

b138 242 35

U.O.V.S. BIBLIOTEEK

HIERDIE EKSEMPLAAR MAG ONDER  
GEEN OMSTANDIGHED E UIT DIE  
BIBLIOTEEK VERWYDER WORD NIE

University Free State



34300000352009

Universiteit Vrystaat

**A POLITICAL ALLIANCE IN GOVERNANCE IN THE  
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

**BY**

**MOKOPANE MOSHABESHA**

**THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENT FOR THE DOCTORAL DEGREE IN  
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT**

**IN**

**THE FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT  
SCIENCES**

**(DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT)**

**AT**

**THE UNIVERSITY OF FREE STATE**

**PROMOTER: PROFESSOR J.C.O. BEKKER**

**CO-PROMOTER: PROFESSOR D. P. WESSELS**

**BLOEMFONTEIN  
MARCH 2000**

## CONTENTS

<b>Acknowledgements.....</b>		<b>iv</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1:</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Issues and Overview.....	1
1.2	Statement of the Problem.....	3
1.3	Purpose of the Study .....	4
1.4	Significance of the Study .....	4
1.5	Limitation of the Study.....	5
1.6	Methodology .....	6
1.7	Explanation of Terms.....	7
1.8	Scope of the Study .....	7
1.9	Conclusion .....	8
<b>CHAPTER 2:</b>	<b>POLITICAL IMPACT OF POLITICAL ALLIANCES ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.....</b>	<b>10</b>
2.1	Introduction.....	10
2.2	Code of Ethics.....	11
2.3	Transparency and Openness.....	15
2.4	Accountability and Performance.....	17
2.5	Professionalism.....	22
2.6	Control.....	25
2.7	Coordination.....	29
	2.7.1 Unity of Command.....	30
	2.7.2 Rationalization of Resources.....	31
	2.7.3 Consultative Mechanisms.....	32
2.8	Industrial Relations.....	35
2.9	Conclusion .....	39
<b>CHAPTER 3:</b>	<b>EFFECT OF POLITICAL ALLIANCES ON POLITICAL SYSTEMS.....</b>	<b>40</b>
3.1	Introduction.....	40
3.2	Public Policy-Making.....	42
3.3	Individual Rights and Grassroots Participation.....	46
3.4	Law and Order.....	51
3.5	Collective Responsibility.....	54
3.6	Checks and Balances.....	56
3.7	Political Stability.....	60
	3.7.1 Empowerment.....	61
	3.7.2 Representation of Groups in the Political Process .....	62
	3.7.3 Relationship between Government and The Media.....	63
3.8	Conclusion .....	65
<b>CHAPTER 4:</b>	<b>CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ANC-SACP-COSATU ALLIANCE.....</b>	<b>66</b>
4.1	Introduction.....	66
4.2	Political Parties and Alliances.....	66

	4.3	Factors Influencing Formation of Political Alliances	72
	4.4	Objectives of Political Alliances.....	75
	4.5	Comparisons and Contrasts.....	76
	4.6	Formation of the Tripartite Alliance .....	78
	4.7	Terms of Reference .....	81
	4.8	Objectives of the Alliance .....	86
	4.9	Achievements of the Alliance .....	89
	4.10	Constraints .....	91
	4.11	Conclusion .....	93
<b>CHAPTER</b>	<b>5:</b>	<b>MEANING OF GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA.....</b>	<b>94</b>
	5.1	Introduction.....	94
	5.2	Definition.....	94
	5.3	Context of Governance.....	96
	5.4	Legitimacy of the State.....	97
	5.5	Efficiency and Effectiveness.....	100
	5.6	Relationship between Government and Citizens...	104
	5.7	Representation and Checks.....	107
	5.8	Intergovernmental Relationships.....	110
	5.9	Conclusion .....	113
<b>CHAPTER</b>	<b>6:</b>	<b>IMPACT OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ON GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA.....</b>	<b>114</b>
	6.1	Introduction.....	114
	6.2	Public Policy Analysis.....	115
	6.3	Public Service Delivery.....	118
	6.4	Transformation.....	121
		6.4.1 Public Service Reforms.....	121
		6.4.2 Macro-Economic Restructuring.....	124
	6.5	Corruption.....	127
	6.6	Planning and Financial Management.....	131
	6.7	Conclusion .....	135
<b>CHAPTER</b>	<b>7:</b>	<b>IMPACT OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ON GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE.....</b>	<b>136</b>
	7.1	Introduction.....	136
	7.2	Globalization.....	137
	7.3	Regionalization.....	142
		7.3.1 Definition.....	142
		7.3.2 Context of Regionalization.....	144
		7.3.3 SADC Trade Protocol.....	145
		7.3.4 General Coordination.....	148
	7.4	Competitiveness.....	149
	7.5	Foreign Investment.....	150
	7.6	Conclusion .....	153
<b>CHAPTER</b>	<b>8:</b>	<b>CONCLUSION AND OBSERVATIONS.....</b>	<b>155</b>
	8.1	Introduction.....	155
	8.2	Dynamics of Political alliances on Governance	156

8.2.1	Rationale and status of Political Alliances in Governance.....	156
8.2.2	Institutional Factors in Public Policy Making Endeavours.....	158
8.3	Contemporary realities of governance in a multi- party democracy.....	160
8.3	Uniqueness of the ANC-SACP COSATU Alliance	161
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>		<b>164</b>

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In almost every scholarly venture, there are several perspectives and distinct contributions from innumerable scholars, individuals and organizations to be acknowledged. This gesture, though professionally obligatory on the one hand, is also a personal appreciation of the researcher to the individuals concerned, for the impact made in the study by their work, on the other.

In the light of this reality, I wish to register my indebtedness to the scores of scholars, professionals, organizations and individuals whose contribution have been cited throughout the study. Doubtlessly, the successful production of this research report would have been an impossible task without their individual and collective contributions. Unavoidably, given the obvious constraint of space to acknowledge them individually, it suffices to say thank you for your valuable help.

Having said that, I do, however, want to personally acknowledge the essential guidance and professional expertise given by my promoter and co-promoter, Professor J.C.O. Bekker of the Department of Public Management and Professor D.P. Wessels of the Department of Political Science respectively, in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences. As it were, their guidance was, indeed, intellectually stimulating and superbly professional in terms of focus and the issues to be addressed. I am, therefore, grateful to them in this regard.

The support given by many friends at the University of Free State will remain indelible in my heart, as their encouragement provided a strong motivation throughout the project.

I owe special thanks to Mrs M. Lekau and Miss M. Ntepe respectively for their patience in the typing of the document.

Finally and most important, I am greatly indebted to my family for their enduring tolerance and moral support. In particular, Mamabuiso Julia Moshabesha has been totally supportive through sacrifices imposed on her by the demands of this project.

Mokopane Moshabesha

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Issues and Overview

Not surprisingly, a world-wide trend towards a multi-party democracy as a major theme of governance in contemporary public administration has been quite phenomenal. This inclination is not accidental but rather a conscious response by the inhabitants of the earth to the socio-economic and political realities of the twentieth century, and hopefully beyond. As the enhancement of human rights and the need for collective responsibility in public policy making endeavors become more articulated, cooperation among political parties in pursuit of societal well being is mandatory. Consequently, the inevitability of political alliances between political and social organizations in government remains unavoidable.

With this development, the impact of these alliances on governance is being increasingly subjected to scrutiny, both as an academic exercise and a social phenomenon. In this regard, one of the consistently debatable issues is the extent to which a political alliance is seen as facilitative of good governance or otherwise. Unavoidably, South Africa, as an emerging multi-party democratic state with peculiar circumstances of multi-culturalism, wide ranging socio-economic challenges and divergent ideological inclinations, has not been unaffected by this reality. This is the fundamental theme of this proposal.

In the thesis, it is proposed to explore, through an in-depth comparative analysis, the impact of a political alliance between political parties on governance with particular reference to South Africa. In this regard, the alliance between the African national Congress (ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) on governance is the focus of the study. Among the questions to be investigated, the following are

noteworthy. What political impact does a political alliance have on public administration? How does a political alliance affect a political system of a state in terms of public policy making processes law and stability, representation, grassroots participation, accountability, competitiveness, globalise and several other factors that are related with good governance? Furthermore and most importantly, given the scope and complexity of public administration in an extremely volatile situation, what effect does a political alliance have on the general stability and govern ability of diverse population groups. These and other related questions, will be extensively explored in the study.

At the time when the South African political leadership is faced with an enormous task of ending the humiliating absurdity in which the country is seemingly endowed with wealth and opportunities but the majority of its people are poor and getting poorer, when the expectation for employment-generating growth is a national priority and when, above all, among the major stakeholders in governance, the issues of crime, budgetary constraints, corruption and social stability are uppermost in peoples minds, does a political alliance facilitate or obstruct good governance?

Given the importance of a multi-party democracy as ideal form of government for political stability and general welfare (Bhagwati 1995:59) governance is, undeniably, an underlying concept among comparative perspectives from which the results of this study will be viewed. In this regard, the concept will be analysed in its broad dimension which, inter alia, includes a network of interrelationships between public officials and the general population on matters relating to the form and use of political power for the purposes of law and order, social welfare, economic welfare and numerous other government functions (World Bank 1992 54-55). Implicit in this dimension, are administrative interrelationships for public policy making, responsiveness to people's socio-economic needs, sound fiscal and financial management, transparency, rule of law, accountability, interdependence, absence of corruption and effective security measures on the part of the state and its functionaries.

From the South African viewpoint in particular, the concept of governance covers areas such as constitutional provisions for the effective administration of the state, government power and ability to deal satisfactorily with all mandated functions and problems such as crime, unemployment, payment (services) boycotts, implementation of macro-economic policies, corruption in government institutions and many others.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

Despite its majority of seats in Parliament following the 1994 general election, the ANC-led Alliance has come under increasing criticism for what is perceived as ineffectiveness in governance ever since it came to power. There are many reasons for this criticism. First, the alliance between the ANC, SACP and COSATU is seen as obstructive to good governance (Nyatumba 1996:16). Second, government inability to secure consensus among its alliance partners on key economic and social policies including the growth, employment and redistribution (GEAR) and privatization, is widely viewed as a major impediment to economic growth (Mahlabe 1997:9). Third, the scale and complexity of provincial mismanagement as reported in the recent revelations about fraud and corruption in some provincial governments, is suggestive of government inability to manage its affairs effectively and efficiently (The Economist 1998:45). Fourth, a contradictory official pronouncements by alliance partners on key policy issues, is indicative of lack of coherence about policy initiatives.

A combination of these reasons and several others is, indeed, reflective of a more fundamental problem of governance wherein, government institutional machinery for public administration seems defective. Over and above that, the social unrest manifested through wide spread incidents of crime, armed robberies, labour unrests and disputes, inclusive of paralysis in service deliveries in the townships, can be attributed to the general problem of lack of consensus and accountability on the part of the political functionaries for a common

vision and approach about national priorities. Hence questionable governance.

### **1.3 Purpose of the study**

Because of the importance of governance for an effective public administration in a democratic dispensation, the purpose of this study will be:

- to examine the underlying socio-economic and political factors in the formation of political alliances or coalitions.
- to assess the impact of a political alliance on public administration.
- to analyze the impact of a political alliance on political systems with particular reference to South Africa.
- to analyse the impact of a political alliance on governance in South Africa from 1994 to 1999.

### **1.4 Significance of the study**

The significance of the proposed study lies mainly on the following factors:

- The underlying factors for good governance or otherwise in political alliances.
- The discovery of the truth behind the seemingly complex and restrictive tri-partite alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU on governance in South Africa.
- The success or otherwise of the strategy of political alliance within a multi-party government.

In the context of the emerging multi-party democracy in South Africa, numerous challenges and perspectives are identifiable. First, with a total of nineteen political parties that contested the first general election under a multi-party democracy in 1994, immense opportunities

for coalitions and alliances are quite inevitable. Consequently, the phenomenon of political alliances may well remain a permanent feature of public administration in South Africa. Second, given the impact of proportional electoral system on coalition bargaining according to Laver and Budget (1992:11), political alliances to become unavoidable strategies for securing political influence on policy-making. Third, as the issues of macro-economic planning, provincial and municipal budget over-runs, jobless growth, and others become more articulated and urgent, the ANC led Alliance will increasingly be put to test for consensus and decisiveness. This challenge could well precipitate a political and social instability through conflict in outlook and political expediencies amongst the partners, in the long run. Hence a negative impact on governance. Fourth, the disguised representativity of the constituent partners in the Alliance is highly contentious with regard to who really calls the tune. Is it the ANC per se or a question of voting amongst the members for decision making? This becomes even more complex in the light of the dual membership of both the rank and file and leadership in the three parties. Not surprisingly, the alleged disproportionate influence of the SACP and ANC policy (Vick 1997:9) is indicative of some discomfort within the Alliance, particularly on issues relating to policy making. The seemingly disagreements amongst the partners on macro-economic policies, transformation, job creation and many others is a pointer to a tension in the Alliance.

Notwithstanding the supervision of unexpected events for the policy pledges made to the electorate before the elections, the effect of a political alliance on governance cannot be unexpected; be it positive or otherwise.

In this study, it is proposed to make a comparative analysis between experiences outside South Africa with what obtains inside in order to draw some parallels and thereby come up with relevant innovative devices for public administration enrichment.

### **1.5 Limitation of the study**

The controversy of the topic in terms of the apparent tension amongst the partners in the Alliance, will affect the smooth availability of information. Second, inconclusive perceptions due the shortness of time frame, could affect the overall picture of the study in terms of trends, reliability and status quo.

Third, with the 1999 election campaign gaining momentum, major shifts in policy initiatives can be expected amongst the constituent members of the Alliance. Undoubtedly, this will have profound effect on the on-going programmes, and hence implications for unexpected outcomes and biases.

Regarding the logistics in the conduct of the study, several constraints can be expected. First, some opinions and outlooks from individual members in the respective organizations will pose a problem with regard to authenticity. This will certainly apply to cases where such persons hold dual membership in those organizations. Second, the process of obtaining first and reliable information for verification will not be an easy one, given the pressure of election campaign.

Finally, the impending court cases on corruption charges among some officials could necessitate deferments of outcomes. Consequently, this may result in inconclusive evidence about the actuality of conditions.

## **1.6 Methodology**

Given the nature of the study which is basically descriptive and therefore analytical in approach, wherein a complex network of interrelationships amongst numerous organizations (public and private) will be deeply probed, the main instrument of this study will comprise the following:

Records, books, journals, policy papers, legislation, articles, official documents, newspapers, video tapes theses, dissertations, party manifestos and any other relevant publications.

## **1.6 Explanation of terms**

Alliance- For the purpose of this study, the term alliance refers to a temporary 'loose association of political parties or other groups in society for the purpose of achieving some specific goal(s) within a given political system or social environment (Readers Digest Dictionary).

Governance – As indicated above under the introduction, governance can be defined briefly as a process of interrelationship between government functionaries on the one hand and the general population on the other, on matters pertaining to the provision of goods, services and the general welfare, through specific institutional logistics including the legislature, administrative units and several others. Being essentially an interactive process, governance entails legitimacy on the part of the government and the willingness of the governed to play an active role jointly with the government in pursuit of the common good. It is thus a reciprocal process within a socio-economic and political environment.

## **1.8 Scope of the study**

In the context of the proposal, the meaning of political alliance in a multi-party democracy is a key factor of focus. In this regard, therefore, an in-depth analysis of political alliances will be pursued. Some comparisons and contrasts will be drawn from different countries across the globe on socio-economic factors responsible for the formation of alliances, in the first instance. Second, the extent to which these alliances impact on public administration and how they affect the general political system of the countries concerned will also be analysed.

Third, given Kickert's (1997:735) perspective about governance, wherein government is highly crucial, and extends beyond organizational matters to many different actors in society, different dimensions of governance dictates an extensive exploration. In this instance, certain models of multi-party government will be analysed in terms of the following criteria of norms and values as suggested by

Harmon and Mayor (Harmon and Mayor 1986, quoted by Kickert 1997:735).

- Efficiency and effectiveness concerning the functioning of government itself and the production and distribution of goods and services.
- Individual rights and the adequacy of the government process concerning the relationship between government and citizens.
- Representation and power checks concerning public scrutiny of the functioning of government.

These three criteria, being some of the essential requirements of public governance, are of vital importance in the characterisation of a multi-party democracy. Undoubtedly, their fulfillment will broaden the understanding of how governance operates under a multi-party democracy. With this background and analysis, some common ground and generalizations can be facilitated for comparative purposes between global experiences and what obtains in South Africa specifically.

Last and most importantly, the main focus of the study will be an in-depth analysis of the Tripartite Alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU on governance in South Africa from 1994 to 1998. This analysis entails, an extensive focus on the process of period in question. For the sake of clarify, Kicket's (1997:735) definition of public governance is presumed, namely, "the management of complex networks consisting of many different actors from the national, provincial and local government, political and societal groups, pressure, action and interest groups, societal institutions, private and business organizations" in the provision of goods, services, stability and general welfare.

## **1.9 Conclusion**

In the course of their socio-economic and political development, societies are often faced with the most peculiar and complex challenges of adjustment, rationalization and transformation. This

phenomenon is global in scope and exceedingly perplexing, particularly in the majority of the emerging multi-party democracies in Africa. In this regard, the issue of governance tends to be highly provocative and more debatable in the context of unique circumstances of limited experience in government, wide ranging development challenges and divergent ideological perspectives among the stakeholders in government. Hence the complexity of the task of ensuring adjustment, rationalisation and effecting transformation for meaningful development.

In the context of the South Africa's emerging multi-party democracy, a unique challenge has been provided for scholarly investigation and analysis. Hence the motivation of this study.

## CHAPTER 2

### POLITICAL IMPACT OF POLITICAL ALLIANCES ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter an overview of the pertinent issues of the study was made, with the view to putting the analysis into some perspective. This chapter examines the nature of political impact of political alliances on public administration, concentrating particularly on the essential requirements of public service in a multi-party democracy.

Professionalisation of public administration through the development of specialized interest and a field of systematic academic inquiry over the years is universally acknowledged. This trend, *inter alia*, has facilitated further research and scrutiny into the nature of the discipline in terms of its relationship with the state on the one hand and society at large on the other. Accordingly, given its political context whereby public decisions are presumed to be undertaken by decision makers in the political system (Heady 1966:2), public administration is by and large a product of complex interplay of socio-economic and political factors. Understandably, these factors are highly dynamic and wide ranging in scope. For example, they range from the recognition of the will of the people as a basis of all government (Thomas Jefferson as paraphrased by Dumbauld 1966:110) to the importance of continuous consultation between political office bearers and other stakeholders in governance; and from the imperative of bureaucratic transparency and openness to a balanced participation of all concerned parties in public policy-making endeavours; from a need for a shared political leadership to a common understanding about the state prerogative to raise revenue for the common good.

In this scenario, the role and impact of political parties and alliances on public administration is quite considerable and thus worthy of special attention. In the light of this perspective, the examination proposed here will be both from the theoretical and practical point of view. Admittedly, the diversity of administrative systems globally and the range of issues involved, does, impose a restriction on the scope of the examination. For this reason, it is intended to confine the attention to what is here considered as the essential criteria of good governance, relative to the image and functions of public service, namely, code of ethics, transparency and openness, accountability and performance, professionalism, control, co-ordination industrial relations. The examination will thus be made within the framework of public expectations.

## **2.2 Code of Ethics**

The integrity of public institutions and their personnel is one of the critical elements of government and public administration in a contemporary democratic state. As these two entities touch everybody, people's expectations for certain values and ethical conduct among public functionaries is both legitimate and inevitable. Again, with the inseparability of politics and public administration in government as noted above, the impact of political alliances on public administration becomes quite relevant and unavoidably perplexing.

Since the subject of ethics is both pervasive and complex, through many obstacles to achieving high ethical performance and diversity in ethical issues and mechanisms from one country to another, a consensus regarding a universal code of ethics for public administration is somewhat problematic (Kernaghan 1997:291). Consequently, perspectives and experiences differ in this regard.

Nonetheless, some reflections about its nature may facilitate a better understanding of the subject. First, ethics by definition pertains to an evaluation of the behaviour of public functionaries according to public interest and ideals (Van der Waldt and Helmbold 1995:158).

This characteristic entails an intricate network of relationships between government officials and the public at large on a variety of issues relating to conduct in the performance of duties. Bowman and Williams (1997:519) describe these relationships as follows: "since many decisions in government must supersede personnel preferences, there is little doubt that individual actions can be affected by an institution's written policies and unwritten expectations." In other words, the behaviour of public officials is largely determined by societal criteria of good morality and general expectations. Without doubt, these are not easy kind of relationships.

Second, ethics are essentially problematic as they tend to pose serious dilemmas for the people concerned. For example, there is always the dilemma of reconciling civil servant obligations with his/her personal conscience (Hunt 1994:14). By way of illustration, a civil servant or public functionary may be compelled to pursue a particular line of action in terms of his/her official duties but at the same time have the feeling that such an action is morally improper or against his/her own principles as a person. This becomes a bit problematic.

Third, ethics are relative and thus subject to different interpretations according to circumstances. Given the dynamics of public policy making and the inherent changeability of government rules and regulations, the impact of changes on ethics becomes unavoidable. Hence a shift on the code of ethics. No wonder that, in certain circumstances which may dictate discretionary decision power and without prior clearance or consultations with superiors, official actions, though seemingly justifiable, could easily precipitate undesirable consequences in some instances. A classical example in this regard is the issue of the Sarafina 2 scandal, pertaining to the Department of Health in South Africa. In this particular instance, an unauthorised expenditure was made in pursuance of a given policy. However, as the drama unfolded, huge sums of money were subsequently unaccounted for (Business Day 1 March 1989:16).

In short, the discretionary power of some officials went beyond the limit of tolerance and thereby posed a serious ethical dilemma in

public expenditure. From the above cited example, there is no doubt about the complexity and pervasiveness of the subject of code of ethics.

Regarding the impact of political alliances on public administration in general and code of ethics in particular, the following is generally observable:

First, from its description as comprising a combination of separate units with the implication of the presence of an alternative and opposition, alliances main preoccupation in government is with choices, values and issues. This is irrespective of whether the alliance is outside or in government as coalition. Unavoidably, such a pre-occupation, being mostly in the public domain necessitates intensive debates on the merits and demerits of alternative policies or guidelines for ethical conduct. It is through this process of search for societal well being by political alliances that a consensus may emerge on how a given public administrative system should be organised to achieve effectiveness, impartiality and equitability in pursuit of its mission in society.

Second, political alliances, by virtue of their community representativeness through interest groups, different ideologies and societal objectives, are facilitative of societal agreement on special criteria about ethical conduct. Accordingly, as Hunt (1994:15) rightly observes, "civil service ethics in relation to openness are determined by the political culture of the country concerned." Quite implicitly, political culture involves both the diverse institutions and decision-making processes relating to policy formulation, inclusive of political alliances. Furthermore, given the fundamental importance of ethical considerations to the quality of democracy and public administration, it is through the inter party competition and co-operation within alliances that meaningful and sustainable consensus can be reached on civil service ethics (Bowman and Williams 1997:517).

