of logosemantics is that, just as we may study the syntactic structures of everyday language, so we may study the conceptual (logosemantic) structures of philosophical discourse” (1998: 342).

Briefly, the predominant initiative is to pinpoint the meaning within the conceptual architecture of the discourse by examining the propositions of the actual language used in the text and pick out “kernel propositions” which sustain the entire body of discourse. From the outset, it is important to note that Key theory is not an exercise in reduction. Even if that impression is given, this should not be the intent of the analyst. The point of the exercise is certainly not to pluck out a few well-known quotes from a writer, such as Sartre’s “Hell is other people” (in Priest, 2001: 224) or Nietzsche’s “God is dead” (in Kaufmann, 1982: 447), without being responsible, respectful and accountable insofar as possible to the original (con)text. Incidentally, both of these quotes do not qualify as the kernel propositions to which I am referring here.

A full systematic analysis of the theory and its complexities follows below (Section 2). There are thinkers who previously considered such phenomena in Philosophy that initiated inquiries leading up to what is presently termed Key theory.^{viii} For Visagie then, similarities and themes occurring in discourse production are not selected at random. They are indicative of an explanatory feature that ‘a semiological analysis must take account of’ (1990: 69). Although the following thinkers did not work out such detailed models as Visagie has done, the origins of such lines of thought must be acknowledged.^{ix} In this section, I am only dealing with the historical context from which Key theory

gained its impetus; these philosophers may be referred to again below in alternate contexts as required.

3.1 Martin Heidegger: *destruktion*

In the wake of Nietzsche's nihilistic philosophical epoch, and the reflexive subject-centred philosophy of Descartes and the moderns, Heidegger sought to unlock a new path of inquiry. He suggests in *Being and Time* (1962: 30, 31) that traditional Western metaphysical systems make foundational 'ontotheological' claims which set up specific conceptual parameters for understanding by ontologically grounding and theologically authenticating people's historically fluctuating perception of what is, as well as what they are. Accordingly, Heidegger's central concern was the question of *Being*, which he considered to be forgotten and was critical of philosophers who had not said enough about it. The term *Being* covers existence in every form and *Dasein* covers human being specifically. The word *Being* itself functions as a noun, for which there is no lexical equivalent in English, except for the gerund. It derives from the infinitive *to be*. *Being* does not seem to be designative of any specific form of that verb; rather it has a connotation of limitlessness and indeterminateness. With an understanding of *Being*, it seems Heidegger is looking for a uniting, universal and wholly comprehensive, broad-meaning term that can accommodate the original possibility of every individual thing. Indeed, Heidegger stresses that since the Greeks, thinkers have had many misinterpretations of the original question of *Being*. This in turn has left us with a severe deficit in that people no longer have a sense of *Being* that can 'name everything that "is"' (1959: 204). From Inwood (1997), one may assimilate the following explanation: *Being* is everywhere in that everything is, but it is also nowhere in that it is not inherent in entities as a readily discernible property. It does not exist in terms of properties,

but possibilities. As so often occurs in philosophy, one comes across a somewhat indeterminate subject underlying an inquiry, but Heidegger states that people have a concept of *Being* before they investigate it. If people had no such concept, even if said concept is vague, they could not begin any investigation. Heidegger's extensive investigation in *Being and Time* begins with a formulation of the question, which is relevant to Key formulation:

"Any inquiry as an inquiry about something, has *that which is asked about...* in addition to that what is asked about, an inquiry has *that which is interrogated...* in questions, which are specifically theoretical – what is asked about is determined and conceptualized. Furthermore in what is asked about there lies also *that which is to be found out by the asking*; this is what is really intended: with this the inquiry reaches its goal" (1962: 24).

In order to find out what is really happening in discourse, Heidegger focuses attention on a structural formulation of the subject-object type mentioned in the brief explanation of a key above. For Heidegger, *Being* unites the world (of entities) and it must form the framework that fits every particular metaphysical position. Furthermore, Heidegger cautions against accepting doctrines that have hardened into dogmas and suggests returning to the source in order to interpret afresh with new thoughts of one's own. This new interpretation is *destruktion* and the reason for making all the constitutive factors transparent is to uncover function, aim and motive with a view to authenticity. The way Heidegger uses *destruktion* is to disentangle the theories of thinkers like Aristotle and Kant and offer his insight and explanation as to why they might have failed.

One of the most important and central elements of *destruktion* is questioning which Heidegger sees as ‘the authentic and proper and only way of appreciating what by its supreme rank holds our existence in its power’ (1959: 83). He argues that any amount of actual scientific or technical skill cannot replace this kind of questioning and it would appear that if one cannot engage in such inquiry, one runs the risk of not understanding properly. This might place one in the dangerous position of what he quite suitably expresses as ‘serving a mere word idol’ (1959: 33). In Key theory, analysts must assume a similar cautionary stance - logosemantic structures may also be interpreted as uncovering such notions as ‘word idols’. Further, one may see in Heidegger’s investigations into *Being*, that he advocates against reducing or collapsing differentiating phenomena into each other which happens rather frequently in discourse, and he goes to painstaking lengths and explanations in order that this should not happen. Visagie has echoed the merits of such an approach in DA with his overarching thesis of recognizing both the uniqueness of phenomena and coherence between them in reality. In Key theory, this is similarly honoured, in that it points out weaknesses in theories which make a bid to reduce, for example, morality to happiness, or wisdom, or goodness. Such reductions could not lead to a universal semantics that will be acceptable in any comprehensive ontological theory. And yet, it must be noted that Heidegger unites all phenomena in *Being*, as it is enclosed by *time*, while DA differentiates (out) the phenomena, allowing none to enclose any other.

Destruktion purports to break down historical ontological constructs and concepts, with the aim of uncovering (in Heidegger’s terminology ‘A-Lētheia’ or ‘Non-Concealment’) them to get to ‘the originate meaning of Being as Presence’ (1962: 17). Heidegger expresses in *Being and Time* that the way in which these concepts have been passed down in the form of ‘standpoints’ (1962: 40) which may differ significantly from that in which they originated. This traditional

‘transmission’ (1962: 43) has resulted in a concealment that renders such primordial sources inaccessible to us. He argues that these primordial sources have consequently been forgotten by us and people need to return to them in order to uncover the truth. References, in various forms, to hiding and exposing run deeply throughout the work of Heidegger (and many others), and in Key theoretical terms, this theme of what is knowable, and indeed unknowable, dates back to the earliest philosophical discourse available to us, with the Early Greeks who investigate whether there is an unknowable substrate underlying a knowable reality. Today, one still finds this running theme persisting in all forms of inquiry - assuming that one’s pursuit of a hidden truth will enlighten one’s understanding of the world. *Destruktion*, then, will similarly lead one to ‘destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of *Being* – the ways which have guided us ever since.’ (1962: 44) Heidegger explains further that the tradition is not outwardly negative and he points out the importance of a positive stance which entails identifying the ‘positive possibilities of that tradition’ (*ibid*). It is debatable whether he actually enacts this view in a positive manner. This sentiment is not only endorsed, but explicitly stated, in the development DA^x, which proposes that there are elements of truth to be located in every philosophical theory; therefore, even while one is critiquing discourse, this mind-set of validating the viable should be maintained. It would be quite absurd to imagine that any serious philosophical endeavour will result in discourse that could be deconstructed in its entirety.

Heidegger goes about (positively) applying his method in the following manner: he calls into question the relation between *Being* and time as it has occurred in the history of ontology^{xi} with the aim of uncovering faulty judgments regarding the relation. The question needs to be reformulated and entities re-characterized, almost as if this exercise will lead to an awareness of any

structural connections between old and new. Heidegger mentions the importance of recognizing what has been covered up by interpretations with a view to accessing the most universal of questions, the answer to which must lie in the disclosure of *Being*. The specific framework of *Being* as such is not advanced in DA, but the need to question and expose 'truth' is present. Key theory, in particular, looks to raise awareness of how structural hierarchies, accepted over time in various discourses, need to be exposed and questioned, especially where they lead to perceptible imbalances by promoting specific ontological entities in the determination and/or overshadowing of others.

3.2 Jacques Derrida: *deconstruction*

Jacques Derrida is widely regarded as one of the most well-known and prolific continental philosophers of the twentieth century, but his vast body of work does not come without controversy. While making a concerted effort to extricate his work from the constraints of the philosophical traditions and movements that preceded him, Derrida developed an approach to analysing texts that became known as 'deconstruction' in the late 1960's. Deconstruction, while being recognized as anti-foundational, is not a purely negative enterprise and is chiefly concerned with what could be characterized as a critique of the 'Western philosophical tradition'. In Derrida's own words, deconstruction '...has never, never opposed institutions as such, philosophy as such, discipline as such' (1997: 5). So, Derrida's approach is both positive and negative at the same time, in truly Derridean style. His intent lies in dismantling structures within institutions, disciplines etc. that serve to foster an unyielding or dogmatic barrier to originality in further research and development across all boundaries, while retaining the uniqueness of philosophy itself.

With a deconstructive approach, philosophy is granted the freedom to question any axiom or certainty previously held, including philosophy itself, and also to revere nothing in particular which is especially compatible with the models housed in Key theory and DA. This approach serves to thrust the discipline into a kind of communicative motion - no longer looking for the indubitable foundational truths on which to rest indefinitely – but relentlessly scrutinizing (after Derrida) origins, hierarchies and binary oppositions. However, while Derrida has been charged with, what some see, as a radically relativist or even sceptical stance^{xii}, he does caution readers against irresponsibility throughout his works. His deconstructive approach does not give one the license to say whatever or blindly pursue one's own agenda. Some have made the mistake of interpreting Derrida's freedom to question as a kind of "do what works for you" maxim, and that would be distorted, to be fair. One may infer this, with good grace, from the by and large respectful manner in which Derrida handles the writings of numerous thinkers such as Plato, de Saussure, Rousseau, Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, and so on. His approach seems more to open up one's understanding of how one produces truth and knowledge about the world, rather than simply to lay bare misgivings and inconsistencies in texts.

From Lawlor (*SEP* 2011), one may extract Derrida's basic argument: when one reflects on experience in general, one must allow that all and every experience is conditioned by time, in that experience unavoidably takes place in the present, the kernel of which is *now* and therefore the *now* is recognized as a singular event. Although each singular event, or now, is different from every other event that one has ever experienced in the past, or will ever experience in the future, one is *at the same time* able to recall the past at will and anticipate the future based on repeatability or what Derrida calls *iterability*. So, the present is an event, but, at the same time, it is not an event because of this repeatability. From Lawlor (*ibid*), one may conclude that '...This "at the same time" is the crux

of the matter for Derrida... one has no experience that does not essentially and inseparably contain these two agencies of event and repeatability.' Experience is never as simple as experiencing something present before me, there must necessarily always be something else. In the agency of repeatability, there is always contained something that has already passed away and is no longer present, as well as something that is about to approach and is not yet present. Presence and non-presence are essentially contained within one another, thereby disturbing the traditional ideas of a united, external, certain, foundational, homogenous origin (or *logos* or *arché*) from which meaning is generated. Further, preference for one side of a binary opposition or establishment of a clear and certain hierarchical structure becomes impossible. One may refer to Derrida for examples of '...worldly and the non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality and non-ideality, universal and non-universal, transcendental and empirical', etc. (*Of Grammatology*, 1976: 8).

Derrida frequently acknowledged the importance of Heidegger's notion of *destruktion* (and his attempt to go beyond the parameters of metaphysics) but clearly distances himself from Heidegger in his readings of Heidegger's post-metaphysics and post-representational thinking. Sheehan puts it as such: 'Heidegger remains not his model, but his target, for as Derrida has said, "How can one model oneself after what one deconstructs?"' (2003: I: 139). Derrida argues that Heidegger's negation of metaphysics does not succeed in conquering or demolishing metaphysics as he intended, because his negation of metaphysics fails to break ties with the ontological structure and vocabulary of metaphysics. In short, he holds that non-metaphysics, or a reversal of metaphysics, remains a form of metaphysics and is actually no different from metaphysics; it is simply a repetition thereof^{xiii}, and hence, an affirmation. Derrida goes on later to apply this type of critique to post-modern thought, implying then, that post-modern denials of the transcendental do not really go

beyond the bounds of metaphysics – just like Heidegger, the post-modern thinkers (by rejecting modern thought) remain trapped in the same ontological structures and vocabulary from which they seek to deviate.

I will further consider, for these purposes, the example of Derrida handling Heidegger, which in this context, simply serves to illustrate how the problem of logocentric thinking leads Derrida to deconstruct the so-called presuppositions of this writer. Derrida suggests the origin of metaphysics lies in that (meta-condition) which structures the very possibility of Husserl's Transcendental Ego/Subjectivity^{xiv} or Heidegger's *Being* as presence^{xv}, and he calls this *différance*. One may read in Dillon (2003: I: 47) that 'Derrida constantly reminds us that *différance* is not a word and not a concept...but it is the condition for the possibility of lots of things...*différance* subtends and remains undecided...' through difference and deferral between various opposites. One could explain it as follows: difference respects the differentiation between opposites and mutual deferral ensures there is no establishment of a hierarchy between opposites. *Différance*, then, lies between what Derrida sees as the empirical idealism of Heidegger and the transcendental idealism of Husserl; and neither of them accommodate the idea that a meta-condition actually configures their philosophies. In short, the problem he has with Heidegger's *Being-as-presence* is that it obscures *différance* to the reader, which in turn obscures meaning. To quote Dillon again: "What is present is therefore a representation that was never present, a presence that necessarily obscures that of which it is a trace" (2003: I: 49). Presence alone, for Derrida, cannot be the origin of metaphysics, for the origin must lie in a non-origin – that is in the apory, or impasse, of both the transcendental and the empirical.

For Derrida, there can be no truth where there is an elevation or assigning of priority, as there is in logocentrism. He is consistent in his critical work - echoing time and time again the recognition of the suspension of knowability. Truth can only be accessed in understanding its impossibility; it is brought about by *différance*, that is, the indefinability, or rather to use Derrida's term, 'undecidability' that exists in the space between competing systems or binary opposites, like those mentioned above, of transcendentalism and empiricism. Privileging *Being* as presence results in a relegation of its opposite of non-*Being* and absence into a subordinate role, (or even absorbs them into Being itself) when for Derrida, they are both essential in determining the structurality of metaphysics. This return to a privileged origin for the production of opposites is unacceptable for Derrida and it is the grounds from which he rejects Heidegger's thesis. Habermas (1990) explains further that Derrida calls for the deconstruction of all significations, especially that of the truth, that find their origin in the *logos*, including Heidegger's *Being*, which is also seen as inevitably connected to the *logos*, because it is inseparable from the spoken word and presence and Derrida 'wants to confront the logocentrism of the West in the form of phonocentrism'. (1990: 164) What Derrida wants, then, is to move away from the emphasis on the spoken word, which is necessarily connected to a subject, toward an emphasis on the written word, which according to him overcomes all those restrictions in its infinite readability in order that it may transcend such worldly constraints.

Along similar lines, Derrida (1997: 13) holds that one does not have to choose between opposites, say, the examples of unity and multiplicity in the context of a discussion on a person or a culture and the conditions for the workings of the state and indeed how those disciplinary structures function in reality. One cannot think in terms of pure unity or pure multiplicity. One needs both in order to prevent totalitarianism, nationalism, egocentrism, and so on. Again, he refers to

Heidegger. He tackles Heidegger's reference to *Versammlung* which Derrida reads as a privileging of assembling over dissociating. (Collectedness is a strong theme throughout the work of Heidegger.) According to Derrida, this privileging cannot be; one needs to dissociate in order to relate to the other. Focusing only on community results in a displacement of the other. 'So, dissociation is the condition of community, the condition of any unity as such' (1997: 15). The point is that between the tension of opposites lies Derrida's idea of the state – a state must have an affinity with plurality, otherwise the outcome will be a disaster. His examples continually ask not only what is exalted or elevated, but also what is left out, or just missing, in the conceptual progression of a text and in what will that exclusion result?

What does become pertinent, is an issue which finds, in a sense, a point of contact between Visagie and Derrida who both state, albeit from different points of view, that when one engages in such logocentric commitments (or subscribes to 'golden keys' in Visagie's terms), it is all but inevitable that one will run into trouble. One will be caught in some sort of contradiction or dualism along the way. However, it seems that in all theoretical writing, keys simply do occur - they are inescapable and they are pervasive. Notably, though, Visagie does not see them as a particularly negative phenomenon. He comments that deconstruction of keys is extremely useful, but it does not end there. Reconstruction needs to occur in order to license some sort of valid discourse, unless thinkers want the entire structure of philosophy to collapse into contingency and '...be severed from all science.'^{xvi} Visagie acknowledges Derrida's sensitivity to the presence of keys in philosophy as well as his uncanny ability to extrapolate the *inner tensions* that arise in these structures when their 'foundations are stressed beyond limits' (2006: 212). I must concur, since theories which are free from key formulas have not yet been shown to me. Incorporating *valid* keys into discourse analysis seems to be what one needs in this on-going process of deconstruction

and reconstruction. Furthermore, while Derrida elucidates the important and interesting phenomenon of logocentric thinking and method of deconstruction, even Derrida himself it seems, cannot escape such key formulations, and this will emerge in the systematic context below.

3.3 Herman Dooyeweerd: *ground-ideas*

One may draw a similarity between key structures and the notion of 'ground-ideas' found in the work of Herman Dooyeweerd (*A new critique of theoretical thought*, 1969). From Friesen's detailed concordance^{xvii}, one learns that Dooyeweerd also makes reference to 'ground-motives', 'ground-thought', 'ground-principle', 'ground-problem', 'ground-attitude', 'ground-categories', 'ground-relation', 'ground tendency', and 'ground-antinomy'. When Dooyeweerd refers to 'ground-motives', he is referring to the major driving forces of thought and experience, and actions as they occur throughout history. They direct one on specific paths, even if one is not aware of them. He mentions the Christian ground-motive of Creation, Fall and Redemption in Christ; as well as the Form/Matter ground-motive of the Greeks; the Nature/Grace ground-motive of the scholastics; and the Nature/Freedom ground-motive of modern Humanism. They are supra-temporal forces which are not theoretical; they are spiritual forces - for Dooyeweerd in the religious dimension. They are not rational premises or conceptual conjectures; they are the pre-theoretical, religious foundation for all concepts.

Ground-ideas, on the other hand, are 'theoretical expressions' of these ground-motives and they form the foundation of any philosophy. The content of such ideas will be determined by whichever ground-motives one has, whether they

are explicitly stated or not. Dooyeweerd proposes that theoretical thought is not neutral, nor is it absolute; rather it is fallible and it is formed by the ground-motive of the philosopher or school of philosophy. This view may not sit well with the fairly traditional assumption that arguing from a set of reasonably acceptable premises to an objectively true conclusion is the way of philosophy. There is somewhat of a pseudo-scientific expectation in theoretical discourse that one should be able to rise above individual or group attitudes and attain a higher level of rationality or truth which, if successful, is widely, if not universally, accepted. However, Dooyeweerd is against the notion of the 'self-sufficiency of philosophical thought' and the 'absolutizing of meaning' (1969 I: 20). He is highly critical of theories that he sees as being idolized by the individual functions of the temporal world. It seems reasonable to propose that anyone who produces discourse must do so from their own conceptual framework – it is probably impossible to conceive otherwise, and so, following Dooyeweerd, such conceptual conviction is the basis for theoretical thought, and consequently, for philosophy.

Dooyeweerd has a clear objective in his approach which is to critique such ground-ideas while defending a Christian Reformational worldview and he was preoccupied with the concepts of origin and totality or unity. Visagie, who was initially heavily influenced by Dooyeweerd, subsequently states that he found Dooyeweerd '...too limited. I was also inspired by... Chomsky... Thus, I was looking for a way to analyze, in formal symbols, the kind of language/discourse (rather than "ideas" as such) which speaks of ultimate origins in the widest possible sense' (2006: 202). One may deduce from this declaration that Visagie did not wish to work within a specific (Christian Reformational) worldview and wanted to be free to incorporate any sources that gainfully added to analysis. He patently did not pursue a system that was constrained by theological codes of belief and tried to avert any lapse into theological discourse.

Dooyeweerd's ground-idea, which as the name may suggest, can be said to be the limiting foundational concept in which any philosophical theory is embedded. It is the central chosen ideal, the lens through which all other sides of reality are viewed, which determines how a philosophy is to be understood and will underpin the entire conveyance of its meaning. The created diversity of everyday experience is refracted by cosmic time into what Dooyeweerd termed 'modal aspects'. Dooyeweerd uses the analogy of a prism (1969: 102).

Adapted from The Dooyeweerd Pages, these aspects and their **meaning nuclei** may be listed with (my incidental) *brief examples* using a novel^{xviii}, *Atonement* (2001) as a specimen, highlighted here using textual variances:

Modalities / **Meaning nucleus** / *Example*

- i. Arithmetical / **quantity** / *Atonement is one novel with 480 pages.*
- ii. Spatial / **extension** / *It is a rectangular three-dimensional book.*
- iii. Kinematic / **movement** / *I turn the pages and move my eyes across the page from left to right and downward to read.*
- iv. Physical / **energy** / *The book reflects light.*
- v. Biotic-Organic / **life** / *My nervous and visual systems must act in order for me to read this book.*
- vi. Sensitive-Psychic / **feeling** / *I see the words in the book and they induce significant emotional responses from me.*

- vii. Analytical / **distinction** / *I can distinguish themes in this plot and think about them.*
- viii. Historical / **formative power** / *The narrative is constructed against the detailed historical backdrop of 1935 - World War II - England.*
- ix. Lingual / **symbolic meaning** / *One might describe the language in this book as: 'lush, detailed, vibrantly coloured and intense.' (see back cover)*
- x. Social / **social interaction** / *The relationships between the classes in English society forms a point of moral inquiry in this novel.*
- xi. Economic / **frugality** / *The extraordinary range of this epic tale has been successfully contained in this publication.*
- xii. Aesthetic / **harmony** / *The novel is a masterpiece in which all of literature's humanizing possibilities come together.*
- xiii. Juridical / **retribution** / *The main characters suffer great injustices as a result of a misunderstood 'crime'.*
- xiv. Ethical-Attitudinal / **love** / *The encounter between Cecelia and Robbie Turner is intensely sensual.*
- xv. Pistic-Faith / **commitment** / *I believe this is an extremely influential work of fiction.*

Dooyeweerd's objection is that when one absolutizes some or other aspect in one's articulation of an autonomous theory, one is attempting to understand any given thing in terms of that selected modal aspect. All the others are rendered subordinate to it and one abandons the idea of unity that resides in one's supratemporal experience. One fails to experience totality because one reduces

other aspects to mere modalities of the absolutized one. Further, one may produce an antithesis between the elevated and its subordinate opposite, or an antinomy – an unavoidable dualism, which Dooyeweerd strongly rejects. In effect, one loses the coherence maintained in the totality. The dogma of ‘autonomy of thought’ (as Dooyeweerd terms it) leads to a loss of the true foundation, which for Dooyeweerd lies in the transcendental ground-idea of the religious ground-motive. Dooyeweerd refers to the ‘isms’ assumed in a theoretical vision of reality such as materialism, biologism, psychologism, historicism, etc. (1969: 46). He would have been strongly opposed to such elevations due to the fact that Dooyeweerd’s entire philosophy steers decidedly away from anything that might result in any form of reductionism.

From McIntyre (1985: 5) one may deduce that Dooyeweerd stresses the importance of creational law and creational diversity. Creation is defined by law, so it follows that there must be a universal norm or standard for each kind of thing to which it must be reinstated and by which it is differentiated from every other kind of thing. This view is found in the work of Kuyper who had a profound influence on Dooyeweerd. Also influencing Dutch intellectual life at the beginning of the 20th century was the thought of the German-speaking world, which was dominated by neo-Kantianism (1985: 10). However, McIntyre correctly notes that ‘Dooyeweerd was not an out-and-out neo-Kantian, as the autonomous rationality of neo-Kantianism was especially incompatible with the Kuyperian view of the religious nature of all science’ (1985: 11). One may conclude, then, that theoretical excursions characterized by abstractions of singular modalities are unacceptable for Dooyeweerd and Visagie alike, notwithstanding the fact that Visagie’s approach has departed significantly from this in his development of Key theory.

4. The systematic context: discovering golden keys

One examines the argument structure contained in texts as a starting point in order to address the central question of what key emerges. Boundaries of texts can be confusing, so an analyst might take a 'step back' in order that one does not get over-enmeshed in the language of the discourse at hand. Rather, one should proceed from the position of identifying recurring concepts and themes – or as Visagie terms it - search for so-called *golden keys*. What Visagie intends to highlight with such a term is a disruption in the balance set forward by a principle of uniqueness and coherence, integral to every part of DA and indeed DA itself. What happens in the construction of golden keys, is that some aspect of the world is selected and pulled out of coherence with other aspects of the world and is elevated to a position of dominance over others. The problem is that the promise of what is offered by the golden key can never really be delivered.

Much of the earlier material concerning DA and its sub theories state that archaeological analysis has to do with 'the problem of origins' (1989: 1). Reference is made to the Greek *arché*, which is translated as 'to begin' or 'to commence', but Barnes (1987:20) raises an alternative which suggests that *arché* is also translated as 'to rule' or 'to govern'. So, golden keys may be formed not only as the quest for origins, but a variety of other powerful, or awe-inspiring, and governing functions in reality as well. While Key theory does indeed investigate these questions of origins and foundations, it should be noted that Key theory (and DA) itself proposes no such origin or foundation. What one is after, then, in terms of a possible universal semantics, is a conceptual mechanism which can depict possible keys in foundational discourse as well as being capable of opening up a critique thereof. From the historical context

above, I will list some central ideas that concern Key theory and its critical application:

- i. the possibility of identifying grounding concepts in philosophy
- ii. hierarchical relations and the primacy of subjects
- iii. the problem of uniform origins and indubitable foundations
- iv. the structures of thought in forming knowledge and truth
- v. unquestioned supremacy in dogma and doctrine
- vi. motivating forces in philosophy on macro and micro levels
- vii. binary oppositions and dualism
- viii. the importance of questioning components of kernel propositions
- ix. totality and unity in philosophy
- x. differentiating, clarifying and making implications explicit
- xi. deconstruction and reconstruction.

