


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DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS: *DE DEMOSTHENE*: A CRITICAL  
APPRAISAL OF THE *STATUS QAESTIONIS*, FOLLOWED BY A  
GLOSSARY OF THE TECHNICAL TERMS

by

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## INTRODUCTION

The autobiographic details of Dionysius of Halicarnassus are very scanty, given in passing and dispersed through all his extant works, viz. the *Archaeologia*, his work on the history of Rome, his literary essays and a few letters.

From his *Archaeologia* we learn that he took a ship to Italy at the conclusion of the Civic War (30 B.C.); that he spent the twenty-two years, which passed between that time and the time at which we know he was writing, at Rome; that he had to master Latin for the sake of the composition of his *Archaeologia*, and that the writing of this work kept him busy all the time. As we find no allusion whatsoever to his other works in this historical study, it might be inferred that he most probably wrote them after he had completed his *Archaeologia*. He also probably remained at Rome for a considerable time, although no definite proof for this opinion can be supplied. Likewise, the time and place of his death are unattested and therefore not knowable. However, from the fact that he formed part of an active literary circle,<sup>1</sup> we may assume that he had been staying in the capital for at least the time during which he produced his works, among which the *De Demosthene*.<sup>2</sup>

So far as his occupation during his stay at Rome is concerned, he must have been a teacher of rhetoric to Roman youths: in his treatise on composition, the *De compositione verborum*,<sup>3</sup> addressed as a birthday present to one of his pupils, Metilius Rufus, he promises to expound certain aspects more fully in the daily lessons, ἐν ταῖς καθ' ἡμέραν γυμνασίαις...<sup>4</sup> This is confirmed by the didactic character of his essays in the *De oratoribus antiquis*, and especially by the general introduction to his corpus where Dionysius explicitly promises to point out which qualities of the individual styles of the orators he is going to discuss, are worthy of imitation, μίμησις,<sup>5</sup> by students.

Although his treatises on the Attic orators would indeed be of great help for orators-to-be, they were not intended to be rhetorical handbooks for students but must be regarded as literary treatises with an impact on prose literature in general. This is especially true of the *De Demosthene*,

as can easily be inferred from the fact that Demosthenes is compared in it not only with orators, but with a philosopher, Plato, and a historian, Thucydides, as well. As a matter of fact, the introduction of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system into the *De Demosthene* enabled Dionysius to determine the relative position of Demosthenes in the whole field of prose literature, and not only in oratory. In his treatment of the musical aspect of the style of Demosthenes (*De Dem.* II, cc.35ff) he likewise has recourse to a system, the ἁρμονία system, which includes even poets like Homer. Finally, in his general introduction to the *De oratoribus antiquis* Dionysius spends some time on the controversy between the Asianistic and Atticistic movements. This discussion points in the direction of prose literature in general and is not only of concern to oratory.

These remarks concerning the literary character of his works inevitably lead to the following observation: Dionysius must have been an active member of some literary circle at Rome, thus participating in an activity that was a feature of intellectual life in the capital in the period in which he wrote.<sup>6</sup> His essays suggest that a constant interchange of opinion took place between himself and interested friends, not mere students. This is confirmed by the fact that, although the essays were addressed to individual persons, they were destined for a wider public: in ch. 23 of the *De Demosthene* Dionysius invites all lovers of literature (οἱ φιλόλογοι ἅπαντες) to examine the validity of his opinion concerning Plato.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, although the *De Demosthene* was addressed to Ammaeus, he refers to the readers of this essay in the plural.<sup>8</sup> In his essays we meet some of these persons who most probably constituted the literary circle: Ammaeus (two letters and the essays on the Attic orators), Metilius Rufus (*De compositione verborum*), Pompeius Geminus (two letters), Demetrius (one essay), Quintus Aelius Tubero (one essay), while the names of Zeno and Caecilius of Calacte are mentioned in the second letter to Pompeius. Of these only Caecilius of Calacte is known through other works as well, e.g. ps.-Longinus and Plutarchus. Generally speaking, these persons were well acquainted with Attic literature: in the *De Demosthene* Dionysius frequently refers to this fact: ὡς ἐν εἰδόσι λέγων.<sup>9</sup> For this reason Dionysius gives only a few or no examples: καὶ πάντ' ἤδη γνώριμα οἷς λέγω, καὶ οὐθέν δεόμεθα παραδειγμάτων.<sup>10</sup>

So far as the setting of the *De Demosthene* is concerned, two controversies had a direct influence on the essay on Demosthenes: the controversy between Atticism and Asianism, and the controversy between the philosophers and the rhetoricians. These were topical issues in Rome at the time of Dionysius, issues in which he had to show his inclination. Atticism was "a reaction against the excesses of Hellenistic prose style..."<sup>11</sup> In the general introduction to the corpus on the Attic orators Dionysius clearly expresses his desire to promote the Atticistic movement, and the way in which he treats the orators is a final confirmation of this desire: especially in the *De Demosthene* he severely criticizes excessive and unjustified use of embellishment, disclosing thereby his attitude towards Asianistic elaboration in style.

The other dispute was one between the philosophers and rhetoricians concerning the rôle of philosophy and rhetoric in the educational program in Rome. Without elaborating on the long history of this dispute, a few remarks will be sufficient to understand Dionysius' attitude towards Plato. He reacted against the extremist philosophers who undervalued rhetoric as a subject in the educational program to such an extent, that they regarded Plato, a philosopher, as the best orator as well. (*De Dem.* 23).

In the present study, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: De Demosthene: A critical appraisal of the status quaestionis, followed by a glossary of the technical terms*, an attempt will be made to understand the *De Demosthene* primarily out of itself and secondary as part of the corpus, the *De oratoribus antiquis*. In the history of research on this essay the interpretation of this essay was mainly determined by a few great issues. The first issue is the problem of the object and nature of the *De Demosthene*. The presence of a large section on the musical aspect of the style of Demosthenes (cc. 35ff.) does not seem to fit in with the object of the first chapters (cc. 1-34); moreover, the nature of these two major sections differs so much, that former researchers hardly have regarded them as different sections of one essay. I hope to prove that they were originally part of the *De Demosthene*, and deliberately included.

The second matter which caused much dispute, is the position of the *De Demosthene* in the corpus of which it forms a part (as we have it today). The treatise seems to differ in so many aspects from the other extant works of this corpus that one could legitimately ask whether the *De Demosthene*

was indeed the essay on Demosthenes promised in the general introduction to this corpus. I hope to prove that it is indeed.

The third issue that really interested scholars is the one concerning the chronological relation between the *De Demosthene* and the *De compositione verborum*, another essay of Dionysius on composition. The reason for this interest is the resemblance between this treatise and cc. 35ff. of the *De Demosthene*. I hope to prove that the *De compositione verborum* had been written before the *De Demosthene*, and not during an alleged break in the composition of the *De Demosthene*.

In the last chapter I wish to discuss a matter which so far has not attracted the attention of scholars, but which I regard as essential for the understanding of this essay, that is the application of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. I hope to prove that Dionysius could not have attained his goal without recourse to this system, albeit that the presence of this system in the *De Demosthene* seems to have escaped notice.

A glossary will be included as a practical aid to the study of the text.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1. Cp. p. 2 below.
2. The *De Demosthene* is virtually universally abbreviated with "*De Dem.*" - which I shall use as well.
3. I shall abbreviate the title of this essay of Dionysius with "*C.V.*" - which is commonly accepted by most scholars.
4. *C.V.* xx, 206:23-24. In the case of the *De compositione verborum* I have used the text of W. Rhys Roberts, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Literary Composition*, London: Macmillan and Co., 1910. In the case of the *De Demosthene* and the other essays of the *De oratoribus antiquis*, I have made use of the Loeb text by S. Usher, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Critical Essays*, vol. I, London: William Heinemann, 1974, being more available than the text of Usener and Radermacher. The first numeral used by me refers to the chapter, the second to the page and the last one to the lines on the page.
5. 4,12:1-5.
6. "Dionysius was, if not the central figure, at least a very active member of one of the literary coteries which were so marked a feature of the period in which he wrote." (S.F. Bonner, *The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, repr. Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1969, p.3). G.P. Goold calls it a "professorial circle" in his article on this matter: *A Greek Professorial Circle at Rome*, TAPA, 92 (1961), pp.168-192. Cp. W. Rhys Roberts, *The Literary Circle of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, CR, 14 (1900), pp.439-442 as well.
7. 23,326:25-26.
8. Cp. notes 9 and 10 below.
9. "speaking to well informed persons." (14,292:1-2).  
Cp. 38,382:28: ὡς ἐν εἰδούσι λέγοντας; 46,418:11-12: οὐ γὰρ εἴ γε τοῖς ἀπείροις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τάδε γράφω... ("for I do not write these things for those who are not acquainted with the orator...")  
Cp. 50,432:11-15 as well.
10. "And this is already known to my readers - and I need not quote any examples at all." (13,290:12-13). Cp. 42,404:1-3 as well.

11. G.Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, Princeton: New Jersey, 1963, p.330. For detail on the controversy between Atticism and Asianism, cp. E.Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, vol.I, Berlin: Teubner, 1915, pp.355-371, and W.Kroll, *Rhetorik*, in R.E., par. 32, pp.1105-1108.

## CHAPTER I

### THE PURPOSE OF THE *DE DEMOSTHENE*

Reading the *De Demosthene* one comes across a wide variety of subjects which can all be related to rhetoric in some way or other, and for this reason one can be tempted to think that Dionysius is treating the rhetorical system of Demosthenes in this treatise. Is this the case? Obviously, understanding the intention, the purpose of the *De Dem.*, is a *sine qua non* for a critical appraisal of all other problems posed by the *De Dem.*

As will be indicated, Dionysius has applied some principles of his own rhetorical system himself whilst writing this treatise. In view of this the process of determining the structure of the *De Dem.*, from which the purpose emerges, has been done. Investigations undertaken by previous researchers will be critically evaluated throughout the chapter.

The structure of this chapter is as follows:

- posing the problem concerning the intention of the *De Dem.* in the light of Dionysius' final remark in the last chapter that his treatise deals with the style of Demosthenes;
- history of research on this matter;
- brief exposition of own view;
- discussion of the structure of the *De Dem.*:
  - cc. 1-34;
  - cc. 35-52;
  - cc. 53-54;
  - cc. 54-58;
- conclusion.

*The problem concerning the purpose of the De Dem.*

The introduction to the *De Dem.* being lost,<sup>1</sup> one has no choice but to ascertain the purpose of this treatise from the extant and major part itself - in which case the most obvious<sup>2</sup> place to look for it is the end.

Now the last but one sentence reads as follows: ταῦτα, ὦ κράτιστε Ἀμμαῖε, γράφειν εἶχόμεν σοι περὶ τῆς Δημοσθένους λέξεως (The spaced print is mine).<sup>3</sup>

In this recapitulating sentence one seems to get the key to the *De Dem.* - the λέξις of Demosthenes; moreover, the subsequent sentence, being the very last one of the treatise, solves the possible problem of the meaning of λέξις at this place, for when Dionysius promises his friend that he will present to him another treatise dealing with Demosthenes' treatment of subject-matter,<sup>4</sup> one is tempted to infer that the *De Dem.* indeed deals with the λεκτικὸς τύπος, which, according to the rhetorical system of the time, consists of ἐκλογή τῶν ὀνομάτων, σύνθεσις and σχήματα.<sup>5</sup> On the surface of it everything seems to fit well, for there is a section in which the ἐκλογή seems to predominate (cc. 1-34), being followed by an instructive section on Demosthenes' σύνθεσις (cc. 35-52), a section on how his speeches should be delivered, ὑπόκρισις (cc. 53-54), and a few chapters (starting at the end of chapter 54 and continuing to the end of the treatise) in which various points of criticism against Demosthenes' style are discussed; some remarks on the figures are given as well, although not in a separate section.

The question to be dealt with, then, will be whether the *content* of the treatise indeed confirms that the λέξις of Demosthenes is the object of the treatise.

Hand in hand with investigations done on this matter, researchers have discussed the *nature* of the essay, i.e. the way in which Dionysius has presented his material. This matter will be discussed first.

*A survey of the investigations of these problems.*

So far as the *nature of the essay* is concerned, one is inclined to regard the *De Dem.* as a whole as a purely *theoretical exposition* (on the style of Demosthenes) in view of the recapitulating sentence, in ch. 58: ταῦτα, ὦ κράτιστε Ἀμμαῖε, γράφειν εἶχόμεν σοι περὶ τῆς Δημοσθένους λέξεως<sup>6</sup> This seems to be the view of H.M.Hubbell, as can be inferred from the following quotation: "But the

essay on Demosthenes that we possess, deals wholly with style..."<sup>7</sup>

The opposite of this view is that Dionysius wanted to *prove* that Demosthenes is the best in the field of style. The exponents of this view are L.Radermacher,<sup>8</sup> E.Kalinka, J.Lücke and G.M.A.Grube. Quoting R.H.Tukey, E.Kalinka says: "*in der Schrift über Demosthenes aber* 'his only concern is to *establish the pre-eminence* of Demosthenes,' *und deshalb* 'the work takes the form of *argument* rather than exposition (Tukey 396)' (The italics are mine)."<sup>9</sup> The same attitude is taken by J.Lücke: "*In diesem Kapitel* (ch. 33, my note) *gewährt uns Dionys einen Überblick über die gesamte Anlage seiner Schrift. Sein Ziel ist es, Demosthenes als den s t ä r k s t e n R e d n e r zu bezeichnen.* (The spaced print is mine)"<sup>10</sup> This is also the view of G.M.A.Grube: "He is too determined to *prove the superiority* of Demosthenes. (The italics are mine)"<sup>11</sup> The third possible answer to the question is to recognise a *two-fold nature* in the *De Dem.*: in *De Dem. I* Dionysius is trying to prove the supremacy of Demosthenes in the field of λέξις: this is the polemic section; in *De Dem. II* he is simply giving an exposition of the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes. This is the whole view held by R.H.Tukey. Referring to *De Dem. I*, he comments: "the work takes the form of *argument* rather than *exposition*; (The italics are mine)"<sup>12</sup> but when he turns to the 'purpose of the second half of the essay...' <sup>13</sup> he remarks: 'Here then we no longer have *argument* but *exposition*. (My italics)' <sup>14</sup> Whereas Dionysius' only concern in *De Dem. I* is to establish the pre-eminence of Demosthenes, especially over Plato, there is no attempt at comparison between Demosthenes and the authors that are quoted; any comparison with Plato is carefully avoided.<sup>15</sup>

My own view is the following: the *De Dem.* can be divided into four sections which I am going to call: *De Dem. I, II, III, IV*;<sup>16</sup> *De Dem. I* and *IV* are polemic; *De Dem. II* and *De Dem. III* are expositional or didactic. In *De Dem. I* Dionysius is intent on *proving* that Demosthenes is the best in the field of λέξις; with this aim comparisons with Lysias, Thucydides, Plato and Isocrates are introduced, which brings the polemic nature of this section to the fore; seeing that *De Dem. IV* is the section in which Dionysius is trying to refute current criticisms against his idol, this section is polemic as well. On the other hand, in *De Dem. II* Dionysius is not concerned with giving proof; his position there is that the supremacy of Demosthenes in the field of composition need not be proved, but is a fact recognised even by Aeschines,

Demosthenes' greatest rival. As a result, this section gives the impression of a mere exposition of various aspects relating to the composition of Demosthenes. In *De Dem.* III there is no polemic argumentation either; in general this section deals with how speeches of Demosthenes should be read aloud.<sup>17</sup>

The second problem to be discussed is whether the content of the treatise indeed confirm that the λέξις of Demosthenes is the object of the treatise. I hope to prove that, although all the aspects of style do appear in the *De Dem.*, the *style of Demosthenes as such* is not the object of the treatise, for determining which one has to consider all the evidence provided by the text itself, and not content oneself with one single remark at the close of the work. I now propose to analyse the treatise in terms of the four independent sections mentioned above, viz. *De Dem.* I, II, III and IV.

*De Dem.* I (cc. 1-34)

Whilst some scholars suggest that some noticeable time must have lapsed between the composition of ch. 32 and of the rest of the work,<sup>18</sup> each of them agrees that Dionysius starts with a new subject in ch. 35, and that cc. 1-34 form a well-defined section with marked unity.<sup>19</sup> And small wonder, for at the end of ch. 32 Dionysius says that he will now proceed to recapitulate his argument: βούλομαι εὖ εἰρημεῖν καὶ συλλογίσασθαι τὰ εἰρημένα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ δεῦξαι πάνθ', ὅσα ὑπεσχόμεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς θεωρίας τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου, πεποιηκότα ἑμαυτὸν,<sup>20</sup> and so he does in ch. 33, starting with: ἡ πρόθεσις ἦν μοι καὶ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα τοῦ λόγου...<sup>21</sup>, words which are followed by the summary. In ch. 33 his recapitulation is formulated in terms of the system of the types of style, the χαρακτῆρες, but in ch. 34 in terms of the virtues of style, the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system.<sup>22</sup> Thus, in cc. 33-34 we are given the recapitulation of all that has been said from the first chapter onwards<sup>23</sup>; furthermore, in ch. 34 Dionysius announces that he is about to proceed to a new section: ὀλίγα τούτοις ἔτι προσθεῖς περὶ τῆς λέξεως, ἐπὶ τὸ καταλειπόμενον τῆς < προκειμένης > θεωρίας μέρος μεταβήσομαι...<sup>24</sup> which is introduced by the following words at the beginning of ch. 35: φέρε εἰ τούτων εἰρημένων ἡμῖν λέγωμεν ἤδη καὶ < περὶ τῆς σύνθεσεως > τῶν ὀνομάτων ἧ κέχρηται ὁ ἀνὴρ.<sup>25</sup>

We can now proceed to the discussion of the problem whether the content of *De Dem. I* confirms the idea that the object of the *De Dem. I* is the λέξις of Demosthenes, at least so far as cc. 1-34 are concerned. Since Dionysius himself calls his study a θεωρία τοῦ λεκτικουῦ τόπου immediately before his recapitulation of the first part,<sup>26</sup> the reader gets the superficial idea that the *De Dem. I* is a theoretical exposition of the λέξις of Demosthenes *as such*.<sup>27</sup> However, the moment one reads the very next sentence, i.e. the first sentence of ch. 33, the more specific aim of *De Dem. I* comes to the fore: ἡ πρόθεσις ἦν μοι καὶ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα τοῦ λόγου, κρατίστη λέξει καὶ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν ἡρμωσμένη μετριώτατα. Δημοσθένη κεχορημένον ἐπιδείξαι... (The italics are mine).<sup>28</sup> Rearranging the sentence, one gets: ἡ πρόθεσις καὶ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα τοῦ λόγου ἦν μοι ἐπιδείξαι

Δημοσθένη κεχορημένον

λέξει  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{κρατίστη} \\ \text{καὶ μετριώτατα ἡρμωσμένη πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν.} \end{array} \right.$ <sup>29</sup>

A translation of this sentence done according to this rearrangement is as follows: "The theme and the subject of my treatise was to show that Demosthenes has used a style (which is) the best and (which is) in the most perfect measure adapted to all aspects of human nature..."

It is important to note that, according to this sentence, the object was not the style of Demosthenes *as such*, but to show that his style is the best and in the most perfect measure adapted to all aspects of human nature (μετριώτατα ἡρμωσμένη πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν). This is no trivial difference - on the contrary: in the first case *De Dem. I* would have had the nature of a *theoretical exposition*, whereas in the second case it would be *polemic*, for this object would only be attained by proving that the style of his idol is better than that of other authors. The content of *De Dem. I* proves that this is indeed what Dionysius has done. However, another problem immediately comes to the fore: did Dionysius have *two*

objectives concerning the style implied by the καί? These would be: firstly, that Demosthenes uses the best style (in other words, that the style used by Demosthenes is the best); secondly, that the style used by him is best adapted to all aspects of human nature. It is clearly not the case.<sup>30</sup> Another possibility would be that λέξις is to be understood in the sense of *type of style* and that Dionysius is using Demosthenes as the best exponent of the middle type of style to prove only that this type is the best and best adapted to all aspects of human nature. This is the best and best adapted to all aspects of human nature. This possibility cannot be accepted either.<sup>31</sup> A third possibility would be that he uses the best type of style, firstly, and secondly, that using the best type of style, his *personal* style is the best example of the best type of style. This view is improbable and thus unacceptable.<sup>32</sup> A fourth possibility, to my mind the correct one, is that λέξις refers to the personal style of Demosthenes and that the object of cc. 1-32 has been merely to prove that the style of Demosthenes is the best, since it is the best adapted to all aspects of human nature. This means that I think the καί is epexegetic.<sup>33</sup> That the ultimate aim of *De Dem.* I is to prove the supremacy of Demosthenes in the field of λέξις, is finally confirmed by the very last sentence of ch. 33: ἐπεὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ κρατίστου χαρακτήρος οὗτοι ζηλωταὶ γινόμενοι μεγίστης δόξης ἔτυχον, ἵνα δείξαιμι, κἂν εἰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμείνους εἴσι, Δημοσθένει γε οὖν ἀξίους ὄντας ἀμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων.<sup>34</sup>

This conclusion is borne out by further evidence from the work itself. To attain his object, Dionysius has made use of his χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system, according to which Greek prose writers could be, and were, classified by the rhetoricians. In cc. 1-15 he proves that the *type* of style which Demosthenes uses, the middle type, is better than both the extraordinary<sup>35</sup> and the simple types of style. After that, there remains only one thing to be done: he still has to prove that Demosthenes is the best exponent of the best type of style, which he does in cc. 16ff. By dealing only with the best representatives of the extreme types, Thucydides and Lysias,<sup>36</sup> and subsequently with the best representatives of the best type of style, the middle type, viz. Plato and Isocrates,<sup>37</sup> Dionysius did indeed follow the shortest logical way to prove his point. In fact, he is merely following a logical procedure which had already been formulated by Aristotle as one of his four common topics, the topic of τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἀδύνατον: the possible and the impossible.<sup>38</sup>

I shall now proceed to prove that the content of cc. 1-32 confirms that this is indeed the object of *De Dem.* I.

A close look at the text allows to see that ch. 16<sup>39</sup> definitely introduces a new section: εἰρηκὼς δὲ κατ' ἀρχάς, ὅτι μοι δοκοῦσιν Ἰσοκράτης τε καὶ Πλάτων κράτιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτετηδευμένοι τοῦτο τὸ γένος τοῦ χαρακτηῖρος καὶ προαγαγεῖν μὲν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ μῆκιστον, οὐ μὴν καὶ τελεῖωσαι, ὅσα δ' ἐνέλιπεν ἐκεῖνων ἐκάτερος, ταῦτα Δημοσθένην ἐξειργασμένον ἐπιδείξειν ὑποσχόμενος, ἐπὶ τοῦ τῆς ἡδη πορεύσομαι... (My spacing of print.)<sup>40</sup>

In fact, in the closing stages of the first sub-section (cc. 1-15), Dionysius already suggests that he still has much essential ground to cover,<sup>41</sup> doubtless referring to the new sub-section he is about to start in ch. 16. He then continues to explain his method: he will compare the most suitable passages of these authors, subjecting all of them to minute scrutiny: τὰς ἀριστα δοκούσας εἶχειν (A) παρ' ἐκατέρω τῶν ἀνδρῶν λέξεις προχειρισάμενος καὶ ἀντιπαραθεῖς (B) αὐταῖς τὰς Δημοσθένους, ὅσαι περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς συνετάχθησαν ὑποθέσεις, ἵνα μᾶλλον αἱ τῶν ἀνδρῶν προαιρέσεις τε καὶ δυνάμεις γένωνται καταφανεῖς τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην βάσανον ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔργων λαβοῦσαι. (C) (My spacing of print).<sup>42</sup>

This corresponds all too closely, indeed nearly verbatim, with 33,366:26 - 33,368:2:

ἀλλ' ἀντιπαρατιθεῖς (B<sup>1</sup>) αὐτῇ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρων τε καὶ φιλοσόφων λέξεις τὰς κράτιστα δοκούσας εἶχειν (A<sup>1</sup>) καὶ τῇ δι' ἀλλήλων βασάνω φανεράν ποιῶν τὴν ἀμείνω. (My spacing of print). (C<sup>1</sup>)<sup>43</sup>

This correspondence is enlightening - it becomes clear that the former passage serves as an introduction and the latter as a recapitulation of this sub-section.

Having stated his objective and method for the chapters to come (cc. 17-32), Dionysius then immediately starts with Isocrates, εἰσαγέσθω δὲ πρῶτος Ἰσοκράτης,<sup>44</sup> staying with him as compared with Demosthenes up to ch. 23. There he turns to Plato, whom he treats in the same fashion as Isocrates and again in full concord with the aim and method stated in his introduction, concluding in ch. 32.

Thus I conclude that cc. 16-32 represent the section in which Dionysius proves Demosthenes to be the best exponent of the best type of style, the middle type, by showing how he exceeds the most prominent exponents of this type of style, viz. Plato and Isocrates.

cc. 1-15

Seeing that Dionysius introduces a new topic in ch. 16, one may expect to find the clue to cc. 1-15 in his ἀνακεφαλαίωσις at the close of this section.<sup>45</sup> - which is indeed the case: ch. 15 starts with εἴ τις μὴ μάλιστα ἀποδέχοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν οὔτε τὰ θουκυδίδεια ἐκεῖνα περιττὰ καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένα τοῦ συνήθους κράτιστα ἡγοῦμαι οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς Λυσιακοῖς τοῖς ἰσχυροῖς καὶ συνεσπασμένοις τὴν τελείαν τῆς λέξεως ἀρετὴν τίθεμαι (My spacing of print),<sup>46</sup> after which he elaborates on the idea that the diversity of the audience necessitates diversity of style as well, closing his discussion of these authors with: διὰ ταῦτα ἐγὼ τὴν οὕτως κατεσκευασμένην λέξιν μετριωτάτην εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων νενόμικα καὶ τῶν λόγων τούτους μάλιστα ἀποδέχομαι τοὺς πεφευγότας ἐκατέρου τῶν χαρακτήρων τὰς ὑπερβολάς.<sup>47</sup>

From these words it appears that Dionysius is stating that at the outset he intended to *prove the mixed type of style to be the best of the three types*. What is more, these two passages correspond closely to one that is to be found in the recapitulating ch. 33. Having stated there the method he has applied in cc. 16-33, he also recalls his procedure in cc. 1-15: ἵνα τὴν φυσικὴν ὁδὸν ὁ λόγος μοι λάβῃ τοὺς χαρακτήρας τῶν διαλέκτων τοὺς ἀξιολογωτάτους κατηριθμησάμην<sup>48</sup> καὶ τοὺς πρώτους ὄντας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας ἐπῆλθον,<sup>49</sup> ἔπειτα δεῖξας ἀτελεῖς ὅσους ἐκείνους καὶ καθ' ὃ μάλιστα ἀστοχεῖν ἕκαστον ὑπελάμβανον τοῦ τέλους ἐκλογισάμενος διὰ βραχέων,<sup>50</sup> ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη.<sup>51</sup>

The fact that it is the *types* of style which are discussed in cc. 1-15, and not individual authors as such, is confirmed by yet another interesting clue: the words denoting "type of style" are present only in cc. 1-15 in this sense - not in cc. 16-32.<sup>52</sup>

Finally, the fact that the aim of cc. 1-15 is to prove that the mixed type of style is the best, is confirmed by two casual remarks of Dionysius: in ch. 10 he proceeds to his critique of the extraordinary type of style with the remark that it is a requirement for his thesis: ἀπαιτεῖ γὰρ ὁ λόγος.<sup>53</sup> The same prominence is given to the section in which the simple style is criticized: τίς οὖν ἐστὶ κἄν τούτοις ἡ διαφορὰ; ...ἀξιοῦς γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο μαθεῖν.<sup>54</sup>

After a theoretical exposition of the three types of style (cc. 1-3), Dionysius proceeds to prove that the middle type is the best. C. 4-10 contain his arguments for proving that the extraordinary type of style, if applied throughout a work, violates two principles: appropriateness (τὸ πρέπον) and moderation (τὸ μέτρον), which is not the case with the middle style; in cc. 11-13 he discusses the simple style, showing that this type of style does not fit every kind of subject-matter (because of the principle of appropriateness) and that the absence of certain qualities of style in this type makes it inferior to the middle type of style. He concludes his discussion with a few examples from Demosthenes to illustrate the nature of the best type of style, the middle style, in ch. 14.

I shall now proceed to show that the *object of cc. 4-10* is to prove that the *middle style is better than the extraordinary type of style.*

Of the forty lines of ch. 4 about Isocrates,<sup>55</sup> the first twenty-two are an introduction to the style of this orator which merely summarizes its main features from the former thorough discussion in *De Isocr.*: ὄντινα χαρακτῆρα ἔχειν ἐφαίνετο μοι, διὰ πλειόνων μὲν ἐδήλωσα πρότερον. οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύσει καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκασιότατα εἰπεῖν.<sup>56</sup>

These two sentences indicate that the first twenty-two lines of ch. 4 only supply the necessary background, and thus serve as an introduction to what he actually wants to say in this chapter, which is stated in the second part and turns out to be a severe criticism of Isocrates' way of violating the paramount stylistic qualities of appropriateness and moderation in his application of the extraordinary style.<sup>57</sup>

Proceeding to Plato in cc. 5-7, Dionysius reveals his purpose with the philosopher at the very beginning of ch. 5: ἡ δὲ δὴ Πλατωνικὴ διάλεκτος βούλεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ μίγμα ἐκατέρων τῶν χαρακτήρων, τοῦ τε ὑψηλοῦ καὶ ἰσχυροῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται μοι πρότερον, πέφυκε δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς χαρακτήρας εὐτυχίης (My spacing of print).<sup>58</sup> He wants to indicate how badly Plato applies the extraordinary style, in fact, after a few remarks on the philosopher's application of the simple style,<sup>59</sup> the bulk of his discussion of this author is devoted to exposing the errors<sup>60</sup> of the extraordinary style, exemplified by quotations from his works. In the subsequent comparison between Demosthenes and Thucydides (cc. 8-10), the two themes of appropriateness and moderation likewise form the basis of the discussion.<sup>61</sup> in ch. 33 Dionysius claims to have shown that Demosthenes made his style κοινὴν καὶ φιλόστοργον<sup>62</sup> and that he was the most successful of all writers in the application of all three types of style: ἀποδεικνύς δ' αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ γένεσι κατορθοῦντα τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα.<sup>63</sup>

This is exactly Dionysius' aim in cc. 8-10 so far as the application of the extraordinary style is concerned: where Demosthenes and Thucydides both apply the same (extraordinary) type of style, Thucydides' is inferior to that of Demosthenes in moderation and appropriateness: τῷ δὲ προσῆ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῖς καιροῖς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀταμίεύτως τῇ κατασκευῇ κέχρηται καὶ ἄγεται μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἢ <αὐτὸς> ἄγει καὶ οὐδὲ τὸν καιρὸν αὐτῆς ἐπίσταται λαβεῖν δεξιῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον πολλάκις ἁμαρτάνει. καθ' ὃ ἡ μὲν ἀμετρία τῆς ἐξαλλαγῆς ἄσκη ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κρατεῖν τῶν καιρῶν ἀσκη<sup>64</sup> (My spacing of print) - so far for Thucydides. But Demosthenes τοῦ τε ἀρκοῦντος στοχάζεται καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς συμμετρεῖται. (My spacing of print).<sup>65</sup>

With this Dionysius closes his discussion of the extraordinary style; negatively he has indicated its propensity to deficiencies, providing one extensive example, taken from Plato; positively he has indicated the superiority of the mixed type of style, supplying an illustrative example, from Demosthenes, as proof.

Having proven that the middle style is better than the extraordinary style, Dionysius still has to compare it with the other extreme, *the simple style*, and *establish its supremacy over* this style as well. He does this in cc. 11-13.

The reader is provided with an example from Lysias, exhibiting the inherent weakness of this type of style: because of the absence of a number of qualities of style, it is not suited for every situation and is therefore guilty of violation of appropriateness. He concludes his discussion of the simple style with an example of the correct way of applying it, taken from Demosthenes.

Having proven both extreme types to be inadequate to fit all occasions,<sup>66</sup> Dionysius concludes this sub-section of his work with four examples from Demosthenes as final illustration of the best type of style in ch. 14. Instead of concluding this section of his argument, Dionysius includes yet another argument in ch. 15 in case there should still be an unconvinced reader (εἴ τις μὴ μάλιστα ἀποδέχοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν.<sup>67</sup> He elaborates on the fact that the public is not homogeneous and that the type of style which accommodates this diversity best, would be the most effective. Neither the extraordinary, nor the plain type of style would be able to accommodate the diversity of the public; only the middle, mixed type, ὁ μεμιγμένος ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν χαρακτήρων: ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέρα τῶν χαρακτήρων πείθειν ζητῶν ἥττον ἀποτεύξεται τοῦ τέλους. ἔστι δὲ οὗτος ὁ μεμιγμένος ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν χαρακτήρων.<sup>68</sup>

Only after this final argument does Dionysius repeat his conclusion to this section, viz. that he regards the mixed type of style as adapted in the most perfect measure (μετριωτάτην)<sup>69</sup> to all aspects of human nature, using the same word (μετριωτάτην) in this concluding sentence as in ch. 33 (μετριώτατα) where he explicitly stated his object for *De Dem.* I Thus I conclude that Dionysius had the intention to prove that Demosthenes is the best in the field of λέξις. Whereas he reviews cc. 1-32 in ch. 33 on the basis of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system, his basis of review in ch. 34 is the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system: in terms of this system as well Demosthenes is superior to all other writers of prose literature.<sup>70</sup>

The second major section of the *De Dem.*, *De Dem.* II, (cc. 35-52), has never been an object of controversy so far as its purpose is concerned, and for a very good reason, viz. that the reader is nowhere kept in the dark about what is intended in it for it is provided with a complete introduction to the chapters to come, and, what is more, each of the three topics discussed in this section is clearly announced.

*De Dem.* II is introduced by a general statement of what will be discussed in the section: φέρει δὴ τούτων εἰρημένων ἡμῖν λέγωμεν ἤδη καὶ <περὶ τῆς συνθέσεως> τῶν ὀνομάτων ἢ κέχρηται ὁ ἀνὴρ (My spacing of print),<sup>71</sup> which is subdivided at 36,376:19-22 as follows:

τίς δὲ ὁ τῆς ἁρμονίας αὐτοῦ χαρακτήρ  
καὶ ἀπὸ ποίας γέγονεν ἐπιτηδεύσεως τοιοῦτος  
καὶ πῶς ἂν τις αὐτὸν διαγνοίη παρεξετάζων ἑτέροις,  
ταύτη περὶ ἴσσομαι λέγειν...<sup>72</sup>

In short, he is going to treat this subject of the composition of Demosthenes under three headings: firstly, which of the three major types of ἁρμονία is applied by Demosthenes; secondly, how does Demosthenes bring about his composition; thirdly, how can one recognise his ἁρμονία and distinguish it from that of other authors?

cc. 36-46: *The first topic: which of the three major types of musical composition is applied by Demosthenes?*

Having stated these three topics at 36,376:19-22, Dionysius immediately proceeds to a theoretical exposition of the three major types of composition: after a general introduction to the types in cc.36-37, he elaborates on the rough type of composition in cc.38-39, the smooth type in ch. 40 and the middle, mixed type in ch. 41. This extensive exposition of the three types of composition is in fact a digression, a παρέκβασις,<sup>73</sup> which Dionysius regards as necessary for the sake of apprehension of this first topic.<sup>74</sup> It is not until ch. 43 that Dionysius actually proceeds to the discussion of his view that the type of composition applied by Demosthenes is the middle, mixed type: ἐπειδὴν ἀποφαίνωμαι γνώμην ὅτι τὴν μέσην τε καὶ μικτὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐπιτηδεύσεν ὁ Δημοσθένης...;<sup>75</sup>

δεδειγμένης δὴ μοι τῆς αἰρέσεως τοῦ ῥήτορος ταύτης ἤδη τις παρ' ἑαυτῷ σκοπεῖτω τὰ λεχθέντα, ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστίν, ἐνθυμούμενος μὲν ὅσα σεμνῶς κατεσκευάσται τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ αὐστηρῶς καὶ ἄξιωματικῶς, ἐνθυμούμενος δὲ ὅσα τερπνῶς καὶ ἡδέως.<sup>76</sup>

C. 43 is devoted to the proof of this view by the discussion of Demosthenes' *Olynthiācs*, ii 22-23. Before proceeding to the discussion of his second topic, Dionysius inserts yet another elaborate παρέμβασις,<sup>77</sup> viz. a discussion of two questions: Why did Demosthenes deem it necessary to make use of variation and not apply only one type of composition?

Secondly, on which principles did he base his preference of one (extreme) type of composition above the other one?<sup>78</sup> (In other words, how did he determine when a certain type of composition should be used?)

*ca. 47-49: The second topic: how did Demosthenes attain his personal kind of the intermediate composition?*

In ch. 47 the second topic is discussed: δεύτερον δὲ κεφάλαιον ἦν ἐπιδειξαι, τίσι θεωρήμασι χρώμενος καὶ διὰ ποίας ἀσκήσεως προελθὼν τὸ κράτιστον μέρος ἔλαβε τῆς < μικτῆς καὶ μέσης > ἁρμονίας.<sup>79</sup>

According to the introduction to *De Dem.* II, the second topic would simply be: How did Demosthenes bring about his individual form of melodious composition? However, the formulation of the second topic in ch. 47 incorporates a maybe somewhat unexpected element, viz. the principles he applied.<sup>80</sup> Dionysius immediately proceeds to the discussion of the first question. Virtually every piece of art has two objectives, τὸ καλόν, beauty, and ἡδονή, pleasure. In the case of literary composition, both have the same elements: εὕρισκε δὴ τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντα αἴτια, τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς καὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς πρέπον...<sup>81</sup> tone, rhythm,<sup>82</sup> variation and propriety. He then explains what is meant by each of these four terms (48,420:9 - 48,422:14), and then turns to the second question of the second topic by saying how Demosthenes applied these elements (48,422:14-22). He then returns to the matter of the principles and elaborates on the fact that although beauty and pleasure are both achieved by the same four elements, the final result is not the same, and discusses the reasons for this (48,422:22 - 48,424:7). Finally, he again returns to the matter of application and shows how Demosthenes applies these

principles (48,424:8 - 27). At this point of his discussion a digression on tone, rhythms, variation in rhythm and tone, as well as appropriateness concerning these matters would be quite justified,<sup>83</sup> but Dionysius does not present one; instead, he gives his reasons for the omission and concludes the discussion of the second topic by referring those who still insist on more information about these matters to his *C. V.*, where they will learn everything they want about rhythm, tone, variation and appropriateness (49,426:12 - 16).

*cc. 50-52: The third topic: how can one recognize the distinctive characteristics of the composition of Demosthenes and distinguish it from that of other authors?*

In ch. 50 the last topic of *De Dem. II* is introduced with the following words: ὑπεσχόμεν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο δεῖξαι ἔτι, πῶς ἂν τις διαγνοίῃ τὸν χαρακτήρα τῆς Δημοσθένους συνθέσεως καὶ ποίους χρώμενος σημεῖους ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων διορίσειεν.<sup>84</sup>

Just as in the case of the second topic, this introductory sentence does not correspond exactly with its equivalent in the introduction in ch. 36; the καί seems to suggest that Dionysius is adding another element to this topic, viz. the σημεῖα *as such*. However, in the subsequent discussion it becomes clear that those σημεῖα (tone, rhythm and variation) are presented as the "keys" to determining the distinctive quality of the composition of Demosthenes: it is described in terms of these three elements: tone (ἑμμέλεια) in 50,428:14 - 50,430:2, rhythm (εὐρυθμία) in 59,430:2 - 50,432:8 and variation (ποικιλία) in 50,432:8-15). That this is what he had in mind is confirmed by the recapitulating sentence in ch. 51:

ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ μηνύματα τῆς συνθέσεως εἶναι τῆς Δημοσθένους <ἀνυφαίρετα> καὶ χαρακτηριστικά, ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις αὐτὴν διαγνοίῃ πᾶσαν, ἐξετάζειν βουλευθεῖς.<sup>85</sup> He has even prescribed the order of investigation to be followed.<sup>86</sup>

Having completed his discussion of this topic, Dionysius pays attention to a question which could be raised, viz. why Demosthenes paid so much attention to his composition. His answer to this question is presented as yet another elaborate digression, devoted to the importance of composition.<sup>87</sup>

cc. 53-58

In ch. 53 Dionysius introduces a new topic<sup>88</sup>: εἰς ἔτι μοι καταλείπεται<sup>89</sup> λόγος ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑποκρίσεως... (My spacing of print), delivery, which is afterwards explained practically by a discussion of examples in ch. 54. He closes this discussion at 54,446:3-5: πόλλ' ἄν τις εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εἶπεῖν ἔχοι, τοῦ δὲ συντάγματος ἱκανὸν εἰληφότος ἤδη μῆκος αὐτοῦ που καταπαῶσαι χρὴ τὸν λόγον...<sup>90</sup>

The last section of the *De Dem.*,<sup>91</sup> which starts at 54,446:6, is devoted to a discussion of various points of criticism against his idol. Dionysius commences with admitting that the style of Demosthenes is lacking in *wit*, that manifestations of *urbanity* are indeed lacking: ὅτι πάσας ἔχουσα τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡ Δημοσθένους λέξις λείπεται εὐτραπέλεια, ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ καλοῦσι χάριν. πλεῖστον γὰρ αὐτῆς μετέχει μέρος... Οὐ γὰρ πως ἅμα πάντα θεοὶ δόσαν ἀνθρώποισιν, ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἀστειῖσμοὺς ἅμα ἐν τοῖς Δημοσθένους λόγοις. οὐδὲν γάρ, ἄν ἐτέροις τις ἔδωκεν ἀγαθῶν ὁ δαίμων, ἐκείνῳ ἐφθόνησεν. (My spacing of print).<sup>92</sup> From cc. 55-58 Dionysius discusses the criticisms of Aeschines against Demosthenes: the use of harsh, bitter words (πικρὰ ὀνόματα) (ch. 55) of overwrought words (περίεργα ὀνόματα) (ch. 56) of vulgar and disgusting words (φορτικὰ καὶ ἠδη ὀνόματα) (ch. 57) and of pleonasm (τὸ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα δηλοῦν) (ch. 58).

The treatise is concluded with: ταῦτα, ὦ κράτιστε Ἀιμαῖε, γράφειν εἴχομεν σοι περὶ τῆς Δημοσθένους λέξεως<sup>93</sup> and a subsequent promise of a forthcoming treatise on Demosthenes' *πραγματικὸς τόπος*.<sup>94</sup>

This brief survey of cc. 53-58 is complete enough to pose the problems concerning these chapters:

firstly, why did Dionysius insert a section on delivery which is obviously out of place in a treatise on the style of an author?

secondly, of the six points of criticism none has anything to do with the section on the composition<sup>95</sup> of Demosthenes; however, they do fit in perfectly with the subject-matter of *De Dem. I*, since in every case the emphasis is on the *choice of words*, ἐμλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων, with no deliberate reference to the musical aspect of language. Why discuss them here and not where they obviously belong, i.e. in cc. 1-34?

The *history of investigation* of the *De Dem.* reveals a lack of interest in these chapters which is probably due to overwhelming interest in the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως and ἁρμονία systems presented in *De Dem.* I and II.<sup>96</sup> This has resulted in either a total disregard for the distinctive nature of the section, or a recognition of it without any discussion of the importance of the contents.

The best example of *total disregard* for the distinctive nature of cc. 53-58 is J.Lücke's declaration: "*Die Schrift de Demosthene können wir in folgende Kapitel einteilen:*

I.	1.	<i>tria genera dicendi</i>	Kap. 1-7
	2.	<i>elocutio Demosthenis</i>	Kap. 8-32
	3.	<i>Recap. der Kapitel 1-32</i>	Kap. 33
	4.	<i>virtutes dicendi</i>	Kap. 34
II.	1.	<i>tria genera compositionis</i>	Kap. 35-41
	2.	<i>compositio Demosthenis</i>	K a p. 42 - S c h l u s s "
			(My spacing of print) <sup>97</sup>

He simply incorporates cc. 53-58 in *De Dem.* II, the section about the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes.<sup>98</sup> J.Lücke's division of the treatise is a replica of R.H.Tukey's: "the essay on Demosthenes falls into two distinct parts, and its references to the essay on 'Composition' are in the second part."<sup>99</sup> which must be read along with: "The purpose of the *second half* of the essay, as is stated by Dionysius in chap. xxxvi,"<sup>100</sup> and with "The first topic he treats in chaps. xxxvii-xlvi, the second in chaps. xlvii-xlix, and the third in chap. l."<sup>101</sup> Since E.Kalinka criticized the view of R.H.Tukey in 1925, conjecturing that several interruptions occurred in the course of the composition of the *De Dem.*, one would naturally expect to find a remark on cc. 53-58 - but one seeks in vain. He merely says that cc. 51ff. was composed as a unit.<sup>102</sup>

On the other hand, some researchers have realized that cc. 53-58 *simply cannot be regarded as part of the section on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes, whilst rating them rather low: "Efin, dans les derniers chapitres, il traite diverses questions accessoires (ch. 53-58, pp. 1117-1129) (My spacing of print.)*"<sup>103</sup>

Although this scholar, M. Egger, regards them as "diverse minor questions," he still distinguishes two separate sections in this part of the treatise, viz. one on delivery and one on criticism: "Après l' 'action', quelques mots sur une qualité dont Denys regrette l'absence chez Démosthène."<sup>104</sup>

G.Pavano holds the same point of view: "i cc.53-58 trattano di quistioni minori sempre più o meno concernenti la forma; ...Essa, come si vede, si divide sostanzialmente in due parti: una prima parte rivolta allo studio dello stile, la seconda allo studio dell' ἀγωγή in Demostene."<sup>105</sup>

A slight improvement is presented by those scholars who do recognise the distinctive character of cc.53-58, but fail to elaborate in this opinion, giving only the minimum of detail. A.G.Becker's concise description is a good example: "Deklamation und Action des Demosthenes, c. 53-54, Widerlegung der Angriffe des Aeschines und Anderer, c. 55-58."<sup>106</sup>

G.M.A.Grube does not present an ampler argumentation." After a few words on the importance of delivery, Dionysius disposes of Aeschines' criticisms of Demosthenes with ease (55-6), but he probably admits lack of wit in Demosthenes, though the text is unfortunately uncertain at this point."<sup>107</sup> However, he betrays his real unconcern for these chapters in an article of 1952 with the following words: "The *Demosthenes* falls into two main divisions, explicitly indicated. The second of these, from c. 35 on, deals with σύνθεσις or composition."<sup>108</sup>

In short, with regard to the investigation of cc. 53-58, all scholars have failed to understand Dionysius' intention with *De Dem.* III and *De Dem.* IV, I could not find one researcher who has seen the connection between *De Dem.* IV and *De Dem.* I; who has tried to explain why *De Dem.* IV is separated from *De Dem.* I; who has tried to explain why Dionysius has inserted a section on ὑπόκρισις which does not seem to fit in the *De Dem.*, an essay on style (generally speaking).<sup>109</sup>

I intend to prove that *De Dem.* IV is an essential part of the treatise and not a section where "minor questions"<sup>110</sup> are at stake, but that the separation of this section from *De Dem.* I can be understood in terms of the rhetorical system of Dionysius itself, more specifically of his view on arrangement of subject-matter, οἰκονομία; and that *De Dem.* III is a παρέμβασις, *digressio*, digression, deliberately incorporated in the work.

By removing the section in which Demosthenes is criticized from the section where, since it is concerned with ἐκλογή, it logically belongs, viz. *De Dem.* I, Dionysius is rather unconventional so far as the arrangement of the subject-matter is concerned, but by no means wrong in terms of the traditional rhetorical doctrine: when an unconventional arrangement of subject-matter can serve the orator's purpose better because it is *more effective*, it has to be applied.<sup>111</sup> He could not ignore the points of criticism against his idol - that would have reduced the quality of his treatise; but, by removing *De Dem.* IV from *De Dem.* I, the glamour of the supremacy of Demosthenes would be least affected due to the length of the treatise as a whole, the length and contents of *De Dem.* II and III, and the way *De Dem.* IV is presented, as I shall now proceed to show.

Firstly, in sharp contrast to the rest of the treatise, Dionysius introduces the section of the criticism *as inobtrusively as possible*. At the beginning of the section on delivery, his words imply that this will be the last topic (in the singular!) of the treatise: εἷς μοι καταλείπεται λόγος ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑποκρίσεως (My spacing of print).<sup>112</sup> Having read this sentence, the reader obviously would not expect yet another section on a different topic after this one.<sup>113</sup> Furthermore, he cunningly introduces the criticism section in such an inconspicuous way,<sup>114</sup> that the reader's attention does not fall on the remarks concerning wit and urbanity, the points of criticism admitted by Dionysius too, and that the reader easily takes these criticisms as part of the previous section, *De Dem.* III, (the one on delivery); he achieves this by not even starting *De Dem.* IV with a new sentence: πόλλ' ἂν τις εἷς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εἰπεῖν ἔχοι, τοῦ δὲ συντάγματος ἰκανὸν εἰληφῶτος ἦδη μῆκος αὐτοῦ που καταπαῦσαι χρῆ τὸν λόγον, ἐκεῖνο ἔτι νῆ Δία τοῖς εἰρημένοις . προσαιποδόντας, ὅτι πάσας ἔχουσα τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡ Δ η μ ο σ θ έ ν ο υ ς λ έ ξ ι ς λ ε ί π ε τ α ι ε ὑ τ ρ α π ε λ ί α ς, ἦ ν ο ἰ π ο λ λ ο ἰ κ α λ ο ὦ σ ι χ ά ρ ι ν (The italics are mine).<sup>115</sup>

Another matter of importance is the fact that Dionysius leaves the impression that he is only going to add one single idea: ἐκεῖνο (singular) ἔτι... προσαιποδόντας,<sup>116</sup> but proceeds to mention the criticism of ἀστεῖσιμός as well, hoping that the latter will not be noticed. Having finally arrived at the discussion of the criticisms of Aeschines (cc. 55-58),

a less attentive reader could thus easily miss the two important points of criticism which Dionysius feels he has to grant. Thus the digression, or παρέκβασις,<sup>117</sup> on delivery has the effect of concealing<sup>118</sup> the criticisms regarding εὐτραπελία and ὀστεϊσμός.

Secondly, Dionysius minimizes the effect of the criticisms section by removing it from the polemic section (*De Dem.* I) and putting it after two didactic sections (*De Dem.* II and III) in which the supremacy of Demosthenes is not questioned and no other is attacked: in the case of *De Dem.* II the supremacy of Demosthenes is recognised even by Aeschines, his greatest opponent;<sup>119</sup> in the case of *De Dem.* III we have exposition - no polemic argumentation.<sup>120</sup> This ensures that the reader becomes positively inclined towards Demosthenes from chapter 35 to chapter 54, which makes Dionysius' task of rebutting the criticisms against his idol much easier than if he would have tried to do that in the polemic *De Dem.* I.<sup>121</sup>

Thirdly, fatigue and lack of concentration on the part of the audience have always been matters of great concern to ancient orators.<sup>122</sup> In the case of a treatise so lengthy as the *De Dem.*, as compared with the other literary treatises,<sup>123</sup> the reader would probably become tired and be more likely to miss arguments which Dionysius does not like to be prominent by reason of his aim of proving the supremacy of Demosthenes in the field of style. In addition to this, the time-interval between *De Dem.* I and IV, which is considerable (seventeen chapters), could make it more difficult for the reader to connect *De Dem.* IV to *De Dem.* I.

Thus *De Dem.* IV is indispensable: logically, according to the traditional rhetorical system, it belongs to *De Dem.* I, but by the use of several rhetorical devices, mainly an intelligent arrangement of subject-matter, Dionysius has separated it from *De Dem.* I for maximum impact of his aim in *De Dem.* I and for minimum adverse effect in the case of *De Dem.* IV. *De Dem.* III is a *bona fide* digression (on delivery), specifically introduced to serve this purpose.

Thus, surveying the *De Dem.* as a whole, the following plan emerges.

The λ έ ξ ις of Demosthenes

*De Dem.* I: cc. 1-34: object: to prove the supremacy of Demosthenes so far as λ έ ξ ις is concerned.

- cc. 1-15: Demosthenes uses the best type of λέξις.
- cc. 1-3 : theoretical exposition of the χαρακτηρες της λέξεως.
- cc. 4-10: the middle type of λέξις is better than the extraordinary type.
- cc.11-13: the middle type of λέξις is better than the simple type.
- c. 14 : examples from Demosthenes to illustrate the nature of the best type of λέξις : the middle, intermediate, mixed type of λέξις.
- c. 15 : conclusion, including argument of the diversity of the public.
- cc.16-32: Demosthenes is better than the most prominent exponents of the best type of λέξις (the middle, mixed type).
- c. 16 : introduction.
- cc.17-22: Demosthenes is better than Isocrates.
- cc.23-32: Demosthenes is better than Plato.
- c. 33 : conclusion in terms of the χαρακτηρες της λέξεως system.
- c. 34 : conclusion in terms of the ἀρεταί της λέξεως system.
- De Dem. II: cc. 35-52: object: a theoretical exposition of the σὺνθεσις of Demosthenes.*
- c. 35 : introduction.
- cc.36-46: the first topic: which of the three major types of musical composition is applied by Demosthenes?
- (cc.36-42: digression: the three types of composition.)
- c. 43 : Demosthenes uses the intermediate type of composition.
- (cc.44-46: digression: why did Demosthenes deem it necessary to make use of variation and to apply not only one of the extreme types of composition? On what principles does he determine his use of the one he prefers rather than the other?)
- cc.47-49: the second topic: how did Demosthenes attain his personal form of the intermediate composition?
- c. 47 : the principles involved.
- c. 48 : more about the principles involved, as well as Demosthenes' application of them.
- (c.49: digression: reasons for not elaborating on tone, rhythm, variation and appropriateness.)
- cc.50-52: the third topic: how can one recognise the distinctive characteristics of the composition of Demosthenes and distinguish it from that of other authors?

(*De Dem.* III: cc.53-54: digression: object: delivery of the works of Demosthenes.)

*De Dem.* IV: cc.54-58: object: discussion of various points of criticism against Demosthenes.

If the arguments adduced so far are accepted as plausible, we may conclude that today it is not adequate to designate the object of this treatise as the λέξις of Demosthenes - one could get the idea that the *De Dem.* is a theoretical exposition of the style of Demosthenes. This is not the case, for although it does give a theoretical exposition of the style of Demosthenes in *De Dem.* II in terms of the musical qualities of his work, the object of *De Dem.* I, on the other hand, is polemic in nature: granted the subject under discussion in *De Dem.* I could also be described as the style of Demosthenes, but the text provides enough evidence to be more specific: Dionysius there wants to prove the supremacy of Demosthenes in terms of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system, making use of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system as well. It has also become clear that the other polemic section, *De Dem.* IV, has been separated from the section to which it naturally belongs by two didactic sections, *De Dem.* II and *De Dem.* III (the section on delivery) for reasons of convenience.

The twofold object of the *De Dem.*, reflected by a twofold treatment, compels the researcher to investigate the relation of this work to the rest of the *corpus*, of which it forms a part, the *De oratoribus antiquis*, more specifically its relation to the introduction of this ample work, in order to determine whether the *De Dem.* should indeed be regarded as part of it. This will be the object of chapter 2.

The difference between *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II inevitably raises the question of the way of composition of Dionysius: could Dionysius have written the *De compositione verborum* in a possible time-interval between the composition of *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II? This question will be the topic of chapter 3. It has become clear that Dionysius has made use of three systems of evaluation in the *De Dem.*: the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως, the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως and the ἀρμονία systems. In the fourth chapter his way of applying the first of these, viz. the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system, will be discussed at length. One could ask whether his application of this system was indeed restricted to ch. 34. This important matter will be the object of the last chapter.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. We join the essay some way through a discussion of the extraordinary type of style. The problem of the lost introduction will be discussed in chapter 2: cp. n. 76. pp. 85ff.
2. The ancient teachers of rhetoric used to emphasize the necessity of aiding the audience in remembering the main points of the speech. This is done by a clear and concise recapitulation of the argumentation. Especially in the case of intricate and hard to follow argumentations the speech must be concluded by an epilogue, *ἐπίλογος*, in which the recapitulation is essential. (Arist., *Rhet.*, III 13.3 and Arist., *Rhet.*; III 19.4: (ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ περὶ οὗ ἡ κρίσις,) ἐνταῦθα δὲ δι' ὧν δέδεικται κεφαλαιωδῶς. ("(There we must state the subject, so that the issue may not escape notice,) but here we must give a summary of the proofs.") (Arist., *Rhet.*, III 19.4). According to Aristotle certain rhetoricians recommended a summary of the arguments even in the introduction, so that the orator might be easily followed. (ὡπερ φασὶν ἐν τοῖς προσιμίαις... ἵνα γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ἢ, κελεύουσι πολλοὶ εἰπεῖν.) (*Ibid.*) Furthermore, the use of introduction and summary, the core of the idea of *ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*, was not restricted to the beginning and the end of a speech as a whole, but could be applied to any major section of a speech according to necessity. (For more detail on this matter, cp. H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik*, München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960, pp. 237-238). There is ample evidence that Dionysius applied this principle himself in the treatise (cp. pp. 11ff.) and whilst the lost introduction must have provided the key, this very fact (i.e. that he did apply the principle) makes it possible to determine his intention with the work.
3. "This, my dear Ammaeus, is what I had to write about the style of Demosthenes." (58,454:17-18).
4. Cp. n. 94, p. 47 below.

5. Although Dionysius does recognise the σχήματα, the figures of speech, he does not regard them as one of four major elements of the λεκτικὸς τόπος. (ἐκλογή, σύνθεσις, σχήματα and ἄρεται according to E.Kremer, *Über das rhetorische System des Dionys von Halikarnass*, Diss. Strassburg, 1907, pp. 2-3.) At *De Dem.* 51,434:14-15 he merely says: τοῦ λεκτικοῦ δὲ εἰς τε τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ εἰς τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν ἐκλεγέντων... ("and style into choice of words as well as composition of the (words) chosen...") The problems concerning the ἄρεται will be dealt with in ch.4.
6. Cp. p.7 above.
7. H.M.Hubbell, *The influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides*, Diss. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914, p.52. This view can easily be refuted by the text itself: *De Dem.* I (cc. 1-34) and *De Dem.* IV (cc.54-58) are polemic - cp. p. 9. For the division of the *De Dem.* into four sections, viz. *De Dem.* I, II, III and IV, cp. p.9. However one would not do justice to this scholar by assuming this, for the remark was merely made to emphasize the fact that Demosthenes' way of treating subject-matter is not discussed in this essay. In any case this vague remark is not accompanied by more information concerning his view on the nature of the *De Dem.* Consequently one had better ignore this remark so far as the subject under discussion is concerned.
8. It seems that L.Rademaker regarded the nature of the work as didactic and theoretical, as could be inferred from the following quotation: "*Die Schrift über Demosthenes, ... (behandelt) einseitig die stilistischen Vorzüge des Redners ...*" (L. Rademaker, *Dionysios*, in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, G. Wissowa, ed., 9 (1903), 965). However, it must be noted that this sentence does not convey all of Rademaker's view on the matter; in fact, the following two quotations prove he was convinced that the nature of the treatise as a whole is polemic and not didactic: "*Zweck, den Demosthenes als grössten Darstellungskünstler und Meister in allen Stilen zu erweisen ...*"

(L.Radermacher, *art. cit.*, 964. The italics are mine.), and more specifically: "*Aber die zahlreichen polemischen Beziehungen, die das ganze Buch durch-ziehen...*"

(L.Radermacher, *art. cit.*, 965. (My spacing of print.)

