Knowledge Transfer and British Expertise in Zambian Urban Planning

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DECLARATION

I, Helen Garnett, declare that the thesis I herewith submit for the Doctoral Degree in African Studies at the University of the Free State, is my independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.

Signed: 

Date: **27 March 2017**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between the history of technical assistance and present day urban planning practice in Zambia and builds on multiple literatures spanning the field of planning history, technical assistance and planning knowledge transfer. It bridges a scholarly gap in the understanding of how historic ties impact on the way in which planning knowledge travels. Focussing on technical assistance and urban planning during the period 1962 to 2015, this thesis demonstrated that the conventional historiography has not sufficiently addressed the way in which post-colonial planning and technical assistance continued to instil British norms, values and standards beyond Zambia's independence. It explores three key post-colonial mechanisms of soft power and technical assistance: bi-lateral technical assistance through the Overseas Service Aid Scheme; volunteering in the form of the Voluntary Service Overseas and; planner education in both Britain and Zambia. Through focusing on these mediums it examines how outdated planning ideologies remain ingrained in post-colonial Zambia some fifty years after independence. To understand how early technical assistance resulted in a further embeddedness of colonial planning logics, the thesis draws on archival material held within Britain and Zambia, as well interviews carried out with contemporary actors involved in the planning knowledge transfer process. Focussing on everyday experiences of planners, these primary sources identify how this history affects contemporary knowledge transfer. In doing so it uncovers the way that colonial planning logics emerge within, and affect the way that knowledge transfer takes place, as well as highlighting some of the complexities and enduring characteristics between colonial ideologies, post-colonial technical assistance, and everyday urban planning practices in post-colonial countries. The thesis concludes that independence witnessed a modification in the knowledge relationship between Britain and Zambia, and that rather than contemporary knowledge transfer opening up new routes and ideas, it merely follows a well-established colonial and post-colonial path. In tracing these continuities, this thesis demonstrates the centrality of history to contemporary planning practices. In doing so, this thesis opens up space for more comprehensive conversations between scholars of planning history, technical assistance and planning knowledge transfer.

Keywords: Zambia, history, urban planning, knowledge transfer, post-colonial, technical assistance, volunteering, OSAS, VSO,

Opsomming

Die tesis ondersoek die verhouding tussen die geskiedenis van tegniese bystand en hedendaagse stadsbeplanning praktyke in Zambië. Die studie oorbrug 'n veelvuldige literatuur wat aspekte van beplanningsgeskiedenis, tegniese bystand en beplanningskennisoordrag aanspreek. Dit vul 'n leemte in die begrip van hoe historiese bande inslag maak op die wyse waarop beplanningskennis oorgedra word. Deur te fokus op tegniese bystand en stadsbeplanning gedurende die periode 1962 tot 2015, demonstreer die tesis dat die konvensionele historiografie nie voldoende aandag verleen het aan hoe postkoloniale beplanning en tegniese bystand voortgegaan het om Britse norme, waardes en standaarde na Zambië se onafhanklikheid te vestig nie. Dit verken drie sleutel postkoloniale meganismes van 'sagte mag' en tegniese bystand: bilaterale tegniese bystand deur die 'Overseas Service Aid Scheme', die lewering van vrywillige diens in terme van die 'Voluntary Service Overseas'-skema en beplanningsopleiding in beide Brittanje en Zambië. Deur te fokus op dié aspekte ondersoek die tesis hoe verouderde beplanningsideologieë verskans is in postkoloniale Zambië vyftig jaar na onafhanklikheid. Om te verstaan hoe vroeë tegniese bystand gelei het tot die verdere verskansing van koloniale beplanningslogika, ontleed die tesis Britse en Zambiese argivale bronne, as ook onderhoude met eietydse belanghebbendes bemoei met die kennisoordrag proses. Deur te fokus op beplanners se alledaagse ervarings, identifiseer die primêre bronne hoe geskiedenis eietydse kennisoordrag beïnvloed. Sodoende ontbloot dit die wyse waarop koloniale beplanningslogika van binne ontwikkel en die wyse waarop dit die oordrag van kennis beïnvloed, as ook klem plaas op die kompleksiteit en blywende kenmerke tussen koloniale ideologieë, postkoloniale tegniese bystand, en alledaagse stadsbeplanning praktyke in postkoloniale lande. Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat onafhanklikheid 'n wysiging in die kennisverhouding tussen Brittanje en Zambië aanskou het, en in plaas daarvan dat eietydse kennisoordrag gelei het tot die vestiging van nuwe idees, dit bloot voortbou op goed gevestigde koloniale en postkoloniale beginsels. Deur dié kontinuïteit te ondersoek, demonstreer die tesis die sentraliteit van geskiedenis tot eietydse beplanningspraktyke. Sodoende, maak die tesis ruimte vir meer omvattende gesprekke tussen akademici van beplanningsgeskiedenis, tegniese bystand en beplanningskennisoordrag.

Abstract

Diphuputso tsena di hlahloba kamano pakeng tsa nalane ya thuso ya botekgeniki le tshebetso ya moralo wa metsetoropo ya nako ya jwale mane Zambia mme e haella hodima mefuta e mengata ya dingolwa ho ntshetsa pele moralo wa nalane, thuso ya botekgeniki le ho etsa moralo wa phetisetso ya tsebo. E fedisa kgaello ya borutehi bakeng sa kutlwisiso ya kamoo mekgwa ya nalane e nang le sekgahla mabapi le ka moo moralo wa tsebo o phethahalang ka teng. Ha re tadima thuso ya botekgeniki le moralo wa metsetoropo nakong ya dilemo tsa 1962 ho isa 2015, diphuputso tsena di totobaditse hore nalane ya molao ha e a kgotsofatsa ka katleho tsela eo moralo wa nako ya kamora bokolone le thuso ya botekgeniki di tswetseng pele ho sebedisa ditlwaelo tsa Borithane, makgabane le maemo kamora tokoloho ya Zambia. E lekodisa mekgwa e meraro ya sehlooho ya nako ya kamora bokolone ya matla a bobebe le thuso ya botekgeniki: thuso ya botekgeniki ya phapanyetsano ka *Overseas Service Aid Scheme*; ho ithaopa ka sebopeho sa *Voluntary Service Overseas* le; thuto ya baetsi ba meralo ho Borithane le Zambia. Ka ho tadima mekgwa ena, e hlahloba ka moo menahano ya kgale ya meralo e dulang e ntse e theilwe ho Zambia kamora nako ya bokolone dilemo tse mashome a mahlano kamora tokoloho. Ho utlwisisa ka moo thuso ya botekgeniki ya pelepele e qeteletseng ka ho kenyeletsa menahano ya meralo ya bokolone, diphuputso tsena di sebedisa thepa ya dipolokelo tsa dingolwa e fumanweng Borithane le Zambia, hammoho le dipuisano tse entsweng le baphethahatsi ba kajeno ba amehang tshebetsong ya moralo wa phetisetso ya tsebo. Ha re tadima boiphihlelo ba letsatsi le letsatsi ba baetsi ba meralo, mehlodi ena ya motheo e bontsha ka moo nalane ena e amang phetisetso ya tsebo ya kajeno. Ka ho etsa jwalo, e senola mokgwa oo menahano ya meralo ya bokolone e hlahellang le ho ama mokgwa oo phetisetso eo ya tsebo e etsahalang ka ona, esita le ho hlahisa a mang a mathata le matshwao a boitsebahatso pakeng tsa menahano ya bokolone, thuso ya botekgeniki ya kamora bokolone, le ditshebetso tsa kamehla tsa meralo ya metsetoropo ka hara dinaha tsa nako e kamora bokolone. Diphuputso tsena di qetella ka hore tokoloho e hlahisitse phetoho ya dikamano tsa tsebo pakeng tsa Borithane le Zambia, mme ho na le hore phetisetso ya tsebo ya kajeno e bule ditsela le menahano e metjha, e mpa e latela feela tsela e theilweng hantle ya bokolone le kamora nako ya bokolone. Ka ho latela diketso tsena tse latellanang, diphuputso di totobatsa bohlokwa ba nalane ho tshebetso ya meralo ya kajeno. Ka ho etsa jwalo, diphuputso tsena di bula tsela bakeng sa dipuisano tse ding tse feletseng pakeng tsa baithuti ba nalane ya meralo, thuso ya botekgeniki le ho etsa meralo ya phetisetso ya tsebo.

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Abbreviations

AAPS	Association of African Planning Schools
BACS	British Aided Conditions of Service
BESS	British Expatriate Supplementation Scheme
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CAF	Central African Federation
FNDP	First National Development Plan
GIS	Geographical Information System
GIZ	German Technical Cooperation Agency, *(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH)*
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NDP	First National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSAS	Overseas Service Aid Scheme
RTPI	Royal Town Planning Institute
RVA	Returned Volunteer Action
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNZA	University of Zambia
VITA	Volunteers for International Technical Assistance Inc.
VOSA	Volunteering Overseas Service Association
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas

List of figures and tables

Map of Zambia



Chapter 1

Introduction

In 2016 the story broke of a Scottish actress, Louise Linton, whose book, which describes her Zambian gap year experience, had rapidly turned into a meme for its overindulgence in well-worn colonial notions of Africa as the "dark continent".[1] According to a cliché packed serialisation entitled 'How my dream gap year in Africa turned into a nightmare' published in *The Telegraph*, for the 'long angel haired' girl her gap year was characterised by dangerous insects, malnourished children and guerrilla warfare.[2] It was both inaccurate and carried the many overused tropes so heavily criticised in recent years and shone further light on the problematic nature of volunteerism.[3] However despite the recent backlash against the culture of volunteerism, it remains alive and well. Volunteering can take many forms and whilst it is often portrayed as the unskilled 'gap year' student descending insensitively on a community with few skills to offer, there is another side to volunteering which draws in highly skilled experts with a conscientious and professional approach. This underlines the multiple ways that volunteering manifests itself and the manner in which complex amalgamations of different actors, sites of contact and histories result in unique moments and encounters that shape future ideas and practices. The Zambia that Louise Linton describes as having being part of, would be unfamiliar and in contrast to the experiences of most volunteers. For many, the experience of volunteering reveals the multiple intertwined and complex colonial and post-colonial histories that impacted on the shared relations between Britain and Zambia.[4] As Gewald *et al.* point out, there is 'one Zambia, many histories', and this thesis takes one historical strand to explore the way in which

[1] M. Shearlaw, 'Briton's African Gap Year Memoir Sparks Angry Twitter Response', *The Guardian*, 5 July 2016, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/05/zambians-hit-back-at-white-saviour-gap-yah-memoir, accessed 15 January 2017.
[2] L. Linton, 'How My Dream Gap Year in Africa Turned into a Nightmare', *The Telegraph*, 1 July 2016, Online edition, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/how-my-dream-gap-year-in-africa-turned-into-a-nightmare/, accessed 2 July 2016.
[3] B. Wainaina, *How to Write About Africa* (Nairobi: Kwani Trust 2008).
[4] In this thesis post-colonial will be used to refer to the time periods after decolonisation, whereas when discussing a state recovering from the social, cultural and economic effects of colonial the term postcolonial will be used.

histories impact on contemporary everyday encounters between volunteers and local planners in Zambia.[5]

As Home notes, cities in the Global South 'have their roots deep in the colonial situation, and colonial approaches survive in the policies of government and development agencies'.[6] Zambia which before independence in 1964 was known as Northern Rhodesia, was profoundly influenced by colonialism, particularly in the twentieth century as this period saw the greatest expansion of European migration and urban growth in the country.[7] This rapid period of growth also coincided with two ideological shifts, first British colonial development doctrines began to be reassessed in the interwar period, and second, the period also witnessed a world-wide rapid advancement of the professions, including land planning.[8] These two factors set in place a distinct path for urban knowledge transfer between Britain and Zambia that continues to this day. This knowledge was transferred through many mediums, however this thesis will primarily consider two particular mechanisms of knowledge transfer; technical expertise and education.[9] Together these two elements form the predominant means by which planning knowledge has been transferred between Britain and Zambia in the post-colonial period.

Despite some officials having been taken by surprise by the "wind of change" sweeping across the African continent, the process of decolonisation was not swift, nor did it result in a clean break from colonial influence.[10] Many commentators often imagine decolonisation to have

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[5] J. B. Gewald, M. Hinfelaar, and G. Macola, eds., *One Zambia, Many Histories towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia*, (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

[6] R. K. Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities* (London: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), p. 264.

[7] R. Hall, *Zambia* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965); A. Roberts, *A History of Zambia* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976). I refer to the period before the enactment of the Zambia Independence Act on the 24th October 1964 as Northern Rhodesia and the period after the enactment as Zambia. Whilst the formation and subsequent dissolution of the Central African Federation is acknowledged, land use planning remained the responsibility of national governments during the Federation period.

[8] D. L. Dresang, 'Ethnic Politics, Representative Bureaucracy and Development Administration: The Zambian Case', *The American Political Science Review*, 68:4 (December 1974), pp. 1605–1617; M. O. Nkomo, 'A Comparative Study of Zambia and Mozambique Africanization, Professionalization, and Bureaucracy in the African Postcolonial State', *Journal of Black Studies*, 16:3 (January 1986), pp. 319–342.

[9] For this thesis knowledge is taken as meaning knowledge that is developed scientifically rather than local or indigenous knowledge. Whilst all three are applicable to planning to a lesser or greater degree, it is generally the universalising scientific knowledge that manifests itself within the process of planning and knowledge transfer.

[10] S. Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients', in M. Jerónimo and A. C. Pinto, eds., *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,

brought about a rupture in power at the moment the flag changed, however this thesis argues that in land planning, the dramatic shift of norms, standard and values did not necessarily occur as envisaged.[11] Yet as Craggs and Wintle highlight, the existence of colonial and post-colonial 'historiographical silos' in academic work has led many scholars to ignore the process of decolonisation itself. They argue that this period was 'one of the most important and protracted shifts in the geopolitical landscape' but that a 'historiographical and imaginative divide' prevents the process from being seen as a 'long-term, as yet incomplete, political and economic shift'.[12] The period of decolonisation resulted in a coherence of planning discourses - not a dramatic shift - which brought continuities in the coloniality of knowledge.[13] This continuity has the capacity to affect contemporary knowledge transfer experiences, and this thesis argues that the continued coloniality seen in the early independence period plays out in contemporary epistemological acts. To account for the impact that the process of decolonisation has on ongoing interconnectedness between Britain and Zambia, and to build up an understanding of the current political and social contexts, this thesis explores the way in which the norms, values and standards of British colonial planning have continued to be perpetuated and remained deeply embedded in post-colonial Zambia.

To understand this shared history of colonialism and post-colonialism, the historical focus of the primary research covers the period immediately prior to independence, extending into the post-colonial period, incorporating the years where colonial authorities were beginning to recognise that independence of many of their territories would soon be realised. With the recent experience of the transition to independent rule in Ghana in 1957 and the impending independence of Nigeria in 1960, it was during the late 1950s that the mechanisms of post-

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2015); H. Macmillan, 'Wind of Change. Speech by Harold Macmillan given to the Parliament of South Africa.', 3 February 1960.

[11] J. Darwin, 'Diplomacy and Decolonization', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 28:3 (September 2000), pp. 5–24.

[12] R. Craggs and C. Wintle, 'Reframing Cultures of Decolonisation', in R. Craggs and C. Wintle, eds., *Cultures of Decolonisation: Transnational Productions and Practices, 1945-70*, Studies in Imperialism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), p. 4, 5.

[13] Coloniality of knowledge refers to the way in colonial structures of knowledge and power persist in within the Global South. See J. Suárez-Krabbe, 'Introduction: Coloniality of Knowledge and Epistemologies of Transformation', *KULT 6: Special Issue – Latin America*, 2009; S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013).

colonial knowledge transfer began to be refined and implemented. This period was referred to by Low and Lonsdale as the 'second colonial occupation' for the way in which Britain, even though the continent was going through reform, still scrambled to assert and embed power and control in the post-war period.[14] Further developing these debates, this research extends through the 1960s and into the early 1970s to account for how these mechanisms were implemented in Zambia, tracking the changes that occurred in Britain's approach to Zambia's independence. It does this through examining the ways in which technical expertise adapted over this time, and the ways in which its reception in Zambia changed over the first ten years of independence. Having examined the events surrounding the process of knowledge transfer at decolonisation, the thesis then analyses the role that this process had in setting the background for the way in which technical expertise is used, and knowledge is shared, in contemporary Zambia. In doing so, it charts a course towards a greater understanding of the complex ties which link together colonialism, soft power and everyday practice in the Zambian planning system. Whilst planning is often considered to be primarily about technical skills, it is underpinned by certain moral codes, ethics and value judgements which are less quantifiable than the written words of legislation and policies or the street layouts that transpose from one place to another. Therefore instead of concentrating on the transfer of these statutes and policies, the thesis will primarily focus on the soft transfer of everyday norms, values and practices. This allows the thesis to explore and attempt to account for the less tangible yet equally important factors that manifest in contemporary knowledge transfer, thereby providing a deeper understanding of how historical and professional practices converge within planning activities today.

Overseas Service Aid Scheme

A number of mechanisms of technical knowledge transfer thread historical continuity through Britain's post-colonial assistance policies, providing a link between the past and the present. This included two key British governmental organisations; the Overseas Service Aid Scheme (OSAS) and Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO). Both these schemes were born in the late

[14] D. A. Low and J. M. Lonsdale, 'Introduction: Towards the New Order 1945-1963', in A. Smith and D. A. Low, eds., *History of East Africa*, vol. 3, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

colonial and early independence period.[15] The burgeoning of the colonial service was as a consequence of post war Britain's attempts to 'undertake the great programmes of economic and social development which were planned for the post-war period'.[16] Britain realised that the political developments in the colonies signalled a shift in the trajectory of local politics, and adapted its colonial policies to try to capitalise on the impending situation. They recognised the need to further their colonies 'advance towards self-government', but were also concerned for the future for the thousands of staff recruited for the colonial service.[17] On the latter issue, the example of Sudan in 1956, where the sudden withdrawal of British personnel had led to "chaos", was still fresh in their minds.[18] Britain had begun to review the role of its civil servants and set up a working party in 1953 to discuss the prospect of a 'corps of experts so needed by developing countries'.[19] In 1954 the British Government set out its new role in the provision of civil servants to its colonies through a statement of revised policy, entitled *Reorganisation of the Colonial Service.*[20] This statement outlined the problems that Britain faced in retaining the men and women of the service, and detailed the conditions for the successor of the Colonial Service: the Overseas Civil Service. The Overseas Civil Service initially comprised of former Colonial Officers who were to remain in post within newly independent territories to prevent a sudden loss in efficiency. In addition to the formalising of such an arrangement, it made provision for the compensation of any officer whose job became surplus under the policy.[21] This was to alleviate some of the concerns over what the future of their roles would be following

[15] The OSAS emerged out of the Colonial service, which, by 1949 was employing around four per cent of public servants in mainly higher level administrative and professional roles within British overseas territories.
[16] P. Williams, *British Aid - 4; Technical Assistance* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1964), p. 24.
[17] 'Overseas Service Aid Scheme; Review Memorandum Zambia 1965, Designated Officers Association, The Zambia Police Service' (Lusaka, March 1965), p. 5, CO 9-1-9, National Archives of Zambia.
[18] A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service: A History of HM Colonial and Overseas Civil Services, 1837-1997* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 65; A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Aspects of Empire: A New Corona Anthology*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 232.
[19] Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service*, 1999, 65; Kirk-Greene, *Aspects of Empire*, p. 232.
[20] Colonial Office, 'Reorganisation of the Colonial Service, Issue 306 of Colonial (Great Britain. Colonial Office).', (1 October 1954).
[21] 'Overseas Service Aid Scheme; Review Memorandum Zambia 1965, Designated Officers Association, The Zambia Police Service'.

independence, whilst simultaneously adhering to the developmentalist approach which required a strong focus on policy formation, along with 'financial and bureaucratic management'.[22]

The measures put in place had, however, fallen short of what was needed to stem the outflow of staff. In Nigeria for example, many colonial staff chose to leave before being transferred onto the new scheme.[23] They did so because of the uncertainty surrounding both the political and economic stability of newly independent countries as well as concern over the impact that indigenisation would have on their long term career prospects. While a new policy of recruitment was adopted which expanded the scope to include those Colonial Office staff from other geographical regions in the service, this did little to stem the loss of skilled officers. With the increasing rate of independence and self-governance gaining force, it became clear that recruiting solely from within the colonial service was not a sustainable option and so the British government reconsidered their stance. The publication of *Cmnd 1193; Service with Overseas Governments* (1960), opened up the recruitment pool beyond those already in service, and in addition, it set in place the terms under which they would be employed, including benefits and inducements which would be funded by the British Government.[24] This programme was the OSAS. The basic principal of the scheme was that staff would be paid the local salary, which following independence was likely to be reduced by the host government in accordance with local circumstance. The salaries would, however, be supplemented with a financial inducement from the British in order to make the roles more attractive to people coming into the scheme.

Voluntary Service Overseas

The OSAS and similar programmes were not the only type of technical assistance to be introduced during this period. According to Bocking-Welch, the decline of the empire brought about a loss of Britain's sense of purpose and it was this loss that prompted the growth of a number of volunteer organisations.[25] The origins of the VSO date back to 1958, when VSO

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[22] L. Rakner, *Foreign Aid and Democratic Consolidation in Zambia* (Helsinki: WIDER, 2012), p. 6; Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service*, 1999.
[23] Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service*, 1999.
[24] Her Majesty's Government, *Service with Overseas Governments. Cmnd. 1193*, 1960.
[25] A. Bocking-Welch, *The British Public in a Shrinking World: Civic Engagement with the Declining Empire, 1960-1970.* (Unpublished thesis, University of York, 2012).

founder Alec Dickson colluded with Dr. Launcelot Fleming, the then Bishop of Portsmouth, in writing to *The Sunday Times* calling for funding to allow 'Senior Boys', to provide volunteer assistance to African countries 'in the field of primary teaching, youth work, community development, adult education and social welfare generally'.[26] Unlike colonial institutions which, according to S. Stockwell, 'possessed a "corporate mission"' that 'required reconfiguring for a post colonial world', the VSO was born out of the later years of the colonial period, at a time when the question was not if, but when, independence would happen.[27] As this thesis will show, on the one hand this was advantageous because it distanced the organisation from some of the colonial legacies associated with other agencies. However it remained financially tied to government and somewhat reminiscent of the earlier colonial approach to knowledge, which entailed non-specialist district administrators of the colonial authorities. Mirroring the general shift in approach away from generalists to technical experts - which had been witnessed in the late colonial period and spearheaded by the development industry - the VSO quickly moved from unskilled volunteering and now recruits its volunteers largely from the skilled workforce in the Global North.[28]

Despite having a presence in Zambia for over 50 years, it was not until 2007 that the VSO developed a comprehensive planning governance project in the country. The remit of the VSO's planning arm in Zambia was to build capacity across district councils through placements with provincial authorities and also through a placement assisting the government planning department at national level.[29] Within this role of capacity building, overseas planners were involved in two tiers of governance; community engagement and; skills development, with project involvement ranging from the facilitation of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), and

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[26] Senior boys means in this instance UK based male school leavers. M. Adams, *Voluntary Service Overseas: The Story of the First Ten Years* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968); The Bishop of Portsmouth, 'The Year Between', *The Sunday Times*, Letters to the Editor (March 1958).

[27] Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients', p. 149.

[28] J. M. Hodge and J. L. A. Webb, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007).

[29] P. Cockhead and M. C. Hemalatha, 'Sharing Planning Skills Across Borders: International Volunteers Helping Build Planning Capacity in Zambia', in A. Kumar, D. Meshram, and K. Gowda, eds., *Urban and Regional Planning Education: Learning for India*, (Singapore : Springer Singapore, 2016).

the planning of new urban centres, along with community outreach and participation.[30] This partnership of a non-state actor or actors working with a government is not a unique facet of the work of the VSO in Zambia, indeed it has been, and is, a very common feature of major urban development projects which have received previous historiographical attention.[31] What makes this project stand out from other knowledge mobilisation programmes, is the way in which it involved volunteers; its focus rests more on skills than policies, it is led by volunteers and, it is also taking place within an environment where postcolonial tensions might arise. In turn, this context is likely to bring about a range of added complexities not likely to be present in more commercially led projects. The VSO is primarily funded by the British Government with 77% of its £68.7 million 2013/14 income originating from British governmental funds and is made up of a mixture of restricted and unrestricted funding, - restricted meaning grants given for a particular purpose or with specific conditions, unrestricted meaning that they are free to use them in whichever way to meet the organization's objectives.[32] The motives behind the VSO's work are examined within this thesis along with the constraints, whether they be ideological or financial, that the VSO are sensitive to and the kinds of deference, if any, to its expert knowledge.

A further key component to Britain's technical assistance package came in the form of educational exchanges and scholarships. These facilitated the training of Zambia's, including Zambia planners, at both British universities and through the provision of technical assistance into Zambian schools, colleges and universities. As Perraton notes in respect to Commonwealth Scholarships, the impetus behind these often lay in a desire to meet 'political ends' and formed

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[30] VSO, 'Case Study – Zambia; Strengthening Town Planning and Ensuring Public Involvement', February 2012, http://www.vsointernational.org/Images/zambia-strengthening-town-planning-and-ensuring-public-involvement_tcm76-37497.pdf. Accessed 23 June 2016.

[31] S. V. Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World', in P. Healey and R. Upton, eds., *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*, (London: Routledge, 2010); K. Ward, 'Policies in Motion and Place: The Case of Business Improvement Districts', in K. Ward and E. McCann, eds., *Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the Global Age*, (MN, 2011); D. McNeill, 'Airports, Territoriality, and Urban Governance', in E. McCann and K. Ward, eds., *Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the Global Age*, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); S. V. Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"? The Internationalisation of Planning Practice, 1890-1939', *The Town Planning Review*, 76:2 (2005), pp. 119–141; K. Olds, 'Globalizing Shanghai: The "Global Intelligence Corps" and the Building of Pudong', *Cities*, 14:2 (April 1997), pp. 109–123; E. R. Rapoport, 'Globalising Sustainable Urbanism: The Role of International Masterplanners', *Area*, 47:2 (June 2015), pp. 110–115.

[32] VSO Annual report, *Annual Report and Financial Statement*, Annual report, (2014).

part of a broader campaign to seek influence within the postcolonial world.[33] Similarly, education formed an important aspect of the broader soft power based technical assistance package. These saw British teachers placed in Zambian schools as both volunteers and salaried staff, with an additional dedicated technical assistance programme set up to provide university lecturers to newly independent countries.[34]

Like many countries in the region, this influenced the ideological course of planning knowledge in Zambia. However the role that such knowledge transfer has on the way that Africans conceive both themselves, and for planning students their cities, has, through calls to decolonise the curriculum, been brought into sharp focus.[35] The 'hegemonic western epistemology' identified within African postcolonial planning education has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, as academics, and planners, seek to realign planner education with the needs of African society.[36] But whilst contemporary analyses of planner education acknowledges the role that colonialism played in the formation of its curriculum, it has tended to lack an understanding of the intricate mechanisms through which such norms were perpetuated by donor states, in this case Britain, in the postcolonial environment. This thesis seeks to unpick some of the early educational ties that Zambian planning retained with Britain through exploring its history, to form an understanding of how these might have resulted in knowledge ties to the former metropole, and how these are still evident today.

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[33] H. Perraton, 'International Student Mobility: Lessons from the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan', in D. M. Schreuder, ed., *Universities for a New World: Making a Global Network in International Higher Education*, 1913-2013, (New York: SAGE Publications, 2013), p.178.

[34] The British Expatriate Supplementation Scheme under which faculty and research staff were employed, is discussed in more detail later in this thesis.

[35] A. Mbembé, 'Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive', *Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research*, n.d., http://wiser.wits.ac.za/content/achille-mbembe-decolonizing-knowledge-and-question-archive-12054, accessed 25 May 2016.

[36] H. K. Adriansen, L. M. Madsen, and S. Jensen, *Higher Education and Capacity Building in Africa: The Geography and Power of Knowledge Under Changing Conditions*, (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 152; N. Odendaal, J. Duminy, and D. K. B. Inkoom, 'The Developmentalist Origins and Evolution of Planning Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, C. 1940 to 2010', in C. N. Silva, ed., *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial and Post-Colonial Planning Cultures*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015); V. Watson and N. Odendaal, 'Changing Planning Education in Africa: The Role of the Association of African Planning Schools', *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 33:1 (March 2013), pp. 96–107.

Research Methodology

Archival research methodology

In order to understand the nature of early post-colonial technical assistance, this thesis draws on archival material from across the UK and Zambia. The archive, and in particular the national and institutional archives, often provide only a singular perspective of a particular event or time period. These perspectives can be shaped by both the institution itself, for example by the "official mind" as well as the archivist.[37] From a positivist perspective, the archive is a true reflection of reality and are 'the organic and innocent product of processes exterior to archivists and reflect, provide an image of, are evidence of, those processes'.[38] However as Graham has suggested, archives can be subjected to significant institutional censorship, where 'documents deemed unsuitable or potentially embarrassing [can be] removed or lost'.[39] The view that any censorship is a deliberate attempt to alter the narrative that emerges from the archive might not hold true in every case. The author was fortunate enough to meet with Stephen Butters, who had overseen the task of saving documents from the Returned Volunteer Action archives as the organisation was shutting down. Faced with what he described as a disorderly collection of institutional paperwork, challenged by time constraints and a limit on archival space, he and a small group of volunteers who held little archival experience set about trying to discern what needed to be retained. This particular case also speaks to the way in which archives might be 'shaped' with a 'future discovery in mind'.[40] In addition to the reliability of the archival process itself, censorship also occurs long before the archivist reviews their content. For Stoler, every document is subjected to 'official bias' and 'comes layered with the received account of earlier events and the cultural semantics of a political moment' which historians are tasked with trying to temper.[41] Therefore regardless of how a collection came into being, the task of the historian

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[37] R. Robinson, J. Gallagher, and A. Denny, eds., *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).
[38] V. Harris, 'Claiming Less, Delivering More: A Critique of Positivist Formulations on Archives in South Africa', *Archivaria*, 44:0 (January 1997), p. 133.
[39] M. Graham, 'Finding Foreign Policy: Researching in Five South African Archives', *History in Africa*, 37 (January 2010), p. 381.
[40] F. X. Blouin and W. G. Rosenberg, *Archives, Documentation, and Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: 2006), p. 2.
[41] A. L. Stoler, 'Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the Form', in C. Hamilton et al., eds., *Refiguring the Archive*, (Cape Town: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 91, 92.

lies not just in analysing what the archives say but also to try to interpret what they are not saying. As Verne Harris notes, 'in any country, the documentary record provides just a sliver of a window into the event'.[42]

The archival research undertaken in the course of this thesis builds a deeper understanding of the history of the VSO and planning expertise in Zambia and the wider Southern African region. As well as intellectual concerns about the archive there are also practical impediments such as time and accessibility. One of the main challenges was navigating the vast number of sources given the extent of aid that flowed into Zambia in the years following independence, in particular, the roll out of technical assistance programmes by the British government in the late 1950s. This ran parallel to the development thinking of the time and coincided with the move towards Zambia's independence. The effect of this was a change in the type of aid stemming from Britain. Regional politics also influenced British aid policies, particularly after Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965.[43] An increase in aid coincided with UDI in Rhodesia, which with trade sanctions against Rhodesia and consequently overland supply routes to Zambia cut off, the British Government were under pressure to mitigate potential economic damage caused by the Rhodesian situation.

One of the difficulties in finding and analysing the data lay in how the terminology of planning and the role of town planners changed over time, but for the purposes of archival research it is important to distinguish between the use of planning relevant to this thesis and its use as a term where this is not in reference to land use. For example, the terms 'planning' and 'development' are used broadly throughout government departments and at many levels, from 'national development planning' to 'land use planning' and 'rural development', which can have quite distinct meanings from contemporary 'development' and 'planning'. While town planning undoubtedly feeds into the Zambian National Development Plans, many references made in relation to central government were considered to be less relevant to this study as they referred

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[42] V. Harris, 'The Archival Sliver: Power, Memory, and Archives in South Africa', *Archival Science, 2,* March 2002, p. 64.
[43] L. White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence And African Decolonization*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2015).

mainly to financial and large scale strategic resource planning. In each case the search terms require cross referencing against other sources and historical documents such as journal articles and books, to ascertain whether the term is being used in the context of planning as defined in this thesis, or whether it referred to crop, financial, strategic or some other form of planning.

This thesis draws on two sources of primary data, semi structured interviews and archival records which incorporated a variety of material in across a number of locations. The private papers of G.M. Coverdale are housed at The Bodleian Library, Oxford, and provided an important insight into the way in which this early post-colonial actor established knowledge sharing connections between Britain and Zambia, as well as an insight into how early planning education for Zambian planners was formulated.[44] Granted leave by his British employer, Devon County Council, Coverdale took on the role of Principal of the Natural Resource Development College in Lusaka during its inception. Contained in this relatively small collection, were meeting minutes, a prospectus and course outlines along with a report detailing a trip to the United Kingdom (UK). Coverdale had undertaken this trip in an attempt to secure staff to take up teaching positions in the college, but also with a view to assisting the Zambian government devise a strategy for overseas recruitment within broader governmental departments. A small collection of the papers of Professor H. Myles-Wright are held at the University of Liverpool Archives. Myles-Wright was a Professor with the university and had been commissioned by the Northern Rhodesian government to produce a report on the state of planning. Within this collection was the report on the state of the planning service at independence as well as associated correspondence between Myles Wright and the United Nations (UN). The papers of another important actor, Malcolm Macdonald were consulted at the University of Durham Archives.[45] After his retirement he acted as chancellor of the University of Durham, and in 1975 he took over the presidency of the VSO.[46] Whilst the VSO

[44] 'Principal's Report to the College Council, Natural Resources Development College', August 1964, MSS Afr. S. 1176 (1), Bodleian Library Special Collection.
[45] Macdonald held a number of colonial office roles from 1931 to 1940 then moved on to a number of diplomatic posts having first been appointed High Commissioner to Canada in 1940, moving on to Governor-General of Malaya in 1946 as High Commissioner in India from 1955 to 1960, followed by the role as Governor-General of Kenya between 1963 and 1964.
[46] C. Sanger, *Malcolm MacDonald: Bringing an End to Empire*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1995).

occupied a limited amount of his time during retirement, there were nevertheless a number of important country reports dating from the 1960s and 1970s which gave an insight into the type of volunteers which were being deployed overseas during the period. Both these sources provide little in respect to personal accounts, but their retention of professional correspondence and reports enriches the material obtained by the institutional archives in Lusaka and London.

The majority of papers viewed were held in institutional archives, namely the National Archives of Zambia in Lusaka, and The National Archives in London. Spread across a variety of British Government departments, the research at the British National Archives fell into three categories: VSO planning related activities; British technical assistance to Zambia and; finally, the British Governments attitude to the VSO and the role that government felt the VSO had in the field of technical assistance. Most documents of interest fell within the Commonwealth Relations Office and Foreign Office (1960s), the Foreign and Commonwealth office (1970s), the Ministry of Overseas Development (1960s to 1970s) with some British Council files covering the 1960s and 1970s. The occurrence of files related to Zambian technical assistance and/or the VSO was substantially higher in the 1960s, however this subsequently tapered off during the latter years of the decade and into the 1970s. This is likely to be related to political events, a heightened government interest in the VSO and technical assistance during this time, and because during the 1960s, around the period of Zambia's independence, there had been an underlying desire for a transfer of power in which Britain was "in charge" and had eyes on the ground. Additionally the nature of aid changed during the 1970s and with the closure of various technical assistance schemes was a drift away from this type of technical assistance.

Significant time was spent consulting the National Archives of Zambia.[47] This specific element of research encompassed a range of themes. First, the history of planning in Zambia, its outside

[47] Sources within the National Archives of Zambia shed a particular light on the reception of technical assistance in Zambia. Suffering from common problems in post-colonial African archives; bureaucratic rituals, catalogue descriptions were of limited merit, files were missing and retrieval was slow.
[47] Frustrations were compounded since when specifically researching planning these factors can be somewhat of a hindrance since both land planning files that is those of interest in this thesis, and national planning, which extensive in number and cover a broad range of fields were labelled under 'planning'. In addition, whereas some government files might contain extensive civil servant notes, others contained very few notes to complement the containing documents meaning that the narratives surrounding the sources were somewhat arid.

influence and how independence might have affected the way in which planning functioned, its staffing and the impact that Zambianization might have had on the need for external expertise. Second, evidence was sought which related to technical assistance and planning in Zambia, along with instances of the provision of technical assistance, in the form of external experts entering Zambia but also in the form of local and foreign education and training. Third, the research took a broader view to examine the attitudes and expectations within Zambia. For example, from which channels should technical assistance be sought, how the national and international political climate influenced who Zambia might have looked towards for assistance and, how Zambia felt that it should be delivered and their frustrations and the ways in which it was being delivered. Time constraints meant that the research primarily focussed on; The Ministry of Local Government and Housing which covered provincial and local levels of government; The Cabinet Office which dealt with bilateral and multilateral aid, including technical expertise; The National Commission for Development Planning (formerly Office of National development Planning) which concerned national planning, including bilateral and multilateral aid; Ministry of Finance under which National Development Planning was carried out in the early years of independence and which retained an interest in technical assistance.

Gaining access to the VSO archives was problematic. It was initially suggested, and later confirmed by the Director of VSO Zambia, that although the VSO did have some archive material, that in recent years it had become inaccessible. Further enquiries with VSO's UK head office resulted in deflection and avoidance. In order to bridge this gap, alternative sources were used, particularly those of the Returned Volunteer Action (RVA) organisation. Following its institutionalisation in 1966, the initial purpose of the RVA was to provide an association for a representative body for volunteers. Initially called the Volunteering Overseas Service Association (VOSA), the organisation took on a broad role beyond the representation of volunteers through supporting volunteers both on their return but also whilst they were in post. Holding a seat on the Lockwood committee, they started to challenge the role and usefulness

of volunteering.[48] As an independent body who felt their remit was to 'counterweight to the sending agencies (especially VSO)', there were naturally some tensions between the two organisations.[49] Whilst it was disappointing that access to the VSO archives was not practical, the RVA offer a good counterpoint, as it is frequently critical of the early work of the VSO. For Butters, whilst generally supportive of volunteering, the RVA also sought to challenge its usefulness, thereby providing a fascinating insight into the everyday working of the VSO projects. Given the volunteer driven nature of the RVA, and that the volunteers were largely drawn from university educated professional classes, it is no surprise that the organisation was in a position to ideologically challenge the work of the VSO. Whilst many area specific papers which might have addressed Zambian issues had been discarded, the papers do reveal a great deal about the ideological battles that played out between the RVA and the volunteer sending organisations. Understanding these tensions helps facilitate a level of reading beyond conventional scholarly accounts of the VSO, which have tended to focus on the inception of the organisation.[50] Beyond these, accounts are limited to the official record, which in the case of the VSO has often been presented through corporate publications as well as through books by leading VSO figures.[51]

Interview research methodology

Complimenting the extensive archival research upon which this thesis turns, interviews were also conducted with a range of contemporary actors. As Barbara Bush has argued, 'it is difficult to be value free and unburden oneself from your geographical, social and political background and ideologies' and in this respect one must first situate themselves and understand how their

[48] This was a joint committee set up in 1962 under the chairmanship of Sir John Lockwood to co-ordinate the work of the various volunteer sending societies.
[49] S. Butters, 'Returned Volunteer Action from 1966 to 2006: An Assessment of the Life Cycle of the Fly in the Ointment of the British Returner Volunteer Programme | Institute of Historical Research' (Institute of Historical Research, 25 April 2010).
[50] J. Bailkin, *The Afterlife of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); C. Jeppeson, 'A Worthwhile Career for a Man Who Is Not Entirely Self-Seeking: Service, Duty and the Colonial Service during Decolonization', in A. M. Smith and C. Jeppeson, eds., *Britain, France and the Decolonization of Africa*, (London: UCL Press:, 2017).
[51] D. Bird, *Never the Same Again: History of VSO* (Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press, 1998); M. Dickson, *A World Elsewhere : Voluntary Service Overseas*, (London: Dennis Dobson, 1965); M. Edwards, ed., *Arriving Where We Started: 25 Years of Voluntary Service Overseas* (London: VSO and Intermediate Technology Publications 1983); VSO, 'Case Study – Zambia; Strengthening Town Planning and Ensuring Public Involvement'; VSO, *Annual Report and Financial Statement*.

geographical and epistemic background influences their understanding and interpretations of events and actions.[52] The author is aware of the position in which they arrive at this thesis, that is, an urban planner of British origin who has been educated in the Global North. This position brings with it both advantages and disadvantages. McCann and K. Ward call for an anthropological approach to the study of agents and networks in urban policy transfer studies which can be useful given this positionality. They suggest that rather than 'studying up' to elites, or 'studying down' to the powerless, that attention is given instead to what Reinhold coined as 'studying through'.[53] This method has been usefully applied by Rapoport to study the work of elite planners overseas, and allows for a more comprehensive approach to our understanding of policy transfer through attempting to seek to understand it through 'those affected by the policy'.[54] Harris and Moore suggest that ethnographic methods can also be helpfully utilised to understand how actors 'learn about and compare across cities', not only through epistemic networks and their formal mechanisms of learning, but also through 'ongoing forms of imagination, persuasion, passive learning and informal interactions'.[55]

In considering the value pitfalls of conducting the research, the work of James Ferguson has been particularly instructive. He queried the position anthropologists have taken in critiquing the work of development professionals, and suggests that analysis of projects and work carried out in these contexts should be mindful of the privileged position the academic holds and be resistant of the temptation to 'serve up post ad-hoc criticism of failed projects'.[56] Similarly, Healey has cautioned against criticism that fails to be constructive in nature.[57] Cooper and Packard have also warned against a certain type of academic naval gazing. They suggest that

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[52] B. Bush, *Imperialism and Postcolonialism*, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 7.
[53] E. J. McCann and K. Ward, 'Assembling Urbanism: Following Policies and "Studying Through" the Sites and Situations of Policy Making', *Environment and Planning A*, 44:1 (2012), pp. 42–51.
[54] S. Reinhold, *Local Conflict and Ideological Struggle : 'Positive Images' and Section 28*. (Unpublished thesis, University of Sussex, 1994); Rapoport, 'Globalising Sustainable Urbanism'; McCann and Ward, 'Assembling Urbanism: Following Policies and "Studying Through" the Sites and Situations of Policy Making', 46.
[55] A. Harris and S. Moore, 'Planning Histories and Practices of Circulating Urban Knowledge', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 37:5 (September 2013), p. 1502 Here, formal refers to workshops, courses, conferences and study tours.
[56] J. Ferguson, 'Anthropology and Its Evil Twin: Development" in the Constitution of a Discipline', in F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 165.
[57] P. Healey, 'Introduction', in P. Healey and R. Upton, eds., *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*, (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 16.

academic concern with 'context and complexity' is a form of 'self-serving professionalism', whereas the development professionals concerns regard 'replicability of project design, the desire for stable decision-making frameworks and the need for a quick and readily graspable analysis' upon which to base decisions.[58] Whilst there is an acute awareness that this background might distort the author's approach by hindering the '"detachment" and objectivity', on the other, this privilege does give the author an insight into some of practices of planning and helped bridge professional divides between the academic and development expert.[59]

Running central to this thesis is the relationship between power and knowledge and how this shapes interactions and knowledge transfer. Considerations should thus be given to the author's positionality in respect to the power/knowledge and identity dynamics that play out in the interview process. One of the key hurdles in conducting the interviews lay in the negotiation of cultural and social boundaries between myself, a white, female British planner/academic, and planners in the field. As Cooper and Packard note, such shared vocational identities may provide an access point, however one cannot take it for granted that similarities will lead to a more meaningful exchange.[60] Cultural differences occurred in both the arrangement of interviews, such as the language barrier and a willingness to commit to pre-arranged meetings proved difficult to overcome. However the interviews also managed to yield some deep situational insights into the everyday practices and experiences which was helped in part by a shared professional understanding and positionality.

In addition, there was a clear differentiation in the depth and accessibility granted by Euro-American planners in comparison to those planners either from Zambia or elsewhere in the globe. This can be attributed to the shared cultural assumptions granted by the knowledge that the person you are speaking to holds the same social history, which in turn can lead to a degree of openness. Taking a broad definition of identity, to include nationality, social, age, race,

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[58] F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, p. 26.
[59] J. Sangster, 'Telling Our Stories: Feminist Debates and the Use of Oral History', in R. Perks and A. Thomson, eds., *The Oral History Reader*, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 92.
[60] C. K. Riessman, 'When Gender Is Not Enough: Women Interviewing Women', *Gender & Society*, 1:2 (June 1987), pp. 172–207.

gender, sexual orientation, religion and socioeconomic status, Sands *et al.*, attempt to understand the cultural barriers that can occur when seeking to gain access and the interview process itself. In particular, they consider how these manifest where two people with a similar professional knowledge but of different race and cultural background meet in the interview setting. They also suggest that 'cross-cultural' interviews can 'cross multiple boundaries simultaneously', and go on to highlight the facilitating factors which can help overcome barriers to an effective interview.[61] Sands *et al.,* as well as Shah, particularly highlight how a shared professional connection helped to overcome cultural barriers relating to race and religion, suggesting that this was one of the factors which influenced an interviewers ability to connect with an interviewee of a different background.[62] In respect to these shared connections and differences, Schoenberger suggests that where there are both differences and similarities between interviewee and interviewer the similarities might be sufficient to overcome the barriers created by the differences.[63] Robinson, Meah and Hockey found that similarities between interviewer and interviewee did not necessarily translate into or 'guarantee interviewees' openness'.[64] In acknowledging difference and potential points of difference between interviewee and interviewer, it is also important to note the parallels and grounding commonalities. In this respect the interviewer did have significant commonalities with the interviewees which centred on shared professional training and employment background.

Whilst differences in race and culture clearly played a role in the interviews, the business and technical language in which they were conducted also worked to break down perceived barriers. Interviewees were able to talk in the language of the profession without either over simplifying it or having to think carefully about their choice of words or acronyms. In this respect the interviewer therefore occupied both an inside and outside positionality, and as Cooper suggests,

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[61] R. G. Sands, J. Bourjolly, and D. Roer-Strier, 'Crossing Cultural Barriers in Research Interviewing', *Qualitative Social Work*, 6:3 (September 2007), p. 254.
[62] Sands, Bourjolly, and Roer-Strier, 'Crossing Cultural Barriers in Research Interviewing'; S. Shah, 'The Researcher/Interviewer in Intercultural Context: A Social Intruder!', *British Educational Research Journal*, 30:4 (August 2004), pp. 549–575.
[63] E. Schoenberger, 'Self-Criticism and Self-Awareness in Research: A Reply to Linda McDowell', *The Professional Geographer*, 44:2 (May 1992), p. 218.
[64] V. Robinson, A. Meah, and J. Hockey, 'Representing "Sex" in the Research Process', *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 10:3 (July 2007), p. 189.

scholars can simultaneously occupy this multiple positionality needing not to necessarily choose between an 'inside or outside' perspective.[65] Cooper's assertion of multiple positionalities is of relevance to the interview process of this thesis since the author, being of a similar age, educational and professional background as the interviewees provided a certain level of "inside" perspective. However, at the same time the interviewer retained an "outside" perspective, to a lesser or greater extent, with almost all the interviewees. In particular, the interviewer occupied a cultural outsider role in respect to the Zambian interviewees. As Shah points out, this can place the interviewer as an 'intruder' or that a lack of tacit knowledge might lead to messages that 'escape the notice of an outsider', leading to different interview outcomes and quality. Shah particularly notes that where there are cultural divisions between interviewees, some might feel more intimidated and reluctant to take part for fear of vulnerability or by revealing information which could potentially be held against them. [66] This "vulnerability" as Shah describes, played out in the willingness of interviewees to be recorded on tape, 75% of the interviewees whom asked that notes be taken instead of a voice recording were Zambian women.[67] The gendered dynamics of the interview is a consideration in that gender which can manifest within power relations between participants.[68] By initiating the conversation by explaining their background, the interviewer also sought to overcome some of the masculine positioning experienced by scholars such as Barbara Pini who's work with elites in the Australian sugar growing industry. She highlighted the 'methodological and epistemological difficulties' and power discourses surrounding female researchers interviewing 'knowledgeable men'.[69]

Whilst the interview parties shared a similar work experiences, the author was conscious of the fact that they were a British urban planner in Zambia and operating with a backdrop of historic British-Zambian relations. The concern was that rather than being seen by Zambian planning staff as "one of them", the interviewer might also be viewed as merely another "expert" from

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[65] F. Cooper, 'Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective', *The Journal of African History*, 49:02 (July 2008), p. 195.
[66] Shah, 'The Researcher/Interviewer in Intercultural Context', p. 549, 556.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] H. P. M. Winchester, 'Ethical Issues in Interviewing as a Research Method in Human Geography', *Australian Geographer*, 27:1 (May 1996), p. 128.
[69] B. Pini, 'Interviewing Men Gender and the Collection and Interpretation of Qualitative Data', *Journal of Sociology*, 41:2 (June 2005), p. 209, 213.

the Global North. There was certainly an element of this in some of the interviews. This was specifically felt where, despite pre-circulated information stating otherwise, the interviewer was seen as a representative of the VSO rather than an independent researcher. There is a sense that this might have been different if the interviewer had not been British.

The changing role of planners and their function in Zambia today

Crucial to interpreting the archival data and interviews is understanding what actually constitutes planning and how this differs across time and space. For Friedmann, planning is deeply embedded in political culture and is 'always historically grounded', yet in practice it differs across geographies, so the point at which planning might be historically grounded is open to debate.[70] It is relatively simple to define the role of planners and the function of planning in any one place at a given historical time. However a historical and transnational analysis adds a layer of complexity owing to the way in which planning's role in society continues to change with the skills required and tasks being carried out by planners having evolved over time. Considering the timeframe of this study, it is important to understand these changes to our interpretation of the term planning, in order that the research can take account of this. It will allow the thesis to be grounded in the understanding that what we, in this specific time and place, consider to be "planning" may have changed considerably from the colonial period through to the present day. As Healey points out, planning is an 'open field of ideas and practices', defined by 'ambiguity and contestation' which draws on both formal knowledge as well as 'experiential knowledge', and that understandings of planning vary across different geographic locations.[71]

Examining the history of planning in this way not only allows the thesis to consider the differences in the roles of planners and planning across the timescale of this thesis, but also poses the question as to who plans cities and rural areas today. As Rapoport suggests, 'planning is a task undertaken by people from a wide variety of [professional] backgrounds, many of whom would not necessarily label themselves as "planners"'.[72] It is possible for example, that an environmental impact assessment specialist, whilst not strictly a planner, may have a

[70] J. Friedmann, 'Globalization and the Emerging Culture of Planning', *Progress in Planning*, 64 (2005), p. 184.
[71] P. Healey and R. Upton, *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*, p. 2.
[72] Rapoport, 'Globalising Sustainable Urbanism', p. 16.

fundamental role in the planning process. Similarly a planner may also be a community engagement specialist who also has an interest or expertise in the field of planning. In examining the role of experts in the urban field, K. Ward suggests that new approaches to urban management have spawned a broader skilled professional that is 'part economist, part engineer, part planner and part marketing executive'. Of relevance to how we understand planners involved in knowledge transfer, he ascribes this new style of mobile urban professional as a 'contributing factor toward, this rapid-fire, no-questions-asked movement of policies and programs'.[73]

Taking into account the rather broad and perhaps generalist skill set of planning, a number of planning scholars have sought to define the scope of town planning as it was applied within colonial countries. King seeks to broaden the remit of planning to be understood as "environmental decision-making" and in this respect those working within the national planning unit who are involved in, for example, major infrastructure and economic development projects, would fall under this definition of town planning.[74] Latterly the work of Njoh, in his analysis of post-colonial planning in Cameroon, takes a view of planning functions based on government departments, which included Town Planning, Housing, Architecture, Surveys, waste management, street naming and numbering and Transport, however these focus solely on local government functions.[75]

At the time of Zambia's independence in 1964, planning as a discipline was witnessing a theoretical shift in towards the dual "systems view" and "rational process" approaches. These emergent themes split the physical object of planning and the actual process of planning (rational process) which led to the emergence of structure planning, broad framework policies (systems view), and a bureaucratising of the profession.[76] The role of planning thus acquired the need for a different skill set, whilst taking it in a new direction and away from the art of

[73] Ward, 'Policies in Motion and Place: The Case of Business Improvement Districts', p. 76.
[74] A. D. King, 'History of Planning. Opportunities for New Theory and Method. Paper Presented to the British History of Planning Group. Quoted in King, A. D., Shaping an Urban World.', (London: Mansell, 1980).
[75] A. J. Njoh, *Planning in Contemporary Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
[76] N. Taylor, *Urban Planning Theory Since 1945* (Los Angeles: Sage, 1998).

master-planning. This suggests that these emerging theories reflected more broadly to recent changes in approaches to national governance and development doctrines at the time. For example in Zambia, this also coincided with the push to create the First National Development Plan (NDP) 1966-70, which emphasised the need for strategic national planning as well as rural development, a follow on from the Colonial Office development plans.[77] However despite these possible connections at a broader national level, by independence planning in Zambia had failed to keep up with progress that had occurred elsewhere. For example, one observer branded planning as having been left behind, suggesting that 'the attitude of many who talked to us in the Rhodesias seemed a little behind the times on the subject of land-use planning'. For them the scope of town planning in Northern Rhodesia was limited to 'layout changes and land use within city boundaries'.[78]

Agrarian development also presents an interesting area when exploring histories of planning in the Zambian context. Rakodi suggests that in Africa, agricultural policy has lacked a spatial dimension 'despite the spatially differentiated nature of its outcomes and impact'.[79] Speek highlights the 'continuances between colonial and late-modern concepts of sustainable resource use', the foundations of which are important considerations for contemporary planners.[80] Whilst not suggesting that planners as we understand them today might concern themselves with rural development as it was conceived in the colonial period, there are certain aspects of rural development that have made their way into the role of modern Zambian planning. For example, historically, rural development combines agricultural 'land use' with settlement, community and infrastructure planning which, with the exception of 'land use' which in this case referred to crop planning, are all elements which fall within the remit of planning. The 1981 British backed Zambian Integrated Rural Development Plans, which were adopted in the

[77] National planning was introduced to Zambia at independence with the Transitional National Development Plan (1964-1966), which was subsequently superseded by the First National Development Plan (1966-1971)
[78] H. Myles-Wright, P. Brenikov, and J. G. Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', (7 April 1964), p. 35, P7021/3, University of Liverpool Archive.
[79] C. Rakodi, 'Policies and Preoccupations in Rural and Regional Development Planning in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe', in D. Simon, ed., *Third World Regional Development: A Reappraisal*, (London: Paul Chapman, 1990), p. 129.
[80] S. Speek, 'Ecological Concepts of Development? The Case of Colonial Zambia', in J. M. Hodge, G. Hodl, and M. Kopf, eds., *Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), p. 300.

early 1980s, are a case in point. Whilst a significant proportion of these plans were to deal with crop yields, there was an element of improving social infrastructure such as services, housing and schools.[81] In a sense, these broad remit plans would appear to be a pre-cursor to sustainable development as we know it today, which did not make it into the planners lexicon until after the United Nations Brundtland Commission report of 1987.[82] This view is reiterated in a 1974 publication by GM Coverdale entitled "*Planning education in relation to rural development*" published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).[83] The publication passes comment on the future of rural development, stating that it 'should comprise the establishment of rural towns, roads, transportation systems, communications, banking and credit facilities, marketing and commercial services, rural industries, and health, education and social services'.[84] This statement aligns planning with the field of rural development in the eyes of Coverdale, whilst at the same time indicating that this might not be how it was seen by others. It also suggests that rural development planning shares many similarities with certain planning specialities today.

As well as being defined by the precise nature of a given role the term "planning" can also vary in its meaning across different geographical spaces. A planner's function in say the UK can differ substantially from that of a planner in the Middle East or China. This variation was very much reflected in how historically planning was carried out across imperial colony's. Silva observes that in colonial Africa, differences in planning 'reflected the nature of the political organisation in Europe', but that a colonies significance to the metropole, colonial policy, and the way in which different individuals working in colonies affected its interpretation and application.[85] Whilst representative of what was taking place in the metropole, planning did change according to geographic location in relation to it and the colony's residual ties to the

[81] That rural development was not seen to fall within the remit of planning in this era is reflective of the duality of the planning system.
[82] P. Næss, 'Urban Planning and Sustainable Development', *European Planning Studies*, 9:4 (10 November 2009), pp. 503–524.
[83] Coverdale was also the Principal of the Natural Resource Development College in Lusaka.
[84] G. M. Coverdale, *Planning Education in Relation to Rural Development*, UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning 21 (Paris: UNESCO, 1974), p. 35.
[85] C. N. Silva, *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: Colonial and Post-Colonial Planning Cultures* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p. 11.

metropole. Njoh for example tracked the way in which colonial planning in Cameroon morphed over time and points to the impact that various colonial influences have had on development, the creation of space and legal processes, pointing to a complex set of influencing factors.[86] These geographical disparities all exists within a field of expertise which in itself is morphing and changing over time as different approaches fall in and out of favour.

In the case of colonial Northern Rhodesia, untangling the professional roles can be problematic. Planners both in the colony and the metropole at the time largely operated in the form of master-planners, or architect/planners and as Home points out, colonial planners fell into three categories; surveyors or engineers employed by the colonial service, consultant architects employed by Britain on contract for a specific project and; a small number of 'peripatetic propogandists'.[87] The role of many of these actors lay in physical planning and designing urban layouts, often drawing on a range of skills such as architecture and draughtsmanship, alongside lesser policy and legislative roles. As chapter five identifies, just as the supporting legislation has changed little since independence, so too has the profession, with many Zambian planners retaining their master-planning roles. This is in part due to the fact that development is led not by the private sector as is seen in the United Kingdom, but by the state. For example in housing developments, the planning authority allocating plots and drawing up masterplan layouts, before schemes are up for bidding by private buyers. Chapters four and five explore in more detail how these differences might have come about and how they impact on the experiences of modern day practitioners from both the Global North and Zambia.

Periodisation

Whilst the periodisation of this thesis extends from the colonial era planning through to the present day, maintaining a standard focus throughout such an extended period can prove problematic. Aside from the technicalities of accessing information where it might be held under the twenty or thirty year rules and the archival gap that this presents, the limited length of the PhD inevitably leads to a targeted approach. Taking this into account, whilst the 1980s

[86] Njoh, *Planning in Contemporary Africa.*
[87] R. K. Home, 'Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire 1910–1940', *Planning Perspectives*, 5:1 (January 1990), p. 24.

and 1990s are relevant to the timeline of technical assistance between Britain and Zambia, the thesis seeks to primarily focus on two particular timescales: First, the early independence period which saw the roll out of and intensification of a number of technical assistance programmes. It was during this early period that such programmes were under a greater degree of scrutiny from both the British and Zambian authorities, and a period in which some adaptations were made to the projects in response to the needs of each country. In focussing on this period the thesis is better positioned to concentrate on the more substantial and revealing archival material of this earlier episode. The second period of focus rests in the present day, specifically a contemporary project involving the process of planning knowledge transfer. In taking this approach, the thesis opens up opportunities for a greater degree of analysis of contemporary planning related development projects and the influence that historical events might have on these.

Structure of the thesis

The prevalence of former colonial staff within Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international organisations is widely acknowledged in existing literature. What is, however, less well explored is the way in which these similar continuities in staff and practice endured in Zambian government after independence. These continuities existed at a time when Zambia was seeking to strike a balance between the desire to indigenise its workforce whilst accepting the reality of the dire shortage skills left by the colonial education system. Using archival material gathered from the United Kingdom and Zambia, chapter three outlines the nature of technical assistance to explore; the motives that fuelled Britain's extensive programme, including the mechanisms used to continue to impress British norms and standards on the newly independent Zambia, and; the reception that such technical assistance was given by Zambia. It then details the origins of the VSO and how the organisation went about capitalising on Britain's search for a new role and the 1960s boom in technical assistance. In doing this, the chapter creates a deeper understanding of early post-colonial knowledge transfer whilst framing it within the political and ideological climate of the time. It will demonstrate how, for many in government, the moment of independence did not result in a rupture in the flow of knowledge and technical assistance, seeking to highlight the importance of placing this period in an uninterrupted historiography of post-colonial knowledge transfer.

Chapter four provides a breakdown of the ways in which external expertise, as well as "expatriates", helped the British entrench norms, values and standards in everyday planning practice.[88] It starts by examining the role of key individuals in post-colonial Zambia, that is the networks, experts, and "men-on-the-spot", that contributed to the establishment and perpetuation of British or western knowledge norms and standards.[89] It highlights the problematic nature of the planning service at independence and then examines the way that ideological shifts, as well as government reorganisation, had a profound impact not just on the planning service's ability to adapt and change in response to the needs of the new state. It identifies how these factors, combined with manpower, education and economic pressures, left a service reliant upon external expertise for its functioning. In particular it examines the way in which early Zambian planners were trained in Britain and the British based professional standards they were expected to adhere to. In doing so it establishes how British planning values, norms and standards embedded during colonialism were further perpetuated through post-colonial technical assistance, and that this contributed to the difficulties Zambia faced when attempting to indigenise the workforce. In order to understand of the foundations upon which the current VSO programme is based, chapter four concludes by building on the work of Rakodi, Mwimba and Taylor and Thole, amongst others, to outlining the legislative changes to planning and local government in the post-colonial period.[90]

Using semi structured interviews, chapter five provides an analysis of the material gathered in interviews with volunteer planners, and their Zambian local government counterparts, whom had worked alongside them during their placement. Beginning by setting out the rationale for the use of in depth interviews, it explores the background of the various actors in the knowledge transfer process and their experiences of practice in Zambia. It then particularly focuses on

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[88] Whilst the author recognises that the term "expatriate" can generate controversy, as many of the historical documents referred to in this thesis use the term the word expatriate will be used for continuity where appropriate.
[89] P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: 1688-2015*, (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 341; Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, *Africa and the Victorians*.
[90] C. Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy', *Third World Planning Review*, 8:3 (August 1986), pp. 193–217; C. Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia', (presented at the South African Planning Institute International Conference on 'Planning Africa'., Durban, South Africa, 2002); T. K. Taylor and C. B. Thole, 'Re-Thinking Town and Country Planning Practice in Zambia', *Developing Country Studies*, 5:10 (2015), pp. 34–43.

perceptions, expectations, workplace practices and cultures. Using these themes, the chapter then considers the implication of planning histories for contemporary planning and knowledge transfer. It teases out the continuities not just in the way that planning policy works, but also the ways in which everyday workplace relationships, values, norms and "mundane" practices are influenced by colonial and post-colonial legacies.