What emerges from these concerns is the need to establish some sort of systematic framework within which one may clarify the constituents of all particular philosophical positions and ascertain how they might interrelate in the deep structure of discourse. While the basic idea of thought being hierarchical is clear enough, accounts are rarely accompanied by precise technical or operational definitions and procedures. This is what Visagie has attempted to do with Key theory. This exercise begins with pinpointing the means for a specific diagnosis of the smallest building blocks comprising the sustaining propositions before moving outward to broader considerations from other departments of DA.

4.1 Samples from philosophical discourse

Within the wider systematic context of DA, there are specific structures which can be identified as models of reality involving sectors of the world which may be seen, theoretically, as able to determine the state of the world, or significant parts thereof. These structures may be described as relational hierarchies in which the striking semantic feature of the relationship between entities is one of some kind of *power*, *privilege* or *governance*. In fact, Key theory relies explicitly on hierarchical architecture in its explanation and evaluation of philosophical discourse. Evident in philosophical discourse, is the presentation of certain entities in a superior role while others are perceived as affected in some significant way. In philosophical discourse, some examples of these entities might be [Nature]; [Knowledge]; [Law]; [Economy]; [Society]; [Culture]; and so on. I refer to these core hierarchies as *keys*.

While reading texts, the analyst should be on the lookout for major ontological statements involving a specific power relation between such entities that operate to sustain the entire body of discourse. As mentioned, some of the earlier literature concerns DA specifically with statements of origin, however, more recent work has moved away from this approach. The need to account for origins has arguably become less prominent in modern discourse, and it is conceivable that this may not be the primary concern in discourse. Further, these so-called *originating items* proposed in some discourse, may be the produced item in other discourse (or sometimes problematically in the same discourse), as there is no consensus regarding the roles of such items in reality. To illustrate, here are a few sample formulations of hypothetical key propositions. (Both Visagie and I often use hypotheticals in explanation, assuming that, if the key is not consciously designated to a specific thinker, the

key has in all probability been used elsewhere in philosophical discourse, and this practise takes the emphasis off the purely historical approach to the discipline)^{xix}:

(i) [Reason] [Precede] [Knowledge]

One does not need much philosophical expertise to recognize this formulation, customary in the work of rationalists, such as Descartes and Malebranche, who accept the notion of *a priori* knowledge and innate ideas.

(ii) [Experience] [Generate] [Knowledge]

Rivalling Rationalism is of course Empiricism, which boils down to (ii) above, typically found in the work of empiricists like Locke and Hume, who adhere to the principle of *a posteriori* knowledge - that would be knowledge arising from sense-perception and human experience.

(iii) [Nature] [Constitute] [Reality]

This formulation typically forms the foundation of many naturalist philosophies exemplified in, say, Hobbes, which exclude non-natural or non-spatiotemporal phenomena. This type of study really follows the so-called “hard sciences”, which rely heavily on experimental, empirical or quantifiable data and advocate only the “scientific method” as a means of ontological study, with the focus squarely on accuracy and objectivity.

(iv) [Existence] [Precede] [Essence]^{xx}

This is a well-known existentialist formula, to be found in the work of thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre, which asserts that one wholly determines the individual one is, or chooses to be.

Keys like these may be extracted from any actual body of theoretical discourse an analyst may choose to analyze, but Visagie has emphasized the need to keep the subjects and their domains as general as possible in order to expose the 'golden' quality of the key and make the power distribution immediately apparent. Further, one will notice immediately the elimination of grammatical units such as articles (the, an, a etc.); prepositions (by, of, from, etc.); conjunctions (since, and, but, etc.); and other units that are not part of the category-constituted deep structures of discourse. One can see from the samples that the first entity in the key indeed fulfils the requirement of a hierarchical relationship of power over the second entity. In many corpora of discourse, the terms are explicitly stated almost identical in lexical selection to the keys above, while in other texts some assimilation may be required from the analyst. Further, the analyst should be careful to identify exactly which entity is applying the power as it may be presented somewhat obscurely in the language of discourse (see (iv) above). In order to see how actual examples present themselves, one may extract such a key from the work of John Rawls:

(v) [Justice] [Structure] [Society]

while the reverse structure may be found in the work of David Hume:

(vi) [Society] [Structure] [Justice]

Now, if the analyst switches from a purely descriptive mode to an evaluative one, it is possible that both (v) and (vi) are plausible, depending on the context in which they are to be used^{xxi}. In Lessnoff (1990: 138), Rawls' discussion of contractarian justice repeatedly addresses the subject of "...justice, the basic

structure of society...” in such a way that rationally-attained, just principles regulate social, political and economic institutions in order to develop a unified, stable and free society. Hume, on the other hand, in *A Treatise of human nature*, argues that justice “...takes its rise from artifice and human conventions” (1985: 548). Justice, for Hume, is not a rationally achieved set of universal principles, but rather a changeable set of rules aimed at regulating the pursuit of one’s own and public interests, which change from time to time. Visagie works from the assumption that key structures are pervasive throughout philosophical discourse, so it would appear that when formulating theory of this kind, one might also assume that this is how people naturally think, speak and conceive of reality – in terms of relational hierarchies. Moreover, Visagie suggests, these structures may be found in virtually all types of discourse, or texts in any form of language. In the present work I will deal only with philosophical texts and concepts^{xxii}.

4.2 The kernel structure of keys

The kernel structure that emerges from a given discourse is engendered from that which lurks at the heart of the discourse: the core conceptual arrangement around which the entire discourse is assembled. Philosophical keys might be described as the most elementary units that generate meaning in discourse. Visagie and I assume that it is possible to refine the actual expressions in any given discourse to a basic tripartite formula of the type XYZ. Further, this kernel structure may be either implicitly or explicitly present in discourse, depending on the author and how s/he wants to convey the argument to the reader. Consequently, if featured explicitly, a basic key, appearing within the text, may be constructed following the linguistic typology of a simple, transitive sentence:

- i. [X: Subject] [Y: Transitive verb] [Z: Object]

The verb in this typology is qualified here as a transitive verb because there must be an action conveyed from subject to object – correspondingly, the key does not hold if the action remains within the subject (i.e. no object), or if the action is not directed at an object. The object is subordinate, but it is still an integral part of the formula. Key propositions simulate a kind of metaphorical application of power from the subject to the object. The grammatical correlation is useful in providing a more precise account of the role of each component of the key as it is represented linguistically. From Trask (2007: 306), one understands the prototypical transitive construction is usually noted in a general schema where the following three semantic features can be noted:

- i) Agent: A controlling agent who is responsible for instigating the event or the change of state.
- ii) Patient: A patient who is acted upon or who receives the event's change of state.
- iii) Transitive Verb: A verb that represents an event that is directional - carrying action or state change to the patient, (so both units need to be present in the construction).

For formal notational purposes of key construction, Visagie (2006: 208) refers to the X-term, or agent, as the *subject*; the Y-term, or verb, as the *operator*; and the Z-term, or patient, as the *object* or *domain*. I will continue to use these terms for the components of a key structure. Of further interest here, according to DeLancey, (1987: 60) '...the transitive prototype is a universal and extremely natural category, its natural basis being the universal human understanding that events have causes, i.e. that the basis of the transitivity prototype is a simple CAUSE → EFFECT schema as Lakoff and Johnson describe (cf. 1980).' There is a key structure that actually follows this schema, namely:

ii. [X] [Cause] [Z]

However, with keys, analysts are looking for conceptual structures; one is not dealing with events, and one is not dealing with ordinary language. It seems that key constructions follow the typology similarly, but large sectors of reality and vastly abstract concepts change roles with surprising facility. In Key theory, [Cause] is interpreted as only one instance of a broader system of concepts called 'operators'. I would propose that the whole semantic field cannot be reduced to [Cause] alone. For example: [Cause] does not adequately epitomize the finer semantic distinctions contained in other operators such as [Transcend] or [Ground]. Moreover, there are a number of complex additions to the basic structure which must take place in order that a full analysis may begin to take shape. The ordering, linking and movement of key components is assumed to be precise, with all analysis aiming to eliminate anomalies and ambiguity. It is no simple task to extract such a key from discourse and this must be carefully done by the analyst to ensure that the abstract construction, eventually achieved, accurately reflects the contents of the discourse in question. The analyst may have to reconstruct the key from the surface syntax and semantics of the text. For example, one may take an actual kernel sentence from Rousseau (in Lessnoff, 1990: 108):

"Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men."

The simple key that could be formulated here would be:

iii. [X: Society] [Y: Base] [Z: Law]

Now, I will look a little closer at formulating a simple key from the text: Rousseau is an advocate of the social contract. He asserts that no man is naturally endowed with power over any other man and he may not exert force over others

in order to gain such power. The will of the individual succumbs to the will of the post-contractual collective body, hence the *X* term [Society]. The *Y* selected is [Base] and the *Z* term is [Law] since he is discussing the foundations of legal authority of the collective civil state. The aim is a precise description of the contents of the discourse, especially in terms of the aspect of a perceived discovery that the text is presenting – this being the relation of hierarchy which has significant ontological magnitude.

Further, one sees that the concept of [All] or [Everything], which occurs frequently in philosophical discourse, will always be found on the right side of the operator technically notated as [Reality], receiving the action from the *X*. So, it seems that human minds naturally make the assumption that the *X*'s apply the rule over *Z*'s and this may form the basis of theories. However, I am specifically stating in Key theory, that no such key on its own can form such a basis, because Key theory (and DA) rejects the promotion or absolutization of selective parts of Reality over all other parts of Reality. However, the theory does propose that, in plain terms, this might well be the way humans think - it is not negative and there is no alternative. Nonetheless, analysts should be aware of the potential hazards of key thinking, especially if exercised in the extreme.

4.3 The complex structure of keys

Visagie has noted one possibility for key theory: '...analysing the relationship between the subject and the domain, or the head and tail of the key' (2006: Appendix I). The object of exploring the complex structure of keys is to determine the kind of relation between the subject and the object expressed in the kernel sentences of discourse as well as to identify and differentiate the


participants involved and the *manner* in which they are involved. There may be one or more entities in either the subject or object domains and there may be more than one operator at play in the discourse, or indeed, even in a single sentence in its linguistic form. Certain elements in discourse are no doubt more prominent than others; this effect could be termed *foregrounding* and is largely dependent on the stylistic devices employed in discourse. If one carefully considers these structures, and how their parts are related, the structures have many complexities to reveal regarding why theorists theorize the way they do and what makes them infer and draw conclusions the way they do? In other words, when one is locating such constructs in discourse, one is actually concerned with the theoretical goals they serve rather than the linguistic functions they perform. Visagie explains: ‘... The critical goal here would be to show that the concept(s) featured in the head cannot possibly bear the combined “weight” of those realities in the tail end for which it is supposed to function as some kind of foundation’ (2006: Appendix I). This will become progressively more apparent in what follows.

4.3.1 Operators

I begin with operators as they are the easiest component to identify in discourse. As established above, depending on the operator used, there may be different levels of transitivity: the subject may be less of an agent or the domain may be less affected by the subject. For Visagie, a fully generative analysis would also require a distinction between operators which have to be qualified as hard or soft options – hard options showing forceful action and soft options implying a more passive reception of operational power by Z, or even *having some say* about how it allows itself to be affected. Although the semantic fields of operator terms provide quite an extensive list of lexemes, the variations among prototypical conceptual constructions are relatively small. Consider the following

set^{xxiii} which I have assimilated from Visagie's examples and general reading of various other philosophical writings:

i. Prototypes for operators:



The above set is suggested as possible structural content for the main verb types constituting primitives of operator functions. The aim is to find paths in argumentation, and operators should be made explicit in analysis in order to show the precise mode of determination. Below an attempt has been made to construct a lexicon of operators, the probable context of which has been described in each example. The lists of signifiers indicate relevantly similar semantic terms that might be used in the discourse and, if spotted by the analyst, usually give a clue as to which components may be abstracted in order to construct the schema of the key. Further, the operator may be expressed in antonymic form, and therefore, would require a certain amount of handling by the analyst in order to get at the correct ordering of the power / superiority relation as well as the most suitable operator that remains loyal to the intent of the thinker.

Enclose

In the key, this operator is expressed as: *X Enclose Z*, and is recognized as the ultimate limiter of Z. X encloses Z from all sides, actively forming a boundary in order to contain Z.

Signifiers: encompass; surround; encircle; enfold; outline; delineate; restrict; delimit; demarcate; circumscribe; encase; envelop; border; confine; contain; bind; bound; frame; cover; hem in; ring; circle; close in; environ; fence; imprison; limit; lock; shut; set apart; veil; wall in; wrap

Transcend

In a key, this operator is expressed as: *X Transcend Z*, where X exists independently of Z - it simply goes beyond the presumed boundaries of Z. There is a clear separation of the two entities, with the X being the superior entity, and therefore holding power over Z.

Signifiers: rise above; go beyond; exceed; surpass

Centre

In a key, this operator is expressed as: *X Centre Z*, where X collects Z around a midpoint by drawing Z in toward itself.

Signifiers: collect; draw; bring together; attract; is the core of; heart of; focus; focalize; concentrate; pivot; axis of; hub of; nucleus of; crux of; centralize; converge; middle; hone; zoom in

Ground

In a key, this operator is expressed as: *X Found Z*, where X is conceptualized as stabilizing Y in a foundation: e.g. grounding claims in trustworthy evidence or first principles.

Signifiers: base; root; establish; seat; basis; underlie; support; sustain; maintain; settle; hold; reinforce; fix; bring down; plant; station; stabilize

Begin

This key appears as *X Begin Z*, where X is the prime mover, initiating some action, or place of origin in the relationship.

Signifiers: found; originate; start; establish; commence; set in motion; open; launch; arise

Precede

In a key, this operator will be expressed as: *X Precede Z*, in that X goes before Z in place, order, rank importance or time.

Signifiers: head; lead; go before; precipitate

Govern

This commonly used operator, expressed as *X Govern Z*, applies the rule over the Z. The relationship here is one of implied authority, influence, regulation, or maintaining the state of Z, as Z is perceived as unable to sustain itself.

Signifiers: rule; reign over; preside over; direct; run; head; dominate; regulate; manage; organize; order; control; arrange; manage; define; administer; dictate; normalize; make conform; standardize

Cause

In a key, this operator is expressed as: *X Cause Z*, where there is a constancy of sequence in events and X is conceptualized as an antecedent producing the consequence of Z.

Signifiers: initiate; institute; instigate; effect; affect; offset; trigger; activate; incite; induce; evoke; elicit; bring about; bring to pass; engender; stimulate; introduce; launch; mobilize; move; provoke; yield; protract; feed; continue; sustain; maintain

Form

In a key, this operator is expressed as: *X Form Z*, in the sense that X actively creates Z by means of a process of initial formation or brings about a change in the state of the Z.

Signifiers: structure; create; produce; construct; build; shape; mould; frame; make; develop; fashion; model; engineer; modify; transform

Generate

In a key, the operator is expressed as *X Generate Z*, where the process of generation is a vital or natural one, in the sense that X brings Z into being.

Signifiers: give rise to; birth; beget; source; bring forth; spawn; reproduce; procreate

Integrate

The operator occurs in a key as: *X Integrate Z*, where X assimilates the parts of Z into a whole as Z is unable to perform the function on its own.

Signifiers: incorporate; combine; mix; amalgamate; assimilate; join; include; arrange; classify; categorize; unite; unify

Express in

This operator usually takes the form: *X Come to expression in Z*; where X as such is unknowable, except through the Z, thereby giving the Z a little more agency.

Signifiers: embody; manifest; communicate as; articulate as; present as; put forward as; exemplify; symbolize; personify; reveal; expose

Pervade

When one finds the key *X Pervade Z*, the Z term is really seen as having little to do with determining the state of affairs in the relationship because X spreads itself throughout the parts of Z and affects Z strongly (as in indoctrinate or ingrain).

Signifiers: access; colonize; extend; fill; imbue; infiltrate; infuse; intersperse; invade; saturate; spread through; penetrate; permeate; populate; possess; saturate; suffuse; transfuse; instil

Constitute

The operator is stated as *X Constitute Z*, where X forms the elements of the set of Z; thereby resulting in X is actually being tantamount to Z.

Signifiers: aggregate; be; compose; comprise; configure; make up; represent; set up

Goal

X is the Goal of Z is asserted in the sense that Z in its present form is incomplete and will aim at becoming X or going toward X. The process is not yet complete as in *End*, below.

Signifiers: aim; objective; aspire; intend; endeavour; try; seek; set sights on; strive for; point to; purpose, target

End


This operator typically takes the form *X End Z*, where X is the endpoint to which Z must proceed. Z is interpreted as not being where, or as, it should be.

Signifiers: finish; destruct; determine; close; result; is the outcome of; stop; terminate; cease; conclude

4.3.2 Bi-directionality

Sometimes, during one's analysis, it appears impossible to pick out one or two operators. In such a case, a technical notational arrow (i.e.:→) has been suggested and is used in the literature in order to deal with the indistinctness^{xxiv} of the operator. Often in key notation, one would insert an arrow above the operator in order to specify the direction of application from subject to domain. When the action is suggested as turning back on itself as depicted by a cyclical

schema, it might be useful to insert an arrow pointing back towards the subject under the operator(s) in order to show this kind of bi-directionality as:



The most important point to consider with the operator is the structural function of this component within the context of key formulation. The operator must at best express the particular type of relationship occurring between subject and domain, that is, between the relevant sectors of reality as this serves to make the nature of the relationship explicit. In rotational complexes below, one will see the arrow has been used especially in the case of hypotheticals. Concerning applications of the theory, Visagie *et al* (1989: 19) have stated: 'Rather, we suspect that the choice between knowledge creating experience, and experience creating knowledge, to be a false dilemma (where, incidentally, the opposing views share resemblances which go deeper than the apparent differences.)' Usually with bi-directionality, one looks at the XYZ key, and then, reverses it as ZYX. Further, bi-directionality should not be confused with antonymic form. When the subject is syntactically placed after the object as in 'Z is based in X', the analyst should recognize this as a key in antonymic form and should place the X and Z appropriately. In linguistics, this would be recognized as passive transformation, where the active sentence has been turned into a passive one. When bi-directionality occurs, the X and Z are interchanged in terms of reversibility of the key and may function e.g. in a contradictory way or a cyclical way. (See schemas and complexes below.)

4.3.3 The function and development of attributes

Apart from analysing the relationship between the subject and domain, Visagie has suggested another approach that one can take with Key theory: ‘... one can look at the attributes (binary or otherwise) that complement both the head and tail’ (2006: Appendix I). Similar to everyday language, key structures may also involve the use of *attributes*, which Visagie describes as “adjectival elaboration” (2001: 89). Presently, I will avoid grammatically related classifications, as attributes are also able to qualify the operator, or other attributes, which makes its function comparable to an adverb as well as that of an adjective and grammar is not chiefly what concerns me here. The useful question at stake is whether a characterization of states or conditions of the X, Y or Z terms may be extracted in the context of keys and what implications they may have for the theory.

Attributes, then, may be defined as descriptive terms *attributing* (one or more) qualitative distinctions to any of the three components of a key structure. For example, typically an existentialist thinker would propose a model of a subject’s thought, experience and action as being the primary driver in a key. The attribute designated to the subject will be *individual*; and, if this subject moves through reality which contains various *universal* structures, they do not define him as an individual life form. A person exists, and is free to choose what he or she will do, or be, and he or she is wholly and individually responsible for his or her actions (as opposed to the influences of environment, culture, biology or genetics, for example). So, if one were to formulate a simple key, adding attributes for existentialists, it might look like this:

- i. [(Att: Individual) X: Life] [Y: Precede] [(Att: Universal) Z: Categories]

Attributes can obviously be applied and adapted in a number of ways depending on the desired effect of the author. Most often, they are assumed to be linked with a particular viewpoint of an author rather than facts, which is why the analyst is required to be aware of the stylistic devices employed - they may be quite significant regarding the strength and purpose of an argument. Value and meaning of subjects and domains are defined against what one is perceived to be and what the other is not. Visagie (2001: 89) notes an important binary (*upper* and *lower*) set of attribute pairs that repeatedly crop up in philosophical discourse.^{xxv}

ii.

One(Simple)	Finite	Continuous	Constant	Knowable	Universal	Necessary
Many(Complex)	Infinite	Discontinuous	Dynamic	Unknowable	Individual	Contingent

Visagie (2001: 90) goes on to note that the use of attributes is linked to specific types, time-frames, ideologies and paradigms. For example, the Ancient Greeks (of the so-called 'classical period') preferred the upper attributes being attached to their chosen subject, while in post-modern philosophical reflections, the lower ones are more prominent as seen in the work of Derrida, who advocates for *différance*; Lyotard's celebration of the *différend*, *plurality* and *paralogy*; and Deleuze's fondness of *the multiple*; all of whom demonstrate a disillusionment with any form of canonization or unification, stabilization and totalization (in Schrag 1992: 6). And, interestingly enough, it would appear that a large part of the philosophical bill of fare remains relatively unaltered as certain favourites tend to come and go through the ages. This would be a useful explanatory tool when considering possibly similar typological traits between dissimilarly packaged philosophies of, for example, Parmenides and Heidegger, because

contexts and groupings play an important role in meaning. Types and time frames will be explicated below.

In Key theory, the analyst looks to avoid the selection of one attribute at the expense of another, rather favouring a *balance* between attributes as none are seen as superior. Attributes are assumed to be unique and of equal consequence in their occupation of ontological theories, and therefore dependent on one another for their existence in conceptual applications. These qualities do not exist within any component of the key, but in the relation between the components of the key. To explain further: in the formulation of a key that is representative of Buddhist philosophy, one may suggest:

iii. [(Ontological) Flux] [Constitutes] [Reality]

The idea is that deep insight into this key would reveal that one must stop efforts to grasp at, or cling to, “lasting” objectives, and thereby become liberated or enlightened to let go and thus achieve a serene tranquillity – which begins when desire ends. Attachment to desire causes suffering and this suffering will end when one loses the substantial self and therefore frees oneself from desires. Key theory would reject the attributive fixation on [Flux], at the expense of [Constancy] here. Both are worthy of a place in Reality, and one needs both oppositions for understanding. One cannot conceptualize one (flux) without conceptualizing the other (constancy). People generally refer to something that does not change as *constant* (and of course for a Buddhist key, flux is itself constant.)

So, if one looks at the Buddhist philosophical key above, Macro-motive theory will also reject it because of the privileging of a transformationalist^{xxvi} motive, which overemphasizes flux. There is at stake the factual impossibility of the goal

as well as the value fixation on serenity. And finally, the last sub-theory must reject the key on the basis that it forms a dualism which degrades desire as such. Visagie has noted there are some ambiguities in Buddhist teachings as to whether reality is simple or complex and ‘...the enlightened Buddha nature as one that can be distinguished from the empirical world of the compounded and the fluctuating ... in Zen Buddhism there is an explicit acceptance of the undivided nature of true reality, a primordial singleness before the complex contrasts created by ordinary discursive thought’ (1998: 354). In this tradition, there is either a fundamental reality of ceaseless flux and complexity or a singularity that transcends change. On the other hand one can reckon with two realities where the singular finally transcends the complex (as in Abhidharmist teaching). Visagie has represented these in key notation (1998: 354) as:

iv. [(One) Reality] [Transcend] [(Complex) Nature]

v. [(Complex) Nature] [Pervade] [All that exists]

It seems the tension underlying the Buddhist problematic lies primarily in the first and fourth attribute pair, and it will depend on which teaching one selects as to which key is more accurate.

4.3.4 Left and right binary attributes

Left binary attributes are those related specifically to the subject of the key. They are added as a means to emphasize the privileged role of the subject – almost always offering a sense of grandeur with regards to its superiority over that of the domain. If, for example, the author suggests *infinity* as an especially significant requirement for the primary cause of reality, he will usually attach the attribute of *infinite* to his X-term, and go about justifying his claim in a variety of

ways in order to cement this concept into his theory. The attribute performs two important functions in that it makes known the perceived quality of distinction of the subject in this case which adds meaning, as well as acting as an intensifier regarding the ability of the subject. Conversely, right binary attributes are those which are specifically reserved for the domain, and consequently, they are qualities that are perceived to be inferior to, or subservient to, those attached to the subject. Note again that these are not objective features of the world, but constructs of the thinker in question (or even the socio-cultural imprint unwittingly adopted in his thought) who might stretch his argument considerably to make his point.

Adding qualitative distinctions serves to further highlight the overdetermination apportioned to the subject key structure. The problem of binary oppositions is mentioned in the work of structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure when he suggests that, 'The linguistic mechanism is geared to differences and identities' (1966: 108). De Saussure sees oppositions as being counterparts of each other and he argues that when the same conditions are met, similar entities are obtained, even if in reality those entities are materially dissimilar. He links the notion of identity/difference with the notion of value. He notes that this idea of value has remained somewhat indistinct, and yet he states is of 'prime importance' (1966: 111). For Key theory, this is an important point regarding the difference thinkers perceive between X- and Z-terms. One notes that in terms of attribution, it is important that one tries to define these units of qualification as they are utilized in the model. The above upper and lower attributes, form the basis of that model. Furthermore, thinkers might use less typical attributes, and these sets, like any other, remain open for further refinement and review. One may take the example of a kernel statement by Rousseau to illustrate the point:

'Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains' (2003: 1).