9. E.Kalinka, *Die Arbeitsweise des Rhetors Dionys*, (I), WS,43 (1924), p.162. However, Kalinka is not completely right in quoting R.H. Tukey in support of his view, for at p. 401 the English scholar stresses the fact that the second half of the *De Dem.* is exposition and not argument - cp. p.9 above.
10. J.Lücke, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der genera dicendi und genera compositionis*, Diss. Hamburg, 1952, p.93.
11. G.M.A.Grube, *The Greek and Roman critics*, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965, p.225.  
However, in *De Dem.* II one looks in vain for polemic argument; in fact, Dionysius says that the supremacy of Demosthenes in the field of composition is admitted even by his greatest rival, Aeschines - cp. p.47, n.95. For further detail on the nature of *De Dem.* II and *De Dem.* III, cp. p.9.
12. R.H.Tukey, *The Composition of the 'De Oratoribus Antiquis' of Dionysius*, CP, 4 (1909), p.396.
13. *Ibid.*, p.400. This "second half" corresponds to *De Dem.* II, III and IV - cp. p.22.
14. *Ibid.*, p.401.
15. "He does not even try to demonstrate the superiority of Demosthenes over the other orators, but contents himself with saying that everybody... granted that. Any comparison with Plato is carefully avoided." (*Ibid.*) I regard this view as the correct one (cp. n.11 above) but I still have a couple of points of criticism against R.H.Tukey: he simply ignores the different nature of *De Dem.* III and *De Dem.* IV (*Ibid.*, p.400), and when he speaks of 'the second half of the essay...' (*Ibid.*) he clearly refers only to *De Dem.* II. As will be shown presently (Cp. pp23-25), *De Dem.* III and *De Dem.* IV cannot be incorporated in *De Dem.* II, and, moreover, *De Dem.* IV is polemic in nature.

16. The terms "De Dem. I" and "De Dem. II" have become commonly used by researchers for cc.1-34 and cc.35-58 respectively. I hope to prove that the section on delivery (*De Dem. III*) and the section on criticisms (*De Dem. IV*) cannot be regarded as part of *De Dem. II*, but were in fact added by Dionysius as necessary, independent sections on their own. (Cp. pp. 23ff.) For this practical reason it would seem the distinction of "De Dem. III" and "De Dem. IV", although so far not used by anyone else, may be justified.
17. For more detail, see discussion of the following problem (pp. 10ff).
18. This view will be discussed extensively in ch. 3, pp. 95-100.
19. "Après une introduction sur les différents genres de style et leurs représentants (ch. 1-8...) Denys examine chez Démosthène le style sublime et le style simple, imités de Thucydide et de Lysias (ch. 9-13...) puis le style moyen, imité d'Isocrate et de Platon (ch. 14-32...); il résume alors tout ce qui précède (ch. 33 et 34...), puis il étudie l'arrangement des mots (ch. 35-52...)." (M.Egger, *Denys d'Halicarnasse*, Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, Editeurs, 1902, p.112 - "This essay on Demosthenes('s) ... first part, ... ends with chap. xxxiv. This section of the essay has a certain completeness in itself..." (R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p.398.); "Dionys (beschreibt) von Kap. 35 an ausführlich die  $\sigma \upsilon \nu \theta \epsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma$  des Demosthenes..." (E.Kalinka, *Die Arbeitsweise des Rhetors Dionys*, (II), WS, 44 (1925), p.50). "After a brief summary of the results obtained in cc.1-33, he proceeds to explain the characteristics of these types (i.e. of composition, my note)..." (S.F. Bonner, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert - Publisher, 1969 (Unchanged reprint of the edition of 1939), p.77) - "Il saggio *De Dem. verb.* è composto di 58 capp.; di essi i primi 34, premessa una esposizione teorico - illustrativa sulla dottrina dei tre stili (cc.1-7), trattano dello stile di Demostene, o meglio, della sua superiorità assoluta nell'uso e temperamento dei tre stili; i cc. 35-52 ..."

("The essay *De Dem. verb.* is made up of 58 chapters; of them the the first 34, introduced by a theoretical illustrative exposition on the doctrine of the styles (cc.1-7), deal with the style of Demosthenes, or still better, with his absolute superiority in the use and adaptation of the three styles; the chapters 35-52...") (G.Pavano, *Sulla cronologia degli scritti retorici di Dionisio d'Alicarnasso*, Atti della Accademia di Scienze, Lett. e Arti di Palermo, 4 (1942), p.256) - "The *Demosthenes* falls into two main divisions, explicitly indicated. The second of these, from c.35 on, deals with σύνθεσις or composition." (G.M.A.Grube, *Thrasymachus, Theophrastus, and Dionysius*, AJP, 73 (1952), p.262); "He treats first (cc.1-34) the χαρακτηρισες τῆς λέξεως and then goes on to describe the ἁρμονία συνθέσεως." (Prof. D.M.Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius "On Style"*, Diss. Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 964, p.67); for the view of J.Lücke on this matter, cp. p. 22.

20. "But, indeed, I wish to recapitulate what has been said from the beginning and to show that I have done everything I promised to do at the start of my examination of the subject of style." (32,366:16-19).
21. "The theme and the subject of my treatise was ..." (33,366:20).
22. Ch.34 is, therefore, not superfluous, for a summary in terms of the system of the types of style cannot include the discussion given in terms of the system of the virtues without some uneasiness, since these two systems are essentially different from one another - cp. pp. 139-142. I intend to prove that ch.34 contains more than a mere recapitulation (pp. 146f), but the point I want to make now is that ch.34 is an essential part of *De Dem.* I. In 34,370:26ff. he refers to his method of attaining his goal by having recourse to the three types of style (τῶν τριῶν πλασματων, 34,370:27); in 34,370:8ff. he refers to his view that Demosthenes is superior to the exponents of the extraordinary style, to the exponents of the plain style in 34,370:14ff. and to the exponents of the mixed style in 34,370:20ff, all these types of style being characterized by some of their most outstanding qualities.

23. I hope to prove that the recapitulation of these two chapters indeed refers to the whole of cc.1-32 - cp. pp. 11-17.
24. "Having added a few more things concerning his style, I shall proceed to the rest of my < proposed > examination..." (34,368:29-34, 370:1); προκειμένης has been inserted by Usener at a lacuna, and is acceptable in view of πρόθεσις at 33,366:20 - cp. p.32, n. 21.
25. "Well, now that these things have been said by me, let us now also speak about how (Demosthenes) < constructs > his words (into sentences)." (35,372:14-16). The lacuna at this crucial point could have provided great trouble for the understanding of *De Dem.* II, had it not been for the words τῶν ὀνομάτων immediately following the lacuna, in view of which the insertion of Riske is virtually indisputable, as well as ample evidence throughout *De Dem.* II concerning the object of *De Dem.* II - cp. pp. 18-20.
26. 32,366:19; cp. p.32, n. 20.
27. If λέξις were used in the comprehensive sense, i.e. including the choice of words, the composition and the figures of speech as well, a theoretical exposition would have to include a systematic treatment of these elements. Although one does come across all these elements in the course of *De Dem.* I, it cannot be stated that a theoretical exposition of style *as such* is the object of *De Dem.* I - in fact, Dionysius himself removes all doubt in the very next sentence - cp. discussion on p.11ff. In any case, the meaning of λέξις still has to be determined - cp. p.27.
28. "The theme and the subject of my treatise was to show that the style used by Demosthenes is the best: it is in the most perfect measure adapted to all aspects of human nature..." (33,366:20-23).
29. Rearranging the sentence in this way one gets a clear picture of its structure, which is not so easy in the case of the original arrangement, because of its unnatural word order.
30. This would mean that there is a basic distinction between the two qualities described in these two claims, which is simply not the case; in fact, his style is κοραιότης for the very reason that it is best adapted to all aspects of human nature. (Cp. my own view, p.12).

It must be noted that *κράτιστος* is not to be confused with *δεινός*; the latter has a stronger meaning in terms of persuasion, viz. "forceful, powerful (cp. glossary, s.v.) while the former has a more general meaning of "best", "most excellent," H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958, p. 1991,2. I have used the new revised and augmented edition of H.S. Jones, 1958. Any further references to this lexicon will be with "LSJ". In this sense it is the superlative of *ἀγαθός* and fits the description of a type of style. It can, however, also be translated with "strongest", "mightiest", (*ibid.*, 1) as the superlative of *κρατύς*. According to LSJ this meaning is only applied in this literal sense, and therefore it would not be suitable for the description of style.

31. Although the types of style do play an important rôle in *De Dem.* I, they merely serve as an aid for Dionysius to prove his point, as clearly indicated by Dionysius himself - cp. p.13, as well as p.35, n.34 and p.38, n.51; but cp. n.32 below.
32. This opinion is attractive, especially after it has been realized that the object of cc.1-15 is to show that the *middle type of style* is better than the extreme types (cp. pp. 6-9), whereas the object of cc.16-32 is to show that the personal style of Demosthenes is better than that of the best exponents of the best type of style (cp. pp.5-6). However, the object of cc. 1-15 is prefunctional to the object of cc.1-32 as a whole, and Dionysius has merely followed this *modus operandi* to attain his objective in the shortest possible way - cp. 12. In any case, this view presupposes that *λέξει* would be used in the sense of "type of style" with *κράτιστη*, but in the sense of "personal, individual style", when taken with the second phrase added to it - in other words, that it is one word being used in two different senses in the same sentence. This would be confusing, and although ancient orators did do just this here and there (the rhetorical device known as *syllipsis* - for more detail, cp. H.Lausberg, *op.cit.*, p.350, par. 702), it was avoided in recapitulations written especially for aiding the understanding of the audience - cp. p.28, n. 2.

33. This use of καί is quite common - cp. F.Blass and A.Debrunner, *A Greek grammar of the New Testament and other early christian literature*, Cambridge: University Press, 1961, p.228, par. 442(9). The validity of this view will furthermore be confirmed by the discussion of the content of cc.1-32.
34. "so that, since these (sc. authors) (i.e. Plato and Isocrates, my note) acquired a very high reputation as emulators of the middle - and the best - type of style, I might show that, though they happen to be superior to the others, they were not worthy to compete with Demosthenes for the first prize." (33,368:24-28).
35. I prefer to use this term to designate this extreme type of style in the case of Dionysius, instead of "elaborate" or "grand", for the following reason: this type is the exact opposite of the simple, plain type, and this idea seems to be expressed more closely by "extraordinary" than by the other translations. However, this is only a *general* designation by which the *general* impression of the type can be conveyed. Words like "elaborate" or "grand" do indeed describe certain features of this style, but not its general nature as the *opposite* of the simple, plain type.
36. τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῶν διαλέκτων τοὺς ἀξιολογωτάτους κατηριθμησάμην καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους ὄντας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνδρας ἐπῆλθον... ("I enumerated the most noteworthy characteristics of the types of style and discussed the men who were the best in them...") (33,368:3-5). The emendation of Kiessling (πρωτεύσαντας instead of πρῶτους ὄντας of the *codices*) is unnecessary. Although πρωτεύσαντας would be the easier reading in view of the fact that the same expression has been used in 42,404:6, πρῶτος is also used to denote rank, dignity and degree (LSJ, p.1534). Seeing that Dionysius is indeed referring to Thucydides, Lysias, Plato and Isocrates, who were regarded as the most prominent exponents of the different types of style, πρῶτους ὄντας would denote the same as πρωτεύσαντας. Dionysius' love for variation, of which numerous examples can be supplied from the glossary, would also justify this variation (πρῶτους ὄντας and πρωτεύσαντας).

37. Cp. p.35, n.34; the reference is to Plato and Isocrates.
38. Discussed at length at Arist., *Rhet.*, II. 19. One of his examples of this topic is: εἰ τὸ χαλεπώτερον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥᾶον. ("if the more difficult thing (is) possible, so too the easier thing.") (*Rhet.*, II, 19. 3). Applied to *De Dem.* I, this principle implies that, if Dionysius could prove that Demosthenes is better than the best exponents of the different types of style (the difficult part), it would be easy to prove that he is better than all the other exponents as well.
39. My reason for not dealing with cc. 1-15 first. is a concern for conciseness and clarity of exposition.
40. "*I have said at the beginning that it seems to me that Isocrates and Plato are the best cultivators of this kind of style amongst all and that they developed its possibilities to the utmost, but failed to bring it to perfection as well; I also promised to show that Demosthenes brought to perfection all the aspects in which both of them failed and shall now proceed to (the fulfilment of this promise)...*" (16,296:18-24).
41. πολλῶν δέ μοι καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔτι καταλειπομένων... ("But seeing that I still have much essential ground to cover...") (14,290:27-28).
42. "(I shall now proceed to the fulfilment of this promise), by selecting the passages from each of these men *which seem to be their best* (or: are considered the best), and by *comparing* passages from Demosthenes written on the *same subjects* with them, in order that their *preferences as well as their (rhetorical) powers may become quite clear in view of the most precise testing of similar works.*" (16,296:24-30). Although one does come across an example of comparison by means of quotations from the authors (i.e. between Demosthenes and Lysias, cc. 11-12, with a subsequent discussion of both in ch.13), it is rather interesting that Dionysius explains his method of comparison only in ch.16, no sooner, since this is the method which he will apply in the chapters to follow. However, it must be mentioned that the comparison of cc. 11-12 with the discussion in ch. 13 differs notably from the

examples in the section to which ch. 16 refers, since the detail of the examination (promised in ch. 16) is not to be noticed in ch. 13, where the reader merely gets general impressions.

43. "but by *comparing* with it the passages of the other orators and philosophers that are *considered the best*, and by *showing the best one by means of comparative testing*." (The italics are mine).
44. "Let Isocrates be introduced first..." (17,298:1).
45. Cp. p.28, n. 2.
46. "if anyone should fail to accept wholeheartedly my reason for *regarding neither that Thucydidean* (type of style), extraordinary and remote from the customary, *as the best*, nor *the Lysianic* (type of style), plain and spare, *as the perfect excellence of style...*" (15,294:8-13). (The italics are mine).
47. "That is why I for my part conclude that the style constructed in this way is the most balanced of all and I most approve of those speeches which are free from the excesses of each of the two (extreme) types of style." (15,296:13-17). The translation of *μετρωτάτην* causes several problems. From the direct context as well as from the basic line of argumentation two meanings seem to be associated with this word: on the one hand *μέτρος* refers to the property of the mixed style that it avoids the extremities of the two extreme types. In this sense *μετρωτάτην* could be translated by either *the most balanced* or *the most moderate* or *the best proportionate*. On the other hand, *μέτρος* refers to the quality of *versatility* as well. The mixed type is the best equipped to meet all types of variety, so far as subject-matter and the audience are concerned. It seems that this sense is predominant in ch. 33 (*μετρωτάτα ἠρμοσμένη πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν*, 33,366:22-23). Seeing that this meaning occurs in the recapitulation where the object of *De Dem.* I has been stated, this meaning must be kept in mind as well. It is clear that it is rather difficult to select the one word which would do justice to both the aspect of versatility and the aspect of the avoidance of excess. It seems to me that *balanced* comes the closest, although it lays more emphasis on the one aspect (avoidance of excess) than on the other.

48. Cp. cc. 1-3.
49. Cp. cc. 9-10 (Thucydides) and cc. 11-13 (Lysias).
50. Cp. cc. 4-10 (extraordinary style) and cc. 11-13 (simple style).
51. Cp. cc. 8-10 (concerning his discussion of the superiority of the middle style above the extraordinary style) and cc. 13-14 (concerning his discussion of the superiority of the middle style above the simple style). "In order that my argument could take the natural course, I enumerated the most noteworthy characteristics of the types of style and discussed their most prominent exponents; then, after showing all these to be imperfect and briefly considering in what respects I thought each missed perfection, I came to Demosthenes." (33,368:2-8).
52. The terms denoting 'types of style' do appear in cc. 33 and 34, because these chapters represent the summary of cc. 1-32. For more detail about these words, cp. glossary.
53. "For the treatise demands it." (10,274:13-14).
54. "What, then, is the difference (between Demosthenes and Lysias)?... For you would expect to get to know this as well." (13,288:19-23).
55. I have not come across one single scholar who tries to explain why Dionysius discusses Isocrates and Plato twice, viz. in cc. 4-7 and again in cc. 16-32. All researchers who do say something about the first few chapters of the *De Dem.* have been misled by the fact that the first discussion of Isocrates and Plato follows directly upon the theoretical exposition of the mixed type of style in ch. 3, and they assume that cc. 4ff. are a mere confirmation of the discussion of the mixed type of style. (Cp. my p.31f., n. 19, for the views of M.Egger and G.Pavano, and p.22 above, for the view of J.Lücke; the same assumption appears in S.F.Bonner *op.cit.*, p.63). They have all failed to see that the nature of the discussion changes from exposition (cc. 1-3) to polemic argumentation in cc. 4ff. and to understand what is really at stake in cc. 4ff., where Dionysius exposes the inefficiency of the extraordinary type of style. The only problem is: why on earth does Dionysius prove the inefficiency of the extraordinary style by referring to two authors

who are, according to the theory of his time, no exponents of this type of style, although they do make use of it occasionally? One should mention that this treatment of Isocrates and Plato by Dionysius would not have been altogether strange to the contemporaries of Dionysius; in his article, F. Quadlbauer has pointed out that Isocrates has always been associated with sublimity by virtue of the subject-matter of his speeches ("erhaben in den Stoffen ...", *Die genera dicendi bis Plinius d. J.*, WS, LXXI (1958), p. 61); his λέξις, however, was "typisch epideiktisch" (*ibid.*), showing features on account of which Dionysius could easily obtain examples of the extraordinary type of style. Cp. "Tendenz zum Ungewöhnlichen ..." of the epideictic style (*Ibid.*) Even Plato's style was regarded as sublime because of his view concerning "göttliche Begeisterung, die θεία μανία, ερ ένθουσιασιός." (*Ibid.*, p. 60). (Cp. *art. cit.*, p. 60, n. 50: "die Folgerung, dass ... sein (i.e. Plato's) Stil 'hoch' wurde ..."): His application of dithyrambic type of language was the reason why he was associated with the extraordinary type of style and why Dionysius could obtain examples of this style from his work as well. Here, however, I would like to explain this procedure of his concerning Plato and Isocrates in the light of one way an orator was accustomed to conceal his art: referring to Quintilian, X.1.21, C. Neumeister states: "Der Redner deutet Gedanken, die er erst später ausführlich und offen behandeln wird, in beiläufig - versteckter Form schon vorher, und in einem ganz anderen Zusammenhang an." (C; Neumeister, *Grundsätze der forensischen Rhetorik gezeigt an Gerichtsreden Ciceros*, *Langue et Parole*, 3: München, Heuber, 1964, p. 133. (Diss. Heidelberg, 1962). (My spacing of print.) It seems to me not far-fetched in fact, it seems quite likely that this remark of Neumeister could provide the key to the problem concerning Plato's and Isocrates' styles: in cc. 1-5 Dionysius is not concerned with the styles of Plato and Isocrates, but his major concern is the *types* of style. In other words, reference to any author would simply serve his main object there, viz. to prove the superiority of the mixed type of style above the extreme types. At this point the reader would not have any idea that in cc. 16ff. Dionysius is going to compare the styles of these very two authors to that of Demosthenes in order to prove the supremacy of his idol. By using examples from their *oeuvre* to prove the supremacy of his idol. By using examples from their *oeuvre* to prove the deficiencies of the extraordinary type of style of which they were not recognised representatives (exponents), although they did make use of it

occasionally, he is cunningly discrediting these two formidable exponents beforehand. (He could have taken his examples from any exponent of the extraordinary type, e.g. Gorgias). So, he knew beforehand that, in cc. 16ff. his ultimate object would be to prove that Demosthenes' style is better than that of Plato and Isocrates, but prepared his readers already in cc. 1-15, in a concealed manner, "*in bei-läufig - versteckter Form und in einem ganz anderen Zusammenhang,*" for his attitude towards the styles of Plato and Isocrates.

56. "The idiosyncrasy of his style, as I understood it, I did describe earlier at some length. However, there will be no hindrance to summarise its very essential features right now." (4,252:8-10).
57. Concerning the violation of moderation, cp. the following:  
 οὔτε μετριόζοντα ('neither moderate...') (4,252:27-28).  
 Concerning the violation of appropriateness, cp. οὔτε ἐν καιρῶ ('nor timely...') (4,252:28-29).
58. "The style of Plato, too, purports to be a mixture of both types of style, of the sublime as well as of the plain (type), as has been said before by me, but essentially it is *not equally successful* in both types of style." (5,254:14-18)
59. The positive remarks following the quoted introductory sentence appear to be included to emphasize by contrast the wrong application of the extraordinary style by Plato, since Dionysius is noticeably uninterested in a critical analysis of Plato's application of the simple style at this stage: in fact, he admits that the philosopher is virtually blameless in his use of this style, (Cp. 6,258:9-19: ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀμαρτάνει καθόλα ἢ βραχὺ τι κομῶν καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κατηγορίας.) ((Then) he either commits no error at all, or a quite slight one which is not worthy of criticism.") It is also to be noticed that the rest of his discussion of Plato is devoted to exposing the inadequacy of the extraordinary style, as exemplified by quotations from Plato. The contrast at stake is compellingly emphasized by μέν and δέ: the fourteen lines of positive comment on his use of the simple style start with: ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰσχυρὴν... (5,254:18-19), whereas the censure of his application of the

extraordinary style starts with: ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὴν περιτολογίαν  
καὶ τὸ καλλιπεῖν... (5,256:1-2) (My spacing of print).

60. Violation of τὸ πρόπον: ἄκαιρος: 5,256:14; 7,264:12-13;  
οὔτε καιρόν: 5,256:17-18;  
violation of τὸ μέτριον: 5,256:3; 5,256:17.
61. Ancient orators used to repeat ideas which they deemed important for their cause, so that the audience might not be allowed to forget them. This device was known as ἐπιμονή. (For more detail on it, cp. H.Lausberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 415-417). The recurrence of the themes of moderation and appropriateness is a good example of the application of this device by Dionysius himself.
62. "appealing to the whole range of human nature..." (33,368:11-12).
63. "and by showing that he was the most successful of all in the three types (of style)..." (33,368:17-18). Dionysius' middle or mixed style is in fact nothing else than the application of both the extreme types - however not simultaneously as *mixed* might suggest, but an alternating application of either one of the two extremes according to the requisite of appropriateness.
64. "but (they differ) in *degree* and, even more, in (their use of) *fit occasions* (for the application of a type of style, my note): (Thucydides) has used embellishment in an *unrestrained* way and he is carried away by it more (often) than that he controls it <himself>; neither does he know how to choose the *proper occasion* for it (the embellishment) skilfully, but often misses that as well. Thus his *excessive* use of unfamiliar language renders his style obscure, and his failure to choose *proper occasions* (for its application) (makes it) unpleasant." (10,274:17-24) The insertion of Sylburg (αὐτός) is acceptable, for it fits in perfectly with the antithetic nature of the sentence. From this quotation one can clearly see that appropriateness has to do with the *fit occasion* and moderation with the *degree* of application of a type of style.
65. "(but the orator) strives after *what is sufficient* (of embellishment, my note) and he *determines (the special needs of) every occasion exactly*" (10,274:24-26).

66. Having reached this point, Dionysius has eliminated the most reputed exponents of the extreme types of style and it remains only to prove that Demosthenes is the best of all the eminent exponents of the mixed style.
67. "In case anyone should not accept wholeheartedly my reason ..."  
(15,294:8-9).
68. "but the (speech) which aims to persuade both (classes of) audience is less likely to fail in its objective. This (speech) is the one that is a blend of both (extreme) types of style." (15,296:10-13)  
The emendation of Reiske (τάκροατήρια replacing τα κριτήρια of the manuscripts) is plausible, for in the first part of this sentence (not quoted above) Dionysius is actually saying that a speech intended for the well-educated will not appeal to the ignorant masses, and *vice versa*. (ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ εὐπαιδεύτων στοχαζόμενος λόγος οὐκ ἔσται τῷ φαύλῳ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ πλήθει πιθανός, ὁ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ἰδιώταις ἀρέσκειν ἀξιῶν καταφρονηθήσεται πρὸς τῶν χαριεστέρων...) (15,296:6-10).  
Obviously τὰ κριτήρια cannot accommodate this remark of his.
69. 15,296:14.
70. The rôle of this system will be discussed at length at pp. 139ff.
71. Cp. p. 33, n. 25.
72. "What is the type of composition (preferred by Demosthenes) and what techniques he has practised to attain it, and how one would, examining it by comparison with others, distinguish it (from them), these things I shall try to answer..." (I prefer to translate ὁ τῆς ἀρμονίας... χαρακτήρ with "type of composition" rather than with "distinctive quality of (his) melodious composition," the translation of S. Usher, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, The critical essays*, vol. I, (Loeb), London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1974, p. 377.

My reason is that Dionysius has the types in mind, as can clearly be seen the moment he proceeds to the actual discussion of this first topic at ch. 43. Cp. p. 44, nn. 75 and 76 as well.) Concerning the emendation of Sadée, τῶτι in stead of τῶτη of the codices: According to J.Schmidt (*apud* E.Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik*, vol.I, München: C.H.Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1939, p.550), τῶτη can be an Ionic-Attic neuter nom. or acc. pl. (in this case accusative). This implies that the emendation of Sadée (ταυτί, the easier reading, instead of τῶτη of the codices) is unnecessary.

73. This claim of mine is confirmed by two facts: firstly, the fact that the theoretical exposition of the types of musical composition is relevant to the first topic, but not exactly part of the discussion of this topic; secondly, the fact that Dionysius himself regards this exposition as a (justified) digression, for referring to this exposition, he says: ἔπειτα, ἵνα μοι μὴ μονόκωλος ἦ μηδὲ ἀσθηρὸς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλ' ἔχη τινὰς εὐπαιδεύτους διαγωγὰς. οὔτε γὰρ πιστοῦν τὰς τοιαύτας προσθήκας οὔτε ἀπαιτοῦντος τοῦ λόγου παραλιπεῖν καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι. ("the second (reason was) that my treatise should not be one-sided and rigorous, but that it should contain certain erudite diversions. For just as it would not be fair to insist on such additions, so it would be wrong to omit (them) when the argument demands (them)." (42,404:14-17). (The emendation of Sylburg, πιστοῦν instead of πιστεύειν of the codices, is convincing; this emendation would accommodate the fact that the object of the word at stake (τὰς τοιαύτας προσθήκας) is Accusative, which is not the case when πιστεύειν, which takes the Dative, is retained. In any case, it would not make much sense to retain πιστεύειν: "relying upon" additions would then be contrasted with omitting them when they are demanded by the argument. This is not the point. It seems that Dionysius is rather saying that it would be wrong to *include* additions when the argument does not admit them, and conversely, to omit them when they are demanded by the argument. According to LSJ πιστοῦν means "to make trustworthy". "To make valid" seems to me would convey the same idea, which would convey the idea of the sentence at stake: "For just as it would not be fair to make valid such addition (when they are not demanded by the argument)..." This could be translated by "For

just as it would not be fair to insist on such additions...") This remark of Dionysius, indicating that the theoretical section on the types of composition was intended as a digression, implies that it was written preparatory to the discussion of one of the topics and must not be regarded as an independent section all on its own. The discussion of the first topic, viz. what type of melodious composition is preferred by Demosthenes, actually starts at the beginning of this long digression; in fact, Dionysius ties this exposition directly to the discussion of the first topic himself - see n.74 below.

74. ἴν' ... μηδεὶς ὑποτυγχάνῃ μοι ταῦτα λέγων· "αἱ γὰρ ἄκραι τίνες εἰσὶν ἁρμονίαι; καὶ τίς αὐτῶν ἐκατέρας < ἢ > φύσις καὶ τίς ἢ μίξις ἢ ἡ κρῶσις αὐτῆ; οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ τῶν ἄκρων." ("in order that... nobody would interrupt me saying: "What are the extreme (forms of) composition? And what is the nature of each of (these two extremes), and what (is) this mixture or blend? For the extremes are not needed." (42,404:6-12).
75. "whenever I put forward my opinion that Demosthenes cultivated the middle and mixed type of composition..." (42,404:6-8).
76. "This preference of the orator having been indicated by me, let anyone examine the speeches by himself (and come to the conclusion) that they are of such a nature, when he considers how many (passages) of all the (passages) have been constructed on the one hand in a solemn, rough and dignified way by him, (and) on the other hand (how many have been constructed) in an agreeable and pleasant way." (43,404:18-23).
77. Having completed the proof of his view on the preference of Demosthenes concerning the types of melodious composition, he introduces this digression in a rather conspicuous way: νυνὶ δέ, ὃ προσσπαιτεῖν ἔοικεν ὁ λόγος, ἔτι προσθεῖς, ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν προκειμένων μεταβήσομαι. ("Now, however, I shall pass on to the rest of my above-mentioned subject, after having added yet another matter, which seems to be demanded additionally by the discussion." (43,410:24-26).

- This digression presents a neat, well-structured unity, which is summarised in ch. 46 (συνελόντι δ' εἶπεῦν...) (46,416:17) and finally brought to an end with the last sentence of ch. 46; ἐπάνειμι δ' ἄν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπά, ὧν ἐν ἀρχῇ προὔθειμν ἔρεῦν. ("I shall therefore return to the remainder of what I proposed to talk about at the beginning.") (46,418:13-14).
78. τί δὴ ποτε βουλόμενος οὐ πορεύεται μίαν αἰεὶ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδόν; καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷδε ἢ τῷδε πλεονάζειν χαρακτηρὶ ποίοις τισὶν ὀρίζει κανόσι; ("What, then, is his purpose in not always following one and the same way? And according to what principles does he determine to use one type (of composition) more than the other?") (44,412:1-4). Obviously, although these questions could be raised, the discussion of these matters is not indispensable for his discussion of the first topic; their very relation to the first topic, however, makes them perfectly fit for a digression at this place - see pp. 50f., n. 117 below.
79. "The second topic was to show by the use of which principles and by means of which practice (of these principles) he proceeded to receive the most important share of the mixed, intermediate composition." (47,418:15-18). The insertion of *Sadée* (μικτῆς καὶ μέσης) at a lacuna can be justified in view of the discussion following this sentence, especially when we bear in mind that the matters discussed in these chapters are very important, since they are regarded as the elements of the distinctive characteristic of the composition of Demosthenes. (Cp. the third topic, p. 20).
80. Cp. n. 72, pp. 42f.
81. "He discovered that both had the same causes, tone, rhythm, variation, and propriety which accompanies all them ...". (47,420:3-6). The emendation of Radermacher (the substitution of παραίτιον with πρέπον) can be easily justified in view of the subsequent discussion - cp. 48,422:2 and 49,424:28-49,426:1.
82. μέλος can be translated by *tune* when it refers to music to which a song is set. (LSJ, p. 1099, s.v., B2). When it is translated by *melody*, it refers to the music produced by an instrument (*Ibid.*, B3). *Tone* is a more general equivalent for this word (*ibid.*), which makes it more suitable when the *musical aspect of language* in general - and not *music* in the technical sense of the word - is at stake. It stands to reason that, to be on the safe side, the context will have to be considered each and every time this word occurs.

83. Dionysius realizes this himself, as can be inferred from his remark at the beginning of ch. 49: ἄρα γε ὀπαιτήσῃ με τις ἐνταυθοῦ λόγον ... ("Perhaps someone will require an exposé from me at this point ...") (49,424:28).
84. "As you can remember, I promised to show further as well how one could distinguish the idiosyncrasy of the composition of Demosthenes, and with what indications one could distinguish it from those of other (authors) " (50,426:19-22).
85. "These I regard as the <inseparable> and characteristic features of the composition of Demosthenes, from which one would distinguish it in its totality, when one wishes to examine it." (51,432:16-19). The insertion of ἀσυφαίρετα (by Radermacher) is justified in view of the analogous phrase in ch. 34: μνηύματα χαρακτηριστικὰ καὶ ἀσυφαίρετα (34,370:3-4).
86. First the tone must be considered (50,428:14-15), then the rhythm (50,430:1-2), then the variation in clauses and periods, and finally the variation in figures of speech (50,432:8-13).
87. Again a perfect situation for a digression: the discussion of the third topic (cc. 50-52, how the distinctive characteristics of the composition of Demosthenes can be recognised and distinguished from that of other authors) could cause some questions to be raised, which are not essential to the discussion of this very topic, but could be of use; the reader should, however, realize that they will be dealt with in a digression. This digression comprises two chapters (cc. 51-52).
88. Henceforward called by me *De Dem. III*.
89. "One subject remains for me (to be discussed), *delivery* ..." (53, 440:1-2).
90. "One could say much on this subject, but as the treatise is already long enough, I suppose I must conclude my discussion of it ..."
91. Henceforward called by me *De Dem. IV*.
92. "that the style of Demosthenes, although it has all the qualities, is lacking in ready wit, which most people call 'charm'. For it is abundantly present in ... (lacune) 'The Gods by no means bestow (Gnomic Aorist) all their gifts at once on man (Hom., *Il.*, iii.320) (is) also the case with the instances of urbanity in the speeches of Demosthenes. But fate did not begrudge him any of the gifts it bestowed on some of the other (orators) " (54,446:6-13).
93. "This, my dear Ammaeus, (is) what I had to write about the style of Demosthenes" (58,454:17-18).

94. ἐὰν δὲ σῴζη τὸ δαιμόνιον ἡμᾶς, καὶ περὶ τῆς πραγματικῆς αὐτοῦ δεινότητος, ἔτι μείζονος ἢ τοῦδε καὶ θαυμαστοτέρου θεωρήματος, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς γραφισομένοις ἀποδώσομέν σοι τὸν λόγον (58,454:18-22), ('If God preserves me, I shall render to you in a subsequent treatise an account of his skill in the (handling of) subject-matter - which (will be) an even greater and more remarkable object of contemplation than (that about his ability to handle style).')
95. περὶ δὲ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν οὔτε μείζον<sup><</sup>οὔτ' ἔλαττον δύναται κατηγορεῖν, ἢ ἔγνημα<sup>></sup>ἢ καταγέλωτα φέρον. (35,374:17-19). ('But regarding his composition (Aeschines) cannot bring any charges, whether rather great<sup><</sup> or rather small, or any (charges) that may expose (Demosthenes) to censure<sup>></sup> or to ridicule.') Seeing that the rest of ch. 35 deals with the positive attitude of Aeschines towards Demosthenes' composition, the intercalation of S. Usher is acceptable. Can *De Dem.* II as a whole be regarded as an interpolation because of the statement made on p. 21 above? This would be difficult to prove. The contrary is acceptable, viz. that it was originally intended as part of the *De Dem.*, as can be inferred from his remark in ch. 34, where he referred to *De Dem.* II as the remaining part of his <sup><</sup>proposed<sup>></sup> examination: τὸ καταλειπόμενον πτης<sup><</sup> προκειμένης<sup>></sup> θεωρίας μέρος ... (34,368:30 - 34,370:1).
96. Cp. ch. 4 of this dissertation.
97. J. Lücke, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 7: "Wenden wir uns nun dem zweiten Teile des Buches de Demosthene zu, der ... die σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων behandelt."
99. R.H. Tukey, *The Composition of the De Oratoribus Antiquis of Dionysius*. CP, 4 (1909), p. 400.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*, p. 401. The three quotations from pp. 400f. (cp. nn. 99 and 100 above as well) clearly show that Tukey simply ignored the fact that cc. 53f. deal with a subject (the delivery of the style of Demosthenes) that cannot be accommodated under the subject of *De Dem.* II; that goes for cc. 54-58, where the points of criticism against Demosthenes are treated, as well. Tukey simply regarded cc. 35ff. as the *second half* of the essay, the section on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes.
102. E. Kalinka, *Die Arbeitsweise des Rhetors Dionys*, II, WS, 44 (1925), p. 65-68. The following quotation will prove that S.F. Bonner likewise ignored the individual character of the last two sections of the *De Dem.* (*De Dem.* III and IV; i.e. cc. 53ff.): 'The latter portion of the *De Dem.* (i.e. cc. 34ff.) is hardly more than an appendix in which the principles evolved in *De Comp. Verb.* are restated and applied to Demosthenes.' (S.F. Bonner, *op. cit.*, p. 77); and so

- too prof. D.M. Schenkeveld: "He treats first (cc. 1-34) the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως and then goes on to describe the ἁρμονία συνθέσεως." (D.M. Schenkeveld, *op. cit.*, p. 67). Prof. Schenkeveld, it may be noted, is here merely stating where information about the two systems can be found; he is not concerned with the purpose of the *De Dem.*
103. M. Egger, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
  104. *Ibid.*, p. 134; cp. pp. 135-137 as well on the criticisms of Aeschines against Demosthenes.
  105. "the chapters 53-58 deal with *minor questions* more or less concerned with the form; ... as one sees, the work is divided basically in two parts; the first part dealing with the study of the style, the second dealing with the study of the ἁρμονία in Demosthenes." (G. Pavano, *op. cit.*, p. 257 (49)).
  106. A.G. Becker, *Dionysios von Halikarnassos über die Redneregewalt des Demosthenes vermitteltst seiner Schreibart*, Leipzig: Verlags-Comtoir, 1829, Introduction, p. xxxix, n. 57.
  107. G.M.A. Grube, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
  108. G.M.A. Grube, *art. cit.*, p. 262. F. Nassal does recognise a separate section on ὑπόκρισις in the *De Dem.* (p. 164) and does recognise the criticisms of εὐτραπελία and ἄστεϊσμός in ch.54: "DH. (*De Dem.* 1122) spricht dem Demosthenes die εὐτραπελία ab, dagegen den ἄστεϊσμός legt er ihm bei" (F. Nassal, *Aesthetisch-rhetorische Beziehungen zwischen Dionysius von Halicarnass und Cicero*, Diss. Tübingen, 1910, p. 145. However, he fails to recognise *De Dem.* IV as a separate section; so does G. Kennedy (G. Kennedy, *The art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972, p. 360)).
  109. Although Cicero does indeed often include a discussion on delivery when style is at stake, this has nowhere been done by Dionysius in any of his essays. This confirms the idea that the inclusion of such a section in this essay is rather strange and that it has been done for other reasons than what could have been customary. This is even more so when taking the length of the essay (in comparison with the essays on the other orators) in consideration (cp. p. 56).
  110. Cp. notes 103 and 105 above.
  111. οἰκονομία, arrangement of material, is the second step in the process of making a speech, the second ἔργον τοῦ ῥήτορος. It is divided into τάξις, placing of the topics throughout the speech, and ἔξεργασία, development of the topics by means of arguments: τάξις ἐὲ καὶ μερισμοὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἡ κατ' ἐπιχείρημα ἔξεργασία ...

("Arrangement and divisions of topics and the development (of these) by means of argumentation ...") (*De Isoc.*, 4,114:2-4). Normally the material is arranged according to the *μέρη τοῦ λόγου*, viz. *προοίμιον, πρόθεσις, διήγησις, πίστεις* and *ἐπίλογος*, in the case of a forensic speech (E. Kremer, *op. cit.*, p. 3). A *τάξις κατὰ τὸ συμμέρον*, however, is unconventional: "*Unter die τάξις κατὰ τὸ συμμέρον kommt nun jede begründete Abweichung von der normalen*" (*Ibid.*, p. 6). In the *De Isaeo* Dionysius compares Isaeus with Lysias and one learns that he regards Isaeus as cleverer than Lysias in the field of arrangement of subject-matter: *περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ὅτι δεινότερός ἐστιν οἰκονομῆσαι Λυσίου καὶ ὅλους τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν ...* ("that (Isaeus) is cleverer than Lysias in the arrangement of subject-matter, so far as speeches as a whole, as well as their parts are concerned ...") (*De Isaeo*, 14,206:5-7). When Dionysius proceeds to furnish proof for this statement, he devotes two chapters (14 and 15) to Isaeus' unconventional way of arranging material. Isaeus worked in this way in order to be more affective, more forceful. (*τότε δὲ προκατασκευάζεται τινα πρὸ τῶν διηγήσεων πράγματα καὶ προλαμβάνει τὰ μέλλοντα πιστοτέρας αὐτὸς ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι χρησιμότερας ποιήσεν οἰόμενος*) ("Sometimes he presents some material before the narratives and anticipates the later material, reckoning that he will thus make (the narratives) more credible or more effective for some other (purpose) ...") (*De Isaeo* 15,208:14-17). (Cp. *De Isaeo* 18,224:9: *ὁ δὲ τοῦ δεινῶς*. ("but (Isaeus) aims at forcefulness.")). Dionysius is quite frank about his view concerning this matter: the material should be arranged in the *most effective way* - not necessarily according to convention. In any case, with effectiveness in mind, it would have been inappropriate and contra-productive to introduce points of criticism against his idol while he was still in the process of proving his supremacy.

112. Cp. p. 45, n. 81.

113. I have indicated how Dionysius does not keep his readers in the dark so far as his object is concerned - cp. p.28, n. 2; in fact, the immediately preceding section (*De Dem.* II) is a good example of how the writer has been keeping his promises (stated in the introductions); the reader has grown accustomed to the fact that Dionysius has been executing all his promises throughout the whole treatise. Consequently, when he says that he is now proceeding to the last topic, the reader has no reason not to believe that this is indeed going to be the last topic.

114. In his dissertation C. Neumeister devoted one chapter to the important matter of concealing of art (C.3: *Das Verbergen der rhetorischen Kunst*, pp. 130ff.). He says that the orator carefully planned the way in which he was going to present his material, but that he usually did not reveal this plan of his to the audience ("*Jedoch wird diese durchdachte Planung ... oft bewusst verborgen.*" (My spacing of print.) (C. Neumeister, *Grundsätze der forensischen Rhetorik gezeigt an Gerichtsreden Ciceros*, *Langue et Parole*, 3, München: Hueber, 1964 (Diss. Heidelberg, 1962), p. 130. He continues to say that the orator was only applying the general rule of concealing of art: "... *allgemein giltiger Regel, das der Redner seine rhetorische Kunst vor seinen Hörern verbergen müsse.*" (*Ibid.*) (The italics are mine). Dionysius is merely applying this principle himself in the *De Dem.*, which is a natural thing to do, if one bears in mind that this general principle was one of the important matters he most probably taught his pupils to apply in their speeches.
115. "One could say much on this subject, but as the treatise is already long enough, (I suppose) I must conclude my discussion of it, having added yet another thing - by Jove - to my discussion (of the subject), that the style of Demosthenes, although it has all the qualities, is lacking in ready wit, which most people call 'charm' ..." (54,446:3-9).
116. 55,446:6.
117. Does *De Dem.* III fit the idea of a παρέμβασις? Quintilian defines παρέμβασις as follows: παρέμβασις est, ut mea quidem fert opinio, alicuius rei, sed ad utilitatem causae pertinentis extra ordinem excurrentis tractatio. ("παρέμβασις may, I think, be defined as the handling of some theme, which must however have some bearing on the case, in a passage that involves digression from the logical order of our speech.") (Bk. IV, iii 14) (Translation by H.E. Butler, *The institutio oratoria of Quintilian*, Vol. ii (Loeb), London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1977, p. 129). υπόκρισις has indeed some bearing on style (Cp. *De Dem.* 53,440:25-53,442:3: τί δὴ τοῦτα πρὸς τὴν λέξειν αὐτοῦ συντείνει; φαίη τις ἄν. ἡ λέξις μὲν οὖν, εἴποιμι' ἄν, οἰκείως κατεσκεύασται πρὸς ταῦτα, μεστὴ πολλῶν οὔσα ἤθῶν καὶ παθῶν καὶ διδάσκουσα, οἷα εἰς ὑποκρίσεως αὐτῆς δεῖ. ἄστε τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας τὸν ῥήτορα τοῦτον ἐπιμελῶς χρὴ παρατηρεῖν, ἵνα τοῦτον ἕκαστα λέγεται

τὸν τρόπον, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐβούλετο. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ λέξις  
 διδάσκει τοὺς ἔχοντας ψυχὴν εὐκίνητον, μεθ' οἷα  
 αὐτὴν ὑποκρίσεως ἐκφέρεισθαι δεήσει.) (My spacing of print.)  
 ("Now, what has this to do with his style?", someone might ask. (To this)  
 I would answer: 'His style is properly constructed for it, being full  
 of portrayal of character and passion, and thus prescribing what kind  
 of delivery is needed. Accordingly, those who recite (the speeches  
 of) this orator, should take special care to deliver every sentence in  
 the manner he intended (it to be delivered): for the style itself  
 prescribes to those with susceptible minds with what kind of delivery  
 it will have to be delivered.'" However, it is a separate section  
 in the rhetorical system. (Referring to ch. 53 of the *De Dem.*, E.  
 Kremer points out it is one of the στοιχεῖα of the πραγματικὸς τόπος:  
 "Neben εὐρεσις und οἰκονομία wird einmal noch ein drittes στοιχεῖον  
 erwähnt." (E. Kremer, *op. cit.*, p. 6). However, it is to be stressed  
 that delivery has to do with style (λεκτικὸς τόπος) as well, as can  
 be seen in *De Dem.* 53,440:25-53,442:3, quoted above, as well as in  
 the discussion of the examples in ch. 54). Thus, being strictly  
 speaking a separate topic, the presence of delivery in ch. 53ff. is  
 out of place in view of the object of the *De Dem.*, but is appropriate  
 as a digression. One last note on digressions: they were regarded  
 as normal practice in oratory; in fact, Dionysius had a positive  
 attitude towards them, since he regards them as essential under cer-  
 tain circumstances - cp. pp. 43f., n. 73.

118. Generally speaking, a digression is inserted with the specific *purpose*  
 of aiding the writer in some way or another (Cp. H.V. Canter,  
*Digressio in the orations of Cicero*, AJP, 52 (1931), p. 359:  
 "the digression in Cicero ... is inserted with the ultimate aim  
 of aiding his client or the cause he is presenting"); Dionysius  
 talks about the "relief of monotony" (τὸ διαλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ὁμοειδέειαν)  
 (*De Isoc.* 4,114:4). However, in the *De Partitione Oratoria*, v 15  
 Cicero mentions one specific function of digressions which is of great  
 interest to our passage: the *concealing of facts* which could be to  
 the benefit of the opponent in a case, but to your own disadvantage:  
 "firmamenta ad fidem posita aut per se diluenda aut obscuranda aut  
 digressionibus obruenda." ("corroborations put forward to carry  
 conviction must either be done away with as a separate item, or thrown  
 into the background, or covered up with digressions.")

(Translation by H. Rackham, *Cicero*, Vol. iv, (Loeb), London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1968, p. 323) (Cp. H.V. Canter, *op. cit.*, p. 351, n. 1: "to weaken or bury out of sight proofs upon which prosecution relies"). Similarly, Dionysius is exploiting this use of the παρέκβασις in order to conceal the criticisms of ὀστεϊσμός and εὐτροπελία. A possible point of criticism against the idea that the section on ὑπόκρισις should be regarded as a παρέκβασις, is that the παρέκβασις has not been followed by a return to the main line of argumentation, as is the case with the three instances of digression, i.e. in cc. 36-42, cc. 44-46 and ch. 49 - cp. nn. 77, 79 and 89 above. To this objection may be noted that it would not make sense to return to the main argument of *De Dem.* II, for the simple reason that Dionysius has completed his discussion of the three topics at stake. However - and this is the important point - he does indeed return to the main argument of *De Dem.* I, for the discussion of points of criticism against Demosthenes belongs to *De Dem.* I and not to *De Dem.* II (cp. p. 21). He does not return in the same conspicuous way he did in the case of the other digressions, by explicitly saying so, but prefers to return as unobtrusively as possible for reasons discussed above.

119. Cp. p. 47, n. 95.

120. There is no comparison between any authors in *De Dem.* III.

121. Dionysius could have learned this ingenuity from his idol, Demosthenes: in the case against Ctesiphon Demosthenes had no chance of winning, for Ctesiphon's bill for conferring a crown on Demosthenes was indeed illegal in two respects: firstly, the law forbade coronation of a responsible magistrate (ἀρχῶν ὑπεύθυνος) (which Demosthenes still was at the time the bill was proposed); secondly, the law forbade coronation in the theatre at the Great Dionysiac festival (which was what Ctesiphon proposed). These two illegalities played a major rôle in Aeschines' prosecution, and Demosthenes had to deal with them. However, instead of following the order of argumentation of Aeschines, he placed his answers to these two matters in the midst of a narration of historic events in which he had gained the greatest diplomatic triumph of his life. Thus he ensured that the weakness of his arguments concerning these two matters was totally overwhelmed by the merit of the rôle he had played in these events. (Eventually Ctesiphon was acquitted with 80% of the votes and Demosthenes received his crown at

the Great Dionysia of 329 B.C.) (For more detail on this subject, cp. W.W. Goodwin, *Demosthenes On the Crown*, Cambridge: University Press, 1957, pp. 257-273).

122. Cp. pp. 51f., n. 118.

123. Cp. p. 56.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PLACE OF THE *DE DEMOSTHENE* IN THE *DE ORATORIBUS ANTIQUIS*

The *De Dem.* has been preserved as part of the comprehensive work of Dionysius on the Attic orators, the *De oratoribus antiquis*,<sup>1</sup> a work which had been intended as a contribution to the Atticistic movement current at the time of Dionysius' activities in Rome by means of a series of discussions of what was worth imitating in the works of the ancient Attic orators. Since the *De Dem.* has been handed down to posterity as part of a corpus of which the object has been stated explicitly, it stands to reason that this fact could be of crucial importance for the understanding of the nature and object of the *De Dem.* In fact, in the history of research on the *De Dem.* researchers realised this and tried to explain the problems connected with this matter. The object of this chapter is a critical analysis of all the hypotheses and an exposition of my own view - that the *De Dem.* does indeed fit in with the general object of the *De or. ant.*; but first the dilemma concerning this matter must be explained.

On the one hand the researcher faces the following facts: firstly, in the general introduction to the *De or. ant.* Dionysius explicitly says that his work will be divided into two sections, of which the second will contain three essays, viz. one on Demosthenes, one on Hyperides and one on Aeschines.<sup>2</sup> Thus the first fact is that we have a *promise* of treatises to come, one of which is a work on Demosthenes, and the second important fact is that these essays, including one on Demosthenes, will be part of a corpus, the general purpose of which had been clearly stated in its introduction. Secondly, in the opening word of the *De Dinarcho*,<sup>3</sup> generally regarded as the last of the extant literary essays of Dionysius,<sup>4</sup> Dionysius refers to the *De or. ant.* when explaining why he had decided to write the essay on Dinarchus: *περὶ Δεινάρχου τοῦ ῥήτορος οὐδὲν εἰρηκῶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων γραφεῖσιν διὰ τὸ μήτε εὐρετὴν ἰδίου γεγονέναι χαρακτῆρος τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τὸν Ἴσοκράτην καὶ τὸν Ἰσαῖον, μήτε τῶν εὐρημένων ἑτέροις τελειωτὴν, ὥσπερ τὸν Δημοσθένη καὶ τὸν Αἰσχίνη καὶ < τὸν > Ὑπερείδην ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν ... ἠγησάμην δεῖν μὴ παραλιπεῖν αὐτόν ...*<sup>5</sup> From this evidence it seems justified to infer that Dionysius had fulfilled his promise at the time of writing *De Din.* On the other hand, however, the following facts must be considered as well: firstly, no work on either Hyperides or Aeschines has been handed down to posterity;

secondly, we do have a work on Demosthenes, but this work seems to be quite different from the other extant works of the *De or. ant.*

In the course of time these problems have become so important to scholars, that the place of the *De Dem.* in the *De or. ant.* was determined by their solution of these problems. Consequently these need to be considered very carefully. They can be described as follows. In the general introduction to the corpus Dionysius clearly states the overall purpose of the *De or. ant.*: in the frame of the controversy between the Atticists and the Asianists current in his time, he intends to make a contribution in support of the Atticists. To this end he selects from the best Attic orators the qualities most suitable for imitation, explaining these qualities and indicating at the same time what should be avoided.<sup>6</sup> It stands to reason that the motif of imitation, of μίμησις, would be dominant in the essays to follow. Reading the *De Lysia*, the *De Isocrate* and the *De Isaeo* one can see that this is indeed the case, as has already convincingly been pointed out by R.H. Tukey<sup>7</sup> and E. Kalinka.<sup>8</sup> In the *De Dem.*, however, one comes across the noun μίμησις only once,<sup>9</sup> and the verb μιμῆσαι occurs only four times.<sup>10</sup> The noun is used in a digression on the reason why different authors would prefer different types of literary composition and has nothing to do with the intention of the *De Dem.* This goes for the verb as well: at 1,244:1 Dionysius merely states in passing that Thucydides had not been imitated (with complete success)<sup>11</sup> and at 10,276:9 that Demosthenes imitated Thucydides; the μιμῶμενος at 12,286:6 need not be considered, being part of a quotation, which is also the case with the μιμῆσθαι at 26,340:7. Thus it would appear that Dionysius did not have imitation in mind when he wrote the *De Dem.* In fact, this idea is confirmed by the actual purpose of the two polemic sections, *De Dem.* I and IV: in these sections Dionysius could not have had imitation in mind when writing them, for his sole aim there was to *prove* the pre-eminence of Demosthenes, whereas theoretical exposition would be more suitable when a writer has imitation in mind.<sup>12</sup> For this reason the two theoretical sections, *De Dem.* II and III, would be perfectly in line with the general intention of imitation stated in the general introduction, although there is no direct hint that they are presented for this purpose. Thus the very nature and the twofold object of the *De Dem.* represent the first conspicuous difference between this work and the rest of the corpus of which it forms a part.

Secondly, in the first three essays of the *De or. ant.* Dionysius applies the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system as the only system of evaluation - at least, so it appears;<sup>13</sup> in the *De Dem.* he applies it as well, but the whole essay is dominated by the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system and the ἁρμονία system, which are virtually<sup>14</sup> absent from the works of volume I.

Thirdly, in contrast with the essays of volume I, the πραγματικὸς τόπος is left totally out of consideration in the *De Dem.*, the only reference to it, so far as Demosthenes is concerned, being a promise of Dionysius that he will send Ammaeus a treatise on Demosthenes' way of handling subject-matter some time.<sup>15</sup>

Fourthly, possibly but not certainly due to the loss of the first few chapters of the *De Dem.*, the work does not contain a βίος of Demosthenes, whereas the other works do have a βίος in every case.<sup>16</sup>

Fifthly, in spite of the third and fourth differences, the *De Dem.*, as we know it today, is longer than the whole of volume I of the *De or. ant.*: according to the Loeb-text, Dionysius devotes 108 pages to the *De Dem.*, but only approximately a hundred to the *De Lys.*, *De Isocr.* and the *De Is.* together, and approximately five to the general introduction to the *De or. ant.* Neither in the general introduction nor at the end of the *De Isocr.* does Dionysius indicate that one can expect the *De Dem.* to be so lengthy, whereas he was clearly constantly aware of the length of the *De Dem.* while writing it.<sup>17</sup>

Sixthly, scholars have been constantly aware of a difference in the critical evaluation of authors discussed in the *De or. ant.* This difference (which becomes clear by a comparison of the *De Dem.* with the other essays) involves not only Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus, but also other authors who do not play a major rôle in the work, like Homer, Gorgias and Thrasymachus.

In the case of Isaeus, the difference is very conspicuous: whereas this orator had been highly esteemed by Dionysius, in fact, to such an extent that he deserved a place in volume I instead of, e.g., a man like Antiphon,<sup>18</sup> he received no recognition in the *De Dem.* - in fact, along with other orators he is described as one of those who οὐδὲν οὔτε καινὸν οὔτε περιττὸν ἐπετίθεισαν ...<sup>19</sup>

This goes for Lysias as well: he too had been treated more favourably in volume I than in the *De Dem.*: whereas one is aware of all the excellences of this orator's style in the *De Lys.*, his deficiencies receiving only minimum attention, the position is quite different in the *De Dem.*; in this book the good qualities of the style of Lysias are mentioned only to demonstrate certain aspects of the style of Demosthenes, whereas a definite change concerning a certain characteristic of Lysias' style, viz. charm, can clearly be pointed out.<sup>20</sup>

In the case of Isocrates, G. Pavano was struck by the fact that this orator is indeed described in terms of stylistic features characteristic of the smooth type of sentence-arrangement (σύνθεσις) in the *De Dem.*, but that in the *De Isocr.* there is no attempt to link his name to this critical system.<sup>21</sup> Quoting F. Nassal, Pavano says that the same type of thing has happened in the case of the Gorgianic figures applied by Isocrates: although they are indeed mentioned in the *De Isocr.*, they are not presented as devices originating from Gorgias, as in the *De Dem.*: "*Hier werden diese Figuren zum erstenmal ausdrücklich mit Gorgias in Zusammenhang gebracht.*"<sup>22</sup> G. Pavano has also pointed out that in the *De Dem.* the *Pro Pace* of Isocrates is presented as the best work of this orator, while this is not done in the *De Isocr.*<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, whereas Homer is regarded as the best representative of the mixed type of composition in the *De Dem.*,<sup>24</sup> he is not even mentioned in the first volume of the *De or. ant.*<sup>25</sup>

Gorgias poses another problem: in ch. 19 of the *De Isaeo* Dionysius clearly indicates that he does not intend to deal with Gorgias, but in the *De Dem.*, which is in fact the very next book of the corpus (according to text tradition), Gorgias is the first author whom we come across.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, in the *De Isaeo* (ch. 19) Gorgias' style is closely associated with Isocrates', but in the *De Dem.* the sophist is presented as an exponent of the extraordinary type of style, whereas Isocrates is made there a representative of the mixed type of style.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, although Thrasymachus seems to be highly esteemed by Dionysius in the *De Dem.* as the likely inventor of the mixed type of style,<sup>28</sup> he is severely criticized in the *De Lys.* (ch. 6) and the *De Is.* (ch. 20); moreover,

in these essays he is constantly associated with Lysias, who is an exponent of the simple style, and not with one of the exponents of the middle or mixed type of style, of which he might be the inventor according to the *De Dem.*<sup>29</sup>

Thus, in short, the issue is the following: is the *De Dem.*, as we have it today, the work on Demosthenes promised in the general introduction to the *De or. ant.* (in which case the alleged differences will have to be explained)? Or must we deem the differences too great for a work forming part of the same corpus (in which case the differences are the very reason for not regarding the *De Dem.* as the originally intended work on Demosthenes)?

In former research on this matter scholars have indeed developed their views according to these alternatives: some took the *De Dem.* for the work promised in the general introduction, while others denied this, saying that the *De Dem.* had not been intended to be part of the *De or. ant.*

A short survey of research done in the nineteenth century on the problems of the second volume of the *De or. ant.* is essential for a clear understanding of the issue. At first scholars never questioned the legitimacy of the presence of the *De Dem.* in the *De or. ant.* They only kept themselves busy with the missing essays on Hyperides and Aeschines. So far as the *De Dem.* was concerned, scholars never questioned the legitimacy of its presence in the *De or. ant.*, and it was generally regarded as the work on Demosthenes, promised in the general introduction. This was the view of A.G. Becker in 1829,<sup>30</sup> F. Blass in 1863,<sup>31</sup> C.T. Roessler in 1873,<sup>32</sup> U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff in 1899<sup>33</sup> and M. Egger in 1902.<sup>34</sup>

Although these scholars agreed on the question concerning the position of the *De Dem.*, they were by no means unanimous so far as the rest of the second volume of the *De or. ant.* is concerned. According to the testimony of A.G. Becker, the traditional view was that Dionysius had indeed completed the second volume according to his promise, that the *De Dem.* must be regarded as the first essay of this volume, and that the essays on Hyperides and Aeschines had indeed been written originally by Dionysius, but that they must have been lost in the course of time. According to A.G. Becker it appears that scholars unanimously accepted that the essays on Hyperides and Aeschines had indeed been written: "was doch alle Literatoren einstimmig annehmen."<sup>35</sup> This view was advocated by F. Blass as well, by reason of a

remark of Syrianus in his commentary on the περὶ ἰδεῶν of Hermogenes: Διονύσιον ὅς περὶ χαρακτῆρος διέλαβε Δυσίου Δημοσθένους Ἰσοκράτους Ὑπερείδου Θουκυδίδου.<sup>36</sup> This remark of Syrianus led Blass to the conclusion: "*Quamquam accurate non loquitur hoc tamen probare videtur ultimam quoque partem libri de antiquis oratoribus absolutam esse.*"<sup>37</sup> C.T. Roessler was also, by virtue of the opening words of the *De Din.*, convinced that the second volume had been completed.<sup>38</sup> This goes for M. Egger<sup>39</sup> and R.H. Tukey<sup>40</sup> as well.

A challenge to this view had already been put forward by A.G. Becker as early as 1829: "*Es bleibt nämlich ... höchst ungewisz, ob die versprochenen Abhandlungen über Hyperides und Aeschines jemals geschrieben sind, was doch alle Literatoren einstimmig annehmen.*"<sup>41</sup> This new idea, that the *De Dem.* was the last work of the *De or. ant.*, was accepted by U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff<sup>42</sup> as well.