Over and above that, as the survival of both individuals (including interest groups) and governments depends on the outputs of public policy in most democracies (Ouma 1997:476), the shared

political responsibility of partners within alliances is conducive to tolerance and stability - two of the most vital ingredients of ethical standards in government and public administration. From the point of view of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance, it is the broad diversity in outlook which provides a good base among its membership for intensive debates that promote tolerance and stability, through restraint and compromise. Theoretically, therefore, disposition towards consensus as evidenced by prolonged debates on issues such as, for example, working conditions, privatization and job creation, ultimately provides a common ground for guidelines on civil service professionalism and appropriate code of ethics.

Certain aspects of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 such as certificate of service, notice of termination and child labour, for example, are reflective of this condition, particularly as viewed against the background of the seemingly protracted deliberations by the stakeholders, prior to its promulgation. With the above outcome mainly ascribable to the joint consultations between the parties concerned, the statutory consultative mechanisms for public policy making in South Africa has, doubtlessly, provided an impetus to tolerance and stability.

From another perspective, a similar case obtains in the Federal Republic of Germany's coalition governments. As Klingermann and Volkens (1992:195) indicate, through the bargaining process among coalition partners on questions relating to policies and their goals and division of personnel in the ministries, a broad spectrum of politicians and staff are included in decision making. This is particularly true as intensive debates take place on diverse policy questions in committees and subcommittees.

With the management of human resources moving to the centre stage in all public services from the 1980s (Harrison and Politt 1992:132), developing countries like South Africa cannot remain indifferent to the challenge of developing human resource strategies with particular emphasis on ethics.. Unavoidably, this challenge, which is seemingly more prompted by the crumbling ethical foundation and

professional standards of administration, dictates closer co-operation and unity of purpose amongst the stakeholders (Braibant 1996:171). In this regard, any consultative forum between the government and its alliance partners does, indeed, facilitate social and administrative ethics based on collectivism.

### **2.3 Transparency and openness**

As the central theme of democracy dictates that government should be constantly accountable and responsible to the people for its actions, (Bourn 1979:174) it stands to reason that people are, indeed, the source of all political authority, as noted above. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon all government political and administrative institutions to remain transparent and open in their respective functions. Transparency and openness for political and administrative institutions is concerned with lack of secrecy on all matters pertaining to government activities. The public must, therefore, be knowledgeable about the way in which decisions are made, the rationale behind those decisions and have the necessary information to enable it to participate meaningfully in the public policy making process. The Department of Public Service and Administration in South Africa describes this condition quite distinctly through the "Sixth Principle" of the "People First" transformation of service delivery process, namely that people should be told how national and provincial departments are run, how much they cost and who is in charge (Republic of South Africa 1997:16). By implication, therefore, all government institutions are to be subjected to public scrutiny in terms of their operations, finance, staffing and general responsibilities. The imperative for transparency and openness thus become unavoidable.

As transgression is often a misfortune of human nature, adherence to the requirement of transparency and openness by public officials dictates institutionalisation of peoples monitoring mechanisms. Consequently, through devices such as the media, interest and pressure groups, constitutional bodies like the Judiciary, Public

Protector, Auditor General and other non-governmental organisations (NGO's), political parties and their alliances, government transparency and openness is seemingly facilitated (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108/1996). However, for the purposes of this study, it is with the latter that the main focus will be directed, relative to how they impact on government transparency and openness.

Few groups can have so profound an impact on the course of public affairs as political alliances, according to the results of the study so far. Through their broad spectrum of community representativeness of interests, professions and ideologies, political alliances have a broad knowledge and unique influence in policy making endeavours, both locally and provincially. Indeed, without their input and advice hardly an acceptable single policy decision can be reached by government agencies. The South African ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance's relationship with government provides a good example in this regard. For instance, despite government insistence that the macro-economic policy of growth, employment and redistribution (GEAR) is non-negotiable, it could not take a unilateral decision regarding its implementation, following the divergent perspectives from the other partners in the alliance (Trevor Manuel as quoted by Hartley 1997:24). It, therefore, came as no surprise that the policy had to be temporarily suspended in the face of the lack of support amongst the partners in the Alliance. As a consequence of this unique status, government actions relating to policy making have frequently been conducted openly and transparently, through the Parliamentary Committee System and other statutory consultative mechanisms, as noted above.

The reason for this requirement is quite obvious and understandable. It is to facilitate, constructive interaction among all stakeholders in public policy making. Admittedly, with each constituent member of the alliance as an indispensable part of a single whole, there cannot be any secretive dealings. The logic and inevitability of transparency and openness on the part of both the administrative and executive arm of the government, therefore, becomes imperative.

Further more, as political alliances are invariably representative of diverse social groups and thus publicly accountable in the final analysis, it behoves the public service to be more open and transparent in its interactions with the general public. This posture is of vital importance because the public service, in terms of its mandate, is obliged to uphold the values and ethics of impartiality, integrity and objectivity - all of which can only be evaluated through open public scrutiny. The South African experience in this regard is both unique and exemplary. For example, most public deliberations relating to economic development and labour/business relations since 1994 general election have, undoubtedly, been subjected to intensive inter party negotiations and politicking. Within the statutory consultative forum between business, labour, government and community organisations, including members of the tripartite alliance, known as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), government intended policies are openly debated, commended upon and critically examined by the major stakeholders (Lawlor 1997:2).

The innovative device of NEDLAC, a mechanism for government openness and transparency in public policy making, has been at the disposal of the Alliance for collective decision making and consensus regarding the mandate of public administration. Irrespective of the Alliance failure to reach consensus on a variety of issues concerning the economy, the necessity of an open and transparent forum cannot be taken for granted.

Finally, despite the protracted cold war struggle amongst the conflicting interests from both within the Alliance and outside, the reality and consequence of openness and transparency as a political impact on public administration is well entrenched.

## **2.4 Accountability and Performance**

With accountability and performance constituting one of the main criteria of measurement for a responsive public service and good governance, the impact of political alliances on these is worth some

scrutiny. For clarity sake, the two concepts, though functionally related, will be treated separately. However, in the ensuing analysis the two will be taken together and thus treated as one, particularly with regard to how political alliances impact upon them.

Starting first with accountability, Ennis (1966:17) defines it as a liability for a subordinate to give an account for the way in which powers and duties given to him/her by the superior have been discharged. Essentially therefore, accountability relates to answerability by a subordinate in respect of duties assigned. From the public service perspective, public accountability, by and large, takes two forms in Stewart and Ranson's view as paraphrased by Quirk (1997:580), namely being held to account and giving an account. Meaning an obligation to carry out assigned duty and reporting back. With the public service being composed of a network of agencies, mechanisms, processes, relationships and structures of authority, it is important to note that public accountability is, unavoidably, manifested through the process of politics which by definition, is a decision-making process. Hence the notion of political accountability. The latter, according to Quirk (1997: 580 - 581) has two distinct aspects. The first being the well-known democratic mechanism of accountability between political office bearers and citizens. Being commonly found in the majority of multi-party democracies, this form of accountability is effected through periodic elections, referenda and questions directed to Ministers in Parliament. In this scenario, politicians as appointees of the electorate are continually held to account upon their election, and also by the fact that their actions are subject to public scrutiny and deliberation.

Similarly, in the second aspect of political accountability, one group of elected representatives (members of Parliament) holds another more powerful group (political office bearers) to account for its actions. The mechanism for this relationship is normally reflected through a separation of powers between an "executive" and a legislative assembly of a parliamentary system. Put another way, it is a

characteristic of the majority of multi-party democracies to entrust their accountability to a hierarchy of personnel who are legitimately considered as trustees of the whole community and acting on their behalf (Derbyshire 1984: 7 – 9). All such persons are collectively known as public functionaries and each of them, in their respective official capacity, is presumed to be subordinate to a higher authority. In the majority of modern democracies this subordination is usually prescribed in the constitution of a country through specific articles or chapters. This prescriptive and authority status of the constitution gives rise to the notion of the supremacy of parliament as the pinnacle of all political, economic and social power for the entire civil society, according to the specific provisions of a given constitution. However, it is important to note the peculiarity of the Constitution of South Africa in this regard which, according to chapter 1, section 2, stipulates that the Constitution as such, is the supreme law of the Republic. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), specifically chapter 5, confers executive powers to the President who exercises the executive authority together with his/her cabinet in the first instance. This team, in turn become publicly accountable through parliament under specific chapters. Way down the authority line, civil servants (i.e. Directors-General of Departments and other high ranking officials), though indirectly accountable to Parliament are, however, internally accountable to their respective Ministers.

Notwithstanding this seemingly inexplicable accountability procedure between parliament and the civil service, the discharge of the accountability of a Minister to Parliament is endless as long as Parliament continues to meet. It is also wide ranging in scope to cover all matters including activities of officials within their jurisdiction (Ennis 1966:45). Political accountability is thus a consequence of the politicised nature of public institutions, inclusive of the legislature and the executive. In short, it is a process of public trust with the inevitability of politics, public scrutiny and controversies.

As regards performance, the dimension of scope is too broad

and thus subject to a wide spectrum of perspectives and interpretations. In this context, therefore, it suffices to observe that, with the radical enlargement of the size and structure of government in the twentieth century (Horowitz 1989:40), there has been a corresponding multiplication of functions of every government world-wide. However, broadly speaking, only three main criteria of measurement for the performance of government in relation to its mission are generally applicable globally. These are the economy, efficiency and effectiveness. A simple definition of these terms will suffice at this juncture. Further expatiation of the concepts will follow later in Chapter 4.

**Economy** - This has to do with the optimum utilization of resources at one's disposal.

**Efficiency** - It implies a cost-benefit ratio whereby what one produces is by far greater than the costs used in producing it. Put another way, the production of goods and services should be at a lower real costs to the state.

**Effectiveness** - is simply an ability to get things done in accordance with one's responsibility. Accordingly, government effectiveness is measured in terms of how well it is able to carry out its mandated functions.

In short, through a relationship of partnership between the various elements of government machinery, every government performance is measured in terms of what it produces and delivers, how well it does it and at what costs to the tax-payer, the electorate.

From the foregoing perspective on the notion of accountability and performance, a descriptive account of how a political alliance impacts upon public administration can be made. First and foremost, it is important to realise at the onset that there may be several

institutional factors that might influence the impact of political alliances on government accountability and performance. Second, and quite frankly, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of these factors, given the peculiarities of individual states and multiplicity of administrative systems globally. However, it suffices to do no more than offer a few examples, drawn from different countries in order to highlight the essential points in this process.

So far, a closer scrutiny of some multiparty democracies seems to suggest the issue of the legitimacy of a given state tends to render such a state vulnerable to numerous pressures. The realignment of parties for election purpose does seem to be a major contributing factor. In this scenario which is common in some European countries, notably, France and Italy, for example, administrative systems are continuously subjected to external pressure of political alliances. Accordingly, as Pierce (1968:5) contends, the continuous nature of institutional instability in French politics is conducive to administrative instability. This political instability within party alliances does, indeed, impact adversely on public accountability and performance. In these circumstances, alliances and coalitions inevitably become more concerned with the selfish motive of the sustenance of their regimes than with long-term policy matters, electorate expectations and sound governance. Pierce's (1968:7) remarks on this issue are more pertinent, "The leaders of each regime (alliances in most cases) have to expend much energy not only in the conduct of government policy but also in the defence of the regime against its opponents." The implications of this state of affairs are quite frightening. With a portion of government revenue being expended on maintaining political power instead of providing goods and services, there is undoubtedly, serious undermining of the principles of accountability and performance. Seen, from this perspective, wherein power is thought of as the be-all and end-all of the state, then there is a complete reversal of means and ends ensues (Lipson 1966:76).

The distortion of political representation of political parties through some electoral systems is another major contributing factor for

the political impact of alliances on public accountability and performance. Given the general characteristics of political systems with proportional electoral method of representation to favour bigger parties, periodic realignment of parties becomes unavoidable (Coppedge 1997:157). Unfortunately for the majority of states, the repercussions of this tendency are very costly to the taxpayer as accountability and performance are compromised. For example, more often than not numerous alliances regimes collapse on the issues of budgetary allocations, thereby affecting certain government programmes rather negatively in terms of continuity and resources. The Italian government of Prodi which fell recently because of the refusal by an alliance partner to back it up on the budget bears true testimony to this reality (Sancton 1998:41). In this particular instance, Prodi's government had proposed what it termed a moderate budget. However, contrary to its expectation for support by the Alliance partner Bertinotti's Refoundation Party, the latter charged that "the bill did not do enough to fight the country's 12% unemployment or to help the poor."

With the proposed 1999 budget of Prodi closely linked to the launching of the Euro (European Currency) for the European Union, the collapse of his regime raised serious questions regarding Italian entry into the Europe's Economic and Monetary Union. Doubtlessly, it is the electoral system of proportional representation which tends to make political Alliances vulnerable to all sorts of instability, and hence reduced public accountability and poor performance, as it will be noted in Chapter 4.

## **2.5 Professionalism**

The difficulty of ensuring the provision of social welfare and basic services without state initiative is universally acknowledged (Hinton and Wilson 1990:128). These services, such as, for example, sanitation and security, necessitate state capacity to ensure sustainability and affordability to the beneficiaries or consumers, by

virtue of their collective nature. Accordingly, state capacity, inter alia, is a multi-dimensional mechanism of power, whose efficiency and effectiveness largely depend on professionalism. The latter being essentially characterised by controls, specific standard, specialised knowledge, integrity of personnel, accountability and all other related requirements. Unavoidably, therefore, professionalism in public service delivery systems is imperative for ensuring economy, efficiency, equity and effectiveness.

Although there may be some variations in public service delivery systems world-wide, in terms of requirements and logistics, nonetheless, the commonalties of goals, values and mission between them is indisputable. These commodities, though generally enduring, depending on individual needs and requirement, are highly dynamic in regard to consumer demands and expectations.

From the South African perspective, relative to the effect of political alliance on public management in particular, two substantive issues of concern immediately arise.

First, given the volatile situation of labour in the rendering of social welfare and essential services in South Africa, concern for professionalism becomes absolutely essential. Understandably, the expectation for adherence to the administrative law principles such as, for example, legality of public servants' actions, accountability, equal treatment of clients and sensitivity to public needs, necessitates a highly professionalised public service (Thakathi 1995:14).

Second, the seemingly increased unionisation of the public sector workers (the majority of whom being presumably COSATU members through its affiliates), certainly provokes some controversies on the requirement and obligation for uninterrupted provision of essential services, in terms of section 20 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act in the first instance. Furthermore, with COSATU seemingly occupying a highly influential position as an alliance partner with big membership in government, a conflict of interests between the public sector union demands and professionalism cannot just be overlooked. In the context of this outlook, the effect of a political

alliance on professionalism in public management assumes the following characterisation.

First, given the ultimate answerability of the members of the cabinet to members of several parliamentary parties (alliances, coalitions or individually) and non-parliamentary parties and groups, despite their formal responsibility to Parliament, some conflicts are unavoidable (Jupp 1966:37). In this regard, conflict of interest between the public professionals and their superiors, the political office bearers, are inevitable. Accordingly, under the ministerial system of government wherein, officials owe their loyalty to their minister and not directly to Parliament, professional standards seldom can easily be compromised through the lack of collective responsibility between ministers and their subordinates – public officials. The case involving the retention and subsequent redeployment of unqualified teachers in South Africa in 1998, consequent upon the policy of education rationalization is indicative of this eventuality (Radebe 1998:10).

Unsurprisingly, COSATU's influence on government action, presumably through pressure from the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) must have superceded all other considerations, including the up-holding of teaching standards. In other words, contrary to the expectation for policy implementation on retrenchments, government yielded to the demands of COSATU to suspend retrenchments (Radebe 1998:10). Hence a conflict of interest between the public professionals on education and the political office bearers as superiors. Undoubtedly, the Alliance's power and influence on government actions became more assertive and pronounced in direct conflict with the professional ethical rules and practice.

Second, is government retreat on the training of between 18,000, and 30, 000 professional public servants a year according to governance schools estimates (Sullivan 1994:10). In the light of the imperative to retrain the inherited public servants for the purpose of reorientation, and the training of new ones with greater understanding for democracy and the modern world, as previously envisaged, government failure to distinguish between this ideal and COSATU's

concern for retrenchments arising from the rationalisation requirements, is, indeed, highly questionable.

Although it may be difficult to accurately assess the damage in terms of the opportunities lost for improvements in efficiency and effectiveness, nonetheless, the major issue is whether professionalism, as envisaged under the public service transformation, has to be sacrificed in favour of the retention of an unproductive and totally disoriented and unprofessional labour force. In other words, when it comes to the ideal of consensus on public service professionalisation, most alliances are found lacking in many ways on account of diversity in ideology and excessive individualistic concern to get a bigger slice of the national cake (Jupp 1966:209).

Notwithstanding the peculiarity of this phenomenon to the South African situation, nonetheless, there can be a general lesson drawn with a wider application. In this regard, one can venture to ascribe lack of professionalism in political alliances to internal contradictions on socio-economic and political outlook. These internal contradictions, although generally thought provoking and thus potentially constructive, can, nevertheless, be detrimental to consensus building exercises.

## **2.6 Control**

When dealing with control in the government system, a cautionary note is deemed necessary for contextual reasons. Unlike with the other general functions of management which, in the main, tend to be exclusive to government systems or departments, in terms of mission and objectives, control is everybody's concern and responsibility. It is thus one function upon which the interests and concerns of government and the public at large tend to converge. Understandably, control in the government system has to be exercised within the above framework for the following reasons, according to Botes (1994:248 – 249):

- Parliament is obliged to maintain control over the executive

institution to ensure satisfaction of the needs and expectations of society at large.

- Correct expenditure of public funds as allocated by Parliament.
- Human nature may tempt public employees to act in an improper or dishonest manner.
- Government legality and legitimacy of its actions demands constant subjection to the rule of law.
- The prerequisites of order, welfare and peace for the achievement of community wellbeing dictate the exercise of control to ensure effectiveness.

In the light of the sensitivity of these reasons in terms of good governance, and the implementation of consultative relationships between the government and other stakeholders, control thus become a balancing mechanisms for the mutual satisfaction. Consequently, despite the technicality of its processes for implementation, certain specific devices for public involvement find application for the facilitation of joint responsibility between the government and all other relevant stakeholders. Hence, the two dimensions of internal and external control. The former being defined as processes and measures within the organisation such as internal audits, inspections, work performance appraisals, institutional procedures and regulations. With regard to external control, control measurers and processes come from outside the organisation, and include mechanisms such as the media, investigation by the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, Parliamentary Standing Committees' and enquiries by interest groups, political parties, non-governmental organisations, petitions by the community and other role players (Du Toit et al 1998:191).

Generally speaking, external control is a facilitative device for ensuring citizen participation in the maintenance of constitutional

provisions and public accountability.

With the above conditions and general background as a basic framework for this section, the impact of a political alliance on the function of control in the public management will be examined, both from a theoretical and practical point of view.

For the purpose of this examination, control is defined in terms of Du Toit's and Van de Waldt (1997:15) perspective, which explains it as the generic process of ensuring that all administrative and functional activities are carried out effectively and efficiently to achieve the objectives of a public institution: namely the efficient provision of goods and services to the community. In terms of this perspective, control certainly entails numerous evaluative processes and measures that are both scientific and general in nature, depending on the focus. Accordingly, given the vulnerability of public institutions to inefficiency and ineffectiveness world-wide, be it inherent or otherwise, it is absolutely essential to subject public institutions to control regularly and intensively.

Theoretically, the impact of political alliances on control can assume two characterisations. In the first place, political alliances, as a means by which allocational decisions are determined by influence, relative to budgeting, can distort the allocation in favour of their interests. In this scenario, as economic issues are the central concern of the parties (and alliances) and governments, the tendency is to allocate the nation's resources in their favour, irrespective of the national priorities and the need for equity (Jupp 1966:209).

Inevitably, control of government expenditure may be seriously compromised and thus become meaningless in terms of the efficient provision of goods and services. Second, political alliances, being at times obsessed with destabilising mechanisms for replacing governments for selfish ends, are inherently susceptible to administrative instability, and therefore, lack of control. The French experience provides a classical example in this regard. In this instance, the stability of many coalitions and alliances can never be guaranteed as different regimes constantly become questionable in

terms of their legitimacy.

Although there may be some constitutional devices to restrain the crossing over of the party members in parliament, nonetheless, the vulnerability of political alliances to political instability is beyond any dispute. Doubtlessly, such instabilities do impact negatively on the control of the administrative machinery in the long-run. For instance, the 1998 Auditor-General's report on education performance in the Eastern Cape, revealed some disturbing anomalies. Among others, it was observed as follows, according to the Star (8 July 1998:)

- 94% of Department of Education budget went to salaries,
- Nearly 70% of School principals were underqualified.
- Learners go to school on average four-and-half years longer than necessary to get their standard ten qualifications. Approximately R3-billion a year has to be provided as an additional cost for salaries (The Star 8<sup>th</sup> July, 1998:).

Needless to observe that, this disturbing account happened within the prolonged impasse over retrenchments and public service transformation; between the ANC and its social partners in the alliance. Unsurprisingly, control measures on the employment of qualified teachers, cost-effectiveness strategies for education delivery and expenditure controls were either deliberately overlooked or plainly ignored. With the Province seemingly under the majority rule of the alliance, it certainly cannot be otherwise, particularly given the apparent cracks in the group.

On the practical side, some interesting manifestations come to the fore. First, the inclusive membership of COSATU as an important partner in the Alliance poses serious professional dilemmas on some categories of the public service employees, and hence a negative impact upon the function of control. For example, during the then impending teachers' strike over the policy on rationalization of education in 1998, COSATU committed itself to fight the battle for the

teachers, presumably through industrial action (Radebe 1998:10). Quite frankly, it is the alliance's misguidedness over terms of reference, which leads to negative influence over control measures, relative to public service operations.

Second in the case of the South African public making processes which, for all intents and purposes, are collective and broad based in nature, the Alliance partner's strategy of outbursts and threats in areas where there are internal disagreements, honestly leaves much to be desired. Undoubtedly, this has the effect of paralyzing control processes as, more often than not, resort to strike is inappropriately used, with devastating consequences on the provision of services.

In conclusion, it can be rightly observed that there is a lot of screw tightening to be made from the point of view of the Alliance, in terms of gearing up to effective control in the administrative system.

