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SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN LESOTHO

BY

ISRAEL VUSI MASHININI

A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Faculty Science, Department of Geography at the University of the Orange
Free State, South Africa

May 2000

PROMOTER: Professor G. du T. de Villiers, Department of Geography

CO-PROMOTER: Dr. I. B. Groenevald, Centre for Sustainable Agriculture

SUMMARY

The sustainability of rural development policies, strategies and projects formulated and implemented in Lesotho since independence in 1966 was investigated in this thesis. This was accomplished through the use of secondary and primary data. Secondary data was collected on all major rural development projects. Primary data was sought on the sustainability of the activities initiated by the Farm Improvement with soil conservation (FISC)/Production Through Conservation (PTC) project in the Molele's hoek district which was used as a case study. The primary data collection involved the use of a questionnaire administered to 200 rural households selected through the use of a multi-stage sampling procedure from the households in the villages where the project operated.

At both the national level and the local FISC/PTC project level, the results of the study showed that the modus operandi used in donor assistance, the politicians, decision-makers and planners contributed in part to the lack of sustainable rural development in Lesotho. However, the study concluded that the biggest contribution to the demise of sustainable rural development in Lesotho came from the communities themselves due to their lack of willingness to change their perceptions of, and attitudes towards, development. The communities were reluctant and leave the unsustainable conveniences accorded by their old lifestyles to which they were accustomed for centuries and throughout generations, and adapt to the costs, pains and risks that accompanied changes in their life-styles introduced by sustainable development in their communities and regions.

Abstract length: 250 words

Key words: Sustainable development, communities, Production Through Conservation (PTC), Molele's hoek, Lesotho.

Opsomming

Die volhoubaarheid van landelike ontwikkelingsbeleid, strategieë en projekte in Lesotho sedert onafhanklikheid in 1966 is in hierdie proefskrif nagevors. Sekondêre data is ingesamel van alle groot plaaslike projekte, terwyl primêre data ingesamel is deur die aktiwiteite van die "Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC)/Production Through Conservation (PTC)" projekte in die Mohale's hoek distrik. Die primêre data-insameling behels die gebruik van vraeslyste aan 200 plaaslike huishoudings.

Al die gegewens wat ingesamel is, het getoon dat die modus operandi wat deur die skenkers, politici, besluitnemers en beplanners gebruik is, deels bygedra het tot die gebrek in landelike ontwikkeling in Lesotho. Dit het egter uit bogenoemde studies geblyk dat die grootste bydrae wel van die plaaslike gemeenskap gekom het, weens hul onwilligheid om hul houding teenoor ontwikkeling te verander. Die rede vir hul onwilligheid was die gevolg van hul eeue oue tradisies en die verandering wat dit sou meebring in hul lewenstyl.

Sleutelwoorde: Volhoubare ontwikkeling, gemeenskappe, PTC (Production Through Conservation), Mohale's hoek, Lesotho.

STATEMENT OF DECLARATION

“I declare that the thesis hereby submitted by me for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at the University of the Orange Free State is my own independent work and has not previously been submitted by me at another university /faculty. I further more cede copyright of the thesis in favour of the University of the Orange Free State.”



Israel Vusi Mashinini

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many people who have contributed to the success of this thesis. My sincere gratitude goes to my promoter Professor G. du T. de Villiers for his invaluable, able and patient professional supervision of the study. The other members of the Department of Geography at the University of the Orange Free State made my study very comfortable in the department.

To the rural communities in Mohale's hoek who were patient to provide their time for interviews during the field work I say thank you very much.

My heartfelt thanks go to Mrs. N. Lephole and Ms. M. Sehalahala who patiently and meticulously typed all the drafts and the final report.

Finally, my wife Novusi, my sons Vusi Jr. and Andile and the rest of the Mashinini family were a source of inspiration and my pillar of emotional and moral support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADF	African Development Foundation
ADP	Area Development Programme
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AIDS	Acquired Immunity Defficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
ATS	Appropriate Technology Section
BASP	Basic Agricultural Services Project
BCP	Basutoland Congress Party
BEDCO	Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation
BLS/BOLESWA	Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
BNP	Basotho National Party
BOS	Bureau of Statistics
CARE	American Co-operative Agency for Relief Everywhere
CCL	Christian Council of Lesotho
CCPP	Cooperative Crop Production Project
CIG	Common Interest Group
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPDO	Central Planning and Development Office
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DA	District Administrator
DAO	District Agriculture Office
DCFLUP	Department of Conservation, Forestry and Land Use Planning
DCs	District Councils
DDC	District Development Council
DEPENDS	Development of infrastructure, Economic growth, Poverty alleviation, Equity, Natural resource base protection, Democracy, Social justice
DFS	Director of Field Services
DGAs	Districts Government Assistants
DMO	District Military Officer
DRWS	Department of Rural Water Supply

DVWS	Department of Village Water Supply
EA	Extension Agent
EEC	European Economic Community
ESAP	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme
ESCAP	East Southern Countries and the Pacific Islands
ESCOM	Electricity Supply Commission
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FFYDP	Fifth Five Year Development Plan
FFYDP	First Five Year Development Plan
FFYDP	Fourth Five Year Development Plan
FISC	Farm Improvement with soil conservation
FSSP	Food Self-Sufficiency Programme
FTD	Forestry Training and Development
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDS	German Development Service
GEAR	Growth, Equity and Redistribution
GNP	Gross National Product
GOL	Government of Lesotho
GOS	Government of Sweden
GRISP	Grassroots Initiative Support Project
GTZ	German Technical Assistance
HIP	Hololo Irrigation Project
HTST	High Temperature Short Term
HVC	High Value Crop
HVP	Hololo Valley Project
HYVs	High Yielding Varieties
IAD	Integrated Area Development
IDA	International Development Agency
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IEMS	Institute of Extra-Mural Studies
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development

ILO	International Labour Organisation
ILUP	Institute of land Use Planning
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPA	Interim Political Authority
IRD	Integrated Rural Development
IRDP	Irrigation, Research and Development Project
ISAS	Institute of Southern African Studies
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
IUCN	International Union for Conservation and Nature
IVS	International Volunteer Service
LAC	Lesotho Agriculture College/Land Allocation Committee
LADB	Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank
LAO	Local Administration Officer
LAPIS	Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support Project
LCU	Labour Construction Unit
LCCU	Lesotho Cooperative Credit Union
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy Party
LCH	Lesotho Cooperative Handicrafts
LCN	Lesotho Council of Non-government Organisations
LDA	Lesotho Dispensary Association
LEC	Lesotho Electricity Corporation
LEMP	Lesotho Energy Master Plan
LHWP	Lesotho Highlands Water Project
LHWRF	Lesotho Highlands Water Revenue Fund
LIFO	Last in First Out
LIPAM	Lesotho Institute of Public Administration and Management
LISP	Local Initiative Support Project
LLA	Lesotho Liberation Army
LMC	Livestock Marketing Corporation
LNDC	Lesotho National Development Corporation

LPMS	Livestock Produce Marketing Services
LRCS	Lesotho Red Cross Society
LSPP	Lands, Surveys and Physical Planning
LWA	Lesotho Workcamps Association
LYS	Lesotho Youth Service
MADF	Machobane Agricultural Development foundation
MADP	Mphaki Area Development Project
MDADP	Mafeteng District Agricultural Development Programme
MDO	Maoamafubelu Development Organisation
MDP	Mafeteng Development Programme
MDT	Matsieng Development Trust
MFP	Marematlou Freedom Party
MICRD	Ministry of Interior, Cooperatives and Rural Development
MIRDP	Matelile Integrated Rural Development Project
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MS	Mellem Folkeligt Samvirke
NDSO	National Drug Stockpile Organisation
NES	National Environment Secretariat
NEYC	National Environment Youth Corps
NFAP	National Forestry Action Plan
NFEA	Non Farm Economic Activities
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NPK	Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potassium in Chemical fertilizers
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NRSP	National Rural Sanitation Programme
NTTC	National Teacher Training College
NUL	National University of Lesotho
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OPEC	Oil Producing and Exporting Countries
PAC	Pan African Congress

PHAL	Private Health Association of Lesotho
PHC	Primary Health Care
PIRDP	Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project
PMC	Produce Marketing Corporation
PMU	Para Military Unit
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
PTC	Production Through Conservation
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RDP	Rural Development Programme
RET	Renewable Energy Technology
RSDA	Rural Self Help Development Association
SAA	Selected Agricultural Area
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Policies
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SFYDP	Second Five Year Development Plan
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIP	Seaka Irrigation Project
SMS	Subject Matter Specialist
SNAP	Support to National Agriculture Programme
SNDP	Sixth National Development Plan
SOWACO	Soil and Water Conservation Project
SRAE	Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project
SRDP	Semonkong Rural Development Project
SSIVP	Small Scale Irrigated Vegetable Projects
SWACAP	Soil, Water, Conservation and Agro-forestry Programme
T & V	Training and Visit
TFYDP	Third Five Year Development Plan
TPPP	Thaba-Phats'oa Pilot Project
UHT	Ultra Heat Treated

UN	United Nations Organisation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCC	Unitarian Service Committee of Canada
USD	United States Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VDC	Village Development Council
VIDO	Village Industrial Development Organisation
WASA	Water and Sanitation Authority
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WDC	Ward Development Council
WFP	World Food Programme
WOCCU	World Council of Credit Unions
WUS	World University Service

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Geography and Third World Development

Geographers study the Third World Development Question from many perspectives (Chant, 1991). Environmental determinists analyse the role of the physical environment, particularly, the climate in terms of rainfall and temperatures and argue that Third World development is retarded in arid and semi-arid areas due to lack of rainfall and dry high temperatures. In tropical and sub-tropical areas, too much rainfall and very high temperatures create an uncondusive environment for development (Chisholm, 1982). Arguing in support of physical determinism, Chisholm (1982 p. 185), concludes that

the evidence is now compelling that environmental, and especially climatic, changes have been occuring throughout the historical period and to a degree sufficient to have an impact on the wealth of nations in at least parts of the World and especially those which are climatically marginal.

Physical determinism down plays the crucial role played by technology to overcome physical environmental barriers to development on the grounds that such technology is often expensive for the areas most in need of it, and it is environmentally unfriendly (Gupta, 1988; Rees, 1991).

The Natural Resources School argues that the natural resource base of a region is very important for its development. The more natural resources a region is endowed with, the higher its export base is and the higher the level of development it gets and vice versa (Hodder, 1968; Chisholm, 1982). However, the Natural Resource School is shallow on questions of exactly how many natural resources a country needs to develop. Third World countries feature high in the list of world producers of mineral resources of various kinds. Yet they are not developed, while countries like Switzerland, are far developed, with little natural resources of any note. Despite their tremendous oil resources, the Oil and Petroleum Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) are not part of the developed countries of the world, because oil prices are controlled by factors in industrialised countries where demand is reduced due to new substitutes for oil, such as nuclear energy. Therefore, a resource-based development approach (Chisholm, 1982) only provides a partial explanation of development.

Others emphasise the importance of the relationship between population, its growth and development (Findlay and Findlay, 1987). Some, within this population school, raise some Neo-Malthusian fears that high population growth promotes accelerated rate of resources utilisation that endangers development and human sustenance through eco-doom (Meadows *et al.*, 1972). Within the population school, others, such as Boserup (1970) actually argue for increased population growth because they find it to be an engine for improved agriculture and development.

The human potential of a region and development is considered of importance for regional variations in development by some Geographers. Chisholm (1982), for instance, argues that countries like Japan, China and India use their human resources to foster endogenous, self-reliant development unlike other Third World countries with less populations which rely on exogenous forces, or what he calls the big push approach, to foster development.

After Ginsburg (1960), some geographers viewed development as a process that involved the presence of some economic variables used as indicators of development. Absence of these indicators prevalent in Western countries, was viewed as reflecting a lack of development in the Third World. The function of Geography was viewed as how to devise ways to diffuse the missing variables to promote development of the Third World, where it was seen to be absent - this newly found role of Geography became referred to generally as spatial analysis of development (Cannon, 1975). Blaut (198 p. 337), argues that:

Modern diffusionism is a theoretical model in which diffusion from developed countries to Third World countries (along with the phenomenon related to it such as the internal characteristics of the Third World societies) are depicted in such a way as to demonstrate, scientifically, that diffusion is the only possible road to development, to "modernisation" (the *modewort*) of modern diffusionism.

Blaut (1987 p. 30), further argues that:

Diffusionism has become reinvigorated, primarily because it fits with the stance that progress for the Third World consists in accepting the "modernising" diffusion of multinational capitalism and the material traits, ideas, and socio-political behaviour associated with it.

The diffusionist approach to Third World development has been criticised for being static, eurocentric, linear and failing to take adequate account of the role of political economy on Third World development.

Instead, following pioneer work by Harvey (1973), some Geographers, from the radical school employ a political economy framework to emphasise that lack of development (underdevelopment) in the Third World is the result of past and present political and economic relationships of exploitation and dependency in the Third World by the developed countries through merchant capitalism, colonial capitalism and today's transnational capital, spearheaded by the process of globalisation (Forbes, 1984; Hoogvelt, 1997; development, 1998).

Geographers have also given attention to the distributional dimension of development. In this regard, concern is expressed about the necessity to provide the various Basic Human Needs and entitlements for achievement and sustenance of human development using a welfare approach (Smith, 1977). Feminist Geography also gives attention to, among others, gender sensitive development in the Third World (Boserup, 1975; Nattigly and Falconer – al- Hindi, 1995).

These different and often conflicting perspectives on Third World development, have their own idiosyncratic imprints on conceptualisation and analysis of rural development in the Third World, Lesotho's rural development included, which often hinders a richer cross fertilisation of ideas and perceptions. However, the nature of rural development is such that it is multi-faceted and needs a multi-dimensional analysis to be captured in a comprehensive manner. Therefore, a holistic perspective, that entails physical, environmental, socio-cultural, administrative, political, technological and economic facets has the potential to lead to a better, more comprehensive, understanding of rural development prospects and problems in the Third World.

Some writers such as Kay (1975) emphasise the importance of politics in development. The political paradigm of development and underdevelopment maintains that a well functioning and efficient, responsible and accountable political system is a pre-condition for development. Third World underdevelopment is attributed to lack of accountable government regimes, typified by autocracy, corruption, nepotism and state militarism. In the realm of public administration, bureaucratic red tape, inefficiency, self-aggrandisement and public service involution aggravate the nature of the weak state incapable of managing development (Wallis, 1989).

Analysis of the various development perspectives discussed thus far reveals that their explanatory strengths about the (under)-development of the Third World falls short due to their idiosyncratic determinism. Each one of them offers an univariate analysis and explanation of the (under)-development of the Third World. Whereas, in reality, development is a complex phenomena which requires a multivariate analysis and explanation.

The development process does require natural resources as inputs. While Third World countries do have natural resources, some of which are of high repute and importance such as gold, diamonds, copper, oil, forests and so on; they however, lack other important factors to combine with the natural resources such as technology, skilled labour, management and capital necessary to effect meaningful development. Likewise, physical determinism overlooks the fact that there are some regions where the climate and rainfall might be good but which are not developed due to a host of other factors such as lack of technology, skilled labour and management capability, corruption, nepotism, autocracy and capital mismanagement.

Development requires skilled labour and disciplined manpower as exemplified by the case of Japan and the Asian tigers in the Far East. Abundance of labour which is both unskilled and undisciplined, as obtains in many Third World countries, is inimical to development. The situation is made no less better by the explosive growth of the labour force due to high population growth in these countries. Development depends a lot on controlled population growth in order to reduce the demand and pressure on the use of resources for consumption and save them for investment. Explosive population growth can mostly be seen as a development time bomb in the Third World.

In the modern world, technology plays a crucial role, in its own right and as a complement to labour, in the development process. Lack of technology that is appropriate for the Third World hinders development of these countries. This situation is aggravated by lack of serious efforts by the Third World to develop their own indigenous technologies and attune them to the demands of modern development as did Japan, for instance.

The lack of adequate financial and technical resources in the Third World has necessitated the use of foreign aid since the 1950s. However, the aid is either abused by Third world governments or it has strings attached to it which obstruct its usefulness in development.

Availability of capital is yet another crucial factor in the development process. Third World countries continue to lack capital for development despite more than forty years of Post World War II bilateral development assistance from the industrialised countries and multi-lateral development assistance from the Bretton woods sister institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; and humanitarian development assistance from Non-Governmental Organisations in the North. At present capital scarcity for development in the Third World is not real, but artificial, because these countries have been given too many chances, through development assistance and debt reduction to build their own domestic capital base for development. The capital that came has often been mismanaged and diverted to finance military expenditure to keep in place undemocratic governments. Capital flight engineered by some senior politicians and government servants has resulted in the donor finance lining their pockets in overseas personal accounts in Swiss Banks and, lately, the Channel Islands as evidenced by for instance, in the case of Ferdinand Marcos, the former Prime Minister of the Philippines, and the late Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Unless peoples attitudes to public finances change and they become accountable, lack of capital is likely to become the biggest challenge for Third World development in the 21st century. Administrative efficiency is necessary for both development planning and implementation. However, in the Third World, administrative efficiency is obstructed by involution of the civil service, lack of discipline, misplacement, corruption, nepotism and red tape, all of which make it mandatory that civil service restructuring and reforms be undertaken as a prelude to foster the efficiency necessary for development.

Political stability and efficiency based on democracy is a pre-condition for development. Yet the phenomenon of political inefficiency and instability is almost synonymous with the Third World due to lack of democracy, autocracy, militarism and coup d'états that abound in the South. Lack of democracy and political instability are the biggest obstacles to development in the Third World because they open up an avenue for lack of government will and accountability, corruption, nepotism and the general looting of the state by those in positions of power and responsibility. This situation is aggravated by the prevalent culture of lack of socio-cultural, ethnic and political tolerance, which have turned the Third World into a battlefield instead of a development field. Enormous resources in the Third World are spent to maintain and sustain civil or cross border wars and refugees instead of provision of livelihood and basic services to the poor. For instance, Ghana and Uganda were very strong economies based on export of cocoa and coffee in the 1960s, but socio-cultural and political intolerance has turned them into pauper states today. Moreover, despite their abundant natural resources for development, countries like the

Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Angola in southern Africa have become the poorest of the poor countries in the region due to the absence of peace, socio-cultural and political tolerance necessary to guarantee political stability for sustainable development.

1.2 The Research Problem

Since the attainment of independence in 1966, the Government of Lesotho has formulated and implemented a wide range of policies and projects aimed at enhancement of sustainable rural livelihoods for the Basotho. Rural development policies and projects in the field of agriculture have been geared towards the achievement of the twin objectives of increased agricultural productivity and equitable distribution of rural income to attain social justice. Rural development strategies used to foster these agricultural objectives have been provision of easy access to farming inputs such as improved seeds and chemical fertilisers; introduction of mechanisation to alleviate bottlenecks in farming technology; better access to credit in order to facilitate capitalisation of agriculture; introduction of institutional reforms such as in the field of land tenure and improved land management practises, especially through afforestation, soil and water conservation, and livestock and range management strategies (First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP), 1970; Second Five Year Development Plan (SFYDP), 1975; Third Five Year Development Plan (TFYDP), 1980; Fourth Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP), 1986; Fifth Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP), 1992; Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP), 1997). A detailed discussion of these policies and strategies is presented in chapter five of this thesis.

It is now more than 30 years since Lesotho's independence and formulation and implementation of the first generation of post-colonial agricultural development projects; yet the country's agriculture remains very poor in performance by all standards. Productivity per hectare of major crops maize, sorghum, wheat, beans and peas have fluctuated over the years at low levels of 1,000 kilograms per hectare for maize; 800 kilograms for sorghum and wheat, and 500 kilograms for beans and peas, respectively (Bos, 1994).

Overall agricultural production has remained at the capability to satisfy less than 50% of domestic food requirements, leaving more than 50% to be met through food imports mainly from neighbouring South Africa, and food aid from other countries abroad. This failure to accomplish sustainable food production has resulted in food deficit and income problems at household levels and a lack of food security at national level. It is estimated that 54% of Basotho living in the rural areas are below the poverty line (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997).

Since gaining independence in 1994, South Africa has, through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and lately the Growth, Equity and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), devoted priority to feeding its own citizens. Increasingly, therefore, dependent countries such as Lesotho have to seek alternative ways to manage their in-house food deficit problems. Moreover, Lesotho's "development honeymoon" with the international community is over, since many development agencies have either ceased or cut down their support to the mountain kingdom, in favour of the newly independent South Africa across the border. Large scale retrenchment of Basotho migrant workers from South Africa since the late 1980s, has also undercut the purchasing power of many rural households formerly dependent on migrant earnings, to access food supplies because of increased food prices as a result of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). SAPs are austerity measures recommended by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a panacea for Lesotho's (and indeed that of the rest of the Third World) development problems. On their part, projects initiated to help improve agricultural development have failed to become sustainable from independence to date without provision of significant positive impact on the livelihoods of the majority, who have been bypassed, in the rural areas. The projects on land management was not sustainable. Lesotho continues to lose 40 tons of its topsoil to South Africa through various kinds of erosion annually (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1989). A daunting task that faces Lesotho, more than before, in the 21st century, is how to achieve sustainable agricultural production for its food security. A detailed discussion of Lesotho's agricultural development prospects and problems is presented in chapter five of this thesis.

Efforts to generate domestic rural employment and alternative off-farm income generation have prompted the Government of Lesotho to formulate and implement policies and projects on rural industrialisation throughout the post-independence period. In order to maximise the advantage to Lesotho, deliberate efforts were made to attract rural industries that are labour intensive, foot-loose, export-oriented and import-substituting. However, over the decades, the many industries that have come to Lesotho have either collapsed or left the country because of problems related to poor linkages, poor infrastructure, lack of skilled manpower and the poor competitive advantage of Lesotho's products in the international markets of today's globalised economy (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997). At present Lesotho's vast pool of largely unskilled labour force remains unemployed to the level of 40% and without any reliable source of income and livelihoods (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997). Likewise, Lesotho's raw materials such as wool and

mohair, are exported cheaply to overseas markets, instead of being utilised locally to promote domestic multiplier effects necessary for sustainable rural industrialisation. Therefore, yet another challenge for Lesotho in the 21st century is how best to promote and manage rural industrialisation in such a way as to enable it to generate sustainable employment and income for rural households, and utilise the raw materials available to promote a sustainable rural economy.

At community development level, efforts to improve rural livelihoods also concentrated on the design and implementation of policies and projects that could provide rural communities with social and physical infrastructure services to meet their basic human needs and entitlements. Specific areas of focus have been health, transport, energy, nutrition, sanitation, and village water supply. In order to harness the limited resources of the communities, resource pooling, sharing and sustainability have been encouraged through promotion of participatory community development. However, despite the participatory approaches adopted, many community development projects and programmes initiated since independence to-date have either collapsed, or, are in the process of decay, leaving little chance for future generations to have their basic human needs and entitlements met (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997). The challenge for Lesotho, is, again, how best to promote sustainable community development in the 21st century. A detailed discussion of community development in Lesotho is in chapter five of this thesis.

Planning and implementation of rural development policies and projects requires institutional capacity for proper management and co-ordination. In rural Lesotho, the co-ordination and management efficiency of three actors, namely, traditional rural administration, modern rural administration and project management play an important role for the success or failure of rural development projects. Since independence to-date, despite efforts at capacity building for efficient management, some rural development projects have not been successful because, either of the three actors, or a combination of them, created management problems. A crucial issue worthy of note in this regard, has often been the role played by politics, access to and monopoly of power by various management actors. Since independence to-date, the politics of Lesotho have not provided a conducive political environment with the necessary freedom of expression, behaviour, choice, individual and national security needed for the success of sustainable rural development. Each political and ruling regime has often changed, re-directed and used rural development policies and projects as development propaganda to support their short-term populist objectives, the result of which has been lack of consistency and continuity necessary for sustainability.

One of the factors responsible for inconsistency and discontinuity in rural development planning and implementation in Lesotho is that the project approach has predominantly been used. Projects are donor funded and each donor has their own priorities and aims. Projects are time and target bound, so that project management often pursues meeting some quantifiable targets over specific times by project documents. Projects also use ideas and methods that reflect their mentors more than those expected to benefit from them and can thus be alien to, and encounter apathy from, local communities. Projects have a life cycle, they come and go - yet the problems and local communities have remained behind. Donor-driven, project oriented rural development in Lesotho has often not promoted sustainable rural development. In-depth analysis of rural development projects on a case study basis and their potentials and constraints is essential in order to assist Lesotho to devise more sustainable approaches to rural development in future. This detailed discussion is presented in chapter five of this thesis.

1.3 Research Objective

The thesis has four major objectives. First, it aims to provide a comprehensive documentation of Lesotho's experience with sustainable rural development 1960 to 1999 under following sub-themes:

- 1.3.1 sustainable agricultural development
- 1.3.2 sustainable rural industrial development
- 1.3.3 sustainable community development
 - Rural health services
 - Rural sanitation
 - Rural transport
 - Rural energy
 - Rural nutrition
 - Village water supply
 - Rural local government.

The second objective of the thesis is to provide a critical evaluation of Lesotho's experiences with sustainable rural development on each of the key themes listed from 1.3.1, 1.3.2, and 1.3.3 above.

The third objective of the thesis is to highlight Lesotho's experiences with sustainable rural development through provision of a microscopic analysis of one of its rural development projects, the Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC) later known as the Production Through Conservation (PTC) Programme, operating in Mafeteng and Quthing districts, as a case study.

The fourth objective is to highlight critical issues, which need to be considered as lessons of experience by the Government of Lesotho in its future design and implementation of sustainable rural development.

1.4 The Operational Framework

Sustainable development is defined as development that meets the needs of today's generations without sacrificing the needs of future generations (Brundtland Commission, 1987). It is also defined as development that takes into account the fact that the environment upon which it is based needs to be conserved (Elliot, 1994). Sustainable rural development is rural development that incorporates environmental conservation as part of increased production and equitable distribution of income and access to rural livelihood strategies and basic services (Shepherd, 1998). A detailed discussion of sustainable development and rural development is presented in chapter two of this thesis.

The key concept of sustainable rural development is operationally defined, for the purposes of this study, through use of a number of major indicators within the physical and human environment. A schematic representation of these major physical and human environment indicators is presented in Figure 1.1. These various indicators are used as the litmus test for assessment of the achievement of sustainability (or otherwise) of the various projects discussed, in particular that used as a case study.

Figure 1.1 indicates that sustainable rural development is operationally defined, in this study, as a process composed of four major facets. The first, the biophysical facet, is composed of the physical environment upon which rural development activities depend for natural resources as inputs. Successful sustainable rural development would be typified by a decrease in natural resource degradation on private and communal lands and an increased improvement in natural resources use patterns and management systems. These would constitute sustainable land management.

A useful way to deal with the natural resource base and sustainability is to use an ecological footprint. An ecological footprint enables us to assess the resources available for a given spatial unit per year against the annual consumption requirements of organisms dependent on it for a living. This enables us to assess the sufficiency or deficiency of the resources for the sustenance of those dependent on that ecosystem for that year.

The second one, the socio-economic facet, deals with the social and economic aspects of sustainable rural development. It is premised on the understanding that sustainable rural development is both people-centred and economic at the same time. It is about improvement of natural resources productivity so as to better the economic and social welfare of people. Therefore, a successful sustainable rural development would be judged by increased resource productivity measured through increased yields in agriculture and non-agricultural activities to guarantee household food security. It would also be judged by use of improved technology seen through better farming methods, farm management techniques and management of non-farm income generation activities. Lastly, it would be judged by increased household income and its equitable distribution derived from agriculture and non-farm income generation activities.

The third facet, the politico-institutional facet, concentrates on the social and political institutions necessary for decision making, planning, implementation and management of sustainable rural development. Within this facet, emphasis is on institutional capability, institution building and capacity creation at the local beneficiary level, and the national benefactor cum-beneficiary level as well. A successful sustainable rural development project would be judged by the extent to which the beneficiaries composed of the target groups have been strengthened to make better decisions, plans, strategies and manage their own sustainable livelihood strategies in a self-reliant manner. It would also be judged by the extent to which change agents at the local and national levels who can be categorised as both beneficiaries – since they receive functional and other structural support services training to enable them to do their job well, and benefactors to the extent that they impart knowledge, skills and capability to the target groups, have also been strengthened to make better decisions, plans and strategies for sustainable, self-reliant management of their respective duties, functions and obligations in the District Agricultural Office and the Ministry of Agriculture at national level.

The fourth and the last facet, replication, has a socio-spatial and temporal dimension. It deals with the magnitude and longevity of the positive impact of sustainable rural development on the

individuals, households, groups and communities that adopted its practice. Ideally, a successful sustainable rural development would be judged by a large adoption by various targeted social groups, over a large and increasing spatial coverage for an ever-lasting time as it becomes internalised as part and parcel of their livelihood system.

A. BIO-PHYSICAL

- Increase in improved natural resources use patterns and management
 - Private lands
 - Communal lands
- Decrease in natural resource degradation
 - Private lands
 - Communal lands

B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC

- Increased resource productivity
 - Agricultural yields
 - Non-agricultural yields
- Increased income and distribution
 - Agricultural activities
 - Non-agricultural activities
- Improved technology
 - Farming methods
 - Farm management and activities
 - Non-farm production methods

C. POLITICO-INSTITUTIONAL

- Capacity building
 - Local capacity building
 - Farmers organisations
 - Chieftainship
 - Village Development Councils
 - Beneficiaries
 - Ward Development Councils
 - District Development Councils
 - Local + National Level
 - Extension Agents
 - Subject Matter Specialists
 - District Agricultural Office
 - Benefactors
 - Ministry of Agriculture

D. REPLECATION

Spatial Expansion

Individual, Household, Group, Community adoption

Figure 1.1: Indicators of sustainability compiled on the basis of data from Chambers (1988); Watkins (1995) and Shepherd (1998).

1.5 Research Questions

The study is guided by, and attempts to answer, a number of research questions at different spatial levels of analysis.

Table 1.1 Research questions for the study

Spatial Level of Analysis	Research Questions
- International conceptual level	- what is sustainable rural development?
- National country-wide level	- what rural development policies and projects have been attempted in Lesotho since independence?
	- where are they located in the country?
	- have they been (un)sustainable?
	- what rural development activities were started by FISC/PTC?
- Local project level	- what mode(s) of operation(s) were used to implement the activities?
	- have these activities and modes of operation become (un)sustainable?
	- what lessons of experience can be drawn for the future design and implementation of sustainable rural development projects?

1.6 Research Hypotheses

Two major hypotheses guide this study. At the national level, the working hypothesis is that rural development efforts in Lesotho since independence have been unsustainable. At the local Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation/Production Through Conservation (FISC/PTC) project

level, the hypothesis is that, despite tremendous energies expended, the project activities and modes of operation are not sustainable.

1.7 The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is presented in nine chapters. Chapter One: The introduction, provides an entree into the study through a discussion of Geography and development, the research problem, objectives, operational framework, research questions and hypotheses. Chapter Two: Development and Rural Development, provides a theoretical and conceptual framework upon which the study is grounded. Chapter Three: Methodology discusses the methodologies employed in the design and implementation of this study. The strengths and limitations of these methodologies and their implications for this study are also pointed out.

Chapter Four: Development profile gives the development context and background of Lesotho through a discussion of the physical and human environment of the country. In Chapter Five: Rural development policies and projects, a comprehensive documentation and critical discussion of rural development policies and projects in post-independence Lesotho is presented. Chapter Six discusses non-governmental organisations and rural development in Lesotho. Chapter Seven deals with the case study. It presents the historical profile of FISC/PTC. Chapter Eight presents fieldwork data and its analysis; while Chapter Nine summarises major findings and draws some conclusions.

CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT : SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

PART 1: DEVELOPMENT

2.1 The Concept of Development

Post World War II era ushered in a revolution in the perception and conceptualisation of the phenomenon of progress. While before then, social change was perceived as an evolutionary endogenous process; after World War II it came to be perceived as a revolutionary, externally inducible process that could be both speeded up in pace and shaped in form and outcome by man (Hewitt, 1992; Burkey, 1993; Norgaard, 1994). The concept development, came to be coined and used, especially by and in the newly formed post World War II international institution, the United Nations Organisation (UNO), to denote this newly born vision and perception of social change (Conyers and Hills, 1984).

Conceptualisation and practice of development spread rapidly in the late 1940s and the 1950s as a result of a number of factors, among some of which the following deserve special mention. The first reason relates to the experiences of Western Europe with the use of the Marshall Plan, a grandiose capital injection aid programme supplied in 1947 by the United States of America, for re-construction of war torn European economies (Dickenson et al., 1983). Successful application of the Marshall Plan to boost west European countries between 1947 and 1950 led to some hope that a similar application of external capital injection into the economies of poor countries of the World in Africa, Asia and Latin America, could similarly improve the economic performance and standard of living in these countries. The second reason has to do with the process of decolonisation. After World War II, countries which had been colonised before started to gain independence partly as a result of increased pressure for freedom exerted by nationalist movements within these countries themselves and in part as fulfilment of promises made by colonial countries in return for support in World War II by their colonies (Dickenson et al., 1983). Decolonisation assisted the spread of development thinking and practice in that the United Nations Organisation bound former colonial powers to provide capital and technical assistance to their newly independent former colonies until they had gone beyond teething problems of independence infancy. On their own part, the colonial countries used the development nexus with their ex-colonies as a strategy for continued access to economic and market resources they had forged during their colonial rule.

The third reason related to the Cold War. The political geography of the world after World War II showed a polarisation of space and societies into two major opposing ideological camps - the Western World based on capitalism on the one side vis-a-vis the Eastern World based on socialism on the other. Spatially, both of these modes of production and their various ideologies were initially concentrated in Europe, and actually had the continent divided into capitalist Western Europe vis-a-vis socialist Eastern Europe through the then famous Berlin Wall which was dismantled in 1989. The tug-of-war whereby competition of ideological and power control and influence in the world ensued between the west and east, rendered the newly independent countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, a potential political and economic madonna to be suited. And each, in their own different ways, showered countries in these continents with development gifts, loans and promises in kind. They were a prime stake in the cold war (Leys, 1996).

The fourth major reason was the formation of the United Nations Organisation as a successor to the League of Nations in 1945. Membership of nationalist movements from colonies enabled these movements not only to present the predicament of poverty in their countries, but also, to impress upon the international community, the urgency of support to alleviate the problems. On its part, the organisational structure of the UN along sectoral functional lines like the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO); the International Labour Organisation (ILO); and many others, provided information on the plight of the poor countries and assistance on behalf of the UN. Moreover, the UN through the United Nations Development programme (UNDP) insists on financial support to poverty alleviation in poor countries by rich countries worth an equivalent of 1% of their Gross National Product (GNP) annually (Reed, 1985).

All these UN activities have, in different ways, contributed to the spread of the concept and practice of development. The formation of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and that of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1944 at Brettenwoods also played an equally important role (Hewitt, 1992; Leys, 1996).

The fifth factor, relates to the rise of humanitarianism in the World. Modern technology after World War II has turned the World into a global village, so that information on the plight of poverty in poor countries has become more accessible to the World. Good Samaritans, operating either individually or as organised groups such as Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have greatly responded to requests for assistance by the needy and contributed significantly to

the spread and promotion of the concept and practice of development. However, more recently Cowen and Shenton (1996) have challenged the notion of the origin and history of development as a Post World War II phenomenon. They reason that development thinking and practices began before the 1850s in Europe during the Christianity era; became stronger during industrialisation in the middle of the 1800 in Europe, and only became a state induced agenda through "trusteeship" by the state after 1945.

2.2 The Meaning of development

The concept of development has been around for more than 40 years now. Yet its meaning has, throughout this time, remained unclear, ambiguous, controversial and changing from time to time. The following different definitions illustrate the controversial nature of what development means.

Goodall (1987 p. 123) defines development as "a process of becoming larger, more mature or better organised". Goodall goes on to add that "in an economic and social context, (development) is used to describe the state of nations and the historical processes of change experienced by them". He emphasises that, often, certain characteristics are used as indicators to measure levels of development.

Todaro (1989 p. 620) defines development as "the process of improving the quality of human lives". He further elaborates that there are three equally important aspects of development. The first aspect is raising people's living levels - incomes, consumptions and services through economic growth processes. The second aspect is creation of conducive conditions for fulfilment of peoples self-esteem through social, political, and economic systems and institutions that bestow human rights. The third aspect relates to assurance and provision of freedom of choice. Seers (1972) defines development as the reduction of poverty, unemployment and inequality. Conyers and Hills (1984 p. 22) argue that development can best be defined via an understanding of the verb 'develop' from which it is derived. They go on to say that develop means to change gradually, progressing through a number of stages towards some sort of state of expansion, improvement, or completeness or a state in which the subject's true identity is revealed. They further note that any definition of the concept "to develop" can be either in the transitive form, which means a self induced process, or intransitive form, which means a process induced from outside. This distinction is important in defining development especially for the Third World, because it implies that development can be defined through the spectacles of those that

experience it (endogenous) and/or it can be defined through the spectacles of those that are trying to bring about or induce development (exogenous).

The fore-going sample of different definitions of the concept of development indicate that there is a wide disagreement on the meaning of the concept. As Reed (1985 p. 21) observes:

“development is a very general concept; ask any three experts to say what they mean by ‘development’ and the likelihood is that you would be given three different definitions.”

It is now generally accepted in the literature on development that there is no single, all embracing and universally accepted definition of development (Seers, 1972; Haq, 1976; ESCAP, 1979; Fair, 1982; Webster, 1984; Reed, 1985; Sacks, 1992; Ingham, 1993; Galtung, 1993; Noorgard, 1994; Simpson, 1994). Yet, going through the maze of definitions provided in the literature, one observes and concludes that; first, development is both an end and the means. As an end, development is defined in terms of the many multifaceted and often contradictory objectives expected out of it such as economic growth and equity, for instance. As a means, development is defined as a process of creation of capacity and an enabling environment within which people can fulfil their expectations. Secondly, definitions of development are based on ideological premises and per definition emphasise different things as the ideologies upon which they are grounded. As a result of this, efforts to use development indicators like the GNP per capita, for example, to help shed better light on the meaning to the concept of development are equally fraught with various kinds of bias, inadequacies and controversies (Seers, 1972; Haq, 1976; Streeten, 1981; Chenery, 1994). The last, but equally important, observation is that these differences and controversies in the meaning of development have largely contributed to the emergence and diversity of development paradigms. Both Preston (1982, 1986) and Leys (1996) provide useful summaries of analyses of various theories and the history of development. More recently, debates on development centre on post-developmentalism which condemns the failure of post World War II strategies and policies. Post-developmentalism emphasizes the importance of resolution of human problems such as insecurity, health, starvation, poor shelter and unemployment as the core of what development should be about (Seethal, 1996)

2.3 Development Paradigms

Fair (1982) provides a useful grouping of development paradigms. Three major paradigms exist in the development literature, namely, Modernisation Paradigm, Dependency Paradigm and the Reformist Paradigm. Within each of these three paradigms exist a number of different theories with particular ideological and disciplinary orientations.

2.3.1 Modernisation paradigm

Johnston et al., (1994) define modernisation as "a process of social change resulting from the diffusion and adoption of the characteristics of expansive and apparently more advanced societies through societies which are apparently less advanced". Goodall (1987 pp 308-309) himself defines modernisation in a comprehensive manner as:

“a process of social change, relating economic growth to social structure, by which social systems evolve and become more complex. It involves both the application of science and technology to enhance productive efficiency, and changes in social structure and values necessary to support a more sophisticated organisation of production. As a temporal process it represents a spatial diffusion of the characteristics of the western (apparently more advanced) societies through less developed societies.”

Goodall's definition above, shows that there are at least three broad sets of theories within modernisation paradigm. These theories are economic theories, sociological theories and spatial theories of modernisation.

2.3.1.1 Economic Theories

Economic theories of modernisation are often called economic growth theories of development because they emphasise the importance of achievement of high economic growth rates as the ultimate goal of development itself (ESCAP, 1979; Reed, 1985; Fair, 1982; Todaro, 1989; Haq, 1976). A number of economic growth theories were formulated and propagated in the early 1950s and 1960s. However, the most notable in economic development theory and practice have been those, by first, Harrod and Domar generally referred to as the Harrod-Domar Growth Model (Todaro, 1989). This model is used to estimate capital/output ratios in economies and is therefore useful in the estimation of necessary annual growth rates of economies and the process of capital formation in development. Todaro (1989 p.66) argues that the Harrod-Domar theory of economic

growth "states simply that the rate of growth of GNP ... is determined jointly by the national savings ratio - and the national capital/output ratio ... more specifically, it says that the growth rate of national income will be directly or "positively" related to the savings ratio (i.e., the more an economy is able to save and invest out of a given GNP, the greater will be the growth of that GNP) and inversely or "negatively" related to the economy's capital/output ratio"

The Harrod-Domar Theory has been widely used as a theoretical diagnosis of lack of development in the Third World and a source of wisdom from which development policy and strategies have been devised to improve development in the Third World. In general, according to this theory, lack of development in the Third World is caused by low savings from GNP, that do not enable investment high enough to increase output and growth of national income. This capital shortage has left Third World countries in a low equilibrium trap characterised by a vicious circle of poverty in the Third World (Dickenson et al., 1983; Reed, 1985; Agrawal & Hal, 1989; Todaro, 1989). Development policy recommended the diffusion of capital from outside (western world) into Third World economies to boost up savings (foreign financial assistance) and diffusion of technologies through foreign investment. This would improve output and eventual growth in these economies and bring about modernisation in the Third World. The high traffic in the business of foreign development assistance to the Third World today is largely theoretically justified on the Harrod-Domar theory. However, the Harrod-Domar theory and its recipe of foreign aid as a viable strategy to promote Third World development have been strongly attacked, particularly from the political economy paradigm, as being responsible for the creation and maintenance of exploitation and dependency nexus. (See debates on foreign aid and development in Dickenson et al., 1983; Webster, 1984; Riddel, 1987; Todaro, 1989).

The second most influential economic growth theory of development has been that by Arthur Lewis (1954) generally referred to as the Lewis two-sector model of development. The central thrust of this theory is that Third World countries proceed from traditional subsistence agriculture to modern industrial economies in their process of transition to development. According to this model, traditional agriculture is inefficient because it is characterised by too much labour with a low productivity - surplus labour. The industrial sector on the other hand has high productivity despite a labour shortage. The high productivity in industry enables capital accumulation and growth of the economy. Therefore, in order to achieve economic growth countries must transfer the surplus labour out of rural agricultural sector into the urban-industrial sector, where it will assist in increasing productivity levels and therefore growth of the economy - what he calls

economic development with unlimited labour supplies. In the 1950's and 1960's Lewis's model was adopted by development economists to promote the policy of industrialisation as the engine for development in the Third World, and, specific development strategies such as import substitution industrialisation (ISI) were developed and vigorously pursued in the Third World. Lewis's two sector model has not been supported by empirical evidence over the years in the Third World. First, import substitution industrialisation strategies have become a dismal failure. In reality, the ISI has caused more problems of development to the Third World. It has led to a relative neglect of agriculture in development policy design and resource allocation and consequent food shortages. The ISI encouraged an exodus of rural-urban migration that has complicated urban employment, service provision and created labour shortage in agriculture. The ISI contributed to escalation of balance of payments problems as the limited foreign exchange had to be used to purchase equipment and spare parts for machinery used by the industries (Mountjoy, 1963; Lipton, 1977; Mabogunje, 1980; Dickenson et al., 1983; Webster, 1984; Todaro, 1989).

The third most influential economic growth theory of development is that developed by Walter Rostow (1960) generally referred to as the stages of economic growth theory. Rostow's Theory argues that development is a process that occurs in five stages of traditional stage, the transitional stage, the take-off, drive to maturity and high mass consumption, one after the other.

His basic argument is that at the traditional stage, society is essentially undeveloped. However through various socio-economic, political and technological changes, a process of gradual evolutionary transition to modernity is set into motion, and eventually, at high mass consumption, society is developed. Key requirements in the process of transition, according to this theory, are levels of savings and investment that must be at between 10 and 15 percent of GNP (an element obviously linked to Harrod-Domar theory). Failure to achieve domestic savings of this level needs to be supplemented by external stimuli (some reference to and condonment of foreign aid). There must also be an economic shift from agriculture to industry as the dominant sector in employment generation and general contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Development of modern infrastructure is also essential to facilitate diffusion of ideas and resources from the urban-industrial sector to the rural-agriculture sector. These key elements fuel the transition process and each country gradually experiences development by going through each of them. The idea of development as a phased process has been used by other economists such as Adelman (1977) in her theory of re-distribution before growth, despite heavy criticism

levelled at Rostow's theory for being too simplistic in likening the process of development to an aeroplane revving, taxiing along the runway, taking off, finding course and cruising airborne. Moreover, the theory assumes that development is a unilinear process followed and replicated similarly by all countries of the World. It ignores the differential, concrete material conditions in space and time. Therefore models of development and experiences of Western countries cannot be replicated directly by the Third World (Fair, 1982; Todaro, 1989).

In general, one can conclude that economic growth theories place emphasis on growth as the most important objective in development.

In order to achieve this growth the traditional subsistence sector has to be changed and transformed through diffusion of capital, skills, technology and know-how to become modern-market oriented. Economic growth is thus made synonymous with development. However, views from alternative theories, argue that economic growth often leads to underdevelopment rather than development per se. Therefore development is more than economic growth (Amin, 1973).

2.3.1.2 Sociological Modernisation Theory

Long (1977) and Webster (1984) contend that, in its sociological sense, Modernisation Theory started from the classic works of Emile Durkheim on the question the division of labour in society and that of Max Weber trying to explain the emergence of industrialisation and conditions necessary for its sustenance. Webster (1984) notes that:

In their different ways Durkheim and Weber have provided many of the basic themes of present day Modernisation Theory in particular their contrast between traditional and modern societies. Each conceives of this contrast in different terms yet this has not discouraged today's social scientists from attempting to combine Durkheim's and Weber's notions into a grand theory of development that incorporates an analysis of changing normative systems, differentiation, rationalisation, business motivation and individual ambition.

Other important contributions to Modernisation Theory come from Talcott Parsons (1951); McLelland (1961); Hagen (1962) and Lerner (1964).

All the above sociologists have, in different ways, contributed to the development of Modernisation Theory which, in a sociological manner, is based on pattern variables whose

performance differs in traditional societies and modern societies. The first variable considered is norms and values in society. It is argued that in traditional society norms and values are particularistic, meaning they are inward-looking, and based on preferences of the local group. In modern society they are universal meaning they are outward looking and based on a world-wide perception, interest and knowledge. Universalism allows for adoption of innovations and technologies developed elsewhere outside the immediate social group that help develop that group; while particularism promotes a closed society that frowns on innovations and alternative ways of doing things as long as they do not come from within that social group. Therefore particularism retards development. A proposed solution is that to promote development of traditional society particularism must be abolished and universalism diffused in its place (Webster, 1984).

A second pattern variable discussed in modernisation theory is that of roles played by individuals. In traditional society the division of labour is such that one person performs many roles and/or functions and therefore fails to develop functional specialisation necessary for efficiency of production. While in modern society a person specialises in one role and/or function, thereby, developing a high level of specialisation necessary for efficiency of production. In order to promote development, traditional society people must be made to perform specific functions, so that they can develop functional specialisation, increase efficiency of production and achieve overall growth (Webster, 1984).

The third pattern variable is the reward system. In traditional society reward is based on ascription, meaning on the social status or stratum that people are born into. This discourages and depresses motivation and the need to achieve (N-Achievement drive) among people because upward social mobility is very limited. In contrast, in modern society reward is based on achievement by individuals, as a result people strive to become successful so that they can achieve better social status. Motivation and N-achievement drive are high. As each individual strives to better themselves, combined, cumulative efforts lead to development of world society. Again, ascription has to be abolished and achievement diffused into its place as the basis of reward and pre-condition for development of traditional society.

The fourth pattern variable is what Lerner (1964) calls empathy, meaning, the ability to think positively and constructively under new and rapidly changing circumstances. Lerner (1964) in particular, argues that in traditional society, this ability is low because society is relatively closed

and prescriptive. This low empathy retards what Hagen (1962) refers to as entrepreneurial capability in traditional societies and promotes general social stagnation. By contrast, in modern society there is high empathy because society is open and permissive. This allows people to experiment in various ways and undertake risks in many ways as they wish. This innovative thinking promotes not only new positive ways of doing things, but also the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs necessary to undertake the accompanying risks to forge a way forward. Again, traditional societies have to be modernised through inculcating empathy and entrepreneurial spirit so as to promote their development (Webster, 1984).

There has been a wide application of sociological Modernisation Theory in development theory and practice. This theory has been widely used to design Community Development, policies, programmes and projects especially in the Third World, whose main objective has been to modernise the traditional rural sector so that social conditions can be conducive to development. Despite its wide use in development theory and practice, Modernisation Theory has, however, received scathing criticism in development discourse. The classic critique of modernisation theory was launched by Andre Gunder Frank (1969) where he accused it of sociological determinism, Eurocentric ignorance of political economy and a history with respect to the Third World material conditions. Other criticisms can be found in Long (1977); Roxborough (1979) and Webster, (1984); Preston, (1986) among others.

2.3.1.3 Geographic theories of Modernisation

Spatial theories of development were started by economists rather than geographers per se. Pioneer work was done by both Gunnar Myrdal (1957) and Albert Hirschman (1958). Myrdal (1957) argues that development is a process that involves interaction among areas. In this process of spatial interaction, exchange of resources takes place and this exchange of resources leads to accumulation of gain or growth in some areas involved - spread effects; and simultaneously causes deprivation in other areas involved in the interaction - backwash effects. This creates a situation of spatial inequality at the beginning, with poorer areas getting backwash effects because they pick up resource combinations more slowly; while the richer areas are able to combine resources more quickly and therefore enjoy spread effects quickly. Myrdal, however, contends that after some time as resources filter through into the lagging areas they too will eventually catch up and develop as a result of multiplier effects. Closely related to Myrdal's conceptualisation is that of Hirschman (1958) who argues that development is essentially a process of unequal starts premised on inequality - unbalanced growth theory. He argues that this

is so because areas are not the same (areal/spatial differentiation) in terms of resource endowments. In the process of development rich areas become richer because they can take maximum advantage of both backward linkages - which means inputs, and forward linkages - which means markets and distribution of commodities. By contrast, poor areas are less able to take advantage of both forward and backward linkages and thus initially lag behind in development. However, as development occurs, a gradual process of trickle down effects occurs whereby development benefits from advanced areas are automatically extended to backward areas that become modernised in the process. Both Myrdal and Hirschman have been criticized that both their spread effects and trickle-down ideas do not occur automatically in real life. Once a place becomes developed, there is a tendency that this process assumes a snow-ball effect and concentrates exclusively there; what is referred to, ironically, as the trickle up process. Instead, deliberate effort is needed on the part of development planners to intervene through regional planning to induce trickle down effects to avoid polarised growth. The early 1960s saw the emergence of Geography of Modernisation as part of the then on-going revolution in Geography (Taaffe et al. 1963; Haggerstrand, 1967; Soja, 1968).

The central thrust of Geography of modernisation is to identify modernisation variables, their places of origin, the process and rates by which they diffuse to backward, lagging areas - innovation diffusion - until a situation of spatial equilibrium with respect to the diffused variables is attained. Sometimes problems that thwart or delay innovation diffusion - diffusion barriers are identified and solutions suggested. Thus for example, Taaffe *et al.* (1963) concentrate on the physical infrastructure variables especially transport to explain modernisation process in the Third World. Soja (1968) concentrates on social variables to discuss modernisation in Kenya, East Africa; while Haggerstrand (1967) concentrates on agricultural innovation diffusion in West Germany. Towards the late 1960s and the 1970s Geography of Modernisation came under heavy criticism, more especially from Marxist radical geographers of the Antipode school - named after the radical geography journal Antipode from Clark University. Use of area-based development approaches and extension service in development, rely heavily on Geography of Modernisation. Radical geographers blamed Geography of modernisation for being empirical and descriptive instead of analytic. They argued that it was pre-occupied with mathematical modelling and projections which critics regarded as idealism, rather than development of sound theoretical frameworks within which to situate geographic research and analysis. Moreover, it is argued that Geography of Modernisation is Eurocentric in that modernising variables considered innovations

for diffusion are often ideas, techniques and technologies from Europe. Lastly, it is also accused of lacking adequate appreciation of the political economy of development and change (Cannon, 1975; Williams, 1977; Dattoo & Gray, 1979; Blaut, 1987). The notion of polarised development in the 1960s largely contributed to the emergence of Regional Development Planning (Friedman & Weaver, 1979).

Three concepts emerged in regional development planning that are of relevance to development theory and practice. These are Growth Pole, Core-Periphery, and Growth Centres. The Growth Pole concept was started in the 1950s by Peroux in France to refer to a tendency for industries to locate together in clusters due to economies of scale instead of spreading themselves evenly in space (Friedman & Weaver, 1979). This idea of Growth Pole came to be used to refer to the general tendency of development to favour and concentrate itself in some locations and create islands or pockets of development in the midst of deprivation. Largely influenced by the ideas of automatic trickle down effects propagated by Hirschman (1958) regional development planners encouraged policies based on deliberate identification, selection and concentration of resources in some areas with high development potential as growth poles using promotion of propulsive industries with the hope that once developed, increased demand for raw materials to use as inputs into production and markets to sell finished products from these industries, would force them to reach out to the lagging areas and in the process help induce development there (Friedman & Alonso, 1964; Friedman, 1966; Johnson, 1970; Hilhorst, 1971).

A closely associated concept to growth poles is growth centres which tend to emphasise the importance of urbanisation in development. Growth centre theory advocates that creation of small towns especially in rural areas is an engine for rural development because it is through these small towns that diffusion of innovation to modernise the countryside can best be done. Goodall (1987) argues that growth centre is based on an urban-industrial complex which experiences spontaneous and sustained growth that also influences the economic fortunes of surrounding areas. It consists of one or more urban areas which, together, provide or are likely to provide a range of cultural, social, employment, trade, and service functions for itself and associated hinterlands.

Both growth pole and growth centre theories and strategies have been heavily criticised. First, they are condemned as being conceptually bankrupt, in the sense that the concepts of growth pole and growth centre are used synonymously to refer to large urban centres and small towns in rural

areas. Secondly, it is often not clear what indicators are to be used to measure what development has been diffused into hinterlands. Thirdly, there is no specified time-frame within which the diffusion is to take place in order to reach its expected maximum level to promote development. Fourthly, the roles of stakeholders and actors in the process are not defined, for example, what is the role of the state? What are the roles of entrepreneurs and industrialists? What is the role of the consumers of the services? What is the continued role of the planners themselves? Lack of clarity on these roles by stakeholders has often led planners to implant a growth centre and quit without making adequate arrangements for its sustainable operation. Many have collapsed soon after construction as a result. Fifthly, contrary to promotion of development, growth centres have been accused of acting as nexus through which core regions and central government are able to exploit the countryside more (for debates on growth poles and centres see Appalaraju & Safier, 1976; ESCAP, 1979; Friedman & Weaver, 1979; Van Staven & Van Desselorp, 1980; Stohr & Taylor, 1981; Johnston *et al.* 1994).

The demise of growth centre theory and policies, coupled with notions of basic needs approach to development prompted Friedman & Weaver (1979) to formulate what they call Agropolitan Development Strategy which they argue is suitable for the Third World especially Asia and Africa. The objective of agro-politan strategy is to promote rural development in the Third World through provision of basic needs to the poor regions. This, they argue has the potential to minimise core-periphery relations of production and their similar spatial imprint. Basic pre-conditions for this strategy are: i) Selective territorial enclosure which they argue lessens dependence on the outside and promotes self-reliance within the region, to minimise exploitation. ii) It needs Communalisation of productive wealth, so that equalisation of access to basic resources can be achieved. This avoids unequal starts by stake holders in the development process and promotes a sense of community among the beneficiaries of development. iii) It requires equalisation of access to the bases for the accumulation of social power (p.195). Again agro-politan strategies have been used as recipes for rural development in Third World countries. There are however, some problems related to them. First, agro-politan strategies, like growth centres, still rely heavily on artificial infusion of small towns into rural structures. A mismatch arises as a result of failure to get these urban centres integrated into the productive structure of the areas concerned. Linkage effects defy artificial infusion of towns. Secondly, the strategy is based on conceptualism, idealism and utopia. For instance, all the three pre-conditions for its successful implementation are at best myopic. First, how does one practice selective territorial

enclosure, in the era of globalisation where the world is so integrated that it is but a global village? Secondly, how does one achieve communalisation of productive wealth within the framework of capitalist production and society premised essentially on inequality of access to productive wealth and class differentiation and struggles? Thirdly, how does one achieve equalisation of access to the bases of social power under capitalism? Good pointers are that efforts to achieve this through decentralisation only, actually manage to enable central authority to have more socio-political grip and power dominance over the disadvantaged people and regions (Gore, 1984; Fergusson, 1990; Setsabi, 1998). As Gore (1984) argues, agro-politan development theory and strategy can at best be dismissed as neo-populist because of its romantic idealist appeal to the feeling of community, and community action as though it were a homogeneous entity; whereas in reality community is heterogeneous and differentiated and as such members have divergent and often conflicting and competitive interests. The various theories discussed under the Modernisation paradigm, have profound implications for rural development theories, policies and strategies.

First, economic growth theories have introduced the notion of growth as key in development. In rural development, this has encouraged adoption of Green Revolution approaches typified by capital intensive methods of production and technology, whose aim is to achieve very high output levels and rural economic growth. Where capital is not available for investment due to the nearly non-existent savings by rural populations, in the Third World, condonement of foreign aid by economic growth theories has encouraged donor driven rural development in the Third World (Shepherd, 1998).

Secondly, sociological modernisation theory, which emphasises eradication of the traditional society and its replacement by modern society has influenced community development approaches to rural development in the Third World. Moreover, the bulk of extension work in various sectors such as agriculture, health, nutrition in rural areas heavily depend on adequate understanding of sociological modernisation theory (Long, 1977).

Thirdly, geography of modernisation has aided understanding of innovation diffusion processes and mechanisms for speeding up innovation diffusion. This has become helpful in rural development in the design of extension strategies to introduce new crops, animal, food varieties and so on and in the design of strategies to eliminate barriers to these various innovations being diffused (Haggestrand, 1967).

Fourthly, polarised development and the associated growth pole/centre strategies have put industrialization, urbanisation and services in the fore front of development, and have therefore influenced introduction of urban-industrial led rural development strategies in the Third World. A variant of this approach, agro-politan strategy, has added a decentralisation dimension that involves not only de-concentration of activities but also delegation, and hopefully devolution, of power to accompany urban-industrial and basic needs oriented rural development strategies (Friedman and Weaver, 1979).

2.3.2 Dependency Paradigm

In the late 1960s, dissatisfaction with the performance of development policies and strategies espoused in the Third World in line with the specifications of modernisation paradigm, led to efforts to seek alternative bodies of knowledge to provide explanation of (under)-development. This alternative was to be found in Marxist theory of social change. Neo-Marxist theories of under-development proliferated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. However all emphasise in one way or the other, dependency of the Third World on the industrialised countries as a central theme.

2.3.2.1 Dependency Theory

This theory is associated with the work of many economists (Laclau, 1971; Dos Santos, 1973; Amin, 1976; Cardoso, 1979). However, it originated in the work of Andre-Gunder Frank (1967). In general, Frank argues that the world is composed of a network of metropolis-satellite relationships at the international, national and local levels. The metropolis act as spatial points of development with concentration of capital, technology, know-how and power and use these to dominate the satellites and turn them into a position of servitude, dependent on and ministering to the needs of the metropolis at their own expense. Frank uses historical evidence drawn largely from Latin America to argue that Europe imposed a specific kind of export-led production in the Third World during the Mercantile and Colonial periods. This export led production of raw materials for European industrialisation created a situation of dependency of the Third World on Europe for markets and prices of the commodities which has always been to their dis-benefit. The dependent production has been maintained and promoted in the post-colonial period through incorporation of the ruling class in the Third World as comprador elements of metropolitan bourgeoisie. It is through this comprador bourgeoisie in the Third World that the metropole - Europe and America - is able to extract surplus - by exploiting the masses in the Third World. The metropole - satellite relationship promotes selective production, so that the Third World

produces commodities required by the Metropole instead of local people. This undermines self-sufficiency and reliance in the Third World. Emmanuel (1972) added the dimension of unequal exchange to show that under pricing of the commodities in the international markets also creates the necessity to do super-exploitation of Third World resources. Samir Amin (1972) and Wallerstein (1976) discuss the various phases and mechanism through which Africa, for instance, was incorporated in the World Capitalist System and exploited during colonialism. Amin (1972) divides Africa into three blocks to show the kind of economic processes by which Europe exploited them. He refers to West Africa as the Africa of colonial trade economy, East Africa as the Africa of the concession owning companies and southern Africa as the Africa of labour reserves. Rodney (1972) also discusses at length how Europe underdeveloped Africa.

A general development strategy suggested to solve the problem is that, since underdevelopment is caused by the links between the Third World and the developed countries, then the solution lies in delinking from it. Moreover, revolutions should be done to do away with the comprador bourgeoisie through whom exploitation occurs and put a socialist state in place. Lastly, internal self reliance must be forged to promote endogenous development (Frank, 1967; Webster, 1984; Forbes, 1984).

Dependency is heavily criticised for being impracticable in the Third World. First, how do Third World countries de-link from the international capitalist system without loosing stability because they have been part of it for centuries? Experiments at de-linking by countries like Tanzania, for instance, show that de-linking is far from easy and is at best disastrous for development. Secondly, the fact that revolutions have to be instituted to overthrow the comprador bourgeoisie and replace it with socialist states is politically disastrous. The important question is whose revolution will this be? In theory it is assumed that it will be the people's revolution, however, reality shows that it is often a bourgeois revolution that does not create any significant change in the exploitation of the masses. Again Tanzania and Zimbabwe, are handy examples. Thirdly, endogenous self-reliance advocates attempting to practise a closed economy; how feasible is this in today's world? Lastly, dependency puts all the blame of Third World underdevelopment on external factors. What contribution has been made by internal factors to Third World countries to promote their own under development? (for debates on and critique of dependency see O'Brien, 1975; Long, 1977; Leys, 1977; Roxborough, 1979; Browett, 1984; Webster, 1984; Corbridge, 1986; Todaro, 1989; Amin, 1994).

2.3.2.2 Articulation of Modes of production

The articulation of modes of production theory has arisen as a response to the weaknesses of dependency theory. The articulation school recognises what it calls pre-capitalist mode of production. In its conception development consists of a progression of society from being pre-capitalist, capitalist and socialist which signifies development in its view. In a literal sense, the process of development consists of gradual subsumption or conversion of pre-capitalist mode of production by/into capitalist mode; and over yet another time, subsumption of capitalist mode by the socialist mode - a supposedly most superior mode of production equated to high development. This transition is, however, blocked in the case of the Third World, by the specific nature in which capitalism takes place there, which creates a partial subsumption and partial retention of pre-capitalist modes at the same time. The pre-capitalist mode retards the development of productive forces by the capitalist mode (Long, 1977). Therefore, underdevelopment is a consequence. Thus Goodman and Redclift (1981 p. 54) write of the articulation school as follow:

“In this view, peripheral social formations are constituted by the articulated combination of the dominant capitalist mode of production and surbordinate, non-capitalist modes of production. The persistence of these modes in articulation with capitalism ‘blocks’ the expansion of capitalist production relations and full development of the productive forces again is impaired.”

Further elaboration with the articulation school, has gone on to argue that the capitalist mode of production deliberately maintains some elements of pre-capitalist modes in order to ease the latter's exploitation by the former. Wolpe (1972) for instance, has argued that in former Apartheid South Africa the pre-capitalist modes of production were maintained through creation of Bantustans as labour dormitories to ease exploitation of the labour in urban-industrial-cum-mining production. The costs of production and reproduction of the black labour were borne by Bantustans and satellite independent states in the region while the capitalist white core regions enjoyed fruits of this labour cheaply through use of oscillating migrant labour system (Wolpe, 1972).

The articulation school has been criticised for being as linear in its conception of development as the modernisation paradigm. Secondly, it has been accused of dualist conception of development in the Third World because it positions pre-capitalist mode against capitalist mode and argues

that the capitalist mode - just like traditional society in modernisation theory - inhibits the capitalist mode - like the modern sector in modernisation theory - to develop productive resources fully for development (for debates on the articulation school and its critique see Long, 1977; Goodman and Redclift, 1981; Forbes, 1984; Booth, 1985).

More generally, the dependency paradigm as a whole, is criticised for being oppositional, deterministic, spatially over-aggregationist and epistemologically confrontational, meaning they oppose every other explanation that is not Marxist. To them, Marxism (neo) is the Bible; they dump and draw conclusions of all world countries on two simple groupings, core and periphery; they also dismiss empiricism (Corbridge, 1986).

2.3.2.3 Dependency Paradigm : Implications for Rural Development

The dependency paradigm as a whole is very shallow on practical policies and strategies to be implemented to bring about development in the Third World. Its arguments are abstract, theoretical and melodious for and to the academic; but for the development practitioner they are dry, rhetorical and empty of policy action (Fair, 1982).

However, the dependency paradigm must be applauded for sensitising development theorists, policy makers, planners and perhaps the masses, to the political economy of development and underdevelopment. Particular issues of relevance to rural development in the Third World are, among others, first, the political economy of all forms of foreign assistance to rural development - capital, technology, manpower, and techniques of production. Secondly, the role of policy makers and planners in rural development has increasingly come under scrutiny as a result of dependency paradigm. Thirdly, the question of who actually benefits from rural development policies and projects and why, is of utmost importance in the evaluation of the success of rural development today (Long, 1977).

2.3.3 The Reformist Paradigm

The failures of modernisation paradigm through its capitalist economic growth oriented policies to bring about development in the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s; and the utterances from the neo-Marxist dependency paradigm urging for socialist revolutions to overthrow governments and install socialism as an alternative route to development, led to the birth of the reformist paradigm (Fair, 1982).

In the early 1970s efforts were made within the capitalist framework of modernization paradigm to modify the over emphasis on growth and introduce two elements borrowed from the socialist model, namely, the increased involvement of the state in development, and that of increased access to the benefits of development by the majority of people. State intervention and re-distribution of growth therefore came to be given great priority in development theory policies and strategies. Pioneer work was initiated by a group of economists working under the auspices of the World Bank under the chairmanship of Professor Chenery which culminated in 1974 in the publication of the book Redistribution with growth. The basic message contained in the theme redistribution with growth is that growth of the economy is important for generation of wealth in a country, but it should be accompanied by some equitable distribution of this wealth to the majority of people, in order for development to be achieved. This raised questions of practical strategies to ensure the re-distribution.

2.3.3.1 Basic Human Needs Approach

The Basic Human Needs approach arose as a strategy to bring into implementation the re-distribution of income to the majority of people so that they too can enjoy the fruits of development. The key question which is also a problem - in Basic Needs approach is what exactly are Basic Human Needs? This question became a big issue in the United Nations organisation (UN) and a study had to be commissioned to look into it and make recommendations accordingly. Streeten (1981) did much work on this question of Basic Needs and raised the fundamental issue to be, who determines whose basic needs? The concept of Basic Needs was made operational by selecting the most basic entitlements in life. These are Food, Shelter and Clothing. However, increasing pressure in the UN for recognition of various human rights has led to a proliferation of items or entitlements under Basic Needs to include availability and access to various kinds of physical/material and social/non-material services like clean drinking water, sanitation, education, health, employment and to various kinds of freedoms - speech, choice, thought, belief and so forth (for more discussions of Basic Needs see ILO, 1976; Sen, 1983; Hopkins and Van der Hoeven, 1983; Ghosh, 1984; Ingham, 1993).