Free and *Ordered*, as such, are not part of the core set, but they are recognized as attributes as they are terms of distinction and can easily be notated in a key:

- i. [(Free) Humanity] [Precede] [(Ordered) Society]

Or they could be appropriately translated into this key:

- ii. [(Infinite) Humanity] [Precede] [(Finite) Society]

Immediately, what one can expect from Rousseau in this formulation is a rejection of a 'natural order' in society. Social order, for Rousseau is founded on conventions, not nature. Consequently, he has some serious reservations about the legitimate functioning of human obedience under authority within that order. He calls for a complete overhaul of the social contract in order that people may have recourse to become fully autonomous beings. The underlying tension between the freedom of the individual and the submission of individuals to the body politic in contractarianism is evidenced in the work of Rousseau. The issue at hand is that, in application, it seems clear that the thinker selects one attribute over the other and applies the more favoured of the two in his X-formulation, while selecting the opposite for his Z-formulation. This is an assignment of more and less value in the thinker's key, based on what he prefers to emphasize (liberty and equality for Rousseau), and one may use these value functions to determine similarities in types of thinking. In this instance, one would put, e.g. Rousseau, John Locke and John Rawls in the same *type* based on a liberal tendency of thought, which grapples with the problem of individual freedom versus societal restriction and immediate tension of balancing the attribute of *individual* with that of *universal* can be expected.

De Saussure offers some insightful observations about values, namely that:

'They are always composed:

- (1) Of a dissimilar thing that can be exchanged for the thing of which the value is to be determined; and
- (2) Of similar things that can be compared with the thing of which the value is to be determined' (1966: 115).

The relevance for Key theory of what de Saussure proposes is the interdependence between key elements as they exist in relation to one another affects the conveyance of meaning of the whole unit of discourse. It is important to be aware that subjects and domains do not inherently possess these values in themselves. One should be more specifically focused on the validity of their interactions. They are surrounded by associated elements in the structures which serve to distinguish which values the thinker presents as being more important or desirable than another. Attribute distinction and their positioning in the structure makes this point clearer if one considers what is now commonly referred to as 'association of ideas'. This occurs where various concepts are clustered around a central concept in order to accentuate and further qualify how it functions in terms of meaning in discourse. Tensions between binaries often underlie a text and give some insight into how a thinker may be struggling to reconcile the disparity. (This function is closely linked to metaphorical identifications as covered in the work of Lakoff and Johnson below.)

In the proem of Parmenides, *On Nature* (Barnes, 1987: 129-142), readers are presented with two opposing views of reality in the *Way of Truth* and the *Way of Opinion*. In the available text excerpts, some of the concepts Parmenides associates with these two different *Ways* are as follows:

TRUTH:

OPINION:

Immortal / High / Light	Mortal / Low / Dark / Heavy
One / Whole	Divided / Opposite
Finite / Complete	Infinite / Incomplete
Continuous	Discontinuous
Beginningless and ceaseless	Generated and destructed
Changeless / unwavering	Changing / moving
Knowable / Real	Unknowable / Appearance / Veiled
Universal (truth)	Individual (objects)
Necessary	Contingent
Reason / Intelligible	Experience / Perceptible

With regards to attribute designation, one sees the qualitative divide between what is desirable on the side of *Truth* as opposed to what is less valued in the group associated with *Opinion*, so much so that the *Way of Opinion* is not only attributed to fallible mortals, but also to the ways of metaphorically lower animals and darkness. Further, there has been much controversy surrounding whether Parmenides opts for a monistic or dualistic schema (see schematization discussion below) in his proem. I would argue that when considering the attribute tensions in the text, he seems to support a monistic view of reality (contained in the plenum / sphere) like some of his predecessors while at the same time arguing for a dualistic view of knowledge (similar to that of Xenophanes and Alcmaeon, or later seen in Descartes) as evidenced in the table above. Many theories still aspire to such heights (in such terms) with their key construction and the play between attributes often evidenced in an unavoidable dualism between the subjective and objective components.

4.3.5 Key rhetoric

In maintaining an attitude of responsibility, one should take care not to be lured in by what might appear to be naïve interchanges between the upper and lower attributes. Moreover, it is rare that a thinker will blatantly attach one attribute to a subject and the opposite thereof to a domain and present it straightforwardly in discourse. More often than not, it becomes apparent to the discerning reader that thinkers are actually struggling to reconcile opposites within a balanced theory and attention should be paid to the play of differences and opposites - one cannot assume that these groups of qualitative distinctions are necessarily indiscriminately exploited without recognizing the other. They are used specifically to provoke the reader towards a certain response and steer one towards particular inferences and conclusions, be it on the surface or in a more subtle manipulation of the components of a key. Visagie explains: 'The rhetorical aspect I have in mind here, is the awe, the wonder, the delighted surprise with which the X-concept of a particular philosophy is initially discovered and regarded by its adherents' (2001: 91).

Visagie (1984) examines the attributive component of what he terms a 'conditioning structure' in the models of Foucault and Chomsky. Chomsky is a proponent of the so-called rationalistic view that the mind is constituted by a number of faculties that are governed by innate principles. Abstract mental characterizations are physical mechanistic structures of the brain which are mostly unknowable largely because of one's limited mental capabilities. Vast knowledge and belief systems are able to be constructed on limited evidence due to the creativity of the human mind operating with innate principles. 'This 'thesis of incomprehensibility' is thought by Chomsky to date back to Cartesian rationalism and the romanticism of Rousseau – two philosophers whose ideas

on knowledge and freedom he greatly admires' (1984: 19). Foucault, on an opposing view, one is able to distinguish different forms of knowledge as constituting the epistemic subject. These fields of discourse exhibit a discontinuous transformational rhythm on an evolving subject and are centred on the interrelated concepts of knowledge and power. 'Power exists in multiple mechanisms that invest sexuality, family and kinship, knowledge and technology. Power induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse, effects truth. The individual himself is an effect of power' (1984: 21).

In short, Visagie notes that Chomsky would be supportive of forming a human nature in its intellectual and cognitive aspects while Foucault is sceptical of such an approach which is independent of strategic social and cultural conditioning. Both have an underlying tension that rests in the problematic dialectic between knowledge and freedom. Knowledge aims at a complete understanding of man and reality which, if it is known, is fixed and *finite*. This would fly in the face of the lofty ideals of human freedom which is, per definition, *infinite* at its core. Visagie notes this kind of attribute tension occurs in many other types and traditions. In Fig. 1 (1984: 26) one sees that Chomsky's grand subject would be [Principles of Human Nature] enhanced by the attributes of 'reasonable thought', 'infinite creativity', 'immutable principles' which limit and control human action, 'perfection', and 'incomprehensibility' related to a rationalist philosophical framework, 'unity and simplicity'. In Fig 2 (1984: 33) Foucault's would be [Power], supplemented by the attributes of 'mysterious, visible and invisible, present and hidden always and everywhere', 'omnipotence, omnipresence and sovereignty', 'multiplicity' in the subject. One may gain from Visagie's analysis that although Chomsky and Foucault examine origins of knowledge and belief from apparently conflicting perspectives, 'their views reflect an underlying convergence in the epistemic ground-structure' (1984: 42), and they both illicit strong attributive augmentation in order to elevate their chosen subject in the

respective rhetoric of their arguments. This is what analysts are on the lookout for when examining rhetoric in discourse – how is that matrix presented to the reader in order to convince them of the appeal of a majestic subject?

I would argue that Visagie's reading of these two thinkers is foundationally important. Key theory draws our attention to the deeper motivational divide in their thought. Fortunately, there is a record of these two thinkers in debate (*Human nature: justice versus power*, 1971) to illustrate the tension. Very simply, in Macro-motive theoretical terms, Chomsky selects as his X the first Macro-motive of [Nature], while Foucault selects [Power]. Chomsky's affinity for the Nature motive comes out in his requirement of a common foundational component of the human mind and all that it can produce. His admiration thereof comes out in his repeated referrals to the ability of the human to creatively produce huge, organized systems of thought from relatively small and degenerate data acquired from childhood onwards, so the structures required to attain this feat, which he characterises as a massive inductive leap, must be already there. Foucault's alternative allows him at some point to talk past Chomsky, yet near the end of the debate there is a clear break from Chomsky who voices disagreement. Foucault then states: "And in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice" (1971: 26). And here is the evidence of a deep split in their key logic: Foucault allows for the shift in basic fundamentals in terms of how they might or not be produced in the power structures of societies and institutions, while Chomsky will not allow that. For Chomsky, there are certain concepts like justice, which are grounded in the fundamental principles of human nature in a very real way. Foucault does not engage with the Nature macro-motive in this manner. The rhetoric surrounding their macro-motive split becomes very evident as the debate concludes.

In another publication *Fritjof Capra's holism and the structures of philosophical conceptualization: The Logosemantics of complexity* (1998), Visagie notes the conceptualization of holistic complexity in Capra as opposed to reductionistic simplicity. He notes in this article the attempt of holism to move away from foundational structures in a rejection of any reductionist schema. Immediately, then, Key theory will direct our attention to the kernel proposition contained in holistic discourse. Holistic discourse begins with the whole and moves toward determining the interconnected parts, while reductionism attempts the reverse. Visagie notes that holistic discourse has for some time been considerably influenced by systems theory in which dynamic relations occur when subsystems are integrated into larger systems until the ultimate system ends the process. From Visagie, one can isolate the following basic kernel formula for holism (1998: 349):

- i. [(Complex) Universe] [Unifies] [(Complex/Simple) Matter, Mind, Culture, Society]

One may note the first attribute pair of one-many coming into play, seeing that the [Universe] is the ultimate encloser for Capra. However, the tension is exposed when it needs to be explicitly *complex* in nature, but also unified, in order to contain the differentiated parts, some of which may be simple, which is evidenced in the deployment of both attributes with regard to the domain. What this shows is that the *complexity* on the domain side is actually subordinate to a more impressive *complexity* on the subject side. Visagie affirms: 'The complexity of Capra's universe is located on various levels. Most importantly, there is the small-scale complexity of the subatomic world the large-scale complexity of the physical-cosmological universe and the large-scale complexity of the universe as all-embracing system containing many other part-systems' (1998: 351n). One can see the conceptual problems and tensions already coming out here in that

even the most complex of systems retain an element of simplicity to the extent that they present themselves as a unified whole, perhaps even entailed in the very concept of [Universe] in the above example. .

In the rhetorics of complexity, the attribute of *complex* is given an unmistakable aura of seriousness and distinction. It is assumed to be the defining character of a suitably complex system that is the focus of investigation. Visagie has noted the aesthetic appeal of such attribution in rhetorical metaphor employment of terms like ‘dance’ and ‘prettiness’ in Capra and Bateson. Further, in Key rhetoric, one may become aware of a pointed divergence between oppositely attributed subject and domain, but Capra does not exhibit this in a particularly stark manner. Capra does, however, mention an ‘infinitely complex’ universe (1998: 357) which is an instance of internal attribution, and this serves to magnify the complex attribute even more so that readers understand that the complexity at issue here is so vast, it transcends one’s abilities to comprehend it fully. One can see in this example the kind of awe now emerging around the subject – this is typically what analysts look for in Key rhetoric – something that shows real power potential. One usually finds as the discourse goes on, this intensifies, and becomes further qualified by attributes and metaphors alike, resulting in what the reader may perceive as the ‘discovery’ of an exclusive subject.

4.3.6 Operational binary attributes

Operational binary attributes are a little more obscure and more difficult to ascertain than those attached to the subject and domain terms; yet the theory seems to suggest that they should be present, and possible to apply, seeing that

the comparisons with syntax and semantics still holds. For the time being, this speculation has not been formally elucidated but one may reasonably predict that, though tentative, it does seem plausible that one should be able to provide for such variations in description. If one considers Marxist discourse for a moment, one possible subject^{xxvii} would be [History] with attached qualifiers (in Schrag, 1992: 16), and the operator would have *Necessarily* attributed to it either implicitly or explicitly, given the Marxist deterministic view of the manner in which history unfolds toward a post-capitalist stateless society, a view now largely abandoned. Incidentally, in Marxist thought, this progression toward a free society would result in a freedom from material necessity. Visagie (2006: 20) has also noted this kind of attribution of ‘necessarily’ to the operator in Habermas’ thought regarding the [Lifeworld] preceding or being foundational to [Knowledge] because one cannot objectify everything. Parts of the Lifeworld have to be taken for granted while others may become problematized. Lifeworld in this sense is necessarily behind our back, so to speak. Operator attribution using *Infinite* as the qualifier may be found in a silver key found in contemporary physics:

- i. [Nature] [(Infinite) Create] [Multiverse],

or in Popper:

- ii. [(Objective) Knowledge] [(Infinite) Create] [Truth],

where one sees the unending process of truth acquisition presented as a metaphorical journey which never comes to an end. One gets closer and closer to truth, but one never arrives. And one can find similar images in Deleuze’s ‘nomadic’ thinking which implies that we will never get there (Visagie, 1990: 67).

Visagie has noted possible schemas for subjects and has used a square root sign ($\sqrt{}$) over the attributed subjects when stressing a split in the way the

attributes apply in the key: i.e. if *knowable* and *unknowable* are simultaneously attached to the subject. It seems this binary split can be extended to also cover the position occupied by operators and this would be a way of notating the binary split.

Another example of this phenomenon also occurs in the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland. Regarding an interview that Susan Blackmore conducts with the Churchlands on the problem of consciousness: they come up with an interesting concept when answering Blackmore's difficulties regarding an internal-external dualism when she thinks of '...neurons firing in the anterior cingulate cortex can be this awfulness of pain' (2005: 57). They acknowledge a dualism, but not one involving 'spooky stuff'. They claim that the issue simply involves people not being high enough up the 'knowledge gradient' in order that one may know the specific neural representation connecting the subjective and objective. This might be roughly interpreted as:

- i. [(Subjective)Consciousness] [(Knowable/Unknowable)Express in] [(Objective)Brain]

This simply means, for the Churchlands, that problems of consciousness may not all be knowable in terms of objective neurobiology right now, but sometime in the future they probably will be. This signifies an attribute tension due to the disparity in tensed time between what is knowable/unknowable in the present and future respectively. Science will probably prevail.^{xxviii} This kind of tension also holds for keys that show disparity between what *is* and what *should be* in a tension between the descriptive and the prescriptive.

4.3.7 Non-binary attributes

Non-binary attributes may be understood as an umbrella term used to cover qualitative distinctions that are not indicated in the core binary set above and are applied in a singular way to the selected constituents of a key. These may include terms like *good*, *true*, *just* and *beautiful*, where, in the context of a given philosophical discourse there is no overt relationship between two alternatives existing in opposition to one another. The non-binary stands alone in the key construct. One reason for this is that a key usually puts forward the philosopher's best possible argument for drivers of sectors of reality, so one is unlikely to find inclusions of traditionally undesirable concepts like *evil*, *false*, *unjust*, *ugly*, which are the opposite of those just mentioned in this segment. One can see in the core set of attributes above that none of these are traditionally perceived as undesirable *per se*, elevating the *necessary* over the *contingent*, or vice versa, might be evident in theories, but not as a particularly bad or immoral choice. Usually, one would presume that a philosopher is arguing for a good ethical life or system of morality, not a dysfunctional one. Take the example of the utilitarian principle, versions of which are well-known in moral theory:

- i. [(Right) Morality] [Produce] [(Maximum) Happiness]

Here one sees the use of a non-binary *right* attached to the subject, and a non-binary of *maximum* used on the domain side. If a moral act is right, it will produce the maximum happiness for the maximum number of people. For adherents of utilitarianism, this is a seemingly clean and clear-cut accounting system, the outcome of which has benefits outweighing costs as a consequence of right or good moral action. There is no need to accommodate the binaries in the key, however the converse functions are mentioned in the discourse as undesirables – in the negative form (i.e. wrong morality will produce minimum happiness or maximize pain and suffering, which is not the aim of moral theory.)

4.3.8 Second order attributes

In *Philosophy as a language game* (2001: 92), Visagie examines a 'new game in town ... post-modernism/post-structuralism...' specifically as it appears in the form of deconstructionism which purports to subvert all kinds of logocentric thinking and one of its chief proponents is Derrida. Second-order attribution occurs when attributes are used to qualify other attributes such as the multiverse being 'infinitely multiple' or being in a state of 'constant change.' As one would expect, keys for deconstructionist thinkers are prohibited in favour of a more free-playing kind of discourse due to a conscious desire to subvert tradition or at least exit the centres of tradition with a stance of detachment or disinterest. Nevertheless, Visagie notes, this is not so easily accomplished '...despite some deft sleight of hand ... this kind of play itself is actually produced – and can only be produced...' by attaching to key logic and, indeed, its very structure. In Derrida (1976), reference is made to a difference which is not constituted, but is the product of pure movement. This pure trace is *différance* and is noted in the earlier section on Derrida. Although he asserts that this *différance* does not exist, its possibility is anterior to all that one calls sign or concept. Visagie comments that in this instance, one sees Derrida 'struggling magnificently' to escape the XYZ language of philosophy but has to revert to it constantly. Perhaps one must concede that in order to leave key structures behind, one must in fact make use of it (Visagie, 2001: 97n) in ascribing X-power to the 'differences' of things that help one constitute one's concepts of things (by that which is not). Again Visagie comments: 'This partial aspect of conceptualization is then granted X-status and transformed into a non-structural structure (!) of continuous absence that precedes and pervades languages and texts, and everything the latter encloses' (2006: 212).

This conceptual acrobatics that has made Derrida somewhat difficult to pin down for many a reader is what Rorty critically called 'word magic' (1989: 124n). What Derrida wants to establish is that his own thinking is not centred in constancy (like previous thinking - even when highlighting change – in its constant presence). So, technically *différance* may seem to point to the ideal of identifying things, but Derrida tries to show that this always depends on implied distinction. (E.g. identifying a *flower* depends on all other present and absent things that are NOT a *flower*, as in de Saussure. However, attempting to get them into the *flower*-picture in order that they may constitute the *flower* by being a not-*flower* will fail because each entity or even the whole, not-*flower*, again refers to its difference with its others.) Famously, as one may recall, *différance* is a difference that continues to be deferred INFINITELY. This is how Derrida can claim to be rooted in neither *constancy* nor *flux*: he has apparently shown that the concept of *flux* is actually itself still endeavouring to halt the difference somewhere.

Derrida is not alone in this type of thought. Other notable thinkers of this difference-endorsing ilk have also come up with interesting challenges to the problem of what Schrag handily terms 'the despised logos' (1992: 17). Baudrillard, in his critique of the current trend toward substituting all reality and meaning with symbols and signs, offers the 'simulacrum' which does not conceal the truth; it is in fact the truth which conceals that there is no truth. Deleuze and Guattari, in their thwarting of a subject-centred philosophy and struggle against a dominance of the signifier regime, advocate for a penetrating concept of 'multiplicity'. They call for a 'nomadic' thinking to displace a 'sedentary' thinking (in Visagie 1990: 34). Lyotard offers 'paralogy' as a means to overcome the modern thinking modelled on meta- and grand narratives. Paralogy means a state of inconsistency proven by a superior theory so that consensus is a horizon beyond attainment. Consensus may be a state that one temporarily

reaches, but it is not the end of discourse, the end is 'paralogy' (1984: 66) or as Lyotard often describes it the 'future anterior' (1984: 81). This implies a recognition that one will never finally get there – to a future that is in front – so to speak. One need not delve too deeply into the language of post-modernism in order to identify the consistent and spirited rejection of the upper attributes of *one, finite, continuous, constant, knowable, universal and necessary*. The Key theoretical codes contained in the ideological language of post-modernism invariably stress a multiplicity and fragmentation over unification and wholes; a rejection of finite and fixed knowledge with an ideal of the infinite prevailing; a disbelief in the legitimation and continuity of grand and meta-narratives; a penchant for difference and deferral; an avoidance of knowability in favour of a decidedly speculative approach which includes images of nothingness, lost origins and vacuums with the focus on an unknown future; a denunciation of a possible theory that will result in a universal explanation; and a resolute shift away from necessity evident in the ruinous attitudes towards institutions, dogma, and the like. This often presents in the form of a second-order attribution that on the surface resembles some sort of non-logic which has negated a discernible subject.

Key theory would also raise objections to the overdetermination of futurism in postmodernism contained in concepts like Derrida's 'always becoming' or 'Messianicity', (cf. concepts like Lyotard's 'future anterior', *ibid*). These concepts unfortunately singlehandedly dismiss the inevitability of the brain's being fated to biologically think in *present* Key structures – i.e. in which you are now thinking - permanently. Visagie argues that one cannot realize as yet unknown keys which must necessarily lie in the future. Derrida's deconstructionism will surely also be displaced, but it cannot be granted to him to actualize this in a futuristic anticipation of some ultimate X, to be grasped now by grasping at the *flux* attribute in a clever second order schema that holds the attribute itself to be in

flux. As so much of post-modern language shows, the irrationalistic running for cover from anything remotely resembling a definition still results in a hierarchy, albeit of a different kind, identifiable by Key theory, largely as moved attributes. Visagie aptly concludes, 'in the end this type of discourse 'is constrained to speak, very precisely, in such words' (1989: ix).

Deconstructions of the postmodern type would immediately call for a deconstruction themselves for their apparent one-sidedness, the manner in which they create 'a reactionary metaphysics of multiplicity' (Visagie, 2006: 60). From a Key perspective, the theory would demand a full acknowledging of both attributive functions, upper and lower, as neither set-member can be conceptualized without the other. It seems that leaning toward irrationalism (or anti-rationalism) in the form of overemphasis of the lower attributes leaves proponents of postmodernism with speculative metaphysical notions of pure unadulterated lower attributes centre stage and with the upper ones forming an unreasonably shadowed corps de ballet behind them. Again, the key structures and kernels emerge, even though they may be disguised in some highly technical conceptual interplay. In effect, what seems to be a clever jettisoning of the logos by philosophers such as the postmoderns, results in the emergence of another kernel of indeterminate characteristics, but nevertheless identifiable as a kernel in forms such as that of a 'labyrinth, network, abyss, void, absence, and so on' (Visagie, 1998: 345). In key terms this would still be a lower attributed schema with something like *flux* operating *constantly*, but also as *flux* itself. It is no longer first-order *flux*, but second-order where the *flux* itself *fluctuates*.

4.3.9 Schematizations

When analysts consider the structure of any theoretical discourse, one must look rather circumspectly at how the particular elements are organized when revealing the key to the reader. Schematization sometimes involves a certain amount of creative arrangement on the part of the thinker in that it is presented to readers in specific patterns or pictures of argumentation. The X-entity, and surroundings, is occasionally displayed in somewhat of an idiosyncratic structuring that is imposed on the key, often implicitly and intuitively, in an attempt to elucidate explanation. Visagie comments that schematizations ‘...contribute to the overall form of philosophical propositions, and also play a decisive role in differentiating philosophical languages from each other. A class of these schematizations also structure the relationships between ... more than one proposition, that go into the *propositional interlogic* informing philosophical languages’ (2006: 31). Schematization will affect the interlogic of a key and will also serve to further qualify types of keys in the section below.


One might look at some examples for illustration. A *monistic* schema serves to reduce all operations in a given ontology to a single self-determining subject. (In notation, Visagie has used a square root sign ($\sqrt{}$) on the left of, and over, the subject to indicate schematization; I will use a simple elbow connector on the left of the subject and similarly label the schema above the key):

$$\text{i.} \quad \begin{array}{c} \text{Monist} \\ \updownarrow \\ X \rightarrow Z \end{array}$$

A somewhat obvious example of monism would be the theory of Spinoza which encloses the whole of reality within a solitary God/Nature concept. There is nothing beyond God/Nature and all and every substance and entity is subjected to the causal laws of God/Nature. Nature, for Spinoza, is so revered that he has endowed it with epitomes typically assigned to that of a deity and indeed


metaphorically identifies the concept of Nature with the concept of God. (This worldview was later shared by such notable thinkers as Einstein who stated that he too believes in Spinoza's God.^{xxix}) Spinoza explicitly attaches the upper attributes to God/Nature, arguing that dissimilar substances cannot share an essence or quality, but a singular God/Nature has all possible essences in the form an absolute, infinite, original substance; and that leads him to conclude that all other (individual) substances are precluded by the already-existing, ungenerated God/Nature. Further, for interest sake, God/Nature is also necessarily determined, and does not act arbitrarily or by free will, in creating things of the world in random ways. One might assume that this is a further attempt to divorce the God/Nature concept from any anthropomorphizing of a supposedly divine being which would be beyond such mundane qualifications and distinctions. A key for Spinoza would be:

ii. Monist




A *dualistic^{xxx}* schema usually involves an irreversible split in the X-term (but can also be an irreversible split between the X and Z).

iii. Dualist



A well-known example of a dualistic key would be that of Descartes, which one could notate as follows:



The type of dualism that Descartes advocates is one of superiority in that he recognizes the contribution of both the mental and the physical in order that one may acquire knowledge of the world, but he places the mental (mind) in a position of superiority over that of the physical (spatially extended body) and proceeds from the assumption that the former produces necessary knowledge while the latter produces contingent knowledge. With his famous method of doubt, Descartes shows how he is untrusting of knowledge obtained from the senses which are contained in the body and may be erroneous. Nevertheless, he is satisfied with the true and certain knowledge produced from reason and regards this as an acceptable foundation on which to build all other knowledge. The resulting split between the mental and physical as producing different types of knowledge (note the attachment of upper attributes to the mental, and the attachment of lower attributes to the physical, in the sense of extended things,) proves ultimately impossible to overcome as even trying to unite the two in the pineal gland in the brain still leaves him with a spatial explanation to explain the link with non-spatial mental phenomena. Descartes then leaves readers with a problematic recourse to a theological solution, invoking God (non-extension), in order to unite knowledge. Either way, the impasse is not averted. This superiority of mind is contained in the *Meditations* that he, Descartes, can conceive of himself existing as a mind without a body (1968: 156) and therefore

the two must not only be distinct and separate, but as for his existence as such, the body could be done away with, while the mind cannot.