## **2.7 Co-ordination**

Since the functions of control and co-ordination are somehow related and thus complementary within the overall mission of the public sector, it is deemed necessary to deal with co-ordination as well. Co-ordination is generally defined as the process of ensuring the appropriate functioning of a given administrative system by regulating the arrangement or interaction of component parts (Readers Digest Reverse Dictionary 1989:618). In the case of the public administrative system specifically, it implies functions performed to synchronize groups of activities of individuals or institutions in such a manner that, with the collective activities of individuals or institutions, specified objectives will be achieved to the greatest extent more efficiently. Efficiency, effectiveness and rationalisation are thus achieved through the process. Accordingly, top officials in an institution or department are charged with the full responsibility to co-ordinate the activities of all divisions, sections or units of the staff under their supervision (Cloete 1996:22).

In terms of this perspective, co-ordination is an all embracing management /administrative function whose success is dependent on many factors including the rationalisation of resources, integration of activities, unity of command, continuous consultative mechanisms between superiors and subordinates and the common vision about what the public service ought to do. The observation by Acknoff (Acknoff 1994:23) in this regard is more enlightening; "the performance of a system is not the sum of the performance of its parts taken separately, but the product of their interaction".

Against this observation about the process of coordination, it is proposed to examine the impact of a political alliance relative to the process as such. In this regard, given the multi-dimensional nature of coordination, as noted above, the examination will be limited to a few notable areas such as unity of command, nationalization of resources and consultative mechanisms.

### **2.7.1 Unity of Command**

The principle of unity of command as an organizational regulatory device is universally acknowledged from classical management theory. In its basic and simple forum, it means an integrated process of ensuring organizational stability through specified lines of authority whereby, for example, subordinates are answerable to one authority exclusively (Allen 1983:13-200). Through it, many other requirements like accountability, discipline and order are facilitated and enhanced. Hence its valuable contribution towards effectiveness, efficiency and productivity.

With this characteristic as an ideal condition, however, when it comes to the general application and realities, experiences world wide seem to suggest otherwise. Consequently, deviations do occur quite often. Unsurprisingly, therefore, some administrative systems, within the multiparty democracies with alliances/coalitions are reflective of this condition. South Africa, most certainly under the ANC led alliance, has not been unaffected by this peculiarity which seems to affect both the

executive and administrative levels of government. One or two examples will serve to make an illustration.

First, in the executive arm of the government unity of command within the administrations was undermined. In the Free State provincial government, for example, the seemingly inexplicable divergence between the authority of the ANC as government and as a party in 1998 did have serious public policy implications on co-ordination when translated into the governing institutions. In this instance, the unconstitutional removal of the premier by the party, consequent upon the political conflicts which led to the firing of some of his ministers for alleged of mismanagement, impacted negatively on good governance. Accordingly, party interests superceded national imperatives through compromising some essential administrative requirements that emanate from the principle of unity of command. A matter of particular concern in this instance, was the undermining of the premier's authority by the dominant ANC faction in the power struggles. This group was trying to impose its will on how the premier should run his government (Sunday Times 15 December, 1996:22).

Second, regarding the manifestation of this negative impact in the Northern Province where Premier Ramatlhodi suffered the same fate, the balance of forces within the party structure was such that government paralysis could not be allowed to happen. However, the threat to effective governance did exist (Makhanya 1998(b):12).

### **2.7.2 Rationalization of Resources**

Given the objective of achieving efficiency and effectiveness through co-ordination, it stands to reason that rationalisation of resources constitutes a critical element of co-ordination. In other words, for co-ordination to be meaningful and justifiable, utilisation of resources has to be rationalised in terms of several things including, for

example, priorities, logistical requirements, staff capabilities and the overall objectives of the organisation.

In assessing the Tripartite Alliance impact with regard to this requirement of co-ordination, the following observations are reflective. Generally, there seem to be the pervasive problem of short-term outlook with regard to the rationalization of resources. The crucial shortcoming here is apparently the lack of strategic planning in some departments. Over and above that, is the dilemma of inadequate monitoring of operations for effective work analysis. Some examples in this regard will suffice to illustrate the point.

First, taking the department of education as an example, some disturbing trends are identifiable in some provincial administrations. In the Eastern Cape where, for instance, the Alliance is in control of the legislature, the department's short-sighted view in budgeting largely accounts for its ineffectiveness. Accordingly, R4,4 million was spent in transporting secondary school pupils from their homes to a nearby school, instead of building a new school that would have cost R5 million at their village in 1997, according to the audit report presented to the public accounts standing committee (Business Day 3 July 1998:1). In addition to this seemingly poor budgeting, the report further noted that, some electrical equipment had been supplied to schools without ensuring electricity was available. Hence laxity in monitoring procedures.

Needless to indicate that, notwithstanding the serious constraint in the delivery capacity of the department, particularly for the required infra-structures, facilities and other resources, however, in the last resort, it is not so much a matter of money, but of how effectively existing resources are used, according to Lewis (1997:14)

### **2.7.3 Consultative Mechanisms**

As regards the requirement of consultation between those in authority and their subordinates, an administrative paradox does emerge, especially on definitions and expectations in the public domain. Traditionally, in terms of scalar chain, a chain of authority extends from the bottom of the organization to the highest level at the top. This is the characteristic of a source typical organization. However, when it comes to the government/public domain, relative to the application of this principle, the reverse is the case. Not surprisingly, therefore, through an array of constitutionally specified administrative and legal devices, all categories of public functionaries (officials and political office bearers) are made true servants of the people. Accordingly, they become ultimately accountable and responsible to the nation as a whole, something which necessitates the institutionalization of a consultative relationship.

Against this background of the seemingly administrative paradox, this section traverses the area of consultative relationship between political office-bearers and their constituencies, within a broad framework of coordinational requirements as a factor in good governance.

The relationship between a political office bearer or for that matter a politician and the public is a subject of great fascination and many expectations in all democracies. Its potential for ensuring effective public policy making and quarantening societal involvement in national affairs is unlimited. However, to explore the full dimension of this relationship is an exercise requiring much more space than the scope of this exercise can allow. In view of this constraint, the exploration will thus be limited to the recognizable shortcomings in relation to the political effect of a political alliance on the requirement of consultative relationships.

With the view to facilitating understanding and appreciation of the dynamics of the forces at work, it behooves one to make a preliminary description of the ANC-SACP-COSATU political alliance. (A more detailed account of this alliance will follow in chapter 4).

The peculiarity of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance in contemporary multi-party democracies is quite an interesting one. Given its democratic selection of candidates from the general delegates at the National Conference of the party list in the national as well as provincial elections and the unrestricted allocation of portfolios in government from those elected, one would expect a well disciplined and coherent diversified political entity. However, as events and experience have amply shown, the latter has been more of an ideal than the reality in many ways, as it will be shown below.

First, the problem of factionalism which is characteristic of many broad based political groupings with diverse interest groups, is partly responsible for the inadequate consultation between the leadership and the masses (Jupp 1966:209). As an inevitable consequence, most Alliance's parliamentary members seem not necessarily bound by any party requirement or obligation to be constantly in touch with their constituencies; presumably, for fear of hostile reactions from the enlarged electorate on some controversial legislative matters and other constituency based concerns. Doubtlessly, a break of vital communication links results in unpleasant consequences for consultation (Jacobs 1998:12).

Taking the example of the ANC factionalism in the Free State power struggle recently, it is quite clear that a serious problem of consultation between the leadership and the masses obtains in the Tripartite Alliance. A similar manifestation was reflected in the Northern Province. No wonder that, despite the premiers popularity as heads of the respective governments, some elements within the leadership found it difficult to acknowledge this. Hence the ensuing crisis which, very unfortunately, impacted negatively on the entire provincial management. Over and above that, as Smith rightly observes, "ANC parliamentarians are lazy. Few bother to report back to constituencies during long parliamentary breaks" (Smith 1998:13). Consequently, with limited interaction and consultation between members of parliament and their constituencies at large, public policy

making is seriously affected, through lack of information and distorted perspectives.

Second, the incoherent in-house party discipline among the alliance partners negates the requirement of consultative relationship. Unavoidably, party affiliations among the partners is widely spread over a broad spectrum of political parties and groups, with differing perspectives on national issues. Under such conditions, one would expect a meaningful consultation between COSATU, for example, and other parties and groups affected, particularly on issues of sensitive nature such as, for example, conditions of service, retrenchments, privatization of state enterprises and others. Contrary to this expectation, however, COSATU, in more ways than one, has tended to be less obliged to consider the feelings of others and thereby found it more expedient to go it along through industrial actions. The latter, though generally legitimate, is, nonetheless, less constructive, in terms of ideal consultative relationships and consensus building. In this instance, the delay in promulgation of the Basic Condition of Employment Act due to COSATU's intransigence and continuous strikes (Paton 1997:1) and the teachers strikes over retrenchments and redeployments (Mvoko 1997:2) are typical cases in point.

## **2.8 Industrial Relations**

The process of industrial relations in the public sector is, indeed, a subject of great complexity and some controversy. Its complexity lies in the fact that, unlike in the private sector where collective bargaining is fully negotiable, the latter becomes somewhat problematic in the public sector through many institutional and professional constraints. For example certain services that can be classified as essential and sensitive in nature thus subject to no-interruptions tend to render the principle of collective bargaining less applicable in the public sector. Furthermore, controversies are more likely to emerge whenever public services employees embark on some industrial actions, consequent upon any failure to reach an agreement with the government over

several issues pertaining to the general welfare.

Again, as it is often the case nowadays, equitability in budgetary allocations is more likely to impose a restraint on government benevolence, irrespective of any agreements amongst the parties concerned. Unavoidably, therefore, budgetary requirements such as, for example, expenditure control, are subject to the legislative input and approval. The latter is by and large a reflection of government policy in terms of targets, goals, priorities and provision of goods and services.

Given the representativity of all major stakeholders in the budgetary consultative process, it stands to reason that the importance of budgeting as a mechanism for government strategic decision making process is indisputable. Consequently, any agreement made between government and its employees impose further scrutiny and evaluation by other interested parties. This condition, naturally, is in line with the democratic requirements of accountability.

Most importantly, as the reflection by Pityana, the labour Director General indicates (as quoted by Ballenger 1997:6) that the right to strike is central but not absolute, industrial action as a labour weapon becomes less creditable and more negotiable in its application. Consequently, it becomes open to controversy in the public sector collective bargaining endeavours. Against this backdrop of the seemingly complex process, it is the purpose of this last part of the Chapter 2 to analyse government performance on the sensitive issue of industrial relations in the public sector.

In order to put the analysis into perspective a definition of industrial relation is deemed necessary at this juncture. As applied in this context, by industrial relations, is meant the relationship between the employer (government) and the employees on matters pertaining to employment conditions, consultative mechanisms on how the organization should be managed and all other obligations resulting from the condition of employment or service (Derbyshire 1984:139). From a public sector perspective, this relationship is based on certain assumptions on the part of the government. These include, among others, clarity of mandate, decisiveness and the ability to rally the

collective around a common goal. Simply put, clarity of mandate entails government's full understanding about its role and responsibility to society that is comprised of various sectors and interests. Decisiveness, in this context, means taking the necessary action in response to any challenges arising from the mandate given. Consequently, in terms of this prerogative, any dubious tendencies cannot be tolerated. Ability to rally the collective around a common goals is simply an exercise of reconciling the collective provision of services of goods with the common goals of societal well being.

Over and above, that a government must be in a position to resolve any disputes that arise in the conduct of its business generally. Whether such disputes emanate from among its employees or outside in the private sector is immaterial. The fact of the matter is that whatever dispute arises, it must be resolved in the public interest for the sake of stability and orderliness. In the light of this reflection, therefore, the process of industrial relations is an extremely important task in the realm of government overall responsibility.

In analysing the impact of the Tripartite Alliance, relative to the process of industrial relations, the government has hardly done well generally. As a matter of fact, three main characteristics are identifiable in this regard, namely, confusion, irrationality and sheer opportunism from the alliance partners.

First, it seems quiet surprising that, despite the Alliance apparent dominance in the industrial relations initiatives in both the private and the public sectors, there has been a continuous series of protests, marches and indeed, general illegal strikes within the country since 1994. This state of affairs, engineered by COSATU and the SACP stands in stark contrast to virtual control of these organisations by the ANC led alliance, through its Secretary-General, Motlanthe, who incidentally, is a leading trade unionist and a central committee member of the SACP (Bell 1998:2). With the latter as a central figure in the three organizations, there is no doubt about the reality of exercising some degree of control over their activities and outlook. However, paradoxically, ever since his election in 1997 as the ANC's

Secretary-General, there have been more industrial actions taken by the two organizations than in the period preceding his election. The Alliance performance on this score has, therefore, been hardly creditable.

Second, given Sydney Mufamadi's unique position as a politburo's member of the SACP and the ANC government's minister for Safety and Security then, it is curious to note government paralysis in containing the seemingly illegal industrial actions by some of its employees.

From the above account, it does seem as though the Tripartite Alliance handling of the function of industrial relations in the public sector is, indeed inexplicable in terms of government mandate, decisiveness and the ability to rally the collective around a common goal. If the public sector employees freely participate in protest marches, regardless of the legality or otherwise of such actions, then, what justifies government intervention in the name of public interest? This is rather confusing. Furthermore, any government's disinclination to exercise its authority when the prevailing circumstances so dictate, can only be ascribed to the opportunistic tendencies of the Alliance partners to exploit any situation that has the potential to further their ideological interests. In this regard, protests and marches against the proposed privatization of state enterprises is a case in point.

For example, the condemnation of the COSATU – affiliated South African Municipal Worker's Union's (SAMWU) protest to privatization by constitutional development and provincial affairs Minister, Mohammed Valli Moosa, as motivated by 'Ultra-leftists' within the Union in 1998, has indeed struck the nail on the head. As Moosa rightly observes, "SAMWU is refusing to cooperate with government in the redistribution of resources to disadvantaged areas. When Councils tried to transfer staff from formally white areas to townships, SAMWU will oppose this, saying it is a change in the workers conditions of service. So in the name of worker's rights they are in reality opposing transformation. This is a typical ultra-leftist approach that is a trend in SAMWU" (Moosa as quoted by Bulger 1998:10).

From the above analysis, it is undoubtedly clear that the effect/impact of a political alliance on public sector industrial relations is somewhat unpredictable and extremely problematic in terms of direction, decisiveness and reconciliation of political party interests and the public's interests.

## **2.9 Conclusion**

As public administration is evidently a product of the complex interplay of dynamic socio-economic and political factors, several public expectations, arising from its professionalisation, become unavoidable. In this scenario, the primary and proper role of any political authority, inclusive of political alliances, is to ensure ideal standards of conduct and performance, relative to the overall mission of providing goods and services to the community. In this regard, as it has been noted above, political alliances do, indeed, play a significant role towards the public administration's orientation, responsiveness and development.

## CHAPTER 3

### EFFECT OF POLITICAL ALLIANCES ON POLITICAL SYSTEMS

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the context of politics and public administration being inseparable and therefore like the individual parts of a system, the effect of political alliances on political systems is quite logical. Put another way, politics and public administration are individual parts of the system which is called government. In order to put the analysis into a context, a definition of a political system will be considered. Easton (1964:153) defines a political system thus:

- a set of interactions through which valued things are authoritatively allocated for a society.
- a means for resolving differences.
- a set of interactions through which demands are processed into outputs.
- A means through which the resources and energies of society are mobilized and oriented to the pursuit of goals.

Hence the implication for the three main parts of a government; the legislature, executive and judiciary. Understandably, these bodies are functionally integrated and interdependent. For example, the legislature and, perhaps, in conjunction with the executive perform some functions related with 1, 3 and 4 above whereas the Judiciary, naturally, deals with 2, either as an arbitrator or dispenser of justice between groups or individuals within the system, inclusive of government's institutions.

This regulatory and distributive function of a political system, in addition, does have an implication for group representation, social interaction, societal welfare and other demands on a collective basis, inclusive of conflict resolution. All these things, unavoidably, dictate some rationality in dealing with them and hence the existence of specialised institutional devices such as, for example, Commission of Human Rights and Inquiry Independent Complaints Directorate and Code of Conduct for public service in South Africa.

Given the integrative and interdependence of a political system as outlined above, the inevitability of complementarity of the constituent parts becomes quite obvious. Accordingly, as Ackoff (1994:20-21) argues, the parts of any given system necessarily interact, and consequently no defining function of a system can be carried out by any part of the system taken separately. In the light of this observation, this section is a complementary examination of the impact of political alliances on government from another angle of the system, namely, the political side.

According to Golden (1986:298) modern democratic states are intimately intertwined with political parties and alliances. With regard to political alliances, in particular, as party groupings which focus on specific electoral issues or covering a wide range of policies on a transient or permanent basis (Coxall 1986:43), several implications arise thereof. First, the effect of political alliances on a political system is a highly dynamic process which is influenced by many factors, including the nature of the system in question, operative value system, decision-making processes and general interaction with all other stakeholders. Second, such an effect is also dependent on volatility of the alliances and the pressing issues of the time. In this section, it is proposed to consider some specific areas which are applicable to the political dimension such as public-policy making, individual rights and grassroots participation, law and order, collective responsibility, checks and balances, and political stability.

### 3.2 Public Policy-Making

Without going into detailed explanation of the term public policy, it suffices to suggest that public policy is a two dimensional process of decision making by the state for societal welfare. On the one hand, it is the political dimension whereby political functionaries through the legislature, decide on what has to be done to meet the various needs of the populace and also on the necessary resources to realise the desired objectives. In other words, the political dimension of public policy emphasises the intentions of the law-makers on how to steer society towards a more satisfactory state of affairs with available national resources. The second aspect of public policy is the administrative dimension. This aspect involves the executive governmental institutions whereby specific goals of policy are achieved within the framework of full accountability and transparent performance. The President and National Executive of South Africa under Chapter 5 of Act 108 of 1996 provides a good example in this regard.

As public policy making is an important part of government activities, there has been a development of theories of policy making over the years (Dye 1987:20). These theories or models primarily serve as a guide to shape definitions and questions to be addressed in policy analysis. Above all, as Kelly and Palumbo (1992:643) rightly observe, theories help set the agenda for public policy as well as policy enquiry.

Another important characteristic of public policy is the fact that it is a continuous process which has no apparent beginning or end. Being mostly a result of compromise and consensus between contending parties, it is constantly subject to review and change according to changes in the societal value system and output.

Since public policy-making is a political process which emanates from governmental institutions in the first instance, it may be regarded as an outcome of intergovernmental relationships on how society should be

organised for the general welfare - the latter being understood as governance which, in terms of Mohamad's (1998:441) perspective, "is the exercise of political economic and administrative authority to manage a nations affairs," with all the presumptions about the involvement of other bodies outside the state in the whole process.

Since political systems, like all other social systems, are identifiable through the interaction between parts and the environment from which the system operates, the involvement of other bodies in governance, as stated above, becomes obvious (Easton 1964:15). Consequently, through these interactions (which, by nature, are highly dynamic), decision-making processes are facilitated).

From this perspective, the effect of political alliances, as components of coalition groups, on political systems is quite understandable. Moreover, as the theories of public policy are not necessarily competitive but rather complementary in policy-making endeavours (Dye 1987:21), public policy is a power sharing mechanism involving all relevant stakeholders in policy making, irrespective of the policies involved. Consequently, the issues of definitions and questions to be addressed in policy analysis are mostly determined by the parties concerned. Hence a combination of theories or models used in policy making. With this background, it is hoped to examine a few instances wherein the effect of political alliances on political systems is discernible.

First, with public policy-making processes of necessity involving a struggle about power and values (Lipson 1966:17-22), political alliances and other interest groups in any given political system perennially engage in controversies, compromises and disagreements. Consequently, tensions become unavoidable as contestants debate the merits and demerits of proposed policies. In this scenario of search for ends as well as means for societal well being, the contending parties, more often than not, tend to get entangled in traditional point-scoring instead of problem solving mode of operation. This is particularly true of political alliances

whose partnership is made up of diverse political and ideological groups. It is this point-scoring mode of operation in public policy making endeavours which affects the entire political system of any given state. Inevitably, despondency and apathy creep in amongst the electorate as governments fail to deliver on promises and pledges made during elections.

The Government macro-economic policy, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) is Government's strategy which was announced on 14 June 1996, is a case in point. Viewed strongly as a blueprint for growth and development, through a combination of growth in export production, infra-structural development, the restructuring of state assets, decreasing the budget deficit, human resource development, and a comprehensive policy for labour relations, inclusive of job creation and a fair distribution of wealth (Mandela as quoted by Wessels 1999:240). Unfortunately, for reasons associated with disagreement in the ANC-SAPC-COSATU Alliance, government's real achievements during the period under review fell far short of its promises. As a result, repercussions of disagreements amongst the alliance partners on GEAR have been far reaching in scope, particularly with regard to domestic tranquillity and governance in general. Through failure to meet its targets on GEAR, government's delivery on promises was affected by continuous squabbles within the Alliance's members. This tendency does, indeed, bear negatively on the smooth operation of government's delivery mechanisms as unnecessary delays and conflicts are made on the resolution of vital issues in public policy (The Centre for Development and Enterprise 1999:101)

Second, given the vulnerability of coalition governments to political instability, apathy and despondency amongst the voters become inevitable. This disposition creates an unhealthy relationship between the government and the electorate as accountability is compromised. In the long run, the entire political system gets paralysed through sheer

indifference of the key stakeholders. For example, during the 1996 general election in Italy, weary Italians wondered whether they should bother to vote at all, consequent upon the inability of coalition governments to have a stable government for the full maximum period of five years allowed by law (Castelfranco 1996:27).

Third, it is the frequent shift of government policies in political alliances which encourages the instability of governments through failure to carry through intended policies. Under these conditions, political systems become distorted and difficult to manage. The Swedish experience in this regard is more enlightening. As Bergman and Strom (1992:125) explain, whenever alliances break up over policy disagreements, parties make some shifts which serve as concessions to former coalition parties by the government under siege. Understandably, the more shifts in policy occur, the greater the tensions and paralysis of the political system as it has been clearly shown within the South African experience over the GEAR policy. Despite these drawbacks of political alliances on political systems, however, it is important to note that there is something also on the positive side.

It is quite obvious that political alliances do promote political pluralism in multi-party democracies through various groupings and the establishment of parties. Drawing from experiences in Western European Coalition governments and multi-party democracies, there is enough evidence to conclude that political pluralism is greatly enhanced by political alliances (Lewer and Budge 1992). In addition to that, the more recent experience with political alliances in South Africa seems to confirm this view. It is no wonder that, since 1994, numerous party groupings for possible alliances have emerged, especially in the run-up to the 1999 election. With multipartyism steadily taking roots globally, the move towards party alliances is irrevocable and hence the enhancement of multiparty democracy.

### 3.3 Individual Rights and Grassroots Participation

In any country where one party dominates the political system and where there are limited job opportunities and great needs, the issue of individual rights and grassroots participation tends to be crucial to the process of governance. It is no wonder, therefore, to observe that during the cold war struggle between the East and the West, one-party states in the Eastern block were frequently subjected to intensive analysis on these same issue. This trend has affected many states in Africa and else where. In this regard, South Africa is no exception and thus provide a unique case study to investigate the effect of a dominant political alliance on the exercise of individual rights and grassroots participation, relative to the operation of the political systems. In this sub-section it is proposed to explore the effect of a political alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU on individual rights and grassroots participation consequent upon its electoral victory and dominance upon the political system.