Chapter six concludes the thesis by identifying where the research sits within the historiography, pointing to broader relevance for a wide range of academic constituencies. It highlights how the thesis has sought to build on our understanding of the significance of the early post-colonial period, and identifies the key themes that emerged from the research process. These were; the enduring knowledge and power relations in post-colonial planning, the role of technical assistance in early post-colonial planning; the complexity of the knowledge transfer process and; the way that histories that occur beyond colonial planning can profoundly shape the process of planning and knowledge transfer.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

The thesis draws on key literatures relating to power, knowledge and colonial history in order to understand how these manifest within both historic and contemporary planning practices. In order to appreciate the role of knowledge in colonial and postcolonial exchanges it is important to first identify the theoretical ties between power, knowledge and development by examining the ways in which planning knowledge and expertise were conceived in the colonial period. This chapter then sets out the way in which Zambia has been subjected to external expertise as a consequence of its mining history, before outlining the ways that colonial policy along with urban expertise and experts influenced land governance and early towns and cities. The chapter goes on to examine the way in which expertise adapted to changes in colonial governance and development ideologies, focussing specifically on the nature of early expert technical assistance programmes and how these led the charge for the programmes that grew out of decolonisation. Literature relevant to these themes is reviewed before moving onto an analysis of knowledge transfer literature, with a specific focus on those works that address planning and urban geography. Finally it outlines the role of education in knowledge transfer before providing a summary of the scholarly work to have considered the state of planning in Zambia.

Colonial experts and men-on-the-spot

Whilst Berkman has argued that post-colonial technical assistance grew from the need to compensate for the loss of a critical mass of managers, technicians, and skilled workers at independence, it is actually more likely that it formed merely a natural progression from late colonial development ideologies.[1] Hodge and Webb support the latter assertion by highlighting the role that knowledge and expertise played towards the end of British colonialism in the twentieth century. They argue that it was characterised by the 'growing confidence it placed in the use of science and expertise, joined with the new bureaucratic capacities of the state', and

[1] S. Berkman, *Technical Assistance in Africa : How It Works, and Doesn't Work*, (31 March 1994), The World Bank Archives.

mirrored a general post-Second World War 'trend towards professionalization and modernization'.[2] However the roots of the "expert" in Africa are more deeply embedded in historic relations between metropole and colony, with early instances of travelling expertise being particularly prolific in the field of agriculture and animal disease.[3] Tilley highlights the importance that the colonial administration placed on having a man-on-the-spot, whilst identifying a degree of cynicism levelled at outside experts by colonial officers. Many felt that anthropologists interfered with progress, and that scientists with little on the ground and practical experience contributed little.[4] The nature of expertise was often expressed differently in the colonies than it was in the metropole. For Tilley, colonial expertise meant 'avoiding watertight compartments of knowledge' and embracing new ways of thinking to include 'social and natural interrelations'.[5] Similarly, Beinart *et al.* have observed that many experts might not necessarily have been the best in their field, but succeeded in the colonies where they were 'able to make significant advances because they were trained in generalizing and comparative ways of thinking'.[6] This requirement for a diverse and generalised approach to knowledge likely fuelled the rise of the so called man-on-the-spot of the colonial era.

While a number of scholars have written about the various characters and experts to engage with Africa, however there is disagreement as to what might constitute a man-on-the-spot. Some tend to refer to the man-on-the-spot as comprising those who hold significant positions of political connections, economic power or the ability to influence policy decisions in the metropole such as businessman and imperialist Cecil Rhodes or colonial administrators.[7] In stating that 'The man on the spot knows more about that spot than the man whose nearest

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[2] Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*, p. 8.
[3] W. Beinart, K. Brown, and D. Gilfoyle, 'Experts and Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered: Science and the Interpenetration of Knowledge', *African Affairs*, 108:432 (July 2009), pp. 413–433.
[4] H. Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[6] Beinart, Brown, and Gilfoyle, 'Experts and Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered', p. 423.
[7] J. Fisher, 'Man on the Spot: Captain George Gracey and British Policy Towards the Assyrians, 1917-45', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 44:2 (2008), pp. 215–235; A. Porter, *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III: The Nineteenth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); J. F. Gjersø, 'The Scramble for East Africa: British Motives Reconsidered, 1884–95', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 43:5 (October 2015), pp. 831–860; R. Hyam, *Understanding the British Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); A. Schölch, 'The "Men on the Spot" and the English Occupation of Egypt in 1882', *The Historical Journal*, 19:3 (1976), pp. 773–785.

approach to it is 60 miles away', Brice broadly defined it as a representative located in the particular physical place which was the site of enquiry.[8] Crucial to this understanding of the term is the ability to report back from such a place, suggesting that the person has the ears of the enquirer. Tilley also suggests that colonial field officers' 'proximity to the land and constant contact with peoples in their environs' facilitated the production of 'a kind of vernacular science'.[9] This alludes to the fact that they themselves began to be nodes of local knowledge production or interpretation and not just benign agents of knowledge transfer. Indeed Hodge and Webb credit shifts in colonial ideologies as being influenced by an 'increasing sensitivity and awareness of the complexities of local conditions articulated by technical officers and researchers working on the ground'.[10] Ranger on the other hand, takes a broader and perhaps more cynical view. In citing the work of James de Vere Allen he highlights that one reason for the broad definition during the colonial era was not only related to their geographical position *per se*, nor how their knowledge might have been received by the metropole, but how they saw themselves or wanted to present themselves. In essence, for Ranger their expertise was an adoption of a power role which was 'an essential part of local white self-image in Africa'.[11] To highlight this he discussed a particular case in which de Vere Allen recalled an example of a painter who, upon arrival in the East African Highlands, had reimagined and rebranded himself as a '"scientist" specializing in geology'.[12] Whilst Rangers' broader interpretation is useful in understanding colonial self-image and the assuming of such roles, it lacks relevance to more recent relationships between experts, the state and recipient counties, failing to acknowledge the important point about whether the men-on-the-spot had any political or policy sway in Britain. It also does not address the selection process which was often according to their socio-economic background and education, whether they were the "right sort", or as Lester describes, as benefitting from a 'common academic background and world view'.[13]

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[8] A. M. Brice, 'Prof. Copeland's Revised Map of Franz Josef Land', *The Geographical Journal*, 10:3 (1897), p. 337.
[9] Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*, p. 318.
[10] Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*, p. 4.
[11] T. Ranger, 'White Presence and Power in Africa', *The Journal of African History*, 20:4 (1979), p. 468.
[12] de Vere Allen cited in *ibid.*
[13] A. Lester, 'Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire', *History Compass*, 4:1 (2006), p. 125.

The roaming and to some extent "self-styled" experts described by Tilley and Beinart *et al.* filtered through into the post-independence period through the various development organisations, and this resonates with contemporary accounts of expertise. Picking up these debates in the post-colonial period, Hilton *et al.*, have tracked the growth of expertise through the NGO world. They point out that equally as important as the organisations and government departments that promote knowledge transfer, are the specific individuals or experts based in the donor country or on the ground.[14] In effect these are contemporary man (or woman) on the spot. The field of urban planning and management has not been immune to the march of the expert. In highlighting the role of expertise in the mobility of urban policies and programmes, K. Ward emphasises the way that policy 'gurus' travel the world presenting and giving guidance on a particular aspect of urban management.[15] Elsewhere, S.V. Ward has also examined the role of international planners in the late colonial period, highlights the rise and prominence of 'global figures' of planning practice in this period. He argues that an 'exotic planning figurehead' was seen as a way of 'signifying and validating these evolving ideas of progress' but in some cases resulted in the figureheads merely 'endorsing solutions that had actually been generated by local professionals'.[16] It was these local professionals that Myers credits for keeping the momentum rolling on development projects, yet despite their important role, he suggests that scholars of colonial discourse have 'seldom looked to the apparently humdrum' actors of the colonial period.[17] In an interesting account, Craggs and Neate highlight how the empire witnessed a reverse flow of colonial urban expertise at the point of decolonisation.[18] Therefore in its various mutations, these notions of expertise, experts and men-on-the-spot have continued into the post-colonial period, through their legitimisation by structures within international organisations and also by post-colonial governments themselves.

Colonial knowledge in Northern Rhodesia

[14] M. Hilton, J. McKay, and J. F. Mouhot, *The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 263.
[15] Ward, 'Policies in Motion and Place: The Case of Business Improvement Districts', p. 79.
[16] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 128.
[17] G. A. Myers, 'Intellectual of Empire: Eric Dutton and Hegemony in British Africa', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 88:1 (1998), p. 5.
[18] R. Craggs and H. Neate, 'Post-Colonial Careering and Urban Policy Mobility: Between Britain and Nigeria, 1945–1990', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, September 2016, pp. 44–57.

European colonization and the role of technical expertise in colonial Northern Rhodesia

The use of European technical knowledge as a conduit of power has been witnessed in Zambia since its colonial beginnings. Whilst Britain expressed little concern for 'northern "Zambezia"' following the Berlin conference of 1884-85, Cecil Rhodes was keen to see it retained as a British interest.[19] In 1890 Rhodes chartered a number of expeditions in order to prevent advances being made by the Belgians to the north and Portuguese who held territory to the east and west.[20] By 1889 chartered rule had been granted to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to negotiate mineral rights across large parts of what was to become Northern Rhodesia.[21] As a consequence of the poor quality copper deposits, low copper prices, political distractions along with broader economic factors, in comparison with its activity to the south of the Zambezi, the BSAC paid little attention to Northern Rhodesia. By 1910 the railway line from South Africa had crossed Northern Rhodesia and reached Elisabethville in the Katanga Province of the Belgian Congo, but the trade which flowed along the line largely bypassed the Copperbelt. Aside from a small amount of ore production interest during the First World War, the BSAC managed to do little with the vast, yet unrealised copper deposits in what is now known as the Copperbelt.[22] In 1924 the BSAC administration was replaced by Colonial Office governance when Northern Rhodesia became a protectorate. It was around this time that large copper deposits were found at the Roan Antelope and Bancroft outcrops which coincided with advancements in technology that made Northern Rhodesian copper processing viable.[23] Northern Rhodesia had, until then, remained largely agricultural and it was not until the mining industry grew in the Copperbelt that much urban development took place outside of the relatively small urban centres of Livingstone and Fort Jameson.[24] The handover in governance and interest in mining therefore changed the nature in which experts operated and knowledge

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[19] Hall, *Zambia*, p. 56.
[20] Roberts, *A History of Zambia*.
[21] *Ibid.* Limits to BSAC authority were enforced in Barotseland in the West of what is now Zambia.
[22] Hall, *Zambia*; Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; Roberts, *A History of Zambia*.
[23] Roberts, *A History of Zambia*; Hall, *Zambia*.
[24] The post WWII history of the Copperbelt is hugely complex history. For a more in depth analysis see I. Phimister, 'Corporate Profit and Race in Central African Copper Mining, 1946–1958', *Business History Review*, 85:4 (January 2011), pp. 749–774.

transfer happened in Northern Rhodesia. It became more heavily influenced by both colonial rule and external interests in the form of mining firms.[25] This period marked the acceleration in the transfer of technical expertise, specifically mining and engineering expertise, from the metropole and more established mining centres elsewhere in Southern Africa.[26] The mining industry had grown at such a pace that by 1930 there were 22,000 Africans working on the Copperbelt with 4,000 Europeans who had been employed as "skilled" workers who, according to Money, were largely transient in nature.[27] Despite the increased attention Northern Rhodesia received, the flow of knowledge and expertise was not necessarily straightforward or linear. Hodge and Webb highlight the messy nature of knowledge flow between London and its colonies, suggesting the role of experts and administrators was in adapting and modifying policies according to local needs. Similarly Cooper and Packard assert that the discourse on knowledge and power should not be over simplified, and that within North-South interactions, there emerges 'appropriations, deflections and challenges'.[28] Northern Rhodesia saw a particularly prolific influx of mining expertise from the United States who had held 'technical and financial supremacy' in the copper extraction business.[29] This demonstrates the truly transnational nature of Copperbelt expertise, and also would suggest that in Northern Rhodesia the linear flow might have been disrupted as technical knowledge influenced and shaped the adoption of certain colonial policies.

Land governance in Northern Rhodesia

The motives behind colonial governance often rested on the desire to exploit resources and people for the benefit of the colonial state under the guise of a "civilizing mission". Land management and governance were fields which were subjected to significant external influence

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[25] Hall, *Zambia*.
[26] C. Andersen, *British Engineers and Africa, 1875-1914* (London: Routledge, 2011).
[27] Roberts, *A History of Zambia*, p. 186 The colonial government prevented Africans from moving their families into or owning property in urban areas. As a consequence African mine employees were forced into a pattern of circulatory migration where neither the rural or urban areas constituted a permanent home. J. Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*, Perspectives on Southern Africa 57 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); D. Money, *'No Matter How Much or How Little They've Got, They Can't Settle down': A Social History of Europeans on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1926-1974* (Unpublished thesis, University of Oxford, 2016).
[28] Cooper and Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences*, p. 10.
[29] Hall, *Zambia*, p. 253.

in colonial countries, however there were contradictions surrounding the manner in which British rule was applied to its colonies. Unlike in the direct ruled territories held by France and Belgium, where the aim was to assimilate Africans into the coloniser's culture, or in the French case, to convert 'Africans into Frenchmen', prior to the Second World War the British tended to favour indirect rule.[30] In the most part this saw the creation of indigenous levels of authority which were ultimately controlled by colonial governments. Mamdani recognises indirect rule as 'Janus-faced [and] bifurcated', containing a 'duality: two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority'.[31] Despite there being a general acceptance that British utilised indirect rule, this often differed across colonies and even within colonies themselves. Njoh suggests that a multi-dimensional approach was often used, arguing that for example that a lack of 'indigenous large-scale political units' within many British territories in West Africa pre-empted the use of direct rule.[32] Andersen and Cohen argue that it was often the 'tension between policies of assimilation and diversity' which resulted as a consequence of local conditions that affected type of rule used.[33] In the case of Northern Rhodesia, its size, the relatively polarised concentration of high land values within the Copperbelt, and the 'difficulties of controlling vast tracts of territory with little in the way of personnel and revenue', led Britain to call for a more 'pragmatic response' which was further complicated by the British Government's arrangements with Barotseland.[34] This dual approach manifested itself in multiple ways. For example, in 1928, Northern Rhodesia was divided into Crown Land and Native Reserves. The more directly ruled Crown Land primarily covered the urban areas along the railway line including the main towns and the economic hubs of the Copperbelt. 1947 saw the conversion of some Crown Land into Native Trust Land which facilitated the tenure of white farmers on limited 99 year leases where this was considered to be mutually beneficial to both races.[35] Urban areas again were split between white settler and African areas. This suggests that ultimately the British had a fluid

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[30] *Ibid.,* p. 104.
[31] M. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1996), p. 18.
[32] A. J. Njoh, *Planning Power Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa* (London: UCL Press 2007), p. 145.
[33] C. Andersen and A. Cohen, eds., *The Government and Administration of Africa, 1880-1939*, vol. 1, Britain and Africa Series (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2013), p. xvii.
[34] *Ibid.*; J. W. Donaldson, 'Perceptions of Legal and Geographic Clarity: Defining International Land Boundaries in Africa', in R. Home, ed., *Essays in African Land Law*, (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2011).).
[35] B. van Loenen, 'Land Tenure in Zambia', (University of Maine, 1999).

approach to governing its colonies which could change across both time and space. As figure two shows, this made for a complex arrangement of land law upon which planning legislation was built, and ultimately left a legacy that still deeply affects the way in which land development manifests itself in Zambia today.

Figure 2. Map of land designations.



Map adapted from Andrew Roberts '*A History of Zambia'* (1976)

Planning knowledge transfer in colonial Northern Rhodesia

Njoh notes that the imposition of planning techniques was just one way in which imperial powers embarked on their "civilising mission" by stamping their 'Eurocentric models of spatial design and organization' on the rest of the globe.[36] As such, planning formed an important component of the colonial toolbox with which Britain sought to achieve exploitation and

[36] A. J. Njoh, 'Europeans, Modern Urban Planning and the Acculturation of "racial Others"', *Planning Theory*, 9:4 (January 2010), p. 371.

control.[37] Formal town planning had initially emerged from the need to address urban problems in the Global North, but quickly gained traction 'as a new approach to managing the colonial city'.[38] As Cooper and Stoler observe, urbanism was at the core of colonial development, and a 'general enthusiasm for town planning' emerged at a time when Northern Rhodesia itself was in the early years of its colonial occupation.[39]

The period of rapid growth in Northern Rhodesian towns coincided with an increasing mobility of planning professionals and practice. Whilst not well documented, the BSAC oversaw much of the early urban development of Zambia, embarking upon company led forms of, what King would describe, as 'conscious planning' for early Kalomo, Livingstone and Fort Jameson.[40] It was during this period that the first professional planners had been invited to Northern Rhodesia by the colonial government in order to draw up plans for Livingstone, Ndola and a new capital, Lusaka.[41] The earliest manifestations of planning practice were, however, not necessarily in the form that we conceptualise planning today. Mining towns had been largely drawn up on scientific and practical grounds, with separate townships for European and African workers. The early colonial concern was, as Home notes, less to do with urban design and more with municipal practices such as 'public health, building regulations and property rating', and linked more closely to 'sanitation syndrome' than it was to architecture and design.[42] The arrival of expert planners signalled a shift in planning ideologies, bringing with them ideas such as the garden city. In one of the earliest works in the field of Northern Rhodesian urban planning, Collins tracks how colonial garden city principles were imported and transposed and translated in the sub-Saharan setting, noting that Lusaka differed from other colonial cities because of the anticipated 'settler' nature of its population.[43] The use of the garden city as a framework for

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[37] R. K. Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa', in C. N. Silva, ed., *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. 55.
[38] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*, p. 263.
[39] F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*, p. 167.
[40] Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; A. D. King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', in G. E. Cherry, ed., *Shaping an Urban World*, (London: Mansell, 1980), p. 204.
[41] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*.
[42] Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa', p. 54, 59.
[43] J. Collins, 'Lusaka: Urban Planning in a British Colony, 1931-64', in G. E. Cherry, ed., *Shaping an Urban World*, (London: Mansell, 1980), p. 227 It could be argued that Collins does not make a convincing case for the

planning was prevalent throughout the colonial world, and particularly in Northern Rhodesia which saw a rapid period of development of new urban centres at a time when the garden city movement was at its most prevalent.[44] The initial site for Lusaka was chosen by Adshead in 1931 on the basis that it 'was geographically central in the territory', and at the junction where the Great North road divided into the routes running north and east.[45] The depression stalled progress on the new capital until P.J. Bowling in 1933 set about 'revising the Adshead proposals'.[46] The plan for Lusaka was, according to Kay, to build a 'generous gracious city' signalling a shift away from the purely practical approach that had previously been in use across the colonies.[47] Home and Myers highlight how the eventual development of the plan details and its implementation was left to Eric Dutton, an officer in the public works department who took over the project in 1934.[48] Neither an architect nor a governor, Dutton's role was, according to Myers, a 'facilitator' who 'kept the ball rolling' through his professional and intellectual connections.[49]

For the colonial government, planning logics expedited the "othering" of Africans through the separation of races. The urban areas needed an African population in the form of domestic and unskilled labour to function, but Africans were prevented from formally residing in towns and cities.[50] It unsuccessfully sought to control the movement of African people from and to urban

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classification of Lusaka as a settler city. The low levels of housing ownership in the city suggests that a high proportion of European residents saw themselves as temporary. Research by Phimister and Money relating to other Zambian urban areas support the notion that populations were generally more transient than settler in nature. Lusaka in this sense perhaps mirrored Zambia's other main economic centres. See ; I. R. Phimister, 'Workers in Wonderland? White Miners and the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, 1946–1962', *South African Historical Journal*, 63:2 (June 2011), pp. 183–233; D. Money, '"Do We Fight or Do We Surrender?": Settlers, Resistance, and Decolonisation in Zambia, 1959-64, Unpublished Paper Delivered at the LSE', 2016.

[44] First envisioned by Ebenezer Howard at the turn of the twentieth century, The Garden Cities Movement became the poster child of early urban planning. Designed as an antidote to the chaotic expansion that had characterised the industrial revolution, it called for the balancing of urban and rural life and the orderly separation of uses. The style gained traction as the preferred method of new city and urban extension development in the early half of the twentieth century, being eventually exported across the globe. In particular its use was popular in British colonies. See: E. Howard and L. Mumford, *Garden Cities of To-Morrow*, F. J. Osborn, ed., (Cambridge: Faber and Faber, 1965); King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience'.

[45] R. K. Home, 'Introduction', in by H. Meller, *Lusaka: The New Capital of Northern Rhodesia*, (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 8; Myers, 'Intellectual of Empire'. P. 8

[46] Home, 'Introduction', p. 9.

[47] G. Kay, *A Social Geography of Zambia* (London: University of London Press, 1967), p. 112.

[48] Home, 'Introduction'; Myers, 'Intellectual of Empire'.

[49] Myers, 'Intellectual of Empire', p. 11, 12.

[50] K. Tranberg Hansen, *Distant Companions: Servants and Employers in Zambia, 1900-1985*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989).

areas through a series of legislative tools that were designed to keep maintain the transience of the Africa population by encouraging ties to their rural areas. The tools used to enforce this arrangement took the form of home ownership bans, permits, identification and a prevention of permanent residence and spouses from moving to urban areas.[51] Rakodi emphasises the impact that the circulatory labour migration system had on urban and rural areas in the early years and the role urban policy had in maintaining this social control.[52]

Although scholars have challenged the notion that Lusaka ever existed as a true garden city, Myers cites this style of planning as being a major conduit for urban duality, claiming that the layout merely served to provide planning for a few whilst ignoring the vast majority.[53] Bigon also argues that it was through the role that garden cities played in the 'creation of racially polarized colonial urban environments that have long been recognized in relevant scholarly literature as 'dual cities', within which colonial governments sought to embed their ideologies into the fabric of the city.[54] It was the separation of uses and the zoning of land as characterised by the garden city style which provided a ready-made template for the racial segregation needed for the enforcement of the circulatory labour migration system.[55] Although land was set aside for Africans in the original Lusaka plan, the provision was, according to Collins, vastly inadequate. Whilst this problem was identified before the finalisation of the initial plans, it was little improved upon by subsequent revisions and remained as an area marked as being for African inhabitants rather than a formally planned area of the city.[56] The duality seen in colonial land governance was also evident in Zambian urban planning. This saw colonial planners carve out cities in which white areas were carefully planned and constructed whilst provision for

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51 Collins, 'Lusaka: Urban Planning in a British Colony, 1931-64'; Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia'.
52 Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'.
53 G. A. Myers, *Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 2003); J. Collins, *Lusaka: The Myth of the Garden City*, Zambian Urban Studies 2 (Lusaka: University of Zambia, Zambia, 1969); Home, 'Introduction'.
54 L. Bigon, 'Garden Cities in Colonial Africa: A Note on Historiography', *Planning Perspectives*, 28:3 (July 2013), p. 477.
55 Collins, 'Lusaka: Urban Planning in a British Colony, 1931-64', p. 231.
56 Collins, *Lusaka*; Collins, 'Lusaka: Urban Planning in a British Colony, 1931-64'; Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*.

Africans was inadequate, unplanned and offered no long term stability.[57] Therefore it was not just the separation of races in which a duality manifested itself, rather it played out in multiple ways and on multiple levels. On one level the way that Africans and Europeans were to be separated created dual spaces of living and consumption. The second duality occurred in a bureaucratic sense. In African areas little, if any, planning occurred and if it did, it was 'always inadequate' and concerned largely with issues of sanitation.[58] Conversely in European areas however, the space was to be carefully planned so as to create a city of 'beauty'. [59] Notwithstanding the fact that Africans inhabiting urban areas during the colonial period were not adequately or specifically planned for, African areas still formed an important part of the economic and social structure of the city.[60] As d'Auria notes, such areas often remained 'key contributors to the colonial production of space'.[61]

A number of scholars have sought to characterise the precise nature of colonial planning, and the ideologies that underpinned it, and how these related to broader colonial objectives. Within the built environment, power often manifested itself in a spatial sense and it is clear that both monitoring and domination were central tenets to the urban development and physical form of colonial cities. For Gilbert and Tiffin, colonial governments held a 'semi-official credo that colonial actions were (or should be) altruistic, and self-abnegating', and that power and control was portrayed as being used only in the interests of those it controlled.[62] This underlines the notion that Britain saw, or at least wanted others to see, its imperial mission as a benevolent act. The overarching message of benevolence transcended into the realm of urban development, as S.V. Ward has noted, planning was a form of control which was often carried out or enforced under the guise of betterment. In his assessment, at a symbolic level Britain promoted imperialism as a benevolent force which advocated social and environmental improvement.

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[57] Myers, *Verandahs of Power*; Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa'; Home, 'Introduction'.
[58] Home, 'Introduction', p. 18.
[59] Collins, *Lusaka*, p. 5.
[60] Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'.
[61] V. d'Auria, 'More than Tropical? Modern Housing, Expatriate Practitioners and the Volta River Project in Decolonising Ghana', in R. Craggs and C. Wintle, eds., *Cultures of Decolonisation: Transnational Productions and Practices, 1945-70*, p. 196.
[62] H. Gilbert and C. Tiffin, 'Introduction', in H. Gilbert and C. Tiffin, eds., *Burden or Benefit?: Imperial Benevolence and Its Legacies*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), p. 5.

Such notions were used as a means of utilising soft power to allow Britain to 'entrench their dominance'.[63] Similarly Home identified three ideologies of colonial urban development; state control; capitalism and; an experimental utopian ideology that pushed through new forms of social organisation that could not be tested in Britain.[64] For Home, power and control were embodied within the physical layouts that were used as a means to control populations across the British empire and in this way coercion under the guise of betterment was used as a means of control. These notions of control, experimentation and monitoring described by Home, also suggest that the utilisation of Africa as some sort of laboratory extended beyond the purely scientific endeavours described by Tilley.[65] This idea of experimentation is alluded to by Kothari and Njoh. Kothari picks up on the theme of empty land discourse, suggesting that 'Colonial spaces were, at least initially, imagined as "empty", unobstructed and uninhabited, thus open to unhindered exploration and exploitation'. She observed that during the process of forming administrative districts 'space was appropriated and cartographically mapped into apparent exactitude, becoming and object of knowledge, carved into identifiable districts'.[66] Njoh, echoing Home's "experimental utopia", argues that colonial architects and planners extended their powers 'far beyond' their European scope.[67] For Myers, the ideologies of colonial development spatially present themselves in contemporary Zambia cities. His analysis of colonial planning against these benevolent motives and highlights how they were played out in the built environment of Lusaka through a spatial strategy of colonial 'enframing'.[68] This notion of 'enframing' was first set out by Timothy Mitchell as he identified it as holding three characteristics: 'order without frameworks'; the distinction of 'inside' and 'outside' to architecture and urban design and; city segmentation allowing observation from outside.[69] Rakodi suggests that such colonial notions filtered into post-colonial local government. For her, the problematic nature of local planning is 'rooted in the imposed colonial local government

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[63] Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World', p. 51.
[64] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*.
[65] Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*.
[66] U. Kothari, 'Spatial Practices and Imaginaries: Experiences of Colonial Officers and Development Professionals', *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 27:3 (November 2006), p. 237.
[67] A. J. Njoh, 'Urban Planning as a Tool of Power and Social Control in Colonial Africa', *Planning Perspectives*, 24:3 (July 2009), p. 307.
[68] Myers, *Verandahs of Power*, p. xii.
[69] T. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 55.

system', which was 'based, as in the UK, on an ideology of impartial officials guided by notions of technical rationality'. She notes such values 'thinly cloaked the authoritarian mode of rule' imposed by colonial officials, going on to suggest that this insincere set up transposed into post-colonial local government.[70]

The very act of colonisation, and with it the imposition of external bureaucratic systems to exercise control and power, created asymmetric power relations where certain types of knowledge exclusive to the colonisers created a power void for the colonised. Sidaway points to the way in which planning cannot be 'disassociated from certain European philosophical concepts of presence, order and intelligibility'.[71] Similarly for Peattie, the processes of development and planning were characterised by the imposition of western aspirations and notions of how communities and cities should exist.[72] Even beyond locations where historic colonial and postcolonial power relations flourished, Healey points to the way in which governance and planning are laden with certain power relations.[73] In this sense, land use planning represents an interesting field within which to explore the way in which colonial and post-colonial development relates to contemporary perceptions of knowledge, power, networks and space. Yet it is important to keep in mind, as both Healey and Peattie acknowledge, that it is difficult to identify the point at which the divergence between power within general planning practice, and power within colonial planning practices, can be identified.[74]

Studies of colonial legacies tend to be characterised by a focus on the way that colonialism manifests itself in a spatial sense, whereas Britain's early post-colonial interest was less to do with creating space to emulate the global North, and more to do with ensuring the soft transfer of norms, values and standards into the institutions of new states. Chapter four specifically explores this institutional embeddedness to highlight the way in which independence in Zambia did not mark a paradigm shift in the flow of knowledge from Britain to Zambia. Instead it saw

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[70] Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy', p. 213.
[71] J. Sidaway, 'Postcolonial Geographies: Survey-Explore-Review', in A. Blunt and C. McEwan, eds., *Postcolonial Geographies*, Writing Past Colonialism, (New York: Continuum, 2002), p. 11.
[72] L. Peattie, *Thinking About Development*, (Boston: Springer, 2013).
[73] P. Healey, 'Collaborative Planning in Perspective', *Planning Theory*, 2:2 (July 2003), pp. 101–123.
[74] Peattie, *Thinking About Development*; Healey, 'Collaborative Planning in Perspective'.

the continuation of planning knowledge transfer from the Global North to the Global South. Whilst it acknowledges that, in a spatial sense there remained a colonial legacy, it focusses on the way in which individuals within the planning system helped perpetuate British norms, values and standards in everyday Zambian planning practice.

Shifts in colonial development ideologies and their influence on knowledge transfer

The wave of urban development of Zambia in the 1920s and 1930s had coincided with a dramatic change in colonial governance ideologies as Britain began to adopt a different approach to its colonies. From the mid-1930s, international pressures, ideological shifts, as well as pressure from Britain, prompted the colonial project to undergo a paradigm shift in ideas of development.[75] This came predominantly from a reassessment of the interactions between the metropole and periphery, and the types of colonial personnel involved. This also brought with it an evolution in colonial concerns which led them towards the promotion of 'good government'.[76] Hodge and Webb point to this as being both a shift in British development doctrines that saw a re-evaluation of 'British imperial goals'.[77] In colonial territories, this emerged in a change in focus from the generalist skills of the district commissioners and administrators to system of 'metropolitan specialists and their technical counterparts in the field'.[78] Packard emphasises the role this placed on technology to modernise practices, arguing that 'faith in technology and the optimism about our ability to transform the world carried with it certain assumptions about the peoples and societies that were to receive our technology and be transformed'.[79] With this new found emphasis on technology as well as concerns over good governance, a greater emphasis was placed on the role of expertise. The post Second World War period also witnessed an increased level of professionalisation as colonial governments

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[75] F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, 'Introduction', in F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*.

[76] V. Hewitt, 'Empire, International Development and the Concept of Good Government', in M. Duffield and V. Hewitt, eds., *Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2009), p. 30.

[77] Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*, p. 4.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[79] R. M. Packard, 'Visions of Postwar Health and Development and Their Impact on Public Health Interventions in the Developing World', in F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, p. 101.

moved to place a greater emphasis on expertise over more generalist local based staff and this manifested itself in the creation of several Commonwealth or colonial based professional bodies.[80]

Despite the enactment of the Colonial Development Act of 1929 and the increasing emergence of the developmentalism agenda during the 1930s, it was not until the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of the 1940s that Britain began to significantly contribute to the development of its colonies.[81] Williams suggest that the limited amount of aid funds available during this period were spent on non-dependent countries and that Britain gave virtually no aid to independent Commonwealth countries in the period 1945-62. [82] However others have argued that aid spending to non-Commonwealth and Commonwealth countries alike was negligible, since Britain before the mid-1950s 'did not accept that it should provide official financial assistance' to them.[83]

As previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated, little consideration was given to the needs of Africans in urban areas. Despite this, it was in rural areas colonial expertise turned their attention to addressing issues of development and more heavily imposed western knowledge on Africans. Unlike urban areas which were destined to be for European settlement, rural parts of Northern Rhodesia were potentially there to be exploited, and in line with colonial development policies there was a general emphasis placed on agrarian and rural development. Overseas possessions such as Northern Rhodesia had been there merely as a source of 'unexplored wealth' for which Britain could tap into in order to further its own development.[84] This approach was tied into colonial concerns surrounding rural-urban migration and urbanisation, and ways in which they could control this. The British thought that if they could use knowledge and expertise to improve conditions for rural dwellers then this would reduce

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[80] C. Andersen, 'Internationalism and Engineering in UNESCO during the End Game of Empire 1943-68', *Technology and Culture*, Forthcoming; d'Auria, 'More than Tropical? Modern Housing, Expatriate Practitioners and the Volta River Project in Decolonising Ghana'.
[81] R. J. Reid, *A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present*, (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
[82] Williams, *British Aid - 4; Technical Assistance*, p. 7.
[83] B. Ireton, *Britain's International Development Policies: A History of DFID and Overseas Aid*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 35.
[84] J. M. Hodge, G. Hodl, and M. Kopf, eds., *Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), p. 7.

the demands placed on urban areas. Migration to urban areas was always contested, as one African colonial expert in the 1940s remarked, 'our policy is rural development as opposed to urban development. We want to keep people on the land and to encourage local industries'.[85] Here consideration was given to infrastructure, housing and rural development, which brought with it alternative mechanisms of knowledge transfer. In their analysis of colonial expertise in the rural development sector, Hodge and Webb have argued that imperial powers 'commonly viewed the diffusion of European knowledge, commodities, capital and, where suitable, settlement, as the most natural and efficient way to develop the material forces of what they considered to be unused or underutilized areas of the world'.[86] Yet despite the rhetoric of western powers and the importance they placed on diffusing knowledge, in many countries the state of manpower at independence indicates that very little knowledge was transferred. Yet it was precisely the colonial desire to "exploit" Africa which resulted in the poor skill level at independence.[87] Despite colonial rural development being concerned with the dissemination of agrarian practices throughout the colony, technical assistance had mostly comprised of infrastructure improvements. This did little to generate skills of local peoples and farming techniques which paid little attention to indigenous knowledges to the detriment of 'African agricultural practices'.[88]

Post Second World War international organisations

During the post war period other external funding streams for technical assistance emerged, including the UN, World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organisations however, did not necessarily offer a break from colonial ideologies. For Mazower the UN's ideology is deeply rooted in imperial internationalism and this in turn was affected by Britain's colonizing mission.[89] Cooper and Packard note that these external pressures further solidified the position of colonial experts in forming the new post-war development agenda. As they argue, it was the recruiting of experts, in particular economists, into national governments and

[85] Quoted in Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*, p. 263.
[86] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[87] Hodge, Hodl, and Kopf, *Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism*.
[88] Speek, 'Ecological Concepts of Development? The Case of Colonial Zambia', p. 144.
[89] M. Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

international organisations which 'helped to shape an international community of expertise, with members from almost every country in the world'.[90] This coincided with the Cold War contestation in which development in the "Third World" 'became the grand strategy for advancing such rivalry' and grand 'designs of industrial civilization'.[91] Cooper and Packard highlight the importance of the creation of international organisations during this period as being 'the growing convergence of U.S. and European interests around the need to generate development through technical assistance programmes'. For them, this played an 'important role in fostering the creation of a series of international organisations during the late 1940s and early 1950's'.[92] Bayart and Bertrand also suggest that these institutions offered an escape from colonialism 'without compromising the insertion of old possessions in the international capitalist economy nor their diplomatic fidelity during the cold war'.[93]

As is further explored in this thesis, in the early independence period such institutions rarely chartered a radically different path from colonial ideologies owing to their infiltration by former colonial personnel. Therefore despite the source of this expertise now coming from international organisations, there remained a 'colonial framework of ideas' that championed a 'doctrine and vision of development that would become deeply embedded in international policies and institutions in the decades following the end of colonial rule'.[94] Whilst the World Bank and IMF largely led the post-independence development charge, their doctrines nevertheless followed on from recent changes to colonial development ideologies. Scholars have drawn out certain similarities between late colonial British development ideologies surrounding notions of aid, expertise and development and the doctrines of development promoted by the World Bank. Hewitt points to the criticism levied over the self-interest and conflicts between the promotion of good self-governance whilst maintaining the strength of their hegemony. He asserts that good governance is merely 'the unacknowledged offspring of

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[90] Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', 1997, p. 14.
[91] A. Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 34.
[92] Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', 1997, p. 8–9.
[93] J. F. Bayart and R. Bertrand, 'What Colonial Legacy Are We Speaking Of?', *Esprit*, December 2006, p. 135, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/0901_Bayard-Bertrand-AN.pdf, accessed 1 April 2016.
[94] Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*, p. 19.

British colonial reform', yet he also cautions about the practice of comparisons between colonial and post-colonial practices.[95] The early years of independence saw significant assistance being brought in by these international organisations for major infrastructure projects. These were often overseen by former colonial officials who had 'returned to England [to pursue] second careers in the newly emerging but rapidly expanding international development industry in the UK'.[96] As also noted by Kothari, alternatively some experts had acted in independent advisory capacities to former territories following independence.[97] Former colonial officials also occupied prominent scientific and technical advisory posts in newly emerging international aid agencies.[98] As Packard notes, despite the emergence of development as a discourse, 'post-colonial "development" remained remarkably similar to those of colonial interventions" and 'flows of information, knowledge, technology and expertise [moved] predominantly outward from the "developed" to the "underdeveloped" world'.[99] Moreover, as Andersen suggests, in some post-colonial countries there was significant influence still held by national professional bodies such as in the Engineering field, which still had a degree of authority not just in former colonies but also within international organisations.[100] As chapter three demonstrates, this late colonial shift in development ideologies paved the way for new forms of technical assistance and aid packages that provided useful means by which the British government, amongst others, could seek to gain influence in new states.

British development doctrines at the transition to independence

Zambia's transition to independence was further complicated by the creation of the Central African Federation (CAF) in 1953, which was formed as a means to prevent Afrikaner

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[95] Hewitt, 'Empire, International Development and the Concept of Good Government', p. 39.
[96] M. Duffield and V. Hewitt, 'Introduction', in M. Duffield and V. Hewitt, eds., *Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2009), p. 161.
[97] U. Kothari, 'Spatial Practices and Imaginaries; Experiences of Colonial Officers and Development Professionals', in M. Duffield and V. Hewitt, eds., *Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2009), p. 161.
[98] J. Tischler, *Light and Power for a Multiracial Nation: The Kariba Dam Scheme in the Central African Federation* (Basingstoke: Houndmills, 2013); Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*; Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients'.
[99] Packard, 'Visions of Postwar Health and Development and Their Impact on Public Health Interventions in the Developing World', p. 93.
[100] Andersen, 'Internationalism and Engineering in UNESCO during the End Game of Empire 1943-68'.

expansion to the north.[101] Despite having ambitions to strengthen the position of white settlers, Tishler notes that at an international level the creation of the Federation undermined the strength of Northern Rhodesia's bargaining position by undermining its sovereignty. This meant that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 'was able to exert considerable influence and push through its notoriously conservative financial policy'.[102] As Darwin suggests, the creation of the CAF ensured that the existing colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia remained 'under the supervision of the Colonial Office'.[103] However he also notes that at lower levels of service, such as local government, white settlers and expatriates who held government posts were in many cases transferred to the management of Salisbury.

The arrival of Zambian independence in 1964 did little to abate the flow of knowledge and expertise into the country, indeed the transition from colonial rule offered an opportunity for development ideologies to emerge as a 'key concept in managing the transition'.[104] Outside the ranks of the Colonial Office, 'complacency [had] abounded' over the imminent independence of many colonial states and Britain's future role in their development and there was a sense that so long as Britain provided funding then they would have an element of control.[105] Varying agendas prompted Britain's continued investment of aid funds into its former colonies, for example self-preservation, or as a move by former colonial regimes in order to retain links and influence through these epistemic communities.[106] There was also the encouragement Britain gave colonial officers to stay in posts to ensure that the transition to independence did not result in a collapse of governance. As Kirk-Greene writes in the case of Nigeria, in 1955 colonial officials were concerned that, 'unless a UK based service were created, the governor general acknowledges that he might be unable to prevent a breakdown of administration'.[107] From a

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[101] A. Cohen, *The Politics and Economics of Decolonization in Africa* (London: I.B. Tauris, Forthcoming); Low and Lonsdale, 'Introduction: Towards the New Order 1945-1963'.
[102] Tischler, *Light and Power for a Multiracial Nation*, p. 45.
[103] J. Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*, 7., The Making of the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Houndmills, 1999), p. 199.
[104] F. Cooper, 'Modernizing Bureaucrats', in F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, p. 80.
[105] Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients', p. 152.
[106] British High Commissioner in Zambia, 'Zambia: Transitional Development Plan', 25 February 1965, DO 183.764, The National Archives; Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'.
[107] A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service: A History of HM Colonial and Overseas Civil Services, 1837-1997* (London ; New York : New York, 1999), p. 69.

British government point of view, Cooper highlights how there was also a vested interest in allowing 'British Standards and methods' to '"permeate" the life of the colony' and that this 'represented the best of what authorities could hope for in the late 1950s'.[108] Whilst Hodge and Webb emphasise continuity by default, simply because the systems and people were already in place, S. Stockwell convincingly argues the continued importance placed by the British on maintaining influence. For S. Stockwell, the British administration went to great lengths in order to 'entrench British expertise across different sectors in new African states at independence', to ensure that a British ethos of best practice and good governance could be instilled in post-colonial states in order to maintain ties.[109]

Despite this however, British attempts to instil a preference for British expertise had not always worked as planned, and British involvement in projects was not always warmly received. Cohen points to the case where when it came to assessing bids for the Tanzam oil pipeline, the then Minister for Home affairs Simon Kapwepwe had been 'vehemently anti-British' in his reasoning.[110] Others argue that there was not necessarily continuity between certain colonial and post-colonial networks. d'Auria for example, makes the observation that the new multilateral agencies took over as the main disseminators of knowledge and argues that 'professional mobility and trans-cultural knowledge production encouraged by the prominence of internationalisation and UN-induced development can therefore hardly be understood as merely old colonial relations living on in post-colonial linkages'.[111] Conversely Hodge, and latterly Andersen, have argued that continuities in personnel within such international organisations could be beneficial.[112] Hodge suggests that they offered 'an important thread of continuity across the seemingly fundamental rupture of decolonization and independence'.[113]

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[108] Cooper, 'Modernizing Bureaucrats', p. 80.
[109] Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients', p. 150.
[110] A. Cohen, 'Britain and the Breakdown of the Colonial Environment: The Struggle over the Tanzam Oil Pipeline in Zambia', *Business History Review*, 88:04 (December 2014), p. 755.
[111] d'Auria, 'More than Tropical? Modern Housing, Expatriate Practitioners and the Volta River Project in Decolonising Ghana', p. 202.
[112] Andersen, 'Internationalism and Engineering in UNESCO during the End Game of Empire 1943-68'; J. M. Hodge, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of International Development', *Journal of Modern European History*., Special Issue: Modernizing Missions: Approaches to 'Developing' the Non-Western World after 1945,:8 (2010), pp. 24–46.
[113] Hodge, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of International Development', p. 24.

Whilst this thesis does not argue that mobility and knowledge transfer occurs only via historically colonial linkages, it nevertheless seeks to highlight how the continued presence of colonial era experts in post-colonial development across Africa, proved as being as important in the establishment of the norms, values and standards that are seen today. Moreover, it suggests that these have a bearing on post-colonial networks, since colonialism may have acted to legitimise forms of western knowledge, and this in turn might affect the direction in which Zambia looks for knowledge and expertise.

Whilst the British were keen to see expatriate officers remain in post, this preference ran contrary to the rhetoric emerging from within the newly formed Zambian government. In particular, the first government under Kenneth Kaunda had rolled out a programme of Zambianization which saw the promotion of Zambians in the workforce. Despite attempts to Zambianize the economy, there were also attempts to secure foreign expertise to aid in the realisation of the new state. Thus despite moves towards "self-determination" there was a continuing trend of outsiders having considerable influence in Zambia into the early days of independence. Furthermore, these struggles over the origins of knowledge were occurring at a very early stage in Zambia's independence leading to 'continuity across time and space' which existed between the colonial and post-colonial periods.[114] It was a difficult balance for Zambia to strike, and this is evidenced in the somewhat contradictory messages sent out by the Zambian government. When Kaunda, addressed the UN in 1964, he highlighted the need for the development of skills and technology in the country but warned that 'we will not purchase economic development at the cost of a new type of colonialism' as he recognised that these could lead to a 'new type of dependence just as difficult to throw off as the old'.[115] Later however, Kaunda warned officials in his United National Independence Party (UNIP) not to drive away foreign expertise suggesting a disjuncture between what he said in public and what

[114] Nkomo, 'A Comparative Study of Zambia and Mozambique Africanization, Professionalization, and Bureaucracy in the African Postcolonial State', 321; Kothari, 'Spatial Practices and Imaginaries; Experiences of Colonial Officers and Development Professionals', p. 170.
[115] 'Kenneth Kaunda's Address the 19th Session of the United Nations General Assembly', 4 December 1964, Dag Hammarskjöld Library, United Nations, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/PV.1291.

happened in private.[116] Despite tracing the continuities between colonial service and subsequent international organisations, Hodge in his work on ex-colonial officers in the World Bank does highlight that there was a significant break from the established "old school" development networks that occurred during a period when the World Bank broadened its recruitment in the 1970s.[117] There is no doubt that such a break also occurred at some point during the post-colonial history of planning in Zambia, but of relevance to this research is how much such a rupture might have contributed to a divergence in planning ideologies.

Like other countries on the continent, at independence Zambia rushed to develop national development planning. These early national plans were intrinsically linked to colonial ideas of development which had perpetuated through into independence, as 'models and recommendations were revived and reformulated into ten year development plans' which coincided with a 'great surge in training of new technical candidates'.[118] As Cooper notes, the '1960s African state sought to take over the interventionist aspect of the colonial state, and indeed to intensify it, in the name of the national interest', but it also had to 'demonstrate to voters that the state was improving their lives'.[119] As a consequence, this further increased demand for Zambia to recruit from outside. Similarly Diouf, in his analysis of Senegalese development noted the important link between colonial development doctrines and nationalism, pointing out that 'development entailed simultaneously imagination, knowledge, and progress toward the realization of the nationalist dream'.[120] As chapter four demonstrates, this move towards national planning had a profound effect on the land planning service in Zambia, due to the polarisation of resources into central government and a lack of connection between national planning and local implementation as a consequence of general disregard for local government.

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[116] A. DeRoche, 'Non-Alignment on the Racial Frontier; Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968', in S. Onslow, ed., *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation*, (New York: Routledge, 2012).
[117] Hodge, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of International Development'.
[118] Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*, p. 11.
[119] F. Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 88.
[120] M. Diouf, 'Senegalese Development; From Mass Mobilisation to Technocratic Elitism.', in F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, p. 291.

Knowledge, power and planning.

Two core theoretical debates form the foundations for this thesis: the relationship between power and knowledge and, the concept of global development in the post-colonial world. Like elsewhere in its former colonies, the way in which the imperial powers used western knowledge in Zambia to sculpt and mould the physical landscape for their own means and to control indigenous populations, was often an important motivation for imperial missions. It is this interplay between the colonial knowledge and power relationship that shaped cities and rural areas of Zambia, and this relationship continues to be played out today through post-colonial relations. Foucault stressed the linkage between knowledge and power as there being 'no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations'. He suggested that those who are dominated are not passive bystanders 'it invests them, is transmitted by the and through them; it exerts pressure on them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resists the grip on them'.[121] Similarly Sachs highlights the way in which knowledge 'wields power by directing people's attention; it carves out and highlights a certain reality, casting into oblivion other ways of relating to the world around us'.[122] Understanding this way in which knowledge can be used to subjugate and control is central to formulating any analyses of how knowledge travels and lands, but also forms a central tenet of the planning profession. For example, Escobar highlights how Foucault's work in *Discipline and Punish* relates to the way in which planning is predicated on control and power. For him, 'one cannot look on the bright side of planning, its modern achievements (if one were to accept them), without looking at the same time on its dark side of domination'.[123] This draws into the debate the issue of planning and how power might specifically manifest itself in this particular case study. First there are the various power relations that manifest themselves through the planning process. A second layer of power manifests itself the process of knowledge exchange. Like in other disciplines, scholars of planning have been persuaded by Foucault's arguments regarding power knowledge

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[121] M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 27.
[122] W. Sachs, 'Introduction', in W. Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, (London: Zed, 2010), p. xix.
[123] A. Escobar, 'Planning', in W. Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power,* (London: Zed, 2010), p. 147; Foucault, *Discipline and Punish.*

relationships. Fischler argues that Foucault's work illuminates the ways in which planners operate, suggesting that the 'fields of power are systems of practice through which actions as well as identities are shaped'.[124] For Watson, both pastoral and disciplinary manifestations of power play out within planning practice.[125] Whilst Watson and Fischler rest their analyses on the basis of a two party process of exchange and/or domination, the act of planning knowledge transfer in the development setting clearly includes a third dimension – and thus does not just entail the planners and the planned, but also a third tier of the experts whose knowledge is being transferred onto both other parties.

Yet planners in Zambia are not just passive recipients of knowledge, but are in fact technical elites. They hold a high level qualifications and professional expertise which places them as holders of power and gatekeepers of knowledge, particularly where this knowledge is geographically situated. This geographic situatedness might also affect the way that power manifests itself. As Njoh points out, unlike in the Global North where planners assume an expert advisory role, in Africa they had far greater freedom to use their expertise to exert 'power to effectuate large-scale change in society' using 'institutional authority', 'coercion and consent'.[126] Thus, the research must not only consider the way that multiple actors leads to multiple manifestations of power, but also the way that each manifestation might differ from the next.

Postcolonial theory

Whilst independence from Britain marked a point at which Zambia gained self-governance, colonialism left a legacy that ran through almost every strand of Zambian society. Regardless of how new governments manifested themselves, or the new policies were laid out, their actions would always be set against a backdrop of this legacy. It is clear, therefore, that Zambia's colonial history affects the level of influence external bodies, such as the VSO can wield in post-colonial Zambia. The question of who owns knowledge and who is in a position or has the agency to

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[124] R. Fischler, 'Strategy and History in Professional Practice: Planning as World Making', in H. Liggett and D. C. Perry, eds., *Spatial Practices: Critical Explorations in Social/Spatial Theory*, (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995), p. 17.
[125] V. Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning: Metropolitan Planning in Cape Town Under Political Transition*, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 5.
[126] Njoh, 'Urban Planning as a Tool of Power and Social Control in Colonial Africa', 313–314, 311, 310.

share or impose their knowledge, is central to the discussion of post-colonial development as well as knowledge transfer where this occurs in the post-colonial setting. This thesis draws inspiration from postcolonial theory which provides an important body of work within which to frame thinking surrounding post-colonial knowledge transfer. The emergence of postcolonial theory in the mid-1980s challenged conventional ideas of knowledge, power and modernity, and offered a rejection of European universalism and the hegemonic narrative to the postcolonial. It argues that the lowering of the flag did not mark a point, as Hall suggests, 'when everything is reversed at the same moment, all the old relations disappear forever and entirely new ones come to replace them', instead colonial influence continues to inhabit the lives of postcolonial citizens.[127] Many post-colonial countries saw a rise in "nationalist" histories. Alongside this was also a shift in the understanding of continuing legacies of centralism and a reconceptualization of the relations between the "West and the rest". This determined the way in which colonial legacies perpetuated. Postcolonial theory specifically criticises the role that the predominance of western external knowledge has in the post-colonial setting. It argues that knowledge is often imposed by the dominant Euro-American hegemony with economic, political and social relations of domination and subordination. This view is critical to studies of geography and space since, as Sidaway argues, they cannot be untangled from postcoloniality, as they are 'inescapably marked (both philosophically and institutionally) by its location and development as a western-colonial science'.[128]

Postcolonialism is notoriously difficult to define, however in seeking to define it a number of scholars have taken a broad view, tracing the geographical extent of postcolonialism, arguing that it had an impact beyond the borders of colonised countries. Loomba points to the suggestion that the process of decolonisation affected both the metropole as well as colony, and thus both are in effect postcolonial but not necessarily in the same way.[129] McClintock describes Brazil, Argentina and Hong Kong as all postcolonial but not necessarily displaying

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[127] S. Hall, 'When Was "the Post-Colonial"? Thinking at the Limit', in I. Chambers and L. Curti, eds., *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 247.
[128] Sidaway, 'Postcolonial Geographies: Survey-Explore-Review', p. 11.
[129] A. Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, 2nd ed, The New Critical Idiom (London: Routledge, 2005).

the same conditions, suggesting that postcoloniality manifests itself differently across geographies and according to colonial regimes.[130] Goss identified the lack of clarity in what is understood to be the "postcolonial condition" and questioned whether the term postcolonial refers to a material condition or 'a strategy to arrive at a broader postcolonial condition'. He concludes by suggesting that this failure to clarify its meaning makes the task of applying it problematic.[131] Taking this broad view put forward by these scholars both Zambia and Britain operate in some sort of postcolonial state. In the period after independence they both sought to redefine their role but relations forged in the colonial period had a heavy bearing on their relationship in the postcolonial period. Yet some scholars argue against applying the term postcolonial across a broad range of settings. Ashcroft *et al.*, point to the fact that 'the increasingly unfocused use of the term "post-colonial" over the last ten years to describe an astonishing variety of cultural, economic and political practices has meant that there is a danger of it losing effective meaning altogether'.[132] Like Ashcroft *et al.*, Sidaway also questions conventional understandings of postcolonialism, suggesting that because continuities with the past might be perpetuated through neo-imperialism, the term post-colonialism might be somewhat redundant.[133] Taking this approach there would be a need to discern what events or actions within the process of knowledge transfer constitute a reference to postcolonialism, and what is merely an act of neo-colonialism. Yet there also remains a need for awareness that postcolonial and neo-colonial conditions can exist within the same action or event, and these events and actions can simultaneously be neo-colonial whilst coming into contact with the postcolonial environment or postcolonial condition.

Concerns with the over simplification of postcolonialism have been raised by a number of scholars. Cautioning against a reductionist approach, Bayart and Betrand warn of the danger of reducing postcolonialism to a mere memory of colonialism as this only serves to undermine the extent of its reach. Similarly, Cooper emphasises the complexity of defining postcolonialism,

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[130] A. Mcclintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, (New York: Routledge, 1995).
[131] J. Goss, 'Postcolonialism: Subverting Whose Empire?', *Third World Quarterly*, 17:2 (June 1996), p. 242.
[132] B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, and H. Tiffin, eds., *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 2.
[133] Sidaway, 'Postcolonial Geographies: Survey-Explore-Review'.

and cautions against the formulation of 'arguments that posit a causal link between "colonialism" or a "colonial legacy" and "the post-colony"' because colonial regimes were effectively 'moving targets'.[134] For them, since the colonial regimes differed greatly across the various stages of their evolution and indeed across geographies, it is difficult to pinpoint the cause and therefore impossible to pinpoint the exact effects. A central tenet of this thesis draws on these arguments and suggests we cannot define a specific moment at which colonialism ceases and postcolonial/post-colonial period starts. Far from there being a moment of rupture in practice and the flow of knowledge, instead, established methods remained, albeit in an ever changing and fluid way that responded to external and internal demands. It proposes that knowledge transfer in urban governance in Zambia is affected by both colonial and post-colonial influences, and that this affects the nature of knowledge transfer in the present setting.

Knowledge transfer and postcolonial theory

Knowledge ownership is a central theme within postcolonial literature in which scholars argue that the colonial legacies of knowledge continue into the post-colonial setting and that that control of knowledge is a form of neo-colonialism.[135] Grosfoguel identified nine hierarchies of the 'coloniality of power' that form current western domination of power. The most relevant of Grosfoguel's typologies for this thesis is what he describes as the 'epistemic hierarchy that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over non-western knowledge and cosmologies'.[136] In examining this 'coloniality of power', this thesis interrogates whether or not Zambia's colonial legacy and early post-colonial linkages encouraged the country to seek outside assistance for solutions to its development problems. In addition, it also examines the extent to which the historic imposition of ideas may have shifted to the conscious and selective borrowing of ideas. It asks whether Zambia actively sought western knowledge, why it might, and to what extent it stands out among other post-colonial nations in this respect.

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[134] Cooper, 'Possibility and Constraint', p. 170.

[135] J. W. Crampton and S. Elden, *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, (Aldershot: Routledge, 2007); B. M. Kazimbaya-Senkwe and P. Lubambo, 'Subaltern Speak in a Postcolonial Setting: Diffusing and Contesting Donor-Engendered Knowledge in the Water Sector in Zambia', in P. Healey and R. Upton, eds., *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*.

[136] R. Grosfoguel, 'The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms', *Cultural Studies*, 21:2 (March 2007), p. 217.

Scholars argue that knowledge and power perpetuates colonial relationships in post-colonial times. Ndlovu-Gatsheni for example, describes the coloniality of knowledge as 'a complex process of deployment of global imperial technologies of subjectivation taking the form of translating and re-writing other cultures, other knowledges, and other ways of being, and presuming commensurability though Western rationality'.[137] For many, the concept of development is a key mechanism for the perpetuation of western knowledge. Maekawa for example, levelled criticism at the role of external knowledge in the post-colonial development setting. For him, knowledge is imposed from globally-dominant West European/North American quarters, which coincides with economic, political and social relations of domination and subordination.[138] Sheppard and Leitner link this into the international development discourse by acknowledging that such development often legitimises first world expertise.[139] Similarly Escobar, as with Ferguson's work in Lesotho, questioned how Europe and America became the definitive model of development elsewhere in the globe. He reiterates the case that development often relies on strong categorizations and unequal power and that predominantly discounts non-western knowledge systems.[140] For Chakrabarty, this domination of knowledge is as a consequence of ignorance as much as knowing. For him, a western ignorance exists in relation to Third World social science, that leads him to ask what allows 'modern European sages to develop such clairvoyance with regard to societies of which they were empirically ignorant?'.[141] Cooper and Packard highlight this in the tensions brought about by development and the way in which it 'cannot escape questions of when the intervention of knowledge-bearing people brings about constructive change or when it merely demeans those who cannot claim such knowledge'.[142] It is not just the overarching imposition of western knowledge in the development setting that can be problematic, but also the way in which it is delivered. Mitchell, Escobar and Ferguson have pointed to the codifying of development knowledge through

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[137] Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity*, p. 33.
[138] I. Maekawa, 'Neo-Colonialism Reconsidered: A Case Study of East Africa in the 1960s and 1970s', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 43:2 (March 2015), pp. 317–341.
[139] E. Sheppard and H. Leitner, 'Quo Vadis Neoliberalism? The Remaking of Global Capitalist Governance after the Washington Consensus', *Geoforum*, 41:2 (March 2010), pp. 185–194.
[140] Escobar, *Encountering Development*.
[141] D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)*, p. 29.
[142] Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', 1997, p. 17.

language whereby the 'objects of development are constructed by those who practice development in ways which legitimate particular approaches to development'.[143] That is, the postcoloniality of knowledge can be all consuming.

This idea finds resonance with Chakrabarty's assertion that ignorance can be asymmetric, and that in seeking to develop non-western cultures consciously casting their gaze towards the West.[144] Similarly Ghertner observed this phenomenon in the experiences and aspirations of slum dwellers in urban India. He discovered that following years of subjection to negative media and political campaigns against their presence, slum dwellers started to 'see the city through the lens of world-class aesthetics – to see themselves as "illegal" for being outside the "normal" visual order'.[145] This fascinating example explores how asymmetric ignorance may be playing out beyond the postcolonial sphere in contemporary India. That is, officials and professionals and middle classes or those deemed to hold knowledge, are capable of projecting a bourgeois ideology onto the poor to the extent that it not only defines the aspirations of the poor, but also defines the poor's knowledge of themselves. These observations resonate with Foucault's and Leow's assertions that knowledge becomes so powerful and all-embracing that oppressed themselves become conduit of the "knowledge" that enabled their continued subjugation.[146] This asymmetry of knowledge production can also have a profound impact on both development experts and the way in which those African's trained in Britain and elsewhere in the Global North perform urban planning. Robinson argues that contemporary urban knowledge fails to address the needs of cities in the Global South, and calls for a realignment in order that theory better relates to southern urbanity.[147] Commentators have observed that it is 'dominant patterns of knowledge production and consumption [which] lead us largely to ignore substantial areas of the world' and that 'even when they are represented, their depiction

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[143] Packard, 'Visions of Postwar Health and Development and Their Impact on Public Health Interventions in the Developing World', p. 110.
[144] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.*
[145] D. A. Ghertner, 'Rule by Aesthetics: World-Class City Making in Delhi', in A. Roy and A. Ong, eds., *Worlding Cities*, (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p. 290.
[146] Crampton and Elden, *Space, Knowledge and Power*; R. Leow, 'What Colonial Legacy? The Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka (House of Language) and Malaysia's Cultural Decolonisation.', in R. Craggs and C. Wintle, eds., *Cultures of Decolonisation: Transnational Productions and Practices, 1945-70.*
[147] J. Robinson, *Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development*, (London: Routledge, 2006).

is isolated, masking the wider relevance of the contributions in the formulation of general patterns and theory'.[148] Yet postcolonial states are not just passive ciphers through which former colonial or global powers can continue to promote their interests. Rego in his article on the dissipation of ideas in the Brazilian setting states that 'a foreign cultural value is only embraced as long as it fits the general system of the welcoming culture'.[149] Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Lubambo similarly raised the issue of resistance to outside influence.[150] That is not to say that former colonised peoples have no agency, as Myers notes it was never a case where colonial ideas were swallowed whole but in fact 'African and Asian functionaries of state were conscious agents in this transfer'.[151] This thesis responds to this issue by suggesting that, as in the colonial period, Western expertise may not always be welcome, and it explores some of the ways in which expertise might be deflected by recipients in Zambia.