Up to this stage scholars never questioned the position of the *De Dem.*: the only issue was the position of the essays on Hyperides and Aeschines. However, the moment Croiset joined the polemic on this subject, the issue changed: he must receive the credit for being the first to realise that the *De Dem.*, as we know it, need not be the one originally promised in the general introduction to the *De or. ant.* He was very much aware of the different nature of the *De Dem.* and of the difference of its contents; consequently he tried to solve the difficulty by assuming that "the *De Dem.* was an independent essay but contained portions of an earlier essay on Demosthenes which had formed a part of the *De oratoribus antiquis.*"<sup>43</sup> According to this hypothesis it is the sections on Plato and Thucydides which provide the evidence of the existence of an earlier essay on Demosthenes, and, according to this hypothesis, they must have formed part of that essay.<sup>44</sup>

It is quite clear why this new idea of Croiset is so important for the sake of this study: if it can be proven that the *De Dem.* had never been intended to be part of the *De or. ant.*, that Dionysius meant it to be an independent essay, then, obviously, the peculiar nature of this essay is no problem so far as its relation to the *De or. ant.* is concerned; on the other hand, if this hypothesis can be proven wrong, then one still has to explain why the *De Dem.* is so different in comparison with the works of volume I of the *De or. ant.*; in any case, from now on the validity of the presence of the

*De Dem.* in the *De or. ant.* cannot merely be assumed - it has to be proven.

This new idea, that the extant work on Demosthenes is a later essay which was afterwards incorporated into the *De or. ant.*, was accepted by R. H. Tukey as the best way of coping with the problems concerning this treatise. This scholar tried to improve on the hypothesis of Croiset in the following way: "According to this hypothesis, we are to suppose that the *De oratoribus antiquis* at first contained two sections (συντάξεις); that later a third was added which contained a new presentation of the stylistic merits of Demosthenes and proof of his pre-eminence; that still later, probably after the death of Dionysius, the second section, containing the essays on Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Hyperides,<sup>45</sup> ceased to be copied and disappeared from circulation ..."<sup>46</sup> The reason for this would be, according to him, the hypothetical fact that Dionysius might have followed "the same method of treatment that he employed in the first section, with consequent monotony arising from its repeated application."<sup>47</sup> The actual impetus to the writing of this surmised second essay on Demosthenes, according to Tukey, had to do with extreme claims of the admirers of Plato: in the alleged first work on Demosthenes Dionysius wanted to show, he says, that Demosthenes stood first among the orators. However, after he had completed the alleged first essay on Demosthenes, "he is aroused by the renewal of the old claim of the philosophers that Plato had surpassed all others in writing and speaking and should be taken as the standard for the simple style of the dialogue and also for the more vigorous style of public address, in fact, that he not only stood first among the philosophers, but as an orator outshone even Demosthenes in his own field."<sup>48</sup> This claim of the Plato-idolisers had been the reason for his writing the surmised second work on Demosthenes: "It was to refute the claims of the advocates of Plato that he then prepared this second essay on Demosthenes."<sup>49</sup> Tukey then proceeds to provide two external proofs that this essay was indeed incorporated into the *De or. ant.*: firstly, in the *Epistle to Pompeius*, in which Dionysius replies to some criticisms levelled at him because of his treatment of Plato in the *De Dem.*, he quotes cc. 5-7 of the *De Dem.*, which he describes as being ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν Ἀππικῶν πραγματείᾳ ῥητόρων;<sup>50</sup> secondly, in the *Second Epistle to Ammaeus* he refers to his discussion of Thucydides with the following words: ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων πρὸς τὸ σὸν ὄνομα συνταχθεῖσιν ὑπομνηματισμοῖς.<sup>51</sup>

This new idea of Croiset and R.H. Tukey, viz. that the *De Dem.*, as we have it today, was not the essay originally promised in the general introduction to the *De or. ant.*, but that it was an independent separate work on Demosthenes that had been included into the *De or. ant.* afterwards, was advocated by I. Stroux<sup>52</sup> in 1912, and a few years later, in 1924, by E. Kalinka<sup>53</sup> as well: "*dasz Dionys nicht von Anfang an als Fortsetzung von ἀρχὴ bestimmt hatte, sondern erst später einbezogen hat.*"<sup>54</sup> To this scholar the different nature and object of the *De Dem.* provide the key to understanding the problem: this treatise could not have been the work originally intended by Demosthenes. Supporting R.H. Tukey on these matters, he adds another argument, the difference in evaluation of Isaeus: "*Der letzte Zweifel daran, dasz Δημ λ nicht von Anfang an zu ἀρχὴ gehört hat, ... , wird gebannt durch den scharfen Gegensatz der Urteile über Isaios ...*"<sup>55</sup> Moreover, in no extant manuscript the *De Dem.* has been placed where we find it today: "*wie denn auch in keiner Handschrift Δημ λ unmittelbar auf ἀρχὴ folgt ...*"<sup>56</sup> On the other hand, as to the question about what has become of the promise of a work on Demosthenes made in the general introduction, he cannot find any justification for the hypothesis of R.H. Tukey a.o. that the second volume of the *De or. ant.* had originally been completed: "*Ebenso unbeweisbar und inhaltbar ... ist die Anschauung Tukeys, der Δημ λ wegen der verschiedenen Anlage und Abzweckung nicht als Teil dieser Fortsetzung von ἀρχὴ anerkennt, sondern meint, Dionys habe den zweiten Teil ganz in der Art des ersten ausgearbeitet, doch sei dieser zweite Teil völlig verschollen.*"<sup>57</sup> His solution of this problem is quite different: he believes that Dionysius never executed his promise made in the general introduction, but changed his views and accordingly his plans as well: "*Zwischen der Vollendung von ἀρχὴ und von Δημ λ hat sich also ein tiefgreifender Sinneswandel vollzogen, der nur damit sich erklärt, dasz Dionys mittlerweile die Absicht, einen einheitlichen λόγος auch über die drei jüngeren Redner abzufassen, aufgegeben und sich entschlossen hat, Δημ λ als Abschlagszahlung gelten zu lassen.*"<sup>58</sup>

As could be expected, this new view of an independent work on Demosthenes was not unanimously accepted; as a matter of fact, with this new approach Croiset had started a polemic which lasted for many years: his suggestions were followed by a reaction of M. Egger in 1902, who maintained that the *De Dem.* was not an independent essay, but the one promised in the general introduction.<sup>59</sup> Likewise S.F. Bonner (1939) and G. Pavano (1942) reacted

against this view as put forward by R.H. Tukey and E. Kalinka.<sup>60</sup> They all want to prove that the *De Dem.* was not an independent essay on Demosthenes, but the essay promised in the general introduction. To them the reference to the *De Dem.* found in the *Ad Gem.* and *Ad Amm. II*, ch. 1 proves their thesis,<sup>61</sup> and the final proof is found in the *De Dem.* itself, where Dionysius refers back to the *De Isocr.* and the *De Lys.*: referring to Isocrates, he says: ὄντινα χαρακτήρα ἔχειν ἐφαίνεται μοι, διὰ πλείονων μὲν ἐδήλωσα πρότερον;<sup>62</sup> in ch. 2, Dionysius, talking about Lysias, says: τίς δὲ ἦν ἡ προαίρεσις αὐτοῦ καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐν τῇ π ρ ὀ τ α ὕ τ η ς δ ε δ ῆ λ ω τ α ι γ ρ α φ ῆ,<sup>63</sup> and in ch. 13: φυσική τις ἐπιτρέχει τοῖς Δυσίου λόγοις εὐστομία καὶ χάρις, ὥ σ π ε ρ ἔ φ η ν κ α ἰ π ρ ὀ τ ε ρ ο ν.<sup>64</sup> (My spacing of print). In fact, E. Kalinka has drawn attention to the "wörtlichen Uebereinstimmungen" in the passages of the *De Dem.* where Dionysius is referring to the *De Isocr.* and the *De Lys.*<sup>65</sup>

Although G. Pavano is convinced that these two arguments are irrefutable proof of his conviction that the *De Dem.* is the original treatise and no "revised and improved edition" of a surmised lost original treatise on Demosthenes, he proceeds to add further evidence: in the third place, he considers the fact that Ammaeus is the recipient of the *De Dem.*<sup>66</sup> to be yet another proof, *garanzia*.<sup>67</sup> Fourthly, says Pavano, already in antiquity the *De Dem.* was regarded as part of the *De or. ant.*, more specifically of the second volume: in the commentary of Syrianus on the *ιδέαι* of Hermogenes, one reads: Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ χαρακτήρων περὶ Γοργίου λέγων τάδε φησί· δικανικοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.<sup>68</sup>

Fifthly, the promise of a treatise on the subject-matter of Demosthenes at the close of the *De Dem.*<sup>69</sup> proves, according to Pavano, that Dionysius wanted to bring the *De Dem.* in line with his practice in the case of the books of volume I of the *De or. ant.*;<sup>70</sup> in fact, he seems to be convinced that this book simply had to follow. He proceeds to infer that the *De Dem.* could be the beginning of the second volume of the *De or. ant.*: "*Che il De Dem. verb. costituisse il principio del II vol. è chiaro dal fatto che esso si chiude (cfr. c. 58 e x t r.) con la promessa di un altro saggio sul contenuto in Demostene.*"<sup>71</sup> (My spacing of print). To this he adds the fact that the *De Dem.* is put first of all in the summaries made by Dionysius, whether they have to be regarded as post-dated to the *De Dem.*, or not.<sup>72</sup>

Sixthly, according to Pavano, the similarities of treatment between the *De Dem.* and the essays of volume I of the *De or. ant.* also confirm his view. These similarities are:

- First, the *De Dem.* is also directed to competent people.<sup>73</sup>
- Second, like the essays of the first volume, the *De Dem.* was also supported by a collateral work, now lost, viz. a book on the authenticity of the works of Demosthenes: the *De Demosthenis orationibus*.<sup>74</sup>
- Third, the absence of a βίος in the *De Dem.* probably is solely due to the loss of the first few chapters of this work<sup>75</sup> and cannot be regarded as yet another formal difference between this work and the rest.<sup>76</sup>
- Fourth, considering the first eight chapters of the *De Dem.* as an introduction to the book,<sup>77</sup> Pavano, following Kalinka, states that Dionysius continued to introduce the authors in chronological order according to the τάξις τῶν χρόνων), as he had done in volume I of the *De or. ant.*<sup>78</sup>: cc. 9-10: Thucydides; cc. 11-13: Lysias; cc. 16-22: Isocrates; and cc. 23-32: Plato.
- Fifth, it may be assumed that the *De Dem.* did include a βίος and likewise most certainly Dionysius did write a treatise on Demosthenes' πραγματικὸς τόπος, in conformity with his practice in the books of volume I.<sup>79</sup>

This leaves Pavano with the problem of explaining the differences between the *De Dem.* and the essays of the first volume of the *De or. ant.* To him all the differences that are worth considering can be related to the methodological plan of the *De Dem.*: Dionysius chose to use the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως and the ἁρμονίαι systems as the basis of discussion in this work, whereas he applied the ἀρεταί system in the essays of the first volume. Although Dionysius must have been acquainted with these systems before the composition of the *De Dem.*, he does not make use of them for his argumentations in the first volume of the *De or. ant.* The introduction of these two systems can account for all the differences: Firstly, due to the necessity of theoretical exposition of these two 'new' doctrines,<sup>80</sup> the book became extraordinarily long; secondly, because of the introduction of the system of the types of style, by which the scope of the work became widened to include all prose-writers, Dionysius was forced to change the tone from didactic to

polemic in order to answer the extreme claims of the pro-Plato extremists;<sup>81</sup> thirdly, the difference in critical evaluation of the authors can also be accounted for: when Dionysius was forced to classify them according to fixed categories in the *De Dem.*, he inevitably had to make some remarks on these authors which would seem to be contradictory to his views on the same authors expressed in essays where these categories played no rôle at all.<sup>82</sup>

In conclusion my view on the place of the *De Dem.* in the *De or. ant.* is as follows: the *De Dem.* was not meant to be an independent essay on Demosthenes, but is the essay promised in the general introduction to the *De or. ant.* - in fact, there is no reason not to believe that this essay was indeed the first essay of the second volume on the Attic orators. On the other hand, the hypothesis of an alleged "original" essay on Demosthenes replaced by a later one which was handed down to posterity, is sheer speculation. No researcher was able to prove that the *De Dem.* is not the one promised in the general introduction to the *De or. ant.*

So far as the differences between the *De Dem.* and the essays of the first volume of the *De or. ant.* are concerned, I have tried to prove that they can all be explained in some way or another - that goes for the formal differences (no introduction, no section on subject-matter, and the length of the essay), as well as for the differences in evaluation of authors, and the alleged difference in tone. In all these matters the purpose of the *De Dem.* is of crucial importance. In this essay Dionysius is not merely dealing with one of the Attic orators - he is dealing with his idol, the supreme orator, the man who produced literature which Dionysius regarded as written in the best prose-style. The *De Dem.* would not be just another essay in his corpus - it would be the most important essay of all. As a matter of fact, the reader is prepared for this by the very inclusion of the essay on Isæus. Dionysius does not even hesitate to deviate from his evaluation of Lysias the moment this orator is compared with the great master, Demosthenes! I have tried to show how the structure of the *De Dem.* can be explained in view of this high rating of Demosthenes: by removing the section of criticism (*De Dem.* IV) from the first section (*De Dem.* I) where it naturally belongs, by the insertion of two sections in which he deals with matters concerning which the position of Demosthenes is not debated (*De Dem.* II, on harmonious sentence-structure, and *De Dem.* III, on delivery.)<sup>83</sup> The introduction of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system in *De Dem.* I can also

be brought into relation with the purpose of *De Dem.* I: to prove that Demosthenes is the best prose-stylist. I have already pointed out that Dionysius must have been aware of the fact that he has indeed introduced something new into the corpus by making use of this system in the process of evaluating the authors. As a matter of fact, recapitulating *De Dem.* I in ch. 33, he comments that he has attained his aim by making use of comparison,<sup>84</sup> and that the introduction of the system of the types of style was a natural outcome of the needs of the issue at stake.<sup>85</sup> But why would Dionysius have deviated from his practice in the essays of the first volume where he compared the authors in terms of the ἀρεταί system?<sup>86</sup> He did not have much of a choice: if he did adhere to the ἀρεταί τῆς λέξεως system, he would have to compare Demosthenes with Lysias, Isocrates and Isæus in order to determine Demosthenes' relative position so far as each of the qualities of this system is concerned - as he did with these authors in the first volume. Doing this in the same fashion as in vol. I of the *De or. ant.* (λεκτικὸς τόπος, πραγματικὸς τόπος, examples, discussions, comparisons), he would have ended up with a treatise far more lengthy than the preceding ones in any case. Moreover, he was faced with the difficult problem of how he could discuss Plato. Strictly speaking, his discussion of the style of Plato, a philosopher, in a corpus on the Greek *orators* is out of place, but if he wanted to prove the supremacy of Demosthenes, he had no choice but to include Plato in his discussion, by virtue of the extreme claims of the Plato-idolisers.<sup>87</sup> Thus, so far as Plato is concerned, on what basis could he compare the style of a philosopher (Plato) with that of an orator (Demosthenes)? On top of all these problems another matter can be added: the personal diversity of the styles of the authors who would play a major rôle in the *De Dem.* He was constantly aware of the necessity that the examples compared should be of the same kind<sup>88</sup> to justify comparison. It goes without saying that it simply would not be possible to do justice to an author like Lysias when he is compared to someone like Isocrates on the basis of the ἀρεταί τῆς λέξεως system, for this system clearly favours an author making use of embellishment, whereas the system of the types of style considers every type as valuable in its own right (cp. Cic., *Or.*, III.28). In any case, Lysias, Isocrates, Isæus, Plato and Demosthenes do not all apply the same type of style, and a straightforward comparison on the basis of this system would simply not accommodate the differences in personal types of style. Thus the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως system by virtue of its very nature would enable Dionysius to include any personal style in his attempt to prove the supremacy of Demosthenes.

At the same time, this system would enable him to attain the purpose of *De Dem.* I in the shortest possible time: he only had to prove that the type of style applied by Demosthenes is the best, which would eliminate all the exponents of the extreme types automatically, leaving him only with the need for a comparison between Demosthenes and the best exponents of the best type of style, the mixed type, Plato and Isocrates. By proving that the mixed type of style is the best (cc. 1-15), Dionysius has not only eliminated all the exponents of the extreme types of style, but has also overcome the problem of diversity of personal styles to a great extent, for the styles of the remaining authors, viz. Plato and Isocrates, are, broadly speaking, much closer to that of Demosthenes than that of Lysias or of Thucydides. Consequently, a comparison on the basis of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system would be much easier. This, then, was his method of proving the supremacy of Demosthenes over Plato and Isocrates (cc. 16-32).<sup>89</sup>

The inclusion of such an elaborate section on the musical aspect of the style of Demosthenes (*De Dem.* II) has been discussed in chapter 1. I have tried to show that, due to the polemic nature of *De Dem.* I, this exposition has probably been included in order to bring the *De Dem.* more in line with the intention of imitation stated in the general introduction to the *De or. ant.*<sup>90</sup> - and nobody will question its usefulness in this respect. I have also tried to prove that Dionysius has included this section (along with the section on delivery) in order to minimize the effect of the section of criticism (*De Dem.* IV) on Demosthenes,<sup>91</sup> applying a technique of οἰκονομία which his idol himself had applied in the *De Corona* with astounding effect.<sup>92</sup> Although everyone will willingly agree the *De Dem.* II would fit in perfectly into a work on the Attic orators written with imitation in mind, scholars have been struck by the conspicuous difference in tone between *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II - to such an extent that the supposition of an interruption during the composition of the *De Dem.* was raised, in which time Dionysius is supposed to have written his theoretical work on musical composition of sentences. It stands to reason that such an interruption between *De Dem.* I and II could have implications not only for the purpose of the *De Dem.*, but also for its position in the *De or. ant.* - which is the reason why it has now become necessary to discuss this matter at length.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Henceforward to be referred to as *De or. ant.* by me.
2. At the end of the general introduction to the work on the orators Dionysius says that his work will be divided into two sections: the first dealing with the older orators, viz. Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus; thus the *De Lysia*, and *De Isocrate* and the *De Isaeo* constitute volume I. Of the proposed essays on the three orators of the later generation, viz. Demosthenes, Hyperides and Aeschines, only the one on Demosthenes, the *De Dem.*, is known to exist. The works on these three orators would have constituted the second volume. (ἔσονται δὲ οἱ παραλαμβανόμενοι ῥήτορες τρεῖς μὲν ἐκ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, Λυσίας Ἰσοκράτης Ἰσαῖος, τρεῖς δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐπακμασάντων τούτοις, Δημοσθένης Ὑπερείδης Αἰσχίνης, οὓς ἐγὼ τῶν ἄλλων ἠγοῦμαι κρατίστους, καὶ διαιρεθήσεται μὲν εἰς δύο συντάξεις ἡ πραγματεία, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης λήφεται τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων γραφείσης.) ("The orators that will be compared, will be three from the older generation, viz. Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus, and three from those who flourished after these, viz. Demosthenes, Hyperides and Aeschines - whom I regard to be the best of all - and my work will be divided into two volumes; the first will be the volume which deals with the older (orators.") (Introduction, 4,12:23-4,14:2).
3. Henceforward to be referred to *De Din.* by me.
4. S. F. Bonner, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
5. "Seeing that I have not said anything about the orator Dinarchus in the essays on the ancient (orators) - due to the fact that he was neither an inventor of a personal style (as I consider Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus), nor an accomplisher of the discoveries of others (as I consider Demosthenes, Aischines and Hyperides) ... I deemed it necessary not to pass him by ..."
6. καὶ τί παρ' ἐκάστου δεῖ λαμβάνειν ἢ φυλάττεσθαι ... (4,12:4-5).
7. R.H. Tukey, *The Composition of the 'De oratoribus antiquis' of Dionysius*, CP, 4 (1909), pp. 390-404.
8. E. Kalinka, *Die Arbeitsweise des Rhetors Dionys*, I, WS, 43 (1924), pp. 161ff.
9. 36,378:11.
10. 1,244:1; 10,276:9; 12,286:6 and 26,340:7.

11. The insertion of εἰς ἄκρον by Kiessling is plausible for the very fact that Dionysius regards Thucydides as the model of the extraordinary type of style (ὄρος καὶ κανὼν ..., "standard and model ...") (1,242:26).
12. It stand to reason that a student could learn a lot from any polemic section as well, e.g. from the comparisons and discussions of passages comprising such a great part of *De Dem. I*; in fact, in the exposition of my view (cp. pp. 64 ff. I shall argue that Dionysius did not have much of a choice about how *De Dem. I* was to be presented, but that the development of his argument in *De Dem. I* is a natural outcome of the way he had presented his ideas in the essays of volume I - at least, to a great extent.
13. This is indeed the general impression, but I intend to prove that the other systems play a rôle as well - cp. pp. 63 ff.
14. Cp. pp. 63ff.
15. Cp. n. 95, p. 47 above.
16. In the case of the other works Dionysius devotes the first chapter of every treatise to the βίος of the orator concerned.
17. The following quotations will clearly prove this: ἔφερον δ' ἂν ἐξ ἐκάστου τὰ παραδείγματα, εἰ μὴ πλείων ἔμελλε τοῦ μετρίου γενήσεσθαι ὁ λόγος ... ("I would have given examples from each of these, had this not threatened to protract my treatise unduly ...") (13,288:5-7); εἰ μὲν οὖν χρόνον ἀρκοῦντα εἶχον, καὶ τὰς λέξεις αὐτὰς ἂν παρετίθην. πολλῶν δέ μοι καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔτι καταλειπομένων, τοῦτο μὲν ἕσσω, δείγμασι δὲ μόνον ἐν τῷ παρόντι χρήσομαι βραχυτάτοις ... ("If I had sufficient time I would have provided the actual passages as well. However, since many essential (matters) are still left for me (to deal with), I shall leave the matter, and for the present I shall use only very short examples ...") (14,290:25 - 14,292:1); ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἵνα μὴ περὶ ταῦτα διατρίβων ἀναγκασθῶ παραλιπεῖν τι περιλειπομένων ... ("However, in order not to be forced to leave out something of the rest (of my discussion) by spending too much time on these matters ...") (23,324:17-18); ἐβουλόμην ἔτι πλείω παρασχέσθαι παραδείγματα ... νῦν δ' ἐξείργομαι, σπεύδων ἐπὶ τὰ προκείμενα καὶ ἅμα δόξαν ὑπορώμενος ἀκαιρίας. ("I wanted to provide even more examples ... But now I am prevented (from doing so) by my desire to proceed with the above mentioned subjects and also by my concern to avoid the reputation of lacking a sense of proportion") (42,402:27 - 42,404:1).

(The translation of ἀκαιρία with "lack of sense of proportion" in this case is inevitable if one takes the context into consideration; "inappropriateness" would have no sense for the non-specialist); παραδειγμάτων δ' οἶμαι δεῖν ἐνταῦθα, ... πολὺ γὰρ < ἂν > ἡ σύνταξις τὸ μῆκος λάβοι ... ("But I do not deem examples necessary here ... for my treatise would become very long ...") (46,418:4-8). (The insertion of ἂν by S. Usher is acceptable in view of the Optative of the verb, λάβοι.); πόλλ' ἂν τις εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εἰπεῖν ἔχοι, τοῦ δὲ συντάγματος ἱκανὸν εἰληφότος ἤδη μῆκος αὐτοῦ που καταπαῦσαι χρὴ τὸν λόγον ... ("One could say much more on this subject, but, seeing that the treatise is already long enough, I suppose I must conclude my discussion of it ...") (54,446:3-5); (Reiske has substituted ἔχει of the manuscript with ἔχοι - a viable emendation in view of the ἂν.) To all these examples, 4,254:11-13 and 8,264:14 could have been added as well, had it not been for the textual problems present in these two cases. In spite of the fact that Dionysius was constantly aware of the length of the treatise, there is no evidence that he decided to leave out essential parts in order to shorten it; on the contrary, he had foreseen the treatise would be long, but nevertheless regarded every element as indispensable.

18. Seeing that antiphon had stronger claims to originality, being the first autochthonous Attic orator, one can assume with certainty that Dionysius' choice had been biased. (Cp. S. Usher, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-173). For more detail on this matter, cp. pp. 64ff.
19. "did not cultivate anything new or extraordinary (so far as style is concerned) ..." (8,264:22-23).
20. In the *De Lys.* Dionysius devotes cc. 2-14 to the discussion of the style of Lysias, and the subsequent chapters to that of his subject-matter. Of the thirteen chapters on the style only approximately ten lines (viz. in ch. 13: 13,46:13-24) have been devoted to deficiencies of the orator's style; the rest of cc. 2-13 represents an elaborate exposition of all the excellences of his style, whereas Dionysius rebuts in ch. 14 some points of criticism made by Theophrastus. What is more, in the case of one of the qualities of style, charm, χάρις, a difference between *De Lys.* and *De Dem.* can be detected. In the *De Lys.* this quality is described as the finest and most important quality of the style of Lysias (καλλίστην τε καὶ κυριωτότην .. - *De Lys.* 10,36:27-28). Dionysius states that Lysias has surpassed *all other*

orators in the application of this virtue: ἢ πάντα ὑπερέχει τοὺς λοιποὺς ῥήτορας. (11,40:9-10) (My spacing of print). (Cp. 10,38:1-2 and 13,44:23-25 as well.) In fact, none of his successors even could imitate him with complete success: ἦν οὐθ' ὑπερεβάλετο τῶν ἐπιγινομένων οὐθεὶς οὔτε εἰς ἄκρον ἐμιμήσατο. ("in which none of his successors either surpassed or imitated him with complete success") (13,44:23-25). Although Lysias is not criticized in the *De Dem.* as severely as the other writers with whom Demosthenes is compared, probably due to Dionysius' affinity with the Atticistic movement which extolled this orator as the model κατ' ἔξοχόν, (cp. p. 54), he does not receive the same positive treatment here as in the *De Lys.* This will be put into perspective on p. 64, but at present it is important to note that Dionysius' high esteem of Lysias' application of the quality of charm cannot be vindicated on the basis of evidence from the *De Dem.* In fact, in the case of charm a conspicuous change has taken place: compare *De Lys.* 11,40:9-10 with *De Dem.* 13,288:25-26 on this matter: ἢ πάντα ὑπερέχει τοὺς λοιποὺς ῥήτορας (*De Lys.* 11,40:9-10). However, in the *De Dem.* Demosthenes is excluded: ἢ προὔχει πλὴν Δημοσθένους τῶν ἄλλων ῥητόρων. (*De Dem.* 13,288:25-26). (My spacing of print in both cases.)

21. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 55, referring to the second chapter of the *De Isocr.* If Dionysius does not link Isocrates with the types of ἁρμονία, that does not necessarily mean that he did not yet know this advanced concept of critical evaluation; it merely means that he chose to use the ἀρεταί system to compare the authors of the first volume with one another, but that it would be rather impossible to write an essay on Isocrates without considering the musical aspect of his writing; however, to bring those remarks in connection with the types of ἁρμονία would not make sense, since the latter system was not applied in volume one. One should keep the basic difference between the ἁρμονία, χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως and ἀρεταί τῆς λέξεως systems in mind. The ἁρμονία system focusses on the musical aspect of language, and all aspects of expression or style (not including subject-matter) are interpreted in terms of their musicality; in the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως system all prose literature is divided into different types of style (the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως) with no consideration of the musical aspect of style. Dionysius distinguishes two extreme types,

and all the aspects of style, choice of words (ἐκλογή τῶν ὀνομάτων), composition of sentences (σύνθεσις) and figures of speech (σχήματα) are considered to describe on the one hand a type of style that looks quite like vernacular speech (the plain (ἀπλοῦς) style), and on the other hand a type that is, generally speaking, characterised by its deviation from what is customary (the extraordinary (περιττός) style). The best type is the mixed (μικτός) type, the type in which the two extreme types are applied according to propriety (το πρέπον) and in accordance with the principle of moderation (το μέτριον). In the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system all literature is evaluated in terms of certain qualities of good style (ἀρεταί) of which some are prerequisite at all times (ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί) and some are facultative (ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί). For more detail on the distinction between these three systems, cp. ch. IV, pp. 139ff. below).

22. F. Nassal, *Aesthetisch-rhetorische Beziehungen zwischen Dionysius von Halicarnass und Cicero*, Diss. Tübingen: Tübingen, H. Laupp Jr., 1910, p. 137, n. 2. Obviously, to infer from this that Dionysius did not see the connection before writing the *De Dem.*, would be rash. In the essays of the first volume it would have served no purpose to link these devices with Gorgias, but this was indeed convenient in the *De Dem.*: in the *De Dem.* Dionysius firstly proves that the mixed type of style is the best - better than both the extraordinary and simple types of style. (cp. ch. 1, pp. 13ff.). Gorgias supplies numerous excellent examples of the extraordinary type of style, and the moment Dionysius decided to make use of the system of the types of style, his inclusion was nearly inevitable; furthermore, the devices he became associated with, the "Gorgianic figures," are so often the very reason why Dionysius prefers the mixed style to the extraordinary one, that it is only natural to link them with the man who introduced them into prose, even more so when this man, Gorgias, is presented as an exponent of one of the types of style discussed.
23. "Ancora in *De Dem. verb.* 17, 162, 16; 18, 165 *exord.* è detto che la cosa migliore di Isocrate è *Per la pace*, mentre ciò non è detto, ed è strano, nella monografia speciale su *Isocrate*, c. 7." (G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 265). This inference is not justified, for in ch. 17 of the *De Dem.* Dionysius is merely referring to the passage (taken from the *De Pace*) he is about to quote: καὶ τούτου λαμβανέσθω λέξις ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης λόγου χαριέστατα

δοκοῦσα ἔχειν, ἦν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως λόγῳ προφέρεται μέγα ἐπ' αὐτῇ φρονῶν, ... (My spacing of print) - "and let us take from his work a passage which is considered the most charming in his speech *On the Peace*, and which he himself included in his speech *On the Exchange*, because he esteemed it so highly, ..." (*De Dem.* 17,298:1-5). (Referring to the same passage as in the previous quotation, Dionysius comments: ἡ μὲν οὖν Ἰσοκράτους λέξις ἡ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων δοκοῦσα ἔχειν τοιαύτη τίς ἐστὶ ... ("Such is the passage of Isocrates which is reputed to be the most beautiful of all ...") (*De Dem.* 18,302:26-27)).

24. Ch. 41.
25. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 54. There is no need for any reference to Homer in the first volume simply because Dionysius did not have recourse to the ὁμονίαι system in that volume.
26. The reason for the inclusion of Gorgias has been mentioned in n. 22, p. 71 above; so far as the reference to the *De Is.* is concerned, G. Pavano (*art. cit.*, p. 56) is clearly making a mistake: when Dionysius says that he does not intend to deal with Gorgias (along with several others), he does not mean that he will totally ignore this author, but simply that he will not write a separate essay (γραφή, 19,224:22, and λόγον τινα ποιῆσθαι, 19,226:13) on him, so there is nothing wrong with his inclusion in the *De Dem.*
27. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 57. The sentence concerned is the following: ἐνθυμούμενος δέ, ὅτι τὴν μὲν ποιητικὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸ μέτερον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ πομπικὸν εἰρημένον οὐδεὶς Ἰσοκράτους ἀμείνων ἐγένετο, παρέλιπον ἐκῶν, οὓς ἦδειν ἦττον ἐν ταῖς ιδέαις ταύταις κατορθοῦντας, ... - "But since I considered that none was better than Isocrates at the artificial, elevated and 'ceremonial' style, I deliberately passed those over, whom I knew to be less successful than he was in these forms (of style), ..." (*De Is.* 19,224:23-27). This would indeed be a problem if Dionysius had had style in general in mind; however, he may very well be merely referring here to the specific style of epideictic oratory, in which case he may plausibly choose Isocrates as the best exponent of this kind of oratory, and then the linking of Isocrates with Gorgias is quite legitimate. Cp. n. 26 above.
28. *De Dem.* 3,246:20-25.
29. Dionysius is convinced that Lysias is the best exponent of practical forensic oratory - not Thrasymachus, as had been suggested by Theophrastus (*De Lys.* 6,30:12). That this was the basic principle according to

which the comparison between Lysias and Thrasymachus can be justified, can be seen in the following sentence: τῶν δὲ τοὺς ἀριβεῖς προαιρουμένων λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐναγώνιον ἀσκούντων ῥητορικὴν ... ("Of those who preferred factual discourses and practised lawcourt-oratory ...") (*De Is.* 20,228:4-6). As a matter of fact, Thrasymachus has left no forensic speeches, but has devoted himself to writing handbooks and *display*-speeches (*De Is.* 20,228:17ff.). So there is no real contradiction between *De Dem.* 3 on the one hand, and *De Lys.* 6 and *De Is.* 20 on the other hand, for the basis of classification differs.

30. A.G. Becker, *op. cit.*, introduction, p. xxviii.
31. F. Blass, *De D.H. Scriptis Rhetoricis*: Bonn, 1863, pp. 10ff. I regret that the works of F. Blass, C.T. Roessler (cp. next note), U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff (cp. note 33) and Croiset (cp. note 43) have been inaccessible; they are, however, known to me through the works of S.F. Bonner and R.H. Tukey.
32. C.T. Roessler, *Dionysii Halicarnassensis scriptorum rhetoricorum fragmenta*: Leipzig, 1873, pp. 1-13.
33. U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Lesefrüchte*, *Hermes*, 34 (1899), p. 626.
34. M. Egger, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
35. A.G. Becker, *loc. cit.*
36. "Dionysius, who treated the style of Lysias, Demosthenes, Isocrates, Hyperides and Thucydides." (Waltz *Rh. Gr.*; VII, 1048 - *vide* R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 392, n. 1.)
37. "Although he does not talk correctly (i.e. does not give the exact names of orators discussed in *De or. ant.*), this seems still to prove that the last volume (lit.: part) of the book about the ancient orators was also completed" (F. Blass, *op. cit.*, p. 11 - *vide* E. Kalinka, *loc. cit.*). The remark of Syrianus could be the oldest testimony of the fact that Dionysius had indeed completed the second volume of the *De or. ant.*, but one cannot draw this conclusion with certainty: Syrianus could simply have assumed that Dionysius had completed the work according to his promise in the general introduction, or by virtue of the introductory remark of the *De Din.* (cp. p. 54), although he himself did not have access to it. The remark of Syrianus is too isolated and too vague to be of any use so far as the problem of the second volume of the *De or. ant.* is concerned. (E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, p. 159, has the same view, and describes it as

"ganz unbestimmten und unverbindlichen Ausspruch"). But cp. n. 68 of this chapter, *infra*, p. 83.

38. C.T. Roessler, *op. cit.*, p. 8; *vide* E. Kalinka, *loc. cit.* It stands to reason that the correct interpretation of the opening words of the *De Din.* is of crucial importance for the clarification of this problem. Let us have a look at the words again: περι Δεινάρχου τοῦ ῥήτορος οὐδέν εἰρηκῶς ἐν τοῖς περι τῶν ἀρχαίων γραφεῖσιν διὰ τὸ μήτε εὐρετὴν ἰδίου γεγονέναι χαρακτῆρος τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥπερ τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τὸν Ἴσοκράτην καὶ τὸν Ἰσαῖον, μήτε τῶν εὐρημένων ἑτέροις τελειωτῆν, ὥπερ τὸν Δημοσθένη καὶ τὸν Αἰσχίνην καὶ <τὸν> Ὑπερείδην ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν ... ἠγησάμην δεῖν μὴ παραλιπεῖν αὐτόν ... (For a translation, cp. n. 5, p. 67 above). L. Radermacher, *art. cit.*, 965, reacted to this view, saying that this conclusion of C.T. Roessler is not justified; in this he was followed by I. Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 112; E. Kalinka, *loc. cit.*, and S.F. Bonner, with the following words: "Whether the essays on Hyperides and Aeschines were written it is hard to say for certain; the reference already quoted cannot be regarded as decisive proof," *op. cit.*, p. 30; he also criticizes the view of R. H. Tukey, who deduces from this passage that "in the second σύντοξις, Dionysius set out to show that Demosthenes perfected the style of Isaeus, Aeschines that of Isocrates, and Hyperides that of Lysias." (*Ibid.*) He is referring to the view of R.H. Tukey as explained on pp. 392-395 of the quoted article.) When R.H. Tukey uses this passage to reconstruct the lost essays on Hyperides and Aeschines (R.H. Tukey, *ibid.*), he is having recourse to far-fetched speculation, for this passage does not supply sufficient detail. However, on the other hand, I cannot see why one cannot deduce from this passage that Dionysius had indeed completed the second volume of the *De or. ant.* as well. If one does not understand it this way, how else is this passage to be understood? S.F. Bonner did not try to give an explanation, but before him E. Kalinka did. To him the key-words are γραφεῖσιν, which, because of the aorist form, refers to a part which had already been written down ("in dem schon niedergeschriebenen Teil ..." - E. Kalinka, *loc. cit.*), volume I of the *De or. ant.*, and κρίνομεν, which, being present tense, refers to the essays on Demosthenes, Aeschines and Hyperides, volume II of the *De or. ant.*, which has not yet been done ("Ja drängt κρίνομεν diese Deutung nicht geradezu auf?" - *ibid.*).

However, this scholar totally fails to understand the structure of the sentence involved: the meaning of the sentence comes to the fore only when one realizes that *ellipsis* is employed to a large extent: δ ι ά τ ό μήτε εὐρετὴν ἰδίου γ ε γ ο ν έ ν α ι χαρακτήρος τὸν ἄνδρα ὡπερ τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τὸν Ἴσοκράτην καὶ τὸν Ἴσαϊον (ἡ μ ε ῤ ς κ ρ ἰ ν ο μ ε ν εὐρετὰς γεγονέναι) μήτε τῶν εὐρημένων ἑτέροις τελειωτὴν (γ ε γ ο ν έ ν α ι) ὡπερ τὸν Δημοσθένη καὶ τὸν Αἰσχίνην καὶ Ὑπερείδην ἡ μ ε ῤ ς κ ρ ἰ ν ο μ ε ν (τελειωτὰς γεγονέναι) ... (The spacing of print is mine, and the words between brackets are the words which have to be added.) From this it appears that ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν goes with the phrase in which the orators of the first volume are mentioned as well, in which case the view of E. Kalinka is untenable. In any case, I can see no other way to explain the accusatives in the phrase under discussion.

39. M. Egger, *loc. cit.*

40. R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, pp. 391-395; cp. n. 38 above as well. This scholar adds two arguments to prove that at least the essay on Hyperides had indeed been written: "Furthermore, the detailed statements (quoted below my note) about the style of Hyperides which are found in the *De Dinarcho* indicate that Dionysius had worked out a systematic treatment of that author at least; and the manner in which they are introduced presupposes an acquaintance with such a treatment on the part of the reader." (*Ibid.*, pp. 391-392). The "detailed statements" about the style of Hyperides found in the *De Din.* are the following: τοῦ δ' Ὑπερείδου (sc. χαρακτήρος) ταῖς τε οἰκονομίαις ἀκριβεστέρου καὶ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς γενναιοτέρου πως ὄντος τῶν Λυσιαιῶν ... ('while (sc. the style) of Hyperides is more precise in the arrangement (sc. of subject-matter) and more noble in the embellishments than those of Lysias...') (*De Din.* 304,12.640). The second one is: ὁ δ' Ὑπερείδης κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡττᾶται Λυσίου, κατὰ δὲ τὸν πραγματικὸν τόπον διαφέρει ('Hyperides is inferior to Lysias so far as choice of words is concerned, but better so far as subject-matter is concerned.') (*De Din.* 305,11.641) (Cp. R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 392). These are indeed "detailed statements", and seeing that he does not proceed to prove them, one can infer that the reader must have been acquainted with them. One has little choice but to link these two remarks to the reference to the second volume of the *De or. ant.* at the beginning of the *De Din.*, in which case it is quite

justified to say that Dionysius is in fact referring to the work on Hyperides, promised earlier (and meanwhile completed).

41. A.G. Becker, *op. cit.*, p. xxviii. This scholar, however, does not seem to have considered the references in the *De Din.* at all. (Cp. discussion in notes 38 and 40, pp. 74ff above.)
42. U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *loc. cit.*
43. R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 403.
44. It is rather strange that Croiset should base his hypothesis on the sections on Plato and Thucydides, for in a work on orators these two writers do not nicely fit in. Although R.H. Tukey agreed on the idea of an original but lost treatise on Demosthenes, he could not accept this argument of Croiset (*ibid.*). Moreover, Croiset made no attempt to explain *why* Dionysius thought it necessary to replace the alleged original essay on Demosthenes by another one.
45. In other words, according to this hypothesis, the *De or. ant.* originally contained *two* essays on Demosthenes. There is no evidence in support of this view, which can be nothing more than a hypothesis. R.H. Tukey must receive credit for admitting this very fact - cp. p. 404 of the quoted article.
46. R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 404.
47. Obviously this could not have been the reason why the second volume disappeared from circulation, for the *De Thucydidē*, which has indeed been handed down to posterity, is constructed in the same fashion and according to the same principles as the works of the first volume of the *De or. ant.* In any case, it is not worth while speculating on matters about which no relatively solid statement can be made.
48. R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 397. He is adducing as proof *De Dem.* 23,324:23-27: ἐπεὶ τινες ἀξιούσι πάντων αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνειν φιλοσόφων τε καὶ ῥητόρων ἐρμηνεύσαι τὰ πράγματα δαιμονιώτατον παρακελεύονται τε ἡμῖν ὄρω καὶ κανόνι χρῆσθαι καθαρῶν ἅμα καὶ ἰσχυρῶν λόγων τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδρὶ ("because some claim that he is the supreme literary genius among philosophers and orators, and urge us to regard him as the norm and model for both pure and forceful writing.") In fact, Dionysius says, some even maintain that, if the gods speak the same language as man, the king of the gods uses the language of Plato! (ἤδη δέ τινων ἤκουσα ἐγὼ λεγόντων, ὡς, εἰ καὶ παρὰ θεοῦς διάλεκτός ἐστιν, ἢ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κέχρηται γένος, οὐκ ἄλλως ὁ βασιλεὺς ὡν αὐτῶν διαλέγεται θεός ἢ ὡς Πλάτων.) (23,324:27-23,326:1). Obviously Dionysius was

influenced here by the same ideas as those expressed in Cicero's *Brutus*, 120-121: *Quis enim uberior in dicendo Platone? Iovem sic aiunt philosophi, si Graece loquatur, loqui.* ("For who is richer in expression than Plato? Jupiter would speak this language, the philosophers say, if he were to speak Greek.")

49. R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 396. That these outrageous claims of the Plato-idolisers were indeed the reason for including Plato in the treatise, can be inferred from 32,366:12-14: *ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρελθεῖν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐνῆν Πλάτωνα, ᾧ τὰ πρῶτεῖά τινες ἀπονέμουσι ...* ("Since it was not possible for me to pass Plato by, to whom some people award the supreme position ..."). Whether Dionysius at some time decided to widen his scope in the *De Dem.* or not, he had no choice but to compare Demosthenes with Plato as well if he wanted to prove the pre-eminence of Demosthenes above all orators or all prose writers in general, for the very reason that some regarded him as the best. This high, extreme evaluation of Plato was by no means novel in Dionysius' time - in fact, it can at least be traced back to Posidonius (*ca.* 135-51 B.C.) and even Panaetius (*ca.* 180- *ca.* 110 B.C.) (W. Kroll, *art. cit.*, 1084-1085) and was still going strong at the time of Cicero, (106-43 B.C.), as can be inferred from my quotation from the *Brutus* (n. 48 above). R.H. Tukey was quite aware of this strong tradition: "Now he is aroused by the renewal of the *old claim* of the philosophers that Plato had surpassed all others in writing and speaking ..." (R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 397) (The italics are mine.) However, if one reads the quoted sentence carefully, the first part, i.e. "Now he is aroused by the renewal of the old claim ...," suggests that a "renewal of the old claim of the philosophers" occurred *after* Dionysius had completed the first essay on Demosthenes, that this upset him ("he is aroused ..."), and finally led him to write a new essay on Demosthenes in order "to refute the claims of the advocates of Plato ..." It could be possible that an interest in philosophy faded *among the general public* in Rome during the time of Dionysius, and that this was followed by a revival of interest. However, *among the philosophers* the opposite is more likely, viz. that this tradition prevailed at least from *ca.* 150 B.C. and during the time of Dionysius as well, for which reason Dionysius had no choice but to include Plato in his treatise on Demosthenes in any case.
50. R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 402.

51. *Ibid.* While I regard the hypothesis of a second *De Dem.* as unacceptable, these two external references indeed prove that a work on Demosthenes formed part of the *De or. ant.* I hope to have proven that this could not have been a later, independent essay on Demosthenes (cp. nn. 44-49, pp. 76ff. above); there was only the one essay on Demosthenes - the one promised in the introduction to the *De or. ant.*, the one preserved to us today. Thus one is left with the task of explaining the differences between the *De Dem.* and the works of the first volume of the *De or. ant.*
52. I. Stroux, *loc. cit.*
53. E. Kalinka, *Die Arbeitsweise des Rhetors Dionys*, I, WS, 43 (1924), pp. 157-168, and II, WS, 44 (1925), pp. 48-68.
54. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, I, p. 168. He uses the Greek abbreviation instead of "*De or. ant.*"
55. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, p. 163. (He uses Δημ λ to designate the *De Dem.*) In the *De Dem.* Isaeus has been presented as an author with no claim to originality (cp. notes 18 and 19 above, p. 69), but scholars have overlooked the fact that Dionysius admits this in the *De Is.* itself. He is aware of the fact that people might ask why he, no original artist, but an *imitator* of Lysias, has been included in the first volume: τὸν ... Ἰσαῖον εἶ τις ἔροιτό με τίνος ἕνεκα προσεθέμην, Λυσίου δὲ ζηλωτὴν ὄντα ... (*De Is.* 20,230:7-8). The reason, he says, is that "in him we find the seeds and the beginnings of the genius of Demosthenes, which everyone agrees is the most excellent of all: τῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος, ἣν οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν ὅς οὐ τελειοτάτην ἀπασῶν οἶεται γενέσθαι, τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ παρῴχεῖν (*De Is.*, 20,230:10-12). As a matter of fact, his being the teacher of Demosthenes is the main reason for his fame: Ἰσαῖος δὲ ὁ Δημοσθένους καθηγησάμενος καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα γενόμενος περιφανής...(*De Is.* 1,174:1-2). Yet, some scholars were convinced that the presentation of Isaeus in the *De Is.* is far more positive than in the *De Dem.* (E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, I, pp. 163-164). As explanation of the difference, they argue that Dionysius had rated Isaeus too high at first, and was forced to correct himself. E. Kalinka, on the other hand, finds it impossible to believe that the high rating of Isaeus in the *De Is.* could have been *followed* by the remark in ch. 8 of the *De Dem.*, that he οὐδὲν οὔτε καινὸν οὔτε περιττὸν ἐπέτρεψεωεν. He conjectures that Dionysius' idea of Isaeus

must have been not so good at first, and that he gradually came to a higher estimation of this orator: "*dasz Dionys ihn anfangs gering-schätzte ... und dasz er sich erst allmählich zur Einsicht in die Bedeutung des Isaios durchgerungen hat.*" (Art. cit., p. 163). Without providing any positive proof for this view, he comes to the following conclusion: "*Der Schluss ist unausweichlich, dasz Δημ λ 8 vor dem Abschnitt über Isaios in ἀρχ ὁ geschrieben worden ist.*" (Ibid., p. 164). However, these scholars miss the point: Dionysius' evaluation of Isaeus in ch. 8 of the *De Dem.* - that he did not cultivate anything new so far as style is concerned - does not differ from his evaluation of this orator in the *De Is.*, where he says that he was an imitator of Lysias; and seeing that Dionysius operates with the *χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως* system in the *De Dem.* in such a way that the imitators have to make way for the inventors and the supreme exponents, he could not treat him there on the same level as Lysias. Moreover, the three citations quoted above (from *De Is.* 1 and 20) clearly prove that Isaeus did not deserve his place in the first volume on the same basis as Lysias and Isocrates; no - his connection with Demosthenes was the reason why Dionysius had decided to include him. Dionysius' admiration for the genius of Demosthenes was so domineering, that he included his idol's teacher in volume one; thus he could direct the attention towards Demosthenes already in the *De Is.*

56. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, p. 163. Determining the chronological order of the works of Dionysius is a difficult task. In some cases no definite answer can be given. One of the reasons is the peculiar way in which Dionysius went about writing his essays: to be in the process of writing more than one essay simultaneously: in the *De Thuc.* we read that he set aside the essay, which he has been busy writing, in order to write the essay on Thucydides on the request of Tubero: *ἀναβαλόμενος τὴν περὶ Δημοσθένους πραγματείαν, ἣν εἶχον ἐν χερσίν, ὑπεσχόμεν τε ποιήσειν, ὡς προηροῦ* (*De Thuc.* 1,264:6-9) (Cp. S. Usher, *op. cit.*, Introduction, p. xxiv: "Dionysius's working methods ... that he may have been working on two or more treatises at the same time;" cp. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.* II, p. 68, as well). With this fact in mind, one can imagine how difficult it must have been for scholars to determine in what order the works of Dionysius should be arranged. Furthermore, the relativity of the order of works in

the manuscripts has been realized by all the scholars who made a contribution to the research on the order of the works of Dionysius, for no one ever referred to the manuscripts so far as this matter is concerned. In view of these arguments I would suggest that one should ignore the manuscripts in this matter.

57. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, I, p. 160. "Es fehlt demnach jeder feste Anhaltspunkt für die Annahme, dass der zweite Teil des Werkes περι τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων vollendet worden und in Verlust geraten sei." (*Ibid.*, p. 159) Cp. n. 45, p. 76 above.
58. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, II, p. 48. He argues that Dionysius had begun with the *De Dem.* long before the first volume of the *De or. ant.* had been completed, but that this work on Demosthenes had nothing to do with the promise of a work on Demosthenes as part of the *De or. ant.*; this was his "Hauptwerk" (i.e. the *De Dem.*), which kept him busy for many years, and which he set aside on several occasions to write other works: "Dieses Hauptwerk Δημ λ, das ihn gewiss jahrelang in Atem hielt, hat er mehrmals unterbrochen ..." (*Art. cit.*, II, p. 68). All these other works, which he completed while composing this work on Demosthenes, must have contributed to his deviating from his original plan set out in the general introduction to the *De or. ant.*: "Sicherlich war geraume Zeit zwischen den zwei grundverschiedenen Arbeitsplänen, zwischen der Vollendung von ἀρχ ῥ und von Δημ λ verstrichen, und es ist wahrscheinlich, dass die Zwischenzeit durch andre Arbeiten ausgefüllt war, die ihn immer mehr von der geraden Linie seines ersten Programms abdrängten" (*Ibid.*, p. 49). Finally Dionysius added the promise of a work on the subject-matter of Demosthenes to bring this work in line with the essays of the first volume, and thus presented this independent work on Demosthenes as a substitute for the promised work on Demosthenes (made in the general introduction). This scholar cannot accept the hypothesis of R.H. Tukey about an alleged original essay on Demosthenes, but makes himself guilty of the same type of speculation in trying to explain the relation between the *De Dem.*, the essays of the first volume, and the general introduction to the *De or. ant.* I have already shown (cp. pp. 64-66 and 70ff.) that most of the differences between the *De Dem.* and the essays of the first volume can be easily explained; I am going to argue that Dionysius did not have much of a choice about how to present his idol, that the inclusion of Plato and Thucydides can be related to the object

- of the *De Dem.*, and to the extreme claims of the Plato-admirers -  
cp. n. 70, pp. 83f. and n. 85, p. pp. 90f.
59. Cp. n. 39, p. 75.
60. I have not come across any research done on this problem during the time since E. Kalinka's article became known in 1925 and until the work of S.F. Bonner on Dionysius was published in 1939.
61. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 242. Cp. n. 51, p. 78 above.
62. G. Pavano, *ibid.*, p. 243. ("I have already discussed at some length the characteristic features (sc. of his style) before ...") (4,252:8-9).
63. "*In the writing before this one* I have explained what his choice was and his success (in it)..." (2,244:17-18) (The italics are mine.) G. Pavano, *ibid.*, p. 254. The meaning of γραφή is crucial: it could be a reference to the *De Lys.* This is not possible, for although the reference is to what has been discussed in the *De Lys.*, this essay had not been written immediately "before the *De Dem.*" R.H. Tukey suggested that "the word γραφή is to be taken as referring to the collection of six essays ..." (*Art. cit.*, p. 403, n. 3). He has no choice but to hold this view, in order to justify his hypothesis that the second volume had indeed been completed, but that it was replaced by an independent essay on Demosthenes (the *De Dem.*) which was written after the second volume had been completed. I regard this interpretation as unjustified for the following reason: in the phrase under discussion Dionysius made use of ellipse; he should have written ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης τῆς γραφῆς δεδιλωται γραφή, in which case he would have violated the virtue of conciseness, ἡ συντομία, for obviously τῆς γραφῆς is not necessary and can be supplied by the context. This will be admitted by anyone, but I am afraid that scholars have failed to realize that this ellipse is only acceptable when the word left out has the same meaning - exactly the same meaning - as the appropriate word in context. This is indeed true in writing like this, viz. in a treatise, where the writer deliberately avoids ambiguities. (The ancient writers did apply the technique of ambiguity in other types of literature, but then it could be justified by the subject-matter and the type of literature.) This means that the meaning of the omitted γραφῆς will determine the meaning of γραφή and *vice versa*; I shall try to determine the meaning of γραφή by first determining the meaning of the suppressed word, γραφῆς.

Scholars have never differed on the question of the meaning of the omitted word; the issue has always been the meaning of γραφή.

Firstly, one could say that Dionysius is referring to the *De Dem.* with the suppressed γραφή; however, this means that γραφή must refer to a work which would be equivalent to the *De Dem.*, which could be nothing else but the *De Lys.* - a suggestion which I have already proven not viable. The only alternative is to regard γραφή as referring to the whole of the second volume of the *De or. ant.* which was in the process of being written. In that case γραφή must refer to the first volume of the *De or. ant.* - which would make the ellipse quite acceptable. (Although G. Pavano does not prove this by reasoning, he comes to the same conclusion: "*Le parole ἐν τῇ προ τούτης ... γραφή provano appunto che il vol. in cui si trova il De Lys i a precedeva quello in cui si trova il De Dem. verb.*" - *art. cit.*, p. 36.) This is a natural solution to the problem, is based on grammatical and stylistic practices, and refutes the hypothesis of R.H. Tukey, which is speculative in nature. It should be noted that the technical term for a corpus like volume I or II of the *De or. ant.* is not γραφή, but σύνταξις or σύνταγμα (T. Birt, *Die Buchrolle in der Kunst*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1976, pp. 264f.). This problem can be met, for γραφή has a wide range of meanings. According to LSJ it can be used for *writing in general* (i.e. *that which is written*), hence for *various written documents*, e.g. letter, document, writing, book, written law, copy (LSJ., s.v., II, 2). Consequently, according to this information, γραφή can indeed refer to volume I or II of the *De or. ant.* However, although this proves R.H. Tukey wrong, it cannot be presented as proof of the inclusion of the *De Dem.* into the *De or. ant.* In fact, this goes for all the references to the works of the first volume. On the other hand, if this one fact that has been established, viz. that the second volume (of which the *De Dem.* is the first book) was preceded by the first volume and not by some other work, is considered along with the promise at the close of volume I (ἑτέραν δὲ ἀρχὴν ποιήσομαι τοῦ λόγου περὶ τε Δημοσθένους καὶ Ὑπερείδου καὶ τρίτου λέγων Αἰσχίνου. - *De Is.* 20,230:18-20), then it seems justified to conclude that the *De Dem.* is the one promised in the general introduction.

64. "As I also said before, a certain natural euphony and charm flows through the speeches of Lysias ..." (13,288:23-25) Cp. critical remarks in the previous note.

65. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, I, pp. 164-167.
66. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 243. He is referring to cc. 49 and 58 of the *De Dem.*
67. "In fine sembra ben farne garanzia anche il nome del destinatario (*Ammeo*) ripetuto in *De Dem. verb. ...* (G. Pavano, *ibid.*) (My spacing of print). To this one may object that the letters addressed to Ammaeus have not been included in the *De or. ant.*, although the addressee is the same. This argument can, therefore, only support the others, but has no force in itself. (Yet it is important to take for if the *De Dem.* had not been addressed to Ammaeus, one would really have been up against a great problem.
68. "Speaking about Gorgias, Dionysius the elder says the following about types of style in the second (part of his work): thus forensic ..." (G. Pavano, *ibid.*) . The way in which this reference to the *De Dem.* is presented, reveals an acquaintance with the *De Dem.* in the time of Syrianus, and shows that the *De Dem.* was indeed regarded as part of the *De or. ant.* Although Syrianus is quoting from manuscripts which had been preserved, one must not forget that this tradition is very old. Cp. n. 37 of this chapter as well, *supra*, pp. 73f.
69. Cp. n. 95 of chapter 1, p. 47, for a discussion of this sentence. Cp. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 244.
70. G. Pavano, *ibid.* The aspect of subject-matter was treated extensively in the case of Lysias (*De Lys.*, ch. 15ff.), Isocrates (*De Isocr.*, ch. 12ff.) and Isaeus (*De Is.*, ch. 14ff.). At the end of volume I Dionysius explicitly states his intention of discussing the next three orators, Demosthenes, Hyperides and Aeschines in treatises to follow - cp. n. 63, pp. 81f. above. Seeing that he did write an essay on Demosthenes, the one mentioned first, according to this promise (exactly as he published the essay on Isocrates according to his promise at the end of the *De Lys.* - ἔπεται δὲ τῷ ῥήτορι τούτῳ κατὰ τὴν τάξιν τῶν χρόνων Ἰσοκράτης· περὶ δὲ τούτου λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσιν, *De Lys.* 34,98:17-19), one could have expected a promise of an essay on the next orator in line, viz. Hyperides, at the end of the *De Dem.* By not giving this promise, but by saying that his next essay will deal with the subject-matter of Demosthenes, Dionysius is in fact revealing that he cannot proceed with his planning before this matter has been dealt with. This is not strange, for the reader can only arrive at a comprehensive evaluation of the

style of Demosthenes after having seen how the orator treated subject-matter as well. These considerations indicate that he deliberately intended to bring his treatment of Demosthenes in line with the discussion of the authors in volume I. Thus, if Dionysius had not made any reference to the aspect of subject-matter, one would have had a grave deviation from the treatment of the authors in volume I. (As a matter of fact, it appears that Dionysius, faithful to traditional rhetorical theory (cp. Cicero, *Orator*, 43ff.), generally regarded the discussion of the treatment of subject-matter as indispensable for the discussion of the style of an author: in the *De Thuc.* he devoted cc. 6 to 20 to this aspect of the style of Thucydides.) In view of these remarks I think it is quite justified to come to yet another conclusion: the *De Dem.* was the first essay of the second volume of the *De or. ant.* Finally, the reason why he left out the discussion of this important aspect, is not hard to guess: in the case of Demosthenes this aspect is so important, that it will have to be treated in a separate essay, in order to do justice to the subject. Moreover, if he had treated it in the *De Dem.*, he very well could have ended up with a comparison between Demosthenes and Lysias, Thucydides, Plato and Isocrates, as a matter of fact, Isaeus would have been brought into the picture as well, being regarded as better than Lysias in this field (cp. n. 111 of ch. 1, pp. 48f.). This would have made the treatise extremely long, which he never would have permitted, for he regarded the *De Dem.* without a section on the subject-matter as long enough, and was in any case constantly aware of the matter of length - cp. n. 17 of this chapter, pp. 68f.

71. "That the *De Dem. verb.* could be the beginning of the second volume is clear from the fact that it ends (see ch. 58 end) with the promise of another essay *on the subject-matter in Demosthenes...*" (G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 244.) Cp. discussion in my preceding note.
72. *Ibid.* It would be hard to explain why Dionysius always mentions the *De Dem.* first when he refers to the essays of the second volume, if he had not actually written it first. I cannot see how the validity of this argument can be questioned.
73. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 245. Cp. the introduction to this dissertation, p. 2. Although one should not rely on a minor argument like this, it is still worth noting, for if the addressees were not the same as in the case of the first volume, we would have been faced by an additional problem.