Other forms of dualism^{xxxi} differ from that of Descartes. Leibniz also exhibits a sort of dualism, but his is a *parallel* dualism in which there is no assumed causal interaction between the split X – they simply run alongside one another and in some way are not perceived as substantially unlike, but just different types of phenomena occurring in a unified reality. Physical causes have physical effects and mental causes have mental effects; the two are unrelated. Further, if one considers another dualistic option evident in Meister Eckhart's perception of mind and body, there is a relationship of *denigration* in the split X, which puts the non-physical in a good light and the body and emotions in a bad or unsatisfactory light. The mark of such a dualism is not only an exalted X_1 , but also a demonized lower X_2 -term and is very common in religious rhetoric. One can determine this dualism clearly in Eckhart (1986: 110) who argues: '...The second thing to recognize, as Dionysius says in the *Divine Names*, Chapter 4, is that the good of a human being is to exist according to reason, but evil is what is outside reason. The explanation is that good is always from form, evil from matter and the material. The third point is that a human being is composed of a double nature, that is, the sensitive and the rational parts, or flesh and spirit, matter and form... These points clarify, explain and prove the passage from Romans 7: "I know that in me, that is in my flesh, no good dwells...With my mind I serve the law of God, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin..." In this example, the relationship between the split X is one of good versus evil.

Contradictory (or *paradoxical*) schemas occur when both upper and lower attributes are employed simultaneously, (i.e. in a contradictory fashion) to the X- or Z-term. Probably the most famous example of a contradictory thinker was

Heraclitus, who was nicknamed 'The Riddler' or 'The Obscure' (Barnes, 1987) and is notoriously difficult to read. There seems to be an overall tone of contradictory sentiments in Heraclitus who notices the paradoxical strife between opposites and notices that connection changes which results in persistent confusion for mortals (while they conduct themselves as if they know), hence a preferred emphasis on the unknown and the unapparent (which may be echoed in the work of philosophers like Derrida). From Hippias one reads: 'Heraclitus says that the universe is divisible and indivisible, generated and ungenerated, mortal and immortal, Word and Eternity, Father and Son, God and Justice' (1987: 102).

In addition, here are some good examples of contradictory attribute-play from Heraclitus:

v. Changeless-Dynamic:

'They do not comprehend how, in differing, it agrees with itself' (1987: 102).

vi. One-Many:

'Combinations – wholes and not wholes, concurring differing, concordant discordant, from all things one and from one all things' (1987: 114).

vii. Finite-Infinite:

'Immortals are mortals, mortals immortals, living their death, dying their life' (1987: 104).

Cyclical schemas of Nature are posited by many of the Pre-Socratic philosophers. They propose that things in the world come from a first principle or *arché* which generates by various processes the individual, changing things in

the world and after their destruction they return to their original state in the *arché* in a circular tessellation. This first cause differs for different philosophers: water for Thales; air for Anaximenes; *apeiron* for Anaximander; number for Pythagoras; the four elements of earth, air, fire and water for Empedocles, and so on. These schematizations ‘impose a fixity on what was in reality fluid and irregular...’ (1987: 10) in order to explain and understand their world as ordered without the intervention of divine entities. Many philosophical theories propose that particular forms of matter are compliant, passive receptacles for general forms and structures that exist externally to it. Matter itself is thus perceived as incapable of any spontaneous morphogenesis. It is acted upon by a transcendental resource. With the Presocratics, there is the added dimension that after existing as a particular in materiality, matter will destruct into this transcendent resource in a repetitive interchange.

In Lakoff and Johnson’s *Metaphors we live by* (1980) one finds an approach that may prove useful in further explaining schemas. Seeing that in this section analysts are looking for patterns contained within discourse, the discussion on orientational metaphors (1980: 14-22) is helpful. Structural metaphors use one concept to structure another, but orientational metaphors concern ‘...spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral...they have a basis in our physical and cultural experience’ (1980: 14). These kinds of trajectories are present in discourse and in so far as they affect meaning should be noted. Consider again the case of Heraclitus who states: ‘The path up and down is one and the same’ (1987: 103); and ‘We step and do not step into the same rivers...’ (1987: 117). Heraclitus often describes this kind of oppositional orientation as a backward-forward motion like that of a bow and lyre. This serves to further entrench his views in the contradictory schema with spatial references reinforcing the unknowable and the speed with

which things change. Image schemas such as these are strongly connected to actual perceived positioning of key components.

Visagie has also done extensive work on the philosophy of Dooyeweerd mentioned above and made the following interesting observation about the Dooyeweerd's image schema of God: '...for example, a discourse selecting as attributes both "knowable" and "unknowable" can feature a *theo-ontological* schematization, whereby the latter attribute functions to qualify the X-factor as it is "in itself", and the former attribute then qualifies this factor as it appears "to us"' (2001: 210 my italics). This schema, argues Visagie, has been traditionally attached to a theological identification of the virtues of God, but the structure has a more-than-theological relevance reaching back into Greek thought which can also be found in Kant's distinction between 'Ding an sich and Erscheinung' as well as in Popper's emphasis on the split between the objectivity and independence of theoretical thought from the peculiarities the human knowledge apparatuses (Visagie, 1983: 23). Further, I suggest that distinctions based on this kind of knowable-unknowable attribute play occurs with analogous similarity in the work of Heidegger, Jaspers and any others who argue for the existence of unknowable entities that transcend the limits of human knowability, in whatever form, and these schematizations are frequently accompanied by metaphors of hiding/veiling/screening/covering, etc.

Suffice it to say, schematizations may present in many different images such as *triangular* as in a perceived relationship between spirit-mind-body as the unifying concept of a person^{xxxii}; or *concentric circles* popular in the discourse of cosmopolitanism and the Stoics^{xxxiii} who suggested that one views oneself as surrounded by concentric circles beginning with self, then family, then neighbours, fellow countrymen, and so on, ending with humanity; or *internal-*

external images as in the subject-object dichotomy, etc. Such imagery may require some creative interpretation (if not overtly stated) on the part of the analyst; this creativity is encouraged especially with students, who have come up with interesting observations and alternatives in the classroom. There has been some cross-referencing in the literature on key theory with regards to time-frames, types and schematizations but I will stick with the distinctions as they are presented here and below as I make the assumption they are interconnected and can describe one another in diverging contexts.

4.3.10 Operator sets for a single key

Visagie has noted the importance of designating the explicit operational capability extending over domains in order that one may distinguish between hard and soft options which are representative of more or less 'transitive force' present in the key. 'A hard option is one where the domain has no input in the process of its being governed ... by the subject ... A soft operation is one where the domain has some contribution to make to (has some "say" in) the way in which it is governed (1989: 59). One might argue that the domain must necessarily have some input in the function of the key seeing that there is at least a need for the domain's presence (if nothing else) or the action of the subject will be rendered null and void if there is nothing to act upon. There do, however, seem to be degrees of strength in the operation. If one look at the way Aristotle reports on the early Greek philosophers, one can gain an understanding of operational sets in a single key:

'Most of the first philosophers thought that principles in the form of matter were the only principles of all things. For they say that the element and first principle of the things that exist is that from which they all are and from which they first

come into being and into which they are finally destroyed, its substance remaining and its properties changing ... ' (Barnes, 1987: 63).

For the first philosophers, then, one can construct a key:

- i. [(Constant)Arché] [Generate/is the Goal of/Constitute/ Govern] [(Dynamic)Reality]

The operator set reveals that the first principle not only (in whichever form) *generates* things in reality but also *governs* them in the form of a principle. The operator of *is the goal of* is not as strong as the operator *deconstruct/end*. Here, I select this example purposefully because in the work of the early Greeks, it is not clear that the *Arché* actively ends or deconstructs the things of the world. It is simply the primary unchanging substance into which they return when they deconstruct and lose their dynamic properties. So, it implies a little passivity on the part of the subject – hence a softer option. Further, there is the question of essence for the Presocratics. Not only do these operators describe the relationship between the X and Z, but in some circumstances it is argued that the arché is also *in* everything that is, i.e. *constitutes* the objects in the world. In the causal mechanics of operational logic, one might pose the question: could the perfect subject perform all operations on the domain?

What is more, Visagie has noted the matter of tensed time relating to operator action. For example, when a philosopher such as Nietzsche discusses the rule of power, he is not referring to a key that obtains, he is alluding to a state of affairs that should be. For Visagie, this would have to be designated in key notation, not left to what the context might imply - again the need for explicitness arises. These possible ambiguities point toward a need to indicate future tense by means of a special qualifier in order that the analyst would be able to clarify

the intent of the text which is to prescribe to the reader how things should be, as against what they might be in the present.

4.3.11 Keys within keys

Layers within a discourse need to be distinguished by investigating the context of the claims. The idea of 'keys within keys' proposes a kind of recursion where key concepts and relations are embedded in other key concepts and relations at different levels. One may find these embedded keys in either the subject or domain such as:

- i. {[Nature] [Generate] [Culture]} {Enclose} {Science, Art, Economy, Politics}

Or,

- ii. {Rationality} {Transcend} {[Society] [Determine] [Morality]}

One may use the example of an argument put forward by Richard Rorty in *Contingency, irony, and solidarity* (1989: 21): '...the argument that since truth is a property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their existence on vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are truths.' The keys would be expressed as:

- iii. {[(Human) Contingency] [Create] [Language]} {Enclose} {Truth}

Rorty suggests, in this context, a world of universal or factual truth cannot exist beyond language. Truth, in turn, is embedded in language, and language is a product of human contingency in that is not fixed. Therefore a universal truth can be neither 'out there' as Rorty puts it, nor is it hidden within all of us, waiting to be known. In key terms, the transitive relation implies $A \rightarrow B$, and $B \rightarrow C$, so A in

effect produces both B (directly) and C (indirectly), and the directionality prohibits an independence of either B or C from A. This key is actually dependent on a more primary one for Rorty which would be:

iv.

[(Historical)Contingency] [Produce] [Knowledge/Personhood/Culture/Society/ Humanity]

This would be the key that provides the basis for the first one and so investigates another level of implication for Rorty's argument. One can see in Rorty's work a clear favouring of the lower attributes (singling out *contingent* as an X-function) as one would expect from the modern philosophers who have seriously questioned the notion of any of the upper attributes outdoing the lower ones in philosophical discourse. For instance: Rorty cites Nietzsche's claim that truth is '... a mobile army of metaphors' (1989: 28). He sees such philosophers' contributions as useful but unable to further the political and social aspirations of liberalism. As expected, he is critical of the Platonist and Positivist tradition which puts forward that there is a hidden reality within us which comes to expression in language, and he also rejects the idea that universality can transcend contingency. The more overarching liberalist project in Rorty's thought can be represented in his simple and most foundational key where individual freedom is fused into the public venture of human solidarity by means of what he calls 'linguisticizing' pre-linguistic turn philosophies (I would assume the key term for 'irony' in literature would be [Language]):

v. [Language] [Unite] [(Free) Society]

Visagie in his ideological analysis of Rorty asks whether Rorty has succeeded in constructing sentences and therefore forming conceptualizations in which he has managed to avoid X and Z components representing key governance in a

non-reversible way? The above keys show that the answer is: no. To quote him again: 'The line of thought common to Blumenberg, Nietzsche, Freud and Davidson suggests that we try to get to the point where we no longer worship anything, where we treat nothing as a quasi divinity, where we treat everything – our language, our conscience, our community – as a product of time and chance. To reach this point would be, in Freud's words, to 'treat chance as worthy of determining our fate' (1989: 22). So, on a standard Key technical level, one can see once again the key language emerging here quite clearly with the operator of [Cause] covering 'produce' and 'determine' and the subject of [Contingency] irreversibly acting on the domains of [Language], [Self], and [Society]. One can see in these keys that Rorty is loyal to his neo-pragmatic rejection of foundational truths, representation, objective epistemology and subject-centred philosophy.

4.3.12 Movement and types of movement

Visagie describes *movement* in Key theory as follows: '...whereby a given concept can move from one propositional slot to another' (2006: 31). One may recognize the link to movement (subjacency) in linguistics or the feature of 'Move – α ' which can be found in Chomsky's linguistic theory and states briefly that any constituent of a sentence can move anywhere. Lasnik and Saito extended this feature to 'Affect – α ' which allows that one may 'Do anything (move, delete, insert) to anything' (1992: vii). While the intricacies of linguistic theory are beyond the scope of the present study, this feature does seem to be useful when considering what might be happening in keys. Somewhat obviously in the Rorty key discussed in the previous point, one can see that *contingency* no longer fulfils the function of *attributing* the X-term, but has indeed *become* the X-term, while *historical* moves to fulfil the function of a non-binary attribute,

therefore moving away from its usual slot of a Z-term or X-term (History). [History], then, does not disappear completely, but remains in the discourse as a kind of trace which has been displaced from its usual subject position to a more subordinate one. The same happens with Anaximander who moves the attribute of *infinite* into the X-position, while [Nature] moves into an attribute position which qualifies the subject as opposed to acting on the domain.

Interestingly enough, when one begins to manipulate the movement options, it seems plausible that anything can move anywhere among the key constituents:

- Attribute movement to a subject or domain can be found in Anaximander whose subject 'the infinite' generates finite objects in reality and later in the eternal, natural cycle takes them up again as a kind of penalty for their assuming individuality in reality.
- An attribute can also move into an operator position as in [Society] [Necessitates] [Morality] which would imply that if there were no social cooperation there would be no need for morality^{xxxiv}.
- Subjects and domains can be moved or switched as seen in the above keys of Rawls and Hume.
- Subjects and domains can also become attributive as seen in [(Historical) Contingency] or [(Political) Power].
- Operators can be moved into attributive positions as well as in [(Transcendent) Knowledge].
- Operators can also move into subject and object domains as seen in Jaspers' the *Transcendence* and the *Encompassing*.

Looking briefly at the keys contained in Jaspers' philosophy, one sees a concept of the *Encompassing* emerging as the source from which all human experience and thought springs. So, one may formulate his keys as:

- i. [(Unknowable)Encompassing] [Express in] [(Knowable)Existence, Consciousness, Spirit]
- ii. [Encompassing] [Ground] [(Free) Personhood]
- iii. {Encompassing} {Precede} {[Transcendence] [Constitute] [Knowledge]}

Jaspers needs a subject so abstract and broad that it must enclose all modes of human existence, knowledge, thought and experience, but it cannot be a recognizable object of reference from our space-time bound reality. It can be expressed in mythical and religious terms, but it is not contained in the terms themselves – hence the very complex and indeterminable *Encompassing* which can express the freedom for possibility and potentiality open to human actualization and authentication. One often finds this kind of movement in keys that want to express a kind of operator rhetoric contained in an especially commanding (and often extremely abstract) subject, similar to the *apeiron* of Anaximander.

In Jaspers, one sees a reworking of Kantian transcendentalism in terms of subjective experience and freedom, accentuating the constitutive value of a lived existence for authentic knowledge. In his investigations of Being, Jaspers follows Kant in that Being-in-itself is an unknowable limit-concept, and even attempting to think of it must be abandoned because one then turn Being into an object, which is only an appearance. The very use of the moved 'Transcendence' from the operator *transcend* has important implications. Firstly, it presupposes a boundary of some sort between what one can and cannot

access in terms of knowability, and as Samay states: ‘...the relative that can be known is unsubstantial, while the absolute that exists in itself is unknowable’ (1971: 16). The same limit is applied by Kant and Jaspers alike, there can be no positive transcendent or metaphysical knowledge. Kant’s phenomenal-noumenal distinction remains intact – and it is in between this divide that the Encompassing appears, and envelopes the divide, one can see from this key term that a sense of awe is presented here – the ability to unite the world in a way in which subjects are not able.

Kant’s transcendent ideas supposedly provide an injunction against knowledge of our concepts of world, soul, and God, and these may correspond to Jaspers’ corresponding unknowable notions of World, levels of Existence and levels of Transcendence. Because he infuses a substantial and experiential content into transcendent ideas, this existential component cannot allow a unity of the world for us, one can only think in terms of a splintered world. The Encompassing unifies in a way that is not available to objective thought. However, Jaspers asserts that our subjective experiences remain plagued by a hopeless desire for metaphysical transcendence to an originary form or state. Accounting for this transcendent origin is a primary task of philosophy for Jaspers because it allows for a view of humanity that includes human possibilities and freedom actualized in levels of Existence. What lies beyond the boundary is that which allows for possibility and freedom and again must be disconnected from objective knowledge which tends toward fixity and stability (one can see evidence again of this in Jaspers’ balancing of secular and religious concerns as a means to walk a middle path on the dialectic between two obligations). By relativizing knowledge and attaching the lower attributes thereto, he tries to advocate for a kind of balance between knowledge and freedom in order that both be made possible for our levels of Existence in the world. Similar struggles are evident in many different philosophies as investigated above.

For Jaspers, the distinguishing features of humans are that they possess the authentic attributes of Existence and Transcendence, and questions about those attributes cannot be posed in objective or material terms. The point is that the two X-terms of 'The Encompassing' and 'The Transcendent' show not only a superiority over that which is encompassed and transcended, but also a hierarchical binding of ideas into the highest concept imaginable for Jaspers. The human condition then is characterized as an on-going journey of sorts one that will not be fully accomplished or completed in the world because that would result in an absolutization of objective knowledge which Jaspers will not allow, hence the high abstraction of X-terms. By selecting indefinable terms such as these, Jaspers is able to retain the noumenal quality of that which lies beyond the boundary of our experience of the world, and our knowledge thereof.

4.3.13 The question of counter subjects

Counter-subjects may be encountered in discourse that contains (at least two or even multiple) different subjects with similar operators aimed at the same domains. This mode of binary/pluralistic application to the subject term explains and structures what might initially puzzle the reader in trying to reconcile seemingly divergent areas in a certain thinker's work; counter subjects are usually notated below the main subject. The problem for Key theory is that counter subjects imply an ipso facto dualism (as covered in Department 19 of DA) which will direct the analyst to immediate deconstruction because dualisms are not accommodated in DA's systematic model.

Remaining with the work of Jaspers for the time being, there is an important issue to consider which is central to his work. Jaspers covers a number of areas in his work, including the freedom and restraint of our existence in the world. I note here that a central concern of Jaspers is located in the DA notion Personhood (2). However, in this instance, I want to focus on its rooting in the dark postures – specifically that of failure (*das Scheitern*), or foundering which he takes to be universal. Now, this failure, in its authentic form provides for something beyond a scientific worldview which is limited, and which cannot be provided in happiness which has an ‘emptiness’ (1932: 203). One can see here the trend in the existential posture is toward that of irrationalism in that it is concerned with a highly individual motif. One can only be awakened to possible Existenz in the suffering of the boundary situation that Existenz emerges from its dormant state and allows one to reach authentic personhood and to make a leap – to transcend - to ‘touch being’ (1932: 222). The existence of people in the world frees them to possible Existenz and Transcendence as depicted in the key formulation:

i. [Personhood(2)/Postures-dark] [Precede] [Existenz/Transcendence]

I have alluded to Kantian remnants in Jaspers’ work above, but similar reflections can be found in Popper’s Three Worlds theory of knowledge (Visagie, 1983: 15), for which one could formulate the following key:

ii.

[Extension]

[Personhood] [Precede] [Knowledge]

[Theory]

In this key, it is clear that Popper distinguishes the physical world, the subjective apprehension thereof, and the objective abstraction to theory as separate from,

but all constitutive of, knowledge. One must bear these multiplicities in mind when doing archaeological analyses.

4.3.14 The wider context: key interlogic

In philosophy, as in mathematics, one may speak of transitivity, similar to that mentioned above in the linguistic sense. What this entails for Key theory is the linkage of terms in a chain of recursive argumentation which is different from the explicit formulas mentioned above. These formulas ‘grow’ the subsequent sequences from the originating X-term such as:

i.

$A \rightarrow B$

$B \rightarrow C$

$C \rightarrow D$

The chain could go on and on in terms of actual arguments employed in discourse, but what remains is that A is more superior and dominant than all the other terms that follow it. This could also be linked to the idea of recursion in which concepts are built upon other concepts in an infinite chain, or as Chomsky states: ‘There is a perfectly coherent sense to the notion of infinite use of finite means’ (2000: 62). What then seems relevant for philosophical discourse is that some parts of the argument are subordinate to other parts of the argument, and again one is left with the hierarchical structure depicted in Key theory. To take an actual example of Mark Johnson’s grounding of morality (1993) the argument could be notated as:

ii.

[Body-Brain] \rightarrow [Metaphor]

[Metaphor] → [Frame]

[Frame] → [Concepts]

[Concepts] → [Morality]

Alternatively the format could be:

iii. $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D$

Hence, for Johnson:

iv. [Body-Brain] → [Metaphor] → [Frame] → [Morality]

Visagie has used the term for the keys that follow the main subject term 'shadow keys' and the notation would depend on how the analyst wants to break down the structure in deconstructing the various elements. What the example of Johnson exhibits, is that whether one wants to note the argument chain in one way or the other, the hierarchical structure portrays all pursuant elements as grounded in the bodily experience together with imaginative processes. Whatever key elements are recursively generated thereafter - metaphors, which map together to form frames, which invoke the concepts employed in morality - are all grounded in the initial subject - which is accredited with suitable superiority in moral language. However, the analyst chooses to break up morality, in this case, into its various constituents, Key theory proposes that these constituents will point back to the X-factor involved without one necessarily being aware of it in every part of the ordinary semantics of the discourse. Once one has clearly established which X-term(s) the thinker in question has chosen, the recursive chains should be more readily detectable.

4.3.15 The interface context: Chomsky and Jackendoff

In the interface context of Key theory, I, like Visagie, am concerned both with meaning and creativity as it occurs in philosophical discourse. With meaning, one aims to locate grounding structures in discourse and examine how they are put together to form key concepts. With creativity, one aims to understand how these key concepts are used. This kind of approach is not the same as the Saussurean associations above, which largely have to do with social conventions. It is linked to the work of Chomsky and Jackendoff, as the title of this section suggests, who take a decidedly more scientific attitude to the study of language and Visagie has drawn extensively on their work in developing Key theory as a part of DA which can be described as 'a set of specialized, interacting analytical tools' (2005: 135). He sees theories which consist of single analytical tools as insufficient for delving into the vastly differing types and levels of discourse with which one has to contend in philosophy. Further, Visagie postulates that these theories are in fact interrelated, so the tools one acquires for analysis must be able to be combined in order to relativize one another. 'Thus the analysis that each tool provides is of relative value' (2005: 136). In this way, one can introduce both the idea of constraint as well as that of enhancement. One could take a glimpse at Chomsky and Jackendoff's approaches to language in order to see what each may bring to analysis.

In *Syntactic structures* (1975: 2), Chomsky discusses the independence of grammar with regard to the linguistic analyses of a language. Natural languages have a finite set of phonemes (letters in its alphabet) which are representable as finite sequences of these phonemes in sentences, but there are infinitely many sentences in a language and the aim of linguistic analysis is to distinguish between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences as they are acceptable (or

not) to a native speaker. This syntactic device occurs independently of meaning or semantics and these famous examples are cited to make the point (1975: 15):

- i. 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.
- ii. Furiously sleep ideas green colourless.'

The first example is grammatically acceptable, and the second example is not; both are meaningless in the semantic sense. (One can refer to the well-known Lewis Carroll poem *Jabberwocky* for an excellent literary example of this phenomenon.) Chomsky does acknowledge the importance of other elements and studies of language, but that they have no direct relevance in the problematic of establishing grammatical utterances. From this interesting perspective, language, for Chomsky is representational and requires a determination of the constraints for use. He suggests that the most that can reasonably be expected from a linguistic theory would provide an 'evaluative procedure' (1975: 51) for grammars which show us the better use of competing proposed grammars. Incidentally, *movement* in Key theory, as described above, would basically be explained as transformations or manipulations of the simplest segments of the key structure. Here Key theory might find a point of concord in structural analysis with Chomsky's suggestion: 'To understand a sentence it is necessary (though not, of course, sufficient) to reconstruct its representation on each level where the kernel sentences underlying a given sentence can be thought of, in a sense, as the 'elementary content elements' out of which this sentence is constructed ... which can support semantic analysis' (1975: 108). It seems clear here that Visagie has envisaged the contents of key structures in much the same way that Chomsky has proposed in this work.

Jackendoff, on the other hand, has proposed 'that phonological and conceptual structures do have properties of their own, not predictable from syntax, so we

must abandon the syntactocentric picture' (1997: 39). He has been concerned with formulating grounds for a theory of meaning – Conceptual Semantics – which interfaces generative syntax and phonology as well as taking into account theories of perception, cognition and conscious experience. In effect, regarding semantics, Jackendoff looks to go beyond the borders of linguistic experience and include non-linguistic experience in order to generate a set of primitives which can be combined in an innately constrained way that renders them usable. In dealing with the acquisition of concepts (which are mental representations of the meaning of linguistic expressions), Jackendoff suggests that one can make a case not only for learners of a language acquiring principles which allow us to assemble syntactically well-formed sentences, but also acquiring principles 'for constructing the corresponding sentential concepts' (1990: 10). The theories of syntax/phonology and conceptual structure, then, are taken to be entirely parallel to one another.