As Zambia has a history of importing knowledge, the extent to which the legacies of colonial systems and ideologies influences the willingness or reluctance of a society to embrace such imported values remains a key question. It is against this backdrop of knowledge and development in postcoloniality that the following questions are raised: What is the lens through which the Global South as well as the Global North is viewed; who owns knowledge in this particular setting; what is the extent to which outside knowledge is resisted or welcomed and; what influence history may have had on this. It is also pertinent to consider here the point raised by Briggs and Sharp. They regard an apparent disjuncture between the worlds of postcolonialism and development, and ask whether space is made within developmental circles for the theories and ideas that have emerged from postcolonial studies.[152] With these observations in mind one must ask the extent to which such criticisms are filtering through to

[148] S. Oldfield, S. Parnell, and A. Mabin, 'Engagement and Reconstruction in Critical Research: Negotiating Urban Practice, Policy and Theory in South Africa', *Social & Cultural Geography*, 5:2 (June 2004), p. 289.
[149] R. L. Rego, 'Importing Planning Ideas, Mirroring Progress: The Hinterland and the Metropolis in Mid-Twentieth-Century Brazil', *Planning Perspectives*, 27:4 (2012), p. 626.
[150] Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Lubambo, 'Subaltern Speak in a Postcolonial Setting: Diffusing and Contesting Donor-Engendered Knowledge in the Water Sector in Zambia'.
[151] Myers, *Verandahs of Power*, p. 159.
[152] J. Briggs and J. Sharp, 'Indigenous Knowledges and Development: A Postcolonial Caution', *Third World Quarterly*, 25:4 (May 2004), pp. 661–676.

development organizations working in the aid sector in Africa and elsewhere, or whether these notions reside exclusively in the realm of academia.

A continuous thread that runs through the process of planning in Zambia is the importance placed on external knowledge. Whilst the mechanisms may be different, it is easy to see how the colonial narratives and motives of ordering, monitoring and domination, outlined by Home, Mitchell and Ward inform the postcolonial discourse surrounding present day urban development sectors.[153] Myers asserts that Lusaka, perhaps like many African cities, can be conceived of as 'postcolonial' in two ways, first as a city living in 'the "temporal aftermath"', and secondly that 'it is a city amid the "critical aftermath"'.[154] It is perhaps as a consequence of its history, economic plight and this postcolonial condition that Zambia has continued to engage, whether as an active participant or out of necessity, in knowledge transfer. That is, it continues to learn and borrow ideas from western donor funded experts and continues to be shaped by, or under the influence of others. Watson, Vale and Topping note that major cities and towns in Africa have long been subject to grand master-planning both under colonial rule and through various schemes dreamed up in the post-independence eras and through to the present day.[155] Yet it is not just the physical space in cities which might betray the postcolonial characteristics of planning. Chapter five builds on these spatial analyses to explore how this postcoloniality might manifest itself in that way that certain norms, values and standards have been internalised and become evident in postcolonial policies, legislation and practice.

Knowledge transfer studies

To understand the mechanisms by which modern policies and practices might flow, the thesis draws on literature surrounding knowledge transfer studies. This field originated in the United States as a means to understand the way in which knowledge spread throughout the Federal

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153 Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*; Home, 'Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire 1910–1940'; Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*; Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'.

154 G. A. Myers, *African Cities: Alternative Visions of Urban Theory and Practice* (London: Zed, 2011), p. 30.

155 V. Watson, '"The Planned City Sweeps the Poor Away…": Urban Planning and 21st Century Urbanisation', *Progress in Planning*, 72:3 (October 2009), p. 173; L. Vale, *Architecture, Power and National Identity*, (London: Routledge, 2014); A. Topping, 'Kigali's Future or Costly Fantasy? Plan to Reshape Rwandan City Divides Opinion', *The Guardian*.

System.[156] A significant body of case study literature therefore deals with knowledge transfer in the supra national and NGO sector, with particular focus on initiatives and programmes run by the World Bank.[157] For the purpose of this study it is important to define the terms used in relation to the exchange of information between jurisdictions and organisations. Three main terms emerge in the literature, these are: lesson drawing; knowledge transfer and policy transfer. Key theorists in the field of lesson drawings and knowledge transfer are Richard Rose, David Dolowitz and David Marsh. Rose is credited with articulating the theoretical concept of lesson drawing. He identifies lesson drawing as addressing the question: 'Under what circumstances and to what extent can a programme that is effective in one place transfer to another?'.[158] Dolowitz and Marsh take a broader view, defining a difference between three types of knowledge transfer 'policy transfer, emulation and lesson drawing', but state that all three are 'a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place'.[159] Holzinger and Knill define lesson drawing as being where 'governments rationally utilise available experience elsewhere in order to resolve a domestic problem' and suggest that lesson drawing is actually more of a voluntary activity than perhaps is suggested by Rose. However like Dolowitz and Marsh he acknowledges that lesson drawing is different from policy transfer.[160] Page seeks to clarify difference between policy transfer and lesson drawing by highlighting the key differences and overlapping features of each. He points to the greater emphasis in policy transfer literature which seeks to understanding the process and conditions 'by which policies and practices move from exporter to importer

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[156] D. Stone, 'Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the "transnationalization" of Policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11:3 (January 2004), pp. 545–566.
[157] W. D. Coleman and A. Perl, 'Internationalized Policy Environments and Policy Network Analysis', *Political Studies*, 47:4 (September 1999), pp. 691–709; K. Holzinger and C. Knill, 'Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12:5 (October 2005), pp. 775–796; S. Jasanoff, 'NGOs and the Environment: From Knowledge to Action', *Third World Quarterly*, 18:3 (1997), pp. 579–594; E. Page, 'Future Governance and the Literature on Policy Transfer and Lesson Drawing', (presented at the ESRC Future Governance Programme Workshop, London, 2000), http://personal.lse.ac.uk/Pagee/Papers/EdPagePaper1.pdf; D. Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', *Politics*, 19:1 (February 1999), pp. 51–59.
[158] R. Rose, 'What Is Lesson-Drawing?', *Journal of Public Policy*, 11:1 (January 1991), p. 3.
[159] D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature', *Political Studies*, 44:2 (June 1996), p. 344.
[160] Holzinger and Knill, 'Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence', p. 783.

jurisdictions'.[161] James and Lodge offer a critical assessment of the work of Rose and Dolowitz and Marsh. They make the case that there is little difference between conventional policy making and lesson drawing and that it would be difficult to find a case of any rational decision making that has not sought to learn from other experiences across time and space.[162]

It is clear from the literature that the terms are interlinking and overlap in many places, with terms such as 'lesson drawing' meaning different things to different authors. In addition, scholars of knowledge transfer have also tended to focus on the transfer of specific policies and programmes, giving less weight to the actors and the more subtle processes of transfer that occur alongside these.[163] Stone's analysis is helpful here, in that she sets out a contemporary perspective of the difference between these 'hard' transfer "policy tools, structures, practices" and 'soft' transfer "norms and knowledge".[164] This is useful for separating policy from everyday practice, and in understanding the nature of the transfers that were occurring in the Zambian planning service. In the post-colonial setting it is important to appreciate and understand the less clearly definable soft transfers of knowledge due to their resonance with certain colonial doctrines surrounding the idea of "British standards".[165] It is these forms of "soft transfer" which help us to understand the networks, relationships and interactions that underpin the process of knowledge transfer and to some extent highlight the cultural aspects of such interactions.

From an ideological point of view, some scholars such as Blakie and Gilbert attempt to theorise the processes involved and offer a critique of the neoliberal agenda behind knowledge transfer.[166] Like Shepherd their studies are framed within the postcolonial setting and touch on

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161 Page, 'Future Governance and the Literature on Policy Transfer and Lesson Drawing', p. 2.
162 O. James and M. Lodge, 'The Limitations of "Policy Transfer" and "Lesson Drawing" for Public Policy Research', *Political Studies Review*, 1:2 (April 2003), pp. 179–193.
163 P. Healey, 'Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques: The Transnational Flow of Planning Ideas and Practices', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 37:5 (2013), pp. 1510–1526.
164 D. Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', *Politics*, 19:1 (February 1999), p. 546.
165 Cooper, 'Modernizing Bureaucrats', p. 80.
166 P. Blaikie, 'Development, Post-, Anti-, and Populist: A Critical Review', *Environment and Planning A*, 32:6 (2000), pp. 1033–1050; A. Gilbert, '"Scan Globally; Reinvent Locally": Reflecting on the Origins of South Africa's Capital Housing Subsidy Policy', *Urban Studies*, 39:10 (September 2002), pp. 1911–1933.

some of the issues surrounding power relations.[167] Rose also described the role that 'political values' have in lesson drawing, arguing that shared interests and values often influence choice of donor and effectiveness of transfer.[168] Peck *et al.* brought attention to embeddedness and path dependency in the adoption of neoliberal restructuring projects. They highlighted the way in which distinctive national, regional and local institutional frameworks led to the morphing of an economic theory according to different conditions of the places it lands. This approach is relevant to the study of knowledge transfer where 'path-dependency' might be affected by both colonialism and by different geographic and socio-economic situatedness.[169] For them, policies might be preferred where they have been granted ideological anointment or sanctioning out of a perception of shared ideologies. Such shared ideology might be born out of historical events and this is particularly pertinent to studies of post-colonial knowledge transfer. Indeed Stone has criticised knowledge transfer literature for being too ahistorical in failing to adequately recognise that both colonial and cold war periods resulted in policy and knowledge transfer.[170] In the case of a postcolonial state such as Zambia, the institutional, economic and social legacy of colonialism will clearly have an impact, even some 50 years post-independence.

The transnational exchange of urban development knowledge and policies has been traced by a number of scholars. Of these, several have sought to examine the way in which European town planning ideologies and schemes were transplanted and imposed within colonial states.[171] A significant body of literature also addresses the ways in which knowledge flowed after empire ended, examining the way in which this continued and diverged from history and was influenced

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[167] A. Shepherd, 'Consolidating the Lessons of 50 Years of "development"', *Journal of International Development*, 13:3 (April 2001), pp. 315–320.
[168] Rose, 'What Is Lesson-Drawing?', p. 17.
[169] J. Peck, N. Theodore, and N. Brenner, 'Neoliberal Urbanism: Models, Moments, Mutations', *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 29:1 (2009), p. 50.
[170] Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', February 1999.
[171] Njoh, *Planning Power Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa*; Njoh, 'Urban Planning as a Tool of Power and Social Control in Colonial Africa'; King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience'; Collins, 'Lusaka: Urban Planning in a British Colony, 1931-64'; G. E. Cherry, *Shaping an Urban World*, (London: Mansell, 1980); Home, 'Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire 1910–1940'; Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*; Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa'; T. R. Grunow, 'Paving Power: Western Urban Planning and Imperial Space from the Streets of Meiji Tokyo to Colonial Seoul', *Journal of Urban History*, 42:3 (May 2016), pp. 506–556; A. Armstrong, 'Colonial and Neocolonial Urban Planning: Three Generations of Master Plans for Dar Es Salaam Tanzania', *Utafiti*, 8:1 (1986), pp. 43–66; Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; Bigon, 'Garden Cities in Colonial Africa'.

by the new wave of international politics and tracing new directions of knowledge transfer.[172] A further strand to emerge from the planning knowledge transfer literature are those works that specifically attempt to understand the theory and processes behind the way in which planning knowledge might travel from one place to another.[173]

This thesis seeks to understand how the historical flow of knowledge in Zambia influences planning today. However it acknowledges that tracing planning histories across time and space is complex because sources, destinations and characteristics might be difficult to pinpoint. Clarke for example highlighted the difficulties in drawing such comparisons across policy/institutional and historical categories and suggests a need for an expansive view.[174] Duffield and Hewitt similarly advise caution in drawing similarities between colonial and post-colonial activities.[175] One of the problems that might arise is an oversimplification of the narrative. Grunow identifies the types of complexities that feature in historical perspectives on knowledge transfer. In his work, he describes the multifaceted role that planners assumed in the dispersal of knowledge in the Far East, knitting together the history of planning ideas and their influence on Japanese cities. For Grunow the flows of knowledge might not necessarily be one dimensional in nature. In his case study he discovered that in the 1880s Japanese authorities has been the recipients of knowledge in seeking 'Western planning and technical

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172 Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'; S. V. Ward, 'The International Diffusion of Planning: A Review and a Canadian Case Study', *International Planning Studies*, 4:1 (1999), pp. 53–77; N. Feniger and R. Kallus, 'Israeli Planning in the Shah's Iran: A Forgotten Episode', *Planning Perspectives*, July 2014, pp. 1–21; R. Harris and C. Giles, 'A Mixed Message: The Agents and Forms of International Housing Policy, 1945–1973', *Habitat International*, Learning from the past: international housing policy since 1945, 27:2 (June 2003), pp. 167–191; V. Prakash, *Chandigarh's Le Corbusier: The Struggle for Modernity in Postcolonial India*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); N. Clarke, 'Town Twinning in Cold-War Britain: (Dis)continuities in Twentieth-Century Municipal Internationalism', *Contemporary British History*, 24:2 (June 2010), pp. 173–191; E. Mehilli, 'The Socialist Design: Urban Dilemmas in Postwar Europe and the Soviet Union', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 13:3 (Summer 2012) (2012), pp. 635–665; d'Auria, 'More than Tropical? Modern Housing, Expatriate Practitioners and the Volta River Project in Decolonising Ghana'; Craggs and Neate, 'Post-Colonial Careering and Urban Policy Mobility'.

173 Stone, 'Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the "transnationalization" of Policy'; Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', February 1999; P. Healey, 'The Universal and the Contingent: Some Reflections on the Transnational Flow of Planning Ideas and Practices', *Planning Theory*, 11:2 (May 2012), pp. 188–207; J. Friedmann, 'Crossing Borders: Do Planning Ideas Travel?', in P. Healey and R. Upton, eds., *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*; B. Sanyal, 'Similarity of Difference? What to Emphasize Now for Effective Planning Practice', in P. Healey and R. Upton, eds., *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*.

174 N. Clarke, 'Actually Existing Comparative Urbanism: Imitation and Cosmopolitanism in North-South Interurban Partnerships', *Urban Geography*, 33:6 (August 2012), pp. 796–815.

175 Duffield and Hewitt, 'Introduction', p. 1.

knowledge applicable to Japan'. However they had then gone on to be donors of knowledge when Japanese planners later sought to impose the ideas they had adopted from the West during the refashioning of colonial Seoul in the early 1900s.[176] This highlights just one aspect of the complicated nature of knowledge flows which might also be influenced by borrowing and imposition as well as multiple sources. It does not, however, account for the influence that colonial knowledge transfer has in the post-colonial world and how they were influenced by development doctrines. Development and planning are intrinsically linked as Escobar notes, the history of development is akin to the 'history of the institutionalization and ever more pervasive deployment of planning'. Charting planning's rise with successive changes in international development goals, he concludes that the basic human needs strategy of the 1970s was that 'no other concept has served so well to recast and spread planning'.[177] Thus as the international development movement grew, so too did the spread of planning knowledge. Ward, amongst other, highlights the way that planners and other urban professionals had always worked internationally and managed to switch from being funded by colonial states to the new international organisations of the post-colonial world.[178] As Saunier points out, these groups and individuals carved out roles for themselves in the various international organisations which emerged after the Second World War.[179] Yet knowledge transfer did not always follow on from colonial ties, as Friedmann's experience shows, the United States became heavily involved in planning and development in Latin American countries.[180] It was in the early post-colonial period that planning knowledge transfer to colonial countries witnessed a geographical diversity, partly fuelled by the emerging development ideologies but also through Cold War rivalries. The field of planning drew strength from these rivalries, with America 'actively [employing] urban planning to accomplish a number of Western cultural and ideological objectives', which

[176] Grunow, 'Paving Power: Western Urban Planning and Imperial Space from the Streets of Meiji Tokyo to Colonial Seoul', p. 541-42.
[177] Escobar, 'Planning', p. 151.
[178] Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'; R. K. Home, 'Knowledge Networks and Postcolonial Careering: David Oakley (1927-2003)', *ABE Journal. Architecture beyond Europe*, 4 (July 2013), pp. 1–14.
[179] P. Y. Saunier, 'Sketches from the Urban Internationale, 1910–50: Voluntary Associations, International Institutions and US Philanthropic Foundations', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25:2 (June 2001), pp. 380–403.
[180] J. Friedmann, *Re-Tracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning.* (New York: Anchor Press, 1973).

manifested itself in a number of Ford Foundation backed schemes across the Middle East.[181] This was countered by moves from the Soviets and East European states. For example, in 1960 Croatia sent 30 urban professionals to Guinea to develop a new Urban Development Plan for Conakry, and Polish planners were involved in a number of post-colonial development projects.[182] Meanwhile the influence of Soviet planners has also reached into allied states such as East Europe and Vietnam.[183]

Scholars have used the postcolonial lens to examine the directions in which planning and urban knowledge flows, by highlighting the negative consequences of the adoption of expertise and experiences from elsewhere.[184] Clarke argues that European colonialism prompts a heightened interest in comparative urbanism between North and South, since cities formed 'sites of encounter between different planning cultures or sites of production for new planning knowledge and techniques'.[185] It would be easy to assume that in the post-colonial setting, the direction of knowledge travel would be from rich "developed" to poor "undeveloped" countries, but although this has been the dominant trend we are increasingly seeing the reverse. Sanyal, writing as far back as 1990 challenged this 'colonial notion that [the] transfer of "know-how" from rich cities, where there is plenty, to the poor cities, where it is lacking' was dominant.[186] Increasingly, places outside the "developed" world are recognised as offering knowledge and experience gained by western experts which will then flow back to the Global North, although Johnson and Wilson note that a gap in 'mutuality' can lead to missed opportunities in learning.[187] They argue that 'differences of status and influence in the partnership' can obscure learning opportunities both in North-South as well as South-North

[181] Njoh, 'Europeans, Modern Urban Planning and the Acculturation of "racial Others"', p. 374.
[182] M. Smokvina, M. S. Cvitanović, and B. Kincl, 'Influence of Croatian Urban Planners on Post-Colonial Africa: Urban Development Plan of Conakry, Guinea, 1963', in C. N. Silva, ed., *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa*; Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'.
[183] Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'.
[184] V. Watson, 'Seeing from the South: Refocusing Urban Planning on the Globe's Central Urban Issues', *Urban Studies*, 46:11 (October 2009), pp. 2259–2275.
[185] Clarke, 'Actually Existing Comparative Urbanism', p. 4,-5.
[186] B. Sanyal, 'Knowledge Transfer from Poor to Rich Cities: A New Turn of Events', *Cities*, 7:1 (February 1990), p. 31.
[187] H. Johnson and G. Wilson, 'Learning and Mutuality in Municipal Partnerships and beyond: A Focus on Northern Partners', *Habitat International*, City-to-City Co-operation, 33:2 (April 2009), p. 26.

exchanges.[188] Such South-North knowledge transfer includes examples such as the Bus Rapid Transit systems, the concept of which travelled from Brazil to Europe and participatory budgeting where attempts were made to transplant it from Porto Alegre to Bradford.[189] Recent development and aid projects to transfer knowledge from the Global North to the Global South have demonstrated the creativity that such arrangement can inspire. Set up by then Mayor Ken Livingstone, the London Caracas agreement sought to exchange urban development knowledge for cheap oil with 'each side [providing] the other with that in which they are rich, and which for them is therefore relatively cheap - oil, on one hand, and the expertise in managing a modern advanced city on the other'.[190] For London and Caracas this was an attempt to avoid engagement with finance and markets and their 'wider power-geometries' whilst, as Massey argues, simultaneously asserting a sense of 'equality'.[191] This view of course ignores the more subtle discussions surrounding power-knowledge relationships discussed earlier in this chapter. Other scholars have traced more linear paths, for example Stead *et al.*, investigated West-East policy transfer between Germany, Latvia and Poland, concluding that even where the same policies are transferred, differing contexts in the recipient country can result in radically different outcomes.[192]

This conclusion that the way in which conditions in the recipient country might have a significant bearing on outcome, intersects with issues of postcoloniality and path dependency, and the way that these might have bearing on knowledge and policy transfer in Zambia. This may not relate to just material and spatial conditions, but also cultural, political and ideological ones, for instance, in Zimbabwe today there may be a far greater resistance to 'British' planning ideas than in Zambia. Local conditions, as Robinson and Parnell have argued, affect the take-

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[188] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[189] C. Canales et al., 'Public Transport Policies in Europe: Implementing Bus Rapid Transit Systems in Major European Cities', (June 2004); S. Mejía-Dugand et al., 'Lessons from the Spread of Bus Rapid Transit in Latin America', *Journal of Cleaner Production*, Special Issue: Advancing sustainable urban transformation, 50 (July 2013), pp. 82–90; C. McFarlane, *Learning the City: Knowledge and Translocal Assemblage*, RGS-IBG Book Series 56 (Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
[190] K. Livingstone, 'A Piece of Mindless Vandalism', *The Guardian*, 2 June 2008, sec. Opinion.
[191] D. Massey, 'A Counterhegemonic Reality of Place', in E. J. McCann and K. Ward, eds., *Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the Global Age*, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), p. 11.
[192] D. Stead, M. De Jong, and S. Reinholde, 'West-East Policy Transfer in Europe: The Case for Urban Transport Policy', in P. Healey and R. Upton, eds., *Crossing Borders: International Exchange and Planning Practices*

up of neoliberal policies. They suggest that despite the way in which urban policy formation is 'profoundly power-ridden', it cannot be assumed that the disproportionate power held by agents of transfer 'will necessarily result in the effective adoption or implementation of policies, since there are many variables at a local level which can affect a policies implementation'.[193] Scholars have highlighted the 'paucity' of studies of 'the apparently mundane practices' that constitute the process of 'policy making', and it is these 'mundane' practices that account for a significant aspect of the planning function.[194] In addition, despite the official rhetoric, the way in which knowledge and policy transfer does not necessarily follow a neat and linear trajectory, rather in reality it often operates within the 'messy actualities' of an organisational environment.[195] This echoes Cooper and Packard's assertion that knowledge transfer is often met by 'appropriations, deflections and challenges'.[196] However in addressing the potential for a wholesale rejection of western planning knowledge, Njoh suggests the need for a postmodernist approach that is sympathetic to diversity and capable of taking into consideration 'traditional knowledge' and 'appropriate technology'.[197] In a globalised society this is perhaps a more useful approach than a complete rejection of knowledge from elsewhere.

The VSO project is set within a broader overhaul of the Zambian planning system which include the adoption of Integrated Development Plans (IDP's), a planning policy tool originating in South Africa. Whilst relevant to the broader debate on planning knowledge transfer in Zambia, the transfer of policy tools such as South African IDP's are not yet mature enough in the process to effectively assess the process. Instead, this thesis explores the individuals, relationships and experiences in the field of planning to examine how post colonialism and development collides and how this in turn impacts on knowledge transfer in a post-colonial context. In doing so the thesis contributes to broadening scholarly debates on

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[193] J. Robinson and S. Parnell, 'Traveling Theory: Embracing Post-Neoliberalism Through Southern Cities', in G. Bridge and S. Watson, eds., *The New Blackwell Companion to the City*, (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 526.
[194] E. J. McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities: Global Circuits of Knowledge in the Development of Vancouver, Canada's "four Pillar" Drug Strategy', *Environment and Planning A*, 40:4 (2008), p. 886; W. Larner, 'Neoliberalism?', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 21:5 (2003), p. 511.
[195] McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities', p. 5; W. Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality', *Studies in Political Economy*, 63 (Autumn 2000), p. 14.
[196] Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', 1997, p. 10.
[197] Njoh, 'Europeans, Modern Urban Planning and the Acculturation of "racial Others"', p. 376.

post-colonial Zambia, post-colonial knowledge transfer and the role of power and knowledge relationships in post-colonial technical assistance. As this section has demonstrated, while there exists a large body of scholarship which addresses the mobilisation of policies and plans from one place to another, less attention has been given to the transfer of norms values and standards, and the way in which this might occur in planning. For planning knowledge these collections of skills and experiences contribute to a set of conditions that affect the characteristics and efficiency of knowledge transfer.

Central to the transfer of these norms, values and standards are the various actors involved in the process of transfer. Focusing on the mechanisms and people involved in the transferal of ideas, Rimmer identified a 'global intelligence corps' of urban development professionals. For Olds this corps comprised of an "elite" group of architectural, planning and engineering firms that compete on a global scale for prestigious projects.[198] Yet there are similarities between contemporary 'corps' and the way in which colonial and early post-colonial experts operated. S.V. Ward identified three types of 'transnational planning practitioners', highlighting 'salaried colonial officers' whom went on to work in international development agencies or under technical assistance schemes, as being part of this group, along with the private consultants and migrants with planning expertise.[199] These characters have been accused within the literature as holding problematic views. Hodge for example, describes these former colonial officials as 'displaying arrogant attitudes', who restricted their purview to a 'distinctly British ex-imperial outlook'.[200] Building on the theme of the transnational movement of urban experts, Craggs and Neate use the study of urban international careering to offer an alternative way of analysing policy mobility, allowing for consideration of the 'ideas, skills, experiences, affiliations and contacts' of individuals involved in the process. They suggest that 'expertise and ideas embodied in (sets of) individuals over extended periods', and their work affords a greater understanding

198 Olds, 'Globalizing Shanghai'; P. Rimmer, 'The Global Intelligence Corps and World Cities: Engineering Consultancies on the Move', in P. W. Daniels, ed., *Services and Metropolitan Development: International Perspectives*, (London: Routledge, 1991). Although Ward is critical of this term for overstating the degree of mutual discipline, see ; Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'

199 Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 126.

200 Hodge, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of International Development', p. 38.

of historic encounters in the post-colonial urban development sector.[201] Seeking to understand the way such past experiences might reflect in the way that planning experts apply their skills, Watson argues that planners, when faced with a new case or project, rather than 'applying abstract and decontextualized' rules, are in fact 'using judgement based on experience'.[202] For Watson, Schon and Rein, learning from past experience is key to building up a 'useable repertoire of cases' from which to draw on. [203] Similarly McCann describes expertise itself as being an 'assemblage' of 'concepts, models, initiatives and techniques' spread via a 'global consultocracy'.[204] The problematic relationship between colonialism, power and control created the potential for the 'repertoire' of skills that colonial officers held to go unquestioned, and this thesis seeks to understand if and how legacies of this colonial power led to the unquestioning of post-colonial technical assistance.

To understand how post-colonial knowledge transfer operates within the Zambian setting, the work of Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Lubambo proves particularly instructive. They investigated the role of the World Bank in reforming the water utilities sector on the Copperbelt and the impact that previous experiences on the stakeholders and a "Zambians versus the foreigners" concern. Their emphasis was on the reliance of Zambia on former colonial countries for development programmes, arguing that this 'perpetuates a new colonialism in which foreign agencies and experts assume a seat at the policy-making table and use their financial resources to leverage their knowledge to influence policy and development outcomes'.[205] Although this thorough and insightful piece points to a resistance from within Zambia to outside influence from Washington, it does not attempt to delve beyond recent memories involving the World Bank or IMF, nor does it distinguish between neo-colonialism and colonialism. In the context of Zambia this distinction remains important because, as chapters two and three show, the post-colonial state viewed former colonial and therefore British technical assistance in quite a

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[201] Craggs and Neate, 'Post-Colonial Careering and Urban Policy Mobility', p. 11.
[202] Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning*, p. 8.
[203] Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning*; D. A. Schon and M. Rein, *Frame Reflection: Toward The Resolution Of Intractable Policy Controversies: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies*, (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 205.
[204] McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities', p. 887.
[205] Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Lubambo, 'Subaltern Speak in a Postcolonial Setting: Diffusing and Contesting Donor-Engendered Knowledge in the Water Sector in Zambia', p. 192.

different light to assistance from international organisations. The issue of neo-colonialism also does not address broader concerns within the literature on knowledge transfer which feeds into many of the anxieties raised by postcolonial theorists. The use of the term by Sanyal of a 'colonial notion' in knowledge transfer ties in with the cultural and technocratic elitism which, as Stone highlights, results in 'exporting lessons [which] can be interpreted in a negative sense by recipients as imperialistic or neo-colonialist'.[206]

Whilst Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Lubambo provide important detail, there is a distinct lack of verification of the coercion they describe, and a failure to make a distinction between an exchange, (as is normal in any kind of financial agreement whether it be loans or purchase of goods and services), and exploitative coercion.[207] There is no doubt that as Coleman and Agnew point out, the 'punitive financial innovations' engineered by global organisations puts the holders of knowledge in a position to exert power, but this "catch-all" view is used where there appears to be a lack of willingness to delve into what composes western interests.[208] As such attempts to theorize the processes and relationships involved can misplace an emphasis on the role of the former colonisers without sufficient justification. As pointed out by Rodriguez, we must be careful not to appropriate the terminology of postcolonialism in an attempt to justify our own reasoning.[209] Indeed Spivak herself has argued that 'the word "subaltern" is losing its definitive power because it has become a kind of buzzword for any group that wants something that it does not have'.[210] Although in the above case Spivak was referring to its appropriation by groups in order to benefit themselves, misuse of the term in other contexts could ultimately undermine and cloud the debate. Postcolonial analysis thus need greater validation and more substantial theoretical and empirical grounding than to just summarise that it involved an

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[206] Sanyal, 'Knowledge Transfer from Poor to Rich Cities: A New Turn of Events', 31; Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', February 1999, p. 57.
[207] Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Lubambo, 'Subaltern Speak in a Postcolonial Setting: Diffusing and Contesting Donor-Engendered Knowledge in the Water Sector in Zambia' Exploitative coercion is where the primary role of financial support is in the interests of benefitting the donor.
[208] M. Coleman and J. A. Agnew, 'The Problem with Empire', in J. W. Crampton and S. Elden, eds., *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*, (Aldershot: Routledge, 2007), p. 317.
[209] I. Rodriguez, 'A New Debate on Subaltern Studies,' Unpublished Letter, Circulated at 51st Congreso Internacional de Americanistas, Chile, 2003', 2003.
[210] D. Landry and G. M. MacLean, 'Interview with the Editors', in D. Landry and G. M. Maclean, eds., *The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak*, (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 290.

"outside" agency and occurred at a time "after colonialism". Additional complexity to the postcolonial identity can be brought about by the nature of expertise and how the role of experts fits into contemporary post-colonial institutions and society. In Zambia, like elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, this is set against a growing awareness that 'western" style planning systems have failed to address the growing problems faced by many urban areas.

A further intricacy in the relationship between VSO "expatriate" volunteers and their Zambian counterparts is the postcolonial nature of the setting, that is, a British backed organisation working in a former colony.[211] It raises questions as to the extent to which these transient professional volunteers engage with the colonial history of Zambia, either consciously through engagement with history, or through their enactment of 'racialised colonial identities'.[212] Whilst there are countless bi-lateral aid projects in Zambia, currently no study assesses the impact of how these relationships operate when the donor is the former colonial state and where knowledge and finance flows directly in this post-colonial setting. This is particularly important for planning because, as King notes, the transfer of planning from Britain to its colonies is 'an area not only of immense importance for present-day planning practice in the "Third World" but also one which offers insights into fundamental theoretical and methodological issues in planning'.[213] While some 36 years have passed since this statement was made, the need to understand the past in order to make sense of the present, still remains. Little has been done to understand the flow of contemporary planning knowledge in Zambia's postcolonial setting and this thesis argues that this aspect is a less-visible continuation of colonial relationships. Stone, Healey, Harris and Moore argue for a longer term perspective on policy and planning knowledge transfer to include the analysis of historic travelling policies and pathways that would 'highlight important historical continuities, genealogies and institutional legacies to contemporary urban

[211] The author acknowledges that the use of the term 'expatriate' is controversial. However archival documents repeatedly refer to non-local or non-African staff as 'expatriates' and so in order to retain continuity of language throughout this thesis the contemporary volunteers will be referred to as 'expatriates'. For detailed discussion see A. M. Fechter, *Transnational Lives: Expatriates in Indonesia* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2007).
[212] A. M. Fechter and K. Walsh, 'Examining "Expatriate" Continuities: Postcolonial Approaches to Mobile Professionals', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36:8 (September 2010), p. 1197.
[213] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 204.

policy circuits and pathways'.[214] Just as Mcfarlane underlines the importance of how 'historical relationships can dictate' present actions, Home calls for a better understanding of history in order that contemporary practice can be understood and improved upon.[215] On this basis, this thesis knits together a broad range of literature through contemporary and historical knowledge transfer. In doing so it locates the practice of contemporary planning knowledge transfer within a broader historical context to explore the way in which history and postcoloniality impact on the knowledge transfer process today.

The role of education in knowledge transfer

The provision of technical expertise in the context of North-South transfers saw the veneration of the British education system, which had the effect of instilling western norms, values and standards in planning practices. Alongside changes to Britain's approach to colonial governance, from the 1930s Britain also began 'promoting Africanisation' through the academic scholarships at British universities.[216] These scholarships remain today a fundamental tool of Britain's soft power armoury.[217] British universities, namely Oxford, Cambridge and London, opened up entrance to their overseas public administration courses to African recruits in order to localise overseas services in preparation for independence. S. Stockwell focusses on the recruitment for such courses at the "elite" universities and highlights how by 1963-64 overseas students occupied the majority of the places.[218] This does not however take into account the significance of other universities which provided more specialist technical education and the proliferation of courses specifically designed to train Africans in fields of technical expertise. Lee observes this rapid expansion of education provision for students from outside the UK, stating that 'Between 1950 and 1960, overseas students in the United Kingdom increased five-fold from around 10,000 to 50,000', with over half of these originating from colonies or dominions.[219]

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[214] Harris and Moore, 'Planning Histories and Practices of Circulating Urban Knowledge', p. 1500; Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', February 1999; Healey, 'The Universal and the Contingent'.
[215] McFarlane, *Learning the City*, p. 118; Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa'.
[216] A. Roberts, 'The Awkward Squad: Arts Graduates from British Tropical Africa before 1940. Unpublished Paper', (n.d.), p. 11.
[217] *Soft Power and the UK's Influence, Evidence Session No. 1 Heard in Public Questions 176 - 22* (House of Lords, 2013).
[218] Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients', p. 157.
[219] J. M. Lee, 'Commonwealth Students in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960: Student Welfare and World Status', *Minerva: A Review of Science, Learning and Policy*, 44:1 (March 2006), p. 1.

Whilst it could be argued that such prestigious universities might better instil a sense of "Britishness", specialist training at other universities would have still embedded local recruits into the British ethos of working practices and values. Yet despite the openness of the universities, students from overseas faced significant racism upon arrival in Britain. A.J. Stockwell traces the experiences of African students in Britain during the colonial era from the viewpoint of racialism; British attempts to mitigate negative experiences and; involvement in nationalist movements and their reception on returning home. He notes the potential these returning students had as 'future customers' of Britain.[220] Similarly S. Stockwell examined the role of education and technical expertise in exporting "Britishness" noting that the process of "'institutional devolution and transition" rather than "decolonisation of the colonial state"… has remained largely below the radar in general accounts of British decolonization'.[221] Education was also a place in which Cold War tensions manifested themselves, with Zambia retaining a "Humanist neutrality" in which it could seek assistance from both East and West. As De Roche notes, 'Kapwepwe and his soviet counterpart signed a pact authorizing more scholarships for Zambians', acknowledging that 'education would be helpful in the long run, but did not address Zambia's most pressing concerns'.[222] This highlights the difficult situation Zambia faced in terms of manpower and educational needs, a problem which did not escape the planning service in Zambia or indeed other former colonies. Chapter four explores the way in which Zambian planners were forced to adopt British "standards" of planning education and professional practice through requirements set in place by former colonial and "expatriate" planners in the 1960s. However Zambia is not isolated in its experience of this. The British responded to this need through opening up planning courses to foreign students, as S.V. Ward notes. 'the training of planners soon became a significant outlet for financial and technical aid, both to support in-country training and to bring trainees to well established planning schools in the more developed worlds'.[223]

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[220] A. J. Stockwell, 'Leaders, Dissidents and the Disappointed: Colonial Students in Britain as Empire Ended', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 36:3 (September 2008), p. 502.
[221] Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients', p. 148.
[222] DeRoche, 'Non-Alignment on the Racial Frontier; Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968', p. 139.
[223] Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World', p. 55.

From a contemporary perspective, Kothari traced the performances of colonial officers and development experts. She suggests that whilst the backgrounds of development professionals has become more diverse, many development professionals from 'former colonies' have been 'trained in western institutes of higher education and therefore [are] immersed in broader ideas and possibilities'.[224] Rosen points to the significant contribution training in the Global North makes to the building of capacity and institutions at home. As he argues, the value lies not in their ability to apply western practices but the creation of, for example, economists who are then go on to 'examine, analyse, and suggest solutions for the problems of their own country'.[225] Conversely, Cooper and Packard highlight the tensions over knowledge that can be found within organisations working on development projects. They suggest that contradictions exist between the organisation's insistence of 'academic qualifications for their personnel' but that they then go on to 'complain that the economists coming out of [western] universities lack the skills required to work in international development'. [226] Their point being that an African scholar educated in Britain might not gain knowledge that is relevant to Africa. This resonates with current debates that have questioned the relevance of planning knowledge and the way that there exists a dominant Euroamerican hegemony in the production of and teaching of knowledge to future African planners.[227] In turn this contributes to ongoing broader discussions surrounding the decolonising of the curriculum.[228] In recent years the call has been made to improve planning education through the Association of African Planning Schools (AAPS). This in particular seeks to educate new planners in emerging approaches to urban planning which do not necessarily reflect approaches meted out in the Global North. The work done by the

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[224] Kothari, 'Spatial Practices and Imaginaries', p. 248.
[225] G. Rosen, *Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Change in South Asia, 1950-1970*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1985), p. 233 Cited in Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', 1997, p. 27.
[226] F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, 'Introduction', in H. Lauer and K. Anyidoho, eds., *Reclaiming the Human Sciences and Humanities Through African Perspectives*, (Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2012), p. 357.
[227] V. Watson and B. Agbola, 'Who Will Plan Africa's Cities?', http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/publications/who-will-plan-africas-cities/#S4, 2013, accessed 13 April 2016; Cockhead and Hemalatha, 'Sharing Planning Skills Across Borders: International Volunteers Helping Build Planning Capacity in Zambia'; Association of African Planning Schools, 'Conference on Revitalising Planning Education in Africa', (Dar-es-Salaam, 2010); V. Watson and N. Odendaal, 'Changing Planning Education in Africa: The Role of the Association of African Planning Schools', *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 33:1 (March 2013), pp. 96–107.
[228] A. Mbembé, 'Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive', *Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research*, n.d., http://wiser.wits.ac.za/content/achille-mbembe-decolonizing-knowledge-and-question-archive-12054, accessed 25 May 2016.

AAPS has extended the curriculum provision both at The Copperbelt University as well as the University of Zambia in order to improve what is seen as sub-par provision.[229] Chapter four identifies the way in which early planning education in Zambia was influenced by western expertise. This provides an understanding of how the education system might have worked to instil and reinforce western planning norms, values and standards within practice.

Zambian planning systems

As chapter four will outline, there was a general lack of sufficient planner education in the post-independence period. It is therefore no surprise that for a number of years following independence, planning in Zambia remained an under researched field. The scholarly body of work examining the town planning system remains sparse throughout the post-colonial period. The first significant attempt to address planning concerns in Zambia after independence came from the Zambian Urban Studies collection, which emerged out of the Institute for African Studies and Social Research at the University of Zambia.[230] Edited by the then Professor of Geography, Hywel Davies, this provided the first small steps in critically assessing the town planning function in Zambia. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the editorial note to the third book of the series which criticises the state of the planning service. Specifically it highlights the failings of the planning system and identifies the issue of the number of expatriate planners were still in post.[231] Subsequent to this, little interest was shown towards Zambian urban planning until the 1980s, when Rakodi published a series of articles on the Zambian planning system in which she analysed its legacy some twenty years after independence.[232] Yet despite drawing on the work of Davies, Rakodi's work does not sufficiently acknowledge the continuities in personnel and how this contributed to the continuation of colonial norms. Like many observers of colonial and post-colonial planning, Rakodi instead conceptualises the transition between governments at independence as more of a clean break, giving little

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[229] Association of African Planning Schools, 'Conference on Revitalising Planning Education in Africa'.
[230] H. Davies, *Lusaka, Zambia: Some Town Planning Problems in an African Capital City at Independence*, Zambian Urban Studies 1 (Lusaka, Zambia, 1969); Collins, *Lusaka*; J. Gardiner, *Some Aspects of the Establishment of Towns in Zambia during the Nineteen Twenties and Thirties*, Zambian Urban Studies 3 (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1970).
[231] Gardiner, *Some Aspects of the Establishment of Towns in Zambia during the Nineteen Twenties and Thirties*.
[232] Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; C. Rakodi, 'Urban Plan Preparation in Lusaka', *Habitat International*, 11:4 (January 1987), pp. 95–111; Rakodi, 'Policies and Preoccupations in Rural and Regional Development Planning in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe'.

recognition to the extent to which expatriate individuals continued to influence the practices of government departments.[233]

More recent literature has sought to challenge the conventional processes of and rational behind planning in Zambia. The timing of these corresponded with the increased scrutiny and general awareness to emerged out of the 1990s which concluded that African planning systems were not suitable or fit for purpose. Building on Rakodi's work, Mwimba's 2002 paper explores the legacy of town planning to the early 2000s. He concludes his analysis by offering an assessment of the professional standing of planners, going on to criticize the role of 'pioneer [African] planners' for their failure to sustain the institutional framework to support planners early in their careers.[234] Similarly Taylor and Thole highlight the purely regulatory role that Zambian planners play, the poor policy frameworks, lack of political engagement and de-professionalization of the profession.[235] An emergent theme in more recent literature addresses the role of external agencies in the town planning profession. Berrisford provides a descriptive assessment of the process of revising planning legislation, highlighting the various cultural and institutional barriers to a project for which he took part as a travelling expert.[236] Similarly Cockhead and Hemalatha detail the processes involved in the placement of VSO volunteers, using specific case studies relating to the implementation of Integrated Development Plans and their involvement in the revitalizing of the planning degree at the UNZA.[237]

Poor institutional capacity, a lack of political will and poor training (as highlighted by scholars) has taken their toll on the planning system which was tasked with managing urban change on a monumental scale. According to Ferguson, the 'rapidity and scale' of the urban expansion and social transformation from rural to urban communities 'stunned' observers in the 1960s and 1970s.[238] These pressures manifested within the planning service in a number of ways. Notably,

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233 Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'.
234 Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia', 13.
235 Taylor and Thole, 'Re-Thinking Town and Country Planning Practice in Zambia'.
236 S. Berrisford, 'Revising Spatial Planning Legislation in Zambia: A Case Study', *Urban Forum*, 22:3 (September 2011), pp. 229–245.
237 Cockhead and Hemalatha, 'Sharing Planning Skills Across Borders: International Volunteers Helping Build Planning Capacity in Zambia'.
238 Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity*, p. 2.

as Mwimba points out, only two urban areas in Zambia, Livingstone and Ndola, have up to date city development plans. He highlights one of the causes of the government's weakness being that plans often 'relate to unrealistic standards or activities that go against the grain of market forces'.[239] Berrisford cites a lack of capacity and apathy amongst consultees; a lack of willingness to change planning legislation, and ultimately a desire to retain or reinforce the status quo; a lack of reliable data and an unwillingness to release data; a limited timeframe in which to make such a significant change.[240] Broader themes relevant to planning address issues that intersect with planning. Mulungushi for example, examined issues facing Zambia from an economic development perspective, identifying a range of factors affecting capacity at all levels of government, including lack of resources, low staff numbers and lack of technical skills.[241] It is clear that British planning continues to have a profound impact on the Zambian planning system but the post-colonial mechanisms that influenced this are less well understood. Chapters three and four redress this through examining how post-colonial technical assistance in planning might have stymied Zambia's ability to develop new ways of thinking about and approaching the development of the built environment.

It is against this backdrop that the VSO currently operates its capacity building knowledge transfer programme through the use of western trained experts in Zambia. Outside influences on states vary, and are often determined historically, particularly if the state experienced colonial rule, through political allegiance or as a result of conditional aid from elsewhere. In the case of Zambia, despite funding from Germany, Japan, Sweden and now the UK, Zambia's urban sector has, when compared to other countries, 'received relatively little donor support'.[242] Throughout the literature on knowledge transfer it is highlighted how coerciveness and control play a significant role in contemporary relationships. Gilbert, Dolowitz and Marsh, DiMaggio and Powell, along with Rose all identify forced adoption and/or coercion as playing a role in

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[239] C. Mwimba, "'We Will Develop without Urban Planning": How Zambia's Urban Planning Practice Is Removing Value from the Development Process', (presented at the Unpublished paper presented to the Planning Africa 2006 conference, Cape Town, 2006), p. 2–3.
[240] Berrisford, 'Revising Spatial Planning Legislation in Zambia'.
[241] J. S. Mulungushi, *Policy Development and Implementation in the Post-Liberalization Era in Zambia (1990s and beyond): Towards a Participatory Planning and Economic Management Model* (Unpublished thesis, UNISA, 2009).
[242] Berrisford, 'Revising Spatial Planning Legislation in Zambia', p. 2; VSO, 'Case Study – Zambia; Strengthening Town Planning and Ensuring Public Involvement'.

knowledge transfer.[243] This is almost inevitable when discussing projects and financial incentives governed by international organizations such as the World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund. This issue is therefore a fundamental consideration when assessing knowledge transfer in the post-colonial setting.

Thesis interventions

In the first instance, this thesis is informed by approaches in postcolonial theory and knowledge to further examine the relationship between contemporary knowledge transfer, postcolonial identity and historic technical assistance. It responds to the call of a number of scholars whom highlight the need of an understanding history in order address Africa's planning concerns. Like Home, Njoh for example, has emphasised the importance of a historical understanding of the colonial ties, commenting that 'ongoing efforts to promote development on the continent are unlikely to succeed without an adequate understanding of the objectives of colonial spatial policies'.[244] This thesis builds on historical interpretations of colonial planning practices to expand our understanding of international expertise into the post-colonial period.[245] In doing so addresses the need for a greater appreciation of the way in which independence need not be seen as a moment of rupture, but that histories continue to be intertwined.[246] Whilst there is no doubt that the origins of contemporary planning in Zambia lie in colonial planning practice, less well understood is the way in which this managed to permeate through into the contemporary planning service through the activity of post-colonial development programmes. Whilst NGOs and supra national organisations such as the UN and World Bank have been

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[243] Gilbert, '"Scan Globally; Reinvent Locally"'; Dolowitz and Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom'; P. DiMaggio and W. Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', *American Sociological Review*, 48:2 (1983), pp. 147–160; Rose, 'What Is Lesson-Drawing?'

[244] Njoh, 'Urban Planning as a Tool of Power and Social Control in Colonial Africa', p. 301; Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa'.

[245] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*; Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa'; Bigon, 'Garden Cities in Colonial Africa'; Njoh, *Planning Power Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa*; Myers, *Verandahs of Power*; King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience'; Njoh, 'Urban Planning as a Tool of Power and Social Control in Colonial Africa'; Silva, *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2015; Cherry, *Shaping an Urban World.*

[246] Craggs and Wintle, 'Reframing Cultures of Decolonisation'; M. Bell, 'Inquiries as Postcolonial Devices: The Carnegie Corporation and Poverty in South Africa', in A. Blunt and C. McEwan, eds., *Postcolonial Geographies*, Writing Past Colonialism, (New York: Continuum, 2002), p. 67–68.

heavily critiqued, little attention has been given to the nature of early post-colonial British technical assistance such as the OSAS. These programmes were implemented with little fanfare but subtly worked away in the background. However they had a significant impact on establishing continuities between colonial development and contemporary forms of technical assistance. Because of such programmes the internal and external events, actors and agencies had a profound impact on the shaping of post-colonial Zambia. Yet despite there being a wide range of historical actors, operating in a critical and hotly contested period of Zambian independence, their roles are not adequately understood.

This thesis also addresses the call for further examination of the historical underpinnings of knowledge transfer in planning, it sheds further light on the ties that bind contemporary practice to its colonial beginnings.[247] It adds to the body of work which examines the historical context of knowledge transfer, specifically in the field of planning. Building on the work of Ward, Healey and Friedmann it analyses the way in which everyday norms, values and standards are tied to historical practices.[248] In doing so this thesis responds to Stone, Healey and Harris and Moore who argue that knowledge transfer literature has remained too ahistorical, ignoring important aspects of 'path dependency' which might influence choice of policies and practice and how effectively they are adopted. [249] In addition, it builds on the work of scholars of Zambian planning by adding a further dimension to the body of work. Instead of focussing on plans, spatial practices or development policies, it instead examines the interactions between external and internal actors through the 'mundane practices' of everyday planning.[250] It is through understanding the acts of the quotidian that we can better comprehend the 'messy actualities' of postcoloniality and planning practice and how these affect knowledge transfer in Zambia.[251] In doing so this helps establish a greater understanding of the way that planning

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[247] Harris and Moore, 'Planning Histories and Practices of Circulating Urban Knowledge'.
[248] Ward, 'The International Diffusion of Planning'; Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'; Healey, 'The Universal and the Contingent'; Healey, 'Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques'; Healey and Upton, *Crossing Borders*; Friedmann, 'Crossing Borders: Do Planning Ideas Travel?'; Friedmann, *Re-Tracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning*.
[249] Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 'Neoliberal Urbanism', p. 50; Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', February 1999; Harris and Moore, 'Planning Histories and Practices of Circulating Urban Knowledge'; Healey, 'Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques'.
[250] Larner, 'Neoliberalism?', 511.
[251] Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality', 14.

practice travels from one place to another. Finally it frames these historical ties through an understanding of knowledge and power concepts and their entrenchment within post-colonial practice. In understanding this entrenchment it sheds light on the difficulties that the concept of South-South knowledge transfer faces in order to challenge certain assumptions about the value of southern knowledge.

Chapter 3

The Scramble for Influence; Post-colonial Technical Assistance

Introduction

> Zambia, a country beset with internal political and economic troubles, is ill-equipped to play the role it has chosen in the black challenge to white southern Africa. Zambia's modern sector, dominated by the important copper industry is a world apart from the very primitive, isolated subsistence farmers who make up the bulk of the population. Deficiencies of skilled and trained manpower are so great that the country depends, even more than the Congo, on the hired services of a large number of whites.[1]

Joseph Nye's 1990 article in *Foreign Policy* introduced "soft power" into the political lexicon. Yet governments have long used tactics which conformed to Nye's definition.[2] The rapid pace of decolonisation in the mid-twentieth century saw Britain increasingly adopt such policies as it sought to address, in the oft-quoted phrase of Dean Acheson, having 'lost an empire but not yet found a role'.[3] This chapter explores the ways in which Britain's soft power, in the form of knowledge and technical assistance, manifested itself in the late colonial and early post-colonial period in Zambia. It outlines the developmental mechanisms Britain used, the motives behind the adoption of these, as well as examining the reception they received on the ground. It also analyses why the Zambian government were prepared to accept development aid from their former colonial master. The first section explores the ways in which Britain sought to manage this shift to independence and retain its influence in Zambia through the use of cultural and intellectual soft power that is afforded by the provision of education. As Dei argues, 'knowledge is socially, culturally, and politically relevant if it maintains a fit with people's aspirations, lived experiences, and practices', and in this way Britain was seeking to influence future relations through embedding certain British values through its higher education system.[4] It was through this power of knowledge and the aspirational values attached to a British education that Britain

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[1] Central Intelligence Agency, Board of National Estimates, 'Special Memorandum: Troubles Ahead for Zambia', 18 June 1968, General CIA Records, Central Intelligence Agency Archives.
[2] J. Nye, 'Soft Power', *Foreign Policy*, 80 (1990), pp. 153–163.
[3] Cited in D. Brinkley, 'Dean Acheson and the "Special Relationship": The West Point Speech of December 1962', *The Historical Journal*, 33:3 (1990), p. 599.
[4] G. J. S. Dei, 'Indigenizing the Curriculum: The Case of the African University', in G. Emeagwali and G. J. . Dei, eds., *African Indigenous Knowledge and the Disciplines*, (Rotterdam: Sense, 2014), p. 34.

sought to capitalise on in promoting its scholarship to newly independent countries. It then sets out the ideologies of, policies and methods used in the process of Zambianization. It examines the extent to which the adherence to a colour bar created educational gaps and how it was enshrined within national ideologies and national planning. The section analyses the differing pace of Zambianisation, emphasising how this occurred initially in a conservative way and was against a backdrop of apathy amongst staff and a lack of skills. Section three takes a broader perspective, and details the landscape of aid in which the VSO operated in the early 1960s, focussing on the precise nature of volunteering during this period. It seeks to understand the motives behind the individuals and the organisations involved along with examining the way in which volunteering was received in Zambia. It highlights how a number of factors, both nationally and internationally, set the British government on the path to enthusiastically supporting the concept of volunteering.

Section four considers the schemes set up by the British government to aid the transition of overseas governments and British overseas staff from colonial Northern Rhodesia to post-colonial Zambia. It underlines the way that post-independence technical assistance was wrapped up in notions of soft power, detailing the mechanisms by which British colonial officers were retained in OSAS posts after independence. It outlines the global aid and technical assistance environment in which the British government scheme operated. It asserts that Zambia did not overtly reject British influence as had been predicted, but that also its continued reliance was not an active choice. Rather colonialism had left Zambia in such a dire situation in terms of manpower, with few other countries willing or capable of delivering the levels of assistance it required. As a consequence of this, the nature of knowledge transfer in this period proved to be problematic, and attempts to indigenise the workforce was slow. The chapter concludes by highlighting how technical assistance to the new state allowed for continuities, not just in terms of the staff present, but also in the way in perpetuated the norms, values, standards and practices established during colonialism.

This chapter draws on archival material from Britain, including government papers in the UK National Archives as well as those of Returned Volunteer Action at The Women's Library in

the London School of Economics. This is in addition to smaller personal collections of Malcolm Macdonald which are held at Durham University and G.M. Coverdale's, papers which are held at the New Bodleian Library in Oxford, and H. Myles-Wright's held at the University of Liverpool. The chapter also incorporates material gathered from the National Archives of Zambia, including the papers of government departments as well as various government publications such as plans and policies.

Education as soft power

Following independence, Zambia wished to remove its reliance on former colonial officials through the greater provision of technical education for its citizens. Lusaka favoured Britain's higher education system as it provided a ready-made incubator to produce Zambia's future elites. Britain was happy to oblige, believing that the provision of such education would boost perceived level of aid it supplied and also help establish future influence through embedding British values. The training of African scholars was originally structured on the "Devonshire 'A'" course, which was designed to equip colonial civil servants for their posts.[5] Later on, however, the scope of the courses broadened to include general administration and technical fields. By the 1950s and 1960s this programme had transitioned into a full scale British soft-power exercise. As part of Britain's extensive programme of technical aid, British academics were subsidised on placements in African Universities under the British Expatriate Supplementation Scheme (BESS). The BESS scheme operated in the same way as OSAS but covered staff whom were not directly employed by government but nevertheless worked in sectors that delivered government functions, such as education and the postal and communications service. Initially some were critical at the lack of attention the British Government gave this aspect of their foreign relations role. Anthony Hartley, when lamenting the lack of investment in the British Council during the early 1960s, noted that 'among those who direct our foreign policy there seems to be little understanding that in Africa and Asia our relations with states will be conducted through schools and institutes every bit as much as

[5] The Devonshire 'A' course was a requirement for all potential colonial officers. It required attendance for two semesters at either Oxford or Cambridge, and a further third term at the University of London for language training.

through chanceries and consulates'.[6] The enthusiasm for providing education through scholarships and academic placements provided the foundations upon which the British emphases on technical aid during this period were built, and these scholarships had the potential to profoundly shape future governments.[7]

For the fledgling Zambian government, Britain, amongst other countries, provided a rich source of training and higher education. Such technical assistance provided full degrees and postgraduate diplomas as well as short courses with hundreds of Zambians travelling to Britain each year.[8] During the 1960s, courses available included specialisms in treasury, diplomacy, economics, military, human resources, public administration, local government administration and tourism. What is also noticeable about this period is the diversification of institutions away from the traditional providers such as London and Oxbridge. In this period institutions such as Leeds, Manchester and Birmingham featured prominently as places that Zambian government employees could gain qualifications or further their training on shorter courses. Training provision overseas was becoming increasingly popular, and in a 1967 file note from the Zambian Department of Establishments it was stated that the courses in public administration for overseas government officers at Manchester were held in 'high regard'.[9] Whilst there is some evidence of trainees and more junior staff being sent abroad, it was predominantly the most senior staff which were most often granted the opportunity to partake in such courses. In the period between 1975 and 1976 for example, two requests were received by the Cabinet Office from junior planning staff – a town planner and town planning assistant, whereas the remaining nine applications were received from commissioners, acting commissioners and department directors.[10]

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[6] A. Hartley, *A State of England*, (London: Hutchinson Press, 1963), p. 124.
[7] C. Lancaster, 'Sixty Years of Foreign Aid What Have We Learned?', *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 64:3 (September 2009), pp. 799–810.
[8] 'Brief Note on the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Written by Directorate of Europe, Government of Zambia', April 1992, CO 6-1-63, National Archives of Zambia.
[9] 'Note from Zambian Department of Establishments to Cabinet Office.', April 1967, CO 17/1/6, National Archives of Zambia.
[10] 'Applications Made to the Cabinet Officer for Authority to Go Abroad', 76 1975, CO 2/16/012, National Archives of Zambia.

The professional standing of these applicants is interesting in a number of ways. First it supports Mwimba's assertion that the African elite failed to support embryonic planners.[11] Second this speaks to British aspirations of using education to influence African elites. As King notes, education scholarships were just another aspect of cultural imperialism reinforcing 'the cultural dependence of the ex-colonial country'.[12] Therefore there can be little doubt that education also served as a means by which the British government hoped to continue to exert influence by allowing British standards to '"permeate" the life of the colony' in an attempt to build strong future relations with post-colonial countries.[13] According to S. Stockwell, when the founder of the Goats Club Mary Trevelyan, met with the leaders of the newly emerging nation-states in the 1950s, she observed that almost all 'had been trained in Britain'.[14] Here Trevelyan recognised the important and significant reach that British education had within foreign elite circles. Debates about the strategic importance of these programmes reached a broad British audience, with *The Times* calling for an improvement to the living conditions of for foreign students, describing them as 'the intellectual or hereditary elite of the colonies and the leaders of tomorrow' and 'the principle should be that, if it is worth allowing them over here at all, it is worth looking after them well'.[15] Table one indicates the numbers of foreign scholarships taken up by the Zambian government in 1968.

Table 1. Zambians studying in Britain for the year 1968

British Council Scholarships	3
Zambian Government Scholarships	130
Company Scholarships	55
World Health Organisation Fellows	1
Ministry of Overseas Development Scholarships	85
Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan	4
Government Bursarys	23
Short Term Scholarships	9
Study Tours	3
Total	**313**

[11] Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia'.
[12] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 216.
[13] Cooper and Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences*, p. 80.
[14] Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients', p. 501. The Goats Club was an organisation set up for foreign students at the University of London.
[15] *The Times*, 'Our Special Correspondent; Students From The Colonies', 9 May 1949, p. 2, *The Times* Digital Archive.

Source: British Council.[16]

Rapoport highlights how in some instances scholarships can lead to the subsequent commission of urban experts from the country or organisation that bequeathed the scholarship.[17] However, the question remains as to what extent the impact of overseas training had on those who became future leaders and government staff in Zambia. The autobiography of one Zambian educated in Britain reveals some interesting insights as to how the Head of the Zambian Civil Service, Valentine Musakanya, was affected by his British education.[18] Musakanya was heavily influenced by his education and colonial training, but spoke of how the 'African realities' of the civil service did not align with his own beliefs that the civil service should be apolitical.[19] In addition, he seemed to resent the presence of overseas experts, yet conversely felt that the Zambian civil service should base themselves more on the British. There is a sense that Musakanya struggled between seeking to emulate the practices and norms he experienced in Britain and under colonial rule, whilst at the same time resenting the involvement of non-Zambians in the running of the country.

The opening of the University of Zambia in 1966 was an important step in making 'Zambia self-sufficient in high level manpower'.[20] However 8.6% of staff at opening were Zambians, the rest were 'Indians, South Africans, New Zealanders, Canadians, British and Americans'.[21] In 1967 the academic and then Minister of Education, J Mwanakatwe, 'undertook a goodwill mission to the Soviet Union to prepare for recruitment of suitable lecturers for the university'.[22]

[16] 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1968-1969', 1969, Annex B, BW 133/4, The National Archives, Kew.
[17] E. R. Rapoport, *Mobilizing Sustainable Urbanism: International Consultants and the Assembling of a Planning Model.* (Unpublished thesis, UCL, 2014).
[18] Musakanya attended the Devonshire A course in the closing years of the empire, and then went on to become the first African District Officer before becoming involved in post independent administration. He was a key figure in the first Zambian government, helping to establish the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, holding several senior posts, before eventually moving into the post of Minister of State for Technical and Vocational Education. See M. Larmer, 'Chronicle of a Coup Foretold: Valentine Musakanya and the 1980 Coup Attempt in Zambia', *The Journal of African History*, 51:3 (November 2010), pp. 391–409.
[19] Musakanya to His Excellency the President, 'Memorandum on the Dangers of Cultural Conservatives', 2 April 1969, cited in M. Larmer, *The Musakanya Papers: The Autobiographical Writings of Valentine Musakanya* (Lusaka: The Lembani Trust, 2010). P.46
[20] J. Mwanakatwe, *Teacher Politician Lawyer: My Autobiography* (Lusaka: Bookworld Publishers, 2003), p. 163.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

This suggests that despite a reliance on the West, the Zambian government were willing to draw from numerous political blocs in order to secure the expertise they needed.