With the view to putting the investigation into perspective, a brief definition of the term individual rights and grassroots participation is pertinent at this juncture. In the context of this investigation, the term individual rights and grassroots participation refer to the Declaration of Human Rights as adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 through 30 Articles. Implicitly, these include collective civil liberties such as, for example, freedom of speech (Articles 18 and 19) freedom of association (Article 20) freedom to participate in government (Article 21) and so on. South Africa, being a member of the United Nations Organization and a multi-party democracy, has also adopted these rights under Chapter 2 of the Constitution, Act 108 of 1996. These rights enable an individual to have meaningful participation in decision making processes, through choice on how he/she should be governed and thus enjoy life, liberty and security of person (Article 3), irrespective of the organization to which he/she belongs. By

definition, participation here includes voluntary involvement in any civil association such as public organisations, political bodies and several others. Needless to indicate that, the exercise of individual rights within these bodies, assumes that the activities undertaken are sanctioned through democratic principles of equality, openness, transparency, accountability and responsiveness to members' interests.

Furthermore, given the complexity of the term participation, it is worthwhile to give a brief explanation of what it actually implies. Participation can either be direct or indirect. In the former, it can be manifested when people (particularly those who are mostly affected) actively confront their leaders or local authority on specific issues of policy. In indirect participation individuals may offer their support to a given cause of action, leaving others to direct operations (Boaden et al 1982:15) Grassroots participation, in this context, means the rank and file members of the organization taking an active role in the affairs of that organization.

From the above perspective, several presumptions can be made relative to the character of the Alliance in question, as both a dominant political entity and an association of interest groups with a specific social agenda. Both these dimensions will be briefly outlined.

(a) The Alliance as a dominant political entity:

- Membership is free and subject to individual commitment to policies, rules and regulations.
- Decisions are by democratic means of consensus or majority rule.
- All members enjoy the same rights of full participation in party's deliberations.

(b) The Alliance as an association of interest groups:

- Each group has a right to pursue its own interests both independently and in conjunction with others.
- May differ in policy matters but bound by common value systems in place or at work.
- None of the constituent members will impose its will on other partners.

It is reasonable, albeit risky, to speculate that in the majority of cases, this mode of operation may be applicable to a wide range of political alliances in multiparty democracies. However, in view of the variations in political systems and constitutional models, emphasis may differ according to circumstances. It suffices to assume that, in the case under consideration, the suggested mode of operation has some degree of applicability.

Like in many other constitutional models across multiparty democracies, South African party politics is reflective of the general society. In this scenario, the cabinet, though formally responsible to parliament is, more often than not, answerable to several parliamentary parties (including alliances) or to extra-parliamentary interest and pressure groups through Parliament Committee System. Under this system, these groups voice their concerns and expectations on proposed legislation to Parliamentary Committees through public hearings (Rantao 1997:9). Political alliances being more representative of interest and pressure groups, are thus assured of meaningful grassroots participation and enhancement of individual rights. Admittedly, with parliamentary committees mandated to monitor, investigate and enquire into and make recommendations relating to any aspect of the legislative programme,

intensive debates and exchange of views do take place. It is through these monitoring and investigative processes that effective grassroots participation in national affairs is effected. In this regard, agreements and consensus have to be reached within the interest groups to facilitate a common approach to issues at hand. Unavoidably, therefore, the mode of operation within and amongst the groups is presumed to be as suggested above. The effect of political alliances on political systems is very positive from this perspective. However, as individual behaviour is somewhat unpredictable in politics, it is not uncommon to find political pressure taking precedence over individual rights and grassroots participation. Hence a negative impact on the political system.

A critical examination of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance in South Africa seems to suggest that a precedence of political pressure over individual rights and grassroots participation has crept in. First and foremost, it is common knowledge that the trade unions power to levy money from their members for political purposes is limited and not absolute. Accordingly, in terms of the Trade Union Act of 1913 of the United Kingdom, specific requirements are imposed whereby the unions are required to ballot their members for approval to set up a political fund (Ewing 1994:258).

The reason behind this imposition is not hard to find. Trade unions main objective is to strive for ideal working conditions for their members who, incidentally, belong to several political parties. This dimension becomes even more critical in the context of the confederations of trade unions like COSATU in this instance. Contrary to the above principle and COSATU's declared respect of its members constitutional rights, in particular the freedom of choice and expression (Mpati 1998:8), a resolution was adopted to support the ANC election campaign and hence an election levy on individual members.

As one would expect in matters of this nature, broad consultations with affiliates before a decision is made could have been a logical step to

take. However, as Mpati (1998:8) points out, the issue was passed on to the affiliates for debate after the decision was made. In other words, there was no attempt to secure approval and support prior to the final decision. Affiliates were pressurized to be in line with the mother body. Consequently, meaningful grassroots participation was compromised. Interestingly enough, despite strong criticism, both within and outside, COSATU, it was suggested that COSATU was not the first trade union movement to have adopted a position in support of a particular party for the purposes of winning an election as other trade unions elsewhere did the same (Mpati 1998:8). This position further proves the point that political pressure does indeed take precedence over individual rights and grassroots participation in political alliances.

Second, given the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance's composition whereby the majority of top political office bearers have dual membership in the tripartite alliance, it is not surprising to see some squabbles and intrigues over provincial leadership. The removal of Patrick Lekota as Premier of the Free State is a case in point.

According to the Sunday Times (December 15, 1996:22) at the core of the problem is the ANC leadership worry about relinquishing central control over broad membership. Whether this worry is justified, time will probably tell. However, it seems a bit odd that, the Tripartite Alliance, which had endorsed the idea of decentralization of power through a division of the country into semi autonomous provinces under a central government, federalism, should have doubts about the implications there in, particularly in the context of broad diversity of regional socio-economic and political needs. Makhanya's (1998(b):12) perspective on this matter is more enlightening, "The nine provinces have developed distinct identities over the past four and half years and provincial politicians have built power bases on which their passage to higher office is dependent ... By effectively taking control of provincial government out of provincial party structures and putting it in the hands of the national

leadership, the ANC will stifle this development."

Undoubtedly, when internal conflicts and power struggles take precedence over national interests, individual rights and grassroots participation are seriously compromised. Despite Lekota's popularity and his good standing as provincial premier, he had to be sacrificed over party's interests following his firing of some provincial ministers for alleged mismanagement (Makhanya 1998:12).

In conclusion, it is quite obvious that political alliances, whilst generally complementary to democratic process and therefore positive on the operation of a political system, can and do have some undesirable consequences in terms of individual rights, grassroots participation and as for democracy as a life style.

### **3.4 Law and Order**

With governance presumably linked to a political and socio-economic stability, it is quite inevitable that the presence of law and order is an essential precondition for a stable society. Consequently, any political system's ability to effect governance should be measured by the degree in which it generates and sustains law and order. With this perspective, it is the purpose of this sub-section to examine the effect of political alliances upon law and order within a political framework of government the general framework of political system.

The meaning of law and order in multi-party democracies should be dissected with extreme care. There are many reasons for this caution. However, it suffices to point out that the two terms (law and order) are highly subjective in terms of meaning and therefore open to different perspectives and interpretations. In view of this characteristic, a contextual clarification is necessary at this juncture. Law, in the context of this analysis, refer to any approved directive aimed at regulating the conduct of the people, both individually and collectively through customs,

traditions, legislations, code of ethics and several other sanctioned methods. It is a means by which society promotes peace and stability. Order, on the other hand, simply refers to a general framework of national security, which insures stability, protection of individual rights and personal property through mutual trust (Lipson 1965:61). Its presence is mainly intended to uphold societal wellbeing in conjunction with the laws of the country. Law and order are thus complementary and mutually reinforcing. Accordingly, given the characteristics of democratic states to secure peace and stability through the political responsibility of all people, the function of law and order becomes regulative, integrative, rationalizing and anticipatory in Karpen's (1993:96) opinion. This means that, through law and order, society is able to regulate its activities, bring together all constituent groups for the common good, rationalize its resources for development purposes and thereby achieve relative stability on a sustainable basis.

From a global perspective, most multi-party democratic states, all things being equal, should be able to achieve this state of affairs. However, as it is frequently the case with societies that are extremely fragmented, the South African political system through its irreconcilable groups within the dominant Tripartite Alliance, has failed dismally to effect maintenance of law and order. With the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance seemingly beset by internal dissent on macro-economic policies, there has been a serious decline of law and order in the political system, particularly with regard to labour relations, accessibility of the labour market to the poor, fiscal management and containment of crime, to mention but a few. For example, the discord within the alliance on the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Bill (The Star 5<sup>th</sup> August, 1997) has precipitated serious tension between employers and employees. In this connection, the absence of a common approach within government (alliance) turned the bill into a "battlefield" amongst the contending parties (Grawitzky 1997:12). With the latter wrangling on business' demand for flexibility and

labour's for regulation, passage of the Bill through the various stages was prolonged and highly emotional, with devastating consequences for labour relations. Still on the macro-economic policy endeavours, South African economy has continuously declined, with growth rate seemingly sagging instead of improving. As the National Productivity Institute (NPI) indicated in its annual report for 1998, job-loss growth took over from job less growth which preceded it (Cokayne 1998:3). As a result of these developments, accessibility of the labour market to the poor and unemployed has been greatly reduced. It is this state of affairs which creates political instability and therefore lawlessness and disorderliness as many people fail to meet their obligations in paying for services, providing for their families the mean of livelihood, generally getting access to essential amenities. In consequence thereof, services are withdrawn and some people with homes get evicted, and hence acceleration of criminal offences. Undisputably, the underlying factor in this scenario is to come to grips with its internal contradictions on macro-economic policies.

As regards the fiscal mismanagement issue, the virtual anarchy in the Northern Province's finances recently is a case in point. In this particular case as Smuts (1998:3) reports, the province paid more than 22-million r and in salaries to 84 people who had resigned or died in the 1995/96 financial year, according to the Auditor General report tabled in The provincial legislature. The Northern Province is not an isolated case as the total picture of the nine provinces is quite reflective of this trend. Accordingly, as the Economist points out, an additional 2.1 billion rand was set aside in 1998 to cover provinces overspending. It came as no surprise that, according to Judge William Heath special investigation unit, provincial governments were the biggest culprits among the 834 cases of alleged public-sector corruption under investigation (The Economist 28 February 1998:45). Needless to indicate that, of the nine profligate provinces, seven are controlled by the ANC led Alliance.

Through general fiscal mismanagement in the provincial

administration, the ANC led Alliance has not fulfilled its primary obligation of sustaining law and order as preconditions for socio-economic and political stability. In other words, the ideal of a culture of law and order in both the public and private domain for stability seems to be lacking. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there have been more manifestations of power struggles amongst the top political office bearers within the Alliance's controlled provincial administrations. For example, the ANC premier of the Free State was unseated while in the Mpumalanga Province the premier's authority was challenged by populist faction within the Alliance.

With the Alliance's led provincial administration seemingly beset by internal conflicts and gross financial irregularities, any linkage of mismanagement within the Alliance is not illogical. No wonder that, in the current case of Mpumalanga province, both the provincial executives of COSATU and the SACP were the main protagonists in the internecine involving the Premier Mathew Phosa (Sechaba ka Nkosi 1999:1). Given the importance of provincial governments as vehicles for socio-economic and political transformation for the entire political system, the ANC led Alliance's track record on law and order leaves much to be desired. This is particularly true because democracy cannot be firmly established without the rule of law (Karpen 1993:94), which should be respected by all.

### **3.5 Collective Responsibility**

One dimension that needs to be considered, if only briefly, is the concept of collective responsibility in the parliamentary system of government with multipartyism. In this instance, it is proposed to assess the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance's effect upon collective responsibility relative to the South African political system in general.

The term collective responsibility has generally been associated with the British system of government as the basis of a government

strength that unites the various parts of the administrative machine. Being primarily associated with the interrelationships of political office bearers towards government policies, collective responsibility means that all politicians who are members of the government are expected to support its policies in public at all times (Popham 1969:25). In terms of this condition, members of the government are bound by the decisions of the cabinet collectively. And, if, for one reason or another they feel otherwise about certain policies, they cannot dissociate themselves from such policies in public, except when they resign. Any deviations from this posture may result in the dismissal of such officers. The rationale behind collective responsibility lies mainly in unity of purpose towards government policies. In this regard, the expectation is that any government of the day has a specific mandate to the electorate which must be fulfilled with the minimal disruption from within.

Generally speaking the idea of collective responsibility is intended mainly for reconciling all internal groupings within the government machinery system. Consequently, as Popham (1969:25) further suggests, it tends to counteract departmentation and separatism, which are characteristic of many large-scale organisations.

Although the principle of collective responsibility is binding on all political office bearers according to the British model, nonetheless, its influence has far reaching implications for the entire political system. First, not a single ministry can deviate from any government policy once it has been approved. This is regardless of any individual differences of opinion on some aspects of the said policy by the people concerned. Second, collective responsibility affects party discipline quite considerably as both front bench and the backbenchers are bound by the doctrine. Equally, the opposition, according to Popham (1969:25), is not unaffected by this condition. It is expected to project a positive image to the electorate through cohesion on policies as an alternative government. Undoubtedly the doctrine of collective responsibility does affect the entire political

system through interrelationships of governance and power sharing amongst the various government personnel.

With ministers collectively responsible for policy and individually responsible for the administration of their departments, certain inconsistencies easily arise in the hierarchy of responsibilities in most political systems. South Africa and particularly the ANC led political alliance is a case in point in this regard. It is common knowledge that many of the government's macro-economic policies failed to be implemented due to the disruption in the collective responsibility chain of command. For example, despite government declared policies of privatisation of state enterprises and the down-sizing of the public sector personnel, little achievement has been realised in implementation. Contrary to the spirit of collective responsibility that must prevail in all departments, the ANC led alliance clearly lacked cohesion within its government machinery for implementation. Through divergent socio-economic outlook and party indiscipline among its constituent members, the alliance was incapacitated to deal with collective responsibility within its ranks. Inevitably, the entire delivery mechanisms were paralysed as the majority of socio-economic programmes could not take off. For example, the attraction of foreign investment as a consequence of privatisation has been severely constrained. Similarly, the seemingly enlarged public sector has contributed quite tremendously to the government deficit spending (CDE 1999:47). These examples are just illustrative of the issue at hand, however, suffice it to suggest that further analysis on these matters will be undertaken in Chapter 6.

### **3.6 Checks and Balances**

The applicability of the concept of checks and balances in all multi party democracies is irrefutable. Through the requirement of the separation of governmental powers, whereby the legislature, executive

and judiciary supposedly operate separately, checks and balances act as an impartial regulatory mechanism for preventing administrative abuses and undesirable tendencies between these three branches. It is thus a constitutional mechanism for ensuring sound governance and proper intra-governmental control against corruption, maladministration and despotic tendencies amongst political office bearers and public officials (Moshabesha 1998:35).

Given mounting evidence of maladministration and continuing corruption in government institutions, as it will be shown in the subsequent chapters, the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance's performance in regard to the concept of checks and balances, deserves special attention. Quite frankly, the examination in question is highly desirable, particularly in the light of the necessity of keeping the public functionaries on track, relative to the enormous task of good governance. Moreover, as the democratisation process steadily becomes operational, consequent upon the adoption of the new constitution in 1996, more, attention will be focussed on the Alliance's ability to master the art of governance, despite some discernible cracks within its ranks.

As a prelude to the proper examination of the matter, a word of caution is deemed necessary at this juncture, especially for contextual reasons.

First, in the opinion of the researcher, the success of checks and balances is somewhat problematic, as it is dependent on several factors. These factors include, inter alia, meaningful participation in national affairs by the citizens, vigilant press, government sensitivity to people's concerns and criticism, code of conduct and professional ethics among public servants and many other facilitative conditions.

Second, several things are presumed as conducive to the initiation of the process including, for example, free flow of information, transparency, accountability and the rule of law – all of which tend to be subjective in many respects, and therefore difficult to measure.

Last but not least, given the transitional nature of the government system since 1994, some specific logistical constraints become unavoidable. For example, pending staff appointments, adequate financial inputs and other related matters have to be considered in the overall application of the concept.

Notwithstanding these realities and the consequences arising thereof, the political impact of the ANC led Alliance on the principle of checks and balances is reflective of the following characteristics.

First, the parliamentary vigilance over departmental affairs and government expenditures seemed to have been less assertive. As a result, some departments, notably health, found themselves entangled in some projects whose objectives and status in the department were questionable. The scandal of Sarafina 2 is a case in point in this regard (Sono 1998:14). With the passage of time, eventually, discretionary tendencies of officials crept in and ultimately precipitated a serious accountability short-comings within the entire department.

Interestingly, despite the Heath Special Investigation Unit report on Sarafina 2 which, *inter alia*, found the conduct of the Minister responsible 'reckless' and 'negligent' over the R14-million funding of the project, the minister exonerated herself from the findings.

The president's seemingly disinclination to compel his minister to accept the principle of accountability was, unsurprisingly, viewed with indignation by some people across the political spectrum (The Star 26<sup>th</sup> March 1999:14).

Quite clearly, the requirement of checks and balances as presented by the above incident was disappointingly undermined or ignored. Regrettably, the incident had a negative reflection on the part of the alliance governance, relative to the inescapable constitutional challenge of the rule of law.

Second, with the state's capacity as a co-ordinator of many

functions and services, the Alliance has been quite weak through its disinclination or lack of pressure to utilise appropriate constitutional prerogatives to contain illegal strikes by its workers (public service unions). This weakness has contributed quite significantly towards its shortcomings in the application of checks and balances. For example, in terms of Chapter 5, section (2) (a) of the 1996 constitution the Presidential executive authority to co-ordinate the function of the state departments and administration in conjunction with his/her ministers is fully spelled out. This authority, read in conjunction with the provisions of chapter 4 section 44 (2) (d) and (f) of the constitution which establishes minimum standards for the rendering of services and prevents any prejudicial action by a province to the interest of another province or to the country as a whole respectively, seem to imply and affirm government discretion to initiate court injunctions.

Quite frankly, endless illegal strikes by teachers, nurses and members of other professions who render vital services to the communities, cannot remain unregulated in the public interest. The nature of the services provided by these categories of state employees does necessitate the application of checks and balances between the branches of government involved. Hence the need for prompt and decisive action to ensure maintenance of required standards and public order.

Although it may seem somewhat presumptuous to make any speculations on this matter, nonetheless, it suffices to ascribe government inexplicable disinclination for decisive action to the bondage of fraternal ties existing between the alliance partners. However the net effect of this inaction is the disruption in the provision of essential services to the communities, through inoperative checks and balances in the government system.

### 3.7 Political Stability

The quest for political stability, as a prerequisite for sustainable development in Africa generally and South Africa in particular, remains upper most in people's aspirations. Admittedly, it cannot be otherwise, given Africa's sad experience with political strifes, social disorders, debilitating socio-economic inadequacies, ethnic conflicts and many other problems that characterise the African region.

With the South African political leadership under a microscopic examination for its responsiveness to the challenge of ensuring political stability, consequent upon the above realities, the ANC led alliance's performance in this regard, provides a special opportunity for this examination. Unavoidably, more so, in the context of analysing the impact of a political alliance on the political system, with particular reference to South Africa.

To provide a framework of the ensuing examination, a brief definition of the concept of political stability may suffice. Political stability is, first and foremost, a relative concept with the implication of a broad spectrum of interpretations and meanings. By virtue of this characteristic, therefore, it tends to be highly subjective and difficult in terms of consensus. However, in the context of this analysis, political stability will be defined as a social condition of general satisfaction and tolerance by the citizens in relation to the prevailing political conditions. Accordingly, it is manifested through things such as, for example, free political activities among the general public, absence of intimidation by anybody, existence of free media, and a conducive atmosphere to the general stability. By implication, therefore, it is a subject of enormous interest to the stakeholders in governance.

From another perspective, political stability implies an effective political culture that sustains an efficient and responsive loyalty and commitment by the citizens (Abcarian and Masannat (1970:48-52). In

terms of this condition, the extent to which individuals feel integrated with the other citizens in the same political system constitutes a measure of the degree of trust and confidence available for public purposes. Hence the characterisation of a "pragmatic or bargaining rather than ideological style of conducting political transactions" (Abcarian and Masannat 1970:48).

Unsurprisingly, therefore, political stability is identifiable through a stable political system that sustains pluralism in decision-making processes, especially in a multiparty democracy.

Given the above definitional peculiarity and primarily with the view to highlight the nature of the effect of political alliances on government systems, particularly on the ideal of political stability, a limited examination will be taken on the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance's performance. In this regard, only three elements will suffice, namely, empowerment, relationship between government and the media and representation of groups in the political process.

### **3.7.1 Empowerment**

In terms of the empowerment of people within the general government system (which, incidentally is multi-institutional in character), political alliances are generally empowering. Undisputably, the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance performance in this regard, has been quite reflective of this characteristic.

First, political alliances, by virtue of their inclusive character, generally enable pressure groups to exert a strong influence upon the policy making processes (Derbyshire 1979:20 – 23). With the majority of political alliances across the globe having an open and inclusive membership of diverse interest groups like, for example, the British Labour Party, numerous sectors of the population are empowered in terms of promoting their interests. The ANC led Alliance has certainly not

been an exception in this regard, as the following assessment indicates.

The plural and inclusive character of the Alliance membership, despite its seemingly discomfort and self defeating tendencies in some ways has, nevertheless, been highly instrumental for the political empowerment of many people across a wide spectrum of the socio-economic environment.

Second, through several agreements and policy objectives as reflected in their election manifestos, a broad section of the general population is given the opportunity to pursue their interests quite effectively. No wonder that the ANC led Alliance, through its firm and unequivocal commitment to social and infrastructural development, as embodied in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), accorded a lot of previously disadvantaged groups an opportunity to acquire some skills through training. Undoubtedly, this training, from increased enrolments in schools, technicons and universities, has had a psychological effect upon the trainees. The latter, accordingly, have been provided with a meaningful existence whereby, for instance, the development of potentialities constitutes the ultimate destination and primary intention of a human being (Frankl 1967:9). Hence, the saying that knowledge (as a consequence of education and training) is power. In this regard, political empowerment was certainly effected as people were enabled to make a meaningful impact on socio-economic issues. Frankl's (1967:4) assertion that, a certain amount of power such as economic, financial and political power is generally a prerequisite for meaningful fulfilment has thus been affirmed. The Alliance's impact on political stability in this regard is unquestionable.