74. G. Pavano discusses this matter in the quoted article, pp. 319-321. Since the reputation of his idol, Demosthenes, was at stake, and since many works of inferior style had been erroneously ascribed to Demosthenes (*De Dem.* 44,412:14-23; 57,452:4-14), Dionysius had to have a fair amount of certainty concerning the authenticity of Demosthenes' works; as a matter of fact, in ch. 57 of the *De Dem.* he is referring to another treatise of his on this matter: ἐν ἐπέρῳ ἐηλοῦται μοι πραγματεία τὰ περὶ Δημοσθένη. (*De Dem.* 57,452:11-12). The time of writing of this treatise is immaterial; the important point is that Dionysius did have fixed ideas on the authenticity of Demosthenes' speeches. However, the fact the *De Dem.* was indeed accompanied by a work on the authenticity of the orator's works, cannot be regarded as an attempt by Dionysius to attain a similarity of treatment with the essays of the first volume of the *De or. ant.*; ascertainment of the authenticity beforehand was no distinctive characteristic of the essays of the *De or. ant.*, but was a prerequisite to *all* the literary treatises written by Dionysius.
75. "Più accettabile resta dunque l'ipotesi che anche questo saggio cominciasse con un βίος." (G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 245). This was also the view of F. Blass (*De D.H. scriptis rhetoricis*, Bonn, 1863, p. 12).
76. There is no external or internal evidence on the problem of a βίος in the introduction to the *De Dem.* In the history of research on the *De Dem.* two explanations for the absence of a βίος in the *De Dem.* have been proposed. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff suggested that the reason for this absence is the close link between the ideas at the end of volume I and those which we come across at the beginning of the *De Dem.*; a βίος would cause a break: "Es ist ganz klar, dass D. in einem Zuge weiter geschrieben hat; denn die Gedanken, die im Anfang des Erhaltenen von II verfolgt werden, knüpfen unmittelbar an den Schlussteil von I an" (*Art. cit.*, p. 627). This is not convincing; in a corpus like the *De or. ant.* one can expect that the writer should try to link the separate essays together in order to effectuate a high degree of unity. In any case, the βίοι in the essays of the first volume are very short: they comprise only one chapter in every case. (The one on Isocrates is rather long, but the one on Isaeus very short; the one on Lysias is of moderate length.) From this

fact I would conclude that these introductions were not meant to be lengthy, in order that the object of every essay - which is neither biography nor literary history - should not elude the reader. Moreover, although these βίῳι are short, the information provided is quite relevant to the rest of the essay and can be regarded as essential background for an understanding of the discussion of the authors. If the *De Dem.* did have a βίῳς, it would have been of the same nature as those in the other essays: concise and to the point, providing information that is quite relevant to the object of the *De Dem.*

Another attempt to explain the absence of a βίῳς has been made:

E. Kalinka has referred to the biographic information on Demosthenes given in the fourth chapter of Dionysius' *First letter to Ammaeus*. He notices the fact that Dionysius says he has taken his information from some historians. From this Kalinka infers that the *De Dem.*, which, according to him, had been written before the *Ad Amm. I* - or at least its first few chapters - could not have contained a βίῳς, for otherwise, he would have made use of the biographic information of the *De Dem.* and not of these sources. "Somit kann in dem verloren Anfang von Δημ λ, der damals schon geschrieben war, kein βίῳς enthalten gewesen sein, was einen weitem Unterschied der Anlage zwischen Δημ λ und ἀρχ ὁ bedingt" (E: Kalinka, *art. cit.* II, p. 59). The assertion that, when writing the *Ad Amm. I*, he would have made use of the biographic information of the *De Dem.*, if it did contain a βίῳς and not of the historians to whom he refers in this letter, cannot be proven. On the other hand, it is quite sensible, as well as scientifically justified, for Dionysius to name his sources in matters concerning which he had to rely on information supplied by other people, whether he had included a βίῳς in the *De Dem.*, or not.

To my mind two matters are decisive in determining whether the *De Dem.* had a βίῳς or not:

- Firstly, the fact that all three essays of volume I of the *De or. ant.* did have βίῳι. For this reason I think it could be assumed with a reasonable amount of certainty that the *De Dem.* most probably did have a βίῳς as well. However, it could be objected that no βίῳς is found in the unmutilated *De Thuc.*, which was of the same nature as the essays of volume I of the *De or. ant.*
- Secondly, the biographic information on Demosthenes supplied in *Ad Amm. I*. This information comprises forty-seven lines and can

be a perfect match for the βίος in the essays of volume I of the *De or. ant.*: the βίος on Lysias comprises twenty-six lines, the one on Isocrates fifty-six, and the one on Isaeus seventeen.

Due to the lack of definite indications I do not think that the chronological relation between the *Ad Amm.* I and the *De Dem.* can be determined with certainty. However, even if it was possible, it would not have been of much help so far as the problem of a βίος of the *De Dem.* is concerned. If the *Ad Amm.* I was written *after* the *De Dem.*, it would be less likely that Dionysius would find it necessary to repeat the biographic information in the *Ad Amm.* I. But then, repetition of this kind is not altogether improbable, for Dionysius did repeat the ideas of the C.V. on a great scale in *De Dem.* II. On the other hand, if the *Ad Amm.* I had been written *before* the *De Dem.*, Dionysius could have regarded a βίος in the *De Dem.* unnecessary, or he could have included a short βίος in the *De Dem.* in order to conform to his practice in volume I of the *De or. ant.*

Whatever choice one makes concerning the presence of a βίος in the *De Dem.*, one is forced to have recourse to speculation.

For this reason I prefer to leave this matter and turn to the question whether Dionysius could have supplied information other than biographic in the lost introduction of this essay. I intend to prove that this was indeed the case.

In the *De Lys.* and the *De Is.* Dionysius included a short summary of the topics he intended to treat in these essays: *De Lys.* 1,22:7-11, and *De Is.* 2,174:18-19. In both cases the execution of the plan stated in the introduction can be clearly pointed out. In the *De Isoc.* he does not announce the topics explicitly in the introduction, but the method and the structure of this essay are identical with those of the other two. In my first chapter (cp. pp. 10 ff.) I have pointed out that the *De Dem.* has a fine structure which is the result of well considered planning. With the exception of the last section - in which Dionysius discusses various points of criticism against Demosthenes - all the topics are properly introduced, and the discussion of every topic forms a well-structured unity. It therefore may be argued that Dionysius had included a basic outline of the whole essay in its lost introduction as well, possibly leaving out any reference to a separate section in which he would discuss the points of criticism raised against his idol (for rhetorical reasons, cp.

pp. 23-25 above). As a matter of fact, on a few occasions Dionysius is actually referring to this basic outline which in my view he included in his introduction. In ch. 16 he introduces a new topic: Demosthenes is better than the best exponents of the best (middle) type of style. He says that he *did promise to discuss* this thesis, and that he will proceed to the fulfilment of this promise: ταῦτα Δημοσθένην ἐξειργασμένον ἐπιδείξειν ὑποσχόμενος, ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἤδη πορεύσομαι ... (16,296:23-24) (My spacing of print).

Nowhere in the preceding chapters can this promise be traced, so he must have made it in the introduction; the occasional lack of precision in his wording is no valid objection, because of his notable love of a literary style. At the end of ch. 32 we again come across a direct reference to the (lost) introduction, where Dionysius says that he is going to recapitulate his argument and show that he has done all that *he promised to do at the start* of his examination of Demosthenes' style, i.e. at the start of the treatise: βούλομαι δὲ δὴ καὶ συλλογίσασθαι τὰ εἰρημένα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ δεῖξαι πάνθ', ὅσα ὑποσχόμενον ἀρχόμενος τῆς θεωρίας τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου, πεποιηκότα ἑμαυτόν (My spacing of print). Finally, it may be said with certainty that the discussion of the three types of style (cc. 1ff.) was also announced in this introduction, as can clearly be inferred from his remark in ch. 34: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ τῶν τριῶν πλασμάτων παρακολούθειν ἔφη καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἡξίουν τὴν Δημοσθένους δύναμιν <εὔρειν> ... ("Well, *I did say* that I *would pursue* each of the three types of style individually and I *thought* that I <would find> in them the rhetorical power of Demosthenes ...") (34,370:26-29). (The italics and spacing of print in all these cases are mine.)

In short: Dionysius could have included a short biographic section on Demosthenes, and he definitely did provide a basic outline of what the reader could expect in the *De Dem.*

77. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 246. In pp. 14-17 of my first chapter I have argued that cc. 1-3 serve as the theoretical basis of the critical evaluation in *De Dem.* I and IV - not of *De Dem.* II, where another evaluation system has been applied. Moreover, there is no justification in suggesting that the first eight chapters form the introduction; there is no break after ch.8 - as a matter of fact, cc. 4-10 form a unity, in which Dionysius tries to prove that the middle type of style is the best.
78. G. Pavano, *ibid.*
79. Cp. my discussion of this matter in n. 70 of this chapter, pp. 83f.

80. G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 258. ("data anche la necessità delle due esposizioni teorico-illustrative delle nuove dottrine") With this remark this scholar does not say that Dionysius was not acquainted with these two doctrines before writing the *De Dem.* This is not the case, and many examples can be adduced to prove the point - cp. discussion in ch. 3 of this dissertation, n. 22, pp. 114ff. below. the point is that he chose to use these two systems as the basis of his discussion in the *De Dem.* - cp. my discussion on pp. 64ff. (Note that he did not abandon the ἀρεταί system altogether; as a matter of fact, it plays an important rôle in *De Dem.* I - cp. my discussion in ch. 4, pp. 142ff.
81. G. Pavano, *ibid.* I have already discussed the matter of the tone of the *De Dem.* in ch. 1, and tried to show that *De Dem.* I and IV are more polemic than didactic (pp. 8-10), while *De Dem.* II and III are didactic. Obviously the polemic sections have an indirect didactic value as well. As a matter of fact, the essays of the first volume of the *De or. ant.* are not just presented as straightforward exposition; the technique of comparison was also applied in the essays of volume I, which renders the tone more polemic than when no comparison occurs. Granted, this is not the case where this technique has been applied merely to *distinguish* the personal style of one author from another one, e.g. that of Lysias from that of Isaeus, as at *De Is.* 3,176:22ff.; *De Is.* 4,178:22-23; *De Is.* 5,182:1; *De Is.* 7,186:7; and *De Is.* 12,200:1-2. But on the other hand, many examples can be supplied where Dionysius has compared authors in order to prove *superiority* of an author to another one in respect of different qualities or aspects of style in general: in *De Isocr.* 2,106:15 - 3,112 Dionysius maintains that Isocrates is inferior to Lysias so far as purity, conciseness and charm are concerned, but superior to him so far as - broadly speaking - the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί are concerned in *De Isocr.* 3,112:2ff. He also compares these two authors in the field of subject-matter (*De Isocr.* 4,112:22ff.), saying that Isocrates was more successful than Lysias in the handling and arrangement of subject-matter (*De Isocr.* 4,114:2ff.). Thus one can say that the inclusion of Plato did indeed render the tone more polemic, but that it would have been polemic in any case; that the essays of the first volume were polemic as well - at least to a certain extent; that his readers still would have been able to benefit from a treatise of which about half has been written in a polemic tone.

82. "Queste scissure e questi mutamenti nel giudizio critico sugli autori ... produssero le due nuove teorie-casellario, degli stili e delle ἀρμονίαι ..." (G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 265.) The deviations he is referring to, are those related to Homer, Isocrates, Thrasymachus and Gorgias. I have discussed these matters in notes 18-26 of this chapter, pp. 69-72 above, having to prove him wrong in some cases, and supporting him in other cases. In general my view can be stated as follows: Dionysius was well acquainted with three different systems of evaluation: the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως, the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως and the ἀρμονίαι system. In the essays of the first volume of the *De or. ant.* he used only the first system as the basis of his discussion, although one can clearly sense his acquaintance with the other two; in the *De Dem.* he made use of all three, relying heavily on the second and third. These three systems represent three *different* ways of treating the *same* literary material, and it goes without saying that this could cause much confusion in view of the fact that all three systems are applied in the same essay. On pp. 65f. of the present chapter I shall elaborate on the possible reasons why Dionysius introduced the other two systems, deviating from the basis of evaluation used in volume I. (Cp. n. 21, pp. 70f. as well).
83. Cp. pp. 23-25 above.
84. ἀλλ' ἀντιπαραθεῖς ... (*De Dem.* 33,366:26-27).
85. ἔν' οὗν τὴν φυσικὴν ὁδὸν ὁ λόγος μοι λάβη ... (33,368:2-3). The moment he had decided to have recourse to this system, Dionysius was compelled to pay some attention to Thucydides as well - although this author was a historian and not an orator. Although he was the supreme exponent of the extraordinary type of prose style, his rôle was limited to the minimum: in the *De Dem.* Dionysius supplies only one example from Thucydides, viz. in ch. 1, to illustrate the distinctive features of the extraordinary type of style. In contrast with his comparisons between Demosthenes and Lysias, Isocrates and Plato, he supplies no examples from Thucydides (cc. 9f.) and does not even refer there to the example quoted in ch. 1. Furthermore, between 55 and 44 B.C. Thucydides was a model among some of the pursuers of the Atticistic style, as can be seen in the following words:  
'Atticorum similes esse volumus' ... 'Thucydidem ... imitamur'  
('Our aim is to be Attic' ... 'We try to imitate Thucydides.')
- (Cic., *Brut.* 287,248:24-28) (Translation of G.L. Hendrickson, *Cicero*, vol. V, London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1971, p. 249, in the Loeb series).

So if Dionysius wanted to show that Demosthenes would be the best model for the pursuers of the Atticistic style, he had no choice but to evaluate Thucydides as well, even though he was a historian and not an orator.

86. For the essential difference between the three types of evaluation applied in the *De Dem.*, cp. ch. 4, pp. 139ff. below.
87. Cp. n. 49, pp. 77 below.
88. Recapitulating cc. 1-32 Dionysius explicitly refers to his concern to compare passages which are of the same kind (ὁμοειδεῖς, of the same form 33,368:19) and on the same subjects (τὰς αὐτὰς ὑποθέσεις, 116,296:27-28). These remarks can be verified by what he has indeed done:
  - Firstly, the passages he quoted from Lysias and Demosthenes to compare these two orators, are both taken from narrations of each orator and are similar in subject-matter (τὴν πραγματικὴν ὁμοιότητα, 12,280:18-19).
  - Secondly, the passages in which he compares Isocrates with Demosthenes deal likewise with the same subject-matter: a comparison of the achievements of ancient times with those of modern times (cp. 17,298:5-12 and 21,314:14-21).
  - Thirdly, even in his comparison of Plato with Demosthenes, he seems to be aware of the need of similarity between the passages to be compared. Knowing that Demosthenes has produced nothing like the *Menexenus* from which his example from Plato's *oeuvre* has been taken, he quotes *De Corona* 199-209, which he calls an encomium, ἐγκώμιον (31,358:7), trying to justify the comparison in this way. Thus one could indeed say that Dionysius was constantly aware of the need of similarity of passages to be compared. However, to compare a passage from the *Menexenus* to one from the *De Corona* is not at all justified: The *Menexenus* was not forensic like the *De Corona*; as a matter of fact, scholars are convinced that it was most probably merely a parody (S.F. Bonner, *op. cit.*, p. 67) (cp. L. Méridier, *Menexenus*, Paris, 1931).
89. Cp. ch. 4.
90. Cp. p. 55 above.
91. Cp. pp. 23-25 above.
92. Cp. p. 24 and n. 121, pp. 52f. above.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE CHRONOLOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN THE *DE DEMOSTHENE* AND THE *DE COMPOSITIONE VERBORUM* OF DIONYSIUS

In my first two chapters I have repeatedly paid attention to the differences in content and tone between *De Dem.* I (cc. 1-34) and *De Dem.* II (cc. 35-52), and discussed the ways scholars have tried to explain them. In chapter 1<sup>1</sup> I came to the conclusion that the way in which the subject-matter of *De Dem.* II has been presented, was deliberately chosen by Dionysius to serve his purpose best.

The peculiar nature of the *De Dem.*, so far as both content and tone are concerned, has also played a crucial rôle in yet another, and probably the most controversial, dispute about this essay of Dionysius: the one about the chronological relation between the *De Dem.* and another essay of Dionysius, viz. the *De compositione verborum*.<sup>2</sup>

The similarity in subject-matter of *De Dem.* II and the *C.V.* immediately strikes the reader: in *De Dem.* II Dionysius gives, *inter alia*, an applied theoretical exposition of the sentence-arrangement of Demosthenes according to the ἀρμονία system, while the object of the *C.V.* is the theory of sentence-arrangement as such, based on the musical considerations of the ἀρμονία system. Consequently, overlapping of contents was to be expected, and is borne out by the following tabulation:

	<i>C.V.</i> (chapters)	<i>De Dem.</i> (chapters)
ἡ ἡδονή	10 - 20	47
το καλόν	10 - 20	47 - 48
το μέλος	14 - 16	47 - 49
ὁ ρυθμός	17 - 18	47 - 49
ἡ μεταβολή	19	47 - 49
το πρόπον	20	47 - 49
αὔστηρα ἀρμονία	22	38 - 39
γλαφυρα ἀρμονία	23	40
εὐκρατος ἀρμονία	24	41

So far as the chronological relation between these two books is concerned, two references in the *De Dem.* to the *C.V.*, viz. in cc. 49 and 50, are

decisive: εἰ δέ τις ἀπαιτήσει καὶ ταῦτ' ἔτι μαθεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει, τοὺς ὑπομνηματισμοὺς ἡμῶν λαβῶν, οὓς περὶ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων πεπραγματεύμεθα, πάντα ὅσα ποθεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε παραλειπομένων εἴσεται,<sup>3</sup> and: τὰς δὲ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους πίστευς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς συνθέσεως γραφεῖσιν ἀποδεδωκώς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἠγοῦμαι κἀνταῦθα λέγειν (My spacing of print).<sup>4</sup>

That the treatise referred to in both cases is the *C.V.*, cannot be, and has never been, denied, since Dionysius in both cases uses the actual words that appear in its Greek title; consequently, the researcher is compelled to accept that the *C.V.* had been written before the *De Dem.*, or, more precisely, before ch. 49 of the *De Dem.* was written; this gives us a *terminus ante quem* of the composition of the *C.V.*)

Up to this point no problem seems to exist: it seems quite evident that the *C.V.* had been written before the *De Dem.* However, in ch. 18 of the *C.V.*, there is an apparent reference to the *De Dem.*: μῦρία τοιαῦτ' ἔστιν εὐρεῖν καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι. ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἐμμέλειάν τε καὶ εὐρυθμίαν συνιδεῖν δαιμονιώτατος, καὶ εἴ γε δεινὸς ἦν οὕτως ἐκλέξαι τὰ ὀνόματα ὡς συνθεῖναι περιττός, 'καὶ νύ κεν ἦ παρέλασσεν' τὸν Δημοσθένη κάλλους ἐρμηνεΐας ἔνεκεν, ἢ 'ἀμψήριστον ἔθηκεν.' νῦν δὲ περὶ μὲν τὴν ἐκλογὴν ἔστιν ὅτε διαμαρτάνει καὶ μάλιστα ἐν οἷς ἂν τὴν ὑψηλὴν καὶ περιττὴν καὶ ἐγκατάσκευον διώκη φράσιν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐτέρωθί μοι δηλοῦται σαφέστερον. συντίθησι δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ ἠδέως καὶ καλῶς νῆ Δία, καὶ οὐκ ἂν τις αὐτὸν ἔχοι κατὰ τοῦτο μέμψασθαι τὸ μέρος. (My spacing of print).<sup>5</sup> Seeing that the content of this pericope indeed has focussed the interest of scholars on the issue to be discussed in this chapter, I shall now proceed to prove that Dionysius was indeed referring to the *De Dem.* in ch. 18 of the *C.V.*

In cc. 5f. of the *De Dem.* Dionysius elaborates on the excellence of Plato in the use of the plain type of style; as a matter of fact, his plain style is virtually beyond any criticism: ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀμαρτάνει καθάπερ ἢ βραχὺ τι κομῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον κατηγορίας.<sup>6</sup> However, the moment he applies the extraordinary type of style, the situation changes drastically: ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὴν περιττολογίαν καὶ τὸ καλλιπεῖν, ὁ πολλάκις εἴωθε ποιεῖν, ἀμετρον ὀρθὴν λόβη, πολλῶ χειράων ἑαυτῆς γίνεται.<sup>7</sup> Having pointed out that the result is a violation of the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί (ἢ συντομία, ὁ ἑλληνισμός,

το σαφές, το πρόπον), (5,256:4ff.), he repeats that this happens when the philosopher is using the extraordinary type of style and expresses himself in a remarkably similar way to *C.V.* 18,182:6-8: ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐνδείξασθαι βουλόμενον ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀμαρτήματα ἐν ταῖς κατασκευαῖς εἶωθεν ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ χείρων μὲν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γίνεται, ὅταν τὸ μέγα διώκη καὶ περιττὸν ἐν τῇ φράσει ...<sup>8</sup> Comparing this sentence with the one in *C.V.* 18,182:6-8 (νῦν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἐκλογὴν ἔστιν ὅτε διαμαρτάνει, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν οἷς ἂν τὴν ὑψηλὴν καὶ περιττὴν καὶ ἐγκατόσκευον διώκη φράσιν), one sees that the constituents in both cases are the same or closely related.

<i>De Dem.</i> ch. 5	<i>C.V.</i> ch. 18
ἀμαρτήματα, ἀμαρτάνειν	διαμαρτάνει
ἐν ταῖς κατασκευαῖς	ἐγκατόσκευον
ὅταν	ἐν οἷς ἂν
εἶωθεν	ἔστιν ὅτε
τὸ μέγα	τὴν ὑψηλὴν
διώκη, ὀριμὴν λαβῆ	διώκη
περιττὸν	περιττὴν
φράσει	φράσιν
χείρων ἑαυτῆς γίνεται	χείρων ... αὐτοῦ γίνεται

Dionysius' extensive discussion of Plato at cc. 24-32 (including the comparison with Demosthenes in ch. 31) of the *De Dem.* amounts to the same thing, viz. to prove that Plato, although good at the simple style, is no match for Demosthenes because of the errors he commits in the use of the extraordinary type of style. Since Dionysius does not criticize Plato in this fashion in any other extant work of his, the word ἐτέρωθι, "elsewhere", in ὑπὲρ ἧν ἐτέρωθί μοι δηλοῦται σαφέστερον, cannot refer to any other work than the *De Dem.*<sup>9</sup>

Thus, in short, the heart of the problem concerning the temporal relation between the *De Dem.* and the *C.V.* is as follows: on the one hand, the references to the *C.V.* in the *De Dem.* (cc. 49 and 50) suggest that the *De Dem.* (or a part of it) was written after the *C.V.*; on the other hand, the alleged reference in the *C.V.* (ch. 18) to the *De Dem.* suggests that the *De Dem.* (or a part of it) had been written before the *C.V.*

In the *history of research* on this problem the views have been determined

by the following matters: firstly, the interpretation of ἐτέρωθι; secondly, the interpretation of δηλοῦται; thirdly, certain aspects of the content of *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II (τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν and Dionysius' view on Plato).

The first possible explanation is that the *C.V.* must have been written *during a break* in the composition of the *De Dem.* According to this view, ἐτέρωθι does refer to the *De Dem.*, δηλοῦται should be taken as present tense or historic present, and many examples of alleged difference in content between *De Dem.* I and II are cited to prove the hypothesis. To my mind, this popular view is wrong. I hope to prove that the only alternative, viz. that the *C.V.* has been written before the *De Dem.*, is the most acceptable explanation. I shall take ἐτέρωθι as referring to the *De Dem.*, δηλοῦται as referring to a future event and shall try to give reasonable explanations for the differences in content between *De Dem.* I and II.

*Consideration of the first possible explanation: a break in the composition of the De Demosthene.*

The man who must receive the credit for being the first to sense a problem concerning the chronological relation between the *De Dem.* and the *C.V.*, is the man who first realized that *C.V.* 18 most probably refers to the *De Dem.*: F. Blass.<sup>10</sup> Taking δηλοῦται in the crucial sentence (ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐτέρωθί μου δηλοῦται σαφέστερον) as a present tense used instead of a perfect in full concord with an alleged practice in the times of Dionysius,<sup>11</sup> he concluded that the *C.V.* was written after a certain part of the *De Dem.* had been completed; on the other hand, he also realized that, in order to account for cc. 49 and 50 of the *De Dem.*, one should also admit that a certain part of the *De Dem.* must have been written *after* the *C.V.* had been completed. With this handling of the problem, F. Blass introduced the concept of an *interruption in the composition of the De Dem.*, during which time the *C.V.* is supposed to have been written - an hypothesis that has indeed been virtually universally followed.<sup>12</sup>

For the researchers who adhered to this idea, the only problem that remained, was *not whether, but where the interruption occurred* (in other words, determining the *terminus post quem* of the composition of the *C.V.*).<sup>13</sup>

F. Blass did not indicate at which point of the treatise he thought the alleged interruption could have taken place; in fact, in spite of his strong assertion concerning the alleged reference in the *C.V.* to the *De Dem.*, he

lost heart when he had to draw up the chronological order of the works written by Dionysius, by putting the *C.V.* before the whole of the *De Dem.*, and not after one section of the *De Dem.*, but before the rest of this work on Demosthenes.<sup>14</sup> R.H. Tukey undertook the task of determining the exact spot of the alleged interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.* He declares that the *De Dem.* "naturally falls into two distinct parts".<sup>15</sup> Since the references to the *C.V.* occur in the second part of the essay, while the first part contains the places to which the passages in the *C.V.* refer, the alleged interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.* must have occurred in the region of the transitional chapters, i.e. cc. 32-34. According to this scholar, the key to the problem is to be found in the first sentence of ch. 34 of the *De Dem.*: ὀλίγα τούτους ἔτι προσθεῖς περὶ τῆς λέξεως, ἐπιτοκαταλειπόμενον τῆς προκειμένης θεωρίας μέρος μεταβῆσομαι, ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν, αὐτοῖς τρισὶ πλάσμασιν ὁμοίως παρέπεται καὶ ἔστι παντός λόγου Δημοσθενικοῦ μηνύματα χαρακτηριστικά καὶ ἀνυφαίρετα. (The spaced print is mine).<sup>16</sup>

According to Tukey, τὸ καταλειπόμενον ... μέρος in this passage does not mean σύνθεσις, which, according to him, is in fact the subject of the chapters to follow, but subject-matter, the πραγματικὸς τόπος, which regularly<sup>17</sup> forms the second part of Dionysius' essays on the orators.<sup>18</sup> At the end of ch. 32 Dionysius states that he has completed his proposed treatment of the λεκτικὸς τόπος: βούλομαι δὲ ἤ καὶ συλλογίσασθαι τὰ εἰρημένα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ δεῦξαι πάνθ' ὅσα ὑπεσχόμην ἀρχόμενος τῆς θεωρίας τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου, πεποιηκότα ἑμαυτόν.<sup>19</sup> Now Dionysius, according to this scholar, reasons as follows: "But 'composition', which is treated in the following chapters, belongs under the λεκτικὸς τόπος and in fact had already been included in the discussion of the various authors in the preceding chapters. Our only way of escape from the difficulty is to suppose that Dionysius finished his treatment of Demosthenes' style with the intention of proceeding immediately ... to the discussion of his subject-matter, but that he abandoned or postponed the treatment of the latter topic and in its place he discussed at length<sup>20</sup> the subject of 'composition' and its application to Demosthenes."<sup>21</sup>

Giving more detail on this crucial point of his hypothesis, Tukey conjectures that Dionysius completed the first section of the *De Dem.*, laid it aside in order to prepare an essay on sentence-arrangement as a birthday present to Metilius Rufus and "with a new grasp of the subject he returned to the

essay on Demosthenes and, instead of proceeding according to his original plan with a discussion of Demosthenes' subject-matter, he restated his doctrine of composition as developed in the *C.V.* and applied it to Demosthenes."<sup>22</sup>

Thus he maintains that the alleged interruption occurred between cc. 32 and 33 of the *De Dem.*, during which time Dionysius is supposed to have written the *C.V.*

E. Kalinka accepted the basic idea of an interruption between cc. 32 and 33 of the *De Dem.*: "*Den Grund, warum Dionys von Kap. 35 an so ausführlich die σύνθεσις des Demosthenes beschreibt, hat Tukey mit recht darin erkannt, dass Dionys in der Pause zwischen 32 und 33 das Werk περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων geschrieben hat ...*"<sup>23</sup>

However, in contrast with previous efforts to explain the present tense of ἐηλοῦται of *C.V.* 18 as a substitute for one of the other tenses, he is perfectly satisfied with the present tense: "*Wenn indes Dionys συνθ (i.e. C.V.) schrieb, als er mitten in der Arbeit an Δημ λ (i.e. De Dem.) steckte, so bedarf es gar keiner Umdeutung und keiner Änderung, sondern das Präsens ἐηλοῦται kommt zu seinem vollen Rechte.*"<sup>24</sup> Thus, according to E. Kalinka, Dionysius clearly indicates that he *is still busy* with the *De Dem.*, only putting it aside for the time being.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, he rejected Tukey's hypothesis concerning the absence of a section on subject-matter in the *De Dem.* He does that on the basis of the polyvalence of the word λέξις,<sup>26</sup> and of the consideration that this word does not refer to the "λεκτικὸν μέρος im ganzen Umfang, sondern vorzugsweise die ἐκλογή τῶν ὀνομάτων."<sup>27</sup> Thus, according to this scholar, if the *De Dem.* deals with the θεωρία τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου and if Dionysius has already dealt with the ἐκλογή part of it, the καταλειπόμενον μέρος can be nothing else but the σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων - to which Dionysius indeed attended in the chapters to follow.<sup>28</sup>

Having established the alleged fact of an interruption, Kalinka ended up with placing not only the *C.V.*, but also the *De Is.*, *Ep. ad Pomp.* and the *De Im.* between *De Dem.* 32 and 33.<sup>29</sup> Not accepting R.H. Tukey's hypothesis concerning τὸ καταλειπόμενον μέρος, he had to seek for other clues which

could indicate *where* the alleged interruption could have taken place.

First he tried to pinpoint the *terminus ante quem* of the *C.V.*, i.e. the earliest reference to the *C.V.* in the *De Dem.* If one considers the two references to the *C.V.* in cc. 49 and 50 of the *De Dem.*, as well as the similarity of subject-matter, it goes without saying that Dionysius must have used the *C.V.* as source here. But which chapter of the *De Dem.* would be the earliest one in which definite knowledge of the *C.V.* could be traced? The earliest point revealing knowledge of the *C.V.*, is, according to Kalinka, chapter 36: in the thirteen lines from 36,378:12 to 37,378:25 Dionysius for the first time in the *De Dem.* mentions the three basic types of ἀρμονία discussed in ch. 21 of the *C.V.*: "*Dieser Vergleich, der συνθ 21 (i.e. C.V. 21, my note) als Quelle von Δημ λ 36f. (i.e. De Dem. 36f., my note) beweist, wird dadurch besonders wertvoll, dasz wir damit der Fuge zwischen Δημ λ 32 und 33, in die wir die Entstehung der Schrift verlegt haben, so nahe kommen wie nur möglich.*"<sup>30</sup> He based his conclusion on the similarity in terminology between this pericope in the *De Dem.* and ch. 21 of the *C.V.*<sup>31</sup> So, according to him, the *C.V.* must have been written before *De Dem.* 36: "*Aber schon vor Δημ λ 36f. (i.e. De Dem. 36f., my note) muss συνθ (i.e. C.V., my note) entstanden sein ...*"<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, Kalinka thought that if he could find substantial deviations on the same subject in the *De Dem.*, these could not only confirm the hypothesis of an interruption, but also be the means by which he could determine the place of interruption more precisely. He then proposed that substantial deviations can be determined in Dionysius' view of το ἡδύ and το καλόν and in his opinion of Plato.

After ἡδύ and καλόν had been part of the rhetorical system of Dionysius for a long time, according to Kalinka he later developed a new theory in which a sharp distinction between these two terms is established and we meet this at *C.V.* 10f. Now, in *De Dem.* I this distinction plays no rôle yet, according to this scholar: "*aber wie wenig er sich früher ihrer Scheidung nach den Kategorien des ἡδύ und καλόν bewusst war, geht aus Δημ λ 18 (i.e. De Dem. 18, my note), wo er I 165<sub>20</sub> i.e. 18,302:26-27, my note) die λέξις des Isocrates als ἡ κ α λ λ ι σ τ α τ ῶ ν ἄλλων δομοῦσα ἔχειν bezeichnet, sie gleichwohl aber I 166<sub>5</sub> (i.e. 18,304:2-4, my note) ἡ δ ε ῖ τ α καὶ εὐμορφος ὀποχρώντως nennt. Somit liegt Δημ λ 18 noch vor συνθ (i.e. C.V., my note).*"<sup>33</sup> (My spacing of print). He then proceeds to show that Dionysius does recognise the distinction in *De Dem.* II, viz. in ch. 47,

where he says that τὸ καλόν is the aim of the rough type of composition, and τὸ ἡδύ that of the smooth type: τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ... τῆς μὲν αἰσθητικῆς τὸ καλὸν ὑπολαβὼν εἶναι τέλος, τῆς δὲ γλαυρωτικῆς τὸ ἡδύ ...<sup>34</sup> In short, according to Kalinka the differentiated use of τὸ καλόν (beauty) and τὸ ἡδύ (pleasure) in *De Dem.* II in comparison with undifferentiated use in *De Dem.* I proves that Dionysius composed the *C.V.* after he had completed *De Dem.* I, but before he started writing *De Dem.* II.<sup>35</sup> However, Kalinka failed to see that, firstly, the non-technical use of τὸ καλόν occurs in *De Dem.* II as well; secondly, that differences concerning τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν have to do with the fact that Dionysius has not only applied one system of evaluation, viz. the ἁρμονία system, but two others as well, viz. the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως and ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως systems.

As to Dionysius' opinion of Plato, Kalinka exerts himself trying to prove that a substantial difference in judgement on Plato can be discerned between *De Dem.* I and II. This change of attitude towards Plato, according to this scholar, seems to have taken place during the alleged interruption between c.c. 32 and 33: "*Auch der Gesinnungswandel gegenüber Platon scheint sich in der Zeit, die zwischen Δημ λ 32 (De Dem. 32, my note) und 33 liegt, vollzogen zu haben.*"<sup>36</sup> However, this scholar failed to realize that the very difference in objective between *De Dem.* I (polemic) and *De Dem.* II (theoretical) can account for the difference in attitude towards Plato in these two parts of this essay: whereas Dionysius has to prove the superiority of Demosthenes in terms of the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως and ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως systems, he is merely giving a theoretical exposition of the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes in *De Dem.* II, in which case a critical analysis of Plato would be inappropriate.

S.F. Bonner accepted the basic idea of an interruption in the *De Dem.* as well; however, he believed that the alleged break did not occur between cc. 32 and 33, but between cc. 33 and 34.

Firstly, he is - quite rightly - convinced that no break between cc. 32 and 33 can be proven, for c. 33 is the conclusion of cc. 1-32.<sup>37</sup> This is, according to this scholar, not only confirmed by the opening words of ch. 33, which restate the whole purpose of his study, but by the fact that these are followed by a summary of the results obtained. He refers to a similar summary found in the *De Lys.* (ch. 13), before the consideration of the πραγματικὸς τόπος.<sup>38</sup> According to S.F. Bonner Dionysius should have proceeded to his new topic in ch. 34, but instead of doing that, he "gives a

further summary of his views on the superiority of Demosthenes to other stylists in c. 34, ἵνα εὐσύνοπτος μᾶλλον γένηται ... ὁ λόγος, and only then proceeds to the discussion of σύνθεσις."<sup>39</sup> Thus, according to Bonner, this "second summary" must have been added to the first after the completed section of the *De Dem.* had been put aside for some time, and was in fact then the way in which he returned to the *De Dem.*, having completed the *C.V.*<sup>40</sup> However, ch. 34 is just as indispensable as ch. 33 as part of the conclusion of cc. 1-32: whereas Dionysius recapitulates cc. 1-32 in ch. 33 in terms of the χαρακτηρες τῆς λέξεως system, he does so in terms of the ἄρεται τῆς λέξεως system in ch. 34.

Bonner's second argument is based on ἐν ἀρχῇ in the last sentence of ch. 46 of the *De Dem.*: ἐπὶ αὖτις δ' οὖν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπά, ὡς ἐν ἀρχῇ προϋθέτην ἐρεῖν.<sup>41</sup> According to him, this shows that Dionysius himself regarded this part of his work as a fresh start, for he was referring to the πρόθεσις outlined in ch. 36, and since he was referring to this new section already at the beginning of ch. 34 (ὀλίγα τούτοις ἔτι προσθεῖς περὶ τῆς λέξεως, ἐπὶ τὸ καταλειπόμενον τῆς <προκειμένης> θεωρίας μέρος μεταβήσομαι ...),<sup>42</sup> the break must have occurred between cc. 33 and 34, the fresh start beginning with ch. 34.<sup>43</sup>

However, by interpreting ἐν ἀρχῇ in this way, Bonner is having recourse to strained reasoning and is totally disregarding the direct context of these words; Dionysius has inserted ἐν ἀρχῇ not to denote "a fresh new start" at ch. 34, but to *exclude the possibility of misunderstanding* what he was about to discuss and thus to be as clear as possible. He is *not* returning to the topic he has been discussing up to the point where he started his digression (i.e. in ch. 44), but to a new topic mentioned in the introduction to *De Dem. II*, mentioned *in the beginning* of this section on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes.

In conclusion: the first proposed solution to the problem of the chronological relation between the *De Dem.* and the *C.V.* is that these two works were composed simultaneously in a sense: having completed *De Dem. I*, Dionysius first completed the *C.V.* before returning to the *De Dem.*; but this solution proves to be unsatisfactory.

*The alternative solution: the C.V. was written before the De Dem.*

Since S.F. Bonner, the idea of an interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.* was rejected by G. Pavano (1942) and G.M.A. Grube (1952). The former spent considerable time in refuting the hypothesis of an interruption (*art. cit.*, pp. 268ff.), but failed to substantiate his own view, viz. that the *C.V.* had been written before *De Dem. I*. This goes for G.M.A.

Grube as well: although he becomes rather agitated about the hypothesis of

an interruption,<sup>44</sup> he also fails to put forward a well motivated alternative. Consequently I have no choice but to supply myself the basis which makes this view more viable.

This view is based, firstly, on evidence that Dionysius relied on his theory of σύνθεσις as expressed in the *C.V.* not only in *De Dem.* II, but also in *De Dem.* I, proving that the *C.V.* must have been written *before De Dem.* I as well; secondly, strange as it may seem, on the present tense of ἐηλοῦται in ch. 18 of the *C.V.*

#### *The argument of σύνθεσις*

In ch. 5 of the *C.V.* Dionysius discusses the traditional theory of σύνθεσις - the view of the dialectic theorists in general and of Chrysippus in particular. According to this theory, σύνθεσις merely involves the connection of the parts of speech (being nouns, verbs and conjunctions)<sup>45</sup> in the sentence according to grammatical-logical rules, which prescribe mechanically, e.g. that a noun must be placed before a verb and an adjective; verbs before adverbs; common nouns before proper nouns, and pronouns before common nouns; so far as the verb is concerned, that a primary tense must precede a secondary tense in one sentence and that the indicative must precede the infinitive. The basis of this system is purely logical, e.g. a verb must precede an adverb, since that which denotes the action takes precedence above those circumstances, modal, local, temporal, etc., which are expressed by adverbs.<sup>46</sup> Having spent some time in disclosing the defects and disabilities of this system,<sup>47</sup> Dionysius proceeds to his new approach to σύνθεσις, viz. that all aspects of σύνθεσις should be related to the musical aspect of language, to its *musicality* - a system which would do the genius of the classical authors more justice than the traditional.

Bearing in mind that F. Blass *c.s.* rely strongly on the supposition that, among Dionysius' works, we meet this new approach for the first time in the *C.V.*, we should deduce from it that our rhetor would have had no choice but to make use of the traditional approach set forth in the preceding paragraph before the invention of this new approach to σύνθεσις reflected in the *C.V.*, despite his final rejection of this traditional approach. This would have been the case in the *De Lys.*, *De Isocr.*, *De Is.* and - according to F. Blass *c.s.* - *De Dem.* I as well.

However, I am now going to attempt to prove that the opposite was true,

that Dionysius had already applied this new concept of σύνθεσις, as explained in the *C.V.*, in *De Dem.* I. This implies that the *C.V.* must have been written *before De Dem.* I as well - not only before *De Dem.* II.

Firstly I wish to prove that Dionysius had already applied the new concept of σύνθεσις based on musicality, and secondly, that his presentation of it in *De Dem.* I does not differ in principle from his presentation of this new concept of σύνθεσις in the *C.V.* and *De Dem.* II.

*Firstly, then, the presence of the new system of σύνθεσις in De Dem. I*

In ch. 4 of the *De Dem.* Dionysius says in connection with Isocrates: καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον (sc. ἢ Ἰσοκράτους λέξις ἀμαρτάνει) ἐν οἷς τῆν εὐέπειαν διώκουσα καὶ τῆν εὐρυθμίαν δι' εὐλαβείας μὲν λαμβάνει τὸ συγκροῦσαι, τὰ φωνήεντα τῶν γραμμάτων, δι' εὐλαβείας δὲ ποιεῖται τὸ χρῆσασθαι τινι τῶν τραχυνόντων. (My spacing of print).<sup>48</sup> All the words in spaced print are concerned with musical effect. In ch. 18 of the same treatise we read that Isocrates is afraid of harsh sounds (ψαροδεής);<sup>49</sup> having quoted a passage from Isocrates' *On the Peace*, Dionysius comments: τὸ ... τῆς λέξεως λεῖτον καὶ μαλακὸν αἰτιῶμαι.<sup>50</sup> He continues by saying that it ought to have been rough and harsh: τραχεῖον γὰρ ἔδει καὶ πικρὸν εἶναι ...<sup>51</sup> The next sentence is equally significant: ἢ δ' ἔστιν ὑγρὰ καὶ ὁμαλὴ καὶ ὡπερ ἔλαιον ἀψοφητὶ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς ῥέουσα, θέλγειν γέ τοι καὶ ἠδύνην ζητοῦσα τὴν ὁμοίην<sup>52</sup> - words which express musical effect. Finally, in describing the Isocratean period, we come across yet another term echoing musical effect, εὐρυθμος: καὶ πάντα ἀξιούσιν εἰς εὐρύθμους καταλείπειν περιόδων ἁρμονίας ... (My spacing of print).<sup>53</sup>

In Dionysius' appraisal of Plato in ch. 24 too, there are a few indications of a musical approach to composition: discussing a passage from Plato, Dionysius refers to the συμμετρία and εὐφωνία<sup>54</sup> of the passage concerned.

Secondly, this material not only reveals a new concept of σύνθεσις, but *is indeed basically the same as that used in the C.V. and De Dem. II.*<sup>55</sup>

This can be seen in the following tabulation in which the comparable material of the *C.V.*, *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II has been taken up. I have put together the material under the headings of quality of words chosen (so far

as musicality is concerned), clashing of vowels, semi-vowels and consonants, flow of words, type of clause and of period preferred, and figures of speech.<sup>56</sup> The similarity of meaning expressed by words of the same semantic domain, or in some cases even the iteration of the same word, is striking:

quality of words chosen:	{ C. V. : εὐφανος, λεῖος, μαλακός, ἡ εὐέπεια. { De Dem. I: εὐφανος, λεῖος, μαλακός, ἡ εὐέπεια. { De Dem. II: εὐφανος, λεῖος, μαλακός, ἡ εὐέπεια.
clashing of vowels:	{ C. V. : φωνήεντων ... ἀντιτυπίαν οὐκ ἂν εὖροι ... { De Dem. I: δι' εὐλαβείας ... λαμβάνει τὸ συγκροῦσαι τὰ φωνήεντα τῶν γραμμάτων ... { De Dem. II: φεύγει ... ἀπόση σπουδῆ τὰς τῶν φωνήεντων συμβολὰς ...
aim in terms of effect upon the ear:	{ C. V. : ἡδέως. { De Dem. I: ἡδύνειν. { De Dem. II: ἡδέως, ἡδύ.
flow of words	{ C. V. : κελινῆσθαι, { ὥπερ τὰ ῥέοντα καὶ μηδέποτε ἀτρεμοῦντα. { De Dem. I: ὑγρός, ὀμαλός, { ὥπερ ἔλαιον ἀψοφητὶ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς ῥέουσα. { De Dem. II: ἐπιτρόχαλος, καταφερός, { ὥπερ ... νόματα μηδενὸς αὐτοῖς ἀντικρούοντος { καὶ διαρρεῖ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς.
type of sentence:	{ C. V. : πάντα εἰς περίοδον τελευτᾶν. { De Dem. I: ἐν παντὸς τρόπου τὴν περίοδον ... { De Dem. II: οὐδὲν ... ἔξω περιόδου ...
type of period	{ C. V. : εὐρυθμος, σύμμετρος. { De Dem. I: εὐρυθμος, { ὑπαγωγικός, πλατύς. { De Dem. II: εὐκόρυφος, εὐγραμμος, { ὕπτιος, κεχυμένος.
figures of speech	{ C. V. : τρυφερός, κολαϊκός, ἀπατηλός, θεατρικός, νεαρός, { ἀντίθετοι, παρόμοιοι, πάριστοι, { καὶ οἱ παραπλήσιοι τούτοις ...

- ( *De Dem.* I:    θεατρικός, μειρακιώδης,  
 (                    πάρισα, αντίθετα  
 (                    και τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις.  
 ( *De Dem.* II:    τὰ κινητικώτατα τῶν ὄχλων,  
 (                    παρισώσεις, παρομοιώσεις, ἀντιθέσεις, τα παρωνο-  
 (                    μασμένα, τὰ ἀντιστρέφοντα, τα ἐπαναφερόμενα,  
 (                    καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ...

This comparison reveals a remarkable similarity between *De Dem.* I and the *C.V.* on the one hand, and *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II on the other hand and, as a matter of fact, even between *De Dem.* I, *De Dem.* II and the *C.V.* in some cases. Consequently the conclusion is justified that Dionysius did not develop an entirely new system of σύνθεσις during an alleged interruption between *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II; on the contrary, the only acceptable conclusion appears to be that the *C.V.* had been written before *De Dem.* I, and that the aim of *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II respectively can account for the incomplete information in *De Dem.* I concerning this new theory of σύνθεσις.

The second basis of this view concerns the present δηλοῦται in *C.V.* 18. I am going to argue that the present tense suited Dionysius best.

Taking δηλοῦται as a present tense referring to a future event is no innovation - in fact, it was first proposed by C.T. Roessler as early as 1873: "*Dionysius cum verba ὑπερ ὧν ἐτέρωθί μοι δηλοῦται σαφέστερον conscriberet, non sine animi quadam alacritate se ipse ea jam intuebatur conficientem et exponentem, quae futuro demum tempore persecutus est.*"<sup>58</sup>

In spite of the popular interpretation of F. Blass, Croiset took this interpretation from Roessler, but made a fatal mistake in assuming that Dionysius is referring to the later chapters of the *C.V.* itself.<sup>59</sup> In no time the interpretation of δηλοῦται as having the force of a future tense was totally overruled by the idea initially proposed by F. Blass, so much so that researchers did not bother any more to reconsider the matter of an alleged interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.*, but virtually only tried to ascertain exactly where this alleged interruption must have taken place.

However, in spite of this grim picture of the history of the interpretation of ἐηλοῦται as referring to a future event, I must still regard it as the most probable possibility; as a matter of fact, it appears that Dionysius did not only refer to a future event with ἐηλοῦται, but also had a special reason for using the present tense instead of the future.

Firstly, it must be noted that a *present used for a future is not at all strange*, not only in classical,<sup>60</sup> but also in Hellenistic times.<sup>61</sup> In fact, recent studies on the verbal aspect in Greek reach the conclusion that the present tense is neutral so far as time is concerned, that it is a zero-tempus: "*Praesens: Wat tyd betref is dit neutraal: dit kan verlede, hede of toekoms aandui, of tydloos gebruik word. ... die praesens lief is om te neutraliseer en as zero-tempus te figureer.*"<sup>62</sup> Thus the present tense of ἐηλοῦται need not be a stumbling block to any of the above-mentioned interpretations - whether one takes it as referring to the future, present or past.

Still the question remains why Dionysius would have preferred to use the present tense instead of the future if he wanted to refer *forward* to the *De Dem.* The following consideration could explain why: whereas the present tense is neutral so far as time is concerned, the future tense expresses *nothing more than time*, that is, future time: "*Futurum: Aspekties neutraal, eintlik net 'n blote tydvorm wat op die toekoms dui.*"<sup>63</sup> Bearing in mind that to Dionysius the fulfilment of the future is uncertain,<sup>64</sup> a mere *future* instead of a present tense would not only give no indication as to *when* in the future he would really criticize Plato's ἐηλογία, but might even cause his reader to be rather sceptical about the fulfilment of this promise. This he would not like Metilius Rufus to think, because at that time the Plato-admirers were rating their idol so high, that they deemed him superior to Demosthenes, Dionysius' ideal example, even in the field of oratory.<sup>65</sup> Knowing that Plato was going to get a favourable treatment in the *C.V.*, because his style in terms of musical composition is very good,<sup>66</sup> and realizing that this could give a wrong impression of his (i.e. Dionysius') view of Plato's style in general, he said that he would expose the weaknesses of Plato in the field of ἐηλογία elsewhere. By using the present (ἐηλοῦται) instead of the future tense he wants to *remove all uncertainty* as to the fulfilment of his promise; the preference for this tense could even indicate that he had already conceived his plan for the *De Dem.*, or even that he had already collected some material. Such mental attitude of Dionysius would indeed be

best expressed by the present tense: "The present is used instead of the future in statements of what is immediate, *likely, certain* or threatening.";<sup>67</sup> "such Futural Presents differ from the Future tense 'mainly in the *tone of assurance* which is imparted";<sup>68</sup> "In *confident assertions* regarding the future, a *vivid, realistic* present may be used for the future,"<sup>69</sup> and finally: "Wat reliëfgewing betref is dit (i.e. the present, my note) aktueel en reëel"<sup>70</sup> (The italics in all these quotations are mine).

### *Conclusion*

In this chapter on the chronological relation between the *De Dem.* and the *C.V.* I have shown that the similarity of subject-matter between *De Dem.* II and the *C.V.* immediately raised among researchers the question of the chronological relation between these two works, but that cross-references in these works really made it the most disputed subject in the recent study of the *De Dem.*: in cc. 49 and 50 of the *De Dem.* Dionysius clearly refers to the *C.V.*, which justifies the conclusion that the *C.V.* had been completed first, or at least before cc. 49 and 50 of the *De Dem.*; on the other hand, in ch. 18 of the *C.V.* Dionysius is apparently referring to the *De Dem.*, from which the opposite conclusion can be drawn. This is the heart of the problem.

I started by trying to prove G. Pavano wrong, who refused to accept that Dionysius was referring to the *De Dem.* in ch. 18 of the *C.V.* I then proceeded to discuss the popular hypothesis (advocated by F. Blass, R.H. Tukey, E. Kalinka and S.F. Bonner) that the composition of one part of the *De Dem.* must have preceded that of the *C.V.* and the elaboration of the remainder must have followed that of the *C.V.* I have tried to prove this hypothesis not viable, by showing that no proof exists that Dionysius deviated from his original plan; that *De Dem.* II fits in perfectly in his work on Demosthenes - as confirmed by the rhetorically founded intrinsic unity of the work; secondly, by showing that alleged differences between *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II (e.g. concerning τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν, and Dionysius' view on Plato) can be easily explained.

Finally, seeing that I could not accept the hypothesis of an interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.*, I had to substantiate the only alternative, viz. that the *C.V.* had been written not only before *De Dem.* II, but also before *De Dem.* I. I elaborated on evidence in *De Dem.* I showing that Dionysius did make use of the new theory of σύνθεσις as expressed in the *C.V.* already in *De Dem.* I, from which the conclusion can be drawn that the *C.V.* had preceded *De Dem.* I as well. Secondly, I discussed δηλοῦται (*C.V.* 18), showing that the present tense was deliberately chosen, for, in view of Dionysius' opinion of Plato, a present tense referring to a future event suited Dionysius better than a future tense.

Considering all the evidence, I had no choice but to reach the conclusion that the *C.V.* could not have been written during an alleged interruption between *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II, but that it had been completed before *De Dem.* I as well.

Seeing that Dionysius made use of three systems of evaluation in the *De Dem.*, viz. the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως, the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως, and the ἁρμονίαι systems, and that this very fact has highly contributed to the problems discussed in cc. 1, 2 and 3 of this dissertation, the time has now come to proceed to the discussion of these systems in the *De Dem.* I shall attend to this matter in the following chapter.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Cp. pp. 23-25 above.
2. Cp. nn. 3 and 4, p.5 above.
3. "But if anyone will request still to learn how these things are as well, he can take my treatise that *I have written concerning arrangement of the words* (in a sentence) and he will discover all that he wants (to know) of (details) omitted here ..." (49,426:12-16) (The italics are mine).
4. "Since *I have expounded* my arguments on this subject in *my treatise 'On literary composition'*, I do not deem it necessary to repeat them here." (50,432:5-8) (The italics are mine.) From the use of the perfect tense both in ch. 50 (ἀποδεδώκας) and in ch. 49 (πεπραγαμπεύμεθα), it is quite justified to infer that the C.V. had been fully completed when Dionysius wrote these sentences.
5. "Countless similar instances can be found in Plato as well. For he is excellent in paying attention to melody and rhythm, and if he had only been as able in his choice of words as he is extremely good in their arrangement, 'he then either would have outstripped' even Demosthenes, so far as beauty of style is concerned, or 'would have left the issue in doubt'. But as it is, on some occasions he is at fault in his choice of words - especially in passages in which he is aiming at a lofty, extraordinary and elaborate way of expression; with respect to this *I explain myself more explicitly elsewhere*. But, indeed, he does arrange his words pleasantly as well as with beauty, and one would not be able to find any fault with him so far as this section is concerned." (C.V. 18,182:1-11; for the C.V. I am using the text of W. R. Roberts, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Literary Composition*, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1910). (The two quotations by Dionysius are from Homer's *Iliad*, xxiii, 32, and the italics are mine.)
6. "For he either commits no error at all or he errs only quite slightly and (then) without deserving criticism." (*De Dem.* 6, 258:9-10).
7. "But whenever he launches into extraordinary and beautiful language - which he is used to do often - with unrestrained passion, (his style) becomes far more inferior than (the rest of his style) " (*De Dem.* 5,256:1-4).

8. "but I only wish to point out that he is accustomed to commit errors of this kind in his embellishments and that he falls below his own standards whenever he aims at grandeur and at the extraordinary in his style ..." (*De Dem.* 6,258:2-5).
9. The only scholar who refused to admit this, is G. Pavano. He conjectures that Dionysius was referring to another work of his, preceding the *C.V.*, and now lost to us. He favours the hypothesis of a σύγκρισις (*a comparison*) of *Plato and Demosthenes*, in which the ἐκλογή of both authors would have played a major rôle. Dionysius would have been well under way with this work at the time of writing the *De Dem.* and he would have had at least notes and plans for such a σύγκρισις at the time of writing *C.V.* 18, to which he then would be referring. (G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 303). Pavano bases his hypothesis firstly on the fact that, contrary to his reference to the *C.V.* in cc. 49 and 50 of the *De Dem.*, and to the *De Lys.* in ch. 2 of the same work, Dionysius is *vague* as to the book where his criticism of Plato had been expressed: he merely refers to an "elsewhere": ἐτέρῳθι. Theoretically this word refers to any other work - not necessarily the *De Dem.* According to this scholar, this vagueness points in the direction of a work *not yet published* (*Ibid.*, p. 301). Finally, he is convinced that the existence of such a book is suggested by two hints made in passing in ch. 32 of the *De Dem.* and in ch. 1 of the *C.V.*: *De Dem.* 32,364:28 - 32,366:6: δυνάμενος δ' ἂν, εἰ βουλοίμην, καὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἑκατέρως κατορθώματα ἐξετάζειν καὶ δεινύειν, ὅσφ κρείττων ἐστὶν ἢ Δημοσθένους λέξις τῆς Πλατωνικῆς, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὸ ἀληθινὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀγῶνας ἐπιτίθειον ... ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ τροπικόν ...
- "I could, if I so desired, examine the individual successes of each of the two styles, and demonstrate *how superior the style of Demosthenes is to that of Plato*, not only according to its fitness in reality and in oratorical struggles ... but also in its use of figurative language ..."); *C.V.* 1,68:11-12: εἰ δ' ἐγγένηται μοι σχολή, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐκλογῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐτέρων ἐξοίσω σοι γραφήν. ("And if I have time, I shall also publish a second book *on the choice of words*." (The italics and spaced print are mine.) Bearing in mind that this sentence is *directly followed* by the promise that Metilius Rufus could expect to receive this study within a year's time (ἐκείνην μὲν οὖν τὴν πραγματείαν εἰς νέετα πάλιν ἄραις ταῖς αὐταῖς προσδέχου - *C.V.* 1,68:13-15), the existence of such a work,

according to Pavano, becomes a definite possibility, albeit decidedly theoretical in nature: ἵνα τὸν λεκτικὸν τόπον τελείως ἐξευροσμένον ἔχῃς. (C.V. 1,68:13).

This hypothesis of Pavano is indeed a possible way of coping with C.V. 18, but far too speculative to be acceptable. This scholar himself admits that no proof exists that the two works referred to in ch. 32 of the *De Dem.* and in ch. 1 of the *C.V.* were indeed written: "*che nulla fa presumere che sia stata scritta*" (G. Pavano, *ibid.*, p. 247, n. 2). In any case, whereas Dionysius is indeed promising a forthcoming book on the choice of words to Metilius Rufus in the *C.V.*, this is by no means the case in *De Dem.* 32. Here he is merely saying that he *could* if he wanted to: δυνάμενος δ' ὄν, εἰ βουλοίμην ... (*De Dem.* 32,364:28 - 32,366:1). What is more, Dionysius is not using the expression "ἐκλογή των ὀνομάτων" with reference to what he could do if he wanted to, but "λέξις" (32,366:3), which is more vague and could include all aspects of style - not only diction. Finally, it seems unlikely that Dionysius would have written a σύγκρισις on Demosthenes and Plato in which the ἐκλογή of both plays a prominent rôle, without referring to it in some way or other in the *De Dem.*, seeing that he does so in the case of his works on Lysias and Isocrates: at *De Dem.* 2,244:15-18 he refers to his work on Lysias: τίς δὲ ἦν ἡ προαίρεσις αὐτοῦ (sc. Λυσίου) καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης δεδήλωται γραφῇ ... ("I have explained what his choice was (i.e. of Lysias) and what his success in the work before this one ..."). His reference to the *De Isochr.* is not as specific as this one to the *De Lys.*: ὄντινα χαρακτηῖρα ἔχειν ἐφαίνετό μοι διὰ πλείονων μὲν ἐδήλωσα πρότερον. ("I earlier described at some length what seemed to be the characteristics of his style ...") (*De Dem.* 4,252:8-9), but the subsequent summary (4,252:9ff.) confirms that he is indeed referring to the *De Isochr.*

In conclusion: over and above all these arguments, it may be added that Pavano has undermined his own view himself to such an extent that one is astounded by the fact that he still regarded it as the most probable hypothesis.

I cannot but agree with S.F. Bonner who regarded this interpretation of ἐπέρωδι as "a supposition which has little or nothing in its favour" (S.F. Bonner, *op. cit.*, p. 32).

10. *Apud* R.H. Tukey, *The Composition of the De Oratoribus Antiquis of Dionysius*, CP, 4 (1909), p. 399, n. 2.