Zambianization in government

In common with other newly independent African countries, Zambia began to pursue a policy of indigenisation in respect to its employment practices. Initially this policy was referred to 'Zambianization' and 'localisation', though in government documents these terms were subsequently superseded by the term 'Africansation'.[23] In Zambia this process was initiated with the signing of the first advancement agreement in 1955.[24] The education of Africans fed into this ideological policy, in that the supply of manpower was so poor at independence that it was felt that self-governance could not be achieved without the external provision of education.[25] Zambianization had already begun in the late colonial period, yet at independence the need to localise positions became increasingly urgent.[26] H Myles-Wright, a UN consultant based in Britain, noted in 1964, just before the first democratic elections, that 'all the higher posts in the technological professions are held by Britons or South Africans of European origin, together with the great majority of posts of responsibility at a lower level'.[27] Supporting this, Mehmet suggests that in Zambia, 96% of high level manpower jobs were filled by expatriate personnel.[28] It became clear at independence that this was going to be a key policy issue for the new government - something reflected in the amount of coverage the issue was given both in government channels and the broader public sphere. The problem Zambia faced was the lack of qualified Zambians to replace skilled Europeans, a situation not unique to Zambia and one which characterised many post-colonial states to a lesser or greater degree. The British

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[23] Cabinet Office, 'Cabinet Office Meeting Minutes' (Lusaka, 9 June 1964), CO 4-1-1, National Archives of Zambia.
[24] M. Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines: From African Advancement to Zambianization*, Zambian Papers 7 (Lusaka, Zambia, 1972), p. 27.
[25] 'VSO Tour Report of Zambia.', March 1977, 78/6/1, Durham University Library, Archives and Special Collections.
[26] 'Internal Memorandum from G. Goundrey, the UN Inter Regional Advisor at the Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, to Chief Section for Africa BTAO, UN.', 6 January 1967, MF 1-2-24, National Archives of Zambia.
[27] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 5.
[28] O. Mehmet, *Economic Planning and Social Justice in Developing Countries*, (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 87–88.

recognised that the manpower shortage crated by colonialism would place a 'disproportionate claim on British aid'.[29] For Zambia, like other countries going through similar processes, the answer to this problem was seen to lie in the transitional use of expatriates to buffer the shift in the skilled labour force from predominantly European to local African staff.[30] An article from the Zambian newspaper *The Chronical* in January 1967 entitled "Zambia intends to keep thousands of whites in the top jobs" gives a good indication of the state of the workforce and projections. Its suggested that the Zambian government had a long term demand for expatriate staff and projecting that it was necessary for the number of whites in Zambia remained at the present level of 26,000 'until at least 1980'. The article summarises the state of education, training and expertise amongst Zambians by highlighting the fact that at independence, Zambia had only 104 graduates and only 8,000 secondary school places. It also points out that at the time of writing there were 4,000 vacancies in the two top grades of the civil service in 'establishment of less than 14,000'. The government survey quoted in the article forecasted a 'sharp increase in imported skills until 1970' coupled with continuing Zambianization through the 1970s leading to a Zambia that would be 'truly independent, self-sufficient in the terms of manpower in the 1980s'.[31] This was corroborated by the Under Secretary to the Cabinet in October of that year, who reiterated that a decrease in demand for expatriates would not occur until into the 1970s.[32] In suggesting that Zambia was not expected to be self-sufficient until 1980, the timescale for self-sufficiency was clearly envisioned to be a lengthy one. Indigenisation could be a contentious subject. Leaders and white settlers south of the border in Southern Rhodesia had seen Africanisation as an 'unfair' process of decolonisation that would put in power what Sir Roy Welensky, the prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,

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[29] 'Confidential Ministry of Overseas Development Report of the Visit to Lusaka Made by AJ Peckham and AD Cooper.', May 1970, FCO 45/564, The National Archives, Kew.
[30] J. Duffy, 'Staying on or Going "Home"? Settlers' Decisions upon Zambian Independence', in K. Fedorowich and A. S. Thompson, eds., *Empire, Migration and Identity in the British World*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).
[31] 'Zambia Intends to Keep Thousands of Whites in the Top Jobs', *The Chronicle*, 23 January 1967, CO 3/1/109, National Archives of Zambia.
[32] 'File Note from the Under Secretary of the Cabinet to the Staff Development Advisor.', 17 October 1967, CO 9/1/9, National Archives of Zambia.

would describe as 'insufficiently prepared' Africans.[33] Despite the impact that Zambianization would have on British expatriates, there was, however, little indication of resistance or resentment towards Zambianization in the planning or education fields, unlike what had been witnessed elsewhere in Africa and indeed in the Zambian mining industry.[34] Myles-Wright observed that despite the doubt shed on expatriates careers and their families future, he was 'greatly impressed by the calmness, fairness and loyalty to the job that had to be done'.[35] The Principal of the Natural Resources Development College was similarly committed to Zambianization and acknowledged that whilst it was a difficult time for expatriates, there was 'no doubt in his mind' that attempting to recruit locally in the first instance was essential. He believed that there could be 'no disputing the policy of Zambianization. Britain or any other country, would pursue precisely the same policy under similar circumstances'.[36]

As S. Stockwell notes in relation to localisation in the Gold Coast, indigenisation often happened slowly and Zambianisation was particularly slow in the built environment employment sector.[37] In addition, despite the overarching discourse of Zambianization, some sectors needed to maintain a higher number of expatriate staff and had a slower rate of change. This created conflicts at policy level, particularly where Zambia expected the private sector to Zambianise at a more rapid rate than public service.[38] Gordon Goundrey, a UN expert in national planning highlighted this conflict of aims, suggesting that 'the heavy emphasis placed on eliminating special treatment for expatriates in the mining sector reads strangely against the suggestions for recruiting skilled and professional [expatriate] personnel in the public sector'.[39] This had the potential to create problems for the Zambian government because they were

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[33] K. V. Law, *Gendering the Settler State: White Women, Race, Liberalism and Empire in Rhodesia, 1950-1980*, (New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 65; R. Welensky, 'The United Nations and Colonialism in Africa', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 354 (1964), p. 145.
[34] Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines: From African Advancement to Zambianization*.
[35] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 5.
[36] 'Recruiting for Zambia in the United Kingdom' (Oxford, June 1965), MSS Afr. S. 1176 (2), Bodleian Library Special Collection.
[37] Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and Its Clients'.
[38] 'Report of the Commission of Inquiry in Connection with the Discharge of Its Functions by the Bancroft Management Board', 5 January 1966, CO 3/1/54, National Archives of Zambia.
[39] 'Internal Memorandum from G. Goundrey, the UN Inter Regional Advisor at the Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, to Chief Section for Africa BTAO, UN.'

unable to demonstrate their commitment to Zambianization whilst pressuring other sectors, such as mining, to change.

Despite allowing a long timeframe for the shift from expatriate to Zambian staff, there is evidence that Zambia was, and still is to some extent, struggling to overcome its dependence. By 1981 there were still some 800 British subsidised staff across all branches of government, suggesting that Zambianization was not happening as swiftly as some would have liked.[40] Zambia was still, in 1987 for instance, struggling to recruit a non-expatriate Surveyor General.[41] Even as recently as 2011 the Zambian government announced that it would be resurrecting 'K[enneth] K[aunda]'s Zambianization programme' to restrict expatriates only to jobs that no Zambians had the skills to perform.[42] Therefore almost 50 years after independence Zambia is still faced with the same problems. Rhetoric often comes easy and action less so, as Beveridge suggested in 1974, 'simply because someone in authority, in this case Zambia's President Kaunda… says that something should happen does not mean that it will'.[43] This slow rate of change might suggest that external expertise at independence did not necessarily translate into the transferral of knowledge and skills, and that in reality this hindered the ability of Zambia to generate its own experts. Attempts to indigenise the workforce have also not been without criticism in recent years. As Mbembe and Fanon have observed, Africanisation is something quite different to decolonisation but still the two are seen as synonymous with each other. For them it is seen as a means by which the middle class or bourgeoisie could gain and retain power.[44]

Volunteering and the VSO

The VSO and volunteering in general was one way that Britain garnered influence in new states under the guise of plugging the skills gap. A number of overseas voluntary organisations

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[40] 'Letter from the British High Commission in Lusaka to M.P. Lynch', 25 November 1981, FCO 106/580, The National Archives, Kew.
[41] 'Letter from B. Kakoma, Minister of Lands and Natural Resources Regarding the Zambianization of Post of Surveyor General in Survey Department.', 7 March 1988, CO2-16-012, National Archives of Zambia.
[42] 'Government to Resurrect KK's Zambianization Programme.', *Lusaka Times*, 30 November 2011.
[43] A. A. Beveridge, 'Economic Independence, Indigenization, and the African Businessman: Some Effects of Zambia's Economic Reforms', *African Studies Review*, 17:3 (1974), p. 477.
[44] Mbembé, 'Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive'; F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, (New York: Gove Press, 2005).

emerged during the 1960s and 1970s and as well as the VSO, there also existed at the time the National Union of Students, Scottish Union of Students, United Nations Association and the International Voluntary Service. These organisations were often grouped under the banner of Lockwood Organisations, after the chairman of the committee set up to co-ordinate the work of several sending agencies.[45] The VSO was however by far the largest supplier of volunteers from Britain, accounting for some 68% of all overseas volunteers in 1965.[46] The VSO garnered much support from the government in its early years to the extent that the Department of Technical Co-operation described the government as a 'permanent supporter of V.S.O. though thick and thin'.[47] Due to its positioning as the biggest volunteer organisation, and the one which garnered the greatest amount of government support, there is an interesting set of debates surrounding the issues of what the VSO meant to Britain. Certainly in the early 1960s the VSO was very much seen as being of benefit to Britain, perhaps more so than to those countries within which the volunteers served. This message is reiterated by one of the architects of the VSO, Mora Dickson, who opined that 'it was a genuine fact that the volunteer was gaining as much from the country he served as he was giving'.[48] There were a number of British-born conditions for prompting the levels of government interest in the VSO. First, as the Conservative Member of Parliament for Horncastle, Sir John Maitland M.P, raised a motion to debate the VSO in order to give publicity and thus continued government support. In the ensuing debate, he stated that 'he had worked as a midshipman and "had a fine time" and that whilst young people no longer able to work as a midshipman they could "enjoy the next best thing in voluntary service overseas"'.[49] Similarly, the ODI acknowledged that the VSO offered a bright prospect for filling gaps left by the return home of British personnel after independence. The ODI considered that:

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[45] 'Note for the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on Commander Sir John Maitland's Motion to Call Attention to the Work of the Voluntary Overseas Service and to Move a Resolution.', 1962, FO 371/164566, The National Archives, Kew.
[46] A. Moyes, *Volunteers in Development.* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1966).
[47] 'Note to Mr Vosper for the Debate in the Commons on Wednesday, 12th December on Sir John Maitland's Motion about Service Overseas by Volunteers.', 7th December 1962, FO 371/172470, The National Archives, Kew.
[48] Dickson, *A World Elsewhere*, p. 13.
[49] 'Department of Technical Co-Operation Background Paper to Sir John Maitland's Motion', 7 December 1962, p. 1, FO 371/164566, Foreign Office files, The National Archives, Kew.

> it must be frankly recognised that, as it is at present constituted, the British volunteer movement's contribution and value lie quite as much in the experience it gives to the volunteers and to the socially valuable leavening effect it is likely to have on attitudes in Britain towards developing countries.[50]

It was therefore clearly seen by some as an alternative outlet to National Service which had formally ended in 1960. A number of commentators have noted how Britain found itself scrambling to redefine its new global identity in the decades following the Second World War.[51] Drawing on the writings of social commentators, including those with and interest in the VSO project, Bocking-Welch highlights the sense that there has been a loss of purpose and a perceived crisis of national identity. For both her and Adams, these crises were brought about around a 'traumatic moment' at the loss of empire.[52] It was therefore not just national service that the VSO replaced, but perhaps the gap left by the rapidly diminishing empire which the British needed to bridge in order to continue to exert influence.

During the early 1960s there was also a flurry of interest in the VSO following the announcement and global expansion of the United States Peace Corps. Established in 1961 by President Kennedy, the Peace Corps was organised on a similar basis to the VSO, sending young volunteers overseas to promote American idealism.[53] Despite the championing of the programme by the Kennedy government, it sustained a great deal of criticism in its early years, eventually coming to be described by Kennedy as a 'lemon', but one which Sarge Shriver had turned into lemonade.[54] The British Government, resistant to the notion that they might have to support an American programme which was being promoted by the US across Europe, and had already gained traction in other European countries.[55] They set out to find a British alternative which they could use to justify a rejection of the Peace Corps programme. In a file

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[50] Williams, *British Aid - 4; Technical Assistance*, p. 152.
[51] S. Ward, *British Culture and the End of Empire*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); A. Thompson, *Britain's Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
[52] Bocking-Welch, 'The British Public in a Shrinking World: Civic Engagement with the Declining Empire, 1960-1970.'; Adams, *Voluntary Service Overseas*, p. 25.
[53] K. Schwarz, *What You Can Do for Your Country: An Oral History of the Peace Corps*, (New York: Morrow, 1991).
[54] J. N. Giglio and S. G. Rabe, *Debating the Kennedy Presidency*, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 184 Sarge Shriver was charged with establishing and running the Peace Corps. He was director of the organisation from its inception in 1961 to 1966 .
[55] 'Memorandum from C.N.F Odgers to J.F. Walker, British Embassy, Oslo.', 28 February 1963, FO 371/172469, The National Archives, Kew.

note dated April 1961, a Foreign Office official stated in respect to the VSO, that 'this organisation has been in business considerably longer than President Kennedy's Peace Corps, and I think it might well do proportionately as much good on a very much smaller budget'.[56] Another Foreign Office official noted in 1961 that:

> Since the announcement of President Kennedy's Peace Corps, the activities of the voluntary bodies already in existence in the U.K. have been increasingly in mind and discussions have been going on as to how best to help them, though it should be emphasised that we are not "tagging on the behind" the Peace Corps. The U.K. was, after all, first in the field.[57]

Therefore for Britain one of the motivations behind their VSO support also lay in the presence and scale of the Peace Corps. As once civil servant in the Cultural Relations Department of the Foreign Office feared, without at least an additional 100 VSO volunteers Nigeria they would be 'swamped by Peace Corps'.[58] The feeling in the British government was that the US organisation threatened their cultural strength with its former colonies and their ability to project soft power.

Lacking the money and manpower to match the provision from the US, Britain needed to market their volunteer programme in a different way. Although the VSO was beginning to be taken more seriously within government, it remained a relatively young organisation still struggling to find a role. In its early days it was involved predominantly with sending school leavers, or unskilled volunteers, on placements as teachers and youth workers, with the primary role of promoting community development. The school leavers were initially favoured as they were thought to offer an environment of 'cooperation between equals as opposed to the more didactic approach proper to the "expert" imparting his specialised knowledge'.[59] However as time went on the organisation began to professionalise the nature of its volunteering. It was partly as a result of the greater interest and involvement of the British Government, but also the pressure to compete with the Peace Corps which pushed the VSO away from recruiting

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[56] 'Confidential File Note Written by CFR Barclay', 12 April 1961, FO 371/157977, The National Archives, Kew.
[57] 'Letter from H.M. Government Economic Relations Department to the Foreign Office', 23 May 1961, FO 371/157977, The National Archives, Kew.
[58] 'Proposed Re-Organisation of the GVSO, Written by J.A. O'Brian, Cultural Relations Department of the Ministry of Commonwealth Relations.', 16 June 1963, DO 163/23, The National Archives, Kew.
[59] Adams, *Voluntary Service Overseas*. P. 48

school leavers in favour of graduates. Highlighting this, a note written in June 1963 by the Cultural Relations Department of Commonwealth Office, states that the graduate volunteer scheme was set up in 1962 in order to 'encourage more graduates to volunteer for teaching overseas'.[60] In a communique it was observed that the VSO 'are trying to diversify as much as they can' arguing that the Peace Corps were in 'competition with the V.S.O. and the tendency now is for requests to be confined to those with 'A' level science subjects probably because nearly all Peace Corps volunteers are graduates.'[61] As figure three shows, Britain did not have the financial power to compete in terms of numbers. By 1965 Britain had under 1,000 volunteers overseas but was determined to ensure that the Americans did not become the primary country of assistance in its former colonies. The competition with the Peace Corps therefore centred around British attempts to position itself as being more knowledgeable than the Americans.[62] Similarly they felt threatened by New Zealand, Australia and Canada owing to their 'uncolonial, unaligned' status and English language use, however it was felt that Britain 'knowing the ropes' would prove advantageous.[63] That little was mentioned of any sort of one-upmanship with France, given the numbers of volunteers they were sending overseas, is telling. It is likely that France concentrated their volunteering in former Francophile countries and so Britain focussed its energies on fending off volunteers in its former colonies. It is also indicative of the fact that Britain felt that knowledge gained from its colonial experience might place them in a better position to provide technical assistance and was reflective of the way in which Britain perceived themselves as specifically superior to America amongst others.[64] Indeed in a speech given to the International Conference on Human Skills in the Decade of Development in 1962, the Foreign Office Secretary for Technical Cooperation suggested that Britain stood out from

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[60] 'Note on the Voluntary Service Overseas and the Graduate Volunteer Scheme.', 17 June 1963, DO 163/23, Commonwealth Relations Office and Commonwealth Office: Cultural Relations Department, The National Archives, Kew.

[61] 'Note from Mr Lovett', 22 November 1961, DO 163/22, Commonwealth Relations Department, The National Archives, Kew.

[62] It was only in the closing years of the 1960s that the Peace Corps embarked upon what was then a half hearted attempt to professionalise P. Grimes, 'The Faded Dream: Peace Corps Droop as Volunteers Fall', *Philadelphia Bulletin*, 22 February 1970.

[63] 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1966-1967' (Lusaka, 1967), p. 2, BW 133/4, The National Archives, Kew.

[64] 'Proposed Re-Organisation of the GVSO, Written by J.A. O'Brian, Cultural Relations Department of the Ministry of Commonwealth Relations.'

other developed countries. They felt that as its 'experience of supplying middle level manpower to developing countries extends back over many decades' offered certain advantages, a view the British held on to well into the 1980s.[65] In a sense this was placing value on the role of local knowledge such as the type held by the man-on-the-spot of the colonial era, as discussed in chapter two, could play in the application of technical assistance.[66] This also resonates with a general cynicism and distrust levelled by Britain at other countries, particularly the United States, when their interest in Africa increased, but were subsequently met by "'ingrained suspicion" and "widespread condescension" by many in Whitehall'.[67] As Lord Hood remarked, the Americans were generally seen to hold the view that the experts were 'contradictory' and that beyond the few who held knowledge of the continent, there was a general understanding that 'all Africa is no more than a large area of steaming jungle inhabited by wild animals, naked savages and pompous officials'.[68]

Figure 3. Total numbers of volunteers sent by country in 1965.



[65] 'Speech given by Mr Vorsper to the International Conference on Human Skills in the Decade of Development' (Puerto Rico, October 1962), FO 371/164566, The National Archives, Kew; 'Letter from R.S. Gorham at the British High Commission in Lusaka to Sir W. Ryrie', 31 July 1984, OD 31/492, The National Archives, Kew.
[66] Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*; Beinart, Brown, and Gilfoyle, 'Experts and Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered'.
[67] Cohen, *The Politics and Economics of Decolonization in Africa.*
[68] R. Hyam and Wm. Roger Lewis, *British Documents on the End of Empire, Series A, Volume 4, The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1957-1964: Part I: High Policy, Political and Constitutional Change,* (London: HMSO, 2000), p. 242.

Source: Moyes, Overseas Development Institute.[69]

The shift towards graduates over school leavers coincided with a rapid expansion of the programme. The table below demonstrates how the British government's drive to provide a greater quantity and quality of volunteer affected the rapid expansion of the VSO, from 176 school leavers in 1961-62, to 486 in 1966-65 plus an additional 1,008 graduate volunteers. As table two shows, this fast rate of increase in the number of graduates also highlights a relatively early shift away from school leavers.

Table 2. Summary of VSO Volunteer numbers[70]

	Cadet	Graduate/ Qualified	Total
1958/59	18	-	18
1959/60	61	-	61
1960/61	86	-	86
1961/62	176	-	176
1962/63	284	36	320
1963/64	349	152	501
1964/65	392	339	731
1965/66	453	601	1054
1966/67	486	1008	1494
1967/68	404	963	1367

Source: Adams; Foreign Office[71]

The evidence indicating a decline in the overall proportion of school leavers in the early 1960s is at odds with other analyses of the VSO, which credit Malcolm Macdonald with shifting the focus of the VSO during his presidency in the 1970s. His biographer credits him with the shift from 'placing mainly school-leavers in one or two-year posts to being and agency providing a range of technical assistance'.[72] Therefore, the move to change the type of volunteers sent

[69] Moyes, *Volunteers in Development.*
[70] Adams, *Voluntary Service Overseas*, 223; 'Note from W.J. Smith to Sir John Maitland; Service Overseas by Volunteers', December 1962, FO 371/164566, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966. The National Archives, Kew.
[71] Adams, *Voluntary Service Overseas*, 223; 'Note from W.J. Smith to Sir John Maitland; Service Overseas by Volunteers'.
[72] Sanger, *Malcolm MacDonald*, p. 433.

overseas did not originate from Macdonald, rather the British Government had a significant bearing on the direction of VSO recruitment as it sought to compete with the Peace Corps.

As Craggs *et al.* point out, amateur enthusiasm is not always viewed as a positive, and can instead be 'understood as a threat to rationality and professional practice'.[73] Whilst this threat might account for a further pressure to professionalise, the shift also resonated with events which took place during the closing years of the empire. The imperial mission had adapted in the latter years of the colonial period to account for a greater number of technical experts 'who knew his science' over a reliance on more generalist district administrators who 'knew his native'.[74] Mirroring this, in the 1960s the VSO similarly moved from the use of the "right sort", that is, graduates of the more elite universities who might be of a suitable character, to volunteers who held some level of professional or technical skill. Hodge and Webb identify in the later colonial period this shift from more generalist staff to experts, and Bocking-Welch also suggests that this was also mirrored in the NGO world. As she argues, the field saw a situation where 'the enthusiastic amateur found himself marginalized from the increasingly professionalized ranks of development employees'.[75]

Despite providing significant funding to the programme, the British Government were keen to remain in the background. The VSO was largely seen by recipient countries as being managed as a volunteer organisation and this offered a much appreciated level of detachment from the British government. In a file note by JRS Guinness of the Foreign Office, it was suggested that Britain should be cautious of being seen to be neo-colonial. They were aware of the fact that the volunteers were 'not government sponsored is some times of value in countries which are particularly sensitive about neo-colonialism'.[76] This was reiterated in a note by an official in the Commonwealth Relations Office who observed that the placing of volunteers in posts should be under the jurisdiction of the VSO, and that this was because of 'the V.S.O.'s desire to

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[73] R. Craggs, H. Geoghegan, and H. Neate, 'Managing Enthusiasm: Between "Extremist" Volunteers and "Rational" Professional Practices in Architectural Conservation', *Geoforum*, 74 (August 2016), p. 1.
[74] Cooper and Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences*, p. 13.
[75] Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*; Bocking-Welch, 'The British Public in a Shrinking World: Civic Engagement with the Declining Empire, 1960-1970.', p. 209.
[76] 'File Note from J.R.S. Guinness to Mr Mason', 16 May 1963, FO 371/172476, Foreign Office files, The National Archives, Kew.

emphasise its independence of official government agencies'.[77] Yet on the other hand the VSO's funding mechanisms, coming mainly from the British Government, gave the Department of Technical Co-operation the confidence that 'it could give informal guidance to the volunteer organisations to ensure that its activities were broadly in line with British Policy'.[78] This presents an interesting interplay between what Britain's intentions were and how it wanted to be seen in the international arena. However ultimately the way the scheme had been set up to be financially detached from the government, impacted on the government's ability to influence the VSO and the actions of its volunteers. A particular incident that arose from this setup and which highlighted its problematic nature caused some concern for the British government. In October 1965 WJ Smith of the Ministry of Overseas Development expressed misgivings over the fact that there was reluctance from the VSO and their volunteers to withdraw from Rhodesia in the throes of its UDI, unless it was for reasons of safety of the volunteers. Writing to the VSO in October 1965, a civil servant at the Ministry of Overseas Development pointed out that because the wages of the volunteers were paid by the host countries, 'according to the British High Commission in Rhodesia if VSO volunteers were to stay on after U.D.I. they would be in effect in the pay of a rebel government'.[79] Here the government demonstrated their concern about the negative public relations that such a position might bring. This also indicates that whilst the underlying priorities of the VSO and British government both rested on their public image, these priorities were sometimes oblique and resulted in conflicting practice. With the government keen to ensure that even the actions of volunteers aligned with national policy, the pressure remained on the VSO to evacuate staff despite the VSO later highlighting that all but one of the volunteers wished to stay on regardless of UDI. As Lord Amory of the VSO noted in November 1965, the volunteers were reluctant to abandon 'African Rhodesians', and that in actual fact none of the volunteers were on the payroll of the Rhodesian government, being instead paid by non-governmental organisations and missions. He went on to say that the VSO

[77] 'Note from TL Grosthwait to Mr Smedley', 11 April 1962, DO 163/23, The National Archives, Kew.
[78] 'Confidential File Note by F.C. Mason', 16 November 1964, FO 371/178134, Foreign Office files, The National Archives, Kew.
[79] 'Letter from W.J. Smith to the VSO', 18 October 1965, DO 183/647, The National Archives, Kew.

had expressed reluctance to withdraw volunteers on any grounds other than personal safety.[80] This exchange reveals a weakness in the relationship between the VSO and government, and perhaps cast doubt as to whether it was indeed as convenient and effective a means of influencing foreign states as it was first imagined.

The notion that the VSO was a tool for the promotion of Britain overseas is perhaps emphasised by the handing over of local VSO staff responsibility to the British Council. Founded in 1932 the remit of the British Council was at this time to take up a 'cultural offensive' for the 'purpose of promoting a wider knowledge of the United Kingdom and the English language abroad and developing closer cultural relations between the UK and other countries'.[81] The relationship between the two organisations and their objective was highlighted in a motion put forward by Sir John Maitland, who had described the VSO as 'the British Council in Disguise'.[82] This connection between the two bodies does, to some extent, place the activities of the VSO within the scope of what Julie Reeves sees as part of the British Government's 'cultural propaganda'.[83] This view of the VSO as a cultural propaganda tool was long been held in government circles and it is thus fitting that the VSO fell within its remit.[84] Indeed it was initially (and perhaps still is) treated with some suspicion by the Zambian government, who cautioned that the organisation was 'one of the front organisations which work undercover of promoting U.K. cultural fields' and that their work should be 'investigated fully'.[85] Suspicion of government links to the British Council made the VSO's operating environment difficult at times with one Zambian Minister acknowledging that it was merely a 'British Government

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[80] 'Letter from Lord Amory to the Ministry of Overseas Development', 10 November 1965, DO 183/647, The National Archives, Kew.
[81] 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1966-1967', 2; Williams, *British Aid - 4; Technical Assistance*, p. 136.
[82] 'Department of Technical Co-Operation Note to the Secretary of State for the Debate in the Commons on Wednesday, 12th December on Sir John Maitland's Motion about Service Overseas by Volunteers.', 7 December 1962, FO 371/164566, The National Archives, Kew.
[83] J. Reeves, *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists*, (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 52.
[84] 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1966-1967'.
[85] 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs File Note on the British Council', Late 1960s, MFA 1-1-109, National Archives of Zambia.

propaganda machine'.[86] Even the organisation themselves acknowledged that the organisation did not yet have the gravitas it needed in some countries.[87]

The issue of cultural propaganda was raised in a February 1963 letter from Anthony Head, then British High Commissioner to Nigeria who hinted at concerns relating to the growing presence of Peace Corps in the country. Head suggested that the presence of VSO volunteers may have a greater impact on the hearts and minds of Nigerians than staff supplied through other technical assistance routes:

> I feel bound to point out that the impact of 500 young enthusiastic members of the Peace Corps; almost all engaged in teaching in schools, would have a very considerable impact on the younger generation in Nigeria. A young member of the Peace Corps is a more effective evangelist for his county than the average technical aid man who comes out here to show Nigerians how to spray for capsid beetles or how to file secret documents. I do not under-estimate the impact of our technical aid programme but there are about 60 of them in Nigeria and most of them middle-aged government servants.[88]

It is notable that Head does not consider volunteering as a form of technical assistance. Yet in the same period however, the ODI listed 12 types of technical assistance in the 1960s, one of which is listed as 'individual service overseas through voluntary societies'.[89] That this was listed separately from, for example, teaching, nursing and technical experts, suggests that the volunteers were not necessarily viewed as providing the same type or level of service as experts sent via other channels. This conflicting view point may suggest that the VSO occupied an unusual position whereby it was marketed as technical assistance yet was not seen as a "legitimate" form of technical assistance by the British government. Rather it fulfilled more of a cultural role, influenced and promoted in multiple domains and by different actors.

On one level fresh faced school leavers, and indeed many graduates, had little to offer in terms of technical assistance, however these relatively low skilled volunteers perhaps did represent

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[86] J.M. Mwanakatwe, Former Minister of Education, quoted in 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1974-1975', 1975, p. Confidential Appendix, BW 133/4, The National Archives, Kew.
[87] 'Letter from British Council to the Commonwealth Department.', 29 December 1965, BW 133/3, The National Archives, Kew.
[88] 'Letter from A. Head, High Commission Lagos to the Duke of Devonshire', 16 February 1963, DO 163/23, Commonwealth Relations Department, The National Archives, Kew.
[89] Williams, *British Aid - 4; Technical Assistance*, p. 53.

certain ideologies surrounding the preference for western knowledge in contrast to local knowledge. Here, we see soft power being channelled through the VSO, a seemingly independent and philanthropic organisation but nevertheless one which was promoting British values and ideas across the globe. Also crucial is the role that the perception of knowledge plays in this relationship. It was not so much that the knowledge itself was superior (the skill levels of the volunteers suggests otherwise), but rather it reinforced the ingrained notions of the superiority of western knowledge even if it was delivered by school leavers. The early briefing notes for volunteers emphasised the importance of knowledge and ideological transfers in stating that 'remember that you represent, above all, an export of ideas'.[90]

In respect to recruitment there is an interesting continuity in the background to the volunteers. As Kothari points out in relation to the colonial service, 'recruitment of officers was initially self-selecting in that certain young men already possessed the "appropriate" cultural capital by virtue of their class and educational background'.[91] This is also strongly reflected in the recruitment of school leavers in the early days of the VSO. In 1963 for example, of the 242 school leavers sent overseas, over half came from fee paying private schools, a further two-fifths coming from selective grammar schools with just six school leavers coming from comprehensive schools.[92] While the picture for graduates differed slightly, reflecting Kirk-Greene's analysis of colonial officers, there was still a weighting towards Oxbridge and red brick universities.[93] For example, in 1972 the top three sending universities were: Oxford, London and Cambridge respectively, with the vast majority of the remaining graduates coming from what are now Russell Group universities.[94] Yet, perhaps more telling is the manner by which Mora Dickson referred to apprentice volunteers as having 'the chance to make 'technical aid' real to the man in the street: to make it possible for the ordinary young man in industry to feel

[90] Volunteer briefing notes cited in Dickson, *A World Elsewhere*, p. 30.
[91] Kothari, 'Spatial Practices and Imaginaries', p. 241.
[92] Voluntary Service Overseas, 'Voluntary Service Overseas; 1962/63 Volunteers', n.d., OD 163/23, The National Archives, Kew.
[93] A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Britain's Imperial Administrators, 1858-1966*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 138.
[94] 'Evaluation of the British Volunteer Programme Carried out by Overseas Development Group, University of East Anglia. Report to the BVP (British Volunteer Programme)', April 1978, RVA Box 38, The Women's Library, London School of Economics.

that he, personally, could have a stake in this kind of assistance'.[95] In using the word "ordinary" here, Dickson sets these "man on the street" volunteers apart from what she might be implying as "extraordinary" young "right sort" graduates. This signifies a class dimension to the VSO's view of volunteers from different backgrounds. Even though graduates and school leavers came to their posts without prior colonial experiences, the continuities in the value of dispositions and ways of being in the world such as reliability, honesty and "good character" over technical competence, can be seen to have filtered through from colonial expectations into the recruitment criteria of the VSO.[96] The issue of character, whilst key to imperial expansion, can be hard to define. Peter Cain has explored some of the ideas which surrounded the notion of "character" in Victorian and Edwardian Britain. He highlights the way in which notions of British character were bounded to aspirations of empire and for him, character was seen by Victorian elites as encompassing 'energy, industry (in its broad meaning), thrift, prudence, perseverance (and) honesty'.[97] Echoing this sentiment, Mora Dickson herself addresses the character of the early volunteers. She argued that in sending young volunteers, aged just eighteen or nineteen in most cases, they would be less influenced by historical social perceptions, and more likely to have embraced 'a new conception of racial partnership'. At the same time however, she adopts a similar tone to the Victorian paternalist elite, suggesting that the character of the volunteers should be those of self-discipline; initiative confidence; responsibility, which would be backed up by the VSO instilling qualities of 'integrity, truth, faith and confidence, humility and humour'.[98]

Reception of volunteers

Opinions of volunteers varied. Whilst it was recognised by Zambia that they could be engaged in valuable work, their presence was, at times, problematic, with concerns ranging from the reliance on volunteers, through to their suitability and questions surrounding their conduct. Publically, volunteers were generally highly regarded. As reported in the local press, the *Times of*

[95] Dickson, *A World Elsewhere*, p. 95.
[96] Kothari, 'Spatial Practices and Imaginaries', p. 241.
[97] P. J. Cain, 'Empire and the Languages of Character and Virtue in Later Victorian and Edwardian Britain.', *Modern Intellectual History*, 4:2 (August 2007), p. 252.
[98] Dickson, *A World Elsewhere*, p. 17.

Zambia noted that 'They are definitely not vague idealists and fumbling do-gooders messing about in an amateurish way with uncoordinated projects'.[99] The article then goes on to criticise the Zambian government because the national enthusiasm for volunteers was being countered by lack of provision of support and resources.[100] This positive sentiment shown by the *Times of Zambia* was, however, not always replicated in government thinking. By 1969 the British High Commission in Lusaka noted that in general, the anti-British sentiment had 'continued to rise' but also noted that this did not fully reflect onto the VSO.[101] In 1969 a representative from the Development Division of the Zambian government, echoing the criticisms raised in Ivan Illich's 1968 speech, launched a scathing critique of the volunteers, citing a particular case whereby a group of young men arrived in Zambia as volunteers then proceeded to treat their time in the country as a holiday.[102] He pointed to concerns over the lack of skill which some volunteers arrived with citing a particular example whereby on 'one project they did work on resulted in qualified people from the ministries having to get involved in the project to put it right' and a case where work done in 'a very slipshort [sic] fashion so that the whole structure they had made had to be dismantled'.[103] There was also criticism as to how the lack of experience of volunteers meant that some handled themselves poorly when in Zambia. According to the minutes of a meeting between volunteer coordinators and the Zambian Directorate of Technical Assistance, one particular group turned out to be:

> flamboyant in the extreme, and were led by a particularly aggressive young man who was a "law unto himself" and who later 'took it upon himself to ask the whole team to go to the Victoria Falls for a week or more completely without permission in Government vehicles.[104]

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[99] 'The Volunteers: A Hard Working and Enthusiastic Team.', *Times of Zambia*, 27 June 1969, NCDP 2/4/6, National Archives of Zambia.
[100] *Ibid.*
[101] G. A. Crossley, 'Letter from British High Commission in Lusaka to Ministry of Overseas Development.', 23 May 1969, BW 133/5, The National Archives, Kew.
[102] In April 1968 Ivan Illich delivered what has been dubbed as the 'To Hell with Good Intentions' speech to the Conference on Inter-American Student Projects, in which he criticised the hypocrisy, paternalism and idealistic views displayed by volunteer organisations and their workers., I. Illich, 'Talk Delivered at the Conference on Inter-American Student Projects', 1968, http://ciasp.ca/CIASPhistory/IllichCIASPspeech.htm, accessed 2 February 2016; 'Minutes of Meeting between Volunteer Co-Ordinators and the Directorate of Technical Assistance, Held on 4th June 1969', 4 June 1969, NCDP 2/4/6, National Archives of Zambia.
[103] 'Minutes of Meeting between Volunteer Co-Ordinators and the Directorate of Technical Assistance, Held on 4th June 1969'.
[104] 'Minutes of Meeting between Volunteer Co-Ordinators and the Directorate of Technical Assistance, Held on 4th June 1969'.

On the back of these criticisms, it was recommended that the Directorate of Technical Assistance sets the standard for the recruitment of volunteers, specifically stating that 'volunteers should be experienced and have professional qualifications for the type of job they are going to do'.[105] These criticisms not only resonate with many of the concerns over present day unskilled volunteerism, but also reflected British aims at the time which positioned the VSO as a vessel which could primarily serve as an adventure for the volunteers, rather than being of actual use to the host country.[106] The volunteers were not always viewed negatively within the Zambian government. In a 1981 report written by Frank Judd of the VSO, Zambian officials noted a two way flow of cultural exchange. They were said to have valued the 'significance of the two way contributions' of the programme, hoping that the exchange might prompt volunteers to talk about their positive experiences so that they might 'contribute to public understanding in Britain on their return'.[107] This suggests Zambia was beginning to actively engage with ideas surrounding the way it was viewed internationally, rather than just using volunteers for their practical skills, and in one sense this represents the South-North flow of knowledge.[108]

Though the term "volunteer" would suggest that there was a zero or very low price associated with schemes, there were in some cases more substantial outlays, in the form of running costs and payments to volunteer agencies, associated with their presence. Whilst a small number of countries provided volunteers at no fee to the recipient countries, others such as Britain and Canada, required a contribution from their hosts.[109] It is difficult to see how such an arrangement, which involved low skilled assistance, might have been attractive when compared to more official offers of technical assistance. Trained experts from organisations such as the OSAS, similarly attracted a cost for the host countries but at a significantly subsidised rate. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was noted that the Zambian government wanted to protect itself from

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[105] *Ibid.*
[106] 'Confidential File Note Written by CFR Barclay'.
[107] 'Report and Follow up Action by F. Judd of the Visit of the VSO in Zambia in October and November 1983.', n.d., RVA Box 3, The Women's Library, London School of Economics.
[108] Sanyal, 'Knowledge Transfer from Poor to Rich Cities: A New Turn of Events'.
[109] 'Development Division Circular No. NDP/12/69: Volunteers, Bilateral Expert Programmes 1969/70 and U.N. Special Fund Projects 1969-1974', 14 February 1969, NCDP 2/4/6, National Archives of Zambia.

spending money on volunteers who were not qualified for the job.[110] In addition to capital costs, host countries were also in the most part expected to provide accommodation for volunteers. [111] This had the potential to lead to political tensions in countries such as Zambia, which at the time was unable to adequately house a substantial number of its own population.

Further to these ideological issues raised in relation to volunteerism and housing, Zambia had to consider the political implications of their acceptance of volunteers and what kind of role they could take on. In a 1965 letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to all departments, it was requested that all volunteer requests were passed through them so as to ensure that the volunteers could be vetted as they did not 'agree that people from outside can be sent to departments of some ministries which are very sensitive'.[112] Zambia was not alone in having doubts about the provenance of volunteers. In the early 1960s President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana viewed the American Peace Corps with suspicions, harbouring concerns that it was merely a 'front for the Central intelligence Agency'.[113] In Zaire, Peace Corps volunteers had regularly subjected to overzealous scrutiny by government officials, and Peace Corps volunteers had caused embarrassment in Turkey, Liberia and Ethiopia for becoming politically active.[114] This accolade was reserved not only for the West, since Soviet advisors had been involved in overthrowing Nkrumah which had made African governments cautious towards them.[115] The political concerns which had been expressed with regard to the Peace Corps and VSO were also expressed towards other volunteering sources. Zambia turned down an offer of volunteers from an organisation known as Operation Crossroads on political grounds, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt the organisation was 'politically unacceptable'.[116] This is not to say that Zambia was

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[110] 'Minutes of Meeting between Volunteer Co-Ordinators and the Directorate of Technical Assistance, Held on 4th June 1969'.
[111] 'Development Division Circular No. NDP/12/69: Volunteers, Bilateral Expert Programmes 1969/70 and U.N. Special Fund Projects 1969-1974'.
[112] 'Letter from Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary to the Cabinet.', 30 November 1965, CO 17/1/7, National Archives of Zambia.
[113] E. Cobbs-Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s.* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 160.
[114] DeRoche, 'Non-Alignment on the Racial Frontier; Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968'; Grimes, 'The Faded Dream: Peace Corps Droop as Volunteers Fall'.
[115] DeRoche, 'Non-Alignment on the Racial Frontier; Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968'.
[116] 'Draft Letter from the Permanent Secretary in the Development Division to Secretary General to the Government.', June 1969, NCDP 2/4/6, National Archives of Zambia. Operation Crossroads was a American volunteer organisation which sent students to volunteer in Africa during school holidays.

closed to alternative sources of volunteers other than Britain, indeed a clear interest was shown in expanding to recruit volunteers from the Far-East. This was highlighted in a letter the Zambian Director of Technical Assistance who spoke of the difficulty in diversifying the volunteer pool but observed that 'at present, developing countries get their volunteers from the western world; the East, it would appear, is not interested in the scheme which is, in most cases, paid for 100% by the donors'.[117] It is not known whether this desire to seek volunteers from the East was borne out of a wish to increase numbers to diversify from the former metropole, or because they felt that volunteers from the East might be able to offer skills and experiences which western volunteers lacked.

British perspectives of volunteering

Despite the initial enthusiasm in government, the situation in Britain was not all smooth sailing. The VSO, once hailed as a major success story began to lose favour with the government, with external pressures, affecting the organisation's willingness to be transparent.[118] The "official" government record provides a rich history of the VSO during the 1960s but information on the VSO in government archives becomes more limited as the late 1970s and early 1980s progress, which adds complexity to tracing its decline. However the RVA archives go some way to filling the gap in the "official" records. This period also signified a moral shift in the way in which volunteer agencies such as the VSO and the work they were doing were viewed. Previously volunteering was viewed as having inherently, at the very least, a neutral impact on host countries, however this period saw the emergence of a greater level of self-reflection by agencies and the volunteers themselves. For the VSO this shift was spearheaded in the UK by Returned Volunteer Action (RVA). The VSO started as a loose collection of support groups set up by former volunteers to help those returning to adjust back into life in the UK. It was institutionalised as VOSA in 1966 and later rebranded as Returned Volunteer Action. RVA

[117] 'Letter from Director of Technical Assistance to Mr Baldwin', 6 November 1969, NCDP 2/4/6, National Archives of Zambia.
[118] 'VSO Tour Report of The Sudan (Also Visiting Zambia and Tanzania)', March 1977, 78/5/62, Durham University Library, Archives and Special Collections.

supported not just the returning VSOs but also all those sent overseas as part of the British Volunteer Programme as shown in figure four.[119]

Figure 4: Sending organisations overseen by Returned Volunteer Action.



Figures in brackets denote volunteer numbers placed by each sending society between 1976-77. Source: Evaluation of the British Volunteer Programme carried out by Overseas Development Group.[120]

The VSO represented the vast majority of volunteers sent from Britain, and as such they were the main target for the work of the RVA. The relationship between these organisations was a 'complex one', with the VSO in particular considering the RVA as a thorn in their side.[121] As the former director of the VSO once commented, the RVA were in his view overly radical and largely comprised a collection of 'left wing' 'recycled student activists'.[122] Despite the rather disparaging view held by those senior in the VSO, the RVA became an important outlet for volunteers whom had come to question the role of volunteering and their own position in relation to the communities they had been based in. A 1988 letter from a volunteer whom had spent time in Ghana raised some important questions in respect to the utility of their role. The

[119] This was the umbrella confederation for the four sending societies.
[120] 'Evaluation of the British Volunteer Programme Carried out by Overseas Development Group, University of East Anglia. Report to the BVP (British Volunteer Programme)'.
[121] 'The Origins of Voluntary Service. Appendix: RVA Relationship with the VSO.', March 1979, RVA Box 2, The Women's Library, London School of Economics.
[122] Bird, *Never the Same Again*, p. 91.

author acknowledged that the principles and motives at the heart of the VSO itself 'clearly avoids the worst aspect of most expatriate postings overseas' through its 'objectives of shared skills, the promotion of self-reliance, the use of appropriate technology and it[s] encouragement of team-work help to contribute to its anti-colonial philosophy'. However she then goes on to question 'the extent to which, despite intentions, our actions do challenge the perpetuations of the South's dependence on the North and whether they counteract or bolster the impression that "traditional" expat workers make overseas'.[123] For her, any kind of knowledge transfer, no matter how sensitive to history and local conditions, was problematic. In essence their mere presence marks them out as some sort of western knowledge elite and if knowledge transfer is successfully imposed it will mainly reinforce existing perceptions and prejudices surrounding the superiority of western knowledge. However, although the volunteer makes some astute observations, the notion that the VSO had an anti-colonial philosophy is perhaps mislaid, especially given the funding of the VSO was still very reliant upon central government. Indeed she goes on to object to the way that certain projects were selected being based mainly on the amount of foreign influence that can be leveraged. Despite the criticisms levelled at the RVA by the VSO, there is a sense that the RVA and, accordingly the volunteers themselves, acted as a kind of moral compass to the VSO. However the very nature of the type of volunteers sent by the British Volunteer Programme – highly educated, with a greater awareness of ethics than unskilled volunteers, lead to a greater level of moral questioning of their roles.

It was in the 1980s that the VSO had begun to address the neo-colonial concerns being levelled at the development and volunteering sectors. In a 1986 RVA report it was suggested that Zambia had been identified as a test country for more innovative approaches to garner better project investment. According to the report, the intention was that Zambians would go from being 'subjects' to being 'in control', going on to discuss how the role of field staff needed to change 'from that of the expatriate agencies "power brokers" to that of catalysts, facilitating

[123] 'Letter from a Former VSO Volunteer to Returned Volunteer Action', 27 May 1988, RVA Box 2, The Women's Library, London School of Economics.

effective local decision making'.[124] The 1980s also marked the point at which the professionalism of the VSO volunteers began to match that of government funded experts. A 1986 RVA position paper on technical development suggested that there had become a 'narrowed perceptible degree' of 'distinction between volunteers and other personnel supplied under Britain's Overseas Manpower Aid programme'.[125] Indeed so closely aligned were the VSO and Overseas Development Assistance programmes, that VSO volunteers were often poached to work as OSAS staff.[126] This alignment helped justify the actions of the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, to cut the Overseas Development Assistance technical cooperation officer programme in order to channel the money instead into volunteering. The VSO were viewed as more cost effective to the OSAS, and the VSO, along with other volunteering programmes, were by then seen as the preferred form of technical assistance and seen as suitable replacements to the OSAS and its successors. This suggests a synergy between the two groups, and links together past and the present technical assistance.

British bi-lateral technical assistance programmes

As King suggests, international organisations 'became important means by which planning knowledge was diffused to the colonial and, from 1960, to the ex-colonial societies'.[127] Yet less well understood are the national organisations and schemes which had the potential to greatly influence governmental planning in the post-colonial period. The presence of the VSO in Zambia during the 1960s was set against a complex backdrop of technical aid and colonial legacies, along with a push for 'Zambianization' from the new government. In the years following Zambia's independence a number of schemes were in operation which aimed at aiding Zambia's transition from a colonial entity to an independent state. Of note were the OSAS which saw the temporary placement of British technical experts within Zambia, British Aided Conditions of Service (BACS) scheme which facilitated the retention of former colonial/Federation employees and BESS which extended to non-government employees such

[124] 'Innovation in VSO Zambia, Appendix 1, by T. Scott', 1986, RVA Box 2, VSO Zambia, The Women's Library, London School of Economics.
[125] R. S. Porter, 'RVA Position Paper on Technical Development', 23 January 1986, RVA Box 3, The Women's Library, London School of Economics.
[126] 'Report and Follow up Action by F. Judd of the Visit of the VSO in Zambia in October and November 1983.'
[127] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 216.

as University staff. These ran alongside the increasing use of technical assistance by organisations such as the United Nations and World Bank. This is in addition to Commonwealth related programmes such as the later Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation and the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan, which was, according to Williams, 'not very Special, and [was] certainly not a Plan'.[128] The OSAS for example, facilitated a significant degree of continuity between colonial and post-colonial governance in Zambia, both in terms of managing the change at independence and in reaffirming British influence. Ultimately this would fulfil its aims and would work to Britain's advantage. The following section, therefore explores the role of the scheme in the 1960s, examining the way in which this both represented a continuity with the past, as well as potentially influencing the VSO's involvement in contemporary Zambia.

Before independence, British officers had been installed in senior positions in the Colonial public service - with the hope that these officials would remain in post following the transition to independence. The aim of this service was to assist the new government to 'retain the services of expatriate officers in the interest of economic and social progress and stable administration until such time as they can build up their own local Public Service', by recruiting 'technical experts to fill established' posts. [129] The stimulus for the formation of the OSAS lies with Nigeria, which, having gained its independence in 1960, prompted the British Government in the latter years of the 1950s to review the provision of expatriate officers overseas. The scheme emerged from both the direction of development thinking at the time as well as the recognition that most government posts were filled by non-Africans during the colonial period. This was compounded by a severe lack of education provision in British Colonial Africa and the perceived need for a "handing over" period. Concerns culminated in a 1960 announcement to

[128] 'Draft Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Understanding for Technical Assistance between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of Zambia', 14 April 1967, CO 17/1/7, National Archives of Zambia; P. Williams, *Aid in the Commonwealth* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1965), p. 10; G. Goundrey, 'The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation', *The Round Table*, 62:245 (January 1972), pp. 93–99.
[129] Her Majesty's Treasury, *Assistance from the United Kingdom for Overseas Development, Her Majesty's Stationery Office [HMSO]*, 1960, p. 62; 'Secretary of State's Visit to Africa, October/November 1967, British Aid to Zambia (Excluding Contingency Assistance), Defensive Brief (Background Only), Ministry of Overseas Development/Zambia and Malawi Department', 16 October 1967, 52/1/46, Malcolm Macdonald Papers, Durham University Archive.

the British parliament of the introduction of an Overseas Service Aid scheme and the subsequent enactment of the Overseas Service Act of 1961.[130] As a result of the moves made by the Federation to consolidate public services in Salisbury, expatriate civil servants had been removed from the service of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service (HMOCS), and therefore were not automatically eligible for entrance into the OSAS scheme, though they eventually were admitted.[131] This complication highlights how problematic such geographically broad policies can be, and also the disruptive and disadvantaging affect the Federation was likely to have had on staffing levels within local government. Rakodi specifically notes that it was during this period that there was local government resistance to the involvement of Africans in civic roles prior to independence, whereby 'the local authorities were able to evade or dilute central government attempts to promote direct African participation in Urban Administration'.[132] The OSAS scheme operated a system whereby the Ministry of Overseas Development recruited staff to fill posts within Zambian Public Service, with the staff being paid by the Zambian government at the standard local rate. The British government would also contribute towards the cost of 'officers' salary, education allowances, passages and pensions, compensation and gratuities'.[133] The idea was that these British experts would be placed on temporary contracts during which they would train "local staff" to fulfil their duties after their contract ended. The standard length of service under the OSAS was initially three years but this could be, and often was renewed. Similarly the BESS programme provided the same benefits to British staff whom were not based in government posts.[134] The BACS scheme was introduced in 1966 and extended the same benefits as OSAS staff to former Federation/colonial workers. Whilst the BACS and BESS schemes were significant in facilitating the exchange of knowledge, this thesis concentrates on OSAS staff because the early post-colonial planners were predominantly under this scheme.

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[130] Her Majesty's Government, *Overseas Service Act. Ch. 10*, 1961.
[131] 'Overseas Service Aid Scheme; Review Memorandum Zambia 1965, Designated Officers Association, The Zambia Police Service', p. 8.
[132] Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy', p. 201.
[133] 'Secretary of State's Visit to Africa, October/November 1967, British Aid to Zambia (Excluding Contingency Assistance), Defensive Brief (Background Only), Ministry of Overseas Development/Zambia and Malawi Department'.
[134] K. Morton, *Aid and Dependence: British Aid to Malawi*, (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2010).

During this period, Britain was not the only country sending external expertise into the continent. Coverdale makes reference to the supply of a planning expert from Israel to teach the planning course and like Money, Sindab notes that whilst the majority of 'expats' in Zambia were of British origin there were also experts who had arrived from elsewhere across the globe.[135] She notes in particular that experts from outside Britain were initially drawn from 'Scandinavian countries, Holland and Canada', but that by the late 1970s Zambia began to attract 'personnel from other continents as well, particularly Third World countries'.[136] Specifically relating to housing and planning related organisations, *D'Urbanisme et D'Habitat* was a French government sponsored organisation set up to advise 'under-developed' countries on matters of urban development, though its focus lay mainly on former French colonies.[137] The remit of this organisation was on building development matters and they provided planning, design and contracting services for "under-developed" countries as well as guidance for the development their own building industries. From West Germany, a regional planning team were collecting basic information for the future development of Zambia's Southern Province, a programme which still has some involvement in Zambia today.[138] Israeli experts who reported on the "Construction and Housing sector" (1969), and a Dutch academic team carried out a research project in 1971 into 'Local Administration', which examined the extent to which the then administrative systems met Zambia's needs.[139]

In addition to bi-lateral technical assistance projects and teams, this period is defined by assistance from multilateral agencies. Of particular relevance is the UN Economic and Social Council which expanded their programme of technical assistance in 1965-66 to include public

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[135] Money, "'No Matter How Much or How Little They've Got, They Can't Settle down": A Social History of Europeans on the Zambian Copperbelt, 1926-1974'.
[136] N. J. Sindab, *The Impact of Expatriates on the Zambian Development Process* (Unpublished thesis, Yale University, 1984), p. 128.
[137] 'Letter from Richard Sharples at the Ministry of Public Building and Works, to Peter Thomas, Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office.', 13 February 1963, FO 371/172469, The National Archives, Kew.
[138] 'Letter from German Expert in Regional Planning to the District Secretary in Mazabuka', 12 August 1969, SP 3/18/7, National Archives of Zambia.
[139] 'Letter to the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Provincial and Local Government and Culture from Acting Principal at the National Institute of Public Administration.', 2 July 1971, LGH 1-17-3, National Archives of Zambia; 'File Notes on Israeli Report on Building Construction and Housing Sector in Zambia', 1969, LGH 1-5-28, National Archives of Zambia.

administration to aid in decentralisation as well as housing, physical planning and building programmes.[140] The Zambian National Archives is dotted with reports by multilateral aid funded experts on the future development of Zambia, specifically from the United Nations Economic Survey mission of 1964.[141] For example, in the late 1960s a UN expert named Greenwood was tasked with reviewing the organisation of local government in Zambia, a further UN representative Donald Hanson went on to report on Housing policy in 1969.[142] The Hanson report also refers to earlier studies on the issue of housing, including 1966 UN reports into housing and the creation of a National Housing Authority for Zambia. The sheer numbers and extent of external experts in Zambia could at times cause confusion over policy direction, as Hansen noted, that the four reports which went into informing his study had some 'recommendations which were diametrically opposite to one another'.[143] These four reports, although published close together, drew conflicting recommendations. This is representative of both a lack of coordination and more importantly the way in which outcomes were aligned to the needs and aims of donor countries and organisations rather than Zambia's needs.

Despite a Zambian 'desire to be associated with international bodies as much as possible', it was felt that placements from organisations such as the UN took too long to arrange. Time was of the essence, and as the Director of Technical Assistance put it in 1969, 'Africa is in a hurry and would prefer friends who are prepared to meet her in this respect half way'.[144] The OSAS scheme and Britain's willingness to act promptly complimented the aims of the government with the need for expatriates being firmly embedded in early national development planning.

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[140] UNESCO, *The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance; The Programme for 1965-1966, Long Term Project Description, Northern Rhodesia*, (9 October 1964), UNESCO Archives.
[141] U. N. E. C. for Africa and F. and A. O. of the U. Nations, *Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia*, 1964; 'United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2012). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision', http://esa.un.org/unup/, 2014, accessed 20 April 2014; UNESCO, *The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance; The Programme for 1965-1966, Long Term Project Description, Northern Rhodesia.*
[142] 'Written Comments on the Greenwood Report', 23 September 1970, LGH 1/1/62, National Archives of Zambia.
[143] 'Report on Housing Policy in Zambia by D. Hanson', 1 October 1969, LGH 1-5-29, National Archives of Zambia.
[144] 'Letter from Director of Technical Assistance to Mr Baldwin'.

Indeed the First National Development Plan made explicit provision for expatriates, acknowledging their key role in the transition to self-sufficiency:

> No country can plan in the long run to rely upon expatriates to man the key posts in the Civil Service or the private sector. . . . In the short run, it is not possible to achieve this, because it takes time for educational and training programs to come to fruition and because the Department Plan will require more skilled manpower rather than less. But the objective of the nation is self-sufficient. First National Development Plan (FNDP).[145]

The overall plan laid out in the FNDP, was that an initial burst of expatriates would lead to a greater self-reliance through an ongoing process of "Zambianization". Yet as Sindab notes, the execution of these plans exacerbated capacity problems in Zambia. She argues further that that the National Development Plans contributed to Zambia's problems in respect to its reliance on expatriates: 'from its very inception, the plan suffered from a serious flaw — its success was based upon the most scarce resource that the country possessed: skilled manpower. As such the FNDP was a major cause for the increased demand for expatriates'.[146] It would have been British and Zambian colonial relations that allowed for such provisions to be forecasted into the early National Development Plan. The drawing up of these plans would, after all, have been overseen by former colonial and expatriate staff that held the knowledge that this scheme would be available as a source of staff for Zambia.

It would be easy to conclude that this scramble for expertise in Zambia began at independence, however in 1964 there was already a concern that the shortage of staff would only get worse in the post-colonial period. In a note written by the Minister of Lands and Works in February 1964 regarding staff shortages, it is stated that most Northern Rhodesian ministries were short of staff and that 'the present position will be worsened at the end of 1964, when a proportion of expatriate officers will leave'.[147] The minister suggested that 'the Government needs to examine ways of retaining officers who may leave, and of recruiting new ones on contract' and that if insufficient replacements were found the country would be seriously facing 'a situation

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[145] Office of National Development and Planning, *First National Development Plan 1966-1970*, (July 1966), National Archives of Zambia.
[146] Sindab, 'The Impact of Expatriates on the Zambian Development Process', p. 108.
[147] 'Staff Shortages, Note for the Minister of Lands and Works. Presented to the Emergency Development Coordination Committee', 5 February 1964, CO 13/1/25, National Archives of Zambia.

where lack of professional and technical men will prevent schemes being carried out properly'.[148] This indicates that Zambia was destined to enter independence with significant staffing weaknesses, yet be expected to embark on an accelerated programme of Zambianization. This was an impossible position for a new country faced with promoting itself as an employment destination during a period where many viewed its future political and economic stability with suspicion.

Political and international relations and the role of technical expertise

Despite fears of a backlash against British expertise, the supply of OSAS was welcomed in Zambia, with expatriate staff playing an important role in Britain's technical assistance packages. It is important to highlight that the OSAS scheme also offered benefits in return and was not merely an exercise in philanthropy. As noted by the British High Commissioner in 1965 'at this stage, as I have said to the Department, I regard the retention of such officers as a British as well as a Zambian interest of the highest importance'.[149] A memorandum from a Foreign Office civil servant in December 1970 also suggests trade advantage of having British expatriates in the Zambian public service as being British they were more likely to 'buy British produced goods'.[150]

Like other types of aid, technical expertise schemes eventually began to be used as a negotiation tool by the British. By 1971 tensions between Zambia and the UK over Britain's lukewarm response to ending the Rhodesian rebellion were growing, leading to the British reviewing their aid packages.[151] Discussions were held in which it was suggested that Britain could cease to fund the OSAS scheme. However as one Foreign and Commonwealth official pointed out, it was going to be difficult to use the OSAS supplementation scheme withdrawal as a bargaining tool, as this would cause harm mainly to British citizens working under the scheme. As an alternative, it was suggested that a British 'delay in the rate of OSAS recruitment' which could be used as

[148] 'Note from the Minister of Lands and Works Presented to the Emergency Development Coordinating Committee', 5 February 1964, CO 13-1-25, National Archives of Zambia.
[149] 'Report from the British High Commissioner in Zambia to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations; Zambia: Transitional Development Plan', 25 February 1965, DO 183/764, The National Archives, Kew.
[150] 'Letter from J.C. Rowley', 4 December 1970, FCO 45/564, The National Archives, Kew.
[151] D. Anglin, *Zambian Crisis Behaviour: Confronting Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1965-1966*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994).

leverage in negotiations, but warned of likely 'official O.D.A.[Office of Development Assistance] dissent' on such a proposal.[152] In the end it was concluded that 'it would be wrong and probably counter-productive to try to use a restraint on OSAS recruitment as a general political bargaining counter', and that any negotiation 'should only be applied to secure Zambian compliance with their undertakings in respect to conditions of service under OSAS itself'.[153] This is reminiscent of the difficulties Britain had in using the technical aid supplied by the VSO as a bargaining tool against UDI. It is suggestive of the fact that technical assistance was too valuable a tool of soft power for the British to be willing to start using it for leverage, but also that they were conscious of causing financial detriment to British citizens stationed overseas.