Jackendoff argues that attention has been given to the grammatical constraint of language use but not much attention has been given to the cognitive constraint and that is needed in order to apply the language in a useful way. The issue for Key theory is that Jackendoff's examples deal with objects, events, actions, states and not abstract domains and the conceptual structure has to further encode an appropriate argument structure. Jackendoff looks to establish some sort of model that can deal with the same utterance identified in a syntactic analysis and translate it into a conceptual structure, which is a similar field to that which Key theory tackles, aiming to deal with semantic issues, going beyond syntax in the conventional sense. Hence, one is not left with a contradiction between syntax and semantics, but an interface. One would assume that Chomsky would simply deny this approach, calling it manipulation of the sentence. In Jackendoff's function argument structure, he uses the form:

- iii. Verb, (Subject, Object), or, in relevantly similar key notation,
- iv. Operator, (Subject, Domain), as in a key:
- v. Cause, (Nature, Reality)

So, while he makes appropriate inroads in elevating other domains like the physical world to new importance in conceptual structuring, the world of Visagie's abstract sectors of reality and their configurations seem, up to now, somewhat left out. What one can glean from Jackendoff, however is the importance of not only studying objects, which is what the DA departments individually do, but also use multiple studies to interface even more domains that Jackendoff suggests to avoid conflation of concepts. He suggests that one does not want to add more primitive functions to the system, but develop seemingly large semantic primitive fields into coherent feature systems. This is what Visagie has attempted to do in forming Key elements in a minimalistic way, so as to acquire more structure as opposed to growing content. Jackendoff appropriately notes: '...without a theory of structure, we cannot know what a theory of process has to explain' (1983: 6). What analysts gain for Key theory is an interface between all parts and levels of arguments. Each department is assumed to have a unique language, but there can be mapping between them.

4.3.16 Trans-contextuality: silver keys and intra-departmental shifts

Up to now, I have been dealing with primarily 'golden keys' which occur between departments. However, Visagie has made the observation that there may also be 'silver keys' which occur within a discipline. How the thinker chooses to treat the constituents within his discipline will affect the theoretical framework within

which he works. For example: within the discipline of linguistics, there may be the following silver key:

- i. [Syntax] → [Thought/Communication/Semantics]

One may term these phenomena as ‘interdisciplinary keys’ which do not put the discipline itself in the subject or domain, yet they do serve to further clarify how the thinker perceives his subject. For a syntactic linguistic key like that exemplified in the work of Chomsky, one can immediately deduce that syntax enjoys an elevated status over that of semantics and phonetics, and functions independently from that of semantics and phonetics (1975: 17). Moreover, what this implies is that syntax is not causally subjected to anything outside of itself - syntax is the determiner – therefore the focus is on how words are combined and ordered as opposed to concentrating on the words themselves. This internal ordering is present in other disciplines like the question of *form* over *content* within the discipline of logic and argumentation; or in aesthetics, the question of whether the *form* of an artwork, the *creative* skill and *intent* of the artist or the *interpretation* of an onlooker takes primacy in determining the validity and value of art objects, and so on. No individual key should be uncritically seized upon as normative.

I suggest that one should differentiate between ‘silver keys’ and differing paradigms existing within a discipline. This entails the integration of other departments which affect the thinking and organization of theoretical frameworks within a discipline. This may be displayed in linguistics as separate or related ventures investigating e.g. the role of culture (anthropological linguistics), society (sociolinguistics), mind (psycholinguistics), common-sense understanding (folk linguistics), crime facts (forensic linguistics), embodiment (cognitive linguistics), history (comparative linguistics) and so on. This, in turn, may also affect the interdisciplinary machinery as such, but from an external perspective, in

something resembling a Kuhnian 'paradigm shift'. The issue of whether 'mind' or 'society' might be a determiner in language will bring about changes in thought patterns and approaches in a discipline. Further, these competing views may come and go out of fashion but they may all seem to bear a measure of legitimacy within the discipline itself, and so further an analyst's quest to inquire about the foundations within and across disciplines.

Visagie has argued systematics is linked to the history of philosophy and to foundational issues within disciplines which are invariably of a philosophical nature – disciplinary philosophy – where e.g. artists are forced to lapse into a philosophical language within their discipline while making pronouncements that transcend the actual borders of the discipline. When posing a foundational question such as, "What is science?" one is no longer doing science but philosophy, and Visagie would suggest that one needs access to an effective philosophy at this point which advocates the uniqueness and coherence of the departments. In practical application, Key theory pervades the whole landscape because it allows for these shifts in internal logic and rhetoric within disciplinary debate. Whether the key application occurs between or within disciplines and whether this begins with evident changes in conceptual worldviews - it would seem that no matter the precise context, the structure remains the same.

5. Typological and diagnostic contexts

Close study of the whole key complex shows certain typological characteristics which illustrate how there might be interesting similarities between facets of the philosophies of, say, Parmenides and Heidegger, or Parmenides and Descartes, when these philosophers are not customarily linked together. As Visagie has noted: 'The structural descriptions of logosemantic propositions seem to make it possible to distinguish between different philosophical "languages", and to determine what expressions belong to what languages, according to certain choices that fill out the content of a given proposition' (2006: 31). The idea of such language games has been noted in the work of thinkers such as Lyotard (1984: 9) and Wittgenstein (in Finch, 2001: 44). Visagie notes the difference between types of thinking that emphasize certain attributes over others as allowing them to be grouped together, but this is not the same differentiation that occurs when one picks out philosophical 'isms' such as Rationalism and Empiricism which he calls *philosophical ideologies*. So, for example, Key theory would recognize the naturalism found in present-day embodiment theses in cognitive science (which are examined below) as a descendent of Darwin and evolutionist theories, who, in turn, received their naturalistic foundations from Hume. Usually, these 'isms' are evident in the thinker's selection of the X-term; they are emphasized and further discernible by the qualitative semantic elements orbiting that X-term.

These philosophical ideologies are set apart from those found in the first *social culture* sphere housed in Department 7^{xxxv} of DA (see ITM in Overview). The first sphere is immediately concerned with what happens on a contextualized or existential level in particular social/cultural/historical/political environments. Connections between authority and power, and how or whether they are

legitimately applied in concrete contexts, are of paramount importance in this type of investigation. Issues surrounding forms and effects of domination and subjugation are relevant here in terms of identifying ideologies that enjoy a hyper-normative status which allows an illicit annexation of numerous other cultural domains resulting in what Visagie has termed 'hypercontextual knowledge' (1994: vi). As I understand it, these norms serve to motivate people to think and conduct themselves in ways which recursively re-sanction the functioning of a given social or cultural order. This provides room for perversion of truth, skewing of justice, altering of perceptions, and so on. Further, one should note that often what is happening in actuality, on the ground, so to speak, may not be reflected in theoretical discussions, even when particularly about the phenomena in question. This is why the model seeks to differentiate the spheres, and I would suggest the differentiation is an important one because of potential discrepancies between the three spheres.

I return to what concerns analysts in this context. Philosophical ideologies are housed in the same department but in the second sphere of *theoretical culture*, (with *aesthetic culture* in the third sphere). Each may have an effect on the other, direct or not, overt or not, which should be noted accordingly in analysis. In this kind of classification, one would look to key formulations in order to determine what exactly is forming conceptual continuities that '...may link the world view of thinkers situated in wholly different philosophical paradigms (whether the latter be near to, or far from each other, in terms of cultural time)' (Visagie, 1994: 160). Alternatively, the same procedure could be used to expose deeper-level differences within the same philosophical paradigm. For example: In existential discourse one may note a similarity between Jaspers and Sartre, who address subjective (positive) considerations of freedom and choice by way of the dark postures (suffering, guilt, meaninglessness, failure, nothingness) contained in Department 2 of DA, while Heidegger is set apart from them in his

shift in focus to people's participation in an upper-attributed conception of *Being* (which moves away from the individualized situatedness of the subject toward authenticity and freedom in the generalized potentiality of *Being*.) This he possibly inherits from Parmenides and the Greeks, whom he greatly admired. Explicitly optimistic or hedonistic existential language like that of Epicurus, on the other hand, may focus on the light postures as a means to knowledge and freedom while pessimistic language remains resignedly embedded in the dark postures as in e.g. Schopenhauer, for whom suffering is expressed as a normal state of being. Many philosophers will overtly distance themselves from being hemmed into an 'ism', like Jaspers, who did not want to be known as an 'existentialist' *per se*. That does not preclude analysts from using key logic and semantics to locate his use of existentialist *language* which revolves, at major stages in the discourse, around the issue of Personhood (P2) as key subject. To clarify the differences in the Personhood macro-motive: the first type of Personhood (P1) would be found in Kant which studies the structure of human nature; P2 involves aspects of one's subjective being in the world; while P3 which caught the attention of philosophers like Rorty and Foucault reawakens something of the transformational ethics reminiscent of the Hellenistic philosophers e.g. the Stoics which emphasizes dynamism – transforming oneself and living artfully are strong themes here.

Visagie (1994: 161) duly acknowledges the influence of Vollenhoven ('types / time streams') and Seerveld ('philosophical neighbourhoods') in recognizing possible types and thought traditions in the fundamentals of philosophies^{xxxvi}. The relevance for Key theory is that when one surveys the history of philosophy with systematic interests, one is directed toward regarding the difficulties investigated by various thinkers as recurrent and unchanging systematic problems in the discipline. One notes these recurring themes in order that one may gain insight from one's predecessors and reinterpret them in the light of

contemporary concerns and developments. In Wolters, one reads Vollenhoven's problem-historical method proposes 'a theory of constant types' which is traced from the time of the Greeks and shows 'remarkable continuity' (1979: 233). One can rework this in the typology of Key theory as recognizing successive connections in time streams where they are relevant and breaks from precedent traditions where they are relevant. There is continuity and discontinuity with regard to types, schools, periods and reactions to them throughout the history of the discipline. Wolters comments further: 'Behind every philosophical difference, he looks for the common ground which makes it possible...This common basis is the formulation of the problem, and the comparison and contrast establishes *verbanden*^{xxxvii}' (1979: 248). Visagie also finds a point of contact in his own minimalistic approach to Key types as he also does not see the problem of types as an infinite one, they are relatively limited in number and relapse repeatedly in every new philosophical epoch.

Key theory would be able to accommodate all kinds of 'isms' in description as well as what Seerveld has referred to as *geneticistic* and *structuralistic* types; the former of which will have a subject associated with attributes and operators of the flowing, dynamic genesis often found in irrationalism or anti-rationalism; while the latter favours the rationalist approach of unchanging and stable structuring represented in the Greeks and the Scholastics. In his analysis of Heraclitus, Eckhart, Machiavelli and Cassirer, he categorizes all of them into a philosophical neighbourhood he calls 'geneticistic contradictory monism' (1975: 274). It is *geneticistic* because it emphasizes a process whereby recurring, changeless cycles order life; it is *contradictory* because it involves struggle and strife and a tension between opposites; and it is *monistic* because it proposes a singular model of Reality in terms of origin, process and end. From his interesting diagrams, one may extract the following key for Machiavelli:

i. [Opportunity] [Generate] [Reality]

Machiavelli emerged from a strong humanist educational paradigm and the context of his life history is informed by ruthless political strife and power as well as the struggle for dominance of the Catholic Church over some powerful monarchs. So, he had an appreciation for the harsh realities of the human condition and conceptually identified [Reality] with ‘endless striving’ (1975: 287). In *The prince*^{xxxviii}, Machiavelli offers a model of power that connects specifically to authority. He is not describing a legitimate authority that applies power in a benevolent way over his subjects because he is a good and virtuous ruler. He is describing a model of power that implies whoever is in charge has the right to wield power – hence [Opportunity] in the X-position with lower attributes attached. For Machiavelli, morals have no bearing on power and moral rulers are no better authorities because they are good; in fact, they may use any means they deem necessary to hold on to their power. Further, it is their business to educate themselves in the strategies that will ensure law and order among their subjects. Seerveld rejects this view on the basis that it is placed in the ideology of statism, racism and fascism. (He goes on to reject a number of ‘isms’ in his argument such as secularism, rationalism, scientism, positivism, humanism, and so on.)

What is interesting in the analysis, though, is that Seerveld fails to recognize all the ideologies he supports as a consequence of his own religious sentiments. If one takes Machiavelli at face value, there is a case to be made against this supposed support for abuse of power. However, Machiavelli is known for claiming that he was not a philosopher, and he was a noted satirist who wrote popular, bawdy stage comedies. Rousseau and Mattingly, and others have long held that Machiavelli intended to *expose* and *not* celebrate the immorality and foibles of the ruling class. In *The Cultural atlas of the Renaissance* (1993: 118)

one gets a completely different picture in that Machiavelli was merely describing events as they were, and he dedicated the work to the ruling Lorenzo de' Medici which could have been a satirical slap in the face, or a show of renewed loyalty in order to gain favour as the Medici's were responsible for Machiavelli's imprisonment, torture and exile on conspiracy charges (Marriott, 2007: 10) and did not offer him office after his release. This alternative point of view has been discussed simply to show another type of interpretation to Seerveld, and the possible shortcomings of criticizing typologies within one's own specific ideological frameworks, which are abundantly evident in Seerveld by the strong metaphorical and rhetorical language he uses in his assessments (manifest in numerous phrases like '...the decidedly secular Spirit gives its fix on reality on a specially heartless character...deeply diabolical' 1975: 286).

It may be useful at this point to note that in analysis, it is not only the attributes, but also subjects, domains, metaphors, and so on, that come into play when establishing types and time frames, although they might be the analyst's first clue as to where the thinker may be heading. Moreover, this is not to say that the discourse will choose *all* the upper attributes or *all* the lower attributes. In order to engage in critique of attributes, one need minimally locate at least one pair. Further, in establishing types and time-frames, one would have to examine the various components in key formulas and clarify just how they compare with the components of other key formulas. Comparisons and contrasts of units in keys will reveal similarities and differences that are both obvious and subtle.

Again, the aim is to identify the dialectic at play in discourse in order to acknowledge and specify a possible temporal context and/or ideological structure in which a thinker works and not package philosophers into definitive compendiums. That would indeed put a ceiling on possibilities for meaning and

impede interpretation which is not the aim of Key theory. What needs to happen in this part of analysis is that the analyst work from the critical standpoint that no philosophy can be considered in effect *neutral* as much as one might like to envisage an ideal philosophy completely vacated by isms. There are ideologizing elements at play in various forms which need to be relativized against other justifiable driving components to reduce the damage they may be doing in terms of their possible slanting of truth by means of either overplaying their hand or overlooking the hand of others. Schrag (1992: 86) has also recognized the problem of over-identification of a single regulator: 'The determination of a genre or type unfolds against a background of a spectrum of social practices and linguistic usages, including social expectancies and institutional forms as well as speakers' intentions.' In other words, there may be a need to appeal to theoretical elements outside of what one would ordinarily consider in a certain area of study in order to validate its claims. How then does one temper this inexorable push toward key dogma in favour of a more balanced analysis?

DA proposes that Macro-motive theory (Visagie, 1996: 129) would have the analyst balance the discourse in a non-ideologized way by accommodating the macro-motives alongside one another in the subject as opposed to simply substituting X-terms for other X-terms. The deeper level of Macro-motive theory entails an abstract attitude to thought about macro values, and imagining their combinations, transformations, permutations in relation to concrete ideological environments. In terms of the critique that Macro-motive theory brings to the real world, one actually works from the perspective of the idealized life world, where the Macro-motives would co-exist harmoniously, none of them perpetrating harmful relations of domination over another. Visagie (1996: 129) notes the macro-motives of Nature, Knowledge, Power and Personhood as the main contenders. Later suggestions include Society, Culture and Humanity (and I

show below that all of the departments and their sub-divisions can actually enter the picture here - some legitimately and some not). Any of these motives commonly fill the subject term in keys quite periodically and in discourse they function like a meta-narrative. These are the targets of many of the postmodern critiques. In order to curb their hyper-normative tendencies Visagie suggests relativizing them against one another by looking at each 'through the lenses' of the other, so to speak, thereby limiting their horizons. The analyst, then, has to take the stance of conceptualizing the macro-motives as a set of cross-temporal, cross-cultural archetypal themes situated over the ideology spheres as such. Thus, although someone like Seerveld makes interesting diagnoses and designates typologies quite well, he does not relativize e.g. the Machiavelli macro-motives of Power and Culture against, say, Nature, Knowledge, Personhood and Humanity in his critique. He relativizes them against *another* ideology, i.e. the Christian Reformationist religion, which, in its *particular* disciplinary presuppositions, is not viewed as 'wrong' per se, but it is socio-historical, so it cannot lay claim to a *universalizable* truth about human beings in general; it cannot even speak for the whole group of, say, Christians.

Moreover, this shows that in order to broaden and deepen analyses of texts, it seems advantageous not to rely solely on cognition and conceptuality or 'reason' as proposed by some theorists. Analysts must be able to access some understanding of cultural and historical paradigms that inform such thinking as well as be able to recognize where they are encroaching on other parts of reality and manipulating readers' views thereof. The model of ideology, as utilized in DA, distinguishes between the possible truth content contained in a theory or discourse, and its ideological aspect. This includes the paradigms in philosophical texts which themselves may fall prey to adverse effects of 'classical elements of falseness, illusion, distortion, and the like' (Visagie, 2005: 14). The actual content of key structures is informed by the various ideologies

(or value-paradigms) that operate within a given society as they break into trends in art, science and other cultural spheres, as they are advanced to the rank of an absolute principle and become unavoidably ideological in nature. This is why the theory suggests interdepartmental synthesis for concept formation produced by the diversification of the DA model as opposed to remaining within the ideology exchange loop as Seerveld unfortunately does.

Further, one might note in this context philosophers like Heidegger who engage in a dangerous culturalist key-play that undermines the deconstructionist imperatives in key logic. There is a temptation in culturalist discourse to identify a specific culture as a group and therefore seemingly avoid the prejudicial implications of a subject-centred discourse. The communitarian associations inherent in this kind of discourse supposedly combat the fall into particularism usually associated with privileging of an individual subject. However, with Heidegger, it is well-known that there is an elevation and clear favouring of all things German – the language, the people, and the systems of education. This is acutely evident in his rectoral address (1945) which is dedicated to ‘a self-affirmation of the German university’. Derrida deconstructs this spiritual mission with fervent enthusiasm in *Of spirit. Heidegger and the question* (1989: 32). Ironically, Heidegger’s investigations into a pre-ontological, structuralistic understanding of *Being* become problematic in the context of his rectoral address. Under the unifying power of the *Dasein* of the German people, the leaders will lead toward an authentic form of life for the people, which is imprinted in their destiny. Derrida notes this exaltation of spirit emerges in the form of a will to know and a will to essence, with the explicit aim of achieving power and grandeur. This, he suggests results in a ‘biologism...naturalism...racism in its genetic form’ (1989: 39). Habermas critiques Heidegger in the following manner: ‘Heidegger now singles out the historical existence of a nation yoked together by the Fuhrer in a collective will in

which *Dasein's* authentic capacity to be whole is to be decided' (1990: 157). Now one can see that this leaves Heidegger somewhat wanting if pressed to envision something like a Culturist Ideology of the university in general: what would this imply in a formal model? Here, one finds somewhat of an inability to recognize a Culturist discourse for what it is, and its implacable hijacking of the university, via a German spiritualist colonization of authentic academic norms. DA can show formally how, in Culturalist ideology, knowledge in the university context is hindered from being penetrated by communicative democratic processes even though it is presented as a communitarian concern. Culturists might be at a loss when asked to formally conceptualize this obviously crucial link. As Habermas aptly concludes his remarks on Heidegger: 'Inasmuch as he propagates a mere inversion of the thought-patterns of the philosophy of the subject, Heidegger remains caught up in the problematic of that kind of philosophy' (1990: 160).


I surmise it useful to bear in mind, that while typologies are convenient in explicating recurring themes historiography and designating shared foundations, such understanding is never complete, and is usually modified in interpretation among different philosophies. It should always be subject to further breakdown. Any indulgence in the analysis of theory is necessarily finite and fallible. Possible misinterpretation and ambiguity should constantly look toward explanation and evaluation for clarity, and these, as well, should be seen as on-going interchanges.

6. Keys and metaphors – the interface with semiotics


Given that Key theory (and DA) is an approach to discourse with goals that include forming crossing points between theories, it seems relevantly compatible with the new inter-disciplinary field of cognitive science which has been quite well-established in universities in recent years with various departments, conferences and journals of its own. There are now over 70 universities in North America with cognitive science departments and many more who, at least, offer courses in the discipline^{xxxix}. In South Africa, studies in cognitive science are considerably more limited but it is my assumption that this discipline has much to offer the field of philosophy and vice-versa. Cognitive science seeks to assimilate what is known about the mind and intelligence from several academic fields of study, including philosophy, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, computer science or artificial intelligence and neuroscience. In Hookway and Peterson (1993: v) one reads: 'The background to this growing interest in the sciences of mind is a more general breaking down of disciplinary boundaries.' In this context, I wish to explore a relationship between Key theory and cognitive science that would be mutually beneficial as well as mutually censorious. Visagie (1990: 3) has indicated the need for taking note of these modern developments because not only do they affect the field of archaeological discourse itself, but for some time now, philosophy has been concerned with the phenomenon of language.

In DA, keys are complemented by the Figurative Semiotic department in order to further enhance the evaluation of the discourse concerned. This approach offers another level of critique besides looking at the key relationship and attributes and, in my opinion, is of decisive importance to Key theory. The protological inter-faculty link to the Semiotic theory (Department 5 in DA) sheds further light

on how thinkers convey their argument to the reader by helping us to determine which metaphorical constructs might come into play in the discourse. Again, metaphorical constructs may be linked to any part of the key construct and, in notation, Visagie and I usually ‘box’ it below the relevant term as such:



Further, the above conceptual clusters could be represented in an actual key notation with which readers may be familiar:



Visagie has referred to this example of the metaphor of 'nature as mother' (1990: 22) as have many others from the Greeks to Darwin to the Gaia hypotheses in more recent discourse. Apart from the *hierarchical* relationship contained in keys and the *qualitative* distinctions contained in attributes, there is also a connection of perceived partial identification contained in metaphors and similar cognitive constructs. In this sense, there has been a decisive move away from what has traditionally been defined as 'metaphor'. The theory is not only working with metaphor in the narrowly confined aesthetic sense as a literary device for manipulating meaning. According to Mark Johnson (1981: 4), the traditional view of metaphor has been developed from the time of the Greeks,

who viewed metaphor as being primarily associated with the realm of poetry and they were suspicious of it being misused when altering the meaning of truth. The Greeks also perceived metaphor as a form of comparison, and this continued for some time as shown in the work of Cicero, who then relegates metaphor to a 'subordinate form of comparison' (*ibid*: 8) which further reduces its importance in philosophical discourse. Johnson further notes the more overt and hostile criticisms that emerged from the monastic traditions which emphasized what Visagie would term a 'transformationalist account of personhood' that stresses, among other things, the importance of a contemplative inner life over worldly concerns (2006: 57). Words become outer expressions of inner truths. Aquinas allows, on the other hand, that the use of metaphor can be good when applied to God, because one can only describe God in figurative terms due to one's inability to apprehend him in himself; one can only apprehend him in *similarities* that one can identify. One will recall Visagie's designation of this type of thought to the theo-ontological schematization discussed in 4.3.9 above. In modern philosophy, there is also a notion of mistrust attached to metaphor since it is assumed to distort meaning and deceive readers. In the contemporary cognitive scientific context, these suppositions are not really bestowed upon metaphor anymore. Furthermore, metaphor is not only recognized as a linguistic phenomenon, but, as Johnson suggests, a matter of thought and action, language and cognition, meaning, truth and human understanding. I am in agreement with Johnson here, and I believe the Cognitive faculty of DA is quite partial to being compatible with this view.

In order to clarify this section, I draw primarily on the work of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson in *Metaphors we live by* (1980) who demonstrate their argument in numerous ordinary language specimens like 'argument is war' and 'time is money', and so forth. Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors, or metaphorical concepts, are omnipresent in all thought,

language and action. Metaphor is not just a matter of words, but defines people's conceptual systems in a largely unconscious way. They draw their conclusions from numerous examples in ordinary language. The structure of a metaphor within a key is simply one of understanding a key element in terms of another (different) concept or thing, i.e. 'X is M' or 'X as M', with M being the source domain and X being the target domain. This structure also forms the basis of a Figurative Semiotic theory in DA which houses all forms of figuration, be they basic metaphors or novel metaphors; or larger constructs like frames, categories, metonymies and types; or variations in representation like symbols, signs, icons, personification, synecdoches; and so on. There does, however, seem to be merit in distinguishing between the figuration that one unconsciously accesses and novel fabrications that are formed for various preferred outcomes in philosophical discourse.

I will consider as an example some metaphorical mappings for the concept of 'justice'. If one returns to the work of Rawls, one would see that apart from his key [Justice] [Base] [Society], the metaphor he uses is 'justice as fairness'. In Key notation, one would box 'fairness' under the X-term. However, one would note that the content of the metaphor 'justice as fairness' cannot be taken as a universal - there are many other metaphors for 'justice' such as 'justice as retribution', 'justice as transformation', 'justice as restoration', and so on. It is not the case that 'justice' is exactly the same kind of thing as 'fairness'; they are actually two different kinds of things but one is partially structured, understood, carried out and discussed in terms of the other. I take note of what Lakoff and Johnson observe: 'The concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured' (1980: 5). Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson argue that these associations are not necessary for people's conceptualizations of (my example of) "justice", they are tied to culture and there may be different associations for

“justice” across different cultures. Indeed, in a totalitarian monarchy, “justice” may be conceptualized as obedience to the king or successfully executing the biddings of the queen. What these contrasting conceptions of “justice” allow analysts to do, is form systems based on subcategorization in order that one might expose the entailment relationships between the metaphors and, most importantly for key critique, evaluate whether or not they are tenable or if there are better / alternative substitutions. Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphorical systematicity allows for hiding and highlighting of specific features in the metaphorical relationship (1980: 10). For instance: “justice as fairness” allows one to concentrate one’s attention on *equality* and *parity* assumed to be integral to Rawls’ distributive justice. This is opposed to *reckoning*, *punishment* and *revenge* in the retributive model, or *healing* and *repairing* in the restorative model, or *change*, *education* and *conversion* and *reintegration to society* in the transformative model.