11. *Apud* R.H. Tukey, *ibid.*, p. 399, n. 6. As a matter of fact, Richards, a scholar who made some textual observations, suggested that δηλοῦται should be changed to the Perfect, ἐδήλωται - *apud* E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, II, p. 51. He expressed his view in C.R., 19, (1905), p. 253.
12. E.g. by R.H. Tukey, E. Kalinka and S.F. Bonner - cp. subsequent discussion.
13. It has become clear that this hypothesis is based upon the assumption that, firstly, C.V. does indeed refer to the *De Dem.*, more specifically to certain chapters in *De Dem.* I, and secondly, that δηλοῦται does not refer to the future. The basis is safe so far as the first matter is concerned (cp. pp. 93f. above), but I intend to prove that δηλοῦται refers to a future event.
14. "*Ordo igitur scriptorum adhuc manentium, si quis eum e temporis rationibus instituire velit, hic erit: (1) Epistula ad Amm. I, (2) De compositione, (3) De oratorius antiquis (De Lysia Isocrate Isaeo, De Demosthene, ...)*," F. Blass, *op. cit.*, *apud* R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 399, n. 5.
15. R.H. Tukey, *ibid.*, p. 400. I have already pointed out this view does not take *De Dem.* III (ch. 53f.) and *De Dem.* IV (cc. 54-58), two essential parts of the treatise, into consideration - cp. p. 22.
16. "I shall add a few more things concerning his style and then proceed to *the remaining part of my <proposed> examination*; these are things equally connected with the three forms (of style) and are characteristic and inseparable features of every speech of Demosthenes" (34, 368:29 - 34,370:4).
17. νυνὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἑξῆς διαλέξομαι, τίς ὁ πραγματικός ἐστὶ Λυσίου χαρακτήρ, ἐπειδὴ τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς λέξεως λόγον ἀποδέδωκα. ("I shall now talk about the following matters - what are the characteristics of his treatment of subject-matter - now that I have dealt with his style.") (*De Lys.* 15,50:8-10); ταῦτα μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς λέξεως τοῦ ῥήτορος. τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ πραγματικῷ τόπῳ θεωρήματα ... ("So much for the style of the orator. In the treatment of subject-matter, however, ...") (*De Isocr.* 3,112:20 - 4,112:22.) (In LSJ (p. 796) the following meanings have been annotated under θεωρήματα: I 1) *sight, spectacle*; 2) *object of contemplation*; II 1) a) *speculation, theory*; b) *rule of art; scheme, plan*; c) *theorem*; 2) a) *subject of investigation* b) *investigation*. None of these meanings fits θεωρήματα in this passage, for Dionysius is saying that Isocrates'

*treatment* (θεώρημα) of subject-matter is sometimes similar to that of Lysias, sometimes better (τὰ μὲν ὁμοία τοῖς Λυσίου, τὰ δὲ κρείττονα, *De Isocr.* 4,112:22-23)). τὴν μὲν οὖν λέξιν οὕτως ἂν τις διαγνοίη, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι τοιαύτας τινὰς εὐρήσει διαφορὰς. ("Thus one could distinguish their style(s) in this way, and in their treatment of subject-matter one will find the following differences." (*De Is.* 3,178:5-7); εἰρηκῶς δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ... ("As I have also said concerning his treatment of subject-matter ..") (*De Is.* 14,206:5).

18. R.H. Tukey, *A note on Dionysius*, CR, 33 (1909), p. 187. This statement cannot be proven, which explains the hypothetical nature of the explanation proposed by Tukey. Granted, his hypothesis is very attractive, but it cannot be accepted for the following reasons:
- Firstly, Dionysius simply proceeds to the discussion of the sentence-arrangement of Demosthenes as if this section of the *De Dem.* had originally been intended to be part of this study: φέρε δὴ τούτων εἰρημένων ἡμῖν λέγωμεν ἤδη καὶ περὶ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων ἣ κέχρηται ὁ ἀνήρ (*De Dem.* 35,372:14-16). As a matter of fact, comparing this introductory sentence with the crucial sentence in ch. 34 (cp. p. 96), the most natural conclusion is that Dionysius regarded τὸ καταλειπόμενον τῆς προκειμένης θεωρίας μέρος (34,368:30 - 34,370:1) as his section on the sentence-arrangement proceeding from ch. 35; in ch. 34 he says: ὀλίγα τούτοις ἔτι προσθεῖς ("I shall add a few more things ..."), which he does in ch. 34. He starts ch. 35 by referring to this with the words: τούτων εἰρημένων ... ("Now that these things have been said ..."); in ch. 34 he says that he will then (i.e. "having said a few more things ...") proceed to the remaining part of his subject; in ch. 35 he proceeds to his new subject, the *compositio*, sentence-arrangement of Demosthenes, "having said these things ..." (referring to ch. 34): φέρε δὴ τούτων εἰρημένων ἡμῖν λέγωμεν ... The only acceptable conclusion is that τὸ καταλειπόμενον τῆς <προκειμένης> θεωρίας μέρος is his section on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes (or the remainder of the *De Dem.*, i.e. with the inclusion of *De Dem.* III and IV).
  - The second reason why this view of Tukey cannot be accepted, is closely linked with the first: why on earth would Dionysius include a new (i.e. unexpected and foreign) section in the *De Dem.*, leaving out the intended section on the subject-matter of Demosthenes, but make no attempt whatsoever to justify or explain this change

in plan? On pp. 85-88 I have discussed the problem of the missing introduction of the *De Dem.* and come to the conclusion that one can accept with certainty that Dionysius would have provided the basic outline of his treatise on Demosthenes. If my arguments there are plausible, it follows that a deviation from this plan would have caused confusion. It is a fact that all the works of Dionysius show a neatly organised plan, cp. pp. 23ff. above; therefore, the inclusion of a section not originally intended to be part of the treatise would be accompanied by an explanation. This is confirmed by the fact that, with the exception of the section on the delivery of the works of Demosthenes, Dionysius clearly indicates when he is making use of a digression - cp. ch. 1 of this dissertation, pp. 43-45 and 50-52 above. So, even if he had included *De Dem.* II only as a digression, he would not have left the reader in the dark.

- Finally, the view of Tukey cannot be accepted in view of the unity of the work. In ch. 1 of this dissertation, pp. 23ff., I tried to prove that *De Dem.* II and III have been included as sections on topics in connection with which Demosthenes' superiority was not questioned. This is a skilful device applied by Dionysius, by means of which the impact of the section of criticism (*De Dem.* IV) could be reduced to the minimum - cp. pp. 52f. above, n. 121. The different nature of *De Dem.* II (and III) does not prove that this section had not originally been intended to be part of the *De Dem.*; on the contrary, it is rather indicative of the ingenuity of Dionysius himself so far as the composition of the *De Dem.* is concerned.

In conclusion: the section on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes is indeed the section Dionysius is referring to with the expression: τὸ καταλειπόμενον μέρος.

19. The explanation of the genitive of τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου is crucial. If one takes it with πάντα (πάνθ'), the consequence is that Dionysius is saying that he wishes to show that he has done everything concerning (of) style (τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου) that he promised. This interpretation could then, obviously, favour the view of R.H. Tukey (cp. pp. 96f. above). I cannot accept this explanation of the genitive for the following reason: it is quite natural to take τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου with the immediately preceding, i.e. τῆς θαυρίας. In this case it is an

objective genitive, conveying a natural meaning to the phrase *θεωρίας τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τύπου*, viz. "examination of style". Consequently, πάντα (πάνθ') refers only to those promises he made in the introduction which he fulfilled in *De Dem.* I, and ἡ θεωρία τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τύπου does indeed refer to the *whole* of the *De Dem.* This interpretation of πάντα (πάνθ') is confirmed by the expression, τὸ καταλειπόμενον τῆς <προκειμένης> θεωρίας μέρος, "the remaining part of my proposed examination", at the beginning of ch. 34. In view of these arguments, I wish to translate the passage under discussion as follows: "But indeed I wish to recapitulate what has been said from the beginning and show that I have done everything that I promised (to do) at the start of my examination of style." (32,366: 16-19).

20. Why would Dionysius discuss "at length" the subject of composition after he allegedly had just completed a work on that subject? G. Pavano has drawn attention to this matter, arguing that such an elaborate theoretical exposition as *De Dem.* 36-41 was quite unnecessary if Dionysius only had the practical application of the theory in mind. (*Art. cit.*, p. 296.)
- Moreover, as I have already pointed out, Dionysius was constantly aware of the length of the *De Dem.* - cp. n. 17, pp. 68f.; if the *C.V.* had just preceded *De Dem.* II, Dionysius could have saved much time by referring to the *C.V.*, without giving in *De Dem.* II as much detail as he did. (Compare his reference to the *De Lys.* and the *De Isocr.* - cp. p. 110.) I suggest that, among others, a possible reason is that the *C.V.* had been written a considerable time before the *De Dem.*, in which case the elaborate theoretical digression in cc. 36-41 of the *De Dem.* is justified.
21. *Art. cit.*, pp. 187f. For a critical evaluation of this view, cp. n. 17, pp. 111f. above.
22. R.H. Tukey, *ibid.*, p. 188. (The italics are mine.) According to this scholar the *C.V.* represents a *new approach* to the subject of composition, "an *important advance* over its treatment in the earlier essays" (*Ibid.*) (*Ergo*, in the *De Dem.* I as well, my note.) One can even go further and say that this doctrine of Dionysius on the subject of composition *first came to light* in his *C.V.*: "he restated his doctrine of composition *as developed* in the *De Compositione* and applied it to Demosthenes." (*ibid.*) (Cp. "new grasp of the subject ...", *ibid.*,

and "new knowledge ...", *The Composition of the 'De oratoribus antiquis' of Dionysius*, CP, 4 (1909), p. 400.) From these remarks it follows that Tukey was convinced that *nothing of his new approach* to the subject of composition, as seen in the *C.V.*, will be reflected in *De Dem. I*: "With this new knowledge he returned to the essay on Demosthenes." (*Ibid.*) (I.e. the second part of the *De Dem.*, my note.)

However, I wish to prove that Dionysius understood σύνθεσις *in the sense of the C.V. already in De Dem. I*. He did so in the case of Isocrates and even, although to a lesser extent, in that of Plato as well, whereas he adhered to the old system of σύνθεσις in the case of Demosthenes (cp. pp. 102ff. and 129ff.). (The italics in all these cases are mine.)

A more moderate view is voiced by some scholars who maintain that the theory of the *C.V.* as such does not appear in the works of Dionysius preceding the *C.V.*, but that some musical concepts can indeed be traced in works written before the *C.V.* - at least in the *De Isocr.* (e.g. *De Isocr.* 2,108:2 - 3,110:23; 13,136.) Comparing *De Dem.* 36 with *C.V.* 21, E. Kalinka remarks: "Besonders hat es ihm der musikalische Ausdruck ἄνεσις καὶ ἐπίτασις angetan, den er 44 (*De Dem.* 44, my note) ... und 46 (*De Dem.* 46, my note) ... wiederholt, aber schon 13 (*De Dem.* 13, my note) ..., ja schon Ἰσοκράτης 13 = I 73<sub>3</sub> (*De Isocr.* 13, my note) kennt." (E. Kalinka, *art. cit.* II, p. 52.) According to this view, one could argue that Dionysius did conceive σύνθεσις in terms of musicality before he wrote the *C.V.*, but that it was not till he finally committed his ideas concerning this subject to paper in the *C.V.* that his ideas became fixed and logically related to one another in a new system. All the evidence of a musical concept of σύνθεσις in *De Dem. I* would then, according to this hypothesis, represent a phase in which his ideas on this subject had not yet been fixed; but having written the *C.V.* during an alleged break in the transitional chapters (cc. 32-35) of the *De Dem.*, his ideas on this subject would be fixed and would have become an integral part of the ἀρμονία system. This would then be reflected in the repetition of his theory in *De Dem. II*. Consequently, a comparison of the relevant information of *De Dem. I*, *C.V.* and *De Dem.* is called for now.

- Firstly, it must be noted that Dionysius was not the first rhetorician to realize that prose language is musical as well. In her dissertation on Dionysius' system of ἀρμονία, Karin Pohl devotes one chapter (pp. 69-126) to the problem of the sources of Dionysius

so far as this system is concerned. Referring to the *C.V.*, the theoretical work in which this system is also discussed, she says: "*Die Schrift De c. v. bildet ein Konglomerat der verschiedenartigsten Quellen, die aus Bereichen der Rhetorik, Poetik und Ästhetik, Grammatik und Musiktheorie stammen.*" (K. Pohl, *Die Lehre von den drei Wortfügungsarten* (Diss.), Tübingen, 1968, p. 72). Dionysius did not invent the theory of musical σύνθεσις; he did not even develop the system of three types of ἀρμονία ("dasz sich drei Fügungsarten bereits vor Dionys nachweisen lassen ...", *ibid.*, p. 70). Dionysius merely selected in an eclectic way from a wide variety of theories and proceeded to develop his personal system based on the more or less widely spread principle of the musicality of language.

- Secondly, the comparison of relevant material in *De Dem.* I, the *C.V.* and *De Dem.* II will prove that *De Dem.* I does not represent an earlier stage compared to the *C.V.*; on the contrary, it will prove that no substantial difference between *De Dem.* I and the *C.V.* on the one hand, and *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II on the other hand, can be detected, from which the conclusion can be drawn that the *C.V.* must have been written before *De Dem.* I as well - for the detail of this comparison, cp. pp. 103f. and 129ff.

23. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, II, p. 50 and pp. 52f. as well. Neither Tukey nor Kalinka explains why the alleged break should have taken place between cc. 32 and 33, rather than between cc. 33 and 34, or cc. 34 and 35. The reason for their choice of a break between cc. 32 and 33 is probably the fact that ch. 33 is an extensive recapitulation of the argument up to that point. One could argue that the reason for the extensive recapitulation in cc. 33 and 34 was the natural result of the fact that Dionysius had put *De Dem.* I aside for a considerable time and wrote this recapitulation as a transition to the special subject of σύνθεσις. However, in ch. 1, pp. 10ff. above, I have shown that the application of the structural principles of introduction and recapitulation were so typical of the style of Dionysius, that he would never have set his work aside at the close of ch. 32 without adding a recapitulation. Cc. 33 and 34 are the recapitulation of cc. 1 to 32, a natural, logical conclusion to these chapters, and there is nothing in the content, nor in the way it is presented, that suggests that Dionysius did not *immediately* proceed to add this recapitulation to this part of his work. (S.F. Bonner suggests that the alleged break must have taken place between cc. 33 and 34 - cp. pp. 99f. above.)

24. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

25. Dionysius, then, is thinking of the *De Dem.* as a whole, which implies that the *De Dem.* has *not yet been completed*, and he does not indicate where he is criticizing Plato, nor whether he has completed his criticism of him or not. As such this is quite acceptable, but I intend to prove that other evidence from the content of *De Dem.* I, and evidence specifically concerning sentence-arrangement at that, proves that the *C.V.* had been completed before the *De Dem.*-cp. pp. 102ff. Another hypothetical possibility, though not advocated by any scholar, is that one could think that the *C.V.* and *only De Dem.* I - not the whole of the essay on Demosthenes, as suggested by E. Kalinka - were composed *simultaneously*, in which case the cross-references in *C.V.* 18 to *De Dem.* I, and those in the σύνθεσις passages on Isocrates in *De Dem.* I to the *C.V.*, could be explained. Thus, if *C.V.* 18 would refer to *De Dem.* 6 and 23-25, this might mean that Dionysius had completed the *De Dem.* at least up to ch. 25 when he wrote ch. 18 of the *C.V.* However, this possibility is directly refuted by the references in the *De Dem.* to the *C.V.* concerning Isocrates, for ch. 4 and ch. 18 of the *De Dem.* rely on the theory developed in the *C.V.*, especially in ch. 23, where the smooth type of composition is described. This entails the conclusion that ch. 23 of the *C.V.* *must have been completed before ch. 4 of the De Dem.*

I now firstly intend to prove that the *C.V.* could not have been written during an alleged break between *De Dem.* I and II, cp. pp. 101ff.; secondly, I intend to suggest that ἐηλοῦται (*C.V.* 18) should be taken as referring to a future event, thereby removing the final obstruction to the view that the *C.V.* preceded the *De Dem.* - cp. pp. 104f.

26. "Aber λέξις ist mehrdeutig ...", E. Kalinka, *art cit.*, II, p. 50.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.* The argument of E. Kalinka seems so convincing that no alternative seems possible. However, his view cannot be accepted for the following reasons.

Firstly, although he is quite correct in saying that λέξις cannot be restricted to one sense (cp. glossary, s.v.), Dionysius is not using this word (λέξις) at the end of ch. 32 of the *De Dem.*, but λεκτικός: πάνθ', ὅσα ὑπεσχόμεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς θεωρίας τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τύπου ... (32,366:19-20). Although λεκτικός is an adjective derived from λέξις, it is likewise true that it is linguistically more correct to determine its meaning by analysis of its own use. This adjective

is only used on four occasions in the *De Dem.*: at 35,374:10, substantivated and meaning 'diction', and at 32,366:19 as well as 51, 434:9 and 18. In the case of the last three instances it is being used together with τόπος in the expression ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος - an expression which represents a fixed concept in Dionysius of Halicarnassus: the whole field of expressing ideas (opposed to πραγματικὸς τόπος). Consequently, it appears unjustified to say that this fixed expression does not have its common meaning, but refers only to diction, ἐκλογή τῶν ὀνομάτων.

Secondly, it is important to note that Dionysius does not say that he will proceed to τὸ καταλειπόμενον τῆς προκειμένης θεωρίας μέρος τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου (My spacing of print) in ch. 34. The expression τῆς θεωρίας τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου is used only at 32,366:18-19.

From this it seems justified to infer that θεωρία in ch. 34 is used in a broad sense, referring to *all* that Dionysius wishes to discuss in the *De Dem.*, whereas θεωρία in ch. 32 only refers to what he has done up to that point. This explains why he says in ch. 32, where the complete expression ἡ θεωρία τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου is used, that he is going to recapitulate and show that he has discussed everything he had promised (δεῖξαι πᾶνθ', ὅσα ὑπεσχόμεν ἄρχόμενος τῆς θεωρίας τοῦ λεκτικοῦ τόπου, πεποιηκότα ἑμαυτὸν - 32,366:18-19) but does not include the phrase λεκτικὸς τόπος in ch. 34 where he says that he is going to return to the remaining part of his examination, ἡ θεωρία.

Thirdly, the view of Kalinka cannot be accepted because the text itself proves that Dionysius did not restrict himself to the ἐκλογή in *De Dem.* I. As a matter of fact, he not only used the σύνθεσις in his discussion in *De Dem.* I, but used it even in the same sense as in the *C.V.*, which E. Kalinka believed to have been written after he had completed *De Dem.* I, or during the alleged interval between cc. 32 and 33. For detail on this matter, cp. pp. 102ff. and 129ff. above.

29. In fact, he is convinced that similar interruptions occurred between cc. 9 and 10, during which time *Ep. ad Amm.* I was written, and between cc. 50 and 51, during which time the *De Thuc.* and the *Tabulae criticae* were written.
30. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.*, II, p. 52f. For the sake of criticism, it is important to note that this scholar did not recognise the presence of σύνθεσις in the sense of the *C.V.* in the chapters preceding the pericope he is referring to, viz. *De Dem.* 36. Consequently, if one

can prove this wrong, (which I hope to do - cp. pp. 102ff.) the hypothesis of an interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.* will become unnecessary and unjustified.

31. Comparing *C.V.* 21 and *De Dem.* 36f., Kalinka remarks: "Aber schon von  $\Delta\eta\mu\lambda$  36f. (i.e. *De Dem.* 36f., my note) *musz*  $\sigma\upsilon\nu\theta$  *entstanden sein, weil dort A u s d r ü c k e* bereits geläufig sind, die hier erst geprägt werden." (E. Kalinka, *ibid.*, p. 52.); and: "Die *Terminologie*, die er hier (i.e. *C.V.* 21, my note) erst einführt oder doch einzuführen vorgibt, steht ihm  $\Delta\eta\mu\lambda$  36f. (i.e. *De Dem.* 36f., my note) schon fest." (*Ibid.*); and: "Besonders hat es ihm der musikalische Ausdruck  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  και  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma$  angetan ..." (*Ibid.*) (My spacing of print in every case). Although the three types of  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha$  play no rôle in *De Dem.* I, I hope to prove that Dionysius made use of the *C.V.* in *De Dem.* I as well - to my mind the most important matter in this dispute concerning the chronological relation between the *C.V.* and the *De Dem.* - cp. pp. 102ff. and 129ff. above.
32. E. Kalinka, *ibid.*
33. E. Kalinka, *ibid.*, p. 53. The use of  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$  on this spot is indeed non-technical, for when Dionysius proceeds to supply reasons why he regards this passage of Isocrates as  $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$ , he enumerates a few of the  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron\iota$   $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota$  (cp. n. 35, p. 121 below). If it was used in a technical sense as part of the  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota$  τῆς λέξεως system, it would mean that all the  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota$  enumerated as motivation for this statement, must contribute to  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$  in a technical sense; this is simply not possible, for this feature was merely *one* of the  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\tau\omicron\iota$   $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\iota$  - not the most important one. Although this might seem to strengthen the argument of Kalinka, truth is that this non-technical use of  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$  is not restricted to *De Dem.* I: in 46,418:3, 48,422:4 as well as 48,424:21 (all three cases occurring in *De Dem.* II) he uses  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$  in a non-technical sense, in the section of this essay where, according to Kalinka, only the highly technical uses of  $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{o}\varsigma$  is used (46,418:3: τούς καλοὺς ἐκείνους λόγους ... ("those beautiful speeches ..."); 48,422:4-5: τὸ κάλλιστον ... μέλος ... ("the most beautiful melody ..."); 48,424:21: ἡ καλῶς κατεσκευασμένη λέξις ... ("style constructed in a fine way ...") (Cp. 36,376:24 as well). These evidence deprive the argument of Kalinka from any validity.
34. 47,418:27 - 47,420:2. As a matter of fact, Kalinka is convinced that the presentation of this theory in *De Dem.* II, more specifically in ch. 48, even represents a development beyond the *C.V.* - *ibid.*

35. The whole question of τὸ καλόν and τὸ ἡδύ (called ἡ ἡδονή in my chapter I, p. 19 above) is complex and full of inconsistencies to which G. Pavano refers (*art. cit.*, p. 283) and which have recently been discussed by D.M. Schenkeveld (*Theories of evaluation in the rhetorical treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, Museum Philologum Londoniense, 1 (1978), pp. 93-107). In this article prof. Schenkeveld discusses the difference between τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν in terms of the way in which these qualities are detected by the audience: the irrational faculty of man (ἡ ἄλογος αἴσθησις; τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον) is concerned with τὸ ἡδύ, the rational (τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον) with τὸ καλόν. Other evidence, however, shows that τὸ καλόν can also be discerned by the irrational faculty of man. The solution proposed by prof. Schenkeveld is as follows: the listener firstly evaluates a literary text by means of his faculty of ἄλογος αἴσθησις, by means of which he becomes aware of the feature of τὸ ἡδύ. The technical perfection, τὸ καλόν, however, will be evaluated in the subsequent process, by means of the rational capacity of man, τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον: "when evaluating, the layman and the expert first judge a literary text by means of their irrational perception and establish by this means the presence, or absence, of τὰ ἡδέα. This being done, the expert takes over, practises his specific skill, founded on *logos*, and ascertains, on a scientific basis, the technical perfection of the text." (D.M. Schenkeveld, *art. cit.*, p. 103). So far as the *De Dem.* is concerned, the reader is faced with the intricate situation that both qualities (τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν) are applied in the three different systems of evaluation: in the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system as two ἀρεταί (among others) of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί; in the χαρακτηρες τῆς λέξεως system as two features of one of the types of style, and in the ἁρμονία system each separately as the objective of the two extreme types of ἁρμονία.

Returning to the criticism of Kalinka's view, the following remarks will prove its invalidity: having drawn attention to the inconsistencies related to these two terms, G. Pavano remarks that they cannot be put forward as evidence of a development in Dionysius' ideas on this topic, for all these inconsistencies refer to the theoretical basis of Dionysius' system: "*Tutto questo comunque riguarda la base teorica del sistema di D. (Dionysius, my note), che potrebbe tutto - partizione per partizione - essere sottoposto a una facile critica. Ma de ciò*

*naturalmente non potrebbe venire alcun appoggio alla tesi del Kalinka," (Art. cit., p. 284.) Kalinka is indeed comparing two different systems with each other: in the ἁρμονία system τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν are raised to the extraordinary position of the *aim* of composition: τὸ ἡδύ of the smooth type of composition, and τὸ καλόν of the rough composition (*De Dem.* 47,418:27 - 47,420:2). On the other hand, τὸ καλόν and τὸ ἡδύ are treated merely as two of the many ἐπίθετοι κόσμοι in the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system of Dionysius, which need not, in contrast with the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί, be all present in every passage (cp. p. 140 below). I have already indicated that the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system plays a major rôle in *De Dem.* I (cp. ch. 1, p. 10 above), and I shall discuss this matter in detail in the next chapter. At this moment the following remarks will suffice: ch. 18 of this work of Dionysius is one of the chapters where Dionysius is applying this system in his discussion of a quotation in order to evaluate the style of an author. In accordance with his practice in the books of vol. I of the *De or. ant.* he starts with the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί:*

τὸ καθαρόν (ὁ ἑλληνισμός) (purity) at 18,302:26-30;

τὸ σαφές (lucidity) at 18,302:30 - 18,304:1;

τὸ σύντομον (conciseness) at 18,304:7ff.; and

τὸ πρόπον (propriety) at 18,304:27ff.

In his discussion the ἐπίθετοι κόσμοι (or ἀρεταί) are considered as well, as "virtues" of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system: καὶ γὰρ ὑψηλὴ καὶ ... ἡδεῖα ... ἐστίν (18,304:2-4). It is to be noticed that this is introduced by: πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπιθέτων κόσμων ἔχει (18,304:1-2). Thus in this case the ἡδύ to which Kalinka refers, is operating as one of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί and not as the τέλος of one of the ἁρμονία. Although τὸ καλόν is not present in the same explicit way as τὸ ἡδύ, it seems to appear in καλλιρρήμων (18,304:3) and in any case, since the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system is being applied here, τὸ καλόν plays a rôle, although a subordinate one, in this system as well; it does not operate here as the τέλος of one of the ἁρμονία, but *technically* as one of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί.

In conclusion: τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν as constituents of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system cannot be equated with τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν in the ἁρμονία system.

Kalinka could argue that this does not refute his thesis, for the thought of ch. 18 of the *De Dem.* could still represent a less elaborated

stage of Dionysius' theory of ἡδύ - καλόν, despite the difference of evaluation system. The reply to this is simple: Dionysius applies three systems, the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως, χαρακτηῆρες τῆς λέξεως and the ἁρμονία system, according to the necessities of the moment. Although the view of ἡδύ - καλόν in the ἁρμονία system may represent a progress in comparison with ch. 18, Dionysius neither *abandons* the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system, nor even his view concerning καλόν - ἡδύ in this system: 'the conclusive proof can be found in the work of Dionysius on Thucydides, the *De Thucydide* (*De Thuc.*), which has been written *after* the *De Dem.* Although the ἁρμονία system and his opinion concerning ἡδύ - καλόν in this system may be regarded as the better or more developed ones, he yet applies the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system and his view concerning καλόν - ἡδύ of the latter system in that (more recent) book of his: τὸ ἡδύ as well as τὸ καλόν are regarded as two of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταὶ (*De Thuc.* 23,524:10ff., cp. p. 141 below). In the quoted passage a synonym of τὸ καλόν has been used, viz. ἡ καλλιρόημοσύνη, but in ch. 48 (48,608:4) κάλλος is used as one of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταὶ along with τὸ τάχος (rapidity), ὁ τόνος (intensity), ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια (magnificence), ἡ δεινότης (forceful persuasiveness), and τὸ πάθος (passion) (48,406:4-6). Contrary to this one seeks in vain for the distinctive sense of these qualities (i.e. τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ καλόν) as seen in the ἁρμονία system.

In short, the view of ἡδύ - καλόν in *De Dem.* I does not represent an earlier stage of the ἁρμονία system and the differences so far as these two features are concerned are no indication of an alleged progress of thought between *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II. (Cp. discussion at n. 33, p. 119 as well.)

36. E. Kalinka, *ibid.*, p. 55. The difference in attitude towards Plato in *De Dem.* I and in *De Dem.* II could favour the hypothesis of an interruption, but on this point this scholar does not seem to have convinced anyone, despite his favourable position as an exponent of the popular theory of interruption. Even S.F. Bonner, who favours this hypothesis as well, already pointed out that "Dionysius' praise of Plato in *De Comp. Verb.* and *De Dem.* c. 41 is for his σύνθεσις - quite a different thing from the subject of his censure in the first half of *De Dem.*" (*Op. cit.*, p. 33, n. 3). It is indeed so that in *De Dem.* I Plato's ἐμλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων is criticized in terms of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. In *De Dem.* II Dionysius is not applying

the ἀρετὰ τῆς λέξεως system and the σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων is being evaluated on the basis of musicality (cp. my next chapter, pp. 139ff. below). From this point of view Dionysius does not raise any point of criticism against Plato.

Furthermore, in the case of Isocrates Dionysius is indeed severely criticizing the σύνθεσις of his style in *De Dem.* I (cp. pp. 13-15 and 25f. above) whereas in *De Dem.* II, ch. 40, he quotes Isocrates (40,394:14 - 40,396:30), but refrains from any form of criticism.

In the case of both Plato and Isocrates the answer is quite simple: in *De Dem.* I Dionysius has the set purpose to *prove* that Demosthenes is the best; consequently one can expect that all other classic writers will have to be criticized. In *De Dem.* II Dionysius is not trying to *prove* anything; he is giving a theoretical exposition of Demosthenes' σύνθεσις in terms of the ἁρμονία system. He is not trying to *prove* the superiority of Demosthenes in this respect (in which case he would have ended up with comparisons and criticism in order to prove his point), but is merely giving a theoretical exposition of the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes. (Cp. p. 9 above). Furthermore, Dionysius regarded Plato's ability in this aspect of style, viz. σύνθεσις, as exceptionally high. As a matter of fact, in *C.V.* 18 he says that no one would be able to find any fault with him so far as this aspect is concerned (cp. n. 4, p. 108 above). So, in any case, even if Dionysius intended to compare Plato with Demosthenes on the basis of σύνθεσις, Plato would have been treated more favourably than in *De Dem.* I.

In view of these two arguments, as well as of the fact that the superiority of Demosthenes in this aspect of style was unanimously accepted (cp. pp. 9, 30 (n. 11) and 47 (n. 95) above), criticism of either Isocrates or Plato would be out of place.

Thus the difference between *De Dem.* I and II so far as Plato (as well as Isocrates) is concerned, cannot be put forward as an argument in favour of the hypothesis of an interruption between cc. 32 and 33 of the *De Dem.*

37. "Dionysius is clearly drawing to the conclusion of his study of the λέξις of Demosthenes in c. 33," *op. cit.*, p. 32.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. S.F. Bonner does not really give an acceptable explanation for this "second summary". He fails to see that ch. 34 is just as indispensable as ch. 33 as part of the conclusion of cc. 1-32. I have already

discussed this matter in ch. 1 of my study, n. 22, p. 32 above, and shall give more detail in my next chapter, pp. 142ff. below: in ch. 33 Dionysius summarizes the preceding chapters in terms of the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως system, and in ch. 34 in terms of the ὁρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. This latter part of the summary is just as important as the former, for the ὁρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system is in fact the evaluation system according to which Dionysius proves the superiority of Demosthenes above Isocrates and Plato in cc. 16ff.

41. "I shall therefore return to the remainder of what I proposed to speak about at the beginning." (46,418:13-14).
42. "Having added a few more things concerning his style, I shall proceed to the remainder of my <proposed> examination ..." (34,368:28 - 34,370:1).
43. For three reasons this second argument of S.F. Bonner cannot be accepted. Firstly, ἐν ἀρχῇ cannot refer to a fresh, new start, for the phrase τὸ καταλειπόμενον τῆς προκειμένης θεωρίας μέρος (34,368:28 - 34,370:1), which refers to this very section (cp. n. 17, pp. 111f. above) proves that Dionysius regarded it as an integral section of his study on Demosthenes. As a matter of fact, this phrase echoes the lost introduction of the *De Dem.*, in which one can expect Dionysius would have mentioned this section on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes (cp. n. 76, pp. 85-88 above). Secondly, the sentence under discussion (viz. ἐπάνειμι κ.τ.λ., 46,418:13-14) is the last sentence of an extensive digression (cp. n.77, pp. 44f.) above) on variation and appropriateness, starting at ch. 44. Before this digression Dionysius has discussed the first topic: which of the three major types of musical composition is applied by Demosthenes? In ch. 43 he proves that Demosthenes does indeed use the mixed type of composition. By using the expression ἐν ἀρχῇ he simply wants to state it clearly that he is not returning to the topic he has been discussing up to the point where he started his digression, i.e. in ch. 44, but that he intends to proceed to a new topic according to his introduction in ch. 35. ἐν ἀρχῇ is simply a phrase inserted to limit confusion and to recall the topics mentioned in the introduction to this section on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes. Thirdly, if ἐν ἀρχῇ signifies a new start, why did Dionysius return to the subject of *De Dem.* I in the final section of his work, viz. *De Dem.* IV, cc. 54-58? (Cp. my first chapter, pp. 23ff. above). We

may rest assured that *De Dem.* II had been intended from the start to be part of the *De Dem.*, and that its inclusion was deliberately done in such a way as to conceal the last section or reduce all possible negative effects that could result from hearing (or reading) *De Dem.* IV, to the minimum - cp. nn. 117, 118 and 121 (pp. 50-53) above.

So far as the content is concerned, one does notice a definite break between cc. 34 and 35, where the new topic is introduced. Although many scholars have favoured the hypothesis of a break in the composition of the *De Dem.*, I have not come across even one who suggested that the alleged break was supposed to have taken place between cc. 34 and 35. In any case, the break between these two chapters is quite natural considering the content of cc. 35ff., but as such cannot be indicative of any break in composition, simply because similar breaks so far as the content is concerned, occur in all the other literary works of Dionysius. (I am referring to the definite break in the essays in every case where Dionysius proceeds from the discussion of the *πραγματικὸς* τόπος of the writer to his *λεπτικὸς* τόπος, or *vice versa* in the case of Thycydides.)

44. "To meet this difficulty, with the never-to-be-defeated ingenuity so often displayed by even the best scholars (*but so rarely to be commended*) the theory has been put forward that the 'Demosthenes' should be split in two. ... For such a theory there is *no evidence* ... I am inclined to consider any interpretation which makes nonsense of the essential structure of a Dionysian treatise as more likely *to be itself nonsense*." (G.M.A. Grube, *Thrasymachus, Theophrastus, and Dionysius*, AJP, 73 (1952), p. 262, n. 15.) (The italics are mine.)
45. This is the oldest division of the parts of speech; further subdivisions were introduced at a later stage.
46. *C.V.* 5,100:8-12.
47. Still in ch. 5 of the *C.V.*
48. "and (*sc.* his style is) even more (*sc.* at fault) when, in his pursuit of *beauty of sound and rhythm*, he admits (only) with caution the *clashing of vowels* and uses *some of the rough consonants* (only) with caution." (4,252:29 - 4,254:4). (The italics are mine).
49. 18,304:16. Cp. 18,306:3-5: τὸ δ' ἐκ παντὸς ἠδύνειν τὰς ἀκοὰς εὐκρίνων τε καὶ μαλακῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκλογῇ ... ("To please the ear by every means, by the selection of sweet- and soft-sounding words ...")

50. "I criticize the smoothness and softness of the style." (20,312:15-16).
51. 20,312:16-17.
52. "On the contrary, it is smooth and even, and flowing without noise *through the ear* like oil, all because it is seeking to charm and *delight* it." (20,312:18-20). (The italics are mine.)
53. 18,306:5-6.
54. λυμῖνεται γοῦν τὴν τε συμμετρίαν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν εὐφωνίαν. ("at least, it causes damage to both its balance and (its) euphony.") (24,332:10-11). Granted, συμμετρία need not refer to any musical quality, but εὐφωνία most certainly does.
55. Some scholars, like E. Kalinka, who favour the view of an interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.*, acknowledge the fact that Dionysius did have a musical concept of σύνθεσις before the *C.V.* was written, but claim that these ideas were not founded on any elaborate theory before he composed the *C.V.* I hope to prove that this view is not correct, and that no difference can be shown in the comparable material of the *C.V.*, *De Dem.* I and *De Dem.* II. It is also possible that the incompleteness of the theoretical information concerning this new approach to σύνθεσις in *De Dem.* I is related to the very presence of *De Dem.* II in the work on Demosthenes: Dionysius knew beforehand that he was going to give sufficient information in *De Dem.* II on all the aspects of this new concept - where a digression on the theory of the σύνθεσις would be appropriate. This would nicely explain why the information on this new system in *De Dem.* I is not only incomplete, but also made in passing.

However, it is obvious that, in spite of so many similarities between *De Dem.* I and II, or *De Dem.* I and the *C.V.* in connection with this new system of σύνθεσις, the idea of the three basic types of ὁμοιότητα, so dominant in both the *C.V.* and *De Dem.* II plays no rôle at all in *De Dem.* I. The reason for this, it can plausibly be argued, is that Dionysius did not use the system of the three ὁμοιότητα as a basis of evaluation in *De Dem.* I, although he did make use of his new concept of σύνθεσις in his appraisal of especially Isocrates, where it is quite applicable by reason of this author's specific style. In short: because of the peculiar smoothness and musicality of Isocrates' style, Dionysius could hardly evaluate it justly without doing it in terms of his system based on musicality; on the other hand, the very aim of *De Dem.* II, as well as that of *De Dem.* I, made a complete theoretical presentation of this theory in *De Dem.* I unnecessary.

56. These subjects are not the only ones in terms of which the σύνθεσις is explained, but since one does not come across any information concerning the other aspects (e.g. rhythm and cola) in *De Dem.* I, they have not been included in the tabulation.
57. Cp. the appendices, included for the sake of clarity and verification, pp. 129ff. below.
58. C.T. Roessler, *Dionysii Halicarnassensis scriptorum rhetoricorum fragmenta: collegit, disposuit, praefatus est Car. Theod. Roessler*, Leipzig, 1873, *apud* R.H. Tukey, *The Composition of the 'De Oratoribus Antiquis'*, p. 399, n. 6. At that time the hypothesis of an interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.* had already been put forward by F. Blass (*ibid.*, p. 399), and an interpretation which did not give due consideration to this hypothesis, was apt to be overruled. F. Blass, biased by the idea of an interruption in the composition of the *De Dem.*, reacted against this interpretation of C.T. Roessler in the *Philologischer Anzeiger*, 5 (1873), p. 353, defending his own interpretation (present tense used as a perfect).
59. *Apud* R.H. Tukey, *art. cit.*, p. 400. Cp. my discussion above, pp. 93ff.
60. Cp. H.W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 421, par. 1879: "Present of Anticipation."
61. Cp. F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, Cambridge: University Press, repr. 1961, p. 168, par. 323: "In confident assertions regarding the future, a vivid, realistic present may be used for the future ...", and C.F.D. Moule, *An Idiom-book of New Testament Greek*, Cambridge: University Press, 1968, p. 7: quoting J.H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*, vol. I, *Prolegomena* (third edition, T. and T. Clark), 1908, p. 120, he says that "Futural Presents differ from the Future 'mainly in the tone of assurance which is imparted'."
62. J.P. Louw, *Verbale Aspek in Grieks*, Taalfasette, Part 8-15 (1971), p. 25.
63. J.P. Louw, *ibid.*, p. 26.
64. When he promises Ammaeus that he shall present to him (*fut.*: ὀποδίσσωμεν, *De Dem.* 58,454:22) a subsequent treatise on Demosthenes' way of handling subject-matter, he betrays his uncertainty with the following words: ἐὰν ἐξ σώζη τὸ δαυμόνιον ἡμᾶς ... ("And if God preserves me ...") (58,454:18-19); and even when he is very certain about writing a forthcoming book and goes so far as to announce the time of delivery (εἰς νέετα πάλιν ὥραις ταῖς αὐταῖς ...) ("next year at the

same festive season ...") (C.V. 1, 68:14), he still deems it necessary to add: θεῶν ἡμῶς φυλαπτόντων ἀσινεῖς τε καὶ ἀνόσοοις, εἰ εἴποτε ἡμῖν ἄρα τούτου πέπραται βεβαίως τυχεῖν. ("if indeed it has been fated that I shall certainly attain the blessing from the gods to guard me from accidents and *diseases*."') (C.V. 1,68:15-16) (The italics and spacing of print are mine). This reference to diseases seems to suggest that Dionysius was not a healthy man; this could be the main reason for his uncertainty concerning the future. If this was indeed the case (i.e. that he was not healthy), one can assume with certainty that his friends, among whom Metilius Rufus, the man to whom he promised to criticize Plato's ἐκλογία, might be sceptical. This fact could urge him not to use a future tense, which would give rise to doubts - which he wanted to avoid, so far as the fulfilment of this promise was concerned.

65. Cp. n. 48, pp. 76f. above.
66. Cp. n. 36, pp. 122f. above.
67. H.W. Smyth, *op. cit.*, p. 421, *par.* 1878.
68. C.F.D. Moule *op. cit.*, p. 7. This idea of vividness is closely related to what has been said by E. Schwyzer concerning the present tense used for the future (*praesens pro futuro*): "*vor dem Auge des Sehers die Zukunft gegenwärtig erscheint (wie bei der künstlerischen Verwendung des praesens pro praeterito die Vergangenheit ...*" (E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*, Vol. II, München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1910, p. 273.)
69. F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
70. J.P. Low, *art. cit.*, p. 25.

APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER III

*Comparison between C.V., De Dem. I and De Dem II in terms of the musical approach to language*  
*(Translation on pp. 133ff.)*

DESCRIPTION	C.V.	DE DEM. I	DE DEM. II	
quality of words chosen	<p>εὐφωνάτε εἶναι            βούλεται πάντα τὰ ὄνοματα            καὶ λαεκά καὶ            μιλακὰ καὶ παρθενατά.            (xxiii, 234:14-15);</p> <p>ἡ εὐέπερα (xxii,            246:1);</p> <p>τοραχελιας δέ            συλλαβαῖς καὶ ἀντιτύποις            ἀρέχεται που. (xxiii, 234:            15-16).</p>	<p>τὸ δὲ τῆς λέξεως λαετον            καὶ μιλακὸν            αἰτιῶμαι. (20, 312:15-16);</p> <p>εὐφῶνων τε καὶ            μιλακῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκλογῆ.            (18, 306:4-5);</p> <p>ἡ εὐέπερα (4, 254:1);</p> <p>ψοφοδεής (18, 304:16);</p> <p>δι' εὐλαβείας δὲ ποιεῖται τὸ            χρῆσασθαι τινι τῶν            τοραχυνόντων.            (4, 254:3-4).</p>	<p>λέξιν ἕξ εὐφῶνων συνιεῖσθαι            νοσημάτων καὶ μιλακῶν.            (40, 390:9-10);</p> <p>ὀνομάτων αἰεὶ βούλεται λαμβάνειν            τὰ λαετότατα καὶ μιλακ-            ῶτατα, τὴν εὐφωνίαν            κεραιμένη καὶ τὴν εὐμέλειαν, ἕξ            αὐτῶν δὲ τὸ ἦδύ. (40, 388:19-21);</p> <p>εὐέπερα (40, 390:4).</p>	<p>φεύγει μὲν ἁπλῶς            τὰς τῶν φωνῶν            συμβολὰς ... (40, 390:2-3).</p>
clashing of vowels	<p>φωνῆντων μὲν γάρ            ἀντιτυπίαν οὐκ            ἄν εὐρολις οὐδεμί-            ῶν ... (xxiii, 244:25-26)</p>	<p>δὲ εὐλαβείας μὲν            λαμβάνει τὸ σφ-            κροῦσα τὰ φω-            νῆντα τῶν γραμ-            μάτων ... (4, 254:1-3).</p>	<p>φεύγει μὲν ἁπλῶς            τὰς τῶν φωνῶν            συμβολὰς ... (40, 390:2-3).</p>	<p>φεύγει μὲν ἁπλῶς            τὰς τῶν φωνῶν            συμβολὰς ... (40, 390:2-3).</p>



## DESCRIPTION

C.V.

DE DEM. I

DE DEM. II

type of sentence (Βούλεται) ... καὶ πᾶν τὰ εἰς περὶ ὁδὸν τελευτῶν.

(xxiii, 234:20);

διώκει δ' ἐκ παντὸς τὸ πού τὴν περιόδον συντίθων. ... (4, 254:4-5).

(40, 392:14-15).

ἀπερίοδον δέ λέγειν ...  
οὐκ ἀνυπομένειεν ἐργάσασθαι.  
(xxiii, 234:23 - xxiii, 236:1).

type of period καὶ τῶν περιόδων τὸς τελευτὰς εὐρύθμουσ εἶναι βούλεται καὶ βεβηκίας ὡς ἀνὸς στάθμης ... (xxiii, 236:3-4).

(περίοδον) οὐδὲ ταύτην στρογγύλην καὶ πυκνήν ἀλλ' ὑπεργωγὴν καὶ ἤντινα καὶ πλάττειν καὶ πολλοὺς ἀγκῶνας, ὥστε οἱ μὴ κατ' εὐθείας ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ ποιοῦσιν, ἐγνωπλισμένην. (4, 254:5-8); καὶ πάντα ἀξιούσιν εἰς εὐρύθμουσ κατακλείειν περιόδων ἀριονίας. (18, 306:5-6).

εὐκέρως δὲ φαίνονται καὶ εὐγρᾶμιμοὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἰς ἕδραν ἀσφαλήν τελευτῶσιν. (40, 392:18-19); αἱ δὲ ὑπερτεταί τε καὶ κερυμένα. (43, 410:11).

figures of speech (σχημασί) ... τοῖς τρουφεροῖς τε καὶ κολακικοῖς ὡς τὰ πολλά χαῖσθαι φιλεῖ, ἐν οἷς παύσασθαι ἀπατηλὸν ἐστὶ θεατρικόν.

(xxiii, 236:9-10);

διὰ τῶν θεατρικῶν σχημάτων καλλαρῖζειν ... (18, 306:6-7); ἔστι τὰ μελικολώδη πᾶρσι καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ ἀντιθετα καὶ τὰ τῶν δὲ σχημάτων διώκει τὰ κλητικώτατα τῶν ὄχλων ... ὧν εἰσὶν αἶτε παρσιώσεσ και παρομοιωσεσ και ἀντιθεσεσ και τὰ παρωνομοσ-

DESCRIPTION

C. V.

DE DEM. I

DE DEM. II

οἱ οχηματισμοὶ πολλὸν νεαρὸν παρὰ πλῆσια τοῦτοισι.  
 ἔχοντες· εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀντίθετοι (20, 312:25-26).  
 καὶ παρόμοιοι καὶ πᾶριστοι  
 καὶ οἱ παρὰ πλῆσιοι  
 τοῦτοισι ... (xxiv, 246:5-7).

μὲνα τὰτε ἀντι-  
 στρέφοντα καὶ τὰ  
 ἐπαναφερόμενα  
 καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλαῖ  
 τοῦτα πούτησ  
 καὶ μεληκῆσ λέξωσ ὄρωνα.  
 (40, 392:19-26).

## APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

*Translation of Greek passages quoted in appendix A, pp. 129-132*

DESCRIPTION	C. V.	DE DEM. I	DE DEM. II
quality of words chosen	"It requires all the words to be <i>euphonious, smooth and soft</i> like a girl's face ..." (xxiii,234:14-15); <i>euphony</i> (xxiii,246:1); "and it shrinks from <i>harsh, clashing</i> syllables." (xxiii,234:15-16).	"but I am criticizing the <i>smoothness and softness</i> of his style." (20,312:15-16); "by the choice of <i>euphonious as well as soft-sounding</i> words ..." (18,306:4-5); <i>euphony</i> (4,254:1); afraid of <i>harsh</i> sound (18,304:16); "and (only) with caution does he use any of the <i>harsh</i> consonants." (4,254:3-4).	"that a word is composed out of <i>euphonious and soft-sounding</i> letters ..." (40,390:9-10); "It always prefers to take the <i>smoothest and softest (sounding)</i> words, because its objective is <i>euphony</i> and fine melodious effect, and the pleasure they produce." (40,388:19-21); <i>euphony</i> (40,390:4).
clashing of vowels	"For on the one hand <i>one would not find any clashing of vowels</i> ..." (xxiii,244:25-26).	"on the one hand he admits (only) <i>with caution the clashing of vowels</i> ..." (4,254:1-3).	"on the one hand it exerts itself to <i>avoid the clashing of vowels</i> ..." (40,390:2-3).

## DESCRIPTION

## C.V.

## DE DEM. I

## DE DEM. II

<p>aim in terms of effect upon the ear</p>	<p>"I think that the one who intends <i>to please the ear</i> in composition, must observe the following things: either he must link together melodious, rhythmic and euphonic words - by which the sense of perception has an experience of sweetness and also softness, and generally speaking, is brought into a fitting disposition - or (he must) intertwine and interweave those (words) which are not of such a nature with those that can bewitch it (i.e. sense of perception) in such a way that the unpleasant effect of the former is overshadowed by the grace of the latter." (xii,134:7-14).</p>	<p>"<i>To please the ear</i> by every means ..." (18,306:3-4);          "all because it is seeking to soothe and <i>please the ear</i>." (20,312:19-20).</p>	<p>"its aim being euphony and fine melodious effect, and the <i>pleasure</i> they produce." (40,388:20-21);          "it flows rather <i>pleasant and welcome through the ear</i> to the same degree as music produced by instruments and melodies in songs." (40,392:7-10).          "understanding <i>pleasure</i> to be the object of the smooth (sc. type of composition) ..." (47,420:1-2).</p>
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## DESCRIPTION

## C.V.

## DE DEM. I

## DE DEM. II

flow of  
words

"but it requires the expressions to move freely and come sweeping along one on top of another, each relying on the mutual support (of neighbouring words), *like streams that never rest*; it requires that its component parts should be fused and woven together, thus rendering an appearance of a single (word) phrase as far as possible." (xxiii,234:5-10).

"However, it is smooth and even and *flows like oil without noise through the ear ...*"  
(20,312:18-19).

"The flow of the words comes indeed swift and rapid, like streams running down a hillside when their course is unimpeded, and it *flows rather pleasant and welcome through the ear ...*" (40,392:4-8).

type of  
sentence

"(it requires) ... that *all* (utterances) come to an end in a *period...*"  
(xxiii,234:20)  
"And it would *not* endure to construct a passage *without periods ...*"  
(xxiii,234:23 - xxiii,236:1).

"However, he seeks to *apply the period as much as possible ...*"  
(4,254:4-5).

"For it uses *no* sentence-structure *other than a period.*" (40,392:14-15).

## DESCRIPTION

## C.V.

## DE DEM. I

## DE DEM. II

type of  
period

"It requires that the *endings* of its periods should be *rhythmic* and fixed as if regulated by a carpenter's rule..." (xxiii,236:3-4).

"... nor the terse, compact (type of period), but the *slow-moving* and *broad* type which also follows a course with many curves and inlets, like meandering rivers do." (4,254:5-8);  
"and to insist on wrapping up everything in *rhythmically* constructed periods ..." (18,306:5-6).

"For this very reason they look *well-turned* (i.e. ending in a beautiful rhythmical acme) and *well-defined* and *end on a firm note*." (40,392:18-19);  
"and others are *sprawling* and *diffuse* ..." (43,410:11).

figures of  
speech

"it loves to apply as frequently as possible the dainty as well as bland (figures), which contain much that is seductive and *showy*."  
(xxiii,236:9-10).  
"the figures full of *youthful exuberance*: for there are *antitheses*, *parallelisms in sound*, *parallelisms in structure* and those similar to these ..." (xxiv,246:5-7).

"to adorn with the *showy* figures ..." (18,306:6-7);  
"are the *juvenile parallelisms in structure*, the frigid *antitheses* and those similar to these."  
(20,312:25-26).

"Of the figures it favours, are those which most excite the emotions of mass audiences ... Of these are *parallelisms in structure*, *parallelisms in sound*, *antitheses*, the *paronomasias*, the *antistrophes*, the *epanaphoras* and many other similar devices of non-lyrical and lyrical literature."  
(40,392:19-26).

APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER III

*Translation of Greek words quoted on pp. 103f.*

quality of words chosen:	(C. V. : { De Dem. I: { De Dem. II:	euphonious, smooth, soft, euphony. euphonious, smooth, soft, euphony. euphonious, smooth, soft, euphony.
clashing of vowels:	(C. V. : { De Dem. I: { De Dem. II: {	"one would not find any clashing of vowels ..." "he admits (only) with caution the clashing of vowels ..." "it exerts itself to avoid the clashing of vowels ..."
aim in terms of effect upon the ear:	(C. V. : { De Dem. I: { De Dem. II:	pleasant. to please. pleasant, pleasure.
flow of words:	(C. V. : { { De Dem. I: { { De Dem. II: { { { {	to have moved freely; "like streams that never rest ..." smooth, even; "flowing like oil soundlessly through the ear ..." swift, rapid; "like ... streams when their course is unimpeded ..." "and it flows through the ear ..."
type of sentence:	(C. V. : { { De Dem. I: { De Dem. II:	"to bring to an end every (utterance) in a period ..." "the period as much as possible ..." "nothing ... other than a period ..."
type of period:	(C. V. : { { De Dem. I: { De Dem. II: { { {	rhythmic, due proportion (cola). rhythmic, slow-moving, broad. ending in a beautiful rhythmical acme, well-defined, sprawling, diffuse.

figures of speech: { *C. V.* : dainty, bland, seductive, showy, immature;  
 { antitheses, parallelisms in sound.  
 { parallelisms in structure;  
 { "and those similar to these ..."  
 { *De Dem. I*: showy, juvenile;  
 { parallelisms in structure;  
 { antitheses;  
 { "and those similar to these."  
 { *De Dem. II*: those that most excite the emotions of mass  
 { audiences;  
 { parallelisms in structure;  
 { parallelisms in sound;  
 { antitheses, paronomasias,  
 { antistrophes, epanaphoras;  
 { "and many other similar devices ..."

## CHAPTER IV

### THE ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως SYSTEM AS SYSTEM OF EVALUATION IN THE *DE DEMOSTHENE*

The object of *De Dem.* I is to prove that the style of Demosthenes is the best. To attain this object, Dionysius felt he had to rely upon a system or systems of evaluation in terms of which he could prove his thesis. He had recourse to the system of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως, by which he could attain his purpose in the shortest possible time, viz. by immediately eliminating the best exponents of the extreme types, i.e. Thucydides and Lysias; thus the only task left to him was dealing with Isocrates and Plato, both extremely renowned representatives of the mixed type of style. At this point of his argument he turned to the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system, in terms of which he could prove that the style of Demosthenes is better than that of Isocrates and Plato. In *De Dem.* II he relied upon the ἁρμονία system to elaborate on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes. Recent investigations published by F. Quadlbauer,<sup>1</sup> D.M. Schenkeveld,<sup>2</sup> G. Kennedy,<sup>3</sup> K. Pohl,<sup>4</sup> J. Lücke<sup>5</sup> and C. Augustyniak<sup>6</sup> have revealed a fact important for the present study, viz. that the three systems of evaluation represent *three different* approaches to literature. This fact must never be forgotten, especially when Dionysius is applying more than one at the same time. The ἁρμονία system has its origin in the general theory of music and its core is the musical aspect of language; the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως as well as the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως systems both developed from "more general and less defined notions of style,"<sup>7</sup> but along different lines, to end up in two different approaches to literature.

On the one hand some rhetoricians divided all the literature of the past into different types of style (χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως) and proceeded to describe the peculiarities of each of these. In general these rhetoricians unanimously approved of three or four commendable types of style and disapproved of other ones which resulted from the violation of the principle of moderation.

Contrary to this approach, the Peripatetics developed the system of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως, according to which they evaluated every piece of literature not in terms of types of style, but in terms of certain precepts (ἀρεταί), which were regarded as "the essential requirements of good style."<sup>8</sup> Consequently they recognized a distinction between good and bad style only in terms of these qualities.<sup>9</sup>

In view of all the research already published, I have decided not to duplicate views already expressed by many scholars, but to concentrate on one important matter, the presence of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system in the *De Dem.* This matter has hardly received any attention in former research, and I would like to show that the *De Dem.* cannot be understood without full acknowledgement of the application of this system. Before proceeding to this issue, a short survey of the history of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system will be of great help in determining its application in the *De Dem.*<sup>10</sup>

*A short history of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system*

The ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system was Peripatetic and in this philosophical school had a long history. These "essential requirements of good style" started with Aristotle, who demanded only one ἀρετή which good prose style should possess, viz. σαφήνεια, clearness, clarity, which must be appropriate at the same time (πρέπειν). Theophrastus augmented the number to four, viz. ἑλληνισμός (purity of language), σαφήνεια (clarity) τὸ πρέπον (appropriateness), and τὸ κεκοσμημένον ἢ ὁ κόσμος (ornateness), the last comprising τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές (magnificence) and τὸ ἡδύ (pleasantness).<sup>11</sup> After Theophrastus, the Stoics added yet another essential requirement, viz. brevity (ἢ συντομία). At this point of the history of this system, the nature of these requirements, being essential requirements which all must be present always, that is, simultaneously, in every piece of good prose literature, necessitated a new approach. Rhetoricians felt that it could be expected of all style to exhibit simultaneously the qualities of ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία and τὸ πρέπον - that would be possible for a good prose writer; but acceptance of τὸ κεκοσμημένον as an essential requirement for good style along with these other four, would be an unachievable ideal.

The following solution to this problem emerged: a distinction was made between necessary qualities (ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, *virtutes necessariae*) and accessory qualities (ἀρεταὶ ἐπίθετοι, *virtutes adiectae*).<sup>12</sup> The former were regarded as a *sine qua non* for all prose style, whereas the latter were facultative. This, however, does not mean that the ἀρεταὶ ἐπίθετοι could be ignored - on the contrary. Although they depend upon the presence of the ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι for their effect (cp. n. 14, p. 153 below), the ἀρεταὶ ἐπίθετοι are the qualities which really reveal the efficiency,

the δύναμις, of an orator: τὰς δ' ἐπιθέτους, ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα διάδηλος ἡ τοῦ ῥήτορος γίνεται δύναμις ...<sup>13</sup> In the *De Thuc.* Dionysius refers to this ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system in his discussion of the historiographer's style: καὶ ὅτι τῶν καλουμένων ἀρετῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ ἐν ὅποιον ὀφείλουσι παρεῖναι τοῖς λόγοις, αἱ δ' ἐπίθετοι καὶ ὅταν ὑποστῶσιν αἱ πρῶται, τότε τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἰσχὺν λαμβάνουσιν, εἴρηται πολλοῖς πρότερον.<sup>14</sup> In the following chapter he goes into the details of the two types of qualities: the essential qualities consist of purity, clarity, and conciseness: τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαίως, ἀρετὰς, ... καὶ γὰρ καθαρὰ καὶ σαφῆς καὶ σύντομος ἐστὶν ἀποχρώντως.<sup>15</sup> Although τὸ πρέπον has neither been listed among the essential qualities, nor among the ἀρεταὶ ἐπίθετοι in this essay,<sup>16</sup> it figures prominently in his evaluation of Thucydides, e.g. at *De Thuc.* 39,580:13-14; 40,584:18ff.; 44,598:3; 45,600:5-9; 50,614f. and 51,618:7ff. As a matter of fact, propriety, τὸ πρέπον, was regarded as the most important quality of all by Dionysius: τὸ πρέπον ... κρατίστην ὅποιων ἀρετῆν καὶ τελειοτάτην ...<sup>17</sup>

So far as the accessory virtues, the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί, are concerned, Dionysius lists the following groups:

- 1) sublimity (τὸ ὕψος), beauty (ἡ καλλιῤῥημοσύνη), solemnity (ἡ σεμνολογία) and magnificence (ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια);
- 2) intensity (ὁ τόνος), gravity (τὸ βάρος) and passion (τὸ πάθος) (essential to the quality of forceful persuasiveness, ἡ δεινότης);
- 3) persuasiveness (ἡ πειθώ), charm (ἡ χάρις) and pleasure (ἡ ἡδονή).<sup>18</sup>

These groups illustrate an important difference between the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως and the χαρακτηῖρες τῆς λέξεως system: all qualities need not, as in the case of the χαρακτηῖρες τῆς λέξεως system, be present at all times; only those which would meet the demands of the occasion best. For example, when the writer wished to convey the quality of forceful persuasiveness, δεινότης, he would have recourse only to intensity (ὁ τόνος), gravity (τὸ βάρος) and passion (τὸ πάθος); the others are not necessary.