It is worth noting that technical assistance was not the only aid available to the Zambian government in this period, but the conditionality of non-technical aid packages further pressed the Zambian government to be reliant upon British expertise. In a draft letter of intention to the Zambian Minister of Finance in 1969, the restrictions were set out for an £8 million aid package of a conditional loan on commercial terms which made it subject to limitations. This required that the money be used in either buying British goods or for

> payment of a proportion of the costs of consultancy services (including the services of architects and quantity surveyors) provided by a firm of consultants ordinarily resident or carrying on business in the United Kingdom and selected in consultation with, and on terms approved by, the Ministry...[154]

In addition, all work was required to be carried out by persons who are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. In a sense therefore, if Zambia was to accept any bilateral aid package from Britain it could not escape British technical assistance. This packaging of technical assistance into many strands of aid speaks to British fears that Zambia might look elsewhere for its external expertise. Cooper points to independence as offering a moment in which African states could start to determine their own foreign policy and approach to aid. He argues that

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[152] 'File Note to Mr Le Quesne', 19 April 1971, FCO 45/889, The National Archives, Kew.
[153] 'Letter to Secretary of State; Anglo/Zambian Relations', 30 April 1971, FCO 45/889, The National Archives, Kew.
[154] 'Draft Letter of Intention; To Minister of Finance, Zambia from British High Commission in Lusaka', April 1969, FCO 26/354, The National Archives, Kew.

'sovereignty gave African leaders the possibility for shopping around for multiple patrons overseas, for exercising more direct control over patronage resources within a country'.[155] Indeed, the internal ideology of Zambian humanism was projected into the international arena through the adoption of foreign policies which embraced both pan-Africanism, and non-alignment.[156] On the surface this granted Zambia access to a wide range of aid and expertise, though in reality Zambia remained somewhat tied.

Initially Britain expressed concern that the supplying of overseas experts might be rejected because it would limit the agency of newly independent African countries. This rejection of British assistance was certainly blamed for the poor uptake of recommendations made by H. Myles-Wright, the then Professor of Civic Design at Liverpool University, who opined that recommendations they made in papers between 1955 and 1957 'did not get very far, partly because newly independent countries, tended, very naturally, to look for advisors outside the United Kingdom during the first few years'.[157] As also noted within the Ministry of Overseas Development correspondence, there was concern that Zambia may 'seek assistance from countries except Britain because of previous exclusivity to Britain'. They did however add that despite a likely initial rejection, Zambia would soon realise the superiority of British technical assistance and knowledge, and that upon its return to Britain, Zambia would be 'more pro-British than before… let the Zambians find out for themselves'.[158] Whilst the British Council observed that Zambia's non-alignment was used as a way of seeking assistance from non-British sources, in reality, Zambia chose to embrace the new OSAS scheme from the outset.[159] This is evidenced by the fact that recruitment often exceeded the numbers actually needed on the ground, and so in effect, Zambia was over recruiting expatriate workers.[160] In addition, even

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[155] Cooper, 'Possibility and Constraint', p. 180.; Adopted by Kenneth Kaunda when he became President of Zambia in 1964, Zambian Humanism was a form of African socialism 'which blended traditional African values with Western socialist and Christian values'. See *Times of Zambia*, 'Remembering K K's Humanism', http://www.times.co.zm/?p=57297, accessed 26 February 2017.
[156] T. M. Shaw, 'The Foreign Policy of Zambia: Ideology and Interests', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14:1 (1976), pp. 79–105.
[157] 'Letter from Professor Myles-Wright to Chief of Planning and Urbanization Section, United Nations, New York', 24 May 1963, P7021.4, University of Liverpool Archive.
[158] 'Note to Mr Ensor', 17 December 1964, OD 20/223, The National Archives, Kew.
[159] 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1966-1967', p. 1.
[160] 'Letter from Secretary to the Cabinet to Gordon Goundrey', 5 May 1966, CO 3/1/109, National Archives of Zambia.

though new sources of aid and expertise opened up at independence, which Zambia did to some extent take advantage of, it chose to remain heavily reliant upon Britain. In particular, Zambia drew other expertise from international organisations, the United States and to a lesser extent China.

Evidence supports the notion that colonial era British influence had, as Peck *et al* would argue, set a 'path dependency' for Zambia in the post-colonial period.[161] In a telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office representative in Lusaka dated October 1964, it was said that there were a number of reasons why the Zambians were keen on engaging with Britain on the matter of technical assistance. First it was felt that training in or by Britain offered a level of unity as many African nationalists in power at the time had themselves been trained by Britain. It was impressed on the representative that Zambians trusted the British not to 'introduce ideology or pursue direct international policy aims of our own in arranging training courses'.[162] As one government minister noted: 'we prefer the devil we know'.[163] This sentiment was repeated in a 1967 memorandum regarding a courtesy call from Mr Makulu, Chairman of the Zambia Public Service Commission who stated that demand for overseas staff was likely to increase. He expressed a 'preference for British Staff because they fitted in more easily and because British professional and technical standards were easier to gauge for appointments purposes'.[164] Indeed this view was held by Britain into the 1980s, when the High Commission pointed out that 'the importance of manpower aid to Zambia is well established. The United Kingdom, for historic links, is better placed than other donors to provide what is needed'.[165] Despite Makulu's utterances, this rhetoric could merely have been an act of diplomacy – as the official Zambian record shows the difficulty the government faced when trying to recruit from

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161 Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 'Neoliberal Urbanism', p. 50.
162 'Telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office Representative in Lusaka on the Visit of King', October 1964, OD 20/223, The National Archives, Kew.
163 *Ibid.*
164 'Memorandum Regarding Courtesy Call from Chairman of the Zambia Public Service', July 1967, OD 38/46, The National Archives, Kew.
165 'Letter from High Commission in Lusaka to Permanent Secretary at the ODA.', 23 August 1984, OD 31/492, The National Archives, Kew.

elsewhere.[166] In addition, because the scheme was already established, was politically acceptable and could supply high numbers of staff required at a manageable cost, the OSAS programme proved popular. In fact, so popular were the OSAS terms that Zambia pushed for the same system to be implemented with other countries which had put forward technical expertise as a source of aid.[167]

Zambia did attempt to seek expertise from within continental Europe, where they experienced a 'fairly good response'. However, the Zambian authorities were very clear that 'Britain must remain our main source of supply'… [finding it encouraging that]… despite U.D.I. which has had its effect, we are still getting far more recruits than other countries in East and Central Africa'.[168] Although some attempts to diversify the flow of expertise worked, there was also a realisation that no other European countries could match the supply provided by Britain. Furthermore, the shared institutional history of the two countries might further explain why Zambia was reluctant to seek additional external expertise from elsewhere. It was against this predominance in British technical assistance that the Zambian government began to consider the diversification of its sources of technical assistance arose. By virtue of the sheer numbers of British expatriates based in Zambia, and of the favourable terms by which officers were placed, the Zambian authorities had the view that 'all, or nearly all, of [their] eggs are in the British basket' and were 'carried with many dangers'.[169] However Zambia also acknowledged that there was 'little practical likelihood of other sources of supply developing' which could accept 'a commitment to supply staff in anything approaching the numbers an covering the wide range of occupations catered for by the O.S.A.S. and allied schemes'. [170]

By 1967 the dash to recruit as many overseas experts as possible prompted Zambia to approach a number of other countries for assistance via the same framework as the OSAS. In 1966 the

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[166] 'Memorandum Regarding Courtesy Call from Chairman of the Zambia Public Service'; 'Memorandum from Staff Development Advisor to Secretary to the Cabinet' (National Archives of Zambia, 13 October 1967), CO 9-1-9, National Archives of Zambia.
[167] 'Letter from Secretary to the Cabinet to Gordon Goundrey'.
[168] 'Annual Report for the Year 1965. Office of the High Commissioner for the Republic of Zambia.' (Lusaka, January 1966), MFA 1/5/56, National Archives of Zambia.
[169] 'Memorandum from Staff Development Advisor to Secretary to the Cabinet'.
[170] *Ibid.*

Zambian government expressly started that 'the O.S.A.S. arrangements are the approximate foundation on which people are being recruited elsewhere than in Britain for established posts', and by that point the American and Norwegians had 'accepted our stand of no extra privileges for their operational personnel', with Japan, Canada and Denmark also having been approached to supply trained staff on OSAS terms. [171] There were also a number of technical expertise schemes proposed by other countries which required extensive funding from Zambia and which were largely rejected for not meeting the benchmark set by the OSAS. One such scheme was proposed by the Volunteers for International Technical Assistance Inc, (VITA). This New York based organisation advertised the 33 city and town planners available for technical assistance, an offer rejected by Zambia as it did 'not compare very favourably with the executive volunteer aid where the volunteer actually works alongside our people'. It is likely that the costs of the scheme (£60,000 for nine VITA representatives) also had a bearing on the decision.[172] That is not to say that other countries did not provide experts on more favourable conditions than the British, but a letter from the Staff Development Advisor to the Secretary to the Cabinet in October 1967 suggests that of the 19 countries who also provided expatriate officers, only five, in addition to the UN, 'provided financial aid in terms of topping up salaries'.[173]

In this period the Zambian government was still likely to have been heavily influenced by expatriate staff who would have been retained through the OSAS scheme and held senior and advisory positions. The feelings towards U.S. technical assistance expressed by Whitehall had been reflected in Lusaka in no uncertain terms in a confidential letter from the Northern Rhodesian Ministry of Finance to the Administrative secretary:

> We all of us have our misgivings about the type of chap the U.S.A. and other countries might send us as technical assisters. There is always the danger that they may be far less interested in assisting out development technically than

[171] 'Letter to Permanent Secretary', 22 August 1966, MFA 1-1-164, National Archives of Zambia.
[172] 'Letter from Permanent Secretary at the Zambian Ministry of Development and Finance', 30 September 1969, NCDP 2/3/9, National Archives of Zambia; 'Letter from Volunteers for International Technical Assistance Inc. to Ministry of Development and Finance', 15 October 1969, NCDP 2/3/9, National Archives of Zambia.
[173] 'Memorandum from Staff Development Advisor to Secretary to the Cabinet'.

> in promoting some propaganda line, either with malice aforethought or simply through vaguely benevolent but woolly thinking.[174]

Regardless of whether or not the same colonial senior staff occupied posts in the Ministry of Finance, there is a strong chance that such thinking would have permeated through to their predecessors because of the extent of Zambia's reliance on expatriate knowledge. This can be seen in an exchange in 1967 which states that the Chairman of the Zambian Public Services Commission had voiced the ease of 'gauging' the 'standards' of British personnel and how there was some concern over the validity of qualifications held by Czechoslovak doctors. The utilisation of British standards for "gatekeeping" purposes suggests that British influence had deeply permeated the Zambian civil service.[175]

The reliance on British assistance, a lack of diversity into other sources of experts, and the slow pace of Zambianization, undoubtedly impacted on Zambia's dependence on the OSAS programme. Indeed one of the most striking characteristics of the OSAS was not necessarily the scale of their presence in the early days of independence, but the extent to which Zambia continued to be reliant on expatriates. From an initial rolling agreement, the OSAS plan was capped at a further five years in 1971. This length of time and the demand for expatriates poses an interesting question regarding knowledge transfer and change. In the case of the OSAS and BACS staff, it suggests that Kaunda's initial plan to affect knowledge exchange had failed which raises the question as to whether seeking predominantly British expatriate staff had contributed in some way to this failure. This at times resulted in an influx of experts with pre-existing ideologies and norms, which meant that they were less effective in transferring expertise then perhaps experts from elsewhere would have been. This led to maintenance of the status quo rather than change. One could also presume that there may have been a mind-set of self-preservation for the OSAS, BACS and BESS funded staff, whom might have acted in self interest in not effectively transferring skills and knowledge. Tordoff also points to a 'failure to implement a clearly formulated Zambianization programme' which likely affected the Zambian

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[174] 'Letter from Ministry of Finance to the Administrative Secretary', 12 June 1962, MF 1-3-232, National Archives of Zambia.
[175] 'Letter from J.K. Thompson at the Ministry of Overseas Development to Mr. Lynch', 20 July 1967, OD 38/46, The National Archives, Kew.

governments ability to plan and make use of OSAS staff.[176] However, despite attempts at Zambianization, Sindab has argued that there is a synergy between the process of colonial and postcolonial 'buffering' towards to the Zambian ruling class, who, felt threatened by the technocrats moving out of the post-independence education system. She suggests that they used the expatriate staff as a bulwark to prevent the 'younger, better trained, educated and highly ambitious' technocrats from using their skills to challenge the established authority.[177] Similarly, Beveridge described how a 'monopoly of expertise' might have been used to maintain control, either by expatriates or the new technical elite.[178] It is perhaps this gameplay by Zambia that left the country with a 'substantial expatriate community' holding posts in across a number of influential positions.[179] This experience of the middle class in the postcolonial setting seeking to bolster their own positions is not restricted to Zambia. As Fanon's contends, the innermost vocation of the African middle classes was to 'keep in the running and part of the racket' turning the national project into 'an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what might have been'.[180]

Another failing of the scheme can be found in the roles that expatriates were expected to fulfil, including whether they had counterparts to transfer knowledge to. The principle of the OSAS was to recruit or keep existing colonial era expatriates in place to assist with the transfer of their skills and knowledge until the workforce could be Zambianised. Unlike similar schemes in the US which acknowledged the input that local counterparts could play in a 'mutually beneficial symbiosis', albeit only as a 'native informant', the British seemed to view knowledge transfer as being more dominated by western expertise.[181] As a development circular of 1969 notes, 'Technical assistance in its broadest sense should enable Zambia to become independent and not as at present dependent'.[182] However one of the stumbling blocks in achieving this

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[176] W. Tordoff, *Politics in Zambia*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p. 270.
[177] Sindab, 'The Impact of Expatriates on the Zambian Development Process', p. 91.
[178] Beveridge, 'Economic Independence, Indigenization, and the African Businessman', p. 477.
[179] 'Returned Volunteer Action. Report of the Tour of Tanzania and Zambia.', 1985, RVA Box 3, The Women's Library, London School of Economics.
[180] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 149.
[181] International Cooperation Administration, 1956, Malaria Manual for U.S. Technical Cooperatiion Programs, Public Health Technical Series, Manua 1, Washington D.C. Quoted in Packard, 'Visions of Postwar Health and Development and Their Impact on Public Health Interventions in the Developing World', p. 109.
[182] 'Development Division Circular No. NDP/12/69: Volunteers, Bilateral Expert Programmes 1969/70 and U.N. Special Fund Projects 1969-1974'.

independence was that local staff were just too short on the ground to be spared for shadowing experts. Indeed, as noted in a 1969 cabinet office meeting, 'It would be desirable to have a number of specially selected local officers working alongside planning experts from overseas in the establishment of the Planning Office, in order to ensure that they would be experienced local officers in the future'. However it was felt that it would be necessary to 'temper this … with the need to deploy the strictly limited number of qualified local officers on administrative rather than specialist duties'.[183] A memorandum from the Staff Development Advisor in 1967 also acknowledges that the expatriates in Zambia were not just building services, but were also maintaining them.[184] As discussed in chapter five, this resonates with observations made by contemporary local staff in Zambia who felt that their role was mainly to prop up the existing system rather than affecting positive changes to the system. It seems therefore, that although Zambia's dependence on expatriates was likely to be as combined result of poor education, the loss of staff in the run up to independence also contributed to a failure of knowledge transfer. Chapter five examines the ways in which the Zambian reliance on British technical assistance might mirror, as well as influence, contemporary planning.

Reception of the OSAS scheme

In the early post-colonial period Zambia received a significant amount of technical assistance from various sources, however much of the expertise was often directed to areas which interest individual donors. As both Tilley and Stoler note, colonial countries became 'laboratories of modernity', something which had not gone unnoticed by the British Government.[185] Indeed Sir John Johnson, the British High Commissioner to Zambia noted in 1984, that 'grandiose projects rumble on providing a fascinating field of study for experts, but with little relevance to Zambia's needs', going on to suggest that such schemes actually placed a 'strain on the Zambian administrative machine'.[186]

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[183] 'Extract from Cabinet Minutes, Discussion Item C.', 9 June 1964, CO 4/1/1, National Archives of Zambia.
[184] 'Memorandum from Staff Development Advisor to Secretary to the Cabinet'.
[185] A. L. Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 15; Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*.
[186] 'Extract from Draft "Farewell Zambia", Departure Speech of British High Commissioner to Zambia, John Johnson', 21 June 1984, OD 31/492, The National Archives, Kew.

It is no surprise that this additional burden meant that technical assistance was subjected to some scrutiny. Within two years of independence, the way in which the OSAS scheme functioned was not without criticism from Zambia. A review memorandum written in 1965 by a collaboration of the Designated Officers' Association of Zambia and The Zambia Police Association paints a picture of how some groups within the government viewed the programme. Perhaps in the most damning statement it describes a 'failure of the OSAS in Zambia, as evidenced by the particularly high rate of retirement of designated officers, is marked'. It then goes on to say that the OSAS scheme in Zambia had 'generally failed to achieve its main purpose' and that 'this failure is particularly apparent in Zambia'.[187] Because of the timing of this memorandum, just two years into independence, it is likely that the element of the OSAS scheme referred to could include former Colonial Office staff. These were already in Zambia at the time of independence, who then having transferred onto the OSAS scheme had not sought to extend their terms in service. The report acknowledges that whilst the majority of those in Zambia are working towards a prosperous Zambia, it nevertheless remains that individuals will 'look towards their own immediate personal advantage in deciding whether to continue to serve in Zambia'. The principle reasons put forward for this is that the scheme lacked flexibility and the inducements offered failed to be sufficient to stem the flow of experience from the country who were under pressure from the 'administrative and technical' changes taking place as a result of independence.[188] A forthright memorandum of 13 October 1967 also criticised the standard of recruitment by the UK, and suggests that one option to increase both numbers and quality would be to recruit and pay expatriate costs themselves.[189] Further criticism was received at a meeting of the Heads of Departments held in 1968 where frustrations with the over reliance on expatriate staff were vented. The Permanent Secretary, whilst lamenting the lack of expertise in departments, noted that 'considerable reliance on expatriates who execute elaborate plans but later leave the country before executing them. These

[187] 'Overseas Service Aid Scheme; Review Memorandum Zambia 1965, Designated Officers Association, The Zambia Police Service'.
[188] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[189] 'Memorandum from Staff Development Advisor to Secretary to the Cabinet'.

are left to inexperienced local officers and in most cases the plans are shelved'.[190] In another report by the Town and Country Planning Service it was noted that the blame lay not just with the expatriate planners, but rather 'that often unstinted efforts of expatriate personnel to transfer their knowledge to Zambians is wasted'. In observing this loss of knowledge to the private sector, it notes that 'the brighter and more conscientious trainees, after reaching a stage where they are useful assets in the daily administration of the department, leave for better paid posts in commerce or the professional world outside Government'.[191] As well as concerns raised in respect to the numbers and lack of knowledge transfer, Zambia was also suspicious of the divided 'loyalty' of expatriate officers and the proposed requirement that they report directly to Britain.[192]

Given these failings and criticisms, it might be assumed that when in early 1968 Britain attempted to put the brakes on recruitment under the OSAS scheme, citing financial pressures at home, it would have not been met with significant resistance. This was however not the case. A letter sent by Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister in 1968, stated that while Britain was more than happy to continue supplying technical assistance the 'difficulty arises solely in paying for them' due to economic pressures at home and the devaluation of the pound, which meant that the aid programme would 'not go as far as it did'.[193] This was not well received by Zambia, with Kaunda expressing his disappointment, subsequently attempting to lever favour by suggesting that Britain could benefit from Zambia's trade:

> There must surely be projects in the development of Zambia's economy in which British interests would like to participate and also particular fields of export which your government would like to pursue in your desire to capture some of the Zambian market as we divert our trade and traffic from the south.[194]

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[190] 'Minutes of the Meeting of Heads of Department on 4th December 1965', 13 December 1968, NCDP 2/7/7, National Archives of Zambia.
[191] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1965' (Lusaka, 1966), Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
[192] 'File Note on the Draft Agreement between Zambia and U.K. Governments.', 21 April 1967, CO 17/1/7, National Archives of Zambia.
[193] 'Text of Message from the Prime Minister in Reply to His Excellency the President's Letter of 1st April on O.S.A.S.', 29 April 1968, MFA 1/1/163, National Archives of Zambia.
[194] 'Letter from Kenneth Kaunda to Harold Wilson', 24 May 1968, MFA 1/1/163, National Archives of Zambia.

Kaunda went on to publically acknowledge the fact that 'Technical assistance is one of the modern versions of diplomacy, which recipient countries can turn to good account provided they are careful to avoid any "attached strings"' and that 'a donor's program may be largely influenced by its desire to supply a recipient with certain kinds of equipment or goods - or by its foreign policy'.[195]

By the late 1960s Zambia began to realise that the extent of its dependence on the UK might not be in its best interest. Concerns were raised that since independence the number of OSAS officers in Zambia had actually increased as opposed to achieving the desired outcome of decreasing reliance. Commenting some three years later, the Under-Secretary to the cabinet found it 'almost incredible' that from 1,952 in 1962 to 2,072 in 1967 with an expected increase to 'at least 2500' in the following five years.[196] His report suggests that there was a sense of bitterness towards Britain's involvement, describing a 'dependence upon OSAS staff since "independence"… due to the increased pace of development administration within the country'.[197] The placement of the word independence within inverted commas is particularly telling, and suggests that in his view this reliance runs counter to the notion of an independent Zambia. This resentment continued into the following years. Towards the end of 1968 a diplomatic spat erupted over the release by the ODM of a press notice detailing British aid to developing countries which showed that Zambia was the biggest recipient of aid to the extent of £14.7m. The Zambian secretary to the Cabinet reacted with indignation at the rhetoric in the press:

> This statement was later carried in the British press, of which I enclose a rough cutting, and evoked caricatures of our President receiving aid from Mr. Wilson and yet according to them ungrateful… You will appreciate that this is a complete distortion of the truth in that £14.7m. was agreed between us and the British Government not to be aid, but a reimbursement to the Zambian Government for losses sustained through

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[195] 'Letter from Permanent Secretary in the National Development and Planning to Ministry of Home Affairs', 27 May 1966, MFA 1-1-164, National Archives of Zambia; A. Waterston, *Development Planning: Lessons of Experience*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1969), p. 394.
[196] 'File Note from the Under Secretary of the Cabinet to the Staff Development Advisor.'
[197] *Ibid.*

> the British Government's persecution of the policy of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.[198]

In Zambia there was also a 'commonly-held local view' that the country was 'Ian Smith's whipping boy' because any sanctions against Zimbabwe adversely impacted on Zambia.[199] Zambians recognised that this increase in aid was to balance against the effects of UDI sanctions. By 1967 relations were so bad that the British Council Regional Officer described how 'on the official level there is a virtual embargo on free and informal working relationships with Zambian Officials'.[200] However, the animosity expressed locally cannot be explained solely by the conditions arising from UDI and also turned on the history of relations between the two countries. As a Zambian staff development advisor stated in respect to Zambia's need for technical assistance 'all this is simply a reflection of Zambia's appalling legacy from the past'.[201] This was recognised within British channels, as one British Council officer put it:

> The Rhodesian situation last year inflicted wounds on the Anglo-Zambian relations which continue to fester; the injury must seem even harder for Zambians to bear because of the country's dependence upon the "treacherous" British for the health of its economy, and the administrative control of many important aspects of its affairs. It is exasperating not to be able to give full vent to one's righteous indignation through a throughgoing upset of relations; instead, the sense of grievance tends to express itself in a lack of cooperation, or in petty obstructiveness.[202]

This view was also voiced directly by Zambia to Britain in the 1968 notes made by Maurice Smith of a meeting which took place with a Zambian representative Valentine Musakanya, the then head of the Zambian Civil Service. Musakanya was said to have used the argument that 'education in Zambia had been so neglected during British rule that we owed them a special obligation and he made reference to the strains imposed on Zambia by the Rhodesian situation'.[203] Whilst his is still very much couched in paternalistic language, this perhaps led to a sense of Zambia seeing itself as more deserving of technical assistance than elsewhere across

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198 'Letter from the Secretary to the Cabinet to the Permanent Secretary.', 2 October 1968, MFA 1/1/163, National Archives of Zambia.
199 'Letter from British Council to the Commonwealth Department.'
200 'Memorandum from Regional Officer, Zambia, to Director of Commonwealth', 10 May 1967, BW 133/4, The National Archives, Kew.
201 'Memorandum from Staff Development Advisor to Secretary to the Cabinet' Para. p. 7.
202 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1966-1967'.
203 'Note from N Leech to Maurice Smith', 1 July 1968, OD 38/50, The National Archives.

the globe, even other former British colonies like itself. For example, reference was made to an 'uncommonly severe shortage of local skilled and educated manpower' in the review memorandum of the Designated Officers Association, but it is not clear how this might have differed from elsewhere in the former British Commonwealth.[204] Similarly this was echoed within the British Government, as one report suggested that Britain had a 'moral obligation' to meet Zambia's needs.[205] However despite the language and rhetoric of poor relations between the two countries, it did not stop Zambia from accepting further volunteers or OSAS staff, nor Britain from providing them.

Zambia had taken up a significant proportion of Britain's technical expertise aid, accounting in 1967 for £2.8 million, and having more expatriate staff based there than any other country.[206] By 1968 demand had exceeded earlier projections and 3,255 British officers serving in Zambian public service under the OSAS scheme, however this had reduced slightly by 1969 to 3073, and by 1980 it was down to 800.[207] This reflects an overall trend in the reduction of expatriates, from around 12,000 to around 4,000 in the ten years to 1979.[208] Despite this decline in the 1970s the presence of expatriate officers in Zambia loomed large. In a VSO tour report from Zambia dated March 1977, Chris Robertson notes that:

> Having inherited an acute manpower shortage from the colonial period, Zambia remains heavily dependent on highly paid expatriate "contract" personnel. Despite the expansion of educational facilities this dependence is likely to continue for some time.[209]

A number of factors account for the lowering of OSAS numbers during the 1970s. First this period saw several changes in development focus which ties it in with a general rise in aid through multilateral channels which rose sharply in the late 1970s. The multilateral aid channels

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[204] 'Overseas Service Aid Scheme; Review Memorandum Zambia 1965, Designated Officers Association, The Zambia Police Service', p. 21.
[205] 'Secretary of State's Visit to Africa, October/November 1967, British Aid to Zambia (Excluding Contingency Assistance), Defensive Brief (Background Only), Ministry of Overseas Development/Zambia and Malawi Department'.
[206] *Ibid.*
[207] 'Letter from the British High Commission in Lusaka to M.P. Lynch'.
[208] J. Carstairs et al., *British Technical Cooperation Officers Serving in Developing Countries; an Evaluation*, (London: ODA, 1979). p. 4.
[209] C. Robertson, 'VSO Report on Tour of Zambia', March 1970, Malcolm MacDonald Papers, Durham University Library, Archives and Special Collections.

differed in that instead of aid being distributed through 'discrete development projects' tied to the 'provision of technical assistance', it was channelled instead through financing in support of structural adjustment.[210] Second, recipient countries became more demanding of the specialists they required and there was a greater engagement with inter-regional assistance.[211] Third, provision diversified, with organisations such as the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation entering the arena, as well as the increasing numbers of shorter term specialist technical cooperation officer posts.[212] Finally, economic pressures during the 1970s as a result of the 'oil shock' impacted on Britain's capacity to deliver aid because of the dire consequences it had on its finances.[213] Of course Britain was not the only supplier of technical assistance. Whilst a general trend saw countries moving away from this form of development aid, despite a year on year decline of 13.47%, by 1988 technical cooperation still accounted for some 43% of total development assistance in Zambia.[214] Indeed as Jaycox observed in 1993, 'the extraordinary fact is that there are more expatriate advisers in Africa today than there were at the end of the colonial period'.[215] Notwithstanding the relative decline in this type of assistance and despite the attack on technical assistance by the Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher, a Directorate of Europe report from 1992 indicated that the supply of staff continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Britain was still spending some £7 million a year by 1992. By then, the majority of its direct technical cooperation budget to Zambia went to supporting 360 British expatriates which were employed under OSAS and BESS. In addition, a new type of expert was promoted by Britain for the first time, in the form of Technical Co-operation Officers, who were 'primarily engaged in agriculture and in assisting the Zambian Government's

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[210] T. Killick, 'Policy Autonomy and the History of British Aid to Africa', *Development Policy Review*, 23:6 (November 2005), p. 667.
[211] Carstairs et al., *British Technical Cooperation Officers Serving in Developing Countries; an Evaluation*; Goundrey, 'The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation'.
[212] Goundrey, 'The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation'. The role of technical cooperation officers tended to be characterised by shorter term more specialist roles.
[213] A. Cohen, 'Lonrho and the Limits of Corporate Power in Africa, C. 1961–1973', *South African Historical Journal*, 68:1 (January 2016), p. 48.
[214] 'Report on Development Cooperation in Zambia 1988 by C.M. Fundanga', 24 April 1989, CO 2/19/7, National Archives of Zambia.
[215] Jaycox, E.V.K. 1993. Capacity building: the missing link in African development. Address to the African-American Institute, 20 May 1993, Reston, USA. African-American Institute, Washington, DC, USA; T. Mkandawire, and Soludo, *Our Continent Our Future. African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1999).

training programmes'. The aforementioned 1992 report also stated that at a meeting in the 1990's, the commonwealth NGO Forum identified technical cooperation as one of its emerging priorities. [216] This is an interesting announcement, since it would suggest that technical assistance was something of a new priority, however as this chapter has shown, Britain has historically placed emphasis on technical assistance, and in the case of countries such as Zambia, placed more emphasis on it over capital aid. This may however also be a reflection on the mechanisms by which aid is delivered, with Britain wanting to distance itself from the direct provision of technical expertise and focussing on a commonwealth approach in order to diversify, allowing a better flow of expertise from other global locations. As Nye observed in his recent appearance at the Select Committee on Soft Power and Britain's Influence, the EU offers a 'second arrow' in Britain's aid arsenal, whereby Britain can chose to do things as either an individual actor or as an EU member where British influence might not be seen as so attractive.[217] The shift to a focus on the Commonwealth could have been an earlier permutation of this "second arrow" approach, as well as emerging out of the recognition that South-South technical exchange has its merits, both in terms of the type of expertise and the cost to Britain.[218] The way in which schemes and programmes are recycled is evident when viewing historical documents across a number of decades. In the end however, Britain pledged to support Zambia following its economic recovery and restructuring programme through embarking 'on assisting Zambia in fields of education such as health, including the provision of personnel in areas where Zambia did not have adequate skilled manpower'.[219]

Conclusion

Whilst Sindab has explored the way in which the presence of expatriates impacted on everyday life in Zambia, this chapter moves the literature forward, by examining the way that these expatriates influenced government functions and were used as a political tool.[220] Technical

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[216] 'Brief Note on the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Written by Directorate of Europe, Government of Zambia'.
[217] *Soft Power and the UK's Influence, Evidence Session No. 10 Heard in Public Questions 176 - 186* (House of Lords, 2013).
[218] Goundrey, 'The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation'.
[219] 'Brief Note on the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Written by Directorate of Europe, Government of Zambia'.
[220] Sindab, 'The Impact of Expatriates on the Zambian Development Process'.

expertise played an important role for both Zambian and British governments. For Zambia it provided much needed skills to assist in the transition from colonial government to independence and it helped fulfil the goals of the First National Development Plan. For Britain, Zambia's reliance on expatriate expertise aligned conveniently with its aid agenda at the time, albeit this type of aid came with restrictions that hindered Britain's ability to use it for diplomatic leverage. Nevertheless, technical assistance formed an important aspect of Britain's soft power. This combining of two willing partners led to the extensive infiltration of British technical expertise into all aspects of Zambian government and training, which undoubtedly had an impact on the way in which Zambia developed in its independence period. Ultimately however, Zambia discovered during these early years, that its transition to a fully Africanised government would not be as simple as waiting for African staff to be trained by their counterparts, with both personal and political issues at play.

The OSAS programme and VSO were both borne out of Britain's desire to retain or gain influence in Zambia. However despite this common aspiration, both organisations pursued their aims differently. The OSAS was grounded in the provision of staff to fill technical positions within government roles. This places their emphasis on the British aspirations for the internalisation of British norms and standards as a means to ensure continued close ties and a reliance or preference for certain values and standards associated with Britain. The VSO on the other hand operated largely away from formal government institutions and was an exercise in promoting less tangible, but equally as important aspect of values of openness. For the VSO, their overarching remit was less about providing specific knowledge and more related to winning over the "hearts and minds" of everyday Zambians. In this respect the contemporary VSO programme bears little resemblance to the school leavers and graduates of the early VSO programme. However by looking at the work of the VSO today and how it has changed over the last fifty years, and comparing it with the functions that the OSAS performed in the 1960s, it is easy to spot some similarities between the two organisations. That is, despite the VSO experts being volunteers, they are embedded within government structures and perform

functions more akin to the role that OSAS staff played in the 1960s. It is therefore the OSAS that we look to for continuity.

Whilst Zambia gave some resistance to British Technical expertise through seeking assistance from elsewhere, ultimately for historical reasons it remained tied to British provision. Therefore after the ideological moment of colonialism and formal empire has passed, relations changed but still existed in ways that are still imperial but without the baggage of being labelled as "colonial". In this way the period signifies not an end to colonialism but instead a period where the colonial contract was merely being re-negotiated. In turn this renegotiation and continuity helped to set in place norms, values and standards that play out in government practice today. This had significant repercussions for the planning function in Zambia, and the following chapter explores the way in which the rush to provide technical assistance filtered into the planning service, detailing how this helped lay the foundations for the current state of the service.

Chapter 4
Colonial Planning in Disguise

Introduction

> unfortunately, there are not enough funds to finance all the developments we would like to see in Zambia, and local government has suffered along with other sectors of government in this respect.[1]

Chapter three explored the various ways in which British technical assistance manifested itself in the independence period, the rationale behind it, and reception of the schemes. Like many states, independence in Zambia occurred against a backdrop of financial pressure, a skills vacuum, the loss and replacement of skilled former colonial staff and, conflicting development ideologies. This chapter builds on chapter three by analysing the way in which early post-colonial technical assistance manifested itself within the planning service. It explains how these conditions had a profound effect on the ability of Zambia to deliver a cohesive and effective planning system after independence. The chapter starts by addressing the main actors in development planning in Zambia, from the colonial period through into the first decade of independence. These actors were inevitably sponsored through outside bodies, whether it be the colonial government or through multilateral aid, and had various degrees of influence over the way in which planning functioned at independence. It then examines the way in which governance structures were changed by the incoming government, highlighting how these affected the planning process, before examining the practicalities of independence on the planning system. In particular it focusses on skills and knowledge amongst indigenous planners and the way in which Britain used its privileged position as the former coloniser to influence Zambia's planning future. Finally it examines how these external and internal factors influenced the legislative planning framework through tracking the changes to the planning system since independence and considering how these might relate to changes, or lack of, in planning personnel and ideologies. In doing so it establishes a greater understanding of how external expertise helped to embed and perpetuate British ways of doing things across government, and

[1] 'Address given by President Kaunda at the Annual Local Government Conference' (Chipata, 28 April 1969), p. 7, LGH 1-1-62, National Archives of Zambia.

how this might have set in place certain conditions that affect the way that planning knowledge transfer happens today.

Men-on-the-spot and experts of planning

One of the characteristic features of urban development and planning knowledge transfer in colonial countries was the role that key individuals played in the facilitation of projects and the defining of planning practice and development. As far back as 1980, King called for a greater understanding of the way in which these specific planning 'brokers' enabled the transfer of planning to the Global South.[2] These planners scoured the globe seeking opportunities to demonstrate that western expertise could resolve urban problems through urban renewal.[3] King, Home and Myers have provided rich accounts of the international careers number of these key figures in the colonial town planning sphere. In Sudan, Scottish civil engineer William Mclean was tasked with the job of providing urban infrastructure for Khartoum which formed part of Kitchner's new town.[4] Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners worked in Nairobi, Kampala, Entebbe as well as Dar es Salaam.[5] Mclean later moved to Egypt, before joining the scores of western planners, including Clifford Holliday, Geddes, Ashbee, Austen Harrison, and Howard Kendall, all of whom had been mandated to 'grapple with the challenges of the Holy Land'.[6] To the East, India provided fertile grounds for International planners seeking the make their mark on these new urban worlds.[7] A number of roving planners worked on various planning projects across Zambia, including Charles Reade who planned Livingstone and Ndola with the assistance of R.D. Jones, and Adshead, along with Reade, Bowling and Dutton who involved themselves in the planning of Lusaka.[8] These colonial roving planners all form the backdrop against which both early post-colonial and contemporary planners work today. These men were primarily drawn from the (white) empire and travelled from colony to colony combining

[2] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 214.
[3] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*, p. 181.
[4] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*.
[5] Armstrong, 'Colonial and Neocolonial Urban Planning'.
[6] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*, p. 181.
[7] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience'.
[8] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*; Home, 'Introduction'; Myers, 'Intellectual of Empire'.

knowledge gained in the UK and the antipodes with experience from colonial countries.[9] Whilst these mobile planners might have held a greater degree of specialism than the more generalist officers of the colonial machine, much like the permanent colonial office staff, their circulatory nature of travel and the way in which they moved from one overseas project to another suggests there was a demand for experts whom knew the specific socio-economic conditions present in colonial countries.

King identifies three phases of planning exportation to colonial countries. The first was a more organic development of settlements, camps, towns and cities, which he suggests occurred in the early twentieth century. The second phase coincided with the formal development of town planning theory and the adoption of practices and professionalization of the field. Finally the third is marked by 'neo-colonial developments' of the post-independence period.[10] For him, this ushered in a new phase of urban development which was often closely tied to nationalist ideologies, national planning and global economic ties and manifested itself in grand project designed, major infrastructure projects, iconic symbols as 'emblem[s] of power which took the form of civic buildings and public squares.[11] Whilst many of these newly independent states 'provided fertile ground for international practitioners' most 'preferred to use their own planning expertise'.[12] However in reality, most countries were left reliant upon external expertise from Britain and elsewhere. This meant that the early years of independence experienced a renewed surge of planning experts who built or enhanced careers through working in former colonial countries. S.V. Ward and Home have provided particularly rich accounts of such urban professionals in postcolonial settings.[13] This section seeks to build on these works to frame studies of these types of urban professionals within the broader technical assistance field in Zambia.

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[9] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*; Collins, 'Lusaka: Urban Planning in a British Colony, 1931-64'.
[10] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 205.
[11] M. Herz, *African Modernism: The Architecture of Independence: Ghana, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia* (Zurich: Park Books, 2015); Myers, *Verandahs of Power*, p. 138.
[12] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 124.
[13] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'; Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'; Home, 'Knowledge Networks and Postcolonial Careering'.

One particularly notable post-colonial international planner who operated in Zambia was H. Myles-Wright. A professor in the department of Civic Design at the University of Liverpool, he, along with fellow planner Paul Brenikov of Liverpool University, and Geoffry Powell a Surveyor from London, were commissioned by the United Nations to conduct a tour of Northern Rhodesia. The timing of the trip proved apt, with the team arriving in Northern Rhodesia on the day after the Federation dissolved, and leaving the country on the day before the first democratic election. Unlike the previous generation of planners, whom had largely been tasked with drawing up plans for specific urban areas, his remit was to examine 'the present state' of the profession in the country, and to determine future needs in terms of staff; the provision of planner education and; the overall status of the profession. After brief stops in Addis Ababa and Nairobi to speak to planning professionals, academics and representatives from international and regional organisations, he commenced his somewhat grandly self-titled 'journeys in the Rhodesias'.[14]

The team was welcomed in Northern Rhodesia by the established planning departments which then predominantly consisted of white expatriates. They also met up with a number of Northern Rhodesian ministers, most notably the future president Kenneth Kaunda, who was at the time the Minister for Local Government and Social Welfare. The findings of the report produced by Myles-Wright *et al.,* provides an interesting insight into the circulatory nature of international planning professionals. Not only does it lend itself strongly towards recommending the provision of expertise from the Global North, but it also actively encourages the continued involvement of the UN. The report's findings specifically recommend that the UN 'should consider offering the services of two men for further examination of the role of regional planning in Northern Rhodesia'. The authors felt that one of these "men" be appointed to the staff at the Natural Resources Development College, but that they should also be involved in the formulation of a socio-economic analysis for Zambia. The second appointment would be 3-6 months placement 'on-the-spot' to study the 'problems' faced by the country.[15] Though not

[14] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 1.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

directly referred to, it is quite possible that the use of short term UN appointments and the nature of the person specification suggests that their idea was that these placements would be filled by themselves. Certainly Brenikov had an interest in planning education which would have well suited a temporary posting to the Natural Resources Development College, he had also previously been commissioned by the UN to work on a project in Santiago, Chile.[16] Such recycling of experts between posts, mirrors what had been seen across the process of decolonisation. For example Donald Hansen, a UN advisor was contracted to work in Zambia on at least two occasions.[17] Indeed this was not the first occasion that Myles-Wright himself had been involved in what he described as the 'problem' of African planning, having studied and produced a number of papers in the period between 1955 and 1957, and having previously served on a West Indies commission to choose the capital.[18] This 'self-perpetuating' nature of aid, expertise and NGO management, with directors and officers recycled between projects and organisations, was cause for concern through the 1980's and remains a criticism of the sector today.[19] Indeed as Mcfarlane writes, instead of broadening the pool of expertise, such practices merely 'enhances the power of a relatively small circle of actors who consistently draw lessons from each other'.[20] Yet such recycling of expertise has not always been dimly viewed. For example, in the 1970s the professionalisation of development roles was encouraged by the Institute of Development Studies which recognised that there was a 'crisis' in recruitment. Its concern was that the OSAS had tended to recruit older staff with past experience whom adopted a 'paternalistic' approach and enjoyed the '"colonial" type of existence', they also acknowledged that there was a need to retain those younger more enthusiastic development staff through facilitating long term careers in the field.[21]

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[16] 'Letter from Professor Myles-Wright to O. Weerasinghe, Chief of Planning and Urbanisation, United Nations', 22 November 1963, P7021.4, University of Liverpool Archive.
[17] 'Letter from A.G.A. Faria at the United Nations Development Programme to W.K. Nkowani at the Ministry of Power Transport and Works. Government of Zambia', 12 October 1973, NCDP 2/11/2, National Archives of Zambia.
[18] 'Letter from Professor Myles-Wright to O. Weerasinghe, Chief of Planning and Urbanisation, United Nations', 24 May 1963, P7021.4, University of Liverpool Archive.
[19] 'Draft Report "The Future of the VSO"', 1988, RVA Box 2, The Women's Library, London School of Economics; Hilton, McKay, and Mouhot, *The Politics of Expertise*.
[20] McFarlane, *Learning the City*, p. 118.
[21] R. Chambers et al., *Aspects of British Technical Cooperation (Botswana and Mauritius): An Evaluation*, (London: Ministry of Overseas Development, 1977), p. 23, 24.

The subsequent Myles-Wright *et al.* UN report led to the inclusion of a planning course at the Natural Resources Development College. The college was, at that point, headed by the Vice Principal of the Devon School of Agriculture, GM Coverdale, whom had been seconded to Zambia to oversee its inception. A central feature to emerge from the Coverdale papers is not so much the individual struggles he faced, but the role that one individual had in embedding British expertise in Zambia. Coverdale was keen that he was not seen to overtly seek British expertise over other countries he faced, and openly voiced concern that Britain might use expertise to seek 'greater influence in Zambia'.[22] However it was his personal connections in Britain which created a "snowball" effect once he was appointed within the college, and these led to a number of professional connections between Zambia and Britain. An example of such "snowballing" is evidence in a letter from the Zambian Cabinet Office to the High Commission in London in August 1965 which speaks of the 'useful contacts you have made with Devon County Council' going on to discuss a visit to Zambia by a Devon County Council Education Officer, with whom they had discussed secondment and training opportunities.[23] As described by Hodge in the case of Kenya, and as demonstrated in the case of Coverdale in Zambia, these experts or "men-on-the-spot" drew from their epistemic networks – forged during the colonial era – to pull in further British and colonial expertise.[24] A large part of one of Coverdale's visits back to Britain was spent liaising with officers at Devon County Council, which culminated in a move by Coverdale to set up formal links with a view to using these connections to obtain skilled professional teaching staff on two year secondments.[25] As Clarke and Zelinsky both note, formal town twinning arrangements did not take off in any substantial form between the Global North and Global South until the late 1970s.[26] Yet these attempts to form some sort of official

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[22] 'Recruiting for Zambia in the United Kingdom', p. 2.
[23] 'Letter from the Cabinet Office to the Zambian High Commission in London.', 19 August 1965, CO 17/1/6, National Archives of Zambia. The Nottingham and Devon County Council archives have been approached in this regard however they do not hold a record of any exchange or links between bodies in Britain and Zambia which suggests that Coverdale was unable to establish these connections; 'Recruiting for Zambia in the United Kingdom'.
[24] Hodge, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of International Development'.
[25] 'Recruiting for Zambia in the United Kingdom'.
[26] N. Clarke, 'In What Sense "spaces of Neoliberalism"? The New Localism, the New Politics of Scale, and Town Twinning', *Political Geography*, 28:8 (November 2009), pp. 496–507; W. Zelinsky, 'The Twinning of the World: Sister Cities in Geographic and Historical Perspective', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 81:1 (1991), pp. 1–31.

relationship between Zambia and Devon, provide a precursor to later movements which sought to capitalise on the benefits which could be gained from such arrangements. Indeed in a note by WD Sweaney at the Department of Technical Cooperation, and in the report produced by Coverdale, the term 'twinning' was used to describe the proposed arrangements.[27] Officials in Devon were particularly keen to 'help Zambia with surveyors, architects and planners' and by 1965 one planner had applied for a posting in Zambia. [28] An attempt was made in 1966 through the twinning arrangement to recruit an architect planner to draw up plans and layouts, however it is not known whether this attempt was successful or where the recruit might have been placed.[29]

Myles-Wright drew a distinction between the role of the colonial officer and the type of planning expert that might be required in the new state. He felt that the abolition of the district officer system would result in an increased demand for planning experts.[30] For Coverdale however, the main role of twinning was seen as being a means of retaining former colonial staff in Zambia. For him, the lack of job security offered through technical assistance posts could be offset if former colonial officers could be assured of a job in Devon upon their return to Britain.[31] This suggests that whilst the work of Coverdale and Myles-Wright arose out of a need for skills and expertise, it also led to a further endorsement of western knowledge through their attempts to pull in further western experts. Beyond the retention of existing staff, both experts looked to recruit into Zambia, but held differing views on what Zambia needed. For example, Coverdale felt that the specifications for 'highly-trained specialists' were too demanding, and asked if some of the posts could 'be filled by general-purpose men'.[32] Where Myles-Wright had suggested that planning 'called for a maturity of judgement that cannot be expected from a boy only one year removed from a secondary school', Coverdale had sought more informal

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[27] 'Note from W. D. Sweany at the Department of Technical Cooperation to O.H. Morris and W.J. Smith', 11 August 1965, OD 8/162, The National Archives, Kew.
[28] 'Letter from W.D. Sweaney to the British High Commission in Lusaka', 27 October 1965, OD 8/162, The National Archives, Kew; 'Letter from H. Nield to Mr. Bunce', 12 July 1965, OD 8/162, The National Archives, Kew.
[29] 'Recruitment for Zambia, Note of Parliamentary Secretary's Meeting with Mr. S. Wina, Minister of Local Government and Housing, Zambia.', 12 January 1966, OD 8/162, The National Archives, Kew.
[30] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 13.
[31] 'Recruiting for Zambia in the United Kingdom'.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

approaches to recruitment of less skilled staff.[33] Using language very similar to the VSO in describing the 'enthusiastic' young men that he was keen to recruit, he wanted only those who were 'absolutely determined to have a spell in service overseas' to 'broaden their outlook and horizons'.[34] Despite this, these moves were resisted by the British government whom felt that less than qualified staff were inappropriate.[35] Whilst it would be easy to draw a number of criticisms about the exact nature of these independent experts and the way in which they operated, it is perhaps a characteristic of their somewhat loosely defined roles that facilitated a more laissez faire approach. This approach also caused headaches for the authorities. A 1965 Department of Technical Cooperation file note for example indicated that Coverdale had recruited an engineer whom was 'not thought suitable' and subsequently had to be transferred to a different post.[36] These divisions between London and experts in Lusaka mimic the tensions that had previously been experienced between colonial officers and the Colonial and Foreign Offices in respect to the provision of expertise, with London placing a greater importance on technical skills over general attitude and knowledge.[37] These conflicting views also put strain on the relationship between the British government and various parties. This escalated to the point where one civil servant in the Department of Technical Cooperation suggested that it might be advantageous if the Clerk of Devon CC, HC Godsall, 'sustained a head injury' and was 'out of action for several weeks', that way nothing would be resolved until the recess if things were not 'pushed along' by the department themselves.[38] Despite these tensions Coverdale's initially agreed three year sabbatical was extended. However he never did return to Devon County Council, instead emigrating to teach at a higher education institution in Australia.[39] Thus it would seem that these two men used their time in Zambia as a springboard to further their international careers. However despite this self-serving purpose, having planning professionals with several years of experience was preferential to what was happening in other recipient countries at the time where volunteers and could easily be projected to the status of the "expert"

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[33] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', 26.
[34] 'Recruiting for Zambia in the United Kingdom', p. 7.
[35] 'Department of Technical Cooperation File Note.', 6 October 1965, OD 8/162, The National Archives, Kew.
[36] 'Department of Technical Cooperation File Note', 21 September 1965, OD 8/162, The National Archives, Kew.
[37] Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*.
[38] 'Department of Technical Cooperation File Note.'
[39] 'Sociological Association of Australia and New Zealand; Directory of Members', 1971.

where they would not necessarily be back home. According to one account, 23 year old college graduates on the Peace Corps programme had been given the task of planning entire new model towns in Southern and Central America. They had later, accordingly to the *Philadelphia Bulletin*, been 'sorely disappointed to later find they had to start at the very bottom' of the profession when they returned home.[40]

Whilst Craggs and Neate identify the phenomenon of 'post-colonial careering' of colonial officers whom travelled back to Britain to establish careers, this was somewhat counterbalanced by the flow of experts from Britain across the globe.[41] However where our understanding of the flow from the UK to new states is not new, what Zambia's experience highlights is how the nature of the two flows could be characterised by different skill sets. Where colonial officers were able to 'repackage' their generalist and non-urbanist overseas expertise and apply them to the booming urban development sector in Britain, the generalist men-on-the-spot of colonial Africa were replaced with urban experts whom travelled in the opposite direction.[42] However these generalists who were left behind by the ending of colonialism and the new fields of expertise still managed to find a niche in the market for their skills. This mirrors a trend which has been observed in recent literature, which explores the way in which colonial and post-colonial knowledge became more professionalised and specialist.[43] It is clear from Zambia's experience that the urban development sector followed the general trend which witnessed nature of expertise change.

Governance in Zambia and the state of planning at transition

Myles-Wright was damning of earlier planning intervention, suggesting that 'the arrival of British planners, trained in the involved details of British city planning, and armed with powerful remedies for diseases that hardly existed in the Rhodesias, inevitably led to frustration'.[44] For him the earlier less formal applications of planning (that is the way in which it was carried out

[40] Grimes, 'The Faded Dream: Peace Corps Droop as Volunteers Fall'.
[41] Craggs and Neate, 'Post-Colonial Careering and Urban Policy Mobility'; d'Auria, 'More than Tropical? Modern Housing, Expatriate Practitioners and the Volta River Project in Decolonising Ghana'.
[42] Craggs and Neate, 'Post-Colonial Careering and Urban Policy Mobility', p. 7.
[43] Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*.
[44] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 36.

before the introduction of the legislative framework), represented the most suitable approach to Zambia's urban development needs. Experts such as Myles-Wright and Coverdale operated within Zambia at a politically turbulent time, when old powers grappled to retain influence and new powers looked to assert their authority.[45] In the years after independence these power shifts proposed significant changes being made to the way in which the Zambian government functioned. In part, this was due to necessary restructuring but it is also likely it was an attempt to "de-colonise" a government that had been defined by British colonial rule. In 1969, Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda highlighted this sentiment when he gave a speech in which he declared that:

> We must recognise… that many of these things are based on ideas imported from [a] foreign and a different society and we must be prepared to work out new forms and new conventions to meet the needs of our own distinctive, dynamic and fast moving society. We inherited the past and anything we do must of necessity be built upon the past.[46]

Scholars such as Njoh, have argued that politically, town planning faired particularly badly in the early independence period, primarily because its origins were deeply rooted in the colonial system with many of its guiding principles having been shaped by colonial ideologies.[47] He observed that despite more recent planners having adopted a more practical approach, they had failed to eradicate these prejudices. However whilst Kaunda admitted that all departments had suffered, his government offered little change from the situation under the colonial government which had seen planning disregarded. Whilst the rhetoric for change was strong, as this chapter demonstrates, planning had already suffered from a skills shortage before this point, and the nature of the changes to governance and governmental structures took a further toll on this already under staffed section. At the same time, national planning took root along with

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[45] H. Rangan, '"Development" in Question', in K. R. Cox, M. Low, and J. Robinson, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography*, (Thousand Oaks, Calif; London, 2008).
[46] 'Address given by President Kaunda at the Annual Local Government Conference', p. 8.
[47] Njoh, *Planning Power Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa*; Silva, *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2015; Home, 'Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire 1910–1940'; Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*.

Zambianization, which, although already initiated in planning whilst under colonial rule in 1959, increased rapidly at independence.[48]

The National Plan

One of the defining features of the early Zambian nation building project was their enthusiastic embracing of national planning. Though the origins of national planning in former colonial countries often lay in the Ten Year Colonial Development Plans which were introduced in 1947, these had tended to be disjointed and had a propensity to reflect the 'administrative structures of the colonial government'.[49] In a departure from their colonial predecessors, these new national plans were seen as a 'one of the standard attributes of sovereignty' by many new states.[50] Zambia's initial embracing of the concept was done through the Transitional National Development Plan. This concerned the first two years of independence (1964-65) and was superseded by the First National Development Plan (1966 - 70). Despite sharing similar titles to their colonial predecessors, the new national plans had 'different rationales and outlooks' from the colonial style of governance.[51] The First National Development Plan set out national objectives regarding: agricultural productivity; economic productivity; infrastructure and transport and; social infrastructure, with the plan then providing further detail on projects according to province, listing specific projects of national and regional importance. The role of coordinating specific physical development projects was in some cases delegated to the provinces.[52] The plan concerned both development and public expenditure, and for this reason the Office for National Development Planning had a substantial need for economists as well as smaller numbers of other professions including national planning experts. That the focus of national planning lay in the economy, and this mirrored the predominant global development thinking of the time, which tended to place Gross National Product at its core.[53] As will be

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[48] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1962' (Lusaka, 1963), Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
[49] A. Sekwat, 'Economic Development Experience in Nigeria', in K. T. Liou, ed., *Handbook of Economic Development*, (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1998), p. 571.
[50] R. H. Green, 'Four African Development Plans: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3:2 (1965), p. 249.
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] Office of National Development and Planning, *First National Development Plan 1966-1970.*
[53] M. Finnemore, 'Redefining Development at the World Bank', in F. Cooper and R. M. Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

discussed later in this chapter, National Development Plans had a profound impact on development planning in Zambia, since they not only signalled a shift in development ideologies but also impacted on funding for sub-national levels of government. As well as closely linking public expenditure to development, one of the key features that shaped thinking was the rate of transferral of roles from expatriates to local staff, in other words, Zambianization.

Changes to Zambian governmental structures

In many new states, post-colonial governance was often a mixture of the need to bring about ideological and fiscal changes. Whilst Zambia went through a more peaceful "velvet revolution", the desire to move away from its colonial history still remained strong. It was left balancing ideological considerations with the prosaic realities of independent statehood. There was often an overwhelming desire to want to shake off the colonial legacy in governance, and a need to address the rapid disengagement from colonial fiscal control and management. Like many new states, Zambia also used this opportunity to change in order to consolidate power nationally.

Rakodi notes that in Zambia this period was defined by 'a series of attempts to find an administrative structure' in order to balance both national unity and economic objectives with allowing for the decentralisation of decision making.[54] On the eve of independence, several changes were made to the inherited government organisation and structures, with one of the more notable moves being the breaking up of the provincial administration which had been considered by Kaunda to be the main 'king pin' of control by the colonial government.[55] Some functions of the provincial administrations, such as policing, were moved to newly formed central government departments, whereas others were transferred to local government. While the efficiency of the provincial administration was not denied by the Zambian Government, they felt that in the post-colonial period the power at this level needed to be blunted, as it was seen by then as being incompatible with the parliamentary and the political leadership of the

[54] Rakodi, 'Urban Plan Preparation in Lusaka', p. 97.
[55] 'Speech by President Kaunda to District Secretaries. Quoted in: Report of the Working Party to Review the System of Decentralised Administration. P.17', 7 January 1968, LGH 1-5-30, National Archives of Zambia.

country.[56] This went against recommendations made by the UN housing and planning team which highlighted regional planning as being 'the most important level' for coordination of land use projects. These conflicting goals and clashes between internal ideologies, external advice and the realities that Zambia faced had emerged across government. Just as Musakanya was critical of the way that post-colonial state apparatus was merely the '"brainchild and apparatus" of the departing colonial order' (whilst at the same promoting the work of British civil servants), the government in general struggled with conflicting ideologies - following external expertise or forging a new direction themselves.[57] Further causes which limited the capacity of provincial administration may have also lain in the need to reduce the fiscal burden of government. The inherited colonial system was considered not only 'cumbersome and expensive both in terms of funds and manpower', but also unsuitable for dealing with the new states problems.[58] This is not to say that provincial government was dissolved completely, but whilst a provincial level of government did remain in a politicised form, its role was reduced to that of coordination, monitoring and reporting of national plan policies as opposed to being directly involved in their implementation. A further step towards eliminating Zambia of its colonial governance system was introduced through the Local Government Act of 1965. This replaced Native Authorities with elected Rural Councils, which further removed the historic colonial systems of government and democratized, or politicised, this level of government.[59] What is interesting about this approach, is that despite a consolidation of power to national government, Kaunda retained a substantial function at local government level. To understand this, an account must also be taken of the role that the provinces played before, and in the run up to independence. Luapula Province in northern Zambia for example, had benefitted from a greater degree of stability under colonial rule but was also the site of some 'intense involvement in the anti-colonial

[56] 'Overseas Service Aid Scheme; Review Memorandum Zambia 1965, Designated Officers Association, The Zambia Police Service'.
[57] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', 9; Larmer, *The Musakanya Papers*, p. 29.
[58] 'Memorandum from the Minister of State to the Permanent Secretary.', 12 March 1970, LGH 1-1-62, National Archives of Zambia; 'Address given by President Kaunda at the Annual Local Government Conference'.
[59] 'Note on the S.N.D.P, Some Administrative Problems by V. Subramaniam', 1971, LGH 1/1/62, National Archives of Zambia.

movement'.[60] It was this highly politicised aspect of the provinces that Kenneth Kaunda was seeking to bypass through appointing local councils in which representation was dominated by UNIP representatives. Rakodi also highlights local government as having become a political battleground in which 'struggles against the colour bar' played out.[61] Also relevant here is Kaunda's previous posting as the Minister for Local Government and Social Welfare which might have prompted him to target the hollowing out of provincial government based on his experiences in his previous department. In practice this weakening at provincial level resulted in a disjuncture between what the plans and expectations were in the National Development Plan, and what regional and local government were capable of delivering. Taking housing as an example, where at national level housing numbers and standards were set, there was weak implementation because middle tier authorities lacked political authority and there was a poor connection to planning and housing boards at local level. As Chikulo notes, this ultimately left municipal government lacking power to influence decisions, because 'the major functions… remained with central ministries'.[62] Scholars have also criticised this Act for not bringing about much of a deviation from colonial local government. Despite the intention being that it would represents a change, Hampaway has suggested that it merely 'advocated for adopting the "English Type" of local government.[63] As had been predicted by Gordon Goundrey, the Interregional Advisor at the United Nations, the weakening of the provincial tier of government was eventually seen by many as having been a failure.[64] This perhaps explains why in 1970 Hywell, in Davies's assessment of Zambian town planning, concluded that the Copperbelt Development Plan produced few recommendations for future development' reading 'more like a progress report than a statement of planning strategy'.[65] This was combined with the impact of the transferral of experienced Zambian staff from provincial government to posts in Lusaka,

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[60] G. Macola, '"It Means as If We Are Excluded from the Good Freedom": Thwarted Expectations of Independence in the Luapula Province of Zambia, 1964-6', *The Journal of African History*, 47:1 (2006), p. 45.
[61] Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy', p. 201.
[62] B. C. Chikulo, 'The Zambian Administrative Reforms: An Alternative View', *Public Administration & Development*, 1:1 (January 1981), p. 62.
[63] G. Hampwaye, 'The Limits of Decentralisation in Urban Zambia', *Urban Forum*, 19:4 (November 2008), p. 348.
[64] 'UNATO Expert Planning in Northern Rhodesia; Report No. 3, G. Goundrey', 22 May 1964, MF 1-2-24, National Archives of Zambia.
[65] H. Davies Editorial Note in: Gardiner, *Some Aspects of the Establishment of Towns in Zambia during the Nineteen Twenties and Thirties*, iii.

the rapid promotion of more junior staff and the exodus of 'able manpower' from the system as political and economic uncertainty led to "white flight".[66] This eventually meant that towards the end of the 1960s planning powers at both provincial and local level were severely depleted.