Basic Needs approach is broadly used in development planning and strategies today to ensure that peoples entitlements (Sen, 1983) are available. Today, success of development policies is measured by, among other indices, the extent to which the policies have assisted the poor beneficiaries to meet their basic needs. The Basic Needs Approach does, however, pose some problems. The first problem is that of definition - what is Basic Needs? Choice of basic needs

differs from one person to the other and one society to the other, therefore priorities often pose problems in the design of basic needs oriented projects. The second problem relates to the notion of entitlements embodied in Basic Needs approach. Not all these entitlements may be provided due to resource limitations. Often choice and prioritisation have to be made. Getting people round to making these priorities involves compromises that pose problems in the design and implementation of projects. To avoid development planners and agencies making choices for people, it becomes essential that efforts be made to involve the people to make their own choices and priorities through needs assessments and participation.

2.3.3.2 Participatory development

Participatory development started in the 1960s and 1970s largely as a response to involve people in development to neutralise the temptation of them revolting against governments as encouraged by the dependency paradigm. Moreover, participatory development was meant to minimise the failure of economic growth oriented development strategies of that time by giving them a human face and making it people-centred (Conyers and Hills, 1984; Mathur, 1986; Burkey, 1993; Ingham, 1993). The central thesis of participatory development is that people must come first in development because they are the object that is to be developed. Therefore concern about their felt needs must be given priority in development. In its later formulation, participatory development has changed from viewing people as objects to be developed to arguing that they are actually both subjects and objects of development. This means people have to be empowered to make their own decisions, policies, strategies and programmes to better themselves. Viewed in this light, participatory development involves notions of decentralisation and self reliance as practical strategies to implement it on the ground. In development theory and practice a lot has been written and done on decentralisation and self-reliance. Equally, a lot of questions have remained unanswered in the process. First, the definitions of participation, decentralisation and self-reliance remain ambiguous. As such efforts to operationalise these concepts in development practice have left room open for anybody to use them to suit their purpose, for instance, many governments in the Third World today have embarked in privatisation of public assets under IMF structural adjustment policies. These governments argue that through privatisation, they actually promote people's participation in development; and yet privatisation leads to marginalisation of the masses from development and promotes poverty as can be witnessed in civil unrest prevalent in Zimbabwe currently.

Decentralisation has remained a development rhetoric than reality for the masses. Instead of empowerment through devolution, de-concentration of services and administrative delegation have been prided as decentralisation by many third world countries. At its worst, this kind of decentralisation has been used as a strategy to enable central government get a closer grip on the masses. At best, participatory development has remained more of a populist development slogan than a viable development strategy.

2.3.3.3 Interdependent development

Goodall (1987) defines interdependence as "a term used to describe the mutually interlocking relations of economy and society". Within the framework of development, interdependent development means the interconnectedness and mutual dependence of world economies and societies (Brookfield, 1975). The notion of Interdependent Development arose as a response to the challenge posed by the dependency paradigm to the effect that in order to develop, Third World countries need to de link themselves off the world capitalist system. Interdependent development challenges the feasibility of this recipe by arguing that the world capitalist system is composed of member countries who are structurally dependent on one another. There is an implicit denial that the relationships among countries of the World are asymmetrical; rather, it is contended that there exists symbiosis. It is, however, accepted that the symbiotic relationship needs to be strengthened through the creation of the New International Economic order in which the Third World countries can have increased participation in international decision making on issues such as setting prices for commodities in the international markets. Formation of regional economic blocks was encouraged as a useful strategy to promote mutual benefits in the exchange of resources and improvement of trade relations through collective self-reliance. However, the rhetoric interdependent development blew in the face of its promoters in the mid-to late 1970s when the industrial countries embarked on diversification of their development technology to reduce their dependence on oil from the oil producing and exporting countries (OPEC) which had raised prices of oil in 1974. The OPEC is now stuck with its oil, because industrialised countries, their market, have switched to energy substitutes like nuclear power.

The notion of interdependent development was raised again towards the end of the 1970s and early 1980s by the Brandt Commission report (1980) that tried to promote the idea of a North-South Dialogue, calling it a programme for survival of the two worlds. The Brandt commission, however, only re-emphasized the ideas of interdependence which the North had so clearly demonstrated, in its boycott of oil, was non-existent. Its message made no significant impact in

development discourse (see Jepma, 1988; The South Centre, 1993). Moreover, the unveiling international economic scenario negated the idea of interdependence, for example, in the 1980s America under Ronald Reagan, adopted Protectionism especially against goods and services from Japan, a situation that led to the use of the slang concept of Reaganomics. Adoption of similar protectionist economic policies by Britain under Margaret Thatcher against even other European countries and joining the European Union by Britain led to use of the slang concept of Thatcherism.

2.3.3.4 Eco-development

The early 1970s witnessed emerging awareness in development theory and practise that linked development to the environment. The Club of Rome sponsored a research programme to investigate the state of the world natural resources, population and prospects for increased economic growth. Meadows (1972) and his colleagues published their findings and recommendation in what came to be known as the Limits to Growth theory. The basic message herein was that economic growth strategies followed in 1950s and 1960s and strained the world stock of natural resources especially, the non-renewable ones. It further argues that the world had to cut down on its consumption rates, modify its technology to reduce pollution, reduce industrialisation which consumed natural resources as inputs and raw materials into production and reduce population growth to lower demand for utilisation of natural resources. In essence this theory argues for zero growth. A number of independent studies emerged at that time such as that by Riddel (1981) that connected development to the ecosystem and echoed the sentiments of the Limits to Growth theory. The United Nations also joined chorus and hosted, under Swedish funding, the international conference on the Human environment in Stockholm in 1972, where the sentiments of Limits to Growth were endorsed and formally adopted in the UN as part of the development agenda. Since 1972 there has been much talk of environment in development discourse. Institutions such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) based in Nairobi, Kenya have been formed and funded to assist countries of the World formulate environmentally friendly development policies and strategies.

Despite its appeal, the limits to growth was not implemented by both developed and developing countries alike precisely because the zero growth it advocated had serious implications. In western countries they were that countries must stop to develop because they were essentially overdeveloped already. The political economy of development in the developed countries could not allow this to happen because it implied a cut in over consumption their people are used to,

and also a direct loss of power. On their part, developing countries were faced with the implication that they must stop to develop even before they had started any development at all.

2.3.3.5 Sustainable development

Failure to implement the limits to growth strategy prompted the limited United Nations Organisation to establish the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in the mid-1980's to question and propose how best the world could be re-sensitised to heed the environment in their development efforts. The report of this commission came out in 1987 - Brundtland (1987): Our Common Future. The basic message of our common future is to create what Sachs (1992b) calls "Global Ecocracy" by advocating one development strategy, sustainable development. Sustainable development is defined as development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Svedin, 1988, p.7). The essence of sustainable development is that it calls for caution to ensure that development activities do not harm the environment. Critical strategies to implement sustainable development are reduction of population growth in order to reduce pressure on resources; check on technology used to reduce its side effects, such as pollution, on the environment; reduction of consumption rates of resources and introduction of positive consumption through replacement of resources utilized and recycling process; elimination of mass poverty through re-orientation of the objective of development away from economic growth towards satisfaction of basic needs and increased participation in decision making at all spatial levels by the majority of the population.

Since 1987, much has been said and written about the "greening of development" (see for example Simmons, 1990; Harrison, 1987; Conroy and Litvinoff, 1988; Agarwal & Narain, 1989; Pearce et al., 1990). The fire of sustainable development was rekindled in 1992 in the Rio summit where countries of the world reviewed their performances in its implementation, and signed Agenda 21 as the guiding document pointing the way forward.

One must accept that sustainable development has sensitised policy makers to the importance of environment in development. This is borne by the many National Environmental Action Plans and National Conservation strategies presented to the Rio summit in 1992. It is, however, not clear whether the ordinary person - entrepreneur, investor, industrialist, farmer and so on - has actually come to be that part of the realisation as perhaps their governments may seem to be. The reason for this doubt is that sustainable development as a strategy is fraught with problems. The

first problem is that of definition. What exactly is meant by sustainable development? A look at the definition provided by the Commission shows that it is vague and ambiguous. Sustainability is conceived differently by different people depending on their interests and class position. The second problem, is that of implementation, how are we to measure sustainability, with what indicators? Different people emphasise indicators of sustainability to suit their interests. There is a need for an integrated framework of indicators of sustainability. Thirdly, there is divergence in terms of actual strategies to be used to ensure sustainability. For instance, the United States of America refused to sign the Forestry Treaty of Agenda 21 in Rio despite the fact that everyone had signed.

Fourthly, sustainability is practised and judged within the socio-cultural, economic, environmental and political framework of different societies and groupings throughout the world, it is therefore a very open-ended development strategy (for more discussion and critique of sustainable development see Tesdell, 1988; Redclift, 1984; Svedin, 1988; Ingham, 1993; Sachs, 1992b). Detailed discussion of sustainable development is provided in section 2.11 of this chapter.

2.3.3.6 Another Development

In the early 1970's new areas of development thinking came to be based on the concept of "Another Development", which is also sometimes called "Alternative Development" (Hettne, 1982; Friedmann, 1992; Burkey, 1993). This view originated from the Cocoyoc Declaration of 1974 and was popularised by the Dag Hammerskjold Foundation in its report What Now: Another Development (1975). The basis of Another Development is that policies derived from former conventional theories based on growth and Neo-Marxism have failed to bring about Third World development. Therefore, it is time that alternative theories and policies were sought and implemented. The new policy areas are self-reliance, women led development/gender sensitive development, de-regulated/de-bureaucratized development. Other areas such as interdependence, eco-development and basic needs were also included as part of the agenda of Another Development; these have been dealt with separately in this work because of their big influence in development thinking.

Hettne (1982 p. 76) argues that self-reliance implies that "each society relies primarily on its own strength and resources in terms of its members' energies and its natural and cultural environment". Self-reliance became fashionable in the 1970's and 1980's especially to those

thinking and working on leftist principles. For those using Rightist principles self reliance came as direct opposite of the notion of inter-dependence. This conflict in perception contributed to conceptual practical confusion and redundancy of self-reliance. The moot question here is "how self-reliant is self-reliance"?

Another Development also introduces the idea of gender sensitive development. It argues that deliberate efforts had to be made to involve women in development so as to harness the full potential of available human resources for development. Again, the idea of women in development has been interpreted differently by various people. To some, especially those from the Female Liberation Group, it means equating women with men, and if necessary through female upheavals and social negativists dubbed revolutions against patriarchy and male chauvinism (Russon, 1993)

To the liberal moderates, it means giving increasing responsibilities to and participation of women in public matters. Yet to the conservatives, the whole idea is condemned as nonsense in that every society and culture has its own division of labour based on gender. That, women and development is a complex and socially volatile issue, was witnessed by the disagreements between women following a Western Culture from Europe and America, Latin America and Africa on the one hand, and those from Asia on the other, regarding the exact contents of the Beijing Declaration in 1996 in China. Problems notwithstanding, different countries, in different ways, make specific policies to incorporate women in development today (see Boserup, 1975; Russon, 1993; Hendricks, 1993).

Another development also challenges the ability of the state to induce development in the Third World, key factors behind the doubt have to do with the soft nature of the state and its inability to enforce its decisions, its susceptibility to foreign donor and political pressure, the dependent nature of its comprador bourgeoisie as decision and policy makers, endemic corruption and over centralisation that brews incompetence and irrelevance to grassroot problems and needs (Friedman, 1992). Friedman (1992 p. 7) writes that in this alternative development,

“The state is defined as the enemy. It is bureaucratic, corrupt and sympathetic to the needs of the poor. Often it is the hands of military and civilian elites who treat it as their private domain.”

Within another development, policies are made to sideline the state through encouragement of heavy involvement of non-governmental organisations and also that of voluntary interest groups emanating largely from within the communities under the catch words of participation and empowerment. While one notes an increase in NGO's participation in Third World development; one also observes that NGOs are penetrated by bureaucracies of their own kind that are no differently inefficient from government bureaucracies. Furthermore, NGO's that dominate development practice like OXFAM, RED CROSS, SCF, CIS, Africa Network 2000, ADF and so on are international power houses with a domineering influence and paternalistic attitude that does not provide tremendous departure from a top-down approach to development in the Third World.

2.3.3.7 The Reformist Paradigm: Implications for Rural development

The various development strategies discussed under the reformist paradigm have the following implications for rural development policies and strategies. First, the basic needs strategy emphasises provision of basic services and entitlements of people. In rural development, policies that emphasise provision of basic entitlements and services such as education, water supply, energy, shelter food and so on are given priority. Secondly, participating in development has resulted in a high priority given to peoples participation in Rural Development, using various kinds of structures under decentralisation and local government. Self-reliance has been emphasised. Thirdly, interdependent development has been instrumental to create awareness of partnership in rural development between the donor, government and people at grassroot level.

Fourthly, eco-development has sensitised rural development practitioners to the fragility of environment and the eco-system upon which much agriculture in rural development is based. When combined with sustainable development strategy, rural development strategies are made to be comprehensive mosaic of participatory basic needs oriented strategies based initially on partnership with outside agencies but meant to gradually and in the long term promote self-reliance among the rural communities involved.

Fifthly, the importance of non-governmental organisations in the promotion of rural development in the Third World has come to the fore-front.

Lastly, women in development has promoted gender sensitive rural development policies and projects in the Third World.

2.4 The Meaning of Development: A Synthesis

It can be concluded from the various theories of development and strategies they recommend in the preceding section that development is a multi-faceted, and multi-activity process. A synthesis of these facets and activities, however, shows that the following issues are key components of a development process. The first component is that of economic growth. The process of development involves generation of growth of the economy at all levels of society - household, community and national levels; local, regional and national levels. This growth is responsible for generation of wealth in society and it is upon wealth that livelihoods are based through receipts of incomes. Growth of Gross National Product (GNP) is therefore a very important component of development.

The second component of development is distribution. The economic growth achieved must filter through into various socio-spatial levels of society in an equitable manner. Equity is therefore an important component of development because it is through it that wealth generated in a national economy can be shared among citizens. Therefore the per capita dimension, particularly as tested through Gini Coefficient measures, is an indispensable part of development process, because it is through such measures that checks and balances can be introduced to reduce income disparities in society.

The third important component of development is that of satisfaction of basic needs. Development should be people-centred. It should aim to provide or enable people to meet the very basic of their various human entitlements within the framework of social services such as health, education, nutrition, housing, clothing, human rights and so on. Development should create an enabling framework for people to enjoy this bundle of rights.

The fourth component of development is that it should strengthen organisational capacity of society. Therefore, capacity building should be one of the key objectives of development processes.

The fifth important component of development is that of sustainability. The various means used in the development process and the various ends achieved by the development process should have a lasting positive impact on betterment of human livelihoods. It should be integrated with the natural resource base upon which it is based.

PART 2: RURAL DEVELOPMENT

2.5 The Concept of Rural

Definition of rural is controversial (Clout, 1972; Robinson, 1990; Halfacree, 1993; Saraceno, 1994; Mafume, 1996). Analysis of literature debating the concept rural, however, shows that various definitions used can conveniently be grouped and discussed. Robinson (1990) discusses a number of criteria used to define rural. First, rural is defined through use of settlement continuum. Rurality, in this definition, is symptomised by villages, hamlets and small towns that provide them with urban services. This definition poses the problem of clarity of physical demarcation because the small towns have morphological and functional structures that are urban. This definition is, however, used in rural development in the design and implementation of growth centre strategies.

The second criterion used to define rural is that of settlement size using population density. Areas with low population density are regarded as rural. There are, however, rural areas with high densities because of factors such as climate. In Botswana, for instance, semi-aridity has led to high density rural villages such as Mochudi.

Ecological criteria, especially greenness and aesthetic beauty, are sometimes used to define rural. Yet, greenness exists in urban areas as well today through planning green cities; while pollution and overgrazing have rendered many rural areas far from green.

Economic criteria are also used to define rural. The economic activity of farming is associated with rural; and so is the phenomenon of extensive land use. However, much farming takes place in urban areas today using intensive urban farming methods. In the rural areas, intensive land use occurs through processes such as stall feeding and Greenhouse farming, for instance. Moreover, existence of rural industrialisation, dents monopoly of industrialisation as an exclusive economic activity of urban areas.

Sometimes socio-cultural criteria are used to define rural. The traditionalism - modernity dichotomy of modernisation theory is used in this case. At other times these are represented by use of the concepts of *Gemeinschaft* - *Gesellschaft* respectively. *Gemeinschaft* represents traditionalism and both are used to denote rurality composed of indices such as sacred, ascribed status, tradition-bound, extended family and so on. Again, this criterion has been discredited for

being too crude and simplistic. There exists no area that is purely traditional. Rather, a mixture of characteristics exist within one space (Saraceno, 1994; Mafume, 1996).

Religious criterion are used to denote rural as areas where people are heathens and still practice paganism and various forms of animism. However, the increased rates of urban crime and that of satanic churches and cults in urban areas are proof that "bad boys and manners" are not only a preserve of rural areas.

Lastly, political criterion that depict rural as the place of the powerless, the meek; the willing to be lead, those that vote without much questions and troubles are also used. Again, care has to be taken that rural areas also have a high potential for political struggles and power as shown by the French revolution; Russian revolution, the Chinese revolution, and more recently in southern Africa, that of the present day Democratic Republic of Congo led by President Kabila who freed it through armed struggle from the bush, from the despotic rule of the late Mobutu Seseseko of Zaire.

Use of these various definitions to denote the concept of rural and the problems that are associated with each of them, creates some definitional complexity regarding rural development in two ways. First, if rural development is taken to mean a process of self-improvement, then how does one identify the subject of this process? If on the other hand, rural development is interpreted to mean improving the rural areas - how exactly does one identify the spatial object to be transformed?

2.6 The Meaning of Rural Development

The concept of rural development is defined differently by various authors (see Aziz, 1978; Leupolt, 1975; Lele, 1975; Belshaw, 1977; Escap, 1979; Livingstone, 1979; Chambers, 1983; Chaudhri Lea 8, 1983; Dias & Wickramangyake, 1983; Todaro, 1989; Reed, 1985). Other writers such as Burkey (1993) write about rural development without making any attempt to define it. A more widely used definition of rural development is that advanced by the World Bank (1975 p. 3) that, it is

“a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people - the rural poor. It involves extending the benefits of development to the poorest among those who seek a livelihood in the rural

area. The group includes small scale farmers, tenants and the landless.”

This definition highlights the fact that rural development involves first, efforts to improve the rural economy. Rural development involves efforts to promote growth of the rural economy through stimulation of increased productivity and production both in the agricultural and rural industrial sector. Rural development also involves improvement of peoples social livelihoods through provision of basic needs and entitlements. Therefore rural development entails the betterment of the material and non-material livelihoods of rural communities. Focus on the rural poor is meant to emphasise that rural development should also reduce social disparities. Nowadays increased concern with the environment has added the dimension of sustainability to the definition of rural development (Huisman, 1994).

Stenkenburg (1987 p. 20) has developed a comprehensive definition of rural development as

“a process of change in the rural areas leading to better living conditions and a greater security of existence for the population, which process comprises: the growth of production and productivity, and the diversification of production activities within the agricultural sector; the increase in complexity and linkages in the rural economy as a result of the expansion of non-agricultural production activities, rural industries in particular; the improvement of the employment situation and the rise of incomes for broad segments of the rural population; the expansion and amelioration of agro-support and community services; and the improvement of environmental conservation as a form of preserving natural resources; which is essential to sustain the process over a longer period of time.”

More recently Huisman (1994 p. 17) has defined rural development as

“a transformation process in rural areas which results in a sustainable betterment of living conditions for a large majority of the rural population; this process of change takes place mainly due to (first) a rise in agricultural output and productivity levels, (second) a structural improvement of non-farm employment and income levels and (third) an increase in the availability and accessibility of basic social services.”

A number of implications can be drawn from the above definitions on the meaning, objectives and scope of rural development. The first implication is that rural development aims to achieve growth of output in the rural sector. This output growth is necessary for the generation of material wealth on which rural livelihoods are dependent. Two sectors are key elements for the generation of growth of the rural economy. These are agriculture and rural industries. Growth of output from these sectors is a pre-condition for rural development because people cannot redistribute nothing. The second implication is that rural development is concerned with redistribution of wealth and reduction of rural poverty through strategies of improved access to income and employment generation; together with provision of access to basic necessities of life such as education, health, nutrition, sanitation and others. Thirdly, rural development aims to reduce social and spatial inequalities by raising the standard of living of the majority of the rural poor as its target group. Fourthly, rural development depends on use of natural resources in its various activities. If not utilised sustainably, the natural resources could, sooner or later, get depleted and jeopardise the process of rural development. In order to avoid this possible disaster, rural development also involves deliberate effort to conserve the environment through sustainable use of natural resources. Fifthly, rural development seeks to induce sustainable rural livelihoods by creating an enabling framework within which survival strategies pursued by rural populations can have on lasting positive impact on their lives; induce increased income for the majority of the population; and lead to capacity building through inducing processes that can be maintained with local capital, technologies, and manpower resources. Lastly, rural development is a multi-objective, multi-faceted, multi-activity process that cuts across many sectors. This implies that one of the biggest tasks of rural development is that of co-ordination through effective local administration and governance (Huisman, 1994).

2.7 The Rationale for Rural Development

The imperative for rural development in the Third World is premised upon many considerations. First, within the Third World, the majority of the population, often more than 70%, resides and ekes part of its living in the rural areas. As a result, governments embark on rural development in order to meet the needs of this majority. The second rationale for rural development is that the agricultural sector which produces food, is found in the rural areas. The prevalence of food shortages in the Third World since World War II, aggravated by droughts and famine, implies that agriculture and food production deserve priority in rural development in these countries in order to reduce malnutrition, starvation and disease.

Thirdly, seasonal employment, underemployment and outright unemployment imply that opportunities of a stable income are low. This has, amongst others, led to increased flow of rural-urban migrants to towns in the hope that opportunities there might be better (Todaro, 1989). Governments embark on rural development as a strategy to provide alternative income generating activities within the rural areas, so as to reduce rural-urban migration. The third justification for rural development is that shortage of basic needs and entitlements especially education, health, clean water and energy, is acute in the rural areas. Deliberate programmes to improve these living conditions are therefore implemented by governments under rural development.

Socio-cultural conservationists have justified rural development as a viable vehicle for the maintenance of rural morality, tranquility and social coherence. Viewed from this perspective, rural development promotes cultural heritage and diversity. More recently concerns with environment in development have led to the justification of rural development on the grounds that it promotes preservation of bio-diversity and facilitates eco-tourism that generates income for the nation. Lastly, uncontrolled growth of settlements and their encroachment on former agricultural land combined with the complications of informal land use conversions within the urban-rural fringe have necessitated intervention through rural development to ensure a more orderly spatial development (Huisman, 1994)

2.8 Rural Development Strategies

Four major types of rural development strategies can be identified in rural development thinking and practice in the Third World. There are green revolution community development, integrated rural development and spatial/regional rural development strategies.

2.8.1 Green Revolution Strategies

In the 1950s and 1960s economic growth theories dominated development thinking. Likewise, rural development thinking around the time was dominated by economic growth theories. While in the 1950s and early 1960s largely as a result of models like the Lewis two sector model, industrialisation was given dominance, and in the 1970s onwards agriculture gained recognition (Johnston & Kilby, 1975). In essence rural development came to be perceived as a process by means of which economic growth in the rural sector was to be promoted and achieved. In pursuit of this objective, rural development was promoted through design and implementation of policies

and strategies that aimed, in particular, to increase levels of productivity per acre and unit of labour, so that overall production and growth could be achieved in agriculture. Agriculture was perceived as the engine of growth in the rural sector in which once growth was stimulated, then trickle down effects emanating from that growth would filter through to improve other sectors and rural communities. The importance of agriculture is seen in terms of generation of employment and income, provision of food, supply of inputs to the ailing industrial sector, provision of market for products of the weak industrial sector, and also supply of primary commodities for export and generation of foreign exchange (Johnston & Kilby, 1975; Todaro, 1981).

Third World countries, aided by developed countries, began to seek ways by means of which their agricultural sectors could be assisted to achieve these objectives. One of the breakthroughs achieved through research in Mexico Latin America, and the Phillipines in Asia was that of High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) in wheat and rice, respectively. The High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) improved crop yields tremendously and produced breeds that could resist crop diseases. Since then, rural development strategies that emphasise use of High Yielding Varieties to promote agriculture are generally referred to as Green Revolution strategies.

Essentially, in a Green Revolution strategy, emphasis is on the following elements. First, it is agriculture led. High levels of output in the agricultural sector are seen as a pre-condition for growth of the rural economy. Secondly, use of HYVs is encouraged as a means to achieve increases in agricultural output levels (Shepherd, 1998).

The HYVs are composed of biochemical fertilisers, improved hybrid and selected seeds. Thirdly, capital intensive techniques of production accompany the HYVs to create a breakthrough in the technology gap in the areas of irrigation and draft power (Farms and Smith, 1985).

The Green Revolution helped farmers increase yields tremendously in Asia and Latin America. It did, however, have some limitations. First, social factors were completely neglected in its design and implementation. The improved seeds, fertilisers, insecticides and irrigation and traction machinery used needed a lot of capital for purchase, use and maintenance. Only the few rich farmers afforded them and were thus able to realise high yields. The majority of the farmers who are poor could not afford them and failed to participate in their use. For them yields remained low. Therefore, the Green Revolution accentuated rural differentiation. Secondly, heavy reliance on the Green Revolution and its biochemical and mechanical solutions led to a neglect of the

importance of other factors such as extension, structural changes like land reform and adequate provision of agro-support services in agriculture. Thirdly, the spatial impact of Green Revolution was limited to Latin America and Asia, because of the HYVs were on wheat and rice. Africa, which depends on maize and tubers as its staple foods did not benefit much. Fourthly, the technologies used were dependent on basic knowledge imported from the west. This led to dependence on the west for spare parts and drain on scarce foreign exchange. Besides, some of these technologies such as chemical fertilisers, pesticides and fungicides are not environmentally friendly (Bernstein, 1992; Glaesner, 1987; Farms & Smith, 1985; Reed, 1985).

Despite its shortcomings, Green Revolution strategies have a strong appeal to policy makers and planners in the Third World and they continue to be implemented with disastrous effects for the envisaged beneficiaries - the majority of farmers. There is need to devise more appropriate small scale agricultural development strategies that can be understood and afforded by the majority of poor farmers in the Third World. Such a strategy is "unimodal" (Johnston and Kilby, 1975). It must be one that encompasses elements of not only achieving increased agricultural output, but one that maximises the social welfare of the rural population so that there is structural transformation of both the economic, social and political and environmental aspects of rural areas. These then, would be the basic ingredients of a sustainable agricultural strategy necessary in the Third World.

2.8.2 Community Development Strategies

A community is a body of people with something in common. This definition is endorsed by both Goodhall (1987) and Johnston et.al (1994). Burkey (1993 p. 40) writes that most westerners and urban based development workers and elites in the Third World believe that rural areas are "a community of friendly, warm-hearted natives living together in harmony, oppressed by their poverty, and perhaps also their ignorance, but working together and trying to make the best out of a difficult situation". He, however, goes on to argue that this definition of community is wrong, in that, it is based on an idealised, idolised, romantic harmony model of rural life and communities. In reality, he argues, communities in rural areas are heterogeneous, and composed of individuals, groups and classes with conflicting interests and aspirations.

From the voluminous literature on community development, it can be deduced that community development is defined as the process by which peoples' efforts are combined with those of the

government and/or non-governmental organisations to improve their economic, social and cultural conditions (Escap, 1979; Dore & Mars, 1981; Swanepoel, 1992; Burkey, 1993).

The objectives of community development are mainly to introduce changes and promote activities in the rural areas that lead to the betterment of the economic, social and cultural and political lives of the inhabitants. These various activities are those that are regarded as basic needs by the communities. There are many actors in community development in the Third World. These actors are the Donors, the Government, non-government organisations, and the communities at grassroots level. The process of community development aims to coordinate and synchronise the activities and perceptions of all these actors in sectoral programmes and projects that improve the quality of life of the masses (Swanepoel, 1992). Within community development thinking and practice, emphasis is put on mass participation and self-help. Communities are assisted to help themselves in their self-development. Three strategies are used jointly or independently.

The first strategy is that of improvement of social infrastructure. Within this strategy emphasis is put on provision of education as a basis for promotion of mass literacy. Activities concentrate on provision of primary formal education and non-formal adult education and distant learning. Specific activities consist of construction of schools by communities, community involvement in school management; and the design and dissemination of learning programmes and materials for non-formal education. Promotion of food and nutrition is another important area used to improve the nutritional levels of communities. Specific activities in this strategy include home gardening, communal gardening, cooking methods and new food varieties, and household hygiene. Improvement of health conditions of the communities is another area of concentration, and it includes sanitation, waste disposal, personal hygiene and provision of clean drinking water supplies in the villages. The second strategy used to promote community development is that of provision of physical infrastructure. Areas of concentration in this strategy include, shelter provision, construction of rural feeder roads and bridges, clinics and school buildings; and conservation structures such as water ponds, water ways and diversions; gully reclamation structures and afforestation. Community participation is solicited through use of own labour in these activities. Sometimes payment, food aid or both are used as instruments to increase people's participation.

The third strategy used in community development, is that of promotion of cottage industries where activities like sewing, knitting, shoe repairs, brick making, honey making, candle making, soap making and other small scale industrial activities are undertaken.

Community development has been practised and, has no doubt, helped develop many communities in the Third World. However, there have been problems as well. As Burkey (1993) observes, a major problem with community development is that it is based on false conceptual assumption of community as a homogeneous, harmonious entity with common interests, while the opposite is true. Community development projects are more often than not, hijacked and monopolised by prominent persons, groups and classes in rural areas to suit their own interests. At other times, projects fail to take off or collapse due to lack of co-operation among community members. Another problem is that often projects emanate from outside the communities themselves and are imposed on them, despite the rhetoric of participation. Such projects collapse with the departure of their mentors from the villages where they are implemented. A closely related problem is that of a patron-client attitude that often arises between the donor-community worker on the one hand, and the community on the other. The patronising nature of the donors and their agents sometimes creates apathy on the part of the community. The last problem is that community development has come to be donor and government driven through use of provision of credit payment and food aid despite the rhetoric of self-help. Often when these foreign forms of assistance stop, project activities die as well.

2.8.3 Integrated Rural development (IRD)

In the 1970s it became clear that rural development strategies of Green Revolution and that of Community Development were being pursued independently of each other. Yet, in essence, the two were meant to solve the problems of the same communities. This tended to put strain on the limited resources of the community. Integrated Rural Development was found to be a new strategy that could help maximise efficiency through combining both agricultural and community development activities in one space and community at the same time (Ruttan, 1975; Belshaw, 1977; Livingstone, 1979; Lea and Chaudhri, 1983).

In general integrated rural development can be defined as a strategy that aims to improve economic output, especially in agriculture and rural industries; and assist in the provision of basic needs in physical and social infrastructures of a given community at the same time. In this way, one can pursue the given objectives of economic growth and social distribution at the same time.

There are many integrated rural development projects in the Third World since the 1970s. Some have been successful in their aims, while others have not been so effective. Problems encountered in implementation of IRD relate to lack of conceptual clarity and uniformity. Integrated means different things to different people. To some it means combining activities together; to others it means combining urban and rural spaces together; and yet to others it means linking the national, regional and local together; and across the sectors (Ruttan, 1975; Lea and Chaudhri, 1983; Conyers and Hills, 1984).

This conceptual confusion creates disagreements in terms of what exactly is to be integrated. The other problem is that where activities are integrated, they are many and require a lot of coordination capacity, which is lacking in many Third World countries. The result is a series of independent activities being carried out within the same project and area with no linkages developed. A closely related problem is that, at worst, the various activities promoted by the project compete for limited resources, especially, finance because the project has spread itself too widely but thinly on the ground. Lastly, given their extensive coverage of activities, IRD projects are expensive to implement over a broad national space; they therefore need an incremental, area by area implementation over time (Conyers and Hills, 1984).

2.8.4 Integrated Area Development (IAD)

Conyers and Hills (1984) trace the origins of integrated area development planning to the formation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States of America in the 1930s. In the 1970s, in particular, integrated area development was promoted over a specific rural development strategy to improve the poor regions in the Third World. It also became the tool by means of which integrated rural development programmes, fashionable then, were given a spatial focus in implementation. Variants of integrated area development in rural development exist. Friedmann and Weaver (1979), for instance, use the concept of Agropolitan Rural Development strategy to denote creation of isolated, autonomous areas whose development potentials are then tapped for the betterment of the communities therein via development of small-scale urban centres as development nuclei. This model by Friedmann and Weaver is a microcosm of centre periphery exploitation and dependency of rural areas on urban areas. Areas have porous borders that allow for filtering in and out of resources, so that an idealised autonomous area as envisaged in their model is more theoretical than practical. Other writers such as Conyers (1985), write of rural regional planning to refer to planning for a specific region or area within the rural areas

with the objective to either promote its development potential or solve its development problems. GTZ (1994 p 79) used the concept Regional Rural Development (R.R.D.) which it defines as a strategy that "seeks to support development processes which are adapted to the specific needs and potentials of any one region". Other authors use the concept of District Development Planning to denote drawing up of integrated area development programmes and projects on a district-wide basis (Van Tilburg, 1985; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1989).

It can be generally concluded that integrated area development refers to an attempt to draw up integrated rural development programmes and projects for specific areas. The criteria for the selection of these areas may be either their resource potentials for development with the hope that once developed those areas would assist weaker areas around them to develop as well, through induced trickle down effects, a situation referred to as "betting on the strong". Choice of the area could also be based on its poverty and deprivation, so that there is need to induce development processes in the region; "betting on the weak" as it were.

Notwithstanding the level of the spatial entity in question, integrated area development programmes and projects have the advantages that they link resource potentials of the areas in question to the magnitude of the planned intervention and people. This has the potential to minimise failure due to discrepancies among the three. Yet, in practice, some integrated area development programmes have remained very large especially those conceived under a district-wide level. This creates the problem that the activities and sectors to be integrated remain large and so does the area coverage. In this case, huge manpower, technical and capital recourses beyond the level of affordability by the area, and even the country as a whole, become necessary. Such projects become unsustainable once foreign support ceases and they collapse. Besides, their implementation is delayed by the sheer size of the area to be covered by activities (Conyers and Hills, 1984). Managing rural development has been hotly debated (Chambers, 1983).

2.9 Rural Development Administration: An Empowerment Approach

A crucial point raised in the discussions on administration of rural development is the fact that there is still too much centralisation of power, decision-making and planning by the central authorities and central government. Among the many disadvantages of centralisation are bureaucratic red-tape and delays; lack of proper knowledge of the rural problems at grass-roots level by planners who operate in their offices in the capital city and working on information gained from "rural development tourism" (Chambers, 1983, p.10). Moreover, inadequate

budgeting for rural development is common since it is done by those without adequate knowledge of the magnitude of the tasks to be undertaken. It is now generally acknowledged that decentralisation is one of the pre-conditions for efficient administration of rural development in the Third World (Conyers, 1986).

This decentralisation should involve devolution of power to sub-national levels, especially local government, to enable rural areas to exercise freedom of choice decision-making and planning. Decentralisation should also include release of the budget, and budgeting strategies and income generation through formulation of by-laws by local governments, so that they are able to finance their programmes and projects. It must further include deconcentration of basic services to make them nearer to the rural people.

Efforts to decentralise fully by Third World countries are, however, delayed by reluctance to devolve power and the budget by central government to local government. This reluctance continues to perpetuate the culture of top-down approach to rural development planning and administration in these countries. More recently, increased involvement of non-governmental organisations in rural development has helped speed up the pace of "democratisation of development" and promote participatory bottom-up rural development of "DEPENDS" approach (Clark, 1991)

2.10 Obstacles to rural development

Third World rural development faces many problems. The harsh physical environment aridity, humidity, floods, poor soils - demand application of technical skills that are not often available in the rural areas or too expensive to be afforded by the majority of farmers. Agro-support services like extension, co-operatives, research, marketing and credit are inefficient and do not always address the needs of majority farmers. Traction power often relies on use of animals, and, attempts to introduce mechanisation are hampered by capital scarcity among poor farmers. The link between agriculture and rural industrialisation is often poorly developed in many countries, and this leads to a non-integrated rural production structure and economy. Provision of human basic services such as clean water, sanitation, education and clinics are constrained by lack of funding, so that governments often have to borrow from the international community in order to finance these efforts. This, however, leads to indebtedness and dependency.

Government policies on rural development, especially production, tend to promote export-led rural development. Unfortunately the terms of trade in international markets are such that primary export commodities from the Third World are under priced. A situation of perpetual exploitation of these countries by industrialised ones is thus promoted. On their part, Third World rural production structures, develop a dualistic structure typified by enclave dependent development whereby small isolated pockets of areas producing export-oriented commodities monopolise major capital and human resources of the country and the rest of the areas devoted to subsistence peasant production are relatively neglected, thus worsening the food deficit conditions of the Third World. Rural development is, in many countries, characterised by a top-down approach and poor participation by local communities meant to be beneficiaries. The poor administrative capacity of governments and corruption has promoted inefficiency and failure of projects, and buttressed the need for decentralisation and increased involvement of non-governmental organisations. On their part, donors have continued to fund rural development in the Third World, largely, for their own political economy expediency. However, the political economy of the world has changed today. The collapse of the Eastern block and socialism have attracted a lot of interest by the west to finance development there and to propagate capitalism. This might seriously affect the monopoly of development assistance from the west formerly enjoyed by the Third World - in particular, rural development is likely to suffer. The adoption of IMF structural adjustment programmes by Third World governments, has decreased government spending in rural development in many ways - removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs have made them expensive for poor farmers; privatisation of services and land have alienated them from the majority of people in rural areas, increased taxation has rendered non-agricultural goods unaffordable for rural communities. In general SAPS have accentuated poverty, and weakened further the resource position of the poor in the rural areas (Mensah, 1994). Rural development in the Third World is also hampered by the donor-preference syndrome. Every donor wants their own thing, so that there are a lot of false starts. Alternative rural development strategies devised have to address these issues in order to promote sustainable rural livelihoods in the Third World. Another important obstacle to rural development is the reluctance and unwillingness of people in the rural areas themselves to change their old lifestyles and adapt to new lifestyles introduced by rural development policies and projects to better their livelihoods.

2.11 Sustainable Development

Perceptions of development undergo continued change. Since the 1980s, there has been a paradigm shift in development thinking away from that based on Modernisation Theory towards the new paradigm of sustainable development (Elliot, 1994; Shepherd, 1998).

In the early 1980s the world experienced accelerated negative effects of modernisation approaches towards development whose sole objective was attainment of increased annual growth rates of Gross National Product (GNP) and increased levels of GNP per capita. This old paradigm had contented that once high levels of GNP per capita were achieved, all the problems of livelihood in communities and societies would automatically disappear. In reality, it had become clearer from the mid-1960s that this contention was false. As evidenced by the critical observations made by the various schools of thought on development, discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, the old paradigm had promoted acute inequalities among nations and societies at the international level, communities and regions at the national level and classes, groups, households and individuals at local levels. The incidence of absolute poverty and deprivation had increased in real terms and was exacerbated by the world recession (Elliot, 1994; Hettne, 1995; Shepherd, 1998).

Evidence provided by the political economy school also showed that the old paradigm and its economism had promoted social and political exclusion of the majority of the population especially, the poor and women, from active participation in the development process (Redclift, 1992; Shepherd, 1998).

Another most glaring negative impact of the old paradigm which promoted theorisation on sustainable development was its devastating effects on the environment (Elliot, 1994). Forest depletion accelerated as a result of industrial and household demands. Pollution of the environment from over use of chemicals and industrial effluence rose. Grazing lands and wild life disappeared due to overstocking and over harvesting to meet the souring demands of meat consumption and by-products by industrial society. Arable lands suffered loss of productivity as a result of the chain reaction from over utilisation, poor use of natural nutrients and the unprecedented use of chemical fertilisers hybrid seeds for increased yields to meet high food consumption demands of industrial society. The greenhouse effect, thermal warming and ozone depletion and led to tremendous disturbances of, and changes in, global and regional climatic and weather patterns and their impact on humanity. In general the development process based on the

old paradigm destroyed the environment and paralysed its potential utility for the future development processes (Elliot, 1994; Ghai and Vivian, 1992; Shepherd, 1998).

Although early warning bells on the negative impact of the old paradigm of development on the environment were rung by the Club of Rome in the early 1970s (Meadows et al., 1972) and the United Nations through its world summit on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, solid theorisation on and use of the concept of sustainable development started in the early 1980s through seminal pioneer works of writers such as Redclift (1984) among others. The concept of sustainable development was then taken up, consolidated and promoted for use by the United Nations appointed World Commission on Environment and Development whose work started in 1984 and culminated in the publication of the report Our Common Future in 1987.

Despite the fact that the concept of sustainable development is now widely used in the development discourse and widely acclaimed as the most recent paradigm in development thought, there exists a wide controversy about its actual definition, objectives and content (Elliot, 1994; Redclift, 1992). In terms of definition, the most widely used definition is that advanced by the World Commission on Environment and Development known as the Brundtland Commission (1987). The Brundtland Commission defines sustainable development as development that it is able to meet today's demands without making a sacrifice on the needs of the future generations. The Brundtland Commission is, however, silent on how countries should go about fostering development that is sustainable. These methodological and strategic issues to ensure sustainable development have been left to individual countries to devise and implement according to their conditions. This disparity might, among others, be exemplified by the lack of agreement and refusal to sign some of the Treaties on sustainable development by some countries formulated and recommended for implementation by all nations during the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil in 1992. The fact that the World's singular and unipolar super power, the United States of America, unilaterally decided to sign some Rio Treaties on environment and development selectively to suit its taste and missions while refusing to sign those Treaties that it felt threatened its domestic and international aspirations and needs illustrates the highly controversial, political and hegemonic nature of sustainable development.

In terms of practice, sustainable development programme is composed of many facets. The first facet is that of sustainable agriculture. Sustainable agriculture aims to improve rural livelihoods through increased agricultural productivity and improved land management, largely using

indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) of farming methods and techniques. It also aims to ensure equitable access to production by the majority of the poor households so as to improve their food security today and in future (Elliot, 1994; Shepherd, 1998). A sustainable agriculture strategy frowns upon use of High Yielding Varieties. Instead, emphasis is on use of indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) because they are both accessible for the majority of the farmers and are environmentally friendly due to their adaptation and suitability to local ecological environments (Shepherd, 1998). Unfortunately, given the training and the mind set of many agricultural officers and extension agents, it continues to be High Yielding Variety's in terms of hybrid seeds, chemical fertilisers and machines that constitute the gist of agricultural programmes and strategies under the technical quick fix approach (Shepherd, 1998) of many Third World governments which are propagated to farmers as good for increased productivity. This situation is made no less better by donor pressure which often promotes the marketing for products of its own agricultural industries abroad. The Green Revolution approach to agricultural development continues to have a strong industrial and political power base for its support in the industrialised and Third World countries despite the green ideology rhetoric in decision making circles. Moreover, the current Eurocentric hegemony in thinking about technological innovation and capability militates against wide spread adoption and use of indigenous knowledge systems for sustainable agriculture in the Third World.

The second facet of sustainable development entails income generation from alternative activities to agriculture, more especially for the landless and stockless rural households. Shepherd (1998) argues that various activities are meant for poverty alleviation and employment generation. Non-agricultural activities in the rural areas of the Third World can be classified two fold as industrial and non-industries.

Rural industries continue to pose a problem in terms of definition. Saith (1991) has argued that one of the best ways to define and classify rural industries is via both their location and linkages. Within the framework of the locational approach a rural industry is by definition one which is located in the rural areas. However, this locational base definition continues to pose problems due to suburbanisation and rural urban fringe phenomena which mars the spatial differentiation between urban and rural in the industrialised and Third World countries, respectively. As a result it becomes problematic whether industries located in the suburbs and urban fringe might be defined and as classified rural (Saith, 1991).

The linkages approach, instead, concentrates on the nature of the forward and backward linkages that an industry generates. Ideally, a rural industry is deemed to be one whose forward and backward linkages are rural based (Saith, 1991). Again, problems with the linkages based definition abound. For instance, there are many industries whose inputs come from urban areas but are themselves both based in the rural areas and their outputs are also consumed in the rural areas. Besides, there are also many industries whose inputs come from the rural areas and they are also rurally located, but whose outputs are consumed in the urban areas. These definitional problems imply that one needs to take into account a combination of both locational and linkage factors in the definition and use of the concept rural industry.

Sustainable rural industrialisation is one which is eco-sensitive and generative of high employment levels for improved rural household incomes (Elliot, 1994). Moreover, as Shepherd (1998) argues, a sustainable rural industrialisation programme needs to promote small scale enterprises (SSE) because they demand less capital outlay, are labour intensive and less demanding in administration; thus they have a higher chance of sustainability in the Third World where capital, skill and high level management acumen are scarce. As Saith (1991) argued, use of rural inputs, rural location and rural consumption of outputs would be hall marks of an ideal sustainable rural industry.

Unfortunately, in many Third World countries, most rural industries are run away extractive industries, which have come to exploit the cheap labour and raw materials abundant in the rural areas with little impact on contribution to increased income levels and poverty alleviation of rural households. In fact many of the industries are attracted in the first place to do business in the rural areas because of the incidence of poverty which depresses the rural labour market value since households are willing to be employed at very low wages for the sake of survival. Moreover, the political economy of industrialisation militates against any significant struggles for better wages and working conditions by the rural industrial labour which is often too politically and socially weak and fragmented to form strong trade unions to mobilise mass action against rural industrial oppression and exploitation.

In cases where Small Scale Enterprises (SSE) have been attempted, they have been more successful in employment and income generation in informal sector. Within the formalised government induced involved sector, SSEs have fallen victim to bureaucratisation, red tape, corruption and exploitative tendencies by industries on the rural labour force, with little impact

on employment and income generation necessary for rural poverty alleviation. Many small scale enterprises are also overwhelmed by large industries which can sell in bulk at cheaper prices and attract more market. Many Third World countries are waking-up to the reality that not only is the rural informal sector having a positive impact on employment and income for rural households, but that as an off-farm poverty alleviation and livelihood strategy for some rural households, it is not transitory but there to stay. Informal small scale enterprises are endogenous to the local communities and are more sustainable ecologically, management-wise and temporally. This is more so for informal small scale enterprises that are non-industrial in nature and rely mostly on informal small scale community co-operative work (Shepherd, 1998).

The third facet of sustainable development within the context of rural areas concerns sustainable access to basic human entitlements and services necessary for sustainable human development. Most rural areas in the Third World are poorly provided with health services. Curative facilities are poor. Hospital population ratios are high and typified by high doctor/patient ratios and bed/patient ratios as well as nurse/patient ratios. In terms of preventative health care, poor nutrition, lack of clean drinking water and poor sanitation and levels of personal and household hygiene continue to promote a high incidence of disease and mortality among the poorest of the poor in the rural areas of the Third World (Shepherd, 1998). Within the framework of sustainable rural development, efforts to promote sustainable health provision concentrate on Primary Health Care (PHC) as the main strategy. An important challenge to the success of Primary Health Care strategy is how best to combine curative and preventive care, western and traditional health care systems, and facilitate a sustainable personal, household care systems, and promote a sustainable personal, household and community environmental hygiene (Shepherd, 1998).

Sustainable water provision in the rural areas is one of the key concerns in sustainable human development. For many Third World countries, the motto has been to have clean drinking water for all by the year 2000. Yet today, at the dawn of the year 2000, it is clear that many of these countries are far from achievement of clean drinking water for all, especially, in the rural areas. Many rural households continue to draw water from rivers and unprotected wells. Long queues at water points abound, while many modern water provision pumps have collapsed due to technical failure, community mismanagement and sheer vandalism. These are some of the challenges that sustainable water provision has to come to grips with in order to promote sustainable rural development in the Third World. A more crucial issue is related to mechanisms to introduce

sustainable institutional management of clean water supplies to ensure their sustainability and equitable access to the needy in the rural areas (Shepherd, 1998).

Education is a conduct through which better livelihoods can be accessed. Not only does education facilitate acquisition of knowledge and skills; but it guarantees access to better employment for sustainable household incomes as well. In the Third World, education in the rural areas remains very poor. Adult illiteracy is high. Higher level educational institutions are few and far apart, resulting in high school-pupil ratios. Classroom-pupil ratios, teacher-pupil ratios and desk-pupil ratios continue to be very high as well. High costs of education make it inaccessible to many rural children as evidenced by high drop-out rates. This more so recently with the adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPS) and privatisation and removal of government subsidies on education in most Third World countries that are financially dominated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund austerity measures (Todaro, 1989)

Sustainable rural development focuses on the provision of sustainable education through adoption and provision of basic literacy and education. Unlike in the old development paradigms where education tended to emphasise numerical and white collar literacy, sustainable education aims to equip students of all ages with life skills or survival skills whose emphasis is education with production in the areas of agriculture and non-agricultural industries. This emphasis is on what can be termed green collar education, as it were, because of its emphasis on environment, production, and development.

In most Third World countries provision of energy resources remains a problem. Man-made energy sources especially those that are derived from petroleum continue to become inaccessible to the majority of the poor rural households due to the continuing increases in prices of oil and petroleum products. This has led to a heavy reliance and strain on the use of natural energy sources, especially forests for fuel wood (Elliot, 1994). The disappearance of forests as a result of fuel wood demand, other household demand such as roofing, and industrial demands for lumbering and paper industries pose one of the most serious threats of our time to sustainable development (Shepherd, 1998). Deforestation is also accountable for ozone depletion and thermal imbalances of the atmosphere too.

Within the context of sustainable development, sustainable energy provision in the rural areas, promotes efforts to reduce levels of deforestation by encouraging sustainable, selective and replacement harvesting practices to ensure continued forestation and afforestation. Moreover, use

of alternative natural energy resources such as solar energy gas and thermal heat are encouraged. Emphasis is also put on joint management of forestry resources (Shepherd, 1998). However, given the present acute rural poverty levels in the Third World, use of these alternatives remains more theoretical than practical due to their prohibitive prices.

Another important area of focus in sustainable rural development is that of sustainable transport service provision. Transport service is essential to enable connectivity so that people can become accessible and access various goods and services too.

Sustainable rural development depends on a fourth facet which is sustainable institutions for its successful decision-making, planning, implementation and management. On the one hand, individual households find it hard to finance and manage their needs to access rural livelihood strategy alone due to lack of resources, while on the other, governments increasingly find it difficult to finance and manage state enterprises sustainably due to dividing financial resources and mismanagement of state enterprises in general. Recent thinking in sustainable development maintains that a more sustainable way to manage rural development depends on joint management where the communities through their local institutions work in partnership with the state to share both resource inputs, management responsibilities and the sharing of benefits or outputs of the development initiatives embarked upon. This partnership would result in decentralization of development, the empowerment of the communities at grassroot level and would ensure that there would be popular participation necessary to guarantee the success of sustainable development (Elliot, 1994; Redlicft, 1992; Vivian, 1992; Shepherd, 1998). Popular participation for sustainable development is also promoted through increased use of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as an alternative institutional set-up to both government and private institutional initiatives (Elliot, 1994; Vivian, 1992; Shepherd, 1998).

Despite its appeal, sustainable development is far from easy in terms of its theory and applications. Elliot (1994) noted three contradictory approaches towards sustainable development. The first approach which Elliot (1994) calls the ecology centred approach argues that it is not possible to have economic growth and environmental conservation at the same time. Therefore, economic growth has to be sacrificed if environmental conservation is to be realised (Elliot, 1994). In essence the ecology-centred approach is neo-malthusian in theory and policy recommendations for practice. However, it must be noted that the ecology-centred approach might face problems of implementation because it advocates non-growth policies of

governments. In the industrialised countries, the comforts of high economic growth are likely to lead governments and societies in these countries not to accept readily policies that would be likely to have a reduction impact on current high mass consumption standards of living. In the Third World, where households and communities struggle to eke their daily livelihoods by sometimes over exploiting their environments, the attitudes might also be against non-growth policies because these would be more likely to worsen their poverty.

Elliot (1994) maintains that the market-based approach is the second approach to sustainable development. The market-based approach exemplified by the Brundtland Commission, advocates for economic growth through sound application of knowledge, human conscience and technology-sensitive policies to environmental conservation to satisfy the needs of the present generations and those of future generations. The crux of the market-based approach policies is how to achieve an eco-sensitive and friendly economic growth in today's capitalist world which is dominated by self-centred individual, household, community, national and international self-aggrandisement, attitudes and policies. A drastic change in the perceptions and attitudes of all is a pre-requisite for the success of market-based sustainable development approach.

The neo-Marxist approach which Elliot (1994) labels as the third approach to sustainable development is premised on current regional inequalities at local, national and international levels. This approach maintains that sustainable development is not possible within the present world capitalist order characterised by unequal political and economic power among regions. Regions that have a stronger political and economic power will always use hegemony to access more resources to themselves to suit their consumption demands contrary to the spirit of sustainability. Therefore sustainable development would only be applicable to and adopted by weaker regions in reality as evidenced by the refusal by the United States of America to sign the forestry convention during the World Environment Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

In conclusion, it needs to be noted that the success of sustainable development depends on the willingness of individuals, communities and nations to change and adopt a new perception and attitudes towards the ways in which they exact and access their sustainable livelihoods from the environment. Moreover, changing attitudes to family size and population growth, especially, in the Third World are key to a reduction in the magnitude of the mouths to be fed and numerical demands and needs to be satisfied today and in future generations.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.0. Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodologies that were employed to collect data for this thesis.

3.1 The role of evaluation in rural development

Rural development is implemented through formulation of policies, strategies and programmes of action. At grassroot level, specific projects are designed and implemented as the cutting edge of rural development practice. Rural development projects need to be monitored and evaluated to ensure that their implementation takes place as planned. Conyers and Hills (1984) define evaluation as the process that is meant to identify the extend to which specified objectives (of a project) are being achieved or have been achieved. Evaluation measures project impacts on the target population (Taylor, 1991; Wigboldus and Knisely, 1997; Shepherd, 1998).

According to Dias and Wickramanayake (1983) evaluation is conducted in order to determine whether the project objectives set at the beginning of the project have been met. This idea is supported by Shepherd (1998). There are three types of evaluation, namely, ex-ante, on-going and ex-post evaluations (Goodman and Love, 1980; Dias and Wickramanayake, 1983; Conyers and Hills, 1984).

Ex-ante evaluation occurs during the phase of project preparation and planning. It is composed of project feasibility and appraisal studies (Shepherd, 1998). Ex ante evaluation, therefore, aims to assess the feasibility of intended project objectives, activities, mode of operation and outputs (Goodman and Love, 1980; Shepherd, 1998). Ex-ante project evaluation is also intended to assess the pre-project situation through conduct of baseline surveys, so that later the impact of the project can become easily determined by comparing the situation before project intervention with that after project intervention to see if there might be any changes (Dias and Wickramanayake, 1983; Wigboldus and Knisely, 1997).

On-going project evaluation takes place throughout the process of project implementation (Shepherd, 1998). It is meant to assess whether or not the intended project objectives and targets are being achieved, at the scheduled time and with the allocated resource inputs. In cases where problems exist, on-going evaluation is expected to assist project planners and administrators to suggest solutions or, at worst, complete death of the project. On-going evaluation, therefore aides project monitoring (Goodman and Love, 1980; Dias and Wickramanayake, 1983; Conyers and

Hills, 1984; Uphoff, 1991; Taylor, 1991). On-going project evaluation can be an in-house activity done by employees of the project being evaluated. An in-house on-going project evaluation has the advantage that it can be quick and positive because it is done by members of the project themselves who are knowledgeable about the project situation. However, an in-house on-going project evaluation can, on the other hand, be misleading and less critical of serious problems of the project due to reluctance to effect self-criticism by the in-house project evaluators. Moreover, an in-house on-going evaluation may lack a comparative dimension because of lack of comparative experience by the in-house evaluators (Conyers and Hills, 1984; Taylor, 1991; Vargas, 1991).

On-going project evaluation is also done by external agencies and consultants with no structural relationships with the project, external on-going project evaluation. External on-going project evaluation has the advantage that evaluators are neutral and have the chance to assess the project objectively and critically. Moreover, the external evaluators can also add their experiences with other similar projects elsewhere to provide a richer comparative dimension in their assessment. The disadvantages of external on-going project evaluation are that it might be expensive due to payment of external evaluators, take a long time while the external evaluators acquaint themselves with the project, and sometimes be misleading due to misinterpretation of some issues by the external evaluators (Conyers and Hills, 1984; Brown, 1991).

As Vargas(1991) argues an evaluation process must be done by the different actors that take part in the programme at its different levels, and this process must have as its main result, a better understanding of the action and reaction of the different elements involved in a social development programme.

Ex-post or post-project evaluation takes place at the end of the project. It might be carried out shortly after the end of the project or some years afterwards. Ex-post project evaluation is intended to assess whether the objectives of the project have been achieved or not. It is meant to show the effects and impacts of the project (Dias and Wickramanayake, 1983; Shepherd, 1998). The advantages of the post-project evaluation are that it can reveal whether or not the project has actually benefited those it was meant for, the costs incurred and the outputs achieved; or, whether, contrary to the intention of the project planners, it has disadvantaged them, became too costly and generated negative outputs. As Dias and Wickramanayake (1983 p. 206), argue "unless a proper evaluation is done it may not be possible to find out whether the intended

benefits have been derived or there has been any benefit at all from the investment made." This point is supported by Taylor(1991); Uphoff(1991); Oakley and Marsden(1991); Brown(1991) and Wigboldus and Knisly(1997).

3.2 Sample surveys and evaluation of rural development projects

The process of evaluation of rural development projects involves data collection, analysis and report writing. Collection of data is done from secondary and primary sources. Primary data collection itself, is done through use of many techniques, one of which is the social survey (Conyers and Hills, 1984). In a social survey, the entire population may be observed through the conduct of a census or that of a sample survey.

In a sample survey only a part of the entire population is observed. In order to ensure representativeness, two issues, the sample size and the equal probability of choice into the sample, among all units the population, are crucial. The determination of sample size depends on the margin of error allowed by, and the confidence limits expected in, the research (Moser and Kalton, 1971). Toyne and Newby (1971) argue that 30 percent of the population constitutes an acceptable sample size that has statistical validity. In reality, however, determination of the sample size goes beyond purely statistical considerations and depends also on consideration of resources available to conduct the research (Dias and Wickramanayake, 1983; Conyers and Hills, 1984). In order to ensure equal chances of choice into the sample, probability sampling is used. Again, depending on the objectives of the survey and resource constraints, non-probability-sampling procedures are sometimes preferred. Higson-Smith and Bless(1995) argue that although, from a scientific point of view, probability samples are of a much higher quality, non-probability samples have pragmatic advantages. They can save time and money and their disadvantages can be reduced by enlarging the sample or by choosing homogeneous populations. They are thus frequently used in social sciences.

Sample surveys are commonly used for data collection in evaluation of rural development projects because they respond to resource constraints more economically than census surveys. Under the prevalent situation of what Chambers (1983) calls the urban trap, sample surveys are a more effective way to use the scarce professional manpower willing to do rural development research. Moreover, given the current urban bias (Lipton, 1977) in financial resource allocations, sample surveys economise on the scarce financial resources allocated for rural development in many Third World countries. The rapidity with which sample surveys can be done enables the

results of evaluation processes to become available quickly for use in the management of rural development projects (Shepherd, 1998).

Sample surveys are differentiated into qualitative and quantitative sample surveys (Newman, 1997). Qualitative sample surveys are concerned with determination of the qualitative values of variables of a research element (Dey, 1993); whereas quantitative sample surveys concentrate on the determination of quantitative values of variables of the research element (Newman, 1997).

However, the use of a combination of both qualitative and quantitative sample surveys results in a more comprehensive evaluation of rural development projects than use of each of them independently (Dias and Wickramanayake, 1983).

Sample surveys, irrespective of type, are implemented through use of structured or unstructured techniques. Unstructured methods of data collection in sample surveys are spontaneous, unordered and haphazard. Data is collected as it comes from different angles at different depths of analysis. Typical examples are use of brainstorming, check list and participant observation (Casley and Kumar, 1998). The advantage of unstructured methods of data collection in sample surveys are that the data comes naturally with less disturbance in between and chances are high that it is untempered. The disadvantage is that the data may not be logical and consist of gaps (Dixon and Leach, undated.). Structured methods of data collection in sample surveys, on the other hand, consist of an ordered sequence of questions in a questionnaire (Higson-Smith, and Bless, 1995). A questionnaire is implemented through either self-administration or interview (Dixon and Leach, undated). In self-administered questionnaires, the respondents fill in the questionnaire themselves and post them back to the researcher (postal survey) or await their collection by the researcher who delivered them earlier (delivery-collection method). Use of self-administered questionnaires has the advantage that respondents can fill them in at their own time and presumably pay more attention to the content of their answers to the questions. There is, however, the disadvantage that the questionnaires are shelved for extended periods of time and eventually lost before being completed. This results in a high rate of non-response under self-administered questionnaire surveys (Higson-Smith, and Bless, 1995). Moreover, in the context of rural areas in the Third World where the means of communication are poor, use of self-administered questionnaires in evaluation of rural development projects is impracticable.

Interviews involve person to person contact between the interviewer who administers the questionnaire and the interviewee who responds to the questions. The advantage of interviews is

that they allow for establishment of a rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee. Moreover, probing is possible and clarity of issues enhanced (Higson-Smith and Bless,1995). The problem of interviews is that they compete with other commitments for the interviewees time and have to be conducted in an unbiased manner by the interviewer as soon as possible (Higson-Smith and Bless,1995).

3.3 Research Methods

In this study two sets of data were used. First, secondary data was collected at three spatial levels. At the general global level, data was collected on theoretical perspectives on development and rural development. This data consisted of a literature review and has been used to formulate the conceptual framework upon which this study is based. The data was collected mainly from the main library at the National University of Lesotho (NUL), the documentation centre of the Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS) at NUL; the main library of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development in Maseru, and the main library of the University of The Orange Free State in Bloemfontein. At national level, data was collected on the development profile and rural development policies of Lesotho since independence. Most of this data was collected from the archives section of the NUL library, the documentation centre of the Institute of southern African Studies (ISAS) at NUL, and from various government ministries involved in rural development in Maseru. At district level, data was collected from various government departments in Mphahle's hoek district on the overall district development profile since independence. Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture in Mphahle's hoek was intensively combed for various reports dealing with feasibility, appraisal, inception, monitoring and both ex-ante and ex-post evaluation reports, including any other studies done privately on the Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC) Project in the past and the Production Through Conservation (PTC) Project

A sample survey was used for collection of primary data. Choice of use of sample survey rather than a census survey was motivated by scarcity of financial, manpower and time resources on the part of the researcher. Two hundred households were interviewed by four research assistants.

A questionnaire was used to solicit both qualitative and quantitative information on the Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC)/Production Through Conservation (PTC) project, its mode of operation, its activities, their impacts on the population and sustainability in the Mphahle's hoek district. The questionnaire was administered by the researcher and four research

assistants with Bachelor of Arts degrees through use of structured interviews to 200 rural households in the villages in the Mphahle's hoek district. The consent of the chiefs of the areas was sought before the interviews were conducted.

Choice of the Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC)/Production Through Conservation (PTC) project as a case study of rural development in Lesotho, was motivated by the decision by the Government of Lesotho to declare its participatory approach as the national model for all future rural development projects (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997). The researcher felt that this declaration called for a closer inventorisation and analysis of the success (and failures) of the project and highlighted, them for decision-making and planning of future rural development projects in order to minimise repetition of past mistakes.

In order to effect sampling, a number of procedures were used to compile both the sampling frame, the sample size and the actual selection of elements to be included in the sample.

The Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC), later known as Production with Conservation Project initiated development activities in 20 key action villages throughout the Mphahle's hoek district. A preliminary visit to the project headquarters in Mphahle's hoek, revealed that information on the number of households in each of the 20 key action villages was available on only 15 of them. Ground verification showed that the data was old. Therefore recent data on households was sought through a fresh compilation of the sampling frame. This data was available for only 11 areas, which were used for this survey.

Due to resource limitations, it was not possible to do a complete population survey of the key action villages. A sample survey was opted for, instead, as the cost-effective research tool that could save resources but enable the researcher to achieve the desired research objective(s) (Conyers and Hills, 1984).

In general, a multi-stage sampling procedure (Moser and Kalton, 1971; Babie, 1973; Casley and Kumar, 1988; Higson-Smith and Bless, 1995), involving a combination of probability sampling, purposive sampling, proportional sampling and simple random sampling were used to derive the sample size and select the actual households to be interviewed in the survey. The procedures were applied as follows:

(a) Sampling frame

The sampling frame was compiled from the action areas in the Mohale's hoek district as presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Number of households sampled per area.

AREA	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS
Mekaling	458
Ha Reentseng	337
Maphutseng	97
Ha Sekoati	151
Braakfontein	405
Thaba-Ts'oeu	52
Ha Phala	85
'Mamotena (DraiHoek)	423
Ha Makhate	524
Ma Monyake	181
Ha Sephapo	241
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2,954</u>

(b) Sample size

The sample size in the research was determined through the following procedures:

1. Probability sampling: Probability sampling involved the selection of units for observation on the consideration that the results will have statistical validity 30% of the sampling frame has statistical validity according to Toyne and Newby (1971). The 30% of the sampling frame was found to be 886 households.

(2) Purposives Sampling

The probability sample size of 886 was found to be too large given the limited resources of manpower, finance and time, at the disposal of the researcher. Instead, an alternative procedure, the Purposive sampling (Babie, 1973) was found a suitable substitute. Within the context of purposive sampling, the sample size is determined by the researcher bearing in mind all the resources at their disposal and that the objective of the research should not be put in jeopardy in the process of making the resource constant considerations. In this research, 7% of the sampling frame was found to be a workable, preferable sample size that could minimise resource costs but maximise the attainment of the research objective as well. The 7% sample size was therefore

found to be 206. This figure was rounded up to 200 households which was the sample size used in this research.

(c) Sampling techniques

A cluster or multi-stage sampling procedure was employed as follows:

(1) Proportional sampling

The proportion of the sample to which each of the participating villages in the sampling frame was entitled, was calculated by multiplying the number of households in each village by the sample size, and then dividing the product by the total number of households in the sampling frame. The results are indicated below

Mekaling: = 31 households

Ha Reentseng: = 23 households

Maphutseng: = 7 households

Ha Sekoati: = 10 households

Braakfontein: = 27 households

Thaba-Ts'oeu: = 4 households

Ha Phala: = 6 households

'Mamotena (DraiHoek)= 29 households

Ha Makhate: = 35 households

Ha Monyake: = 12 households

Ha Sephapo: = 16 households

(2) Simple random sampling

A household list showing heads of households in each of the 15 villages in the sampling frame was compiled. In each village a simple random sampling procedure was used to select the actual

number of members from the household list to be interviewed. Random number tables were used to effect this selection process.

Preliminary discussion with the project management in the Mphahlele district also revealed that expansion of PTC to the Mafeteng and Quthing districts was fairly recent and most activities were only being introduced in the villages. This information was confirmed by preliminary visits to the Quthing and Mafeteng District Agricultural Offices. On the basis of this information, it was decided that formal questionnaire interviews to sampled respondents would be premature in these two districts. Instead, use was made of open-ended informal group discussions with farmers, common interest groups, field staff, village development councils, chiefs and other non-governmental organisations in the pilot areas of Matelile Ha Seeiso Moreneng in Mafeteng and Ha Tlhaku at Mphaki-Qhoalinyana in Quthing districts, respectively. The data from the informal discussions in these two pilot expansion areas provided an impromptu perspective to the researcher on the modus operandi and preliminary impact of PTC on the target populations in its spatial expansion programme.

Lastly, the technical design of the questionnaire, the coding of questions, the coding of field data and the computer analysis of the field data were all done by the researcher with technical guidance from the Computer Services Centre of the University of the Orange Free State in Bloemfontein.