Furthermore, κάλλος can only be appreciated by the mind, whereas τὸ ἡδύ (ἡ ἡδονή) is sensed by the ἄλογος αἰσθησις.<sup>19</sup> As a matter of fact, these three big groups of qualities are indeed in a way incompatible and cannot be present simultaneously.<sup>20</sup>

So far as *De Dem.* I is concerned, one is never left in the dark as to the rôle of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system. Dionysius has not only supplied an elaborate exposition of this system in the first few chapters, but in his recapitulation in ch. 33 he has even declared that he had chosen this system as the basis of his comparison in *De Dem.* I: διελόμενος μὲν τὴν λέξιν εἰς τρεῖς χαρακτήρας τοὺς γενικωτάτους τὸν τε ἰσχνὸν καὶ τὸν ὑψηλὸν καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ τούτων ...<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, although there is no overt reference to the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system as such in the *De Dem.*, one frequently comes across terminology usually associated with this system, e.g. το σαφές, ἡ συντομία, τὸ πρόπον, ὁ ἑλληνισμός, τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, ὁ τόνος etc., in short, all the ἀρεταί.

In the *history of research* on this matter I. Stroux has accused Dionysius of a confusion of notions: *revera confusas esse virtutes cum generibus*.<sup>22</sup> Another view was adopted by other scholars who simply ignored the presence of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system in the *De Dem.* stating that Dionysius only relied on the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως in *De Dem.* I. Exponents of this view were R.H. Tukey, E. Kalinka, G. Pavano, G.M.A. Grube and G. Kennedy.<sup>23</sup> Referring to the *De Dem.* as we have it today, R.H. Tukey says that it "introduced new methods of approach to the orators in general. Dionysius' earlier treatment of style as we see it exemplified in the essays on Lysias, Isocrates and Isæus, was based principally on the doctrine of the qualities (ἀρεταί) of style."<sup>24</sup> Discussing *De Dem.* I, this scholar, referring to the system of evaluation applied, states that Dionysius "had recourse to the doctrine of the three types of style".<sup>25</sup> Finally, G. Kennedy reasons along the same lines: referring to the works of volume one of the *De or. ant.*, viz. the *De Lys.*, *De Isocr.* and the *De Is.*, this scholar remarks: "In all the essays ... the discussion of style is cast in terms of the 'virtues'."<sup>26</sup> However, in his discussion of the *De Dem.* (pp. 357-360) he only refers to the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system as the basis of discussion; he gives no reference whatsoever to the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system, nor any attempt to explain this alleged 'absence' of the latter system in the *De Dem.*<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand, there were those who saw that Dionysius deliberately made use of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. This was the view of J. Lücke and D.M. Schenkeveld. These scholars, however, restricted the application of this

system to ch. 34 of the *De Dem.* Using the Latin terminology (*tria genera dicendi* for χαρακτηρες της λέξεως, and *virtutes dicendi* for ἀρεταί της λέξεως) J. Lücke divides *De Demosthene* as follows:

1. *tria genera dicendi* Kap. 1-7
2. *elocutio Demosthenis* Kap. 8-32
3. *Rekap. der Kapitel 1-32* Kap. 33
4. *virtutes dicendi* Kap. 34" (My spacing of print).<sup>28</sup>

In the subsequent discussion he confirms that this system is restricted to ch. 34: "Es ist also klar, dass Dionys, bevor er die σύνθεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων behandelt, noch ein Wort über die ἀρεταί Lehre sagen will, und zwar welche ἀρεταί den einzelnen genera dicendi in besonderen (sic.) Masse zukommen."<sup>29</sup> He proceeds to explain that "Auch nach der Einteilung in genera dicendi müssen die Schriftsteller weiterhin die Erfordernisse des 'Latine dicas et aperte et apte et ornate' erfüllen."<sup>30</sup> D.M. Schenkeveld expresses the same opinion: "In the Judgment on Demosthenes ch. 34 Dionysius combines the virtues with the genera ..."<sup>31</sup>

My view is that Dionysius relied heavily on the ἀρεταί της λέξεως system throughout *De Dem.* I, and not only in ch. 34. I shall first discuss the criterion by which the presence of this system can be ascertained and then proceed to the detail of its application in the *De Dem.*

*The basic criterion by which one can determine the application of the ἀρεταί της λέξεως system*

One should not think that the mere presence of certain keywords like ἀρετή, χαρακτηρ or ὁρμονία are indicative of the system being applied by Dionysius at the particular spot. None of these words is used only in one technical sense (cp. glossary, s.vv.) which would have enabled the reader of the *De Dem.* to follow the argumentation so much more easily. This is especially true in the case of ἀρετή, a term which one tends to associate only with the ἀρεταί της λέξεως system. Ἀρετή occurs on twenty-four occasions: thirteen in *De Dem.* I, four in *De Dem.* II, three in *De Dem.* III, and four in *De Dem.* IV.

Of these only a few have the meaning of *quality* or *feature* with direct reference to the ἀρεταί της λέξεως system: in ch. 18 Dionysius

is criticizing Isocrates for his mistakes concerning τὸ σαφές and ἡ συντομία by means of an application of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system.<sup>32</sup> He refers to these qualities in the direct context in an implicit way with the word ἀρεταί (καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπώσας ἀρετὰς, 18,302:31), but quite explicitly at the start of ch. 19: εἰ δὲ ὀρθῶς ἐπιλογίζομαι ταῦτ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν ταύταις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐνδεέστερος ὁ ἀνὴρ ...<sup>33</sup> Defending Demosthenes in ch.58 for not always applying brevity, Dionysius rebukes those critics who are always demanding brevity, requiring no other quality: τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀρετῶν οὐδεμίαν.<sup>34</sup> This is manifestly based on the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system, for in the case of the χαρακτηρες system such an absolute demand for brevity is indeed not always needed or appropriate. In the following case the ἀρεταί of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system are associated with the χαρακτηρες τῆς λέξεως system: εἰ δέ τις ἀξιῶσει συκοφαντεῖν τὴν διαίρεσιν, ἐπειδὴ τὰς κοινῇ παρακολουθοῦσας πάσι τοῖς πλάσμασι ἀρετὰς τρία διανείμασα τὸ ἴδιον ἐκάσταις ἀποδίδωσιν ... καθ' ὃ μάλιστα χαρίον ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρετῶν ὄψιν τε ἡδίστην ἔχει καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρελιμπτάτην, κατὰ τοῦτο τάττειν αὐτὴν ἀξιῶ.<sup>35</sup>

So far as these cases are concerned, ἀρετή is indeed used in connection with the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. However, in ch. 33, where Dionysius is recapitulating *De Dem.* I in terms of the χαρακτηρες τῆς λέξεως system, he uses this word, ἀρετή, to denote the qualities of style according to the χαρακτηρες τῆς λέξεως system. (33,368:21). As a matter of fact, we come across this word in four other meanings as well: "excellence", "basic constituent", "(peculiar) nature" and "moral excellence".<sup>36</sup> From this evidence it is quite clear that the term ἀρετή *taken on its own* is by no means an indication of the application of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system.

Even the distinctive expression "ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί", so reminiscent of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system, taken on its own, is no indication of a use of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. Dionysius used this expression as well as the separate ἀρεταί involved to roughly describe the extraordinary type of style: Having just quoted a passage from Bk. 3 of Thucydides to illustrate the extraordinary type of style, he comments: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ περιττὴ καὶ ἐγκατόσκευος καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις νόσοις ἅπασι συμπληρωμένη λέξις ... (My spacing of print).<sup>37</sup>

Furthermore, with the exception of τέρωις, we meet all the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί in *De Dem.* I, being used by Dionysius for the description of the extraordinary

type of style ὕψος, καλλιῤῥημοσύνη, σεμνολογία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, τὸ μέγα, τόνος, τὸ θαυμαστόν, βάρος, ἰσχύς, ἡδονή, πειθῶ and χάρις.<sup>38</sup> So, if we may not rely on certain keywords for determining where the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system has been used, what is the only valid criterion? It is the essential difference between the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως and χαρακτηῖρες τῆς λέξεως systems. The very nature of Dionysius' ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, viz. ὁ ἑλληνισμός, τὸ σαφές, ἡ συντομία and τὸ πρόπον, being that of essential qualities, basic necessities of good style, it requires the simultaneous presence of these four qualities at all times, whatever the type of style may be. Consequently, wherever these qualities are mentioned, we know that the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system is applied, for they cannot be associated exclusively with any type of style, even though one would be tempted to associate them only with the simple type of style.<sup>39</sup>

Contrary to this, the individual ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system are only expected to be present in a piece of literature when required by the *ad hoc* situation, determined by τὸ πρόπον. Thus, no piece of literature will exhibit all the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταὶ simultaneously; the qualities will be present individually or in groups of cognate qualities, e.g., when a writer wished to exhibit the quality of forceful persuasiveness, ἡ δεινότης, on a specific occasion, his style would show the qualities which tend to enhance this quality best, viz. ὁ τόνος, τὸ βάρος and τὸ πάθος.<sup>40</sup> Likewise, when he sought grandeur, τὸ μέγεθος, the related qualities of sublimity, (τὸ ὕψος), beauty (ἡ καλλιῤῥημοσύνη) and solemnity (ἡ σεμνολογία) would be present. This approach to the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί is typical of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. This explains why in practice evaluation of an author in terms of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system takes the form of determining his position in respect to the different ἀρεταί.

On the other hand, in the χαρακτηῖρες τῆς λέξεως system the approach is comprehensive, in the sense that all the terminology used to describe a specific type of style would be applicable to every practical example of that type of style applied. This is so clearly illustrated in the first chapter of the *De Dem.*: having quoted a passage from B. 3 of Thucydides, Dionysius is by no means selective in his commentary, as would have been the case had he applied the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. Consider: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ περιττὴ καὶ ἐγκατόσκειος καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις ἀπασί σὺμπλερωμένη λέξις, ἥς ὄρος καὶ κανὼν ὁ Θουκυδίδης ... (My spacing of print).<sup>41</sup>

Finally, a very conspicuous difference between the two systems under discussion has to do with the matter of mixture. In the ἀρεταί τῆς λέξεως system one always has a mixture of qualities: in every good piece of literature one should have the minimum prerequisites, i.e. the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί, as well as one or more of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί, in the measure required by the specific occasion.

This, then, represents a mixture of qualities by no means closely related.

On the contrary, although the rhetorician is rather indiscriminate in describing a passage in terms of the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως system, a mixture of unrelated qualities is not possible in this system. In other words, when the mixed type of style is applied, this mixture, μῦγμα, does not indicate a blend of the qualities of the two extreme types of styles. As a matter of fact, this would be quite impossible, considering that the extraordinary and the simple type of style are represented as extreme types with exclusive, opposite qualities:

μεγαλοπρεπῆ λιπὴν,  
περιττὴν ἀπέριττον,  
ἔξηλλαγμένην συνήθη,  
πανηγυρικὴν ἀληθινὴν,  
αἰσθηρὰν ἰλαρὰν,  
σύντονον ἀνειμένην,  
ἠδεῖαν πικρὰν,  
ἠθικὴν παθητικὴν ...

With this set of opposite qualities Dionysius describes the μῦγμα of the style of Demosthenes.<sup>42</sup> Similar opposites are used to describe the qualities of the two extreme types of style. The extraordinary type is strange, remote from normal usage, unfamiliar (ἔξηλλαγμένη, ἀσυνήθης) and extraordinary (περιττός), whereas the simple type of style is plain (ἰσχνός), simple (ἀεληής, ἀπλοῦς), customary (συνήθης). It goes without saying that a mixture in the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως system could not be a blend of opposite qualities in the same pericope. The only possible way of understanding this μῦγμα is as one applied in passages where the two extreme types of style are applied on different occasions according to the appropriate need - in other words, an alternating, not a simultaneous application of the two extreme types of style. With these differences

between the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως and χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως systems as basis, one can determine where Dionysius has applied the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system.

I have already referred to J. Lücke and D.M. Schenkeveld who have pointed out that Dionysius applied the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως in c. 34 of the *De Dem.* Here Dionysius is in fact combining this system with the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system.<sup>43</sup> In practice this combination manifests itself most clearly where an author, whilst using a certain χαρακτήρ, manifests ἀρεταὶ which do not properly belong to this χαρακτήρ. In view of the fact that the μῦγμα of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system consists of the alternating, not the simultaneous, application of the two extreme types of style, such simultaneous application obviously must betray the presence of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. By way of example, I would refer specifically to Dionysius' remark that Demosthenes succeeds in preserving lucidity and plainness when using the extraordinary type of style: δοκεῖ δὴ μοι τῶν μὲν ὑψηλῆ καὶ περιττῆ καὶ ἐξηλλαγμένη λέξει κεχρημένων κατα το σαφέστερον καὶ κοινότερον τῆ ἐριηνεῖα κεχρησθαι προὔχειν ὁ Δημοσθένης.<sup>44</sup> The subsequent sentence is most significant: τούτων (sc. τὸ σαφές and τὸ κοινόν) γὰρ ἐν πάσῃ κατασκευῇ στοχάζεται μέγεθος ἐχούσῃ καὶ ταύταις κέχρηται χαρακτηρικωτάταις ἀρεταῖς ἐπὶ τῆς ὑψηλῆς καὶ ξενοπρεποῦς ὀνομασίας ὡς γε μάλιστα.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, when using the plain style, Demosthenes retains some of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταὶ to avoid the danger of being too plain: τῶν δὲ τὴν λιπὴν καὶ ἰσχνὴν καὶ ἀπέριπτον ἐπιτηδευόντων φράσιν τῷ τόνῳ τῆς λέξεως ἐδόκει μοι διαλλάττειν καὶ τῷ βάρει καὶ τῇ στριφνότητι καὶ τῷ πικραίνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ...<sup>46</sup> These remarks of Dionysius are only conceivable by virtue of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system; a mixture of this kind would be inadmissible in a judgment based on the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system.

However, the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system cannot be isolated and restricted to c. 34 of the *De Dem.* On the contrary, I shall now proceed to prove that this system has in fact been applied throughout *De Dem.* I and IV and that Dionysius could never have attained his object of proving Demosthenes to be the best without having recourse to this system as well.

Firstly, in the first chapter of the present dissertation (pp. 6-9) I have pointed out that the purpose of cc. 1-15 of the *De Dem.* is to prove that the mixed type of style is better than the extraordinary one (cc. 4-10) on

the one hand, and better than the plain type on the other hand (cc. 11-13). Although Dionysius' major concern in these chapters is the χαρακτήρες, he relies heavily on especially τὸ πρέπον, one of the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system,<sup>47</sup> to prove that the mixed type is the best. This is so clear in the following remark of Dionysius, where he is criticizing Thucydides' application of the extraordinary type of style:<sup>48</sup> τῷ δὲ προσῶ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῖς καιροῖς ... καὶ οὐδὲ τὸν καιρὸν αὐτῆς ἐπίσταται λαβεῖν δεξιῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον πολλάκις ἀμαρτάνει (My spacing of print).<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, when Thucydides is applying the extraordinary type of style excessively, not observing τὸ μέτριον, he is rendering his style obscure: καθ' ὃ ἡ μὲν ἀμετρία τῆς ἐξαλλαγῆς ἄσαφῃ ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν αὐτοῦ.<sup>50</sup> τὸ σαφές is another ἀναγκαῖα required under all circumstances - also when the writer is applying the extraordinary type of style.

In criticising Plato as a user of the extraordinary type of style, Dionysius applies all the ἀναγκαῖα ἀρεταί: καὶ γὰρ ἠδεστέρα τῆς ἐτέρας καὶ κᾶλλον ἐλλήνων ἰζουσα καὶ παχυτέρα φαίνεται μελαίνει τε τοσαφες καὶ ζῶα ποιεῖ παραπλήσιον εἰλεῖ τε μακρὸν ἀποτείνασα τον νοῦν, συστρέψαι δέον ἐν ὀνόμασιν ὀλίγοις. ... ἄκαιρος δ' ἐν ταῖς μετωνυμίαις ... σχήμασί τε ποιητικοῖς ... καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Ἰοργιείοις ἀκαίρως ... ἐναβρύνεται (My spacing of print).<sup>51</sup>

So far as his criticism of the plain type of style is concerned, Dionysius likewise relies on the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. In his criticism of Lysias, the best exponent of the plain type, he says that his simple type of style does not have enough τόνος or ἰσχύς to see a whole speech through: αὕτη (sc. χάρις) μέντοι, καθάπερ νότιός τις αὔρα, μέχρι προσομίου καὶ διηγήσεως αὐτὸν ἄγει, ὅταν δ' εἰς τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς ἔλθῃ λόγους, ἀμωδρά τις γίνεται καὶ ἀσθενής, ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς παθητικοῖς εἰς τέλος ἀποσβέννυται τόνος γὰρ οὐ πολὺς αὐτῇ οὐδ' ἰσχύς.<sup>52</sup> Since τόνος and ἰσχύς are not recognised as qualities of the plain style, it is clear that Dionysius is applying the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system.

Turning to cc. 16-32, the section in which Dionysius compares Demosthenes with Plato and Isocrates, the best exponents of the best type of style, the mixed type, showing that his idol is the best, he relies almost exclusively

on the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. As a matter of fact, in his general survey of the style of Isocrates (ch. 18) Dionysius comes remarkably close to the complete ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system as expressed in his work on Thucydides.<sup>53</sup>

He starts with the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί: ὁ ἑλληνισμός<sup>54</sup> and τὸ σαφές,<sup>55</sup> adding ἡ συντομία<sup>56</sup> the moment he commences with his criticism of Isocrates, and το πρέπον<sup>57</sup> as well. Many of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταὶ are mentioned as well - in fact, he even calls them, οἱ ἐπίθετοι κόσμοι: πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπιθέτων κόσμων ἔχει.<sup>58</sup>

The moment he starts giving more detail concerning the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί, one is struck by the similarity with the presentation of this system in the *De Thuc.*

καὶ γὰρ ὑψηλὴ καὶ σεμνὴ καὶ ὀξυωματικὴ καλλιρρήμων τε καὶ ἠδεῖα καὶ εὐμορφος ὀποχρώντως ἐστίν.<sup>59</sup>

Further down we meet τόνος,<sup>60</sup> πάθος,<sup>61</sup> ἦθος,<sup>62</sup> and πειθῶ<sup>63</sup> as well. As a matter of fact, the discussion of Isocrates in this chapter is done on the same basis as in the *De Isoer.*: the aesthetic position of the orator is simply expressed in terms of the ἀρεταί of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system. His good qualities are listed, and the absence of certain of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί is regarded as a valid point of criticism. In the subsequent discussion (cc. 19-20) of the quotation given in ch. 17, Dionysius continues to evaluate Isocrates on the basis of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως: in ch. 19 he gives several examples of how Isocrates has violated the principle of ἡ συντομία, and in ch. 20, of his lack of intensity, τόνος, one of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί which effectuate forceful persuasiveness, ἡ δεινότης: ἄτονος δὲ δὴ καὶ λαβᾶς οὐ κραταιᾶς ἔχουσα πᾶς ἐστίν ἡ λέξις;<sup>64</sup> he concludes his discussion of this orator with one example to show his lack of life, passion, spirit: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε ἀψυχός ἐστίν ἡ διάλεκτος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ παθητικὴ πνεύματός τε ... ἐλαχίστην ἔχουσαν μοῦραν ...<sup>65</sup>

In the subsequent discussion of a quotation from the *Olynth.*, iii par. 23-32 of Demosthenes, the basis of evaluation is likewise the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system: in contrast to Isocrates, Demosthenes does not violate the essential prerequisites of conciseness, ἡ συντομία, and appropriateness, το πρέπον. So far as the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί are concerned, Dionysius is convinced that his idol has expressed the subject-matter in a nobler and more magnificent way than Isocrates: καὶ γὰρ εὐγενέστερον ἐκεῖνης καὶ

μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἠρμήνευκε τὰ πράγματα ...<sup>66</sup> Whereas the style of Isocrates lacks intensity, Demosthenes' does not, for he has made more use of force and intensity: ἰσχύϊ τε πλείονι κέχρηται καὶ τόνοις ἐμβριθεστέροις ...<sup>67</sup> This goes for passion and related qualities as well: μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ τὸ δραστήριον καὶ ἐναγώνιον καὶ ἐμπαδὲς ὄλφ καὶ τῷ πάντι κρεῖττον ἔχει ἐκείνης (i.e. τῆς Ἰσοκράτους).<sup>68</sup>

Finally, the discussion of Plato in cc. 24-30 is developed in the same way as those of Isocrates and Demosthenes: Dionysius has simply selected examples to show how the philosopher occasionally violated the essential requirements of good style, the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί. According to his discussion, the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί of ἡ συντομία<sup>69</sup> and τὸ πρέπον<sup>70</sup> have been the two prerequisites most frequently violated by Plato. Even the prerequisite of purity of language (ὁ ἑλληνισμός, τὸ καθαρόν) has been violated occasionally.<sup>71</sup> Although Dionysius does not criticize Plato for violating the prerequisite of lucidity, τὸ σαφές, he does refer to it on one occasion in his discussion of Plato.<sup>72</sup> The mere presence of the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί is enough evidence of the fact that Dionysius has indeed applied the ἀρεταί τῆς λέξεως system here as well. However, this fact is confirmed by the same type of treatment of the ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί as in the case of Isocrates and Demosthenes. We come across the following ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί: beauty (τὸ κάλλος) and solemnity (ἡ σεμνότης),<sup>73</sup> portrayal of character (τὸ ἦθος), passion (τὸ πάθος), persuasiveness (ἡ πειθώ) and charm (ἡ χάρις),<sup>74</sup> pleasure (τὸ ἡδύ), and magnificence (ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια),<sup>75</sup> solemnity (τὸ σεμνόν),<sup>76</sup> powerful persuasiveness (ἡ δεινότης),<sup>77</sup> force (ἡ ἰσχύς) and intensity (ὁ τόνος),<sup>78</sup> pleasure (ἡ ἡδονή), and charm (ἡ χάρις).<sup>79</sup> Finally, the following remark in the discussion of the style of Plato also confirms that the ἀρεταί τῆς λέξεως system did form the basis of evaluation: in this remark Dionysius incorporates both the idea of *necessary* (with reference to the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί) and of *additional*: ἀλλ' ἄρα γε εἰ μὴ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου, κάλλους γε ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς τῶν ἐπιθέτων ἕνεκα κόσμων παρλείπηται τὸ κῶλον αὐτῶν τούτι; (My spacing of print).<sup>80</sup>

One final remark: the quality of τὸ πρέπον is so important to Dionysius, that he has even applied it in his sections on the σύνθεσις (*De Dem.* II),<sup>81</sup> on delivery (ὑπόκρισις, *De Dem.* III)<sup>82</sup> and in his final section, *De Dem.* IV, where he answers the points of criticism against Demosthenes.<sup>83</sup>

In conclusion: the ἀρετὰ τῆς λέξεως system has been applied in the *De Dem.* on an extensive scale. Dionysius has made use of it to prove that the mixed type of style is the best type, and having determined that, he has fully relied on the ἀρετὰ τῆς λέξεως system to prove that Demosthenes is the best representative of the best type of style. Ignoring the application of this system in the *De Dem.*, can only lead to a great amount of confusion.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. F. Quadlbauer, *Die genera dicendi bis Plinius d.J.*, WS, LXXI (1958), pp. 55-111.
2. D.M. Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius 'On Style'*, (Diss.) Amsterdam, 1964, pp. 72ff.
3. G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 273ff.
4. K. Pohl, *Die Lehre von den drei Wortfügungsarten*, (Diss.) Tübingen, 1968.
5. J. Lücke, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der genera dicendi und genera compositionis*, (Diss.) Hamburg, 1952.
6. C. Augustyniak, *De tribus et quattuor dicendi generibus quid docuerint antiqui*, *Auctarium Maeandrium* VI (1957), pp. 5-84.
7. D.M. Schenkeveld, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
8. G. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
9. F. Solmsen, *Aristotelian Tradition in ancient rhetoric*, *AJP*, 62 (1941), p. 183. (in *Rhetorica*, p. 342).
10. It is, however, to be noted that I do not regard this historical background as an essential part of the problems of my study; consequently, I shall merely give a summary of research done by other scholars.
11. τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, τὸ πιθανόν and τὸ ἐναργές were Isocratean qualities of the narration introduced into the Peripatetic tradition: "Theophrastus is known to have found room in his system of style for τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, two Isocratean requirements for the narration which Aristotle himself had rejected as unnecessary. τὸ πιθανόν and τὸ ἐναργές, two other Isocratean 'virtues' of the narration, were also admitted by the Peripatetics (after Aristotle's time) and even elevated to the position of a quality of style in general ..." F. Solmsen, *art. cit.*, p. 185 (344).
12. Due to the lack of textual evidence, the origin of this distinction cannot yet be determined. According to Dionysius it must have been well known, for having just talked about this distinction, he proceeds with the following words: εἴρηται πολλοῖς πρότερον ... ("this has often been said before ...") (*De Thuc.* 22,522:3, Loeb). S. Usher notes that there are indirect references to this system in Cicero's *De Partitione* 31, *Brutus* 261 and *De Oratore* iii, 52. (*op. cit.*, p. 523, n. 2.)

13. *De Thuc.* 23,524:13-15.
14. "and it has been said before by many (authorities) that some of the so-called virtues are essential and should be present in all prose writing, while others are *accessory* and get their specific effect whenever they are supported by the former." (*De Thuc.* 22,520:28 - 22,522:3).
15. *De Thuc.* 23,524:10-11.
16. See discussion p. 141 above.
17. *De Lys.* 9,34:27-29. This could be the reason why Rhys Roberts (*The Three Literary Letters*, Cambridge, 1901, p. 172) and D.M. Schenkeveld (*op. cit.*, p. 74) were convinced that "perhaps this virtue should be placed in a class of its own". (*Ibid.*) I would go along with this view for the following reasons:  
 Firstly, by reason of the very fact that Dionysius regarded *το πρόειπον* as the most important of all the qualities of style;  
 Secondly, because Dionysius regarded it as essential at all times - thus it cannot be classed among the *ἐπίθετοι ἄρεται*, as Meerwaldt proposed (: *decori virtutem omnino cum adiectis esse coniungendam* (*op. cit.*, p. 25));  
 On the other hand, although exhibiting the distinctive feature of the *ἀναγκαῖαι ἄρεται*, it is mostly applied in connection with *ἐπίθετοι ἄρεται* - cp. Dionysius' criticism of Isocrates and Plato, pp. 148ff.
18. τὰς δ' ἐπιθέτους (*σε ἄρετας*) ... (1) ὕψος λέγων καὶ καλιόρημοσύνην καὶ σεμνολογίαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν · οὐδὲ εἴ (2) τόνον οὐδὲ βάρος οὐδὲ πάθος ... (3) πειθοῦς τε καὶ χαρίτων καὶ τῆς ... ἡδονῆς ἔνεκα (*De Thuc.* 23,524:13-27). In the *Ad Pomp.* (ch. 3), *ἐνάργεια* is added as yet another quality.
19. D.M. Schenkeveld, *Theories of evaluation in the rhetorical treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, Museum Philologum Londiniense, I (1976), pp. 93-107.
20. This is also the view of D.M. Schenkeveld: "three big groups which in a certain way are incompatible with one another and are, therefore, not required everywhere." (*Studies in Demetrius 'On Style'*, p. 75).
21. "by dividing style into the three most basic types, viz. the plain, the sublime and the one between these ...", *De Demosthene* 33,368: 14-16.
22. I. Stroux, *op. cit.*, ch. vii. I cannot agree with this view. Dionysius did not confuse two systems: one should not forget that these two systems represent two different approaches to the same

literature. As a matter of fact, the very nature of the ἄρεται τῆς λέξεως being "the essential requirements of good style," their application to each and every type of style was quite justified as long as the basic distinction between ἐπίθετοι and ἀναγκαῖαι ἄρεταί was kept in mind. This could result in the belief that the extraordinary type of style exhibits the ἐπίθετοι ἄρεταί by reason of its very nature - cp. p. 144. This is not altogether true, for at least one of the ἐπίθετοι ἄρεταί, viz. ἡ χάρις (charm), can be displayed by means of the simple type of style, as is borne out by the case of Lysias. It would also be inconsistent to say that only the simple style exhibits the ἀναγκαῖαι ἄρεταί, for these qualities are equally indispensable for the extraordinary type of style. Furthermore, the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως system made use of the ἄρεται τῆς λέξεως. Stroux was possibly led astray by the fact that Dionysius concludes *De Dem.* I with a double general appraisal, one according to the χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως system, and the other one according to the ἄρεται τῆς λέξεως system.

23. R.H. Tukey, *The Composition of the 'De Oratoribus Antiquis' of Dionysius*, pp. 397-401; *id.*, *A Note on Dionysius*, p. 188; E. Kalinka, *art. cit.* I, p. 162; G. Pavano, *art. cit.*, p. 258 (cp. my discussion above, pp. 63f. ); G.M.A. Grube, *Thrasymachus, Theophrastus and Dionysius*, *AJP*, 73 (1952), pp. 259 and 262, and G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972, pp. 355-360.
24. R.H. Tukey, *The Composition of the 'De Oratoribus Antiquis' of Dionysius*, p. 401. Cp. E. Kalinka, *art. cit.* I, p. 162: "In der Tat springt der Unterschied ihrer Eigenart so stark in die Augen, dass man nicht begreift, wie er übersehen werden konnte: in der Abhandlung über die drei ältern Redner geht Dionys darauf aus, ihre ἄρεταί darzulegen, ... in der Schrift über Demosthenes aber ..."
25. R.H. Tukey, *ibid.*, p. 397. In the other article by this scholar mentioned in n. 23 above, the same idea prevails, for talking about "the two parts of the essay on Demosthenes ..." (*A Note on Dionysius*, p. 188), he continues to refer to the system of evaluation of this part as "χαρακτῆρες τῆς λέξεως discussed in the first part of the essay ..." (*Ibid.*).
26. G. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 355.
27. Cp. G.M.A. Grube, *art. cit.*, pp. 259-262 as well. He discusses the ἄρεται τῆς λέξεως system on p. 259 (n. 12), referring only

- to the essays of the first volume of the *De or. ant.*; in *De Dem.* I, however, only the *χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως* system has been applied: "so three kinds of diction (λέξις) are described in the first (i.e. the first part of the *De Demosthene*, cc. 1-34) ..." (p. 262).
28. J. Lücke, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
  29. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
  30. *Ibid.*, pp. 6f.
  31. D.M. Schenkeveld, *op. cit.*, p. 75. I hope to prove that the *ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως* system is the basis of evaluation in cc. 16-32, and that ch. 34 is only a recapitulation in terms of this system, whereas ch. 33 is the recapitulation in terms of the *χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως* system. As a matter of fact, although the *χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως* system is the basis of discussion in cc. 1-15, Dionysius there has recourse to one of the qualities of the *ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως* system, viz. τὸ πρέπον, to prove that the intermediate, mixed type of style is the best! In fact, he would not be able to prove this point without relying on this quality.
  32. Cp. p. 149 above.
  33. "whether my argument here is sound and he is inferior in these qualities ..." (19,306:12-13).
  34. 58,454:3. That goes for the *ἀρετή* at 54,446:7 as well.
  35. "But if anyone will see fit to criticise the distinction on the ground that it assigns to all three (the types of style) individually qualities which are commonly connected with all three, and thereby an individuality to each, ... my method is to place each quality in the spot where it has the most pleasant appearance and serves the most useful purpose ..." (34,372:2-8). Cp. 34,372:12, as well as n. 39, pp. 156f. below.
  36. For more detail, cp. glossary, s.vv.
  37. "The unfamiliar, extraordinary, ornate type of style, full of *all the accessory embellishment* ..." (1,242:24-26) (My italics). Dionysius uses *κόσμοι* and *κατασκευαί* in the phrases *οἱ ἐπίθετοι κόσμοι* and *αἱ ἐπίθετοι κατασκευαί* as alternatives for *αἱ ἐπίθετοι ἀρεταί*. This is confirmed by the following remark of his: πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπιθέτων κόσμων ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ὑψηλὴ καὶ σεμνὴ καὶ ἀξιωματικὴ καλλιρρήμων τε καὶ ἡδεῖα ... ("It also has many of the accessory embellishments: for it is sublime, solemn and dignified, beautiful and pleasant ...") (18,304:1-3).

38. For more detail, cp. glossary, s.vv.
39. Dionysius seems to make such an association in chapter 13 where he refers to the simple type of style as ὁ ἀναγκαῖος χαρακτήρ: ὅταν εἰς τὸν ἀναγκαῖον καταβῆ χαρακτήρα ὁ Δημοσθένης ... (13,288:20-21). As a matter of fact, one seems to get a final confirmation for this idea in chapter 13. Having quoted a passage from Demosthenes' *Against Conon* to show how Demosthenes made use of the simple type of style, Dionysius comments: ταῦτ' οὐ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκριβῆ καὶ σαφῆ ...; ("Is it not pure, precise and lucid ...?") (13,286:9). Considering the fact that the types system is being used here, one could be tempted to induce from this remark that the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί should be wholly and solely associated with the simple type of style. This would entail a serious inconsistency, for in the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system, qualities are exclusive to the type they are associated with. Consequently, according to the ἀρεταί τῆς λέξεως system some qualities, i.e. the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί, will be regarded as essential in all good literature, but according to another system, applied by the same rhetorician in the same essay in the evaluation of the same writers, these qualities need not be regarded as essential! However, in ch. 34, the chapter where Dionysius combines these two systems (cp. pp. 146ff.), he gives an important clue as to how the combination of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως should be understood so far as the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί are concerned: these qualities are indeed prerequisites for all literature, but certain sub-genres, such as the narration of a speech, tend to have a rich display of these qualities. So, when he associates the ἀναγκαῖαι ἀρεταί with the simple type of style, it is merely a matter of obvious, natural association, and not of exclusion of these qualities from the other types: εἰ δέ τις ἀξιῶσει συκοφαντεῖν τὴν διαίρεσιν, ἐπειδὴ τὰς κοινῆ παρακολουθοῦσας πᾶσι τοῖς πλάσμασιν ἀρετὰς τρίχα διανεῖμασα τὸ ἴδιον ἐκάσταις ἀποδίδωσιν, ἐκεῖνα ἂν εἴποιμι πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι καθ' ὃ μάλιστα χαρίον ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρετῶν ὄψιν τε ἠδίστην ἔχει καὶ χοῆσιν ἀφελιμωτάτην, κατὰ τοῦτο τάττειν αὐτὴν ἀξιῶ, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς σαφηνείας καὶ τῆς συντομίας καὶ τοῦ πιθανοῦ χαρίον ἀποφαίνουσιν οἱ τεχνογράφοι τὴν διήγησιν οὐχ ὡς οὐκ ἀλλαχοῦ οὐδαμοῦ δεῖον ἐξετάζεσθαι τὰς ἀρετὰς ταύτας (πάνυ γὰρ ἄτοπον), ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν τῇ διηγῆσει δεῖον μάλιστα. ("But if anyone sees fit to quibble about this division on the ground that, by dividing (the) qualities which are jointly connected with all three the types (of style), it assigns

individuality to each (sc. of the qualities), I might answer him as follows: I deem it fit to classify each quality in the spot where it has the most pleasant appearance and serves the most useful purpose, since the writers of textbooks declare that the narration is the section for clarity, conciseness and persuasiveness, not because these virtues should not be enumerated anywhere else (for that would be quite absurd) but because they are most necessary in the narration." (34,372:1-13).

40. Cp. p. 141 above.
41. Cp. n. 37, p. 155 above. Cp. 9,268:12ff. as well.
42. "magnificent (and) unadorned,  
extraordinary (and) ordinary,  
strange (and) familiar,  
epideictic (and) factual,  
serious (and) light-hearted,  
intense (and) relaxed,  
pleasant (and) harsh,  
sensitive (and) passionate ..." (8,266:9-12).
43. Cp. p. 143 above.
44. "Demosthenes indeed seems to me to be superior to those who use a sublime, extraordinary and unfamiliar type of style in that he expresses himself in a clearer and more ordinary way." (34,370:8-11).
45. "For he strives after these (qualities) (sc. clarity and ordinary language) in every artistic passage that contains grandeur, and employs them as his most characteristic qualities especially in (passages) with sublime and strange expressions." (34,370:11-14).
46. "On the other hand, he seemed to me to be superior to those who pursued the unadorned, plain and ordinary type of style by his intensity, gravity, close texture and general pungency of style." (34,370:14-18).
47. Although the term τὸ πρόπτον has not always been used, the basic principle was known before the above-mentioned term was coined, and it was expressed by synonymous words, e.g. καιρός, ἐν καιρῷ, (ἡ ἀκαιρία), (ἄκαιρος), (ἀκαιρία), (οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ), (ἄπρεπής), οἰκείως and συμμετρία.  
Cp. H.L.F. Drijepont, *Die antike Theorie der v a r i e t a s*, Diss. Univ. of South Africa, 1978 (presently in Spudasmata xxxvii), pp.134-138.
48. When proving the middle type better than the extraordinary type, he applies the principle of τὸ μέτρον, moderation, as well. This principle, however, has never been associated with the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system.

49. "But it is a matter of degree and, even more, of *fit occasions* ... and he is not adept at seizing on the *right occasion* for its use, but often misses it as well." (10,274:17-22) (The italics are mine).
50. 10,274:22-23.
51. "For (this style) appears to be less pleasing than the other one, since its *dialect* is worse, and it is less transparent; it also darkens *lucidity* and reduces it almost to absolute obscurity; furthermore, it draws out its thought in a long-drawn out way when *it is necessary to condense (it) in a few words* ... *inopportune* in its metonymies ... In an *inappropriate* way it revels in poetical, and especially in the Gorgianic figures." (5,256:4-20) (My italics). Cp. 7,260:23-26 for ἡ συντομία as an ἀναγκαῖα ἀρετή. With reference to Isocrates as user of the extraordinary type of style, we again meet to πρέπον where Dionysius says that this orator fails to select the correct moment for the application of Gorgianic figures: τὰ γὰρ ἀντίθετά τε καὶ πάρισα καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις οὔτε μετριάζοντα οὔτ' ἐν καιρῷ γινόμενα ... (4,252:26-28).
52. "This (*sc.* charm) however, carries him like a southerly breeze through introduction and narration, but when it comes to the proof section, it becomes faint and feeble, and in the passionate section at the end, it dies away, for it does not have much intensity or force." (13,288:26 - 13,290:1).
53. Cp. pp. 141f. S.F. Bonner did acknowledge the fact that Dionysius made use of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system in his evaluation of Isocrates: "He then proceeds to study a passage of the *De Pace* of Isocrates ... Here again he reverts for a while to his system of virtues ..." (*op. cit.*, pp. 64f.). Unfortunately he does not elaborate on this insight and even restricts the application of this system to the discussion of Isocrates.
54. καθαρεύει τε γὰρ εἴ τις ἄλλη τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν ἀκριβῆς ... ("No style is purer in its diction or more precise in its style ...") (18,302:28-30).
55. φανερά (*sc.* ἡ διάλεκτος) τ' ἐστι ... ("it (*sc.* his style) is clear ...") (18,302:30).
56. πρῶτον μὲν τῆς συντομίας ("First there is the question of conciseness") (18,304:7).
57. οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ πρέποντος ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιτυχάνει... ("Furthermore, he is not always appropriate ...") (18,304:27-28).

58. "It also has many of the accessory ornaments." (18,304:1-2).
59. "for it is sublime, solemn, dignified, beautiful as well as quite pleasant and shapely ..." (18,304:2-4).
60. 18,304:17.
61. 18,304:19.
62. 18,304:23.
63. 18,304:25.
64. "Why is it then that the passage is lacking intensity and powerful grip?" (20,310:3-4).
65. "That his style is indeed without life and passion with only the smallest amount of spirit ..." (20,310:25-28).
66. "For he has expressed the subject-matter in a nobler and more magnificent way than he (i.e. Isocrates) ..." (21,320:18-20).
67. "he has applied more force and more weighty intensity ..." (21,320:22-23).
68. "Especially in its energy, vehemence and passion it is entirely superior to his (i.e. of Isocrates)." (21,320:25-27).
69. 24,330:17ff.; 24,332:2ff.; 26,336:18ff.
70. 24,330:9ff.; 26,338:17-19.
71. 27,342:3-6; 27,342:21ff.
72. πότερα σαφεστέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν λέξιν;  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τῆς προσθέσεως ταύτης ἐστὶ σαφής.  
 24,334:1-2). (My spacing of print). Cp. 24,334:6 as well.
73. 24,330:10-11; 24,332:4.
74. 24,332:19-20.
75. 24,334:7-8; 25,336:7.
76. 24,334:8-9; 29,348:22.
77. 27,342:11.
78. 29,350:4.
79. 29,350:5.
80. "But if this clause has not been included for the sake of *necessity*, then (it was) surely for the sake of beauty or one of the other *additional* embellishments?" (24,332:3-6) (My italics) Cp. 24,332:20-22 and 32,364:22-28 as well.
81. E.g. in 44,412:5ff.; 45,412:26ff.; 45,414:8ff.; 45,416:2ff.; 46,418:1ff.; 47,420:6; 48,422:2; 48,422:10ff.; 48,424:6ff.
82. 53,440:26ff., *passim*.
83. 55,446:23ff.; 56,448:28; 58,452:27.

## CONCLUSION

The present study is the result of an attempt to understand the *De Demosthene* primarily out of itself, secondarily as part of the corpus, *De oratoribus antiquis*.

In chapter one I investigated into the two problems of the purpose as well as the nature of the *De Dem.* So far as the purpose of the *De Dem.* is concerned, my major concern was to prove that a title like *The style of Demosthenes* is too vague to do justice to the real content of this essay. As a matter of fact, evidence supplied by the text itself proves that a two-fold object is the only solution to the problem: on the one hand Dionysius wanted to prove the supremacy of Demosthenes in terms of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως and ἄρεται τῆς λέξεως systems. This happens in *De Dem.* I and IV and is highly polemic in nature.

On the other hand Dionysius gives a theoretical exposition of the musical aspect of the style of Demosthenes. This he does in *De Dem.* II, and seeing that the supremacy of Demosthenes is an accepted fact so far as this aspect of style is concerned, Dionysius does not have to prove anything. This explains why the nature of this section is didactic, theoretical exposition and not polemic. This two-fold nature and object must always be remembered in order to have a clear understanding of this essay.

Scholars have failed to explain why Dionysius has done the strange thing to incorporate a section on the delivery of Demosthenes (*De Dem.* III); as a matter of fact, many ignored this section. I have proven that this section has deliberately been incorporated as a digression in order to divert the attention from and soften the impact of the section of criticism of Demosthenes, immediately following the section on delivery. For the same reason he incorporated the didactic, non-polemic section on the σύνθεσις of Demosthenes. The final section of the *De Dem.*, the section of criticism on Demosthenes (*De Dem.* IV), properly belongs to *De Dem.* I. Scholars have disregarded this section, the reason being their inability to recognise the rhetorical structure of this work. Dionysius has deliberately removed this section of criticism against his idol from the section where it belongs, viz. *De Dem.* I. In doing this, he succeeded in minimizing any possible negative effect to the minimum. This procedure of his is by no means a sign of bad composition, but a stroke of genius. The structure of the *De Dem.* has been carefully planned; as a rhetorician, Dionysius himself realized that the οἰκονομία, organizing of material,

is a most important matter in effective communication.

In this essay on Demosthenes he applied this principle himself.

The peculiar nature of the *De Dem.* - generally speaking - has been one of the most important factors which gave rise to the question of the position of this essay in the corpus in which it has been taken up. This issue was the topic of the second chapter. I have shown that the differences between this essay and the essays of vol. I of the *De or. ant.* can all be satisfactorily explained in one way or another: this goes for the formal differences (loss of introduction, lack of a section on subject-matter, the length of the essay), as well as the differences in evaluation of authors, and an alleged difference in tone. Virtually all differences can be related to the fact that Demosthenes was not regarded as just another orator which could be imitated; this orator's style is unequalled. In the *De Dem.* the corpus reaches its climax by virtue of Demosthenes. The *De Dem.* was not intended to be a separate essay, but was indeed the essay promised in the general introduction to the corpus. The highly polemic nature of *De Dem.* I and IV was a natural outcome of the object; as a matter of fact, Dionysius did not have much of a choice to present his work in this way, if he wanted to prove the supremacy of his idol in *De Dem.* I and IV.

In chapter three the focus fell on yet another problem related with the very nature of the *De Dem.*: the chronological relation between this essay and another essay of Dionysius, viz. the *C.V.* In this taxing investigation I exerted myself to prove that the composition of *De Dem.* was not interrupted, during which interval the *C.V.* would allegedly have been written. There is abundant evidence that proves that Dionysius was quite acquainted with the theory of musical composition (the musical aspect of style), as explained in the *C.V.*, at the time of the composition of *De Dem.* I, proving that the *C.V.* was not written after he had completed *De Dem.* I. On the other hand, no positive evidence can be supplied to prove that Dionysius had set his essay on Demosthenes aside having completed *De Dem.* I, in order to turn to the composition of the *C.V.*

In the final chapter the focus was on a matter of great concern to me: the application of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system in the *De Dem.* Scholars

have given due credit to the application of the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως and ἁρμονία systems, but virtually ignored the application of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system in this essay of Dionysius, in spite of the fact that it forms the basis of evaluation in the essays of vol. I of the *De or. ant.* I have proven that this system was not only referred to in ch. 34, but that it formed the basis of evaluation in cc. 16 - 32. As a matter of fact, it plays an essential rôle in cc. 1 - 15, the chapters in which the χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως system forms the basis of comparison, and it even plays a minor rôle in *De Dem.* II, III and IV as well. Scholars who refuse to recognise the rôle of the ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως system, will not be able to understand this essay on Demosthenes.

A glossary has been included in this study primarily as an aid for students and comparative laymen. The inclusion is justified, to my mind, for the following reasons:

- Firstly, the extensive use of technical terminology in this work necessitates an aid of this kind.
- Secondly, the lack of uniformity in the use of technical terminology not only greatly violates lucidity, but also opens the door to wrong interpretation of the text. This lack of uniformity is manifested in the following ways:
  - the use of words in more than one technical sense;
  - the use of words in technical as well as non-technical senses;
  - the use of synonyms (including substantivated and other verb forms, substantivated adjectives synonymous to the equivalent noun, as well as periphrastic constructions, equivalent to the corresponding verb).
- Thirdly, the use of longer comparisons and metaphors, which, at first sight, may not seem to be technical, but had indeed been associated, traditionally or were associated by Dionysius with rhetoric or literary criticism.
- Fourthly, the practice of Dionysius of using terms which are indeed closely related, but not synonymous; his love of variation must strike any reader of a few pages.
- Fifthly, no glossary of this kind is available presently, and the researcher has to make use of the lexicon of I.C.T. Ernesti, *Lexicon technologiae Graecorum rhetoricae*, which is inadequate and has not yet been replaced by a comprehensive work of the same kind, and/or the general lexicon of E.G. Liddell and R. Scott. The article of J.F. Lockwood, *The metaphorical vocabulary of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, C.Q., 31 (1937), pp. 192-203, is of some use as well, but unfortunately not complete. A considerable number of studies on individual technical terms are indeed available, as well as various works on literary treatises, among which the work of W.K. Pritchett, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Thucydides*, but no glossary which can be of any practical aid to the student of the *De Demosthene*.
- Sixthly, an astonishing number of terms or quasi-terms appear to be equivalents of Latin words found in Roman rhetorical works, and their

presence in a glossary of this kind ought to prove helpful in removing still-existing doubts as to the meaning of such Latin words.

The annotated meanings must be regarded as translation equivalents. In each and every case the meaning was not only determined by the general notion of the word(s) involved, but specifically by the contextual application by Dionysius, i.e. the meaning attached by Dionysius to them according to the various contexts. In the references the first number represents the chapter in which a term occurs, the second the page in the Loeb text and the third the line on the page. References marked with a ≠ concern words inserted by emendation.

In conclusion, if found suitable, the glossary submitted here may constitute an embryo of a technical lexicon first to Dionysius, then to the Hellenistic rhetoricians, and finally to all Greek rhetorical works.

## A

ἀβίαστος		
unforced	38,382:28.	
ἀγαθός		
ἀγαθόν, τό		
1) merit	48,420:29;	48,422:10; 54,446:1;
2) gift	54,446:14;	
ἀγαθός, ὁ		
brave man	25,336:2.	
ἄγαμαι		
to admire	23,326:10;	35,376:11.
ἀγανακτέω		
to be vexed,		
irritated	22,324:8;	54,444:7.
ἀγεννής		
ignoble	39,384:7.	
ἀγκών, ὁ		
bend	4,254:7.	
ἀγορά, ἡ		
market-place	23,328:6.	
ἄγροικος		
unrefined	57,452:6.	
ἄγω		
1) to carry	13,288:28;	
2) to lead	22,322:24;	32,364:22;
3) to bring into a certain state	18,304:27;	28,346:11.
ἀγωγή, ἡ		
1) ability to induce emotion	2,246:16;	
2) type of composition	36,378:20;	
3) personal composition	42,402:28;	44,412:1;

4) personal style	23,324:19.
ἀγωγός εἰμί to induce	55,448:7.
ἀγών, ὁ	
1) speech	9,274:3;
2) debate	20,312:21; 45,414:8 <sup>7</sup> ;
3) oratorical struggle	32,366:4;
4) public speech	13,288:4; 23,328:24;
5) lawsuit	4,252:4; 9,274:3; 56,450:1;
6) issue, question	22,322:26;
7) competition	29,350:9.
ἀγωνιάω to anguish	22,322:9.
ἀγωνίζομαι to compete	4,252:6.
ἀδηλος ἀδήλως unobtrusively	50,430:10.
ἀδιάφορος ἀδιαφόρως indiscriminately	56,448:25.
ἀδικέω to do injustice to injure	53,440:12.
ἀδυνασία, ἡ incapacity	26,340:17.
ἀζηλος not to be imitated	28,346:2.
ἀηδής unpleasing, unpleasant	5,256:4; 10,274:24 <sup>7</sup> ; 38,382:25; 45,414:22; 55,446:17; 57,450:21; 57,452:1,5.

ἀηδία, ἡ

- 1) displeasure 5,256:19; 20,314:1;
- 2) unpleasantness 35,374:12.

αἵρεσις, ἡ

- chosen style 43,404:18.

αἴσθησις, ἡ

- 1) sense
  - perception 24,334:11; 48,424:23;
- 2) appreciation 32,364:13;
- 3) feeling 50,428:16.
  - (v. ἄλογος)

αἰτιάσθαι

- to criticize 20,312:16.

αἴτιον, τό

- cause 47,420:4; 48,422:25.

ἄκαιρία, ἡ

- 1) inappropriateness 7,260:26; 24,332:25; 26,338:19;  
56,448:28;
- 2) lack of sense of  
proportion 42,404:1.

ἄκαιρος

- inappropriate,  
inopportune 5,256:14,19; 7,264:12<sup>≠</sup>.
- (v. ἡ ἀκαιρία)

ἄκατάλληλος

- ungrammatical 27,342:10.

ἄκατάσκευος

- unaffected,  
natural, having  
no artifice 13,286:13; 39,386:1.
- (v. ἀποίητος)

ἄκατονόμαστος

nameless 39,384:19.

ἀκίνδυνος

ἀκίνδυνον, τό

unwillingness  
of taking risks 2,246:6.

ἀκίνητος

1) without  
susceptibility 54,444:27;  
2) unmoving 54,446:2.

ἀκοή, ἡ

1) sense of  
hearing 8,266:18; 15,294:28; 18,306:4;  
20,312:19,20,24; 38,382:14,26;  
39,384:13; 40,390:7; 40,392:22;  
43,406:1; 50,448:8;  
2) ear 40,392:8.

ἀκολουθεῖω

1) to accompany 48,420:14;  
2) to be associated  
with 52,438:26.

ἀκολουθία, ἡ

1) remainder 9,268:29; 9,272:15;  
2) grammatical  
agreement 27,344:6; 39,386:10;  
3) sequence 40,394:7;  
4) organized  
uniformity 50,430:28.

ἀκόσμητος

unembellished 4,252:20.

ἀκοῦω

1) to hear 15,294:24; 23,324:28; 24,334:7;  
26,336:11; 48,424:18; 49,426:2;  
2) to listen to 45,414:22;

ἀκούοντες, οἱ	
audience	20,312:22; 20,314:1; 26,336:20; 43,406:3.
ἀκουστής, ὁ	
listener	45,416:6.
ἀκραφνής	
unmixed	37,378:25.
ἀκρίβεια, ἡ	
precision	13,288:10; 24,330:4; 40,392:1; 48,424:25.
ἀκριβής	
precise	4,252:12; 5,254:22; 6,258:7,21; 11,276:11; 13,286:9; 13,298:15; 15,294:23; 16,296:29 ( <i>sup.</i> ); 18,302:30; 27,342:5; 29,350:2; 50,428:5;
ἀκριβῶς	
precisely	50,428:12,26.
ἀκριβολογέω	
to examine in detail	26,340:15.
ἀκροάομαι	
to listen	22,322:6,20.
ἀκροώμενοι, οἱ	
audience	18,304:20.
ἀκροατήρια, τὰ	
audience	15,296:10.
ἀκροατής, ὁ	
audience	4,252:18; 18,304:26; 45,414:20; 55,446:26.
ἀκρότης, ἡ	
the extreme	2,244:22.

ἄκρος	
1) extreme	42,404:9;
2) highest (non-tech.)	6,258:1;
ἄκρα, ἡ	
the extreme	42,404:12;
ἄκρον, τό	
peak	1,244 <sup>≠</sup> ; 2,244:15; 2,246:10;
εἰς ἄκρον	
with the highest perfection	51,436:8.
ἀλήθεια, ἡ	
1) realism	13,286:13;
2) reality	23,326:26; 54,442:27;
3) truth	18,306:11; 23,324:22; 23,326:26; 45,414:26;
4) true need of subject	28,246:7.
κατ' ἀλήθειαν	
actually	54,442:24.
ἀληθής	
true	39,384:11.
τάληθές	
truth	39,384:11;
τάληθῆ	
truth	18,304:24.
ἀληθῶς	
1) actually	24,332:24 <sup>≠</sup> ;
2) truly	55,446:21; 56,450:17.
ἀληθινός	
1) real	22,322:26; 32,364:17;
2) actual	18,304:18;
3) factual	8,266:10; 32,366:4;
ἀληθινόν, τό	
1) reality	32,364:22;
2) effect of reality	53,440:16;
3) oratorical reality	32,366:4.
ἀλλάττω	
to differ	53,440:8.

ἀλληγορία, ἡ

- 1) allegory 5,256:16;
- 2) figurative language 7,264:13<sup>z</sup>.

ἄλογος

- 1) unreasoning 54,444:25;
- 2) illogical (non-tech.) 9,274:10; 52,436:17;

ἄλογος αἴσθησις, ἡ

- 1) irrational  
sense-perception 24,334:11;
- 2) intuitive feeling 50,428:15.

ἁμαρτάνω

- 1) to be wrong,  
to commit an error 4,252:25; 6,258:4,9,13; 32,364:23;  
55,448:12; 56,448:30;
- 2) to miss (the mark)  
(v. ἀποτυγχάνω) 10,274:22.

ἁμάρτημα, τό

- error 6,258:3,24; 56,450:17; 58,452:16,27.

ἁμείνων

- better 33,368:2,27;

ἁμεινον (Adv.)

- better 41,398:9.

ἁμετρία, ἡ

- excess, excessive use 10,274:22.

ἁμετρος

- immoderate 5,256:3; 19,308:5.

ἁμαύρος

- faint 47,418:26.

ἁμιλλάζομαι

- to complete 33,368:28.

ἁμυδρός

- faint 13,288:29.

ἀμώλητος

flawless 6,258:8.

ἀναβάλλω

to postpone 32,366:9;

ἀναβεβλημένος

slow 43,404:27;

ἀναβεβλημένως

slowly 54,444:21.

ἀναγκαῖος

1) necessary 9,270:13; 18,308:4; 24,330:18;  
24,332:2; 26,336:18; 38,380:31;  
39,384:11,26; 39,386:8; 40,390:15<sup>≠</sup>,16;

2) economic 13,288:21;

3) essential 3,248:3; 4,252:10; 53,440:3;

4) necessary (non-tech.) 14,290:27; 32,364:27; 50,432:7;

ἀναγκαῖον, τό

necessity 24,332:4,21; 32,364:27, v. εὐκαρπος;

ἀναγκαῖα, τά

essentials 13,290:6.

ἀνάθημα, τό

work of art 10,274:26.

ἀναίσθητος

1) insensitive 6,256:27;

2) without sensitivity 54,444:26.

ἀνακοπή, ἡ

clashing 38,382:12.

ἀναλήθης

1) unnatural 4,254:10;

2) unreal 32,364:21<sup>≠</sup>.

ἀναλογία, ἡ

analogy 5,256:15.

ἀνάλογος

fitting, analogical 13,290:12.

ἀνάπαυσις, ἡ

pause (in breathing) 43,410:15.

ἀναπλάζω		
to fashion		46,418:3.
ἀναπληρόω		
to fill		38,382:7.
ἀναφέρω		
to refer to		27,344:11.
ἀναφορά, ἡ		
reference		36,378:10.
ἀνδρώδης		
virile		39,384:8; 43,410:20.
ἀνεπίληπτος		
above criticism		33,368:20.
ἀνεπίμικτος		
unmixed		37,380:10.
ἀνεπιτήδευτος		
seeming artless		2,246:9;
ἀνεπιτηδεύτως		
spontaneously		39,386:2.
ἀνεσις, ἡ		
relaxation		13,290:12; 37,378:24; 44,410:30; 46,418:1.
ἀνέχομαι		
to endure		48,422:6.
ἀνθηρός		
1) embellished		18,304:28;
2) flowery		32,364:24;
ἀνθηρόν χωρίον καταγωγᾶς ἡδείας ἔχον καὶ τέρπεις ἐφημέρους		
a flowery countryside with pleasant inns and passing delectation		32,364:24-25.
ἄθος, τό		
flower, bloom		5,254:29.

ἀνθυποφέρω	to answer (in combination with πυνθάνομαι, constituting a figure of thought).	54,444:7
ἀνθυποφορά, ἡ	answer	54,444:9.
ἀνίημι	to relax	2,244:29;
ἀνειμένος	relaxed	8,266:11.
ἀντίθεσις, ἡ	1) antithesis (figure of thought)	20,312:4,4,28; 21,314:20;
	2) antithesis (figure of diction)	40,392:23;
	3) contrast	25,336:9.
ἀντίθετος		
ἀντίθετον, τό	antithesis (figure of diction)	4,252:26; 20,312:25,30.
ἀντίκειμαι	to be contrasted	20,312:29; 26,336:14.
ἀντικρούω	to be a hindrance (v. προνής)	40,392:7 <sup>≠</sup> .
ἀντιλαμβάνομαι	to perceive	48,424:17.
ἀντιπαράτιθιμι	1) to compare by contrast	16,296:26; 17,298:7; 23,326:29;
		33,366:27;
	2) to contrast	26,338:10.
ἀντιπαρεξετάζω	to examine by (contrastive) comparison	31,358:3; 33,368:19.