### **3.7.2 Representation of Groups in the Political Process**

From the foregoing analysis generally, the inference that political alliances are unavoidably representative of a variety of interest and

pressure groups is quite legitimate. Given the diversity of groups within the trade union movement as represented by COSATU, for example, coupled with several civil organisations whose membership is closely aligned with the ANC, it is understandable that the Alliance provides a good forum for the representation of minority as well as majority groups in the political process. The representation of civil bodies such as, for example, the United Democratic Front (UDF), the South African National Civil Organisation (SANCO) the Alexandra Civil Organisation (ACO) and the Soweto Civil Association, (SOCA) are notable cases in mind (Lodge 1999:80 – 95). As regards the relative influence of these groups on the political landscape, accurate assessment would best be left with the political analysts. Suffice it to conclude that political alliances are generally facilitative of an inclusive representation of groups in the political process.

### **3.7.3 Relationship Between Government and the Media**

Cordial relationship between government and the media in a multiparty democracy is valuable in several respects. Perhaps most importantly is its inherent potential to enhance the democratisation process and indeed good governance. Nyatumba's (1995:10) reflection is pertinent in this regard when he contends that, government and the media should realise that theirs is a mutually beneficial relationship whereby, for instance, the media need the government because they have a responsibility to inform the readers, whilst the government needs the media, by virtue of its primary responsibility to communicate with the citizens.

Accordingly, this seemingly two-way relationship between the government and the media ensures a constant mutual dependency, which promotes transparency and openness on the part of the government. Similarly, the media, on the other hand, is enabled to perform its vital

function of informing the public of the current political events and opinions, relative to the national issues (Derbyshire 1984:233). Hence the enhancement of democracy.

With the above framework as the ideal, the performance of the ANC led Alliance in regard to the relationship between the government and the media will be briefly examined.

In the context of the government's anti-corruption crusade among its employees, the success of the media to expose corruption within government circles has been quite commendable. Through transparency and openness, therefore, the media was enabled to expose many public officials on cases involving corruption (City Press 9<sup>th</sup> May 1999:6). Although government intentions about governance seldom coincide with the media perceptions about logistics and priorities, nonetheless, the conveyance of objectives in this case is indisputable (Lidovho 1998:16).

Given the constitutional commitment to governmental transparency and openness, freedom of the press does, indeed, become a double-edged sword in the throes of socio-economic and political transformation. Understandably, tension between government and the media is unpreventable, particularly in the light of the different agendas pursued by the two. Nonetheless, the Tripartite Alliance record regarding the relationship between government and the media has largely been cordial, frank and constructive in terms of achievements. The following examples are illustrative of this trend.

First, during the South African National Defence Force deployment to Lesotho on 22 September, 1998 some members of the media could not subscribe to the South African government's initiative. Despite the publicly stated reasons for the intervention, namely, South Africa's obligation, through the South African Development Community (SADC), to oppose military coups d'etat in the region, the intervention was regarded as unrelated to any rational purpose" by part of the media (Hayson 1998:16)/

Quiet frankly, government action in this particular case was motivated by its national commitment in the first instance and also by the constitutional provision of openness and transparency, and hence the disclosure about the rationale behind the intervention.

Second, government subsequent retreat on the Tobacco Product Control Amendment Bill in the face of the fierce opposition from both the public and the media in particular, was illustrative of its commitment to openness. As the public hearings on the proposed anti-tobacco legislation were both emotional and frank, thus indicative of public outcry, government was left with no alternative but, to reconsider its stand and objective despite its majority in parliament (The Star 27 January 1999:16).

With the media providing a forum for a two way communication between the government and all other stakeholders in governance, the enhancement of the latter thus become a reality. In this respect, the Tripartite Alliance has been facilitative of the process.

### **3.8 Conclusion**

Given the logical interdependence of the individual parts of a political system, the effect of political alliance on the latter becomes a complex and dynamic process of interaction. This process, inter alia, involves societal power structures, operative value system, decision-making processes and several other relationships with interested bodies. Accordingly, through public policy-making endeavours, grassroots participation maintenance of law and order, collective responsibility checks and balances, and political stability, the process of interaction is manifested. This has been the thrust of this chapter, in terms of the impact of the Alliance on the political system.

## CHAPTER 4

### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ANC-SACP-COSATU ALLIANCE

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

Having set up both the comparative theoretical and practical terms of political alliances, inclusive of their relative impact upon government systems, it is appropriate at this juncture to explore the characteristics of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance. In pursuit of this objective, it suffices to indicate that the proposed exploration will be restricted to the formation of the alliance, specific terms of reference, objectives, notable achievements and constraints. With this exercise, it is hoped a meaningful framework will be established for the facilitation of a proper analysis of the impact of the Alliance on governance in South Africa during 1994 to 1999. However, as a prelude to this exercise, a brief overview of the meaning of political alliances in general is deemed necessary at this juncture. In this regard, the origin, evolution and the dynamics of political parties and alliances will be explored.

#### 4.2 Political Parties and Alliances

As a starting point, a definition of the terms political parties and alliances is pertinent at this juncture. Frears (1977:10-11) defines political parties as "an association formally organized with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and/or maintaining legal control, either singly or in coalition or electoral competition with other similar associations over personnel and the policy of the government of an actual or prospective sovereign." Implicit in the acquiring and/or maintenance of legal control in coalition is the existence or potentiality of alliances of political parties which, invariably assumes two distinct and yet related forms. On the one hand, there may be alliances of political parties and other interest groups

prior to, during and beyond electoral campaigns for the purposes of gaining control of the legislature. Within this scenario, alliance partners generally tend to maintain their individual identity, whilst combining forces and resources to achieve their political goals collectively. However, an amalgamation of parties does occur in some instances, depending on the political expediencies and other considerations. The merger between the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party in Britain in 1988 is a recent classical example (Birch 1995:21). Alliances, in this context, meaning political groupings focusing on specific electoral issues or covering a wide range of policies on a transient or permanent basis (Coxall 1986:43). On the other hand, some political parties within the framework of a multi-party democracy, may deem it necessary to form a coalition government, depending on the election outcome or some other considerations prior to the general elections. A coalition is thus essentially another form of political alliance whose main purpose is to establish a government composed of political party groupings (Lapalombara 1974:509). Accordingly, different political parties jointly form a government through the sharing of portfolios in the cabinet and agree on a programme of action, relative to the policies to be pursued and implemented. In this scenario, hard bargaining normally preclude the establishment of such a coalition in terms of specific responsibilities, formula for the allocation of seats and portfolios and any other related matters (Mainwaring 1993:220).

The French experience, under the multipartyism system of the Third Republic, is illustrative of this condition. For example, as Pierce (1968:23-24) indicates, "French Governments always depended upon a coalition of parliamentary parties for their majorities" which invariably, "contained representatives of two or more parties... It required arduous political bargaining among the parties to establish the terms on which coalitions could be formed, and the bargaining generally produced agreement over only a limited number of questions and for a relatively short period of time.

To conclude, the main difference between political alliances and coalitions is that the former can largely be formed at any convenient moment by the parties concerned. Whereas, the latter is usually restricted to the period just before the installation of the new government and during governance. The occurrence of this may be under numerous eventualities such as election outcome, party realignments, parliamentary instability and lack of confidence in the government of the day, for example. Once more, the French experience with ministerial instability provides a good example. Accordingly, as Pierce suggests, through the subordination of the executive to the popularly elected assembly, the rotation in office of the premiers was unavoidable. In the light of this perspective, it suffices to consider political parties and alliances as legitimate institutions of power within a democratic political system, through competition and cooperation amongst groupings of parties and interests groups.

Like all other social institutions, political parties and alliances are, by nature, highly dynamic and thus evolutionary in terms of objectives, challenges and socio-economic and political conditions. The origin of political parties and alliances in the western world has been a debatable issue in terms of time and locality. However, it is generally agreed that, by and large, the origin of political parties and alliances has been a product of distinct historical events in Western Europe and North America. Accordingly, as Levine (1982:173) rightly observes, "parties in the modern sense are a development of the nineteenth century from the need to mobilize the electorate, which was being made increasingly more numerous by the expansion of suffrage. Because the United States was the first country to grant the suffrage broadly, it became the first to have modern political parties." In a similar manner, events in Western Europe seem to complement this view. In this regard, Charlton (1986:81) notes that, earliest modern political parties resulted from divisions within legislature institutions, presumably because of class of interests amongst the interest and pressure groups, who were the dominant constituent

members of the legislatures (Levine 1982:172). Thereafter, more contemporary political parties and their alliances emerged from both inside and outside legislature for a variety of reasons.

In Great Britain in particular, the establishment of a multiparty democracy in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, through the initial formation of a predominantly two-party system in government (Birch 1997:21) was, undeniably, a momentous event, facilitative of the wide spread multipartyism and eventually some mergers through numerous socio-economic and electoral challenges.

For example, at the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) which was then an established pressure group in the interest of labour, agreed to set up a separate political party that was later known as the Labour Party (Beer 1998:28). The new party had, prior to its formation and afterwards, been in alliance with the Liberals (one of the two parties with the conservative at the time) whom they helped win a landslide victory in the 1906 general elections. Ever since these momentous historical events, a trend for multipartism through political parties and alliances in government has become a permanent feature of modern democracy. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the British parliamentary system of government, as practiced in Britain and many other places elsewhere and the American presidential system are the two main multiparty systems of the world.

As regard the continental states of Europe, the political and historical forces that have shaped the development of variations in multiparty democracy have been more similar to one another comparatively. In this instance, as Pierce (1968:3) contends, particularly with regard to the French party system, multiparty democracy is attributable to three significant and consecutive historical events. First, the political, social and religious revolution of 1789 (French Revolution). Second, the Industrial Revolution of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and finally the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. These events, individually and

collectively gave impetus to the establishment and spread of multiparty democracy through regional interrelationship across Western Europe and beyond, consequent upon colonialism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. For example, as Pierce (1968:14) observes, the ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity highlighted in the 1789 French Revolution brought into focus pertinent issues of type of government, and relationship between state and citizens, inclusive of the church. The exacerbation of French economic problems through the Industrial Revolution, undoubtedly, provoked new discussions to the social question of the time, namely, the legitimacy of the state. Last but not the least, the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 impacted heavily on the formation of new political groupings with the different ideologies and political agenda, through the manifestation of class interests, particularly the workers. Henceforth, competition for political power between social groups was legitimised worldwide. Hence the enhancement of multipartyism in France which, according to Pierce (1968:1), is expressive of political conflicts that generate continuing process of combination and recombination of parties for the control of the legislature. Little wonder, then, that French parliamentary system is characterised by inter-party coalitions (alliances) as an essential feature for attaining a legislative majority (Mainwaring 1993:220).

With modern democratic states intimately intertwined with parties as Golden (1986:298) suggests, the impact of the three revolutions upon the contemporary western political systems has, indeed, been significant. Unsurprisingly, therefore, that in the subsequent years, a majority of the democratic constitutional states of Europe in conjunction with America resolved to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as a consequence of common ideals and shared vision between them.

The above events, coupled with the contemporary process of globalization and its implications for human rights enhancement, pluralism in government and accountability, as ideal condition for good governance (Quirk 1997:571), have contributed greatly towards the establishment of

multiparty democracy, inclusive of political alliances throughout the world. Notwithstanding some variations as to the classification of party systems, (Sartori 1976: 121-123), multiparty democracy remains a common phraseology for the majority of purposes relating to competition between different parties in any given party system. Unavoidably, therefore, the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance in South Africa is no exception to the general trend globally.

Regarding the essential characteristics of political alliances, per se, few generalizations are identifiable. First, political alliances, like political parties are a means to an end. The means in this particular context, implies a method by which a given objective is achieved, whilst an end refers to the ultimate goal being pursued. A political alliance is, therefore, a political strategy used by a formal grouping of political parties which share similar beliefs, attitudes and values for the purpose of exercising power within a state (Coxall 1986:13). Second, being essentially a political union, an alliance, more often than not, tends to be a temporary measure of convenience between parties prior to or after an election, depending on the prevailing circumstances of challenge, electoral gains and other related concerns (Mainwaring 1993:200).

Third, political alliances, contrary to the general expectation, are extremely volatile and thus difficult to sustain in unstable socio-economic and political conditions. In this regard, events in Italian politics bear testimony to this phenomenon. For example, during the seventies, the so-called historic centre left alliance of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Republicans and Socialists, managed to get no more than four to five major bills through parliament in eight years” Sterling (1993:48-53). Undoubtedly, the socio-economic and political conditions of strikes, high inflation, recession and incompetent bureaucracy, as Sterling observes, had a negative effect on governance in general.

Last but not least, political alliances, of necessity, entail hard bargaining between the parties, particularly with regard to things such as

allocation of ministerial posts, policy shifts and electoral strategies (Ware 1996:33). Very unfortunately, however, it is this peculiarity which renders such alliances to instability as it will be observed later. It is on these identifiable characteristics that an analysis of political alliances on governance is being pursued in this research.

#### **4.3 Factors Influencing Formation of Political Alliances**

There is a whole range of factors influencing the formation of political alliances in a multiparty democracy.

First, as indicated above on the essential characteristics of a political alliance, alliances are, more often than not, a consequence of joint consultation amongst parties with similar orientation on what the government should do. In other words, a common vision among political and other social groups on what government should be concerned about, provides a good motivation for the formation of an alliance (Pierce 1968:72).

Second, as the survival of governments in all parliamentary systems presumably depends on the retention of the confidence of their legislature, a collapse of any government by any means can facilitate the formation of political alliances. Most European democracies and parliamentary governments elsewhere, inclusive of Africa are typical of this scenario in terms of Ware's (1996:331) minority party model; the latter being identifiable through three major outcomes, namely:

- a minority government with one or more parties in the legislature but without a clear majority. It continues in office as long as the other parties are satisfied with its performance. However, its survival is extremely limited.

- A coalition government based on formal alliances prior to elections. Normally, agreements are such that the parties would form a government should they win a majority of parliamentary seats and also divide portfolios on an agreed formula.
  
- A coalition government that is formed after an election or in the interim period following the collapse of the preceding government. It is here that hard bargaining occurs relative to which parties will be in government and how various portfolios will be shared, including the nature of government policy.

Third, the formation of political alliances may be influenced by the nature of a political system operative in any given state. In this instance, the Swedish so-called compromise model as outlined by Lane (1991:1-7) is quite pertinent. Under this model, the multiparty government operates with a bias towards consensus with three elements being emphasized, according to Lane (1991:1), namely: "compromise, interest articulation and intermediation and comprehensive social engineering by means of public policy-making, with the emphasis on stability in the system." Not surprisingly, therefore, Swedish governments have been characterized by either large minority governments as in 1.2 (iii) above or bare majority ones within a framework of party alliances/coalitions.

Fourth, common ideological inclinations by different political or social groups can be a motivational basis for the formation of political alliances (Kunnert 1991:7). The formation of the Social Democratic Party in Britain in 1981 is a classical example here (Coxall 1986:88-89). With the composition of the leadership and founder members being drawn from the labour and conservative MPs, the new party rejected "the 'so-called' ideological 'extremism' and subjection to the big economic interest groups (business and unions) of the two major parties and sought a political

realignment of the forces of moderate reform opposed to both" (Coxall 1986:88-89).

Fifth, economic conditions do play a significant role in the formation of party alliances according to Coppedge (1997:157-158). In terms of this scenario some governments may be tempted to crack down on opposition parties due to perceived instability caused by these parties. However, the latter, as a response to such an eventuality, may decide to close ranks and merge in opposition to the government move or boycott elections jointly for tactical reasons.

Finally, given the nature of all electoral systems to give an unproportional representation between larger parties and small ones in the distribution of seats in Parliament (Coppedge 1997:159), party alliances can be formed by smaller parties for the purposes of gaining more seats in the legislature. Not surprisingly and certainly in line with the realities of the situation, opportunities for possible mergers and alliances among smaller parties in South Africa seem quite possible in the light of the restrictions on MPs to cross the floor.

The above factors are but a few illustrative instances for the formation of political alliances within a framework of multipartyism. However, given the inevitability of political transformation globally, more unfamiliar conditions may arise with all the implications for new challenges. For example, the envisaged European Political Union is pregnant with new opportunities for inter-territorial party alliances. Hence additional factors for political alliances. Over and beyond that, contemporary socio-economic and political conditions in South Africa already provide unique challenges for alliances. For the moment, suffice it to suggest that political alliances arise out of many factors within multipartyism, including common vision, ideology, pursuit of power and the nature of political system operative in any given state.

#### 4.4 Objectives of Political Alliances

The objective of political alliances in contemporary global politics is a fascinating phenomenon. First, as the French political system has amply demonstrated, the long-term objectives of political alliances is to take control of the state through electoral and parliamentary majorities (Ware 1996:1). Unavoidably, however, this exercise necessitates some experimentation through combination and recombination of parties which in the process result in institutional instability, according to Pierce (1968:1). The latter, being more characterized by frequent turnover of cabinets for reasons of internal conflicts amongst the partners. Second, political alliances may have as their main objective the weakening of an existing regime through some legal destabilising mechanism with the view to replacing it with another political system (Pierce 1968:7).

In regard to the latter scenerio, the parties tend to be constantly engaged in a political warfare which is concerned with the very foundations of the state and the nature of the regime (government). The typical cases in point according to Duverger (1963:419), are France and Italy where the Communist parties operate side by side with the parties that uphold the principle of multipartism. Accordingly, the former, on the one hand, "do not accept western democracy, do not agree with pluralism of parties, which they would replace by a single party, and do not recognize any right of opposition or freedom of speech for all. The non-communist parties, on the other, refuse to countenance the single-party system, the totalitarian view of the state, the distruction of opposition and the suppression of political liberties" (Duverger 1963:419). Hence the endless political warfare, aimed at the replacement of one regime by another.

Third, as recent events in Nigeria have amply demonstrated political alliances' objectives include restoration of democratic rule whenever and wherever the latter seems to be suppressed for whatever

reasons. In this instance, like minded groups, both political and otherwise, combine and form specific alliances for the purpose of speaking with one voice on the pressing issue of the day, relative to governance and political stability.

Sometimes, through political expediencies, alliances are formed with a specific purpose of assisting a given regime from collapsing in the face of strong opposition. The Lesotho 1965 election results provide a classical example in this instance. In terms of this scenario, the government of the Basotho National Party (BNP) had a tie of votes with the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), 29 to 29, where upon a smaller party the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), came to the rescue of the former, through the support by one of its members who crossed the floor (Khaketla 1971:14).

The above objectives of political alliances are, by no means exhaustive, but rather provide a political framework for the rationale behind formation of political alliances, particularly within the context of a multi-party democracy.

#### **4.5 Comparisons and Contrasts**

As already noted, the emergence of political parties and alliances in the western world is attributable to two main factors. Namely, historical events and evolutionary political and socio-economic transformation. Whereas social, political and religious revolutions have been mainly responsible for the formation and spread of parties and alliances in Western Europe on the one hand, some interesting contrast emerges when events in America and England are compared with continental/western Europe. In America, for example, political parties were a consequence of the expansion of suffrage which facilitated the mobilization of the electorate in terms of parties. Similarly in England, formation of parties was facilitated by specific legislation, namely the

Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 which expanded the suffrage (Levin 1982:176). However, it should be noted that, it was in the latter where the seeds of multipartism were sown through a clash of interests amongst the pressure and interests groups within the legislature. In other words competition within the legislature provided an opportunity for the formation of new parties which, ultimately and through electoral challenges, enabled the formation of alliances.

As Europe and England extended their spheres of influence through trade and colonialism, the ideal of multipartism found an irresistible appeal among several colonies in the subsequent years of decolonialization. The trend has been continuous as recent events in Central and Eastern Europe show that the idea of pluralism, democracy and multipartism in government is irresistible (Karpen 1993:95).

Although it is common knowledge that British political parties are not registered or formally recognized by law (Birch 1995:21), nonetheless, multiparty democracy is well entrenched in British political system through convention. This is inclusive of the alliances which have been operational since the beginning of the twentieth century. This unique feature of the British parliamentary system contrasts sharply with developments elsewhere in Europe and outside. Accordingly, as Mainwaring (1995:20) rightly observes, elections in parliamentary systems must, in principle, afford the opportunity of alternation of power through constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties like freedom of speech, freedom of organization and several others. With this condition, formation of political parties and alliances is well facilitated and protected. Unsurprisingly, therefore, as Mainwaring further notes, between 1967 and 1992, twenty four (24) countries across the globe were classified as stable democracies under parliamentary systems; presumably, all with written constitutions and inclusive of former colonies (Mainwaring 1993:205). Approximately sixteen countries of this group have been classified as multiparty systems,

unsurprisingly, with a range of 3-5 or more parties. Ninety percent (90%) of these are found in Western Europe (Ware 1996:159).

#### **4.6 Formation of the Tripartite Alliance**

As a background to the formation of the Tripartite Alliance, a brief historical note about events leading to the actual launching of the alliance is deemed necessary. This review is highly valuable for the understanding of the dynamics of the seemingly diverging tendencies among the partners on matters pertaining to policies and governance in particular. According to the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR 1992:31) the resurgence of black trade unions in South Africa in the 1970's following a prolonged period of repression, enabled the labour movement to venture into the political arena. Inevitably, the movement provided "key organizational and political backbone for anti apartheid resistance through the 1980's." As the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) the two main black political parties then, were banned, the black trade unions filled the gap and thereby articulated the aspirations of the people opposed to the apartheid regime. In due course, through political exigencies of the time, the black trade unions launched what was to be known as the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) in Durban in November, 1985 (Smith 1987:97). It was the consolidation of the black trade unions which facilitated political reorientation of the labour movement in South Africa - the characteristic of which has remained a permanent feature of trade unions in the country. Unsurprisingly, COSATU after a lengthy discussion within its ranks' took a definite, albeit risky, decision to act on political issues side by side with worker concerns. Upon this normalization of the political aspects of trade unionism, Jay Naidoo, the federation's general secretary then, observed as follows:

“experience has taught us that it is not enough to simply concern ourselves with factory issues. Non-political unionism is not only undesirable, it is impossible. And this basic truth has become increasingly clear to the organized worker movement ... we do not see COSATU as a political party but we do believe COSATU has a responsibility to voice the political interests and aspirations of the organized workers and also more broadly of the working class”... (Naidoo as quoted by Smith 1987:77 - 98).

Quite frankly, COSATU's position within the tripartite alliance is based upon these sentiments. In other words, most of the federations' actions within the alliance are attributable to this socio-economic and political outlook.

With this reorientation, COSATU committed itself to seeking alliances with others and hence the establishment of contact with both the ANC and exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) externally. Interestingly, the latter was controlled mostly by communists, according to Smith (1987:98). Needless to indicate that the ANC and the SACP had by then already formed an alliance from the early fifties.

On the home front, COSATU joined forces with the United Democratic Front, (UDM), a predominantly black forum established in the eighties, to campaign for the release of detainees and political prisoners. It was this action, more than any others, which culminated into closer ties between the Congress on the one hand and the ANC and the SACP on the other, consequent upon the unbanning of the latter two. Thereafter, the three bodies jointly participated in the new Government Constitutional Assembly (CIIR 1998:32). Through these developments, COSATU thereby entered into a tripartite alliance with the ANC and SACP, in fulfillment of its goal of formalizing the political aspects of trade unionism.