With metaphors, as with keys, the entailments are not always explicit. In fact, because the hiding and highlighting are partial, they may be extended very craftily on the part of the author, and it is up to the analyst to seek them out and determine their meaning in context, i.e. in terms of what is included and what is excluded. Let me review by means of a very concrete example: when one is presented with certain metaphors like “abortion is murder”, one recognizes this as a branded representation used in anti-abortion campaigns of the type commonly seen in various media, although, in reality, one is presented with a single, oversimplified illustration of abortion - in this case - the “murder” of a foetus. The “act of killing” is highlighted while all the other issues surrounding the very complex topic of abortion are hidden. (E.g. the complex psychological challenges facing mother, father or doctor; the potential horror of an unwanted baby being severely neglected or abused; the rights and choices of women; the social, political and legal contexts; the role of religious beliefs and cultural

customs; cases of possible endangerment of the mother; complications surrounding pregnancy resulting from rape; dealing with foetal abnormalities; and so forth.) These important complexities, and many others, are simply eliminated from the above figuration of the conundrum, and consequently, from the attention of readers. Customarily, the “abortion is murder” figure has been bracketed together with the conservative and religious side of the abortion debate.

However, one has to question why is the debate being framed by the conservatives in this particular way? Is one reason for the frequency of abortion in society not due to the conservative camp’s persistent rejection, degradation and stigmatization of women who fall pregnant outside of heterosexual wedlock and become single mothers? Is another reason for the problem not due to the reluctance of some women to acquire the appropriate birth control because, if exposed, this would be evident of their “immoral behaviour” seeing that extra-marital intercourse is so judged in conservative and religious circles? It would seem that by emphasizing the *killing* of the foetus in the example used, the conservative camp might be looking for a way to avoid accepting their own culpability in directly instigating the very predicament that they seek to demonize in contemporary society. The other side of the abortion debate is the liberal / progressive slogan which emerges in various figures advocating “pro-choice”. Again, the Liberals might be guilty of framing their figure in such a way in order to hide their overemphasis of individual choice which may lead to a reckless abandon of responsibilities and a culture of selfism. When this results in an unwanted pregnancy, the “problem” is taken care of and the responsibility removed. One could elaborate further, but from this brief exchange, one can see that as analysts, one needs to make the extension to other possible representations and actively make them part of the discussion. If these representations are not made part of the debate, they will simply go unnoticed

and unevaluated and the complexity of the quandary never reaches the depth required for constructive resolutions.

Apart from structural metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson include the following constructs, all of which Visagie and I recognize:

- Orientational metaphors give a concept of spatial orientation such as *up-down* and *in-out*.
- Ontological metaphors give categories of entities and substances.
- Personification endows non-human entities with human capabilities.
- Metonymy (dissimilar entities) and synecdoche (part-whole) schemas.

Visagie has mentioned use of these and has also made use of other tropes signifying similar constructs such as symbols, signs, icons, images, models, figures, etc., (*Holistiese Logika*, 1989) in what may be termed an ‘aesthetic descriptive component.’^{xl} These constructs could be carried further to include theme, motif, analogy, parable, irony and narrative as is often addressed in metaphorical analyses (see Visagie, 2006 and Lakoff & Turner, 1989). It is quite clear in the work of Lakoff and Johnson and the related work of Lakoff and Mark Turner (*More than cool reason. A field guide to poetic metaphor*) that they are not dealing with concepts that are especially classified as aesthetic or literary devices even when dealing with poetry, prose or similar material. They are in fact ‘...using the word “metaphor” in a non-traditional way’ (1989: 138). They assert that although particular poets and writers consciously and wilfully compose and extend metaphors in new, interesting, and aesthetically creative ways, they did not conceive the basic metaphors on which their writing is established; those were already widely present in the thought of our culture. This distinction is consistent in the work of Lakoff and his collaborators in varied

disciplines to which he has applied metaphorical analyses, and it is one with which I will proceed here.

Lakoff and Johnson offer arguments proposing grounding for metaphors in experience:

‘In actuality, we feel that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis’ (1980: 19).

And further,

‘...the most important thing to stress about grounding is the distinction between an experience and the way we conceptualize it. We are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more basic than other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental, cultural, or whatever... Rather, what we are claiming about grounding is that we typically conceptualize the non-physical in terms of the physical – that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated *in terms of* the more clearly delineated’ (1980: 59).

When people are confronted with a more abstract term (Nature), they typically determine it with a more concrete one (Mother). There are of course many philosophers who will not agree with this point of view, especially those that advocate for some kind of transcendent or external subject in their keys or those that see metaphor only as non-standard uses of language and therefore incapable of transmitting truth content. DA does make room for such subjects in descriptive and evaluative contexts, which might put it at odds with Lakoff and similar theorists, but does not advocate any particular one as such. The most important point to consider about this model of metaphor is that it is not literal and it is embodied, which does have implications for the practice of philosophy and the way one evaluates philosophical discourse. A running theme in the work of Lakoff and his collaborators is a move away from seeing conceptual metaphor

as an invention by the thinkers in various disciplines, they call for a recognition that basic metaphors have been around before the thinkers in question have used them and they will persist beyond particular works. I would suggest that this forms a point of continuity between this work on metaphor and the work pursued by Visagie in Key theory – that keys are not really ‘discovered’ by particular philosophers as such, but are formed out of structural functions of how one thinks about theory. People all use similar conceptual machinery in order to form both keys and metaphor mappings in philosophical reasoning, otherwise one would not be able to understand what one is dealing with in the work of various philosophers. With keys and with metaphors one may assume that they are carriers of meaning and analysts look for universal semantic elements in constructions that inform how people theorize.

In their expansive work, *Philosophy in the flesh* (1999), Lakoff and Johnson state that the findings of cognitive science put to question the central precepts of Western philosophy. These findings are critical to their work and may be quoted directly (1999: 3):

‘The mind is inherently embodied.

Thought is mostly unconscious.

Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.’

Their argument proceeds from these three major findings of cognitive science and Lakoff and Johnson argue that they are incongruous with fundamental portions of Western philosophy. They specify and analyze these differences as they emerge in philosophical discourse and suggest considering philosophy anew by abandoning some of what one may hold most dear in the Western philosophical tradition in favour of a more empirically responsible philosophy. If one accepts these premises, there are enormously important implications for

one's handling of philosophical theories. *Mind*, as it has been habitually employed in Western philosophy is not defined as a physical entity. When philosophers referred to *mind*, they did not mean *brain*, they meant something beyond the brain and distinct from it – something not reducible to material terms – unless the theory in question is explicitly materialist or physicalist. Lakoff and Johnson are clearly not in support of this view and what is referred to as the *embodied mind* in this work, one would refer to as [Extension] in Key terms. There is no search for such a mysterious entity in this work; mind (and thought) is simply a part of the structure that is employed in one's interactions with the world. Incidentally, because of this view, one will predictably not find the operator of [Transcend] in embodiment theories, except perhaps in the negative sense. More characteristically, one finds [Ground] and [Found] which fit better with an empirical approach.

What Lakoff and Johnson demonstrate in their work is that any attempt to conceptualize the mind involves explaining what it is that thinks, senses, believes, imagines, reasons, wills, and so on. In order to try and explain what these processes involve, one immediately reverts to metaphor. These metaphorical associations typically involve connections to more concrete terms and physical activities like seeing, moving, eating, holding, and so on. This view is supported in their previous work (1980), which argues that when one tries to conceive of abstract entities, one immediately connects them to more readily identifiable physical objects, activities and events. Embodied properties 'constitute our awareness and determine our creative and constructive responses to the situations we encounter' (1999: 266). Lakoff and Johnson apply their embodiment thesis consistently to basic philosophical ideas such as Time, Events and Causes, Mind, Self and Morality, all of which are re-evaluated as ideas which occur in the cognitive unconscious of speakers. These abstract ideas are reinterpreted in their metaphorical presentation based on bodily

experience in order to form the cognitive science thereof. So, for example, the basic keys for the traditions of Rationalism and Empiricism (as mentioned in 4.1 above), which propose either [Reason] or [Experience] respectively, as preceding [Knowledge], are called into question because for Lakoff and Johnson, conceptualization itself is embodied. Abstract experiences are grounded in other everyday experiences, and not in any transcendent entity.

Lakoff and Johnson move on to discuss the cognitive science of philosophical theories, and mention specific philosophers' work in Part III of their work. The first distinction they identify is that between philosophical theories and folk theories. Philosophical theories ask the big questions concerning people's existence and experience in the world while folk theories are understood as emerging from ordinary people and their cultures. What Lakoff and Johnson attempt to do in this section is show how one's basic philosophical theories 'may refine and transform some of these basic concepts, making the ideas consistent, seeing new connections and drawing out novel implications, but they work with the conceptual materials available to them within their particular historical context' (1999: 338). This would further explain how one can have commonly understood ideas across cultures, types and time frames. Visagie has pointed out the problematical term 'folk theory', and has suggested that 'folk' do not theorize^{xli}. I would assume that what Lakoff and Johnson define as a 'folk theory' would be included either in the first department of DA, namely beliefs, the specific contents of which, do not really qualify as 'theories'; or they connect to 'everyday knowledge' contained in Epistemic theory below. Either way, the term would result in some ambiguity which DA would seek to eliminate by way of precise diagnosis within the system. Basic metaphors, then, would not be seen as theories, but constructs contained in a worldview which might affect how a theory is formed. Lakoff and Johnson follow a consistent pattern of analysis in

that they extract the basic metaphors from ordinary language examples and then show which ones underlie particular philosophies.

To look at the metaphors contained in one of the philosophies they investigate, let us consider their chapter on Descartes and the enlightened mind (1999: 391-414) in which they claim it is practically unfeasible to conceptualize mind without metaphor. Descartes metaphorically conceives of mind as an internal representation of an external world. Lakoff and Johnson base their analysis of Descartes on the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor that he employs. Reason is metaphorically identified with *sight* and *light* here. The ordinary language in which the metaphor is identified lies in examples such as:

'I see what you mean' and 'Could you *shed some light* on chaos theory for me? You have a great deal of *insight* into social relations. That's about as *obscure* an idea as I have ever *seen*. We just can't seem to get *clear* about gender roles. Talk about a *murky* argument!' (1999: 394).

This connects Descartes to two other metaphors: IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, and a further one: THINKING IS MATHEMATICAL CALCULATION. These metaphors, in turn, have been adopted in all modes of speculation about the mind and mental vision, and together with the FOLK THEORY OF ESSENCES and the FOLK THEORY OF SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTES, bring one's attention to the dreaded legacy of Cartesian thought: the disembodied mind. I select this particular chapter because Descartes' conclusions form the basis of a diametrical opposite thesis to that of Lakoff and Johnson, (and one simply cannot cover all the philosophers they deal with in the present study).

Metaphors bring an interesting perspective to explanation as well as another level for analysis to interface with Key theory. DA also uses metaphors to identify similar types across theories when they utilise similar metaphorical mappings of partial identification. (E.g. Parmenides, who alludes to perceiving a 'well-lit truth', and Kant who was thankfully awakened by Hume from his 'dogmatic slumber'^{xlii}, are among many philosophers who also use the knowledge is sight/light metaphor.) Visagie and I further agree with Lakoff and Johnson that there is not a *literal* connection between the separate domains of knowledge and sight, or knowledge and light, or similar mappings. And I, in particular, agree that there is an embodied and cultural experiential grounding element to metaphorical and similar constructs which are mostly unconsciously present in thought. However, DA does not allow that key constructs can be reduced solely to metaphor here, hence their location in a different department. Highly abstract formulations such as those contained in keys might be considerably removed from notions of embodiment even when basic metaphors are located in the projected keys evident discourse. Although keys and metaphors interact with one another, they are identified separately as governing instances ($A \rightarrow B$) on the one hand, and relations of identification (A is/as B) on the other. Additionally, key analysts do not privilege metaphors over other constructs in semiotics; they are simply recognizable as the smallest formations of larger constructs.

Now, Visagie and I agree with Lakoff and Johnson that most of one's thought is unconscious. We also agree with their statement that philosophical theories are 'our conscious systematic attempts to develop coherent, rational views about our world and our place in it.' Perhaps one's construction of keys is the activity of conscious thought in philosophy. Regarding limitation, the embodiment thesis is easier to accept with unconscious thought and with prototypical event structuring like transitivity above. It is reasonable to argue that one's conceptual

systems are mostly unconscious and fixed in one's neural networks, and consequently, that makes changing one's conceptual systems difficult and slow. However, this is somewhat problematic for Key theory content of subjects and domains. If I can consciously conceive of a key like [Rationality] [Express in] [Society] as being acceptable, I can also consciously conceive of a key like [Rationality] [Express in] [Language] as being acceptable at the same time, as well as change my mind about keys while reading an effective deconstructive critique thereof or indeed being offered alternatives which I may well deem viable. One would have to assume, then, that the content of keys is perhaps not all that restricted, but the prototypical pattern of thinking in hierarchies is constrained in this way. Keys, however, cannot be assumed to function in the same way as basic metaphors do in the field of philosophical theory formation because one perhaps has a little more rational autonomy active when consciously forming theoretical keys. (If one are working with uncritically accepted keys however, they may function in the same way.) This would also allow how different philosophies can employ the same KNOWLEDGE IS SIGHT/LIGHT metaphor and come up with differing theories of knowledge in the vein of: Parmenides who came up with a tripartite division between ways of truth, error and seeming, while Descartes was split between knowledge produced from necessary mind and contingent extension, and Kant grappled with combinations of the a priori, analytic, a posteriori and synthetic. The prototypical behaviour of kinds of action shown by the operator types (in 4.3.1) and their underlying embodied representation is, however a possibility for further investigation and these constructs may be shown to be sub-categories of metaphorical mappings. As yet, I do not handle keys exclusively in this way.

For DA, and Key theory, when engaging in *philosophical* activity, it is important to note that interpretation cannot begin and end with language or the semiotic, because the A is B (partial) identification is the essence of the semiotic aspect to

which linguistics belongs. Schrag (1992: 92): highlights the problem with an overemphasis on figuration as such: 'But it is precisely this perspective of ascribing to narrative this ontological weight of an incarnation of the logos that again elicits the post-modern challenge. Is this not simply a reshuffling of the locus of logocentrism, shifting the locus from the realm of ideas (classical thought), or epistemic foundations (modern thought), to the region of narrative? Are we not now simply asking narrative to do something that neither classical metaphysics nor modern epistemology were able to pull off, namely provide a principle of unification that binds everything into an unblemished totality?'

One would have to raise objections as to whether a linguistic model adequately generates a fully comprehensive cognitive model. This is an aspect of the world which *could* be evident in conceptuality, but not necessarily or absolutely so. Forming a concept of an object one sees, means analytical recognition of the implicit properties of said object which translates to correct identification through an adequate concept. However, DA requires that analysts must recognize the rich and diverse aspectual backdrops against which discourse operates and interpretations are formulated. Philosophy must move between many aspects in order to expand on ways in which things can be meaningful. How people's brains have evolved to provide them with a biological mechanism of representation is not necessarily constitutional of the analytical mechanism for thought or imaginative processes. One explicates while the other represents. Analysts need to be careful not to conflate explanations in any one aspect because Key theory postulates that all entities may potentially function in all aspects, as well as in subject or domain roles. Both Visagie and Lakoff/Johnson seem to notice how one's concepts limit and shape the way in which one thinks and seem also to note that one needs to constantly examine those limitations and offer new meaning and questions in analysis. Limits presuppose that there is something beyond them as well as something inside them.

Visagie and Lakoff/Johnson both seem to be raising the question of whether the time has come for philosophy to engage in a serious and rational way with science and other disciplines so as to render the whole discipline more empirically responsible, cognitively realistic and relevant to people's lived existence. This is an important point. Perhaps this will at least compel philosophers to re-evaluate their methodologies regarding where they begin and where they end. Lakoff and Johnson are really only committed to two strong views in their thesis, which is that:

'(1) There is no philosophy built up solely from literal concepts that could map directly onto the mind-independent world. (2) There is no transcendent, disembodied, literal reason that is fully accessible to consciousness. Neither of these things is necessary to do philosophy' (1999: 543).

I agree that these commitments are not detrimental to the practise of philosophy and also support a cooperative relationship with the empirical sciences. Whether keys, or parts of keys, occupy some literal or conscious function in cognitive thought remains controversial, but does not render their place in the system moot. Perhaps Lakoff and Johnson would argue that the general operations in Key theory are just another conceptual tool for understanding things in terms of people's embodied, lived experience of, and general human need for, governance, causation, transcendence, organization, precedence, and so on. But when one looks at the whole key structure of, say, [Technology] [Form] [Culture], it seems that these are conscious manipulations of key elements in theoretical formulations. An important point that is made in the Appendix to *Philosophy in the flesh*, (1999: 583) which deals with the neural theory of language paradigm, states that abstract reasoning (in Narayanan's motor control / abstract reasoning task) is not *proven* to actually be done via one's motor control systems but it *can* be. Whether keys or metaphors are more basic to

philosophical interpretation and analysis is a line of questioning that will not be pursued here. I see no reason to choose between Key theory and Metaphor theory regarding evaluative strength or descriptive importance in the Cognitive faculty and both are philosophically interesting and both are pervasive in the discourse of the discipline. I have no doubt that further work in this area will prove fascinating and fruitful.

7. The link to Epistemic theory

The final department in the Cognitive faculty of DA is that of Epistemic theory (Department 6), and as one might suspect, has to do with forms of knowledge dealing with what one knows and what kinds of knowledge emerge in discourse. I have included a description of the theory here as it is necessary to include the final link in the faculty so that readers may see how these theories hang together. There are several basic divisions within Epistemic theory. The reason Visagie considers it important to distinguish between the different forms of knowledge is that with each form comes a different set of 'knowledge-objects' and, consequently, different means of rationalizing or making sense of reality for the analyst. The real objects of theories are not objects-as-such; objects-as-such are identified and studied empirically by independent disciplines in the way that biology will study, e.g. actual animals, and the way they function in themselves and in the world.

On a preliminary level of conceptualization, existing prior to that of theoretical formulations, one might find a form of reason and knowledge that involves one's abilities to acquire and use practical knowledge already in the life world. Ryle (1945) famously dubbed this form of knowledge as 'knowing how' and one could take this form of knowledge as typically implying knowing *how* something is done such as knowing *how* to fix a car engine or knowing *how* to bake a chocolate cake. From Visagie (2006: 45) one identifies this kind of activity as that which would involve acquiring a practical skill or ability of some sort in order to execute the task at hand rather than be concerned with truth elements. This kind of everyday knowledge would enable people to conceptualize, categorize and analyse in the context of every day experience with the specific function of relating to one's immediate social, cultural and concrete environments. It would

constitute knowledge of one's life world as one experiences it in actual contexts of work, leisure, social, or real-world activities. It is largely connected to the present in terms of what one is doing now. Without this knowledge one would not be able to operate optimally in the life worlds throughout which one must move every day. It forms the broad spectrum of assumptions that are largely taken for granted but also recognizes the specific things that hold one's attention in some instances whether they become the objects of one's theoretical formulations or not. Although this kind of knowledge has a strong contextual link to socially established customs, traditions, learning processes, technique and skill, one may concede that it is always part of the theorizing process, even if perceived to be participating in an indirect way. One cannot privilege theoretical knowledge or linguistic expressions or propositional content as the philosopher might be tempted to do.

Visagie (2006: 45) has suggested in this theory that one might also consider the pervasive architecture of knowledge in terms of categories, essences, metaphors, properties, and so on, as they are exhibited in both practical and theoretical knowledge. In both types of knowledge, one tends to categorize what one is experiencing and this is evidenced in one's linguistic expressions or cognitive functions. To explain more clearly: how this might work in everyday knowledge could come to expression in the notion of 'frame semantics' in the work of Charles Fillmore (see Lakoff 1987: 21) which holds that one is unable to understand the meaning of single words without accessing all the essential knowledge that relates to that word. In real terms, then, if I am thinking of eating a *cheeseburger*, I am at the same time invoking (let's call it) a *fast food* frame that will relate all the practical and semantic knowledge I need to acquire a cheeseburger – going to the 'drive-through', ordering my meal, paying at the window, receiving my food and my free toy, etc.. It would not occur to a normally functioning person in the life world to walk into a hospital and order a

cheeseburger from the nurse, because the 'hospital frame' is not invoked for this concept. There is a holistic structure or gestalt that consists of a cluster of facts surrounding a concept that is more than the concept. The features and functions that surround a word in natural language and its characteristic interactions and associations structure one's understanding of what to do in appropriately real circumstances with virtually no contemplation unless one is completely unfamiliar with one's surroundings or what is required from one in those surroundings. From the above everyday example, one can expect a different kind of 'inner logic' of explanation when one contemplates entering the various life worlds of economics, technology, art, and so on. Each has a particular aspect to it as a result of socio-cultural processes of differentiation, while at the same time occupying a place within the whole system.

One can see from the above example that categories are built around what Lakoff has called 'central case prototypes' (1996: 9). Central sub-categories are identified as the typical examples one can think of and they are surrounded in various measures of periphery by: typical case prototypes from which one draws inferences about the whole category; ideal case prototypes which define the standard by which other sub-categories are judged; anti-ideal prototypes form the worst in the group; social stereotypes which form one's culturally biased 'snap judgements'; salient exemplars are the notable single cases which are mostly incorrectly used as typical cases; and essential prototypes based on perceived common properties across different objects or people. Lakoff holds that prototypes form a natural part of people's reasoning on many levels. Visagie seems to be in alignment with these structures for distinguishing and identification (2006: 45) but he goes further in recognizing a difference in the way one categorizes in everyday experience as opposed to the way one categorizes in scientific or theoretical thinking. In theory formulation, one abstracts specific aspects and studies them, while in the life world the

coherence between aspects is far more close-knit, so much so that we hardly notice aspects as such.

Visagie has also termed the theoretical, or discursive, form of knowledge as 'world-distancing knowledge' which manifests in DA in different modes. These may take place on three levels: theory; aesthetic reflection as in the work of Kafka, which Visagie often references; and moral reflection (as in the following section). Theoretical knowledge as provided by keys can be constructed in various theories, as noted above, and are carried over long periods of time within the recurrent networks of discourse. When they are developed and reinforced to the point that they are accepted as knowledge, they seem to gate alternative lines of inquiry. The forms of knowledge Key theory examines consist in the recognition of a departmental focus, but also an expansion to multiple departments which is needed to form different types of knowledge. This requires that one go beyond *conceptual* knowledge or knowing *who* or knowing *how* or knowing *that*. All the departments contained in DA direct analysts towards a more differentiated framework of knowledge. Each department is forced to take others into consideration, and move the borders of what they might previously have considered to be their particular claim on knowledge domains.

Aspectual knowledge is adapted from the work of Dooyeweerd above because it is indeed a refined, systematic model. Further, one should recognize that this is not some obscure system – similar impulses surface quite explicitly in Chomsky as: '...aspects of the world are unified – where such aspects include not only the physical and the mental, but, also, the optical, the electromagnetic, the chemical, etc.'^{xliii}; and less explicitly in Ricoeur who states: 'Because of feelings, we are "attuned to" aspects of reality which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects referred to in ordinary language.'^{xliv} These two thinkers apply the notion

of aspects much more loosely than Dooyeweerd, though. One can detect still earlier awareness of such concepts in several of Plato's works who famously argued for a theory of Forms '...in their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects.'^{xlv} For epistemic relevance here, one can describe the spectrum as the systematically refined aspects in which any particular entity may function in reality. For Dooyeweerd, all entities exhibit all aspects in a kind of harmony. Dooyeweerd describes the relations between the aspects as 'analogies' which point to an inter-modal coherence between them. Each aspect is not reducible to any other aspect because that would encroach on the diversity of aspectual meaning which is necessary to the fullness of meaning itself. Beings and objects may function in any of the aspects, but the aspect itself may not be elevated into an origin or totality of meaning. In terms of aspect distinction, there is a linguistic aspect and there is a conceptual aspect. Although there is no special study of conceptualization as such; it is usually tackled by the study of semantics, which studies the meaning of linguistic entities - words. Key theory would be a kind of philosophical conceptualization. On behalf of epistemic reflections, it simply cannot be assumed that the numerical aspect or the logical aspect or any other single aspect can have applications in philosophical discourse which are fully rigorous in *all* required areas of inquiry. Thus, in DA, the concept of the most general or universal structures would have to be partly relative in that it also consists in the relation between the aspects as they exist at any given time.

What this view leads to, is that aspects are singular forms of knowledge which may be regulative in their own respects, but not all respects. To explain, Visagie has used the common difficulty of 'science' being viewed as a particularly systematic process of 'problem-solving'. This outlook ostensibly removes the problem of accounting for the specialized way in which scientific theory-forming actually works, as divergent from other forms of conceptualization. He

comments that of course a farmer also works systematically, solves problems, and verifies data as a means to successfully control his setup and generate business. But this does not make him a scientist. In accordance, a scientist also engages in such activities, but the fact is, these things are simply not distinctive concerning the essence of science-forming^{xlvi}.

8. Key complexes and protological diversity

The idea of a 'universal semantics' requires that Key theory establish a realm of validity for itself. Key theory (like DA) does not prescribe what one must say, but the model does posit restrictions in terms of what is not allowed. Visagie has noted the critique of hierarchical relationships between key components as well as the critique of attribute deployment (2006: Appendix I). However, there has not been a lot of formal writing on the possibilities presented by protological (see 20 in Overview above) investigations regarding keys and DA, and I tread somewhat carefully into territory that has proven beneficial in the classroom but is, in all probability, not characteristic of conventional philosophical discussions. That perhaps being the case, no matter how tentative such investigations are, they might still be pursued; and if they prove unworkable, analysts will abandon them in due course. Linking forms of knowledge contained in DA here to the work of Lakoff (1987) one would be able to, in this manner, investigate systems which characterize worldviews through prototypes and categorization. What categorization allows one to do is classify all kinds of things instantaneously in order that one may readily distinguish between them and proceed automatically, without too much conscious reflection. To quote Lakoff: 'Every time we see something as a *kind* of thing, for example, a tree, we are categorizing' (1987: 5).