ἀντιστηριγμός, ὁ	
sound-collision	38,382:12.
ἀντιστρέφω	
ἀντιστρέφον, τό	
antistrophe	40,392:24.
ἀντίστροφος, ἡ	
antistrophe	50,430:22.
ἀντιτυπία, ἡ	
jarring effect	40,390:23.
ἀντίτυπος	
ἀντίτυπον, τό	
jarring effect	38,382:20.
ἀνυκαίρετος	
inseparable	34,370:4; 51,432:17 <sup>≠</sup> .
ἀξία, ἡ	
merit (ψ. τὸ πρέπον)	28,346:6.
ἀξιόλογος	
1) noteworthy	33,368:4;
2) considerable	38,380:26; 38,382:1,9;
3) substantial	44,410:30.
ἄξιος	
worthy	23,328:12; 24,332:7; 27,342:4; 28,344:19,25; 28,346:4,15; 29,348:18; 29,350:7; 33,368:20,28; 35,374:20; 36,378:7; 55,446:21.
ἀξιόχεως	
trustworthy	36,376:17.
ἀξιόω	
1) to think	23,324:23; 23,326:5; 29,350:6; 34,370:28; 34,372:8; 48,426:1; 50,428:4;

2) to deem worthy (non-tech.)	26,338:21; 27,342:8; 37,380:12; 51,432:28;
3) to deem fit (non-tech.)	13,288:20; 27,342:5,27; 34,372:2,8.
ἀξίωμα, τό dignity	41,398:18; 45,416:4,15; 56,450:2.
ἀξιωματικός dignified	18,304:3; 39,384:15; 40,392:16; 43,410:20; 44,410:31; 48,422:27; 48,424:1,11;
ἀξιωματικῶς in a dignified way	43,404:22.
ἀξίωσις, ἡ reputation	9,274:9; 22,322:28; 23,326:17.
ἀπαγγελία, ἡ expression, way of expressing ideas in words (ψ. ἡ ἐρμηνεία)	9,272:11; 25,334:27.
ἀπαθής without feeling	4,254:10; 54,444:27.
ἀπαιτέω 1) to require 2) to expect 3) to demand	54,444:6; 55,446:23,23; 56,450:15; 55,448:3 <sup>≠</sup> ; 58,454:4.
ἀπαρτίζω to complete	9,272:12;
ἀπηρτισμένος complete	50,430:4.
ἀπατάω <sup>1</sup> ἀπατήσαι καὶ κλέψαι τὰ πράγματα to conceal the facts	2,246:3.
ἀπάτη, ἡ diversion, pastime	44,412:9; 45,416:9.

ἀπατηλός	
beguiling	8,266:18;
ἀπατηλόν, τό	
guile	45,416:1.
ἀπεικιάζω	
to compare	35,376:10.
ἀπειροκαλία, ἡ	
want of taste	6,258:16; 7,260:10; 23,326:10.
ἀπειρόκαλος	
tasteless	5,256:9.
ἀπερίεργος	
ἀπεριέργως	
in an uncomplicated way	9,270:6.
ἀπερίσκεπτος	
ἀπερισκέπτως	
1) carelessly	40,388:22;
2) ill-consideredly	56,450:19.
ἀτέριπτος	
ordinary	8,266:9; 34,370:15.
ἀτέχω	
to be inferior	35,374:7.
ἀπιστέω	
to experience disbelief	22,322:9.
ἀπλοϊκός	
ἀπλοϊκῶς	
in a simple way	45,414:27.
ἀπλοῦς	
simple	4,252:20; 9,268:17,21;
(ν. ἀφελής, ἰσχνός and λιτός)	9,270:5; 15,294:21;
ἀπλῶς	
simply (non-tech.)	50,432:12.

ἀποδεικτικός

ἀποδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, οἱ

proof section of oration 13,288:28.

ἀπόδειξις, ἡ

proof 43,404:24; 44,412:23.

ἀποδίδωμι

1) to assign 34,372:4; 48,422:1;

2) to expound 50,432:7;

3) to repay 52,438:28;

ἀποδίδωμι λόγον

to give an account of 58,454:22.

ἀποίητος

unaffected (ν. ἀκατάσκευτος) 5,254:19; 6,258:7; 39,384:30.

ἀποκινάω

to wear out 20,314:1.

ἀπολείπομαι

to lack 18,304:30.

ἀπόλλυμι

to destroy 54,446:1.

ἀπολογία, ἡ

1) defence, speech for  
the defence 14,290:23; 14,292:26; 23,328:5;  
57,452:7;

2) defensive part (inserted  
in political discussion) 23,326:15;

τὰς ἀπολογίας ἔχω

can be rebutted 55,446:18.

ἀπονέμω

to assign 32,366:14.

ἀποσβέννυμι

to die away 13,288:30.

ἀποστρέφω

1) to turn away 9,268:18;

2) to divert, relax 20,312:24.

ἀποτείνω	
to stretch out, extend	5,256:7.
ἀποτελέω	
to perfect	8,266:8.
ἀποτραχύνω	
to grate	43,404:29.
ἀποτυγχάνω	
to miss, fail (v. ἀμαρτάνω, 2))	15,296:11.
ἀπόφασις, ἡ	
1) statement	9,272:25;
2) negative	9,270:2.
ἄπταιστος	
ἀπταίστως	
unfaltering	52,438:14,21.
ἀρέσκω	
1) to suffice, to be sufficient	41,398:15;
2) to please (non-tech.)	15,294:22; 15,296:9.
ἀρετή, ἡ	
1) excellence	2,244:15; 13,286:20; 15,294:13; 35,372:20; 35,374:21;
2) basic, constituent (v. τὸ στοιχεῖον)	53,440:3,5,15; 58,454:5;
3) quality, feature	18,302:31; 19,306:13; 33,368:21; 34,370:6,13; 34,372:4,6,12; 54,446:7; 58,454:12;
4) (peculiar) nature	35,376:14; 47,418:26; 56,448:20;
5) moral excellence	23,328:23; 31,358:6.
ἄρθρον, τό	
article	39,386:7.
ἀριθμέω	
to evaluate	35,374:8.

ἀριθμός, ὁ

- |                         |           |
|-------------------------|-----------|
| 1) number (grammatical) | 52,438:6; |
| 2) catalogue            | 54,442:6; |
| 3) number (non-tech.)   | 37,380:9. |

ἄριστος

best 50,428:15;

ἄριστα (Adv.)

best 16,296:24;

ἀριστεία, τά

the first prize 33,368:28.

ἀρκέω

- |                                    |                       |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1) to suffice, to be<br>sufficient | 14,290:26; 19,306:28; |
| to be sufficient (non-<br>tech.)   | 2,244:20; 20,312:3;   |

ἀρκοῦν, τό

what is sufficient 10,274:25.

ἁρμονία, ἡ

- |                                   |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1) composition                    | 18,306:6; 35,372:17; 35,376:8;<br>36,376:19,30; 38,380:27; 39,386:19;<br>40,392:1; 41,398:19; 43,404:28;<br>43,406:19,20; 43,408:22; 45,412:29;<br>46,416:24 <sup>z</sup> ; 50,428:28; 51,434:3;<br>51,436:3;          |
| 2) type of composition            | 36,378:15,25; 37,380:9; 38,380:22,27;<br>38,382:10; 39,384:3,20; 39,384:21;<br>39,386:6; 39,388:14; 40,392:27;<br>41,398:1,7,23; 42,404:5,8,10;<br>43,408:13; 43,410:2; 45,416:12;<br>46,418:2; 47,418:18; 49,426:3,4; |
| 3) musicality, musical<br>quality | 24,330:11; 48,422:29;  |
| 4) musical scale                  | 48,422:29;   |
| 5) junction                       | 40,390:2;  |

διαπασῶν ἁρμονία, ἡ	
the whole musical scale	2,244:21.
ἁρμόττω	
1) to fit	18,306:3; 41,398:9; 45,416:5; 48,420:30;
2) to unite	3,246:22;
3) to adapt	33,366:22;
4) to be appropriate	27,342:1; 32,366:12;
ἁρμόττω ἁρμονίαν	
to make music	2,244:21;
ἁρμόττειν, τό	
interlocking	36,376:24.
ἄρρενικός	
ἄρρενικόν, τό	
masculine (gender)	27,344:9.
ἄρσις, ἡ	
arsis, ictus, rise (of the foot in beating rhythm)	48,420:21.
ἀρχαιοπινής	
with the patina of antiquity	38,382:27.
ἀρχαιοπρεπής	
archaic	5,256:12;
ἀρχαιοπρεπές, τό	
old fashion way of expression	39,388:15; 48,424:14.
ἀρχαῖος	
1) archaic	4,252:12;
2) old-fashioned	39,386:5; 43,410:17;
3) antique	39,386:20;
4) ancient	8,266:13; 17,298:8; 41,398:13; 50,428:20; 56,448:27.

ἀρχαιότης, ἡ	old-fashioned quality	5,254:27.
ἀρχή, ἡ	1) first member of a sentence	20,314:3;
	2) beginning (non-tech.)	20,314:7;
ἀρχὴν λαμβάνω	to begin	38,380:30-31.
ἀσαφής	obscure	10,274:23.
ἀσθενεία, ἡ	weakness	19,308:30.
ἀσθενής	feeble, ineffective	13,288:29; 28,346:21.
ἀσκέω	to practice	34,370:20.
ἀσκησις, ἡ	1) practice	13,290:11; 47,418:16;
	2) training	52,436:19.
ἀσκητής, ὁ	practitioner	22,324:3.
ἀσπάζω	to favour	39,384:28;
ἀσπάζομαι	to cleave to	36,378:5.
ἀσπαιστός		
ἀσπαιστῶς	welcome	40,392:8.
ἀστεῖος	urbane	54,444:20.
ἀστεῖσμός, ὁ	urbanity	54,446:12.

ἀστοχέω	
to miss	33,368:7; 55,448:11.
ἀσυγκρότητος	
1) disjointed	19,308:7;
2) rambling, incoherent	19,308:18.
ἀσυνήθης	
unfamiliar, (ν. ἐξαλλάττω)	9,270:28
ἀσφάλεια, ἡ	
cautiousness	2,246:6
ἀσφαλής	
1) steady	24,332:13; 26,336:17, cp. βάσις;
2) firm	40,392:19; 45,414:25.
ἄτακτος	
disorderly	50,430:27.
ἀταμίευτος	
ἀταμιεύτως	
unrestrainedly	10,274:18.
ἀτελής	
1) imperfect	2,246:19; 14,290:17; 33,368:6;
2) incomplete	9,272:22; 50,430:5;
3) unaccomplished	8,266:6.
ἄτολμος	
not daring	18,304:15.
ἄτονος	
lacking intensity	20,310:3.
ἄτοπος	
1) unnatural	24,330:21;
2) paradoxical	56,450:10;
3) absurd (non-tech.)	34,372:12.

αὐλημαί, τό	
reed-pipe-music (i.e. libitation music)	22,322:5.
αὐξάνω	
1) to increase	52,438:19 (Med.); 54,444:8;
2) exaggerate	54,444:24.
αὐξησις, ἡ	
1) amplification	54,444:9; 58,454:8;
2) hightening of effect	48,420:25.
αὐστηρός	
1) rough	36,378:13; 38,380:21; 39,386:5; 39,388:14; 41,398:22; 45,414:14,19,28; 45,416:12 <sup>f</sup> ; 47,418:27;
2) austere	43,410:17;
3) serious	8,266:11;
4) rigorous (non-tech.)	42,404:14;
5) strict (non-tech.)	55,446:26;
αὐστηρόν, τό	
roughness	48,424:4;
αὐστηραῖς	
roughly	43,404:21.
αὐτάρκης	
self-sufficient	13,290:2; 33,366:25.
αὐτόματος	
independent	39,386:4.
αὐτοπάθεια, ἡ	
susceptibility	22,322:28.
αὐτουργός	
roughly-fashioned, unrefined	39,384:22.
αὐτόφαντος	
ἐπ' αὐτοφάνη	
conspicuously, manifestly	56,450:7.

αύχητος		
dry, arid		45,414:22.
αύχμος, ὁ		
aridity (of style)		44,412:13.
ἀφανίζω		
to remove		24,334:8.
ἀφελής		
effecting simplicity		2,244:3; 5,254:19;
(v. ἀπλοῦς, ἰσχνός and λιτός)		6,258:8; 9,268:17; 9,270:15;
		13,286:13; 39,384:23.
ἀφελῶς		
in a way effecting simplicity		39,384:30.
ἀφή, ἡ		
grip (v. ἡ λαβή)		18,304:18.
ἀφυκτος		
ineluctable		18,304:19.
ἄφωνος		
ἄφωνα γράμματα, τὰ		
consonants		38,382:15; 40,390:5;
ἄφωνα (sc. γράμματα), τὰ		
consonants		43,406:26 <sup>≠</sup> ; 43,408:21,26.
ἀψόρητος		
ἀψορητί		
without harsh sound		20,312:19.
ἄψυχος		
lacking life		4,254:10 <sup>≠</sup> ; 20,310:26.
B		
βαίνω		
v. πλατύς, 2)		38,380:25.

βῆναι, τό		
rhythmical conclusion		26,336:18.
(v. ἡ βάσις, 1))		
βαίω		
to strengthen		36,376:18.
βάρος, τό		
gravity		34,370:17.
βαρύς		
grave		36,378:13.
βαρύτης, ἡ		
low pitch		48,420:15; 52,438:6.
(cf. ἡ ὀξύτης)		
βασιάζω		
to assay		24,330:5; 51,432:30.
βάσανος, ἡ		
testing		16,296:30; 33,368:1.
βάσις, ἡ		
1) rhythmical close		24,332:13, v. βαίνω (τὸ βῆναι);
		39,386:3; 43,410:12;
2) basis		45,414:25.
βασκαίνω		
to disparage		35,374:15.
βέβαιος		
βεβαίως		
firmly, with confidence		50,428:21.
βιάζομαι		
to force		2,246:2.
βίος, ὁ		
1) biography		53,440:25;
2) life		32,364:27.
ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς βίος		
the world of today		56,448:24.

βοάω		
to cry out loud		54,444:19 <sup>z</sup> .
βούλημα, τό		
intention		40,390:26.
βούλησις, ἡ		
1) intention		3,248:10; 23,328:7; 53,440:13;
2) wish		39,386:13.
βραχυλογία, ἡ		
brevis		58,452:26; 58,454:3,12.
βραχύς		
1) narrow		9,270:27;
2) short		43,408:4; 48,420:18,22;
3) short (non-tech.)		14,292:1;
βραχύ		
slightly (non-tech.)		6,258:10;
διὰ βραχείων		
briefly (non-tech.)		33,368:8.
βραχύτης, ἡ		
shortness		48,420:16.
Γ		
γενεαλογία, ἡ		
genealogy		2,244:7.
γέλως, ὁ		
ridicule		29,348:10.
γενικός		
basic		33,368:15; 37,378:22.
γενναῖος		
1) good, excellent		15,294:19;
2) noble		26,336:23; 28,346:22; 29,350:6;
		39,384:15; 48,424:11;
γενναίως		
nobly		45,414:27.
γεννικός		
noble (v. γενναῖος, 2))		39,388:14.

γένος, τό	
1) type	14,290:16; 33,368:17; 39,384:17;
2) kind, sort	46,416:21;
3) principle (of the use of strange language)	56,450:9;
4) gender (grammatical)	52,438:6;
5) kind (non-tech.)	16,296:20;
6) race (non-tech.)	23,324:30; 28,346:13.
γῆ, ἡ	
land (v. εὐκαρπος)	32,364:26.
γλαυρός	
1) smooth	36,378:15; 39,384:27; 40,388:17; 45,414:14; 45,416:13; 47,420:1; 48,422:28;
2) polished	43,410:18;
γλυπτός	
chiselled (v. τορευτός)	51,434:6.
γλωττηματικός	
foreign	4,252:13.
γνώμη, ἡ	
1) mind	22,322:5,13;
2) idea	25,336:3;
3) opinion	42,404:7.
γναμολογία, ἡ	
aphorism	46,416:24.
γνώριμος	
familiar	49,426:8; 50,432:15.
γοητεύω	
to bewitch (v. κηλέω)	35,376:6; 39,384:12.
Γοργίειος	
Gorgianic	5,256:19; 25,336:8 <sup>f</sup> .
γράμμα, τό	
letter	4,254:3; 38,382:17,22; 40,390:9,21; 40,392:1 <sup>f</sup> ; 52,436:29;
γράμμα ἄφωνον, τό	
consonant	38,382:15; 40,390:6;

γράμμα ἡμίφωνον, τό <sup>2</sup>	semi-vowel	38,382:3,15; 40,390:5;
γράμμα φωνήεν, τό	vowel	38,380:28.
γραμματική, ἡ (sc. τέχνη)	literature	49,426:5; 52,436:24.
γραφεύς, ὁ	painter	51,436:5.
γραφή, ἡ		
1) writing		2,244:18; 4,252:6;
2) work of literature		36,376:27;
3) painting		50,428:24.
Δ		
δαιμόνιος		
1) inspired		2,244:23;
2) brilliant		23,324:25; 26,338:15; 46,416:28.
δαίμων, ὁ	deity	22,322:16.
δεδίπτομαι	to fear	22,324:9.
δειγμα, τό	example	14,290:28; 19,308:30; 37,380:13.
δεῖδω	to fear	22,322:10.
δείκνυμι		
1) to display		22,324:1;
2) to show		43,404:18; 50,426:19; 55,448:13;
δείξαι, τό	the showing	46,418:12;
δεικνύμενον, τό	feature	37,380:19.
δεινός		
1) forceful, powerful		10,276:3; 15,294:16;
2) able		22,324:3; 25,334:19; 32,366:7;

3) skilful	2,246:17;
4) overwhelming wondrous	22,324:15;
5) terrible (non-tech.)	54,442:17,18.
δεινόν, τό	
indignation	54,444:8;
δεινῶς	
astonishingly	40,392:11.
δεινότης, ἡ	
1) forceful persuasiveness	10,276:8; 13,288:17;
2) skill	23,326:7; 35,374:9; 35,376:9; 56,450:11,16; 58,454:20;
3) rhetorical power	27,342:11.
δεσμός, ὁ	
connection	40,390:17.
δευτερεῖος	
τα δευτερεῖα (sc. ἄθλα)	
second position	29,350:9.
δεύτερος	
second	35,374:8.
δέω	
to be necessary	34,372:11,13 <sup>f</sup> ;
δέον, τό	
the necessary	8,264:14.
δημηγορέω	
to deliver a speech in the assembly	17,298:12.
δημηγορία, ἡ	
1) deliberative speech	9,274:4; 14,290:21; 56,450:1;
2) public speech	21,314:15; 23,328:9,10.
δημηγορικός, ὁ (sc. λόγος)	
deliberative speech	1,238:2; 2,244:12; 3,248:11; 45,416:4
δημιουργός, ὁ	
1) maker	47,418:20;
2) artist	50,428:20;

δημιουργός πολιτικός, ὁ	professional politician	51,436:10.
δῆμος, ὁ	the people	18,304:25.
δημόσιος	1) civic, civil	4,252:5; 9,274:3; 13,288:3; 14,290:22; 45,416:15;
	2) public	56,450:1;
δημοσία	in public	24,330:17,26; 24,332:1.
διαβάλλω	to discredit	56,450:19.
διαγιγνώσκω	to distinguish	9,274:5; 36,376:21; 50,426:20; 50,428:21; 51,432:18.
διαγωγή, ἡ	diversion	42,404:15.
διαδικασία, ἡ	dispute	13,286:30.
διαιρέω	to specify	54,442:12;
διαιρέομαι	to divide	33,368:14; 51,434:10.
διαίρεσις, ἡ	division	34,372:2; 51,434:8.
διαιλώω		
διαιλώμενος	loose, broken	43,410:22.
διαινίζω	to pick to pieces	35,374:11.
διαιωμυρδέω	to ridicule	57,450:30.

διαλανθάνω

to escape the notice of 48,424:23.

διαλέγομαι

- 1) to address 15,294:22,30;
- 2) to speak, converse 23,324:30;
- 3) to express oneself 27,342:27;
- 4) to discuss 23,324:20; 23,326:5.

διάλεκτος, ἡ

- 1) type of style 2,244:26; 5,254:24; 6,258:9;  
15,296:2; 18,304:1; 18,306:1;  
33,368:3; 34,370:20;
- 2) style
  - a) referring to the types 33,368:3;
  - b) of an author 5,254:14; 8,266:8; 9,270:15,29;  
13,290:6; 18,302:29; 18,304:29;  
20,310:26; 20,314:11; 32,364:26;
- 3) way of expression 27,342:6,21; 55,446:22; 55,448:4,9,14;
- 4) (spoken) language 8,266:17; 9,268:18; 23,324:29;
- 5) dialect 41,398:27.

διάλεξις, ἡ

passage 21,320:16.

διαλλάττω

- 1) to differ 8,266:12; 10,274:11; 32,364:16;  
46,416:23;
- 2) to excel, to be superior  
to 34,370:16; 35,372:18.

διάλογος, ὁ

dialogue 6,258:20; 23,326:7,22; 23,328:8.

οἱ τῶν ἠθικῶν διαλόγων ποιηταί

moral philosophers 2,244:10.

διαμιλλᾶσθαι

to be a rival 29,350:10.

διανέμω

to divide 34,372:4.

διάνοια, ἡ	
1) thought ((to be) expressed in words)	19,306:16; 19,308:18; 20,312:15; 20,314:2; 25,334:28; 26,336:19;
2) idea, thought (generally spoken)	20,312:2;
3) sense, meaning	39,384:26;
4) mind, sense, intellect	2,244:27; 9,272:18; 20,314:9; 45,414:24;
5) intention.	18,304:22;
6) genius	51,436:4.
διαποικίλλω	
to vary	50,430:31; 50,432:12.
διαρκής	
διαρκές, τό	
sufficiency	13,290:3.
διαρρέω	
to flow through	40,392:7.
διασπῶ	
to break up	40,390:5; 43,408:3;
διέσπασμαι	
to be broken up	43,408:14.
διάσπασις, ἡ	
clashing	43,408:24.
διαστέλλω	
to divide	40,392:16.
διασύρω	
to ridicule	54,444:24; 56,448:29; 56,450:10.
διατρίβω	
to waste time	23,324:17.
διαυγής	
transparent	5,254:21.
διαφέρω	
1) to differ	22,322:13; 32,364:14; 37,378:24; 54,446:2;

2) to be superior to διαφθείρω	21,320:18; 33,368:13; 34,370:21.
to ruin, destroy	48,422:10; 53,440:13.
διαφορά, ἡ	
1) difference	13,288:20; 48,422:26; 50,430:17
2) variation	46,416:27.
διάφορος	
different	46,416:19,22;
διαφόρως	
differently	46,416:26.
διαχαράττω	
to disrupt	43,408:27.
διδασκαλεῖον, τό	
school	54,442:26 <sup>7</sup> .
διδάσκω	
1) to instruct	4,252:18; 22,324:7; 44,412:5;
2) to teach	18,306:8;
3) to explain	47,420:8;
4) to prescribe	53,440:29; 53,442:2; 54,442:12;
	54,444:19.
διδασχὴ, ἡ	
instruction	24,334:13; 44,412:10.
διείργω	
to separate	38,382:9.
διεξοδικός	
continuous, uninterrupted	21,314:20.
διέρχομαι	
to write down	23,328:16.
διήγησις, ἡ	
1) narration (i.e. section of an oration)	11,276:17; 12,280:16; 13,288:27;
	34,372:10,13; 45,414:16;
2) account	45,414:22.

διθύραμβος, ὁ	
1) dithyramb	6,258:17; 7,262:3,23;
2) bombastic, inflated language	7,260:15; 7,262:6; 29,348:27;
διθυραμβώδης	
bombastic	29,350:5.
διίστημι	
1) to separate	38,382:4;
2) to disrupt	43,406:20,24;
διεστύσασ	
broken up	43,404:28.
δίκαιος	
fair	23,328:3.
δικανικός	
forensic	1,238:1; 2,244:12; 9,274:3; 23,328:4; 45,416:6,14.
δικαστήριον, τό	
court	18,304:26; 22,322:2; 23,328:6; 44,412:8,11; 45,412:25; 45,414:3; 45,416:13.
δικαστής, ὁ	
juror	45,416:7.
διορίζω	
to distinguish	50,426:22.
διπλάσιος	
(ratio) of two to one	48,420:23.
διώκω	
to strive after	39,388:15; 40,392:20.
δοιέω	
1) to think	23,328:3; 30,350:12; 39,386:23; 43,404:23;
2) to seem	28,346:2; 30,356:30; 32,366:7; 33,366:28; 34,370:5, <sup>3</sup> 8,16; 35,374:7; 44,412:4; 45,414:9; 48,424:26; 50,430:12; 50,432:14; 51,432:16;

	52,438:22,24;
3) to seem justified	30,358:1;
4) to appear	40,394:7;
δοκεῖ	
it seems (non-tech.)	23,328:17; 24,330:24; 24,332:2; 28,346:4; 29,348:15; 32,364:22; 48,420:11,23; 48,422:14; 54,444:25.
δοκιμάζω	
to form a judgement	50,428:13.
δόξα, ἡ	
1) opinion	6,256:28; 8,266:21; 23,326:24; 36,378:5; 39,384:11; 47,418:19; 49,426:10;
2) reputation (neutral)	35,374:3; 51,432:28;
3) good reputation	23,324:21; 23,326:26; 31,358:8; 33,368:26;
3) suspicion	42,402:30.
δραστήριος	
δραστήριον, τό	
energy	21,320:26; 34,370:25.
δύναμις, ἡ	
1) personal ability	6,258:1; 41,398:5;
2) capacity	56,450:15;
3) rhetorical power	13,288:18; 16,296:29; 34,370:29;
4) power	20,312:24;
5) function	55,448:2;
6) meaning	19,306:21;
7) phonetic value	38,382:16; 40,392:2; 52,438:1;
8) success	2,244:18;
9) performance	3,248:9.
δυναστεύω	
to be prominent	41,398:15.
δωδεκάκρουστος	
with twelve springs	28,346:28.

Δάριος

Dorian 22,322:6.

E

ἐγκαθισμός, ὁ

dwelling on a syllable in  
pronunciation 43,408:22.  
(v. ὁ στηριγμός)

ἐγκαταμίσγω

ἐγκαταμίσομαι 22,324:13<sup>z</sup>.

ἐγκατόσκευος

ornate 1,242:24; 6,256:25; 10,276:6;  
15,296:1.

ἐγκαταχωρίζω

to put in 50,430:1.

ἔγκλημα, τό

accusation, censure 35,374:19<sup>z</sup>; 55,446:19.

ἔγκλισις, ἡ

1) mood (grammatical) 52,438:7;  
2) modulation 54,442:23.

ἐγκολπίζω

ἐγκολπιζόμενος

meandering 4,254:8.

ἐγκύλιος παιδεία, ἡ

comprehensive education 15,294:29.

ἐγκωμιάζω

to praise 1,238:4.

ἐγκώμιον, τό

1) praise 28,346:21; 55,446:25; 55,448:16;  
56,450:16;  
2) laudatory passage 23,326:14; 23,328:11; 45,414:6;  
3) eulogy, encomium 31,358:7; 44,412:22.

ἔδρα, ἡ		
basis		38,380:24; 40,392:19.
ἔθισμός, ὁ		
ἔθισμοί, οἱ		
habits		36,378:8.
ἔθος, τό		
1) custom		9,268:19; 56,448:23;
2) acquaintance		50,430:2.
εἰδῶλον, τό		
image		32,364:17.
εἰκόζω		
to compare		32,364:24.
εἰκῶν, ἡ		
comparison		50,426:27.
εἰλικρινής		
pure		37,378:25; 37,380:6,10.
εἰρωνεία, ἡ		
dissimulation		23,326:4.
εἰρωνεύομαι		
εἰρωνευόμενος		
with ironic tone		22,324:8; 54,442:15.
εἰσβολή, ἡ		
beginning		24,330:9.
ἐκβαίνω		
1) to abandon		10,276:2;
2) to depart from		48,424:25; 50,430:13.
ἐκβιβάζω		
to extend		56,450:14.
ἐκδειματόω		
to terrify		54,444:24.
ἐκθλίβω		
to elide		43,408:7.

ἐκκλησία, ἡ	
assembly	22,322:3; 44,412:9; 45,412:25.
ἐκλέγω	
to select	8,266:7; 23,326:27; 23,368:11; 41,398:2; 51,434:15.
ἐκλογή, ἡ	
choice	18,306:5; 24,332:7 <sup>f</sup> ; 35,374:26; 35,376:11; 45,414:12; 51,434:14.
ἐκμύσσω	
to imitate exactly	13,288:16.
ἐκμηκύνω	
to talk at length about	7,260:24.
ἐκπρεπής	
outstanding	34,372:1.
ἐκτασις, ἡ	
lengthening	52,438:5.
ἐκτρέπω	
to divert	43,406:2.
ἐκφανής	
manifest	50,426:23.
ἐκφέρω	
to express (in words)	56,450:12.
ἐκχέομαι	
to waste oneself	5,256:8.
ἐλέγχω	
to prove	50,426:25.
ἐλεέω	
to have pity	22,322:10.
ἔλω	
to draw out	5,256:7.
ἔλλειμα, τό	
deficiency	20,314:11.

έλλείπω	to be wanting	16,296:22; 18,304:6.	
ἑλληνίζω	to write pure, correct Greek (v. τὸ καθαρόν)	5,256:5.	
ἐμβροθής	weighty	21,320:23.	
ἐμμέλεια, ἡ	1) melody 2) modulation	48,424:15; 50,428:15; 51,432:23; 48,424:9.	
ἐμμελής	melodious	48,422:17; 50,428:27.	
ἔμμετρος	in metre	50,430:11,24; 50,432:1;	
ἔμμετροι λόγοι, οἱ	poetry	37,380:2; 47,418:22.	
ἐμπαθής	ἐμπαθές, τό	passion	21,320:26.
ἐμπειρία, ἡ	experience	50,428:18.	
ἐμπεριλαμβάνω	to contain	50,430:4,27.	
ἐμπερίληψις, ἡ <sup>4</sup>	encompassment	38,380:26.	
ἐμπερίοδον, τό	use of periods	39,384:29.	
ἐμπερής	similar to	50,430:9.	
ἐμψύω	to implant	36,378:4.	
ἔμψυχον, τό	animation	53,440:16.	

έναγώνιος	
1) forensic	4,254:11; 10,276:3; 18,304:12; 20,310:27; 30,358:2. <sup>5</sup>
2) agonistic	58,454:10;
έναγώνιον, τό	
vehemence	21,320:26; 34,370:24;
έναγώνιος λόγος, ὁ	
speech written for oratorical struggle	45,412:24; 45,416:1; 53,440:15.
ένάργεια, ἡ	
vividness	58,454:7.
έναρμόνιος	
1) harmonious	24,332:12;
2) enharmonic	22,322:6.
έναρμότιω	
to introduce fittingly	51,432:26.
ένδεής	
locking in	29,350:5;
ένδεέστερος	
deficient	19,306:13; 28,346:6;
ένδεέστερον τῆς ἀληθείας	
inferior to the true need of the subject	28,346:6.
ένθουσιάζω	
to be carried away	22,322:8.
ένθυμέομαι	
1) to ponder	22,322:19;
2) to consider	43,404:20,22; 51,432:27; 52,436:14;
3) to have in mind	45,414:9;
4) to realize	48,422:22; 51,434:7.
ένθύμημα, τό	
argument	27,342:9; 46,416:25.
ένικός	
ένικόν, τό	
singular (grammatical)	27,344:9.

έντείνω	
to compose (music)	48,422:4.
έξαλλαγή, ἡ	
1) unfamiliar language	10,274:23; 13,288:16; 13,290:7; 50,432:13; 56,450:9.
έξαλλάττω	
1) to be strange, unfamiliar, remote from the customary	9,268:17; 9,270:3;
2) to vary	10,274:16;
3) to change	48,422:9,18; 48,424:26; 50,432:9;
έξηλλαγμένος	
unfamiliar	1,242:24; 6,256:25; 8,266:10; 9,270:15,29; 10,276:6; 15,294:10; 34,370:9; 56,448:23,28.
έξεργάζομαι	
1) to overcome	16,296:23;
2) to depict exactly	51,436:8.
έξετάζω	
1) to examine	23,328:2,19; 25,334:16; 29,348:6; 32,366:2; 41,398:20; 51,432:18; 58,452:28;
2) to enumerate	34,372:11.
έξέτασις, ἡ	
examination	23,324:6.
έξευρίσκω	
to find	55,448:6.
έξῃς	
later	54,454:21;
έξῃς, τό	
1) sequence (grammatical)	54,444:22;
2) the following, subsequent	43,408:3,14.
ἔξις, ἡ	
skill	52,436:20,22; 52,438:11,20.

ἐπάγγελμα, τό	
subject	33,366:20.
ἐπαινέω	
to praise	17,298:8; 19,306:26; 26,338:12 ; 28,344:20,24; 35,374:26.
ἔπαινος, ὁ	
1) eulogy	30,350:15;
2) praise	25,334:30; 28,346:13; 52,438:27; 55,446:20.
ἐπαναφέρω	
ἐπαναφερόμενον, τό	
epanaphora	40,392:25.
ἐπανέρχομαι	
to return (i.e. to the discussion of the main subject)	46,418:13.
ἐπανθέω	
1) to adorn	13,286:19;
2) to show itself, to appear	38,382:27.
ἐπάχθομαι	
1) to be annoyed	53,440:12;
2) to be repelled	36,378:6 <sup>z</sup> .
ἐπιδείκνυμι	
to show	47,418:15.
ἐπιδεικτικός	
epideictic	1,238:3; 44,412:13.
ἐπίδειξις, ἡ	
display	13,288:19.
ἐπιεικής	
reasonable, fair	49,426:10.
ἐπιζεύγνυμι	
to subjoin, insert	9,272:14; 27,344:8.

ἐπίθετος	
1) accessory, additional	1,242:25; 3,248:4; 5,254:26; 13,288:8; 13,290:8; 18,304:2; 23,326:11; 24,332:5;
2) abundant	4,252:23;
ἐπίθετον, τό (sc. ὄνομα)	
adjective	5,256:14.
ἐπιλαμβάνω	
to restrict	49,426:7;
ἐπιλαμβάνομαι	
to reproach	7,260:25.
ἐπιλογίζομαι	
to take into account	48,422:16.
ἐπίλογος, ὁ	
peroration (i.e. section of an oration)	45,414:17.
ἐπιμέλεια, ἡ	
concern	51,436:2, v. ποιέομαι; 52,436:18.
ἐπιπλοκή, ἡ	
intertwining	37,380:16; 50,430:5.
ἐπίρρημα, τό	
adverb	26,338:10,10.
ἐπιστήμη, ἡ	
1) science	40,392:4;
2) knowledge	50,430:1.
ἐπιστρέφω	
to correct	19,308:25.
ἐπιστύχω	
to offend	38,382:14.
ἐπίτασις, ἡ	
tension	13,290:11; 37,378:24; 44,410:30; 46,418:2.

ἐπιτάφιος		
funeral		23,328:16;
ἐπιτάφιος, ὁ		
funeral oration		23,328:20 <sup>z</sup> ; 26,340:14; 44,412:21.
ἐπιτελέω		
to accomplish		54,442:25.
ἐπιτήδειος		
1) fit, suitable		32,366:4; 55,448:14;
2) appropriate (non-tech.)		43,410:23;
ἐπιτήδειον, τό		
fitness		32,366:4.
ἐπιτήδευσις, ἡ		
1) artfulness		2,246:8;
2) application		26,338:18;
3) technique (on which one is bent)		36,376:20;
4) deliberation		43,406:6.
ἐπιτηδεύω		
1) to pursue		4,252:20; 5,254:19; 27,342:6; 32,364:20; 34,370:15; 36,376:30; 36,378:15; 38,380:22; 56,450:6;
2) to cultivate		8,264:23; 10,274:15; 16,296:20; 42,404:8.
ἐπιτίθημι		
to add		24,332:25; 25,334:28; 27,342:1; 27,344:12; 28,346:12; 57,450:30.
ἐπιτιμῶ		
to criticize, reproach		6,258:14; 20,314:10; 26,338:16; 57,452:13.
ἐπιτίμησις, ἡ		
criticism		6,258:12.
ἐπιτρόχαλος		
glib		40,392:4; 43,408:25.

ἐπιφέρω

- 1) to inflict 38,382:25;  
2) to inveigh 54,442:27;

ἐπιφέρομαι

- 1) to follow 38,382:18;  
2) to take along 49,426:4.

ἐπιφορά, ἡ

- second member of a  
sentence 20,314:3.

ἐπιχειρέω

- to try 23,326:15; 54,442:5.

ἐπιχείρημα, τό

- argument 46,416:21; 55,446:24.

ἔπος, τό

ἔπη, τά

- epic poetry 18,306:9; 41,398:11.

ἐργασία, ἡ

- literary execution 56,448:22.

ἔργον, τό

- 1) literary work 46,418:5; 51,432:29;  
2) musical work, opus 48,422:3;  
3) result, product 47,418:20;  
4) work (of art) 50,428:23;  
5) activity 52,438:22,23.

ἐρμηνεῖα, ἡ

- way of expressing ideas  
in words 3,250:27; 4,252:20; 9,268:15,22;  
19,308:5; 25,334:22; 25,336:5;  
33,368:12; 34,370:10; 56,448:29.

ἐρμηνεύω

- to express, to put in words 21,320:19; 23,324:24; 26,336:20;  
26,338:15; 28,344:26.

ἔρρυθμος	having regular rhythm	50,430:12,25; 50,432:1.
εὐγένεια, ἡ	1) nobility	39,386:19;
	2) nobility (non-tech.)	28,344:19.
εὐγενής	noble	21,320:18; 23,326:3; 43,410:20.
εὐγραιμμος	well-defined	40,392:18.
εὐδοκιμέω	to be highly esteemed	23,328:2.
εὐέπεια, ἡ	1) beauty of language	25,334:15;
	2) euphony	4,254:1; 40,390:4.
εὐθύς	direct	9,268:15,21; 9,270:12;
εὐθέως	just	19,306:16.
εὐκαιρία, ἡ	right time, convenient situation, appropriateness	34,370:23; 48,424:22, v. τὸ πρέπον.
εὐκαιρος		
εὐκαιρότερον	more opportunely	58,452:27; 58,454:5.
εὐκαρπος <sup>6</sup>	fruitbearing	32,364:26.
εὐκίνητος	susceptible	53,442:2.
εὐκόρυφος	ending in a beautiful rhythmical acme	40,392:18; 43,410:10.

εὐκοσμος	judicially ordered	36,376:28.
εὐκρατος	well-blended	3,250:27.
εὐλογος		
εὐλόγως	plausibly	56,450:18.
εὐμέλεια, ἡ	musical effect	40,388:21.
εὐμετρος	having good rhythmical qualities	50,430:14,30.
εὐμορφία, ἡ	shapeliness	32,364:20.
εὐμορφος	shapely	18,304:4.
εὐμουσία, ἡ	artistic sense	49,426:5,12.
εὐνοεῶ	to be of goodwill	22,322:11.
εὐπαίδευτος	erudite	42,404:15.
εὐπέτεια, ἡ	ease	52,438:14.
εὐπετής		
εὐπετῶς	without trouble	50,428:20.
εὐπρεπής		
	1) appropriate	21,320:20 <sup>z</sup> ;
	2) fair	44,412:1.

εὑρεσις, ἡ		
invention		51,434:12.
εὐρυθμία, ἡ		
good, pleasant rhythm, but not fixed rhythmical		4,254:1; 48,424:16; 50,430:2; 58,454:9.
εὐρύθμος		
containing pleasing rhythm, but not fixed rhythmical patterns		18,306:5; 39,386:3; 48,422:18; 50,430:13,30.
εὐσταθής		
firm		36,378:13.
εὐσταθής, τό		
tranquility		22,322:4.
εὐστομία, ἡ		
euphony		13,288:24.
(ἢ εὐέπεια and ἢ εὐφωνία)		
εὐσύνοπτος		
comprehensible		34,370:7.
εὐτελής		
εὐτελέστερον (Adv.) more pareimoniously		28,346:19.
εὐτεχνία, ἡ		
skill		35,374:1.
εὐτραπελία, ἡ		
ready wit		54,446:8.
εὐφωνία, ἡ		
euphony		24,332:11; 40,388:20.
εὐφωτος		
euphonious		18,306:4; 40,390:9; 43,406:17.
ἔφεσις, ἡ		
appeal		13,286:30.

	ἐφήμερος	
	passing (v. ἀνθηρός)	32,364:25.
Z		
	ζῆλος, ὁ	
	imitation	35,374:28.
	ζηλώω	
	1) to imitate	35,374:1 <sup>≠</sup> ,3; 35,378:10; 41,398:11;
	2) to strive after	36,378:20.
	ζηλωτής, ὁ	
	1) imitator	8,266:4; 33,368:10;
	2) emulator	33,368:25.
	ζόφος, ὁ	
	absolute obscurity	5,256:6.
	ζωγραφία, ἡ	
	art of painting	41,398:6.
	ζώγραμος, ὁ	
	painter	50,428:18.
H		
	ἡγέομαι	
	1) to precede	38,382:17;
	2) to begin	38,382:17.
	(sc. μόριοις ἢ γράμμασι)	
	ἡγεμών, ὁ	
	"hegemon", "leading", the	
	name of a type of rhythm	
	with a v v metrical foot.	48,420:20.
	ἡδονή, ἡ	
	1) pleasure	13,286:17; 18,304:29; 18,306:11;
		22,324:6; 29,350:5; 41,398:10;
		45,416:9; 47,418:22; 47,420:3;
	2) pleasure, entertainment	54,444:17;
	3) pleasure (non-tech.)	17,298:11.

ἡδύνα

- 1) to soothe 2,244:28;
- 2) to please 18,306:4; 20,312:20;
- 3) to make pleasant 25,336:5.

ἡδύς

- 1) pleasant 4,252:15; 5,254:20; 8,266:11;  
18,304:3; 24,334:7,12; 32,364:24,  
v. ἀνθηρός; 34,372:7; 40,390:13,31;  
40,392:8; 41,398:22; 45,414:18;  
48,422:23; 51,434:23;
- 2) sweet (non-technical,  
but metaphorical for  
the pleasantness of  
Plato's style) 5,254:30.

ἡδύ, τό

- pleasure 40,388:21; 45,414:17; 47,420:2;

ἡδέως

- pleasantly 43,404:23; 43,406:18.

ἡθικός

- 1) portraying character 4,252:14; 58,454:10;
- 2) sensitive 8,266:12.

ἡθος, τό

- 1) delineation of character 13,286:15; 24,332:19; 53,440:28;
- 2) mild emotion 2,246:1; 43,406:3;
- 3) mind, disposition 22,322:3;
- 4) character 18,304:23.

ἡμέτερος

- imperfect 8,266:5.

ἡμιτελής

- half-educated 23,324:2.

ἡμίφωνος

ἡμίφωνον γράμμα, τό

- semi-vowel 38,382:7,15<sup>f</sup>; 40,390:5;

ἡμίφωνον, τό (sc. γράμμα)

- semi-vowel 43,406:25; 43,408:21,26.

ἦχος, ὁ

- 1) sound, i.e. produced by  
the uttering of words 40,388:25; 40,390:7,22,25; 43,406:29;
- 2) voice 54,442:16;
- 3) tone (of the voice) 54,444:20;
- 4) sound (non-tech.) 22,322:16.

Θ

θάλλω

- to bloom, to thrive 40,392:21;

τεθηλός

- burgeoning 5,254:28.

θαυμάζω

- 1) to admire 18,302:28; 23,326:10; 35,372:23;  
51,434:4;
- 2) to be astonished 35,374:20; 51,432:20; 51,434:21;  
57,450:23.

θαυμάσιος

- 1) admired 33,368:23;
- 2) marvellous, admirable 42,404:2; 58,454:21.

θαυμαστός

- 1) excellent, admirable 24,330:9;
- 2) remarkable, astonishing 6,256:29; 37,380:8; 48,424:14;  
52,436:26 (sup.).

θεατρικός

- 1) showy 18,304:28; 18,306:7; 25,336:8;  
36,378:16; 39,384:27; 40,388:17;  
43,410:19;
- 2) mere show (negative) 5,256:1.

θέλω

- to charm 20,312:19.

θεραπεύω

- to show solicitude 22,324:9.

θέσις, ἡ

- 1) theme 21,314:20<sup>7</sup>;
- 2) downward beat (of the  
foot in beating rhythm) 48,420:21.  
(cp. ἡ ἄρσις)

θεωρέω		
to examine		33,366:25.
θεώρημα, τό		
1) rule		52,438:16,19;
2) object of contemplation		58,454:21;
3) subject of study		49,426:6;
4) principle		47,418:15; 48,422:23.
θεωρία, ἡ		
1) contemplation		11,276:15; 40,392:4;
2) theory		51,432:24;
3) examination		32,366:9,15,19; 34,368:30.
θηλυός		
θηλυκόν, τό		
feminine (grammatical)		27,344:9.
θηρόομαι		
to pursue eagerly		40,388:20.
θυκυδίδειος		
Thucydidean		15,294:10.
I		
ἰδέα, ἡ		
1) literary form		1,238:3; 4,252:7;
2) style		2,246:6;
3) quality (of style)		9,272:1;
4) type		3,246:20 <sup>f</sup> ; 8,266:23; 39,386:22;
5) section (of a speech)		45,414:11;
6) kind (non-tech.)		8,266:14.
ἴδιος		
1) peculiar		2,246:3,10; 34,370:6,29 <sup>f</sup> ;
		37,380:12; 39,386:12; 41,398:3;
		47,418:26; 50,426:27; 54,444:8,9,9;
2) private		4,252:5; 21,320:30;
3) individual		38,382:30;
4) personal		22,322:26;
5) separate		32,366:10;
ἴδιον, τό		
individuality		34,372:4;

ιδία		
in private, privately, not in public		24,330:17.
ιδιότης, ἡ		
peculiar nature, idiosyncrasy ( <i>ν.ὁ χαρακτήρ</i> )		46,416:18.
ιδίωμα, τό		
peculiarity ( <i>ν. ὁ χαρακτήρ</i> )		38,382:11; 50,428:13; 50,432:8; 58,452:23.
ιδιώτης		
1) everyday		2,244:4;
2) individual, private		56,450:5;
ιδιώτης, ὁ		
layman		15,294:18; 15,296:9.
ιδιωτικός		
1) everyday		28,346:20;
2) private		13,288:1; 45,416:17; 56,450:4.
ίλαρός		
light-hearted		8,266:11.
ιστορία, ἡ		
history		54,444:18;
ιστορία τοπική, ἡ		
local history		2,244:8.
ιστορικός		
historical		24,332:15;
ιστορικος, ὁ		
histiographer		18,304:12.
ίσχνός		
plain ( <i>ν. ἀπλοῦς, ἀφελής</i> and λιτός)		5,254:16,19; 6,258:6,20; 11,276:11; 15,294:12; 33,368:16; 34,370:15.
ίσχυρός		
1) forceful		23,324:27; 42,402:28;
2) powerful		51,436:20; 51,438:12;

3) firm 18,304:18;  
 4) potent 18,304:25.  
 ἰσχύς, ἡ  
 force 2,244:4; 13,290:1; 21,320:22;  
 22,324:14; 29,350:4; 53,440:7.

ἴσχω  
 to keep 47,418:27.

\*Ἴωνικός  
 Ionic 43,410:21.

K

καθαρεύω  
 to be pure 18,302:28.

καθαρός  
 pure 4,252:11; 5,254:20; 7,260:9;  
 11,276:12; 13,286:9; 23,324:26;  
 27,342:6,21;

καθαρῶς  
 purely, exactly 33,366:26.

καθίστημι  
 to bring into a certain  
 state 3,246:22;

καθίσταμαι  
 to make 27,344:14;

καθίστημι εἰς ἥθος  
 to induce mild emotions 2,246:1.

καθυποκρίνομαι  
 to act badly 53,440:12.

καινός  
 new 8,264:22.

καινότης, ἡ  
 καινότης ὀνομάτων, ἡ  
 neologism 35,374:12.

καιρός, ὁ  
 1) opportune time, fit  
 occasion 4,252:28; 10,274:18,20,24,25;  
 44,412:23; 51,434:19; 55,446:23;

2) fitness	5,256:18; 13,286:18; 49,426:9;
3) occasion	4,254:12; 55,448:9;
4) time (non-tech.)	23,328:25;
5) opportune time (non-tech.)	32,366:9; 39,384:21.
κακός	
bad	23,326:28.
κακουργέω	
to be dishonest	48,424:19.
καϊόφωνος	
ill-sounding	38,382:24.
καλλιεπέω	
to use beautiful language	5,256:2.
καλλιλογία, ἡ	
beautiful language	3,248:4; 4,252:18; 13,288:8; 25,334:15.
καλλιρρήμων	
beautiful	18,304:3.
κάλλος, τό	
beauty	4,252:21; 24,332:4; 24,330:10; 25,336:4 <sup>z</sup> ; 35,376:4; 50,432:4.
καλλωπισμός, ὁ	
make-up	25,334:26.
καλλωπίζω	
to make up	18,306:7; 21,320:25; 26,338:4; 40,392:20; 55,448:4.
καλός	
1) beautiful	14,290:24; 18,302:26; 26,336:23; 30,356:30; 30,358:1; 51,434:23;
2) honourable	31,358:8;
3) noble	25,334:16,30; 54,444:28;
4) beautiful (non-tech.)	14,290:23; 46,418:3; 48,422:4; 54,446:2;

καλόν, τό	
1) honour	23,328:23; 31,358:5;
2) beauty	47,418:21; 47,420:1; 48,422:24; 48,424:8;
3) beauty (non-tech.)	32,364:21 <sup>f</sup> ;
καλῶς	
1) in a fine way	36,376:28;
2) fair	42,404:17;
3) in fine way (non-tech.)	36,376:24; 48,424:21.
4) nobly (non-tech.)	26,336:16.
κανών, ὁ	
1) model	1,242:26; 23,324:26; 26,338:21; 41,398:8;
2) standard	8,264:24;
3) general rule, principle	44,412:4.
καρπός, ὁ	
fruit, benefit	52,438:27.
καταβαίνω	
to descend	25,336:6.
(akin to τὸ βάθος)	
καταβιβάζω	
to make to go down	48,424:13.
κατάγελως, ὁ	
ridicule	35,374:19.
καταγωγή, ἡ	
ἴηη (v. ἀνθηρός)	32,364:24.
κατακορής	
satiated	45,416:11.
καταλείπω	
to bequeath	57,452:4.
καταλειπόμενον, τό	
the rest, remaining	34,368:30.

καταλήγω		
to end in		39,384:28; 40,390:20.
κατ' ἄλληλα		
with internal congruence		39,386:12.
κατάλληλος		
grammatical correct		27,344:10.
κατάλογος, ὁ		
catalogue		54,442:18.
καταμετρέω		
to measure out		39,384:6.
καταπλήττω		
καταπλήττομαι		
to startle, astound		2,244:27; 4,252:21.
καταριθμέομαι		
to enumerate		33,368:4.
κατασκευάζω		
to fashion, construct (artistically)		2,246:9; 6,258:7; 8,266:1; 9,266:27; 9,268:22; 10,274:12,26 <sup>f</sup> ; 10,276:9; 13,286:10; 13,288:4; 15,296:13; 20,312:30; 33,368:12; 37,378:23; 39,384:31; 43,404:21; 43,408:29; 43,410:8; 47,418:23; 48,420:19,23; 48,424:21; 53,440:27.
κατασκευαζόμενος		
becoming established		36,378:7;
κατασκευασμένος		
ornate		4,252:23.
κατασκευή, ἡ		
1) ornateness, embellish= ment		2,244:4; 6,258:22; 10,274:19; 14,290:25; 18,304:16; 23,326:3; 28,346:27; 28,348:2; 45,412:28; 48,424:9; 56,450:3;
2) artistic treatment		24,332:23; 39,386:18;

3) artistic form	2,246:11; 44,412:7; 46,416:23;
4) artifice	6,258:8;
5) artistic structure	15,294:18; 34,370:11; 43,410:3;
6) structure	57,452:6;
7) arrangement	48,424:25; 50,430:23;
κατασκευαί, αἱ	
embellishments	3,248:4; 5,254:26 (sing.); 6,258:3; 13,288:9; 23,326:12.
κατὰ περίοδον	
in stanzas	50,430:19.
κατὰ στίχον	
in lines	50,430:19.
κατατήνω τὰς τέχνας	
to waste art and skill	51,436:9.
καταρέρης	
rapid	40,392:5.
καταφρονέω	
to despise	22,322:10; 54,444:23.
κατηγορέω	
1) to criticize	58,454:2;
2) to accuse	35,374:18 <sup>†</sup> .
κατηγορία, ἡ	
1) censure, reproach	6,258:10; 55,448:16;
2) blame	55,446:20;
3) accusatory part	23,326:14;
4) prosecution	14,292:4,12.
κατήχησις, ἡ	
instruction	50,428:16,27.
κατονομάζω	
to name	39,384:18.
κατορθόω	
1) to be a successful exponent	39,386:21;
2) to be successful in	31,358:9; 33,368:17.

κατόρθωμα, τό success	32,366:1.
καχλάζω to bubble	28,346:27.
κενός empty	5,256:10; 44,412:20.
κενοσπουδία, ἡ zealous pursuit of frivolities	25,334:25.
κεφάλαιος κεφάλαιον, τό topic	47,418:15.
ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων in short	4,252:10.
κεφαλαϊώδης aphoristic	9,272:24.
κηλέω 1) beguile 2) to charm	39,384:13; 53,440:11; 36,378:18.
κινέω 1) to stir 2) to excite	20,312:15; 22,322:17; 55,448:5;
κινέω γέλωτα to provoke ridicule	29,348:9.
κινητικός alluring	40,392:20.
κιρνάω to mix	41,398:6.
κοινός 1) common, ordinary (v. ὁ ἑλληνισμός)	4,252:14; 5,256:11; 10,274:16; 13,286:10; 15,294:21; 18,302:30; 34,370:10; 56,450:6;

2) general	49,426:7;
3) joined	23,326:24;
4) general (non-tech.)	21,320:29;
κοινὸς καὶ φιλόανθρωπος	
appealing to the whole range of human nature	33,368:11-12;
κοινῆ	
commonly	34,372:3;
κοινῶς	
in general	55,448:13. -
κοινότης, ἡ	
κοινότης τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἡ	
standard, ordinary vocabulary	5,254:24.
κολακεία, ἡ	
flattery	35,374:3.
κολακεύω	
to flatter	45,414:20.
κόλλα, ἡ	
bonding	40,390:17.
κολπῶ	
κεκολπωμένος	
meandering	19,308:12.
κολπώδης	
turgid, winding	18,304:14.
κόμμα, τό	
short phrase	43,410:6.
κομματικός	
κομματικῶς	
with short phrases	39,384:31.
κόμπος, ὁ	
din	7,260:15.
κομψός	
refined	5,256:1; 19,308:6;

κομψόν, τό	
refinement	36,378:15,16; 38,380:22; 40,388:18.
κόπος, ὁ	
fatigue	20,314:9 <sup>z</sup> ; 45,414:24.
κοπῶδης	
boring	58,454:16.
κόρος, ὁ	
satiety	20,314:1.
κορυβαντικός	
Corybantic	22,322:14.
κοσμῶ	
1) to adorn, to embellish	22,324:1; 25,336:10; 46,416:24; 53,440:2;
2) to bring about	49,426:3;
3) to honour	24,330:25; 29,348:18.
κόσμος, ὁ	
1) embellishment, ornamentation (ν. ἢ κατασκευή)	1,242:25; 13,290:9; 18,304:2; 24,332:5; 45,414:13; 45,416:4;
2) form	3,246:23;
3) distinction (non-tech.)	24,330:25 <sup>z</sup> .
κοῤῥις, ἡ	
blend	42,404:11; 46,416:20.
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3) to quote	12,280:17; 40,394:2,8;
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6) to use	28,344:25;
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λιγυρόν, τό	
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11) discussion	20,312:27; 32,366:8; 43,410:24; 46,416:27; 54,446:5;
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λόγων οὐ δεῖται it stands to reason	50,432:14.
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λυπέω		
to offend		40,392:22.
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Lysianic		11,276:13; 13,286:19; 13,288:15; 15,294:11.
λύω		
to relieve		20,314:9.
M		
μακρός		
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2) long (non-tech.)		4,254:9; 17,298:12; 19,308:6; 50,428:19;
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over a long distance (non-tech.)		9,268:28; 9,272:17; 27,342:10;
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μακροσύλλαβος		
with long syllable		38,380:24.
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2) feeble		28,346:6;
μαλακόν, τό		
soft sound		36,378:17 <sup>‡</sup> .
μαλακάρωνος		
soft-sounding (v. μαλακός)		40,392:12.
μαλάττω		
to relieve		2,244:29.
μαλθακός		
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μάρτυρ, ὁ	
witness	28,344:22.
μαρτυρέω	
1) to confirm	35,372:20;
2) to acknowledge	35,374:21; 35,376:10;
3) to bear witness	18,304:24.
μαρτυρία, ἡ	
evidence, proof	36,376:17.
μαρτύριον, τό	
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μεγαληγορία, ἡ	
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μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἡ	
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μεγαλοπρεπής	
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magnanimous	39,388:14.
μέγας	
1) grand	6,258:5; 28,346:26;
2) long	38,380:24;
3) great (non-tech.)	6,256:29; 33,368:26; 52,438:23,25.
μέγεθος, τό	
1) grandeur	13,290:9; 34,370:12;
2) importance	56,450:2;
3) magnitude (non-tech.)	29,348:6;
4) size (non-tech.)	50,428:1.
μείγνυμι	
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μειράκιον, τό boy	25,336:6.
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μελαίνω to darken	5,256:6.
μελετώω to study	52,436:21.
μελέτη, ἡ practice	52,438:13.
μελίζω to be like music	50,430:16.
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μελοποιός, ὁ lyric poet	39,386:15.
μέλος, τό	
1) tone	26,338:2; 47,420:4; 48,420:14,16,25; 48,422:15,26; 49,424:28;
2) melody	7,262:23; 22,322:6; 48,422:5; 50,430:26; 51,434:22;
3) song	50,430:13,16;
4) singing	54,444:18;
5) vocal music	40,392:10;
6) limb	50,428:2,3.
μέλη, τά lyric poetry	18,306:10; 41,398:12.

μελωδία, ἡ

melody

48,422:8.

(v. τὸ μέλος, 2)).

μέμφομαι

1) to censure

17,298:9; 18,304:6; 24,334:6;

2) to criticize

20,312:14.

μένω

to persist

48,422:8.

μέρος, τό

1) section

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2) part

43,404:25; 45,414:5; 46,416:22;

49,426:18; 53,440:19; 54,446:9;

3) subject

34,370:1; 50,432:5; 54,446:3;

4) share

47,418:17.

μέσος

1) midway between,  
intermediate, middle

3,250:27; 14,292:2; 33,368:25;

34,370:20; 36,378:20; 41,398:23;

42,404:7; 43,410:3; 47,418:18<sup>f</sup>;

2) between

38,382:1,6.

μεσότης, ἡ

the mean, the state between  
two extremes

3,248:6.

μεταβολή, ἡ

1) variation

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48,424:4,11,16; 49,424:29;

2) change (non-tech.)

17,298:9.

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μεταξύ		
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μεταξύ τῶν ἄκρων ἐκστέρων		
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metapher		5,256:16 <sup>z</sup> .
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2) to substitute		28,348:4.
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ν. μουσικός		38,382:6.
μέτριος		
1) moderate, balanced		13,288:6; 14,290:24; 15,296:14;
		21,320:25;
2) proportionate		44,410:29;
3) mediocre (non-tech.)		28,346:11; 32,364:13;
μέτριον, τό		
1) moderation		48,422:7.
2) due proportion (non-tech.)		13,288:6; 13,290:3;
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1) moderately		48,422:7;
2) to some extent		43,406:29;
μετριώτατα		
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μέτρον, τό	
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2) metre	48,420:27; 50,430:4,7,9,18,21,26,27, 31; 51,432:24;
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οἱ ἔξω τοῦ μέτρου (sc. λόγου)	
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1) feature	34,370:3; 51,432:16;
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2) to examine in detail	21,314:19.
μικτός	
mixed, blended	3,246:20; 8,266:23; 36,378:19; 41,398:1; 42,404:7; 43,410:2; 44,410:28; 47,418:17 <sup>f</sup> .

μιμέομαι		
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μίξις, ἡ		
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μισος, τό		
hatred		55,448:4.
μονόκωλος		
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μόριον, τό		
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2) component		39,384:2; 39,386:14; 51,432:22;
3) constituent part		26,336:17; 40,390:27;
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μόριον τοῦ λόγου, τό		
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2) outward form (non-tech.)		8,266:14; 50,428:6,7,8.
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1) musical		40,388:25; 40,390:30; 51,432:24;
2) harmonious		48,424:13;

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μουσικά, τά	
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N

νάμα, τό	
1) fountain	28,346:26.
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2) undeveloped	52,438:11.
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νεωτεροποιία, ἡ	
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νόημα, τό	
thought (which is	
(to be) expressed in	
words)	9,268:16; 9,272:12,15; 18,304:11;
	18,306:2; 20,312:29; 21,320:22;
	36,376:22; 44,412:18; 51,434:2;
	55,448:6.
νόσις, ἡ	
1) thought (which is (to	
be) expressed in words)	25,334:16; 39,384:16; 52,438:21,
	β. κρίνω; 56,450:13;
2) insight	52,438:17.