3.4 Conclusion

Interviews conducted in the study were with head of households or their spouses. Ideally, the interviews were to be alone with the interviewer during the interview in order to make sure that their opinions were not influenced by the presence of other members of the family. However, it was not always possible to get the interviewees to leave their chores and children within a compound household setup and be alone with the interviewer. Sometimes, due to old age and semi-literacy, the head of household or spouse who were interviewees had to seek the assistance of their children to recall the exact figures on yield and time of estimates. Invariably the interviews became household interviews rather than those of heads of households per se. This might have had some influence on the quality of the data collected and presented in this study.

CHAPTER 4: LESOTHO: A DEVELOPMENT PROFILE

4.0 Introduction.

This chapter discusses the development profile of Lesotho through a presentation of the physical, demographic, socio-cultural, political, administrative, and economic profiles.

4.1 Physical Profile

The Kingdom of Lesotho is located at latitudes 29°S and 30°S and longitudes 28°E and 29°E (Moeti, 1996). The country is 30 355 km² in size. It is divided into four physiographic regions, namely the lowlands, the foothills, the mountains and the Orange river valley (Chakela *et.al*,1986). Figure 4.1 shows the location of Lesotho in southern Africa, whilst Figure 4.2 presents the physiographic regions of Lesotho.

Lowlands

The lowlands are composed of a strip of undulating plains that vary from 20km to 50km in width to form a belt that runs along the Caledon river in the western part of the country. The altitude in the lowlands ranges from 1400 metres to 1800 metres above sea level (Moeti, 1996). The relief of the lowlands ranges between 5 metres and 100 metres and is conducive to active soil erosion (Chakela *et al*, 1986).

The climate in the lowlands is characterised by hot wet summers and cold dry winters. The mean annual temperature is 15°C. Winter temperatures often range from below zero degrees to about 15°C, while summer temperatures range from 10°C to 38°C (Rydgren, 1993). Rainfall mostly occurs between October and April which are summer and autumn seasons. The months of May, June and July constitute the winter season and are often dry and frosty in the lowlands (Chakela *et al.*, 1986). Frost is common in winter from May to September. There are 165 frost free days measured at ground level (Rydgren, 1993).

LESOTHO




Figure 4. 1: Location map of Lesotho showing its ten districts and the study area, Mohale's Hoek

The mean annual rainfall in the lowlands is 500 millimetres in the south which is the driest part of the country, and 800 millimetres in the north, which is the wettest part of the country. Rainfall is seasonal, erratic and hail and thunderstorms common in summer (Chakela et al., 1986). The variable temperatures, erratic rainfall and thunderstorms affect the use of the lowlands for

agriculture and its contribution to development in many ways. First, the variable temperatures sometimes become very hot and reach daily peaks of over 30°C for extended periods and cause damage to crops. Secondly, the erratic rainfall sometimes fails to come in time for farmers to start their cultivation. At other times, extended drought in the middle of the cropping calendar causes damage to crops and results in poor harvest. Thunderstorms result in a lot of run off which causes accelerated erosion of the fertile soils necessary to nourish the crops for good harvest. Moreover, hail storms that often go hand in hand with thunderstorms destroy the quality of crops and negatively affect good harvests necessary for sustainable household food security. The Penman potential evapotranspiration varies between 1000 to 1300 millimetres per year (Rydgren, 1993).




Figure 4.2: The physiographic regions of Lesotho
Source: Modified after Moeti, 1996, pa. 51

The lowland region is dominated by lithosols, fersiallic and ferralitic soils, claypan soils and vertisols (Chakela et al., 1986). Schmitz and Rooyani (1987) argue that sand stones of the Clarens Formation, sand stones and shales of the Molteno Formation mostly dominate in the lowlands as shown in Figure 4.3. While the prevalence of sand soils enables the practice of intensive farming in the lowlands, much of them have a high infiltration and allow for high rain water to the underground and leaves little to nourish crops. Moreover, high values of rainfall intensity, estimated at between 10mm and 20mm per hour result in run-off that causes surface erosion (Schmitz and Rooyani, 1987). In the lowlands, the erosion rates are estimated at 20-40 mg/ha. The erosion reduces the fertility of the soils necessary to nourish the crops to have sustainable yields. As a result, use of either chemical or natural nutrients becomes necessary in order to increase the nutritive value of the soil to levels where the yields can be high enough to guarantee sustainable household food security. Unfortunately most peasants do not have the money to purchase and use chemical fertilizers. Most peasants also fail to use natural nutrients because they give priority to use of natural sources for other competing uses such as fuel (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1989).




Figure 4. 3: The geological cross-section of Lesotho showing the 5 formation.

Source: Modified after Chakela et. al, 1986. p. 11

Schmitz and Rooyani (1987) state that Lesotho is a climatic climax grassland composed of six climax vegetation types as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 : The Climax Vegetation Types of Lesotho and their regional distribution

Region	Elevation (Metres)	Climax Vegetation type
Lowlands	1500 – 1800	Cympobogen – Themeda Sourveld/Seboku sourveld
Senqu (Orange) river Valley	1500 – 2000	Mixed sourveld
Foothills	1800 – 2300	Mixed scrub forest/sourveld
Mountain valleys	2000 – 2500	Mixed scrub forest/sourveld
Subalpine	2300 – 2900	Letsiri sourveld
Alpine	2900 – 3500	Mixed Health/Letsiri sourveld

Source: Schmitz and Rooyani, 1987, p.141.

The vegetation of the lowlands is dominated by Cymbopogen – Themeda Sourveld/Seboku Sourveld. Much of the natural vegetation of the lowlands, has, however, been destroyed by overgrazing, use by human beings for fuelwood, medicinal purposes, over cultivation and sheer vandalism. As a result of bad land utilization, very little of the natural vegetation remains of significant value and contribution to development of the region today. Population pressure, overstocking, overgrazing and accelerated erosion are the biggest contributors to land degradation in the lowlands of Lesotho (Chakela et al., 1986; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1989).

The water resources of Lesotho are composed of both surface and ground water resources. Moeti (1996) argues that the surface water resources of Lesotho are influenced by four major catchments, the Senqu, Maphutseng, Makhaleng and Mohokare catchments, (see Figure 4.4) which are responsible for the country's mean annual run-off estimated at 4 100 000 000 cubic metres per year (m^3/year). Table 4.2 shows the run-off by catchment in cubic metres per second (m^3/s).




Figure 4. 4 : The major river catchments of Lesotho

Source : Modified after Moeti, 1996, page 70.

Table 4.2 : The average amount of run off by catchment

Catchment	Run off (m ³ /s)
Senqu	90.7
Maphutseng	1.2
Makhaleng	14.2
Mohokare	24.1
TOTAL	130.2

Source: Moeti, 1996, p.71.

Most of the run off from the four catchments occurs through the lowlands and foothills regions in the country. This run off is too high and badl to sustainable development in that it is one of the factors responsible for accelerated erosion which results in an estimated annual soil loss of 30 to 100 metric tons on farmland in the lowlands (Schmitz and Rooyani, 1987). Due to the absence of dams and the high silt levels of the ponds available in the country, most of the run-off is not captured for storage to use in irrigation to promote sustainable agriculture. Instead, the surface water is lost through the run-off to South Africa via the Orange River through to the Atlantic Ocean, leaving Lesotho, especially the heavily populated lowlands, desperate for water often just a few weeks after heavy rains have stopped. There is a dire need to educate the population in the lowlands to change their perceptions and attitudes towards the construction and maintenance of water ponds, some of which have completely silted for want of maintenance in the rural communities, one of the pre-conditions for the attainment of sustainable development in Lesotho.

The Foothills

This physiographic region is composed of a narrow strip that occupies eight per cent of the country. The foothills are sand-witched between the lowlands and the mountains and run from the north-east to the south-east. The altitude of the foothills ranges from 1750 metres to 2300 metres above mean sea level. The Clarens formation is the dominant land form in the region. The geology of the region is composed of sand stones in the lower parts of the region and basalt in the escarpment. Most sandstones also form plateaux, and deep gorges are common as a result of fluvial erosion. Dolerite dykes often form ridges and the topography is steeper (Chakela *et al.*, 1986). The steep terrain encourages erosion which has resulted in deep gorges and bare surfaces at various places. The steepness has also limited amount of arable land for sustainable agriculture.

The soils have been influenced by volcanic rocks prevalent in the region. The soils are young, shallow and greyish on crests and slopes of hills, and brown and reddish brown on spurs and planation surfaces. Depressions have dark vertisol soils (Chakela *et al.*, 1986). The soils in the foothills are more fertile for crop production than those in the lowlands. However, the prevalence of perma frost for about 5 months in a year has encouraged mainly frost resistant crops such as wheat, peas; tubers like potatoes and vegetables like cabbage, all of which do well in the foothills. Cultivation of maize is limited by the short cropping calendar due to frost that comes as early as March, often followed by snow from the end of April (Schmitz and Rooyani, 1987).

Temperatures in the foothills are cooler than those in the lowlands. The mean annual temperature is about 12°C (Schmitz and Rooyani, 1987). The rainfall is higher than that in the lowlands. The mean annual rainfall is about 1000mm (Chakela *et al.*, 1986). These cooler temperatures and high rainfall allow for the cultivation of crops that are resistant to cold but require a lot of moisture such as potatoes, cabbage, radish, and to a lesser extent wheat and sorghum.

As depicted in Table 4.1 the natural vegetation of the foothills is dominated by Mixed Sourveld (Schmitz and Rooyani, 1987). Chakela *et al.*, (1986) argue that the vegetation of the region is composed of Themeda-Cymbopogon-Eragrostis. The foothills have a high potential for grazing and are used as pasture land for livestock owned by households in both the lowlands and the less densely populated foothills themselves. However, as Chakela *et al* (1986, p.9) note “even in this zone signs of land degradation are apparent. The pastures are over-grazed, certain areas are being invaded by Karroid bushes, and wind and water erosion signs can be observed in most areas”.

The Mountains

The mountain region occupies three-quarters of Lesotho. It ranges from an altitude of 2000 metres to 3500 metres above sea level. The landform in the region is dominated by basalt of the Lesotho Formation. The topography of the region is rugged and consists of a rolling lava plateaux, steep mountain slopes with flat floored valleys, dolerite hills and dykes, mineral soils, calcimorphic soils and vertisols are dominant soils in the region (Chakela *et al.*, 1986). This topography is not conducive to large scale cultivation because of the steepness of the slopes. However, some small scale crop cultivation on plots less than one acre in size does take place in areas where the slope is not too steep and on the bottoms of the valleys.

The mountain region has a cold climate composed of cool rainy summers and very cold snowy winters. The mean annual temperature in the mountain region is about 5.7°C while the mean annual rain fall is about 1400 millimetres. Very cold temperatures are often accompanied by snow.

According to Schmitz and Rooyani (1987) the natural vegetation in the mountain region is mixed sourveld of Themeda Triandra and Festuca Caprinain in the mountain valleys. The mixed sourveld and Letsiri sourveld dominated by Themeda Triandra are found in the subalpine zone of the mountain region, while the Erica Helichrysum heath dominates the Alpine zone of the mountain region.

The mountain region is rich in grass and is therefore used as summer grazing land by the foothills, lowlands and mountain livestock owners alike throughout the country. Chakela *et al.*, (1986) warned that there were already signs that over grazing was the dominant land degradation problem in the mountain region. In recognition of this problem, the Government of Lesotho has embarked on a Cattle post Re-adjudication Programme, and the Livestock Inventory Programme, as some of the official policy instruments to address the problem of overstocking and overgrazing in the region, for more sustainable livestock production and range management in the mountain region (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1989).

The mountain region is very rich in water and mineral resources. The most important mineral resource in the region is diamonds. Individual diamond digging takes place at Kao, Lemphane and Lihobong and provides employment and income to Basotho in the region and other parts of Lesotho. Large scale diamond mining was opened in the 1970s at Lets'eng-la-Terai by the De Beers mining company and provided employment and income to Basotho and Lesotho. However, the mine closed down in the early 1980s due to a fall in the prices of diamonds in the international market as a result of the recession in the world economy in the 1980s (Schmitz and Rooyani, 1987; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1989).

The mountain region acts as a watershed for the water resources in Lesotho. The basalt of the Lesotho Formation is less permeable and erodible and therefore results in less sediment (Chakela *et al.*, 1986). The Government of Lesotho and the Government of South Africa have, since 1986, embarked on the multi-million dollar Lesotho Highlands Water Project to dam the water and sell it to South Africa. The Lesotho Highlands Water Project has brought about tremendous

improvement to the development of the region through construction of physical and social infrastructures and employment and income generation. Moreover, the capital to be received by Lesotho when the actual sale of water starts, has potential to become a viable source of finance for national development in the country. However, it must be noted that there needs to be a change in the perception and attitudes of the decision makers and planners who will handle this capital, so that, instead of lining their pockets in private accounts through capital flight abroad, the capital ought to be used in an accountable manner to invest in sustainable development of Lesotho.

The physical profile provided above and its implications for sustainable development for each physiographic region discussed, leads to a number of important points which need to be borne in mind for sustainable national development in Lesotho.

The land-locked nature of Lesotho makes it heavily dependent on South Africa for its development. While the country can do nothing to change its land-locked position, it can, however, do a lot to make itself less dependent on South Africa if its own people at all levels adopt a more positive attitude towards the use of the resources in the country in a more accountable and forward-looking manner, than they have hitherto done.

4.2 Demographic Profile

When Lesotho attained her independence in 1966, she had a de facto population of 852,361 persons present in the country, and a de jure population of 969,634 persons. The latter was composed of those present within the country and those outside the country as well. Then the population growth rate was estimated at 1.97% annually. Even then, a marked demographic feature of Lesotho's population structure was absence, of some 120 000 persons from the country, mostly involved in migration to South Africa. The sex composition of the population in 1966 was 367 000 males and 483 000 females for the de facto situation and the de jure situation was 463 000 males and 502 000 females. Male absentees were 96,350 and female absentees were 19,350. The de jure male/female sex ratio was 0.92 (LSPP, 1989a; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1970).

In 1996, the total population was 2,124, 390, of whom 1,034,959 were males and 1,089,431 were females. The annual population growth rate was 2.2 per cent (BOS, 1996). Life expectancy at birth was 57 years for females and 56 for males. Forty six per cent of the females were in the reproductive age groups. The fertility rate was 5 and the average household size was 5 in 1996.

The dependency ratio was 83 whilst the population density was 778 persons per square kilometre on arable land in 1996 (BOS, 1994; BOS, 1996).

The vital statistics provided above points to the following trends which are of relevance to development in Lesotho. First, population growth is high and typified by a high average annual growth rate above two per cent, which implies a doubling rate within about 30 years. The country has to tune its development to ensure sustainable livelihoods for the additional population. Secondly, the population exhibits a young age structure. There was also a high dependency ratio composed of more people in the non productive age compared to those in the productive group. Given that there is also a high fertility rate and increased life expectancy, it can be expected that in future, there will be increased population pressure on resources. Contemporary development must be geared to laying down a foundation to cope in various ways with these pressures. Thirdly, the sex structure of the population is skewed. There are more women than men. Given that men are still, to a large extent, main bread winners who, in any case, have shorter life spans; development efforts have to find ways to increasingly involve women in development because they represent a higher percentage of the potential labour force. Fourthly, there is high internal migration from rural areas to urban areas. This rural-urban migration depopulates the rural areas and creates "over" urbanisation and pressure on urban service provision. Urbanisation was 19.4% in 1996 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997). Development efforts have to stem this tide of migration by, among other strategies, embarking on sustainable rural development. Lastly, international migration is pronounced, especially due to the phenomenon of migrant labour to South Africa. While in the past, despite the internal socio-economic problems this migration caused, it was the mainstay of both households and national economic development, today the increased phenomenon of retrenchment has led to a reduction of migrant flows to South Africa. This reduction has resulted in decreased household and national income. Development efforts have to cope with provision of alternative employment and income generation for the retrenched persons, and alternative sources of national revenue than through the remittances arrangement as was the case before.

4.3 Socio-cultural Profile

Lesotho is inhabited by the Basotho, a people who speak the Sesotho language. Unlike in most African countries, the tribal factor is weak in Lesotho, and the Basotho behave as one and speak Sesotho as the national language. However, Basotho are composed of a heterogenous blending of

tribal groups who were unified by Moshoeshoe I during the Lifaqane in the early 1820s. The most significant of these tribes are the Bakoena, the Makhoakhoa of Butha-Buthe, the Bataung in Mohale's hoek, and the Baphuthi of Quthing districts. The chiefs of these three tribes went into equal friendship and partnership with Moshoeshoe I during the formation of Basotho nation. Even today the chiefs of the three and the King treat one another with mutual respect and all command high respect and stature during national traditional ceremonies.

Other Basuto clans are the Bafokeng, Basia, Bahlakoana, Batlokoa, Bakubung, Bakhatla, Bats'oeneng and Makholokoe. Nguni speaking peoples have also mingled with and become absorbed as Basotho after the Lifaqane, a large scale regional warfare started by Shaka's efforts to expand the Zulu Kingdom in the 1820s that resulted in northward migrations and spatial settlement of many Bantu speaking peoples in southern Africa. Prominent Nguni groups are the Matebele who are the descendants of Zulus in the north, and, the Bathepu who are the descendents of Xhosas in the southern districts. There are also Asians concentrated in Butha-Buthe but present in other districts as well. In Maseru, a few Europeans are present as well (Ashton, 1952; Duncan, 1960; Germond, 1967; Jingoos, 1975; Bereng, 1982).

Socio-cultural practices of both Sotho and Nguni groups are fairly similar throughout the country. But linguistic dialects of Sesotho and some cultural practices like circumcision, burials and marriages, show slight differences. Lynn (1994) provides a detailed discussion of the spatial distribution of dialects and the language situation in Lesotho. People of Asiatic and European stock have maintained their own different socio-cultural practices. From a development perspective, Lesotho's relative socio-cultural homogeneity stands out as an opportunity to be taken advantage of, in that, unlike in many African countries where development is stifled by ethnic rivalries and opportunities, Lesotho is ethnically more stable for development.

4.4 Political Profile

The Basotho nation was built by Moshoeshoe I between 1820 and 1830 from the ravages of Lifaqane and Vootrekker attacks. The Vootrekker attacks were caused by the Trekboers in their northward migration from the Cape to the interior of southern Africa in search of independence from the British in the Cape and land for conquer and resettlement in the 1830s.

Moshoeshoe I's stronghold and fortress, Thaba-bosiu, acted as the seat of his government from which he subsequently dispatched his sons and placed them at various vantage points and strategic surrounding areas to act as outposts and effect his governance there (Duncan, 1960).

Despite the military and political prowess and the resourcefulness displayed by Moshoeshoe to defend his territory against invasion, frequent attacks by the Boers in search of more land to conquer and settle themselves more comfortably in the interior eventually led him to seek protection from Britain. In 1868, the country was officially given the status of a Protectorate of the British Empire and administered by Britain. It was then annexed to Cape Colony from 1871 to 1884. In 1884 it became administered directly from Britain again (Duncan, 1960; Maqutu, 1990; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1992).

Moshoeshoe I did not live long to see Basutoland under protectorate rule. He died in 1870, and was succeeded by his sons and their descendants. The period between 1868 and 1966 comprised British colonial rule. As was typical of British colonial rule in Africa, the system of indirect rule was applied in Basutoland. The British maintained a low profile presence through the introduction of western style central and district administration headed by the Resident British Commissioner in Maseru. He was in charge of District Commissioners overseeing British rule and enforcement of law and order in the then nine districts and used the chiefs to effect local administration (LSPP, 1989 b).

In order to effect the system of indirect rule, the British colonial government formed the Basutoland National Council in 1903 composed of senior chiefs, and used them to act both as representatives of the people in the legislative assembly and also the mouthpiece of government policy to the people at grassroots level. The Basutoland National Council was opposed by some Basotho, on the grounds that it was a puppet institution meant to use chiefs to ease oppression of Basotho by the British. As a result, these critics formed an alternative institution. First they formed the Basutoland Progressive Association in 1907 and then later the Basutoland League of Commoners (Lekhotla la Bafo), as the peoples' vanguard in 1919 under Josiel Lefela. It is widely believed that the formation of the Basutoland League of Commoners laid the foundation for nationalism and anti-colonial pressure which eventually led to the birth of the Basutoland African Congress, the fore runner of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in 1952 under Ntsu Mokhehle (Weisfelder, 1973; Sixishe, 1984; Edgar, 1988; Machobane, 1986; Maqutu, 1990; Gill, 1993; Moleleki, 1994).

The formation of the BCP in 1952, marked the beginning of formal political opposition against British Colonial rule and demands that Basutoland be granted independence. In line with the political rhetoric of that time in Africa, the BCP chanted a Pan Africanist ideology with a heavy socialist accent, anti-christianity and anti-chieftainship. This, among others, led to the resignation of some of its followers who were in favour of christianity and chieftainship. Some of those who resigned formed alternative political parties towards the end of the 1950s. In 1957, the Marematlou Party was formed under Seephephe Matete, and in 1958 the Freedom Party under Seth Makotoko. These two parties were pro-royalist and defended the chieftainship; they later merged to form the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). In 1959, under the sponsorship of the Roman Catholic Church, another party, the Basutoland National Party, was born under Leabua Jonathan. This party defended the church, especially the Roman Catholic Church, and small chiefs, whose founder was Leabua Jonathan (Sixishe, 1984).

Thus in 1960 when the British encouraged the Legislative Council in which elected District Councils would take part, party participation through elected representation became necessary and the country had a ready team of three parties to compete in the elections. These parties were the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) under Ntsu Mokhehle, the Basutoland National Party (BNP) under Leabua Jonathan, and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) under Seth Makotoko. The BCP won these elections and went ahead to form District Councils as an experiment at self local government (Weisfelder, 1973).

In 1965, national elections were held again, but, this time to determine the winning party to run the government after independence was granted. Again, the three parties, BCP, the BNP and the MFP went to the polls with much enthusiasm. The BNP won the elections, and formed the first government in independent Lesotho, with its leader Chief Leabua Jonathan as the first Prime Minister of Lesotho. In 1966, independence was granted, and the country became the Kingdom of Lesotho with King Moshoeshoe II, as a constitutional Monarch and Head of State, in line with the British Lancaster Model Constitution it had adopted (Weisfelder, 1973; Maqutu, 1990).

Lesotho's political development never became stable from the onset after independence. Between 1966 and the second national election in 1970, it was marked by degrading verbal exchanges unleashed against one another by the three parties. At times physical violence with loss of life took place such as during the Rothe massacre in 1966 of BCP cadres, and, the Thaba-Bosiu political inferno of 1966 (Leeman, 1985; Moleleki, 1994).

In 1970 Lesotho had its the second general elections. The BCP, the BNP and the MFP contested these elections. The BCP won the elections. However, the Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan annulled the elections, declared a State of Emergency throughout the country and continued to rule by force with the support of the para-military unit (PMU) (Khaketla, 1971; Weisfelder, 1973; Leeman, 1985; Moleleki, 1994).

Jonathan ruled Lesotho undemocratically for 17 years (1970-1986) with an iron-fisted despotism marked by cross violation and denial of human rights where intimidation and abuses of kinds to the opposition became entrenched. These created a conducive environment for nepotism, corruption and self-aggrandisement out of public property to become rife. Towards the end of the 1970s the political environment in Lesotho and southern Africa changed. The BCP, which had gone into exile in 1974 after failing to overthrow the BNP by force, increased pressure for democratisation, through mounting attacks on targets in Lesotho by its military wing, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) operating from South African territory (Leeman, 1985). Jonathan's complaint on this matter to South Africa, was met by demands by the latter, that, he either hand over cadres of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC) living in Lesotho, or at least, expel them further a-field into the interior of Africa where they could be less of a threat to South African stability (Sixishe, 1984; Leeman, 1985;). This damaged the ties of friendship between South Africa and Jonathan, so lavishly displayed since the donation of 100,000 tonnes of mealies by South Africa to support Jonathan's election campaign in 1965, and, development and military support rendered to his government when it needed thereafter (Maqutu, 1990).

Instead of surrendering to the South African demands, Jonathan changed strategy, and sought political friendship and support from the Eastern block - communist China, North Korea, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), Cuba and the Eastern Europe and asked them to establish diplomatic missions in Maseru - especially the USSR (Sixishe, 1984).

South Africa became infuriated by Chief Jonathan's daring, and mounted pressure through encouraging increased LLA attacks, and on its own part, making direct economic blockades, punctuated by actual military raids on Lesotho by the South African Defence Force (SADF) such as the Maseru massacre of 1982, which it justified as operations to purge Lesotho of ANC and PAC terrorists (Sixishe, 1984). In the early 1980s Lesotho became a battle field. The international community also put pressure on Chief Jonathan to democratize rule, in the interests

of order and stability in the country (Maqutu, 1990). Eventually, early in 1985 a pseudo-amnesty Bill was passed in parliament and Chief Jonathan invited all parties to join the BNP in the general elections envisaged for later that year. No party took part in the process of preparing for, and attending, these elections because the constitution was still suspended by the BNP. The BNP, however, went ahead and in September, 1985, mounted the pseudo-elections and declared itself the unopposed victor. Chief Jonathan went ahead to form his government, cabinet and ruled without legitimacy. However, this insensitivity made him fail to realize that the carpet under his feet had long vanished; he had lost confidence and control of his followers who were already busy haggling each other over power and control, using the two factions of the PMU - the old guard vis-a-vis the young brigade composed of the BNP Youth League supported by some senior officers in the newly formed cabinet and government. On January 20th, 1986, Chief Jonathan was toppled in a military coup d'état and replaced by a military government under the Chairmanship of Major General Metsing Lekhanya (Machobane, 1997).

The military government ruled Lesotho for seven years (January, 1986 - February, 1992). The military junta gave King Moshoeshoe II both executive and legislative powers, and ran the country through a two-pronged top brass machinery composed of the Military Council on the one hand and the Council of Ministers handpicked according to the King's favour from civilians on the other (Machobane, 1997).

In the beginning the King and the Military Council worked hand in glove to restore stability and a bit of breathing space to the country, perhaps more so, because the Military Council was pro-South Africa. For instance, immediately after its take over of government, it expelled South African refugees from Lesotho, and also rushed to make a unilateral agreement to sign the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty, pledging the entire mountain watershed of Lesotho to South Africa. However, towards the end of the 1980s, struggle for power between the Military Council and the King and some of his cousins who were top-brass in the Military Council, eventually led Major General Metsing Lekhanya to announce in 1990 that, the Military Council had granted the King study leave in Britain to do Ph.D. studies. In actual fact, it later turned out that the King had been exiled because of his involvement in political affairs of the country. There was opposition towards his envisaged model of a so-called Participatory Democracy - whereby, he apparently wanted to do away with political parties and introduce chieftainship councils in the districts and parliament and himself at the apex as the rightful organ through which to rule the country - a modified model such as that used currently in Swaziland. The King's cousins and close associates

in the Council of Ministers were given summary dismissals, despite their unsuccessful attempts to challenge the legitimacy of the dismissals in the High Court of Lesotho (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Machobane, 1997).

Rivalry within the Military government continued, however, and culminated in the toppling of Major General Metsing Lekhanya and some 20 senior military officers in 1991 by other soldiers. Major General Phisoane Ramaema took charge of rule as the chairman, and worked together with the international community and Basotho to see the country move back to democratic rule through the March 1993 general multi-party election.

The BCP under Ntsu Mokhehle won the 1993 general elections unopposed in all the 65 constituencies. On the 4th of June, 1993, a BCP led democratic government was sworn into power, with Ntsu Mokhehle as the Prime Minister, and head of government, and, King Letsie III as Head of State.

The BCP government never enjoyed any stability of rule since it assumed government in 1993. Hardly a year, down the line, in August 1994, it was toppled by King Letsie III through a palace coup, for alledged incompetence, and he, instead, installed a six pack of ministers to rule under him. Pressure mounted by the international community - the United Nations, the Common Wealth Secretariat, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the internal pressure from various quarters - eventually managed to restore the BCP democratic government (Matlosa, 1994; Sekatle, 1994; Makoa, 1995).

In January 1994 the military forces went on strike for a 100% pay increase, but surprised Basotho when they lost control of their strike, took to the tops of the hills in Maseru city and the Makoanyane and the Ratjomose brigades started to attack each other with grenades and motars causing much damage to private and public property and civilian lives and that of the soldiers themselves. The international community had to intervene to separate them. A series of strikes by the police, teachers, nurses, taxi owners, parastatal employees and others paralysed the smooth running of the government and the country since then. It faced an attempted coup by Bolofo Matsoso on the 29th of February, 1996. However, the biggest paralysis, was perhaps mounted within the BCP itself, where internal conflicts and struggles for power, eventually led the ailing Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle to declare that he had left the BCP, and formed his new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD); but continued to rule with the LCD while he declared the BCP as the opposition, on 9th June, 1997 (Mashinini, 1999).

In February 1998 the LCD, contrary to on-going fear and rumour that it wanted to dodge the elections scheduled for early 1998, officially dissolved parliament on 27 February 1998, and announced the general multi-party election date for 23 May 1998 under the organisation and supervision of a neutral body, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). On Monday, 18th May 1998, the BCP, BNP and MFP launched a case in the High Court of Lesotho to order IEC to postpone the general election because of what the three called serious irregularities in the registration of voters. The three parties lost the case and the elections were mounted as scheduled on the 23rd of May 1998. Twelve parties registered with the IEC for this general election. The Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 79 constituencies out of a total of 80. The Basotho National Party (BNP) won 1 constituency. Despite complaints and public demonstrations by the three other big parties, the Basotho National Party (BNP), the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), that the elections were rigged and should be declared null and void, the international and some local observers declared the elections free and fair and therefore valid. On Friday 29th May 1998, King Letsie II swore in the leader of the LCD, Mr. Pakalitha Mosisili, as the new Prime Minister of Lesotho for the next five years to 2003 (Mashinini, 1999).

A critical turn of political events took place on 4th August, 1998, when the BNP, BCP and MFP staged a demonstration to the palace with a request that the King must dissolve the LCD government, appoint a government of national unity and arrange for new national elections because the May 1998 one was fraudulent and unacceptable. The three parties and their supporters unilaterally stayed and sang at the Palace gates day and night waiting for the King's reply for weeks on end. Government threats through use of some police and the army to drive the protestors off the grounds failed to make them move. Three civilian lives and that of a policeman were lost in the sporadic ensuing physical scuffles between police and the protestors, police and the army and the army and the protestors. Confusion reigned and the police and army became factionalised. As pressure and confusion escalated, the protestors confiscated government vehicles, forced people to boycott work, and closed down government offices. Within the army, a mutiny took place, and a military coup de'tat seemed imminent (Mashinini, 1999).

Shuttle diplomacy between LCD government, opposition parties and the Troika Commission involving South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe on behalf of SADC, headed by Justice Pius Langa of South Africa, delayed to bear fruits and civil stability was replaced by chaos and disorder. On Tuesday, 22nd September 1998, South Africa, apparently acting on behalf of SADC

invitation by Prime Minister Mosisili, sent in its troops to invade Lesotho, in an operation code named BOLEAS. When Botswana forces arrived a day later in Lesotho, many lives were already lost and Maseru was ablaze (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1998).

Doubtful official figures are that South Africa lost 10 soldiers and Lesotho more than 50 people in this SADC military aggression, sugar-coated intervention by its perpetrators. Lesotho lost Maseru, Mafeteng and Mohale's hoek towns. The total damage to property is estimated at R2 billion. Lesotho also has to foot the bill of keeping SADC forces of about 3,000 strong estimated at R8 million per week, for all the weeks they spent in the country (Mashinini, 1999).

In terms of political diplomacy, all the parties in the country agreed to go for fresh elections 18 months from October 1998, and that a multi-party committee composed 2 representatives from all the 12 parties that contested the May 1998 elections should form the Interim Political Authority (IPA) that will work together with the LCD government to arrange for the fresh elections envisaged. The 24 person-strong Interim Political Authority (IPA) was sworn in on the 9th December, 1998 in the presence of the Troica countries headed by South Africa's Minister Sydney Mufamadi (Mashinini, 1999).

The political profile presented above shows that since independence do-date, Lesotho has never had political stability necessary for sustainable development. Autocracy has been prevalent and typified by the Jonathan rule from 1970 to 1986, the military rule from 1986 to 1993, the Mokhehle rule through the Lesotho Congress for Democracy from June 1997 to May 1998 and the present rule since June 1998 until re-election time in 2000 by the Lesotho Congress for Democracy.

During all these autocratic rules the government used the monopoly of violence by the state to entrench itself in power through repressive measures imposed on civil society. Often, a lot of bloodshed was involved. Corruption and nepotism was rife. At worst, a lot of capital was diverted from use for economic investment and provision of basic human needs for the poor, and used on military expenditure (Mashinini and De Villiers, 1999).

In terms of political culture, the prevalence of coup de'tats, lack of political tolerance, habitual refusal to accept election outcomes by defeated parties and lack of peaceful conflict resolution strategies and behaviours, all point to the fact that lack of political accountability and stability

might be the most daunting challenge for sustainable development in Lesotho in the 21st century (Mashinini and De Villiers, 1999).

4.5 Administrative Profile

Lesotho has a dual administrative system. A modern western-style administrative system based on Roman-Dutch System of law, co-exists with a traditional administrative system based on customary law (Poulter, 1981; LSPP, 1989b; Rugege, 1993).

4.1.5 The Traditional Administrative System

The traditional administration is based on the institution of chieftainship (Germond, 1967; Duncan, 1960; LSPP, 1989b). In Lesotho, although chieftainship existed before the Basotho nation was born, this institution became formalised, consolidated and powerful under Moshoeshoe I and his system of placing his sons.

It was formalised in the Laws of Lerotholi in 1905 and strengthened in 1938 and 1968. The system is hierarchical. At the apex of the hierarchy is the Paramount Chief, to-days King in Roman-Dutch Law. Below him is a number of Principal and Ward chiefs who are descendants of Moshoeshoe I, and also those of the major chiefs who sought friendship with him like Lethole of Makhoakhoa, Moletsane of Bataung, Moorosi of Baphuthi, and Sekonyela of Batlokoa. There are 22 of these principal and ward chiefs. This implies also that the country is spatially divided into 22 wards for administration at sub-national level. These wards are responsible to Matsieng Ward, the home of the King. The 22 Principal and Ward chiefs form the College of Chiefs under the headship of the Paramount Chief, the King. Below these chiefs is a network of gazetted chiefs in charge of village administration but responsible to the Principal and Ward chiefs. There are 1,121 of these chiefs throughout the country. Moreover, at the basic grassroot level, the village, there are many village headmen. These are, however, neither gazetted nor paid. They are appointed by gazetted chiefs to act as their "whistles" or village overseers. At all levels, chiefs execute administrative duties assisted by the council of elders "khotla" and through frequent public gatherings called "Pitso" to solicit public participation (Huisman, 1994).

4.5.2 Modern Administration

The Western-style administration in Lesotho is bureaucratic. It is composed of both the central government and local government. Central administration is composed of a number of

institutions. The head of state is the king, Letsie III at present. His duties are ceremonial and not executive. The head of government is the Prime Minister, who is assisted by a cabinet of ministers in charge of ministries. The actual composition of ministers and ministries varies from one government to another and sometimes changes within office tenure of the same government. However, at present there are 13 ministers and 13 ministries. The national assembly is the lower house of parliament and was composed of 65 members elected by people during the 1993 general election to represent constituencies. The number of constituencies has increased to 80 for the 1998 general election, and, as such, the number of members of Parliament adjusted to 80, accordingly. The national assembly is the legislative body in charge of making laws and bye-laws of the country, making and approving the national budget and responsible for public policy formulation and monitoring its implementation (Maqutu, 1990).

The senate is the upper house of parliament. It is composed of 22 principal chiefs and 11 members from the public who are nominees of the King acting on advice by the Prime Minister. The responsibilities of the senate are to debate bills from the lower house and endorse them. The senate, however, has no power to reject them completely. It can, nonetheless, suggest modifications as it sees fit, or express that it does not support the bill (Maqutu, 1990).

The bureaucracy at the bottom is responsible for implementation and daily administration of public policy and also monitors and evaluates performance. The bureaucracy is composed of various ministries, professionally headed by principal secretaries. The ministries are responsible for making some draft policy suggestions within their respective ministries, and draft annual budget estimates for themselves which are submitted by their ministers to the parliament for scrutiny and approval. These ministries are also responsible for implementation and coordination of policy by their line departments at district levels (Sechaba Consultants, 1995).

Local administration in Lesotho dates back to pre-independence period (Wallis and Van der Geer, 1982; Rembe and Mapetla, 1989; LSPP, 1989b; Sechaba Consultants, 1995). Much argument is made by the above authors in writing on local government in Lesotho, to the effect that the traditional Basotho administration which was based on the principle that the chief was a chief by people (Jingoes, 1975) in that he did what the people wanted as expressed through council of elders and pitsos, was local administration.

On its part, the British colonial government, introduced local government in 1948 when it formed the Basutoland Council of representatives at district level which in turn, elected two

representatives to the Basutoland National Council. Members of district councils were elected by people at public gatherings and chiefs were ex-officio members. In the early 1960s district councils became stronger, and nomination took political overtones. The district councils were dominated by the BCP between 1960 and 1965 (Wallis and Van der Geer, 1982).

At independence in 1966, the councils had been discontinued temporarily due to a number of reasons. First, the councils' power in the districts conflicted with that of central government, which essentially saw their autonomy as a threat towards cession. This fear by the central government was aggravated by the fact that election and the functioning of district councils had become highly politicised. They were dominated by the BCP, which was an anti-colonial government and espoused a social democratic ideology (Wallis and Van der Geer, 1982).

Another reason for discontinuation of the district councils was disagreements over the decentralization of the budget and formulation of district by-laws to enable district autonomy to generate their own funds. However, the districts at that time, continued to be the regional arms of central administration. The District Administrator assumed the role of chief administrator and overseer of implementation of central government policy throughout the district. He was assisted, in terms of distribution of justice, by the District Magistrate, and, for maintenance of law and order, by the District Commanding Officer of police. The position of the District Administrator was given more power by the BNP government and re-named District Coordinator in line with a pseudo-decentralization process in the early 1980s which was essentially, centralization (Mapetla and Setloboko, 1984).

When the military government came into power in 1986, it also argued that it was decentralizing by actually posting their own District Military Officers (DMO) in the ten districts to be their own eye on the spot. A drastic centralization of power was that the District Military Officer had the final word on district affairs, and was directly responsible to the Military Council in the central government of the day (Rembe and Mapetla, 1989).

Given the unstable nature of government since independence to 1970, the undemocratic despotic rule between 1970 and 1985, and the military rule of 1986 to 1992, not much was done to effect local government except token national conferences and by-laws, and creation of positions and institutions that centralized, rather than decentralised, administration. Some of the institutions so created are village development councils (VDC) first mooted in 1965, but actually put into practise in 1970 after the declaration of the State of Emergency by the BNP government. Since

then to-date, VDC's have been a very controversial local institution with no clear functional mandate, no clear authority and highly abused by central government to suit its political mission (Wallis and Van der Geer, 1982; Thoahlane, 1984; Dahlberg, 1988; Rembe and Mapetla, 1989). However, VDC's are regularly used by government in development planning and implementation in the rural areas, to (mis) represent the people's perspective and participation. A VDC is composed of 7 members including the chief as ex-officio chairperson. The other members are elected in a pitso by the community. VDC's have an office tenure of 3 years. They are in charge of initiating and administering village development activities, a task over which they conflict highly with chiefs.

More recently, the LCD government initiated and passed the local government bill of 1997 which aims to introduce a local government structure based on formal elections in the rural areas. The local government act was introduced to people around the country for their opinions. It is at the moment being discussed in various government fora. However, the senate, on its own part as a body that debates bills from the lower house of parliament, did not accept the local government bill on the grounds that it was aimed to abolish chieftainship.

4.6 Economic Development Profile

4.6.1 Introduction

Since independence in 1966 until recently in 1994, Lesotho was classified as one of the least developed country's of the World by the United Nations Organisation. The country's economy is predominantly agrarian. More than 80 per cent of the population lives in rural areas and, makes a living from agriculture as a complementary economic activity to migrant work in the mines. Key development indicators show that the country is very poor and lacks major services to the majority of the population.

4.6.2 Macro-economic structure and performance

Statistics available show that in 1970, Lesotho had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of R43 million. This was by far surpassed by the migrant remittances for that year which were R90 million. The per capita income at that time was estimated at R63.00 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1970). The composition of GDP in 1970 was 43% by Primary Sector - Agriculture was 39% and Mining and Quarrying was 2%. The secondary sector was 2.4% and the tertiary sector (including Government services) was 56.4% (Moody, 1975).

In 1985 Gross National Product (GNP) was R1065 million and GNP per capita was R710. In 1990 GNP rose to R2611 million and GNP per capita was R1624. In 1995 the GNP was R4705 million and GNP per capita had risen up to R2206 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1994; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997).

Until the 1990s, Lesotho's economic growth rate was an average of about 2% per annum. More recently, since 1994 the GDP has grown by above 10 per cent annually while GNP has grown by between 5% and 9% annually (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997). Per capita GNP for Lesotho seems high and has put the country into the group of middle income countries. However, marked income distribution disparities exist. In 1995, the high income group that makes up only 10% of total national households received 44% of national income, while the bottom 40% shared a mere 8% of national income (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997).

This high growth in the 1990s is attributable to the spin-off effects and positive externalities emanating from the construction phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. This project imports machinery and equipment of various kinds to the importing firms, royalties through the Highlands Development Fund, capital spending on consumption and taxation of migrant foreign employees, and employment to Lesotho citizens. All these benefits will end with the termination of the construction phase and the economic realities of Lesotho might re-surface. The fact that Lesotho is no more a least developed country, means special treatment for development is gone. An important question to consider is what next will Lesotho do to make sure that the initial momentum of development becomes sustainable?

Lesotho's economy has been heavily dependent on remittances from migrant labour in South African mines and other sectors. This largely accounts for the big difference between GDP and GNP in Lesotho. In 1985, 1990 and 1995 GDP was R551 million, R1509 million and R3219 million, respectively. Until the 1990s, migrant remittances far surpassed the GDP and contributed more than 50% to both national and household income (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975; Van der Wiel, 1977; Huisman, 1994). Matekane (1998) argues that in 1986/87, 37% of the rural households depended on migrant remittances.

Matekane (1998) also shows that in 1998, migrant remittances only accounted for 19% of rural households due to heavy retrenchment of migrant Basotho workers. In 1989 there were 125,800 Basotho migrants, but only 103,700 remained in 1995. Deferred payments totalled R234.7 million while remittance payments were R190.9 million for 1989. In 1995, however, both had

declined to R188 million and R104.6 million, respectively (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997). Estimates by the Six National Development Plan in 1997 show that the total percentage of labour force in migrant labour has declined to a low of 17%.

This reduction of remittances to provide financial support to household and national income results in increased poverty for Basotho. The country is compelled to seek ways to alleviate this poverty through alternative income generation development strategies.

Another important feature of Lesotho's economy is that it has always been dependent on external finance and loans to finance its development programmes. Foreign aid was responsible for financing 59.1% of capital expenditure between 1975-1980, and more than 2/3 of the capital budget in 1984/85. In 1988 total foreign aid to Lesotho was 86 million United States dollars (Huisman, 1994). Foreign aid to Lesotho might decrease because donors have moved to South Africa after democratisation.

Moreover, since 1988 Lesotho entered into a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1991 a second round of SAPs was signed enhanced (ESAP) and since 1997/98 the third round is operational. SAPs in Lesotho aim to assist the country reduce its balance of payments deficit, reduce government expenditure and consumption through retrenchment, cut in fringe benefits and government subsidies to food and services, privatisation of public assets, and increase in government revenue through increased taxation (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997).

The net impact of SAPs on the economy is visible in many ways. On its part, the government claims to have serviced all its debt since 1993 when the democratic BCP government came into power (Mosisili, 1997). Hence the high positive economic growth rate of more than 10% since 1994. The government has, since the late 1990s, retrenched a lot of casual labourers and those deemed less productive in the civil service, it has frozen employment greatly in the civil service and lowered the retirement age down to 45 years. This retrenchment, freezing of posts and early retirement have, however, also created unemployment, lowered the purchasing power of those involved and their families and contributed to poverty increase rather than alleviation (Matlosa, 1990).

The government has also embarked on a large scale process of privatisation through a special unit, the Privatisation Unit, which oversees the process. So far more than 40 public and parastatal

enterprises are earmarked for privatisation, some, such as the airport, national abattoir, feedlot, Lesotho Flower Mills and so forth (Makoa, 1997), have already been privatised. The government claims that it saves a lot of money which it used to spend on subsidies to these enterprises. In an interview on Seboping Programme on radio Lesotho, Minister Kelebone Maope argued that the Government saved R7 million a year by privatising Lesotho Airways. Despite these possible savings, fear and reservations are expressed by some Basotho that, privatisation might lead to more ownership and control of the economy of Lesotho by foreign hands than, it already is in those of the Asians and South Africans (Makoa, 1997). Lesotho's dependence on external financing has resulted in a high indebtedness of the country. In 1991/92 when the Fifth Five Year Development Plan began, external public debt was R1032.6 million, about 62.5% of GDP then, and 38% of GNP. In 1995 there was a total external debt of R1861.5 million, amounting to 39% of GNP, of which the debt: service ratio was only 5.6% (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997).

Lack of domestic employment is another aspect that characterises Lesotho's economy. The country only provides employment to less than 45% of its labour force. In the past, 60% of this labour force worked in South Africa, but many have been retrenched today - for instance in January, 1998, about 20,000 Basotho migrant workers were retrenched suddenly from the mines in South Africa. About 5%, a figure which is on the increase, is employed in the informal sector. The latest employment statistics show that 9% of the labour force is employed in the formal sector 20% in the informal sector while 15% comprise migrant workers in South Africa. The rest are either in agriculture where they are underemployed or are unemployed. General unemployment is estimated at 40% of the labour force (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997) It can be concluded that national development efforts in Lesotho have to address the question of employment creation more seriously in future.

Since 1986, the domestic employment got a boost from the signing of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). The LHWP is a multi-million Dollar Project signed between Lesotho and South Africa where the former sells water to the latter. The project is financed by the European Community, the World Bank, South Africa and Lesotho government. It is divided into three phases. Phase 1A dealt with the construction of Katse Dam in Thaba Tseka and the 'Muela Hydro-Electric dam and plant at Butha-Buthe. Construction of Phase 1A started in 1988 and got completed in 1997. The flow of water to South Africa was opened and commemorated jointly by all stakeholders on 22nd January, 1998. Construction work for Phase 1B, which deals with infrastructure development to the Mphahle Dam and the construction of the dam itself began in

1996 and is far into development. The LHWP has had a big economic boost to Lesotho. First, there has been employment generated for thousands of Basotho. Phase 1A and Phase 1B alone employ about 35,000 to 40,000 people annually (Ka Metsing, 1997).

Income that accrues to the employed helps to improve livelihoods of their households and their dependants. Other households benefit from multiplier effects accruing from demand and supply of goods and services. The rural development Plan of LHWP, together with its Environmental Action Plan, have helped in rehabilitation and conservation of a wide variety of natural resources such as flora and fauna which when used for eco-tourism and production are of importance to the economy. The country is expected to get R50 million per annum for the actual sale of water for 50 years, before revision of the amount. Although substantial today, this amount might be very small over the years to come due to inflation, population increase and other economic up and down swings. Import of equipment and machinery that are taxed have already had a high boost-effect to annual economic growth rates since 1988, such that the country has more than 10% economic growth rate today and was rated the second fastest growing economy in Africa in the 1990s. During Phase 1A alone R6 billion was spend by the LHWP. Another R2 billion has been collected on taxes of various items (Bohloa, 1998). The provision of the Lesotho Highlands Water Development Fund, a lump sum of money given by South Africa and the World Bank to the tune of an annual average of about R215 million, until the construction of Phase 1B of the whole LHWP, acts as a big boost in financing rural development activities through participation in poverty alleviation projects. These poverty alleviation projects employ and pay rural people an average of R300 per month for an average of 3 to 4 months engagement period throughout a year. This facility is also limited to the construction phase only and needs to be used sustainably. However, the present rife corruption in its use from national to local level needs to be stopped first (Mirror, 1995; Moeletsi oa Basotho, 1995; Makhaphela, 1998).

Another important feature of Lesotho's economy is its dependence on imports of secondary goods and special tertiary services from South Africa. It imports all manufactured products, petroleum and its by-products, food supplies, modern technology, and gets specialised medical, educational, insurance, banking and electricity services, among others, from South Africa. It is estimated that more than 90% of Lesotho's imports come from South Africa (Hoohlo, 1991). An important task of sustainable development planning in Lesotho is to reduce this dependence and increase self-reliance in the coming years.

Lesotho's economy is dependent on the South African Rand for value and power. Changes and fluctuations in the value of the rand affect South Africa and Lesotho as well. The local currency, the Loti, has no independent monetary value and is at par with the rand under the Common Monetary Area, of which Lesotho is a member. This implies that Lesotho has no independent economy at all, since it is subject to the fluctuations of the South African economy - this dependence has led to use of the phrase - when South Africa sneezes, Lesotho gets a cold, common in development circles in Lesotho.

Since 1910, South Africa and Lesotho (including Botswana and Swaziland) have had Southern African Customs Union agreement (SACU). SACU makes sure that the three BLS countries are compensated monetarily for goods and services purchased by their citizens from South Africa and going through their borders with it each year. Lesotho's economy benefits much from SACU because it constitutes a significant proportion of the government revenue. The actual amount received varies according to the quantity and value of goods and services bought, however, in general Lesotho gets an average sum of 50% of government revenue per annum from SACU. This money is used by the government to finance various aspects of development in the country (Hoohlo, 1991; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1992).

4.6.4 Conclusion

It can be concluded that Lesotho's economy faces formidable development problems of being externally dependent, donor-driven, export-led, with poor inter-sectoral linkages that retard multiplier effects in the economy, and failing to absorb the majority of its labour force, poor generation of domestic household and national income and that of acute income distribution inequality. It is these weaknesses in the structure and performance of the economy that future development efforts must redress and address in Lesotho, if sustainable Human Development is to be achieved.

CHAPTER 5: RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN LESOTHO: *An Analytical Inventory of Policies, Strategies and Projects since 1966*

5.1 Introduction

The rural development sector in Lesotho is composed of agriculture and community development activities in the rural areas. The agriculture sub-sector is composed of crop production, livestock production and range management. The community development sub-sector consists of village water supply, rural health, rural sanitation, rural energy, rural transport and local government. The chapter discusses agriculture, rural industries and rural services in Lesotho.

5.2 Agriculture.

5.2.1 Production structure and performance

Lesotho's agriculture is composed of crop and livestock production. Agricultural production is mainly for subsistence purposes, although in good years of harvest, some surplus is sold. Rather than being a tribal subsistence economy, Lesotho's agriculture is mainly towards a peasant economy, in that producers also participate in a migrant labour economy, either in urban areas in the country, or mainly in South Africa as miners. Peasant agricultural production is an old phenomenon in Lesotho. The history of agricultural change in the country shows that in the 1830s Basotho came to trade (in grain) with the African population of Bethulie on the Orange river. By the end of the 1830s the Basotho had stored reserve supplies of millet sufficient for between four and eight years, while in the mid-1840s white farmers flocked to them to buy wheat. By the mid 1850s the Basotho were adopting intensive plough cultivation of the lowlands and the use of wagons to transport their crops to markets (Palmer and Parsons, 1977). It was this state of agricultural development and change in mid 19th century that earned the Basotho the reputation that

Nowhere else in South Africa is there a more naturally industrious nation, as honest and as peaceable as the Basuto. Before the Anglo-Boer war the quantity of wheat, maize, and millet which this tribe produced was truly incredible (The Friend of Free State quoted in Germond, 1967,p.319).

According to Murray (1981) in 1873 they exported 100,000 bags of grain composed of maize, wheat and sorghum, and 2,000 bags of wool (and), in the same year goods of British or foreign

manufacture worth about £150 000 were imported into the country. Lesotho was then called the granary of South Africa (Murray, 1981).

This process of peasantization and agricultural boom (Palmer and Parsons, 1977), spearheaded by adoption of new production techniques and crop mixes introduced among the Basotho by the missionaries in the 1820s, also facilitated the process of incorporation of Basotho economy into the world capitalist system through introduction of a cash economy. The period of boom and prosperity began to decline after 1870 (Murray, 1981) due to weak traditional administration after the death of Moshoeshoe I in the same year, and alienation of the fertile lands in the Orange Free State which Basotho used for grain and livestock production, as a result of the Aliwal North Treaty signed in 1869. This Treaty fixed the present borders that marginalised the Basotho to the Drakensberg and Maluti mountain foothills. The Basotho had to resort to increased labour migration to diamond mines in Kimberly which started in 1867. Cash earned from work in the mines was used to buy agricultural equipment to increase production, and guns for security against possible alienation of more land out of their hands. Initially the economy was boosted by these injections from migrant labour. However, after 1880 agricultural production fluctuated in a declining trend into the 20th century as a result of conflict that resulted from the interaction between Basotho and the Boers in the Orange Free State. The British colonial government often came in between to create peace and stability between them.

Dominant factors in this conflict were the loss of much arable land between the Vaal and Caledon valleys which is the Orange Free State to the Boers as a result of incessant wars. Moreover, tariffs were also imposed on grain imports from Lesotho by the Boer republics, and it was substituted with grain imports from Australia and the United States of America after completion of the railway linking the Cape coast with the interior. On their part, the British imposed hut tax on the Basotho, which indirectly forced them to join the migrant labour stream in increased numbers to both Kimberly and after 1884, to the gold mines on the Witwatersrand as well. The Gun War of 1880-81 between Basotho and the British Cape Colonial government and the Anglo Boer war of 1899-1902 between the British and Boers negatively affected the stability necessary for production and marketing (Murray, 1981). The formation of the Union in 1910 and the dispossession of blacks of land in lieu of the Land Act 1912, created an exodus of black peasants evicted from the farms out of the Union into Lesotho (Bundy, 1979). This immigration aggravated the already serious internal population pressure problem on arable and grazing land in Lesotho after the 1869 Aliwal North treaty.

Another set of problems that led to the decline of agricultural performance was the over use of marginal land, rain fluctuations that resulted in periodic droughts, and the rinderpest of the late 1890s that wiped out a lot of livestock (Palmer and Parsons, 1977, Leys, 1979; Murray, 1981). The new century brought drastic changes to which the Basotho did not adapt. As a result, the 20th century has witnessed a progressive collapse of Lesotho's vibrant economy of the 19th century; and a progressive process of underdevelopment and conversion of the country into a labour reserve economy, that specialises in export of male migrant labour rather than grain to South Africa and a net importer of grain from South Africa (Murray, 1981).

Since independence in 1966 the agricultural production of both crops and livestock has continued to take place on a peasant production basis. Crop production is done by households, using their own labour and, occasionally, hired labour, on small plots of about 2 hectares per households on average. This acreage is based on some estimate based on a conversion of the ideal situation where a married Mosotho man is entitled to 3 fields by the customary land law as contained in the Laws of Lerotholi. According to this customary land tenure, those who hold title to crop land are expected to use it or cause it to be used every cropping season. Failure to cultivate the land for two consecutive years entitles the chief to revoke it and give it to someone else. In reality, however, land does lie fallow for years because such revocations are rare and based on wide consultation with the owner before revocation can be effected (Mashinini, 1982). The land tenure has been applauded for guaranteeing equal access to the scarce basic resource land (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975). However, over the years landlessness has risen from about 10% at independence to more than 40% of the population in the early 1990s (Bos, 1994). Moreover, the land tenure system has been accused of being an impediment to agricultural growth because it lacks security of tenure, cannot be used as a collateral to secure credit for farming and encourages land degradation due to the tragedy of commons problem that it facilitates (Williams, 1972; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1989; Phororo and Letuka, 1993; Ambrogetti, 1997). In 1979 the Government of Lesotho enacted the Land Act 1979 in an attempt to introduce tenure reform that could redress the inadequacies of the communal land tenure system. The Land Act 1979 has not yet been implemented in the rural areas due to opposition by the people (Mashinini, 1998).

Land use is regulated by the customary land tenure system. Peasants use oxen to till the land and plant crops because tractors are too expensive. Little use is made of chemical fertilizers, but manure and/or ash is used to increase the nutrient value of the soil. Cultivation of summer crops, maize, sorghum, summer wheat, beans and peas is common, while that of winter crops is not so

common because customary land tenure stipulates that the stuble be used for grazing by the village as a whole after harvest of summer crops. Again, in practice, people do cut down stuble from their own fields to use as fodder for their livestock, without any legal action against them. Some also continue to plant winter crops, especially wheat. Irrigated farming is common mainly in government agricultural projects. Peasants generally fail to raise enough capital necessary for irrigated farming on their own fields (Mashinini, 1982).

Crop production is at present characterised by low productivity and production. Average productivity levels for maize are 1000 kg/ha; 500kg/ha for beans and also 500 kg/ha for peas (Bos, 1994). By comparison, crop production levels for similar crops in the neighbouring Free State province of South Africa are very high. The average productivity levels for maize are 3500 kg/ha; 3000 kg/ha for sorghum; 2000kg/ha for wheat; 2000kg/ha for beans and 1800kg/ha for peas (Bos, 1994).

It might be argued that crop productivity levels in the Free State province of South Africa are high because farm land has a market value and is privately owned by the farmers. The private ownership of the farms, the ground rent that the farmers have to pay annually and the fact that the farmers do farming as a full-time occupation for sustainable livelihood are some of the important factors that promote the private initiative of the farmers to adopt modern farming techniques for sustainable agriculture. By contrast, the negative attitudes of farmers in Lesotho towards farming as a full-time occupation for survival due to the existence of other survival strategies leads them to become reluctant to bear the pains of adopting modern farming methods conducive to increased yields for sustainable agriculture.

Crop productivity levels in Lesotho are also characterised by high annual differences as shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Crop Productivity in kg/ha for 1965/66 and 1991/92 cropping years.

Year	Maize	Sorghum	Wheat	Beans	Peas
1965/66	779	826	815	338	590
1991/92	4,500	3,900	6,860	580	4,090

Source: Bos, 1994, p.37

It can be concluded from table 5.1 that productivity levels of major crops is highly variable from one year to the other. This high variability is caused mainly by the availability or absence of rain.

In Lesotho, crop production is mainly dry land. This means that other things being equal, in a year where there are good rains across the cropping season, farmers get higher yields as well and vice-versa.

Owing to these low production levels, Lesotho fails to meet its domestic annual food requirements and has to rely on food aid and food imports. A survey conducted by Sechaba Consultants on poverty mapping throughout the country in 1991 showed that only in 17 out of 60 census areas into which the country is divided did more than 25% of the households produce enough food on their fields to feed their households (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997a).

Reasons for this poor performance in crop production vary. On the one hand crop production is caused by physical factors such as erratic rainfall, acute soil erosion and loss of soil nutrition, hail storms, frosts, pests and drought. Variations in the amounts of uncultivated land per annum also contributes to poor production. For, instance in 1991/92, the amount of fallow land amounted to about 300,000 hectares. The other set of factors responsible for low productivity and production relates to the farming methods used. Most peasant farmers use simple technologies to farm, composed of ox drawn ploughs, discs and planters. Use of tractors is limited due to high payments involved. Average rates for a tractor are R70.00 per acre for ploughing in 1998. Kraal manure and ash are largely used instead of chemical fertilizers because the latter is expensive. The average cost of fertilizers was about R90.00 a pocket of 50kg in 1998. Chemical pest control measures are used in a limited manner. In general, the costs of inputs have escalated as a result of the privatisation of Co-op Lesotho, a former monopoly parastatal supplier of agricultural inputs, as part of Structural Adjustment Policies in Lesotho.

The quantity of agro-support services is poor but expensive. It is therefore generally available to the few telephone farmers and the rich peasants who can afford the cost. Formal agricultural credit was channelled through the Lesotho Agricultural Development (LADB) Bank which was started for this purpose in 1976. However, the LADB had its headquarters in Maseru and branches in the district towns and service centres like Roma. Most peasants did not know about it. For the few that knew, the costs of having to go towns for its services were high and discouraging. The biggest problem with LADB was that it required farmers to produce co-lateral for security in the form of property or fixed savings account, in order to get loans. Peasants failed to produce that security and therefore got no loans. Thus LADB had become a bank for rich farmers, most of whom were either officers of high positions in government and private

sectors or members of parliament and ministers (Sekonyela, 1991). The government announced the closure of LADB in August 1998 due to its failure to become sustainable. A sister institution that handles credit for farmers is the Lesotho co-operative credit union (LCCU) founded in 1968.

This non-government organisation with a membership of about 72 credit unions in the country, gets funding among other from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) and German Technical Assistance (IGTZ), (LCN, 1993). However, at top management level, it has become bogged down in bureaucracy and red tape which slowdown its efficiency. For instance, it employs 16 paid up staff members. It also became highly politicised in the period immediately after its inception, and lost credibility among those disadvantaged by the negative politics of the undemocratic rule between 1970 - 1992. Credit was mainly given to the then ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) members on no other criteria than their BNP membership. Most of the credit unions have collapsed due to political disagreements among members (Sekonyela, 1991).

The extension systems in Lesotho's agriculture is characterised by discontinuity of policy and strategies. During the colonial period the Progressive Farmer Movement was used as the strategy and emphasized hand picking and assisting progressive farmers to act as models to be emulated by the rest of the farmers. In essence this approach concentrated resources on the rich lead farmers and enriched them while impoverishing the poor farmers who are the majority. This promoted a process of peasant differentiation. This extension approach was maintained and used after independence despite its disadvantages because it was convenient to extension workers and also enabled a deliberate selective assistance to those who supported the ruling party since 1970 (Motseki, 1980).

Since 1986 the extension approach has changed towards participatory extension service. The essence of this participatory extension is community focused rather than class focused. The target is the community of farmers instead of progressive farmers as was the case before. In the participatory extension being promoted lately, the farming community elects its own members to be given more training and impart farming skills to the entire community later as informal extension assistants. Extension agents tackle more serious issues and supervise the assistants. Both assistants and agents are trained so that one person can provide multi-purpose service, within the jurisdiction of their extension area. Subject matter specialists (SMSS) are located at district headquarters and act as technical advisors and monitors of specialised services to all the district (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b). Although mooted in the mid-eighties, participatory

extension took long to design and implement due to lack of government will, and is only gaining momentum of implementation recently after democratisation of government in Lesotho since 1993 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b).

Since 1951, agriculture research is officially entrusted to a government institution called Agriculture Research based in Maseru under the Ministry of Agriculture. This institution does agro-economic experiments, irrigation and soil fertility tests at its own station in Maseru, and conducts field trials out in the villages and districts. The efficiency of the Agriculture Research is hampered by shortage of funds and availability of qualified technical staff. Moreover, the poor working conditions including low salaries have resulted in the loss of many well qualified staff members to greener pastures. Recently many senior technical staff left for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project LHWP. Individual projects also do research within the areas where they operate (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b).

Crop marketing is yet another agro-economic service which does not function well in Lesotho. Informal marketing of crop produce through stores was common in the past, and is still practised on a smaller scale today. The Basotho also sell to one another at household level. No statistical surveys exist as yet on informal crop sales. Formal crop marketing was systematised through the establishment of the Produce Marketing Corporation (PMC) in 1973. PMC stabilises producer and consumer prices by setting prices and quality standards for various produce. It works hand in glove with co-op Lesotho which acts as its marketing outlet at village level through its chain of co-operative stores throughout the country. PMC was forced to follow prices set in South Africa. It thus became a shadow institution with no real impact on influencing trends in production. Vegetable produce marketing, has in particular, remained problematic to PMC, because the South African produced vegetables sold in Lesotho out performed the Lesotho produced vegetables in quality and are cheaper when bought in bulk due to different economies of scale in production (Mpemi *et al.*, 1986; Mokitimi, 1990).

Yet another hindrance to efficiency of production in agriculture arises from lack of continuity of policies and strategies. The government is not able to fund the implementation of its policies and relies heavily on external donor funds (Ferguson, 1990). These donors, however, have their own different and sometimes conflicting priorities. The result is a motley of projects all over the country, each emphasizing different crops, production technologies and marketing. For instance, the government has always attached priority to self-sufficiency in food production for local

consumption, but in most projects, emphasis is on high value crops for export, because it is felt Lesotho has a better comparative advantage for doing so (Ngqaleni, 1991).

Another important factor in agriculture in Lesotho is the politics of food production. On its own part, the government switches strategies to accommodate political rather than economic expediency. Moreover, real government commitment as shown by the budget allocated to agriculture, since 1970 to date is low. Sectors such as defence get a higher budget allocation than agriculture (Ngqaleni, 1991).

Meanwhile, Lesotho imports about 50% of its domestic food requirements from South Africa, and roughly 20% comes as food aid from various donors abroad (Bos, 1994). Recently food aid has declined, perhaps due to cuts in the magnitudes of support given by the World Food Programme (WFP) which encouraged the Ministry of Education to adopt the education policy that emphasizes production in educational institutions since the late 1980s. One can conclude that with the continued decline in crop production and food aid, and the escalation of costs of food imports, Lesotho should devise more sustainable food production policies and strategies.

Livestock production in Lesotho is just as problematic. Major livestock reared are cattle, sheep, goats, horses, donkeys and mules. Table 5.2 shows the quantities of livestock by type since 1970.

Table 5.2: Livestock size and type

Year	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Horses	Donkeys	Mules
1970	551,522	1,655,128	973,767	109,703	89,711	4,092
1980	589,976	1,168,404	766,535	100,890	104,922	-
1990	542,399	1,466,786	729,255	103,781	150,801	-
1995	580,230	1,130,750	739,135	100,270	145,965	-

Sources: Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975; BOS, 1994; BOS, 1995.

It can be concluded from Table 5.2 above that numbers by type of stock have fluctuated with a visible trend to increase on the part of donkeys since 1970. The fluctuations in livestock numbers can be attributed to changes in the prices of livestock which bear an influence on off-take rates. During the years when the prices of livestock are good farmers sell more of their livestock and vice versa. Moreover, in the mid 1970s when the rise in gold prices resulted in increased salaries of gold mine workers, Basotho miners invested the increased salaries in the purchase of livestock. Later their investment shifted from livestock to purchase of consumer items like cars.

Livestock ownership is very unequal. More than 80% of the rural households have no livestock (BOS, 1994). Some of the stockless households get access to livestock services through direct hire or indigenous arrangements called Mafisa. Under Mafisa arrangement, a person with livestock releases part of the stock to one without to take care of, in return for free use for traction and draught power, and by-products such as milk (Sekatle, 1985).

Livestock is very important to Lesotho. It produced and contributed approximately R30 million to the national income in 1993 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997a). In 1990 it generated R31.5 million, from sale of wool and mohair. This figure was about 21% of all exports from the country in 1990. At household level, the importance of livestock is measured in economic terms such as provision of draught and traction power, sales of livestock and by-products to earn cash to meet household needs, and as a general investment portfolio. Capital investment returns on livestock is, however, relatively low - 10% (MOA, 1987). Livestock is also important in the social life of Basotho. It is used in ritual ceremonies of various kinds like sacrifice to the ancestors, circumcision, deaths, lobola payment and celebrations. Livestock is also a measure and sign of social status among the Basotho (Gattinara, 1984).

Livestock management is extensive in the mountains. The livestock is herded by males, especially boys, in communal rangelands. In the lowlands and foothills, these rangelands are composed of open spaces that are neither settled nor cultivated and allow for semi-intensive and semi-extensive husbandry. In these two regions, livestock grazing takes place mainly in winter. In summer, livestock is transferred, through transhumance, to the mountain zone for grazing between November and April months. This management practise was done in order to allow lowland and foothill pastures to recover from high pressure and overgrazing. The practice of land enclosures called leboella also enables the lowland and foothills to recover in summer. Nowadays transhumance has been reduced because government range management policies discourage it.