Odendaal *et al.* point to the way in which in Africa urban planning was considered a 'core part' of the national development planning process, yet this statement does not necessarily resonate with the experiences of Zambia.[67] Despite the emphasis of the new government on National planning, the connection between national and land use planning was not well recognised and so the focus was perhaps too much on the central planning role, to the neglect of its peripheral function. The lack of linking between national and spatial planning in the early years of the Kaunda government, sets Zambia apart from other countries on the continent. As Home notes, some countries chose to place significant value on the planning function of government as it 'appeared attractive as a means of taking an inventory of national resources' and 'as one of the tools with which to negotiate a better living environment, and thereby deliver the promise of independent nationhood'.[68] In Senegal for example, land use planning was seen as 'the cornerstone of political intervention' and a 'frame' in which 'popular energies' could be mobilised.[69] By contrast, in Zambia land use planning was seen neither as a political tool nor a tool through which a new economic geography could be mapped out. There was an appreciation of the importance of some manifestations of physical planning, for example large infrastructure planning in order to deliver economic development, and issues of more local importance such as community planning. However it could not or would not centre land use planning within the mechanisms that were key to the delivery of Zambia's economic and social development. Instead it sat side-lined as a hangover from a colonial past, seen as insignificant and neglected by the post-colonial government. Where for example, Senegal had positioned natural resource management and land use at the centre of its national planning programme in an attempt to

[66] 'Report of the Working Party to Review the System of Decentralised Administration.', 2 May 1972, p. 18, LGH 1-5-30, National Archives of Zambia; Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 6.
[67] N. Odendaal, J. Duminy, and D. K. B. Inkoom, 'The Developmentalist Origins and Evolution of Planning Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, C. 1940 to 2010', in C. N. Silva, ed., *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa,* p. 290.
[68] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*, p. 264, 230.
[69] Diouf, 'Senegalese Development; From Mass Mobilisation to Technocratic Elitism.', p. 299.

make a break with the geography of colonialism, Zambia continued to focus on economies and geographies heavily influenced by the British. It could be that this oversight was linked to the rejection of old colonial government structures, but it also might be linked to the historic use of planning as a means of benevolent control of Africans.

These problems ultimately limited the implementation of the national planning framework and delivery of extensive housing programmes. In a discussion regarding an Israeli report on the building construction and housing sector it was highlighted that, merely allocating land and building housing did not constitute the development of communities:

> In solving the "housing problem" it should be emphasized that there is an essential difference between building a group of houses which administratively constitutes a housing scheme and the development of a neighbourhood or environment worthy of the name. Too often a "housing scheme" is considered to be the creation of living accommodation or shelter for the "average family". This approach cannot yield results which will satisfy a dynamic community for a considerable length of time. The unplanned growth and multiplications of urban areas inevitable [sic] leads to intolerable social and economic chaos.[70]

The call therefore was for better town planning and urban design. A lack of skills, however, combined with a systematic underfunding of housing meant that delivery would be difficult. The Hanson report concluded that the major reason why 30-40,000 families were still living in 'squatter' conditions, with numbers increasing annually, was that 'fixed capital investment' had been 5-6% short each year.[71] Therefore whilst there had been pressure for a renewed focus on planning, the long term outlook for both external recruitment and training remained poor.

Despite earlier attempts to find a solution to managing the various tiers of government, there remained issues surrounding the structure and powers of provincial level. In September 1970 a commentary by an officer of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing written in response to the UN Advisor tasked with reviewing the arrangement for Local Government in Zambia. They called for a review of the 'pattern of planning authorities' with a view to widening

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[70] 'File Notes on Israeli Report on Building Construction and Housing Sector in Zambia', 1969, LGH 1-5-28, National Archives of Zambia.

[71] 'Report on Housing Policy in Zambia by D. Hanson', 1 October 1969, p 5-6, LGH 1-5-29, National Archives of Zambia. Though Hanson does not seem to make adequate connections between colonial planning and post-colonial realities.

the 'scope for planning to be done on regional basis with one authority each for Copperbelt, Greater Lusaka, Kabwe and Livingstone'.[72] At this point, Town and Country Planning teams were also to be established at provincial level, with the intention that all planning applications were to be directed through provincial planning offices.[73] The renewed interest in land use planning proved to be too late and inadequate, since by then the planner shortage not just in Zambia but across the continent as a whole had already become dire. Highlighting this regional problem a UN report into the technical and social problems or urbanisation paints a picture of such shortage across Africa speaking of an 'urgency of planning work' which needs to be carried out by African Planners with a better knowledge of local conditions. It identified that 'most planners in the African countries are expatriates', the report called for the need for the training of City and Regional Planners be 'brought to the attention of the ECA [Economic Commission for Africa] for their consideration'. [74] This marks an important moment in the recognition of the importance of local or indigenous skills and perhaps represents the point at which the profession recognised that there needed to be African solutions to African problems.

Planning manpower

As Home notes, colonial town planning legislation had, by the post-World War period, become 'an inadequate technical response to massive pressure for social and political change'.[75] In Northern Rhodesia this was combined with a lack of political will, a shortage of expertise and an inadequate understanding of the needs of the country. The demands placed on Zambia by its first national plans were exacerbated by underfunding combined with the lack of skilled manpower in the planning system as it entered independence. Further pressure had been placed on the service by the somewhat chaotic arrangements left by the Federation, which impacted on the transition of town planning staff to the OSAS scheme. An internal note of December 1965 outlines the organisation of planning under the Federation whereby it transpired that

[72] 'Written Comments on the Greenwood Report'.
[73] 'Letter from Acting Regional Planning Officer to All District Secretaries', 9 October 1970, SP 3/18/7, National Archives of Zambia.
[74] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and German Foundation for Developing Countries, 'Report of the Regional Meeting on Technical and Social Problems of Urbanization with Emphasis on Financing of Housing', 31 January 1969, p. 14, LGH 1-17-6, National Archives of Zambia.
[75] Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa', p. 61.

Northern Rhodesia did not initially have its own town planning staff. Instead, it was reliant upon Southern Rhodesia who managed the planning service for the Federation from Salisbury, under Federation arrangements in which Northern Rhodesia then reimbursed associated costs. As a consequence of this arrangement, when Southern Rhodesia was faced with increased demand, they simply withdrew their staff from Northern Rhodesia. The set-up also had a further implications on the effectiveness of the service since town planners employed by one state were could not hold executive decision making powers in another. In effect they acted in a purely advisory capacity.[76] This situation had eventually prompted Northern Rhodesia in 1958 to set up its own service in Lusaka which resulted in three staff resigning from the Southern Rhodesia service to take up new posts.[77] This was a relatively small number for such a large country.

For Hywell Davis, the failing in the planning service rested on the fact that rapid urban expansion had placed an unprecedented strain on the service. However whilst urban expansion was a contributory factor, it does not consider the fact that before independence the service was already in a fragile state.[78] The arrangements at independence had left the service relatively weak, with a lack of staff capable of delivering projects noted in memo from Minister of Lands and Works. He observed that whilst 'most ministries were short of staff', a number of schemes, including regional plans in Southern, Central and Eastern Provinces 'are already stretching the Water Affairs, Agriculture, Surveys and other departments to near limits'. Recognising the importance of such fields on delivery of National Development Plan projects he warned that 'unless this issue is addressed it will prevent schemes from being carried out'.[79] This situation highlights how planning, like many other professional and technical fields in Zambia, entered into independence in an already disadvantaged position, then went straight into a programme

[76] 'Minutes on Town Planning Aspects of Civil Service, Preparatory Commission's Report by N.D. Watson', 6 November 1952, CO 1015/225, The National Archives, Kew.
[77] 'Summary of Cases of Officials in Zambia Who Have Been Refused Redesignation and Who Are Regarded by This Government as Being "borderline" cases.', December 1965, CO 9/1/9, National Archives of Zambia.
[78] H. Davies Editorial Note in: Gardiner, *Some Aspects of the Establishment of Towns in Zambia during the Nineteen Twenties and Thirties*, p. ii–vii.
[79] 'Staff Shortages, Note for the Minister of Lands and Works. Presented to the Emergency Development Coordination Committee'.

of Zambianization and reform of governance. Under the circumstances this further weakened their skills base.

Figures for staffing levels highlighted just how difficult a task the planning departments faced in localising posts. Problems in the Town and Country Planning Service at local level were evident throughout the 1960s. For instance, in 1962 the service had problems with the recruitment of professional officers despite the posts being advertised 'locally and overseas'.[80] Additional commentary suggests that this struggle to recruit might be because of the general perception that it is 'a technical backwater'.[81] In 1963 and 1964 there was the sense of frustration over issues of manpower and of recruitment, and in the annual report from 1963 the head of the service was resigned to the fact that 'it has now been accepted that recruitment of Chartered Planners for this part of the world outside the attraction of an overseas based agency such as the United Nations is doomed to be a non-starter'.[82] He goes on to discuss his regret that the opportunity to retain area based planning knowledge had been lost:

> It is unfortunate that the wealth of experience, knowledge and goodwill amongst professionals in erstwhile Colonial territories has been dispersed. Had it been possible to create something on the lines of a Commonwealth Civil Service of those personnel who have proven their suitability of approach over many years the overseas technical assistance programmes would have had a better record of success with fully beneficial results to recipient countries.[83]

By this point, of seven professional posts, only four were filled, with only one of these being filled by a Zambian. Of the thirteen technical posts, ten were filled but with only two by 'local staff'; the outlook thus remained bleak.[84] Myles-Wright confirmed the situation in his report which stated that 'at present there is no African in Northern Rhodesia who possesses full professional qualifications'.[85] The same year the head of planning bemoaned the fact that one

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[80] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1962'.
[81] *Ibid*.; Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 35.
[82] 'Annual Report of the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1963' (Lusaka, 1964), Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
[83] 'Annual Report of the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1964' (Lusaka, 1965), Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
[84] 'Staff Shortages, Note for the Minister of Lands and Works. Presented to the Emergency Development Coordination Committee'.
[85] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 5.

single planning officer was on average responsible for a 'region one and a half times the side of the United Kingdom' and this caused significant loss of work time due to travel.[86] Though in 1965 the planning service had seen a minor success in managing to successfully recruit for posts in Kitwe and Ndola with experienced personnel from other parts of Africa, the general staff shortage continued through the 1960s.[87] This respite from what seemed by now to be a perpetual problem of recruitment in the planning service appeared to be to be short lived. In an attempt to ease the staffing problem the government in 1970 had broadened the intake to the planning profession to include economists, sociologists, geographers and architects with planning experience which enabled the service 'to recruit a number of people from various parts of the world'.[88] The problems spilled into the 1970s where there was no let-up in the staffing shortages. The Working Party to review the system of Decentralised Administration noted in 1972 that 'The usual diagnosis of the ills of rural local government is that the councils cannot attract or retain suitable staff (particularly to man their technical departments)'.[89] In addition in its 1978 annual report the Town Planning service noted that only 65% of 'established professional posts' were filled and only 53% of planning officer, or "technical" posts were filled.[90] What is interesting in the staffing figures for the town planning service is that the process of Zambianization did not suffer the same ills as had been seen in the copper mining industry. Where companies had promoted Zambians that were deemed adequately prepared to replace expatriates, it was often the case that the expatriates would be retrenched into alternative, more senior posts.[91] However in planning and likely other government services, the expatriate names disappeared from the staff lists all together.

The dearth of expertise had been recognised in a report by UN consultant Gordon Goundrey in 1967, who painted a bleak outlook for the provinces and for the Office for National Development Planning's ambitions to use provincial authorities to oversee national policies and

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[86] 'Annual Report of the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1964'.
[87] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1965'.
[88] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1970', Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
[89] 'Report of the Working Party to Review the System of Decentralised Administration.', p. 101.
[90] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1978', Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
[91] Burawoy, *The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines: From African Advancement to Zambianization*.

projects. Goundrey felt that the close association of the Office of National Development Planning with the provincial planning organisations was 'highly desirable' but that the shortage of planning staff in the regions and districts was not sufficiently acknowledged by government. He was not optimistic about the situation going forward, arguing that 'the question arises about the availability of skilled people in the quantity necessary. There will almost certainly be an increasing shortage over the next four years'.[92] By the late 1960s it had also become clear that the government structure was not working, as it was considered that there was 'not sufficient manpower to staff provinces and districts with officers of the right calibre'.[93] In response to the lack of manpower, an official working party was appointed in 1968 to 'consider the reorganisation of the service', the work of which concluded in the creation of a new Ministry of Provincial and Local Government.[94]

Problems with the lack of capacity and policy for regional planning continued, and this, along with the headaches surrounding decentralisation were raised in 1974 by the deputy director at the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Whilst the government often reiterated of the role of provincial governments, he stated that in actual fact the government as a whole 'does not at the moment have a national policy for regional planning'.[95] Goundrey had earlier felt that the efforts at the time to formulate regional plans would be stymied because there was 'no immediate machinery in sight for the implementation of such plans'. He went on to add that his resulted in town plans lacking 'context and relativity in both function and/or in socio-economic activity vis-à-vis their region or sub-region'.[96] It seems therefore that rapid reform in the early 1960s, whilst well intentioned, was ill thought out. The attention received by national planning in Central Government drew away funds and skills from the provincial and local tier, which was left trying to implement the national plan with few resources and without being provided with

[92] 'Internal Memorandum from G. Goundrey, the UN Inter Regional Advisor at the Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, to Chief Section for Africa BTAO, UN.'
[93] *Ibid.*
[94] 'Kenneth Kaunda, Quoted in the Report to the Working Party to Review the System of Decentralised Administration.', 2 May 1972, p. 18, LGH 1/5/30, National Archives of Zambia.
[95] 'Letter from Deputy Director at the Ministry of Planning and Finance to Regional Planning Officer at the Department of Town and Country Planning, Ndola', 25 January 1974, NCDP 2/7/12, National Archives of Zambia.
[96] 'Internal Memorandum from G. Goundrey, the UN Inter Regional Advisor at the Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, to Chief Section for Africa BTAO, UN.'

the effective staffing and legislative or executive tools that the task required. Even when technical assistance was put forward for local government, attempts were made to divert this to central government by senior officers in the Zambian government.[97] This inadequate financing of sub-national tiers of government had been acknowledged by Kenneth Kaunda in an address given at the Annual Local Government Conference in 1969. He admitted that local government, and therefore regional and local planning, were low down the list of financial priorities for the government. He went on to concede that 'unfortunately, there are not enough funds to finance all the developments we would like to see in Zambia, and local government has suffered along with other sectors of government in this respect'.[98] For Kaunda, the national development plans and central power lay at the heart of his nation building project, and any function outside of this fell by the wayside.[99]

Rakodi suggests that the Zambian government had spent the first two decades of independence 'see-sawing between centralization for control purposes and decentralization to 'mobilise' local resources needed to implement major development projects.[100] Yet despite the political will to decentralise, and countless attempts to achieve a system that did not burden central ministries with unnecessarily minor issues, by 2007 decentralisation policy had still yet to be effectively implemented.[101] The financial neglect of local government and organisational swings eventually took a further toll on the local planning system. A lack of planning training and courses in Zambia is blamed for the reason why the Zambian Town and Country Planning Service was to 'rely very largely on the engagement of expatriate qualified planners to fill the posts of Planning Officers in the foreseeable [sic] future'[102] This was set against a lack of political will for planning and a general sense of malaise towards planning that had been carried forward from the colonial era. The Chief Planning officer in 1962 lamented the fact that the service had become

[97] 'Recruitment for Zambia, Note of Parliamentary Secretary's Meeting with Mr. S. Wina, Minister of Local Government and Housing, Zambia.'
[98] 'Address given by President Kaunda at the Annual Local Government Conference', 7.
[99] 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1967-1968', 1968, BW 133/4, The National Archives, Kew.
[100] Rakodi, 'Policies and Preoccupations in Rural and Regional Development Planning in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe', p. 135.
[101] Hampwaye, 'The Limits of Decentralisation in Urban Zambia', p. 351.
[102] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1978'.

'synonymous with interference'.[103] Similarly Myles-Wright had observed, the scope of planning was confined to providing 'layout and change of land-use within city boundaries' and that 'officials in other branches of government were not wholly convinced of the usefulness of the town planning service'.[104] What is striking about the second set of provincial government reforms which had taken place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, is that by their own admission, Zambia was implementing a system of local governance which sought to mirror that of the United Kingdom. [105] In the short space of ten years Zambia had managed to reform its system full circle away from and then back to echoing the British planning system, whilst simultaneously damaging its pool of expertise. Rakodi identified this somewhat chaotic administration of spatial planning as one of the main culprits in the undermining of the planning system but did not address institutional factors such as the personnel that might be behind this.[106] However this early lack of government and political interest in spatial planning had a profound impact the situation today, with the UN Habitat reporting that Zambia is amongst a group of African countries in which 'management of urbanization is not prominent' although planner numbers have improved in recent years.[107] This also raises questions as to what extent the polarising demands of external experts pushing against the desire to be seen to depart from the colonial system led Zambia into its initial reforms and then caused it to do the reverse by adjusting its gaze back to its previous metropole.

Planning and the Natural Resources Development College

As highlighted in chapter three, issues surrounding the use of the British education system to assert soft power and instil British norms, values and standards runs throughout this early post-colonial period. One of the legacies of colonialism and the British colonial policy of restricting access to education and entrance into professional and technical jobs was that Zambia entered independence with a highly unskilled workforce. Late colonial governments had come to the

[103] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1962', p. 1.
[104] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 35.
[105] 'Memorandum from the Minister of State to the Permanent Secretary.'
[106] Rakodi, 'Policies and Preoccupations in Rural and Regional Development Planning in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe'.
[107] United Nations, *The State of Planning in Africa – UN-Habitat*, (2014); 'Personal Correspondence with Zambia Institute of Planners.', 1 July 2016.

realisation that attempts to promote development in their colonies saw 'development efforts choke on the bottlenecks they were trying to overcome' for various reasons including 'shortages of skilled labour [and] lack of planning personnel with both local knowledge and technical skill'.[108] Specifically addressing skills and education in Zambia, a 1964 UN report cited the lack of higher level education in Northern Rhodesia as presenting the country 'with its gravest danger on the eve of independence'.[109] Education for all but the children of expatriate officers had been severely neglected under British rule and this was most marked in the number of graduates leaving higher education.[110] Despite a need for educated and professionally trained African planners having been identified as early as the late 1950s, at independence there remained only a small pool of Africans from which planning authorities could draw; a group whose skills were in short supply and severe demand.[111] A further factor was that in order to join the profession a specific degree courses or diploma was required, for which there was no provision in Northern Rhodesia. While this issue had not gone unnoticed by planning teams, it took the report produced by Myles-Wright for the UN Technical Assistance Mission which visited Northern Rhodesia in 1964 to prompt thinking towards providing education in Zambia.[112] The Town and Country Planning Service placed high hopes of the provision of the Natural Resources Development College course alleviating their recruitment problems.[113]

The Natural Resources Development College had been set up in 1964 to provide skilled workers for the agricultural and associated sectors. Modelled on the University of Natal in South Africa, it had a particular remit to draw students 'from local sources' to take up training for two years in order to 'work as Technical Officers in the various Government Departments concerned with rural development'.[114] It appears that from the various reports and meeting minutes, one

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[108] Cooper, 'Possibility and Constraint', 182–183 It is noted here that 'planning personnel' refers to national planning.
[109] Africa and Nations, *Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia*, 91.
[110] 'Zambia Intends to Keep Thousands of Whites in the Top Jobs'.
[111] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia'.
[112] *Ibid.*
[113] 'Annual Report of the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1964'; Beveridge, 'Economic Independence, Indigenization, and the African Businessman'.
[114] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia'; 'Natural Resource Development College Prospectus', 1964, MSS Afr. S. 1176 (1), Bodleian Library Special Collection.

of the key problems faced in terms of its initial establishment was the recruitment of trained and skilled staff. Coverdale detailed quite extensively the problems that the acting head had in securing a suitably skilled member of staff to teach the draughtsmanship and planning course. In 1965 both planning lecturer posts were vacant and this resulted in a global search for suitable staff and deep uncertainty over the future of the course.[115] Coverdale continued to find that recruitment of qualified town planners during the 1960s to teach at the Natural Resource Development College was difficult. He suggested some possible causes for the difficulties in recruitment of staff from the UK, arguing that demand from the British building boom made the likelihood of recruiting from there slim. Even on the basis that the college could offer a salaried post he stated that:

> If you are talking to a College Principal who has two vacancies on his staff, which he is having some extreme difficulty in filling, or to a County Planning Officer, with three draughtsmen short and an ambitious re-planning programme he is being pressed to carry out (probably in connection with slum clearance or modernising communications or some equally overdue project), then you have to work very hard as a salesman to convince these people of the higher priority of Africa's immediate needs.[116]

In addition to this, Coverdale pointed out that Zambia was 'just not operating in a buyers market', and requests for volunteers with a planning qualification or experience were likely to be competing with exciting large scale projects, which had the financial backing to pay higher salaries for skills that were relatively scarce. As he put it:

> even at sub-professional level they are in tremendous demand in Britain today. Cognisance must be taken of the state of the market and of competitive salaries which he candidate can command. Repeatedly I was told that, by comparison with other countries (most of them with less revenue), Zambia is not notably generous.[117]

In June 1965 the VSO were invited to the college by Coverdale with the intention of establishing whether volunteer graduates could be placed in the school to teach.[118] However the VSO was at a distinct disadvantage as British planners could fulfil their desire to take part in a nation

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[115] 'Principal's Report to the College Council, Natural Resources Development College', p. 76.
[116] 'Recruiting for Zambia in the United Kingdom', p. 3.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[118] 'Principal's Report to the College Council, Natural Resources Development College', p. 78; 'Recruiting for Zambia in the United Kingdom'.

building project whilst still receiving a more generous remuneration package through other schemes such as the OSAS. A summary of replies to circulars regarding requests for VSO volunteers, 1962, indicates the following requests for planning volunteers: a volunteer in Basutoland, a graduate to teach land use planning in Swaziland, town planners in Northern Rhodesia though a note beside this says 'money difficult'.[119] The Hansen report also specifically proposes 'foreign volunteers' within the technical section working under the commissioner for housing.[120] Whether these requests converted into filled positions on the ground is unclear. A further explanation as to the absence of volunteers in this area can perhaps be found in the tour report of the VSO which states that volunteers are rarely placed in government because it is 'plagued by bureaucratic and financial difficulties'.[121] Whilst early VSO volunteers had worked as assistant district commissioners, involved in urban development projects such as road building, it is interesting that there was reluctance to engage with the new, independent government.[122] Since planning is predominantly a role which required a significant level of engagement with government, it therefore follows that the VSO would avoid placing volunteers there if they felt it might be bureaucratically difficult. The focus by the VSO on graduates and school leaver recruits could also explain why the enrolment of planners into the programme was not high on the VSO's agenda during this time. A graduate from one of the small number of town planning courses in the UK would not be a fully qualified planner until completing a number of years of on the job professional development, it would seemingly not have been possible for the VSO to supply the technical skills likely required to be an expert in the field through their traditional channels. In addition the demand for planners from Zambia was affected by changes in government focus, as outlined earlier, which saw planning being met with disinterest from central government.

The Coverdale papers reveal little beyond the early struggles to set up the planning and draughtsmanship course. Despite Coverdale having initially secured the services of a seconded

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[119] 'Summary of Replies to Circulars on Service Overseas by Volunteers.', 1 May 1962, FO 371/164560, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966. The National Archives, Kew.
[120] 'Report on Housing Policy in Zambia by D. Hanson'.
[121] Robertson, 'VSO Report on Tour of Zambia'.
[122] Dickson, *A World Elsewhere*, p. 77.

officer from Devon to teach planning, the 1965 Annual Report of the Town and Country Planning Service described the course as being 'beset with problems'.[123] This was mainly due to the failure for overseas instructors to arrive, and it appears that it never really established itself firmly within the curriculum. One reason for this is likely to have been a change in governance at the college since the departure of Coverdale appears to have coincided with the closure of the course. This effectively resulted in the loss of the only planning course in Zambia. A 1970 list of courses available for public administration listed the available at the College, however the draughtsmanship course has a note alongside stating that the course had been discontinued because of 'a change of responsibility'.[124] This is further confirmed in the 1970 annual report of the Planning Service which states the courses at the college had been discontinued and that although plans were afoot for a course at the Zambia Institute of Technology, and that with no course yet at UNZA there were 'no facilities for training planning assistants in the country'.[125]

By 1971 the Town and Country Planning service was lobbying the Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training to introduce a training course for Planning Assistants at the Zambia Institute of Technology, now the Copperbelt University, however they note that 'the results of these discussions were not encouraging'.[126] A later annual report suggested that a course at Kitwe was not commenced until 1975 which would provide a sufficient supply of sub-professionals, suggesting that the duality to the provision of education was still present.[127] By 1978 graduates from the Zambia Institute of Technology were being employed by the planning service, although the Institute did not have a dedicated school of the built environment until 1981.[128] The 1978 annual report also states that a staff member was to transfer from UNZA to the University of Nottingham in order to undertake postgraduate training. This report notes

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123 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1965'.
124 'Compendium of Courses of Instruction Available for the Public Service.' (7 December 1970), LGH 1-17-3, National Archives of Zambia.
125 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1970'.
126 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1971', Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
127 'Report of the Department of Town and Country Planning for the Years 1972-1977', 1978, Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
128 'The Copperbelt University School of the Built Environment', http://www.cbu.edu.zm/index.php/schools/built-environment, accessed 31 July 2016; 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1978'.

that in respect to planning courses 'no further progress has been made on the proposal to set up a course at the University of Zambia'.[129]

What is striking about the state of planning education is that even until the late 1970s there remained a requirement for professional planners to complete their training in the Britain. This suggests that the standards set by expatriate staff over ten years previous, which were benchmarked to British Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) standards, were still in force. This was at a time Zambia was resisting the idea of adopting a new 'foreign model' of general education whilst in the process of 'trying to shed' the foreign model imposed under colonialism.[130] What's more, the Zambian training situation for 'sub professional' planners fared little better.[131] With the unsuccessful attempts to found a planning course at the Natural Resources Development College, the establishment of a course at the Zambia Institute of Technology marks the first point at which African planners could be trained in Zambia. Whilst little is known about the early nature of this course, a lack of appreciation of alternatives to western planning at the time combined with recent moves to create a curriculum suitable to Zambia's needs make it probable that was modelled on courses in Britain.[132] Brock Unte also points to the foundations for higher education in Africa as being heavily influenced by western donors who impose or coerce African countries into adopting specific western-centric education methods.[133] It is therefore not just the effect of colonialism that left the 'formal philosophy and organization of the [African] educational system [remaining] predominantly foreign'.[134] As a consequence, planning education in Africa is left with what Mbembe describes as 'westernized' institutions seeking to emulate Oxbridge, and within which the 'syllabi designed

[129] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1978'.
[130] 'The British Council Zambia, Representatives Annual Report 1974-1975', Zambian Minister for Education quoted in.
[131] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1978', p. 2.
[132] Association of African Planning Schools, 'Conference on Revitalising Planning Education in Africa'; Watson and Agbola, 'Who Will Plan Africa's Cities?'; Watson and Odendaal, 'Changing Planning Education in Africa'.
[133] B. Brock-Utne, *Whose Education For All? : The Recolonization of the African Mind* (New York: Falmer Press, 2000).
[134] K. Namuddu, 'Educational Research Priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa', in G. Miron and K. Sorensen, eds., *Strengthening Educational Research in Developing Countries*, (Paris: IIEP 1991), p. 41.

to meet the needs of colonialism and Apartheid' which continues long after colonial regimes have ended.[135]

Planner standards and Western planner education

As well as providing 'important sources of developing professional expertise and locations for networking', British universities afforded opportunities for Africans to study planning in Britain.[136] As outlined in Chapter three, Africans scholars first began to study at British universities in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite this, options at the time were limited to colonial administration related courses at Oxford, Cambridge and London. By the late 1950's other opportunities had opened up, broadening the scope of education to include technical and professional qualifications.[137] The first course dedicated to the study of southern urbanism in the UK was prompted by the Colonial Office and was established in 1955 by University College London. Named 'Tropical Architecture', it was felt that traditional planning courses 'were not equipped to offer' the necessary skills required for planners operating in different climates and socio-economic settings.[138] Scholarships and bursaries for such courses fell under the Department of Technical Cooperation and its successors, and were considered as forming part of the British Government's technical assistance packages.

Such opportunities to study abroad were enthusiastically embraced by planning teams and future planners in Zambia as Britain was seen as providing a preferential education. Indeed as one UNESCO report observed, 'the status of the European-type baccalaureate or School-Leaving Certificate still looms large in the eyes of the [African] parents, and their desire to send their children to a university in Europe or elsewhere is unabated'.[139] An overseas education was seen as a mechanism by which the new middle class and future planning elites sought to elevate themselves, that is through the acquisition of knowledge and status through knowledge gained

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[135] Mbembé, 'Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive' n.p.
[136] Home, 'Knowledge Networks and Postcolonial Careering', p. 4.
[137] Roberts, 'The Awkward Squad: Arts Graduates from British Tropical Africa before 1940. Unpublished Paper'.
[138] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 216; It is noted that the first South African planning course opened in 1946. See Odendaal, Duminy, and Inkoom, 'The Developmentalist Origins and Evolution of Planning Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, C. 1940 to 2010'; Home, 'Knowledge Networks and Postcolonial Careering'.
[139] UNESCO, *Report on the Needs of Tropical Africa in the Matter of Primary, General Secondary and Technical Education. Provisional Agenda*, 12 August 1960, p. 21.

at British universities. In a note from Zambian government issued by the Minister of Education, details are given of immediate training requirements and issued to a number of missions. It states that:

> It will be necessary to send Zambians to other countries to obtain qualifications for appointment to the following posts… Town Planning Officers: University degree in Town and Country Planning or the Final Examination in Parts i and ii of the Town Planning Institute [RTPI] of London.[140]

There are two interesting elements to this extract. At a time when it was becoming evident that Northern Rhodesia, like the rest of Africa would soon be independent, the standards set for people entering the profession were to be British. Furthermore, these standards were something that could only be achieved through attendance of a course at a British university. Secondly, as had happened in India and Sri Lanka, the course provided by the Natural Resource Development College in the early 1960s was not accredited by the RTPI.[141] So therefore, whilst the British Course was set at degree level, the course provided locally was only as high as diploma level, meaning that to rise above the level of assistant a candidate needed to fund the course and sponsorship to travel abroad. These duel standards were not unique to Zambia. In a letter between United Nations departments in 1964, the term 'intermediate level' was used in respect to the training of 'local nationals' in East Africa. The letter goes on to say that this need for training at intermediate level, along with 'professional' level training, had outlined at a United Nations Addis Ababa workshop on 'urbanization in Africa'.[142] In setting the RTPI accredited qualification as the local standard, those in charge of the Planning Service in Zambia, headed by ex-colonial staff, were effectively granting British universities a monopoly on the training of Zambian planners. Indeed S.V. Ward highlights the value to the British of such professional organisations in in that the 'facilitated international movements of practitioners', and therefore practices, 'within the empire', suggesting that by 1937 ten percent of Town Planning Institute

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[140] 'Note Issued by the Minister of Education, Zambia; Training for the Civil Service', 22 October 1964, OD 20/223, The National Archives, Kew; The Town Planning Institute gained royal charter in 1964, becoming the Royal Town Planning Institute, or RTPI.

[141] 'Annual Report of the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1963'; Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'.

[142] 'Letter from Officer-in-Charge of Housing, Building and Planning, to Chief of Section for Africa. United Nations.', 30 March 1964, P7021.4, University of Liverpool.

members were based overseas.[143] This might suggest that there was the intention amongst expatriate planners in Zambia to ensure that British "standards" defined the planning profession after independence. However the Zambian case also highlights how this allowed Britain to act as gatekeeper in terms of numbers and of quality, maintaining a sense of "privilege" for those few whom were granted the opportunity to study abroad. This evidence of long established 'benchmarking' might offer an alternative timeline to what some describe as a 'recent trend'.[144] Whilst it is not guaranteed that the true motive of the soon-to-be independent planning service was as a soft power move to instil western standards in Zambia, it is remarkably reminiscent of moves made in the 1950s by the Commonwealth Engineers Council which resisted moves by UNESCO because it felt that engineering collaboration should be 'organised along imperial lines'.[145]

The design of the first planning course in Zambia also raises questions about how these experts, and indeed expatriate employees, viewed the future of African planning. For many there was a close tie-in between community development and planning and perhaps this was an attempt to expand its remit beyond just urban centres. Myles-Wright in linking the two attempted to provide a definition of community development, explaining its relevance and how it might be better linked to the formal planning network. He felt that community development was wrapped up on notions of achieving modernity, with a bottom up approach, simple technology and at a slower pace than in urban areas.[146] In his view the disparity between urban and rural lives warranted a completely different approach, however this is just another way of repeating and reinforcing colonial notions of land use and control which saw distinct approaches for urban and rural areas. It is against this backdrop of colonial ideas about African planning that the Natural Resource Development College, which was primarily concerned with agriculture as a means to encourage rural development, was charged with the provision of a planning course. That planning was included suggests that it was understood to be a rural issue, albeit it was to

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[143] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 131. The Town Planning Institute was granted Royal Charter in 1959 and subsequently became the Royal Town Planning Institute.
[144] Odendaal, Duminy, and Inkoom, 'The Developmentalist Origins and Evolution of Planning Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, C. 1940 to 2010', p. 298.
[145] Andersen, 'Internationalism and Engineering in UNESCO during the End Game of Empire 1943-68'.
[146] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 22.

be couched in a very paternalistic way. The Myles-Wright papers suggest that this is the case, which further muddies the line between community development and land use planning. This also highlights a key difference between planning in Britain and planning in Northern Rhodesia at the time.

The skills void and its impact on the planning function.

Because of the lack of courses in Zambia and the requirement for them to be RTPI qualified, the training of planners was much more of a burden to Zambian planning services than it was in other countries. Staff development and education was a prominent issue for the Zambian planning service. It was noted that trainee planners recruited from a particular school had now been sent to universities in the US and the UK, and that two more were expected to be recruited who would shortly thereafter be 'granted bursaries to study for university degrees abroad'.[147] Where a planning service in Britain, America or Australia might be able to recruit qualified graduates direct from their own universities, in Zambia this process involved taking school leavers and sending them overseas, which would hamper any effective change. This logistical problem was noted in the annual report which highlighted that 'it will be seven years before any benefit is felt from these embryo planners, and time within the office can only with difficulty be given by existing personnel to their training', it also noted that it was 'difficult to obtain qualified planners from elsewhere'.[148]

The frequent absence of planners from their posts within the department was also a cause for concern for the service. In 1961 four non-expatriate staff members in the Town and Country Planning Service commenced courses in Britain, Canada and Australia, and in 1962 a further technical assistant was offered a place at a university in Britain.[149] This of course coincided with the initial push for Zambianization within the public sector.[150] In 1978 Zambian planners were also sent overseas to train in Poland, Britain and the Netherlands, and evidence suggests that overseas education was a long term plan these training scholarships were still being provided

[147] 'Town and Country Planning Service Annual Report for the Year 1961' (Lusaka, 1962), Shelf 16 Box 157 Town and Country Planning, National Archives of Zambia.
[148] *Ibid.*
[149] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1962'.
[150] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1970'.

into the 1990s.[151] Other short courses and more generalist administration courses were made available to staff. Cabinet office files at the Zambian National Archives give an indication of who the requests for training or conference leave originated from and where they planned to travel which seems dominated by requests put in by the Commissioner and Acting Commissioner for Town and Country Planning to attend training and conferences across Africa as well as globally.[152] Whilst planning does not feature heavily in the list of courses available, there is a significant weighting towards local government and local public administration courses.[153]

These schemes to send staff overseas for training were not without problems. Frequently it was felt that the wrong staff were being sent and that the courses were not fit for purpose. The 1978 annual report for the Town Planning Service spoke of problems relating to the people being signed up to courses and the retention of staff following education overseas.[154] Waterston succinctly highlights the nature of the problem and its impact across many government departments in the region:

> Frequently, scholarships and fellowships for training abroad are awarded on an ad hoc basis in inappropriate fields or in unsuitable universities or, from the point of view of national interest, to the wrong persons. This often leads to inadequate or improper training of individuals, unnecessarily long absences of key government officials from their jobs, or, where no prior commitment is made to return home for a stipulated period after completion of foreign training, to the emigration of well-trained professionals.[155]

Whilst foreign training was seen as a "quick fix" for planning manpower, it might not necessarily provide the knowledge and skills necessary for work in Zambia. By training overseas, especially in Britain, potential issues arose regarding the nature of relations in the post-colonial world. For example a constant referencing to the Global North might affect ones ability to generate ideas in the Global South. This was recognised as a potential issue relatively early on in post-colonial

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[151] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1978'; 'Brief Note on the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Written by Directorate of Europe, Government of Zambia'.
[152] 'Zambianization in the Public Sector', 1974-1988, CO 2/16/012, National Archives of Zambia.
[153] 'Training Abroad, U.K.', 1967 1967, CO 17/1/6, National Archives of Zambia; 'Technical Assistance and Aid, U.K.', 1967 1965, CO 17/1/7, National Archives of Zambia.
[154] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1978'.
[155] Waterston, *Development Planning*, p. 398.

planning and from the late 1960s onwards there was an acknowledgement that foreign education might not be the most suitable way to tackle the unique characteristics of African countries. This particular concern was voiced at the conference of African Planners in 1967, when the IDEP (Dakar) submitted a report on 'the relevance of its teaching programme to the day-to-day problems of planning in Africa'.[156] Similarly, the report by the UN Mission on Housing, Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia put forward the idea that the shortage of town planning and development skills in Northern Rhodesia might be addressed by seeking advice 'from India or other countries' that had dealt with similar skills shortages.[157] This call for a requirement of planning in Africa to "see from the South" came some forty years before it was picked up on by the academy.[158] James Ferguson has written that academics are often keen to 'serve up post-hoc criticism of failed projects' of the development industry, portraying their frustration at the lack of practical application of theory. [159] However in this case it is the academy which has been slow to acknowledge the failings of planning education whereas in practice the profession was calling for change decades earlier.

The relevance of Global North based planning education to the Global South has now been subjected to extensive critiques by both academics and various professional bodies.[160] However the extent to which foreign education influenced planning practice in Zambia has not been well chartered. For example, Mwimba points to criticism levelled at the revision of the Zambian Town and Country Planning act published in 1995, suggesting that its content was merely based upon the 'British' 1971 Town and Country Planning Act and held 'little relevance to Zambia'.[161]

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156 'Provisional Agenda for the Conference of African Planners. Second Session' (Addis Ababa, 4 December 1967), MF 1-2-126, National Archives of Zambia.

157 Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 29 Although it is also noted that the British author raised concerns that different professional backgrounds might lead to technological confusion.

158 Watson, 'Seeing from the South'; Odendaal, Duminy, and Inkoom, 'The Developmentalist Origins and Evolution of Planning Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, C. 1940 to 2010'; S. Moore, Y. Rydin, and B. Garcia, 'Sustainable City Education: The Pedagogical Challenge of Mobile Knowledge and Situated Learning', *Area*, 47:2 (June 2015), pp. 141–149.

159 Ferguson, 'Anthropology and Its Evil Twin: Development" in the Constitution of a Discipline', p. 165.

160 Odendaal, Duminy, and Inkoom, 'The Developmentalist Origins and Evolution of Planning Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, C. 1940 to 2010'; Watson and Odendaal, 'Changing Planning Education in Africa'; Association of African Planning Schools, 'Conference on Revitalising Planning Education in Africa'.

161 Mwimba, '"We Will Develop without Urban Planning": How Zambia's Urban Planning Practice Is Removing Value from the Development Process', p. 3; Republic of Zambia, *Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act (Cap*

This influence and lack of relevance is no accident, since the British for their part were active in seeking influence through education and it is perhaps in instances like this that this legacy is clearest. Whilst 1995 marked 31 years since independence, it is quite possible that the continuing shortage of Zambian planners, the training of African Planners in Britain, and the continuing influence of senior expatriates in the planning department, might have led to the perpetuation of British planning ideals and practices well into independence. Some 30 years after independence Zambia still looked towards Britain for guidance in respect to how it might plan its urban areas. Chapter five explores some of the ways in which such continuities might still manifest themselves in contemporary practice and in contemporary encounters between the Global North and the Global South.

Technical assistance in early postcolonial planning

Whilst the Town and Country Planning Department Annual reports suggest that most of the existing expatriate staff had been retained at independence, archival evidence referring to planners recruited under the OSAS scheme is scant. However some documents do suggest that Town Planners were recruited through the OSAS scheme to be placed in Zambia. It is clear from the names of senior staff members that the majority of senior positions were held by expatriates whom had been kept on through the various British technical assistance schemes. As it is likely that planners made up a relatively small part of the OSAS pool it is thought that in official reporting documents they were grouped in 'other' categories or within general 'technical' or 'professional' fields which is why there is little mention of them. Of the few occurrences where planners are specifically referred to, in October 1969 a Department for Technical Cooperation memo set out decline in numbers of OSAS staff in Zambia. The total had dropped from 3,255 in Dec 1968 to 3073 in 1969. The Depatment notes that there were seven serving OSAS and associated officers in Town Planning at this time.[162] In an attachment to the 1965 Annual report by the Zambian High Commission in London, a vacancy in the Town Planning department for a draughtsman is listed.[163] The further appendix shows that at the end

283)., 1995; Her Majesty's Government, *Town and Country Planning Act*, 1971 Erroneously described as a British act, in fact this act covers only England and Wales.

[162] 'OSAS/BACS Statistical Staff Return', 13 October 1969, OD 38/50, The National Archives, Kew.

[163] 'Annual Report for the Year 1965. Office of the High Commissioner for the Republic of Zambia.'

of 1964 there were two vacancies for town planners for which the ODM who oversaw the OSAS scheme were trying to recruit, and that by the end of 1965 one of these posts had been filled but that the other post was no longer listed.[164] There is also evidence that the earlier problems of recruiting planners to work in Zambia encountered by Coverdale continued into the 1970s. In 1976 it was noted that in total there were ten supplemented officers across Town and Country Planning departments in Zambia.[165] The general consensus that Zambian local government functions were critically affected by the loss of staff was shared at local level. The quarterly report of the Officer of Provincial Local Government stated that 'the staffing position has continued to deteriorate with further departures of more staff'.[166] By 1975 the general shortage of skilled manpower in local government prompted the establishment of a 'unified local government service'.[167] The Zambian Manpower Review of 1976 also highlighted the problems they had in recruiting Town Planners from overseas for the Ministry of Housing and Local Government to work in the new councils which had recently been created. It was suggested that 'it was already necessary to contract out to private consultants work normally done within the Department' and the report goes on to recommend that the allocation of officers for 1978-79 should be 10, which was higher than the previous years.[168] What is clear, however, is that despite all the talk of Zambianization, the most senior planning posts were held by expatriate planners throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s.[169] This was regardless of the fact that the Zambian government viewed existing planning staff as a hangover from colonial government, whereas they saw international consultants as being 'free from such traits'.[170] This ultimately meant that those who had the means to influence future practice and policy as well as oversee the mentoring of junior staff, were doing so through a lens of western

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[164] *Ibid.*
[165] 'Zambia Manpower Review 1977, Report of a Mission to Zambia. Ministry of Overseas Development', November 1977, BW 91/937, The National Archives, Kew.
[166] 'Southern Province. Quarterly Report, Office of the Provincial Local Government Officer', 4 October 1974, SP 3/3/35, National Archives of Zambia.
[167] Rakodi, 'Urban Plan Preparation in Lusaka', p. 97.
[168] Ministry of Overseas development, 'Zambia Manpower Review 1976', December 1976, FO 371/164560, Foreign Office files, The National Archives, Kew.
[169] 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1965'; 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1970'; 'Report of the Department of Town and Country Planning for the Years 1972-1977'; 'Annual Report for the Town and Country Planning Service for the Year 1978'.
[170] Hywel Davies, Editorial Note, in: Gardiner, *Some Aspects of the Establishment of Towns in Zambia during the Nineteen Twenties and Thirties*, p. v.

planning ideology. A further interesting observation which was made by Hywel Davies, was that even in 1970, large scale projects were being carried out by 'imported international consultants' whereas locally based planners were left to focus on more 'routine tasks'.[171] So the expatriate planners within the planning service merely concerned themselves with small scale mundane tasks rather than grand master-plans. This lends weight to the argument that it was the OSAS and associated staff that had a greater impact on everyday mundane norms, values and standards than their "starchitect" or 'global intelligence corps' contemporaries.[172]

Records relating to the 1980s are limited, and it was only in the mid 2000s that the VSO began its involvement in Zambian planning. The fact that the current planning service is neglected and remains dependent upon expatriates suggests that this trend continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Whilst the outcomes of independence on the planning service mirrored the events in other areas of the public sector, planning in Zambia faired particularly badly. As a consequence the flow of external expertise into Zambia, whilst at some times has been greater other times, has nevertheless remained a constant feature of the public sector landscape and brings in to question how this reliance might have set a path dependency for the Zambian planning service.

Post-independence legislative landscape

As with in many countries across Africa, planning in Zambia remains under-funded, under-staffed and controlled through 'inadequate planning systems, planning laws and building standards' and a 'bureaucratized and inefficient urban land policy'.[173] The shortages of 'qualified and active planners and other built environment professionals' along with the inheritance of colonial models of urban planning is often credited as being a contributing factor in the perpetual failing of African planning systems.[174] Crucially, capacity plays an important role in Zambia's ability to deliver an effective planning function. It is widely acknowledged that sub-

[171] Hywel Davies, Editorial Note in: *Ibid.*, p. iv.
[172] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'; Olds, 'Globalizing Shanghai'.
[173] M. Arouri et al., *Effects of Urbanization on Economic Growth and Human Capital Foration in Africa*, Program on the Global Demography of Aging, Working Paper Series, (September 2014), p. 18.
[174] C. N. Silva, 'Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Role in the Urban Transition', *Cities*, Special Section: Urban Planning in Africa (pp. 155-191), 29:3 (June 2012), p. 155; United Nations, *The State of Planning in Africa – UN-Habitat.*

saharan African lacks capacity both in terms of volume and skills.[175] As of 2011 Zambia has just 0.45 planners per 100,000 population which in comparison to other members of the African Planning Association is low, with only Malawi, Uganda, Mali and Burkina Faso having a lower ratio.[176] It follows that such lack of capacity combined with the involvement of external experts and the slow rate of Zambianization would therefore significantly impacted on planning practice and particularly legislation in Zambia. Whilst scholars do recognise the enduring influence of colonial planning, they do not tend to acknowledge the forces and people in place which influenced the post-independence period. Rakodi and other scholars have traced the way in which planning practice has been influenced by British based planning policy. She observes that whilst it is often the built environment which is portrayed as the key legacy of colonial governance, it will in fact be the 'inherited policy assumptions and administrative structures and procedures will be seen to be at least as important and possibly as enduring'.[177] What these scholars tend to overlook however is the way in which the inherited colonial systems were reinforced through external forces.

Table three in appendix A shows the key legislation enacted in Zambia. Examining the history of legislative changes provides some insight into the extent to which the perpetuation of western norms and standards has influenced planning practice in Zambia. From a legislative point of view, prior to independence planning legislation in Zambia, like many colonies, reflected the Town and Country Planning Acts of England. The 1961 Town and Country Planning Act, which came into force in 1962, saw the consolidation of legislation under one act. This act, coming late on in Zambia's colonial timeline, was 'closely modelled on British town planning legislation of 1947' and for the first time required that development plans be implemented through a development control system.[178] The Act enforced a dual approach to planning in that it was applicable only to urban areas, excluding rural areas which accounted for the vast majority

[175] Silva, 'Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa', June 2012; Odendaal, Duminy, and Inkoom, 'The Developmentalist Origins and Evolution of Planning Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, C. 1940 to 2010'; S. Parnell, E. Pieterse, and V. Watson, 'Planning for Cities in the Global South: A Research Agenda for Sustainable Human Settlements', *Progress in Planning*, 72:2 (2009), pp. 233–241.
[176] United Nations, *The State of Planning in Africa – UN-Habitat.*
[177] Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy', p. 212.
[178] *Ibid.*, p. 201.

of Zambia's land mass. Like other sub-Saharan states, planning changed little in the forty or so years following independence.[179]

The first post-colonial changes to the planning act occurred with the introduction of the 1975 Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act (1975). This act excluded low income urban areas from the Town and Country Planning Act, leaving it applicable only to more formally developed areas of towns and cities instead provisioning for a 'rudimentary form of planning' in low income areas.[180] It meant that in Zambia there were now three systems governing three areas; middle and upper income urban; low income urban and; rural. As Collier and Venables observe, it was regrettable that the building standards inherited by African governments were inappropriate for the levels of income of the population. They note that it did not occur to these governments to change the system 'because in the early 1960s African cities were still small and occupied predominantly by well-paid government officials and expatriates'.[181] In addition, at the time these changes would have occurred, many staff in the planning service would have been educated in Britain, mentored by expatriates and subjected to constant influence by experts from the Global North. The lack of awareness of the population that were being planned for is striking, instead of planning for low income areas they merely excluded it from the system. However given the involvement of expatriate planners and the way in which African planners would have been trained, there is little wonder that thinking on policy deviated little from the norms and standards established by the colonial planners.

By the late 1990s it had become clear that the three tiered planning system was unworkable, with little control over development taking place even where the Town and Country Planning Act was in force.[182] Mwimba highlights the issues facing the government in at independence and in doing so outlines the complexity of the challenges and ongoing policy synergies between

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[179] W. Scholz, P. Robinson, and T. Dayaram, 'Colonial Planning Concept and Post-Colonial Realities: The Influence of British Planning Culture in Tanzania, South Africa and Ghana', in C. N. Silva, ed., *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa*.

[180] Berrisford, 'Revising Spatial Planning Legislation in Zambia', p. 2.

[181] P. Collier and A. J. Venables, *Housing and Urbanization in Africa : Unleashing a Formal Market Process*, (1 November 2013), p. 5.

[182] Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia'; Berrisford, 'Revising Spatial Planning Legislation in Zambia'.

Zambia and the UK.[183] Like in many post-colonial countries, Zambian space remains viewed and measured 'through the canons of western science, and made legible to certain classificatory and regulatory structures'.[184] It is argued in this chapter that whilst these ideas were originally implanted by colonial regimes, it is the enduring involvement of British expertise and training which might account for the extent to which they remain active today.

During more recent attempts to reform planning functions and systems, Zambia remained reliant upon external expertise in bringing about these changes.[185] For example, the first major change to the planning system came in the form of a team from the Swedish International Cooperation Agency (SIDA) which engaged in the process of drafting revised legislation. Similarly the Japanese International Cooperation Agency and the German Technical Cooperation Agency, *(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH)*, have both been involved in urban development and the planning system.

North-South and South-South knowledge transfer.

The decades after independence were dominated by a North-South flow of knowledge, and despite minor attempts to engage with South-South cooperation since then, it is not until recently that the concept has gained significant traction. A fundamental aspect of the VSO's work in Zambia was to assist with the delivery of a new planning policy which was loosely based on South African Integrated Development Plans. Despite a growing interest in South-South cooperation from various supra national organisations such as the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme and OECD, little literature has addressed the issue of the North's role in South-South cooperation. However Abdenur *et al.* point to the use of triangular cooperation as being an effective way of reducing costs and pooling expertise and resources which is not necessarily the case, they also point to less tangible benefits from such arrangements such as the opportunity to engage with southern providers and that it offers Northern donors the opportunity to 'seek to influence the norms and practices of southern

[183] Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia'.
[184] L. Porter, *Unlearning the Colonial Cultures of Planning* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 105.
[185] Berrisford, 'Revising Spatial Planning Legislation in Zambia'.

cooperation providers and recipients alike' or it 'works to sensitise' its preferred norms. [186] One agency which focusses on the role of South-South cooperation is the Norwegian Intergovernmental Authority on Development which uses as one of its tools for delivering effective aid, a network of both external specialists along with local counterparts across a number of ministries. The reason for this is, according to Felix Da Costa, two-fold, firstly, 'it provides a model of large-scale support to rapid capacity development in core government functions', but also the use of regional knowledge 'mitigates the potential for resentment when the norms and practices of Southern cooperation providers experts are brought into capacity-poor environments'. [187]

Because there is no direct involvement of South Africa in terms of technical expertise or finance, it is not technically a form of South-South cooperation. Neither does the use of a South African policy tool dictate that it is a form of triangular cooperation, as this would again be reliant upon either finance or expertise from South Africa. Nevertheless the move does mark an important moment in Zambian planning history. It represents the first time that Zambia has actively sought to significantly model its planning system on a country outside of the Global North, albeit the process still remains reliant upon donor funding received from the Global North.

Conclusion

As Myles-Wright *et al.* noted, 'It appeared to us that some 30 years ago, when land use planning first appeared in the territories, unwise attempts were made to transplant to Africa contemporary British aims and methods that were not relevant'. [188] There is a real sense in Zambia that planning started with the imposition of irrelevant ideas that failed to serve the whole population, was then pushed through by a service that was disregarded by the government of Northern Rhodesia, then being subjected to further political disregard and imposition from western planners in the post-independence period. While current literature on post-colonial planning systems tend to highlight the extent to which they remain a legacy of

[186] A. E. Abdenur and J. M. E. M. Da Fonseca, 'The North's Growing Role in South–South Cooperation: Keeping the Foothold', *Third World Quarterly*, 34:8 (September 2013), p. 1484.
[187] D. Felix Da Costa et al. Policy Brief, *Triangular Co-Operation for Government Capacity Development in South Sudan*, Policy Brief, (April 2013), p. 1.
[188] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 35.

colonialism, it often largely ignores the extent of external influence in the tumultuous period after independence, further disregarding this important period in which external actors continued to exert power.[189] In doing so, current scholarship pays little attention to is how external agencies and actors reasserted notions of western planning.

Despite Njoh suggesting that planning was a deliberate target of new states in some sort of backlash against colonial rule, as this chapter has shown, in the case of Zambia, the dereliction of planning as a core government function was bound not just in a direct attack on the service, but was instead part of a broader struggle relating to political power, financial strain and changes in staff. Independence in Zambia witnessed an upheaval in its skilled workforce, with the loss of permanent colonial staff, their replacement with staff under the OSAS programme, and also the influx of contract experts from multilateral agencies and through bi-lateral exchange. This, combined with political decision making at the time which resulted in significant changes being made to government structures after independence, ultimately weakened Zambia's government function. Land planning, which had been particularly weak at independence, felt the full force of these changes and it appears to have been on the brink of collapse during early independence. The gaps in capacity were filled to a large extent by expatriate staff and external consultants, either through bilateral or multilateral donors. These expatriates and experts operated at a time when the Zambian government expressed conflicting aspirations over the role non-Zambian's played in post-independence Zambia. On the one hand there were desperate attempts to recruit overseas staff, in the form of experts to fill technical and teaching posts, yet on the other hand a programme of 'Zambianization' was being rolled out across government. One of the reasons for this lies in a perfect combination of the demand created by the First National Development Plan which set in place Zambia's reliance on highly skills staff and made provision for expatriate staff, and a the roll out during the 1960s of various British Government initiatives which fulfilled this demand. The situation in the planning service was further compounded by the problems faced in educating planners in Zambia, including the standards set by the planning service which

[189] Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia'.

meant that that only those planners with an overseas education, the wealthy and/or politically connected, would be considered for professional roles. Despite a relatively swift backtrack, measures failed to stymie the loss of skills and to mitigate the damage done to government structures.

The dependence on expatriate staff and international consultants left the planning service in Zambia over reliant upon outside influence, both in terms of expertise, training and, until into the 1970s, senior staff. The consequences of this are seen in the way that Zambia was unable to free itself from colonial notions of urban development. These historic ties today play out in contemporary Zambia through a continuing engagement with external expertise and the way that planning is conceived. Whilst current projects have gone some way to realigning the gaze to incorporate the Global South, it is external donor funding and external expertise that have led these moves rather than ideas being generated within Zambia itself. The next chapter explores the ways in which these ties work to influence the contemporary planning service, and how these conditions and the realities of planning in Zambia, and in turn affect knowledge transfer today.

Chapter 5

Echoes of Empire

Introduction

> When we examine it, ordinary action turns out to be extraordinarily rich. What passes for "ordinary work" in professional-bureaucratic settings is a thickly layered texture of political struggles concerning power and authority, cultural negotiations over identities, and social constructions of the "problems" at hand.[1]

As previous chapters have highlighted, knowledge transfer and the use of technical expertise in Zambian planning have a long history that extends throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods. This chapter focusses on the knowledge transfer process where this occurs in a recent post-colonial setting and offers a different epistemic lens through which to examine the exchange of ideas and knowledge. As Ashcroft *et al.* have argued, 'Every colonial encounter or "contact zone" is different, and each "post-colonial" occasion needs ... to be precisely located and analysed for its specific interplay'.[2] This chapter draws out these contemporary encounters in an attempt to locate them within the broader colonial and post-colonial history of knowledge transfer and technical assistance in Zambia. It does so through the use of primary research gathered from interviews with both volunteer planners and their Zambian counterparts.

Despite an early general reluctance to engage in government structures, the VSO have been involved in governance related projects since its formation in 1958, placing an assistant district commissioner in Barotseland prior to Zambia's independence, and being heavily involved in community development. They currently have volunteers across Africa involved in programmes ranging from health, education and governance.[3] The planning aspect of the VSO's involvement in Zambia ended in 2016 and as such the scope of the VSO's current programme in Zambia appears to be limited to health education. As outlined in chapters three and four, the planning

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[1] J. Forester, 'On Fieldwork in a Habermasian Way: Critical Ethnography and The Extra-Ordinary Character of Ordinary Professional Work', in M. Alvesson and H. Willmott, eds., *Studying Management Critically*, (London: Sage, 2003), p. 48.
[2] B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, and H. Tiffin, *Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies*, p. 190.
[3] Dickson, *A World Elsewhere*; Voluntary Service Overseas; *Annual Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ending 31 March 2016*, 2016.

system in Zambia has been under resourced and low on the priorities of both the colonial and independent governments. It has, until recently, remained largely modelled on the colonial system even to the extent of retaining separate frameworks for urban and customary land. Planning has also remained reliant upon external expertise, through British technical assistance, multilateral donor funded experts and also through more recent bi-lateral projects. It is also against a backdrop of a continuous outside influence in the panning system that the VSO volunteers operate in Zambia today. The project emerged out of a mid-2000s recognition that Zambia was in dire need of overhauling its planning system. The Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA) funded group had already been involved in the Zambian urban development sector since 1997 and they were commissioned in 2007 to review the existing planning system.[4] Out of this review emerged the Urban and Regional Planning Bill of 2010. This proposed a number of changes to the system including; the replacement of the current housing and planning acts; the incorporation of urban and customary land within the remit of the same planning system; a universal approach to formal and informal development; integrated development plans; decentralisation of planning powers to local councils; and; increasing public involvement in the planning process and implement new integrated development plans.[5] Faced with a monumental shift in the planning system alongside a 'chronic shortage of town planners', it was realised that effective implementation of the changes would be dependent upon an increase in the capacity of local planning departments.[6] Already having had two planners in Zambia working on similar projects, the VSO were approached in 2010 to provide more volunteer planners. The VSO was asked specifically to set up a programme which would see the placement of volunteer planners in local authorities with the objective of providing 'on the job training' through skill transferral, as well as assisting with the formulation of local Integrated Development Plans.[7] This would enable the skills to be in place when the

[4] Berrisford, 'Revising Spatial Planning Legislation in Zambia'.
[5] Cockhead and Hemalatha, 'Sharing Planning Skills Across Borders: International Volunteers Helping Build Planning Capacity in Zambia', p. 303.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 296–297.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 313.

Urban and Regional Planning Act was enacted in 2015, with it technically coming into force in 2016.[8]

The volunteer planners came from a range of mid to mature career backgrounds and were placed either 'short-term (one to six months) or long-term (up to two years)'.[9] Located in various government levels across Zambia, ranging from municipal councils to central government, their remit ranged from hard transfer such as plan development, to soft transfer including procedural skills. Though strictly classed as "volunteers", the present day VSO planners, like the early VSO volunteers, were paid a local salary to cover accommodation and subsistence costs. The volunteers were recruited on the expectation that the change in planning legislation would have been implemented by the time the research interviews took place, however delays in the passing of acts at central government level mean that this was not the case. As such the volunteers operated during a period of legislative uncertainty which significantly impacted on their experiences. A total of 20 planners had been placed in Zambia over the course of the programme, three of whom were in country at the time of research, 17 of whom were from the Global North and three from the Global South (Uganda, China and India).[10] Ethics clearance for the research was granted in April 2015.

This chapter engages with debates in literature on knowledge transfer and African planning. It considers the implication of planning histories on contemporary planning and knowledge transfer through the examination of current working practices between volunteer planners and their counterparts. Through examining the experiences of actors, it also details how the everyday realities of knowledge transfer differs from project and participants expectations. It begins by outlining the theoretical issues associated with interview methodology before going on to examine the material gathered in the interviews. The data is then presented within six

[8] Republic of Zambia, *The Urban and Regional Planning Act, No. 3 of 2015, 23*, 2015.
[9] P. Cockhead, 'Sharing Planning Skills in Zambia', *Scottish Planner*, December 2014, p. 13, http://www.rtpi.org.uk/media/1199364/scottish_planner__160_final.pdf, accessed 2 October 2016.
[10] Cockhead and Hemalatha, 'Sharing Planning Skills Across Borders: International Volunteers Helping Build Planning Capacity in Zambia'.

themes which highlight how culture, history and messy actualities of planning practice affect the way in which knowledge and skills are transferred in everyday practice.