The philosophical target area I will make use of in this exercise is that of ethics and morality, and I will continue with the presumption that in philosophy thinkers pursue a theory which permits a good (not evil) ethical or moral code. It seems most courses in Philosophy at least deal with some variation of either ethics or morality or both and they typically include four main themes detailed in what would commonly be referred to as: virtue ethics (from Aristotelian ethics), utilitarianism (as exemplified in the work of Mill and Bentham), deontological

moral theories like that exemplified in the work of Immanuel Kant, and possibly forms of contractarianism as found in Rawls and Rousseau in the above discussions. I will not use the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' interchangeably and thereby choose to remain with the pragmatic, ethical and moral distinctions as proposed by Jurgen Habermas in *Justification and Application* who states: 'Pragmatic discourses take their orientation from *possible contexts* of application. They are related to the actual volitions of agents only through subjective goal determinations and preferences... In ethical-existential discourses, this constellation is altered in such a way that justifications become rational motives for changes of attitude' (1993: 11). This distinction is useful in the DA model as one would place both pragmatic and ethical-existential discourse in the Ethics and Beliefs faculty which includes the first three departments of Belief theory, Postural theory, and Life Histories respectively. These departments attempt, among other considerations, to answer various forms of the question 'What should I do?' or 'What should we do?' in terms of how one would pursue an ethical life in the concrete contexts of everyday reality. On the other hand, according to Habermas, '... morality is not orientated to the *telos* of a successful life... Rather, it is concerned with the categorically different question of the norms according to which we want to live together and of how practical conflicts can be settled in the common interest of all' (1993: 24). So, for Habermas, the moral point of view must go beyond the particular contexts contained in the first faculty of DA in order to form an abstracted perspective of all those who may possibly be affected by the maxim in question. The Key theoretical point to note is that any moral maxim raises a claim to the attribute *universal*, and so must necessarily remove itself from the pragmatic and ethical emphasis on the *individual* person, group, act, or context and move toward an inter-subjective form of consensus between them.

For the most part, in moral and ethical discourse, it seems the tension between the attribute pair universal-individual is a primary concern and forms much of the discussion in the different theories that tend to favour either side of the pair. But the problem is a little more complex than that, and I would suggest that the crux of the problem lies in the binary attribute pair. On the one side of the spectrum, there is the *individual* which can be seen to lie in the singular subjective *I* or *particular group*. On the extreme other side there is the *universal* which would include *all*. But in moral theory, one comes across other possible binaries with a connection to *universal*, namely, *most* and *some*. These are not included in the attribute pair set, and yet they do come up in moral theory. Consequently, one has to account for their presence as they do not seem to fit the model (except perhaps as a non-binary attribute). If one takes the protological approach and form a 'moral complex', it should throw up some interesting alternatives regarding members of a possible set. In order to do this, one would rotate all departments through the X-position in the Key, while leaving [Morality/Ethics] in the Z-position and then perform the opposite function (i.e. [Morality/Ethics] in the X-position and rotate the departments through the Z-position). I will use brief applied or theoretical examples to explain the different operations.

1. [Beliefs] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Beliefs]

In this instance, a particular belief system affects morality in order to produce what one would recognize as, say, Islamic morality whose norms could be applied in a country like Iran, or Christian morality which would not be easily accepted in a country like Iran. For the opposite key, if ethical norms altered belief systems, it could result in e.g. Practicing Catholics using 'the pill' because they believe it is morally acceptable to choose to limit the size of one's family by this method while their religion is strongly against the use of contraceptives.

2. [Postures] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Postures]

Virtue ethics models are rooted in variations of this type of key. Acting on virtues will produce good morality and acting on vices will produce bad morality. In the reverse, a moral code would determine what one accepts good and bad virtues to be, i.e. if one has accepted, as a moral norm, that it is morally wrong to rape, any propensity to rape would not qualify as a virtue because an inherently virtuous person would not violate such a moral norm.

3. [Life Histories] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Life Histories]

This key would apply to groups of fifth-century Greeks (from south Italy), who followed the practices of Pythagoras and subsequently established the Pythagorean school which sought to establish segregated communities that honoured and fulfilled Pythagoras' aphorisms and ethical objective (Barnes, 1987: 202-213). It's opposite would be when morality of the state, for example, overrides the ethics of a particular person or group like in the case of Warren Jeffs, president of the Fundamental Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints, and his followers, who were found guilty (of child sexual assault and rape among other charges) of arranging illegal marriages between adult males and underage girls.

4. [Key X] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Key Z]

In Keys, one typically examines the hierarchical relationship between X and Z as well as the attributes attached to either or both terms as they affect the meaning of morality and ethics within the text.

5. [Semiotics] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Semiotics]

Various metaphors and similar constructs are examined in this type of key. The first way of thinking can be found in the work of Mark Johnson (*The moral imagination* 1993: 2) who argues that ‘...Moral reasoning is a constructive imaginative activity that is based, not primarily on universal moral laws, but principally on metaphoric concepts...’ If the key is reversed, one’s moral understanding would be seen as affecting the metaphors one uses such as when moral transgressions are expressed as metaphorical physical disgust (see Lee & Schwartz for an interesting perspective on the bi-directional relationship between morality and metaphors of dirt and cleanliness^{xlvii}). Ricoeur also discussed what the symbolism of defilement could reveal about the reality of evil. These types of investigations also look at the relationship between specific metaphors and ethical/moral discourse.

6. [Knowledge] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Knowledge]

In the first instance what one knows determines what one understands to be moral. In Plato’s *Euthyphro* (1993. Trans.), Socrates demands a definition of piety from Euthyphro in order that he may understand what it is to act piously or impiously because he is unable to make a decision on how he should act if he does not *know* primarily and precisely what piety is. This kind of reasoning is common in Socratic thought. Morality defining knowledge, on the converse operation, could be represented in Reality if, say, based on the moral grounds of a cultural group, girls were consistently excluded from formal education, and so, their access to some forms of knowledge is significantly affected. One finds this phenomenon currently in many societies on the African continent where boys’ education enjoys priority over that of girls, especially where there are very limited monetary resources and a strong cultural ethic against the education of girls.^{xlviii}

7. [Ideologies] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Ideologies]

In ideology theory, one is looking specifically at the issue of domination in theory and in social relations. If one looks at the first key, and uses the example of an ideology like 'selfism' affecting morality, one would have theories like Epicurus' egoistic hedonism distorted enough to permit that one may pursue one's own pleasure *at any cost*, even if this is not the way one ought to act. On the contrary key, one finds many examples of morality affecting political ideologies for example the on-going debates in many governments about legalizing gay marriage where large sectors of a society are committed to the view that the state cannot legalize something that the majority of its people feel is morally wrong. These brands of moral worldviews deeply inform ideologies operating on all levels of society.

8. [Macro-motives] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Macro-motives]

Macro-motives listed in the Overview form the main types of thinking in moral and ethical discourse. Nature (pleasure/pain) grounds morality in utilitarianism, (rational) Personhood (2) grounds morality for Kantian morality, and both these feature prominently in virtue ethics as well as that of Society in contractarianism. Culture may also produce ethical systems like that of the 'Ubuntu' ethic in South Africa. On the reverse operation, one may find morality determining e.g. Knowledge. In this case, one could use an example of community work taking precedence over the knowledge essence of the university which would be detrimental to students who are *primarily* in the institution to gain knowledge and staff is in the institution *primarily* to ensure such a goal is obtained (Visagie, 1995: 11). If a student is engaging more in community work than his studies, this does not serve any member group of the institution well and, in fact, can corrupt

the knowledge process. Community service, while morally acceptable, can be validated only as a secondary function of the university and not on a level footing with the knowledge macro-motive here.

9. [Lifeworlds] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Lifeworlds]

When lifeworlds require a set of ethics that pertains specifically to the efficient operation of that particular lifeworld, one gets Business ethics, Medical ethics, Educational ethics, and so on. Readers should be familiar with this understanding of that which is required when one enters these lifeworlds. Particular frames are invoked in order that one may operate successfully or efficiently in such a lifeworld to achieve particular concrete goals in these lived contexts. The reverse operation would allow that a general norm to which all members of that lifeworld can appeal could be established. The morally validated norm that one may not do bodily harm to others would be an example of a norm that is invoked in lifeworlds to ensure one's successful operation within them. E.g. If we could not trust and expect the postural norm of 'care' in the Medical lifeworld, we would not be able to function optimally in that lifeworld.

10. [Rationality] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Rationality]

With Rationality in the X-position, there would be recognition of both subjective and objective priorities in Ethics and Morality. This approach would feature prominently in the work of Habermas mentioned above who identifies the embedding of Ethics in the projects of socialized individuals, but argues that this cannot form the basis of moral norms which are, in modernity, only capable of commanding universal assent as '...the *procedure* of rational will formation' (1993: 150). The reverse key would hold if, say, an inter-state organization committing to a moral norm of realizing human rights, was assumed by member

states in order to produce rationality in a given sphere of analysis like international politics which would allow that an individual can rationally expect to be treated as such in his own right, within his community or state, as well as being applicable across the larger group of humanity.

11. [Creativity] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Creativity]

This kind of key emerges strongly in the work of Marx and similar theories, where ideally, the creative freedom of labourers should take priority over the products of labour with the outcome that labourers are not ethically devalued and alienated from engaging in a sustained productive process. On the reverse function, this would signify what Marx was opposed to – an (undesirable) capitalist moral system inhibiting the creative abilities of workers by forcing them to sell out to those who control the exchange of property in order that they might survive within a system that does not have their interests at heart. This critique would be echoed in the work of Chomsky who regards a free and developed society as one that would promote and sustain the highest goal of free and creative work that is a result of the worker's own initiative and control (Rai in McGilvray, 2005: 228).

12. [Aesthetics] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Aesthetics]

In the on-going and contentious debate around the viability of human genetic engineering practices, such a key would emerge as one's aesthetic preferences for particular characteristics might negatively produce an objectification of a potential person (a foetus in this case) and hence affect one's moral judgments about how far one could go in altering human genetics for one's own preferences. If the opposite key holds, one's moral norms might prohibit prospective parents from choosing arbitrary characteristics like gender and eye

colour to be modified, while positively allowing, say, eliminating risks for hereditary diseases.

13. [Law] → [Morality/Ethics]

[Morality/Ethics] → [Law]

The first key would allow the categorical imperative of a universally acceptable law being applicable over and above a particular moral or ethical consideration. For example, a conscientious objector in Britain during the First and Second World Wars could be considered rightfully arrested for violating government-imposed conscription because the law did not recognize his personal ethical objection to war. The second key might be found in the more liberal model of restorative justice where the moral commitment to restoring the dignity of offenders and reintegrating them into society is the central focus rather than retribution and punishment.

14. [Communication] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Communication]

The first key could be found in the work of Habermas whose communicative rationality allows that a communicative procedure would bring about a morally acceptable resolve that could serve the interests of all affected parties equally. (1993: 151) One may find examples of the opposite key in the work of Brookfield and Preskill (1999: 8) who suggest adopting the following ethical attitudes of hospitality, participation, mindfulness, humility, mutuality, deliberation, appreciation, hope and autonomy in order to foster democratic discussion in classrooms.

15. [Nature] → [Morality/Ethics]

[Morality/Ethics] → [Nature]

When morality is dominated by the sciences, this leads to the kind of relation depicted in the first key. The relationship between nature and morality is a complicated and controversial one and many naturalistic moral theories have suggested that understanding what drives nature will provide moral understanding. One may see this in the work of Richard Dawkins. Versions of utilitarianism have been formed around the assumption that it is *natural* to avoid pain and seek happiness while versions of virtue ethics have proposed that determining virtuous behaviour might lie in what a *naturally* virtuous person would do. The second key has been raised in the work of Stephen Pinker who has raised discussions concerning free will morality versus what genetic endowments supposedly constrain us to do (*The blank slate*, 2002: 174). Issues may emerge in applied examples concerning the euthanasia debate where an ethical standpoint of allowing doctor-assisted suicide of terminally ill patients overrides a commitment to letting nature take its course, so to speak, and these debates rage on in medical circles today.

16. [Time] → [Morality/Ethics]

[Morality/Ethics] → [Time]

Different moral systems emerge in different epochs and the key relationship between morality and time is interesting because it raises the question of whether it is possible to correlate completely different temporal and spatial contexts in a valid manner. It is surely impossible to suspend completely one's experience of living in modernity and go back in time cancelling out historical contexts. In these keys one may substitute the arrow with an operator like *transcend* to better highlight the problem. How important are translational distortions when regarding moral systems far removed from one's own spatial and temporal understandings?^{xlix} In moral theory which supports an absolutist view of right and wrong, moral rules are not dependent on the individual concerns of agent, action, context or consequence. Such a theorist may argue

that the Platonic virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance and justice hold true regardless of such specifics and theories which support such a view have come under fire for ignoring circumstantial specifics. On the other hand, those who see time frames and eras as affecting morality will have the opposing view that a moral system from the classical period will not hold in modern times simply because one can never 'go back', so to speak. In other words, one cannot argue for Platonic virtues in the modern context because one will be fixated on matters that are possibly no longer as central or relevant now as they used to be.

17. [Truth] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Truth]

The above keys could be representative of types of absolutism and ethical relativism respectively. The first key might be found in theories that work with a model of absolute or universal truth and that determines moral actions as absolutely right or wrong in spite of situations or outside influences. For example, one may believe it to be absolutely true that all people should be regarded as free and autonomous no matter what a specific person or culture may hold to be ethically and morally acceptable. Truth therefore determines morality. In the opposing key, for example, what is true or valid might in this instance might be perceived as subordinate to what is ethically acceptable relative to the morality of a specific culture (or subject). Humanist ethics would be an example of a model that has rejected the absolute truths of religion in favour of an ethical relativism which does not allow fixed laws and moral absolutes.

18. [Anthropology] → [Morality/Ethics] [Morality/Ethics] → [Anthropology]

In this formulation, the main perspective would fall under the question whether humanity determines morality or whether morality determines humanity. If the

make-up of humans limits and legitimates one's understanding and application of moral principles, this view would fall into the first key (Visagie, 2006: 102). If one opts for the second key, it may include a transcendent moral blueprint that exists for humanity regardless of what one knows and how one thinks, lives, acts. This outlook could be found in religious texts with which readers are all acquainted on some level, I am sure.

The intent of the above rotation is not to be overly exhaustive in description, but systematic philosophy requires a measure of complexity and connectivity in order to be intelligible. (In actuality, one can see this is a rather condensed version of all the possibilities that could be formed out of rotating DA sub-theories and their parts). What I want to show in such an exercise is the uniqueness of members of the category juxtaposed with coherence within the category (in this case of morality). A 'moral category' shows that the bi-directional relationship does indeed show more similarities than differences in the key relationships - oftentimes directionality is difficult to distinguish and even reversed within one discourse. With morality, it is particularly difficult to offer common properties that link the members of the set and supplying necessary and sufficient conditions for what counts as a moral action seems to provide somewhat impoverished and problematic solutions – this is displayed quite dexterously by Socrates in the Plato dialogues concerning his trial, for instance. Understanding morality in this more multipart way would be representative of the constructive abilities of Key theory rather than destructive, as Visagie has suggested the importance of this in much of his material.

Lakoff suggests an alternative to what he terms the 'objectivist approach', which he rejects on the basis of it hampering the empirical study of mind. Lakoff (1987: 9) rejects a truth-reference basis of meaning between symbols and their

relationship to things in the world; he does not support any theory of kinds that is solely based on common essential properties; he will not allow that mind exists apart from the body or independent of it; he rejects that emotion has no conceptual form or that grammar concerns pure form. He does not accept that reason, rationality or mathematics can be transcendental; there is no singular way of understanding the world for Lakoff; and finally it is false that all people think using the same conceptual system. Consistently, as above, Lakoff holds that human understanding is grounded in perception, embodiment and culture as well as metaphor, mental imagery and metonymy. Categories, then, are formed out of prototypes, which are the best examples or central members, and they are extended radially to provide many more members of the set by chaining and expanding from one's experiential, interactive and cultural formations and motivations (1987: 95).

In key terms, if one could propose a so-called 'golden key' for morality, one would have to isolate a true and valid X-term that demonstrates not only its own supremacy and centrality in terms of being able to determine other significant chunks of reality, but it would also have to invalidate alternatives by showing their inadequacy. The Key complex shows that this kind of pure theory is highly implausible - almost certainly impossible. The different keys formed in the complex show that each are at least conceivable, and can be articulated, at least partway, legitimately in forms of discourse. This, in turn, shows that the human conceptualizing capacity is capable of producing many different ways of reasoning within a category, none of which singularly emerge as especially better or more acceptable, rather as degrees of variation within a system. Recognizing this kind of diversity is necessary for any theory to persist and develop and improve one's understanding, use, framing and organization thereof. So, in the Cognitive faculty of DA, one finds a point of agreement with Lakoff in that: 'To give up on a transcendental rationality – a God's eye view of

reason – is not to give up on reason and rationality. To grant that reason and rationality are human and no more is to assume responsibility for finding out what human reason is really like...' (1987: 365). An important function of forming complexes with students or prospective analysts is to allow them to speculate beyond the possibly mundane exercise of learning various philosophies as they occur in history and open up an imaginative and creative path for them to begin to think of these problems in new and interesting ways, while questioning their own key assumptions and ideologies. The aspiration of philosophy as theory is elucidating truth elements, rather than prescribing, say, a moral code or a particular literary aesthetic for satisfying potential audiences.

9. The anthropological context of Key Theory

With regards to Key theory, one needs to take note of the placement of the theory in the Cognitive faculty of DA and that involves raising questions, conditions and possibilities orbiting the philosophy of mind, which is connected to the anthropological context. One looks at Key theory from the protological focal point of Anthropology which broaches the question of how human beings theorize. A version of the anthropic principle holds that the observations of the physical universe must be compatible with the various forms of human life that makes those observations. There must be fundamental constants, laws, universals that are able to support the evolutionary process that accommodates the existence, or presence, of conscious life as well as the particular ways in which it functions and questions. Humans are in actuality forever restricted by this context in that one assumes that all and everything one understands is understood from the human mind perspective. One would not, however, want to reduce philosophy to this one perspective or reduce all to the 'philosophy of mind' as many analytics wish to do¹. In order to maintain the balance and complexity required when working with any sub-theory of DA, one will have to relativize Key theory's structures against those of the Anthropological Department, which would entail a review into the human mind's ability to conceptualize key formulas.

One of the underlying questions in anthropological theories is the issue of what it means to be human. And, as M. Brewster Smith notes, '...the core of any serious attempt to answer it must be that it means being the sort of creature that can frame such a question about itself' (1978: 3). In the context of Anthropology theory, human nature transcends every particular frame of human identity; therefore a universal semantics also requires a realm of actuality here in terms

of being able to provide the structure for unrestricted access to the different forms of meaning and expression. Matters surrounding an individual's unique identities and life projects can be located in the Life History department (3) of DA and are ascertained to be the actual entities that populate a society. One does possess, in one's individuality, a biographical and biological particular form of a person as such. But the subjectivity thereof must be 'behind' one in the Habermasian sense mentioned above as any particular posture cannot be assumed to represent that of the whole group of humanity. Analysts must proceed with some caution in this area. The interest in how *I / we* conceptualize / think / know / etc. is secondary to the greater concern of how *humans* conceptualize / think / know / etc. in the anthropological context. Human nature has such a concept of selfhood or consciousness, which one tends to take for granted because it is so readily accessible. One feels a 'self' present at the centre of one's life - a proprietor of one's mind and connected experiences. One even has split notions of this self, as in a 'higher self' directing or communicating with a 'lower self' – a kind of self-to-self conversation sometimes perceived as incidental mental chatter. One's brain recognizes this self as an existential reality. As Antonio Damasio^{li} has notably stated: 'Without consciousness – that is, a mind endowed with subjectivity – you would have no way of knowing that you exist, let alone who you are and what you think' (2012: 4). From Damasio's work in neuroscience, one may understand that the development of this subjectivity is crucial to key thinking because it is responsible for the particular ways in which people reason, believe, remember, use language, have consciousness, are creative, emote, know and have developed culture and history. All these phenomena which are connected to experienced, or lived, individuality would not have been possible without this consciousness or self. If people only experienced in the attribute of key universalism, all particularity would dissipate, and this is simply not how the human actually functions.

Further, the anthropological model also recognizes the split between what is genetically already present in the embryo as opposed to what happens to it in the form of experiences within the social totality of life worlds (Visagie 2006: 7). People do seem to be history- culture- society-bound beings but a completely social origin of the self could not be accommodated in DA. 'Although social relations clearly form part of the biographical forming of the self, a science or philosophy that selects the social as origin of just about everything except nature-in-itself, and includes under the rule of the social our experience of a conscious self, must be rejected' (*ibid*: 60). That is not to say that one may privilege the biological to such an extent that the social is removed from the picture. Again, one needs to be able to refer to a number of things in one's experience of the self, things that transcend the subjectivity of one's own thought and experience. Humans have lives infused with meaning that could be represented by all the various keys available for one's free association. Eliminating this complexity of meaning might result in some kind of dehumanization.

Key theory must be able to constitute a domain of normativity for itself, not as a set of universals which are the same for everyone, but as a universal semantics which allows for the possibility of elements for a study of ontology. For Visagie, a central question in this context would be: '...it may well be that the kind of conceptualization with which we are concerned here, takes place on a specific level of what might be some faculty of analysis or concept formation, comparable to the accepted existence of a language faculty...what Chomsky calls the "science-forming faculty"' (2006: 59). One should not think of faculties as little sites in the brain; rather as *capacities*; but to make things clear regarding Chomsky's notion, I will quote McGilvray directly:

‘...to say that the concepts that typically appear in natural languages are anticipated in the machinery of the mind is not to say that we are conscious of them, when latent or active. Nor is it to say that they are “there” ready-formed, with all the features that constitute a specific lexical item already assembled in the form they take in a person’s working vocabulary. Certainly it is not to say that they come already linked to the things or classes of the things in the world. It is to say that they are products of biological machinery capable on an occasion of constituting them or “activating” them, yielding items with configurations that when placed at language’s interface with other systems can affect human cognitive functioning, thereby affording the capacity to recognize, distinguish, gauge, assess, or otherwise use the concept...the machinery provides for them...the machinery that provides concepts to language does not anticipate *all* concepts. Some concepts are native to other systems’ (2005: 8).

In other words, for DA analysts, the linguistic concept of ‘child’ does not absorb, or express, the emotional content of what the mother feels when she embraces her child. Damasio (in *Descartes’ error*, 1994 and *Looking for Spinoza*, 2004) has markedly argued for the irreducibility of emotion and feeling in the human experience as well as its indispensable role in rationality and reason. He has shown that when the emotional capacities are compromised by illness or trauma, there is a significant decline in the reasoning (and general) function of patients. When one reasons about certain types of things, one does so based on preference or ‘liking’ something more than something else and this is an integral part of one’s decision-making capacities and it is informed by an emotion: *like/love*. If humans are unable to select something based on this emotion, prediction and planning become very difficult. I would suggest that one does this with key formulations as well, albeit on a more sophisticated level, especially when *selecting* the X-term and rhetorically embellishing it with the necessary values to impose its supremacy and power over domains. ‘This is because

believing and endorsing *cause* a certain emotion to happen' (Damasio, 2004: 93). On this view, reason cannot be pure and neutral. Moreover, regarding keys, the concepts one acquires in theory-forming are not so easy to come by as they might be in natural language usage. One often needs to pore over a text for some time and work quite hard to understand it. This theory-construction is assumed by Chomsky to be aided by 'a science-forming capacity' (McGilvray, 2005: 8) which was mentioned and taken on board by Visagie (2006: 153) as a possible guide for the idealized proposals that form the content of keys for the proper use and practise of philosophy.

This line of questioning brings up the possibility of whether there can be a modular architecture of mind, and whether it is innately or externally produced. There is much controversy surrounding this question. Followers of Chomsky will accept the internalist strategy of explicating the interface of faculties contained within the mind/brain. To make things plain, as McGilvray writes: 'Look inside the head' (2005: 204). The internalist position is what we have inherited from the Rationalists (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, Spinoza) who reject the claim that experience or environment shape mental contents and structure while the externalist position is inherited from the Empiricist tradition (e.g. Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Mill) that supports the idea of sensory input giving rise to the beliefs and ideas one has. The implications for Key theory are that, if one accepts an internalist point of view, the actual machinery involved in forming beliefs, knowledge and truth conveyed in keys is already present in one's mind/brain structure at birth; one does not acquire it from the world. One is constrained to think in hierarchies by that structure and the seemingly infinite combination of key content is, then, only part of the surface structure. Just like the language organ, on the internalist view, already contains the deep structure (I-language) and the surface structure is the individual languages one learns (E-language). An externalist perspective will allow that objective features of the

world, society, culture are able to influence beliefs, knowledge and truth at the deepest level and so would allow that these external factors can shape the actual machinery, i.e. the hierarchical structure. For Key theory, analysts do not seem to be barred from taking a Chomskyeian approach and one would have to be sceptical of an alternative. It seems impossible to contemplate humans who have developed differently to those populating the Earth now. One simply would not know what another type of theory-forming would look like. It seems, at present, one can allow that even if external factors among knowing subjects are dissimilar, humans' similar brain structures tend to form hierarchies.

The theory suggests that humans do seem by nature predisposed to forming ideas about ultimate ontological grounds, causes, origins, boundaries, ends and so on. Without this human curiosity about the world, one would probably not have the disciplines of science or philosophy as we know it. Indeed, all disciplines may look completely different if we had evolved in another way. Visagie (2006: 60) has suggested another link between these two departments: 'Therefore, anthropological models are linked, directly or indirectly, to some or other philosophical conception that can, as such, be rendered in terms of a logosemantic formula or combination of such formulas.' Regarding applications of Key theory that are designed to seek out different conceptualizations, Visagie argues that thinkers are normatively prohibited from representing key structures in an invalid way, i.e. in a way that would violate the coherence principle.