Moreover, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) has inundated much of the former rangelands. It is estimated that 1491 ha of rangeland will be lost to LHWP (Sechaba Consultants, 1995). Rangelands in Lesotho are highly overgrazed due to overstocking. Estimates of overstocking differ, but some put it at 50% (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1992), while others put it higher at 300% (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1989).

Livestock productivity is very poor and characterised by low rates of off-takes. Off-take from cattle, sheep and goats is estimated at 14% of which about 2% is through formal marketing channels per annum while the rest is through informal marketing outlets. Poor nutrition results in low reproductive rates of livestock, low production of by-products and high mortality. Reproductive rates are 17% for cattle and 40% for sheep and goats (MOA,1987). Wool and mohair productivity per animal are low. The fleece weights for wool are 2.4kg per sheep, and 0.8kg of mohair per goat (Mokitimi, 1991).

The poor productivity of livestock in Lesotho is attributed to a range of factors such as overgrazing, overstocking, loss of palatable grass species, high mortality rates and uncultured stock. Farmers like sheer numbers rather than quality stock for meat, milk, wool and mohair. This attitude is also promoted by the communal grazing which promotes the tragedy of common syndrome. Other factors are the lack of efficient policies on livestock marketing (Swallow *et al*, 1986; Swallow, 1987). Some livestock is sold to butcheries for slaughter. Some wool and mohair is sold to local traders as the middlemen who eventually sell to the livestock marketing corporation. Farmers can also sell their livestock and wool and mohair directly to the Livestock Marketing Corporation (LMC) established by the government in 1973 as a monopoly parastatal in charge of marketing. The LMC has, however, been privatised and marketing of livestock now takes place under private consortia who organise a network of rotational animal auction markets throughout the country.

5.2.2 Agricultural Policies, strategies and projects

Since independence, agricultural policies, strategies and projects in Lesotho have belonged to both crop production and the livestock production sub-sectors. The crop production sub-sector has itself been composed of dryland crop production vis-à-vis irrigated crop production policies, strategies and projects; whilst the livestock sub-sector dealt with both livestock production and range management policies.

5.2.2.1 Dryland Crop Production Policies and Projects

The main government policies, strategies and projects on dryland crop production in Lesotho since the attainment of independence in 1966, to the time of writing this thesis, have been guided by two major approaches to agricultural development in the Third World, namely the Green Revolution approach and the Sustainable Development approach.

In Third World development thinking, the Green Revolution approach dominated during the heydays of Modernisation Theory and it was thought that the solution to low production in agriculture and subsequent hunger and famines in the Third World could be solved through application of technical solutions. In Lesotho, between 1966 and 1985 the policies, strategies and projects in crop production were grounded on this technical-fix approach.

On the contrary, since the 1980s the spread of the World Conservation strategy by the International Union for Conservation and Nature (IUCN) and that of sustainable development strategy propagated by the Brundtland Commission have brought about a shift in the approach to Third World development. Sustainable development is the new approach since the 1980s into the 21st century. Likewise in Lesotho, since the mid-1980s to the present, there has been a shift away from Green Revolution policies towards sustainable development policies, strategies and projects in agriculture.

5.2.2.1.1 The Green Revolution Approach

Lesotho started comprehensive national development planning during the early 1970s following the establishment of the Central Planning and Development Office (CPDO) in 1967 (Hirschman, 1980). The First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP) 1970/71 - 1974/75 acted as the basic document that guided both national and sectoral development planning. At the national level the development objectives of the country emphasized laying foundations for economic development and economic independence. At sectoral level, the objectives of the agricultural sector were to achieve a marked increase in agricultural productivity (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1970) so as to be self-reliant in food production.

In order to achieve the objective of increased agricultural productivity the FFYDP adopted an agricultural strategy based on Green Revolution approaches, one whereby area based projects with a package of high yielding varieties (HYVs) of seeds of maize, sorghum, wheat, beans and cash crops like potatoes, asparagus and with vegetables were introduced to farmers. Chemical fertilizers and insecticides were highly encouraged, and use of tractor services for traction were introduced in an effort to induce mechanisation. These packages were introduced into the "traditional" Sesotho farming (Turner, 1978) to modernise it through large area-based projects. A lot has been written about these area-based projects in Lesotho (Turner, 1978; Garaba, 1980; Moody, 1981; Nqaleni, 1991; Huisman, 1994; Johnston, 1996). However, each of these projects

merits a brief discussion in order to highlight their similarities and differences as strategies aimed at sustainable crop production.

a) The Leribe Pilot Project

This project was located around the Hlotse River catchment and part of the Caledon River catchment near the Hlotse town in the Leribe district. It acted as a pilot project to test the impact of a package of modern inputs on production and income for the affected 2,000 hectares that the project covered (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975). It was meant also to act as a model on which future agricultural projects in the country could be based. It started to operate in 1970 and ended in 1975. Garaba (1980) estimates that a total of 1,034 landholders with about 1,533 individual fields were involved in the project. The Leribe Pilot Project seemed to be a success because it was the first agricultural project that was used as a development propaganda by the self-imposed regime of the Basotho National Party after 1970. A lot of resources were put into the project in order to please the people politically. Unfortunately this project also taught people to expect to get benefits freely without undergoing the pains of change brought by development.

b) Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project

This project started in 1973 and was expected to run for six years. It was located in the central lowland region in the Maseru district and was scheduled to cost USD9.8 million funded by United National Development Programme (UNDP); United States Agency for International Development (USAID); International Development Agency (IDA); Lesotho Government and some commercial banks in Lesotho (Garaba, 1980; Huisman, 1994).

The Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project aimed at transforming traditional agriculture in Lesotho through introduction of a package of improved modern high yielding varieties of seeds, especially high value cash crop like asparagus and potatoes, using mechanization as the principal means of traction power and chemical fertilizers as soil nourishing nutrients. These new methods were expected to increase productivity and increase household income for participating farmers (Huisman, 1994).

This project covered 121,000 hectares of which 31,000 were arable. About 17,000 households were involved in the project. There were also aspects of extension, marketing and road repair attempted by the project. It ended in 1977 only five years in operation, instead of the 6 initially

planned for because of, among others, disagreements among donors on its mode of operation. Farmers were not involved in decision-making and planning of activities and their sustainability became poor. Moreover, emphasis was on cash crops for export and not production of cereals needed to satisfy household demands for food (Letsela, 1995).

c) The Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project

This project started in 1974 and ended in 1976. It covered the entire catchment of the Senqu (Orange) river. In its later years, the project covered the southern districts of Mphahle's hoek and Quthing, a 637,223 ha of which 570,696 were not arable (Garaba, 1980). The project was financed by both the UNDP (US\$1,543,3000) and the Lesotho government (R216 000.00) (Huisman, 1994). The project encountered resistance from the farmers because they expected to get benefits freely without undergoing the pains of change in their old life styles brought about by the project.

The project objective was to raise agricultural productivity and increase incomes of farmers in the southern districts of Mphahle's hoek and Quthing. In particular, it sought to identify constraints to rural development in the project area (Garaba, 1980; Huisman, 1994) and introduce a mixed package of improved modern farming inputs, techniques and technologies. However, the adoption of these new farming methods by the farmers remained very poor because farmers continued to use their old ways.

d) The Khomokhoana Rural Development Project

This project started in 1975 and covered an area of about 19,000 hectares of which 13,000 hectares could be cultivated (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975). The project was expected to cost some R2,503,900 during the plan period and was funded by both the Swedish International Agency for Development (SIDA) and the Lesotho Government for a period of 5 years. Major objectives of the project were a continuation of those for the Leribe Pilot Project, namely, to foster adoption of a crash package of modern improved farming inputs, techniques and technologies to farmers so as to increase their farm output and income. Improvement of credit, agro-support services and conservation was also undertaken (Ngqaleni, 1991).

The area-based rural development projects outlined above had some typical characteristics in common with regard to their mode of operations and performance. They were all meant to

promote modern crop farming on dryland. However, where possible, a small experimental element of irrigation was often included in order to compare the impact of the HYV package under both dryland and irrigated conditions. However, since the majority of small scale peasant farming in Lesotho is done on a dryland basis, the mode of combination of dryland and irrigated farming was prevalent in the project areas only (Huisman, 1994).

Secondly, because peasants did not have the necessary capital with which to purchase the HYV packages promoted by the projects, these projects operated like credit schemes (Ngqaleni, 1991) in that the inputs packages were given to farmers in advance to use and the latter were expected to pay back their credit at harvest. This kind of operation was mistaken to mean free farming by farmers and later when deductions were done, after harvest, they felt cheated. Peasants gradually withdrew their participation in the projects and eventually quit because of not wanting to accept the change.

The projects sought to change the farming system of peasant farmers by introducing new methods of cultivation which replaced the ox-drawn plough with tractors, and replacing staple food crops like maize and sorghum with new crop types that were thought to be high value crops (HVCs) like potatoes and asparagus meant largely for sale. This experiment became a failure because peasants stuck to their old farming system because they felt comfortable in their old ways (Ngqaleni, 1991). The use of tractors was expensive compared to ox-drawn ploughs. The tractors increased the operation costs of peasants so that returns after harvest became low to sustain them throughout the cropping year. Many withdrew from the projects and continued with their old ways of farming. For those who experimented with cash crops, marketing became a problem, and the envisaged cash income with which to purchase food stuffs did not become available. This discouraged farmers and weakened their participation in the projects.

The machines and tractors encouraged in the projects needed spare parts and regular mechanical maintenance which peasants could not afford. When the projects ended, the machines were abandoned and farmers went back to their old ways to use ox-drawn ploughs. Moreover, import of spare-parts and mechanics increased rather than decreased the country's dependence on the Republic of South Africa (Ngqaleni, 1991; Huisman, 1994).

All the projects used block farming approach. In this kind of farming, participant farmers were asked to pool their individual small fields together so that they could be farmed as one block. The argument for block farming was that it facilitated mechanization and economies of scale. As

it turned out block farming lowered accountability among individual participants. Each retained a right to their piece of land in the block and arriving at unanimous decision-making became difficult. This undermined the cooperative effort and participation decreased (Ngqaleni, 1991).

These projects did little to solicit the active participation of farmers in the key decision-making, planning and implementation of farming activities, choice of crops, ploughing, seeding, weeding and harvesting times and technologies. So that there was very little importation of skills to farmers necessary for sustainability of the activities at the end of the project. Key decisions remained the prerogative of the expatriate personnel who were technical advisors in these projects (Ngqaleni, 1991).

All those projects were donor-driven. The government of Lesotho had very little say and financial contribution while local farmers had none. As a result the farmers at local level developed a detached attitude towards them. Instead of associating themselves with the projects, they referred to them as the governments' thing (ntho ea 'muso). This detached attitude was also buttressed by the political overtones involved in the projects. In order to participate one had to produce or seek Basotho National Party (BNP) membership card to prove their allegiance to the then self-imposed BNP government under chief Leabua Jonathan. This political bias of the projects influenced both choice of location of the projects and those who were to participate in them, thereby hampering full participation by farmers and future sustainability of the activities initiated (Johnston, 1996).

Finally, the overall impact of the projects on production was limited because they covered limited space compared to the national space. Moreover, attention given to agro-support services especially extension, input supply and marketing was very low (Huisman, 1994). Besides, the projects promoted spatial and social differentiation in that the bulk of foreign assistance to agriculture tended to be channelled and concentrated in the areas where the projects operated which were the best arable lands in the country (Garaba, 1980).

e) The Basic Agricultural Services Project (BASP)

In the second half of the 1970s, realisation of the fact that area-based projects were failing to create impact on productivity and income led the government of Lesotho to revise strategies. It was particularly noted that the crash nature of the projects tended to create an impression that farming problems could be flushed out in a short-term. Yet a more long term, gradual approach,

seemed to be necessary. Moreover, problems of input supply and marketing seemed primary to the success of any effort to transform traditional agriculture. Government therefore formulated and implemented BASP in 1977 as a strategy to use for provision of rural infrastructure to ease input supply, and marketing of output. The Second Five Year Development Plan (1975 p. 86) introduced BASP in these words: "In contrast to major area-based project development efforts, BASP will attempt to induce a gradual, incremental improvement of farming practices and yields."

BASP continued with efforts to introduce high yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers and machines to peasant farmers. However, unlike area-based projects more emphasis was on staple food crops like maize, sorghum, beans and peas. Moreover, farmers had to purchase the improved seeds themselves. BASP only made them available within reach by willing, needy and capable farmers. In order to bring these inputs nearer to farmers, the country was divided into 6 spatial blocks, each of which had a network of lock-up stores run by extension agents of the Ministry of Agriculture. The extension agents gave technical advice to individual farmers who needed some to farm their own individual fields. Thus the idea of Block farming was not used by BASP. Rather, BASP sought to promote the willing farmer who, out of their own initiative, responded to opportunities in the farming environment and took risks to adopt the new packages (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975; Matanda, 1981).

BASP did not last long. It ended in 1981 due to lack of adequate political support, which was in favour of two other projects which operated at par with it. Moreover, the BASP approach to deal directly with individual farmers on their own individual fields made it unpopular. The farmers had got used to area-based projects where the project did things for them as a group and they only paid at harvest time. Now that they had to pay upfront, they felt dejected by government and were quick to raise alarm at the national conference for farmers held at the co-operative college in Maseru in 1979 (Ngqaleni, 1991).

Dealing with individual farmers made extension agents to adopt overtly or covertly a lead-farmer approach where progressive farmers were given attention at the expense of the rest of their poor peasant counterparts. This made BASP extension service fail to reach the bottom needy stratum among farmers (Huisman, 1994).

The farmers did not want to adapt to the changes brought about by BASP to the effect that farmers had to pay upstart for most services rendered. As a result many did not take part because they felt secure in their old ways of farming.

By continuing to encourage mechanization BASP only continued to tie Lesotho to the aprons of South Africa for spare parts and advanced technical know-how for maintenance and repair. Many of the repair workshops envisaged in the project plan did not actually materialize (Matanda, 1981).

Funding of different spatial blocks by different donors created what Huisman (1991) calls a minefield of problems in that each donor viewed the block they funded as their independent project. As a result each practised, in its block, its own methods of administration, management, budgeting and disbursement procedures. At the national central government level, severe strain was put on the national project steering committee to harmonize and coordinate these multifarious procedures, and activities. This task, it failed to achieve, and resulted in BASP being a haphazard, discontinuous, motley of activities without centrality of direction and purpose.

Lastly, the approach of BASP made it lack popular political flavour that was so necessary for legitimization of the self-imposed BNP government. In order to create false consciousness among peasants in the countryside and legitimize itself, the self-imposed BNP government wanted to create an atmosphere where people would be deceived into the feeling that it cared so much for them especially for feeding them, hence, improving their agriculture by meeting them half-way, in a populist fashion. This, BASP could not do because funding was controlled by donors.

f) Cooperative Crop Production Project (CCPP)

This project was started in 1977 and operated alongside BASP. The rationale to have CCPP was both political and economic (Huisman, 1994). With regard to political aspects, the regional political economy in southern Africa was undergoing drastic changes especially in the then apartheid South Africa in the second half of the 1970's and these changes affected Lesotho politically and economically. In 1976 the Republic of South Africa decided to grant nominal independence to the then Transkei Bantustan. As part of an effort to give credibility and recognition to the Transkei nominal independence, the Republic of South Africa closed the

borders along the southern districts and asked the then Prime Minister of Lesotho, chief Leabua Jonathan, to negotiate their re-opening with the Transkei Prime Minister Chief Kaizer Matanzima. In diplomatic circles in Lesotho it was then felt that this was an indirect move by South Africa to force Lesotho to recognize Transkei's independence (Sixishe, 1984). The closure of the southern borders between Transkei and Lesotho meant that goods and services from Maseru and the other western parts of Lesotho could not reach some parts of the Quthing district and the whole of the Qacha's Nek district which depended on the use of the closed borders for transportation; this amounted to a complete economic blockade. In addition, South Africa removed subsidies on maize and wheat imported by Lesotho. This removal resulted in increased prices of the foodstuffs for consumers in Lesotho. South Africa further threatened to reduce the volume of mine migrant workers from Lesotho (Sefali, 1978; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980).

Political developments internal to Lesotho also contributed to the launching of CCPP. In 1974, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) had attempted an abortive *coup d'état* and many of its leaders defected first to Zambia and then later to Botswana (Sixishe, 1984; Leeman, 1985). Within Lesotho itself, the BCP got banned by the BNP government and many of its active members were harassed through dismissals from the civil service, burning down their houses and other forms of intimidation. Operating in exile, the mines where most able bodied Basotho men are employed, and underground within Lesotho, the BCP continued to condemn the self-imposed and perpetuating BNP government and to ask the Basotho to dissociate themselves from it. Thus from a strategic viewpoint, it became necessary for the BNP government to be proactive in popularising itself among people through use of developmental propaganda. One of the strategies employed to promote this populism was the creation of the CCPP (Phororo, 1979).

Economic factors also contributed to the formation of the CCPP. First, there was a high demand for foodstuffs within the country as a result of increased mine migrant wages in the mid-seventy's in RSA. These increases reflected themselves in greater propensities to consume by households dependent on mine migrant remittances, a situation that Wykstra (1978) referred to as the Golden Seventy's for Lesotho. To satisfy this demand Lesotho's imports of foodstuffs from South Africa rose drastically and affected the balance of payments situation (Huisman, 1994).

The CCPP's major objective was to raise production of food grains, particularly that of wheat to the level of national self-sufficiency (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980). It's minor objective was to

ensure that there was continuous land cultivation by using fields in winter so that they did not lie fallow. The mode of operation of CCPP was based on Sesotho share cropping. The Government entered into a share cropping arrangement with participating farmers on a 50:50 basis. However, unlike in a typical Sesotho share cropping arrangement where the two parties share both farming expenses and produce on a 50:50 basis; under CCPP, the government bore all the costs of production. Farmers only provided land and minimal labour for loading and off-loading harvested produce. Government used high yielding varieties of wheat and fertilizer on peasants fields and high mechanisation of tractors and combine harvesters in field operations. The produce was equally shared by both government and farmers (Phororo, 1979; Ngqaleni, 1991).

Unlike other projects, which were administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, CCPP was directly responsible to the Prime Minister's office and was solely funded by the Government of Lesotho. This added strength to its political nature and mission in that the Prime Minister could do as he wished with it without any complaint by foreign donors (Huisman, 1994).

The spatial coverage of the CCPP was intended to be 12,000 hectares covering the districts of Leribe, Berea, Maseru and Mafeteng. The districts covered were strongholds of the ruling BNP (Ngqaleni, 1991). Viewed in terms of production the CCPP was heralded as a success story (Phororo, 1979; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980). Production of wheat increased tremendously in the country.

Ngqaleni (1991) argues that during the CCPP, wheat production increased from 45,300 tonnes in 1974/75 to 61,400 tonnes in 1977/78. Moreover, the actual hectares used by the project increased from 12,000 ha to 12,249 ha because it was popular and many farmers wanted to participate in it by releasing their field to be farmed.

However, the project was not cost-effective. The government was operating at a big loss due to the high costs of production involved, and the fact that the government bore all costs. Ngqaleni (1991) shows that in 1976/77 costs of field operations were R723,676.06, the returns after harvest amounted to only R423,467.92.

Therefore despite its appeal, the CCPP was not financially sustainable. Writing in his capacity as the then permanent secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Phororo (1979) was quick to point out that the CCPP approach was enemical to sustainable agricultural development in the country. He pointed out that farmers did not participate in any activity except to receive harvest; and that

this had led farmers to view CCPP as Manna fallen from heaven. This approach was costly to the government in financial terms and promoted dependence and laziness among farmers.

Moreover, although the CCPP was seemingly popular, it ironically failed to allow farmers to participate in both decision-making, planning and implementation of its activities. It merely granted them passive and not active participation. As such no skills were imparted to farmers so that they could be able to uphold the production levels sustainably when the project ceased operations. Furthermore, the capital-intensity of the project operations precluded any chances of sustainability by peasant farmers at the end of project (Phororo, 1979).

The CCPP enjoyed a high rate of pseudo- participation and praise by farmers, since they did not have to incur any costs of production at all. To them CCPP was indeed God sent. Indeed peasants christened CCPP "*Ahlama o je*" which means Manna has dropped from Heaven (Phororo, 1979).

Despite the weaknesses of the CCPP, which were diagnosed quite early in the life of the project, it continued until 1979, albeit on a modified scale, because of its populist political flavour to the BNP government. Those who participated in this project were strictly BNP supporters since one had to produce a BNP membership card as a precondition to participate. Besides, registration of fields to be farmed under CCPP was done by the extension agents working together with, and on the advice of, the village development committee (VDC) which was nominated by the BNP and its membership was composed of all BNP stall wards at village level. The VDC granted political clearance to the owners of the fields to be accepted into the project (Johnston, 1996).

g) The Food Self-Sufficiency Project (FSSP)

Lesotho started its Third Five Year Development Plan phase in 1980/81 and continued until 1984/85. It started this plan period faced by a grim political and economic environment. The regional and internal problems of the late 1970's had escalated rather than diminished. In southern Africa, mounting pressure by the international community on South Africa to democratise had resulted in economic embargos against it. These economic boycotts seriously affected the economy of South Africa and its reaction was to put pressure on neighbouring small states in southern Africa with the hope that this would compel them to speak against economic sanctions on South Africa in the UN. South Africa exercised economic blockades at the borders by either closing them periodically or exercising go-slows by its border employees. Sometimes

goods imported from other parts of the world and on transit from its ports through to Lesotho, were delayed. Moreover, migrant workers from these countries were also being reduced, thereby reducing the flow of migrant remittances both to government and households in these countries. This strategy of economic destabilization of the peripheral states in the region by their big brother South Africa was in full swing in the 1980s (Davies, 1991; Sejanamane, 1994). At other times, military force was also used against these countries on the justification by South Africa that they harboured terrorists and also allowed themselves to be used as spring boards from which the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC) guerillas launched attacks on South Africa (Sixishe, 1984).

Given the landlocked position of Lesotho within South Africa, it was more vulnerable to and hard hit by destabilization. This position was aggravated by the fact that relations between Lesotho and South Africa deteriorated very drastically as Lesotho accused South Africa of harbouring the armed wing of the BCP, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) in Qwa-Qwa and other places. On its part, South Africa accused Lesotho of harbouring ANC and PAC guerillas and further making diplomatic ties with communists from the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea and Cuba (Sixishe, 1984). These accusations climaxed with the attack of Maseru by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in 1982 and again in 1984. The BNP government felt South Africa could no longer be relied upon for food supplies (Sixishe, 1984).

Within Lesotho itself conditions were far from stable. The LLA had escalated its attacks on peoples lives and public property including internationally shared facilities like those of the central post office and telecommunications and one of the major international hotels, the Hilton Hotel, where most international visitors used to seek accommodation. All these LLA activities exposed the illegitimacy of the rule of the BNP and sensitized the international community to put pressure on Jonathan to democratize. Again, foreign aid, especially food aid, could no longer be expected to come by as easily anymore from the international community to support BNP rule. Clearly Lesotho had to pull up its socks and be self-sufficient. It was with this kind of political-economic background that Lesotho entered into the Third Five Year Development Plan in 1980/81.

At sectoral level, emphasis was put on the crucial role played by agriculture and rural development to supply adequate food and sustainable rural livelihoods. A special inter-ministerial task force was set up under the co-ordination of the Ministry of Agriculture to draw

up an action plan for agriculture to be implemented during the Third Five Year Development period. This plan document - Agricultural Development: A blueprint for Action (1980) was adopted by the government as the official plan to guide agriculture until 1985. The objectives of agriculture were outlined by the plan as to increase agricultural production, expand gainful employment opportunities in agriculture; rehabilitate and stabilize the land base; use the land wisely; provide efficient support services and to mobilize financial resources.

In order to implement this plan, the government embarked on an aggressive strategy called the Food Self - Sufficiency Programme (FSSP) which was formulated in 1980 and got implemented in 1981. The objectives of the FSSP were to:

- achieve self-sufficiency in food grains-maize, sorghum and wheat;
- use all land at all times and put fallow land to production;
- and demonstrate advantages of use of advanced technology.

The main strategy employed by the government to achieve FSSP objectives was the use of block farming. Farmers participated through contribution of their individual fields to common blocks of 800 to 1,600 hectares so as to allow for mechanization and capture economies of scale. Financing of operations was done by the government alone in the first year and farmers contributed nothing. Yet both the government and participating farmers were to share produce on a 50:50 basis. During the second year, the government and farmers were to share costs on a 50:50 basis and produce on a 1/3:2/3 basis, respectively. From the third year onwards farmers were to be on their own for both costs and produce. Farmers were expected to practice modern farming as introduced to them by the FSSP on a sustainable basis (Ngqaleni, 1991).

In the operations, expensive high yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and weeding sprays were provided by the government and used as a package to transform traditional Sesotho agriculture and improve productivity. Heavy expensive machinery was used throughout - tractors for ploughing, discing, planting and seeding, aeroplanes for spraying weeds and insecticides and machines for harvesting produce (Huisman, 1994). These technical operations were done by the Technical Operations Unit (TOU), a special unit formed for this purpose under the Ministry of Agriculture. The TOU itself got technical advice and support from the Republic of South Africa, which also provided credit to Lesotho for FSSP to the tune of R2 million. The

Lesotho government contributed R3.6 million; while Taiwan funded the project with USD6.6 million for the first three years (Swallow & Boris, 1987; Ngqaleni, 1991; Huisman, 1994).

This project was expected to run for five years up to 1985, at yield levels of about 5,000 kg/hectare. Spatially, the project covered the entire lowland and foothills of Lesotho. Like CCPP, FSSP was responsible to the Prime Ministers office.

The FSSP and CCPP had many features in common. First, like CCPP, the FSSP was responsible to the Prime Ministers office, the only difference was that the latter involved foreign donors for financing as well. This positioning led to suspicion that FSSP was a political project (Huisman, 1994), meant to create populist support to the BNP government (Johnston, 1996). This suspicion was given credibility by the fact that it was not every willing mosotho farmer who could participate in FSSP. BNP party affiliation was the pre-condition for participation. One had first to be politically screened and cleared by the village development committee which was appointed by the BNP. If one was not a BNP member but wished to participate in FSSP, one had to join the BNP party first. As such, therefore, the FSSP was used as a populist political strategy meant to increase BNP membership. The state deliberately used the project as a national resource to make sure that some part of the nation who supported it, participated in benefit sharing of the fruits brought about by this development initiative, at the expense of its critics (Johnston, 1996).

Secondly, the FSSP failed to create positive impact on productivity levels because the targets were too high and there was also drought during its life span. It did, all the same, attract a lot of participation from BNP supporters. Ngqaleni (1991) estimates that in 1988/81 it had 13,878 participants, and that this figure rose to 28,782 in 1982/83. Huisman (1994) also provides some figures which show participation from 1980/81 to 1985/86. These are presented in Table 5.3. However, these figures have to be interpreted in their proper context lest they lead one to draw wrong conclusions. As can be seen they apply to the first years of operation of the project when the government bore all the costs and shared 50:50 produce with farmers. For the later years after 1983 when farmers had to contribute to costs, participation declined and, in some cases, coercion had to be used against withdrawing farmers, who were labelled as having defected to BCP and as such were potential subborteurs of BNP government. Such labels could mean a lot of harassment by the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), the para-military wing of the government those

days. In fear of such political repercussions some people stayed on with the project contrary to their inner wishes and preferences.

Thirdly, the FSSP buttressed Lesotho's dependence on South Africa for finance, inputs, tractors, aeroplanes, high technical expertise and direct funding and left it even more vulnerable politically and economically to South Africa's destabilization tactics. This vulnerability was to reach its climax when South Africa exercised frequent border closures and go-slows, between 1983 and 1985. Necessary inputs into activities of the FSSP were often delayed, along with other imports from South Africa, far beyond the necessary timing in the cropping calendar (Huisman, 1994).

Lastly, although the blueprint for action (1980) had emphasized the need for farmer participation as a pre-condition for sustainability there was no participation of farmers in decision making, planning and implementation in the FSSP activities, so that there was hardly any transfer of farming skills to farmers to ensure continuity and sustainability when the project ended (Swallow and Boris, 1987).

Table 5.3: Food Self-Sufficiency Programme-Production Programme for 1980/81-1985/86

Season	Crop	No. of farmers	Planted(ha)	Harvested (ha)	Yield/kg/ha
1980/81	maize	10,127	5,822	5,790	2,575
	sorghum	237	382	283	1,362
	winter wheat	3,514	3,913	1,834	195
1981/82	maize	23,493	24,448	19,605	1,021
	sorghum	300	401	149	299
	winter wheat	3,387	5,138	5,043	857
1982/83	maize	22,750	24,567	22,446	857
	sorghum	766	1,200	1,131	746
	winter wheat	5,074	8,106	8,106	944
1983/84	maize	18,124	20,591	20,591	484
	sorghum	830	1,747	1,747	576
	winter wheat	4,052	8,106	8,106	944
1984/85	maize	8,924	15,524	15,524	2,454
1985/86	maize	9,564	14,637	13,466	1,890
	sorghum	154	220	220	2,177

Source: Huisman, 1994,p.126

Recognition of some of these problems of FSSP led the government to modify the mode of operation of the project in 1985. In the modified version, the sharing idea between government and farmers was abandoned. Instead, the landholders were encouraged to operate on their individual land and become a member of a co-operative in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural

Development through which FSSP funding was now disbursed both in credit and as a package of inputs. Farmers could therefore seek credit and purchase the improved inputs directly from their co-operatives. They could also rent machinery on credit to be repaid at harvest time. In this modified form, FSSP allowed for increased direct active participation by farmers at all phases of the production activities, because the initiative and responsibility to farm lay with the farmer and not the government through the project. This marked a turn-about in FSSP approach, away from co-operative block farming to a BASP style, individual farmer approach (Swallow and Borris, 1987; Ngqaleni, 1991).

5.2.2.1.2 Sustainable development approach

The year 1985/86 was also supposed to be the beginning of the Fourth Five Year Development Plan which would end in 1989/90. However, the expected Fourth Five Year Development Plan was not started on time in 1985/86. It actually started in 1987 as a result of drastic political changes that took place in Lesotho between 1985 and 1986. These changes also affected implementation of the modified FSSP.

In 1985 both international and national pressure upon Jonathan to democratise had reached their peak. South Africa increased economic blockades and some foreign donors had begun to reduce development assistance to Lesotho unless free and fair elections were held and a democratic government put in place (Machobane, 1997). Within Lesotho itself, the LLA onslaught on people's lives and public property had escalated. Civil disorder perpetrated largely by the BNP youth league was rampant. These pressures eventually convinced Jonathan that calling for a general election was unavoidable. The elections were eventually fixed for September 1985. The BNP was the only party that took part in these elections; other parties boycotted them. This created high political tension throughout the last three months of 1985 and eventually ended up in a military coup d'état on January 20th, 1986 (Machobane, 1997).

The new Military Government ruled Lesotho without a national plan throughout 1986. The Fourth Five Year Development Plan only came out in 1987 and was scheduled to end in 1990/91. This plan placed heavy emphasis on people's participation as a pre-condition for sustainable development planning and implementation. The major objective of the plan was to foster restructuring of the economy to provide better living standards for people. Specific objectives were

- accelerated development with the view to meeting more adequately basic needs, and achieving a more equitable distribution of national wealth;
- maximization of national income and distribution;
- reduction in the poverty level through rural development; and
- increased participation of the people in the developmental process (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1987).

At sectoral level, the objective of agriculture was to increase the production of basic staple foodstuffs; high value horticultural crops; livestock and forest products.

The specific objective for crop production was set as the achievement of food self-sufficiency on basic crops such as maize, sorghum, wheat and the promotion of horticultural crops especially vegetables and fruits. Conservation farming was to be used as a general strategy to implement agricultural production on a sustainable basis.

The strategy employed to implement this objective was to encourage private contractors with capital to make association with landholders to farm their land and increase production. Some form of contract farming approach was to be used as the cutting edge of the strategy. The Fourth Five Year Development Plan did not have much to offer in terms of improvement of crop production except for the vague statement on the strategy. Efforts to implement contract farming had been tried at Masianokeng on an experimental basis without much success due to the nature of the land tenure system and other problems (Santho *et al.*, 1985).

Elsewhere in the country contract farming was attempted more in the field of irrigated agriculture and will be dealt with in that section. The Fourth Five Year Development Plan coincided with a change from liberal donor assistance towards the requirements of adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) encouraged by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as pre-condition for lending to the Third World countries.

Lesotho was itself caught up in this changing donor environment which created a lot of confusion and lack of clarity in development policy directives and directions. The first SAP package was adopted by Lesotho in 1988 and it required tremendous changes in policy and attitude to national development. One of the major requirements of this SAP package was that people's participation can best be achieved within an environment of deregulation and privatisation. Private enterprise

participation in development became encouraged and promoted through government efforts to privatise agriculture parastatals (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1987).

During the mid-1980s the Ministry of Agriculture in Lesotho had begun to adopt some of the basic ideas propagated by the World Conservation Strategy launched by the International Union for Conservation and Nature (IUCN). In pursuit of the World Conservation strategy, under the Fourth Five Year Development Plan, emphasis was put on the use of conservation farming as the main approach adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture to promote increased crop and livestock productivity through conservation of the natural resource base (MOA, 1988).

A lot of agricultural projects were funded by foreign donors in collaboration with the Lesotho government to promote sustainable agriculture through conservation farming from the mid-1980s into the 1990s. The projects implemented from independence to the early 1980s were based on the technical fix approach typical of the Green Revolution which dominated agricultural development thinking world wide at that time. Those projects gave top priority to increased productivity in agriculture in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food. The increased productivity was to be achieved through use of high yielding varieties of inputs and mechanisation of farming. Very little consideration was made about the negative impact of the high yielding varieties and mechanisation on the environment.

On the contrary, the genre of agricultural projects started since the mid-1980s actually put the environment in the fore-front of agricultural development if it were to become sustainable. Conscious efforts were made to create a symbiotic relationship between increased agricultural productivity and a conserved environment within the same process at the same time. Projects that used a conservation farming approach are discussed below. Some of the projects which were started earlier, but changed their approach to conservation farming are included as well in the discussion which follows.

a) Soil, Water Conservation and Agro-forestry Programme (SWACAP)

This project started in 1989. It was sponsored by the government of Lesotho and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). SWACAP covered the lowlands and foothills of the districts of Butha-Buthe, Leribe and Berea and Maseru and ended in June 1998. The objectives of SWACAP were to enforce soil and water conservation so that small farmers could achieve farm production to increase food self-sufficiency and family income; create an

effective agricultural extension system; establish agroforestry research capability and monitor activities initiated (IFAD, 1991). Components of SWACAP were conservation-based agricultural production, reorganisation of extension, agro-forestry research and development and conservation policy and strategy coordination.

Conservation-based agricultural production was promoted through supply of improved inputs like seeds and fertilizers by the project. An evaluation study done by Matobo and Ntoanyane (1996) found out that large adoption of these improved inputs had been hampered by favouritism in the selection of beneficiaries. Extension agents and project staff disseminated inputs with a bias to favour friends and rich farmers instead of the poor as was originally planned. The second strategy used by the project to promote agricultural production was introduction of appropriate technology such as tractors for the rich farmers; harness use of draught animals for poor farmers; and farming methods such as Machobane farming. Rip-line cultivation, where one rips one line and immediately plants different crops consecutively until the whole field is harvested and planted throughout the year was also promoted. The third strategy used to improve production was through introduction of the conservation incentive schemes whereby farmers were encouraged to undertake construction of terraces, waterways, contour grass strips, cut off drains and water harvesting structures. Farmers were given cash, inputs and sometimes food as incentives for participation (Shams, 1993). Again the evaluation study done by Matobo and Ntoanyane (1996) concluded that the incentives tended to promote laziness and promote lack of commitment by farmers in participation. The participation promoted became a means to get inputs and not a conscious process towards self-development as an end.

With regard to the component to improve production through re-organisation of extension service, SWACAP used the CLIENT-DEMAND system. In this system, extension services were provided to farmers (clients) on demand expressed by them to the nearest Resource Centres (RC's) via their extension agents. About 23 resource centres were constructed and they acted as a link between the District Agricultural Office and the farmers at local levels. Farmers expressed their demand to the resource centres and these were met by the project. If the resource centres did not have manpower to meet the demands, they passed the request to the District Agriculture Office for subject matter specialists to attend to. Essentially the resource centres were meant to be training centres for both extension agents and farmers. Matobo and Ntoanyane (1996) argue that in most cases the supply of inputs and promotion of technology packages were not done based on client-demand, but were imposed on farmers by extension agents. Their study

recommended that there was need to improve community participation if activities initiated under the project were to become sustainable. Moreover, SWACAP failed to devise criteria to determine the poor farmers and to be target group specific. Rather, it addressed its packages to the community of farmers.

Because in reality farmers were not a homogeneous undifferentiated community, the rich farmers were invariably favoured by extension agents because the rich farmers themselves were willing to take risks in new farming methods than poor farmers. The net result was that rich farmers gained more from the project than poor farmers. Poor co-ordination between MOA headquarters and SWACAP project management added to implementation problems (IFAD,1991).

b) Matelile Integrated Rural Development Project (MIRDP)

MIRDP started in 1986 and it covered the whole of Matelile ward in the Mafeteng district. This ward is about 400 square kilometres. There are 160 villages with an average number of 8,15 households. The project was financed by the Lesotho and the Federal Republic of Germany. The executing agency of the project was the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ). The project was directly controlled and administered by GTZ and not the Ministry of Agriculture through its headquarters in Maseru. It was, however, functionally attached to the Ministry (Daemane, 1995).

The objectives of the project were to increase food self-sufficiency of basic grains; to reduce dependence on migrant remittances; promote social welfare and to increase people's participation and self-reliance. An integrated approach was used by the project to achieve its objectives. A number of activities ranging from improved crop production, conservation, extension, livestock and range improvement, poultry, piggery, to improvement of physical and social infrastructure were undertaken jointly and simultaneously by the project. It was envisaged that from 1990 to 1998 the project would have been extended to become a district-wide programme, covering urban development as well, and known as the Mafeteng Development Programme (MDP) (Daemane, 1995).

In crop production, the project's aim was to help farmers to increase yield per acre for major food crops like maize, sorghum, wheat, beans and peas. The project also aimed to assist farmers

diversify production and income through choice of high value cash crops. Farmers worked individually on their own fields and were given technical advice by extension agents of the project.

The project supplied, on payment, and/or loan basis a package of improved inputs of seeds, fertilizers and insecticides. Farmers were encouraged to use oxen for traction since tractors are expensive to hire. Tractors could, however, be used where finances allowed. Furthermore, the project did provide a subsidy when its own tractors were used by farmers. The subsidy was given on condition that farmers co-operated in operations (Daemane, 1995).

The MIRDP's performance in dryland crop production varied. First, although it used the ZOPP approach which stated promotion of peoples participation as one of its objectives, it initially charged a fee for joining membership of the project. This payment caused the local people to view the project as a money-making racket intended for the rich who could afford to pay membership fees. Participation became highly impaired by this subscription fee (Daemane, 1995).

Secondly, efforts to encourage use of improved inputs to increase yields of basic grains were thwarted by the fact that farmers had to pay cash on the spot in order to get them, except for Pinto beans where seeds could be given out as a loan to be repaid after harvest. Moreover, the farmers did not want to pay cash for the inputs. Thus the MIDRP evaluation report (1993) whose author is not named, noted that although the project aimed to develop and encourage farmers to adopt appropriate crop packages, the participation of the target group was not sufficiently planned for in the project. Therefore it sadly concluded that much work has been done in order to come up with innovative solutions to crop production problems (but) due to lack of target group participation in development and adaptation of techniques as well as unfavourable environmental and economic conditions, few innovations acceptable to the target population are available.

Thirdly, encouraging use of tractors through provision of a subsidy was confronted with the problem of lack of co-operation among farmers (Daemane, 1995). Fourthly, the fact that the project was managed entirely by GTZ and no participation of local institutions and people, seriously undermined the sustainability of its impact. As the MRDP evaluation report (1993) rightly concludes the low degree of integration into local institutions is at present the most severe obstacle for the sustainability and diffusion of its potential impact.

c) **The Mafeteng Development Programme (MDP)**

The MDP is an extension of the Matelilie Rural Development Project. The MDP, however, covers the whole Mafeteng district. The MDP activities also cover the urban sector. The MDP started in 1993 and is expected to come to the end in 1999. The MDP (1995) brochure states that the project uses an approach that promotes participatory and self-help principles, by encouraging target groups and district agriculture staff to formulate their interests and objectives through dialogue. The area of the district is 2,119 km² of which 708 km² is arable. In 1994 the district population was 255,769 of which 90% (232,719) were rural (MDP Brochure, 1995).

The Mafeteng District Programme has a district wide agricultural component in it. According to the Mafeteng District Agricultural Development Plan (MDADP)(1992), MDADP aims at improvement of services from the Ministry of Agriculture to facilitate increased production and income for the rural population. MDADP employs the following strategy to achieve its objective: First, a district agricultural development plan that outlines development potentials, and identifies development priorities and implementation packages has been drawn. Secondly, training was envisaged to be done to strengthen the local capacity for training in planning by local institutions such as some academic departments at the National University of Lesotho. These NUL departments would work closely with management in the project in research, training of students, and use of materials from the project in the teaching of various aspects of planning. Thirdly, integration of, and co-operation among, various ministries at district level was to be promoted by using one administrative framework at district level (MDADP, 1992).

MDADP is under implementation and so far work is in progress on identification of district development potentials and constraints. This task is done through studies that made inventories of available physical, demographic, socio-economic, political-administration, financial and planning resources. The studies are aimed at provision of recommendations made through a district development action plan for implementation. This exercise has been totally given to a foreign consultancy firm from Bloemfontein in South Africa with no partnership from local companies or institutions except two Basotho who are part of this team. This seriously undermines the future sustainability of the development proposals to be implemented, since there is very little, if at all, participation by locals in this exercise. The foreign firm is going to prepare a blueprint district agricultural development action plan and dump it on top of the desk of the district agricultural office to implement.

The non-participatory nature of MDADP observed above so far, might be accentuated by the fact that the co-operation and co-optation of NUL departments like Geography and Economics referred to in the second strategy above, was attempted but failed dismally as a result of personal and technical idiosyncrasies between these departments staff and MDADP senior personnel. This means that there will be no local institution to assist with monitoring and evaluation of MDADP, thereby necessitating recruitment of continual foreign consultancy at high cost unsustainable to MOA once MDADP project period expires.

d) The Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation Project (FISC)

FISC came into operation in 1985 and is located in Mohale's hoek district. Since FISC is used as a case study in this thesis, discussion on its operations is deferred to chapter 7 and 8.

e) The Soil and Water Conservation Project (SOWACO)

SOWACO started in 1987. It was located in the Taung Ward at Ha Khitsane and neighbouring villages along the lower part of the Makhaleng River valley. Much of the work done between 1987 and 1990 was ground work that laid the foundation for Phase II in 1991. Main activities involved creation of conservation structures such as terraces, ponds, waterways and diversion furrows and planting trees and fodder crops to combat soil erosion and increase land productivity. Farmers were also organised into excursion trips to other projects to share their experiences.

SOWACO II started in 1991 and was scheduled to run for three years. The donor, the Government of the Netherlands, contributed a sum of USD 1,153 223 and the Government of Lesotho contributed in kind. Some implementation delays led to the extension of the project to end in 1996 and not in 1995 as planned for initially (FAO, 1996).

The overall development objective of the project was to encourage farmers in the lowlands and foothill areas of Lesotho to adopt the extension message transmitted by government extension services concerning conservation based, sustainable, environmentally sound agricultural production. Specific objectives were to

- provide for full participation of rural people in formulating and implementing their own village based conservation programmes;

- development of manuals and methodologies on soil and water conservation for increase crop production, livestock and forestry; and
- training of subject matter specialists (SMS's) to be effective in implementation of project activities (FAO, 1996).

SOWACO's mode of operation was to provide some basic tools like spades, wheelbarrows, pick axes, growbars and sows for various activities in the areas where it operated in the Makhaleng extension area with about 45-50 communities in the Mohale's hoek. Extension agents of the MOA in the district provided and spread SOWACO technical messages. They selected lead farmers among the communities and trained them as village extension assistants to assist other farmers with conservation.

SOWACO's activities in crop production included the provision of permanent vegetative cover for the soil through intercropping of potatoes, beans, cowpeas, pumpkin, maize, lucerne and sunflower. FAO (1996) concluded that this effort at multi cropping became more successful and productive than the formerly prevalent monocropping. It did, however, caution that the financial and time costs had made some farmers to withdraw from participation. The report also blamed insecurity of tenure for the un-satisfactory adoption of SOWACO's technical package.

Horticultural crops were also encouraged, especially home gardening of vegetables and fruit trees using kraal manure and composed heap manure as nutrients. Farmers provided their own labour. The project gave out tractors to collect necessary stones for making fences and shelters, and free bonus fruit trees for building walls around the garden. Sometimes vegetable seeds of cabbage, cauliflower, spinach, carrots, beet root, onions and radish were given instead of trees (FAO, 1996).

The report ended with a sad note that farmers in general seemed more interested in incentives from SOWACO than conservation farming activities which failed to become sustainable because of their lack of willingness to change their old ways of farming and adopt the new ones introduced by SOWACO. Since villagers had been used to receiving incentives for their labour, they seemed to think less of combating erosion and reclaiming gullies than stressing their participation as part of SOWACOs paid labour force which is regrettably at odds with the philosophy behind the conservation policy (FAO, 1996).

f) Mphaki Area Development Project (MADP)

The MADP started in 1978. It was funded by the European Economic Community (EEC) to the tune of R2 million for an initial period of 1978/79-1981/82. The project was located in the Mphaki area in the Quthing district. It was located to get maximum advantage of the Quthing and Qhoali Rivers which are major tributaries of the Senqu (Orange) River.

The main objectives of the project were to increase levels of crop and livestock production through introduction of improved agricultural practices. The strategies employed to achieve these objectives were the provision of improved inputs, seeds, fertilizers, technology and technicians for crop production and better range management for methods for increased livestock production. It was estimated that the project would benefit about 20,000 people and achieve a 30% increase in crop yields. The project adopted an integrated area development approach. To this end, it also had improvement of community life as one of the objectives. The strategy to implement this community development objective was to construct physical infrastructure, especially access roads, and social infrastructures like schools and clinic (Grindle and Kirk, 1990). The MADP was meant to be a replica of the Thaba-Tseka Mountain Development Project in the Central mountain region of Lesotho. Delays in the implementation of the MADP led to its extension from 4 years to 8 years. It was intended to end in 1986, but it was extended into a phase II programme lasting up to 1990 (Krinkle and Kirk, 1990).

Under Phase II, the objectives of MADP were modified to emphasize the motto of conservation farming in line with the Fourth Five Year Development Plan. To this end, its key objective was to develop and demonstrate improved land resource management methods at village level and reverse land degradation as well as to increase livestock productivity and food production (Grindle and Kirk, 1990). This objective was to be achieved through provision of organisational, technical and financial support to village communities wishing to introduce basic rules on land resource, stock control and grazing management. Community development work was also financed, especially that which encouraged self-help.

As far as improvement of crop productivity was concerned, the project's crops specialist was to survey existing farm practice and attitudes and recommend introduction of new methods of production, using modern inputs where necessary. The specialist was also expected to ensure timely supply of inputs to farmers and do farm trials to test the appropriateness of the technical

packages suitable to the area. A total of R9,015,000 was allocated for all Phase II activities by the EEC (Grindle and Krik, 1990).

Grindle and Kirk (1990) argue that Phase I of the project 1978-1986 was never evaluated. They concluded that crop production under Phase II did not make significant progress because project activities were biased towards livestock and range improvement in agriculture. Moreover, the study concluded that just over one-third of farmers in these serviced areas were purchasing inputs, and just 10% of all villages in the area were serviced by Mphaki and Plenty projects (Grindle and Kirk, 1990,p.28). The project had no element of peoples participation, it was a clear case of a project introduced by government to people for its own justification without bothering to know how they felt about it. Some people interviewed in the Grindle and Kirk (1990) report argued that the project was imposed on them as a result of the political influence of the then chief of the area, who also happened to be a Minister in the then BNP government. Therefore its sustainability was doubtful. Grindle and Kirk (1990) concluded that the sustainability of an input supply system operated by government is always in doubt, as it requires different skills and incentives from those available. However, it would be naive to expect the private sector to take over in the short term in the isolated conditions of much of the Mphaki area. The market for improved seeds and other specialised inputs has yet to be built up and this development work requires a combination of inputs and technical advice.

g) Local Initiatives Support Project (LISP)

LISP commenced in 1987 and ended in 1996. It was located in the Quthing district in the south. Choice of the district was motivated by low rainfall, few economic opportunities and lack of viable natural resources (UNOPS, 1996). LISP was financed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to the tune of USD 48 million; Plenty Canada with USD 0.9 million; the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) with USD 0.1 million and the Government of Lesotho (GOL) with USD 1.2 million. In total LISP cost USD 7.0 million.

LISP was born out of an interactive process of discussion between IFAD, GOL, farmers and other envisaged beneficiaries of other project activities in the Quthing area in line with what the UNOPS (1996) calls its participatory philosophy. It is one of the few participatory development projects implemented by the Government of Lesotho and IFAD). The project was initially scheduled to take 7 years but it got extended by two years and ended in October 1996.

LISP covered a total area of 182,000 hectares. The population covered was 90,000 people. The broad goal of the project was to improve the standard of living of the poor through the provision of credit, training and improved techniques of production and management. Specific objectives of the project were to

- raise rural incomes by increasing and diversifying agricultural production;
- generate on-farm and non-farm employment and income generating activities for the poor;
- improve quality of life through improved nutrition and water supplies;
- strengthen the capacity of the District Agricultural office (DAO) to respond to and administer development initiatives; and
- ensure sustainability of development activities by strengthening farmer and farmer group control over key factors in their production activities.

LISP was administered through the DAO in Quthing in conjunction with the Ministry of Local Government, then called Ministry of Cooperative and Rural Development (MICRD). Project activities were composed of 4 categories, namely,

- crop production which dealt with adaptive research, low-input packages soil conservation and gravity-fed irrigation;
- rural enterprises promotion composed of farm and non-farm enterprises;
- institutional support dealing with credit, monitoring and evaluation, training and communication; and
- community support services composed of community gardens and village water supply.

In order to achieve project objectives in the crop production sector, under rain fed low input production packages, the project used a number of strategies. First, there was use of inter-cropping where Machobane Farming system was encouraged through demonstrations to farmers by extension agents. These demonstrations took place on some fields of participating farmers. The project assisted farmers to get loans from the Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank (LADB) on an individual basis or a common interest group if they had formed one. Problems of repayment were encountered from some farmers because yields continued to be low due to the recurrent drought throughout the project's duration. The net result was that adoption of low input package tended to be low over time (UNOPS, 1996).

Secondly, the project introduced use of better quality machinery through a tractors and implements hire scheme. This was not adopted by farmers because it was expensive (UNOPS, 1996). An attempt to diversify production was done through introduction of cash crops like beans, groundnuts, soybeans and wheat. Adoption rates were low because farmers could not afford the prices of the recommended seeds (UNOPS, 1996).

Thirdly, soil conservation was undertaken and farmers encouraged to build terraces, dams, waterways and plant trees. Participation of farmers was not very high because LISP did not give out incentives of food-for-work.

The report emphasized the need for the Government of Lesotho to examine and encourage use of participatory approaches without remuneration to farmers in development work.

One can conclude from the foregoing evaluation of LISP in its project terminal report, that the activities initiated by the project were, in most cases, beyond the affordability level of farmers and was not adopted in a sustainable manner over time since farmers failed to repay and secure further loans to continue operations. Indeed, the UNOPS(1996) report itself cautions that credit programmes should be seriously examined in respect of risk and profitability lest they increase poverty or indebtedness of the people they are aimed to assist.

h) The Thabana-Morena Integrated Rural Development Project (TMIRDP)

This project started in 1988 and was scheduled to run for 4 years up to 1991. Delays to start its implementation led to a 2 year extension that resulted in the project ending in 1993. The project was financed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in conjunction with the Government of the Netherlands to a tune of USD2,159 340. The Government of Lesotho contributed R230,000 cash and R440,000 in kind (FAO, 1994). The Food Agricultural Organization (FAO) was appointed the executing agency on behalf of the Ministry of Interior, Co-operatives and Rural Development (MICARD). The project concentrated on 21 villages in the Thabana Morena area, and aimed to assist people to improve their livelihoods through participatory self-help (FAO, 1994).

The development objectives of the project were to promote use of resources to increase incomes in primary production and its processing and promote people participation in self-help to improve capacity building (FAO, 1994). A number of activities were to be promoted using an integrated

approach to achieve the objectives of the project. These activities were supported by the project provided they came from a group of people who had organised themselves around a particular activity in which they had similar interests.

In the area of dryland farming, four self-help groups were assisted by the project to produce wheat as they wished. The groups were based at Masia, Tjoope, Turupu and Sekhonyana villages. The groups had a total membership of 58 farmers and a total land of 73.2 hectares in which wheat was planted. The project advanced each of them with a loan for improved seed, fertilizers and machinery expenses. At harvest, three self-help groups were able to repay their loans, and got their farmers to share left produce. But, one group failed to repay its loan and its members also went separate ways because there had been problems of agreement on the actual implementation and use of the loan granted by the project (FAO, 1994).

i) Semonkong Rural Development Project (SRDP)

The Semonkong Rural Development Project was a joint venture between the Government of Germany and the Government of Lesotho. The Project Agreement was signed in 1983 and the project took off ground in 1984. The project covered 49,000 hectares of which 7,600 hectares was crop land and the rest 44,000 hectares was rangeland. One hundred and sixty villages, with total of 3,000 households whose average household size is 5.2 persons, were covered by the project. The SRDP represented an effort to use growth centre strategy to promote rural development in Lesotho (SRDP, 1996).

The SRDP was implemented in phases. Phase 1 of the project operated between 1984 to 1987. The objective of SRDP during Phase 1 was to provide Semonkong area with infrastructure in order to get it connected to the rest of the country, especially Maseru, and to enable the population to use its resources better. Major activities carried out were construction of roads in the centre and outlying villages, a water supply scheme, rehabilitation of some primary schools, construction of a nutrition centre, a marketing hall and a rural agricultural bank. Roads, schools, water supply and nutrition were meant to improve accessibility and health conditions in the area, while the agricultural bank was to facilitate access to credit by farmers to improve their farming. All these activities were completed by 1987 and the SRDP was ready to move into the next phase in its implementation (Interview with Project Manager on 18/9/98).

Phase II of SRDP started in 1988 and concentrated on the development of agricultural production itself. Major activities during phase two were livestock and range improvement, field crops, communal gardens and commercial horticulture (SRDP, 1996).

Rangeland constituted 85% of the total area in the project while livestock production came second to migrant remittances as a source of household income. SRDP developed great interest in livestock and range development. Training in range management was given to livestock producers. Grazing associations were formed as local institutions through which farmers participation in decision making and implementation of grazing issues could be improved. A Wool and Mohair Growers Association was improved through training, a woolshed and two dip tanks were constructed to improve small stock production. Some farmers were trained as village veterinary workers and were supported by the project to do participatory extension by assisting the extension staff to provide local services to other farmers when the need arose. Interest groups of farmers have been formed and trained in both dairy and poultry farming. Semonkong produced some 400 bales of wool and mohair per season as a result of project intervention (SRDP, 1996).

In the area of field crops, production was hampered by the short growing season because long cold winter shortens the cropping calendar to October through to April. The SRDP successfully introduced production of cold resistant crops such as potatoes, peas, and asparagus in addition to traditional cereals maize, sorghum and wheat. However, lack of local marketing outlets and high transportation costs to the Masianokeng Cannery several kilometres away led the 50 farmers who had adopted asparagus production to abandon it (SRDP, 1996).

The SRDP also gave support to the development of community gardens through provision of training and introduction of new vegetable varieties like curled scale and leek. Thirty-six communal gardens were developed by members who provided their own fencing materials and labour. About 20% of the households were members of the communal gardens SRDP which supplied training on improved production methods such as intercropping, pest control, storage methods, and garden preparation. Some of the communal gardens were weak due to poor cooperation among members on (non) adoption of some modern techniques and the sharing of labour and produce (SRDP, 1996).

The development of horticulture for commercial purposes by some households was encouraged as a viable income generating venture. Frost resistant vegetable varieties were encouraged and

some 50 farmers were given training twice a month on better methods of vegetable production, marketing, budgeting, grading and pricing of produce. SRDP also acted as a link between vegetable producers, the marketing division of the Ministry of Agriculture, and local markets. Besides supplying local markets, commercial vegetable production was also sold to outside markets, especially in Maseru city. Producers formed a cooperative composed of 70 members in 1995, and established a green house for all year round production of seedlings (SRDP,1996).

A central instrument to the success of the SRDP was the development and use of a strong extension system that relied on an adapted training and visit (T&V) system of extension to work in groups of 25 per T & V rather than as individuals, to maximise resources. Moreover, extension assistants were visited by subject matter specialists (SMSS) twice a month. A unified extension approach was introduced through incorporation of the nutritionist and cooperatives officer into the extension staff to form an area extension team (SRDP, 1996).

The SRDP was handed over to the government of Lesotho to assume full financial and administrative responsibility since 1996. So far the local personnel in the SRDP has been taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture and are now its staff and budget allocations are made under the Ministry of Agriculture for SRDP. The Maseru District Agricultural office is involved in the project management and planning of activities. The SRDP itself, and its facilities, have been made the resource training centre in Semongkong (Interview with Project Director, 18/9/98).

Since the primary aim behind the formation and implementation of SRDP was to eventually create Semongkong to become a growth centre, plans are underway to start Phase III component of the project, whose emphasis would be on the development and planning of Semongkong into a town that would provide regional services to adjacent mountain villages (SRDP, 1996; interview with Project Director, 18/9/98).

5.2.2.2 Irrigated Crop Production - Policies and Projects

Irrigated crop production in Lesotho dates back to colonial times. Chakela (1973) argues that irrigated farming in Lesotho started in the 1930s with the construction of the Tšakholo irrigation dam located in the Mafeteng district in southern Lesotho. This dam was meant to provide water for irrigation to improve crop productivity in this driest part of the country which had been hardest hit by the drought of the early 1930s. The dam was supposed to provide irrigation to some 600 acres of land. The Pim Report (1935) states that the Tsakholo irrigation scheme was

financed by the British colonial government to the tune of 1,000 British pound sterling and provided the much needed water for irrigation to offset the bad drought of the early 1930s.

The Tebetebeng Pilot Project which started in 1953 until 1960 and had an irrigation component as well. This component was meant to provide pilot experience with irrigation under cooperative block farming. Co-operating farmers were expected to provide labour and some minimum financial contribution for the irrigation pipes and other materials used. According to Turner(1978) this component encountered problems because the project management failed to explain to farmers that the payment was meant to guarantee sustainable maintenance of the equipment. Farmers, on their part, either refused to participate or withdrew their participation by taking their land out of irrigated farming, because they felt they were being cheated into supplying their labour and also paying money for participation. In some cases irrigation equipment was vandalised by disenchanted farmers.

The biggest effort to introduce irrigated farming in Lesotho by the colonial government was done in 1963 through the launching of the Thaba-Phatsoa irrigation scheme sometimes called the Thaba Phatsoa Pilot Project (TPPP) (Chakela, 1973;Turner, 1978; Borris, 1986; Swallow & Borris, 1987; Moeti, 1996). Much work in 1963 concentrated on construction of the Thaba-Phatsoa Dam which was 18 metres high.

This dam had a capacity of 3,400 litres. The irrigation work started in 1964 on an area of 2.4 ha. Turner (1978) maintained that there were other activities, covered by the project as well, which included livestock production, afforestation, home economics public health, conservation through terrace construction and the general supply of water to the nearby Hlotse town. Around independence in 1966, the project was temporarily discontinued because it failed to properly manage and co-ordinate the its activities. There were also technical problems with the maintenance of irrigation equipment since farmers refused to pay for it. Essentially, farmers complained that they were bossed around like labourers, a treatment which they resented. Productivity was also low and returns to farmers poor (Swallow and Borris, 1987).

In 1967 the Government of Lesotho, in conjunction with the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF), financed the re-opening of the project. The project activities were trimmed down and much emphasis was given to the production of maize, beans, wheat and potatoes under irrigation. Swallow and Boris (1987) estimated that in 1974, the TPPP had a membership of 75 landholders who grew mainly the above grain and tuber crops. During that period farmers provided land

between 1.2 - 1.8 hectares each to be irrigated on a co-operative block farming basis. Farmers also contributed labour for farm operations. Farmers were given financial loan advances by the project to use in farming. They were to repay the financial loans after sharing produce at harvest time (Chakela, 1973).

The Thaba-Phats'oa Pilot Project was, however, dogged by many implementation problems. First, despite irrigation, productivity of crops was not as high as anticipated. After repaying loans farmers found themselves left with little with which to survive. This prompted many to retain produce and postpone repayment. Debt accumulated on the project side and seriously hindered further financing from the donor. The ADF stopped funding in 1975 on account of poor debt repayment by farmers, and the project collapsed. Other factors responsible for the collapse of the project in 1975 were that farmers who participated in the project quarrelled among themselves on account of the unequal sharing formula. Farmers' shares of produce differed according to the size of land. Those who contributed smaller pieces of land also got smaller shares of the produce, which they felt was not fair because all farmers contributed the same amount of labour and finance since they farmed as a co-operative unit. They preferred to share equally on member to member basis. This did not happen and led to poor participation in the project. Another problem that plagued the project continued to be the top-down bossy attitude of project management to participant farmers. Farmers continued to be treated like labourers on their own fields, and were not dully involved in decision-making, planning and implementation of activities (Swallow and Borris, 1987).

Relentless efforts by the Government of Lesotho to see the project back on its feet eventually led to receipt of an offer by the Government of Taiwan to revitalise the irrigation project in 1978. The Taiwanese concentrated on production of high value crops, especially vegetables, using small pumps for irrigation. They provided inputs such as chemical fertilizer, transport and technical advice to the co-operative unit of the farmers, and themselves entered into leasehold arrangements with individual farmers to produce their own vegetables, especially cabbage, to sell to Hlotse town.

The Taiwanese left unceremoniously in 1983. The unceremonious departure was symptomised by, among other indicators, leaving equipment in the fields in agricultural projects where they operated, the National Stadium incomplete in Maseru, and the Prime Ministers Complex called Qhobosheaneng was also not completed. The Taiwanese left because of their displeasure at the

fact that Chief Leabua Jonathan had unilaterally entered into a diplomatic agreement with their arch enemies - Communist China, as part of his new policy to make friends with the eastern block - leano la ho ralotsa (Sixishe, 1984).

Communist China gave Lesotho financial and technical support to carry on with all the activities left by Taiwan. The Thaba-Phats'oa Project was thus taken over by communist China. The idea of co-operative block irrigation farming was maintained, and the Chinese provided technical and credit assistance. Problems of poor co-operation among participating farmers and poor provision of labour at crucial times in farming contributed to the persistence of low yields and failure of farmers to repay their loans. The Chinese found themselves increasingly drawn into direct farming with participating farmers employed as out right labourers, in an attempt to make the Project viable (Mohapeloa, 1991). Unfortunately, this move aggravated the situation. Farmers were ignored in decision-making, planning and implementation. They loathed being converted into labourers on their own fields and generally became apathetic to project activities. The support of communist China to Lesotho ended in 1990 and left the scheme unsustainable mainly because of a lack of willingness to change by the farmers.

In 1965 the colonial government sought to experiment with individual irrigated farming as against co-operative block farming. It mounted the Tsa -Kholo project , which was a revised version of an earlier project of 1935 in Mafeteng. The basis of the Ts'akholo Project was that it emphasized private individual irrigation, on private individual land by participants. This project got financial and technical support from the Irrigation Research and Development Project (IRDP) in the Ministry of Agriculture. The project covered an area of 100 hectares. Like the Thaba-Phatsoa Project, Ts'akholo was taken over and run by the Taiwanese in 1978. It was also abandoned by the Taiwanese in 1983 and taken over by Communist China. Individual farmers got loans from the project on inputs and were individually responsible for repayment of their loans. They also received technical advice. Swallow and Boris (1987) contend that the Ts'akholo project was successful because farmers were individually accountable for their loans and payment. Therefore the project could act as an alternative model based on private ownership of land, operations loans, repayment and benefits to the widely practised but unsuccessful co-operative block irrigation farming.

During the 1970s the three large integrated area-based project had irrigation components. The Khomokhoana Integrated Rural Development Project in Leribe subsumed the Leshoele irrigation

scheme. The Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project had irrigation experiments along the Phuthiatsana - Thaba Bosiu valley whilst the Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project (SRAEP) in Quthing had the largest irrigation component. Swallow and Boris (1987) and more recently Moeti (1996) provide a detailed analysis of irrigation efforts in the Senqu valley.

Irrigation under the SRAE started in 1972. Two consolidated blocks of fields to be irrigated were formed on a co-operative basis under the project advice by farmers at Ha Koali and Ha Ralinku villages. The Ha Koali irrigation block operated on 14.2 ha. of beans, maize and sorghum under irrigation. This area increased to 21.7 ha two years later. Ha Ralinku irrigated beans, sorghum and vegetables on 21 hectares of land. At their peak the two blocks irrigated 42.62 hectares at Ha Koali, involving 26 farmers; 21.34 hectares at Ha Ralinku involving 19 farmers; and a newly incorporated irrigation at Tele involving 22 farmers on 21.84 hectares (Moeti, 1996).

The project gave credit to farmers in advance, and they were expected to pay at harvest. According to Swallow and Boris (1987) this arrangement was not explained to the participating farmers. When after harvest the project deducted its costs, farmers complained that they were cheated (Mohapeloa, 1991). Since farmers had joined the project and participated in provision of free labour on the (uninformed) understanding that the project was ploughing and irrigating free of charge, as was the case with the political projects of that time in the country, they felt cheated by the project. Discontent led to quarrels with project management and farmers withdrew their free labour, and later, their fields. Farmers who expressed a wish to withdraw their fields from the project were sometimes threatened by the village development committees - which were appointed by the BNP, as saboteurs of BNP government programmes. Those days this could mean much trouble with the BNP party militia at village level - Lebotho la khotso - village peace corps, and the more vicious paramilitary unit (PMU). People tried to persevere but were often absent and secretly vandalised irrigation property (Swallow and Boris, 1987). Other reasons for failure included the patronising and bossy attitude of project staff towards farmers who were treated as if they were mere labourers. Shortage of men most of whom were in the mines as a result of the wage increases of the seventies left heavy tasks to women who were unable to execute them. Lastly, some of the produce rotted away because of lack of a marketing facilities. In general, farmers became indebted to the project rather than self-sufficient. Many left the project and farmed independently for subsistence, despite the political trouble this move could bring. This project was terminated in 1977 and at that time the blocks were indebted to the

tune of R17,000.00 (Mohapeloa, 1991). Again, the lack of willingness by farmers to leave their old lifestyles and adopt to the changes introduced by the project resulted in a continued negative attitude to the project and its eventual failure.

One of the oldest irrigation schemes in Lesotho is the Hololo Valley Project (HVP). The HVP started in 1978. It was located in the Butha-Buthe district in the north and lies along the Hololo River valley. It was financed by the Government of Ireland for a period of 10 years. When the HVP started there was already some irrigation work going on in the Hololo Valley sponsored by the Unitarian Service Commission of Canada - a non-governmental organisation. The activities comprised the first arrangement in the HVP where 13 farmers operated 9 hectares. Farmers had a constitution with by-laws and an annually elected management committee. The committee kept records, funds and supervised daily work, while other members equally contributed labour to all tasks. All members got a remuneration of R2.00 per day for work done. Operations on the fields were done communally as a kind of co-operative, and the land itself was consolidated into one block to maximize economies of scale. Farmers that belonged to this arrangement worked successfully and generated increased yields because they shared profits equally for equal work done (Swallow and Boris, 1987) notwithstanding the size of field contributed.