νουθετέω	to express admonition	22,324:10.
νοῦς, ὁ		
1) sense, meaning		7,260:15; 39,384:24; 40,390:16;
2) thought		5,256:8; 26,336:20;
3) understanding		52,438:12;
4) mind		2,244:29; 15,294:17.
Ξ		
Ξενοπρεπής	strange	34,370:14.
Ξένος	strange	5,256:12; 15,294:23; 15,296:2.
Ο		
ὀδύρομαι	to lament	54,442:18.
οἶδα		
εἰδότες, οἱ	well-informed people	14,292:2.
οἰκεῖος		
1) distinctive, peculiar		2,246:6; 39,384:21; 48,420:29; 51,432:24.
2) fit, proper, appropriate		49,426:4 (comp.); 55,448:9;
οἰκεῖως		
1) properly, appropriately		40,392:2; 53,440:27;
2) friendly		35,374:2.
οἰκονομία, ἡ	arrangement of ideas	51,434:2,13.
οἰκονομικός		
οἰκονομικόν, τό	arrangement of ideas	51,434:17.
οἶκτος, ὁ	pity	54,442:21.

ὀλιγαρέω		
1) to neglect	18,304:8;	
2) to belittle	51,436:13.	
ὀλίγυρος		
ὀλιγύρας		
belittlingly	28,346:21.	
ὀλοφυρμός, ὀ		
lamentation	54,442:23.	
ὀμαλός		
even	20,312:18.	
ὀμοειδής		
of the same form	33,368:19.	
ὀμοζυγία, ἡ		
rhythmical correspondence	50,430:29.	
ὀμοιος		
1) similar	50,430:17;	
2) like, appropriate	24,330:12;	
ὀμοίως		
1) in a like way	26,336:20;	
2) equally	34,370:2.	
ὀμοιότης, ἡ		
1) similarity	12,280:19; 13,286:26; 50,428:10;	
2) uniformity	50,430:29.	
ὀμολογέω		
to agree	32,364:12; 41,398:22.	
ὄνομα, τό		
1) word	5,256:8,9; 7,260:15,24; 19,306:16;	
	21,320:21; 28,348:3; 29,348:23;	
	35,372:15; 35,376:5,12; 35,374:	
	17,26; 36,376:17 (ὕ. συνθέτης), 25;	
	38,380:23; 38,382:3 <sup>≠</sup> , 13;	
	38,382:21; 39,384:4,25; 40,388:19;	
	43,406:17; 43,410:1; 44,412:18 <sup>≠</sup> ;	

	45,414:13; 48,422:15; 49,426:15;
	51,434:3,15; 55,446:17; 55,448:3,7;
	56,448:21; 57,450:22; 57,452:2;
	58,452:17; 58,454:1,9,14;
2) words, diction	4,252:13,22; 5,254:25; 13,286:10;
	18,302:29 <sup>z</sup> ; 18,306:5; 24,330:5,10;
	24,332:8 <sup>z</sup> ; 25,336:7;
3) name, term	6,258:17; 7,260:17; 37,380:12;
	50,430:25; 52,436:27; 56,448:25;
4) noun	48,420:11; 52,438:4;
5) name (of a person) (non-tech.)	6,258:14; 13,286:29;
6) reputation (non-tech.)	4,252:3;
ὀνομάτων πλοῦτος, ὁ	
richness of language	28,346:5;
ὀνομάτων καινότης	35,374:12.
(v. καινότης)	
ὀνομάζω	
1) to call, to term	24,332:24; 37,380:7; 50,430:22;
2) to express in words	36,376:27.
ὀνομασία, ἡ	
1) language	18,306:3 <sup>z</sup> ; 34,370:14; 35,374:28;
	56,450:14;
2) group of words	40,390:19.
ὀξύτης, ἡ	
high pitch	48,420:15; 52,438:6.
(cf. ἡ βαρύτης)	
ὄρασις, ἡ	
eye	50,428:19.
ὄργανον, τό	
1) musical instrument	40,392:9; 48,422:4; 48,424:17;
2) device	40,392:26.

ὀργή, ἡ		
anger		54,442:21,22; 55,448:4.
ὀργίζομαι		
to be angry		22,322:11.
ὀρθοέπεια, ἡ		
correctness of style		
way of expression		26,338:21.
ὀρθός		
correct		41,398:19;
ὀρθῶς		
correctly		58,452:24.
ὄρος, ὁ		
standard, norm		1,242:26; 23,324:26.
(v. ὁ κανὼν)		
ὄφελος, τό		
use		53,440:6.
ὀχλήρως		
irritating		24,334:12.
ὀχληρῶς διατίθημι		
1) to upset		15,294:24;
2) to offend		15,294:27.
ὀχλησις, ἡ		
offence (upon the ear)		38,382:25.
ὄχλος, ὁ		
mass		26,340:13.
ὄψις, ἡ		
1) thing seen		32,364:17; 34,370:31;
2) appearance		34,372:6.

## Π

παθαίνω		
to stir the emotions		18,304:19; 20,312:22.

παθητικός	
passionate	8,266:12; 13,288:30; 20,310:26; 34,370:24; 55,446:24; 55,448:14; 58,454:10.
πάθος, τό	
1) passion	2,244:29; 7,260:17; 18,304:26; 20,312:15; 22,322:8,11; 24,332:19; 43,406:2; 53,440:28; 55,448:5,7;
2) feelings	24,334:11;
3) modification	52,438:2;
4) modulation	53,440:20;
5) experience	21,320:29.
παιδαριώδης	
puerile	44,412:21.
παλινοφδία, ἡ	
recantation	7,262:8.
παιμφορός	
fertile (v. εὐκαρπός)	32,364:26.
πανηγυρικός	
epideictic	4,254:11; 8,266:10; 44,412:14; 45,412:28.
πανήγυρις, ἡ	
festival	36,378:17; 44,412:7.
παντοδαπῶς	
in every way	50,432:10.
παρά + Akk.	
according to (v. τὸ πρέπον)	46,416:18,21.
παράγγελμα, τό	
principle	50,428:26.
παράδειγμα, τό	
1) example	2,246:12; 3,248:10; 4,254:11; 7,258:27; 9,266:26; 13,288:6;

	13,290:14; 14,290:22; 14,292:3; 20,312:1; 23,328:25; 29,348:12; 39,386:14; 40,394:8; 42,402:27; 43,406:6; 46,416:26; 46,418:4; 53,442:4 <sup>7</sup> ; 58,454:15;
2) exemplar	40,392:28;
3) model	39,384:31.
παράθεσις, ἡ juxtaposition	38,380:28.
παρακειῖμαι to be juxtaposed	43,408:10.
παράλησις, ἡ exhortation	31,358:5.
παρακολουθέω 1) to be connected with 2) to accompany 3) to pursue	34,370:31; 34,372:3; 47,420:5; 50,426:24; 34,370:27.
παραλαμβάνω 1) to use, to apply 2) to add	37,380:18; 50,430:17; 24,332:21; 24,334:1.
παραλλαγή, ἡ variation	46,416:19.
παρ' ἄλληλα τίθημι to compare	23,328:2.
παραμιμέομαι to take as model	23,328:17.
παραμυθέομαι to assuage	45,414:24.
παραμυθία, ἡ persuasion	24,334:13.
παραπίπτω to be placed side by side	43,406:26.
παραπλήρωμα, τό padding	19,308:3; 39,384:25.

παράσημον, τό	
distinguishing feature, mark	50,426:23
παρασκευάζω	
to prepare	51,434:13.
παρασκευή, ἡ	
preparation	51,434:11.
παράστημα, τό	
exaltation	22,324:1.
παρατηρέω	
to take care	53,440:31.
παρατήρημα, τό	
observation	13,290:5.
παρατίθημι	
1) to quote	19,306:15; 21,314:18; 32,364:15; 42,404:2;
2) to compare	30,350:14;
3) to add	37,380:14;
4) to combine	40,388:24.
παρειβάλλω	
to insert	9,272:13; 40,390:14.
παρειβολή, ἡ	
insertion	38,382:7.
παρεμπίπτω	
to intervene	40,390:23.
παρεντείνω	
παρατείνων	
straining	54,442:16.
παρεξετάζω	
to examine by comparison	36,376:21.
παρέπομαι	
to be connected with	34,370:2.

παρηδύνω	
παρηδύνον, τό	
diversion (i.e. enter=	
tainment)	45,414:23.
παρίσος	
parallel in structure	26,338:12;
(rhetorical device)	
πάρισον, τό	
parison (rhetorical device)	4,252:27; 20,312:25.
παρισώω	
to balance, set in	
parallel structure	26,336:16.
παρίσσις, ἡ	
pariosis, i.e. parallelism	
of clauses so far as parts	
of speech and length of	
corresponding clauses are	
concerned (rhetorical device)	25,336:9; 40,392:23.
παρομοίωσις, ἡ	
paromoiosis, i.e. parallelism	
of clauses in terms of corre=	
sponding sound (rhetorical	
device)	40,392:23.
παρωνομάζω	
παρωνομασμένον, τό.	
paronomasia (rhetorical	
device)	40,392:24.
παρορμίζω	
to express exhortation	22,324:10.
παρωδικός	
burlesque	54,444:18 <sup>#</sup> .
παρησία, ἡ	
candor	23,324:21.

πάσχω		
1) to experience	21,320:28; 22,322:20,22; 27,342:26; 54,442:25;	
2) to befall (non-tech.)	30,350:18.	
παχύς		
1) not transparent	5,256:5;	
2) clumsy	27,342:8.	
παχύτης, ἡ		
dullness	26,340:17.	
πεζός		
πεζή λέξις, ἡ		
prose	40,394:1; 48,424:15;	
πεζοὶ λόγοι, οἱ		
prose	37,380:2.	
πειθῶ, ἡ		
1) persuasiveness	13,286:18;	
2) means of persuasion	24,332:20.	
πεῖρα, ἡ		
experience	44,412:5.	
περιβάλλω		
περιβάλλομαι		
to admit, to include	5,256:16.	
περιεργία, ἡ		
over-elaboration	35,374:13; 56,448:21.	
περίεργος		
laboured	9,270:4,16,21,28; 26,338:4; 35,374:28; 55,446:16; 56,448:18.	
περιέχω		
to contain	50,430:9.	
περιλαμβάνω		
1) to render, to put in words	7,260:25; 21,320:20; 29,348:24;	

2) to embrace	43,408:5; 43,410:5;
3) to acquire	52,438:9;
4) to encompass	36,376:29; 55,448:7;
περιλαμβανόμενος	
existing of	24,332:11.
περίοδος, ἡ	
1) period	4,254:5; 18,306:6; 19,306:29; 19,308:4,5; 20,312:29; 20,314:2; 24,332:9,18; 26,336:18; 26,338:6; 39,384:5,22; 39,386:3; 40,390:28; 40,392:14,15,16; 43,406:16,21,30; 43,408:6,24; 43,410:4,9,10; 50,432:11;
2) stanza	50,430:19,22.
περιπλανάομαι	
περιπεπλανημένος	
erratic	50,430:26.
περιρρέω	
to overflow	18,304:11.
περιτίθημι	
to bestow upon	52,438:13;
περιτίθημι τὸν λόγον	
to put words into the mouth of	41,398:25.
περιτρνεύω	
περιτρνεύομαι	
to fashion	21,320:22.
περιτρολογία, ἡ	
wordiness	5,256:2; 13,290:8.
περιττός	
1) extraordinary	8,264:22; 8,266:9; 10,274:17; 15,294:10,23; 15,296:1; 25,334:28; 25,336:3; 34,370:8; 56,450:7;

2) elaborate	1,242:24; 6,258:5; 56,448:22;
3) striking	43,410:12;
4) excessive, extravagant	25,334:26;
5) exceedingly good	15,294:16; 35,372:16 <sup>z</sup> ; 36,376:16;
6) extra (ν.εὐκαρπος)	32,364:27;
περιττόν, τό	
the extraordinary	24,332:22;
περιττώς	
unconventionally	39,386:12.
περίφρασις, ἡ	
circumlocution	5,256:9; 7,260:24; 29,348:27.
πεύσις, ἡ	
question	54,444:9.
πιθανός	
persuasive	4,252:15; 13,286:15; 15,296:8;
πιθανόν, τό	
persuasiveness	34,372:9; 58,454:11.
πικραίνω	
1) to effect harshly, to offend	43,406:1; 55,448:8;
2) to be harsh	55,448:9;
πικραίνειν, τό	
pungency	34,370:17; 55,446:22.
πικρός	
1) harsh	8,266:12; 20,312:17; 55,446:16;
2) pungent	35,374:25 <sup>z</sup> , 27;
3) severe	55,446:27;
πικρόν, τό	
pungency	35,374:13.
πινόμαι	
πεπινωμένος	
old-fashioned	45,414:19.
πίνος, ὁ	
1) musty antiquity	44,412:14;
2) patina, tinge	5,254:26; 39,386:20.

πίστις, ἡ	
1) argument	42,402:29; 50,432:6;
2) proof	33,366:24; 33,368:13; 45,414:17,25;
3) credibility	46,418:5.
πλάσμα, τό	
1) type of style	34,370:2,27; 34,372:3;
2) (individual) style (of an author)	34,370:5,19,31.
πλάστης, ὁ	
modeller	50,428:17; 51,436:5.
πλάτος, τό	
wordiness	19,308:25; 19,310:1.
πλατύς	
1) diffuse, wordy	4,254:7; 19,308:7;
2) broad	38,380:25 <sup>#</sup> ;
πλατέως	
in a diffuse, wordy way	19,308:18;
καὶ ταῖς ἔδραις αὐτῶν... πλατέως	
πάνυ βεβηκυΐαις	
and (words) resembling buildings with very broad bases	38,380:24-25.
Πλατωνικός	
Platonic	28,346:26; 32,366:3.
πλεονάζω	
1) to make excessive use of words	55,448:10; 58,454:1;
2) to use more	44,412:3;
3) to be predominant	43,410:18;
πλεονάζον, τό	
1) the predominant feature	37,380:17;
2) the predominant element (in nature)	37,380:8.

πλεονασμός, ὁ	
1) amplification	50,426:25;
2) excess	56,448:28; 58,454:13.
πληγή, ἡ	
blow	20,312:17.
πληθυντικός	
πληθυντικόν, τό	
plural (grammatical)	27,344:9.
πλησιάζω	
to be a follower	40,394:2.
πλούσιος	
rich	28,346:26.
πλοῦτος, ὁ	
1) wealth	5,256:9; 28,346:4;
2) wealth (non-tech.)	29,348:17.
πνεῦμα, τό	
1) spirit	20,310:27; 22,322:17; 22,324:13;
2) animation	54,446:1;
3) breathing	39,384:24; 43,410:14.
ποιέω	
1) to present in poetry	23,326:18; 26,338:1;
2) to take (as model)	39,386:1; 40,392:28;
3) to do (non-tech.)	9,266:25; 26,338:7; 32,336:19;
	35,374:11; 45,412:30; 50,428:11;
	52,436:22; 56,450:10;
4) to make (non-tech.)	40,388:25; 40,390:13,24; 44,410:31;
	44,412:1; 45,414:16; 46,416:20;
	48,422:27; 48,424:10; 55,446:26;
	58,454:10,13;
5) to bring about (non-tech.)	40,390:22; 40,392:1;
ποιέω σαφές	
to elucidate	53,442:4;
(ν. σαφής)	

ποιέομαι δόσιν	
to mete out, to lay stress	
upon	48,422:21; 51,434:2;
ποιέομαι ἐπιμέλειαν	
to pay attention to	51,436:2;
ποιέομαι λόγον	
1) to argue	27,344:13;
2) v. λόγος	48,422:5;
ποιέομαι φροντίδα	
to take care	40,388:29;
πεποιημένα ὀνόματα, τὰ	
neology	4,252:12; 5,256:11.
ποίημα, τό	
poem	7,262:24; 40,392:11; 50,430:9, 12,15; 53,440:10,14.
ποιητής, ὁ	
1) poet	8,266:13; 26,336:21; 37,380:15; 39,386:24; 40,392:28; 41,398:8.
2) author	37,380:2; 51,434:5;
3) non-lyric poet	39,386:15.
ποιητικός	
1) poetical	5,256:18; 40,392:25; 50,430:15; 50,432:3; 51,432:25;
2) artificial	7,260:10;
3) bringing about	47,420:2; 48,422:25;
ποιητικώτερον, τό	
the more poetical	56,450:13.
ποικιλία, ἡ	
alternation	20,314:8; 34,370:22.
ποικίλλω	
to vary	48,422:9,19.
ποικίλος	
1) varied	20,312:2; 22,322:17;
2) variable (non-tech.)	8,266:17;

ποικίλως	
1) variedly	50,432:10;
2) variedly (non-tech.)	8,266:3.
ποῖος	
1) of what kind	40,388:24,24 <sup>z</sup> ,26; 44,412:4; 47,418:16; 50,426:21;
2) of what kind (non-tech.)	27,340:17; 27,342:21;
3) any (non-tech.)	28,346:4,5,5; 36,376:20.
ποιός	
ποιόν, τό	
essence	10,274:14.
(v. ἡ ποιότης)	
ποιότης, ἡ	
distinctive quality, nature (v. το ποιόν)	37,380:17.
πολεμιστήρια ὄπλα	
weapons of war (figurative of the style of Demosthenes)	32,364:16.
πολιτικός	
1) civic; civil (i.e. related to a πολίτης)	2,244:26; 8,266:1; 15,294:16; 23,326:13,22; 23,328:15; 30,358:1; 35,372:21; 50,430:8; 50,432:3; 51,432:25; 53,440:4; 55,448:15;
2) of a politician	56,450:14;
3) political (v. δημιουργός)	51,436:10;
πολιτικός, ὁ	
politician	15,294:28; 18,304:22.
πολυπραγμοσύνη, ἡ	
over-activity	56,448:26.
πομπευτήρια ὄπλα	
weapons of ceremonial processions (figurative of the style of Plato)	32,364:16.

πόνος, ὁ hard work	51,436:11; 52,438:22,25; 53,440:22.
ποσός	
ποσόν, τό - degree ( <i>υ. ἢ ποσότης</i> )	10,274:17.
ποσότης, ἡ due proportion	48,424:23; 55,448:11.
πρᾶγμα, τό	
1) subject, subject-matter	4,252:23; 9,270:3; 13,286:17; 18,304:31; 20,312:27; 21,320:20; 23,324:25; 24,330:10; 25,334:23; 28,346:19; 45,412:27; 47,418:13; 50,426:26; 51,432:25;
2) matter (non-tech.)	2,246:4; 23,326:27; 25,334:14; 39,384:9;
3) object, thing (non-tech.)	7,260:25; 40,390:9; 56,448:25; 58,452:17;
4) fact (non-tech.)	46,418:13;
5) deed, act (non-tech.)	35,374:11; 56,450:10;
πράγματα, τά	
action, events (non-tech.)	22,322:22; 27,342:7; 45,414:21;
πρᾶγμα κοινόν, τό commonplace	28,344:23.
πραγματεῖα, ἡ	
1) treatise	32,366:11; 57,452:12;
2) dedication	52,438:23,29;
3) occupation	40,390:26.
πραγματεύομαι to write	49,426:15.
πραγματικός	
of subject-matter	12,280:18; 58,454:19;
πραγματικόν, τό subject-matter	51,434:17;
πραγματικός τόπος, ὁ subject-matter	51,434:9,11 ( <i>sc. τόπος</i> ).

πρανής

ὡπερ κατὰ πρᾶνοῦς φερόμενα  
χωρίου νόματα<sup>≠</sup> μηδενὸς αὐτοῖς  
ἀντικρούοντος<sup>≠</sup>

like streams<sup>≠</sup> of a landscape  
flowing down-hill without  
any hindrance<sup>≠</sup>

40,392:6-7.

πραΐνω

to soothe (v. λεαίνω)

43,406:1.

πρέπω

πρέπων

1) appropriate

22,324:2; 24,330:9;

2) suiting

18,306:2;

πρέπον, τό

appropriateness, propriety

13,286:16; 18,304:27,31; 34,370:25;  
47,420:6<sup>≠</sup>; 48,422:2,12,20; 48,424:6;  
49,426:1.

προάγω

προάγω εἰς πάθος

to provoke violent emotion

2,246:1.

προαίρεσις, ἡ

1) choice

2,244:14,17;

2) peculiarity

3,248:7;

3) predelection

36,378:4;

4) preference

16,296:28;

5) purpose

41,398:4.

προαιρέω

προαιρέομαι

to choose

2,244:23.

προειφέρω

to express before

39,386:11.

προέχω

to be superior to

34,370:10.

προηγέομαι to precede	38,380:29.
πρόθεσις, ἡ theme, thesis	33,366:20.
προκειμαι προκειμένος proposed	34,368:30 <sup>f</sup> ;
προκειμένον, τό the above mentioned subject	42,402:30; 43,410:25.
προνοέω to provide for	48,422:7.
πρόνοιαν ἔχω to provide for	48,422:11; 53,440:17.
προοίμιον, τό introduction (of a speech)	13,288:27; 45,414:15.
προπετής προπετές, τό flow	40,390:1.
προσαναγκάζω προσαναγκάσαι, τό compulsion	2,246:2.
προσαναπαύω to provide a rest	40,390:23.
προσηγώνω to fit	45,416:3; 50,430:11; 52,438:30; 54,442:22;
προσήκων befitting	48,422:1.
προσθήκη, ἡ 1) addition 2) adjunct	24,332:3,21; 42,404:16; 39,384:10.
πρόθεσις, ἡ addition	24,334:3.

πρόσκαιρος brief	50,428:27.
προσκολλάω προσκολλάσας coherent	43,404:28.
προσλαμβάνω 1) to add 2) to receive over and above	26,336:19; 24,332:13.
προσημαρτυρέω to attribute in addition	48,424:20.
προστίθημι to add	23,324:22; 34,368:29; 43,410:25.
προστίβω προστρίβομαι to attach (something to someone), i.e. to accuse someone of something	35,374:14.
πρόσωπον, τό person	9,274:9.
προφέρω προφέρομαι 1) to quote 2) to deliver	22,324:5; 54,442:5; 54,444:17,27.
προφορά, ἡ delivery	22,324:12.
πρώτειος πρωτεῖα, τά first place	32,366:13; 43,408:13;
τὰ πρωτεῖα τῆς λέξεως φέρομαι to be the most eminent stylist	29,350:8.

πρωτεύω		
πρωτεύων, ὁ	the one holding first place	33,368:4 <sup>f</sup> ; 42,404:6.
πτίλον, τό	soft feathers	51,436:7.
πτῶσις, ἡ	case (grammatical)	9,270:27; 39,386:9; 52,438:6.
πυκνός	solid	4,254:6.
πυνθάνομαι	to ask a question (ν. ἀνθυποκέρω)	54,444:6.
P		
ρέω	to flow	28,346:28.
ῥῆμα, τό	1) word 2) phrase 3) verb 4) artistic writing	29,348:18; 28,346:11; 57,450:31; 26,338:11,11; 48,420:12; 52,438:4; 38,382:29.
ῥῆσις, ἡ	style	13,290:11.
ῥητορικός	rhetorical	55,448:1;
ῥητορικὸν γένος	type of style	14,290:15.
ῥήτωρ, ὁ	orator	2,244:7; 2,246:7; 3,246:26; 9,266:28; 10,274:24; 13,288:26; 23,324:24; 23,326:23; 33,366:27; 35,372:17; 35,374:5,21; 41,398:13; 43,404:18; 46,418:6; 48,424:22; 50,432:9; 51,436:2; 53,440:30; 55,446:25; 56,450:11; 58,452:16; 58,454:7.

ῥοπή, ἡ	
balance	48,424:7 <sup>≠</sup> .
ῥυθμός, ὁ	
1) rhythm	7,262:23; 26,338:2; 39,384:6,9,13, 28; 40,392:15; 43,410:6,19; 47,420:4; 48,420:17,20,26; 48,422:5, 9,29; 48,424:10; 49,424:29; 50,430:4,10,18,21,27,31; 51,432:24; 51,434:22;
2) rhythm (non-tech.)	50,428:2.
ῥύσις, ἡ	
flow	40,392:5.
Σ	
σαφήνεια, ἡ	
lucidity	5,254:25; 34,372:8; 50,426:28; 58,454:6.
σαφής	
clear, lucid	4,252:19; 10,276:2; 13,286:9; 18,304:1,8; 24,334:2,3,6; 34,370:9; 53,442:4.
σαφές, τό	
lucidity	5,256:6.
σειρήν, ἡ	
1) Siren	35,376:10;
2) Siren-charm	35,376:8.
σεμνολογία, ἡ.	
use of solemn language	13,288:17.
σεμνός	
solemn	18,304:2; 28,348:3; 29,348:22; 36,378:14; 43,410:17;
σεμνόν, τό	
solemnity	24,334:9; 38,380:22; 40,388:18; 41,398:10; 45,414:17;

σειμνότερον, τό	higher degree of solemnity	56,450:13;
σειμνῶς	solemnly	43,404:20.
σειμνότης, ἡ	solemnity	4,252:17,22; 13,288:8; 24,330:4,11; 28,346:5; 39,386:19; 45,414:28.
σημαίνω	to signify	40,390:8.
σημεῖον, τό	1) example 2) indication	9,274:5; 50,426:21.
σημειῶ	to mark, to note down	58,452:16.
σιωπή, ἡ	pause (γ. χρόνος)	38,382:9.
σιληρός	harsh	5,256:15.
σκολιός	twisty, tortuous	9,270:22.
σκοπέω	1) to examine 2) to study 3) to consider 4) to detect	37,380:18; 41,398:21; 43,404:19,26; 55,446:20; 50,430:1; 48,422:24; 50,428:4.
σκοτεινός		
σκοτεινόν, τό	obscurity	35,374:13.
σοφία, ἡ	philosophy	51,434:4.
σοφιστικός	sophistic	44,412:21.
σπαδονισμός, ὁ	impediment	40,390:22.

σπανίζω	
to lack (ν. εὐκαρπος)	32,364:28.
σπεύδω	
ἐσπευσμένως	
urgently	54,444:21.
σπονδαῖος	
of libitation	22,322:5.
σπουδάζω	
to be bent on, to pay serious attention to	25,334:18; 26,338:3; 27,342:27; 48,422:21; 53,440:19.
σπουδαῖος	
1) serious	18,306:10; 22,322:4;
2) good, excellent, sound	36,376:26; 37,378:21; 38,382:29;
3) good	18,304:22.
σπουδή, ἡ	
1) serious consideration	23,328:13; 24,332:7; 29,350:7; 36,378:7;
2) care	40,390:3.
στηριγμός, ὁ	
sustaining	43,408:21.
στίχος, ὁ	
1) verse, i.e. a line of poetry	50,430:19,21;
2) line of writing	57,452:3.
στοιχεῖον, τό	
1) element	48,420:9; 52,436:28;
2) constituent part	37,380:4; 53,440:8.
στοιχειώδης	
elementary	39,384:1.
στοχάζομαι	
to strive after	18,304:8; 34,370:12; 48,422:11; 58,454:7.

στράγγι, ἡ	
trickle	28,346:28.
στριφνότης, ἡ	
close texture	34,370:17.
στρογγύλος	
1) compact, terse (v. συγκεκροτημένος)	4,254:5; 13,286:12; 18,304:12; 19,308:13; 20,310:15; 24,332:12;
2) well-rounded	43,410:10.
στραφή, ἡ	
strophe	50,430:20.
συγγενής	
inborn	13,290:11.
συγγραφεύς	
1) historian	2,244:6; 2,246:5; 10,276:1; 39,386:20; 41,398:13,17; 42,402:28;
2) prose-writer	37,380:15.
συγγράφω	
to describe	53,440:25.
συγκεῖμαι	
to be composed of	40,390:9,10; 43,406:17.
συγκρίνω	
1) to compare	17,298:5;
2) to compare (non-tech.)	21,314:15.
σύγκρισις, ἡ	
1) comparison	17,298:13; 23,330:2; 33,368:23;
2) comparison (non-tech.)	21,314:19.
συγκροτέω	
to unify	21,320:21;
συγκεκροτημένος	
terse (v. στρογγύλος)	18,304:13.
συγκρούω	
to clash	4,254:2; 43,406:22; 43,408:20.

συγχέω	
συγχέομαι	
to fuse, to flow together	38,382:19; 48,424:24.
συζεύγνυμι	
to combine	39,386:14; 40,392:13.
συζυγία, ἡ	
combination	38,382:26; 40,388:27; 40,390:6,12; 43,410:2.
συκοφαντέω	
1) to misrepresent	25,334:14;
2) to quibble, to quibble about (i.e. to criticize in a pettifoggng way)	28,344:25; 34,372:2; 35,374:11,16; 37,380:16; 49,426:8; 55,446:15; 56,450:20; 58,454:3.
συλλαβή, ἡ	
syllable	38,382:23; 52,438:2,10.
συλλεαίνω	
to combine	43,408:2.
συλλογίζομαι	
to recapitulate	32,366:17.
συμβαίνω	
1) to be an attribute of	50,428:1,8;
2) to be connected with	34,370:6;
συμβάν, τό	
a thing that happens	39,386:4;
συμβεβηκός, τό	
1) feature	37,380:11;
2) attribute, property (non-tech.)	27,342:23.
συμβολή, ἡ	
clashing	38,382:5,20; 40,390:3; 43,408:27.
συμβολικός	
συμβολικῶς	
with a token, sign	46,418:13.

σύμβολον, τό		
token		50,428:7.
συμβουλευτικός		
deliberative		9,274:1 <sup>z</sup> ; 43,410:7 <sup>z</sup> .
συμβουλή, ἡ		
deliberative speech		45,416:10.
συμμεταμορφάζομαι		
to adapt		45,414:9.
συμμετρέω		
1) to determine exactly		10,274:25;
2) to correspond to		39,384:24; 43,410:13.
συμμετρία, ἡ		
balance		24,332:10; 34,370:23.
σύμμετρος		
balanced		24,332:12;
συμμέτρως		
corresponding		43,408:28.
συμπαθεία, ἡ		
affinity of sound		40,392:3.
συμπλέκω		
to juxtapose		43,408:8 <sup>z</sup> .
συμπληρώω		
to fill up		39,384:5.
συμπληρωτικός		
forming an essential part of		46,416:22.
συμπλοκή, ἡ		
1) conjunction (gram= matical)		9,270:2;
2) combination		38,382:13.
συμπυκνώνω		
συμπυκνωμένος		
compact (ν. στρογγύλος 1))		43,404:29.

συμφέρω		
συμφέρον, τό		
advantage		45,414:26.
σύμφημι		
to agree with		30,350:13.
συμφθείρω		
to melt together		48,424:24.
συμφωνέω		
συμφωνούμενον, τό		
consonant		43,408:9.
συμφωνία, ἡ		
harmony		40,390:30.
συνάγω		
1) to reduce		13,290:7;
2) to conclude		33,366:23;
3) to bring together		9,270:28.
συναλγέω		
to sympathize		54,444:23.
συναλείφομαι		
to coalesce		38,382:18; 43,406:27; 43,408:1,7;
συνηλεῖσθαι, τό		
coalescence		40,388:29.
συναπαρτίζω		
to bring to an end		
simultaneously with		39,384:23 <sup>≠</sup> .
συνάπτω		
1) to follow		38,380:30;
2) to join together		54,444:22;
συνάπτομαι		
to be next to		40,390:19;
συναπτόμενος		
sequel (non-tech.)		14,294:7.
συναρμόττω		
to fit together		40,388:23,28; 48,422:17; 50,430:6.

συναρής		
consecutive		38,382:3 <sup>f</sup> ;
συναρές, τό		
continuity		43,406:24.
σύνδεσμος, ὁ		
1) connective word		9,270:27; 39,386:6;
2) conjunction (gram=		
matical)		48,420:12; 52,438:4.
συνδρομή, ἡ		
concentration		50,426:25.
συνεχής		
continuous, uninterrupted		40,390:25; 43,406:18; 52,438:13;
συνεχές, τό		
continuity		54,444:22.
συνέχω		
συνέξεσθαι		
continuity		40,388:29.
συνήθεια, ἡ		
acquaintance		36,378:6.
συνήθης		
customary		4,252:14; 8,266:10; 9,268:17,19; 9,270:3; 10,274:16; 10,276:7; 15,294:11,24; 56,450:6.
σύνθεσις, ἡ		
1) composition		24,332:8; 35,372:15; 35,374:17; 35,376:6,12; 36,376:29; 37,378:21; 40,394:5; 43,406:5,31; 43,408:26; 43,410:4; 44,412:19; 45,414:10,13,23; 46,416:20; 49,426:14; 50,426:21; 50,428:12; 50,430:9; 50,432:6,9; 51,432,16; 51,434:15,24; 58,454:8;
2) type of composition		39,384:29; 40,392:10; 44,410:28; 45,414:18; 48,424:12.

συνθέτης, ὁ	
συνθέτης ὀνομάτων, ὁ	
artist at the composition of words	36,376:16.
συνθετικός	
συνθετικόν, τό	
composition	51,434:18 <sup>7</sup> .
σύνθετος	
combined	3,246:21.
σύνστημα	
intr.: to consist of	40,392:14; 48,420:18.
σύνταγμα, τό	
treatise (β. ἢ σύνταξις, 2))	54,446:4.
σύνταξις, ἡ	
1) coherence	27,342:11;
2) treatise (β. τὸ σύνταγμα)	46,418:7.
συνταράττω	
to disturb	9,272:10.
συντάττω	
to compose, to write	16,296:27; 45,416:13; 51,432:29.
συντείνω	
1) to contribute to	53,440:26;
2) to be directed	45,414:26;
συντείνω τὸν νοῦν	
to induce strain into the mind	2,244:28.
συντίθημι	
1) to combine	36,378:18;
2) to compose	38,382:23; 39,384:4; 39,386:2;
	40,392:15; 48,420:25;
3) to construct	46,416:25;
4) to put together	50,428:7 <sup>7</sup> ; 51,432:23.

συντομία, ἡ		
conciseness		18,304:7; 34,372:9.
σύντομος		
concise		13,286:12; 19,306:29.
συνυφαίνω		
to weave together		8,266:8;
συνυφάνθαι, τό		
to weaving together		40,390:27.
συσπιάω		
to compress (ψ. συνυφαίνω)		21,320:21;
συσπαιθῆναι, τό		
the drawing together		40,390:27;
συνεσπαιμένος		
spare		15,294:12.
συστολή, ἡ		
shortening		52,438:5.
συστρέφω		
to condense		5,256:8; 19,310:1;
συστρέφω τὸν νοῦν		
to induce tension into the mind (ψ. συντείνω)		2,244:28.
συστροφία, ἡ		
compactness		18,304:10.
σφίγγω		
to compress, to condense		19,308:12.
σχῆμα, τό		
1) figure (of speech)		5,256:18; 18,306:7; 20,312:21; 20,314:8; 21,320:24; 25,336:7; 26,338:5,16; 26,340:13; 40,392:19; 43,410:16; 48,422:20;
2) outward appearance		49,426:1; 51,434:22;
3) pattern		50,430:23;

4) arrangement	40,388:26;
5) bearing	38,380:27;
6) modulation (of the voice)	53,440:20;
7) posture (of the body)	50,428:2; 53,440:20;
8) way, manner	54,444:8;
9) form	27,340:19; 30,358:2; 43,410:5.
σχηματίζω	
to shape, to fashion	29,348:13 <sup>z</sup> ; 46,418:1; 47,420:7; 50,432:10.
σχηματισμός, ὁ	
1) figure (of speech)	4,252:26; 39,384:14,18;
2) structuring, formation	50,432:13;
3) expression (of the face)	54,442:23.
σχολή, ἡ	
school	44,412:8.
σχολικός	
school-	46,418:8.
Σωκρατικός	
Socratic	6,258:20; 23,326:22.
σῶμα, τό	
1) human body	50,426:28; 54,446:2;
2) person	50,426:26;
ἐν ἡλίῳ...καὶ πόνοις τεθραμμένα σώματα.	
people raised by hard work in the sun (figurative of the style of Demosthenes)	32,364:17-18;
(σώματα) σκιᾶς καὶ ῥοστῶνας διώκοντα	
(people) that pursue a life of ease in the shade (figurative of the style of Plato)	32,364:18-19.

## T

ταμιεύω		
to regulate	46,418:2.	
ταμιεύομαι		
1) to restrain	28,348:1;	
2) to control, to regulate	48,420:29.	
τάξις, ἡ		
positioning	40,390:17.	
ταπεινός		
1) poor, of low quality	28,346:2; 39,384:7;	
2) mean (non-tech.)	8,266:19.	
ταράττω		
1) to disturb	40,390:7; 43,406:29;	
2) to disturb (non-tech.)	7,260:9.	
τάττω		
1) to arrange	50,430:18;	
2) to classify	34,372:8; 48,420:15;	
3) to organize	50,430:29.	
τεκμαίρομαι		
1) to judge	45,412:25; 53,440:7;	
2) to decide	37,380:18.	
τεκμήριον, τό		
proof	25,334:24; 46,418:10.	
τεκμηριόω		
to prove	52,436:25.	
τέλειος		
1) perfect	18,304:4; 15,294:12; 47,418:26;	
	50,430:5;	
2) complete	54,442:19 <sup>7</sup> ;	
τελέως		
perfectly	33,368:20.	
τελειόω		
to perfect	2,244:14,24; 3,246:26; 14,290:19;	
	16,296:22.	

τελευτή, ἡ	
the epilogue (of a speech)	30,350:13.
τελέω	
τελέομαι	
to be initiated	22,322:15.
τέλος	
1) perfection	33,368:7;
2) objective, aim	15,296:11; 47,418:19; 47,420:1;
3) end	9,272:14,16,19; 13,288:30; 50,430:24.
τερατεία, ἡ	
flight of fancy	23,326:2.
τερπνός	
τερπνῶς	
agreeable	43,404:22.
τέρμις, ἡ	
delectation (cp. ἀνθηρός)	32,464:25.
τέχνη, ἡ	
1) handbook	1,238:2;
2) art	47,418:21; 52,438:18;
3) skill	15,294:21; 51,436:9; 52,436:23;
4) work of art	50,428:20.
τέχνησις, ἡ	
skill	38,382:24.
τεχνογράφος, ὁ	
writer of a textbook	34,372:10.
τίθημι	
to place	40,388:22;
τίθημι ὄνομα	
to name, to attach a name	56,448:24-25;
τίθεμαι	
to take as	50,428:6.

τίμιος	worth, honourable	45,416:8.
τιμή, ἡ	honour	25,336:1; 28,346:10; 31,358:8.
τιητικός	concise, brief	58,452:26.
τολιηρός	daring	2,246:5.
τομή, ἡ	section	51,434:11.
τόνος, ὁ	1) intensity, rigour	13,288:30; 13,290:2,9; 18,304:17; 21,320:23; 29,350:4; 34,370:16;
	2) pitch	54,442:23; 54,444:10.
τοπικός	local	2,244:8.
τόπος, τό	1) place, spot	35,374:28; 43,406:22 <sup>≠</sup> , 25 <sup>≠</sup> ; 43,410:23;
	2) passage	50,432:12;
	3) position (v. χώρα)	53,440:5;
λεκτικὸς τόπος, ὁ	style	32,366:19;
πραγματικὸς τόπος, ὁ	subject-matter	51,434:9 <sup>≠</sup> .
τορευτός	chased (v. γλυπτὸς)	51,434:6.
τόρνος, ὁ	lathe	43,410:11.
τραγωδία, ἡ	tragedy	18,306:9; 41,398:12; 53,440:9.

τραχύνω	
1) to roughen	38,382:22; 40,390:6; 43,408:27;
2) to be rough, harsh	4,254:4; 43,406:30 (Pass.).
τραχύς	
rough	20,312:16; 40,390:20; 43,406:20,
τραχύτης, ἡ	
harshness	38,382:13; 43,408:23.
τριβή, ἡ	
practice	50,428:16.
τρίβω	
to train	50,428:19.
τροπή, ἡ	
change	20,314:7.
τροπικός	
figurative	4,252:16; 5,256:13; 18,304:16; 32,366:6.
τρόπος, ὁ	
1) trope (metonymy, sinecdoche, metaphor, comparison, allegory and hyperbole)	48,422:20;
2) manner, way	43,408:29; 48,424:25; 53,442:1.
πρυφερός	
dainty	26,338:4; 48,424:3; 55,448:3.
τυγχάνω	
τυγχάνω (τίθεσθαι)	
(to place) at random	40,388:22.
τύπος, ὁ	
1) type	24,332:16;
2) form	52,436:29;
3) impression	52,436:20.

τύχη, ἡ

fortune

39,386:4.

Υ

ὕγρως

smoothly flowing

20,312:18.

ὕπαγαναιτέω

ὕπαγαναιτῶν

with an undertone of  
indignation

54,442:15.

ὕπάγω

to lead gently on

43,406:3;

ὕπάγομαι

to be carried away

22,322:23.

ὕπαγωγικός

slow-moving

4,254:6; 18,304:11.

ὕπατος

ὕπάτη (sc. χορδή), ἡ

lowest note

(cf. ἡ νήτη)

2,244:25.

ὕπεραίρω

to exceed

48,420:28.

ὕπερβάλλω

to exceed

2,242:27; 54,442:21.

ὕπερβολή, ἡ

excess

15,296:17.

ὕπεροπτικός

ὕπεροπτικῶς ἔχω

to treat superciliously

39,386:11.

ὕπερφυής

extraordinary

22,324:15.

ὕπόθεσις, ἡ

1) subject

16,296:28; 23,326:13; 32,366:15;  
56,450:2;

2) theme	45,414:10; 46,416:19;
3) circumstantial data	9,274:8.
ὑπόκειμαι	
ὑποκειμένος	
1) underlying	40,390:16;
2) in question	13,286:16;
ὑποκειμένον, τό	
subject, subject-matter	48,422:12;
ὑποκειμένα πράγματα, τά	
subject-matter	24,330:10.
ὑποκρίνομαι	
1) to deliver (i.e. a speech)	22,324:7;
2) to act	53,440:9.
ὑπόκρισις, ἡ	
delivery	22,324:2; 53,440:2,29; 53,442:3; 54,442:12,26; 54,444:6.
ὑπολαμβάνω	
to assume	52,438:18.
ὑπόληψις, ἡ	
1) notion	39,386:13;
2) assumption	36,378:7;
3) prejudice	23,326:1.
ὑπομνηματικός	
of a dissertation	46,418:9.
ὑπομνηματισμός	
treatise (β. σύνταξις, 2))	46,418:9; 49,426:13.
ὑπόροχημα, τό	
song accompanied by dancing and pantomimic action	7,262:24.
ὑπορχηματικός	
of a ὑπόροχημα, choral dance	43,410:21.

ὑπτιος		
sprawling	18,304:10;	43,410:11.
ὑρήμι		
to abate (v. τὸ μέτριον)	28,348:1.	
ὑψηλός		
sublime	5,254:16; 7,258:27; 10,276:6;	
	18,304:2; 33,368:16; 34,370:8,13;	
	39,384:8.	
ὑψος, τό		
sublimity	28,346:5.	
Φ		
φανερός		
1) clear (v. σαφής)	18,302:30; 20,310:29;	33,368:1;
2) evident	35,374:22; 35,376:7;	
3) obvious	50,426:28;	
4) best known (sup.)	52,436:25;	
φανερώτατον, τό		
the most obvious thing	36,378:12.	
φαντασία, ἡ		
1) image	22,322:18;	
2) appearance	40,390:28.	
φαῦλος		
1) trifling	18,304:7; 28,346:10; 39,384:9;	
	51,436:3;	
2) ignorant	50,432:15.	
φεύγω		
to avoid	40,390:2.	
φθονέω		
1) to experience envy or illwill	22,322:11;	
2) to begrudge (non-tech.)	54,446:14.	

φιλόκαλος appealing (v. κοινός)	5,254:20; 33,368:12.
φιλόχαιος old-fashioned	36,378:14; 38,380:21; 49,426:2.
φιλόκαινος φιλόκαινον, τό novelty	48,424:5.
φιλόλογος, ὁ lover of literature	23,326:24.
φιλόσοφος, ὁ philosopher	2,244:7; 3,246:27; 23,324:24; 25,334:23; 26,336:22; 33,366:28; 41,398:13,17.
φιλότης, ὁ affinity	40,392:13.
φιλοτιμέομαι to vie with	36,378:9.
φλέβιον, τό small vein	51,436:7.
φορά, ἡ gesture	54,442:24.
φορτικός 1) inflated 2) vulgar	29,350:6; 44,412:20; 55,446:17; 57,450:21; 57,452:1,6.
φράσις, ἡ 1) diction 2) style, way of expressing ideas in words 3) type of style 4) oratory	4,252:16; 5,256:13; 4,252:24; 6,258:5; 7,260:10; 25,336:10; 26,338:5; 27,344:14; 28,346:23; 39,386:11; 5,254:19; 34,370:16; 51,432:26.

φροντίς, ἡ		
reflection		51,434:21; 52,436:19.
φυλάττω		
to preserve		43,408:10; 45,416:16; 50,430:28.
φυσικός		
natural		13,288:23; 40,392:13; 33,368:2;
τὰ φυσικά φιλοσοφῆσαντες, οἱ		
natural philosophers		2,244:9.
φύσις, ἡ		
1) outward appearance		13,286:14;
2) nature		9,274:8; 14,290:20; 27,344:2;
		33,366:21; 37,380:10; 42,404:11;
		45,416:3; 46,416:23; 50,428:28;
		53,440:18; 54,444:26;
3) natural disposition		38,382:19,29; 43,406:26;
4) natural ability		27,344:2; 35,374:6; 36,378:3;
		44,412:5; 51,436:11;
5) elementary substance		37,380:5;
6) Nature		9,268:20; 39,386:1; 40,390:11;
		47,418:20;
φύσιν		
naturally		43,406:26;
κατὰ φύσιν		
natural		9,268:19; 9,272:11.
φύω		
πέφυκε		
1) to be essentially characteristic of		13,288:18; 20,314:9; 22,322:12;
		23,326:5; 34,370:30; 39,384:20;
		55,448:8;
2) to be naturally inclined to		36,378:3;
3) essentially, naturally		50,426:26.

φωνέω

φωνήθεν, τό<sup>10</sup>

word, utterance

43,408:4.

φωνή, ἡ

1) sound

38,382:22; 40,390:13<sup>≠</sup>; 43,408:23,27;  
52,436:28;

2) voice

53,440:20; 54,444:10,20.

φωνήεις

φωνήεντα γράμματα, τά

the vowels

38,380:28;

φωνήεντα (sc. γράμματα), τά

the vowels

4,254:2; 38,382:4,6,9; 40,390:3;  
43,406:22; 43,408:6,20,25.

X

χαλεπαίνω

to feel angry

53,440:14.

χαρακτήρ, ὁ

1) idiosyncrasy, distinctive  
characteristics

1,238:4; 4,252:8; 9,274:6;  
23,324:19; 23,326:9; 33,368:3;  
34,370:30; 36,376:20; 37,380:12;  
38,380:23; 39,388:16; 40,394:4;  
41,398:3; 42,404:5; 50,426:20,27;

2) character, nature

46,418:9; 50,428:4; 50,430:13;

3) type

2,246:14; 5,254:15,18; 8,264:16,23;  
8,266:22; 33,368:15; 37,378:21;  
37,380:1; 45,414:10; 46,416:20;

4) style

6,258:26; 9,266:27; 13,286:25;  
13,288:16; 16,296:20; 44,412:17;  
58,452:23;

5) type of style

3,252:1; 5,254:18; 8,266:5;  
10,274:13; 10,276:7; 13,288:5,21;  
14,290:15; 14,292:3; 15,294:8;  
15,296:13,16; 33,368:10,25;  
44,412:4.

χαρακτηρικός	
characteristic	34,370:13,18; 39,384:2; 39,386:6; 51,432:17; 58,452:15.
χαρακτηριστικός	
characteristic	34,370:3; 40,392:27.
χαρίεις	
1) charming	17,298:3; 19,306:30; 40,388:27; 40,392:17; 45,412:27;
2) pleasant (non-tech.)	11,276:15;
χαριέστεροι, οἱ	
men of refinement	15,296:10.
χάρις, ἡ	
1) charm	7,260:1; 13,286:18; 13,288:24; 13,290:3; 24,332:20; 29,350:5; 38,382:28,30; 41,398:18; 45,416:8; 54,446:9;
2) boon	29,348:23.
χέω	
κεχυμένος	
diffuse	43,410:11.
χλευάζω	
to ridicule	56,448:20.
χλοερός	
verdant	5,254:28.
χνοῦς, ὁ	
1) bloom, film of archaism	38,382:27;
2) down	51,436:8.
χρήσιμος	
1) useful	3,248:8; 8,266:7 (sup.); 18,306:8; 36,378:19 (sup.);
2) additional	3,248:3;
χρήσιμον, τό	
usefulness	32,364:22;

·χρησίμως		
effective		58,452:25.
χρήσις, ἡ		
1) utilitarian value		10,276:2; 34,372:7;
2) employment		51,434:12;
3) usage (non-tech.)		5,256:11.
ἰχρονίζω		
to continue for long		39,386:9; 49,426:7.
χρόνιος		
prolonged		50,428:17; 52,436:19.
χρόνος, ὁ		
1) time		48,420:14;
2) time-unit		48,420:21;
3) interval of time		38,380:25,31; 38,382:3; 43,408:5;
4) time quantity		48,420:17; 48,422:16;
5) time (non-tech.)		14,290:26; 17,298:8; 22,322:22;
		32,366:10,14 <sup>7</sup> ; 50,428:19;
		51,432:30; 52,438:12,20,28;
διὰ μέσου χρόνος, ὁ		
interval of time between		38,382:6.
χρῶμα, τό		
1) timbre		8,266:17;
2) shade		46,418:1;
3) mode, modification		48,422:29;
4) complexion		50,428:2.
χρωματίζω		
to colour, to tinge		22,324:2.
χώρα, ἡ		
1) place		48,420:30;
2) opportunity (v. ὁ τόπος 3)		53,440:5.

χαρίον, τό	
1) passage	34,372:1;
2) spot	34,372:6; 43,408:9;
3) section	34,372:9;
4) countryside (cp. άνθηρός)	32,463:24;
5) landscape (cp. πρανής)	40,392:6.

ψ

ψέγω	
to criticize	26,338:18 <sup>z</sup> .
ψευδεπίγραφος	
not genuine, falsely ascribed to him	57,452:5.
ψιλός	
ψιλη λέξις, ἡ	
prose	48,424:20.
ψόγος, ὁ	
ensorious part	23,326:14.
ψοφοδεής	
afraid of harsh sound	18,304:16.
ψόφος, ὁ	
mere sound	7,260:14; 7,262:7.
ψυχαγωγία, ἡ	
entertainment, amusement	44,412:10.
ψυχή, ἡ	
1) soul	22,324:1;
2) mind	52,438:13; 53,442:2; 54,444:25;
3) life (non-tech.)	45,416:7.
ψυχρός	
frigid	20,312:25; 21,320:24; 29,350:4;
ψυχρῶς	
frigidly	29,348:13 <sup>z</sup> .

ὠδή, ἡ	
singing	40,392:9; 48,422:4; 48,424:16.
ὠνιος	
for sale	52,438:25.
ἄρα, ἡ	
1) youthful beauty	5,254:29; 7,260:1; 26,338:17; 38,382:30; 48,422:1;
2) fit time	45,416:1.
ἄραίζω	
ἄραίζομαι	
to overdo ornamentation	4,252:25.
ἀρέλεια, ἡ	
aid	44,412:11.
ἀρέλιμος	
useful	34,372:7.

NOTES TO THE GLOSSARY

1. One should not be so unwise as to regard the simple type of style as artless. It does indeed look like colloquial speech, but its art is concealed (*ars celandi artem*).
2. In ch. 14 of the *C.V.* Dionysius enumerates them: λ, μ, ν, ρ, σ, ξ, Ξ and ψ (*C.V.* xiv, 144:9-10).
3. This emendation of S. Usher is unnecessary for the following reasons: συμβεβηκέναι (34,370:6) can be taken with τοῖς ἄλλοις πλάσμασιν just as τοῖς τρισὶ πλάσμασιν (34,370:1-2) in the previous sentence is governed by παρέπεται (34,370:2). Thus the sentence can be translated as follows: "I shall firstly recall the features which, as peculiar to (the style) of Demosthenes, I said are connected with the other (individual) styles ..." (ὑπομνήσω δὲ πρῶτον μὲν, ἃ τοῖς ἄλλοις πλάσμασιν ἔφην (τὰ δοκοῦντά μοι ὡς<sup>†</sup>) ἰδίας ἀρετὰς συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Δημοσθένους) (34,370:4-6).
4. χρόνων τε ἄξιολόγων ἐμπεριλήψει διορίζεσθαι θάτερα ὅπῳ τῶν ἐτέρων ("and that words are separated from one another by a considerable time-interval *on both sides* (sc. of each word) ...") (The italics are mine). (38,380:26-28).
5. It would not make sense to translate πλὴν ὅτι (30,358:1) with "except that," with the implication that Dionysius is criticizing the *Mene xenus* for not being forensic: ἔχει μὲντοι τὰ πλείω καλῶς (οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖ ψεύδεσθαι) πλὴν ὅτι πολιτικόν γε τὸ σχῆμα αὐτῆς ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναγώνιον ("Most of it is indeed good (it does not seem justified to lie), except that its form is political, not forensic.") (30,356:31 - 30,358:2). Likewise it would not make much sense to take ἔχει καλῶς as referring to the quality of the passage as comparable material: "Most of it is indeed good (for the sake of comparison) ..." The parenthesis, ("It does not seem justified to lie") would make this interpretation highly improbable. The expression πλὴν ὅτι rather seems to have the meaning of "it is a pity that", for Dionysius realizes the incongruity of comparing a passage from the *Mene xenus*, which is not forensic, with a passage from the *De Corona*, which is forensic.
6. εὐκαρπος καὶ παμκόρος γῆ καὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἰς βίον οὔτε τῶν περιττῶν εἰς τέρψιν σπανιζούση: "a fruitbearing, fertile land, which is lacking in neither the necessities of life, nor the extras intended

to be enjoyed ..." (32,364:26-28) (figurative language used to describe the style of Demosthenes).

7. ὡς can also be taken as a conjunction, in which case κράτιστα should be rendered by "very good". It is possible that Dionysius deliberately organized this phrase in such a way that both meanings should be understood - an organised σύλληψις.
8. For Dionysius λέξις did not include the treatment of subject-matter, πραγματικός τόπος. In view of this I am reluctant to translate it with "style", which, to the modern specialist in ancient rhetoric, does include the treatment of subject-matter. By translating it with "way of expression," "way of expressing ideas in words," (v. ἐρμηνεία) I am trying to avoid this misconception of Dionysius' idea of λέξις.
9. νήτος and ὕπατος are used to describe the position of the string (ἡ χορδή) on the instrument. Since the top string (ὑπάτη) was the longest, it sounded the lowest note, and likewise, since the bottom string (νήτη) was the shortest, it sounded the highest note.
10. The text has φωνήεντα, vowels: διασπᾶται δ' ἐν τῷ "μᾶλλον δὲ ὄλον ἢ τύχη," βραχέων φωνηέντων πολὺν τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον περιλαμβανόντων ("And (the sentence) is broken up by μᾶλλον δὲ ὄλον ἢ τύχη, in which short vowels embrace long time-interval(s)." (43,408:3-5). This statement, however, is far from convincing, for the following reasons:
  - Firstly, how can short vowels as such involve a phrase in a prolonged pronunciation?
  - Secondly, a close look at the quoted phrase reveals that the short and long vowels are equal in number (four); the short vowels are not a majority.

If φωνηέντων is changed to φωνηθέντων ("words") the remark of Dionysius makes sense: short *words* (five) involve the sentence in many time intervals (between the words) (πολὺν τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον), which would consequently prolong the pronunciation. This would be in line with a remark of Dionysius at *C.V.* xx,202:22-23: αἱ μὲν μονοσύλλαβοί τε καὶ δισύλλαβοι λέξεις, πολλοὺς τοὺς μεταξὺ χρόνους ἀλλήλων ἀπολείπουσαι... ("The monosyllabic and disyllabic words, leaving many time-intervals between each other ...")

In view of these arguments I propose that φωνηέντων should be emended by φωνηθέντων.

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## SAMEVATTING

In die *De Demosthene* word die navorser gekonfronteer met 'n aantal probleme wat in die geskiedenis van navorsing oor dié boek telkens weer na vore gekom het.

Eerstens word mens getref deur die probleem van waaroor die boek nou eintlik handel. Aangesien die inleiding van die boek verlore geraak het, is daar gepoog om die doel daarvan uit die res van die boek vas te stel. Deur te let op bepaalde retoriese beginsels, is vasgestel dat twee doelstellings geïdentifiseer kan word: eerstens, om te bewys dat Demosthenes die beste prosa-skrywer is (hoofstukke 1-34); tweedens, om 'n teoretiese uiteensetting te gee van die wyse waarop Demosthenes sy sinne saamstel in terme van die musikale aspek van taal (hoofstukke 35-52). Daar is ook aangetoon dat die struktuur van die *De Demosthene* nie verstaan kan word sonder inagneming van die retoriese beginsels wat Dionysius toegepas het toe hy hierdie boek geskryf het.

Die *De Demosthene* is oorgelewer as deel van 'n versamelwerk, die *De oratoribus antiquis*, wat 'n oorkoepelende doelstelling gehad het: om die Attiese redenaars voor te stel as navolgenswaardige modelle vir voornemende redenaars. Alhoewel daar in die algemene inleiding tot die *De oratoribus antiquis* 'n belofte gemaak is van 'n werk oor Demosthenes se styl, het navorsers met verloop van tyd begin twyfel of die *De Demosthene* wel daardie beloofde boek is. Die rede vir die twyfel was die eindomlike andersheid van die boek (in vergelyking met die drie boeke van volume 1 van die *De oratoribus antiquis*), byvoorbeeld ten opsigte van die lengte daarvan, die verskil in evalueringsisteme en oënskynlike teenstrydighede ten opsigte van die evaluering van verskillende outeurs soos Isocrates en Lysias. Daar is aangetoon dat die verskille outomaties en natuurlik na vore gekom het in die realisering van die doelstellings van die *De Demosthene*.

Vervolgens is die chronologiese verhouding tussen hierdie boek en 'n ander boek van Dionysius wat inhoudelik baie ooreenkomste vertoon met hoofstukke 35-52 van die *De Demosthene*, die *De compositione verborum*, bespreek. Tradisioneel is aanvaar dat Dionysius eers hoofstukke 1-34 van die *De Demosthene* geskryf het, toe die *De compositione verborum*, en daarna eers die res van die *De Demosthene*. In hierdie studie is daar gepoog om te bewys dat hierdie gewilde standpunt op spekulasies berus en dat die *De compositione verborum* as 'n geheel vóór die *De Demosthene* voltooi is.

'n Laaste hoofstuk is gewy aan die evalueringsisteme wat gebruik is in die *De Demosthene*, in besonder aan een, te wete die ἀρετὰ τῆς λέξεως-sisteem. Navorsers het hulle blindgestaar teen die teenwoordigheid van die χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως en die ἀρμονία sisteme en nooit die onontbeerlikheid van die ἀρετὰ τῆς λέξεως sisteem raakgesien nie. Daar is aangetoon dat hierdie sisteem net so 'n belangrike rol speel in die boek as die ander twee.

'n Glossarium van die tegniese terminologie is ook ingesluit - nie bloot as 'n aanhangsel tot die studie nie, maar as 'n wesentlike deel daarvan, soos die omvang daarvan (120 bladsye) kan getuig. Die rede vir die insluiting van die glossarium is die ontoeganklikheid van die *De Demosthene* vanweë die teenwoordigheid van 'n magdom van tegniese terme. Om alles nog te vererger, is daar geen konsekwenheid wat die aanwending van die tegniese terme betref nie: sinonieme word vrylik gebruik en woorde word in 'n groot verskeidenheid van betekenismoontlikhede aangewend. Die glossarium is bedoel as 'n praktiese hulpmiddel vir die navorser van die *De Demosthene*.