It came as no surprise that some COSATU members assumed leading roles in the ANC and SACP and hence the privileged position of

COSATU's General Secretary, Cyril Ramaphosa as the leading negotiator of the ANC and later chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the formation of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance is attributable to the above events (CIIR:1998:44)

With the view to putting the subsequent internal squabbles within the Alliance into some perspective, the following actions by COSATU are worth noting. Prior to the formal launching of the tripartite alliance, COSATU had commissioned special economic studies for the purpose of assessing the prospects for the transformation of the South African economic system after apartheid. In addition to this, it also did a lot of ground work for the ANC blue print for basic development which became the new government Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), according to CIIR 1998:3

Since its formation, the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance has become one of the most fascinating and complex political alliances in contemporary multi-party systems (The Star 5 August 1997:14). First and foremost, the alliance, despite some discernible cracks in its ranks over a number of policy issues, has undoubtedly stood the test of time, purpose and governance. Its track record during the past five years in government has been quite remarkable in terms of political and economic stability for the country. Second, unlike its contemporary alliances in Western Europe (e.g. Italy and France) in particular, the tripartite alliance has, so far, never been vulnerable to external pressures which seek to challenge its legitimacy and competence (Pierce 1968: 5 - 6). Third, its composition is quite unique from the point of view of power equation. In this regard, it is very clear that the junior partners (SACP and COSATU), in terms of their membership nation wide, do exert disproportionate influence on the affairs of the alliance. No wonder the ANC has seemingly been compelled to defer full implementation of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, following reservations

and strong objections on some aspects by the former. Over and beyond that, following the ANC decision "to make a break with past practice by not setting aside specially reserved positions for their members on the party lists that will determine who become MPS and who will have to stay home..." (The Star 20 May 1998:14), the reality of this influence is thus confirmed.

With this characterization of the Tripartite Alliance, a closer scrutiny of its real status in terms of governance becomes imperative and hence the examination of the terms of reference which follows.

#### **4.7 Terms of Reference**

In any political alliance or coalition, a common ground on goals and objectives is essential for the success of such a union. This requirement is of vital importance for both the existence and sustenance of that alliance or coalition. In this regard, the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance is certainly no exception. In as far as the Tripartite Alliance is concerned, the following is worth noting. As indicated in chapter one under factors influencing the formation of political alliances, the ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance can be ascribed to a combination of three factors, namely, Kunnerts (1991:331) factor of common ideological inclination, Coppedge's (1993:157 - 158) economic conditions motivation and the nature of electoral system's to give an unproportional representation of parties in the distribution of seats. In terms of Kunnerts factor of common ideological inclination, the seemingly shared socialist ideology of both the ANC and the SACP, coupled with COSATU's bias towards workers' interests, was a strong motivational basis for the formation of the alliance. As regards Coppedge's economic conditions motivation, COSATU's strategy of consumer boycotts used for the purpose of widening the issues of struggle by the workers, become irresistible to the ANC and the SACP for a union with COSATU (Smith

1987:102). Consequently, with economic sanctions and disinvestment strategy against South Africa seemingly achieving desired objectives, motivation for the alliance became imperative for the eventual defeat of the common enemy.

As the subject of the relations between the partners has always baffled many people both inside and outside South Africa, clarification of this issue becomes very crucial for the terms of reference. First, according to Mandela the SACP is considered by the ANC as "a firm and dependable ally in the common struggle to rid our country of the system of white minority rule ... The SACP is a separate organization which does not seek to dominate the ANC as the ANC. The ANC for its part does not seek to dominate the Communist Party. The policies of the ANC are not decided in the Communist Party as neither are the policies of the SACP decided in the ANC, regardless of the number of people who might be members of both organizations.... The other member of our Alliance is the Congress of South African Trade Unions. We could like to reaffirm our firm determination to respect the independence of the Trade Union movement and to act in a manner consistent with this position, both now and in the future..." (Nelson Mandela as quoted by Steve Clark 1993:114).

Quite frankly, the position or nature of the relationship as expressed above was more of an ideal than reality and thus subject to change according to circumstance. Subsequent events have indeed confirmed this inevitability, as it will be shown below. Again, given numerous controversies on policy issues among the partners, the relationship is much more complex than as described and hence dubious terms of reference governing the alliance.

Second, the Tripartite Alliance, as a political union, was established within the ANC strategic objective of the National Democratic Revolution. The latter is defined as "the creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society" (Masebe 1998:10). Further

clarification of the relationship was made in August 1998 at the 50<sup>th</sup> conference of the ANC. Accordingly, the ANC National Executive Committee reaffirmed its commitment to the Tripartite Alliance by describing it as "a historical responsibility to pursue the interests of the working class, the poor and the disadvantaged." In terms of this commitment, COSATU and the SACP will continue to work together with the ANC as long as the strategic objective has not been achieved (Masebe 1998:10). For all intents and purposes, the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance can be described as a political union of common interests by different organizations for the promotion of those interests. This is the common ground which binds the three organizations together.

With the view to highlighting some changes and the complexity in the relationship between the three organizations, it is worth quoting a number of perspectives by some political analysts. The objective of this exercise is to understand more clearly the underlying factors behind the terms of reference for the alliance. Remarking on the intriguing nature of the relationship between the partners in the alliance and thereby refuting some-claims by Mandela on the same, Qwelane (1998:8), had this to say, and this is very important:

- "Members of the SACP, in their other roles as members of the ANC, can and do stand for election to the highest leadership positions of the ANC. As such it is self-evident that SACP members in their roles as ANC members influence discussions and are party to every decision the ANC makes.
- Members of the ANC who are not SACP members do not sit at meetings of the Executive of the SACP; it is hardly unlikely that the ANC as such, influences SACP decisions even though the opposite remain very true.

- COSATU members who are at the same time members of both the SACP and the ANC also take part in and influence decision of the ANC. It is all legitimate because their roles as members of any or all these three entities entitle them to do that.
- But ANC leaders who are neither COSATU nor SACP members, have very little influence over decisions of COSATU and the SACP as independent organizations. On the other hand, COSATU and the SACP at leadership level at least - are sides of the same coin."

Given the above scenario, it is obvious that most government policies and decisions do have a backing of both the SACP and COSATU, whether by default or otherwise. In other words, as Qwelane has rightly observed, it is highly unlikely that members of the two bodies whose dual membership entitles them to participate in ANC policy deliberations, refrain from doing so through this status. Paradoxically, the SACP Central committee members Sydney Mofamadi, Alex Erwin, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi and Pahad, as cabinet members within the ANC led government, do participate fully in ANC policy deliberations and implement the same policies. The same is true of COSATU's Jay Naidoo and Shepherd Mdladlana. They cannot escape from this inevitability.

Within this framework of the relationship between the three bodies it is somewhat surprising to note that there have been serious disagreements on some policy issues. Once more, Qwelane's observation in this regard is quite pertinent. "Because of this close relationship it is not outrageous to suggest that both COSATU and the SACP take part in ANC meetings where policies such as privatization and GEAR are agreed upon and adopted but outside the meetings adopt a completely opposite position." Doubtlessly, the explanation for this paradox must be elsewhere. Accordingly, as Nyatumba (1997:12)

suggests "the reality is that whatever influence COSATU and the SACP have been able to exert on the ANC in Government has been as a result not of those individuals the two organizations freed up to take government positions, but rather of pressure directly brought to bear by the organizations themselves." This is the crux of the matter.

From COSATU's viewpoint with regard to the terms of reference Shilowa (as quoted by Crego Gall 1997:204) has been more outspoken.

"COSATU expects to play a major role in economic decision making through tripartite institution (and to) cooperate as far as possible with a democratic government. If it is not possible to influence policy through negotiation we will revert to the traditional weapons we are used to and that is strike action ... we will challenge very vigorously any attempt to undermine the rights of workers, irrespective of the source of such act. The trade union movement should not allow itself to become a conveyor belt for any political party. It must remain independent."

This perspective does, indeed, seem to reflect more clearly COSATU's mode of operation, relative to its status in the alliance.

To complete this brief survey of quotations by analysts, purporting to explain the terms of reference between the alliance partners, the SACP perspective is also worthy of consideration. With full acknowledgment of the unavoidable tensions within the alliance Nqaluka, the SACP General Secretary (as quoted by Vick 1997:9) describes the SACP motivation behind the alliance thus "we have to ensure the ANC retains its character as a movement of workers (italics mine) and for people in rural areas and townships. At the same time we have to jealously consolidate the space the ANC has created in its ranks for other progressive democrats." Accordingly, the SACP sees itself playing a

catalyst role for the promotion of workers interests in conjunction with other progressive democrats, presumably like COSATU, for example.

In line with this perspective, few points need to be emphasized. First, unlike COSATU affiliate members who become ANC members by choice, all SACP members are ANC members. Their position is therefore very special within the alliance, particularly in terms of influence upon the ANC and its policies. As a result of this unique status, according to Paton (1998:4), "when they, as communists, take positions antagonistic to the ANC, they effectively constitute an organized group of dissenters within the ANC, putting enormous stress on the ANC's ability to hold together its diverse parts." Second, given its supposedly representation of approximately 80 members out of 400 seats in Parliament (Gumede 1998:11) the SACP does, indeed, have a disproportionate influence on government policies, irrespective of its autonomous status within the Alliance.

#### **4.8 Objectives of the Alliance**

As noted above in chapter one under factors influencing the formation of political alliances, various reasons account for the establishment of these alliances. Certainly, there are specific objectives for such formations. In the case of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance, a number of objectives are identifiable. First the tripartite alliance had as one of its major objectives, the maximization of opposition against the apartheid regime. In this regard, the Alliance, undoubtedly, achieved some measure of success in the sense that it sustained popular resistance against the apartheid regime, consequent upon the latter's intransigence about institutionalization of repression. Ultimately, rationality did prevail and hence the unbanning of the anti-apartheid organizations, the release of their leaders and negotiations on the democratization of the state (Habib and Taylor 1999:265).

Second, and closely related to the first, has been the objective of the overthrow of the apartheid regime, through legitimate political means. Mandela's (as quoted by Clark 1993:61) remarks on this objective truly captures the alliances rationale, "we have repeatedly made it plain that in the eyes of the 83 per cent of the South African population who were born black, this government and its predecessors since union based on the will of a minority, have no moral claim on authority. That being the case it is our absolute and inalienable right to employ every legitimate device to ensure that they transfer power to the people as speedily as possible." To this end, the alliance participated fully in the talks leading to the establishment of the first government of National Unity (GNU) under the Interim Constitution Act 2000 of 1993.

Third, like all other political alliances in multiparty democracies or systems, the capture of political power, or its retention remains a central motive behind the Alliance. In pursuit of this goal, the alliance has engaged in numerous political activities that are characteristic of many political parties or alliances. For example, the alliance, cognizant of the vulnerability of the state to weakness for failure to be identified with a common good (Hobshawn 1996:273) has never been insensitive to political pressures exerted by major stakeholders within NEDLAC and other consultative forums on policy initiatives. Numerous deadlocks and paralyses regarding the passage of certain important bills in parliament are indicative of this political outlook.

Fourth, given the important function of political parties and alliances as that of uniting, simplifying and stabilizing the political process, according to Ball (1993:81), the Tripartite Alliance certainly provided the highest common denominator in terms of bringing together sectional interests and diverse social groups. Hence the harmonization of various groups into the political process as one of the primary objectives of the alliance.

Fifth, and most importantly, it was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which became the primary objective of the Alliance. The RDP is essentially a tacit bargain between the ANC leadership and COSATU. It represents "a careful balance between the growth though redistribution policies advocated by the left and the emphasis on growth as the harbinger of distribution in more orthodox economic analysis, according to Lodge (1999:4(b) - 5). Unsurprisingly, therefore, it became part of the election manifesto of the Alliance for 1994 the election. Reflecting back on the earlier remark made under 4.1 regarding of political parties and alliances, the following is worth noting. As it was indicated, political alliances, of necessity, entail hard bargaining between the parties on issues such as ministerial posts, policy shifts and electoral strategies (Wave 1996:38). This condition, very unfortunately tends to render such alliances to instability. In the case of the Tripartite Alliance the perception of COSATU and the SACP that their alliance partner, the ANC, has shifted from the original RDP programme, has created serious tension in the Alliance (Mbeki as quoted by Business Day 1998:11).

At this juncture, it is worth noting that the RDP document was jointly drafted by the ANC, the SACP and COSATU (Sunday Times, 8<sup>th</sup> July 1998:18). As a framework for social and infrastructural development, including education and housing, it was viewed by the drafters as the macro-economic policy of the government. As such, it constituted the fundamental instrument for transformation. It is no wonder that COSATU and the SACP expressed displeasure at the ANC's apparent abandonment of the policy in favour of GEAR. Suffice it to indicate that, this issue of the seemingly policy shift, has proved to be a course of instability within the alliance, consequent upon its appearance.

#### 4.9 Achievements of the Alliance

In assessing the achievements of the Alliance, it is important to define the parameters of the assessment. First, in view of the broad scope of government functions and their complexity in terms of management, and financial implications, the assessment will be limited to a few areas of notable concern to the public. Second, only activities relating to policy-making endeavors wherein, presumably more interaction among stakeholders takes place, will be highlighted. Unavoidably, the assessment has to be confined to the period from 1994 elections until the end of parliament as prescribed in the constitution, namely March, 1999.

First, having noted in chapter one on the characteristics of political parties and alliances, that political alliances are extremely difficult to sustain in unstable socio-economic and political conditions, it is remarkable to observe that the Tripartite Alliance has stood this test. With the South African history characterized by divisions, violence, object poverty amongst the majority of the population, and numerous other socio-economic and political problems, sustenance of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance during the first five years of democratic rule is highly commendable. For example, an agreement between the main stakeholders in the negotiations on the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, when all else had failed, gave the Alliance a great achievement in socio-economic and political terms (South African Labour Bulletin 1997:79). In this particular instance, the two main contestants in the negotiations, namely COSATU and Business were trapped into a national collective bargaining dispute on regulation and flexibility (Grawitzky 1997:12). Government's indecision to intervene through spelling out its intentions about the bill, made matters worse and hence lack of common approach among the social partners. However, as noted above, eventually a agreement was reached by these partners, thus turning the bill into an Act.

Second, indications are that, despite COSATU's continuing threats of industrial action, there has been a considerable restraint on wildcatting workers in the past two years. Admittedly, several reasons could be attributed to this development. However, given COSATU's inclination to employ the strategy of industrial action both on matters pertaining to labour disputes and in negotiations with the government (Paton 1997:1), it is reasonable to conclude that this has been the result of some rapport between the partners.

Whether this achievement will be sustained in the context of the complex contradictions and confusion over a number of policy issues, it remains to be seen. The fact of the matter is that the alliance partners deserve a special credit over the restraint of wildcatting workers during the past few years.

Third, considering the divergent ideological inclination of the partners on a variety of key issues in socio-economic and political strategies, including privatization, the RDP and GEAR, the Alliances propensity to hold together is quite perplexing.

Fourth, it does seem as though political maturity and tolerance has played a supremely important role towards the unity of the Alliance. In this regard, the pragmatism displayed by COSATU at its sixth national congress in 1997, during the discussion of the GEAR strategy, can certainly be regarded as a milestone in the complex relationship that seem to govern the alliance. At this congress, even though COSATU rejected GEAR broadly, however, it emphasized that it was open to negotiations (The Star 22 September 1997:14).

Interestingly and indeed, quite surprisingly, subsequent to this sign of pragmatism, COSATU gave a warning that it was ready to mobilize its 2 million (approximately) members against the government's GEAR-policy whilst declaring its willingness to pay a levy to help the ANC to finance the 1999 election campaign (The Star 25 June 1998:20). This attitude, viewed against some very unflattering things said by Shilowa about

GEAR, according to the Star, is reflective of the strong ties which bind the partners to the alliance, despite tensions within. Accordingly, in Shilowa's observation, the policy of GEAR "Stifles economic growth and employment creation and continues to undermine RDPs commitment to growth through redistribution of wealth and income" Needles to recall that Shilowa is one of the key personalities who enjoy full membership in the three organizations that comprise the Alliance. As an executive member within each organization in the alliance, his influence upon the latter is quite immense. Furthermore, his remark about the RDP objective to generate growth through retribution of wealth and income (and not vice versa) is not in isolation but rather part of the SACP policy to end what it terms "ownership of the wealth of the country by a few monopoly capitalists and to place key sectors of the economy in the hands of the actual producers, the workers," according to Mzimande (as quoted by Financial Mail 10<sup>th</sup> October 1997:40). Undoubtedly, the perspectives expressed here are indicative of the differences in outlook among the partners on the one hand and also a clear manifestation of internal contradictions regarding policy issues.

#### **4.10 Constraints**

Like in all other multiparty democracies, constraints facing the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance as a government in South Africa are attributable to numerous factors including domestic realities and global challenges. With these factors closely intertwined, government's ability to forge ahead on policy initiatives becomes even more problematic. For example, attraction of foreign investment to promote socio-economic development is largely dependent on the domestic realities of political stability, good governance and sound macro-economic policies. A brief survey of the constraints affecting the ANC led alliance will suffice to illustrate the point. First, of all the constraints of the Tripartite Alliance in

government, few seem quite intractable as the apparent lack of internal consultative mechanisms on policy matters among the partners. Ever since the issue of privatization came into the fore in 1996, complaints about lack of consultations within the partners have been quite frequent. Whether this was due to political tactics by some members, notably COSATU and the SACP, or not, it may be somewhat difficult to say. Nonetheless, the issue of inadequate internal consultations does seem to exist. Undoubtedly, the net result of this gap between the partners is the unnecessary delays in the implementation of some crucial government policies, particularly those relating to economic development.

Second, a power play between COSATU, through its powerful affiliates, and the business on demands for higher wages by the former, in some sectors, is another major constraint of the Alliance. In this regard, employers (business), being mostly constrained by global and competitive pressures, resisted the double-digit settlements as demanded by the unions (Nxumalo 1998:1). Unfortunately, for the alliance, this power play impacted negatively on the proceedings within NEDLAC, particularly on growth and development related issues. The protracted proceedings on certain labour and economic related bills is illustrative of this eventuality within NEDLAC.

Third, a lack of shared economic vision which mobilizes all constituents for growth, development and job creation is also a major constraint (Parsons 1996:3). With most government policy initiatives bogged down on semantics and ideological differences within the alliance, it becomes very difficult to get anything done. For example, little achievement was realized on the policy of GEAR, consequent upon ideological differences amongst the constituent members.

Fourth, although the economy has grown each year since 1993 (The economist 27 September, 1997:52) the growth has, nonetheless, not been able to create new job opportunities as it was noted in this chapter 3, under law and order. Admittedly, this jobless growth is a complex

economic phenomenon whose solution depends on many factors, including sound macro-economic policies. However, it is lack of consensus among the partners which contributes to inappropriate measures for addressing macro-economic policy issues. In the final analysis, jobless growth seems to be one other constraint for the alliance.

#### **4.11 Conclusion**

In this chapter the main focus has been on the characteristics of political parties and alliances, in terms of their origin, evolution and dynamism generally. Specifically, the status of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance, relative to its term of reference, objectives, notable achievements and constraints, was closely examined as a prelude to the main analysis of the impact of the Alliance on governance in South Africa. Accordingly, a general framework has been established for the facilitation of the ensuing discussion.

## CHAPTER 5

### MEANING OF GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

#### 5.1 Introduction

As a prelude to the thrust of the thesis, it is imperative at this juncture to dissect the concept of governance in general and particularly its implications for the South African socio-economic and political context. Understandably, the main purpose in this regard is to put the ensuing analysis into context. Governance will thus be dissected in its broad characterization which, *inter alia*, includes a network of interrelationships between public functionaries and the general population on matters relating to the form and use of political power, for the purposes of law and stability, social welfare, economic welfare and numerous other government functions (World Bank 1992:54-55). From the South African point of view in particular, questions relating to constitutional provisions for the effective administration of the state, government power and ability to deal satisfactorily with all mandated functions and problems such as crime, unemployment, implementation of policies, and corruption in government institutions will be closely examined.

#### 5.2 Definition

A number of contemporary authors and organizations have contributed quite significantly on the concept of governance as it relates to both public administration and political science (Ginther et al 1995, Dutoit et al 1998, Swilling and Wooldridge 1997, Kickert 1997, World Bank 1992). These contributions and many others not mentioned have, indeed, considered the various dimensions and implications of the process.

However, given the diversity of these perspectives and the complexity of governance as a multi-dimensional and integrative process, only two definitions by Mohamad (1998:44) and Kitchken (1997:192) will be presumed for the purpose of this analysis. Mohamad contends that, "when we talk about governance, we speak of the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation's affairs. This definition broadly includes the complex array of mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens manage affairs involving public life. However, current conditions have shown that governance is no longer the exclusive domain of the state. Various bodies, almost all self appointed, now claim a right to have a role in the governance of a state."

In terms of this perspective, governance is both a process and an outcome of interactions between the state, through its hierarchy of functionaries and various public institutions on the one hand and the public at large on the other. The latter, in this context, being defined in terms of pressure and interest groups, professional organizations, men and women in the street and the general population. Being essentially concerned with societal wellbeing through legitimate acquisition and use of socio-economic and political authority, it is an intricate power relationship that is structurally organized in a system based on mutual trust and reciprocity between the parties concerned. It thus requires government capacity and abilities to provide numerous services and goods, both effectively and efficiently in conjunction with civil bodies, with the latter playing a complementary role. Kitchken's (1997:192) perspective on the other hand, although essentially similar to Muhamed's, does provide another dimension and insight for describing governance as the political economy of the state power playing itself out, namely, the means by which, according to him, "antagonistic forces with material interests in the state and civil society forge alliances and enter into conflicts so as to access more resources to reinforce their power." This

dimension of governance considers the process as a continuous power game of groups and alliances for the control of national resources. Viewed in these perspectives, governance becomes a complex management process with all the implications for social as well as scientific processes.

With the above explanation(s) of the concept of governance in mind, attention can now be focussed on some specific features of the process in order to expatiate on the meaning as such. These include, inter alia, the context of governance, the legitimacy of the state, efficiency and effectiveness, the relationship between government and citizens, representation and checks, and intergovernmental relationships.

### **5.3 Context of Governance**

Consequent upon the adoption of multi-party democracy as a major theme of governance in contemporary world affairs, the latter has increasingly become a major issue of the time. The reasons for this development may, perhaps, be not difficult to find.

First, with the unavoidable globalization of human affairs and development, the majority of national governments become subjected to both domestic and external pressures for conformity to the ideals such as social equity, human rights, representativity of population groups in government, power checks and balances for the smooth functioning of government. Their effectiveness and efficiency in addressing these issues is inevitably measured by criteria, which are determined jointly with international organizations. Understandably, the realization of these idea's depends on many factors. Hence the complexity of the task of governance for many governments.