The second arrangement started in 1982. This arrangement was one where farmers worked individually on their own. However, the farmers co-operated and shared the costs of basic irrigation equipment like pipes and their installation and insecticides. The three farmers involved operated a total area of 2.2 ha.

In 1983 the HVP management started a horticultural unit that involved nine farmers and eight hectares, of which 4.3 hectares were used to demonstrate vegetable production and the rest were used for orchards to produce fruit trees. The nine farmers were paid R150.00 per annum each and expected to take over the unit for their group use after 5 years from its inception (Hall, 1988).

The third arrangement in HVP involved individual farmers who produced individually on their separate plots. Each of the seven farmers provide their own family or hired labour and shared costs of inputs and irrigation. The total land used under this arrangement was 8.4 hectares for vegetables and 6.8 hectares for fruit trees. Production was high as a result of private initiative but labour shortage was a problem. This was compounded by high costs of hired labour.

Assessment of the HVP (Swallow & Boris, 1987; Hall, 1988; Ngqaleni, 1991; Lepota, 1996; Moeti 1996) shows that it succeeded to increase farmers produce and income. Lepota (1996) estimated that farmers made an average of between R1,000 - R3000 per season. However, problems that remained to be solved were lack of marketing channels and the means of transport for timely delivery of produce. Lepota (1996) reported that many producers in HVP sold to individual buyers at the fields (farm gate) and very few transported produce to sell in the Butha-Buthe town. Moreover, the farmers were out competed by cheap vegetables imported from South Africa into the Butha-Buthe town. Another problem was the heavy reliance of farmers on technical and administrative expertise of the project staff. Lack of decentralization of management led to limited impartation of skills and threatened to undermine the sustainability of activities at the end of the project (Moeti, 1996).

In 1986 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) financed yet another project in Lesotho which had a significant focus on irrigation. This project was called the Lesotho Agricultural Production and Institutional Support Project (LAPIS). The major objective of LAPIS was to provide technical assistance to farmers to initiate new types of production to increase yield and income. In order to achieve this major objective, LAPIS used a three-pronged approach that emphasized production, research and education and training. In terms of education, training was provided to students at the Lesotho Agricultural College (LAC) as part of their on-going studies in applied agricultural skills, agricultural extension and agricultural business management. Research involved experiments on new crop varieties, especially high value crops like beans and fodder and new varieties of wheat, sorghum and maize. The production component dwelt on livestock and range management and on production of horticultural crops like vegetables and fruit trees. Emphasis was put on provision of assistance to small farmers individually or in associations to produce and market high value vegetables and fruits (Rooyani *et al.*, undated; Mohapeloa, 1991; Mowbray, 1991).

With regard to irrigation, LAPIS gave support to 34 individual farmers producing irrigated vegetables individually on a total of 27 hectares, mainly along the Caledon River valley in the northern outskirts of Maseru near the National Abattoir. These farmers were individually supported and made repayments of their loans at harvest. In some cases LAPIS acted as guarantor to farmers who sought credit from the Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank. The high production levels experienced by farmers were rendered unsustainable by lack of adequate transportation and marketing channels. LAPIS failed to improve vegetable marketing, although

this was one of its minor objectives. Some produce got spoilt before being sold and created losses for farmers. Vandalism on irrigation pipes and theft of vegetables from the unfenced fields often necessitated that farmers hire night and day watchmen at high costs that lowered profits and rendered their business unsustainable. Occasionally, the Caledon River would flood into the fields, destroy the vegetables and wash away the irrigation pipes. This became so problematic in late 1987 and early 1988 that most farmers affected discontinued their activities because of mounting indebtedness (Mowbray, 1991).

LAPIS also encouraged farmers to pull their land together and do co-operative block irrigation farming. Under this co-operative arrangement, farmers also contributed their labour jointly to plant, irrigate, weed and harvest produce. The co-operative unit was jointly responsible for credit and loans sought from, and granted, by the Lesotho Co-operative Credit Union (LCCU). Produce was sold by the unit, repayments of loans made and the remaining finances shared on a size of land contributed basis. Two co-operative block irrigation schemes were initiated and supported by LAPIS, one the Ha Fusi scheme along the Caledon river in the Berea district in the North covered 3 hectares. The other scheme called Ha Maphohloane Association just above the Makhaleng River bridge in the Mohale's hoek district in the South was 3.5 hectares. The two associations had a joined membership of 50 people and a total land of about 7 hectares (Mowbray, 1991). The associations also produced rain-fed traditional crops on 18 hectares jointly. Production of vegetables for both schemes cost some R35,119.00 per annum, while the gross returns from vegetable sales amounted to R78,145.00 annually. The members, were paid R2.00 per day for providing labour on the farm. The total cost of their annual remuneration and that of management amounted to R25,414.20 per annum (Mowbray, 1991). LAPIS ended in 1992.

The LAPIS experience with irrigation under co-operative block farming (Mohapeloa, 1991; Mowbray, 1991) shows that after deducting payment to loans, the remaining money was not often enough to see farmers through the year. This prompted farmer reluctance to repay loans and the credit scheme was discontinued by LCCU. Farmers then, had to either put up front, their own capital to continue with operations or seek loans from the Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank. However, because land cannot be used as a collateral for loans under the present customary tenure system, the LADB refused to grant the farmers loans. The operations of the two schemes became unsustainable and collapsed (Mohapeloa, 1991; Mowbray, 1991).

Another problem with the schemes was that of lack of co-operation among the participating farmers themselves on the one hand, and, the farmers and the management of the project on the other hand on some activities, especially provision of adequate labour at peak periods in farming. Marketing of vegetables was also a big problem because there was high competition with cheap vegetables imported from South Africa. Adequate maintenance and repair of broken or damaged equipment for irrigation became a problem in that no farmers knew how to repair them and the cost of getting technical assistance from outside the project was high. Mowbray (1991) concluded that

Past experience with donor initiated programs in Lesotho underlines the importance of a thorough understanding of farmers objectives and constraints in agricultural production. Less than successful results have occurred because of differences between donor and farmer objectives. Farmers are often selective in the kind of inputs or practices they choose to adopt. Those inputs and practices considered essential by the donor may be rejected by farmers.

The Bauer Projects were yet another irrigation initiative attempted to foster sustainable agriculture through irrigation.

The Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1987) emphasized that the objective of the horticultural sub-sector was to encourage local production to increase self-sufficiency level to 75% which would reduce imports of vegetables and fruits from South Africa. It stressed that the strategy to be used to achieve this objective was to encourage farmers to consolidate their lands and do co-operative block irrigation. Moreover, Government of Lesotho would encourage large scale farming entrepreneurs to lease land from the Basotho small-scale farmers and employ and pay them as labourers instead, while they learnt technical and management skills necessary for improved farming.

Many irrigation projects were started in line with this policy. The most common, and, perhaps infamous, of these were those that came to be known as Bauer projects. These Bauer projects were initiated in 1986 as a result of a loan worth R21.8 million granted to the Government of Lesotho by the Government of Austria to develop irrigated farming (Molumeli, 1991). There were 11 schemes in Leribe, Teyatenayeng, Maseru, Mafeteng, Mohale's Hoek and Quthing which made up the Bauer project. Major ones were at Tsikoane in Leribe; the second one at

Masianokeng in Maseru; and the third one at Seaka in Quthing. Moeti (1996) provides a detailed history and experience of the Seaka irrigation project under Bauer management.

The Seaka Irrigation Project (SIP) started to operate in 1987, after an Austrian firm Rudolf Bauer then operating in Transkei was appointed to plan, design and supply equipment necessary for large scale springler irrigation in Seaka and Tele. The Seaka irrigation project was a typical top-down approach conceived of at the top by the military government and top officials of the Ministry of Agriculture in Maseru, and then subsequently imposed on both the farmers and some officials of the district agriculture office (Moeti, 1996). Neither the farmers on whose fields the project was to be implemented nor some key Ministry personnel in the implementation of the project were consulted. Instead, order was issued from Maseru that all fields that used to fall under the irrigation during the heydays of the then defunct Senqu Agricultural Extension Project, must be released for irrigation under Seaka Irrigation Project. The affected farmers mounted strong opposition to this proposition by the government, but were threatened that government was empowered by the Land Act 1979 to declare any area with high agricultural potential a Selected Agricultural Area (SAA). Thus farmers found themselves with no other choice but to oblige (Moeti, 1996).

The project began operations in four villages namely, Ha Mosuoe, Seaka, Ha Caswell and Water fall. The project covered 600 hectares, of which 396 was irrigable. A total population of 400 people from the four villages participated in the project.

The mode of operation adopted by the project was to encourage farmers to pool resources together, especially land and to farm it as a single co-operative irrigated block or unit. The farmers shared profit according to size of land contributed per person. Moreover, farmers who were interested got employed by the project as labourers on the fields together with those people in these villages who had no fields at all in the project. All the labourers were paid a wage by the project. The project also gave heavy subsidies to farmers for operations done. The subsidies came from the project funds. Production was concentrated on cash crops, especially vegetables such as cabbage, spinach, beetroot, carrots, radish, tomato and pumpkin which had very high yields and a viable market locally and in neighbouring towns in the southern districts. Fodder production was also very successful and profitable. Financial returns got from the sales of produce were used to pay for costs of production incurred as credit from the project, while the remaining surplus profit was shared among farmers. The returns made by farmers from these

shares were high because the project subsidized most operations from its own budget initially (Moeti, 1996.)

However, as time went on, the project budget got exhausted, and farmers had to shoulder full costs of production themselves from their profits. Paid employment by the project also ceased. This change in the mode of operation made farmers incur declines in profits, which they attributed to corruption and mismanagement of funds by the project management as well as among farmers themselves. The villages separated into three independent blocks in a desperate move by farmers to realign themselves according to areas and fields they controlled. This only aggravated matters. Farmers belonging to different villages began to vandalise irrigation equipment and destroy farm machinery as a result of disagreements over who had more access for their use. In the early 1990's most farmers left the project and began to farm their fields independently. Moeti (1996) reported that of the 400 farmers who were in the project at its peak, only 127 remained in 1994, and that all activities started by the project showed severe dilapidation and unsustainability. The demise of Seaka can be attributed to lack of participation by farmers in decision-making, planning and implementation of activities that affect their livelihoods, top-down approach to project planning, implementation and management and introduction of farming techniques and machinery that cannot be sustainably afforded by farmers in terms of either purchase, hire or maintenance (Molumeli, 1991). It can also be attributed to the lack of willingness to change old lifestyles by the farmers and adapt to the new changes introduced by the project.

The Tsikoane Irrigation Project in the Leribe district was started in 1986/87. It covered an area of 450 hectares and involved 310 farmers. The scheme cost some R5.995 million. The area was divided into 10 blocks and was farmed communally. Membership in a block varied from 30-40 and hectares used varied from 18-90. Each block was semi-autonomous and elected its own committee to plan labour operations and crop mixes. When the scheme was established farmers were just told that the government wanted them to release fields for an irrigation project. The farmers had no option but to co-operate to consolidate fields, elect block committees and provide labour. Project management consisted of 1 project manager, his deputy, mechanic, irrigation technician, storeman and tractor driver. Crops cultivated were basic grains, vegetables and fodder. Credit was extended to farmers, and at harvest the project deducted its costs accordingly for each block, and gave the remainder over for farmers to share according to land contributed.

This scheme operated at a loss that amounted to R320,778.00 between its inception in 1986 through to 1988 (Molumeli, 1991) when it was discontinued.

The Masianokeng Irrigation Project in Maseru also started in 1986 and was located along the lower Phuthiatsana River valley at three different sites. All these sites had a total area of 215 hectares and membership of 300 people. Farmers were merely informed that the government wanted to introduce irrigation in the area and that they should release their fields. Farmers complied after some initial resistance and threats to the effect that their lands would be revoked for good under the Land Act 1979 by the government. The project planted wheat, peas, french beans, sweetcorn, cabbages, broccoli and carrots. Farmers were not involved at all in decision making but were ordered to provide labour. Many farmers demanded that they be paid a minimum wage by the government for working on the farm. Otherwise they loathed being supervised at work and eventually refused to work. The scheme failed to take off ground and equipment and property lay unutilised on the farm. Later in 1990 efforts to revamp this scheme relegated Bauer mainly to promote commercial business management approach based on sub-contracting the block-farm to a private entrepreneur from South Africa, who employed and paid farmers outrightly as labourers. Bauer itself had a contract management with farmers as shareholders to get shares at the end of the year. Under this arrangement export possibilities were sought and a cold storage packaging plant - the Basotho Pride was built on site to pack the produce of broccoli, cauliflower and beans for export to South Africa and the European Union. This endeavour also collapsed and all the equipment is a white elephant in the area today. The major problem underlying the failure of this latter commercial management approach was land tenure. Farmers withdrew their fields at slightest disagreements with management (Black, 1991). The failure was also promoted by the lack of willingness by the farmers to change their attitudes and adapt to the new changes introduced by the project.

The Government of Lesotho implemented, hand in hand, with Bauer Projects, a number of smaller irrigation schemes known jointly as the Small Scale Irrigated Vegetable Projects (SSIVPs). The SSIVPs started to operate in 1988 after some preliminary surveys since 1986/87 on their feasibility (Hall and Cole, 1990; Mohapeloa, 1991). The whole project was implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture with assistance from three technical experts from overseas. The SSIVPs were financed by the European Union (EU). The main objective of the SSIVPs, in line with that of Fourth Five Year Development Plan under irrigated agriculture, was stated as

to diversify and intensify agricultural production into high value cash crops to generate employment and improve income. In particular to increase vegetable production, thereby improving self-sufficiency, raising export earnings; and improving the living standards of rural households (Financing Agreement, SSIVP, 1989 as quoted in Hall and Cole, 1990 p. 11).

The SSIVPs started in 1988 and operated on four areas, two of them the Malere and Rasekila II irrigation projects were in Butha-Buthe district while the other two, the Leribe Village and Ha Ranku Irrigation projects were in the Leribe district. Both the Malere and Rasekila II irrigation schemes were part of the Hololo irrigation project (HIP) discussed earlier on in this section.

The Rasekila II Irrigation Project used a communal, co-operative approach to irrigated farming. It covered an area of about 17.5 ha and had 44 members. Hall and Cole (1990) argue that evidence from their study on this scheme showed that members were coerced by the chief to operate on a communal block basis against their wishes and advice from the District Agricultural officer for Butha-Buthe, to opt for individual operation. This created confusion to farmers and undermined its future sustainability. The farmers either withdrew from the scheme or made token participation. Since the division and sharing of profits was not based on labour contributed but size of the fields contributed, farmers who fully participated felt cheated by those who made partial a participation and disagreements, mistrusts and collapse became unavoidable.

The Malere Irrigation Project located within the same Hololo valley uses the individual farmer approach on a total land area of 12.2 hectares involving 23 farmers. They work individually on their plots but share infrastructure costs. This project has been adequately discussed as a success story under mode 2 in the Hololo irrigation project. The Leribe Village Project in the Leribe district operated a total land of 72 hectares and has 53 members. The farmers joined because the chief of the area and government told them to do so otherwise their fields would be taken away (Hall and Cole, 1990). The scheme used the communal co-operative approach where members pooled fields together to be farmed as one block or unit. Members contributed some labour. The project advanced credit to members as a co-operative unit and all costs were deducted after produce had been sold. The remaining cash was distributed to members according to the size of fields each had contributed. Crops grown were vegetables, fodder, wheat and maize were also grown at times under irrigation.

After a year in operation, the project changed some aspects of operation. It started to pay a daily wage of R2.00 to farmers treating them as if they were labourers. At harvest time, the scheme took all the produce, gave only two bags of wheat to each farmer, sold the remainder, deducted its operation costs and banked the rest of the money on behalf of the members. This caused a lot of anger from farmers who complained that they were being robbed and got nothing from their fields. The project management failed to explain this new operation adequately to farmers and most of them withdrew their participation. Hall and Cole (1990) argued that most farmers who belonged to this project expressed a desire to pool their land together, sub-contract it to a private entrepreneur to work on a commercial basis, while he/she pays them a fixed amount of money per month or year. Alternatively, they wished to go into a share-cropping venture with such a private entrepreneur.

The Ha Ranku Project had a long history. Irrigation work in the area started from the late 1960s. Much work was done by government through a white technical manager called Smites (Hall & Cole, 1990). Then the government did everything - cultivated fields, planted, harvested, sold produced and deducted its costs; and then allowed the farmers to share the remainder on the basis of each acre of land contributed. Farmers provided free labour. Even then the government told farmers they had to join the project otherwise their land would be revoked under the Laws of Lerotholi which decreed that government could revoke land deemed necessary for public development without compensation. When the project was vandalised during the state of emergency in 1970 because it was associated with the BNP government, farmers were left with neither irrigation equipment nor any farming skills to build on because they had not been involved in decision-making, planning and implementation of activities. Thus the project collapsed completely.

Farmers in the area were involved later in some commercial share-cropping arrangement with a private entrepreneur who farmed their lands using his tools and knowledge, and employed farmers as labourers on the fields. After deducting the costs from produce, farmers and the entrepreneur would then share equally the remaining produce. Apparently, farmers were happy with this sharecropping arrangement and realised some good returns. The entrepreneur was unceremoniously chased out by government. He was given one month notice to leave the area and clear it of all his operations in readiness for government takeover. Since that time of notice was too short, he had to leave part of the crops which were destroyed by the SSIVP machinery

when government started its operations (Hall and Cole, 1990). This project covered 23.3 hectares with 31 members.

Under SSIVP farmers were forced to release their fields for co-operative block irrigation. Resistance to this order was met with threats that fields would be taken away for good under the Land Act 1979. Although members were coerced to join, they preferred to work communally, not under the government but under a large private entrepreneur as was the case before SSIVP intervened (Hall and Cole, 1990).

The Local Initiative Support Project (LISP) started in 1987 and ended in 1996 in Quthing. It also had an irrigation component over and above dryland farming. The project used gravity fed irrigation to support 131 small schemes. Each of these schemes cost R2,600 to install the irrigation system (UNOPS, 1996). Gravity-fed irrigation systems were preferred because they were cheaper, simpler and technically manageable by farmers once taught how to operate them by the LISP irrigation resource planner and irrigation technicians. For the large schemes, co-operative farming was encouraged but this created problems of sustainability because of disagreements among farmers on sharing of responsibilities (UNOPS, 1996).

The Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project was one of the oldest attempts by the Government of Lesotho to increase self-sufficiency in food production through irrigation. The project was initially conceptualized in the early 1970s as the Phuthiatsana Irrigation project. The request for this project was made in 1973 by the Government of Lesotho to the African Development Fund (ADF). The initial objective of the project was to irrigate the whole Phuthiatsana valley - a land of 2024 hectares to produce maize, wheat, peas, sunflower and lucerne (Anonymous, 1980; Mochaba, 1983). Although the ADF approved the financing of the project, there were a number of follow-up studies commissioned by both the ADF and the Government of Lesotho, that argued that the project was too grandiose and economically not viable in its original form, and needed to be scaled down in physical size and diversified in terms of activities. The reformulation of the project was far from easy and took well into the 1980's. Eventually the project took off in 1981 and was renamed Phuthiatsana Integrated Rural Development Project (PIRDP).

The PIRDP was an integrated rural development project located along the middle and upper catchment of the Phuthiatsana River valley in the Teyateyaneng district. It aimed to assist some 1804 farm families to irrigate 200 hectares of their land on a consolidated co-operative block

farming approach. In reality 500 farmers were assisted. Major crops to be produced were high value cash crops such as cabbage, carrots, beetroot, potatoes, lucerne and pumpkin. Irrigation used 2 ha for the sprinkler system that used the Phuthiatsana River water. Participating families provided free labour on various activities assigned to them by the project management. They did not have a say in decision-making on farming activities and crop mixes because these were the special reserve of the management. The project also provided seeds, tractors, fertilizers and other inputs on credit to farmers. After harvest the credit was repaid and then farmers shared the remaining produce according to the size of land contributed by each member. The management itself was composed of Phuthiatsana Irrigation Authority composed of the manager, Deputy Manager, and 29 members of staff working at all levels within the project. No community members were allowed to be members of the Authority, a serious error of omission for participation and sustainability of the project.

The PIRDP had other activities on livestock and range development, and community development activities such as improvement of schools, clinics, health, roads and conservation. The PIRDP functioned from 1981 and ended in 1997. It has recently been extended to become a district-wide programme known as the Berea Development Project.

5.2.2.2. Livestock and range management policies and strategies

Lesotho's national livestock and range management policy has changed very little since independence. The policy has aimed "to achieve greater self-reliance and increased incomes for livestock owners while protecting and regenerating the underlying natural resource environment and resource base" (Phororo, 1999, p.71).

Many strategies were used to implement the livestock and range management policy (Motsamai, 1991). The first strategy used was to curb the practice of transhumance, in which the livestock owners resident in the lowlands and the foothills transferred their livestock to the mountain region for summer grazing. Studies undertaken to assess the impact of transhumance showed that it created overstocking in the mountain region in summer and led to over grazing and land degradation in that region (Mokitimi, 1991; Phororo, 1999). The government hoped that if transhumance was prohibited, the sustainability of the range resources in the mountains would be restored, and, the absence of pastures would force the lowlands and the foothills livestock owners to reduce their livestock sizes and rear good quality stock which they would then stall feed. However, some livestock owners continued to practice transhumance because they were used to

that old style of livestock management and did not want to undergo the pains of adapting to the new changes to reduce their stock sizes, do selective breeding, grow fodder and start full time stall feeding of their reduced livestock, as envisaged by the strategy. Moreover, the decline in the practice to transfer livestock to the mountains for summer grazing could not be attributed to the strategy per se. The decline was caused by fear of transborder stock theft which has become endemic in the mountain areas between Transkei and Lesotho on the one hand, and Natal and Lesotho on the other.

The second livestock and range management strategy used was adjudication of cattle posts. This strategy hoped to change the use and management of mountain range resources from control by the principal chiefs, most of whom are resident in the lowlands and the foothills. The principal chiefs of Lesotho have spatially divided the mountain range amongst themselves, and each principal chief was allocated the right of use of the range under their jurisdiction for exclusive use for cattle posts by their own subjects. This denied the mountain residents control over the efficient management of the mountain range resources and facilitated transhumance. The cattle posts readjudication programme aimed to remove the control of the mountain range from the principal chiefs to exclusive control by the residents of the mountain region who constitute the local communities so that a sustainable utilization might be achieved (Motsamai, 1991). However, this strategy had little impact because it was strongly condemned and resisted by the principal chiefs, most of whom are extended members of the royal family and belong to the college of chiefs and the Senate in the country. The principal chiefs felt that the strategy was meant to reduce their power and marginalise them. Therefore the success of that strategy depended heavily on the willingness of the chiefs to accept change in the comfort of their old lifestyles and adapt to the pains of change brought about by new strategies aimed at sustainable development.

The third livestock and range management strategy employed was the reduction of overstocking through encouragement to the farmers to practise livestock culling. The government used the livestock exchange programme whereby a farmer could give away two old or unimproved culls in exchange for one young improved breed particularly sheep and goats, to the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture took the culls to the National Feedlot for fattening and then later they were slaughtered at the National abattoir and sold for consumption. The livestock culling strategy had very little impact, despite the exchange incentive offered by the Ministry of Agriculture because it relied upon the willingness of the farmers to accept change and volunteer to cull their livestock. However, the farmers were not willing to accept this change in their old

style of livestock management. Therefore, they continued to maintain their poor quality stock as security in readiness for the time of household needs when they would either slaughter or sell them (Mokitimi, 1991). During the military government rule effort was made to use force to implement culling by the government. The farmers were threatened that the military would be mandated to go out to the range with the livestock field workers of the Ministry of Agriculture and identify the culls which would be shot on the spot (Lenthoroane, 1990). However, the farmers would not submit to the threat and cull. Instead, the politicians took advantage of the threat by the government and used it to their political advantage to put pressure on the military government to step down and give way to a democratic government.

The fourth livestock and range management strategy used was privatisation of the livestock services and range resources. Following the structural adjustment policies adopted by Lesotho since 1988, the government sought to privatise all veterinary services and institutions that were controlled by the government in a bid to improve their management and efficiency. The National Feedlot complex, the National Abattoir, the Farmers Training Centres and the dip tank cum - Woolshed services were top in the list of veterinary services to be privatised (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b). In terms of privatization of the range resources, the government sought to introduce a market value to the range resources by charging grazing fees to the farmers on their livestock that grazed on communal pastures. This would grant de facto exclusive grazing rights to the farmers that had paid up for their livestock, whilst it would equally deny this grazing right to the farmers who had not paid. The grand idea was that the grazing fees would enforce livestock culling de-stocking and stall feeding. However, grazing fees became a dismal failure due to opposition by the farmers and the chiefs (Molise, 1992). Besides, politicians again took advantage of the grazing fees strategy and politicized it for their own ends. The Basutoland Congress Party government abolished grazing fees in 1994 when it came into power (Phororo, 1999).

The last major livestock and range management strategy implemented was the promotion of community range management through the formation of range management areas controlled by grazing associations (Mokitimi, 1991; Phororo, 1999). The farmers were encouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture to form grazing associations and make rules that regulated access to grazing on their pastures. The associations were given exclusive grazing rights to some portions of the range resources of the communities in which they operated. The associations were expected to introduce regulated access to grazing by granting rights in their exclusive pastures to

improved quality stock only, and, by also charging a grazing fee per livestock unit grazed. However, assessment of grazing associations shows that they were resisted by the majority of the farmers who were not willing to adapt to the new changes in livestock and range management that the grazing associations sought to introduce. The farmers expressed their disapproval and dislike by vandalising the property of the grazing associations, through acts such as cutting away and stealing the fences used to mark the exclusive pastures, grazing their livestock in the exclusive pastures at night, and sometimes burning the exclusive pastures (Weaver, 1986; Lawry, 1988; Ferguson, 1990; Buzzard, 1994).

The grazing associations were also condemned by the chiefs who complained that the power that the chiefs had to control grazing resources in their areas of jurisdiction was marginalised by granting grazing associations exclusive control over some pasture resources. Without the willingness of the chiefs to forgo the comforts of power over the grazing resources accorded to them by the open access regime under the communal land tenure, grazing associations faced a serious problem of sustainable implementation (Molise, 1992). Within the grazing associations themselves poor cooperation among the members as a result of individual and party political idiosyncrasies continued to threaten the sustainability of the associations (Lawry, 1988; Buzzard, 1994).

The analysis of livestock and range management policies and strategies provided in this section leads one to conclude that the strategies employed to promote sustainable development in the sub-sector have been hampered by the lack of willingness among both the chiefs and the livestock farmers to forego the unsustainable comforts accorded by the old life styles and adapt to the pains that accompany the introduction of new livestock and range management practices for sustainable development.

5.2.3. Evaluation and Assessment

The discussion on agricultural policies and projects presented in this chapter leads to a number of conclusions that have implications for sustainable agriculture in Lesotho.

Since independence in 1966, Lesotho has formulated and implemented a variety of policies and projects meant to foster sustainable agriculture. The policies formulated and the strategies to implement them might be categorised into the Green Revolution and the sustainable agriculture approaches. Since independence in 1966 until the mid-1980s, the crop production policies and

strategies were based on the Green Revolution approach. The Green Revolution based policies, strategies and projects had, as their main objective, the attainment of increased crop productivity to boost production and the attainment of food self-sufficiency. The strategies that were employed to increase crop productivity were the use of high yielding varieties composed of hybrid seeds, chemical fertilisers, chemical insecticides and pesticides, and mechanisation. The high yielding varieties were capital intensive and did not pay much attention to negative impacts on the environment.

The high capital outlays necessary to maintain the high yielding varieties proved to be far beyond the capacity of the peasants to afford in order to continue with the modern techniques introduced by the projects. As a result, they became unsustainable once project assistance stopped. This situation was aggravated by the lack of willingness by the farmers to adopt the innovations introduced by the projects because they loathed risks and feared to be indebted financially to the projects. Thus they preferred to continue with their old lifestyles to which they were used.

A lesson learned from the poor adoption of modern innovations during the era of that Green Revolution approach was that the technical fix approach that it used was not the best way to improve agriculture. While technical solutions to improve productivity existed, farmers did not adopt them in a sustainable manner because they were either too expensive or they had political strings attached to them. Moreover, the farmers were aware of the risk of becoming indebted and they averted the risk.

Another important factor that contributed to the lack of success of the policies and projects was lack of dialogue among the main actors, namely the farmers, project staff and staff of the Ministry of Agriculture. Time and again, the farmers withdrew their fields, their labour or both from the projects because of lack of understanding between them and the projects. One would have expected that the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture should have been able to reconcile the farmers and project staff to come to a mutual understanding, but this did not happen, indicating poor liaison and dialogue among the three parties concerned. Sustainable agriculture demands partnership in which dialogue is a tool of empowerment and conflict resolution by all the key actors involved in development endeavours.

Decentralization of decision making and planning is important for sustainable agriculture. Many projects that belonged to the Green Revolution approach in Lesotho failed because of over centralization of decision making and planning by the management of the projects without

including the farmers whose very livelihoods the projects sought to make sustainable. It is only when the farmers are empowered through decentralization that they can sustain better development.

Voluntary participation is also a key component of sustainable agriculture. Participation in the projects was induced through granting people free access to the benefits of the projects by the government in order to promote its legitimacy and popularity among the rural communities. However, such use of development property as populist propaganda by the government cultivated a perception and an attitude to expect to enjoy benefits freely without undergoing the necessary pains brought about by change. Subsequently, when the projects ended and the people had to sacrifice and work hard to maintain the new lifestyles introduced by the projects, they became unwilling and instead preferred to go back to their old lifestyles to which they were used, thus creating and perpetuating a culture of false starts in Lesotho's agriculture. The farmers need to be willing to endure the pains that accompany displacement of old lifestyles by new lifestyles in order for sustainable agriculture to be realised in Lesotho.

Participation also promotes sustainable agriculture better if it is not forced upon the farmers by the government. In Lesotho, participation in the projects of the Green Revolution era was often based on force by the ruling party. The farmers were sometimes compelled to submit their fields and provide their labour to irrigation projects against their will. This promoted apathy on the part of the farmers and sometimes lack of co-operation necessary for teamwork in block irrigation farming. Development is indeed a political agenda, however, it is necessary to make sustainable agriculture a national political agenda to promote household food security, instead of a party political agenda as happened in Lesotho. When expressed as the ruling party political agenda, sustainable agriculture projects might divide farmers, and be faced with poor participation and failure.

The style of the extension system that is used to impart knowledge and skills to the farmers is also crucial for sustainable agriculture. In Lesotho, during the Green Revolution approach, the Training and Visit (T & V) extension system was used. The T & V system facilitated the use of contact farmer approach by the extension agents. The choice of the contact farmers to whom priority was given was based on the fact that they already had the resources necessary for successful farming, and therefore enabled the achievement of quick results that would show that the extension agents were doing their job. In essence, given the shortage of field staff personnel,

the majority of farmers, the poor ones, were often neglected by the extension agents, and this minimised the impact of the new innovations introduced. A more participatory extension system proved necessary for sustainable agriculture.

Conservation of the environment is central to sustainable agriculture. During the Green Revolution approach, projects used mechanisation and modern inputs and techniques without enough concern about their negative impact on the environment. For instance, during the Food Self Sufficiency Programme, aeroplanes from South Africa were used to spray insecticides and pesticides from the air in the fields with much chemical pollution to the air and soil. Moreover, in some irrigation projects salinity of the soil resulted because the sites for irrigation were selected on a political basis without sufficient soil feasibility studies being undertaken before irrigation could start. Many of the projects at that time gave conservation a subsidiary place and increase in productivity a primary place in their project objectives.

Resource pooling and co-operation is another essential part of sustainable agriculture. However, in many projects resource pooling was absent. Instead, lack of co-operation among the farmers and vandalism caused to project resources and properties meant for their own development by some farmers tended to dominate. This lack of a responsible and accountable perception and attitude by some rural community members towards agriculture development resources resulted in numerous vandalised properties left by former projects that lay wasted throughout the country without concern for its need by the future generations in the communities. There was need for the farmers to adopt attitudes that are more responsible and accountable, and conflict resolution and management methods that are more conducive to social and political tolerance necessary for sustainable agriculture.

The adoption of the World Conservation strategy of the International Union for Conservation and Nature (IUCN), and later that of sustainable development of the Brundtland Commission by Lesotho, prompted the country to change its agriculture policies away from being based on the Green Revolution approach to those that were overtly guided by the sustainable development approach. Within the latter approach, Lesotho's agricultural policies, strategies and projects sought to create a symbiotic relationship between the environment and increased agricultural productivity by embarking on conservation farming as the national agricultural strategy. Conservation farming put conservation of the environment in the forefront of agricultural

development. Its main objective was to achieve sustainable agriculture by promoting increased production through conservation of the natural resource base.

The genre of agricultural policies, strategies and projects formulated and implemented under the sustainable development approach since the mid-1980s to the time of writing sought to address the shortcomings of the past approach and enforce sustainable agriculture in the country.

It was recognised that low crop productivity could not be solved purely through a technical-fix approach composed of high yielding varieties of inputs and mechanisation. Rather, the technical solutions proposed should entail a fair content of indigenous knowledge too. It was contended that indigenous knowledge based technical solutions were more easily and cheaply available to the majority of the farmers, and were environmentally friendly too. Therefore, many projects implemented during the phase of sustainable development approach adopted and used the indigenous knowledge based Machobane Farming System as the main technical package encouraged for adoption by the farmers. However, the results of the impact of the Machobane Farming system on increased crop productivity have varied. In various projects, some farmers reported increased crop yields as a result of use of the Machobane Farming system, while others especially the rich farmers, have said their yield actually decreased and argued for the maintenance of the high yielding varieties. Moreover, the Machobane Farming System encouraged use of natural ingredients and local technology such as dung, vegetative matter and oxen for ploughing. The cattle that produced the dung and ploughed were owned by very few livestock owners and the cow dung had a competitive use as fuelwood, whilst the vegetative materials were scarce due to land degradation. These factors militated against the widespread use of the Machobane Farming system, and promoted the need for continued use, wherever possible, of high yielding varieties and mechanisation.

The extension system based on training and visit was also changed. The Ministry of Agriculture and many of the projects adopted the unified extension system as the more effective extension system for sustainable agriculture. However, the unified extension system demanded that extension agents should have a multi-disciplinary training so that they could fulfill their new multi-purpose extension role. Many extension agents had a mono specialist training background and therefore a lot of resources were expended by the projects and the Ministry of Agriculture to retrain the extension agents to become multi-purpose. The unified extension system also demanded that the extension agents be based in the rural communities where they worked and

become part of the communities' daily lives and livelihoods in order to be more effective in understanding the farmers' problems and needs. The rural communities, however, lacked the social and physical facilities that the extension agents needed, and therefore many of them remained resistant to the idea of being village based. They continued to retain private urban housing and went on and off to the rural houses allocated to them to effect duty as they used to do during the days of the Training and Visit system.

Participation in the projects continued to be tainted by party politics despite the rigorous efforts projects to depoliticize their projects. Party politics continued to creep into project activities via the party affiliations of the key persons in the local institutions, especially the village development councils, necessary for sustainable institution building and capacity creation. While between 1986 and 1992 party political activity was prohibited by the military government through Order No. 4 of 1986. Since 1993 the resumption of multi-party democracy has thrown Lesotho back into the pre-1986 party political problem of lack of political discipline, political intolerance and political malignment among community members. This political atmosphere has frozen the cordial and co-operative relationships among community members necessary for sustainable development. In many projects lack of co-operation among community members necessary for the maintenance of irrigation infrastructure was destroyed by political differences among the farmers. Moreover, farming equipment such as ploughs, planters, and tractors which were decentralised to the constituencies from the Technical Operations Unit (TOU) in Maseru by the Basutoland Congress Party government, led to wanton destruction of these development properties by some members of the opposition parties on the one hand; whilst on the other hand, some members of the then Basutoland Congress Party, and more recently the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy, continued to accord themselves and their party colleagues first priority in the use of these national development assets. The party bias in the use of government-owned agricultural machinery was promoted by the fact that the tractors were entrusted to the ruling party members of parliament in their constituencies. The members of parliament worked with their party constituency committee instead of the more multi-party constituted village development councils which were the official local institution entrusted with the duty to oversee development at village level and ensure people's participation.

The genre of projects under the sustainable development approach of the mid-1980s and the 1990s consciously promoted the attitude of cognitive, voluntary participation by farmers in the projects, by phasing out or drastically reducing inducements given to the farmers as reward for

their participation in project activities. Many projects made the farmers pay for the services they needed from the projects in order to improve the financial sustainability of the activities and enforce a more accountable attitude towards the conservation and maintenance of the project resources by the farmers. However, many projects' activities were condemned by the farmers precisely for not being made available free of charge to them. The farmers themselves were responsible for the collapse of many activities initiated to improve their sustainable livelihoods because they continued to expect payment in cash, food or inputs for conservation and maintenance work they did. Without the payment, the farmers refused to participate. A change in the perception and attitudes of the farmers to adapt to the pains and strains that accompany the introduction of new lifestyles and livelihood strategies is essential in order for sustainable agriculture to become successful in Lesotho.

Capacity creation through institution building was another key component of sustainable agriculture. Since the mid-1980s, many projects made much effort to strengthen the institutional capacity of the local communities and the Ministry of Agriculture at district level and headquarters level in Maseru through provision of technical training, financial and infrastructure support of offices and vehicles. Unfortunately, in the infrastructure support there was a proliferation of vehicles for the officials instead of tractors needed by the farmers for sustainable agriculture. The fleet of vehicles owned by each of the projects and ceded to the officials later, sometimes including expensive vehicles were unsuitable for field conditions. This also distorted the budget of the projects and the Ministry of Agriculture in that the bulk of the budgets went for vehicular purchase and maintenance instead of financial support to the farmers for sustainable agriculture.

In the field of training there was a proliferation of courses, seminars, workshops and conferences held at very expensive hotels particularly the Mount Maluti Hotel in Maseru, which was nicknamed "the feedlot" by the civil servants because of the good meals and comfort they received while on training for sustainable development there. In Maseru, senior officers went for training and conferences at either the Lesotho Sun, the Maseru Sun Cabanas or more lately the Mmesesi Lodge at Thaba-Bosiu all of which offer three to five star hotel facilities. In essence most projects became the gravy train for the officials instead of the bread basket for farmers. It needs to be stressed that the Ministry of Agriculture has Farmers Training Centres in the districts with full facilities for training in agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture also has its own board rooms in the districts and in Maseru where the training could have been done in a more cost-

effective manner to enable the bulk of the donor finance to go to finance sustainable agriculture. But those facilities were seldom used. It was only the Soil, Water, Conservation and Agroforestry Programme (SWACAP) that constructed and used resource centres in the rural communities for sustainable training. It needs to be emphasized that sustainable development, of which sustainable agriculture is a key component, calls for a change of attitude among planners and decision makers in Lesotho towards budgeting and the choice of priorities to which expenditure must be committed to be in favour of the target group, the farmers.

Institution building was also promoted through promotion of local institutions, especially village development councils, in decision-making, planning and implementation by the projects. Unfortunately, the efficiency of village development councils continued to be hampered by divisive party politics and a poor commitment to the devolution of power by the central government. As it were, the village development councils remained the extension arm of the central government rather than provide local empowerment necessary for building partnership between the local communities, the projects and the central government for sustainable development.

5.3 Rural Industrialization Policies and Projects

5.3.1 Government Policies and Projects

At independence, Lesotho virtually had no industries, and imported all industrial goods and services from South Africa at high cost (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1970). From the onset, the government realized that an import substitution industrialization strategy to reduce the dependence on foreign imports was necessary. In order to facilitate formulation, implementation and financing of inward-looking industrial development strategies, the government launched the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) in 1967 to promote commercial, industrial, mining and tourist activities (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975). The mandate of the LNDC was also to promote possibilities for outward-looking export-led industrialization which would enable Lesotho to take maximum advantage of the limited absorptive capacity of local industries for raw materials, and the low domestic market for finished products in which Lesotho might have comparative advantage (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975). The LNDC was to spearhead this national industrialization endeavour through the promotion of development of public owned industries, as well as privately owned ones (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975).

Three types of strategies were used by the LNDC to promote industrialization. First, special areas named industrial areas were identified and developed through zoning, plot division and provision of basic infrastructure like roads, electricity and building to be leased to potential private industrial developers. Four industrial areas were identified and developed in this manner.

The areas were the Maseru Industrial Area and The Thetsane Industrial Area, both of which are located in the Maseru district, the Maputsoe industrial area, and Ha Nyenye industrial areas, both in the Leribe district.

The second strategy was to create a conducive production environment for private industrial developers through a combination of government induced incentives. These included measures such as a 6 years tax holiday in the initial phase of production by foreign firms, preferential access to both the preferential Trade Area and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Southern, Central and Eastern Africa preferential access to the European Union through the LOME Convention of which Lesotho is a part, and cost effective labour promoted through deliberate low wage prices for domestic labour which are on average less than R300 per month by law for industrial works. Unconditional banking and repatriation of profits made by private investors was yet another incentive used to attract foreign industrial investment (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975).

The third strategy to promote industrialization was improvement of communication and information flows, through development of all weather roads, telephones and other business communication networks (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980).

All the five year development plans show that the broad aims of industrialization in Lesotho have been to generate employment, improve the income of households, create a market for local raw materials, and to reduce dependence on imports of industrial products.

During the First Five Year Development Plan 1970/71-1974/75, a number of initiatives were launched to promote rural industrialization. A major effort was the decentralisation of industrial development from Maseru, and the creation of Maputsoe as a growth pole meant to attract propulsive industries that would induce development of the northern region - Berea, Leribe and Butha-Buthe (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975). Industries that were attracted to Maputsoe were a clothing manufacturing factory called Secrest Clothing. The cloth and other inputs used by this industry were imported from outside the country. Thus the industry had no backward linkages

within Lesotho except for cheap labour. Outputs of this industry such as school uniforms, umbrellas and others were, however, consumed in part in Lesotho.

Another industry, the Domolux, specialised in making electric lamps. Again all inputs, except cheap labour, were imported from outside Lesotho while outputs were consumed in urban centres especially, Maseru the capital. This firm had virtually no linkages into the rural economy except its rural location. At Kolonyama, the home of then Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan, a plot was developed to house pottery, candles and tapestry making. The pottery used local clay to produce clay pots, plates, mugs, cups, saucers and dishes. The pottery which still exists today, is rurally located and rural linked in terms of inputs. Its outputs are, however, too expensive for rural people to afford, and are bought by the urban rich and foreign tourists. The Basotho women do the manufacturing using clay. The tapestry uses inputs from rural areas - wool and mohair, and is also rural located and rural linked in inputs. However, its products of rugs, mats and jerseys are too expensive and mainly afforded by the urban rich and tourists (Interview with Management, 16/8/1998). The manufacturing of candles was a typical fiasco. All inputs were imported, and most outputs used in urban areas. It was an urban-linked industry, located in the rural areas, just like the lamp manufacturing industry at Maputsoe. Moreover, the weak quality of the candles made them less preferred to imported candles by Basotho consumers.

In Maseru, a milling industry, Lesotho Flour Mills, was established to mill, package and distribute maize meal from local farmers in the country. The industry was rural-urban linked and its outputs are consumed both in the urban and rural areas. This industry has recently been privatised and sold to a South African based American private firm.

Immediately after independence, the Village Industrial Development Organisation (VIDO) was put in place to promote and coordinate craft production in Lesotho. During the First Plan period VIDO was subsumed by the Lesotho Cooperative Handicrafts (LCH) to promote production and marketing of village handicrafts throughout the country. By 1975, the LCH was marketing craft products of 3000 producers with a turnover of more than R200,000 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975).

A major impetus to craft industry occurred in 1969 when the Thabana-Li-Mele handicraft production centre was opened to spearhead training in handicrafts, especially spinning and weaving. The Thabana-Li-Mele Handicraft centre was established through Swedish financial and technical assistance. Swedish experts trained Basotho in the spinning and weaving of blankets, balaclavas, caps, bedspreads, garments and ladies jackets using locally produced wool

and mohair as major raw materials. The Thabana-Li-Mele Handicraft centre trained a lot of Basotho especially women, but closed down frequently due to foreign donor funding and a hitherto lack of will by the government to commit itself fully to finance the centre in a sustainable manner. None the less, a number of Handicraft centres modelled along Thabana-Li-Mele have been created and collapsed in many villages throughout rural Lesotho under CARE funding (Rantso, 1998).

Lesotho went into its second Five Year Development Plan with a declared objective to strengthen rural industrialization, by expanding the planning and co-ordinating capacity of LNDC through the creation of its subsidiary, the Basotho Enterprise Development Co-operation (BEDCO) to promote small enterprises for expansion of employment in rural industries and increase in the number and diversity of the rural industries. The LNDC was to give special attention to the creation of industries to produce building materials and agro-industries that use raw materials produced by local farmers. The aim was to replace formerly imported products through import-substitution industrialization and to add-value to some local raw materials before they were exported (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975). A number of rural industrial enterprises were started in pursuit of these objectives. With regard to the objective to produce local building materials, the following industries were launched:

a) The Loti Brick (PTY) LTD

This industry started in 1980 and is located at the Thetsane Industrial Area in Maseru on a plot covering 3,800 square kilometres. The industry uses clay soil as the key raw material from Lesotho to make baked bricks for building and paving. On average the firm employs about 100 persons in all its activities. The number of bricks produced per year is about 12 million when the market is bad and 20 million per year when there is a good market. Production is projected to last for 40 years since 1980. The bricks produced by Loti Brick firm are used both in the urban and rural areas. Although according to the recently expanded boundaries of the Maseru City, Loti brick falls within the urban area, when the firm was initially launched, it was outside this urban boundary and was therefore rurally located, albeit on the rural-urban fringe (Interview with Production Manager, 5-8-1998). The industry also sells to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the Free State province in South Africa.

So far the Loti Brick has made sustainable production. However, mechanisation of most operations to speed up production and catch up with the demand, has resulted in the last in first

out (LIFO) style retrenchment of labour down to a strength of about 70 employees and the retrenched employees trade union was up in arms with Loti Brick management at the time of interview. Other problems faced by the Lot Brick are that the government prefers to use sandstone for its newly constructed buildings. This has undercut the market for Loti Brick. There is no government protection for Loti Bricks against bricks imported from South Africa except on government projects only. Sometimes Loti Brick fails to compete with these brick imports which are preferred particularly by most of the high class in Maseru high class suburbs like Thetsanes. The Loti Brick (PTY) Ltd is one of the industries that are to be privatised (Interview with Production Manager, 5/8/1998).

b) Highland Ceramics (PTY) LTD

This firm was started in 1995 and is located in Mafeteng some 4km along the Mafeteng-Wepener road. It produces ceramic floor and wall tiles and aims to reduce dependence of Lesotho on imported tiles for floors and walls from South Africa, and to generate employment for Basotho. The industry used soil mined from Tsitasnek area some 10km from Mafeteng town along the main South 1 road to Maseru. This LNDC supported initiative in terms of fixed physical infrastructure was leased to a French company. The firm produced a total of 24 pallets composed of 12 pallets floor tiles and 12 pallets wall tiles per day. Each pallet contained about 50 boxes, each of which contains about 30 tiles. These figures gave an average daily production of 36 000 tiles. The plant worked 24 hours round the clock. The firm produced both high grade and low grade tiles. A pallet of high grade tiles cost R2,500.00 while that of low grade cost R1,500.00 per pallet. About 127 people were employed by the firm at a minimum wage of R900.00 excluding overtime. The industry closed down in March 1998 due to indebtedness. At the time of interview the company running the firm had been liquidated and the assets of the firm pending auction by the High Court of Lesotho. The objective to establish agro-industries was pursued through launching a number of industries.

c) The National Feedlot Complex

The national feedlot complex was established in 1978 under Denmark funding and started work in 1991 as part of a nation wide strategy to improve livestock marketing in the country. The Feedlot is located at Ha Foso, 5km north of Maseru. It has a capacity of 3,600 animals at a time. Livestock was fed for 90 days and sold or slaughtered by the abattoir. The annual output of the feedlot was about 14,200 animals when stocked to full capacity throughout the year. The initial

objective of the feedlot was to export meat to the European Union such as does Botswana (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980). This plan failed to materialise due to the poor quality of the product. The livestock was got through the livestock produce marketing services (LPMS) auction sales, direct purchases from local farmers and imports from South Africa. Products were sold to local butcheries, abattoir, individual persons, special government institutions like the Lesotho Defence Force, and exported to South Africa as well (Interview with the manager, 3/8/1998).

The feedlot functioned poorly because of low livestock sales from local farmers, such that the feedlot had to import a lot of livestock from South Africa. Moreover, low prices of livestock offered by the feedlot prompted farmers to prefer to sell in informal markets rather than the auction sales of LPMS. Competition with South African livestock producers who sell to Lesotho butcheries through credit disadvantaged the feedlot which sold strictly on a cash basis (Interview with the Manager, 3/8/98).

The feedlot was funded by the Ministry of Agriculture through a stabex funding and proposed management for 2 years up to 1996. It was next taken over and funded by the World Bank and the Australians for 12 years until June 1998, whose main task was to experiment with privatisation of both the Feedlot and the Abattoir (Interview with the Manager, 3/8/98). The Feedlot has ceased to purchase livestock from farmers and South Africa. It only keeps some 300 livestock belonging to the Abattoir. Major problems faced by the Feedlot are that it is not sustainable in profit-making terms. It has always run at a loss due to a number of reasons. First, government subsidy is insufficient to enable adequate livestock purchases. Secondly, the little money available is mismanaged by civil servants who are seconded to top management and foreigners who come as part of the aid package to the Feedlot. The two components of management often relax because when operations fail, the civil servant gets recalled to his substantive post in the civil service and the expatriate goes to his post back home. This security for both resulted in low motivation. Corruption is also rife at the Feedlot in that senior politicians in government and civil servants sometimes demand to be given livestock for their feasts but never pay, or give in livestock of very poor quality in exchange. The Feedlot is up for privatisation. At its full operation the Feedlot employed about 70 people but, all these have been retrenched to a low of only 6 employees at the time of interview in August, 1998. Moreover, the entire complex, including buildings for offices and residence, the livestock barns, infrastructure and fodder field are in a state of advanced dilapidation (Interview with the Manager 3/8/98).

d) The Lesotho Milling Company

This Maseru based firm was started in 1979 and is composed of Lesotho Flour Mills and Lesotho Maize Mills. Lesotho Flour Mills specialises in production of wheat flour from wheat purchased from local farmers and topped up by imports from South Africa. The objective is to lessen the country's dependence on imports of wheat flour from South Africa by producing it locally. This firm employs about 300 people of whom 50% are women. The Lesotho Maize Mills specialises in production of maize meal, sugar packaging for domestic consumption is done by Lesotho Sugar Packers. The Maize used is purchased from local farmers and supplemented with imports from South Africa. The sugar used for packaging is imported from South Africa. The supplies of both maize and wheat from local farmers, is, however, so low that about 90% of these inputs are imported from South Africa annually (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1987). The Lesotho Flour Milling Company was supported by the LNDC. The Lesotho Flour Mills was sponsored by the Lesotho government, British Government and oil producing and exporting countries (OPEC). It has a silo of 30 000 tonnes capacity where commercial and strategic wheat reserves of Lesotho are kept, and 30,000 tonnes for storage of maize reserves. The Lesotho maize mill uses 200 tonnes of maize in 24 hours. In 1989 another component, the Lesotho Farm Feed Mills, was added to Lesotho Flour Mills. Lesotho Farm Feed Mills produces animal feed in cubes and pellets which is sold in Lesotho to farmers. The Farm Feed Mills have a capacity of 10 tonnes per hour (Lesotho Flour Mills Employee Handbook, undated). Lesotho Flour Mills operated at a loss due to poor management by personnel seconded from civil service, lack of protection by government against competition with flour feed and sugar imports from South Africa with superior quality. The mills have now been privatised to Seaboard Corporation of USA in May, 1998.

e) Lesotho Fruit and Vegetable Cannery

This firm, based at Masianokeng some 15 kilometres South of Maseru along the main south one road, was launched in 1980 under the LNDC and European Union funding. It supports local farmers to produce asparagus under contract farming, which the firm subsequently buys for canning especially between September and December. During the off-season of asparagus, the firm does canning of green beans, peaches, apricots and dry beans. Most of the produce, especially asparagus is exported to the European Union, while others are sold within Lesotho.

About 500 casual labourers, especially women, are employed by the firm during full operation, while about 20 persons are full time employees. This firm is also up for privatisation.

f) Maluti Dairy

The Maluti Dairy plant is situated near the Lepper Settlement at Ha Leqele some 8km South East of Maseru City along the road to Thaba-Bosiu. Maluti Dairy has a long history. According to Mochebelele (1987), in 1973 the government of Lesotho took over the farm which was established formerly to produce meals to feed the leppers in the Lepper settlement. The Botšabelo Dairy Farm, as it was then called, was financed by UNICEF and FAO and had 60 cows fed on fodder from a farm of 300 hactres. This farm also had a milk processing plant with a capacity of 1500 litres. The farm was primarily intended to act as a demonstration to local Basotho dairy farmers on up to date methods of dairy farming.

In 1987 the farm was funded by the government of Canada which provided both finance and technical experts on dairy farming. A new plant and a laboratory for testing milk were constructed at Botsabelo; and three milk silos, one each at Butha-Buthe, Leribe and Mohales hoek were also constructed to store milk supplies from farmers in the districts. Special milk vans collected the milk three times a week from the districts for processing in Maseru. At district level, dairy farmers had organised themselves into dairy associations and sold to the dairy through the ministry of Agriculture in each district. In Maseru, the milk that was received reached 180,000 litres per month and was processed into High temperature short term (HTST) in plastic containers (Interview with Marketing Officer, 8/8/98).

In 1992 Canadian funding ended and problems began in the Maluti Dairy. The dairy began to operate unsustainably due to a number of reasons. First, the top management that took over had not been properly trained during their counterpart years due to a high turnover of personnel seconded from the Ministry of Agriculture civil service. Secondly, the delivery vans broke down often and repairs were long and expensive. Thirdly, the dairy farmers associations at the district level collapsed due to disagreements on financial receipts.

Yet another problem encountered by the Maluti Dairy was that after selling its fleet of vans, it entered into a deal with a South African based milk brokers company, Denmark Dairies, to collect and distribute its milk and products, together with those of other South African milk companies throughout Lesotho. Denmark Dairies collects and distributes only to places with tarred roads, so

that the rural market for Maluti Dairy in untarred roads has fallen off. Only daily sales of 4,000 litres per day are achieved under Denmar Dairies.

Lastly, although the Lesotho dairy board actively promotes protection of the Maluti Dairy against milk imports from South Africa, this is not possible to apply to Ultra Heat Treated (UHT) milk. Therefore competition is stiff in supermarkets and shops for the market between Maluti Dairy and South African companies such as Longlife Milk, for instance (Interview with Marketing Officer, 1998).

g) The Lesotho Pharmaceutical Corporation

This industry is based in Mafeteng town, approximately 90km South of the capital, Maseru. It started operation as the Lesotho Dispensary Association (LDA) in 1977 with the financial support from the Netherlands, the Private Health Association of Lesotho (PHAL) and the Lesotho Government. The major objectives were to manufacture medical drugs in order to reduce dependence on their import from South Africa. As such the firm was an import substitution industry. The other major objective was to improve the general health of the Basotho through the supply of cheap medical drugs based on non-profit making by the firm, and lastly to improve the health of citizens in the Southern African region by exporting these medical drugs to other countries in the region such as Mozambique, Botswana, Somalia, Zambia and Swaziland.

Closely associated with the LDA in operation and location, is the National Drug Stockpile Organisation (NDSO) which stocks and distributes medical drugs nationwide to hospitals and clinics. All inputs used by the pharmaceutical industry are imported mainly from Europe by sea to Durban in South Africa and by rail from Durban to Wepener still in South Africa, from where they are collected by trucks belonging to the firm to Mafeteng.

h) The National Abattoir Complex

The National Abattoir was established in 1978 and started operations in 1986. It was a venture funded jointly by the Lesotho government and the government of Denmark. The latter's funding was expected to last for five years after which Lesotho government would be fully responsible for the abattoir. The abattoir was managed by the Ministry of Agriculture through its personnel seconded to the abattoir (Interview with the Personnel Manager, 3/8/98).

The objective of the National Abattoir was to improve the quality of meat produced for national consumption and reduce dependence on South Africa for meat supplies. Animal input supplies to the Abattoir came from local farmers, the Feedlot and livestock imports from South Africa. During peak demand, the Abattoir slaughtered 120 cattle and 200 sheep per day while at low demand it slaughtered about 30 cattle and 80 sheep per day. Individual persons or institutions which brought their own livestock for slaughter and were charged R87.00 and R15.00 per unit of cattle and sheep, respectively. The Abattoir sold its meat to butcheries, government institutions like schools and hospitals, supermarkets and private individuals. It employs about 100 people.

The abattoir failed to operate in a sustainable manner for a number of reasons. First, it depended on government funding for its operations. The funding was low and did not enable adequate purchase of inputs, thereby justifying the need for foreign funding and debt servicing. Secondly, there was poor management as a result of laxity by personnel seconded from the civil service to run the abattoir. Thirdly, there was no government protection against meat imports from South Africa because of SACU and SADC trade arrangements of which Lesotho is a member. The Abattoir lost the local market to South African imported meat which had higher quality and dealers had special credit arrangements with local butcheries and supermarkets.

In 1996 the abattoir got financial support from the World Bank and was run by the Australians who refurbished its infrastructure and initiated experimental efforts at privatisation. The abattoir also changed names and became known as the Maluti Highlands Abattoir up to the point of writing. The Australians contract ended in June 1998 and arrangements are advanced to privatise it. Unfortunately, the abattoir burnt down during the SADC intervention in Lesotho.

5.3.2 Small-scale non-farm income generating activities

Rural households engage in different activities in order to supplement income generated from either farming, formal employment, or migrant remittances. These alternative income generating activities serve as the main source of income for some rural households. Saith (1991) refers to these various activities as Non-Farm Economic Activities (NFEA). Non-Farm Economic Activities are characterised by attributes such as mode of operation, size or scale of activity and linkages in the economy. Most NFEA are home-based. They are done within the premises of the homestead in order to avoid or minimize the scale of sunk costs especially fixed costs such as land, construction of buildings and installation of physical infrastructures (Saith, 1991).

In Lesotho, a study carried out by Turner et al (1984) in rural Maseru district shows that NFEA include a wide range of operations such as home brewing, sewing, knitting, shoe making and mending, brick making, food and drink sales from commercial parties called stokvels; making claypots, weaving mats, and making grass hats, among other activities. With regard to mode of operation, a number of them are home-based in order to avoid or minimize sink capital costs. In the case of those activities that might be performed at the point of source of raw materials, such as brick making, there is often rudimentary make shift physical infrastructure developed to minimize sink costs. These NFEA are financed through personal funds or credit from informal sources such as village moneylenders. In cases where the activity belongs to a group, financial contributions from members act as a source of start up capital for the activity until it gains its own financial sustainability. Formal credit from the banks is not available to NFEA. Government does, however, advance credit in few cases as part of rural development project packages in areas where such projects may operate. More recently, the UNDP assists government to advance rural credit for NFEA through the Rural Enterprise Finance Project.

NFEA in Lesotho are also characterised by their small scale operation composed of one person, a household or a small interest group. Thus, while they may be a good source of income, their impact on employment generation is limited by their size. The small size of the NFEA makes them more sustainable in a long term since, here are no problems of management bureaucracy and incompetence typical of large enterprises. Members relate to one another informally and can trouble-shoot problems more quickly than in a large enterprise.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of NFEA is that they have good backward and forward linkages especially with the rural economy. Most of the inputs used by NFEA are derived from the local economy to minimize high costs of goods from a far. Outputs of NFEA are also mostly consumed by the local market (Turner *et al.*, 1984).

The retrenchment of migrant Basotho labour from South Africa is likely to increase the importance of NFEA as the main source of income for many rural households in future. Therefore, government needs to devise a policy on NFEA and be committed to its implementation. The present Rural Enterprise Finance Project is a good initiative in this line of thinking and operation. However, it has to be de-bureaucratized and made more accessible to the rural poor.

5.3.3 Evaluation and Assessment

The discussion on rural industries and (NFEA) presented above leads to a number of conclusions.

First, all the rural industries visited, except Loti Brick, have no financial sustainability. Some have closed down due to lack of financial sustainability. Closer examination shows that the lack of financial sustainability is caused by, among others, poor financial management, financial misuse for personal gain by some members of the management and outright theft of finances of the industrial enterprises. In some cases industrial enterprises either deteriorated or collapsed when foreign aid to them ceased, indicating a high level of dependence on foreign aid syndrome.

A similar weakness and collapse is experienced by rural industries once government protection and subsidies are removed, when they are deemed to have grown beyond the stage of infant industries. The need to have everlasting market protection and subsidies by many rural industries has led to misallocation of public funds, and a prolonged market distortion. In contrast the NFEA have some financial sustainability because they function within the financial capability of the respective entrepreneurs.

The second problem faced by rural industries relates to poor performance due to bad management, especially with regard to top management of agro-industries. The tendency to second senior civil servants, who are used to the lax bureaucracy of the civil service, to manage these industrial enterprises which depend on resourceful management to compete in the national and international market, needs to be reconsidered because it led to unsustainable management of many agro-industrial enterprises.

Thirdly, some rural industries have weak linkages within the economy. Ideally, rural industries should act as a domestic market for local primary sector commodities. Yet in the case of Lesotho, inputs used in some rural industries continue to come from South Africa. This dampens the initiatives of local primary producers. Likewise, commodities produced by rural industries should be consumed within the country to create multiplier effects. Yet, competition with South African produced commodities often leads to marginalisation of Lesotho products in the local consumer market because of South Africa's superior quality of products and the fact that no tariffs or quotas exist on them due to both SACU and SADC trade arrangements. Lack of government protection on rural industries throttles local industrial initiatives which can neither compete sustainably in the local market nor the regional and international market to which the

SACU and SADC agreement entitles Lesotho to compete freely. Lesotho industrial products seriously lack competitive advantage.

Fourthly, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPS) affect rural industries and Non-Farm Economic Activities through both retrenchment and privatisation. The removal of government protection, subsidies and price control have led some rural industries to operate at a loss. This has, in turn, necessitated large scale retrenchment by these industries, thereby reducing their positive impact on employment generation. In line with its declared policy of privatisation of all public and parastatal enterprises, the government is in the process of privatisation of all rural industries in which it had a contribution and share. While this privatisation may improve production efficiency, it may not necessarily improve consumer efficiency, especially in the rural areas of Lesotho with its acute shortage of physical infrastructure. The likely scenario is that prices of commodities produced by these industries will escalate, become more inaccessible to the poor rural households, and aggravate rural deprivation.

5.4 Community Development

5.4.1 Introduction

The PROVISION of adequate social services and physical infrastructure as part of basic human needs is vital to the welfare of the rural Basotho. In recognition of this fact, after independence the Government of Lesotho started the Department of Community and Rural Development to replace the colonial Department of Community Development to formulate policies and co-ordinate programmes and projects that provide social services and physical infrastructure such as water supplies, nutrition and gardening, health, energy and feeder roads and bridge construction to rural communities in the country (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1970). Some of these activities were a continuation of earlier efforts started during the colonial government. During the colonial era and, more so after independence, much community development work in Lesotho relied heavily (and still does) on self-help and food aid (Sefali, 1978). Some activity also depended (and still does) on support by non-governmental organisations, especially those foreign to Lesotho. In the 1980s the department of Community and Rural Development was upgraded and became a fully fledged Ministry of co-operatives and rural development. In 1993, rural development became a department of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and at the time of writing it is a department within the Ministry of Local Government. It is important to note that during the re-democratization era since 1993 rural development has been demoted from the level of a Ministry to that of a

department, a structural and functional position below that of the many ministries whose programmes and activities it is expected to co-ordinate.

5.4.2 Village Water Supply

Adequate provision of clean water supplies is one of the biggest and oldest problems that rural communities have been faced with in Lesotho. Some villages still draw water from streams and unprotected springs, while others get theirs from protected springs that either frequently dry up or are located long distances from consuming households. Seventy per cent of the rural population does not have access to clean drinking water (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1992). In recognition of this problem and in line with the UN motto for water, the Government of Lesotho has declared a policy of free drinking water for all by the year 2000. Provision of village water supplies for rural communities is the responsibility of the Department of Village Water Supplies (DVWS).

The struggle to assist rural Basotho to have access to clean drinking water dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Then, traders and missionaries established gravity-fed water systems to bring water from improved springs on mountain and hillsides down to their business premises and church institutions for domestic use. Some of the villagers, especially those who were staunch followers of the missionaries, were allowed, in theory, free access to the water by the mission stations. In reality, they got the water in return for their piety and faith in the missionaries and their mission (Germond, 1967).

During the 1960s the British colonial government assisted by District Development Councils, organised large scale countrywide public campaigns to mobilise villages to raise funds through household contributions for provision of community water supplies in their villages. The government provided financial and technical expertise to villages which managed to raise the funds, while the villages themselves, further provided free labour for construction (Sechaba Consultants, 1995). The District Councils were abolished after independence. the Department of Community Development, formed in 1965, took over total responsibility to organise villagers to contribute funds, submit requests for assistance to government, and provide unskilled labour for construction of village water supplies. The government used the request from villages as a shopping list with which to solicit foreign financial and technical assistance in this area. Estimates are that 200 village water supply systems were constructed in the ten year period between 1968 and 1978 (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; TAMS, 1996). A major review of the modus operandi undertaken in village water supply was undertaken in 1978, following a number

of misunderstandings between villagers and government. The problems investigated related to the management of funds raised, vis-a-vis the actual costs of the water supply to be installed, maintenance responsibility by the villagers, problems of free riders, quality of plastic materials used which were highly susceptible to vandalism, poor quality of water stored in tanks made of corrugated iron which often rusted and the politicization of government assistance to villages after the 1970 coup d'état (Sechaba Consultants, 1995).

According to Hall (1995) in 1995 there were 816 gravity-fed water supply systems (52%), 420 handpump systems (25%), 12 pumped water systems (8%) and 202 (13%) water supply systems that used a mixture of gravity-fed and hand pump systems. Seventy-three percent of all water collection points of the water supply systems had water flow, with the highest flow recorded in favour of gravity-fed water supply systems. Estimates are that about 57% of the rural population is served by improved water supply systems of which the lowland villages have a higher percentage (87%) due to accessibility and higher population density. Only 26% of the rural population in the mountains is served by improved water supply systems (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Hall, 1995; TAMS Consultants, 1996).

The Department of Rural Water Supply (DRWS) mission statement is to contribute, in a sustainable way, to improvements in the health status and well being of the rural population of Lesotho through the provision of safe drinking water (TAMS, 1996). The cornerstones of DRWs policy are community participation through village water committees elected by villagers themselves, village elected water minders to do maintenance and repair work, contribution of free labour for construction and maintenance work by the community, financial contribution for installation, running repair and maintenance by the community and the adoption of the user pays principle to avoid free riders and ensure sustainability (TAMS, 1996).

Despite this clear mode of operation, provision of clean drinking water through village water supply systems has not been without environmental technical, economic, social and political problems. Environmental problems are related to the fact that during dry periods some water supply systems, especially hand pumps, fail to deliver water to the communities because underground water levels drop. Moreover, surface water sources dry up in cases where gravity feed systems are used. Technical problems are mostly encountered through the silting of boreholes for handpump and malfunctions of the equipment due to mechanical break downs. Economic problems relate to the failure of all community members to pay contributions and the

subsequent failure of the community to maintain its water system. Some economic problems are caused by bad financial management by the village water committees. Social problems are caused by selection of sites for location of taps based on technical criteria which may not coincide with social preferences in the community. Sometimes social problems are caused by the tendency to want free riding by some community members who fail to pay their financial contributions. Failure to free ride at times, leads those who wish to do so to vandalise the water supply system (Hall, 1995). Political problems emanate from differences in political beliefs and membership of national political parties. This problem has been more pronounced since 1970 especially between the supporters of the BNP and those of the BCP. Villages that were pro-BCP scorned water supply systems as an indirect way to solicit political support by the BNP during the latter rule, while the BNP supporters invariably persuaded the BNP government that to assist their pro-BCP neighbouring villages was tantamount to quenching the thirst of LLA guerillas. Some water supply systems were vandalised as a result of differences in politics in the community because they came about as a result of insistence by the then BNP constituted and led village development committees (Sechaba Consultants, 1995).