10. Conclusion:

In conclusion, I would like to begin with a quote from Schrag: 'The grammar of transversality has made its way into the various texts of postmodernity, but only sporadically and quite obliquely. For the most part, it has been called upon in the making of local and isolated observations. No consolidation of its usage has been offered, and much less has a systematic account of it been given' (1992: 153). Schrag has offered a commendable answer to the postmodern problematic in a transversal alliance of rationality as critique, articulation and disclosure. It seems there is a similar intent, albeit different approach, on the part of Visagie when it comes to the formulation of Key theory, and he has made every effort to do exactly what Schrag has suggested is missing: that is, offer a systematic account of how analysts may approach such a critique and invoke it further to produce an astute and detailed articulation of the tricky complications, evident and submerged, in discourse on numerous levels. Within what Visagie has called a 'post-humanist approach' (2006), one may suggest that Key theory offers a novel kind of philosophy, and whether the approach suits every analyst is not the issue, the contribution is clear and it is valuable.

There has been some uneasiness about the possibly overly structural format of DA. I surmise that Visagie would neither have a problem with this notion, nor would he be apologetic for it. His corpus of work seems to point to the assumption that if one has no knowledge of structure, one's investigations into process will be narrow and limited and possibly relegated to ad hoc (or what Visagie has termed 'impressionistic') attempts at evaluation. I share an appreciation of systematic philosophy, but cannot be oblivious to possible objections. Nietzsche stated his reservations about systems quite succinctly in *Twilight of the idols*: 'I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to

system is a lack of integrity' (1982: 470). Nietzsche's suspicions regarding a systematic philosophy cannot be dismissed without consideration. Any system that is restrictive in nature will set itself up for some critique regarding the manner in which it might exclude whatever discussion it deems unimportant and subsequently shut down meaning which could be relevant and expedient to critical evaluation. However, if a system aims at inclusivity, it does not necessarily follow that it must also be imperialistic. This would be the reason that the First faculty has been purposefully integrated into DA: to ensure that there is a counter to an overly structuralistic and rationalistic inclination, even if that entails the inclusion of sub-theories that many philosophers, (like Habermas for example,) do not see as belonging to the practice philosophy as they understand it. From the literature, it is evident that Visagie has gone to painstaking lengths in order to ensure that DA, as a systematic approach, is not executed in this mode, and if this kind of transgression should occur, I would suggest the model is probably being misapplied.

I acknowledge the vast contribution to philosophical teaching and practice by Key theory and Figurative Semiotics theory as they allow for interesting debate and analysis in the classroom giving the student a way of *doing* philosophy and not just learning someone's philosophy and eking out a few criticisms from a relatively limited knowledge base. Learning about other philosophies is important, but scholars in the discipline cannot leave it there, unless a history of philosophy is the sole purpose of their study. Further, the linking of these two theories with the Epistemic department shows quite convincingly that one's understanding of formulating theory is simply not monolithic; rather, it seems to be polythetic. Analysts need the levelled framework that DA offers in order that one is free to maintain a complexity in one's understanding and critique of various philosophies. The fact that keys, figuration and epistemological concepts of similar entities are inconsistent with one another discloses that there are no

single pure theories that can explain hefty philosophical issues approximating, who we are; what and how do we know; and which moral or political codes are acceptable to us, with the appropriate rigour. DA gives us an immediate and effective outline beyond one's own mind/brain or experience as means to tackle difficult multi-disciplinary work.

The great strength of approaching philosophy in this way is that analysts are no longer caught between traditions such as the familiar divide between e.g. Analytical and Continental traditions and the like, because one expects to engage seriously with all the departments. One is no longer presented with the 'either-or' of apparent dilemmas forcing one to choose between conflicting traditions or position oneself either side of theoretical boundaries. In Key theoretical terms, these kinds of gaps are not problematic because they are simply seen as engaging the discipline using different language games – inherited from the Rationalist-Empiricist split. This is exemplified in the Analytic-Continental divide by the Continentals' reluctance to interface with Nature (and scientific) theories and methodologies in a meaningful way for fear of some sort of loss of creativity, and the Analytics' decision to interface with the Nature macro-motive seriously. DA will encourage an interchange between the two as long as none is allowed to over-determine the conversation that takes place on both sides of the binary as well as on macro- and micro-levels.

The variance in protological diversity shows that thinkers have some correspondence in understanding even if there is difference in opinion. Just as the personal and cultural boundaries that exist between interpreters does not preclude them from being able to engage in meaningful analysis beyond boundaries, so does the similarity in human understanding allow for a cross-communication in surface structures that are grounded in the key structure. To

analyze in a satisfactory manner, analysts must be able to turn to a theory much larger than any given X-subject. One would have to locate the X, interpret it and expand on it in order to generate the complexity demanded by DA. DA is perhaps not philosophy-as-we-know-it, but this could be taken as a critique for Lakoff and Johnson as well, or Chomsky, and scores of others. The question persists: should this kind of reading and evaluation of discourse not have a place in how analysts handle theory? Can this approach adequately direct thinkers toward an ultimate questioning of influence which results in reorganisation, restructuring and redefining a system of interdependencies? DA really requires a multiplicity of voices for modes of prediction, which may be overwhelming at first. But I assume that once one grasps the departments and sub-divisions, things get easier and begin to function on a more intuitive level.

Borrowing an idea reminiscent of the work in Foucault's *The archaeology of knowledge* (1972): a total ontology draws everything around a single logosemantic concept, while a general ontology, like that of DA, presupposes the need for dispersion of unique phenomena under a principal of coherence. The differentiated departments contained in DA also serve as limiters or constrainers against imposing a specific or singular view / ideal / type on analysis and this is critical in remembering the limitations of both writer as well as reader. What one is after, is a manner in which to legitimately question totalizations or hierarchies or power relations without automatically replacing them with others. The approach is not only critical, although that does form a component of the analysis, because the intent is not to show all texts and theories up as being faulty or wrong; Key theory is, rather, a way to grant a voice to additional constituents of reality which might be otherwise silenced or even exorcised from the discussion.

For this reason, DA requires that the difference between the dimensions of structure and content must be made clear. The ‘universal’ dimension lies in the structures and one’s capacities for combining these structures as one does, and not in the particular data that form content thereof. Data and content are the objects of study for the theories contained in the separate DA departments. Each theory has its own way in which to study objects and they may be combined at the discretion of the analyst in order to bring new depth and innovation either to that study or to the framework itself. Regarding the functioning of Key theory in this context, Visagie has mentioned the idea of an ontological ‘key ring’ which allows any X to govern provided that it allows itself to be governed by other X’s in the model. He has represented this as:

[Department 1-19] → [Department 1-19]^{lii}

Slowly but surely, the theme and possibility of a total ontology begins to dissipate and what emerges is something resembling a universal semantics for a general ontology. The aim of finding the ever elusive “golden key” is redirected away from the hope of discovering a single centre, origin, ideal, design, goal or methodology towards an integrated approach which takes the uniqueness of structural content and a coherent system seriously.

Visagie has repeatedly stated in his work that Key theory does not see keys as a negative phenomenon per se, and this perhaps arises from a recognition that one is constrained to think in these hierarchical terms due to philosophical and historical inherence or something a lot more concrete like the evolution of one’s brain structure, even when one is trying to deconstruct concepts and contents comprising keys. It seems that monitoring the over-determination of the subject and what it is purported to be determined is worthwhile, so that a golden key is not to have the final say on a given area of study, and this in turn keeps the doors open for positive discourse. Deconstruction in this sense is not compelled

to force an out and out rejection of all key thought, but it does require an unpacking of concepts so one can get behind the obvious to the deeper presumptions. Reconstructing legitimate keys should help avoid a wreck of irreconcilable differences in the arena of philosophical disputes even if that means one has to be more complex and more pedantic in analysis, as systematic approaches entail.

Endnotes:

ⁱ The use of ‘grand narrative’ (or meta-narrative) has caused some concern with readers who question whether DA itself is not just another grand narrative. The term ‘narrative’ when applied in either the grand- or meta- sense necessarily implies a continuity and wholeness by its very definition in that it argues for a succession of events which cohere into a totalizing schema serving to explain, say, history or knowledge. E.g. Kuhn’s incommensurability and discontinuity thesis was particularly aimed at Science as a grand narrative. Narratives can be accommodated within DA, but DA itself is not a narrative unless the term is applied in some uncanny manner. This will become apparent as the finer distinctions of Key theory are discussed within the larger DA context.

ⁱⁱ There has been inclusion of *transcendence* in some of the literature, but I have not included it here due to some confusion about whether or not this should be included in the model. If it is included, I would merely refer to the human need to go beyond one’s concrete contexts and norms at times. This does not necessarily imply transcendence in a religious sense of actually transcending this world, it may also refer to more mundane transcendence like overcoming poverty or engaging in pursuits of altered states of consciousness and so on.

ⁱⁱⁱ In other words, if there is any dominance, the selected posture opens itself up to deconstruction. For example, regarding the Dark postures: Christianity selects ‘guilt’, while Buddhism picks ‘suffering’, and Existentialism usually opts for ‘meaninglessness’; for the Light postures Bonhoeffer chooses ‘letting go’, while van Ruler opts for ‘joy’, and Moltmann decides on ‘hope’, which is also an element in Derrida’s ‘messianicity’. Eastern religions are particularly partial to the Light posture of ‘contemplation’ as it is practised in meditation, in the same way is the trend in New Age and New Consciousness movements when they received impetus in the 1960’s in the West, and this could be extended to include forms of prayer in the myriad of Christian, Jewish and Islamic traditions. Visagie assumes such states to be genuine as long as they are not made into an ideological ideal which compromises the postural balance of a person.

^{iv} See the discussion on typologies in Section 5 below which brings up interesting usage of Ideologies and macro-motives for diagnostic and evaluative purposes.

^v Note here, though, DA will not endorse the Habermasian dualism that forms between System and Lifeworld because of the coherence principle.

^{vi} Taken from Visagie, 2009, Departmental correspondence, UFS. This refers to the extension of Nature into the vast expansion of time before recorded / written history, and by implication, before human existence.

^{vii} The literature Visagie had at the Department of Philosophy (where he was Head of Department) at the UFS is extensive. I acquired as much as possible that could concern Key theory both directly and indirectly. Some of the literature is published and some not; some were departmental guides compiled specifically for students and lecturers; any other forms of reference, such as emails, letters, memos, and

so on, will either be notated as departmental correspondence (DC) or personal communication (PC). This is an attempt to draw all of these sources together into a comprehensive, refined model.

^{viii} Following Visagie, the use of the term *Key* suggests a symbolic unlocking of a deeper understanding of an author's intent, or a reader's interpretation, or typological consistencies and inconsistencies etc. presented in the strata of a text.

^{ix} In this section, I am neither advocating for, nor rejecting, the particular broader philosophies of any these thinkers. Their relevant influences must be acknowledged (see Visagie 2006: 30), but the in-depth analysis in the present context concerns specifically the work of Johann Visagie, and will be expanded anon in the various contexts of Key Theory. From the available resources, I have attempted to assimilate a comprehensive model of the theory, but have expanded upon what I have and appended my own deliberations and applications as well.

^x In DA terminology, this is contained in Department 17 – Truth theory. Apart from the objective and subjective issues surrounding truth claims, there is also the difference between an actual state of affairs and *what can be said* about that state of affairs. This can perhaps be found in the traditional approaches to theories of knowledge that deal with justified true belief, logic and argumentation, critical reasoning, and the complex issues surrounding these truth elements.

^{xi} Heidegger begins with how Kant's views are obscured by those of Descartes before him, in that they both neglected to provide an ontology of *Being*.

^{xii} See Cunningham, D. Jan/Feb 2005. 'Obituary Symposium. Jacques Derrida, 1930-2004.' In *Radical philosophy* 129: 11-14.

^{xiii} It is interesting to note that this thinking is echoed in the work of some linguists such as George Lakoff (discussed below) as expressed in his numerous political writings (e.g. *Don't think of an elephant*) and lectures in which he states that whether you assert or negate a concept, you are actually reinforcing said concept in the neural circuitry of the mind. Put simply, when you ask your audience not to think of an elephant, the mind will automatically conjure up the image of an elephant, and the concept is activated in the mind unconsciously and involuntarily, despite the negating intent of the speaker. Such observations deal with the biological aspect of language which was not Derrida's concern.

^{xiv} Husserl had claimed he always intended to be a transcendental idealist. I will explain briefly in quite simple terms: I, the subject, am conscious of objects. Against the rationalist stance, *I* am not a thinking substance. Against the realist stance, *I* am not an embodied person. Against the empiricist stance, *I* am not even the stream of my experiences. *I* am conscious of, and in that sense, distinct from, my experiences. *I* am the pure transcendental ego (or subjectivity).

^{xv} See discussion on Heidegger above.

^{xvi} A phrase borrowed from Visagie in personal communication, 2011.

^{xvii} See Dr. J. Glenn Friesen's comprehensive website *Studies relating to Herman Dooyeweerd* for page cross-references of *De wijsbegeerte der wetsidee* and its English translation *A new critique of theoretical thought* as referenced below.

^{xviii} One could use any object for these experiments. I have chosen a novel here, but we have demonstrated the thesis in class with anything from an apple to a box, etc.

^{xix} The formulation of the key uses the simple, present form of the verb, and brackets, for clarity and precision of concepts (not grammar) involved. The emphasis is not on agreement here, and the corresponding linguistic typology is viewed simply as a means to identify the concepts and exactly how they are at play in the hierarchical relations contained in the discourse. Obviously, where possible in my evaluations, care has been taken to use accepted philosophical, grammatical and linguistic terms and symbols, but in most instances I have continued with those contained in Visagie's texts as I am unaware of others that appropriately capture the intended meaning.

^{xx} These terms [Existence] and [Essence] would not be used in formal Key notation as they lack precise determination within the wider context of DA. See the sections on Attributes and Typologies for a more accurate formula and distinctions within existentialist keys.

^{xxi} It is possible to have one key standing beside another (different) key when considering a single work by a thinker. Key theory assumes that a given discourse may house a kind of an inter-logic between varying keys which are inter-related, even, e.g. in a contradictory way as in a simple vertical dualism where one has two different (and irreducible) subjects exerting power over the same domain such as:

[X₁] ↘

[Z]

[X₂] ↗

^{xxii} I am excluding ordinary every day and ultimate beliefs of individuals here as these are housed in the Belief Theory (Department 1) of DA proposing an 'ABC' hierarchy of individuals or groups, and goes beyond the scope of the present study.

^{xxiii} These sets are open word classes which will accept the alteration, addition or omission of members where appropriately processed according to further research and development of Key Theory and DA. One must maintain a measure of incompleteness in the models due to the constant surfacing of new insights that on-going research in different disciplines, methodological models, or research programmes may produce.

^{xxiv} It is extremely rare that I do not specify the operator; however, it is prudent to recognize that this might be merely a personal preference, as I find that operators are usually repeated in the text in a particular way signifying the same type of relation which directs me more clearly to the schematic structure of the discourse at hand.

^{xxv} Note that the pair continuous-discontinuous did not form part of the original set, so it is absent from most of the earlier published literature. However, the pair has been added at the suggestion of Prof. D.F.M. Strauss: 'What the author (Visagie) misses in the list is, for example, the pair discreteness-continuity.' (2010: 70) Strauss is referring to the first two of Dooyeweerd's formal table of aspects. Dooyeweerd made aspects the foundation of his whole philosophy in the 1930's and distinguishes sharply *things* from the abstract *aspects* in which they function. What struck Strauss was that the majority of the attribute set corresponds to the foundational aspect of reality in Dooyeweerd's table. The inclusion, then, of continuity-discontinuity is based on empirical grounds, e.g. to fully describe the near universal attributes employed in post-modern discourse.

^{xxvi} Transformationalist discourse has been extensively been discussed by Visagie in *Transformational ethics* (1999). I have not included references to the manuscript here as it extends beyond the immediate concerns of Key theory. However, to sum up, transformational ethics can be designated to the third model of Personhood contained in Macro-motive theory and it aims for the illusory ideal that one can work on oneself, through various methods and techniques, in order to reach a kind of spiritual perfection that far exceeds the mundaneness of ordinary existence. Usually, this transformation is assumed to bring about a higher level of consciousness or understanding, where one can maintain a greater level of serenity or peace or even happiness and abundance in life than ordinary people, while at the same time being able to overcome the hardships of life more easily than ordinary folk. The emphasis is on transformation or continual change towards something better.

^{xxvii} Perhaps the main key subject for Marx would be [Economic Life].

^{xxviii} For an extensive study on the work of Patricia Churchland, see Repko, P. 2006. *Discursive deep structure and philosophy of mind: A critique of the neurophilosophy of Patricia Churchland*. MA Thesis. Bloemfontein: University of the Free State.

^{xxix} Obtained from *The New York Times Archive*, 25 April 1929, Einstein's response to New York Rabbi Herbert S. Goldstein. (URL= <<http://NYTimes.com>>)

^{xxx} Visagie has noted that some Derridean deconstructions have been aimed at Lifeworld dualisms rather than Key theoretical dualistic schemas. It is important to distinguish between the two as one cannot legitimately accept that dualistic worldviews are generated only in key-articulated thought.

^{xxxi} Each dualism will be notated above the key as 'Dualism (priority)' or 'Dualism (parallel)' or 'Dualism (denigration).

^{xxxii} See as an example, the emblem for the YMCA.

^{xxxiii} See Annas, J. (1996: 704) 'Hierocles' in *The Oxford classical dictionary*.

^{xxxiv} Visagie has expressed reservations about this option in conversation because he does not see this operator as specific enough in designating precise action on the domain. If this is the case, the analyst would have to replace this 'operator' with a more suitable one from the context of the discourse at hand.

^{xxxv} In various DA illustrations, Visagie has presented the ITM model in the 7th department as a symbolic image of a ship with a sail on top housing conceptual / discursive domination, and a hull below that representing social / group domination.

^{xxxvi} Note these thinkers function within a specifically Christian Reformationalist ideology which is not the case here; the reader is free to consult their original works for these specific methodologies and their entailments if so desired, but generally I do not make use of them. I take a more agnostic approach to theory. If analysts are specifically looking for a theistic approach, or a scriptural systematics, following these methods as they stand will be useful. However, Key theory makes no such attempt but we extract parts of their methodology that are useful for this work.

^{xxxvii} 'Verbanden' in Vollenhoven can be translated from the Dutch to mean ties, bonds or connections. See in Wolters (1979: 247).

^{xxxviii} I have used the Marriott translation (2007, Arc Manor) in which Marriott gives introductory notes about the life and circumstances of Machiavelli prior to his translation of the text.

^{xxxix} See Thagard, P, "Cognitive Science", *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/cognitive-science/>>

^{xl} My translation from *Holistiese logika* (1989: 2pp)

^{xli} In correspondence to Ray Jackendoff, 2010.

^{xlii} For Parmenides, see Barnes (1987: 132) and for Kant, see Rohlf entry in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

^{xliii} See Bilgrami & Rovane in *The Cambridge companion to Chomsky* (2005: 194)

^{xliv} See Ricoeur in *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor* (1981: 245)

^{lv} See Plato's *Republic* as referenced in *Philosophy in the flesh* (1999: 365). Lakoff and Johnson take this particular translation from the version contained in *The collected dialogues of Plato*. Edited by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961.

^{lvi} See Johann Visagie in an open letter to Jackendoff, 2010. Regarding this particular example he also thanks D.F.M. Strauss for bringing this to his attention many years ago. They both work with this kind of distinction, Strauss more particularly in applying the modal theory of Dooyeweerd.

^{lvii} See paper by Lee, S.W.S. & Schwartz, N. (University of Michigan) *Wiping the slate clean: Psychological consequences of physical cleansing*. In *Current directions in psychological science*. In press.

^{lviii} See Randall, S. K. & Gergel, D.R. July 2009. *The education of girls in Africa*. (Opening address presented at the Federation of University Women of Africa) Lagos, Nigeria.

^{lxix} Visagie gives a more extensive explanation of this sub theory and its effects on the other sub theories which goes beyond the scope of this discussion. (see 2006: 93-94)

^{xlix} The reader should refer to the Overview if contents of the 19 DA Departments are unfamiliar.

ⁱ See in an open letter to Jackendoff, 8.16, 2010.

ⁱⁱ I find the work of Antonio Damasio particularly useful in these types of discussions as he seems to want to engage seriously with philosophy and other disciplines in such a way that elucidates and explores the different facets of the mind/brain without compromising the dignity of disciplines as such.

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Summary:

Key theory, or Logosemantics, was formulated by Johann Visagie as part of a larger project known as Discourse Archaeology (DA) which is an interlocking set of sub-theories designed to investigate the structures, systems, patterns and relationships that occur in philosophical discourse. The present study gives a brief overview of the whole of DA so that Key theory can be placed in the context of Visagie's expansive venture. The historical background from which Key theory emerged is sketched showing where the theory finds points of contact with thinkers in the field of philosophy who previously considered such occurrences in discourse. The systematic context looks to formulate a detailed explanation of Key theory components and their functions, as well as demonstrate its critical, pedagogical and descriptive import in the field of philosophy. A number of different philosophers' work from varying fields, epochs and traditions is used to illustrate the diverse applications of the theory. In contrast, similarities between key elements are further used to diagnose typologies and trends across different time frames and conventions of thought. Seeing that all of the DA sub-theories operate within a systematic approach, the links to the sub-theories of Figurative Semiotic theory and Epistemic theory will also be explored as they are housed in the same faculty of the broader theory. In order to reach a fully generative analysis, it has proven fruitful to interface various departments with one another in order to form complexes which show the protological diversity required to begin asking the kinds of questions that initiate a detailed analysis. The target area for forming this line of inquiry is chosen as ethics and morality as it is an area which has proven notoriously complicated and often difficult for philosophy to deal with effectively either in explanation or evaluation. The link to Anthropology theory gives a brief outline of the possibility that the hierarchical structure contained in keys is universally representative of human theory-forming capacities. We seem to be constrained in some way to think like this and, consequently, we do not propose a rejection

of all keys. We do suggest a deconstruction of keys so that the careful unpacking of concepts contained in, and implied by, key formulations can be evaluated and reconstructed with as much legitimacy as possible. The anticipation is to investigate the validity of acceptable key formulations and look for new conceptual links to replace or rework unacceptable formulations. This is a multi-disciplinary move away from absolutizations of thought and pure theory which we no longer consider plausible in philosophy.

Opsomming:

‘Key theory’ is ‘n onderafdeling van ‘n groter intellektuele projek, naamlik Diskoers Argeologie (DA), wat deur Johann Visagie ontwikkel is. DA is ‘n geïntegreerde stel sub-teorieë waarmee die strukture, stelsels, patrone en verhoudings wat voorkom in filosofiese diskoers ondersoek kan word. Hierdie studie begin met ‘n kort oorsig van DA om aan te dui waar ‘Key theory’ geplaas kan word in die konteks van Visagie se omvattende projek. Die historiese agtergrond waaruit ‘Key theory’ ontstaan het wys waar die teorie punte van kontak vind met die denkers in die veld van filosofie wat voorheen sodanige voorvalle in diskoers oorweeg het. Dit word gevolg deur ‘n gedetailleerde sistematiese uiteensetting van die verskillende komponente van ‘Key theory’ en hulle funksies – wat die kritiese, pedagogiese en beskrywende belang daarvan in die gebied van filosofie demonstreer. ‘n Hele aantal filosowe se werk word gebruik om die diverse toepassings van die teorie te illustreer en ooreenkomste tussen die sleutel-elemente word gebruik om die tipologieë en tendense, asook konvensies van denke oor verskillende velde, tydperke en tradisies te diagnoseer. Gegewe die feit dat al die DA sub-teorieë binne ‘n sistematiese benadering funksioneer word die skakels tussen die subteorieë van Figuurlike

Semiotiese teorie en Epistemiese teorie ondersoek aangesien beide gehuisves word in dieselfde fakulteit binne die breër teorie. Om 'n volle generatiewe analise te kan bereik, is dit noodsaaklik om koppelings tussen verskeie departemente te maak om 'n geheel beeld van komplekse te vorm sodat die protologiese diversiteit ons kan lei om vrae te begin vra wat 'n gedetailleerde analise kan voortbring. Etiek en moraliteit vorm die fokus van die lyn van ondersoek aangesien dit dikwels is 'n gebied wat ingewikkeld is en dikwels moeilik vir filosofie om te hanteer óf in verduideliking óf in evaluering. Die skakel na Antropologie teorie gee 'n kort uiteensetting van die moontlikheid dat die hiërargiese struktuur vervat in keys is universeel verteenwoordigend van menslike teorie-vorming vermoëns. In plaas daarvan om alle 'keys' bloot te verwerp, word eerder geargumenteer vir 'n dekonstruksie van alle 'keys'. So 'n sorgvuldige uitpak van konsepte vervat in, en geïmpliseer deur, 'key' formulerings kan dan geëvalueer word en gerekonstrueer word wat aan dit legitimiteit kan verlee. Die studie het ten doel om die geldigheid van aanvaarbare formulerings te ondersoek en te kyk vir nuwe konseptuele skakels wat onaanvaarbare 'keys' kan laat vervang of herwerk. Hierdie is 'n multi-dissiplinêre skuif weg van absoluterende denke en die idee van suiwer teorie wat nie meer as haalbare ideale in filosofie gesien word nie.

Key terms:

Key theory

Logosemantics

Logocentrism

Discourse archaeology

Philosophical hierarchies

Binary oppositions

Conceptual metaphors

Deconstruction

Destruktion

Ground-ideas