Second, given the indispensability of the state in the distributive function of national resources, goods and services, according to Hobsbawn (1996:274), the importance of governance as a mechanism for

societal well being and stability becomes obvious. This is because society is made up of diverse groups with generally conflicting claims upon the state, despite humanity's mutuality of goals for survival. Third, as governments globally are faced with numerous challenges which vary according to circumstances, their success in tackling these problems lies in their mode of governance. The latter, more often than not, is an outcome of an interplay of variable factors. It is not a surprise, therefore, that governance is a highly complex process whose success implies several things. For example, there must be legitimacy on the part of the government on the one hand, and the willingness of the governed to play an active role jointly with the former through institutionalized processes of power, control, checks and balances, socio-economic and political welfare, international relations and several others, depending on the particular needs of individual states.

In the context of this seemingly complex process of governance, and also taking into account the peculiarities of individual states, the following examination will highlight specific institutionalized mechanisms and relationships which have a direct bearing on the current analysis.

#### **5.4 Legitimacy of the State**

Historically, the state emerged to provide some basic services in response to universal needs. These needs, by their nature, are enduring and thus provide a continuous challenge for their availability, through mechanisms of governance. In the realm of governance, the state remains indispensable (Hobsbawn 1996:274). Accordingly, it is an institution through which governance is effected. Being essentially a network of systematic relationships, the state involves machinery, agencies, jurisdictions, powers and rights (Lipson 1996:5), all of which are facilitative of governance. Viewed in this light, the state is an institutional means for bringing together individuals who share the same culture and

language(s) and aspirations, including protection, order, justice and general welfare. The latter, in this context, implies, *inter alia* provision of basic services like promotion of good health, education, availability of clean water, roads and many other amenities that are related to societal wellbeing.

In order to be able to give a sustainable provision of these services, one of the most important requirements in the existence of a state is its legitimacy. This means that the state must be duly recognized by both its citizens and the world at large. With this condition of recognition and acceptance, any given state is able to function freely within the complex notion of sovereignty which, ultimately accords it a limitless range of government activity.

As the concept of legitimacy is highly subjective and thus open to different interpretations, it is rather difficult to provide a universally accepted definition. However, it suffices to confine the definition to the basic essentials. In this regard, legitimacy, implies territorial integrity, constitutional framework for institutionalizing political and administrative power relationships and free participation of citizens in the election/appointment of government functionaries (Jefferson as quoted by Dumbauld 1996:110-129). In terms of territorial integrity, the state is fully recognized by the world community as an entity. In other words, it is recognized as a lawful/legitimate authority for governance within specific defined boundaries which, of necessity, have to be protected from outside invasion. Such a state has the power, for example, to enter into formal bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states for the purposes of mutual protection (treaties or alliances), trade and many other relations on a wide range of areas, for the mutual benefit. Constitutional frameworks define structures, authorities, checks and balances and all other methods by which the state is to be governed. With contemporary political trends unmistakably leading in the direction of the constitutional democratic state, constitutionalism has become a distinctive feature of state legitimacy.

Undeniably, a contemporary democratic state is, by definition, synonymous with non-discriminatory civil and political rights for all citizens (Kaballo 1995:189) a condition of which must be proclaimed in the highest law of the land. Legitimacy of the state is, thus, enhanced through citizens' involvement in constitution making processes and adoption by popular vote in a referendum. Through provisions such as openness for review and amendments, different generations are enabled to make the necessary changes (amendments) in accordance with their wishes and aspirations. In this regard, Jefferson's (as quoted by Dumbauld 1966:150) remarks are quite pertinent, "each generation is as independent of the one preceding as that was of all which had gone before. It has then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own happiness, consequently, to accommodate to the circumstances in which it finds itself that received from its predecessors; and it is for the peace and good of mankind that a solemn opportunity of doing this every nineteen or twenty years should be provided by the constitution, so that it may be handed on, with periodic repairs, from generations to generation to the end of time, if anything human can so long endure..." In terms of this perspective, legitimacy is relative and thus subject to changes according to peoples perceptions from one generation to another; hence the need for periodic review of constitutions. Regarding the characteristic of free participation of citizens in the election/appointment of government functionaries, the expectation is that three conditions must be met. First, it is normally assumed that elections must be open and competitive to facilitate a clear determination as to who should govern. Second, there must be a universal adult suffrage wherein all bona fide citizens enjoy a democratic right to vote (Mainwaring 19993:201). Third, in keeping with the perpetuating of and guaranteed civil rights, there is a need for periodic elections for the purpose of legitimizing authorities in power.

From the above perspective, legitimacy is, indeed, a crucial

element of the existence of a government in a state. Without it, a state becomes controversial in terms of its status, both domestically and globally. For example, the international position of South Africa during apartheid was questionable. In this regard, the government of the time could not be accepted to the United Nations membership, given its unrepresentative status. As said earlier, in the realm of governance, the state is indispensable; consequently, governance is unthinkable without the legitimacy of the state.

### **5.5 Efficiency and Effectiveness**

Although the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness were addressed in chapter 2 above under accountability and performance, it is quite pertinent at this juncture to revisit them, particularly in relation to governance. As noted earlier, efficiency and effectiveness are the main criteria of measurements for government performance, relative to its mission in society. Unavoidably, government performance is primarily concerned with organizational and programme activities; the former being more related with structures and interrelationships, whilst the latter is concerned with specific operational activities as planned. In short, this means the manner in which the government organizes its activities and general activities, relative to the resources (human and otherwise) at its disposal. Efficiency, in this context implies the extent to which intended results are achieved in the most cost effective and economic manner. Similarly, effectiveness relates to whether the intended results are truly achieved (Price and Mcadams 1996:310-315).

From the point of view of governance, efficiency and effectiveness are multi-dimensional, according to Price and Mcadams (1996:310 – 311). First, organizational and programme performance refers also to the extent to which government organizations and agencies have developed and are maintaining the capacity to deliver intended results in the future.

Accordingly, government organizations have to assume the characterization of innovativeness, durability and self sustainability. Second, as financial inputs are crucial for effectiveness, government financial performance, of necessity, has to be managed according to sound financial controls. The latter, by implication, means;

- strict adherence to the financial regulations at all levels of government (central, provincial and local).
- Internal and external mechanisms of accountability (Gildenhuys 1993:91-104)

Third, it is expected that there should be legal compliance and fairness, equity and probity performance. This means a judgement about government and the public service ability to comply with legislation and related authorities and whether they meet the required standards of behaviour in the conduct of their business. In the case of South Africa, for example, statutes relating to codes of conduct such as the Ministerial Code of Conduct, Parliamentary Code of Conduct and Registrar of Members' Interests; and Local Government Code of Conduct and Register of members' Interests, are typical cases in point (Matsheza, . and Kunaka (1999:36-39). In other words, is the government and its administrative agencies bound by a code of conduct in its operations generally? Undoubtedly, these dimensions are quite complex, particularly given the open questions of social equity, financial limitations and several other related issues. The characterisation of innovativeness, durability and self sustainability for organisations and programme performance is suggestive of several development oriented activities for governance. Stone's (1981:508) perspective in this regard is more articulated and fairly comprehensive.

Accordingly, in his view, government innovations, being the result of sustained curiosity and a belief in the nature of things to change for the better, take many forms. They apply to a host of things including

objectives, policies, character of services or product technology, procedure and process. Over and above that, they also include structure, management style and systems, as well as internal and external relationship. Not surprisingly, innovations may affect a city, country, state or national agency.

As Stone (1981:508-509) further suggests, before an organization can become innovative, it must have a complete overhaul of its low-moving bureaucratic elements and replace them with more dynamic and creative ones. The most contributory elements for administrative capability may include:

- a suitable legal structure
- a responsible, well functioning legislative body
- competent executive and managerial leadership
- facilitative administrative organization
- effective managerial and support processes
- adequate budgetary process
- a high quality work force
- a supportive political and citizen environment (Stone 1981:508 – 9).

From the above perspective, it is quite obvious that the characterization of innovativeness for organizations and programme performance is imperative for governance. Given the difficulties, complexities and dynamics of governance it cannot, indeed, be otherwise. For example, innovativeness could mean a break with past practices and venturing into the untested terrain of partnerships between government and the private sector on service deliveries, ability to adapt operational structure to new challenges and many other innovations. From the South African perspective, the following innovations are reflective of this condition:

- The establishment of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) on 2 December 1992, through an Act of Parliament as a forum for dealing with matters such as public finance, monitoring policy, labour market policy, trade and industrial policy and development policy (Boer 1995:345).
- The channeling of the funds for the promotion of small to medium sized enterprises under the Department of Trade and Industry, through the General Post Office, for the purposes of a wider coverage and equitability (Mantsiu 1997:1).
- The enhancement of democracy, through an increased application of the Parliament's committee system as an independent multipartisan way of dealing with the law-making processes. According, since 1994, the 41 portfolio, joint and select committees have been quite effective as forums for debate on the new legislation. (The Star 13 August 1999:12). All these things, unavoidably may imply adoption of unique financial regulations and controls which may necessitate appropriate legislative devices, relative to the new challenges.

As regards the requirement of sound financial controls for financial performance, internal mechanisms for accountability dictates Auditor-General oversight across all government departments and administrative agencies, among others. The external approach, on the other hand, calls for parliamentary control ensuring that all government expenditure conform to the budgetary provisions continuously. The latter, more often than not, is facilitated through specific constitutional provisions. The South African case in this regard is more illustrative of this condition. Accordingly, Chapter 13 of Act 108 of 1996, specifically deals with this matter under general financial matters.

Regarding legal compliance and fairness equity and probity performance, several complexities and dynamics of public policy making processes are involved. However, it suffices to indicate that, in as much as no government has an unlimited capacity to accommodate all public needs, performance in this regard is an outcome or consequence of numerous interactions and considerations. Needless to suggest that all these factors are derived from government distributive function based on the criterion of public interest, common welfare and social needs (Hobsbawn 1976:274).

With efficiency and effectiveness constituting the main criteria for performance measurement in government and public enterprises generally, the importance of these criteria in governance cannot be overlooked. As governments world-wide are faced with the enormous task of reform, in order to promote development and contain financial and administrative pressures on government, organizational and programme performance becomes imperative for governance. However, the whole process entails rationalization, innovations and macro-management which, according to Shirley (1997:293) "focuses on the tools and procedures to improve government capacity to design and implement macro-economic and sectoral policies to control and direct public expenditures and to develop civil services of optimal size, skill and motivation." This is the crux of the matter in efficiency and effectiveness.

## **5.6 Relationship between Government and Citizens**

Since the impact of government activity is all pervasive and thus touches all individuals in society, according to Wilson and Hinton (1993:3), a good relationship between a government and its citizens is of paramount importance in governance. Regardless of the number of votes a ruling party or Alliance receives, good relationship with minority groups and the population at large remains indispensable for effectiveness. In this

regard, it is absolutely essential to maintain a posture of friendliness towards groups such as industrialists, professional bodies, farmers and several others. For example, in the context of the South African situation whereby the appeasement of these groups is crucial for the attraction of local investment and containment of brain drain, relations with these groups have to be as ideal as possible. Similarly, from the point of job creation and economic development, rapport with these groups becomes imperative (Sole 1999:25). This dimension of governance entails a broad network of cooperative and consultative mechanisms between the parties concerned. A brief scan of these mechanisms will do for the reflection of this dimension.

The mass media is one of the mechanisms used for maintaining relationships between government and the public. This method covers the press (newspapers, bulletins) radio, television and any other related media. The mass media play a crucial role in politics as well as in the public policy-making processes. Accordingly, government accountability and transparency to the electorate is facilitated, whilst promoting intensive and extensive debates and reflections on intended policy outcomes (Cloete 1996:122).

The institutional framework of inclusive boards of state corporations and parastatals is another mechanism of government/citizen, relationship in governance. As the boards composition is often representative of diverse interest groups and stakeholders, interactions taking place are facilitative of good understanding and common outlook among the parties concerned in the first instance. Second, the public through its representatives, jointly participate with the government on a variety of public service endeavors and deliveries at affordable cost to the communities. In other words, the boards provide a forum for consensus on vital issues relating to public service effectiveness. Third, the shared responsibility of the parties concerned enhances pluralism in public policy making. Consequently, conflicts are easily managed and hence

development of mutual trust between government and society at large.

National summits and consultative workshop on a variety of issues in national affairs is yet another mechanism for government/citizen relationship. The recent summit on job creation in South Africa is illustrative of this mechanism. Unavoidably, government macro-economic challenges such as the attraction of foreign investment for development, competitiveness, globalization and others, dictate partnership with the private sector and other stakeholders in planning and decision making. No wonder that, the South African job summit was widely viewed as a movement by the government and its social partners – labour, business and the community – to new terrain in a structured and organized way to build consensus (Grawitzky 1998:13). Unsurprisingly, therefore, the job creation projects an attempt to ensure greater co-ordination between government departments to fulfil service delivery commitments and to focus on the most marginalized sectors such as the women and youth. With greater co-ordination between government departments and a focus on marginalised sectors of the society, government thus demonstrates its responsiveness to policy issues through endorsement of the social partners' concerns. Hence a true reflection of sensitivity to public relations as a factor in good governance.

Notwithstanding the necessity of job summits from the political point of view, it is quite evident that the summit proved to be a catalyst for consensus building among the social partners. Admittedly, differences on strategies among the parties concerned is unavoidable. However, it is important to realize that "even the "best" policies will fail unless they win government commitment and business and labour support..." (Friedman 1999:13). The latter, undoubtedly, is a consequence of improved relationships between the parties concerned.

## 5.7 Representation and Checks

From the point of view of governance as an interactive process of politics and public management, the implications of representation and checks certainly arise. Conventionally, the assumption in this regard is that government action and mandate emanate from the will of the people, through the election of their representatives at all levels of government. Furthermore, with the inherent unpredictability of the human nature, it is essential to put in place specific mechanisms of checks and control to ensure continuous accountability of the elected officials to the electorate. This is, indeed, the golden rule of all representative governments in multi-party democracies. Accordingly, peoples' representatives remain continuously answerable to the electorate (people) - their true masters, for all their public actions.

Representation and checks, in this context, thus mean the selection of public functionaries through democratic means within a framework of institutional checks for conformity and accountability. It is this selected group, acting singly and collectively, who become legitimate representatives of the entire electorate as either political office bearers or public officials, depending on the nature of their selection. As people's trustees, all their actions constitute the public domain, with all the implications of subjection to scrutiny and answerability, through various mechanisms of control and oversight in the constitution (Hilliard 1995:17).

Without venturing into greater details about the development of the idea of representation and checks, it is worth reflecting on the motivation for the same. Historically, the idea of representation and checks originated in America in Boston during the eighteenth century, at the height of colonial resistance against Britain. With Boston in the foreground of the resistance, Colonial authorities clashed with the citizens in the "Boston Massacre" whereupon the latter dumped British tea into Boston Harbour, resulting in the closure of the port to commerce by the authorities (Colliers Encyclopedia 1972: 409-410). In consequence

thereof, Bostonians and other colonies on the East Coast withdrew their tax contributions to the colonial power and pressed for what ultimately turned to be a hard-won principle of no taxation without representation. Thereafter, several American writers and political analysts have elucidated extensively on the concept of representation and checks, presumably, on the basis of the unceremonious encounter with the colonial authorities. A brief reflection of their perspectives is pertinent at this juncture, for clarity sake. Jefferson, (as quoted by Dambauld 1966:118 - 119) being a strong advocate for self and representative government contended that effective self government required that the people participated in every feature of the political process. In this regard, he argued that "it is necessary to introduce the people into every department of government as far as they are capable of exercising it, and that this is the only way to ensure a long continued and honest administration of its powers ... with us all the branches of the government are elective by the people themselves, except the Judiciary of whose science and qualifications they are not competent judges." In other words, Jefferson's idea is that, it is imperative for any political system to ensure peoples democratic right to elect their representatives for legitimacy and sustainability. In so far as the restriction pertaining to the election of the judiciary is concerned, the exception does, indeed, prove the rule. Needless to note that, the competency of the appointing authority in this regard, is derived from the people's confidence and trust on their elected representatives, according to given criteria. Another interesting perspective is the one given by Thomas Paine (as quoted by Adkins 1966:201 - 202) who elaborates thus on the concept, "The true and only true basis of representatives government is equality of rights. Every man has a right to one vote and no more in the choice of representatives". Accordingly, Paine's perception on equality of rights among citizens, assures each and every person equal representation in government, without any favour or disfavour to any particular person or group.

Last but not the least, Madison (as quoted by Gabriel 1966:104) holds that, "As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration (legislature) should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be factually secured." In Madison's opinion, therefore, representation implies intimate bondage between those who are elected and the electorate through specific mechanisms of selection and control, namely periodic elections. From the above perspectives, the sum and substance of the whole concept of representation and checks, is that government mandate and mission rests directly upon the will of the electorate or upon the immediate authority of a representative legislature, in the first instance. Second, and of necessity, equality of rights among citizens insures equal representation and principles of checks through interdependence of the parties concerned. Consequently, deeper down, at the very foundation of governance, lies an inseparable bondage of trust and accountability between the electorate and their representatives.

Undoubtedly, the concept of representation and checks does have profound implications for the newly established South African multi-party democracy. For example, as noted in the recent case regarding the rights of prisoners to vote, the equality of rights for all citizens, irrespective of class or status, was upheld through the decision of the Constitutional Court, within the framework of constitutional checks (Lodge 1999(a):49). In this regard, prisoners' right to vote was given effect in terms of the provisions of the new constitution. Hence Jefferson's (as quoted by Dumbauld 1966: ) dictum that "with us all the branches of the government are elective by the people. Certainly, people here implies all citizens without any discrimination, except as provided otherwise in the constitution.

## 5.8 Intergovernmental Relationships

The issue of intergovernmental relationships in governance is both complex and of paramount importance (Du Toit et al 1998:250). First and foremost, the complexity of this issue lies in the nature of networks of relationships of agencies, departments and structures of authority, which are involved. In other words, intergovernmental relationships encompass a wide range of public functionaries within public institutions. Second, with public management and governance in particular increasingly being professionalised, the challenge of ideal relationships becomes exceedingly complicated in terms of accountability, performance and transparency. As regards the importance of these relationships, it suffices to realize that the expectations of society about the role of government are quite immense. Unavoidably, therefore, the role players in government remain constantly responsive to the challenge of providing efficient and effective services to the community at large.

In the context of this observation, the purpose of this section is to briefly analyse intergovernmental relationships with the view to clarify the process of governance. From the point of view of government and public management, intergovernmental relationships can be defined as mutual relations between certain authorities within government. For example, relations between two or more departments, provinces and agencies.

Generally speaking, intergovernmental relationships can be divided into three main categories; namely, vertical, horizontal and diagonal.

- Vertical intergovernmental relationships refer simply to relations between government institutions at different levels - central, provincial and local levels - on matters of common interest.
- Horizontal intergovernmental relationship. These are relations taking place between government institutions at the legislative and

executive levels of government for example (Du Toit et al 1998:254).

- Diagonal intergovernmental relationships. Relations formed between a local authority and a provincial authority of another province outside it.

All these networks of relationships between different levels and organs of government are presumed to be operative within formal structures as provided in the constitution. This is generally known as the formal type of relationship. However, as relationships are highly dynamic and personal in nature, intergovernmental relationships involve the informal aspect as well. The latter, of necessity, is rather unique as it tends to overshadow the former in terms of rules and regulations. However, a good working relationship between all these different categories is highly desirable (Orpen 1981:16).

Given the hierarchical nature of the power relationship between the different departments and institutions, the relationship has to be based on certain guidelines that are compatible with a democratic dispensation. A brief outline of these guidelines follows:

First, given the importance of government, as a formal mechanism for the purpose of guiding society, the relationships of the key functionaries have to be based on mutual trust. This condition assumes that public functionaries are engaged in a partnership of service delivery through a network of power structures. The latter, by and large, operates through a chain of command and control mechanisms, both of which can be very impersonal. In this regard, the relationship between executive institutions and legislative bodies, for example, should be such that the former is subjected to the direction and control of the latter through specific constitutional provisions. This is the only guarantee for ensuring amicable partnerships which protects one against the other, whilst

facilitating mutuality of goals and interdependence on public service delivery system.

In the spirit of partnership and mutual trust, the political office bearer regards his/her subordinate, public official, as a partner in the business of meeting the basic needs of their ultimate masters, the public. The public official, in turn, reciprocates by remaining loyal to the government of the day, according to the prescribed code of conduct.

Second, consultative working relationships between government departments and their personnel is mandatory for effective performance and good governance (Cloete 1994:101). Consultative working relationships between political office bearers and public officials imply, among others, unity of purpose, coherence and effective communication networks. Hence the three categories of intergovernmental relationships as described above. Quite frankly, no government can afford the misfortune of being seen as incoherent, contradictory and wanting in the coordination of activities within and between departments. Consequently, the need for continuous consultation between the different functionaries on all matters pertaining to policy issues, service deliveries and common vision is unquestionable (Van Der Walat & Helmbold 1995:116-118).

The applicability of these guidelines to the South African situation lies mainly in the publication of a white paper on Public Service Transformation. Accordingly, as Rockey (1999: 176) rightly puts it, the interventions suggested in the white paper on public service transformation are designed mainly to ensure a coherent, performance-oriented public service that is characterized by human resource development and training, promotion of professional service ethos, rationalization and restructuring, among others - all these being ideal conditions for democratic dispensation and sound intergovernmental relationships for effective governance.

In conclusion, it may be noted that the above perspective of the process of governance has been highly selective in terms of the

parameters involved. However, needless to indicate that the perspective as such, does, indeed, set the frame work upon which the next section will be based; namely the analysis of the impact of the Tripartite Alliance on governance in South Africa, during the period in question.

## **5.9 Conclusion**

The necessity to provide a contextual definition of the term governance is undisputable, particularly from the point of view of a meaningful and well focused analysis. This has been the motivation behind the perspective outlined in this Chapter. Since the process of governance is seemingly multi-dimensional and thus open to different perspectives, inclination to some specific definitions is deemed appropriate to the issues involved.

## CHAPTER 6

### IMPACT OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ON GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

#### 6.1 Introduction

In coming to the centre piece of the analysis, caution is warranted because of the context of the exercise. First, the complexity and scope of governance in contemporary socio-economic and political realities dictates a selective choice of areas of concern. However, the analysis, inevitably has to take into account the descriptive framework outlined in the preceding chapter. Second, it should be noted from the onset that this portion of the analysis is not in isolation but rather complementary to what has been traversed in the previous chapters. Third, as no one involved in social studies of this nature can be under any illusion about subjectivity, it is expected that the analyst discretion in this regard will be presumed, particularly in terms of focus. Last but not the least, there is neither a theory nor a hypothesis being espoused or tested in this analysis.