5.4.3 Rural Sanitation

Rural sanitation is yet another problem with which rural households are faced in Lesotho. During the beginning of the 1980s it was estimated that only between 13 and 45% of the lowland rural population and 3% of the mountain population had pit latrines installed. These percentages were limited particularly to rich rural households (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980).

The Rural Sanitation Project lasted for 3 years and succeeded to help the Ministry of Rural Development to devise a clear policy and programme on the provision of improved rural sanitation. The programme called national rural sanitation programme is based in the Ministry of Health and operates fully in six out ten districts. The programme promotes the construction of VIP latrines in the villages, proper use and maintenance of these VIP latrines, appropriate and hygienic disposal of children's waste and maintenance of clean personal and domestic hygiene (Sechaba Consultants, 1995).

Households that adopt use of VIP latrines pay for the full cost of building and maintenance on their own. The national rural sanitation programme only provides technical expertise to train enlisting households on construction and maintenance of VIP latrines, through use of district technical and health assistants.

Estimates are that about 46% of the lowland rural households has latrines, and that only 6.8% of these households actually has VIP latrines. The mountain rural households have a low figure of 8% (Sechaba Consultants, 1995). Reasons for low adoption rate of latrines in the mountain region of Lesotho are that low population density leaves more free space to use for sanitation without travelling long distances by households. The terrain is rugged and soils rocky so that digging pits for latrines is difficult, and there is lack of enough cash to afford construction of latrines (Sechaba Consultants, 1995).

Assessment of the VIP latrine programme encouraged by the National Rural Sanitation Programme shows that their adoption is limited by the high costs involved which amounted to R750.00 in 1993 prices (Sechaba Consultants, 1995). In general, the construction of pit latrines which are not VIP type is done outside the technical advice of the NRSP, and their location is often at places that are upstream of water sources used for drawing drinking water by households. This presents a potential health hazard and requires immediate attention in the lowlands. Moreover, increased health education is needed on hygienic non-latrine systems of rural sanitation for those households that cannot afford a latrine system.

5.4.4 Rural Energy

Shortage of energy sources for rural households is a big problem in Lesotho. Conventional commercial energy sources such as electricity, gas, coal and paraffin are expensive for poor rural households, and leave many to rely on use of fuel wood. It is estimated that 75% of the annual energy demand in the country arises from the cooking and heating needs of the rural population (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b). Mohapeloa (1992) estimated that 90% of the overall national energy demand came from the residential sector. Seven percent of the demand came from transport and 3% came from productive services. Khalema (1992) estimated that only 2% of all households in the country were connected to electricity.

Historical evidence provided by missionary records compiled by Germond (1967) shows that Lesotho had rich woodlands cover in the 19th century. Yet as the population grew over the years, pressure for building and fuel wood progressively reduced the woodlands to the present state of chronic devegetation and woodlessness.

The imperative for provision of alternative energy sources to fuel wood in the rural areas has never been more glaring than today, when continual increases in costs of petroleum energy

sources such as paraffin which are already widely used in rural Lesotho, escalate even higher (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b).

The government of Lesotho, through the Department of Energy in the Ministry of Natural Resources, formulated the Lesotho Energy Master Plan (LEMP) in 1988 as an umbrella national framework that guides policies and projects on energy in the country. Although the LEMP envisages rural electrification, progress is limited by high costs of installation. Current delays before installation can be done are due to a high demand that outweighs the supply capacity of the Lesotho Electricity Corporation (LEC), the monopoly supply nature of LEC and the high costs of wiring houses and recurrent expenditure for monthly payment on electricity. Lack of infrastructure precludes installation of electricity in rural areas, except in rural service centres such as Roma, Matsieng, Morija, Peka, Kolonyama, Mapoteng (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b; Khalema, 1992). Khalema (1992) argues that rural electrification in Lesotho requires high government subsidies.

Lesotho enjoys plenty of sunshine and the government hopes to encourage Basotho to harness solar energy for use, especially in domestic energy needs. The Sixth National Development Plan (1997) estimates that 15% of rural households will have been fitted with PV systems for lighting and radios at the end. Here again, the costs of fitting solar devices and the special equipments used are far from affordable by rural households, save a few financed by rich migrant labourers and those by rich urban migrants within Lesotho. On their part, poor rural households harness solar energy for heating by directly basking in the sun when occasion avails, and drying their washing and other domestic items in the sun.

Petroleum energy sources such as gas, coal and paraffin are used by rural households in Lesotho. Coal and gas are not popular due to their high costs and health risks involved in their use. Use of coal demands that a household should have a coal stove for safe use to avoid possible suffocation from the noxious gas. Coal stoves are a luxury afforded only by few households in rural Lesotho. The commonly used *paola*, has resulted in many deaths if subjected to use of coal without adequate care, especially by children (Sechaba Consultants, 1995). Commercial gas is equally expensive and risky. It requires use of gas stoves, which are an exclusive luxury of the few rich households. Even when used, gas presents a high health and property risk because it is highly flammable and needs special care against use by children. On the contrary, paraffin is widely used in rural areas for cooking and heating. Yet since the oil crisis of the mid 1970s its

prices have continually escalated, and, at present, it costs on average R2.00 per litre in local rural cafes and shops. According to the Sixth National Development Plan (1997), the government hopes to improve access to paraffin by rural households through use of a petroleum fund.

Renewable energy constitutes the major sources of energy affordable to and used by many rural households for cooking and heating. However, various materials used such as cow dung, vegetation, shrubs and trees have alternative uses in sustainable, environmental conservation. The government hopes to reduce consumption of renewable energy through the use of improved and more efficient technologies such as stoves and cookers, and vigorous sustainable harvesting of materials used for burning (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b). In terms of promotion on sustainable biomass consumption, afforestation programmes are promoted to plant trees and indigenous shrub species. The National Forestry Action Plan (NFAP) has been formulated by the Forestry Division of the Department of Forestry, Conservation and Land Use Planning in the Ministry of Agriculture. At present, the NFAP is being sold to donors for funding in order to implement its programmes. On their part, individual rural households are encouraged by the Social Forestry Project of the Forestry Division to plant all kinds of trees including indigenous species for their domestic fuelwood demands (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b).

The Appropriate Technology Section (ATS) of the Ministry of Local Government was launched as a Renewable Energy Technology (RET) Project in the early 1980s, and among some of its tasks, dealt with promotion of development of biogas in the rural areas. This endeavour has become a failure due to high costs involved to develop a bio-digester per households, high skill required in its maintenance, negative attitude to use of human faeces as an input and the scarcity of alternative socio-culturally accepted green matter as inputs (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b).

5.4.5 Rural Health Care

The government of Lesotho has adopted the UN motto of health for all by the year 2000. As a sequel to this national declaration a number of policies are pursued by the Ministry of Health that include Primary Health Care (PHC), development of curative infrastructure through construction of hospitals and clinics and training technical and administrative personnel (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b).

Development of a western health care system in Lesotho began in the 19th century with the missionaries. Mission stations provided basic curative facilities and services to the Basotho at

the level of small clinics, some of which later grew and became mission hospitals functioning today. At independence, 19 hospitals existed in Lesotho and 67 health clinics. There were 34 doctors and 199 nurses throughout the entire country (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975).

Concern about rural health care and deliberate policy initiatives by government towards its improvement started during the first plan period in the early 1970s, but took shape during the second plan period in the mid 1970s. A total of 90 health clinics existed in the mid 1970s (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975). Major efforts were concentrated on improvement of maternal and child health care through the provision of improved nutrition. To this end pregnant and lactating mothers were given food rations composed of milk, eggs, tinned fish and so on to improve their nutrition. Much of this food came as food aid from the World Food Programme under the Food for nutrition programme. Availability of timeous inoculations and vaccinations to immunize children against early childhood diseases was promoted to reduce infant mortality. In rural areas, people had to travel long distances to clinics, and priority was on mapping these distances and catchment areas so that the number of clinics could be increased (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1980). Preventive health care was promoted through education programmes on nutrition, environmental health.

A system of village health workers operates to bring health services nearer to the people through a decentralised health system in rural areas. Moreover, traditional birth attendants are also given basic training so that they can assist in emergency cases of child delivery in the rural areas. Both village health workers and traditional birth attendants also help disseminate health education in matters of nutrition, sanitation, family planning, and maternal and child care (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997).

Adequate provision of rural health care is faced with problems of ignorance on the part of the population towards preventive care, necessitating a wider and more intensive health education programme. Hospitals and clinics suffer from acute shortage of doctors, nurses and drugs. As a result many rural clinics have closed down, especially after government supply of drugs and subsidies to drugs were abolished as a recommendation under structural adjustment programmes since 1988 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1992). Moreover, the government needs to devise and promote birth control in the rural areas as a pre-condition for better health care.

5.4.6 Rural Nutrition and Community Gardens

Lesotho's rural population suffers from nutritional problems related especially to malnutrition. Dietary deficiency of both proteins and vitamins is common. In order to improve the vitamins and protein content of the diet, the government encourages rural households to produce and consume vegetables and legumes. The strategy used to achieve the goal to improve rural nutrition is that of encouragement of development of viable home and community gardens. With regard to development of home gardens, rural households are encouraged to produce their own vegetables, legumes and fruits (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b).

Development of communal gardens started during the late 1960s as an effort to bolster nutrition levels, create employment especially for women in the villages and to promote cooperative spirit and team work for community development. It was also intended to enable households without home gardens, due to the terrain and soil structure in their homesteads, to have access to plots where they could produce vegetables and legumes to feed their household members (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1975).

However, many communal gardens have failed to become sustainable and closed down because of lack of water for irrigation due to dried up sources and failed to repair equipment after break downs. Community garden committees, in some cases, lacked the necessary financial and general management and organisational framework to generate finances and tools. Tenure also posed problems with regard to the length of time households were expected to continue to farm a given plot in the garden. Ideally a rotational system was to be practised. However, this often becomes difficult because some members insist that once they have prepared and fertilised the plot, they are entitled to enjoy yields over a long period to make sustainable profit from the plot. Vandalism becomes common as a means by the agrieved to revenge and avenge. Village and national politics also contribute to the death of many communal gardens. After the 1970 *coup d'etat* by the BNP, membership of communal gardens became highly politicized in favour of BNP members. In due course some of these gardens closed down because BNP supporters who used them expressed fear that BCP supporters had threatened to poison the vegetable crops so that BNP members would die after consuming food prepared from the vegetables. Since democratisation in 1993, tremendous effort is underway to revive these communal gardens under the auspices of support by the United Nations Volunteer Peace Corps and youth clubs, and support by some NGOs (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b; Sechaba Consultants, 1995).

5.4.7 Rural Roads and Transport

Most villages in Lesotho, especially those in the foothills and mountains, are not accessible due to absence of roads. According to a recent government report (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997a p. 130) "the road network consists of 128km unpaved and 956 km of paved (bitumen) roads, and 97 bridges". Most of the tarred roads connect towns, but in between the towns, they serve a lot of the rural population. The tarred roads are constructed and serviced mainly by the Ministry of Works. However, lately some have been either constructed or re-surfaced by the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, especially those that lead to the Katse and Mohale Dams (Kindgom of Lesotho, 1997a).

The majority of gravel roads are in the rural areas and about 1200 km of them are constructed by the Labour Construction Unit (LCU) of the Ministry of Works which hires labourers in the villages to work on construction and maintenance of these roads (Sechaba consultants, 1995). Most villages are connected through a network of feeder roads, tracks and footbridges. The task of construction of rural feeder roads, tracks and foot bridges is entrusted to the civil works section of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Since independence, this rural physical infrastructure has been done by communities under self-help campaigns (*Matsolo-a-iketsetse*) in return for remuneration with food handouts composed of maize meal, powdered eggs, beans, tined fish, cooking oil donated mainly by the World Food Programme's food for work programme. Sometimes small financial payments between 50 cents and R2.00 a day were combined with food rations as payment.

It is estimated that about 1575km of road were constructed by the civil works section of the Ministry of Home Affairs using community self-help as a mode of operation. This facilitated communication and accessibility necessary for rural development. Moreover, employment and income were generated for rural communities for about 5,000 people a year (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997; Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Kingdom of Lesotho, 1992). Rural road construction has not been without problems. Many of the roads constructed were of poor design quality and quickly got destroyed by thunderstorms. This was aggravated by the fact that communities used their participation in construction as a means to gain access to food rations and small financial payments. Without these incentives, communities refused to participate in the maintenance of the feeder roads constructed by themselves for their own use and human development. After the 1970 *coup d'etat* by the BNP, self-help campaigns became politicized. Participation in the

programmes became biased in favour of BNP supporters instead of communities as a whole. From the mid 1980s to the early 1990s decreased WFP support under food-for-work programme and decreased government financial support to employment generation efforts due to adoption of structural adjustment policies contributed to a relative decline in employment and activities of self-help campaigns under the civil works section until they were to be revitalised through the use of the Development Fund of Lesotho Highlands Water Project after democratization in 1993 (Kingdom of Lesotho, 1997b).

The government of Lesotho has established a special fund called the Lesotho Highlands Water Revenue Fund (LHWRF) to look after the revenue that comes to Lesotho from the sale of water to South Africa. The actual transfer of water started on 22 January 1998 and was earmarked by an auspicious inauguration ceremony attended by his Majesty King Letsie III of Lesotho, His Excellency President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, and his Excellency Sir Ketumile Masire of the Republic of Botswana.

The Development Fund of the LHWRF is intended to benefit all Basotho, especially those in the rural areas, by empowering local communities to propose and implement development projects for their own community development (Kingdom of Lesotho 1997b).

The use of the Development Fund to promote community Development in Lesotho is indeed highly commendable. Up to the end of 1997 when the operations came to a halt for some review, it is estimated that the fund had resulted in the construction of 1'070km of roads, 2 bridges, 60 footbridges and although not falling under rural roads - 2 clinics, 20 soil conservation projects, 20 gullies filled and 32328 trees planted (work for Justice, 1997/98). Moreover, the conditions of feeder roads in rural areas improved, rural-urban migration slowed down due to employment opportunities available in the Development Fund projects in the rural areas and the purchasing power and standard of living improved in the rural areas because of incomes received from employment in the projects. Income received from this employment is estimated at R300.00 per person per month (Work for Justice, 1997/98).

On the other hand, the Development Fund and its projects have generated heated debate and received scathing attacks from various quarters in the country. In reality, the Development Fund operated in a manner that was diametrically opposed to its declared intention to use a participatory bottom-up approach, that used technically sound methods of design and implementation of its projects in order to ensure that they were sustainable. Inclusion of

members of parliament (MPS) all of whom were BCP and later LCD in the implementation of the projects has often led the MPS to foster a dictatorial top-down approach in the selection and implementation of the projects according to their personal preference and that of the party instead of the communities. MP' controlled the entire process. They also controlled the funds for payment of technical contractors and general labourers. They got the cheques and cash from Maseru to their constituencies on their person. At first, the members of parliament worked together with their party constituency committees to identify and select projects for implementation. Later, the procedure was changed so that the members of parliament worked with the constituency committees for Development Fund projects, the works committee, elected popularly by the community. In cases where these, constituency committees were mostly composed of non BCP and later LCD party members, the members of parliament sidelined the committees and took unilateral decisions and submitted them to the Development Fund headquarters (Work for Justice, 1997/98).

Village development councils had little influence on the projects, which became party dominated at constituency level. This led to a very confused line of authority, action and responsibility that opened an avenue for corruption and nepotism in both employment, payment and general use of funds at all levels, local, regional and national.

Employment in the projects became largely done on BCP and later LCD party basis. Members of other parties especially BNP, became excluded from employment in the projects because BCP/LCD members argued that it was their turn to enjoy exclusive benefits from state induced rural development (Work for Justice, 1997/98). In some cases, the works committees were appointed by the MP's themselves and served as their stoogies rather than the representatives of peoples wishes, so that the envisaged participatory bottom-up process became just a rhetoric.

In some places the necessary machinery used to do some activities either failed to arrive on time or totally failed to arrive. Moreover, some lack of technical advice became evident as in some constituencies such as Maama in Maseru district wrong sizes of concrete pipes for creation of storm drainage culverts lay unused, unprotected and wasting away (Mokoaleli, 1998). Absence of a legislative framework that regulated disbursement of the LHWRP made it vulnerable to abuse and fraudulent use by some officers at all levels. Large sums of money in the range R150,000.00 released for payment of labourers disappeared on two occasions in the hands of MP's under suspicious conditions (Makhaphela, 1998).

Selective employment and income in the projects also generated social animosity and accentuated rural inequalities. The LHWRP is under review at present and donors, government, NGOs and private sector are involved in some aspects of this review. Unfortunately, the expected beneficiaries, the communities themselves are marginalised in this process.

5.4.8 Rural Development Administration

Administration of rural development is closely linked to local government. In Lesotho, the traditional rural administrative machinery co-exists with a modern rural administrative structure to co-ordinate rural development (Wallis and Van der Geer, 1982).

The traditional rural administrative structure is composed of chiefs and a council of elders. At the top of the apex of the chieftainship structure is the paramount chief, followed by principal and ward chiefs, and then chiefs and headmen. The administration of rural governance and development, in this line of authority, is vested in the paramount chief, who has delegated it down to principal and ward chiefs. The latter have passed this authority down the hierarchy to chiefs and headmen. All are responsible to the paramount chief from the headmen up the hierarchy. In theory the traditional rural administration is not autocratic. Rather, it is based on public participation in decision-making planning, and implementation through the main forum of public gatherings, the pitso, and council of elders democratically elected at pitsos (*the khotla*). However, there is evidence that sometimes traditional rural administration is not as democratic as is often thought to be in that chiefs do have an influence on who gets elected into their khotla (Jingoes, 1975) and can unilaterally impose decisions on the public (Wallis and Vander Geer, 1982).

While in the past the traditional administrative structure was a very powerful force, since independence this power has waned as a result of increased introduction of units of the modern administrative structure in the rural areas, a move which the chieftainship has detested to-date (Wallis and Van der Geer, 1982).

Modern rural administration got its roots from the formation of District Councils (DCs) in 1948 (Wallis and Vander Geer, 1982; Rembe and Mapetla, 1989) through to 1968 when the District Councils were abolished. After independence, the BNP government introduced a centralisation legislation, the Local Administration Act of 1969, which laid the basis of the present modern administrative structure. Since 1969, consecutive governments have introduced measures and

laws which have only enabled them to have what each regarded as a firmer control of the administration through centralization, despite their palatable verbal and sometimes written rhetoric on the need for decentralization and local government.

In its different ways the BN government promoted central control and government since 1970 until its overthrow in 1986 (Rembe and Mapetla, 1989). Instruments used to enforce this process of centralization were the creation of the district administrator, district development councils and village development councils. The district administration process was entrusted at different times to the district administrators (DAs) who were equivalents of assistant ministers in political and administrative rank then by district administrators and district government assistants (DGAs) where the DAs occupied the top administrative rank and the DGA, was the top political rank in the districts. Often both had unclear cut and confused functional relations and borders. The DGAs later got phased out and DAs became chief government officials in the district. The functions of DAs were later to be split between themselves doing everything except administration of lands and Chieftainship which became allocated to a new office the local administration officer (LAO) in the Ministry of Interior. The military government also introduced the position of district military officer (DMO) as their governments chief political overseer in the district until democratization in 1993. The DMO and the DA often had no clear demarcation of power and functions, and conflict and duplication was abundant (Rembe and Mapetla, 1989).

The district development councils (DDCs) were established in 1966 as a body in charge of planning, implementation and co-ordination of all district development under the DA and later the district development coordinator. The district development councils were ideally meant to be composed of all departments of line ministries in the district and elected representatives of the public in its various aspects of civil groups such as farmers associations, co-operatives, churches, businessmen, political parties and so on. The importance of DDCs for rural development lies in the fact that projects decided at village level by people, go through their village development councils (VDCs) via ward development councils (WDCs) to the DDCs for scrutiny and approval before they are submitted to central government. Some of these projects are financed by the DDC when funds permit. Despite, this crucial position for overall development in the district, most DDCs are very ineffective because they are headed by people without adequate training in development planning and implementation. Therefore most planning is still done by the Ministry of Planning and line ministries in Maseru. DDCs are also mostly headed by civil

servants acting on instruction from their Ministry headquarters whose views dominate those of local people. There is no horizontal integration among these line ministries since each owes allegiance to its headquarters in the centre. DDCs are also highly political in favour of the ruling government of the day. Moreover DDCs have no funds to use to implement their programmes.

Village development councils are successors to the village councils created during the colonial rule. In theory, VDCs are democratically elected through pitsos by the public. The main functions of VDCs are to co-ordinate village decision-making, planning, implementation and evaluation of development programmers and projects. Part of their function is also to assist generate revenue to finance village development. VDCs have some committees responsible to them such as land allocation committees, village water committees, village garden committees, village peace corps and so forth which are elected by interest groups in interest areas of civil life and recommended for paternal adoption by VDCs. The function of VDCs is also to co-ordinate and harmonise the activities of these committees and interest groups and reconcile them with the wishes of the large community.

A number of studies have evaluated the performance of VDCs (Wallis and Van der Geer, 1982; Thoahlane, 1984; Rembe and Mapetla, 1989; LSPP, 1989) and concluded that although they are a worthwhile experiment at promotion of public participation in local government, their potential is hampered by the fact that they are condemned by chiefs as intruding on their power so that much time and energies are spent on conflicts rather than productive work. VDC members also need adequate training in general planning and management of development and finance. Corrupt and nepotistic tendencies among some members of VDCs also deserve close attention. VDCs have become highly politicized through the BNP, military, BCP and LDC rules. VDCs need to be depoliticized if they are to become true avenues for the promotion of participatory and sustainable rural development in the country (Wallis and Van der Geer, 1982; Rembe and Mapetla, 1989).

There has been much talked of decentralization by the government of Lesotho since 1980 following the establishment of Thaba-Tseka district as a pilot under the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Workshops, the largest of which was held at the National University of Lesotho in 1980, were hosted and consultancies appointed on decentralization in the country. Besides, a series of legislation meant to empower local rural structures were enacted such as the order No. 9 of 1986, The Development Councils order 1991, The Development

Councils (amendment) order 1992, and the Development Councils (amendment) order 1994. All these pieces of legislation sought to strengthen the power and efficiency of rural structures concerned with development, particularly those of district development councils and village development councils. However, these pieces of legislation failed to empower and render local development authorities efficient in the rural areas because they operated within the basic framework of the Public Administration Act of 1969 whose central thrust was centralization rather than decentralization (LSPP, 1989). Hence, it became possible for various governments of the day to politicize DDCs and VDCs and use them as extension arms of central government at local levels.

More recently the government of Lesotho has enacted and adopted the Local Government Act 1997 (Act Number 6 of 1997) as the legal framework to guide the introduction, planning/formulation and implementation of Local government in Lesotho. This Act supersedes all other prior pieces of legislation on local rural governance. Instead, the Act introduces two governance structures, namely community councils and rural councils.

It is too early to assess the Local Government Act of 1997 because it has not yet even been implemented. However, some preliminary observations are worthy of mention. The process by means of which the Act was formulated was very wanting in popular participation from the grassroots. While the White Paper on the Bill was read out to the public in pitsos organised by officers of the Ministry of Local Government, it should be borne in mind that this was information on the decision central government level merely being passed down the usual bureaucratic ladder in a top-down manner to the public, in which the latter had very little input, if any at all. The fact that by-laws enacted by local councils have to be approved by the Minister of Local Government - who is a politician belonging to his own party running the government of the day can only mean increased centralization by central government instead of devolution of power to the local councils as implied by the Act. The Act is not specific on how decentralization of the budget is to be done. This point demands attention because adequate funding is a pre-requisite for effective implementation of local government decisions, plans and programmes.

The majority of chiefs are in the senate successfully lobbied that the senate should reject the Local Government Bill. However, since the decisions of the senate are not binding to the Lower House, the bill was, in anyway, adopted and passed as the Local Government Act 1997. As a

result, whether rightly or wrongly, in senate, chiefs openly condemn the LCD government for attempting to abolish chieftainship through the Act. Lastly, but equally importantly, the concept and practice of Local government is premised on democracy. Yet since democratisation in 1993, various political events such as the *coup detat* mounted by the palace in August 1994 against the democratic BCP government, the usurpation of the democratic BCP government by Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle and his newly formed LCD party in June 1997, and the current highly controversial outcome of the 23 May 1998 general election which prompted SADC intervention through the Troika commission and later the SADC forces and the nomination of the Interim Political Authority (IPA), are all but indicative of the fact that the practice of genuine democracy is yet to come in Lesotho. Under these kind of political circumstances and environment, it is apt to conclude that, at best, only a pseudo rural local government is possible in Lesotho now and in the near future.

5.4.9 Evaluation and Assessment

The analysis of community development provided in this section leads one to the following conclusions: First, community development policies and projects have been donor-driven since independence. The dependence of projects on foreign aid composed of finance, technical expertise, food aid and models of operation has often disenabled rather than strengthened local capacity for development because of the dependency syndrome it created. This has been evidenced by high mortality of projects once aid stopped. In future, sustainability of community development might need to rely more on endogenous development forged through use of indigenous resources within the reach of local communities. The communities must be willing to accept change and commit themselves and their resources to this change in order for sustainable community development to be achieved.

Secondly, some projects became unsustainable and collapsed due to lack of co-operation within the community. This lack of co-operation raises the need to re-consider use of community development models based on the assumption that the community is a homogeneous entity with common problems and aspirations. It sensitises policy makers and planners to become cognisant of the fact that social differentiation exists within the community, so that solving of problems, needs to be targeted at these common interest groups to maximize chances of sustainability.

Sustainable development demands that the people must change their attitudes towards one another through finding more peaceful and accountable methods of conflict resolution and

management conducive to cooperation. Moreover, the people themselves must develop a culture of social and political tolerance in order to minimize conflict that hinders the cooperation necessary for sustainable development.

Thirdly, despite the official policy-making and planning rhetoric of participatory community development by successive governments since independence, the reality has been that some projects became unsustainable precisely due to lack of participation. The use of various incentives by successive governments as a means to induce participation in order to solicit populist support from the masses failed to induce the sustainability of community development. This lack of sustainability was aggravated by the high politicization of community development efforts, through introduction of party bias in favour of supporters to participate in the sharing the benefits of community development work and exclusion of non-supporters. At best party induced selective participation promoted social animosity and vandalism of development work by those aggrieved by their exclusion. Depoliticization of development work is necessary in order for future efforts to become sustainable.

Fourthly, community development projects had a minimal impact on employment generation and income because of the partisan nature of employment, and the rampant nepotism and corruption that this bias created. The people themselves at all levels of society need to change their attitudes to public property, and adopt new attitudes that are more responsible and accountable for their own sustainable development.

Fifthly, the institutional framework for the administration and the management of community development needs to be revised. The inefficiency of chiefs and VDCs to effect sustainable management of development work implies that in future efficiency criteria has to be considered in the appointment of chiefs and election of VDC members rather than hereditary and political criteria, respectively, as has been common to date. Moreover, sustainable development calls for decentralization of the budget and the devolution of power so that all actors can be empowered to form the necessary partnership for sustainable development.

5.4.10 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that several efforts were made by the government of Lesotho to promote rural development . However, the majority of these efforts failed to become sustainable.

CHAPTER 6: *NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOs) AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN LESOTHO*

6.1 Introduction

Rural development in Lesotho has not only been promoted by the government, but by a number of Non-governmental organisations as well. NGOs involved in rural development in Lesotho are of two types, local and international. Local NGOs are those that have been formed in Lesotho mostly, but not necessarily exclusively, by Basotho. Local NGOs tend to be very small in size and operate from membership fees and funds received from other bigger NGOs and donors. In most cases, they are village-based and may not even be registered (LCN, 1993). Much research needs to be done on local NGOs and their impact on sustainable rural livelihoods in Lesotho.

International NGOs, by comparison, are large in size. They are often subsidiaries of a larger international networkss operating across continents and headquartered in the industrialised countries, to create a North-South nexus with Lesotho. International NGOs are also sources of much financial and technical resources transfer from the industrialised countries to Lesotho where it is used to fund rural development projects in the field, or, fund some local NGOs involved in the field of rural development (Sechaba Consultants, 1995).

Lesotho has had a large number of NGOs since independence. Sechaba consultants (1995) noted the existence of some 45 NGOs that operate largely in the field of rural development in Lesotho. However, at the time of doing fieldwork for this study, some NGOs had closed offices in Maseru and moved elsewhere, especially to South Africa. In recognition of the growing number of NGOs in the country, the Lesotho government mandated the founding of the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (LCN) to coordinate all NGOs activities in the country (LCN, 1993).

The LCN was launched in May, 1990. Its mission statement is "to stimulate, promote and support Lesotho NGOs in their development efforts" (LCN, 1993, p.1). The LCN had seven paid up staff members and 110 member organisations each of which paid an annual membership fee of R250.00. LCN operated an annual budget of more than R2 million that came from Canada Fund, CESO, Canadian International Development Agency, Commonwealth Foundation, Danish International Development Agency, European Economic Community, Lesotho Government, South African Development Community, Swedish International Development Agency, United

Nations Development Programme, United Nations Family Planning Association, United Service Commission of Canada, United States Agency for International Development, Kellogg Foundation and World Bank (LCN, 1993).

The LCN operations were divided into six commissions each of which acted as a kind of sector. These were economic, political and social commission, agriculture, environment and natural resources commission, disaster and humanitarian relief commission, human resources development commission, business and commercial development commission, and democracy and human rights commission (LCN, 1993). Of the six commissions, the Commission that was of direct relevance to rural development was the agriculture, environment and natural resources commission.

6.2 Non-governmental organisations and their activities

The NGOs which were found to perform activities related to rural development in Lesotho were many and varied in specific objectives, strategies, sources of funding, target groups and modes of operation.

a) AFRICA 2000 NETWORK - LESOTHO

Africa 2000 Network was launched in 1989 and operates in 12 countries across Africa. It is a development initiative co-ordinated under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Network was mooted as a result of the concern that for many decades after World War II, Developed countries have given aid to developing countries especially Africa, and yet up to date, not much progress has been achieved. The general feeling behind the Network initiative is that Africa needs Africans to develop themselves through African initiatives, initiated, implemented and managed by themselves, with very minimal external support, where necessary. Africa 2000 Network operates in West Africa in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal and Mauritania. In East Africa, it operates in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi. In southern Africa, it is based in Zimbabwe and Lesotho (Interview with Co-ordinator, 4/9/98).

The Lesotho Africa 2000 Network initiative commenced in 1992. It is based in Maseru, the capital, and operates predominantly in the rural areas. The Network was initially scheduled to run for five years, but has been extended for two more years to end in 1998. Lesotho was

incorporated in order to represent the eroded mountain environment in southern Africa. The specific objectives of the Africa 2000 network in Lesotho show the rationality behind the country's choice and inclusion. The Network aims to promote the achievement of conservation for sustainable development through the provision of assistance to Non governmental organisations, and to grassroots communities to implement their development programmes. The network also disseminates information to both NGOs and communities on strengths and weaknesses of alternative development initiatives between and among themselves, in order to assist them to network (Interview with Coordinator, 4/9/98).

At the national level, the network is run by a national selection committee composed of 10 members, namely the United National Development Programme representative, the Ministry of Agriculture representative, the representative from the Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Planning representative, the Coordinator of Africa 2000 Network-Lesotho, who also acts as the secretary of the committee, and five members elected from and by the NGOs themselves.

During the first year of operation, the mode of operation adopted by the Network was to design a format for submission of projects by NGOs and communities. This approach, however, proved to be bureaucratic, top-down and misleading, in the sense, that NGOs and communities merely filled in the format and submitted what they thought might please the Network to give them funds. This format approach was discontinued because it failed to solicit the real needs of the people as perceived by them. Instead, an open ended system was introduced where the NGOs and communities were asked to assess their needs, select the priority ones, draw them up into projects and submit them for consideration to the network. The Network feels that this latter method, promoted participation by, and empowered the, local communities in project identification, formulation and implementation for sustainable development. The criteria for selection of projects by the network are that they must be related to conservation of the environment, aim to assist household production, and be for the benefit of the community rather than the individuals. The projects considered are those that involve activities such as construction of water ponds and dams, tree planting, environmental health, village water supply, and school nutrition, among others. It employs three paid up staff members (Interview with the co-ordinator on 4/9/98).

Africa 2000 Network-Lesotho so far has projects in Qacha's nek, Mafeteng, Maseru and Leribe districts. Thaba-Tseka, Mokhotlong and Butha-Buthe districts have no projects because project requests from their people were based on individual instead group or community projects. Therefore they failed to meet the selection criteria of the Network. Problems have also been encountered too by the Network. First, the national spatial coverage has not been much. Three out of 10 districts have no projects due to failure to submit group and community requests. The individual requests submitted were not considered. Secondly, some of the group projects supported by the Network have operational problems due to poor co-operation among group members. Group formation seems to be a big problem for the sustainability of projects supported by the Network. Thirdly, despite the commitment they made to the Network, maintenance of activities initiated is not satisfactory. As the coordinator of the Network put it during an interview with him, there is too much talking and very little action on the ground. This prompted the UNDP to consider and grant an extension of two years from 1996 to 1998. The last, and perhaps biggest problem is that of sustainability of the Network itself when external funding ends at the end of 1998. According to the Network Coordinator in Maseru, the UN regulations that govern Africa 2000 Networks, stipulate that the network cannot get funding from anyone else outside its country of operation other than through the UNDP. This implies that when the UNDP in that country considers it time to stop funding to the national Network, then such funding has to come from domestic sources such as government, private sector and bigger NGOs. However, in Lesotho, the government has made it clear that it will not have funds to channel to the continued sustainability of Africa 2000 Network after 1998. No commitment has come from the private sector yet. While the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental organisations (LCN), from which the Network could look up to for parental guidance and support, has collapsed due to financial and management decay (Interview with the coordinator, 4/9/98).

The coordinator of Africa 2000 Network is, however, far from being pessimistic about its future. For the way forward, he has a vision where the Network has the potential to play four major roles to promote sustainable development under the envisaged system of local government. First, the Network hopes to act as an intermediary and facilitator between donors and local authorities. The role of the Network in this regard would be that of a broker. Secondly, the Network hopes to act as a tender board for local government projects in the rural areas, since local authorities would not have the necessary skills for this kind of function. Thirdly, a lot of skill will become necessary in the preparation and appraisal of physical and social infrastructure projects to be

submitted by local authorities for funding. The Network hopes to provide technical expertise to prepare these projects initially, and at the same time, provide training to local personnel to do the job themselves in future. Lastly, the Network anticipates its usefulness in provision of assistance to local authorities in the development of area development plans that involve sustainable eco-tourism (Interview with Co-ordinator of Africa 2000 Network on 4/9/98).

b) WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL

World Vision International is a worldwide organisation that operates in more than 100 countries. It was launched by a United States Evangelist, Bob Piers, after World War II. Moved by the plight of the victims, especially children of the Korean War in the early 1950s in which the USA was heavily involved, Bob Piers sought how best these victims and those of similar man-made and natural disasters could be assisted. As a result of the numerous victims of war due to the "Cold War" that was "hot war" in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, World Vision grew rapidly in size and function. Its headquarters is based in California in the United States of America. The California head office co-ordinates regional offices all over the World. In Africa, West, East and Southern Africa have regional offices. Each regional office co-ordinates member country offices in its region. The Lesotho office of World Vision was opened in 1987 under one director responsible for the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) offices. In 1993, each of the BLS countries was allowed to have its own National Directors in its own country.

The prime objective of World Vision is to promote sustainable human development through a focus on child care. World Vision acts as a link between donors and potential recipient children in Lesotho. Donorship comes mainly from humanitarian sources composed of individuals of good will, groups, organisation and NGOs in the United States of America, Japan, Taiwan, England, Australia, Singapore, Germany and new Zealand. It has an annual budget of about R3 million and employs about 112 office and field personnel.

During the pre-1995 period the mode of operation was that prospective children seeking support would submit their requests together with their photos to World Vision office in Maseru. This office would screen the children and come up with a shopping list of the poorest of the poor to be submitted to potential donors abroad. Individual donors would make their choice of those children they preferred to fund and World Vision would act as facilitator to link the funder and the funded. Sometimes the opposite case would materialise in that, prospective donors would

sent requests to World Vision to find them possible children in need of funding in Lesotho. Much funding to children was in the form of school fees, improvement of the living environment in the school where the child is, such as construction of sanitation facilities, provision of clean drinking water or development of school feeding through assistance to garden development, and health through construction of clinics in the community. Invariably, whenever a child was funded, the broader community within which the child lived, would be equally funded to improve the quality of life in the living environment of that child.

From its inception in 1987 up to 1993, the World Vision Lesotho had 50 projects operating in Butha-Buthe, Leribe, Berea, Maseru, Mafeteng, Mohale's hoek and Quthing. There were no projects in the mountain zones-Mokhotlong, Thaba-Tseka and Qacha's nek districts due to poor accessibility that necessitated high costs of operation. Each of the projects launched was expected to last for 7 years with a possible extension of two more years. In cases, where community projects were involved as part of improving the living environment of the child, close consultation and involvement of chiefs and village development councils was solicited to ensure sustainable management.

By 1994 it had become clear to the World Vision that its approach was slow in delivery of the service it had expected. The actual number of children reached were low, the communities assisted few, and sustainability of community projects poor because they were somehow linked to the child or children in the area who were direct beneficiaries of the funding - an issue that did not seem to convince some segments of the community to provide full, voluntary participation to ensure sustainability of the projects. These issues prompted World Vision to change its mode of operation in 1995 and adopt the Area Development Programme (ADP) approach. There were 4 ADPS at the time of interview and writing in 1998. The first, the Taung ADP is located in the Mohale's hoek district and covers the entire Taung Ward. Then there are the Nazareth ADP near Roma in the Maseru district, the Tabola ADP in the Leribe district and the Mapoteng ADP in the Berea district. Each district is envisaged to have its own ADP in future.

An Area Development Programme uses an integrated approach which is multi-sectoral and multi-activity within one area at the same time. It is meant to activate and reach many groups of people at the same time in order to spread the benefits of development and improve the quality of life of many at the same time. One ADP is an amalgamation of about 10 small villages, or about five big villages. One ADP operates on an annual budget of about 140,000 US dollars.

This budget is used to provide financial and other material support to about 1,200 needy children in the ADP per annum in schools. In some cases, extra staff members are employed and paid by the ADP to facilitate increased pupil enrolments. In other cases, the schools within the ADP are supported in education with production projects to improve the curriculum by teaching pupils self-reliance, and, at the same time, assisting the schools to generate income through poultry, dairy, farming and other schemes. The idea is to eventually get the schools to lower school fees so that as many children as possible may attend within the ADP.

The ADP approach also focuses on individual groups of adults in the community and provides them with refundable loans to form a revolving fund on income generation projects. The idea is to help these alternative groups of 20 people per group to start group projects which can improve their income base so that the quality of life of their children can improve in the communities. The executive committee of the ADP is composed of senior employees of the World Vision who work as field staff in the ADP, representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture, and local government in the district where the ADP is located, and the principal chief of the ward and a representative of the ward development council. The executive committee works together with the chiefs of the villages affected by the ADP and their village development councils to screen projects and encourage full participation by communities to ensure sustainability. Problems encountered so far are slow repayment rates by interest groups, poor financial management skills by groups and the frequent conflicts between local committees and chiefs (interview with Deputy National Director, 3/9/98).

c) LESOTHO RED CROSS SOCIETY (LRCS)

The Lesotho Red Cross Society was established in 1967 by Parliament Act No. 31 just after the country gained independence from Britain. After being an initial Branch of the British Red Cross, the Lesotho Red Cross Society gained full recognition by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 1971. The society's head office is in Maseru and it also operates ten district offices, one in each district in Lesotho. LRCS has about 51 paid staff members (Lesotho Red Cross, Undated).

Membership to the LRCS is open to all Basotho and is guided by the basic principles of the Red Cross Movement which are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. Its main objectives are promotion of health, disease control through

primary health care and alleviation of suffering. In order to achieve its main objectives, the LCRC has organised its agenda through core programmes of action and a number of key activities under each. The first programme is disaster relief and preparedness. Under this programme the LRCs provides natural and man-made disaster relief and participatory rural appraisal. The second programme is that of rural health clinics under which are AIDS awareness promotion, blood donation campaigns, community based rehabilitation and primary health care. Thirdly, first aid education is promoted through provision of training to volunteers and the communities under community first aid, commercial first aid, and sale of first aid kits. Fourthly, LRCs runs a programme on youth and tree planting so as to build up environmental awareness, care and sustainable conservation by the young generations of rural communities. Lastly, the LRCs gives financial support to some smaller indigenous NGOs to enable them to implement their programmes of action (Lesotho Red Cross Society Information Leaflet, undated).

d) LESOTHO WORK CAMPS ASSOCIATION (LWA)

The Lesotho Work Camps Association was established and officially registered in 1977. Its broad aims are to promote the involvement of the local youth in collaboration with those from international organisations like it to become directly involved in promoting sustainable development in rural (and seldom urban) communities. This sustainable community development and cultural exchange are the cornerstones of the LWA mission statement (Interview with the Director, 3/9/98).

Specific objectives of LWA are promotion of peace for development, meaning, peace as part of humanity development and also peace as a precondition for sustainable development. LWA creates an enabling environment for the youth from different cultural backgrounds to work together as volunteers to promote community development, and develop inter-personal relationships and co-operation, through communal living and facility sharing during Work Camps. LWA further seeks to induce improved livelihoods of the rural (and urban) communities in the areas of health, education, social and material improvement, and spiritual revival. LWA employs 7 paid staff members (interview with the Director, 3/9/98).

The LWA is guided by the principle of self-help in its mode of operation. Communities identify their needs, and prioritize them, formulate them into projects and submit requests for possibilities of assistance by LWA. The LWA satisfies itself first that the requesting communities have assembled and are ready to provide human, financial and other material resources necessary for

implementation of their proposed projects. LWA only provides technical expertise and, occasionally, specialised tools to top up the resources of the local communities. This mutual participation enables development of partnerships between the local communities and the LWA. Sometimes the LWA acts as a link between some international organisation with whom it networks, and the local communities in need for development assistance in Lesotho. Completed development projects become the entire responsibility of local communities to manage sustainably (Interview with the Director, 3/9/98).

In the area of networking, the LWAS works closely with similar programmes in southern Africa and is a member of the BOLESWA Exchange programme financed by the German Volunteer Service. The LWA organises about 20 work camps each year, 10 of which take place in December to January while the remaining 10 are done in June and July (Interview with the Director, 3/9/98).

Since its inception in 1977, the LWA has participated in numerous small projects dealing with the activities in block making, footbridge construction, classroom construction, development of communal gardens, fencing, construction of irrigation ponds, digging pit latrines, poultry projects, piggeries, building of school office, dormitories, clinics, halls, churches, school kitchens, store-rooms, tree planting and village water supply (Lesotho Work camps visitors brief, undated). Despite this rather impressive record of performance, Lesotho Work camps Association has had plenty of problems too. An interview with the Director (3/9/98) revealed that the degree of participation in development work by LWA is waning due to donor flight to and preference shift in favour of South Africa since its democratisation in 1994. Moreover, the annual financial subvention started in favour of LWAS by the BNP government in the 1970s and early 1980s stopped when the BNP government was toppled in 1986. This has created tremendous financial problems for implementation of LWA programmes and indeed the sustainability of the very LWA office itself.

e) LESOTHO SAVE THE CHILDREN

The Lesotho Save the Children started during colonial times in the early 1960s. Since then it saw Lesotho into independence in 1966 and until today continues to be one of the biggest NGOs in Lesotho that focuses on improvement of childcare and education for the poorest of the poor (Lesotho Save the Children Brochure, undated).

Lesotho Save the Children has a resettlement home, the Maseru children's village, where abandoned, neglected and orphaned children are housed and rehabilitated. Much rehabilitation and assistance takes place at the homes or relatives' places of the children lately so as to root out the problems at source. The primary education programme assists more than a thousand children a year to have access to basic education and literacy so necessary for healthy livelihoods. Social work programme provides counselling to both children and parents with family problems or intra-family and intra and interpersonal relationships and emotional stability. Since households food security is an important component of sustainable livelihoods, the agricultural programme gives training to adults to go and become trainers in their communities on sustainable land management. Moreover, horticultural inputs such as seeds and tools are given to the needy adults to start farming projects. The Lesotho Save the Children gets funding from local donors, government and international donors (Lesotho Save the children annual report, 1993; Lesotho Save the children Brochure, undated).

Activities of the Lesotho Save the Children are nationwide across both rural and urban sectors. It is therefore not possible to specifically judge its impact on rural development per se. The Lesotho Save the Children employs some 14 paid staff members (LCN, 1993).

f) MELLEM FOLKELIGT SAMVIRKE (MS) - Lesotho

The MS-Lesotho started in 1976 under the name Danish Volunteer Service. It is part of a large international MS known in English as the Danish Association for International Cooperation. The major objective of MS is to promote interrelationships among different cultures and societies and to encourage a fair distribution of resources in the world. In order to achieve the above objectives cooperation focuses on three major areas development of human resources, intercultural cooperation and information and advocacy work in Denmark (MS-Lesotho Brochure, undated).

A brochure on MS-Lesotho stipulates that it works mainly on a partnership basis rather than a donor-recipient one. In particular, community groups and non-governmental organisations are preferred as partners in development than individuals and the private sector. It is also a-sectarian and apolitical in approach. MS-Lesotho also facilitates cooperation between its Basotho partners and their group or organisation counterparts in Denmark. Moreover, preference is given to partners who are involved in intergrated rural development and/or urban development. Twinning of Basotho partners with those in Denmark and other MS operation areas is promoted. MS-

Lesotho does not only provide funding to some development projects by its partners, but it also commits Danish technical expertise to spearhead work and train locals in some programmes and provides other material support as may be deemed necessary between the MS-Lesotho and the partner concerned (MS-Lesotho Brochure, undated).

The procedure used by MS-Lesotho is that potential partners submit their initial requests to the MS-Lesotho office in Maseru. This is followed by a meeting and discussion of the request submitted by both parties on the possibility of cooperation. If a possibility exists, the two parties decide to try how the cooperation will materialise by starting some initial activities. If success is achieved, a long term commitment is made by signing a partnership agreement. MS-Lesotho has 8 paid staff members, and 16 volunteers. It also has an annual budget of some R250,000.

Some of the current partners of MS-Lesotho are Lesotho Federation of Women, Lesotho Pre-School and Day Care Association, Lesotho Red Cross, Lesotho National Association of the Physically Disabled, Lesotho Council of Non Governmental Organisations, Berea Agricultural Group, Transformation Resource Centre, community Legal Resource and Advice Centre, and Lesotho Work camps Association (MS-Lesotho Brochure, undated).

g) THE UNITED NATIONS VOLUNTEERS PROGRAMME (UNV)

The United Nation Volunteers is an arm of the United Nations Organisation launched in 1970 to carry out operational programmes in development co-operation. It works hand in glove with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNV contributes to develop co-operation in developing countries through facilitating provision of volunteers technical service in various fields of development with a community focus humanitarian relief and rehabilitation, and in support of the peace, electoral and human rights work for the United Nations (UNV, 1987).

Within the field of technical co-operation for development, agriculture, health and education command first priority. However, other sectors are also considered of importance. At present, 74% of the UNV volunteer technical personnel comes from developing countries themselves, and are thus a good exercise at South-South technical co-operation for development (UNV, 1987).

In Lesotho, the UNV was launched in 1972 when the first 3 volunteers arrived in the country to take up service in the development co-operation field. The number of UNV technical volunteer personnel grew quickly in the mid-1970s and 1980s to a height of 160 volunteers in 1987. This

UNV personnel was deployed in agriculture where they provided technical advice of various sorts to the four area based rural development projects of Khomokhoana, Thaba-Bosiu, Senqu and Thaba-Tseka projects. They later worked in the Basis Agricultural Services Project (BASP), the land use planning project and the Makhoarane multi-purpose cooperative of the Matsieng-Morija Rural Development Project. In the hydrology division of the Ministry of Water Affairs they provided engineering services which were in dire need (UNV,1987).

The Ministry of Health also benefitted tremendously from UNV personnel by way of doctors, pharmacists, dieticians, nutritionists, laboratory technicians, and medical sociologists to implement its national rural sanitation programmes health for all by the year 2000 mission statement, both of which were started in the early 1980's. The Ministry of Rural Development division of village water supply received engineers, technicians and social anthropologists. Civil aviation was supported with some air traffic control officers, and a cost accountant, while the National Teacher Training College (NTTC) received some volunteer lecturers in the field of science education (UNV,1987).

In 1992 the UNV entered into its 5th country programme with Lesotho to the tune of USD 20.912 million. The budget was later cut by 30%. This programme ended in 1996 and during its lifetime a lot of development support was received in the areas of socio-economic planning, management and civil service reform, human resources development, employment promotion, and rural development and resource management. With respect to the rural development and resource management programme, UNV contributed directly to four projects - Grassroots Initiatives Support Project (GRISP), Rural Development Programme (RDP), National Environment Secretariat Support (NESS), and National Environment Youth Corps (NEYC). The input of UNV to these four rural development and resource management programmes was through supply of some seven volunteer specialists composed of three rural development specialists, one environmental impact specialist, one environmental data management specialist, one soil conservation specialist and one community forestry specialist. One additional soil conservation specialists was due to arrive at the end of 1998 to increase the total to eight(8) UNV volunteer specialists (Interview with UNV Executive Coordinator, 9/9/98).

These specialists add specialised skill and professional knowledge in the four rural development programmes in which they work. The programmes themselves are of crucial importance to sustainable rural development in Lesotho, in that, they address the key areas of efficient use of

natural resources, decentralised planning under local government, environmental protection and conservation, promotion of income generation and capacity building through skill impartation and counterpart training to the Basotho (Interview with UNV execute coordinate, 9/9/98).

h) MATSIENG DEVELOPMENT TRUST (MDT)

The Matsieng Development Trust (CMDT) was founded in 1974. Its objective is to provide employment to rural communities through creation of co-operative agricultural projects, and small scale industries in the rural areas. MDT has projects in Thaba-Tseka, Semongkong and Matsieng. The Matsieng projects are the most developed and comprise a high school, the now defunct agricultural scheme consisting of water ponds for irrigation fish and duck production, conservation terraces, tree planting, livestock dip tank and woolshed. Other activities include weaving by women to generate employment and income for their households and the Trust (LCN, 1993).

The MDT has an estimated annual budget of R100,000 coming from donors such as Anglo-American in South Africa, the Near East Foundation of USA, and from its own income generating projects. The Matsieng projects employ a staff of six paid people (LCN, 1993).

i) RURAL SELF HELP DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (RSDA)

The Rural Self-Help Development Association (RSDA) started in 1982 as the Food Security Assistance Project, supported by the German Agro-Action Foundation. It operated at Sephula area in the Mafeteng district. In 1991 the name changed to become RSDA which is more broad based in programmes and spatial coverage. The objectives of RSDA are the promotion of sustainable rural development through sustainable use of natural resources, support to development of village communities through improved agricultural efficiency, social welfare, roads and the organisation of village communities to work through self-help to identify their needs and propose and implement solutions to their problems (RSDA Brochure, undated).

RSDA's mode of operation is centred around the clientele and requests. The RSDA offers assistance to individuals, groups and village communities. Projects assisted are requests received directly from individuals, groups or village communities by RSDA. If the requests are within the area of conservation, land management infrastructure or agriculture RSDA goes out to the village concerned to conduct a "problems census". In this census the RSDA field staff hosts a

public gathering with the assistance of chiefs and village development councils, where the problems raised in the requests are identified, discussed and prioritised by the community, groups or individuals involved. Thereafter, RSDA provides development assistance based on the prioritised requests. A variant approach is that where RSDA goes out to market itself in the villages through making public gatherings, distribution of information leaflets or over Radio Lesotho. Those farmers who might be interested in RSDA activities submit requests directly to RSDA headquarters in Maseru or through RSDA field staff and the process of consultation through problem census is done, leading to the eventual support itself. Clients supported by RSDA pay a service or membership fee of R10.00 for individuals, R28.00 for groups and R50.00 for schools per annum. All service fees increase by 15% every year of membership in RSDA (RSDA Brochure, undated).

RSDA uses extension workers in the rural areas to provide training and education to its target groups in the implementation of its development programmes. There are 5 development programmes whose activities are supported. The Machobane Farming system is supported and individual farmers encouraged to adopt and use it in their fields. Assistance provided includes seeds of maize, sorghum, beans, peas and potatoes which farmers are expected to repay after harvest. The Machobane Farming system uses indigenous knowledge systems of the Basotho to do sustainable farming. Another development programme assisted by RSDA is that of promotion of permaculture. In this programme, development of home gardens to ensure household food security is promoted. Funding and technical know-how are provided in the construction and maintenance of roof water harvesting technology and to 90% of the cost of trees and 45% of the cost of poultry and duck.

Development of communal gardens is also encouraged. A group of prospective farmers, not less than 10 in number, come together, secure the site from the chief and VDC, raise five percent of the total costs required to develop the garden and pay the R28.00 service fee. RSDA provides fencing materials and irrigation equipment and installation. Management of the garden is entirely decided upon by the group or community. The environmental protection programme involves support with the seedlings to individuals, groups or the village community for tree planting and gully reclamation. Lastly, the infrastructure programme was composed of funding for construction of minor rural roads, bridges, and dams. The infrastructure programme was suspended due to shortage of funds (RSDA Brochure, undated).

At present, the RSDA operates at Ha Notsi at Tsita's nek and Thaba-Tsoeu both in the Mafeteng districts, and Phamong in the Mohale's hoek district. RSDA operates with an annual budget of approximately R400 000 funded mainly by the German Agro Action, Helvetas-Lesotho, Mafeteng Development Programmes and Mellemfolkeligt samvirke-Lesotho.

So far RSDA boasts significant achievements in its areas of operation. About 300 farmers have been given support under the Machobane Farming System, 700 individual farmers are involved in tree planting, 20 communal gardens have been established, 3 schools supported in integrated land use management, 137 households are supported with permaculture and 65 individual farmers and five village communities assisted in gully reclamation (Interview with Public Relations Officer, 9/9/98).

The RSDA has had its share of problems as well. Funding is scarce and programmes and activities have had to become scaled down, especially the infrastructure programme which was too expensive. Support to individuals is being reconsidered as well, because it is more expensive to support an individual rather than a group or community. Sustainability of group and community projects supported depends on co-operation of community members. Yet many projects are in the process of collapse for want of maintenance due to lack of co-operation among the groups or community members. The continual conflicts over power between chiefs and village development councils have also hampered progress in many areas of RSDA partnership with individuals, groups and communities, notably with regard to land allocation (Interview with public relations officer, 9/9/98).

For the future, RSDA's plans are already underway to extend its operations to the Thaba-Tseka district where it will work in partnership with the Lesotho Highlands Water Project to implement the latter's Rural Development Programme (Rural Self-help Development Association Brochure, undated; Interview with the Public relations officer, 19/9/98).

j) MACHOBANE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (MADF)

The Machobane Agriculture Development Foundation was launched in 1997. It is a local NGO initiative whose goal is to contribute towards improvement of food security, health and general welfare of the economically poorest of Lesotho society. The objectives of MADF are to create an effective and efficiently managed institution, to set up effective training and informative extension service with MADF, to conduct relevant and effectively run research programmes on

Machobane Farming System, and to develop a well managed loan system and a seed network programme (Machobane Agricultural Development Foundation Visitors Notes, undated).

The MADF teaches farmers Machobane Farming System which is based on indigenous knowledge systems using ash and cow dung, it works with groups of farmers and at present operates in the Thuathe Plateau in Berea, North East of Maseru capital, Mapoteng in the Berea district and Mafeteng. It gives farmers potato seeds on loan to be repaid as money at harvest. MADF receives funding from Helvetas Lesotho, and the Unitarian Service Commission of Canada. MADF employs 3 paid up staff. The Foundations programmes are limited by lack of funding. However, MADF recognises that its sustainability does not lie in more funding from outside, but with the development of its own domestic income generation sources. To this end, MADF envisages development of its own presently owned site, into a training centre for income generation to sustain itself and its development programmes (Interview with programme officer, 9/9/98).

k) HELVETAS - LESOTHO

Helvetas-Lesotho is an NGO based in Switzerland that started operations in Lesotho around 1981. Its major aim is to provide assistance to development efforts aimed at provision of sustainable rural livelihoods for the Basotho through partnership with local NGOs. Since its inception until 1996, Helvetas-Lesotho had its prime focus on support to provision of rural water supplies.

In 1997 a new programme on natural resources management (NRM) was started in addition to rural water supplies. The prime focus of the NRM programme is provision of support to organisational and partnership development. The NRM programme provides financial support to local NGOs involved in the area of natural resource management for sustainable rural livelihoods in the areas of land husbandry, indigenous knowledge systems for sustainable management and NRM based income generation activities like eco-tourism. The NRM programme also supports cultural exchanges and culture based activities such as book productions on cultural heritage (Interview with NRM programme co-ordinator, 9/9/98).

The mode of operation of Helvetas Lesotho NRM programme is that prospective partners apply for funding to Helvetas. Their proposed projects are screened by Helvetas and if they fall within the areas of natural resource management and preservation of cultural heritage, initial discussions

are held between helvetas and the prospective partner on the details of the proposed project(s). If agreement is reached, the two organisations sign a contract of partnership on a short term basis of one year for a start with possibilities of extension into a long term partnership of some five years if all goes right. The NRM programme also supports small action programmes in areas of natural resource management that require action in the short term such as research and book production on preservation of cultural heritage (Interview with NRM Coordinator, 9/9/98).

Helvetas operates on an annual budget of about R1 million for all its programmes. The NRM programme itself works in partnership with Rural Self Help Development Association, Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations, Grow Association of Mokhotlong and, Agro-forestry Network, the Library Information Network, and Machobane Agricultural Development Fund. The NRM programme is scheduled to run up to the year 2001 (Interview with NRM programme coordinator, 9/9/98).

6.3 CONCLUSION

The discussion on NGOs and rural development in Lesotho presented in this chapter leads one to a number of conclusions. There is a significant number of NGOS involved in rural development in the country. In this study 22 NGOs were identified. However, only 50% of them were selected through a simple random sampling procedure for discussion due to limited resources. Most of the NGOs discussed are either foreign based, headquartered or financed through foreign funding. Small local NGOs are dependent on large international NGOs for funding, and had very meagre resources of their own, with which to implement their programmes. Since the international NGOs have their own objectives and agendas, the local NGOs sometimes had to satisfy the criteria of funding as set by them. This, in essence, implies that development agendas implemented by local NGOs, in fact were those of the international NGOs, which set the local platform for priority development programmes. This undermines the often much talked about promotion of participatory rural development through provision of support to local NGOs by international NGOs. What is needed is that the NGOs must assist the local communities to become self-reliant in terms of resources so that sustainable rural development may be achieved. This could be achieved through breaking the asymmetrical relations between large NGOs and small ones, and, that between all NGOs in general and the communities. At present, under these asymmetrical relations, most NGOs actually work in the communities instead of with them. Attempts to work with the communities call for a structural change towards the achievement of

equal and symmetrical relationships where the NGOs work in partnership with the rural communities in the identification, selection, planning and implementation of rural development. MS-Lesotho, for instance, has used partnership successfully to promote symmetrical relations with the rural communities to promote sustainable development in Lesotho.

Partnership in decision-making between NGOs and the communities enables the latter to feel in control of their lives and livelihood strategies. Partnership enables them also to feel in charge of and responsible for management of the development initiatives within their communities which were started in partnership with the NGOs. Partnership in decision making therefore enables communities to feel confident and break out of the vicious circle of poverty-despair-low development initiative inaction/low production/poverty. If the NGOs could assist rural communities to overcome the prevalent development culture of despair due to development which marginalised the rural poor, then chances for the success of sustainable development might be greatly enhanced in Lesotho.

Partnership in decision making would also help to overcome the present paternalistic and patron-client relationships that exist between most NGOs and the communities that they assist. This patron-client relationship has created a culture of dependence which needs to be abolished. No wonder when the NGOs leave, the communities remain no better than they were before. The strength of partnership in decision making would be that it has the potential to promote capacity building through active participation by the communities, while the NGOs act more as facilitators. The World Vision-Lesotho promotes this kind of capacity building in its Area Development Approach, where it has staff stationed in the field, and living and working together with the local communities and their institutions to devise and implement sustainable livelihood strategies.

Another important area of partnership for sustainable development pertains to funding. NGOs fund development initiatives alone and local communities just enjoy the benefits. The fact that local communities do not contribute to funding makes them develop an apathetic and sometimes irresponsible attitude to development initiatives started for their benefit. The local communities develop an attitude of easy come, easy go, in that they refuse to maintain the properties made for their own development. At worst, they destroy these properties. They refuse to repay the loans granted to them under revolving fund schemes. In order for financial and temporal sustainability to be achieved, communities must be made to contribute to the financing of development

activities so that they can treasure, value and protect them both for themselves and future generations. The Rural-Self-Help Development Association (RSDA) successfully uses this approach of paid up participation by community members to instil a sense of ownership, value and protective attitude towards development initiatives by local communities through individuals and action groups taking part. In the long term, paid up participation helps local communities to develop a culture of self help and independent accessing of resources as a substitute to the prevalent culture of expecting hand-outs all the time.

Bureaucratization is another problem that most NGOs that deal with rural development experiences. Most of them have become institutions in their own right with a large establishment and bureaucratic organisational structure with the Managing Director at the apex. Twenty two out of the twenty three NGOs interviewed had more than five paid up employees. Each of the NGOs has its own red tape and format for handling development requests, finance and disbursement. This bureaucratization delays communication and the response capacity of the NGOs. At worst, in some international NGOs, the approval has to be sought from the headquarters abroad. There is a need to decentralize both international and national NGOs in order to increase their rapid response capacity to rural development problems. They need to become more field based than they are at present. Again, despite their being headquarters in Maseru, both RSDA and World Vision Lesotho have tried to decentralise themselves by having offices and staff based among the communities in their action areas in rural Lesotho.

Closely related to the problem of bulkanization is that of urban bias. Most of the NGOs are located in Maseru and their staff shuttle between Maseru and the rural areas now and then to do business and accompany donors when they are visiting. This kind of development practice promotes what Chambers (1993) calls rural development tourism. Urban location deprives the NGOs of affective association and partnership with the communities where they have programmes, and makes them practise remote control rural development which is not sustainable. Moreover, the NGOs have a regional bias in favour of both the lowlands and foothills. The mountain region which is the most deprived in terms of basic services (Sechaba Consultants, 1995) is grossly neglected, because the working conditions there are even harder than elsewhere in the rural areas of Lesotho and the costs of operation were reported high by the NGOs. There is a dire need to spread out to the mountain region by the NGOs. In order to reduce costs, NGOs need to mobilise and network with local groups in the region.

The majority of NGOs assisted communities instead of individuals under the hope that sustainability of projects would be better under community ownership. However, in reality community management turned out to be full of problems, especially lack of cooperation among members and reluctance to take responsibility. The net result was that community based projects either collapsed or became highly vandalised. Yet project assistance directed at individuals by the RSDA tended to survive because the individuals were charged a fee of R10.00 per annum with an inflation rate of 15% per annum. Despite the wisdom that development assistance directed at individuals leads to social disparities, increasing evidence is that private initiative is conducive for sustainable development because people participate fully in their own individual development than in common property services development where free riders are a problem.

As demonstrated by the Helvetas-Lesotho, directing development assistance at individuals or small groups also helps to reduce management problems. Although not always so, 'the small is beautiful' approach might be the best for sustainable development in Lesotho. An individual or small group would be able to streamline its agenda, motivate and police itself during implementation more easily than a community would be able to do, everything being equal.

Lack of accountability and responsibility among rural communities has also been enemical to sustainability of development initiatives meant for their own good by NGOs. Lack of accountability and responsibility have prompted rural communities to fail to accord the necessary carry over initiative after hand over of projects to them. As experienced by the Matsieng Development Trust, project infrastructures depreciate, dilapidate and become huge development carcasses for want of carry-over initiative by local communities. In the Matsieng-Morija valley, conservation infrastructure composed of dams meant for serial irrigation and fish production from ha Paanya village down stream to the main south one road at Morija, all lie unused, silted and wasting away, despite a demonstration effect potential by the palace private farm in the same valley. Other infrastructures meant for sustainable livestock production and range management, plus a plant for sustainable non-farm income generation through weaving and related activities have equally become white elephants in the region. This experience underscores the fact that people's attitudes towards NGO development assistance have to change and become more accountable than has hitherto been the case in order for sustainable development to become a practical reality in the country.

Indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) are key to the success of sustainable development, because they are readily available within the local environment and less costly to communities. They might also have been part of the production systems of the local communities for a long time with a proven track record of performance and reliability under their specific eco-cultural systems. In Lesotho, the Machobane Agricultural Development Association has been exemplary in the promotion of pioneer work on the Machobane Farming System, an indigenous knowledge system on crop farming developed by its founder in the late 1940s and 1950s. The Machobane farming system involves mixed cropping and use of organic matter as soil nutrients. This method has been so successful among Basotho that it has been officially adopted as the farming system encouraged for sustainable agriculture in the country by the Ministry of Agriculture. Therefore other NGOs in rural development would be well advised to work in close partnership with local communities to devise and employ indigenous knowledge systems, where appropriate, to solve development problems because they stand a better chance to become sustainable.

NGOs sometimes have their pre-conceived agendas, objectives and mode of operation. Sometimes, as was experienced by both World Vision Lesotho and Africa Network 200, the *modus operandi* identified and used by the NGO may not be appropriate for the local communities. NGOs therefore need to be flexible and adapt their *modus operandi* to be in tune with local conditions and expectations in order to achieve sustainability. Both World Vision Lesotho and Africa Network 2000 successfully re-adjusted their *modus operandi* to become more participatory and bottom-up in nature once the need to do so was encountered and perceived in the field. Being a new paradigm, sustainable development calls for a lot of flexibility on the part of both NGOs and communities alike, in order to adjust to new ways of operation and lifestyles.

NGOs need to become apolitical in order to become appreciated by most community members and have a prolonged impact on communities. However, it is not always easy for NGOs to retain political neutrality because development is itself a political agenda. Governments often go out of their way to either coopt or intimidate NGOs in their development work. As was experienced by the Lesotho Workcamps Association, which was indirectly coopted by the Basotho National Party during its rule to become a tool in BNP politicization of the youth in conjunction with the then Lesotho Youth Service (LYS), allowing oneself to meddle in party politics as an NGO can be tantamount to suicide. During interview for this study, the Lesotho Work Camps Association management lamented the foregone days of the BNP rule when it was pampered with tools and

financial resources budgeted for annually by the BNP government. to further its development and, per definition, political agendas among the rural communities.

In Lesotho, the rural communities with whom the NGOs operate are also heterogeneous and divided according to sex, religion, economic power and political affiliation. Since 1970, politics has been the most divisive element among the Basotho. Most NGOs reported that their activities in the communities had collapsed because of lack of co-operation caused by political intolerance among members. Lack of political tolerance and peaceful conflict resolution among the Basotho causes concern, and needs to be addressed by the Basotho themselves at all levels of society if sustainable development is to become a reality. Wanton looting and vandalism to properties meant for community development through assistance by some NGOs is quite common and continues unabated from one ruling regime to another by some members of opposition who invariably associate NGO development work with government-cum-state induced development intervention. People's negative political attitudes and their impact on development at community level need to change in order for sustainability to be achieved.