As Vanessa Watson suggests, interviews provide, a 'deep situational understanding [which] is essential input to new problems and circumstances'. For Watson, 'rich' accounts of planning practice are crucial in helping planners to appreciate various contextual circumstances and 'the extent to which there are sufficient points of similarity' in order that they can assess its usefulness to a particular case.[11] This chapter builds on existing planning knowledge transfer literature to answer the call of Healey, Stone and Harris and Moore who suggest that the study of contemporary knowledge transfer should be better grounded in history.[12] In doing so it offers a greater appreciation of the factors that inform contemporary planning practice.[13] This interpretive study involved the interviewing of volunteers, along with "local" staff (counterparts), who had worked or were working alongside the VSO volunteers. The interviews enable an understanding of the experiences faced by volunteers and their counterparts prior to, during, and after the volunteer period. Multiple layers of the VSO hierarchy were engaged with the VSO project, both within the VSO organisation itself and also in terms of "local staff". The numbers of staff at each level, were limited, which adds weight to the use of the case study approach. By interviewing both parties the dynamics and characteristics of the relationships between actors and the mechanisms by which knowledge is transferred is established. Following meetings during a preliminary pilot study which took place in November 2014, approval for the study was given by the VSO's Country Director in Zambia. As the research required the interviewing of local staff and volunteers embedded within local government and therefore by definition, employees, permission also had to be acquired from the Acting Director of Physical Planning and Housing. Volunteers were contacted via the VSO who provided the names and contact details of past and present volunteers, and local, or Zambian staff, were contacted by

[11] Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning*, p. 9.
[12] Healey, 'The Universal and the Contingent'; Healey, 'Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques'; Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', February 1999; Harris and Moore, 'Planning Histories and Practices of Circulating Urban Knowledge'.
[13] Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa'.

individually approaching local authorities where volunteers had been placed. The authorities were geographically dispersed and included both isolated and relatively central urban areas.

Methodology

The purpose of the in depth interviews was to draw out the everyday experiences and practices of the various actors, in order to assess the extent to which soft transfer, as defined by Stone, occurs in the post-colonial setting.[14] In doing this, the chapter uncovers not just the networks, relationships and interactions that underpin the process of knowledge transfer, but also helps provide an understanding of how knowledge transfer might be influenced by the colonial underpinnings of planning, development and government in Zambia. The interviews conducted as part of this research help generate an understanding of some of the experiences beyond what might be interpreted from corporate and government sanctioned narratives. Whilst on one level it could also be argued that the interviewees hold positions where they can influence and record their views through reports and policy formulation, and in some cases they have blogged about their experiences online, to some extent however, these voices may have been limited to the "official record" of organisational reporting.[15]

Although a small number of the interviewees were in the position of discussing their present, everyday experience, the majority were required to recall historical events which offered a more reflective analysis of their experiences. Whilst the interviews in the most part centre on events in the recent past, this does not necessarily mean that memory might serve as much more accurate since as Thompson suggests, memory loss 'during the first nine months is as great as that during the next thirty-four years'.[16] Memory can also be subject to self-censorship, as Passerini suggests there are subjective ways in which the recall of memories takes place, arguing that there is a 'psychological dimension which allows us to stress the subjective element in memory, including the un-said, the implicit [and] the imaginary'.[17] This censorship can occur in conscious or unconscious ways, for example painful memories might be repressed by the

[14] Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', February 1999.
[15] 'Volunteering in Zambia', http://volunteeringinzambia.blogspot.com/, accessed 24 April 2016; M. Fox, 'Letter from Kabwe'.
[16] P. Thompson, *Voice of the Past: Oral History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 131.
[17] Quoted in K. Figlio, 'Oral History and the Unconscious', *History Workshop*, 26 (1988), p. 128.

narrator, life histories can be 'constructed' in order to fashion scattered recollections into a 'useable past' for the audience.[18] For Thompson, memory is also dependent upon our own understanding of it and that 'in order to learn something, we have first to comprehend it'.[19] Having access to those considering the present as well as those remembering the past allows for a multidimensional examination of the way in which programmes were perceived by those involved directly with its implementation.

Certain viewpoints are forged from the past, from ones social and political background and through life experiences. These can affect how the interviewer approaches a particular topic. Friedmann observed that planners find it easier to relate to those with a familiarity with the practice of planning and the regularly occurring terms and this leads to advantages where a balance of status and knowledge can be achieved.[20] There are also practical reasons for having a balance of knowledge. Schoenberger for example, draws attention to the importance of a well-informed interviewer, suggesting that this offers the interviewee reassurance of the investigators understanding, leading to a greater level of openness and a willingness to let the interviewer lead the conversation. She further suggests that professional or expert knowledge of a subject allows the interviewer to 'assess the accuracy of the information they are being given'.[21] However, disagreeing with this viewpoint McDowell questions whether a researcher in a corporate interview 'is able to establish quite the degree of control' suggested by Schoenberger.[22] Interviewing technical and professional staff also presents challenges to a knowledgeable interviewer because of the assumptions made about such knowledge, and Schoenberger, McDowell and Court all note that this positionality can be accompanied by the constant demand to continuously validate oneself by reaffirming ones knowledge.[23] As Mcdowell points out

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[18] A. Green and K. Troup, *The Houses of History: A Critical Reader in Twentieth-Century History and Theory*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 234; R. Grele, 'Listen to Their Voices: Two Case Studies in the Interpretation of Oral History Interviews', *Oral History*, 7:1 (1979), p. 41.
[19] Thompson, *Voice of the Past*, p. 129.
[20] Friedmann, *Re-Tracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning.*, p. 175.
[21] E. Schoenberger, 'The Corporate Interview as a Research Method in Economic Geography', *The Professional Geographer*, 43:2 (May 1991), p. 186.
[22] L. McDowell, 'Valid Games? A Response to Erica Schoenberger', *Professional Geographer*, 44:2 (May 1992), p. 213.
[23] Schoenberger, 'The Corporate Interview as a Research Method in Economic Geography', p. 186; L. McDowell and G. Court, 'Performing Work: Bodily Representations in Merchant Banks', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 12:6 (December 1994), pp. 727–750.

however, an interviewer must also carefully select the information about themselves, their expertise, values and beliefs and be mindful of how they present these to the interviewee.[24] Whilst the interviewer was professionally equal to the interviewees, there was also an asymmetry in the levels of knowledge of the particular geographical location that they were discussing. However this was also set against a backdrop of colonial and post-colonial history that adds a further dimension to the interactions between the (British) interviewer and the Zambian interviewees.

The author's position as an external "expert" planner from the Global North might impact on the way in which encounters between the interviewer and counterparts might have been burdened with certain pre-prescribed expectations. At the same time the majority of interviewees were young, highly educated, middle class experts in their professional field. Scholarly work surrounding the interviewing of "elites" provides a rich seam of literature that addresses the power dynamics that emerge from the process of researching the views and experiences of such experts. Since the purpose of the study is to engage with experts, both local and international, Schoenberger's theory was particularly instructive. Schoenberger highlights how this difference might play out in the process of interviewing, by noting that the preoccupation of anthropologists with the 'perceived risk… that the interviewer will exert excessive control over the respondent, distorting the information obtained *due to* the unequal power relations'[their emphasis], pointing to the fact that this dynamic might not necessarily apply to interviews with elites.[25] Winchester further challenges the general discourse in human geography that suggests interviewers are more powerful than their subjects. She highlights how 'unequal' relations can hinder access to 'target groups' and interview structures, but argues that this notion is grounded in historical social sciences whereby the 'gaze has been often directed "down" toward the poor and disadvantaged' seeing interview subjects as 'merely as sources of data-gathering in the furtherance of their academic career'.[26]

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[24] L. McDowell, 'Elites in the City of London: Some Methodological Considerations', *Environment and Planning A*, 30:12 (December 1998), pp. 2133–2146.
[25] Schoenberger, 'Self-Criticism and Self-Awareness in Research', p. 217.
[26] Winchester, 'Ethical Issues in Interviewing as a Research Method in Human Geography', 122.

Taking these considerations into account, what follows is an analysis of ten interviews, comprising of four volunteers and six counterparts, conducted between September 2015 and July 2016. Interviewees were selected according to those whom had the most recent experience of the project or were in country at the time. Whilst all the interviewees were planning professionals, their paths into the profession varied greatly. This is particularly the case for the Zambian planners, some of whom had followed less traditional paths into the profession. This diversity of origin, particularly amongst the Zambian staff, facilitated varied and insightful discussions surrounding the purpose of planning and their role in Zambia's development. As is detailed below, the findings have been grouped thematically under motivations, culture, knowledge transfer, knowledge production and personal legacies. In doing so, it highlights the continuities and divergences between contemporary knowledge transfer and historic technical assistance.

The draw to volunteering; motives, morals and money.

Understanding the motivations and backgrounds of the volunteers allows us to consider how these impact on the way in which relationships manifested themselves. These in turn affected the manner in which knowledge transfer occurred. One commonality amongst the volunteers, is that all those from the Global North had spent extended periods travelling overseas, something that the volunteers chose to raise themselves. In highlighting this in particular, volunteers were keen to relate their experiences of overseas travelling as a reason for their engagement with the project, perhaps feeling that this made them more suitable for the role. Michael particularly stood out more than the others in this respect.[27] Well-travelled, his career had been 'on and off for fourteen years', but he had still managed to return to the planning field, albeit in various different capacities.[28] His career trajectory had been interspersed with periods of overseas travel, though these trips were not necessarily undertaken with the aim of building his planning skills and knowledge nor did it previously include volunteering. Beyond this, two broad themes emerged as key rationales for volunteering: philanthropic and; personal,

[27] Michael is a volunteer planner. Educated in the Global North he has held a number of positions, requiring a broad range of skills over a period of around 20 years in local government. As well as professional experience, he has also spent a considerable amount of time abroad travelling.
[28] Michael, Interviewed by the author, October 2015.

that is either for professional development or for financial benefit. Whilst most of the volunteers exhibited motives from both themes, they each fell more definitively within one group or another.

Almost all the volunteers expressed motivations that stemmed from an ideological or philanthropic desire to meaningfully contribute to the development of the Global South. Mary had a background in volunteering and had previously spent time volunteering in the Global South.[29] For Anna, someone who expressed a sensitive, engaged and thoughtful approach to her placement, there was clearly a philanthropic motive in her choice to volunteer.[30] However, out of all the volunteers, Michael was generally the most sceptical of aid. While he had long been interested in volunteering, he recognised the difficulty in placing himself in the role, that he felt he made a positive contribution rather than say the more traditional unskilled volunteer routes. Recognising the inherent difficulty at the heart of the VSO and conscious of his own positionality, he suggested that he wanted to do volunteering in a meaningful way that did not involve 'the kind of paternalistic, going in, telling the [Zambian's] what they want', but was not sure whether he could 'contribute anything' through traditional volunteer agencies. Michael chose the VSO specifically because he agreed with what he perceived as the level of agency afforded to recipient organisations, in this case the way in which the volunteers were requested by Zambian authorities. His interest in the VSO project was rooted in a concern over the imposition of knowledge, and highlighted how he particularly agreed with the set-up of the VSO project. For him, that the host country had a significant degree of agency in the selection process was important as it 'seemed to me a much better way than I perceived aid, which is just throwing money at the problem and recipients holding their hands out for it'.[31] It was important that the country and actors in the process had actively sought out assistance, rather than being passive recipients. Whilst this supports the notion put forward by Holzinger and Knill, that

[29] Volunteer Mary came into planning via community development and has a keen interest in working with deprived communities. In possession of a broad range of technical skills, her interest lies the way planning connects design to quality of life. Mary had previously spent a number of years overseas.
[30] Clearly accomplished and dedicated to her profession, Anna went into planning from a related undergraduate degree before working in a local authority for a number of years. She had a number of years' experience in development management and had an interest in volunteering with the VSO for a substantial period before the opportunity to take a career break arose.
[31] Michael, Interviewed by the author.

recipients have a degree of choice in where and what they select, in the development and aid sector this might rarely be the case.[32] Furthermore, as discussed later in this chapter, 'path dependency' can have a strong influence on a recipient's ability to rationally pick policies and expertise.[33]

Volunteering was conceptualised by some from a "personal development" perspective, which they hoped would lead them into a development career. This notion was echoed by a number of the VSO volunteers. Andrew's motives for taking part in the programme were predominantly grounded in a desire to progress his career in terms of 'skills and knowledge and experience' but 'also to have international experience'.[34] He was specifically keen to acquire international experience and recalled that 'under VSO arrangement you are required outside your country and I wanted to have that kind of exposure by going to other countries to see how that worked… to have that kind of international exposure'.[35] What also emerged from the interview was that Andrew's motives also lay partly in the financial benefits of being a volunteer. He revealed that there was more money to be made by working as a volunteer in Zambia than as a fully salaried professional planner in his own country. This was reiterated by Michael who observed: 'I notice it's more and more African and Asian volunteers, but this is a job for them. So they're often keeping their home country allowance in that country to keep the family going and save the money here'.[36] Being a western volunteer therefore, offers certain privileges, as the volunteer in this case has the opportunity to forgo a salary for a period of one or two years without it having an adverse effect on broader family life. The volunteers from elsewhere in the Global South might not be afforded the luxury of career breaks.

Mary seemed compassionate and perceptive, with sensitivity and awareness of "volunteerism", she held a desire to apply her knowledge to 'developing countries' hoping that her experiences in Zambia would lead to a broader career in community and international development. She

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[32] Holzinger and Knill, 'Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence'.
[33] Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 'Neoliberal Urbanism', p. 50.
[34] A qualified planner, Andrew originated from was trained in and practiced in a different African country prior to volunteering for a VSO position. He worked at a provincial office in rural Zambia.
[35] Andrew, Interviewed by the author, October 2015.
[36] Michael, Interviewed by the author.

described how the VSO programme was an opportunity 'to get my feet wet in "third world" countries', suggesting that this might be the first step in a development career, a position which was affirmed by her subsequent desire to feed her experiences into subsequent research.[37] While for Anna, the placement was an opportunity to do something different, at this stage, she did not necessarily have the intention of pursuing a career in planning. Having spent a number of years in the same role it seemed that she worried about 'leaving her career behind', with the placement offering her the opportunity to combine overseas living with a different life experience whilst also maintaining or enhancing her planning skillset.[38]

As Hilton *et al.* have demonstrated, careerism within the NGO sector is not new, nor is it restricted to the VSO or technical assistance roles. Whilst focussing their interest largely on the elites of the NGO world, they traced the trajectories of the careers of a number of individuals across projects. They specifically point to the fact that entry into the international development field is often driven by values and beliefs, but that that sector can also be seen as an 'arena for a life's work' with people moving between different organisations in the sector.[39] The careerism spoken of by the volunteers has parallels with 'global intelligence corps', the literature on which identifies the phenomenon of expert individuals or teams moving globally to build up a 'repertoire' of skills gained from previous cases.[40] This also resonates with the argument put forward by Sanyal, who has highlighted the recent attention that cross cultural or geographical knowledge has been given by academic institutions. He suggests that that unlike the 'moral undertone' that accompanied the Peace Corps, the global outlook of these experts is led by 'self-interest in the sense that it calls for knowledge of others so one can do good business in a globalised and interconnected world'.[41] In this respect there are both advantages and disadvantages to engaging in career volunteering or operating as a "career expert" to facilitate the implementation of a particular policy or organisational change. While the inflow of new actors may have a positive effect on overall knowledge, it could also lead to the stymying of the

[37] Mary, Interviewed by the author, July 2016.
[38] Anna, Interviewed by the author, October 2015.
[39] Hilton, McKay, and Mouhot, *The Politics of Expertise*, p. 56.
[40] Rapoport, 'Globalising Sustainable Urbanism'; Olds, 'Globalizing Shanghai'; Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'; Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning*, p. 8.
[41] Sanyal, 'Similarity of Difference? What to Emphasize Now for Effective Planning Practice', p. 342.

production and use of local knowledge. Conversely, "career experts" might have developed a specific skill set that focusses on the needs and characteristics of the countries where development organisations work which can be advantageous to host countries. It is also of note that one of the "career" volunteers was originally from the Global South which speaks to the issue of South-South knowledge transfer discussed later in this chapter, but also highlights how opportunities have opened up in the NGO sector for South-South careerism. Michael discussed this aspect which he had some across within the broader volunteer community:

> They often see it as a step up to UNV [United Nations Volunteers] or "A.N. Other" aid agency that pays proper money. There they don't see themselves as volunteers, it's a step up in the career, whereas European volunteers, whilst some see it as a way into development work, but I guess there is more a sense of it being voluntary.[42]

Although Michael is suggesting here that motives are defined by the geographic origins of the volunteer, and thus implying that there were socio-economic drivers, literature has shown that the origins of the actor might not necessarily be relevant when it comes to the acquisition of knowledge as a factor for mobilisation. This theme of professionalization has been explored by a number of scholars.[43] For Lewis and Kanji, the multi-faceted nature of development organisations and the way in which they can 'transcend categories' are seen as key to their power. He argues that they 'can sometimes display a dual character', as they alternate between 'theoretical and activist discourses, between identities of public and private, professionalism and amateurishness, market and non-market values, radicalism and pluralism and modernity and tradition'.[44] The experiences of the volunteer who had mobilised himself within the Global South supports Lewis and Kanji's assertion that they tapped into both a dual professionality occupying a multifaceted post that encompasses that of planning. However this also shows that he is engaging with the development profession, as well as holding moral and monetary motives, amongst perhaps others.

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[42] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[43] Hilton, McKay, and Mouhot, *The Politics of Expertise*; T. Yarrow, 'Paired Opposites Dualism in Development and Anthropology', *Critique of Anthropology*, 28:4 (December 2008), pp. 426–445; R. Hammami, 'NGOs the Professionalisation of Politics', *Race & Class*, 37:2 (October 1995), pp. 51–63; D. Lewis and Kanji, N. , *Non-Governmental Organizations and Development*, (London: Routledge, 2009).
[44] Lewis and Kanji, *Non-Governmental Organizations and Development*, p. 44.

Staff shortages and the everyday mundane

> These people aren't sat around waiting for the VSO to come along, they're… really, really busy and there can be a bit of an inconvenience. [45]

The everyday mundane nature of an "office" environment, for example the lack of facilitates and poor bureaucratic support, hampered efforts to transfer knowledge. These failures were not only limited to "red tape" but also seen in the failure to address capacity such as staff shortages. One of the main hurdles in conducting interviews with the Zambian counterparts was the low numbers of staff and their rate of turnover within departments. From a methodological perspective, one of the consequences of the situation resulted in difficulties in speaking with staff that had direct experience of working alongside volunteers, as they had often moved on to another authority, government department or into the private sector.[46] This stems not from a particular government scheme but from the simple fact that as during the early postcolonial period "elites" in Zambia are in high demand. At one council, for example, volunteers had been placed in the municipality for a number of consecutive years with the last one leaving three years previous. However, upon the interviewer's arrival it transpired that the only reference for one of the staff members to the time the volunteers had spent there, was that they had only recently come across a plan with a 'British' name on it.[47] Whilst from a research point of view this could be seen as problematic, it was incredibly revealing about the knowledge transfer process, as when an individual leaves, whether volunteer or counterpart, any knowledge might leave with them. It suggests that, even if knowledge transfer had worked between individuals, institutionally it was not embedded and it could leave little, if any legacy to speak of. This highlights the problematic nature of elite mobility in two ways; consultant or volunteer mobility and; recipient or counterpart mobility. In the first instance, the consultant or volunteer is in post for a limited time and might not be there when plans come to fruition. Rapoport has observed the way that institutional learning occurs in the private sector. In her examples, where governments have brought in highly paid consultants they might be more driven to implement

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[45] Anna, Interviewed by the author.

[46] The mobility of African experts in not unique to planning, and has previously been highlighted by Berkman. See Berkman, *Technical Assistance in Africa : How It Works, and Doesn't Work*.

[47] Patience came into planning having started working in an administrative position in Local Government, before being promoted to the planning department and latterly to the director of planning in a municipal council. Patience, Interviewed by the author, September 2015.

or continue their work, or have the financial capacity to retain recipients of knowledge in post until that knowledge is embedded.[48] In the more financially pressurised development sector, if a group of counterparts are either lacking, less engaged, have fewer skills and limited agency in the knowledge transfer process, then the continuation of a project is unlikely to happen. Whilst the situation might vary under different circumstances and when applied to a development and volunteer perspective, other scholars have demonstrated that elite mobility is an issue that is not only confined to the international development sphere. McNeill, K. Ward and McCann discuss the nature of the travelling expert and suggest that these 'global intelligence corps' of 'mediators' advise before 'moving on to their next urban government client'.[49] The second issue arises where there is the mobility of qualified staff from department to department or to different geographical locations within the same organisation. Whilst Rapoport highlights the operational difficulties this can cause in the private sector, Berkman suggests that such working arrangements are problematic from an international development perspective.[50] He identifies that in general, technical assistance projects had too great a focus on 'policies, strategies, and physical aspects' of technical assistance that are accompanied by a failure to consider the sustainability of the project by acknowledging the 'ability of the indigenous workforce to achieve project objectives'. Berkman also suggests that one of the failings of technical assistance lies in the fact that although experts are 'well qualified to carry out their job assignments', they struggle when in post due to their 'limited prior experience in developing countries'.[51]

The emphasis placed on the need for previous experience of development work speaks to the circulatory nature of planning professionals in the colonial and early post-colonial era. This also resonates with British perceptions at independence, that they would be better equipped than other developed countries to provide support, due to their history of providing technical assistance in the colonial period.[52] Furthermore, this idea that technical assistance should come

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[48] Rapoport, 'Globalising Sustainable Urbanism'.
[49] McNeill, 'Airports, Territoriality, and Urban Governance', 148; K. Ward and E. J. McCann, 'Introduction. Cities Assembled: Space, Neoliberalism, (Re)territorialising, an Comparison', in E. J. McCann and K. Ward, eds., *Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the Global Age*, p. 178.
[50] Rapoport, 'Mobilizing Sustainable Urbanism'; Berkman, *Technical Assistance in Africa : How It Works, and Doesn't Work*, 2.
[51] Berkman, *Technical Assistance in Africa : How It Works, and Doesn't Work*, p. 2.
[52] 'Speech given by Mr Vorsper to the International Conference on Human Skills in the Decade of Development'.

from those with experience on the ground explains why those who had spent time in the colonial service went on to secure high paid jobs in the development industry in the 1960s and 1970s.[53] However unlike in the instances raised by Rapoport and Berkman, where external consultant are brought in to deal with conceptual work and leave implementation to the permanent staff, in the VSO project the volunteers played a slightly different role from the usual expert advisor in that they were brought in to facilitate the roll out of policy.[54] In addition, whilst some had no experience of working in the Global South, others did. The VSO project therefore both confirms to the historic characteristics of development projects, whilst also responding to the growing trend in recognising a need for area based expertise. The way that the VSO operates, as a facilitator of policy roll out, also exposed the programme to the more mundane and sometimes problematic nature of everyday practices of local planning departments. In this case the lack of skills, resources and staff reduce the volunteers to operating in a "crisis management" role.

As chapter four demonstrated, this issue of staff shortages is not a new characteristic of the Zambian government, nor is it an issue limited to planning. Recent work by Mulungushi has highlighted that low staff numbers and capacity have directly impacted on Zambian local governments' ability to deliver on policies, a scene which Scholtz *et al.* suggest mirrors the capacity problems facing countries elsewhere on the continent.[55] The situation is however improving. According to the UN, in 2011 there were estimated to be 60 town planners in Zambia, but the Zambian Institute of Planners confirmed that as of June 2016 there were 205 'fully registered planners' with more awaiting registration.[56] However, regardless of the number of registered planners, some departments are so poorly staffed that in cases there were only

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[53] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 126.

[54] Although the initial review of the Zambian planning framework and recommendations for change had been carried out by international consultants funded by the Swedish Development Agency. See P. Cockhead and M. C. Hemalatha, 'Sharing Planning Skills across Borders: International Volunteers Helping Build Planning Capacity in Zambia', (presented at the Town and Country Planning Education: Retrospect and Prospect, University of Mysore, 2014).

[55] Mulungushi, 'Policy Development and Implementation in the Post-Liberalization Era in Zambia (1990s and beyond)'; Scholz, Robinson, and Dayaram, 'Colonial Planning Concept and Post-Colonial Realities: The Influence of British Planning Culture in Tanzania, South Africa and Ghana'.

[56] This excludes Technician members, honorary members, honorary fellows and associate members; United Nations, *The State of Planning in Africa – UN-Habitat*; 'Personal Correspondence with Zambia Institute of Planners.'

three out of thirteen staff in post at one provincial authority. In addition, at one point during the VSO programme a further province went down from five staff out of ten, to just three – a manager, one planner and the volunteer.[57] Again echoing the early post-colonial experiences of Zambia, these problems were further compounded due to staff absence whilst they attended university in order to gain a planning qualification. Therefore even if technically there was a planner in post, they would likely be absent for long periods of block study. This particular issue was mentioned as a contributing factor by both volunteers and local staff, and has been historically linked to the 'allowance culture' introduced to Zambia by NGOs.[58] So whilst there have clearly been attempts over the last few years to further improve the numbers of planners and professionalise their roles, there is still some ground to make up the shortfall in skills and numbers.[59]

A major policy impetus for the further professionalization of planners in Zambia is the Urban and Regional Planners Act of 2011. As one volunteer suggested, the new act requires that there be a minimum of two physical planners trained to meet the new planning institute requirements, and felt that in their view, Zambia would struggle to acquire sufficient numbers of trained planners.[60] Striking in respect to the staff numbers and calls to "professionalise", is how this situation resonates with calls in the 1960s to increase the numbers of, and skills, amongst African planning staff in Zambia. This is taking place against a backdrop of changes to planner education which is witnessing a roll out of a revised guidance for the education sector which seeks to realign planner education to cover topics more relevant to the Global South.[61] In the case of the VSO project however, the volunteers often took it upon themselves to fill the gap in skills. This was more of an organic shift rather than representing a change in the overall project aims. Improvements to planning and development are not restricted in scope to policy

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[57] Alfred, Interviewed by the author, September 2015; Emily, Interviewed by the author, September 2015.
[58] Anna, Interviewed by the author; Emily, Interviewed by the author; Cockhead and Hemalatha, 'Sharing Planning Skills across Borders: International Volunteers Helping Build Planning Capacity in Zambia', 10.
[59] Republic of Zambia, *The Urban and Regional Planners Act, 2011*, 2011; Republic of Zambia, *The Urban and Regional Planning Act, No. 3 of 2015, 23*.
[60] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[61] The VSO has also been involved in the roll out of the revised curriculum in Zambia. See Cockhead and Hemalatha, 'Sharing Planning Skills across Borders: International Volunteers Helping Build Planning Capacity in Zambia'; Association of African Planning Schools, 'Conference on Revitalising Planning Education in Africa'.

changes or what happens on development sites, but also speak to the everyday goings on behind the scenes. Poor instructional and bureaucratic support along with a lack of coherent thinking has a major detrimental effect on what work gets completed and what does not. This can be demotivating for volunteers, who witness a mismatch between their skills and objectives of the programme and the institutions capacity to deliver them.

Colliding cultures and conflicting values

Everyday office encounters were an area in which volunteers felt that there were notable cultural differences. While one volunteer felt that this had been raised at their training prior to travelling to Zambia, it appears as a real and live issue in many interviews. Despite important attention being given to issues of cultural sensitivity, in general they felt that more emphasis was placed on sensitivity, adaptability and 'mental robustness' than suitability in terms of skills. In other words, the VSO were keen to engage the services of those who were mentally robust rather than those who necessarily had the technical 'know-how'.[62] However despite the selection process and the UK based training provided by the VSO, the volunteers expressed how they still felt unprepared for some cultural elements of the placement. Anna in particular felt that there were cultural divides she was unable to overcome, feeling that the VSO did not provide much support or training in how to deal with them. In her words; 'I'm not someone who can't build relationships with people but you can't force it on people'.[63] EuroAmerican volunteers also described working in Zambia as generally being 'quite chaotic' and 'quite disorganised' due to staffing problems, and the nature of, and limited available funds which resulted in politically driven 'snap' decisions on spending and departmental focus.[64] As a consequence, two of the volunteers felt that the disorganised nature of the workload and 'lack of planning' limited their ability to perform the job since they would turn up to a meeting but the other attendees had been sent out into the field on short notice.[65] It was also pointed out by another volunteer that these problems were not limited to either planning departments or local government and that in fact it perhaps was the 'Zambian way of doing things', said in a way that acknowledged the

[62] Michael, Interviewed by the author; Lester, 'Imperial Circuits and Networks'.
[63] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[64] Michael, Interviewed by the author; Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[65] Anna, Interviewed by the author; Michael, Interviewed by the author.

difference without making judgement as to whether one 'way' was preferable to the other.[66] Michael also noted that the training fell short of the type of language training offered by the Peace Corps and whilst this may not affect so much the work being carried out in urban centres, he felt that the language barrier perhaps limited the relationships that could be built with colleagues through 'office banter'.[67] In a similar vein one Zambian planner highlighted the difficulties that volunteers had in fitting into Zambian culture '[The volunteer] found it hard to adapt to our traditions and cultures. In the end there was no interaction with staff members, just reports produced. No interaction at all'.[68]

Anna also picked up on an interesting thread relating to her experiences of working in a male dominated environment. She felt that her experience differed from others because of her gender, pointing out that 'all my physical planning counterparts were men and, yeah, I thought that was going to be difficult and I did find it difficult. It would have been nice just to have one female counterpart just to balance it out a bit'.[69] Whilst the gender balance of planning professionals in Zambia is no different from elsewhere, with female planners holding senior positions, just as the Global North struggles to overcome decades of prejudice, so too has Zambia. This speaks to the way in which planning in Zambia, and indeed globally, has been historically dominated by high powered men. Comparing her experiences to that of other volunteers, Anna went further:

> that's another thing, the volunteer I followed was the same age as them, they could drink and watch football with them and I was thinking that it's something I could never do. In Zambian culture men and women are not friends, or if they are it's not [socially] acceptable.[70]

Similarly Mary felt that her gender posed challenges, particularly in relation to the workplace. She felt that gender may have played a role in the way her colleagues approached her, that they challenged her status by not attending meetings and by giving her the impression that her ideas

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[66] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[67] Although the official language in Zambia is English, there are a number of indigenous languages, though almost 80% of the population speak Bemba, Nyanja or Tonga.
[68] Francis, Interviewed by the author, September 2015.
[69] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[70] *Ibid.*

'weren't really taken seriously'.[71] This perhaps taps into an interesting power contradiction in respect to female volunteers. On the one hand Anna arrives in Zambia as an expert, yet she also occupies a gender positionality which might in the view of some, counter or undermine her status as expert. Anna also suggested that there was a general unease towards her from the male counterparts because she was unmarried and childless and so did not fit the classic gender stereotype: 'uneasiness as to why I was there, what's she doing here? Why is she in Zambia and not back in the UK having children'.[72] There is a sense she felt let down by their unwillingness to respect her values norms and standards when she had gone to such lengths to understand theirs. However this also suggests that she expects some level of reciprocity in the learning and exchange of values, and this sits uncomfortably when paired alongside a knowledge transfer activity in which knowledge flows in a singular direction.

Watson positions ethics at the centre of planning values, and these emerged as an area in which cultural differences played out.[73] Anna came from a development management background and was quite disappointed at the lack of interest in enforcement and development management. She described a 'lackadaisical' approach to the planning process, and how she felt that officers could not 'get their head about the process'. This frustration extended to the general public's respect of the planning process, describing how at one monthly planning meeting just one application was received where she acknowledged that in actual fact far more development was taking place 'they're just flinging things up left right and centre, even the council are building things and not getting permission'.[74] Similarly Mary discussed a lack of cognition in the way in which planning should be carried out.[75] Here, Anna and Mary make assumptions in respect to the aspirations and direction of town planning in Zambia, which largely ignores the fact that such an approach holds little relevance to actual existing realities or aspirations. As Watson and Agbola note, in Zimbabwe, urban plans 'assumed an orderly and law-abiding population that was willing to comply with zoning and building laws designed for middle-income, mostly

[71] Mary, Interviewed by the author.
[72] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[73] V. Watson, 'Conflicting Rationalities: Implications for Planning Theory and Ethics', *Planning Theory & Practice*, 4:4 (December 2003), pp. 395–407.
[74] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[75] Mary, Interviewed by the author.

European, car-owning and formally employed families'. They point out that 'the realities of land occupation in the city bore no resemblance to official imaginings' long before there was an institutional recognition of a need to change.[76] The suggestion Anna proposed to this problem was a more active programme of enforcement, such as the removal of unlawful buildings, though as Peattie highlighted some decades ago, in Africa such stringent enforcement has a detrimental impact on overall living conditions.[77] These issues also resonate with the observation by Healey and others that even where planners recognise the limitations of the 'linear development pathway' they 'often failed (and still fail) to notice the assumptions built into their ideas about particular techniques and organisational forms'.[78] Anna seemed aware of the situational differences between Britain and Zambia, but struggled to come up with an alternative approach to dealing with unlawful development.

Some volunteers held what they considered as certain "necessary" social justice based planning values, which they felt was lacking in their Zambian counterparts. This raises questions as to whether these values are, or should be, universal and points to the desire for western planners to universalise their experience/views because they are inherently "better". Campbell defines social justice as 'striving towards a more equal distribution of resources among social groups across the space of cities and of nations', but acknowledges that in practice this means balancing the three spheres of sustainable development in order to achieve such social justice. He offers the notion that planners face the difficult task of balancing 'three conflicting interests' of social, environmental and economic forces, and suggests that it is often issues of environmental and social justice which have to give way in order to achieve economic development.[79] However Escobar writes that planning was born out of the desire to tackle social problems and that it 'embodies the belief that social change can be engineered and directed, produced at will', yet as he subsequently notes, planning has a 'dark side' which manifests itself in the domination of

[76] Watson and Agbola, 'Who Will Plan Africa's Cities?'; Watson and Odendaal, 'Changing Planning Education in Africa'.
[77] Peattie, *Thinking About Development*.
[78] Healey, 'Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques', p. 1513.
[79] S. Campbell, 'Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities?: Urban Planning and the Contradictions of Sustainable Development', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 62:3 (September 1996), p. 298, 308.

'governable subjects'.[80] In addition, morals and principles relating to social justice which are forged in one place, might not necessarily resonate with societies elsewhere. As Escobar has argued, development is a discourse which is essential to planners, elites and scientists whereas planning seeks to impose a 'reality' which 'is certainly not that of the peasants'.[81] Similarly Lee and Smith suggest that morals are a social construction of a particular place, time and society, and that these might not translate across geographies or societies. At the same time however, they acknowledge that custom and culture might not be justifications for certain practices, such as the exclusion of women from public life, which they see as universally immoral.[82] For Winkler and Duminy whilst there has recently been an increased focus on knowledge production including the way cities are perceived in the Global South, little attention has been given to the 'normativity of planning values' that underpin epistemological reasoning.[83] In the context of Zambia, as with other countries in the Global South, the accepted principals of planning as defined in the Global North, that is balancing economic, social and environmental issues, might not fit. It might instead be more seen as more appropriate to consider first the immediate economic needs of the community before any broader issues of environmental protection. This ethical dilemma, whilst not specifically defined as such by the volunteers was certainly evident in the way they described problems and events that occurred during their placement. These divisions were also evident between the expert planners themselves. Watson argues that these 'seemingly irreconcilable gaps' between communities, groups or between experts and the planned, with 'no obvious hope of constructing dialogue or reaching consensus', and the interviews suggests that there exists a lack of consensus where planners from the Global North work alongside those from the Global South.[84]

The volunteers' attempts to connect counterparts, that is the Zambian planners, to broader theoretical notions and principles of planning also raises questions regarding an expert's ability

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[80] Escobar, 'Planning', p. 145, 147.
[81] *Ibid.*, p. 153.
[82] R. Lee and D. M. Smith, eds., *Geographies and Moralities: International Perspectives on Development, Justice and Place*, (Malden: Blackwell, 2004).
[83] T. Winkler and J. Duminy, 'Planning to Change the World? Questioning the Normative Ethics of Planning theories', *Planning Theory*, 15:2 (September 2014), p. 3.
[84] V. Watson, 'Deep Difference: Diversity, Planning and Ethics', *Planning Theory*, 5:1 (March 2006), p. 32.

to gain and share knowledge with other individuals through networks. These individual actors or organisations often move within epistemic communities. Influenced by Flecks 'thought collective', Haas defined epistemic communities as 'a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge'.[85] This is not to say that a community sits in isolation from others; they overlap and collide on many different levels. In the case of the volunteers interviewed in this study, they might simultaneously be located in an epistemic community derived from the planning role, but also occupy space within the development expert community. Similarly their counterparts might occupy the same planning based epistemic community but also other knowledge based communities of which the volunteers are not part of. This relates closely to the work of Robinson, who like Amin and Graham, recognises cities as places where 'many different overlapping networks of association and interaction come together', which simultaneously leads to 'interaction' but also 'fragmentation'.[86]

Scholars have sought to highlight the merits of epistemic communities in knowledge transfer and the importance of networking in the field of planning.[87] Such networking and the introduction to broader thinking also emerged as a theme in a number of the counterpart interviews. Francis for instance, was generally resistant to the idea that the volunteer bought value to the organisation.[88] Nevertheless he did appreciate the way that the volunteer helped him connect 'to a few experts in my profession', helping him 'to network with other Zambians and overseas engineers…'.[89] In doing this, the volunteer was attempting to network Zambian planners into the epistemic communities which might be of practical benefit to their

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[85] P. M. Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', *International Organization*, 46:1 (Winter 1992), p. 3.
[86] Robinson, *Ordinary Cities*, p. 172; A. Amin and S. Graham, 'The Ordinary City', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 22:4 (December 1997), pp. 411–429.
[87] Ward, 'Policies in Motion and Place: The Case of Business Improvement Districts'; Rapoport, 'Globalising Sustainable Urbanism'; Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'; Harris and Moore, 'Planning Histories and Practices of Circulating Urban Knowledge'; Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', (February 1999); Stone, 'Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the "transnationalization" of Policy'; Holzinger and Knill, 'Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence'.
[88] Originally from rural Zambia, Francis started his career as an engineer for a metropolitan council before moving to the private sector for number of years. On completion of his higher education he moved back to his home town to work for the municipal council in housing and roads.
[89] Francis, Interviewed by the author.

counterpart. However this move is also laden with meaning surrounding the value of knowledge. For this counterpart the broadening of their outlook is defined by the ability to tap into knowledge from elsewhere. In one sense, this reinforces the notion that epistemic communities that include international experts adds "value" to the knowledge of external expertise. However whilst such networks are key to the planning profession, they can also lead to the perpetuation of an asymmetrical flow of knowledge from one place to another.

Many Zambian staff reflected not just on the knowledge the volunteers brought with them but also the way they worked and this emerged in Angela's interview.[90] Reflecting on the differences between volunteers from the Global North and volunteers from the Global South, she noted that the volunteer was 'very focussed on [their] work' and that they really wanted to change things.[91] Similarly another Zambian manger suggested that one of the skills the volunteer passed on was the ability to work 'more efficiently and faster'.[92] This continuous reference to a certain work ethic might reflect not the origins of the volunteer, but the fact a volunteer might be naturally more motivated. Reflecting on the general nature of the work one counterpart noted this enthusiasm:

> if [the volunteer] comes into work and [they] find maybe [they] has nothing to do or [they] haven't been given anything [so they]would ask around... "are we going in the field"…. "what are we doing today?". In that way we were encouraged most of the time to give [them] work. [They] wanted most of the time [to] be working rather than waiting for something to happen. [93]

Elaborating further, a manager at another authority noted that:

> In a way they were different. The way they approached work and the other things surrounding work was in my own opinion different to the VSO we have now, the dedication to duty, ability to carry out assignments. I would say that maybe that's what makes a difference between developed and developing. that is, how one applies oneself to work.[94]

[90] Angela started work as a community officer before moving into planning as a registry clerk following the closure of the community department. Angela has no formal planning background and seems somewhat disappointed in her current role.
[91] Angela, Interviewed by the author, September 2015.
[92] Emily, Interviewed by the author.
[93] Richard, Interviewed by the author, October 2015.
[94] Alfred, Interviewed by the author.

The self-reflection in this statement is evident, and the manner in which the interviewees start to make comparisons between what they perceived to be developed and developing, speaks to a range of postcolonial and developmentalism concerns. Here the counterpart attempts to compartmentalise development as merely the western way of doing things. From the perspective of the volunteers, the issue of efficiency loomed largely in the interviews. One volunteer suggested that the work they had done in Zambia could have been done in a fraction of the time if it had been possible to work at a pace she was accustomed to. Similarly, others also found the pace slow. These views are also representative of a single African country, whereas Andrew noted that there were key differences between sub-Saharan countries. Notably he observed that the work ethic in Zambia differed from another central African country, and for him 'the context the work character, ethics and whatever are faster than in Zambia'.[95] The counterpart that looked towards Britain as a model for doing things, ascribing positive aspects to the British practices and standards, ignored the fact pointed out by Andrew, that they might equally find positive practice happening on the same continent.

Actual existing Knowledge Transfer

There is an overwhelming sense that the volunteer planners brought with them an enthusiasm for not just the process of planning but also for the process of knowledge transfer itself. Craggs *et al.* highlight the value of such volunteer enthusiasm within the planning process, albeit they acknowledge the way in which this must be balanced with a professional outlook.[96] However the presence of such enthusiasm also confirms Friedmann's suggestion that planners from 'presumptively more developed countries to those still undergoing a process of "development"' are 'fairly optimistic about transferring planning practice'.[97] Despite this enthusiasm, the pressures caused by staffing problems also inevitably impacted on the nature of the work the volunteers could do, and the way in which knowledge was transferred. This was compounded further by the way in which VSO volunteers are employed. Whilst the volunteers are placed by the VSO, they are paid directly by the councils and are considered to be, as one counterpart put

[95] Andrew, Interviewed by the author.
[96] Craggs, Geoghegan, and Neate, 'Managing Enthusiasm'.
[97] Friedmann, 'Crossing Borders: Do Planning Ideas Travel?', p. 313.

it, 'our officers'.[98] As a consequence, many volunteers were left unclear as to their role and found that they were fulfilling standard tasks to ensure the continued running of the department as opposed to affecting change or transferring knowledge. One volunteer stated that 'practically you're also another pair of hands because it's so understaffed you end up doing rather than advising'.[99] Whilst another highlighted this as a problem raised with the VSO – 'we are coming in as advisors, but practically what happens is that we are more of a back filling', meaning that they were doing the everyday grafting as opposed to consulting. This volunteer also noted that the placement of volunteers depended upon where staffing issues were most acute; indicating that this severely affected their ability to transfer knowledge.[100] This also had an impact on the level of knowledge transfer, with one volunteer commenting that 'we are improving the system but we are playing more roles because it's more of a gap filling than advisory' and that they try to 'concentrate on what advice you can offer but you also become part of the system'. [101] To attempt some form of knowledge transfer, despite these barriers, Anna took on the role of educator with the local staff, whereby instead of doing the work, or diverting local staff to her own project, she took the time to work through the counterparts workload with them to advise on best practice and efficiency. [102] Similarly Michael noted his role had involved more basic office systems setup suggesting that the skills they brought were 'analytical, organisational and procedural skills that are useful in terms of the advice we give'.[103] This was also noted by counterparts, as one local manager also observed, the experience the volunteer brought did not just rest in their planning knowledge but in 'office issues' such as efficiency and database management.[104]

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[98] Alfred, Interviewed by the author.
[99] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[100] Andrew, Interviewed by the author.
[101] *Ibid.*
[102] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[103] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[104] Emily works in management at provincial level. Initially wanting to go into finance, planning was not her first career choice, but as her finance course was oversubscribed she was transferred to planning. Having started her career in a senior role, she moved around between the public and private sectors before being promoted to a management position in a provincial office. Emily, Interviewed by the author.

Whilst some local staff appreciated the relief from everyday pressures that this adaptation brought about, others, such as Alfred, were aware that this approach was far from ideal.[105] Alfred saw himself as a passive cipher and suggested that 'they are just involved in the work we are doing. Now for us to really get the knowledge, that they have that they have come with, it has been quite difficult get that knowledge'.[106] Similarly Emily questioned the role the volunteer occupied, and how this related to skills and knowledge transfer as the volunteer 'was supposed to be an advisor but found it difficult to get into that work. There is a question regarding the point at which advising stops and fulfilling a staff function starts'.[107] The implication here is that this is not the optimal way to transfer knowledge, and that in some cases questions regarding the adaptability of the volunteer left confusion in some departments. This clearly is as a consequence of the low staff levels in which volunteers were to some extent forced into adopting a particular role. This had the additional effect of creating a further barrier beyond the gap-filling role that volunteers adopt. The arrangement becomes particularly stark where VSO volunteers are operating alongside the GIZ programme which according to interviewees, had stricter boundaries in respect to what their staff can and cannot do. [108] This resonates with Anna's experiences of feeling as though she was a burden to her counterparts. The hesitation and reflection on the difference between the role of the various volunteers emphasises Angela's uncertainty about their remit and how her role as a manager fitted in with this.[109] The usefulness of the volunteers in the early stages of their placements was also raised by one volunteer who stated that they had 'been in place for six months and I only just feel I know enough now to really start to focus on what I think I can best deliver or help deliver improvements' 'what you ideally want to do is to give more than you get back. I don't think I've achieved much in the first six months….'.[110] This is representative of a learning curve for any new position and might

[105] Alfred worked as a planning manager for a local authority in Zambia. Sponsored by the government to study administration at Copperbelt University, he worked in a number of ministries before he eventually developed an interest in planning through friends he knew who worked in the field.
[106] Alfred, Interviewed by the author.
[107] Emily, Interviewed by the author.
[108] Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, is a German organisation currently working on a project to improve service delivery through, amongst other things, the role out of Geographical Information Systems. They have had teams in a number of councils across Zambia.
[109] Angela, Interviewed by the author.
[110] Michael, Interviewed by the author.

explain why the VSO place so much emphasis on selecting people who had the personal characteristics to stay in placement for the duration of their contract. Again this echoes some of the "right sort" rhetoric articulated by early VSO pioneers.[111]

It is clear from many of the interviews that most volunteers managed to capitalise on the lack of brief, and higher up the organisational structure there seemed to be a recognition that this was taking place. There was also an appreciation of the contribution volunteers could make. It was noted by one volunteer that when a director from the ministry came to visit the authority, he had said that 'the nice thing about the VSO is that they get on and do things, whereas GIZ won't do anything, they just advise', thus suggesting that senior officers were more enthusiastic of generalists over experts.[112] Zambian counterparts, however, felt that there was a disjuncture between the brief and the work. In some instances this prevented volunteers from being placed in specific posts. For instance, even though there had been an identified need and institutional enthusiasm for a volunteer, one local manager complained that there was a lack of guidelines to stipulate what the volunteer should and should not be doing, and felt that 'the separation between advising and performing staff roles could have been better'.[113] Emily, voiced hesitation towards this way of working but also recognised that it made her job easier because the volunteer fitted easily into the structure of the department and they 'didn't need to ask them' to do something.[114] Similarly, another counterpart highlighted the lack of clear guidelines given to recipient organisations in respect to the scope of their job remit, and that 'when the VSO comes they are involved in the work we do as an office'.[115] Not every volunteer adopted this generalist role, and even then, this was subject to criticisms from their Zambian counterparts, with one suggesting that 'there was no integration, nor was there fulfilling of staff roles as in the other authorities. [The volunteer] was set very far away from the day to day running of the department'.[116] In this particular case, the volunteer was criticised for not making the shift from providing technical knowledge transfer to the softer, more generalist skills transfer. A level of

[111] Dickson, *A World Elsewhere*, p. 17.
[112] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[113] Alfred, Interviewed by the author; Emily, Interviewed by the author.
[114] Emily, Interviewed by the author.
[115] Alfred, Interviewed by the author.
[116] Francis, Interviewed by the author.

hostility was also evident through the views of one counterpart, who was quite negative about a particular volunteer and expressed regret that they had worked alongside them but had not been able to provide the expertise and knowledge transfer they felt they needed.[117] This again suggests a passiveness to their role in the process. This view however is countered by Mary's more positive placement experience, during which she had worked alongside a counterpart who was enthusiastic about the programme. This indicates that different experiences and expectations create difficulty in generalising about role and usefulness of volunteers and highlights how the overall complexity of the relationships and nature of the work involved. This complexity is not unusual, indeed McCann and Larner have identified how actual existing policy transfer is characterised not by a neat transferral of knowledge through slick programmes but by 'mundane practices' resulting in 'messy actualities'.[118] For the planners in Zambia, they dealt with the messy actuality of Zambian planning by adapting their role to suite what they felt the needs of the organisations were.

A prominent thread that ran through all the interviews conducted was the disjuncture between the expectations of the local staff, The Ministry and volunteers. In particular, the need for the provision of Geographical Information System (GIS) systems and training was a continuing theme across a number of interviews. As Michael described:

> it transpired that they wanted a GIS specialists and planners are not a GIS specialist. You use it, often we learn on the job, but when you get here and open up GIS and there is no base map there is no aerial photography, there is nothing, so you're pulling photocopied tiles of topo[graphical] maps. I mean I'd never even heard of a Geo-reference so you have to physically pull them into a location.[119]

Similarly from a counterpart perspective:

> We were consulted and gave recommendations as to what was required. The recommendations were not necessarily met since we asked for GIS but these were sent to the provincial office as we didn't have a GIS system in place at the time. So we were left with [someone with no GIS experience].[120]

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[117] Richard, Interviewed by the author.
[118] McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities', 5; Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality', p. 14.
[119] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[120] Richard, Interviewed by the author.

This lack of alignment between expectations only enhanced the impression that knowledge transfer from North to South perhaps was not happening in the way that either the volunteers or the local staff envisaged, and that Michael was attempting to fulfil a role he was not qualified for. The failure seems not therefore necessarily because of a failure of the individuals involved, but of a failure to align expectations. As Home notes, in speaking of Indore, India, Patrick Geddes suggested that a 'town planner fails unless he can become something of a miracle worker to the people'.[121] Just as colonial planners were expected to perform such "miracles", the local staff held similar expectations that a "white saviour" would be able to solve long term physical infrastructures over their short tenure in post. Similarly the volunteers expressed frustration at the lack of change they could make. For Mary, the brief was unclear and she felt that the VSO and the counterparts were not clear on what they expected from the placement, and that she was seen as 'a temporary fixture' that would be detached from the main running of the department. In the end she worked on a few projects which they had identified, but tried to do so in a way that would empower them to continue with the work after she'd left, to, as she described, 'own the process rather than having everything told to them'.[122] It was also evident that where it was not possible to provide a generic level of advice the volunteers struggled to transfer skills and knowledge. This was particularly evident in the case of Anna, where she faced difficulties on account of absent or uninterested counterparts. When asked whether she felt that knowledge transfer had occurred, Anna felt that it had 'a little bit' and that 'some things were helpful'.[123] There is a sense from the interview that her particular role made her dependent on those around her, and that this affected her ability to be productive.

Even if volunteers do work in a role where they are in a position to share knowledge, if there is not a counterpart to share that knowledge with, then meaningful knowledge transfer is unlikely to happen. This issue mirrors a problem, which characterised the early years of the OSAS scheme (as discussed in chapter three) where it was felt that one of its failings was that experts

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[121] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*, p. 167.
[122] Mary, Interviewed by the author.
[123] Anna, Interviewed by the author.

were sent in but no skills were being transferred due to a lack of counterpart.[124] As a consequence this becomes a barrier to effective knowledge transfer in two ways. First it was found to be particularly disorientating for the volunteers who would, in their initial settling in period, be reliant upon them for gaining local knowledge. Second, if no counterpart is present, then knowledge transfer cannot occur. Even where there was a counterpart the volunteers were not always met with enthusiasm, with one volunteer, Anna, noting that she thought that the counterpart 'would be more receptive to the VSO's involvement'. She observed that there was resistance caused by a lack of capacity, suggesting that in her experience 'they're not doing the work and you turn up and tell them how to do it, how to improve it [and] they're a bit like "urgh, someone coming in to tell us how to do it"'. She describes how she had expected that the local authority had requested a volunteer, but that when they got there they found that the local staff were hostile to her presence. This manifested itself in avoidance of the volunteer and attempts at contact, or challenges, lack of motivation 'with no real enthusiasm for physical planning or really most of the time to actually do their jobs'.[125] For Mary, expectations differed in that Zambians seemed to expect her to take on a passive role which was disconnected from the everyday practice of the department whereas her expectations were that she would be imparting knowledge on everyday practice. For Wards and McCann 'embeddedness in particular institutional and political contexts' defines the effectiveness of knowledge transfer, but both Mary and Anna came up against a lack of commitment and engagement from institutional sense.[126]

In considering the way actors themselves engaged in the knowledge transfer process, Rapoport suggests that where counterparts or recipients are active in the process of seeking solutions, that 'external ideas are more likely to gain purchase'.[127] In Anna's case, there was little hope that counterparts would show any real enthusiasm for knowledge transfer if they are disenfranchised

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[124] This idea has also been examined by Berkman in: Berkman, *Technical Assistance in Africa : How It Works, and Doesn't Work*.
[125] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[126] Ward, 'Policies in Motion and Place: The Case of Business Improvement Districts', p. 75.
[127] J. Robinson, 'The Spaces of Circulating Knowledge; City Strategies and Global Urban Governability', in E. J. McCann and K. Ward, eds., *Mobile Urbanism: Cities and Policymaking in the Global Age*, p. 30.

and uninterested in their jobs. However there are also dissimilarities between the volunteers experiences and the experience of those working in contemporary international private practice. Rapoport suggests that in private practice, unlike in the development aid industry, or indeed colonialism, clients have actively sought practitioners and have a degree of agency where they 'get to decide which of the many options presented to them make sense for their project'.[128] This ability to 'pick and choose' their advisors as well as the policies they propose, might lead to a more effective process of knowledge transfer in these situations.[129] S.V. Ward corroborates this theory, noting that 'without meaningful involvement from local professionals or political actors, the impacts… could be limited'.[130] In the case of the VSO programme in Zambia, whilst at a senior level, management had engaged with the programme, this enthusiasm and agency in some cases had not filtered down to the officers who were left managing the process of knowledge transfer. This in turn resulted in 'appropriations, deflections and challenges'.[131] Again this mirrors project and programme experiences elsewhere and connects engagement with the issues surrounding capacity discussed earlier. In examining project implementation in Ghana, Scholz *et al.* and Inkoom highlight how engagement at lower levels of an organisation are important, citing limited capacities on the organisation's 'lower level' often 'suffer implementation problems because of ignorance of content by stakeholders, apathy and a lack of commitment among others'.[132]

Despite this disjuncture between what the volunteers expected to achieve and what they could achieve, it is commendable that the volunteers did recognise a need, and indeed fulfilled a different more generalist role. It had not been what they were contracted to do, and it did not result in the level of knowledge transfer expected, but it was perhaps the only way in which, under the circumstances, any form of knowledge transfer could have occurred. This does however represent a shift in the working practices away from the expert and towards the more generalist approach which has once again been recycled as being the solution to Africa's

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[128] Rapoport, 'Globalising Sustainable Urbanism', p. 114.
[129] Olds, 'Globalizing Shanghai', p. 117.
[130] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 136.
[131] Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', 1997, p. 10.
[132] Inkoom, D (2008) Cited in Scholz, Robinson, and Dayaram, 'Colonial Planning Concept and Post-Colonial Realities: The Influence of British Planning Culture in Tanzania, South Africa and Ghana', p. 87.

problems. Michael suggested that this might be a characteristic of the VSO placements which set them apart from other organisations as they 'just get on with it and muck in, it seems individuals make that choice to do the work and help out but collectively it seems that everyone in [the] VSO does that'. He observed that with departmental staffing issues the shift to more specialist roles would prove difficult on this project. [133] This generalising of the role and the shift away from technical expertise is at odds from the movement of the VSO away from the idea of having low skilled generic advisors. It also represents a further "circulatory" characteristic of post-colonial Zambia adding a further "loop" to the changing approaches to expertise from generalist to expert and then back to development professionals who have generalist skills with geographic or area based specialisms.[134] Whilst scholars have traced the rise of expertise and professionalization across the development sector, what these broad analyses do not provide is an understanding of the nature of expertise as it is practiced. By contrast, what this chapter demonstrates is that regardless of the label applied, at a micro level experts can apply their expertise as prescribed, or adapt the knowledge transfer to suite local circumstances.

The differences between British planning methods and Zambian planning methods were also noted - in particular the fact that urban design and master-planning still featured heavily in the job specification of Zambian planners. Anna commented on the fact that development control was often overlooked in favour of master-planning, arguing that 'all the focus is on the layout plans, it's almost like that's their job and they don't understand that enforcing the planning process is as important as providing the land for people'.[135] Michael sought to consider the broader issues surrounding the role of master-planning and our understanding of how that related to the planning profession:

> in a way, they're still looking as a planner, as a master-planner'. 'Notwithstanding whether you're policy or DC [Development Control] planner, we just don't design. We allocate land, we assess application for planning permission… is there permeability? sufficient space? We have the

[133] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[134] Hodge and Webb, *Triumph of the Expert*; Chambers et al., *Aspects of British Technical Cooperation (Botswana and Mauritius)*; Hilton, McKay, and Mouhot, *The Politics of Expertise*.
[135] Anna, Interviewed by the author.

> ability to look and see where there are issues but we are not fundamentally urban designers.[136]

Interestingly, Michael suggested that this 'was a failure of our [meaning the British] planning system that we don't do master-planning', and Anna acknowledged that she lacked the technical skills for the placement commenting that she regretted the lack of designing she does in her regular role. She went on to suggest that she felt envious of Zambian planners because 'it's something we don't do so much ourselves, that would be an urban designers role'.[137] As chapter two has outlined, British planning saw a shift from master-planning to process led planning. Even though in Britain, there has been a recent shift back towards having master-planned town extensions, the plans often originate within the private sector through large scale private development, or by sub-contracting specialist urban design firms by government. This goes some way to explaining why there is a skills mismatch seen in this particular case, since in British local government, which is where many of the VSO volunteers were drawn from, there are not necessarily the skills that Zambia might require. However the use of master-planners might not necessarily be the solution, as has been evident in the contracting of Chinese master-planners brought in to contribute to the development of new towns and urban extensions in Zambia. In part thanks to their training, in which 'young planners are trained to draw up 20-year master-plans for cities', they were effective at producing the layout plans.[138] However these plans were ultimately considered to be of little use because the teams who construct them are often "parachuted" into areas with a less consultative or participatory approach meaning that the outputs lacked relevance to local conditions. The worst examples of which related to a master-plan which had been drawn up in Chinese but not subsequently translated to any of the national languages of Zambia.[139]

As the interviews have demonstrated, the volunteers and counterparts rationalised the knowledge transfer process in different ways. Whilst volunteers generally felt that in actually

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[136] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[137] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[138] Friedmann, 'Crossing Borders: Do Planning Ideas Travel?', p. 319; Meeting with a Zambian planning manager, November 2015.
[139] Meeting with a Zambian planning manager.

doing a task you are still in a way passing knowledge on, they acknowledged that it perhaps is not the most effective form of knowledge transfer. A counterpart indicated that this way of working hindered knowledge transfer, suggesting that 'there is little room for us to learn from them' and that they received little knowledge from the volunteer 'not because they don't want to but because the arrangement is such that they do not give out, unless we make a special arrangement for a session to learn'.[140] Further to the trend towards the use of generic skills, an interesting instance raised by one of the counterparts whereby they commended the way in which a volunteer had lent their hand to a range of tasks. When asked about whether expectations had been met one counterpart agreed in saying:

> Yes, for instance the buildings, we used to go with [them], the monitoring of buildings and roads… [They] had knowledge of all those things, which we didn't have an engineer but [they] would involve the same amount as the engineer from the roads department. So [they were] quite good at what [they were] was doing.[141]

This particular case related to the inspection of roads, something normally outside the remit of a planner, and a role which is generally undertaken by a person with an engineering background. In a similar way to Michael and his involvement in GIS, the volunteer had been put into a position where they were not an expert in the task they were engaged in. Intentional or not, in doing this, the volunteer also assumed the role of on the generalist "one size fits all" and inflated their technical capacity beyond what would normally be acceptable in the Global North. This again reflects the characteristics of colonial expertise that the movement towards technical expertise attempted to replace. It in turn also raises some interesting questions in relation to whether this relates to a shared British-Zambian history, whether the nature of the organisation and ill-defined roles allow this, or whether it is the nature of planning itself which lends itself to a more open approach.

One reason for this, perhaps, is the historic applications of knowledge transfer in planning in Zambia. As the 1964 Myles-Wright report detailed, an ideal planner was one who possessed technical expertise in their own field, as well as a 'maturity of judgement' and a broader

[140] Alfred, Interviewed by the author.
[141] Richard, Interviewed by the author.

understanding of technical and social fields.[142] Similarly for Friedmann and Ward, new approaches to urban management have spawned a broader skilled, diverse and flexible, 'professional which is part economist, part engineer, part planner and part marketing executive'.[143] K. Ward and McCann highlight the way planners operate in the international arena, ascribing this new style of broad skilled urban professional as a 'contributing factor toward, this rapid-fire, no-questions-asked movement of policies and programs'.[144] This suggests, therefore, that the particular way in which planners operate, and the broad skillset required, lends itself to adopting a more generic form of technical assistance, over say a civil engineer who might operate within a more defined role.

In addition to the problems faced by staff levels, operational problems also contributed to the volunteers' inability to transfer knowledge. Particularly problematic was the delay in rolling out new legislation as the intention had been that the volunteers would be in post for its implementation and the changes to planning practice that came with it. One volunteer highlighted the difficulty in affecting change whilst an outdated system was in place since there was no point in making changes that would be meaningless once the new legislation was rolled out. Another volunteer described the existing planning system as 'old' and commented that the legislation making process in Zambia is slow, and that the expected adoption of a new system was 'perhaps why there has not been a change in the way we do things. We are still working under the town planning act and awaiting [the] Urban and Regional Planning Bill to be approved. We're not operating on the new system'.[145] In this way, policy limitations that were outside the control of either volunteers or counterparts further affected the actual working practices.

Seeing to the North or seeing from the South?