Sustainable development by NGOs also depends on sustainable institutional development and efficiency. Old institutions have to be restructured, revamped and sometimes replaced by new ones. However, this change is often difficult to accomplish because of resistance mounted by old institutions. In the ensuing institutional scuffle, sustainable development suffers. In Lesotho, the NGOs reported that much of their work was handicapped by the conflict between chiefs, an old traditional and conservative institution in charge of rural development in the country and village development councils, a recent, moderate institution meant to promote community representation and participation or rural development. Unless and until the tug-of-war between chiefs and village development council is resolved, sustainable development initiatives by NGOs in partnership with local communities is likely to become unsustainable for a long while to come.

Lastly, sustainable development depends on successful networking at all levels, among the international NGOs, between the international NGOs and national NGOs, among the national NGOs themselves, and among communities at grassroots level. Networking was ostensibly absent among NGOs and among communities in this study. An exception was the envisaged networking between Rural Self help Development Association and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in the implementation of the rural development plan of the latter. Networks of this nature

can only be encouraged as a step in the right direction to strengthen NGOs intervention in sustainable development in Lesotho.

CHAPTER 7: THE FARM IMPROVEMENT WITH SOIL CONSERVATION (FISC) PROJECT: A Life History

7.0 Introduction.

This chapter presents background information on the FISC Project. It presents the location of the villages affected by the project (Figure 7.1), discusses the objectives, mode of operation and performance of the Project.

7.1 Inception

In 1983, the Government of Lesotho (GOL) submitted a request to the Government of Sweden (GOS) to fund a project that could assist Lesotho to forge alternative ways to combat the chronic land degradation and improve farm productivity in the country. Discussions on this request between the GOL and the GOS throughout 1983 eventually culminated in the production and submission of the Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC) Project proposal by the GOL to GOS, and the production of the Plan of Operations for FISC.

The FISC project took off in March 1985. It was located in the Mohale's hoek district, in southern Lesotho (Figure 4.1). The Mohale's hoek district is one of the driest districts affected by desertification in the Southern part of Lesotho. Rydgren (1993) estimated in the Maphutseng area in central Mohale's hoek, that the mean annual figure for temperature and precipitation for Mohale's hoek were about 16% and 750 mm, respectively. These figures were based on observations made from the Mohale's hoek meteorological station over 16 years for temperature and 74 years for precipitation.

The total population of the Mohale's hoek district was 184 034 in 1996. This population was divided into 17 871 urban and 166 163 rural. The male population was 90 073 while the female population was 93 961 for the same year (BOS, 1997).

The Mohale's hoek district had labour force participation rate of 44.37 according to the national labour force survey of 1997. The males had a labour force participation rate of 51.45 while the females had 38.96 (BOS, 1997). Moreover, 5.9% of all Basotho migrants workers to South Africa (108 808) in 1996 came from the district. The total unemployment rate was 44.6% of whom 51% were male while 44% were female (BOS, 1997).

Agriculture in the Mohale's hoek district im mostly subsisdence oriented. In 1995/96 the total area planted was 23 853 hectares. This was divided into 11 814 ha for maize, 8763 ha for




Figure 7.1: Location of the villages in the study area in Mphahle's Hoek.

- - - - - District Boundary
 - . - - - International Boundary
 ——— Roads

Scale 1 : 360 000

sorghum, 1383 ha for beans, and the remaining hectares were devoted to miscellaneous crop combinations. In the same year, the total area harvested was 23406 ha, of which 11628 was maize, 8733 was sorghum, 1247 was beans and the rest was devoted to harvest from miscellaneous crop combinations (BOS, 1998).

The total agricultural production in the district in 1995/96 was 25696 tonnes. This production was composed of 13060 tonnes of maize, 7611 tonnes of sorghum, 685 tonnes of beans, 3922 tonnes of wheat and 418 tonnes of peas (BOS, 1998).

The Mophale's hoek district was also selected for implementation of FISC as an attempt by the Government of Lesotho to promote a balanced regional distribution of rural development projects then (Plan of Operations, 1983).

7.2 Modus Operandi

7.2.1 Phase 1: 1985 - 1989

Phase 1 of FISC was scheduled to operate from 1985 to mid 1988. It was extended by a year and ended in June 1989, as a result of delays in implementation of some activities. In terms of the spatial coverage, three pilot areas - Maphutseng in the lowlands, the Seepheephe in the foothills, and Ketane in the mountain zones of the Mophale's hoek district were chosen for implementation of FISC during the first year. Each of these pilot areas represented an agro-ecological zone where the FISC projects impacts under different agro-ecological settings and farm management systems could be evaluated. Farming is more intensive in the lowlands, semi-intensive in the foothills and extensive in the mountain zones of Lesotho due to different agro-climatic, soil and terrain factors. The relative importance of agriculture to household income also differs among agro-ecological zones in Lesotho.

The project was to expand its spatial coverage to encompass seven more areas in the second year, and consolidate its activities in all the ten areas during the third year of its operation. The criteria for the selection of areas covered by the project were both the willingness of the chief and his people in the village to participate in order to minimise resistance to project activities, and the availability of an extension agent of the Ministry of Agriculture stationed in the area (Plan of Operations, 1983).

The Plan of Operations for Phase 1 (1983) stipulated the operational strategy of FISC as being three-pronged, in accordance with its three major objectives:

- a) to support farmers to improve farm and land management and productivity individually and collectively;
- b) to encourage development of village level institutions and decision making on conservation; and
- c) to support economic self-reliance at household and community level on a sustainable basis

The project initiated a number of activities in order to realise the three objectives. Haagsma *et al* (1992, p.41-42) have grouped these activities against their respective objectives (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: The objectives and activities of FISC Project.

Objective	Activity Employed
a) Increasing productivity	conservation works provision of inputs range management fodder production spring development
b) Institutions and awareness building	training of - farmers; lead farmers - board of farmers - village development councils and land allocation committees - village veterinary workers - subject matter specialists - unified extension staff
c) Increasing Economic Capacity	income generation through - communal gardens - individual gardens - fruit and fuel tree planting - concrete benches - piggery - candle making - bee keeping - sale of inputs by village development councils - dairy cows

Source: Haagsma et al., 1992, p.41-42

FISC operational strategy was also based on devising packages for implementation on individual land and communal land by the target groups. Increasing agricultural productivity was key to

FISC's operational strategy. A number of programmes as outlined above, were initiated in order to promote the objective of increased productivity. Conservation works promoted by the project on individual as well as communal land included construction of physical conservation structures such as water diversion canals, terraces, waterways, ponds and walls across gully beds. Implementation of conservation works on land by individuals owners was promoted through use of some incentives by the project. The farmer was entitled to R0.10 for every metre of physical conservation, especially terraces, constructed or maintained on their own land. However, no cash was given out. Instead, the farmers got the right to the purchase of inputs in the form of seeds and fertilisers from the project stores - worth the total amount of cash for which they had worked on their own land but under the supervision of the project throughout the year. In this way, the project subsidised farmers and enabled them to acquire improved seeds and fertilisers to increase farm productivity. During the first year of joining the project this kind of subsidy to farmers was equal to 50% of farming costs. The projects aim was that in the second year of membership the subsidy would be reduced to 25% of farming costs, while there would be no subsidy at all for the third and subsequent years of membership of the project by farmers (Plan of operations, 1983).

The rationale to provide subsidised inputs to farmers was premised on the desire by the project to assist farmers to break the vicious circle of poverty. In this vicious circle low output led to low income and low capacity to purchase improved inputs. The use of poor inputs leads to loss of fertility, which results in low yields. The low yields lead to low income, which leads to low household food security and environmental bankruptcy. FISC hoped that farmers assisted with input packages would use them correctly in production. Other things being equal, this would raise their yields, improve their income, and lead to sustainable land husbandry. As it were, FISC's idea was not to create a dependency syndrome on project assistance by farmers. Rather, incentives provided were meant to boot and kick-start farmer capability and self-reliance (Haagsma *et al.*, 1992).

There was limited direct action by FISC on range management on individual land. However, a lot of effort was made to improve fodder production and encourage stall feeding to reduce livestock pressure on the communal rangeland and improve stock productivity. Farmers were provided with fodder seeds of banana grass to plant on terraces of their fields to improve terrace stability and make them productive by providing fodder for livestock at the same time. Fodder seeds were provided to farmers on payment of cash, but under the advice of the project. Moreover, fruit tree seedlings were given to farmers free of charge to plant on own erected

terraces. The various inducement packages advanced by FISC to individual farmers were also meant to solicit a higher participation rate of farmers in its project activities.

Assessment of the achievements of FISC during phase 1 of its implementation covering the period 1985-1989 as compiled by Mashinini (1991) from annual FISC progress reports of 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989, shows that 236, 186 metres of terraces had been constructed; 45,075 metres of terraces maintained and 18015 trees planted on individual land at the end of phase 1 of the project. Moreover, a FISC evaluation report (1991) estimated that 97 480 terraces had either been constructed or maintained during phase 1 of the project. By 1987 there were 326 households participating in the project (FISC/ILUP evaluation report, 1987).

Improvement of productivity on communal land was also undertaken by FISC. According to customary land tenure prevalent in rural Lesotho, all land that is not held under usufruct rights for crop farming, tree planting and residential purposes, is used as rangeland available for communal grazing and other communal uses. Often, this land is a victim of the 'tragedy of commons' syndrome and is badly overgrazed and eroded, thus reducing both range and livestock productivity. FISC project approach to conservation of communal land hinged around use of land allocation committees (LAC) which were sub-committees of village development councils (VDC's) and direct use of the very village development council themselves. The village development councils selected destitute and needy households composed of the landless, female household heads, and those without access to migrant remittances - to engage in conservation work on communal land. The VDCs also supervised community members on duty and paid them with cash from FISC project for the work done (Mashinini, 1991).

Physical conservation work done on communal land included construction and maintenance of water ways and water diversion canals to reduce the erosive power of overland flow and water ponds for small scale water harvesting for irrigation of communal gardens and orchards. Biological conservation work was composed of re-seeding of devegetated patches of land, planting of trees for fuelwood, and gully reclamation through both the planting of trees and kikiyo grasses (Mashinini, 1989).

The use of cash payment for conservation work done on communal land was meant to be an incentive to induce participation of non-farming members of the community in conservation for improved productivity. It was hoped that the cash inducement would be temporary and provide

the needy non-farming households with start-up capital to do alternative non-farm economic activities.

The use of VDCs and LACs for implementation and supervision of work on communal land was meant to enhance involvement of village level institutions in decision-making, planning and implementation of local development. FISC project personnel only assisted communities on technical matters.

Work on communal land to increase productivity also included spring development. These perennial springs were protected and developed. Small reservoirs were created to store overflow and small canals dug for small-scale irrigation of some communal gardens using gravity down slope. The project worked in close consultation with the VDC in this endeavour to mobilise labour and community involvement. Produce from the communal garden was sold to the community and proceeds kept in the bankbook of the community by the VDC (Mashinini, 1991).

During phase 1, achievements of conservation work on communal land compiled by Mashinini (1991) were as contained in Table 7.2 below.

Table 7.2: Achievements on Communal land during phase 1 of FISC

Type of Activity	Quantity
1. Water diversion canals constructed	17,672 m
2. Water diversion canals maintained	no data
3. Ponds constructed	4
4. Pits dug	14,500
5. Trees planted	80,234
6. Nurseries developed	1
7. Orchards developed	1
8. Waterways constructed	2,933 m
9. Waterways maintained	4
10. Areas grass seeded	13.02 ha in 3 extension areas
11. Gullies stabilised	no data
12. Grazing area enclosed	no data
13. stone drop structure	60 m ²
14. Ponds maintained	3
15. Access roads constructed	1
16. Springs developed	9

Source: Mashinini, 1991, p. 15

The second major objective of FISC project during phase 1 was improvement of training and institution building. With regard to institution building the project promoted the participation of local institutions of chieftainship, village development councils and its sub-committees, especially land allocation committees. A survey was commissioned by FISC to document local institutions operating within the project areas, analyse their functions and advise the project on their potential role in rural development activities promoted by the project. This survey resulted in a report by Dahlberg, A. (1987) which report stressed the importance of working through village development councils to promote participation. Chiefs are the ex-officio chairpersons of village development councils and the rest of the six members are democratically elected by communities since 1986. It noted, however, that VDC members were not fully aware of their role in development, and it recommended that FISC needed to provide VDCs with training to tap their potential to the full. Moreover, the training of VDCs on their role in rural development would also help normalise the on going conflicts between chiefs, on the one hand, and VDCs, on the other, on matters of rural development administration. FISC therefore embarked on a rigorous training programme of VDCs, chiefs included, in rural development administration, decision-making, planning, implementation, evaluation, budgeting and bookkeeping procedures. VDCs were the link-pin between the project and the communities and training given to them was meant to equip them with skills to be able to handle this responsibility effectively (Dahlberg, 1987a).

The project also provided training to farmers themselves. Demonstrations, discussions and visits by extension agents were organised by the project for participant farmers. Training emphasised technical skills on farm and conservation management. However, during phase 1, no formal training by way of courses and workshops was given to ordinary farmers, despite recommendations made to this effect by the consultancy report of Chakela (1988). This dampened people's enthusiasm in the project. A survey by Mashinini (1990) found that 64% of interviewees in FISC areas did not know of it at all.

A compromise was, however, made by the project in that lead farmers, were chosen among farmers by the project instead of the community, on the basis of their being interested, progressive literate farmers. They were given basic training in surveying using a line level to align terraces, water diversion canals and water ways. In essence, although lead farmers were selected from the community, they became part of the extension personnel of the project and assisted the numerically scarce extension agents to do part of their work. This effectiveness was,

however, hampered by the fact that their skills were limited to surveying only. Moreover, despite the fact that they were paid R7.00 per day for having surveyed a minimum of 800 metres, they complained that this payment was too low and therefore concentrated on their own business instead of using their skills to assist the community (Mashinini, 1991).

During Phase 1, FISC extension service was based on the existing District Agricultural Office (DAO) model of mono-specialist extension agents, who could assist farmers in their field of specialist training only. FISC relied heavily on these DAO extension agents but had to recruit its own supplementary extension agents too. Shortage of extension agents slowed progress of implementation of project activities. FISC was forced to find a solution to this problem in the introduction of a unified extension service in which all field staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development were given training in all aspects of agriculture, conservation and rural development. The unified extension service approach became effective in Phase II of FISC (Haagsma *et al.*, 1992).

Subject matter specialists (SMSS) stationed within the District Agriculture Office (DAO) in Mphahle's hoek were also given special training in various fields of specialisation such as piggyery, nutrition and home economics, crops livestock, conservation, forestry, horticulture and information systems. Some SMSS were sent by the project to the Lesotho Agriculture College to do specialist training at Diploma level. SMSS were trained to strengthen the capacity of the DAO to better meet the demands of farmers both in the project areas and the district as a whole (Hagsma *et al.*, 1992).

Capacity building of the DAO was also expanded to include the construction of office infrastructure to house FISC project, and to purchase field vehicles and instruments to be used by the DAO as a whole. Some infrastructure assistance was also extended to improve capacity and institution building through financial and roofing materials for construction of VDC offices in the project areas. Training achievements of FISC during Phase 1 are presented in Table 7.2. It might be concluded from Table 7.2 that a lot of training activity was done for lead farmers, extension agents, SMSS, VDCS and land allocation committees. What is not so easy to assess, however, is the extent to which this training actually made beneficiaries effective in their work at that time (Mashinini, 1991).

During Phase 1, FISC encountered a lot of teething problems. Right from the onset, Ketane, one of the areas earmarked by the project to pilot its activities in the mountain zone, had to be left out

because of lack of co-operation by the chief of the area. Instead, Ha Motsinyane in the upper catchment of the Maphutseng River was chosen as a replacement. A year later in 1986, efforts to start project activities at Ha Motsinyane had to be abandoned because of problems of inaccessibility and political instability allegedly caused by sporadic exchange of fire between the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) of the BCP and the Lesotho Defence Force which made the local community in the area unreceptive to outsiders (Mashinini, 1988).

The adoption rates of seeds and fertilisers by farmers was low compared to those recommended by the project. Yaxley (1987) found that during the first year of participation in the project by farmers when they were given up to 50% of inputs by the project for conservation work done, 91% of the farmers used the inputs. Yet in the second year of participation when farmers were expected to buy 75% of their inputs, only 35% did so, and 64% did not buy the inputs because they had some left over from the previous year when inputs were free. He estimated that farmers tended to apply only 125kg per hectare of fertilisers instead of the 250kg per hectare recommended by the project. As far as seeds were concerned, in the second year of participation in FISC, 73% of the farmers did not purchase improved seeds, 29% of the farmers used second generation seeds from those got from FISC - which should not happen with hybrid seeds.

The remainder used seeds saved from some non-FISC source the previous year. Thus Yaxley (1987,p.4) concluded that "in effect, farmers disagree with recommended rates." The overall impact of the inputs package recommended to increase farm productivity was marginal. Mashinini (1990) found that 60% of the farmers interviewed in the three project areas, said that the yield of their crops had actually decreased over the past 5 years, whereas only 36.9% said it had increased. The reasons for decrease were attributed to both drought and poor, or (non) use of fertilisers, respectively.

The impact of FISC inducement packages, especially the payment community members for participating in conservation work on communal land, led to poor maintenance of these structures once payment stopped. This meant that people saw participation as a means to get money, without which their participation waned and eventually stopped, and so did the survival of the conservation structures constructed. It became clear that ways had to be sought to create the culture of cognitive participatory conservation if the sustainability was to be realised (Mashinini, 1990).

Maintenance problems of conservation structures were aggravated by communal land tenure system that allows communal grazing of stover by community livestock after harvest. Much destruction was caused to terraces, fodder, grassland and trees by livestock trespassing, leading to serious quarrels between stock owners, field owners and the community at large (Mashinini, 1989). It became clear to the project that efforts had to be made to introduce some reforms in the land tenure system that would accord farmers and the community better security on improved land, and also encourage non-livestock owners to become equally concerned about the unproductive condition of the rangeland.

Since FISC emphasised improved farm productivity through conservation during phase 1, its activities had a differential impact on communities in favour of those households with land, labour and livestock. Research by Dahlberg (1987b) showed that female headed and female managed households benefited little from the project because the former had little marketable labour to participate in the project while the latter had male labour in the mines. Both types of households had less labour to engage in project activities fruitfully. It became clear to project management that alternative non-farm income generation activities had to be included if the project was to benefit the communities at large (Dahlberg, 1987b).

Yet another persistent problem faced by FISC during phase 1 was continued complaints by farmers that they failed to plough their fields on time for want of implements. Mashinini (1988) found that 50% of the households in the project areas had neither oxen nor the money to hire some for traction. No doubt this late ploughing contributed to poor yields as well. Again, the project had to find alternative ways to give communities some support with regard to farm implements.

Monitoring and evaluation of progress and activities already done proved difficult without some kind of checklist containing an inventory of activities. In order to effect this exercise village activity plans became necessary in Phase II.

FISC aimed to promote participatory conservation planning and management as the basis for sustainability. Yet, as time went on, people's participation in project activities waned. Moreover, it turned out that their participation was partial in the sense that much work was entrusted to the VDCs. Full involvement of the community was necessary to attain sustainable conservation planning and management. Community planning workshops were found to be a necessary instrument that could foster full participation in future.

In terms of training, lead farmers selected by the project were not always approved by communities, for one reason or another. Eventually the communities had to be asked to elect their own lead farmers and present them to the project for training (Mashinini, 1991). Despite the training provided to village development committees, land allocation committees and chiefs on their respective roles in sustainable conservation planning and management, the three of them continued to conflict with one another over their powers and functions. Although the Ministry of Agriculture had undertaken to provide sufficient technical manpower under its management to work as extension agents and subject matter specialists, this promise never materialised. FISC found itself short of technical personnel at field level and its spatial expansion became retarded. Training existing field personnel to become multi-purpose or polyvalent extension agents seemed the most viable option in phase II. FISC also found itself having to rely on short-term contracted expatriate personnel for higher level technical services for which officers from other departments in the district were not willing to help. It was, however, clear that in the long run, deployment of expatriates would be both expensive and contrary to FISC's declared objective of capacity and institution building. In line with the Chakela report (1988) some Basotho Diploma holders were employed by the project and sent locally and abroad for training at degree level.

FISC also suffered a lot of problems, sparked off by institutional rivalry from sister departments within the District Agricultural Office (DAO). Much of this rivalry was fuelled by the fact that, as a new project, FISC had its own vehicles, drivers, a mechanic, secretaries, offices, office and field equipment for its exclusive use. These items are often in short supply at district level in Lesotho, and, the tendency has been to use projects equipment to fill in the gaps that exist in line ministries. The rivalry was accentuated by the fact that, contrary to the then conventional top-down Training and Visit approach that civil servants were used to, FISC advocated a different, participatory bottom-up approach that demanded constant dialogue and partnership with farmers in the field. This approach seemed to sister departments, at best, just another fussy show-off by a new comer. Their co-operation and support thus became very minimal (Mashinini, 1991).

7.2.2 Phase II: July, 1989-June, 1991

The Plan of operations for Phase II (1988) stated that the main objectives of FISC under Phase II remained the same as those for Phase 1. However, emphasis was put on increasing and strengthening the capability of village institutions to decide, plan and implement their own programmes, and to enable the villages to become sustainable, self reliant economic units.

During Phase II the spatial coverage of FISC expanded tremendously to cover the entire district in areas that expressed the desire to be assisted. FISC also changed names. Instead of being referred to as FISC Project, it came to be called the **Mohale's Hoek District Agricultural Programme**. The change of the name was prompted by the district wide nature of its operations, and the fact that a sister conservation project, the Soil, Water and Conservation (SOWACO) project, that operated in the Mohale's hoek district at the same time as FISC did, wound down its operation in the early years of Phase II of FISC. Moreover, discussions to expand activities into the Mafeteng district got underway (Mashinini, 1991).

In order to increase the beneficiaries and enhance community participation by the majority, beneficiaries were made to include groups such as women, herdboys, small businessman and schools. In rural Lesotho, women's fuel gathering activities and burning of dung for fuel, impact on the environment, therefore awareness creation, and their participation to practice sustainable use of nature was found to be necessary. Moreover, it is women that produce and bring up children and are in a better position to impart cognitive environmental education to children from birth. The project slogan was "give one woman environmental education and awareness, then you have educated the whole community". Furthermore, special programmes to involve women in off-farm income generation and economic activities were strengthened to generate employment and improve their household income. Candle making, poultry, piggery and concrete benches (Sand plots) were particularly appreciated by women (Haagsma et al., 1992). Efforts to involve herd boys, schools and small businessmen did not materialise during Phase II (Mashinini, 1991).

In terms of the objective to assist farmers increase productivity, the Mohale's hoek District Agriculture Programme consolidated activities initiated during Phase I. Work on individual land comprised construction and maintenance of terraces. About 224 564 m of terrace work had been constructed and/or maintained by mid-1991. Eleven hectares had been planted with fodder grass, while 5999 fruit trees had been planted over the same time period (Mashinini, 1991). Unfortunately, conservation work on terraces deteriorated drastically and some terraces were destroyed for want of maintenance due to complaint by farmers that they no longer received rewards for doing so from the programme. Fodder grass and fruit trees planted on terraces were destroyed by livestock and frequent conflicts ensued between farmers and owners of impounded livestock. Individual fruit tree planting had to be encouraged within home gardens instead (Mashinini, 1991).

Use of fertilisers and improved seeds as an inputs incentive package to assist farmers to break out of the low input, low output syndrome were condemned by various researchers and consultants (Bojö, 1991; Mashinini, 1991; Haagsma, *et al.*, 1992) as creating a dependency syndrome for farmers and non-cost ineffective to FISC. Eventually, the inputs incentive package was gradually phased out. It was replaced by a new initiative - **the input supply programme** - where the project gave out improved seeds and fertilisers to VDCs to sell to farmers at a mark up price to enable the VDC's to generate funds that could be used to finance on-farm income generation economic activities on its own for the benefit for the entire community.

Work on communal land was also consolidated: water diversion canals waterways and water ponds were constructed. By mid-1991, 6047m of water diversion canals, 328m of waterways, 5 wells, 9 concrete benches had been constructed and 55 200 trees planted (Mashinini, 1991). However, water diversion canals were not being maintained because payment for participation in maintenance work had stopped. Water ponds had silted for want of voluntary community labour for maintenance. Waterways stabilised with fodder grass were burnt because of complaints that they benefited livestock owners, some of whom had refused to participate when they were made. Trees planted to stabilise gullies and slopes were randomly destroyed by fire presumably by livestock owners who complained that the trees reduced grazing land for their animals. In the past trees grown by the community for gully or slope reclamation have often been confiscated for private exclusive use by chiefs in Lesotho. Gully reclamation through afforestation was negatively affected by fear, on the part of the community, that chiefs might claim exclusive use of them later. Efforts were made to encourage individual community members to apply for Form Cs which are documents that provide legal title to the holder, get tree seedlings from the programme and plant them on an individual basis as private property on communal land. Unfortunately, the customary land law does not allow individuals to fence off trees planted by individuals on communal land, although it does recognise the trees as private property. Wanton destruction by livestock has discouraged successful afforestation on communal land by individuals (Mashinini, 1991).

In order to encourage full participation of the community in sustainable range management, the programme did a mock trial of the equal grazing rights experiment. The carrying capacity of a village was divided by the total number of livestock units in the village. This provided the actual number of livestock units that each household became entitled to keep and graze on the village range. Households with excess livestock units would thus be forced to either get rid of them - an

indirect instrument to foster culling-stall-feed them or rent grazing rights from households with none or less livestock units than their prescribed village quota. Mixed feelings about the practicability of implementing this exercise and the potential of rivalry that it might cause between livestock owning and non-stock owning households eventually led to the abandonment of equal grazing rights (Mashinini, 1991;Haagsma et al., 1992;Marake, 1997).

In pursuit of the objective to assist villages become sustainable economic units, the programme implemented a number of activities. These activities were primarily, but not exclusively, meant to ensure equitable distribution of participation and benefits to a larger part of non-land owning households. However since people delayed to form groups the programme assisted them individually in the interim. Bee keeping was one of the first activities to be put on trial. The idea was to generate money through sales of honey to the local community. Moreover, wax could be produced and used as input into a sister economic activity of candle making. The sudden departure of the bee specialist from the programme delayed implementation of bee keeping into other later phases of the programme (Mashinini, 1991).

Dairy cows were encouraged for prospective farmers. The programme supplied dairy farmers with free fodder seeds as an incentive, while the farmers were expected to negotiate loan advances from the then Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank (LADB) for purchase of the cows. Since farmers did not have the collateral needed by the LADB before loans could be advanced, the dairy cow activity did not take off until the programme decided to act as a guarantor for its prospective dairy cow farmers to LADB. This idea did not work and the programme had to experiment with an alternative approach to dairy cows. The programme worked together with the VDC to screen a few prospective dairy cow farmers. Initial financial assistance was given to them to purchase the cows, on condition that they would pass over the female calves to the second round of prospective beneficiaries. This was planned to work like a revolving fund. Despite the good market for milk locally, initial costs of purchase of dairy cows were very high to be sustained by the programme. Moreover, disagreements arose as to who had to be next to get calves among prospective community members (Haagsma *et al.*,1992).

The Programme also assisted individuals to rear pigs. Piggery production was promoted through use of pig loans by the programme. First round beneficiaries of pig loans were given a sow and boar each after attending a course in piggery, and were expected to give two piglets to the programme for re-loaning to the second round prospective beneficiaries, when the first round

farmer's pigs had given birth. Again there were problems related to who got the piglets in the second round. Moreover, some pigs produced male piglets, while in some cases piglets died due to improper care. The piglets were to be fed with improved pig feed for proper growth, but high expenses of the feed led farmers to feed them on left over food from daily household meals as they do to unimproved hogs. Their quality deteriorated and mortality rates increased (Mashinini, 1991).

At community level, the programme continued to assist the VDC to become a viable economic unit through a number of activities. Support to community gardens that produced vegetables and fruits for sale to the local community for income generation by the VDC continued. However, their success continued to be plagued by a shortage of voluntary communal labour as people expected payment for participation. Moreover, disagreements on how the proceeds were to be disposed of continued, to a level where some community members expressed fear that VDCs misused the money for personal ends (Mashinini, 1991).

The input supply package given to farmers for terraces constructed and maintained during Phase 1 was altered in form and function to become the village input supply programme. Under the village input supply programme, the VDC was supplied with inputs of fertilisers and seeds to sell to farmers at a mark up price. The idea was that the VDC could generate its own income to pay for the cost of initial loan of inputs by the programme, purchase its own inputs to make profit and become a sustainable, financially self-reliant local institution with the capacity to finance its own community projects (Haagsma *et al.*, 1992).

The Mohale's hoek District Agricultural Programme continued to provide strong support for training and institution building. Training was given to farmers through demonstrations, experimentation and discussions with extension agents. More lead farmers elected by communities themselves continued to receive training in surveying and some basic aspects of technical extension so that they could help farmers in the absence of extension agents. The use of lead farmers with more technical training helped to reduce pressure for demand of extension agents. In some cases, being more knowledgeable on problems and needs of their home areas, the lead farmers became instrumental as link persons between the farmers and extension agents. Table 7.3 shows the kind of training that lead farmers and extension agents received.

The strategy to convert field staff in the district from the provision of mono-disciplinary extension service to that which was multi-disciplinary came into effect. Nutrition assistants,

rural development workers and extension agents were all given training in polyvalent extension service to become multi-purpose extension personnel. By June 1991 sixteen extension agents had been given polyvalent extension training. Two of them left for diploma training at the Lesotho Agricultural College, leaving fourteen fully in place. Of these 14 who remained on duty, 7 were former nutrition assistants converted into multi-purpose extension agents through on the job training and special courses organised for them by the Programme (Mashinini, 1991).

Extension agents and the farmers expressed satisfaction with the training given to extension agents by the Programme. However, farmers went on to complain that despite their good technical training, some extension staff did not like to go to the fields to assist them and as a result there was little actual contact between farmers and extension agents. They attributed this reluctance to the fact that most of the extension staff was still young and therefore, according to farmer's were still interested in other things in life than farming per se. Farmers further went on to argue that most of the extension staff was not only young but female as well. According to the farmers young females loathed working in the fields (Mashinini, 1991).

Mashinini (1991) further writes that the extension staff attributed ineffectiveness in the field to the fact that their extension areas were too large and they had no transport to use to make frequent visits to farmers. An experiment to solve the problem of transport shortage for extension agents, was the provision of motor bikes on repayable a loan basis by extension agents to the Programme. This experiment was abandoned because repayment became problematic, and, also, the motorbike increased some extension agent's mobility to go elsewhere on personal errands rather than to meet farmers in the field as intended. Extension agents also lacked enthusiasm and commitment to do their work because of lack of incentives for civil servants deployed in the field who become the forgotten in Lesotho.

Training was also given to subject matter specialists to increase their effectiveness to respond to specialised needs of farmers beyond the technical capability of extension agents in the field. However, the effectiveness of the subject matter specialists (SMSs) was dampened by their continued allegiance to their line departments in Maseru, and reluctance to throw themselves full-heartedly to support the programme activities, which they seemingly regarded as disorganising their departmental agendas and programmes rather than complimenting them. Extension agents and farmers alike complained that subject matter specialists seldom responded

timeously to farmer needs. On their part, subject matter specialists blamed their slow response to field demands on lack of transport (Mashinini, 1991).

Table 7.3: Some of the FISC/PTC training achievements

Training Activity	Attendance
A. Training of Farmers, Village Development Councils and Farmers	
- Common Interest groups formation and project identification	400 participants
- Livestock production	150 participants farmers
- Crop production	100 participant farmers
- VDCs and their roles in development	2,600 participants
- Soil conservation and forestry	400 participants
- Farmer to farmer tours	220 participants
- Village Veterinary workers	120 trainee participants
B. District Agricultural Officers, subject matter specialist and field staff training	
- Extension and management	750 participants
- Crop strategies	420 participants
- Conservation, forestry and land use planning strategies	550 participants
- Livestock strategies	360 participants
- management training for District Agricultural officers and field staff	80 participants
- Land husbandry course	24 participants
- Regional tours	47 participants
- National seminar on review of PTC and the unified extension service	365 participants

Source: Modified after Marake, 1997, pp. 75-77

In order to increase the timely response to farmers livestock needs through community participation, the programme introduced the strategy of use of village veterinary workers. This strategy was initiated towards the end of Phase II. Its operation was based on selection of people by the communities in each extension area to be trained as veterinary workers in their villages. By June 1991 all the 16 extension areas in which the Programme operated throughout the district had a trained village veterinary worker awaiting a supply of veterinary drugs on loan from the Programme (Mashinini, 1991).

In terms of institution building at local level, village development councils (VDC's), their sub-committees and chiefs continued to receive training on various aspects of rural development management and administration. Table 7.2 provides an idea of the frequency and kinds of training given to local institutions by the programme. Despite the training, some chiefs and their VDCs continued to conflict over powers and functions. Moreover, VDCs complained that their 3

years tenure in office was too short. It created the problem that every three years the VDC would most likely be composed of newly elected members requiring new training. This led to diseconomies of time and resources on the side of both the programme and the communities (Mashinini, 1991).

Another activity meant to strengthen the VDCs was support for construction of offices in which to work in their respective villages. The programme provided door, window frames and roofing materials while the community contributed communal labour and building materials.

The planning and management efficiency of VDCs and the community was also enhanced by the introduction of village activity plans. Each village community worked with its VDC to produce a list of activities by priority intended for implementation in that year. Each activity was costed and the contribution of the community shown against that expected from the Programme and other sources external to the village in question (Haagsma et al., 1992).

Institution building at district level was promoted through strengthening the District Agricultural Office (DAO) with the board of farmers. The DAO was composed of civil servants who take instruction from and implement central government policies. In order to involve farmers participation in decision-making at DAO level, the **board of farmers** was conceived and put in place. The board of farmers was composed of 2 farmers both of whom were elected by communities in their respective extension areas. By June, 1991 there were 16 farmer members of the board of farmers. The District Agricultural Officer (DAO) was an ex-officio chairperson of this board. The functions of the board were to inject farmers input into decision-making at DAO level and to act as a forum within which experiences from different extension areas could be shared. At the end of Phase II, the Board had met four times (Mashinini, 1991).

7.2.3 From Farm improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC) to Production Through Conservation (PTC)

In July 1989 when FISC embarked on Phase II of its implementation, there was a general change in the thinking about the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) development assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture. Since 1981 SIDA had been providing development support to the Ministry of Agriculture to enhance its capacity to assist the Basotho farmers and rural communities in general, to do proper land use planning using participatory approaches. SIDA embarked on this capacity building endeavour through creation of the Institute of Land use Planning (ILUP) whose prime function was to assist communities nation wide to devise their

own land use plans and implement them. Through trial and error between 1981 and 1989 the ILUP and the communities in which it functioned had developed a useful participatory methodology called "spot planning" which SIDA felt could be successfully used to promote participatory planning by its other projects in the country (Mashinini, 1995). ILUP also gave training to post-graduate diplomates in land use planning offered under the auspices of the Department of Geography at the National University of Lesotho during the early 1980s.

This training programme was discontinued in 1984 because the then Basotho National Party (BNP) led government alleged that the remote sensing techniques taught to the Diploma students posed a national security threat (Mashinini, 1995). Subsequent efforts to revive the programme after the collapse of the BNP regime in 1986 have not been successful due to lack of agreement within the National University of Lesotho as to who would house the Bachelor of Arts Degree in Land Use Planning that was intended to succeed the Diploma. The Institute of Land Use Planning was made the Division of Land use planning (DLUP) in the late 1980s and falls under the Department of Conservation, Forestry and Land use Planning (DCFLUP).

In 1981 SIDA also started to give development assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture to support training of foresters at certificate and, later, Diploma level under the auspices of the Lesotho Agricultural College (LAC). It was hoped that the support to Forestry Training and Development (FTD) Project would provide capacity building to the MOA to provide sufficient extension agents to promote nationwide afforestation and sustainable land management. The FTD was administered under the Division of Forestry.

In 1989 SIDA felt that its separate administration and management of these three projects, FISC in Maseru under the DAO, ILUP in Maseru under conservation and FTD in Maseru under forestry, was too costly and sought to introduce a joined administration and financial management of the projects as one major development assistance programme to the Ministry of Agriculture ((MOA) managed centrally by SIDA in Maseru. Moreover, in their own different ways, the three projects had a common objective to assist rural communities in Lesotho to improve land productivity through sustainable land management (Marake, 1997).

Based on the above considerations, the three projects, FISC, ILUP and FTD, were officially merged in 1989 under the umbrella name of Production Through Conservation (PTC), where each project retained its component status only. Essentially, therefore the period discussed as Phase II of FISC, between July 1989 and June 1992, was simultaneously regarded as a

transitional phase that constituted Phase I of the Production Through Conservation Programme known as PTC I (Mashinini, 1993).

Production Through Conservation also had a fourth component, which started in 1991 called Support to the National Agricultural Programme (SNAP). The SNAP was born as an offspring of the FISC Project. From its inception FISC was intended to be a nation-wide project with an initial focus on the Molepolole district. It had been envisaged that FISC would expand outwards spatially to cover one district after another until it had spread throughout all the ten districts of Lesotho. In reality, the hurdles encountered in the Phase I implementation of FISC showed that this kind of spatial expansion would be very costly in terms of financial, human, technical and time resources. Instead, a compromise expansion programme was planned and implemented as SNAP in 1991 (Mashinini, 1993).

The aim of SNAP was to assist in the capacity building of the Ministry of Agriculture to respond to farmers' needs by positioning as many extension agents as possible in their communities. In addition to quantity, the ability of these extension agents to provide multi-disciplinary extension service was considered of crucial importance. The role of SNAP, was therefore, to use the unified extension approach developed and tested by FISC in Molepolole, as a training model for extension agents and subject matter specialists nation-wide. This was done through formal in-service short course and supply of training manuals of the unified extension, and participatory rural development and regular visits by field staff from other districts, to gain first hand experience on its application in the Molepolole district. SNAP also facilitated consolidated training of SMSS and field staff to Maseru and Quthing districts which were the new action districts of PTC I (Mashinini, 1993).

In July 1992 PTCII was born as a merger between FISC II, FTD and Land Use Planning. All became housed as one PTC II programme under the Department of Conservation, Forestry and Land use Planning. PTC II Programme also borrowed ideas from sister rural development projects in Lesotho, especially the German funded Matelile Integrated Rural Development Project in Maseru, and the USAID funded Local and Initiative Support Programme in Quthing, with both of which it had close operational relationships since the FISC days. The PTC II Programme started in July 1992 and was due to end in June, 1994. However, there have been subsequent extensions to PTC II until it eventually came to an end 4 years down the line in June, 1998 (Marake, 1997).

The Project Document of PTC II Programme (1992 p. 4) captures the rationale for PTC programme in these words:

“The idea behind the PTC was the recognition that in their different but complimentary ways all the project(s) were aiming at the same goal: increasing production on a sustainable basis among rural communities of the country. It also provided an administrative (framework) which enabled Swedish funds to be used more effectively.”

The PTC II Programme Project Document (1992 p. 18) goes on to elaborate on the overall objectives of PTC II Programme as to

"Support land users in increasing production through conservation of the natural environment upon which production depends...to foster self-sustaining communities capable of carrying out economic land husbandry programmes and build the Government of Lesotho's (GOLs) service rendering capacity.”

The three immediate objectives of PTC Programme were to:

- i) help farming communities acquire the technical and managerial skills required to manage their communal resources and their own sustainable production endeavours and support those of their members;
- ii) help the District Agriculture office to develop a partnership relationship with the communities and their members in order to increase sustainable production;
- iii) help the DAO office to adapt their ways of working so as to give optimum support to the farming communities.

A number of specific strategies accompanied by activities were designed and used to achieve the three immediate objectives of PTC II Programme presented above. In order to achieve the first immediate objective, the PTC II Programme sought to continue to work with farmers, village development councils and their committees and the board of farmers to strengthen local

institutions through provision of increased training and to expand programme activities into new action districts of Mafeteng and Quthing (Mashinini, 1993).

In order to achieve the second immediate object the programme would use the strategies of promotion of further use of unified extension and participatory village development planning processes strengthen the capacity building of the District Agricultural Office as a decentralised decision-making and planning unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, and provide further training to all field staff.

The Third immediate objective of PTC II Programme was to be achieved through deployment of the strategies to strengthen area teams, district management groups, departmental management groups and the general efficiency of the board of farmers and the DAO (Marake, 1997).

The general *modus operandi* of PTC II Programme remained unaltered and use of participatory approaches continued to command highest priority. In order to foster improved community participation PTC II adopted the "Spot Planning" methodology developed by its sister component Land Use Planning. Under PTC II Programme, this participatory planning methodology came to be called participatory village development planning. Khatiwada (1993) ably elucidates on the methodology and its procedures.

Participatory village development planning process takes place within the jurisdictional framework of a gazetted chief in his area of jurisdiction. The VDC of the chieftainship area becomes an instrumental local institution that acts as a link-pin between the PTC II and communities at grassroots level composed of a number of villages headed by headmen responsible to the gazetted chief of the area. The planning process starts off with a socio-economic survey on demography, livestock land and non-land resources of the village and their socio-spatial distribution conducted by the VDC, chief and his headmen with the technical support of field staff. The field staff is assisted by the subject matter specialists to analyse the data and compile a report, one copy of which remains with the VDC while the other copy goes to the DAO (Katiwada, 1993).

The institutional survey on existing local institutions, committees, organisations, interest groups and Non-governmental organisations and their functions in the village is again conducted by VDC, chief and headmen with technical assistance of field staff and subject matter specialists.

One copy of the report remains with the VDC while the other copy goes to the DAO (Katiwada, 1993).

The physical resources survey is a more in-depth inventory and mapping of the land resources endowment, actual use and future use. It involves use of maps, aerial photographs and other remote sensed data available by field staff of the area. The VDC is encouraged to participate in this exercise which culminates in a land use map showing settlements, arable lands, cultivated area versus uncultivated area, range land, eroded land, woodlands, springs, rivers, dams and all other physical resources available in the village. A village land use plan showing potential development of the resources is produced. A copy of both the land use map and land use plan is given to the VDC while another copy goes to the DAO (Katiwada, 1993).

After the completion of the socio-economic, the institutional and the physical resources surveys, village workshops were organised in each headman's village within the gazetted chieftainship area. During these workshops all members of the village were expected to attend. VDC member presents the socio-economic survey report and the institutional report for discussion. Thereafter, participating village members break up into groups and discuss the findings of each report and their implications and possible solutions. The needs are clearly identified and listed under agricultural versus non-agricultural needs. A plenary session follows within which each group presents its needs and proposed solutions for discussion by the whole workshop participants. The field staff also present a list of development assistance packages from the DAO at the disposal of individuals and groups.

A long prioritised list of agricultural and non-agricultural needs is eventually arrived at by consensus. The needs in the list are grouped into specific interest areas such as poultry, piggery, dairy, veterinary services, candle making, bottling, canning and so on. The participants are asked to divide themselves into common interest groups around the activities of their own choice. Each group lists the name of its members and elects its own mouthpiece. It develops in detail the specific needs and possible solutions with regard to its chosen interest activity and works out a programme of action for a year, showing resources and a time plan for the implementation of the then activity plan. The VDC compiles the various activity plans into a headman's village development plan with the technical assistance of the field staff and subject matter specialists. For those activities that require field checks, especially pertaining to physical resources, inventory and land use plan, a special day is organised for a community transect walk in which

community members can express their demands and make inputs into the land use plan. The participants also discuss ways to mobilise local resource inputs into the village development plan, while the subject matter specialists submit the external resource demands to the DAO and to the district development council in cases that involve non-agricultural infrastructure development activities (Katiwada, 1993).

The last step in the process of participatory village development planning is the community workshop. This workshop includes all villages under the chieftainship area. It involves all VDCs in the area, all common interest groups, individuals of goodwill, field staff of the gazetted chieftainship area, subject matter specialists, and other staff of the NGOs in the area, members of district departments in related development fields such as health, industry, village water supply, works and rural development and any other persons, groups or institutions from neighbouring areas who may be interested.

The community workshop process involves presentation of various village development plans by members of their VDCs and discussions on them. Participants break up into groups and discuss linkages among the plans, synchronisation of the plans into an overall community development plan that highlights key activities and priorities of infrastructure and common activities linking the various villages in the chieftainship community. The eventual output is a participatory community development plan that highlights needs and priorities by village and common interest groups. This final document also shows the budget estimate for the plan implementation and the intended sourcing of contributions from respective villages and that expected from partnership with the DAO through PTC II Programme. A copy of the participatory community development plan remains with the office of the gazetted chief and VDCs of villages get their copies. Other copies go to the DAO and PTC II offices. These various plans are used by both the communities and the DAO and related departments as the basis of their annual district activity plans. The plans are also useful for monitoring the process of implementation and evaluation of performance. Thus, through the process of participatory village development planning, the PTC II programme managed to induce full community participation in decision-making, planning, implementation and benefit sharing of rural development programmes (Katiwada, 1993).

Marake (1997) estimated that 120 headman village development plans, involving 8,400 villagers had been drawn and implemented. These 120 plans constituted a 40% achievement of the target set by PTC II. Marake (1997) does not explain why 60% of the target was not fulfilled as

planned. However, research by Tiljander (1992) shows that despite the potential role of local institutions such as the VDCs to promote rural development in the PTC II areas, much success depended on the power of individual chiefs to promote or thwart participatory village development planning, a situation to which she refers as "Impeded Democracy." Mashinini (1993) also found out that the village development planning process delayed to start in many villages because it took time for people to understand how it operated and once started it took a long time to complete so that few communities were covered in a given year. Shaxson and Sehloho (1993) complained that the participatory village development planning process was wanting in participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques in its socio-economic, institutional and physical resources surveys.

The PTC II Programme continued to support various activities aimed at the objective to increase crop production in the three action districts. Physical soil conservation structures involving construction and maintenance terraces, water diversion canals and waterways continued to be supported through the use of conservation incentive schemes. In these conservation incentive schemes, individual farmers make a choice among fodder grasses, fruit trees and multi-purpose plants for agro-forestry as remuneration for physical structures constructed and/or maintained on individual land. Farmers are also lent hand tools freely by the VDC to use during construction and/or maintenance of their physical soil conservation structures (Mashinini, 1993).

Agronomic and biological soil conservation techniques involving mulching, composting, intercropping, manuring and agro-forestry were encouraged to enhance soil fertility and increased productivity. Fruit tree planting around the homesteads and use of low input demonstrations continued. The latter involved use of cheap but reliable inputs that could be afforded by farmers. Two demonstration plots, one for sorghum and the other for maize per chieftainship area were used as places where farmers could see for themselves how sustainable crop production should be done. Village tree nurseries managed by an individual or group elected by the village but trained by PTC II Programme were encouraged through provision of free tree seedlings, tools for watering, fertilisers and fencing materials free of charge. Tree planting itself was organised on two basis. First individual tree planting was supported through provision of 100 seedlings free of charge for an individual who intended to plant more than 100 trees.

A charge was laid for less than 100 trees planted. However, all seedlings on communal land were free of charge, and hand tools for use in planting these trees available free of charge from the village development council (VDC).

Secondly, the concept of marketable tree rights developed by Shone (1992) was promoted as a viable tool to promote sustainable management of communal tree resources. The objective of the marketable tree rights approach to communal forest resource management was to introduce some private ownership of, and gain from, common forest resources so that these people with private rights could manage the forest resources in a better and improved manner. The process involves participation by all adult members of a village or gazetted chieftainship area. It may also be a common interest group of individuals within a village or chieftainship area. The members of the group approach the chief and VDC to register themselves and ask for a piece of land for which a "Form C" giving them group usufruct rights on the land is issued. The group submits its bylaws to the chief and VDC. The bye laws may show among others, names of members, trees to be planted, inputs to be used and their shared contribution by individual members, length of time for which the land is required, when harvesting of trees is expected, sharing formula among members, rate of compensation or rent to the community (if any needed) (Shone, 1992).

The DAO through PTC II Programme's role was to provide free seedlings of the type of trees needed and to give technical advice to the tree group. Members of the tree group equally contribute labour and tools to plant the trees and maintain them well for an average period of 4-5 years to get to first maturity level. When the trees were ready for harvest, part of them was to be set aside for sale to meet the costs of recurrent expenditure on their sustainable management. The remaining trees are divided equally among members of the tree group. Each member would be issued with a marketable tree coupon that would show their name, village chief, the number of trees they were entitled to harvest, village, chieftainship, and the period within which the coupon is valid, normally one a year. The marketable tree coupon would entitle the holder to sell, if they wanted, their specified number of trees to any person interested at a rate to be determined by the market (Shone, 1992).

The marketable tree right approach had the potential to minimise the tragedy of commons problem in the country by offering practical private benefits to the community to maximise its participation in sustainable communal forest resource management and use (Shone, 1992).

Gully reclamation schemes consisting of construction of silt traps at gully heads, planting of trees and grasses on gully bottoms and sides were supported through free provision of grasses and tree seedlings. As special effort was made to give priority to the landless, women and female headed households to enhance participation of all social groups in sharing benefits from PTC II Programme. Moreover, women, the aged, female headed households and other disadvantaged social groups were given priority as the beneficiaries of sand plots /concrete troughs and roof water harvesting schemes for vegetable production to improve their diet composition and income position. The PTC II Programme used 50:50 form in sharing the costs incurred in these two schemes by the beneficiaries from the disadvantaged groups (Mashinini, 1993).

The PTC II Programme became more involved in increased livestock production than the FISC. A fodder seed and fertiliser loan scheme was made available to individual farmers. The repayment was by seeds or planting materials for fodder that was given to other farmers on a rotating fund basis. In other cases seeds for palatable grasses such as *Eragrostics curvula*, banana grass, vetiver grass were given to communities to plant on communal land, using hand tools borrowed from the VDC and seeds and fertilisers free of charge from PTC II. Rehabilitation of degraded land programme worked hand in hand with planting and multiplication of palatable grasses (Mashinini, 1993).

Other efforts to improve grazing land management included promoting use of land enclosures to facilitate rotational grazing. Experiments with a transferable grazing rights scheme coupled with a grazing fee scheme was also attempted. In close cooperation with a German funded sister project, the Matelile Integrated Rural Development Project in Mafeteng, PTC II Programme also promoted the Livestock Exchange Programme where a farmer was encouraged to exchange two old culls for one improved sheep. Moreover, PTC II Programme assisted the Ministry of Agriculture with funds to construct more dip tanks for livestock in the three action districts of Mafeteng, Mohale's hoek and Quthing. Moreover, in order to improve the economic viability of households through improved livestock production, the PTC Programme supported dairy and poultry projects by individual farmers. In both cases the PTC II programme/scheme/project encouraged potential farmers to attend training in poultry and dairy farming free of charge. After completion of the course, the farmers were encouraged to seek loans from the Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank. PTC II supported the farmers with technical back-up and transport logistics (Mashinini, 1993).

Implementation of the objective to help the District Agriculture Office to develop a partnership relationship with the communities and their members in order to increase sustainable production (PTC II Project Document, 1992,p.9), was pursued through a number of strategies and activities.

Client oriented work methods were adopted as a key strategy to create extension partnership between the DAO and communities. Community members as individual and/or common interest groups expressed their demands via the extension agents and other field staff. The field staff responded to these demands, with the support of subject matter specialists. In order to increase the efficiency of the DAO response to communities needs, an area team approach was adopted. Within an area team approach, extension areas are earmarked, demands of their communities collected by the extension agent of the area and passed over to the DAO. Specific dates on which each extension area would be visited were allocated. On the selected date each extension area would be visited by subject matter specialists and field staff of the chieftainship area, who all formed an area team and worked jointly as partners to solve the problems with the community members. SMSs acted as back-up technical expertise. The emphasis in team area approach was on strengthening the partnership of field staff with communities. A two way information and knowledge sharing process was thus facilitated and the field staff and SMSs enabled to respond directly to the demands of client communities (Marake, 1997).

The unified extension service was strengthened through further training given to extension assistants, nutrition assistants and conservation assistants. Moreover, the community elected some of its members to become village veterinary workers and village technical assistants and assist extension workers. The unified extension training worked hand in hand with the area team approach to consolidate the efficiency of field service delivery by the DAO. Rehabilitation of farmers training centres (FTCs) was supported in order to provide the DAO with enough and well equipped places for the training of farmers, the field staff and members of local institutions. Moreover, support was given to improvement of the DA offices in Mafeteng in conjunction with the German funded Mateteng Development Programme. Training manuals on polyvalent extension were produced and disseminated nationwide, while DAOs from all districts were given training in administration, time planning, activity planning, budgeting and financial management (Marake, 1997). Marake (1997) further provides list of PTC achievements as depicted in Table 7.2.

The objective "to help DA office to adapt their ways of working so as to give optimum support to the farming communities" (PTC II Programme Project Document, 1992, p.9) was implemented through some operational and institutional reforms. At national level the Support to National Agricultural Programme (SNAP) continued to give intensive training to field staff, subject matter specialists and district agricultural officers in order to ensure nationwide dissemination and adoption of PTC II programme approach of unified extension and participatory land management for sustainable production. Extension manuals, films and video tapes were produced and made available on demand by districts (Shaxson and Sehloho, 1993).

Decentralised management of rural development planning was also embarked upon. At district level, the lowest tier became the area team composed of all field staff of given chieftainship areas, with some back up from subject matter specialists. Area teams managed all field work pertaining to community demands and only depended on SMS's for special technical cases. At departmental levels at the district headquarters, departmental management groups or teams were composed of all subject matter specialists with each department. The team made decisions on key issues that affected the department as a whole. For instance, the livestock departmental management team would be composed of MSS piggery, SMS poultry and SMS dairy. These SMSs would make decisions on matters on dairy, piggery and poultry. Departmental management teams were to act as a forum for sharing of ideas and making timeous decisions and departmental policies, strategies and programmes of service delivery to the communities' demands (Shaxson and Sehloho, 1993).

At the district level a district management team composed of all area team leaders, department management team leaders, representatives of projects, members from sister line ministries, board of farmers and DAO was formed as a unified group that discussed and made key decisions on district-wide and level issues that cut across the departments, projects and line ministries. It also acted as forum for information sharing, networking and partnership building among all members (Marake, 1997).

Three regional teams composed of Mokhotlong, Butha-Buthe and Leribe under the northern region; Berea, Maseru and Thaba-Tseka under the central region; and Mafeteng, Mohale's hoek, Quthing and Qacha's nek under the southern regional team were formed. Regional teams co-ordinated and facilitated contact among their district management teams and the Ministry of

Agriculture in Maseru. They also acted as fora in which district management teams could share information, network and build partnership (Marake, 1997).

Management of PTC II Programme at national level has always been rather controversial and changing among MOA planning, department of field services and department of conservation, forestry and land use planning. However, at present PTC II Programme is responsible to the Department of Conservation, Forestry and Land Use Planning, in whose field activities it is directly involved (Mashinini, 1993).

7.3 CONCLUSION

The life history of FISC/PTC project presented in the preceding sections of this chapter leads one to draw a number of conclusions that are of relevance to sustainable development.

Sustainable agriculture is a central component of sustainable development. However, the project activities in the field of sustainable agriculture were not very successful. Efforts to promote sustainable crop production through the introduction of improved land use, management, and production techniques were hampered by lack of willingness by farmers to change their old attitudes and methods of farming, land use and management. Right from the onset, the use of improved inputs and fertilisers was not adopted by farmers in a sustainable way. Instead, farmers continued to use their own seeds and did not follow the prescribed levels of fertiliser application, despite continued efforts by the project to encourage them to stick to the methods and levels specified so that a sustainable yield could be realised. Failure by farmers to listen to and follow the technical advice provided by the project culminated in the failure of the farmers and the project to realise increased yields for sustainable household food security.

Sustainable agriculture also encompasses sustainable livestock production and range management. Introduction of fodder grass to use as supplementary feed was accepted well by livestock farmers but its sustainable production was hampered by destruction caused by stray livestock and communal grazing. Implementation of some changes in the land tenure that have been introduced by the Land Act 1979 to declare all areas covered by rural development projects as selected development /agricultural areas, so that the development properties and activities initiated in the areas can be protected in a sustainable way is long overdue as a precondition for the success of sustainable development in Lesotho.

Efforts to promote sustainable range management by discouraging complete communal grazing and encouraging stall-feeding were not very successful due to destruction of fodder grass by stray livestock. Equally unsuccessful were rotational grazing and equal grazing rights methods to range management. Rotational grazing was destroyed by herdboys while equal grazing rights were rejected by livestock owners. Failure of both efforts was largely caused by people's lack of willingness to change their old ways of living and go through the pains of adjusting to the proposed new ways of livestock and range management, regardless of the potential that these new methods proposed by the project had for sustainable livestock production and range management in the region. People's perceptions and attitudes have to change in order for sustainable development to become successful.

Sustainable conservation on communal land was not successful in the long run, despite enthusiasm and high participation rates during the stage of construction and plantation. Terraces, water ways, water ponds, springs for irrigation and communal tree plantations which were successfully put in place, subsequently got neglected, destroyed and vandalised by both livestock and the people themselves because of failure to develop a positive perception and attitude towards development property. Unless the people themselves begin to appreciate the value and importance of development initiatives meant for their own good now and in the future, and show a sense of commitment, responsibility and accountability towards the initiatives, sustainable development might continue to have, at best, a very minimal impact on sustainable livelihoods within the rural communities in the region.

Another important component of sustainable development is sustainable alternative income generation economic activities. The project assisted farmers to start agro-related income generation projects such as dairy cows and piggery. Although farmers were eager to participate in these projects, lack of co-operation among the farmers and the reluctance to repay their loans meant as revolving funds among them by the project, led to the collapse of the projects due to lack of funds. This underscores the point that people's perception and attitudes to development property must change. The people need to be more accountable and responsible rather than self-centred and shortsighted. This comment equally applies to peoples' attitudes towards non-farm income generation activities, such as candle making, which had to be discontinued for the same reason of lack of co-operation and poor accountability among the participants, despite their potential to contribute to income generation and sustainable household food security.

Participation is a key component of sustainable development. Participation was promoted by the project through use of incentives and strengthening of local institutions such as chieftainship and village development councils, the introduction of new institutions like the board of farmers and participatory extension assistants elected by the people among themselves, and new participatory village planning methodologies and the unified extension system. While all these participatory endeavours were highly appreciated by the communities, their implementation remained very slow because they were essentially new and revolutionary ways of planning and implementing rural development. They needed time and commitment to change from old ways in order to have a positive impact on rural livelihood strategies.

Capacity building is yet another key component of sustainable development. The project strengthened the institutional capacity of the communities through the provision of training of farmers, local institutions, field staff, and some officers of the District Agricultural Office. While the training provided was of good quality and relevant to sustainable development, the actual use of the training to implement sustainable development remained problematic due to the poor retention capacity of the District Agricultural Office, the loss of some of the trained personnel to other ministries, the private sector and some Non-governmental organisations with more lucrative work prospects. Moreover, the morale and commitment of the remaining personnel, especially the field staff, remained low and damaged the momentum of sustainable implementation of project activities.

Inter-departmental and institutional rivalries also created a lot of friction in the path of sustainable implementation of project activities. A lot of commitment, self-sacrifice and willingness to change and adopt new ways of rural development planning and implementation is necessary on the part of individuals, groups, communities and institutions in order for the success of sustainable development at both regional and national level in Lesotho.

Networking is a valuable instrument for the pooling and sharing of resources of all kinds by the projects, communities and regions engaged in sustainable development. FISC/PTC project initiated networking with other rural development projects such as Mafeteng Development Programme, some Non-governmental organisations such as CARE Lesotho, and communities and regions across the nation through the formation of three regional teams. All these networks have proved very important for the sustainability of FISC/PTC project initiatives. The networks with the Mafeteng Development Programme, CARE-Lesotho and the regional teams continued

to this day and have become the lifeblood responsible for the sustainable socio-spatial and temporal implementation of some of the FISC/PTC ideas on sustainable development in Lesotho.

CHAPTER 8: THE IMPACT OF THE FARM IMPROVEMENT WITH SOIL CONSERVATION (FISC) OR PRODUCTION THROUGH CONSERVATION (PTC) PROJECT ON SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MOHALE'S HOEK DISTRICT

8.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the survey results. It discusses the demographic profile, farmers' knowledge, sustainable crop production, range management, income generation, extension and institution building.

8.1 Demographic Profile

Two hundred households in the rural areas of the Molepolole district were interviewed during the survey. The detailed methodology used in the survey was discussed in Chapter three. The present chapter presents the results of the survey and analysis of the findings. In social science, Human Geography included, an appropriate angle of entry into a community through a survey is via a discussion of the demographic profile of that community so that the readership of the research report is made aware of the basic social context of the community under the discussion.

Rural development involves decision making, planning and implementation of sustainable livelihood strategies at household level. However, the right of participation in decision making, planning and implementation is gender biased in favour of men in most African societies, Lesotho included. For Lesotho, in particular, this gender bias in decision making, is accentuated by the prevalence of the migrant labour system to South Africa, which results in prolonged absence of men, who are mostly *de jure* household heads, from home. This absence distorts decision making. Often, decision making has to await presence of the men, or be communicated through to them in the mines. Moreover, the absence of male migrant workers also impacts negatively on availability of labour for various arduous tasks in agriculture and the implementation of other rural livelihood strategies in Lesotho. Often implementation of the decisions on sustainable rural development is left in the hands of women, who remain *de facto* heads of households.

In this survey, out of the 200 households interviewed, 50 percent were males, while another 50 percent were females. This result was contrary to the general expectation of the survey, namely that, there would be more females than males in the study area due to the latter's absence as a result of migrant labour. The present research did not ask any direct question to find out why

there might be a gender balance in the study area. However, one could conclude from chapter four that the on-going high rate of retrenchment of Basotho mine workers since the late 1980s might be responsible for this situation of relative numerical gender balance among households interviewed. However, for sustainable rural development, the important question, is whether the increased presence of males at home will improve decision making, planning and implementation of sustainable rural livelihood strategies, or whether on the contrary, this presence might negatively impact on the household's ability to cope with and manage sustainable livelihood strategies.

Rural communities in most African countries are characterised by compound as against nuclear households. The former is largely attributable to the extended family system practiced by some households. Controversy exists regarding the impact of the compound household system on sustainable provision of livelihood strategies in rural Africa. Some view the compound household as a hindrance to household economic advancement in that such a household's capacity to consume is increased at the expense of its ability to save, invest and accumulate wealth. This line of thinking often advocates that reduction of family size and adoption of a nuclear type of household are a pre-condition for rural development in Africa. An alternative perception argues in favour of compound households, and sees them as provision of a sufficient pool of labour at the disposal of the concerned households to be tapped to access a sustainable livelihood.

In the study area, 54 per cent of the households interviewed were compound, whereas forty six per cent were nuclear. Those heads of compound households reported that other persons and relatives were a good source of labour at the disposal of the family and also to created good relations with their relatives.

Heads of households which were nuclear argued that their households were more manageable without relatives and others. They added that they were in a better position to feed, clothe and educate themselves as a nuclear household, than they would have been able to, had they been compound.

Migration is important in rural development because, being a process composed of in and out flow of people from a given region over a given time period, it is responsible for the spatial distribution of labour. Migration can also be a good indicator of availability or scarcity of sustainable livelihood resources and services in respective regions. A region with a high rate of

emigration might indicate a lack of resources and facilities deemed necessary for sustainable human development and loses labour resources to the other regions. While a region with a high rate of immigration might indicate the availability of abundant resources and facilities necessary for sustainable human development which attract inflow of people and labour for its own development. In the study area, 86 per cent of the population had never migrated away from their original village of birth on a permanent basis. Temporary migration in search of employment was however, common. Seventy two per cent of the household heads reported having migrated in search of work at one time or another in their life time.

The propensity to migrate is highly related to, inter alia, the level of education and the perceived employment opportunities. In itself, education is crucial for sustainable rural development because it is an avenue through which basic literacy, knowledge, information, and skills on sustainable human development can be easily disseminated. Within the study area, 61 percent of the population had primary school level education, fourteen per cent had secondary school education, six per cent had high school education and only two per cent had post-high school education. Eighteen per cent of the population was illiterate. It might be concluded that the level of literacy was low in the study area.

In terms of occupational distribution, within the survey population, 16 per cent reported that they were farmers, 13 per cent worked in South Africa, two per cent were business persons, two per cent did some clerical and technical jobs, 13 per cent worked in the informal sector, while 52 per cent were unemployed. The unemployment rate in the study areas is high compared to the national average of 45 per cent, and implies that there must be sustainable agriculture and alternative income generation strategies for sustainable rural development in the region.

8.2 Farmers Knowledge of the Farm Improvement with Conservation Project (FISC) Project or Production Through Conservation (PTC) Project

The Farm Improvement with Conservation Project (FISC) project or Production through Conservation (PTC) project as it later came to be called, started to operate in the Mohale's hoek district in 1985. In 1999 when this survey was carried out FISC/PTC had spent 14 years in the district operating as a district-wide programme and was on the verge of complete closure or wind down.

It was therefore expected that there should be a wide knowledge of FISC/PTC among the rural population in terms of its objectives, activities and mode of operation. It was also expected that

the project would have impacted on a larger segment of the rural population. In essence, the study assumed that one of the ways in which one could measure whether FISC/PTC had a sustainable impact or touched on promotion of livelihood strategies of the rural population in the Mohale's hoek district, could be through an assessment of the knowledge that the people had of the project.

In order to test this hypothesis, a number of questions were asked to measure or highlight the extent of peoples' knowledge of the project. Eighty six per cent of the survey population said that they knew the FISC/PTC project, while 14 per cent said they did not know of it. Those who said that they knew the project were asked about its activities. Thirty five per cent of the responses were that FISC/PTC was a project that promoted conservation in Mohale's hoek. Thirty two per cent maintained that FISC/PTC promoted conservation for improved farming. This second group of responses was more informed about the main objective of FISC/PTC which was not just to do conservation, but to link conservation directly with improved farming and productivity. The rest of the responses were spread among isolated specific activities such as provision of improved seeds and fertilizers, improved farming and tree planting and gully reclamation. It is concluded that there was sufficient knowledge of FISC/PTC in the study area.

When asked how they knew of FISC/PTC, the majority of the respondents, 44 per cent, said that they knew of it through the chief and the village development councils, 26 per cent said through the extension agent 22 per cent said through friends, and the remainder said they heard of it from other development assistants and lead farmers in their areas. Chiefs and village development councils would appear to have been instrumental in the dissemination of knowledge on FISC/PTC.

Knowledge of a project leads to the decision to either participate or not participate in the activities promoted by that project. In this study it was assumed that knowledge of FISC/PTC and its activities by the population would be positively related to their rate and longevity of participation in the project activities. Seventy three per cent of the survey population participated in the project while 27 per cent did not. The majority of those who did not participate (38 %) pointed out that they were absent from their villages and engaged in work elsewhere when the project activities were initiated. Eighteen per cent claimed they had other things to do at that time, 11 per cent said they failed because of illness, another 11 per cent said it was because the FISC/PTC did not pay cash for participation, as was the case in other rural development projects

in the area, and the remainder mentioned conflicts between chiefs and village development councils, laziness and lack of knowledge as reasons for non-participation. The absence of the majority of those who did not participate when the project was implemented from the village points to the absence of adequate employment opportunities in the region and the fact that out migration might impact negatively on sustainable implementation and sustainable development projects.

Among those who participated in project activities, the majority, 32 per cent, took part in communal tree planting. Twenty per cent participated in the construction of terraces, 12 per cent took part in gully reclamation programmes and the rest participated in various other project activities. This data has significant implications in the assessment of whether FISC/PTC had a sustainable impact on the rural communities in which it operated. First, the majority of interviewees participated in communal tree planting while the third largest participation was in gully reclamation. Participation in these two activities, especially in the first five years of the project, was remunerated or induced through cash payment and directed primarily at the landless as a target group in the communities. It is possible that the apparent large participation in these two activities, a combined 44 per cent of the population, could be attributable to this cash inducement rather than the cognitive awareness and willingness to engage in sustainable conservation of the natural resource base.

Secondly, 22 per cent was in the construction of terraces. Here again, FISC/PTC used a range of incentives to induce participation in the construction of terraces on ones own farmland. These incentives were improved seeds and chemical fertilizers, to increase crop production. Moreover, fruit tree seedlings to plant on the terraces to improve their stability, improve the farmers' household nutrition and provide a possible source of income generation through direct sales of the fruits and/or in their canned form were given as incentives. Fodder grass seeds were also provided free of charge to plant on the terraces to improve their stability and generate fodder for stall feeding livestock. Again, the apparent significant participation of the survey population in the construction of terraces might be attributable to inducement by these various incentives more than it might have been possible without them. However, dependence on induced participation is not a good indicator of the success of sustainable development projects, because this form of participation often stops incentives stop.

The interviewees who participated in project activities were further asked why it was that they decided to do so. Seventeen per cent said they wanted to improve land productivity. Thirteen per cent said they wanted to generate income for themselves. Eleven per cent said they wanted payment. Twelve per cent said they were told to do so by the chief and the project. It is concluded that those who participated to control erosion and improve productivity were in the majority – a combined 40 per cent of the survey population. However, this was followed by a combined 24 per cent of those who wanted to generate income and get payment. The last category of 12 per cent belonged to those who participated because, as they saw it, they had no choice but to do so, perhaps for fear of the past political repercussions of not doing so during both the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the military rule. However, those who also wanted personal financial gain remained significant too.

When asked for how long they participated, 49 per cent said they did so for less than one year, while 29 per cent said between one and three years. Eight per cent participated up to six years and seven per cent for more than six years. Another eight per cent said they did not remember for how long they had participated in the project. Again, it is concluded that the sustainability of participation was short lived because of the dwindling of inducements. This emphasizes the point made earlier on, that induced participation does not promote prolonged success of sustainable development projects.

In reply to the question why they participated for the length of time they did, the majority of the respondents, 29 per cent, pointed out that, according to FISC/PTC regulations they had to change shifts between one and three years depending on how destitute they were. Twenty seven per cent said that the project ended quickly and the rest mentioned other reasons.

Seventy six per cent of the respondents that had participated in FISC/PTC activities said that the activities in which they participated were no longer going on today after the project stopped. Only 24 per cent said their activities were still continuing. Asked why the activities had stopped, the majority, 45 per cent, said they did not know. Twenty five per cent said it was because the project had ended. Twelve per cent blamed lack of cooperation among community members. Five per cent condemned vandalism as being responsible for their non-continuation. One might conclude that the fact that the majority of respondents who had participated reported not knowing the reasons why the activities had stopped, showed that the people had lost interest because there was no more tangible gains.

Of those who said their activities were still continuing, the majority, 77 per cent, said the activities would continue for a long time into the future. Thirteen per cent said they did not know for how long the activities would continue, while 10 per cent said their activities would only last for a short time of less than two years from the time of interview. The majority, 65 per cent, said that lack of resources and vandalism were a big problem of sustainability of the activities, followed by 13 per cent that blamed lack of maintenance.

A general conclusion that might be drawn from the data presented on knowledge of and participation in FISC/PTC, is that, the project was well known by the communities. The project's activities were well known and peoples' participation in the activities was high. Moreover, participation was highest among the activities which had inducement packages of inputs or cash for participation. However, the participation could not be sustainable without the incentives and declined once the incentives were reduced and finally removed, thereby resulting in the unsustainable continuation and management of the conservation activities through lack of resources, vandalism and maintenance. An important lesson that can be drawn from this experience for future projects and programmes is that, induced participation is inimical to sustainability of rural development efforts because when the inducements run out, the participation dies out too. Instead, what is needed is voluntary participation for sustainable rural development to materialise.

Another important lesson is that, sustainability of development projects depends also on the perception and attitudes of the intended beneficiaries. Lack of a positive will and attitude within the communities leads to their failure to marshal the necessary resources to implement and maintain sustainable development initiatives. At worst, it leads the communities to destroy and vandalise even the development property that has already been put in place for their own use, as soon as they think short term financial gains are no longer available. This implies that there needs to be a change in peoples attitudes towards and perception of sustainable development.

8.3 Sustainable Crop Production:

Throughout the thirteen years that FISC/PTC spent among rural communities in the Mohale's hoek district it preached the gospel of sustainable agricultural development. In the survey effort was made to test whether indeed sustainable agriculture development had been achieved, through an attempt to measure whether there was any decrease in the main indicators of unsustainable agriculture development, namely land degradation and loss of productivity.

The first task was to find out about the decrease in land degradation in the study area over a period of ten years.. Seventy two per cent of the respondents who owned fields reported the prevalence of erosion on their land over the past ten years, while 28 per cent said that there had been none. The study had assumed that the impact of FISC/PTC land husbandry gospel should have resulted in a decreased prevalence of erosion on farm land in rural Mohale's hoek. The findings presented above, however, showed that on the contrary, soil erosion still abounded. Gully erosion commanded the highest occurrence (37%), followed by sheet erosion (33%) and then rill erosion with 28 per cent. All these three major types of erosion reported, were attributable to rain as their cause. Rain was the highest cause of erosion in the study area. Running storm water accounted for 84 per cent of all responses to the question on causes of erosion. It was followed by overgrazing with 7 per cent, walking on the same path with 4 per cent and the rest of the percentage was on other causes.

The study had assumed that, given the enormous energies that FISC/PTC had exerted on construction of terraces, water diversion canals, water ways and water ponds over fourteen years, the impact of running rain water on erosion in the fields would have been curtailed. Again, as the data presented above shows, that was not the case. Rain water continued to cause erosion despite the anti-erosion measures installed due to the poor maintenance of the structures which left them ineffective.

Effort was made to find out whether farmers were aware of the relationship between erosion and loss of productivity on their land. Eighty seven per cent of the respondents said that they were aware that erosion affected the productivity of their land. Twelve per cent said they were not aware, while one per cent said they did not know. Asked how erosion affected their farm production, 41 per cent argued that it reduced the yields from their land. Thirty three per cent complained that erosion washed away some of their crops before harvest. Twenty three per cent accused erosion of reducing their arable land and 3 per cent said that erosion reduced soil fertility. It is concluded that farmers were aware that erosion impacted negatively on their farm production.

Knowledge by farmers is an important facet of sustainable agriculture. Giving farmers knowledge promotes their technical skill acquisition and empowerment in decision making, planning and implementation. FISC/PTC trained farmers on how to combat erosion on their fields. The study assumed that this knowledge would have been used by farmers to husband their

land and improve productivity. In the study area, 82 per cent of the farmers who reported the existence of erosion on their land, had under taken some measures to combat the erosion. However, 19 per cent had not done so because they had no resources (24%), no time (25%) and did know what to do (24%). The reasons advanced for failure to carry out anti-erosion measures point to the fact that some conservation education was still needed among some farmers in the area to the effect that they needed to be willing to change old farming methods and adopt the new ones introduced by the project. Time and resources to combat erosion will not be available unless special effort is made by farmers to include conservation work in their activity planning and as one of their top priorities too. This requires a change in their attitudes and perceptions towards sustainable development.

Among the conservation measures undertaken by those who had done so, construction of terraces was the most commonly done (26%), water diversion canals (18%) and water ways (18%). Planting fodder grasses such as elephant grass and banagrass came third (17%). Planting fruit trees on terraces was the least done activity with a score of eight per cent. The remaining 13 per cent was for other unspecified activities. The project had an incentive package of inputs attached to the construction of terraces on individual land. This might account for the high rate with which the terraces were constructed. Moreover, given that the running storm water was pointed out as the biggest cause of erosion in the area, the construction of terraces, water diversion canals and water ways were a good conservation priority by the farmers concerned. What remained paramount was for farmers to maintain the structures well to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. That was more so because 59 per cent of the respondents who had done some conservation on their land said that their work had been successful and erosion was declining (55%), whereas 41 per cent said that it had not been successful. The latter reported that their conservation works were destroyed by herdboys and their livestock (7%), vandalised by people (2%), their fodder grasses died from drought (4%) and as a result erosion was still present on their land (28%).

Central to and embodied in the concept of Farm Improvement with Conservation (FISC) and Production Through Conservation (PTC) was the spread of the gospel of sustainable agriculture among the farmers. In sustainable agriculture conservation and improved productivity are linked. The survey made effort to find out whether FISC/PTC had managed to create awareness among the farmers that conservation and productivity were linked. Farmers were asked what effect conservation had on their farm production. Sixty four per cent said that conservation increased

their farm income. Eighty per cent said that conservation increased the fertility of the soils in their fields. Nine per cent said that it decreased erosion on their land, and another nine per cent said that conservation had no effect at all on their farm production. It is concluded from the data, that farmers were quite aware that conservation and improved productivity were linked. What remained was for the farmers to translate this awareness into positive action to promote sustainable development.

Sustainable agriculture involves use of improved ecocentric methods of production. This includes land use, crop mixtures, farm technology, improved seeds, improved soil nutrients and high levels of output. Sustainable agriculture also includes an efficient network of agro-economic services at the disposal of farmers. Moreover, the yield that is obtained by farmers should be able to sustain their household food requirements throughout the cropping calendar in order to have sustainable household food security.

In the survey, effort was made to find out the position of farmers with regard to the various facets of sustainable agriculture discussed in the preceding paragraph. In terms of land use, not all farmers were able to cultivate their land annually over the past ten years. Only 74 per cent were able to do so, while 26 per cent failed to do so. This incidence of leaving land to lie fallow is high. Unless indented to allow the land to regain natural fertility, the fallow land does not contribute to sustainable agricultural production. Instead, fallow land undermines sustainable agriculture because it directly contributes to a decline in household and national food security.

The technology used for traction by those who had cultivated their fields was predominantly oxen. Forty three per cent had used their own oxen while 19 per cent had used hired oxen. Twenty nine per cent had used a tractor. Discussions with village development councils revealed that the increased use of oxen for ploughing was partly attributable to availability of farm implements such as ploughs, planters cultivators and discing equipment, given out by FISC/PTC to alleviate their shortage in the communities for hire under the management of the village development councils. The farmers also argued that oxen were cheaper and more readily available within the communities than tractors.

While sustainable agriculture frowns upon use of HighYielding Varieties (HYVS), it does, however, encourage the use of improved seed varieties for sustainable yields. Within the study area, FISC/PTC promoted the use of improved seed varieties by farmers through making them available for purchase under the management of village development councils which sold them at

a mark up price. The study had assumed that due to the impact of FISC/PTC, one would find a high use of improved seeds bought from the local community storehouses run by village development councils. Instead, 32 per cent used their own seed prepared from the previous years' harvest. Only 11 per cent used the seed purchased from the scheme promoted by FISC/PTC under the management of village development councils because they argued it was too expensive. However, an encouraging compensatory factor was that 31 per cent of the farmers had used seed purchased from Co-op Lesotho. Co-op Lesotho sells improved seeds that are conducive for production of sustainable yields just as much as does the Mohale's hoek town based, Jandrel's store, from which twelve per cent of the farmers said that they had bought their seed.

Sustainable agriculture also promotes use of natural vegetative nutrients to nourish the soil for sustainable yield, instead of heavy use of chemical fertilizers. Chemical fertilizers are condemned for their capacity to pollute the environment, while natural methods such as manure, mulching, ash and so on are preferred for being environmentally friendly. FISC/PTC promoted use of natural nutrients and methods by farmers on the one hand, and that of chemical fertilizers on the other hand. Use of chemical fertilizers especially Nitrogen, Potassium and Phosphates (NPK₂), was promoted through its use as part of the input incentive package given to farmers for conservation work, especially terrace construction, done on their own fields. Chemical fertilizers were also central to the input scheme run by village development councils under the support of FISC/PTC. A question that remains unresolved in the sustainable agriculture debate, is whether farmers should completely avoid use of chemical fertilizers in absolute preference for natural nutrients? Or whether they should experiment with a mixture of both? An answer to these two questions would go a long way to clarify both policy alternatives for decision makers and practical strategies for practitioners and farmers in the field.

In the study area, the majority of farmers, 46 per cent, had used manure and other vegetative matter as soil nutrients. Twenty five per cent had used chemical fertilizers, nine per cent used other sources while 20 per cent used nothing. The high use of natural matter as nutrients is indeed applaudable. However, for sustainable agriculture, specific recommendations on the kind of nutrients to use should be based on detailed studies of soils within respective regions in order to promote sustainable agriculture, rather than make a blanket recommendation for use of natural nutrients all round and everywhere. Cost implications to farmers also have to be borne in mind.

Composet is no doubt highly used by small farmers in Lesotho and elsewhere in Africa, because it is cheaper and more readily available within the environment of local communities.

Crop mixture is yet another important face of sustainable agriculture. The general understanding is that crops that would increase household food security should be encouraged. This would imply that crops that constitute the staple diet of respective communities, be given preference by farmers and those from outside who seek to provide them with some assistance in their struggles to achieve food security. Contrary to this expectation, one finds in some quarters within the sustainable agriculture debate and policy formulation, overriding encouragement directed towards farmers to shift from production of staple food crops to production of what are called "High Value Crops". While these "High Value Crops" might have the potential to fetch high prices in export markets, and increase the financial position of farmers, the said crops do not often constitute the basic diet of the farmers in question. As result the farmers have to purchase food stuffs with the money gained from the crop sales. It needs to be noted that this process buttresses the process of integration of farmers into a capitalist exchange economy over which, being remote and powerless, as they often are, they have little influence, let alone control. Thus entered through the angle of promotion of "High Value Crops", the household food security equation may balance in offices and theoretical debates but fails to balance with respect to the food demands of peasant farmers, especially in a country like Lesotho which is already a peripheral part of the southern African periphery in the wold capitalist system.

FISC/PTC did not make specific crop mixture preferences to encourage to farmers, despite some earlier attempts to make practical experiments and consultancy researches in that direction. As such farmers remained free to decide on choice of crops to cultivate. Rather, FISC/PTC concentrated on provision of assistance to farmers to improve their yield. Maize, which constitutes the staple diet of rural households in Lesotho, remained the most cultivated crop, on 132 hectares in the study area, followed by sorghum with 99 hectares and wheat came third with 76 hectares. The mean yield for maize was 9 bags. The mean yield for sorghum was 6 bags, and the yield for wheat was 3 bags. The total acreage cultivated was 302 hectares with a mean acreage of 4 hectares, and a range of 12 hectares. The modal acreage was 1.5 hectares. Total yield was 1,521 bags with a mean yield of 15 bags and a range of 90 bags. The modal yield was 8 bags. The yield levels reported above are very low for provision of sustainable household food security.

Increased yields through conservation farming are the epitome of sustainable agriculture. FISC/PTC preached and spread this gospel among farmers in Mohale's hoek throughout its entire life span of some 14 years. The study had assumed that after all the effort and time spent by FISC/PTC, farmers would have been able to achieve increased yield for sustainable household food security over the past 10 years. However, the study revealed that 71 per cent of the farmers interviewed reported a decrease in their yield over the past 10 years from the time of interview. Only 29 per cent reported some increase. The majority of those who reported an increase, some 36 per cent, attributed it to use of fertilizers. Thirty three per cent attributed it to good rains, while 27 per cent said it was due to good farming methods, and three per cent mentioned use of improved seeds.

Farmers who reported a decrease in yield blamed it mostly on lack of rain, too much sun and poor use of fertilizers. These factors were blamed by 40 per cent, 35 per cent and 12 per cent of the farmers respectively. The poor yield levels which farmers reported as a decrease have a negative impact for sustainable household food security. In sustainable agriculture a good measure of a sustainable yield is one that enables the farming household to have food and access to other basic necessities throughout the cropping calendar. In the study, 56 per cent of the farmers reported that their yield failed to sustain their households' food demand throughout the cropping year. In order to make up for the food deficit, 88 per cent of them said they had to purchase food stuffs in any available food markets. Forty four per cent of the households reported that their yield sustained them through the cropping year to ensure a sustainable household food security.

8.4 Sustainable range management

Sustainable livestock production and management relies heavily on sustainable range management. In the debate on sustainable agriculture, doubt is cast towards the effectiveness of communal range management in the promotion of sustainable livestock and range management. The gist of the argument is that common property regimes, under which communal grazing falls, promote unsustainable use of range resources through the creation of the tragedy of the commons syndrome. In the past, it was often automatically recommended that a switch to private property regime was a pre-condition for sustainable range management. However, recent thinking in the debate contends that within common property regimes, it is possible under regulated access regime, to have sustainable range management in Sub-Saharan Africa, Lesotho, included.

FISC/PTC input in range management operated within the framework of this latter contention. The project encouraged the strengthening of regulated access to, and management of, the range by the communities through the use of stall-feeding, equal grazing rights and rotational grazing. Open access regime style communal grazing was discouraged. Instead, a more regulated access to communal pastures was encouraged. The study had assumed that as a result of FISC/PTC intervention, livestock farmers would have resorted increasingly to stall feeding of their livestock as a sustainable management option. However, the study found that the majority of livestock owners, some 51 per cent, used communal grazing of livestock as the only method. Thirty nine per cent combined communal grazing with stall feeding, while only 11 per cent did outright stall-feeding. Therefore use of stall feeding as a mechanism to regulate access to use of the common pastures does not seem to have had much impact despite widespread effort to promote it using seeds for fodder grasses by the project. Asked about the quality of the range over the past ten years within their community, 85 per cent of the interviewees complained that the quality of the range had deteriorated, while 15 per cent said that it had improved. Forty four per cent of this latter group attributed the range improvement to good management methods in the area, and another 44 per cent equally attributed this to the good rains.

Farmers who complained of deterioration in the quality of the range over the past ten years attributed it to lack of sufficient rains. Sixteen per cent said the cause of the deterioration as was overgrazing and damage caused by both herdboys and livestock to enclosed pastures for rotation grazing. Sixty seven per cent of the interviewees noted that deterioration in range quality impacted negatively on their livestock production. Again, in order for rotational grazing to become effective as a tool for sustainable range management, some change in the perceptions and attitudes of the community members is necessary so that all members can abide by the rules set by the community to govern regulated access to the communal range.

FISC/PTC experimented with the possible use of equal grazing rights as a mechanism to guarantee equal benefits from use of communal range resources by both stockholders and non-stock holders alike, to ensure their full participation and commitment to sustainable range management. Asked to express their opinions on this possible option, 56 per cent of the respondents said that they did not know whether it would work out since it appeared to cheat livestock owners. Thus the viability of possible use of equal grazing rights as a new additional

option to regulate access to communal grazing encountered problems of implementation because it did not fit in well with livelihood strategies perceived by the communities.

Meanwhile, unsustainable livestock production and range management might be aggravated by the fact that despite their own admission that FISC/PTC did assist them with improved management options, most interviewees, 63 per cent, revealed that they did not use the recommended practices anymore, because of lack of resources (30%) and the fact that FISC/PTC project had ended (19%). Those two responses when combined yielded a total response of 49 per cent that complained of lack of resources to continue implementation of the range management activities initiated by FISC/PTC. Twenty seven per cent attributed their discontinuation to destruction by herdboys and livestock. This data leads one to conclude that availability and knowledge of techniques that might be necessary to achieve sustainable range management alone was not enough. There needed to be other resources, especially capital, at the disposal of peasants to be able to implement the knowledge and techniques on sustainable agriculture. However, farmers attitudes towards the perception of improved livestock production and range management also have to change if success is to be achieved.

Sustainable agriculture takes place mainly on individual land, but it does also take place on communal land under implementation by the community for the benefit of the community as a whole. Within the latter context, sustainable agriculture becomes part of the other common goods and resources that are accessed by individuals through community regulations. In Lesotho, the range, water and wood resources are some of the resources that have become abused and neglected by individual members of the community, with dire consequences of loss of productivity, depletion and eventual extinction. In part, the tragedy of commons syndrome is largely to blame for this unsustainable resource utilization.

In an effort to assist the communities to arrest this prevalent unsustainable use of the common property resources in their localities, FISC/PTC implemented specific programmes on communal land conservation and management. The study had assumed that community members would be aware of and able to identify the various activities that the project had implemented in their villages. Eighty seven per cent of all the respondents confirmed that they knew of project activities on communal land in their villages. Out of the seventeen activities mentioned, communal tree planting, gully reclamation and bana grass planting were the most frequently

mentioned with 39 per cent, 18 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively. Participation of individual members, especially in community tree planting, gully reclamation and planting bana grass to stabilise water ways, water ponds and for grass seeding was remunerated by the project. Individuals participated in them on a rotational basis to ensure an equitable distribution of the financial gain and participation. It is possible that this remuneration incentive influenced the higher recall rate on those three activities. What is clear is that, the payment did manage to induce a higher participation rate of some 91 per cent of the respondents. Nine per cent of the respondents did not participate in communal land conservation and management. The majority of the non participants, (38%), argued that they had other more important things to do. Twenty five per cent said they were not interested, another twenty five per cent reported being absent from home at the time when the activities were done, while twelve per cent said they were ill at that time.

The reasons for non-participation mentioned above showed alert advocates of sustainable development the fact that there are many roads that lead to sustainable livelihoods. Depending on their pressures and needs, individuals within communities attach different preferences to prioritization of survival strategies to enable them attain sustainable development. It is only when sustainable livelihood strategies for the households have been assured that sustainable development at the community level can become more effective.

In order to promote sustainable household survival as a pre-condition for the success of sustainable community development, FISC/PTC used cash payment incentive to participants. As a result the majority of community members who reported that they participated (38%) argued that they did so in order to develop their villages. Twenty per cent said they did so in order to stop erosion, while 16 per cent mentioned receipt of cash payment as their reason for participation.

However, the problem with sustainable development at community level that is implemented through induced participation is that its longevity of success becomes unsustainable once the inducements cease to flow. Despite their admission that the erected activities were good in land management, 81 per cent of those who had participated said that the activities they participated in were no longer being done in their communities since the project ended. The majority of them, 46 per cent, said that they did not know why it was so. Seventeen per cent blamed lack of co-

operation among community members, while 15 per cent argued that it was because the project ended.

Ground verifications in the field by the researcher confirmed that many activities which had been initiated were in an advanced state of collapse and decay as depicted in Plate 8.1 to 8.6. As can be seen from these plates, water ponds had silted. Water ways were promoting headward erosion. Gully erosion on formerly reclaimed areas was on the increase, community gardens were destroyed and springs developed to promote gravity irrigation and concrete benches were all in a state of advanced delapidation and decay.

As a summary to the judgement of the impact of FISC/PTC activities on sustainable agriculture respondents were asked to provide individual assessment of each of the activities based on rating scale of five ranging from very bad, bad, don't know, good and very good. The first set of questions were related to land management activities on individual land.

Terraces were rated very good by 72 per cent of the respondents. Sixty per cent of the respondents commended terraces for being effective in the control of running water and therefore reduction of its contribution to land degradation. However, at the time of the research, some terraces visited were in dire need of maintenance.

Water diversion canals were rated very good by 55 per cent of the respondents. Eighty-four per cent of these respondents commended water diversion canals for being effective in the control of running water so that it becomes less erosive and damaging to land productivity. Again, many water diversion canals need maintenance as depicted in Plate 8.1

The planting of fruit trees on terraces was viewed as very good by 52 per cent of the respondents. The majority of them, some 31 per cent were pleased that the fruit trees increased their supply of fruits for increased consumption and better nutrition. The use of inputs incentive scheme by the project for conservation work done on individual land, was rated very good by 52 per cent of the respondents. However, the majority, 41 per cent, cautioned that the inputs incentive package undermined internal sustainability because it created a dependency syndrome of farmers on assistance from outside. Thirty three per cent of the respondents commended the inputs incentive package for reducing the costs of production by farmers.



Plate 8.1

**Water way in need of maintenance at MATOENG village
in the study area.**

The input supply scheme managed by the village development councils to replace the input supply incentive scheme, was rated very good by 49 per cent of the respondents. Forty six per cent of the respondents argued that the scheme ensured a timely supply of farm inputs during the planting season. However, some complained that the mark up price made the inputs more expensive. Another scheme run by the village development council, the implements hire scheme, was regarded as very good by 53 per cent of the respondents. However, in some villages the implements were reported stolen long time ago. Yet in other villages, these implements remained rusting outside without use by farmers because they complained that their rental charges were too high. Average charges were found to be R10.00 per day per item ranging from a plough, planter, harrow, ripper, cultivator and scotch card. Farmers complained that they spent an average R100.00 per ploughing season per farmer on these items. They argued that this cost was too high and prevented to have sustainable access to and use of the implements hire scheme.

8.5 Sustainable income generation

Sustainable rural development depends on sustainable income generation as well. This is particularly so for those households without access to land, livestock and financial resources from outside to enable them to access various basic entitlements to life. Sustainable rural development is, therefore, more than household food security. It entails sustainable human development. Sustainable income generation consists of a wide range of activities which might be both agricultural and non-agricultural in nature.

In recognition of the fact that not all households in rural Lesotho have access to income, especially migrant remittances, FISC/PTC also introduced income generation activities primarily for landless households and the stockless households. Within the realm of agriculture, the income generation activities promoted were dairy cows, piggery, bee-keeping poultry, home gardens and community gardens. Non-agricultural income generation activities were candle making and juice making. The mode of operation in these activities was the introduction of common interest groups (CIG) whereby community members who expressed similar interest in income generation activities were encouraged to form groups to enable them to pool and share resources together. The project largely created an enabling framework and played the role of a facilitator who

supplied training and acted as a guarantor where financial resources were required as start up capital. Detailed discussions on various schemes on income generation was presented in chapter seven.

The dairy cows scheme was rated as very good by 52 per cent of the respondents. Forty four per cent of the respondents praised dairy cows for milk, while 34 per cent said the milk generated household income. As such dairy cows were popular and in high demand by respondents. Some, however, cautioned that the monies needed to purchase food for the cows made them expensive to raise.

Another agricultural income generation activity promoted was piggery. Forty two per cent of the respondents said piggery was very good. Thirty nine per cent said piggery raised household income, while 32 per cent praised them for pork for improved household consumption. Again some respondents cautioned that the high prices for feed threatened the sustainability of piggery production.

Poultry was yet another agricultural income generation activity promoted by the project. The poultry involved production of broilers and eggs. Fifty eight per cent of the respondents commended poultry as very good. Forty three per cent of the respondents praised poultry for production of eggs and meat necessary for sustainable household consumption, while thirty five per cent commended them for their contribution to household income.

Bee-keeping was condemned by the majority of the respondents. Forty seven per cent said they doubted if bee-keeping was a safe activity because it was dangerous to people, especially children. Respondents did, however, indicate that the honey got from bee-keeping would constitute a healthy diet and readily available medical cure for cold related illnesses in the household. Discussion with the District Agricultural Office personnel revealed that the bee-keeping scheme did not actually take off ground for want of popular support.

Vegetable production for household consumption and sale was promoted through use of both home and community gardens. With regard to home gardens, 43 per cent of the respondents felt they were very good, while 38 per cent rated them as good. Fifty one per cent of them said the vegetables produced in the home gardens improved household nutrition, while 23 per cent said that the vegetables contributed to household income when sold. Some respondents (11%) argued

that home gardens had the advantage that individuals were free to decide on the type of vegetables and the timing to plant.

In order to ease availability of water for irrigation of home gardens, the project promoted roof water harvesting technology and use of sand plots or concrete benches as depicted in Plate 8.2. The concrete benches were particularly promoted in the hardest desertification hit area of Taung. A concrete bench is a tank shaped wall built of stones and plastered with cement inside. Its bottom is filled with sand in order to reduce evaporation of the water stored inside. It is used to harvest rain water from the roofs of houses and store it for use to irrigate home gardens as shown in **Plate 8.2**. Sixty two per cent of the respondents said they did not know whether the concrete benches were good or bad because they never had them. However, 22 per cent rated the concrete benches as very good. Forty four per cent argued that the concrete benches enabled them to harvest and store rain water from the roofs cheaply to improve the productivity of their home gardens.

Empirical observation by the researcher during fieldwork showed that most of the concrete benches were still working well and were sustainable.



Plate 8.2

Roof water harvesting for irrigation of home gardens through use of sand plots a TAUNG , in the study area.

Vegetable production through use of communal gardens contributes to sustainable employment generation especially for women, and their empowerment through independent decision-making and income generation. FISC/PTC promoted development of communal gardens in its areas of operation through provision of initial seeds and training on vegetable production, construction of water ponds and improvement of springs for irrigation. Water ponds were rated very good by 59 per cent of the respondents, while 23 per cent rated them as good. Thirty three per cent of the respondents commended water ponds for enabling them to get water for irrigation of gardens more easily. A visit to some of the water ponds including the project show piece at ha Sekoati by the researcher showed that many were badly silted and in need of maintenance as depicted in Plate 8.3. This was due to lack of co-operation among community members. Therefore their future contribution to provision of sustainable irrigation water for gardens is questionable, if left in that state for long.

The spring has been vandalised, together with the sand plots, the pipes, the water storage tank, the ordinary plots and the orchard. At the time of the research, what remained of this endeavour was a typical development white elephant. Asked to express their opinions on spring development, 62 per cent of the respondents said they did not know much about it, whereas 22 per cent said it was very good.

Seventy seven per cent argued that spring development improved clean water for drinking. Only five per cent related spring development to provision of water for irrigation. This might indicate that not enough education was done by the project to make villages aware of the potential of spring development for irrigation rather than home consumption alone. This could also partly explain why the show-piece spring development model was so highly vandalised by some community members. Moreover, vandalism to development property indicates the wilful and intentional refusal by the people themselves to change their old ways in life and adapt to new ways conducive to sustainable development.

In general, without the life blood of both water ponds and spring development, upon which communal garden development was based, many of the gardens were also found to be in limbo, despite their being rated to be very good by 38 per cent of the respondents and good by nineteen per cent. The majority, 34 per cent, noted their potential contribution to household income

generation, while 17 per cent praised them for provision of vegetables for improved household consumption. Discussion with key informants and the village development councils showed that



Plate 8.3

A silted water pond at HA SEKOATI in the study area.

the collapse of communal gardens was due to lack of co-operation among community members and within common interest groups caused by village, as well as, national party politics, vandalism by some community members and the incompetence of some village development councils to give direction to communal garden committees. Despite clear signs of development, at the time of the research most communal gardens were defunct and remained as development ivory towers without actual contribution to sustainable household food security and income generation. The people need to change their negative attitudes and behaviour patterns towards development property and adopt more responsible attitudes and behaviour for sustainable development to become successful in assisting them to have sustainable livelihoods.

The FISC/PTC did not make much headway in terms of promotion of sustainable income generation through non-agricultural activities. A rudimentary small scale industry was started using a common interest group at Braakfontein. The Braakfontein common interest group concentrated on candle making and juice making. Juice production had both backward and forward linkages in the rural local economy in that the inputs used were fruits purchased locally. The juice made was sold locally to households and schools. When the respondents were asked to express their opinions on juice making, 55 per cent said that they did not know because they had never implemented. Twenty three per cent said that juice making was very good and 15 per cent rated it just good. Thirty one per cent of the respondents praised juice making for the good drink that was available nearby. Only one per cent saw it as a source of income generation while three per cent saw it as a source of employment. The majority of the respondents, some 34 per cent, argued that juice making was problematic because it had no market. Moreover, eleven per cent of the respondents complained that it was costly to run. Discussions with the Braakfontein common interest group involved in juice making confirmed that marketing was a problem in that their product faced stiff competition from long established juice brands, especially from South Africa. Another problem mentioned was the seasonality of the business, which limits operations to autumn only when fruits used as inputs are available locally. Use of fruit inputs bought from outside rendered the business unsustainable due to unaffordable costs of operations.

Another sustainable income generation activity experiment with candle making was considered very good by 42 per cent of the respondents while 35 per cent rated it good. Forty five per cent of the respondents argued that candles had a good market. Only ten per cent said that candle making was a good source of household income, while eight per cent said it created employment as well.



Plate 8.4

A Vandalised spring development for the irrigation of a community garden at HA SEKOATI in the study area.

Discussions with the Braakfontein common interest group revealed that their candle making endeavour was a good business. However, competition with other candle products on the market, especially those from South Africa, was very stiff. They complained that the inputs used were purchased at expensive prices which threatened the sustainability of the enterprise for want of sufficient capital to continue operations. At the time of the research, the Braakfontein common interest group had suspended both juice making and candle making for self evaluation. The group admitted that it made little profit and did not know how soon it would resume operations.

8.6 Sustainable extension in organisational and management change

Sustainable rural development is depended on sustainable capacity creation at the field level, the district/provincial level and the national levels.

Within the context of sustainable agriculture, at the field level, the need is to create enabling context for farmers to acquire knowledge and apply it to improve their farm yields with and through sustainable land management. This new thinking requires a change in the structural and functional relationships among the three most important actors at field level, namely, the farmer, the extension assistant and the subject matter specialist. The three need to a form partnership that can enable networking and information sharing to ensure sustainability. The classic Training and Visit (T & V) system that was hierachial, bureaucratic and top-down with the subject matter specialist at the top being the "know-all and think tank" and the extension agent a mere messenger meant to pass the technical message down to the passive, ignorant and confused farmer, needs to change. Instead, sustainable agriculture requires equality in the field and mutual exchange of thoughts, ideas and knowledge among the three.

In order to achieve this partnership, a lot of training and information exchange is vital. The extension system also needs to change from being monospecialist to multi-purpose in order to increase the competence of field staff in problem solving at grass roots level. Moreover, unlike in T & V where there is occasional contact between farmers and the often urban based extension personnel, sustainable agriculture requires that extension agents be field based, interact with, and become part and parcel of the rural communities with which they work in order to develop and acquire first hand knowledge of the community problems and priorities.

FISC/PTC expended a lot of energies in capacity creation for sustainable agriculture. Farmers were given a lot of training courses, on the spot training in their fields and some excursions to sister projects in the neighbouring districts. The training given to farmers was on crop production, livestock production, range management and conservation. Asked to evaluate FISC/PTC training activities for farmers, 50 per cent of the respondents rated the training activities very good, while 31 per cent said that they were good. Fifty seven per cent of the respondents commended the training programmes for teaching farmers improved crop production methods, while 27 per cent prided themselves for having acquired improved livestock production methods from the training. It would, therefore, appear that the project did a lot of training and also satisfied the majority of the farmers in the areas where it operated.

In order to decentralise the extension system and promote partnership among field staff and farmers, FISC/PTC discouraged the T & V system of extension. Instead the project, in partnership with the communities, constructed buildings to house extension agents, and provide office space for the chiefs and village development councils. In cases where the chiefs already had offices, office equipment was provided, whereas in those areas where housing and offices of the Ministry of Agriculture already existed, the project up-graded them and also provided some operational equipments and deployed the extension personnel to stay in the villages and become part of the communities they served. Plate 8.5 shows a typical multi-purpose building constructed with local resources and meant to office the chief, the village development councils and provide office and housing space for the extension agent.

However, at the time of the research, most of the extension agents had left the rural communities, and stayed in the Mohale's hoek town in their own private housing arrangements and occasionally commuted from there to their respective extension areas, thus perpetuating the old T & V system to which they were used to before the project started. Some of the houses constructed for their accommodation by the project in partnership with local communities plus those which belonged to the Ministry of Agriculture and were up graded by the project were found highly vandalised and in a state of advanced dilapidation. During the research, discussions with some extension agents who had stopped staying in the rural areas revealed that they were not satisfied with the pay and social environment in the villages. Discussions with village development councils on the question of vandalism to buildings meant for development revealed

that the attitude of some community members needed to change if sustainable development was to take root at all.



Plate 8.5

A typical multi-purpose building constructed through the PTC project assistance to provide housing to the extension agent and the offices of the chief and the village development council at HA MONYAKE village in the study area.



Plate 8.6

Some of the inputs and impliments given by the PTC Project to the village development council to sell and rent out to the farmers at HA MONYAKE village in the study area.

The FICS/PTC also expended a lot of energies to change the extension system from being mono-disciplinary and dependent on subject matter specialists, to that which was multi-purpose and polyvalent. In order to foster a polyvalent extension system, FISC/PTC provided multi-subject training to its own field staff, and that of the Ministry of Agriculture and rural development as a whole so that they could become competent enough to tackle all immediate problems of farmers without reference to subject matter specialists. The latter only came in as a back up support to deal with higher order special cases. When asked to give their opinions on the extension agents, 34 per cent rated them as very good. Thirty six per cent said they were just good, while 12 per cent said they were bad. Sixty-nine per cent of the respondents argued that the extension agents were well trained and effective at work. The sustainability of extension agents is, however, threatened by their high loss to other employment. Fourteen per cent complained that the extension agents had left the villages and that they were at present without any extension agents. It would appear that the retention capacity of the District Agricultural Office for trained extension personnel needs to be stepped up to ensure a sustainable extension service, and maintain the sustainable capacity creation mounted by FISC/PTC in the district.

In pursuit of its motto to promote participatory extension service, FISC/PTC also involved farmers and the communities in three ways. First, the project asked the communities to elect their own farmers who would be trained by the project to work together with extension agents in the villages. These elected community members called lead farmers became an additional arm in sustainable extension service delivery. When asked to express their opinions on lead farmers, 40 per cent of the respondents rated them as very good whereas 33 per cent said they were good. Seventy two per cent of the respondents said the lead farmers were well trained and effective in their job. Ten per cent said they were well trained but ineffective in their job because they either used favouratism or accorded themselves first priority in service delivery. One would have expected this cadre of trained lead farmers to become absorbed into the Ministry of Agriculture or be maintained as an informal part of the Ministry's field staff when the project ceased. However, at the time of the survey most of them lay idle and unutilised in the villages or were engaged in other activities of non-governmental organisations. Thus the sustainability of lead farmers as extension personnel has collapsed.

The second effort to promote a sustainable extension service through participatory extension was the use of village veterinary workers. Communities elected two of their members in each

gazetted chieftainship area to be trained in basic veterinary service to help farmers with livestock problems in the villages. The village veterinary workers were trained by the project and after completion of their training, they were given an initial loan of a set of working tools with which to start their own service to their communities and charge them for the service rendered. Fifty per cent of the respondents rated the village veterinary workers as very good, while 27 per cent said that they were good. Seventy six per cent of the respondents said that the village veterinary workers were well trained and effective in their work. Seventeen per cent of the respondents complained that they never had village veterinary workers and needed them. Village veterinary workers seem to have become a sustainable success in participatory livestock extension service delivery. Discussions with some of them together with farmers indicate that all parties are happy, perhaps, because they have been left to have their own private enterprise.

Training of village technical assistants was yet another attempt by FISC/PTC to decentralise the extension service through promotion of community participation. Communities elected their own people to be given technical training to repair the village implements and hire equipment given to village development councils. They were given some basic equipment to start work and charge the village development councils. Thirty six per cent of the respondents said that the village technical assistants were very good, while 35 per cent said that they were poorly trained and ineffective. While the idea to attempt to use village technical assistants as part of participatory extension, was good, its impact in the villages was found very wanting. The VDC equipment was new and did not need regular repair, so that the assistants had no employment, except to resort to compete with qualified mechanics for repair of farmers' agricultural machinery. Being less trained, the village technical assistants failed badly in the ensuing competition. Those who were interviewed felt disgruntled by the endeavour because they complained they had no job market.

Subject matter specialists were yet another important factor in the efforts to promote sustainable extension service. Subject matter specialists were also given polyvalent training in order to enable them to solve a broader range of farmers' problems per person while they were out in the field. They also formed teams called developmental management teams around sister subject areas and decided on policy initiatives, and technical strategies. When asked to express their opinion on subject matter specialists, 44 per cent of the respondents rated them as very good while 30 per cent said that they were good. Seventy one per cent said they were well trained and effective. It would appear that the project did a good job training the subject matter specialists

and that their training made them effective in their work. However, at the time of the research, many subject matter specialists who were trained under FISC/PTC had either retired, been transferred to other districts or sought employment in other sectors. Two of the most highly trained subject matter specialists in the United Kingdom had also gone, leaving behind a serious shortage of high calibre personnel. Again, the poor retention capacity of the District Agricultural Office militates against sustainable capacity creation through an efficient extension service and departmental expert management in the district.

8.7 Sustainable participation and institution building

Sustainable development depends on peoples participation in development planning, decision-making and implementation. In the debate on participation, conflict of opinions exists about which type of participation is most conducive for the promotion of sustainable development. Some analysts content that people would not normally participate in development activity unless they stood to gain in some personal reward. From this perspective, use of inducements of kinds to lure people to participate are found to be obligatory for sustainable development. On the contrary, other analysts argue that people would need to be convinced of the long term community gain in order to participate in initiatives for sustainable development. The latest wisdom seems to suggest that sustainable development survives best under the latter perspective where voluntary, free and process oriented participation is prevalent. However, this thesis contends that a mixture of both community and private initiatives would appear to be the most viable strategy for sustainable participation.

Another important issue in the debate on participation is to identify and devise the kind of institutions for decision-making, planning and implementation and procedures and techniques that are conducive to sustainable participation for sustainable development.

FISC/PTC expended a lot of energies to identify, devise and promote sustainable participation for sustainable development. At a local level, sustainable participation was promoted through the identification, use and strengthening of village development councils composed of chiefs and elected community members, as well the local institutions responsible for spearheading decision making, planning and implementation of sustainable development within their respective communities and regions. Village development councils were trained in sustainable development by the project, and given material support in the form of some materials for the construction of

village development councils offices and some office equipment. They were also advanced with farm inputs and implements to sell and rent out to community members, and improve their financial status so that they could become viable economic units as depicted in Plate 8.6.

In the study, respondents were asked to evaluate their respective village development councils. Forty four per cent of the respondents rated village development councils as very good while 30 per cent said that they were good. Seventy one per cent of the respondents said that the village development councils were well trained and effective. It is therefore clear that the project did good work for training and strengthening of the local institutions for sustainable development.

Discussions with members of village development councils revealed that they felt their effectiveness was hampered by their short office tenure of three years, poor resourcing and a non-cooperative attitude among some community members due to differences in village politics and national party politics. Moreover, in some areas, village development councils complained that their chiefs were either highly un-cooperative, non-development minded or wanted to boss them around in decision-making, planning, implementation and monitoring of development initiatives. Another problem negative to sustainable development noted by the researcher during the field work was that of discontinuity of office tenure of some of the chiefs themselves. During FISC/PTC time, offices of some of the chiefs were run by their wives who acted on their behalf while they were working in the mines and other engagements elsewhere. FISC/PTC exhausted its efforts on training the women who were in office during its time. The termination of FISC/PTC has coincided with the height of retrenchment of the men from South Africa while those from the civil service in Lesotho have been retrenched or given early retirement under the conditions of structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The retrenched men have resumed their chieftainship but are totally untrained in development administration. Most are poorly educated, stubborn and male chauvinistic, and likely to have a negative effect on sustainable development.

Sustainable bottom-up procedures and techniques are indispensable for sustainable development. In order to promote sustainable participatory bottom-up planning and decision-making, FISC/PTC promoted a participatory methodology called village development planning process. This methodology was presented in detail in chapter seven. In general, community members assemble together in a public gathering to identify, prioritise and draw up their village development plans under the enabling technical assistance of the field staff of the District

Agricultural Office. This process was meant to enhance the development and planning capacity of the communities and solicit their commitment to its implementation as they would have been responsible for the decision-making process that led to the plan formulation. This approach to planning was meant to promote a bottom-up as opposed to top-down approach to decision-making and planning.

In the survey, respondents were asked to evaluate the village development planning process in their regions. Forty seven per cent of respondents rated the process as good while 40 per cent said that the process was very good. Seventy seven per cent of the respondents said that the village development planning process induced community participation for sustainable development. However, some respondents (10%) argued that the process was ineffective because it was dominated by the chiefs, village development councils and "better" persons (i.e. village elite, rural petty bourgeoisie and other well resourced persons) and extroverts in the community. One other reason mentioned by village development councils was that the effectiveness of the village development planning process was hampered by party politics which constituted a highly divisive element among community members at the time of the research, due largely to the May 1998 national election outcome and its bloody aftermath. Again, peoples' attitudes towards development matters need to change. They need to develop a culture of political tolerance in order to be able to work together despite their political differences.

Closely related to the village development planning process was its sister process the area team approach. The two were inter-related in that the area team approach is composed of subject matter specialists, members of other rural development line ministries, members of other sister projects and Non-governmental organisations in the district headquarters, plus the field staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and that of Local Government and rural development in the area, together with community members. The area team approach provides a large institutional technical framework within which local communities can practice a mixture of bottom-up plus top-down approaches to planning and decision-making in one setting at one time. Complete top-down is authoritarian and void of local content, while total bottom-up can be chaotic and directionless in terms of the macro-national and meso-district frameworks for policy formulation and planning. Thus the area team approach was innovated by FISC/PTC to become a practical merger of the two approaches to aid the village development planning process for sustainable development in Mohale's hoek.

In the survey, respondents were asked to evaluate the area team approach. Thirty eight per cent of the respondents rated the area team approach as very good while 32 per cent said that it was good. Forty two per cent of the respondents argued that the area team approach promoted the sharing of knowledge and skills between the district level, technical experts and local communities. Nineteen per cent of the respondents commended it for promoting community participation while 15 per cent praised it for inducement of effective planning and implementation of sustainable development. Despite the praises, the area team approach was blamed of regional bias by some 21 per cent of the respondents who claimed that the area team approach had never taken place in their villages despite their long awaited requests for its implementation. Moreover, discussions with some officials of the District Agricultural Office revealed that the effectiveness of the area team approach was also hampered by the weak co-operation among ministries and inter-departmental rivalries within the Ministry of Agriculture itself both of which weakened the multi-disciplinary and inter departmental and ministerial composition of the area teams and reduced the frequency of area teams visits to the field to effect sustainable development operations due to differential idiosyncratic preferences and time planning.

Sustainable development also depends on sustainable implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development initiatives. In order to promote this, FISC/PTC devised and encouraged the use of participatory village work plans. After drawing up participatory village development plans, communities came together and drew up village work plans composed of a list of prioritised activities, the cost of each activity, sources of funding per activity (available and anticipated) specific place of implementation per activity and the time plan for implementation of each activity. These activity plans enabled the communities to manage the implementation process of their development plans more effectively, in that, it became easier for them to monitor and evaluate plan performance and take immediate remedial action where necessary.

In the research, respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of village work plans in their regions. Forty four per cent of the respondents rated their performance as good while 34 per cent said they were very good. Sixty per cent of the respondents commended the village work plans for the promotion of effective plan implementation while 19 per cent praised them for being able to induce community participation in plan implementation. No doubt, village work plans were welcome by communities. However, nine per cent of the respondents complained that

their villages did not have village work plans for want of co-operation among community members. Discussions with village development councils also revealed that the effectiveness of village work plans was jeopardised by poor resourcing within the communities. As a result of poor resources for implementation, some village work plans were reported to be gathering dust in the offices of village development councils.

Conventional wisdom on sustainable development decrees that it depends on community action. However, in real life situations, communities are heterogeneous social entities with differentiated needs, interests and resources. Therefore the latest thinking in sustainable development is that while community action is good, sustainable development equally depends on individual and interest group action. FISC/PTC did not only promote community action for sustainable development, but that of individuals and interest groups as well. Community members were encouraged to form common interest groups (C.I.G.) composed of people with similar development interests especially on income generation activities, to be partly funded by the project in partnership with the common interest group as an economic mini corporate unit that could raise and solicit its own funding using the project as its guarantor.

In the research, respondents were asked to assess the performance of common interest groups. Forty two per cent rated them as good while 39 per cent said that they were very good. Forty nine per cent of the respondents said that common interest groups promoted resource pooling and sharing among members. Twenty four per cent said they promoted the maintenance and effective management of development initiatives while ten per cent commended them for promotion of effective participation for sustainable development. No doubt the project initiative on common interest groups was appreciated by communities, however, some problems stood in the way of their effective operation. Discussions with members of one common interest group, the Braakfontein one, that was just closing down around the time of field work revealed that co-operation within the group was not often as good as ought to be for its effective functioning. Moreover, in cases where the group promoted easy access to resources which were subsequently enjoyed on an individual basis by members of the group, those members who had benefited first, became reluctant to repay revolving loan funds to be accessed by the next generation of beneficiaries. As a result common interest group development initiatives became unsustainable and collapsed.

Sustainable development also depends on empowerment of farmers in order to have representation in regional decision making institutions and bodies which make regional policy frameworks to direct the decisions by farmers at local levels. This representation would ensure the presentation of the interests of farmers in such fora.

The FISC/PTC promoted farmers participation in decision making by the District Agricultural Office in Mohale's hoek through the creation of a new institution, the board of farmers, democratically elected by the farmers and community members at large, to represent them in the District Agricultural Office in all meetings and other fora. The survey asked respondents to evaluate the board of farmers. Twenty four per cent said they were very good. Twenty six per cent said they were good while the majority, 40 per cent, of the respondents said they did not know of the existence of such a board of farmers. Fifty one per cent of the respondents said that the board of farmers was well trained and effective in their representation. Again 35 per cent of the respondents complained that they did not have any representatives in the board of farmers. One might conclude that being a new institution meant to promote participation of local communities at the district level, the board of farmers was not yet well known in the communities. It needed time to make its impact. Moreover, discussions with some members of the board of farmers revealed that while FISC/PTC made all effort to make sure they were well trained and present in the meetings of the District Agricultural Office, after the end of the project little effort was made to continue the training of new board members and invite them regularly to attend the meetings of the District Agricultural Office. This seriously undermined the effectiveness and sustainability of the board's representation of communities and function as a viable tool for the promotion of sustainable decision making at both district and local levels.

Sustainable development also depends on restructuring of the regional and national institutions responsible for policy making and planning. In Lesotho, regional restructuring implies re-organisation of the District Agricultural Office to become more receptive to bottom-up participation and a horizontal inter-departmental and ministerial integration. The FISC/PTC promoted the restructuring and strengthening of the District Agricultural Office in Mohale's hoek through many initiatives. Departmental teams were formed to co-ordinate the activities of individual divisions within them. Each departmental team composed of heads of divisions chose a departmental head who acted as the co-ordinator and liaised with the District Agricultural Officer. The heads of departmental teams came together to form the district management team.

Other members of the district management team are the representatives of the board of farmers, heads of area teams and representatives of other ministries and projects operating in the district. The district agricultural officer is the chairperson of the district management team. The area team, departmental management team and district management team all ensured that there was an easier communication between farmers, and various cadres of officers of government in the district. Working in teams also helped to minimize the vertical, bureaucratic boss-underdog relationships typical of a classic top down organisational structure. Instead, the teams promoted equitable empowerment, team spirit and partnership among all stakeholders.

The District Agricultural Office was also assisted to network with other District Agricultural Offices in the country, other sustainable development projects and sister Non-governmental organisations with projects in the Mphahlele district. CARE Lesotho and World Vision International are some of the Non-governmental organisations networking with the District Agricultural Office in Mphahlele. CARE Lesotho was even offered office space within the premises of the District Agricultural Office and has adopted the area team and unified extension approaches developed and promoted by FISC/PTC. Discussions with officers from both Non-governmental organisations revealed that the networking was good and expected to last long into the future.

In terms of sister sustainable development projects, FISC/PTC networked with the then Matelile Integrated Rural Development Project that operated in the Matelile ward in the Mafeteng district. Staff exchange programmes and farmers educational tours saw to the cross fertilization of ideas, techniques and modus operandi between the two projects. It was among others, these exchange visits that attracted the expansion of FISC/PTC into Mafeteng district as the second adopter of the FISC/PTC approach to sustainable development. When the FISC/PTC project ended and the Matelile Integrated Rural Development was transformed into the district-wide Mafeteng Development Programme, the networking responsibilities became passed on to the District Agricultural offices of Mphahlele and Mafeteng and continues unabated to date.

Networking was also forged between FISC/PTC and the then Local initiative support project (LISP), that operated in the Quthing district. This networking resulted in the exchange of ideas, techniques and modes of operation between the two projects and played a crucial role in influencing the expansion of FISC/PTC approach to sustainable development to the Ha Tlhaku

area at Mphaki, where LISP had a big influence on sustainable development. When LISP ended, its project manager was absorbed as the team leader of FISC/PTC to further entrench the sustainable development intercourse initiated earlier on between FISC/PTC and LISP. Again, today, with both projects ended, the networking responsibility has been left to the District Agricultural offices of both the Mohale's hoek and the Quthing districts to nourish, maintain and sustain.

The FISC/PTC assisted the Mohale's hoek district Agricultural Office to network with the District Agricultural Offices of other districts as well. Initially, the networking operated through regular visits of farmers and various cadres of the other District Agricultural Offices to Mohale's hoek to share ideas, knowledge and techniques on sustainable development. Seminars and training workshops were also organised by FISC/PTC for the district agricultural officers of other districts on sustainable development and the FISC/PTC participatory approach. These initial experiences with networking revealed that it was a mammoth task to network the entire ten District Agricultural Offices and their farmers from Mohale's hoek. Instead, it came to light that formation of regional teams would promote a more sustainable network programme. The idea of a regional team was, however, found to be cumbersome as part of the strengthening of the Mohale's hoek District Agricultural Office only. It was, instead, transferred to the national level to become part of the institutional restructuring and strengthening of the Ministry of Agriculture itself at the head quarters level.

The FISC/PTC also influenced some institutional restructuring and strengthening at the national ministerial level. The idea was to re-structure the Ministry of Agriculture away from its apex organisational structure meant to enforce bureaucratic decision making and management, towards an organisational structure that would be accommodative of, and conducive to, a participatory bottom-up style of decision making and management. The first crucial feature of the institutional restructuring process entailed the consolidation of the formerly independent departments of conservation, forestry and land use planning (DCFLUP) into one functional department headed by one director, and each of the three constituent parts retaining the status of divisions. This consolidation enabled conservation decisions to be taken jointly by the three key divisions involved. The second feature involved the placement of this newly formed Department of Conservation, Forestry and Land Use Planning directly under the responsibility of the Director of Field Services (DFS). This placement streamlined what otherwise would have been

bureaucratic tape and delays via the office of not only the management but also Deputy Permanent Secretary (Technical).

The technical efficiency of the Ministry of Agriculture was strengthened at the headquarters level in Maseru. The support to national agricultural programme (SNAP) was launched to co-ordinate and harmonise conservation and extension service. The Ministry of Agriculture was advised to adopt the unified extension approach to sustainable development by FICS/PTC as the national approach to extension service. SNAP assisted with the write up of manuals and training materials for field staff on the unified extension system. Training was also given first hand by FISC/PTC staff to District Agricultural Officers, district extension officers, subject matter specialists and extension agents from other districts in the country which were all encouraged to adopt the FISC/PTC modus operandi which had been adopted as the official national modus operandi by the Ministry of Agriculture.

The districts were encouraged to form area teams, departmental teams and district management teams to devise, implement, co-ordinate and oversee conservation and sustainable agricultural development policies in their respective districts. In order for the co-ordination to become effective, efficient and sustainable networking among the districts was to be promoted through the use of regional teams. Three regional teams were formed. The northern regional team was composed of Mokhotlong, Butha-Buthe and Leribe districts. The central regional team was made up of Berea, Maseru and Thaba-Tseka districts, while the southern regional team constituted Mafeteng, Quthing, Mohale's hoek and Qacha's Nek. Each regional team acts as a sustainable development forum where member districts can exchange information, ideas and techniques. All the regional teams are co-ordinated by the Department of Conservation, Forestry and Land Use Planning, which also acts as a national facilitator and guarantor of an enabling institutional framework within which the regional teams function.

8.8 Conclusion

A number of conclusions might be drawn from the analysis of field data presented in this chapter and their implications for sustainable development in the Mohale's hoek, district and Lesotho as a whole.

Sustainable development is two pronged. It is people centred and environment-centred. In relation to the environment aspects of sustainable development, FISC/PTC promoted numerous technical solutions which were eco-sensitive and friendly. Judged from a purely technical stand point, most of the solutions were fine and indeed had the potential to induce sustainable conservation and land husbandry in the areas where the project operated. However, much of this technical fix potential was undone by the human component into the equation.

Implementation of technical solutions to problems of sustainable development is done by human beings for their benefit. This inclusion of the human element in planning and implementation of sustainable development has many implications which are the key to its success. The first necessary condition for the success of sustainable development is that people need to do the problem identification themselves. This means that the people must realize, and, indeed, acknowledge that there exists a problem of sustainable development in their region. Unless they do so, externally induced efforts to promote sustainable development are likely to fall on deaf ears, and become doomed to failure due to lack of appreciation of the development assistance and its abuse and destruction by the very people who are expected to be its beneficiaries.

In the case of FISC/PTC, the problem identification was initially done not by the communities themselves, but by decision makers and planners, who subsequently sold their idea to the communities thereafter. In other words, the request for FISC/PTC project intervention did not emanate from the communities in Mohale's hoek to the government for the development assistance. Had this happened, then the problem to be solved, sustainable development, would have been identified in a bottom-up manner. Instead, the project intervention was conceived of at the national and then district levels, and eventually sold to the communities at grassroots level. This means that the problem and project were identified in a top-down manner. This necessitated that there be a wide information dissemination and awareness creation on both the problem of land degradation and the FISC/PTC project intervention by the District Agricultural Office and the project staff to the local communities to lure them to jump aboard the band wagon.

However, the people have failed to appreciate the FISC/PTC project assistance properly, and have abused and destroyed much of the activities of which they were meant to be the beneficiaries. The people's refusal to change attitudes and old ways of lifestyles have thus rendered FISC/PTC assistance unsustainable.

It the the communities had submitted the project request themselves initially, perhaps they might have been more willing to participate freely in the project without expecting any inducements. As it were, FISC/PTC band wagon was not enough, the project actually had to become a "gravity train" that gave out financial and inputs incentives to induce community participation in its initial phases of implementation. Unfortunately, this initial strategy of use of inducements for participation in sustainable development implanted a wrong perception by the communities that the benefit of participation was in the inducement packages instead of an improved environment for better productivity of the land in future. No wonder, when FISC/PTC incentives were withdrawn, community participation died as well. This teaches proponents of sustainable development that its success relies on voluntary, cognitive participation more than it does on induced participation. The people themselves have to become committed for their own good. This demands that their perceptions and attitudes have to change to appreciate the new ways of development thinking and practice demanded by sustainable development.

Sustainable development depends on knowledge by the communities. Knowledge creates community empowerment and technical efficiency. FISC/PTC strategies to impart knowledge to the communities became quite appropriate and successful at all levels as judged by the beneficiaries themselves. Despite some mishaps here and there, all forms of training were very good and relevant to their needs according to the respondents. What remained disturbing, however, was the limited extent to which the communities were willing to actually use this knowledge in their struggles to access sustainable livelihoods. This reluctance might indicate that there existed some difference in terms of the frames of reference in decision making used by the project staff and that used by the communities. The latter often act on short term pressures to meet daily demands for survival, a short term planning horizon as it is called. Whereas the former use more of a long term planning horizon, based on an idealised blueprint image of "good" in the distant future. However, the success of sustainable development does not depend on either one of the two alone. Instead, it depends on a combination of the two together. The challenge is how to combine short and long term planning to become harmonious for sustainable development. In essence, the two can be combined to promote sustainable development by embarking on a two-legged strategy or walking on two-legs strategy, where sustainable agriculture is promoted alongside sustainable income generation activities. While FISC/PTC was very strong on the promotion of sustainable agriculture, it was very poor in the promotion of sustainable income generation. Since sustainable agriculture is mostly long term, in the absence

of sustainable alternative income generation in the short term, community members abandoned FISC/PTC promoted sustainable agriculture, and gave preference to short term survival strategies they had relied on in the past to make ends meet. Therefore, one needs to attach equal devotion and resources to both sustainable agriculture and sustainable alternative income generation activities in order for sustainable development to become successful. Moreover, the people must be willing to change their old life styles and adapt to the demands of modern lifestyles encouraged by sustainable development.

Sustainable development relies on realization of sustainable benefits by the communities. Benefits can be either individual or community-wide in nature. They can also be either short or long term, which have already been discussed in the preceding paragraph. In terms of community vis-à-vis individual benefits, conventional wisdom had it that sustainable development depended on community initiative for community gain. However, as evidenced by FISC/PTC experience, although community action has a great potential for resource pooling and sharing, it is not always that individual members of the community are willing to pool and share resources due to lack of co-operation, which accounted for the collapse of many community owned and operated initiatives in the study area. The cause of lack of co-operation is that the community is a heterogeneous unit composed of individuals unequal in assets, resources, needs and power. Those who possess more of these items invariably wish the sharing formulae to be based on the input ratios instead of the principle of equity. Therefore, it would appear that it is time to revisit the conventional wisdom that community-wide action is the most conducive to sustainable development. Instead, private initiative has to be experimented with as the alternative best form of action for sustainable development.

Sustainable development is a new paradigm in development thinking. As such, it is innovative and faces formidable challenges to displace and replace old modes of thinking and behaviour in accordance with the old paradigms. This implies that in the case of farmers and other community members, attitudes to and perceptions of development and benefits have to change drastically. As evidenced by FISC/PTC experience, vandalism to property and wide spread lack of maintenance of sustainable development initiatives attested to the dire need for a drastic change in the perception and attitudes of the people at grass root level whose livelihoods it was that sustainable development hoped to transform. Again as evidenced by the FISC/PTC experience, unless peoples perception of, and attitudes to, initiatives meant for their sustainable development

changes, these initiatives are more likely to remain expensive white elephants as they presently are in Mohale's hoek than to contribute to meaningful changes in the provision of sustainable rural livelihood strategies for the present and future generations in the region.

With regard to sustainable extension and field service provision, suffice to note that old habits die hard. Sustainable development demands a change in the lax old field service approach that relied on remote controlled contact cum progressive farmer approach. Sustainable extension service demands well trained, multi-purpose, on the scene unified extension service, one whereby the field staff becomes actually field based and an integral part of the communities they served. Despite tremendous efforts to promote sustainable unified extension approach by FISC/PTC, most of its field staff had returned to Mohale's hoek town from which it occasionally visited its communities in the rural areas where it was stationed by name only. This experience reminds proponents of sustainable development that sustainable unified extension approach demands more than mere multi-purpose training, building houses for single staff accommodation and re-deployment of extension workers to the rural areas to live there. Unless they are extremely committed, extension workers might view this as indirect punishment. Extension workers are real people with families, friends and a flair for modern amenities such as good schools and education for their children, modern houses with facilities to live in just as does other members of society. Unless this bundle of rights and needs is made accessible to extension workers, efforts to promote a sustainable unified extension service are bound to be frustrated by desertion of the profession for better pastures by some and become a fiasco. This might be aggravated by the poor retention capacity of most District Agricultural Offices. Moreover, the attitudes of the extension staff itself also have to change from the old ways they were used to under the Training and Visit system to the new demands of the unified extension system necessary for sustainable development.

Sustainable development also involves institutional change and restructuring. Classic bureaucratic institutional organisation meant to enable top down decision-making and management need to be replaced by less structured democratic institutions meant to facilitate participatory decision making and partnership management. Evidence from FISC/PTC experience suggests that formation and retention of sustainable institutional change for sustainable development is far from easy. Formation of new structures presents a threat to the old ones. Established territories of power are crossed and tangled. While the disappearance of red

tape makes old bureaucrats and bosses' power base become fragile and leaves them exposed to questions, scrutiny and what they perceive as a challenge from their former juniors and underdogs. As it were, since sustainable institutional change is an empowerment process as well, it turns the tables up side down, and is likely to face formidable opposition unless the top bureaucracy is well enlightened about its meaning and intention and itself willing to change its attitudes from old ways to new ones. The FISC/PTC efforts to promote sustainable institutional change both at the district and the national levels encountered serious inter-departmental and inter-ministerial rivalries that negatively impacted on the sustainability of the institutional innovations meant to promote sustainable development.

The last but very important consideration for Third World countries is that the success of sustainable development depends on sustainable resourcing. Lesotho, like other Third World countries, does not have enough high calibre manpower and financial resources to deploy in the implementation of sustainable development projects. FISC/PTC depended on the flow of high calibre manpower and financial resources from Sweden. These resources were supplemented to a very minimal extent, by local resources of counter part financing from the Lesotho Government and short-term consultancy tasks assigned to Basotho high calibre manpower from time to time. Now that the FISC/PTC project has come to an end, so have most of the sustainable development initiatives it promoted in Mohale's hoek. It is noted that unless the people at local level and bureaucrats and policy makers at the national level change their attitudes towards financial and manpower resource management, lack of resources for sustainable development is likely to remain one of the biggest challenges in the path of successful sustainable development in Mohale's hoek, Lesotho, and indeed, the Third World.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main objective of this thesis was to find out what rural development efforts had been implemented in Lesotho since independence and to assess whether these efforts had been sustainable or not. The study sought to use the Farm Improvement with Soil Conservation (FISC)/ Production Through Conservation (PTC) Project in the Molepolole district as a case study to highlight the complexities and ramifications of sustainable rural development in Lesotho. The major hypothesis postulated by the study was that rural development initiatives in Lesotho, including those by FISC/PTC, were not sustainable.

The analysis of primary and secondary data presented in this thesis on the sustainability of rural development projects in Lesotho led the study to conclude that the majority of these projects failed to become sustainable. Some of the major factors responsible for this failure were land degradation, the politicisation of the projects, mismanagement and abuse of funds meant to initiate and sustain the activities of the projects. Other contributing factors were the persistence of a top-down approach in the formulation and implementation of the projects, the persistence of a "technical fix" approach to rural development, the failure to solicit community participation in the projects on a sustainable basis, lack of decentralisation of the management and services offered by the projects.

The heavy dependence of these projects on foreign funding invariably led to a greater control and influence exerted by donors instead of the civil society in the country, while corruption and nepotism promoted a biased access to the resources and benefits extended by the projects to the local communities.

The thesis further concluded that the biggest contribution to the lack of sustainability of rural development projects in Lesotho came from the decision makers, the planners and the community members themselves, all of whom in their different ways were often reluctant to adjust to the sacrifices demanded by the new ways of livelihood introduced by the projects.

In order to generate further information that could lead to a better understanding of the prospects and problems faced by sustainable rural development in Lesotho, the study recommended further research in the following areas:

- i. Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) and sustainable development. Research in this area would seek to establish the scientific basis of indigenous knowledge systems and how they could be applied to induce the sustainability of rural development projects in Lesotho where access to capital intensive resources by rural communities is poor;
- ii. Institutional reforms and the decentralisation of rural development. This research would evaluate the effectiveness of the current local institutions in the management of rural development and suggest ways in which the current lack of sustainability caused by institutional rivalry between the traditional institutions and the modern democratic institutions might be reduced;
- iii. Decentralisation and sustainable rural development. Research in this area would liase closely with that in (ii) above to establish the most effective ways in which Lesotho's long declared policies of decentralisation might be implemented to empower the rural communities and bring services closer to them;
- iv. The politics of sustainable rural development. This study would assess the impact of foreign aid and the politicisation of rural development by political parties in Lesotho on the sustainability of rural development projects;
- v. The sociology/anthropology of sustainable development. Rural development projects in Lesotho used either the private and/or community-based approaches to promote the sustainability of their development efforts. In most cases the multiple user groups impacted upon by the projects competed for access to the resources and benefits of the projects. This generated conflicts that made the activities unsustainable. Therefore, research in this areas would identify and explore the ways in which these multiple users and uses could be made to engage in collective decision making and choices that would generate the consensus necessary for sustainable rural resources management.
- vi. The ecological basis of sustainable rural development. Research in this area would seek to establish the basis of sustainability of rural development based on an intensive quantitative analysis of the relationships between the ecological capacities, population growth and consumption rates in Lesotho, using an ecological foot printing approach which has never been done to date for the country.

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