[142] Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia', p. 26.
[143] Ward, 'Policies in Motion and Place: The Case of Business Improvement Districts', p. 76; Friedmann, 'Friedmann', p. 64.
[144] Ward and McCann, 'Introduction. Cities Assembled: Space, Neoliberalism, (Re)territorialising, an Comparison'. p. 176
[145] Andrew, Interviewed by the author.

Whilst throughout post-colonial Zambia there have been calls for Zambia to detach from its colonial history and embrace alternative approaches to governance and planning, the enthusiasm for British approaches to planning remains strong. Most strikingly in this respect, one counterpart whom had worked alongside a volunteer who was not from, or trained in the UK, continued to reference back to the UK as a source of expertise. McCann points to the legacies which can linger, in suggesting that 'practices and discourses frame the actions of urban actors as they seek to learn from elsewhere'. In this case it is possible to see how colonial and post-colonial planning and technical assistance might 'frame' the way in which knowledge is produced, used and indeed from where and whom it is sought.[146] Whereas S.V. Ward suggests that the isolation and relatively small number colonial officials 'limited their collective impact', this referencing back to the UK suggests that in Zambia at least, these historical agents of transfer had a profound effect on the legislative and ideological landscape as well as where the "gaze" of Zambians fell when searching for solutions.[147] This path dependency, described by Peck *et al.*, is demonstrated by the way in which the gaze remains on the UK, as though it might be the only country representing the Global North.[148] Instilling practices as well as 'qualitative admiration', led to a post-colonial path dependency which shaped the way Zambia casts its gaze for planning knowledge today.[149]

Perceptions and expectations of what skills the volunteer would bring to the organisation varied across authorities and between staff. There was also evidence of urban comparisons between Zambian cities and those in the Global North. The manager at one provincial authority believed that by getting a British town planner they would wave a "magic wand" which would result in the rapid development of their town to British levels;

> We know what planners in the UK have done to their cities. When we visit cities in the UK we ask "how did they do this"? We see very good sites as we move around and we know that's the work of the planner.[150]

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146 McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities', p. 888.
147 Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 137.
148 Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 'Neoliberal Urbanism'.
149 Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 137.
150 Alfred, Interviewed by the author.

The Zambian planner cited above clearly held a certain imagery of the UK as a place of order, of something that planning in Zambia should aspire to creating. In doing so he sees urban areas through a 'lens of world class aesthetics'.[151] Historically, established colonial standards have filtered through into post-colonial practice and this allows for the continued marketing of Britain as a place of best practice. Furthermore, other methods of soft power such as cultural propaganda reinforce this. As S.V. Ward points out, 'qualitative admiration' was a major factor in the hiring of international practitioners in the colonial era, suggesting that the popularity of the French urbanistes 'benefitted hugely from the high international reputation of Paris'.[152] Additionally, K. Ward and McCann, in discussing the way in which cities across geographies compete, observe that, 'cities are compared against one another in all manner of ways, according to a raft of different indicators'.[153] Clarke examines less formal comparisons and argues that such 'imitative urbanisms' can lead to 'hierarchies of cities and [a] downward policy transfers between them'.[154] Furthermore Peck sheds light on one of the less tangible forms of comparison, in focussing on actors, they suggest that the mobility of people within expert networks leads to '"local" policy development [which] now occurs in a self-consciously comparative and asymmetrically relativized context'.[155] This comparison of development and the disparities between the two countries seemed to weigh heavily on the mind of some volunteers who cautioned against drawing comparisons between Britain and Zambia. For Michael, the role seemed to prompt a level of reflection, not just in terms of his usefulness but also to broader questions surrounding inequality and development:

> we were an industrialised and wealthy nation, with huge disparities of income prior to the welfare state, but we had a base, we had an empire, we had a lot of money we had industrialists who could build Port Sunlight and these lovely garden cities. They haven't got that so you're trying to do the things that would be great but there is no money to do it… Isn't it better to try and legislate for the best possible worlds and realise it's not going to

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[151] McCann and Ward, 'Assembling Urbanism: Following Policies and "Studying Through" the Sites and Situations of Policy Making', p. 47; Ghertner, 'Rule by Aesthetics', p. 290.
[152] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 130.
[153] Ward and McCann, 'Introduction. Cities Assembled: Space, Neoliberalism, (Re)territorialising, an Comparison', p. 176.
[154] Clarke, 'Actually Existing Comparative Urbanism', p. 806.
[155] J. Peck, 'Geography and Public Policy: Mapping the Penal State', *Progress in Human Geography*, 27:2 (April 2003), p. 229.

> work for 20 – 30 years than legislate for the worst, and I'm not sure, I haven't come to a conclusion on that.[156]

Urban scholars are wary of engaging in comparative urbanisms, particularly as this can lead to reductionism as they leave 'out as much contextual "noise" as possible'.[157] Glick Schiller highlights how a tendency to over focus on the horizontal linkages results in a failure 'to identify the parameters through which urban scholars might compare and analyse how and why cities differ'.[158] Of particular relevance to this thesis is the work of Robinson, for whom comparative urbanism is wrapped up on notions of developmentalism and modernity. These debates bring an important perspective on several aspects of the VSO project. First, when planners, or indeed any kind of experts work across different geographical locations, comparisons between places inevitably occur. In the case of the individuals in Zambia, these comparisons were made by both the volunteers and Zambian counterparts. However what was most interesting, was that in locations where the VSO programme is represented by a non-British volunteer, Britain was still a reference point. Here comparisons between British and Zambian systems were still evident, with little reference made to the volunteer's country of origin. These comparisons thus might be driven not by the origin of the volunteers but instead by the historical influence of Britain on Zambia.

This statement made by Michael also suggests that he struggled to apply his skills and knowledge to a setting which is so very different from what he is used to. This backs up Watson's observation that the specific value in planning lies in the application of previously gained knowledge across geographical regions, in this case it is to an area where social, environmental and cultural trends differ from where their 'repertoire of cases' was honed.[159] Similarly as McCann and K Ward have argued, it is not just the policies and actors that affect knowledge transfer, rather we need to appreciate the ways in which assemblages of policy and actors are

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[156] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[157] J. M. Jacobs, 'Commentary—Comparing Comparative Urbanisms', *Urban Geography*, 33:6 (August 2012), pp. 904–914; J. Pierre, 'Comparative Urban Governance Uncovering Complex Causalities', *Urban Affairs Review*, 40:4 (March 2005), p. 447.
[158] N. Glick-Schiller, 'A Comparative Relative Perspective on the Relationships Between Migrants and Cities', *Urban Geography*, 33:6 (August 2012), p. 882.
[159] Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning*, p. 8.

formed from 'the relational situatedness' of sites, and how these relate to our understanding of the process.[160] Michael's statement suggests there is a recognition that urban comparisons were not especially useful, and that his 'repertoire' of experience gained in the UK and its 'situatedness' meant that it was inadequate to deal with the socio-economic and environmental problems facing Zambia.

Conversely, whilst some differences were felt quite strongly by some volunteers, at other times they found a level of familiarity in the work they did in Zambia. For Michael in particular, he felt that advice he had been given before his placement and commentary by other volunteers did not necessarily ring true. In his experience 'some of the problems are just local government – political interference, lack of resources', drawing not difference but similarity between workplace environments.[161] The political environment within which planning operates is for him an environment of uncertainty created by what can sometimes be opposing forces within a government organisation. Craggs and Neate offer a view on these similarities, suggesting that the nature of a colonial administrator's work was seen as making them suitable for roles in urban development upon ending service overseas. They highlight how the Richard Phelps, colonial administrator in Nigeria and later moving on to senior posts in the Central Lancashire Development Corporation, considered his experiences of solitude, chaos and crudeness in colonial service 'was useful experience for a prospective New Town manager'.[162] In this way, the experiences of Michael resonate to some extent with those of Phelps, albeit the direction of travel is reversed.

Picking up on the volunteers' ability to adapt to the development disparities, a number of them expressed surprise at the complexity and social implications of planning in Zambia. They cited problems with settlement upgrading schemes and the way such programmes displace and then entrap citizens into an expensive legal and land ownership framework for which they do not have the financial resources to comply. Mary felt that the issue of poverty 'turned into a

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[160] McCann and Ward, 'Assembling Urbanism: Following Policies and "Studying Through" the Sites and Situations of Policy Making', p. 47.
[161] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[162] Craggs and Neate, 'Post-Colonial Careering and Urban Policy Mobility', p.50.

hindrance' both in terms of what could actually be done and how it impacted on her personally. When asked about cultural differences she might have experienced, Anna reflected on her struggle to come to terms with the everyday experiences of Africa:

> My impression was that middle class Africa wouldn't be that bad, but it is… 'It's just, people are struggling or balancing their work with family problems and health problems…. Even though I'd been told about it. It didn't really hit me until I got here.

Anna also described her time in Zambia with a sense of astonishment, 'you never experience anything like that back in the UK… I was flabbergasted really, I'll never forget that experience'.[163] Michael was more outspoken in his opinion, stating that; 'You just look at it and think it's a clusterfuck'.[164] The act of comparison between the Zambia and the Global North also drew out similarities which the volunteers were not expecting. Michael also noted the similarities between local level politics in both Britain and Zambia when discussing antagonism between members and officers in the UK, he noted that 'It's funny, because there's not much difference here, it's just magnified'.[165] Mary's experience reflected the opposite realisation, that her prior understanding of Africa was skewed by its representation in the Global North:

> I'd been aware of Africa and its problems, but I think when I left I came out seeing it as being more empowered than I'd imagined, because my idea of Africa was always in terms of the pictures that get shown. It's always portrayed as a really poor country, that it's desert throughout the continent.[166]

This two way flow of understanding, seen in the way that Mary's impression of Zambia changed during her time there, is something that the Zambian government have long recognised as being one of the secondary benefits of accepting volunteers.[167]

Further comparisons occurred on a more personal level, with one counterpart highlighting how they felt that transfer could happen more effectively if they could experience planning in Britain. He felt that if in addition to British planners travelling to Zambia, Zambian planners could travel to the UK, the US or Australia. He called for a system 'where planning knowledge is

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[163] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[164] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[165] *Ibid.*
[166] Mary, Interviewed by the author.
[167] 'Report and Follow up Action by F. Judd of the Visit of the VSO in Zambia in October and November 1983.'

shared globally amongst ourselves' and a further stating that it was unfortunate that they do not 'go as volunteers to try to learn from other countries'.[168] Yet these calls for "global" knowledge sharing for now extend only to knowledge originating in the Global North, which unintentionally dismisses the validity of knowledge from within the region. This also perhaps highlights a sense that the volunteer planners were learning as much as or more about planning in Zambia, than Zambian planners were gaining from the volunteers. There was also a justifiable sense that the knowledge and skills they held were to be valued elsewhere in the globe. Yet to some extent they felt that this had been overlooked, as one counterpart put it, 'no-one has approached [me] to see if I'd like to share information I have and to learn from them'.[169] Another suggested that 'when [the volunteer] came then maybe our officers could maybe go to Britain to go and learn and they might come out with great input', and that 'it would be better for us, I would learn something'.[170] One volunteer was in fact quite dismissive of the skills of Zambian planners, suggesting that despite the fact that they had planning qualifications the profession was 'just too difficult for them'.[171] Another volunteer framed criticism in a more positive light, arguing that it was not necessarily personal flaws, but a failure of the Zambian education system to instil certain values.[172] This notion of undervaluing the knowledge of counterparts resonates with the finding of the Regional Conference on International Voluntary Service which acknowledged in a 1980 report that there was a general need to 'examine together the growing awareness that "aid", "transfer" and even "co-operation" have no permanent effect and are of no use as an expression of solidarity as long as they take place in the context of a "dominating/dominated", "giver/receiver" or "assisting/assisted" relationship'.[173] Both the volunteers comments and those of the counterparts, along with historical examples of technical assistance in planning, resonate with this 1980s report. These default relationships might also account for the reality of actual existing knowledge transfer highlighted earlier in this chapter.

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[168] Alfred, Interviewed by the author; Richard, Interviewed by the author.
[169] Patience, Interviewed by the author.
[170] Angela, Interviewed by the author.
[171] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[172] *Ibid.*; Mary, Interviewed by the author.
[173] Regional Conference on International Voluntary Service, *Partnership and Voluntary Service; Mutual Needs and Expectations*, January 1984, p. 2–3.

As King notes in respect to the governance of land, where rules regarding the environment are 'imposed' on a different culture, there is less likelihood that a full engagement with the rules will take place. He points specifically to post-colonial societies which saw rapid change following abandonment by colonial powers as a signifier of the artificial and fragile nature of the rules imposed.[174] For Zambia, the changes in the way urban environments were consumed was rapid, yet governance was slow to react to these changes with the transition from colonial style of land governance being slow and incomplete. This imposition and sluggish adaptation of the land governance system has repercussions for the engagement of overseas planners, particularly those from Britain. As Emily rather astutely noted, the Zambian planning system, was based on the British system and it helped 'that the volunteer was from a country where they operate the same system as us'.[175] In Ward's view, such 'legal and institutional embeddedness' helped to facilitate 'the growth of international practice' in the colonial era, and in this case it is evident that this embeddedness created lasting institutional connections between Britain and Zambia.[176] Mary however considered that these 'old models' of planning that were, and to some extent still are in place in Zambia, are inappropriate mechanisms for dealing with present day socio-economic conditions. For her, the style of planning carried out in the Global North lacked relevance, and she called for a move away from such practices since it contributed to a sense of disempowerment amongst local staff. Her solution however was not a purely southern one, but one that instead was grounded in western knowledge and scholarship, but which drew on ideas also produced in the Global South in which they 'think about what the western academics are teaching and start thinking about how this applies to them and their culture, and take what they can from it but then also contribute to the knowledge in their own ways through their own perspectives'.[177] Shweder argues that 'borrowing, appropriation, migration and diffusion' does not necessarily have to have an impact on the 'authenticity' of a culture, since they are already 'too long detached from their points of original creation'.[178] In

[174] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 214.
[175] Emily, Interviewed by the author.
[176] Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?', p. 129.
[177] Mary, Interviewed by the author.
[178] R. A. Shweder, '"Who Owns Native Culture?": The Gatekeepers', *The New York Times*, 14 September 2003, sec. Books / Review.

this way Shweder, like Mary, is suggesting the borrowing of new ideas and methods in a way that retains a cognisance of local environmental, social and economic conditions.

A theme that emerged strongly from the interviews was that when specifically asked about the notion of South-South cooperation, it seemed to be a more popular concept with planners from the Global North. When asked, Michael supported the idea in agreeing that there was a need for 'southern solutions to southern problems. You need African planners, in some respect'.[179] Clear advantages to South-South cooperation also emerged, with one planner highlighting that elsewhere in Africa the same systems were used, and that a number of sub-Saharan countries also tended to be more centralised than the Zambian system is. However local staff initially seemed to reject the notion of South-South cooperation, stating that their expectations had been that the volunteers would come from the Global North, perhaps representing a victory for British soft power. There was, in a sense, a wholesale rejection of the idea of having a planner from the Global South in one case, not because their skills would be somehow identified as inferior, but because they would not be British.[180] One manager felt that the transfer occurring between southern countries was not happening as effectively as North-South transfers, and suggested that it is important to consider whether knowledge produced in the Global South will have any relevance to Zambia.[181]

One of the most striking views expressed in relation to South-South transfer was made by an African interviewee whom felt that there were distinct differences between the knowledge they gained elsewhere in Africa and its relevance to Zambia. Commenting on how much he learned from his placement and the difference in settlement patterns between the two countries and the polarisation of the population in Zambia around urban areas, they said that in other African countries 'most of the accommodation [housing] is in rural areas so the model is more of a rural based planning'.[182] The validity of southern knowledge for southern problems also emerged when discussing the theme of planner education. For example, one Zambian planner

[179] Michael, Interviewed by the author.
[180] Alfred, Interviewed by the author.
[181] Emily, Interviewed by the author.
[182] Andrew, Interviewed by the author.

highlighted how he chose to be educated in Kenya because the curriculum in Zambia was based on the South African education system which he felt was irrelevant to working life in Zambia:

> what's the reason to learn about Shaka Zulu? It has no point. Now when it comes to education in East Africa you are being taught what you need, what is going to help you to…. It's going to have relevance when you are working, not being taught something which won't ever been needed. So the difference between [the] north and central region is very long.

And:

> You could not say that people from Kenya, Zambia and Uganda are the same because they are different people because of their traditional background. Because what you learn there and what the education system in Zambia is are totally different.

When pressed on the role of South-South cooperation, another counterpart supported such an arrangement, albeit he only acknowledges it when pressured for an opinion.[183] This presents an interesting insight into regional perceptions. Whilst South African scholars have long tended to silo Sub-Saharan Africa urbanity on the basis that they share urban, social and economic problems, this particular interviewee felt that geographical proximity does not really reflect a cultural affiliation. In effect, the statement rejects the South African academy's self-positioning of being the doyen of urban development education in southern Africa through its 'Seeing from the South' movement.[184] This was echoed by a volunteer who cautioned against attempts to silo other countries in close geographical proximity: 'I don't think I could compare Zambia or Kenya, or Zambia and Tanzania, because their economies are very high. I noticed what I'm doing right now and what I did that side are very different'.[185]

Personal and workplace development legacies

Beyond the knowledge transfer occurring in relation to planning and office management, some local staff felt that the volunteers had promoted personal development through education and networking. One counterpart highlighted how the volunteer 'promoted e-learning amongst staff' whilst another noted the softer forms of transfer such as encouragement to progress their professional development. He noted that 'even interacting with her you would find that you

[183] Alfred, Interviewed by the author.
[184] Watson, 'Seeing from the South'.
[185] Francis, Interviewed by the author.

gain something, just by talking to her, not even about office work she would encourage you to do studies and go to school. She would try to teach you one or two things, of what she knows about'.[186] For others, the impact was more personal, and less tangibly linked to a career. Anna suggested that the placement had caused her to reflect on her future, specifically her career: 'It's been good and it's given me the courage just to say…I guess seeing how people live here and how difficult it is and how life is short and not just get stuck in a rut'.[187] This "broadened view" benefit was also echoed by one of the Zambian counterparts, Emily, who reflected on how her experience of working alongside a volunteer said it made her realise there was 'a bigger world out there, experiencing a volunteer from overseas made me realise that'. When further pushed to explain her views she grounded her general agreement surrounding the merits of such approaches in certain situations, by reaffirming her view that she had a more global outlook, beyond the borders of Zambia or even sub-Saharan Africa.[188] The experience of working alongside the volunteers also had a localising effect on the outlook of counterparts, as one Zambian planner noted, their experience of working with the volunteer 'opened their eyes' to the extent of poverty that there was in the area.[189] This highlights how volunteers were assisting not only through the imparting of technical knowledge, but also through the sharing of certain morals and values. Reinforcing this, Mary raised the issue of planning ethics in relation to a different questions, claiming she was surprised that 'they don't teach planning theory and ethics and a lot of the, I guess standards we would expect of ourselves in western countries, they didn't really have that training to work with'.[190] For Mary, the planning process in Zambia was driven by functions or the performance of specific tasks associated with planning, and she saw these as being carried out with no real connection to, or significance with certain social and environmental justice values which she considered to be inherent in planning. Like colonial planning, imposing any form of rules and regulations on the built environment imposes very colonial notions of control. On this point, Sidaway, like others, argues that contemporary planning cannot be disassociated with 'European philosophical concepts of presence, order and

[186] Richard, Interviewed by the author.
[187] Anna, Interviewed by the author.
[188] Emily, Interviewed by the author.
[189] *Ibid.*; Angela, Interviewed by the author.
[190] Mary, Interviewed by the author.

intelligibility'.[191] Whilst this is a pertinent and well documented point, it overlooks a further set of important planning values, which are those surrounding social justice. In essence, the points considers only how planning manipulates the built environment in order to impose western values, norms and standards, without considering how planning responds to moral and ethical concerns surrounding social justice. There is a need to consider not just how the imposition of a physical built environment was a form of coloniality, but also whether imposition of moral and ethical values also represents a form of coloniality that emerges today. King has alluded to this debate, arguing in the 1980s that there is a need to expand on our view beyond issues of order and control that the transferral of British planning systems to the colonies provided, to consider the underpinning 'theoretical and methodological' issues surrounding planning.[192] The way in which the counterpart spoke of the having her eyes opened to poverty also suggests that colonial notions of "othering" might still perpetuate even within professions whose role is supposedly to deliver social justice.

In terms of the learning process, from a volunteer's perspective, Mary approached the placement thinking that she would be the educator but realised quite quickly that she was actually being the educated. She came to the realisation that she understood little and questioned her role:

> I knew virtually nothing about the district so what am I supposed to be teaching them? And it turns out that they actually taught me and that they said my understanding of planning… I was trying to impress them but they impressed me.[193]

This mirrors Friedmann's experience of knowledge transfer in Chile, where he resigned himself to the fact that he had likely taken more from the experience in terms of ideas that could be put to practice in his academic career than 'whether he had anything to transfer at all'.[194] In reflecting what she achieved from the role, Mary felt that it had given her the opportunity to use planning skills which might otherwise be redundant in a conventional planning role and really wanted to

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[191] Sidaway, 'Postcolonial Geographies: Survey-Explore-Review', p. 11.
[192] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 204.
[193] Mary, Interviewed by the author.
[194] Friedmann, 'Crossing Borders: Do Planning Ideas Travel?', p. 324.

be able to utilise specific knowledge and skills she had an interest in such as food systems. This perspective is interesting in that it signals that as described earlier, even if development and government institutions had not engaged with South-North knowledge flow, individuals were more open to it.

The views of the effectiveness and success of the programme also varied across authorities and in some cases even departments within the same authority. One manager felt that there was a difference whilst the volunteer was in post but that 'after VSO have left we just continue where we ended', which suggests that whilst change might have occurred whilst the volunteer was in place, it does not guarantee that these changes will continue once the volunteer has left.[195] This was echoed in the council discussed earlier, where the member of staff had only recognised that a plan had a British name on it.[196] In another authority a piece of policy was started by a volunteer but ultimately was left 'incomplete'.[197] A further authority had started the process of formulating an integrated development plan but ultimately the counterparts deemed that 'the project is dead' and that the process hadn't 'kick-started anything'.[198] In this case, the recipient authority appreciated the work that had been done as it freed up their time to work on other issues, but ultimately the department did not have the resources to finish writing the policy that the volunteer had started. Countering this, in one district authority a Zambian planner suggested that work carried out by the volunteers had been carried on after they had left. This however is framed by a second planner at the same authority describing the volunteers work as having been largely ignored since their departure as '[The volunteer] left manuals that are just dusty now', before going on to suggest that the reason for the lack of continuation related to the 'workflow' or workload in the department.[199]

Conclusion

[195] Alfred, Interviewed by the author.
[196] Angela, Interviewed by the author.
[197] Emily, Interviewed by the author.
[198] *Ibid.*; Patience, Interviewed by the author; Angela, Interviewed by the author.
[199] Francis, Interviewed by the author.

As this chapter has demonstrated, the actual process of knowledge transfer in Zambia is characterised by a variety of 'messy actualities'.[200] It is clear that frustrations and discord emerged over the knowledge transfer process and these frustrations were expressed by both sets of actors. However it is not unusual or unique to this process that such problems are encountered. In this instance of knowledge transfer happened on multiple levels across a range of actors each of whom enter the process with their own agendas, aspirations and expectations. As an added complexity, the process was also set against the stalled implementation of a new legislative framework which hampered the ability of actors to apply the process as originally formulated.

The complex nature of knowledge transfer speaks to the varied agendas of project stakeholders. In this particular process a multitude of actors and stakeholders came into the programme with an assortment of motives and interests as well as varying degrees of engagement and experience. At the highest level, the VSO hold certain expectations and agendas. For example, the organisation is funded in part by the British Government which, whether explicitly stated or not, might put an obligation to honour certain soft power values. Indeed as one volunteer speculated, whilst the British Department for International Development still fund a significant proportion of the programme, they might want the majority of the volunteers to be British. Technical assistance and indeed any kind of aid, is attached to and therefore laden by default with British aspirations of influence. The second major organisation involved in the process was the Zambian government whom took the initial decision to engage with outside expertise. Whilst it is natural that strategic decisions are made at this level, the counterparts expressed a sense of being locked out of the decision making process and lacking agency and this in turn affected the engagement of local level staff.[201] Even when local level agreements were sought, decisions would have been made within formal local hierarchies, with managers involved in the decision making process whilst not necessarily involved in the daily practice of the knowledge transfer process. It is at the lowest levels of the organisational hierarchies that the actual process

[200] Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality', p. 14.
[201] In some instances this was as a consequence of the high level of staff turnover which resulted in staff leaving before the implementation of a project.

of transfer occurs. It is here that volunteers and counterparts navigate sites and moments of knowledge exchange, attempting to make the overarching aims of the project fit into the realities of the actual existing workplace.

As Gilbert and Tiffin have noted, it is difficult to strike the balance between what a donor country wishes to supply and what a recipient country needs.[202] To some extent, the balancing of these expectations played out in the everyday interactions between counterparts and volunteers. The volunteers generally went into the project with a clear understanding of what they wished to achieve from a personal perspective, whether that be related to career breaks, personal or career development. What was less clear was how they saw themselves achieving the philanthropic objectives. There was an understanding that they had skills that were needed but did not necessarily have an awareness of how transferral of these could happen in practice. Most arrived with a strong sense of purpose but when faced with the 'messy actualities' of the knowledge transfer process they had to temper their aspirations and adapt.[203] In some instances this was overcome by the adoption of a more generalist role, providing everyday office and management support which had a mixed response from the Zambian perspective. For others, their approach involved a diversification away from their core expertise to provide specialist knowledge in areas that were not in their core remit. While this was highly commendable on some levels, unintentionally and unknowingly it meant that these volunteers had begun to mirror the colonial and early post-colonial practices of skills inflation. These shifts in the process of knowledge transfer were often led from the Zambian perspective, from which there appeared to be an acute diversity of project expectations. For some, there was a strong engagement in the project and understanding of the process, but for others engagement was poor and this directly affected the ability of the volunteers to both integrate into the department and to perform their role. However what also emerged was that one of the key determinants of successful knowledge transfer is the presence of open and willing counterparts and where this is lacking it can have a dramatic effect on knowledge transfer. This problem was particularly

[202] Gilbert and Tiffin, 'Introduction'.
[203] McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities'; Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality', p. 14.

acute where the host institutional capacity was poor and so had to forego any sort of induction period, but it was also witnessed as a by-product of poor engagement which led to avoidance. Even where counterparts were in place, the nature of Zambian elite mobility meant that often knowledge and skills did not institutionalise and were lost to a specific organisation once counterparts moved on.

What emerged clearly from the interviews was that the volunteers were well educated, had compassion and a degree of awareness of their own positionality. However such awareness did not always translate itself in a full understanding of the complexities faces by Zambian planners, or indeed the planned. This does not necessarily suggest a degree of ignorance, nor an unwillingness to learn, instead it indicates that the problem of transferring a 'repertoire' of skills and knowledge which might not necessarily translate across geographies is alive and well in this context.[204] For planners, this repertoire of skills is inclusive of certain moral values and the ability to consider the broader ethical implications of decision making. It was noticeable that some felt that these values differed across geographies, something that they struggled to reconcile within their own positionality. These values also highlight the problematic power relationships that occur in interactions between the givers and receivers of knowledge. This was particularly evident in the way that values associated with western practices can be linked to an assumption that all other standards are somehow inadequate. Law and Goldberg suggest that the use of words such as these are often 'proxies for tropes that are no longer acceptable to articulate'.[205] Whilst this meaning was not intentional, the use of certain terms can help to reinforce ideologies that are grounded in colonial notions of standards. However it is difficult to detach planning from the concept of standards, since it remains bound up in legal and legislative standards and reliant upon certain moral values, codes and ethics. As a consequence, the practice of planning is tied closely to ethical and moral codes and it is difficult to separate one from the other. The process of knowledge transfer led some counterparts to reflect on what it is to be developed and how they felt everyday practices and making comparisons

[204] Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning*, p. 8.
[205] Law, *Gendering the Settler State*, p. 143; D. T. Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2009).

between urbanisms were a direct reflection or measure of a country's position on a linear development path. The constant referencing back to British and more broadly the Global North as a measure of development or best practice evidences the way in which the Zambian planners had internalised colonial norms, values and practices. Here the knowledge power relations manifest themselves as an internalised view in which they begin to 'see through the lens of world-class aesthetics' assuming that they should aspire to achieve what Britain has.[206] This emphasises that in Zambia there is a certain philosophical path dependency honed over decades of imposition and assistance that has instilled certain norms, values and standards as to what a city constitutes and how it should be planned.

Whilst Friedmann's analysis of knowledge transfer between America and China points to a process that was beset with cultural difference and a general disregard towards the implementation of an system which 'failed to find a responsive audience in China', these interviews demonstrate that in Zambia, there was a general local enthusiasm for British planning.[207] For some counterparts, the British/Zambian historical relationship and its influence on planning was viewed through a practical lens. They felt that is might naturally follow that British planners be involved in a programme to improve an institutional and policy framework so heavily influenced by the British. This synergy in planning practice highlights a second strand of path dependency beyond ideologies, which is that of a kind of practical path dependency. Despite this, differences between the systems arose and this caused anxieties for volunteers. This was particularly evident in the way that master-planning has continued in Zambia to fall under the remit of the local planning departments and the way that GIS is assembled and used. For the volunteers this presented a significant aspect of Zambian planning for which they could offer no skills or knowledge, and there is a sense from their comments that their lack of knowledge left them feeling that they were not fulfilling their remit.

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[206] Ghertner, 'Rule by Aesthetics', p. 290; Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.*

[207] Friedmann, 'Crossing Borders: Do Planning Ideas Travel?', p. 318.

Despite the calls for more southern based production of knowledge, it is difficult to comprehend how Zambia might untangle itself from the ties of colonialism without external assistance, yet there was little overt enthusiasm for southern knowledge.[208] The VSO planner programme, whilst not without problems, has gone some way to addressing the underlying capacity issues in Zambia. This chapter has shown that the experience of confusion and chaos in the process of transferring skills experienced by the VSO volunteers and their counterparts reaffirms the notion put forward by Jacobs and Lees as well as Mccann and Larner, that the mobility of policies and practice, and specifically urban policy makers, or actors, often occurs in a disorderly manner which might not necessarily reflect the project design.[209] The VSO's recent programme in Zambia shows how history, path dependence and in particular postcoloniality can lead to an added complexity that add further to these messy actualities.

[208] Watson, 'Seeing from the South'.
[209] J. M. Jacobs and L. Lees, 'Defensible Space on the Move: Revisiting the Urban Geography of Alice Coleman', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 37:5 (September 2013), pp. 1559–1583; McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities'; Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality'.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Independence heralds a brave new dawn for former colonial states; a moment in which they can shape their government and future direction. Whilst this thesis does not seek to detract from this event, or negate the monumental shifts and the necessity of the move from the colonial to the post-colonial, it does place emphasis on the enduring colonial structures that are present in post-colonial Zambia. Like many other countries on the continent, the immediate post-independence period was critical for Zambia, as the new nation set out to define its own ideological and political course. At the same time, Britain, as the former colonial power, saw this as a period in which it could seek to maintain and strengthen ideological links to the former metropole through soft power tools such as technical assistance. As this thesis has demonstrated, this was particularly the case for planning which found itself in the crosshairs of post-colonial government restructures. In the immediate post-independence period, it was a much disregarded function. It was viewed as a colonial hangover and operated within a conflicted government structure as the new leaders sought to shake off the institutions which has operated as the 'king pin[s]' of the colonial government.[1] This ultimately left a planning service that was ripe for external influence through the various soft-power mechanisms that were born out of the decolonisation period. This thesis has argued that independence saw not a severance but a further modification in the knowledge relationship between Britain and Zambia. Whereas once, the subjugation of the indigenous population was legitimised through unabashed claims of European superiority, by the mid-1960s, British governmental rhetoric had fully shifted to a position whereby, knowledge came not in the form of the colonial officer but from technical experts. However despite this, such exchanges are nearly always predicated on the notion of superior knowledge, reinforcing old notions of the white man as intellectually superior. These impositions of knowledge and technical expertise were merely control and influence hidden behind the guise of aid, which had profound and long-lasting effects on the

[1] 'Speech by President Kaunda to District Secretaries. Quoted in: Report of the Working Party to Review the System of Decentralised Administration. p.17'.

way in which Zambia developed (or underdeveloped) the planning service. What this meant for planning is that rather than Zambia being offered a moment of rupture, where it might diverge away from British ideas and practices, it was bound by the knowledge provided through these formal technical assistance programmes.

In order to understand why these events had such a profound influence on the planning system in Zambia, this thesis has addressed two key questions relating to knowledge transfer in Zambian planning. First it examines planning knowledge transfer from a historical perspective. It builds on the work of those scholars such as Njoh, Rakodi, Mwimba, and Taylor and Thole, that have identified *how* post-colonial planning systems relate to their colonial predecessors, by examining *why* such strong continuities exist.[2] In addressing these questions it adds to the work of a number of scholars of planning history. Home and Myers for example, have identified how planning ideologies and practices were transferred in colonial Northern Rhodesia and in this respect the thesis responds to their work by tracing external expertise beyond this period.[3] Addressing the early post-colonial period, it identifies the many ways that technical assistance was used to instil norms, values and standards within the post-colonial planning system. In doing so builds on the work of S.V. Ward and Home who have pinpointed the way that urban professionals circulated within the broader post-colonial world.[4] In building on studies of colonial planning, to examine the early post-colonial period, it responds to the broader concerns of Bell and Craggs and Wintle by untangling the 'historiographical silos' of the colonial and the post-colonial period.[5] Second, it identifies the way in which knowledge transfer takes place in contemporary Zambia to understanding how the aforementioned histories might result in internalised colonial planning logics. By locating contemporary knowledge transfer within its

[2] Njoh, *Planning in Contemporary Africa*; Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia'; E. Mutale, *The Management of Urban Development in Zambia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); Taylor and Thole, 'Re-Thinking Town and Country Planning Practice in Zambia'.
[3] Myers, *Verandahs of Power*; Home, 'Town Planning and Garden Cities in the British Colonial Empire 1910–1940'.
[4] Home, 'Knowledge Networks and Postcolonial Careering'; Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'; Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'.
[5] Craggs and Wintle, 'Reframing Cultures of Decolonisation', p. 4.

history, it answers the call of Stone, Healey and, Harris and Moore who suggest that analyses of knowledge transfer have been too ahistorical.[6]

As Gewald *et al.* point out, 'In contrast to the rich tradition of academic analysis and understanding of the pre-colonial and colonial history of Zambia' the 'post-colonial trajectory has been all but ignored by historians'.[7] Zambia is not isolated in this experience, and where scholars have tackled the early post-colonial periods elsewhere, they have also uncovered to a general void in our approach to the history of former colonial countries. Scholars such as Craggs and Wintle, have argued that there has been a tendency to 'silo' periods of colonial and post-colonial history, yet in examining these periods, important links and continuities reveal themselves where the might previously have been overlooked.[8] In the case of post-colonial Zambia, technical assistance played an important role in setting norms, values and standards in the planning service, yet little consideration has been given to how this might shape contemporary practice.

Commentators such as Blunt and McEwan have argued that postcolonial trajectories are affected by individual colonial encounters, and that each needs to be approached individually. This thesis has expanded this view to demonstrate that there is also a need to also appreciate each encounter within the postcolonial state because of their ability to impact on the present.[9] In order to assess how early post-colonial impositions might influence contemporary planning practice, the thesis first examined Zambia nation building in the immediate post-independence period, with chapter three outlining the national responses to decolonisation. It identified how the British set out to retain influence in Zambia through technical assistance, using education, technical personnel and volunteering programmes. In doing this, it has underlined why certain types of assistance, such as expertise and education, were preferred by Britain over others, which underlines what Britain sought to gain from its technical assistance programme. The OSAS was

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[6] Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', February 1999; Healey, 'Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques'; Harris and Moore, 'Planning Histories and Practices of Circulating Urban Knowledge'.
[7] Gewald, Hinfelaar, and Macola, 'Introduction', p. 3.
[8] Craggs and Wintle, 'Reframing Cultures of Decolonisation', p. 4.
[9] A. Blunt and C. McEwan, eds., *Postcolonial Geographies*, Writing Past Colonialism.

tasked with ensuring scores of "expatriate" staff were present in Zambia during the early independence period. This thesis has demonstrated how schemes such as the OSAS formed a major part of Britain's technical assistance package to Zambia and offered a number of benefits in return. First this scheme sought to prevent a sudden relocation of thousands of former colonial officers back to the metropole. Whilst some colonial staff did make the move back, fuelled in part by diminishing career prospects in Zambia as a consequence of Zambianization, for those that wished to stay the OSAS scheme provided a means by which they could remain. For Britain this ensured that expatriate officers were retained, or were recruited into more senior posts at independence, meaning that it could capitalise on the loyalty that these might have had toward Britain. This not only helped to secure Britain's interests in Zambia after independence, but also worked to further cement British ideologies and practices into everyday Zambian governance. Of most relevance to planning practice today is the role that these programmes helped in instilling and reinforce British norms, values and standards within the mundane functions of Zambian post-colonial government. As chapter three has argued, in this respect, the OSAS particularly stood out from other key technical assistance programmes such as the "global intelligence corps", or the countless international careerists sent to Africa through multi-lateral funding sources.[10] These 'humdrum' personnel of the early post-colonial period were not to be positioned at the forefront of grand projects, nor did they arrive and leave with great national fanfare.[11] Instead they worked steadily in the background, reinforcing a British way of thinking and working into everyday Zambian governance.

A second key aspect of British technical assistance came in the form of young volunteers that arrived in Africa via the volunteer sending organisations. One such organisation, the VSO, arose as a response to the decolonisation process and was seen as providing a second stream of British technical assistance.[12] As chapter three has demonstrated, it was well funded by the British Government due to concerns over the US Peace Corps gaining ideological superiority in former

[10] Rimmer, 'The Global Intelligence Corps and World Cities: Engineering Consultancies on the Move'; Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'; d'Auria, 'More than Tropical? Modern Housing, Expatriate Practitioners and the Volta River Project in Decolonising Ghana'.
[11] Myers, 'Intellectual of Empire', p. 5.
[12] Adams, *Voluntary Service Overseas*; Williams, *British Aid - 4; Technical Assistance.*

colonial countries. These volunteers, rather than working in government roles, initially went out into communities to provide a softer, less formal type of 'cultural propaganda'.[13] Chapter three argued that whilst the services the volunteers fell under the umbrella term of "technical assistance", their worth was not so much in the technical skills that they could pass on to Zambians, but the way in which they represented British ideologies and values. This programme was, initially at least, predicated on the fact that western knowledge was superior, even if such knowledge was being distributed by fresh-faced school leavers or graduates with few technical skills. Finally, a third strand of British soft power in the early post-colonial period was expressed through an increase in funding for overseas scholarships within the British education system, which provided further reinforcement of British knowledge and practice to the future elites of Zambian government. All these forms of technical assistance were manifestations of soft power, and involved the use of knowledge to exert influence, and contributed to the enduring embeddedness of British norms, values and standards.

Through focussing on the post-independence planning function in Zambia and the various actors involved in the planning process, this thesis establishes the ways in which ideologies and individuals permeated government systems. Chapter four highlighted the key issues which the new Zambian government faced at independence, and details its approach to post-colonial planning. In the first instance, the enduring legacy of colonialism combined with a lack of appropriately educated planners, and the concomitant reliance on external experts greatly affected the nature of planning practices. These issues were further compounded by the governmental structures the country adopted, which had the effect of hampering the development of a fully functioning planning service. Furthermore, the government paid little attention to physical planning, instead focussing on national and therefore fiscal planning. These issues speak to a much broader concern, namely that planning emerged from the decolonisation process as a much-maligned hangover from the colonial regime, placing it out of favour with the new government. These moves further weakened the already depleted Town and Country Planning service as it was forced to implement national policies that originated in the top heavy

[13] Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, p. 52.

structure. The planning function was also undermined by adjustments and side-lining of provincial government structures, which the Kaunda government had seen to be the primary apparatus of colonial control. Chapter four has demonstrated that in stymying the scope and power of provincial government, whilst focussing on national planning, there was a failure to adequately connect the local function of urban planning with the objectives laid out in the new national plans.

Chapter four then went on to highlight how these structural changes were set against a backdrop of external planning influence that arrived from three distinct sources: the arrival of roving international planners; the continued reliance on expatriate knowledge and; Zambia's continued reliance on western planning education. The overseas planners that operated in Zambia during the early postcolonial period included international expert teams whose experience largely lay grounded in the Global North. However this group also included certain travelling generalists such as G.M. Coverdale, whom had taken an interest in the field of planning. As chapter four has demonstrated, whilst the U.N. teams such as those headed by Myles-Wright were characteristic of the 'global intelligence corps' of the time, the actions of Coverdale strongly mirrored the approach of the colonial officer.[14] Whilst this generalist approach was well received within Zambia, it was seemingly at odds with Britain's new model for technical expertise which ultimately led to conflicts with the British Government. The second source of influence took place directly within the planning teams themselves, and this occurred as a consequence of their reliance upon expatriates. Either retained at independence or recruited through various British back technical assistance programmes such as the OSAS, these expatriate officers remained in senior management positions well into the 1970s. This extended reliance upon expatriate staff can also be explained by Zambia's continued dependence on western planning education. This was a situation engineered by expatriates whom set in place the requirement for embryonic planners to be trained in accordance to British standards if they were to become fully qualified. Despite efforts made by Coverdale to set up a planning course in the early independence period, Zambia was slow to establish its own planner education. However, even when it did develop

[14] Olds, 'Globalizing Shanghai'; Ward, 'A Pioneer "Global Intelligence Corps"?'

its own provision the expatriate staff continued to act as gatekeepers. Lacking a fully accredited planning course, Zambia was therefore left reliant upon the limited supply of scholarships offered by Britain to provide professional staff for a country some three times the size of the UK. As chapter four has demonstrated, as a consequence of this planner training and education continued to be led by the Global North which promoted and instilled Eurocentric planning norms onto the first generation of African planners. It therefore follows that in the years following independence, planning policy and practice varied little from its colonial original and continued to "look" towards Britain and the Global North for influence.[15] In this respect the process of knowledge transfer did not necessarily follow the standard interpretation of the concept. Where actors in the knowledge transfer process are often seen as facilitating policy mobility from one place to another, in post-colonial Zambia their role was to act as gatekeepers to prevent any deviation from colonial norms and practices.

Whilst independence would have provided an ideological threshold to rethink urban planning practices, the methods and theory of planning continued under this influence from outside expertise. Whilst Home suggests that planning was valued as a means to catalogue resources, Collier and Venables suggest that governments across Africa have generally under invested in urban planning.[16] For them it was due to a 'resistance' to the process of urbanisation and fear that adopting 'lower standards' might have gone against the aspirations of the political elite.[17] However, whilst this might have some bearing, as this thesis has shown, the causes for poor planning performance in Zambia, and its lack of divergence from colonial planning policies are much more complex. In Zambia, this set up was compounded by the fact that there was neither the interest, nor the capacity to affect a meaningful change in the direction of policy and practice. Whilst there is a certain historiographical acceptance that colonial discourses impacted on post-colonial planning, less attention has been paid to tracing these continuities and threads in the way post-colonial planning continues to be enacted. Yet to understand contemporary

[15] Mwimba, 'The Colonial Legacy of Town Planning in Zambia'; Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; Berrisford, 'Revising Spatial Planning Legislation in Zambia'; Mutale, *The Management of Urban Development in Zambia*.
[16] Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities*.
[17] Collier and Venables, *Housing and Urbanization in Africa*.

urban planning in Zambia requires an appreciation of these continuities of knowledge, and the longer historic trajectories of soft power and technical assistance. This is particularly important and relevant for planning as it has been subject to repeated calls for its realignment with southern ideologies, knowledge production and theory from the South.[18] Like Home suggests, the decolonisation of town planning in Africa requires 'a better appreciation of Africa's urban past' in order that we can better 'build for the future'.[19]

Whilst current literature has accurately identified that Zambia's urban problems undoubtedly stem in large measure from the imposition of colonial ideologies, these existing works give little regard to the continuities in personnel, training and professional standards. Silva alludes to the notion of 'continuity versus rupture' in how we perceive the shift from colonial to post-colonial planning.[20] However existing literature has tended to focus on matters of policy, spatial or urban design continuities between the two periods, and the way that post-colonial cities continue to be physical manifestations of colonial planning.[21] By contrast, this study has demonstrated that it was not just colonial planning and its imposition of planning practices that affect contemporary Zambia. It argued that continuities in personnel and standards within the post-independence planning service also contributed significantly to the continuation of British planning ideologies and practices. This thesis therefore identifies how the end of colonialism in Zambia was a symbolic moment for technical assistance and planning, rather than a monumental juncture that saw the old "civilising mission" cast aside. Instead of marking a

[18] 'Provisional Agenda for the Conference of African Planners. Second Session'; Myles-Wright, Brenikov, and Powell, 'A Housing Building and Planning Mission to Northern Rhodesia'; Association of African Planning Schools, 'Conference on Revitalising Planning Education in Africa'; Parnell, Pieterse, and Watson, 'Planning for Cities in the Global South'; Watson, 'Seeing from the South'; Watson and Odendaal, 'Changing Planning Education in Africa'; S. Parnell and J. Robinson, '(Re)theorizing Cities from the Global South: Looking Beyond Neoliberalism', *Urban Geography*, 33:4 (2012), pp. 593–617.
[19] Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa', p. 64.
[20] Silva, *Urban Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa*, p.3.
[21] Myers, *Verandahs of Power*; Scholz, Robinson, and Dayaram, 'Colonial Planning Concept and Post-Colonial Realities: The Influence of British Planning Culture in Tanzania, South Africa and Ghana'; Home, 'Colonial Urban Planning in Anglophone Africa'; Rakodi, 'Colonial Urban Policy and Planning in Northern Rhodesia and Its Legacy'; Njoh, *Planning in Contemporary Africa*; T. Banerjee, 'U.S. Planning Expeditions to Postcolonial India: From Ideology to Innovation in Technical Assistance', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 75:2 (March 2009), pp. 193–208.

critical threshold, these early forms of technical assistance continued to impress on Zambia the need to conduct land planning in alignment with British standards and practices.

Scholars have questioned whether travelling planning ideas might be merely new forms of neo-colonialism, yet the use of the term "new" is somewhat misleading in the case of Zambia.[22] Whilst travelling planning ideas might in some cases act as a form of neo-colonialism, in the Zambian case there was little, if any, rupture in the flow of knowledge. As chapters three and four have demonstrated, in Zambia, travelling planning ideas have continued unchallenged and unabated since independence. Rather than these transfers opening up new routes and ideas, they merely follow well established colonial and post-colonial paths. Chapter five locates contemporary experiences within these colonial and post-colonial histories of technical assistance, and identifies the ways in which contemporary planners have to navigate the post-colonial planning landscape. It identifies how this history affects knowledge transfer through examining the mundane and everyday experiences of planners. In doing so it uncovers some of the enduring norms, values and standards that inhabit the planning system and which emerge within the complex process of knowledge transfer. This approach is influenced by Healey who calls for more people centred approaches which take into consideration 'specific experiences' acknowledging that 'process of "travelling" itself involves social interactions which may have transformative effects'. [23] In considering the actors and interactions between planning practitioners, the thesis broadens our interpretation of colonial and post-colonial periods by situating everyday actors and 'mundane practices' and knowledge transfer within the post-colonial history of Zambia.[24]

Chapter five highlighted the way in which planning happens with multiple levels of elite actors, all of whom have a specific role in the process and bring with it certain ideologies which were framed by their own experiences and knowledge. As Watson has argued, '"process" or "history"' is a crucial dimension of planners experiences', and these need to be appreciated in

[22] Healey, 'The Universal and the Contingent', p. 190.
[23] Healey, 'Circuits of Knowledge and Techniques', p. 1515, 1519.
[24] Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality', 511; McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities', p. 886.

order to produce 'mediated accounts of experience, that can be interpreted, incorporated and mobilized in the practitioner's mental repertoire of cases'.[25] Contemporary planning experts in the Zambian case, whether local or international, have to navigate both their own post-colonial histories as well as those created by their predecessors in the field. The diverse backgrounds of the actors in this case study therefore creates a complex working environment within which knowledge transfer occurs. This resonates with arguments put forward by McFarlane, that policy transfer literature has a tendency to conceive the process of transfer as a 'rational transfer of knowledge and ideas' but acknowledges, as McCann and Larner do, that knowledge transfer in planning happens within a climate of 'messy actualities'.[26]

Whilst the process of transfer was clearly seen as being worthwhile, it inevitably occurred against a backdrop of colonial and post-colonial involvement, and this played out in the everyday interactions between the volunteers and their counterparts. Like many donor funded programmes, it came laden with expectations and underlying assumptions that became contested once the 'messy actualities' of knowledge transfer emerged.[27] The volunteer planners were met with a familiar system because it was largely based on British planning, but a process of implementation that did not align with their own experiences. They were expected to instil practices which might not have institutional buy-in because of underlying ideological as well as capacity reasons. The research has uncovered how other colonial planning logics had been internalised and how these emerged in the contemporary setting. It highlighted how this cultural embeddedness might be occurring in Zambia through the internalisation of European planning practice and values. As chapter five has shown, in this case study, there was not so much a 'path dependency' based on shared interests and values, but one based on a shared history.[28] As one counterpart suggested, with such a similar system to the British, it made sense for volunteers to be of British origin as they would have familiarity with the system.[29] However, whilst this was

[25] Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning*, p. 9.
[26] McFarlane, *Learning the City*, 117; McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities', 5; Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality', p. 14.
[27] McCann, 'Expertise, Truth, and Urban Policy Mobilities', p. 5; Larner, 'Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality', p. 14.
[28] Peck, Theodore, and Brenner, 'Neoliberal Urbanism', p. 50; Rose, 'What Is Lesson-Drawing?', p. 17.
[29] Emily, Interviewed by the author.

evidenced in the way that planning has been performed in Zambia and a preference for shared practical knowledge, the shared history also emerged within the ideologies and values underpinning practice. This was particularly expressed by the way in which the volunteers were seen to hold omnipotent qualities with the ability to transform urban areas in Zambia into something that resembled cities in the West. These findings suggest that just as colonial practices set in place a framework of norms, standards, values and processes, these were subsequently reinforced by early post-colonial technical assistance and have continued into the contemporary period.[30] In addition, many of the expectations held by counterparts had been forged through the colonial period and reinforced throughout independence through the presence of overseas experts. This was evident in the way that Zambian planners had a tendency to engage in comparative urbanisms, using Britain and British planning as a reference point and as already highlighted by Mwimba in respect to plans, were grounded in 'unrealistic standards'.[31] The work of Ghertner is useful here as he identifies the process in which postcolonialism can produce an asymmetric world view, in which colonial and postcolonial discourses have been internalised to the extent where they began to 'see the city through the lens of world-class aesthetics'.[32]

This study has shown that volunteer planners, through applying their 'repertoire' of skills, can inadvertently re-produce colonial practices, and chapter five uncovered the way that this occurred in two ways.[33] First through the generalising of their roles and the way in which they adapted to suit not just the needs of the planning service but also what might be achievable, and; through providing knowledge in fields in which they were not an expert. There are two separate strands of literature which inform an analysis of this phenomenon. First the work of Tilley, Mann and Beinart *et al.* who argued that colonial experts were good at comparative ways of thinking and diversifying their knowledge, presents one strand the contemporary VSO

[30] 'Memorandum Regarding Courtesy Call from Chairman of the Zambia Public Service'; 'Telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office Representative in Lusaka on the Visit of King'; 'Letter from High Commission in Lusaka to Permanent Secretary at the ODA.'
[31] Clarke, 'Actually Existing Comparative Urbanism'; Jacobs, 'Commentary—Comparing Comparative Urbanisms'; Mwimba, '"We Will Develop without Urban Planning": How Zambia's Urban Planning Practice Is Removing Value from the Development Process', p. 2–3.
[32] Ghertner, 'Rule by Aesthetics', p. 290.
[33] Watson, *Change and Continuity in Spatial Planning*, p. 9.

volunteers adapted a 'flexible ideology' and approach to knowledge transfer. [34] Yet it would be wrong to assume that this was in some way related to a fault in the approach of the volunteers, the counterparts or any of the organisations involved. Instead the cause in this particular case might be better related to the culture of the planning profession itself and the way that planners are expected to call upon a broad skill set. As Friedmann suggests, planning is much more than just design, land use and transport, and it is perhaps the diversity and flexibility of the planning profession that Friedmann describes that lends itself to the adoption of a broad and open approach to knowledge transfer.[35]

Despite the rather dubious history of planning in Africa, the underpinning ideologies of the modern planner emerged in various ways.[36] For planning professionals, whom deal with complex social and political concerns on a daily basis, this can make them more sensitive to moral and ideological concerns surrounding urban and rural development. As Healy and Basta have argued, the action of planning is grounded in a 'moral commitment' with social justice permeating 'contemporary planning discourse'.[37] In some cases there was clearly a disjuncture between the values and ethics of volunteer planners and their counterparts, which often resulted in certain ideological contestations. This was particularly the case where volunteers debated the moral and ideological underpinnings of planning in the Global North, and how the approach that Zambian planners adopted did not necessarily align with these. Similar ideological and moral concerns arose where the volunteers expressed an awareness of, and desire to avoid neo-colonialism, they did not tend to question their own positionality within broader colonial and post-colonial histories.

It is important to recognise these historic knowledge linkages given the role that history plays in the relationship between postcoloniality, knowledge and power relations. As Foucault notes,

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[34] Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory*; Beinart, Brown, and Gilfoyle, 'Experts and Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered'; M. Mann, 'Afterword: Improvement, Progress and Development', in C. A. Watt and M. Mann, eds., *Civilizing Missions in Colonial and Postcolonial South Asia: From Improvement to Development*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 323.

[35] Friedmann, *'Globalization and the emerging culture of planning.*

[36] Myers, *Verandahs of Power*; Njoh, *Planning Power Town Planning and Social Control in Colonial Africa*; Home, *Of Planting and Planning: The Making of British Colonial Cities.*

[37] Healey, 'Collaborative Planning in Perspective', p. 105; C. Basta, 'From Justice in Planning toward Planning for Justice: A Capability Approach', *Planning Theory*, 15:2 (May 2016), p. 192.

power and knowledge are closely related, occupying a symbiotic relationship where one cannot exist without the other.[38] This study has highlighted how the very act of using knowledge through technical assistance to influence post-colonial Zambia in order to establish or maintain influence, was a move that both sought and used power. Zambia was also left reliant upon these programs by the British. This was because, by virtue of the sheer scale of British technical assistance, the lack of skilled manpower at independence and the reliance on British education meant that Zambia was bound by a reliance on British, or British trained staff. Ultimately Britain had used its existing colonial knowledge and influence in Zambia as a means to further post-colonial influence and power, and this had a profound impact on the way in which Zambia could diverge from British ways of doing things. Sachs building on the work of Foucault, argues that knowledge controls and directs the attention of recipients, 'casting into oblivion other ways of relating to the world around us'.[39] In this respect, the British presence in Zambia after independence retained focus on British norms, values and standards and hindered the generation of new ideas that might be more relevant to Zambia.

Despite the power vested in, and the reverence by which volunteers were treated, as this thesis has demonstrated, significant knowledge was held by local counterparts. Contestations over knowledge became apparent where a volunteer might be reliant upon such local knowledge before they were able to apply their own skills. Where volunteers had been met with animosity, or perceived a reluctance to engage in the process, they were rendered powerless, with their knowledge being considered of little use. It is here in these interactions between external experts and the local population that a tripartite relationship between knowledge, power and control becomes apparent. This notion of contestation in knowledge transfer speaks to broader themes identified by Cooper and Packard, who have argued that historically, knowledge might not necessarily follow a linear flow but can often be met with 'appropriations, deflections and challenges'.[40]

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[38] Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
[39] Sachs, 'Introduction', p. xix.
[40] Cooper and Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences*. p.10.

The way in which volunteers and counterparts viewed through their respective North/South lenses also revealed knowledge contestations. Whilst the volunteer planners did not envisage a South-North flow occurring as a result of their time in Zambia, they did come away with altered views of Zambia itself. This reflects Sanyal's 'colonial notion' of North-South knowledge transfer, but also resonates with earlier Zambian attitudes towards VSO technical assistance which had eventually come to be seen as beneficial public relations for the host country.[41] In this way, knowledge does flow from South-North, but not necessarily in the way that might typically be imagined and conversely, the counterparts expressed a desire for their professional knowledge to be recognised and valued by the Global North. If, as Comaroff and Comaroff suggest, that the Global North is 'evolving' towards the Global South, then planners in the North might be advised to take heed of such Southern knowledge.[42]

In the first instance, this thesis has taken steps to document the complex history of planning knowledge transfer in Zambia. In doing so it has also addressed a smaller number of no less significant interrelated problems including; power and knowledge relationships in early post-colonial technical assistance; the significance that early post-colonial technical assistance played in planning practice; the complexity of the knowledge transfer process and; the way that planning histories and planner histories can have a profound impact on contemporary knowledge transfer. This thesis has sought to bridge the scholarly gap in the understanding of how historic ties impact on the way in which planning knowledge travels from one place to another, through focusing on Zambia in the period 1962 to 2015. It has shown that post-independence, relationships of power might surge in different ways, they are imperial in nature but can operate without the baggage of the colonial label. Yet as has been argued, the conventional historiography and post-colonial knowledge transfer literature has not sufficiently addressed the complexities between colonial ideologies, post-colonial technical assistance, and everyday planning practices in Zambia. Watson amongst others, for example, frames postcolonial planning as 'adopted from colonial governments' or 'adopted from Northern

[41] Sanyal, 'Knowledge Transfer from Poor to Rich Cities: A New Turn of Events', 31.
[42] J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, 'Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America Is Evolving Toward Africa', *Anthropological Forum*, 22:2 (June 2012), p. 20.

contexts', but this fails to acknowledge the efforts of former colonial governments in maintaining the status quo after independence, as well as the significance this might have on planning today.[43] Similarly, Ward has focussed on international organisations and the way that new planning ideas were spread via technical elites but this does not take into account the role of the everyday planners that were retained or recruited into government departments.[44] Whilst such elites were an important aspect of post-colonial knowledge transfer, to focus solely on their role is to negate a critical element of technical assistance and the role that this might have played in the continuity and further embedding of British planning ideologies. Similarly whilst King asserted that the transfer of planning from Britain to its colonies is a field 'of immense importance for present-day planning practice', as this thesis has demonstrated, the significance of British planning influence extends far beyond the colonial period.[45] In tracing these continuities of colonialism through into the post-colonial period, this thesis has demonstrated the centrality of history to contemporary planning practices and sheds new light on the significant role that bi-lateral post-colonial technical assistance had in further embedding colonial practices. As well as providing further detail on the nature and form of knowledge transfer planning between the Global North and the Global South, this thesis also adds to literature which examines the role that post-colonial planners played in early nation building. In doing so, it has highlighted the extent to which everyday mundane government activities were shaped by western experts long after colonialism had formally ended.

The continued focus on aid as a means of 'soft power' alongside the growing convergence of British development aid and knowledge production, draws into sharp focus the role that northern technical assistance and knowledge transfer plays in the Global South.[46] This thesis has demonstrated that for planning, whilst continuities exist in a spatial sense, they also exist within the everyday norms, values and standards that contemporary planning in Africa is based

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[43] Watson, 'Seeing from the South', 2260; Njoh, *Planning in Contemporary Africa*.
[44] Ward, 'Transnational Planners in a Postcolonial World'.
[45] King, 'Exporting Planning: The Colonial and the Neo-Colonial Experience', p. 204.
[46] Department for International Development, *DFID Research Review* (London, October 2016); *Spending Review and Autumn Statement*, (2015), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm151125/debtext/151125-0001.htm#15112551000883, accessed 15 January 2016.

upon. However with a long history of post-colonial technical assistance from China and a growing interest in urban planning and development technical assistance from the East, this opens up potential new avenues for assessing the impact that non British, or non-western technical assistance might have in Zambia.[47] Yet the future, however, also represents some challenges if the narrative of South-South cooperation or 'seeing from the South' is to gain traction.[48] The underpinning ideologies of planning and urban development in Zambia are in need of radical realignment, but this is unlikely to happen until it learns to cast its gaze to the South, and cast aside the aspirations and practices associated with its colonial past. This thesis, however, goes some way to pinpointing how scholars seeking to re-orientate the production of planning knowledge to the Global South, need to seek a greater understanding of the insidious ways in which planning continues to be influenced by colonial norms. In doing so, this thesis opens up space for more comprehensive conversations between scholars of planning history, technical assistance and planning knowledge transfer.

[47] C. Mumba, 'New Capital City Approved – Kalaba', *Zambia Daily Mail*, 5 October 2016, https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/?p=81612, accessed 28 February 2017.
[48] Watson, 'Seeing from the South'.

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Appendix A

Table 3. History of Zambian planning legislation

Year	Event
1891	British South Africa Company responsible for Northern Rhodesia
1889	British South African Company Charter required the promotion of good government
1907	Livingstone becomes capital of Northern Rhodesia (previously Kalomo).
1907	Village Management Boards Ordinance
1908	First social infrastructure at Lusaka Halt
1913	Village Management Board set up in Lusaka
1924	Northern Rhodesia becomes British Protectorate
1927	Municipal Corporations Ordinance
1929	Township Ordinance
1929	Town Planning Ordinance
1930	Public Health Ordinance
1933	Mine township ordinance
1935	Lusaka declared open
1937	Division of Northern Rhodesia into seven provinces
Mid 1930s	African Urban Councils established
1948	Urban African Housing Ordinance
1949	Local Government Act
1953	Formation of the Federation
1958	Town Planning Varying Scheme
1958	Planning service established in Northern Rhodesia
1960	Lusaka declared a city
1961	Town and Country Planning Act.
1964	Zambian independence
1965	Local Government Acts
1976	Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act
1995	Town and Country Planning Act (revised)
2015	The Urban and Regional Planning Act

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