Against this backdrop, and also with the view to ensuring clarity, the analysis will be two fold. The current chapter, accordingly, examines the Alliance's performance relative to the domestic dimension of governance, under specific issues of concern. The subsequent chapter addresses the global dimension of governance.

Any analysis of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance's impact on governance in South Africa has to be based on certain specific administrative and logistical realities. Administratively, the Alliance lacked both parliamentary experience and public policy making expertise, personnel-wise. Consequently, the first three years of governance upon ascension to power, were a period of acclimatization, adaptation and gradual assertion for the Alliance. In this regard, despite the Alliance's

clear electoral mandate, the reality of the situation dictated, not only some caution, but, also an unavoidable inclusive approach to public policy-making endeavours. Inevitably, the establishment of the Government of National Unity [GNU] with the National Party [NP] and the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP], provided a good framework for this approach. Logistically, the Alliance found itself in a very untenable position, whereby the inherited bureaucracy from the previous regime was found unhelpful in terms of deliveries. No wonder, therefore, that the Alliance was confronted with many shortcomings from the very beginning. Despite these constraints and shortcomings, the Tripartite Alliance performance on governance can be summed up as both provocative and inconsistent.

## **6.2 Public Policy Analysis**

With governance regarded as partly a matter of "balancing conflicting values and interests," according to Phillip [1999:227], presumably through public policy making endeavours, it is important to recap briefly about public policy analysis. As used in this context, public policy analysis entails a continuous interactive process of providing policy makers at different levels with relevant scientific, professional and political information, for the purpose of improved general welfare [Hanekom 1991:65]. It is a highly dynamic process which involves analyses of various sorts. Generally speaking, the success of this exercise largely depends on numerous factors, including government clearly defined goals, resources available and specific socio-economic and political needs of society. It is thus an important dimension of governance.

With regard to the Tripartite Alliance's impact upon governance, relative to the requirements and guidelines above, the following can be observed. First, although it is not always possible to define societal needs in absolute terms, nonetheless, the ANC-led Alliance's performance in this regard has generally been quite debatable. For example, the

Reconstruction and Development Programme [RDP], which was the government blueprint for effecting transformation, promoting growth and development, was more of an ideal than a serious macro-economic and political strategy. Unsurprisingly, therefore, government commitment to its implementation fell far short of expectations. Consequently, the main targets for the programme were never realized due to inadequate funding, limited personnel and in-effective institutional structures. For example, the economy lost 500,000 jobs in 5 years, according to the Star (9 July 1999:1), especially through the retrenchments in the mining industry and the public sector restructuring.

Second, on the related issue of policy demands within the phases of public policy which, of necessity, entails government interaction with society on needs, the Alliance's preoccupation with divergent internal views on development strategies was a contributory factor towards failure to address real concerns. In this regard, government attention was diverted to trivial matters of strategic differences instead of being assertive on policy implementation, through established channels of communication. Shilowa's remark on GEAR captures the reality of this preoccupation perfectly, "... those who support the GEAR strategy aim to make the poor pay for transition while they continue in their old ways under the guise of international competition and so-called sound policies" (Shilowa as quoted in the Star 25<sup>th</sup> June, 1998:20). Given COSATU's rejection of the GEAR macro-economic strategy which, in their opinion, undermines the RDP, the net result of internal squabbles has been failure to reach targets such as 6 percent growth and the creation of between 300,000 and 500,000 jobs a year, as envisaged in the RDP plan (ANC 1994:79-80).

Undoubtedly, this scenario of ideological disputes incapacitates the government to work out problems as they arise. The government thus become weak and ineffective, relative to its daunting task of equity amongst both competing and conflicting interests. The Tripartite Alliance, in this regard can be described as weak on policy articulation and

consensus. It is not surprising, therefore, that disagreements between the main protagonists in the ideological struggle, have become so acute as to compel the government to suspend for review some of its important policies – GEAR being a case in point (The Star 20<sup>th</sup> October, 1998:12).

Bearing in mind that GEAR was the ANC response to the socio-economic and political challenges posed by both domestic and global realities, Shilowa's seemingly sarcastic remarks are suggestive of big discomfort within the Alliance. With its focus on a wide range of deregulatory measures which are intended to facilitate South African business to compete internationally, inclusive of flexibilities in the setting of wages and employment conditions by the private sector, any internal squabbling by the partners on GEAR is nothing less than inexplicable policy discord and lack of discipline among the people concerned.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the whole process of transformation has hit impenetrable walls through inadequate financing. For example, the strategy of privatization as a means for increasing government revenue, to finance some social programmes, has to be revised due to COSATU's contention that it would cut down on jobs through retrenchments (Jeppe:1996:10).

Notwithstanding the inevitability of labour mobility and adjustments in privatization, ill-informed and dogmatic adherence to state monopoly in economic management is fraught with many unpleasant consequences. Experience world wide seems to show that most state-owned enterprises are less profitable than privately owned enterprises. Certainly, the South African situation is no exception in this regard. All this impasse boils down to the inability of the Alliance to deal effectively with the challenge of public policy making. No doubt, this has impacted negatively on governance.

### 6.3 Public Service Delivery

Public service delivery is a fundamental feature of good governance in any multi-party democracy. It is, indeed, a manifestation of the human commitment by an organisation whose legitimacy and existence depend, to a great extent, on public support. As explained above in 5.4 under legitimacy of the state, it is part of the provision of basic services like promotion of good health, education, availability of clean water and many other amenities. Without it, government becomes both irrelevant and dispensable. Accordingly, through provision of a multiplicity of services in central and local government and public corporations, every government is held permanently accountable to the electorate, who are its true masters and the public at large. It is for this reason that special attention should be given to the impact of the Tripartite Alliance on the provision of public services in general, particularly within the framework of good governance.

In the area of service delivery during the period under review, the Alliance performance was minimally creditable. Quite frankly, the scale and complexity of public service mismanagement, particularly in the provinces, was a source of great concern nationally. Inevitably, this impacted negatively on service delivery. Among the most visible obstacles to service delivery in the provinces are:

- Poor financial control, procedures and accountability.
- Irregularities in provincial administration.
- Inadequate subvention to the provinces by the central government.
- Lack of financial competency, ill-discipline and nepotism in provincial administrations.

Generally speaking, contrary to public expectations for effective and efficient service delivery as described in 5.5 above under efficiency and effectiveness, the Alliance's control of the seven provinces out of nine, fell far short of these. In this regard, the Alliance's performance did not conform to the criteria of strict adherence to the financial regulations at all levels of government. Above all, the ideals envisaged in the white paper on Public Service Transformation were not achieved, as mystery surrounded financial management.

For example, in the Northern Province, the Auditor-General's report revealed serious financial irregularities in 1998. According to Smuts [1998:3], the following, inter alia, were uncovered in the Province:

- Over R2-Million was paid in salaries to 84 people who had retired, resigned or died in 1995/96 financial year.
- Lack of financial control and disregard for procedures left the system open to fraud and mismanagement in all departments.
- An amount of R1,160,012 – being a reminder of a grant paid to the Hoxani College of Education was improperly put into investment instead of being returned to the administration. The invested amount was subsequently withdrawn, however, the Auditor-General could find no trace of the money.
- Some blank vouchers endorsed with the departmental stamp were uncovered in the department of agriculture drought relief scheme. Surprisingly, in this case, some cashed vouchers which did not bear the issuing officer's signature, were also uncovered.

All these discoveries are suggestive of a break down in the service delivery system as it pertains to provincial government.

Furthermore, in the Eastern Cape Provincial Government, according to the South African Institute of Race Relations [1998:482 – 485], a number of schools had their electricity supplies disconnected for non payment in 1998. Over and above that the financial crisis with an overdraft of R800 million led to the government's inability to pay the pensioners under its jurisdiction. Needless to indicate that, the non payment by the schools and the resultant disconnections of electricity supplies were serious matters which warranted full investigation, to uncover the truth and thus bring the culprits to book.

The subsequent redeployment of the members of the Executive Council [MECs] for Welfare and Education by the government, instead of their subjection to an inquiry was, accordingly, reflective of bad administration and indeed, a compromise on accountability 'principles'.

Despite these short-comings in service delivery, the Alliance's impact in some areas pertaining to services has been quite impressive in terms of achievements. In this regard, as Lodge (1999:31 – 32) contends, some significant statistical figures are noticeable.

- In primary health care 8.5 million patients were treated in the new clinics since April 1994.
- In 1997 up to ten new or upgraded clinics became operational every week with more than 52,000 people who had their sight restored, among the beneficiaries.
- In housing, close to 70,000 families were settled on 220,000 hectares of farming land, through land reform.
- Approximately, 600,000 low cost houses were built or under construction since 1994.

- 1500 kilometres of rural roads were built by Public Work's Project between 1994 and 1997.

In conclusion, the Alliance's general impact on service delivery can be summarized as a mixed bag, strongest on the numerical achievement for infrastructures and weakest on personnel management side, including accountability, financial control and incompetence.

## **6.4 Transformation**

Since transformation has been a major thrust of the Tripartite Alliance policies from the beginning, it does deserve a special attention from the point of view of governance. However, given the broad implication of its meaning with regard to the latter, its coverage will be limited to two main areas of concern. In this instance, it suffices to confine the attention to the Public Service reform and macro-economic restructuring. The choice of these areas is motivated mainly by their relative weight in terms of the Alliance's priorities and governance in particular. Unavoidably, public service reforms are crucial for the success or otherwise of government efforts towards policy implementation, growth and development, inclusive of service delivery and performance. Equally important, from the point of view of socio-economic and political wellbeing, is the issue of macro-economic restructuring. The latter is thus certainly pertinent in governance.

### **6.4.1 Public Service Reforms.**

With regard to the public service reforms, the following realities are discernable in terms of the Alliance's impact on governance. Given the transformation priorities as outlined in the White Paper on Transformation of the South African Public Service (Republic of South Africa), one is

inclined to consider the Alliance's Performance as less impressive in terms of outputs. For example, priority [a] rationalization and restructuring to ensure a unified, integrated and leaner public service, seems to have been quite problematic as the Alliance's commitment was fluctuating and ambivalent. First, the perceived bloated employment figures in the public service did not prompt urgent attention of the political office bearers. Accordingly, the divergent views of the Alliances partners regarding the downsizing was a contributory factor towards poor performance. In this regard, government's efforts towards transformation through public service downsizing were invalidated by the Alliance's critics within. The latter opposed the government proposed slash of 300,000 jobs under inexplicable contention of development and efficiency to be lost (Gumede 1998: 11). Consequently, with almost snail's pace movement in downsizing and the apparent annual increases of staff presumably on account of internal pressures and lack of control, as indicated by the Central Statistical Service (Botha 1997:5), government wage bill gets inflated relative to other social expenditures. Unsurprisingly, the cost of the state wage bill has, according to Christianson [1999:10], progressively grown from 53% of government expenditure in 1995 – 96 to 59% in 1998 – 99.

Second, the inadequate planning of retrenchment packages precipitated the loss of skilled and professional staff in the public sector; the majority of whom, seemingly, opting to leave the country for greener pastures overseas [The Economist 27 September, 1997:54]. To compound the problems further, a great proportion of the remaining staff with all their professional inadequacies and inexperience, lacked the capacity and drive to successfully implement the new policies of transformation. The entanglement of some officials in administrative scandals like the speaker and deputy speaker in the Mpumalanga's provincial legislative, for example, through lack of accountability and administrative methods could not be unexpected, eventually (Rantao

1998:1). No wonder that, some provincial premiers had to be sacrificed unceremoniously through unethical behaviour and power struggle of lower ranking political office bearers in the provincial administration as noted in 3.2. above under individual rights and grassroots participation.

Third, failure to imbue public servants with the spirit of accountability and administrative controls by the Alliance was another major contributory factor towards embezzlement of public funds nationally. The scandal of Mpumalanga's deputy speaker in 1998 is one of the cases in point. In this particular instance, as Ngobeni suggests, the official had deposited cheques worth R736,000 into her personal bank account (Ngobeni as quoted by Rantao 1998:1). Surprisingly, both the deputy speaker and the speaker of the legislature were allegedly involved in the scandal – In a similar manner, the North West chief whip was suspended in October 1998 for alleged embezzlement of R400,000 (SAPA 1998:5) The probe, according to SAPA, revealed non compliance with financial control systems to be responsible for the situation, following auditors findings of financial mismanagement.

Undoubtedly, laxity over administrative controls and unethical conduct among a wide spectrum of both political office bearers and public officials, seems to be one of the main factors responsible for the scandals.

Fourth, with human resource development being a great concern to reformers aiming for greater efficiency and effectiveness in public services, according to Turner and Hulme (1997:116), a casual scrutiny of this element is quite pertinent at this juncture. In terms of priority [f] Human Resource Development, under the White Paper on Transformation of the South African Public Service, the impact of the Tripartite Alliance on governance has been very disappointing. Contrary to the expectation for serious consideration of training as the way to remedy inadequate organizational capacity by the Alliance, records seem to refute the ideal. Accordingly, as Greybe (1998:8) points out, the Presidential Review Commission observed that the Public Service did not benefit appreciably

from the billions of rands spent on the on-going process of skills and knowledge for individuals, nor did it have any significant skilled information management resources.

Inevitably, many institutions were thus involved in numerous irregularities pertaining to staff conduct and professionalism. For example, in Gauteng in 1997, more than a hundred schools were involved in irregularities such as "relaxing examination invigilation, deliberately encouraging their pupils to cheat or not putting invigilators in exam rooms in the first place" (The Star 21 April, 1997:14).

Consequently, with the Alliance's partners seemingly ambivalent and irreconcilable on downsizing, coupled with lack of financial control systems, inadequate administrative methods and poor training of personnel, transformation of the Public Service became illusive and above all, impracticable.

#### **6.4.2 Macro-Economic Restructuring**

Regarding the impact of the alliance through macro-economic restructuring, some points are worth mentioning in terms of the Alliance's agenda and the subsequent shifts that were necessitated by global challenges and economic realities. As it may be recalled, the African National Congress adopted the nationalization of the means of production through the Freedom Charter. This orientation remained as such up and until its assumption of power with the Alliance partners in 1994. However, immediately after the attainment of power, the party together with its partners in the Alliance abandoned this posture and thereby changed to a free-market economic system, with minimum state intervention in economic matters (Financial Mail 14 March, 1997:20). Accordingly, Mandela's shift from nationalization to privatization of state enterprises [as quoted by Financial Mail] marked a new orientation in the government's approach to macro-economic policy.

The new orientation was eventually spelled out in GEAR whose main goal was to give effect to the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Being essentially a positive response to the rapidly globalising and highly competitive international environment, according to Trevor Manuel, the GEAR strategy is an economic reform programme directed towards:

- A competitive, fast growing economy that creates sufficient jobs for all job seekers.
- A redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor.
- A society capable of ensuring that sound health, education and other services are available to all, and
- An environment in which homes are safe and places of work are productive (Manuel 1997:1).

For all intents and purposes, therefore, GEAR strategy is a macro-economic framework for growth, development and economic recovery, as noted in 3.1 on public policy-making above. Hence macro-economic restructuring.

From a governance perspective, relative to the Alliance impact on macro-economic restructuring, the following is discernable.

First, the policy has been one of the major sources of discord among the Alliance partners, as noted in 4.1 above. Consequently, achievements on targets related to deficit reduction, job creation and economic recovery have been largely insignificant in terms of output and sustainability.

In this regard, major setbacks characterized the policy., For example, contrary to the envisaged targets on some specific areas, jobs

were lost instead of being sustained or created; and the privatization programme was held back due to internal squabbles in the Alliance; attraction of foreign investment for promotion of economic development was hampered, and most importantly, delivery of services became more problematic in the light of downright incompetence by officials and departments, inclusive of many other constraints that were encountered in the process of implementation.

Second, government's apparent inability to involve all line ministries in the implementation strategy contributed immensely toward GEAR's paralysis. Beinstein's (1997:19) observation in this regard is reflective of this condition "currently links between GEAR and the Ministries appear to be weak. This must be remedied. Sectoral policies must be consistent with the realities of GEAR; limits must be built into programme design and ministries will have to revisit delivery mechanism especially by exploring private sector partnerships." By implication, poor coordination and integration between technocrats (the architects of the policy) and line ministries accounts for government ineffectiveness in policy implementation.

From the point of view of intergovernmental relations in governance as explained above in 5.8 the ideal of consultative working relationships between the political office bearers and public officials seems to have been seriously undermined on the GEAR policy. Hence lack of unity of purpose and coherence among the functionaries and ineffective communication.

Third, the seemingly ill-timed promulgation of the GEAR in the midst of controversies regarding macro-economic transformation among the Alliance partners, nibbed it in the bud for lack of consensus. Accordingly, the alliance partners, though generally regarded as social partners in the socio-economic and political equation, do not necessarily share the same vision or outlook on transformation priorities and strategies. Inevitably, snails pace movement on GEAR across the socio-

economic and political spectrum, came as no surprise. Ultimately, the review of the policy could not be unexpected in the face of unfavorable conditions, both domestically and globally (The Star 20 October, 1998:2).

## **6.5 Corruption**

The term corruption is a relative concept, with the norms and specifics of one society seldom agreeing or corresponding to the norms of another society (Kpundeh 1995:42). Consequently, its precise meaning is somewhat illusive, particularly for universal and inclusive purposes. However, in the context of this analysis, corruption is defined as any irregular and dishonest behaviour by people in positions of authority (public officials and political office bearers), for the purpose of self enrichment, illegitimate acquisition of power and public assets, and any other selfish motives (Matsheza and Kunaka 1999:11). Accordingly, being essentially a behavioural problem that affects government at the administrative and political levels globally, its examination is quite pertinent from the point of view of the current analysis of the impact of political alliance on governance.

As government in any developing country dominates the spectrum of social and economic life (Ouma 1997:475), existence of corruption in any form and at whatever levels of government becomes a national issue. Over and above that, given its undesirable effects on development generally, it can never be left unchallenged. For example, as Bruce [1997:16] indicates, from the proceedings of the 8<sup>th</sup> International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) held in Lima, Peru in September 1997, Corruption, has the following effects:

- It is seen as one of the significant obstacles, for instance by the World Bank, to promoting development in underdeveloped countries.

- It violates the social and economic rights of the poor and retards development.
- It has the potential to undermine development programmes which are intended to assist the poor by increasing their costs.
- It also increases costs of running services.
- It denies societies, and particularly the poor, the benefits of free and open competition.

In the light of this observation about the consequences of corruption, it is appropriate to examine the record of the Tripartite Alliance for dealing with the issue.

According to Greybe (1997:1), approximately two thousand (2000) complaints, involving amounts totaling R19.7 billion were received by the government Corruption and Maladministration Unit in 1977. The unit headed by Judge William Heath, with nine lawyers, five accountants, two computer science experts and a range of on-call specialists (Rantao 1998:3) was established by President Mandela to investigate fraud in government structures in 1997. Undoubtedly, the scale and complexity of corruption as reflected in the cases reported, was indicative of serious scandals within government. Accordingly, over R1-billion was involved in fraudulent cheques in the Health and Education departments of Mpumalanga, Eastern Cape, and Northern Province; R80 million for government building in Queenstown after improper tender procedures were followed and several discoveries of maladministration, misappropriation, corruption, negligence and unlawful conduct which directly affected state institutions at national, provincial and local government levels.

In addition, according to the information taken from a report issued by the National Party's Department of Research and Strategy in 1997 (as quoted by the Star 13 February 1998:15) corruption had, indeed, assumed serious proportions nationally:

- On a national level [excluding provinces] corruption involved between R10.2 billion and R14.3 billion during July 1994 and June 1997. Thus implying that approximately between R3-billion and R5-billion could be involved a year.
- Between 75,000 and 102,790 people were involved in corruption. These included the 'ghost' workers, public servants promoted without proper authorization and those involved in pension scams.
- Alleged fraud accounted for 50.6% of all cases of corruption. Followed by maladministration (20.19%), bribery (13.69%) and embezzlement and nepotism with just over (4%) each.

The above quoted figures are just indicative of the magnitude of the problem of corruption in the South African government, nation wide, particularly during the period under review. However, the crux of the matter is that the issue of corruption is highly provocative and therefore unavoidable for the Tripartite Alliance as the dominant group in governance.

With regard to the impact of the Alliance in response to the challenge posed by corruption, the following is noteworthy:

First, government recognition and acceptance of the challenge of corruption is beyond any dispute. As Hasenfuss [1998:2] rightly observes, a great deal of soul-searching was undertaken in November, 1998, at a conference held in Parliament (Cape Town) with representatives from all

spheres of government. Accordingly, discussions were focussed on how to find ways and means of fighting corruption. Three main strategies were thus identified as a means to address the problem:

- Training and institutionalization of better financial and management systems.
- Need for a moral renewal.
- Encouragement of whistle blowing or rattling on those involved in corruption, as a means of enlisting public support and involvement for rooting out the scourge.

The conference further agreed that there be another one for the public and private sectors in the following year, for the purposes of sensitizing all the stakeholders in governance. Doubtlessly, the above strategy reflects the Alliance's full grasp on the issues involved. A combination of professional, political and public initiatives of the government demonstrates decisiveness in tackling the problem. Hasenfuss (1998:2) remarks on this matters really captures government mood, "rooting out corruption has become a top priority for cabinet because it rightly believes a government that can't be trusted can't even begin to tackle the country massive socio-economic challenges."

Second, the Alliance's commitment to root out corruption through legal means and the application of constitutional bodies is both commendable and pragmatic. Accordingly, almost all reported cases of corruption have been subjected to either judicial inquires or constitutional bodies such as, for example, the South Africa Police Service commission for serious Economic Offences, the Auditor-General, the Public Protector, and the Health Special Investigation Unit.

From the foregoing analysis, it is quite clear that the impact of the

Tripartite Alliance regarding the issue of corruption can be summed up as a non-partisan and inclusive approach. Pallo Jordan, the Environmental Affairs and Tourism Minister then (as quoted by Rantao 1997(b):15) articulated this approach most distinctly during a Parliamentary debate in June, 1997: "The issue of corruption is an issue that concern the Government most integrally. It is an issue which is non-partisan, and I find it a little bit unfortunate that certain parties have sought to make it some sort of political football and means of party point scoring. I don't think it is to the credit of any party to try and pretend the problem of corruption is specific and peculiar to any particular government or political party. It's a national and societal problem which should be addressed as such."

## **6.6 Planning and Financial Management**

Effective planning and sound financial management are crucial for the success of government operations. Their relative importance in any democratic rule cannot, therefore, be overemphasized. With governments increasingly assuming a positive responsibility for social and economic improvement, the need for appropriate planning and effective financial management thus become imperative. Undoubtedly, the tremendous and urgent challenge of development that faces the governments of developing countries, necessitates rationalization of available limited resources and prioritization of socio-economic programmes, both of which are entailed in planning and financial management. In view of these considerations, from the point of view of effective governance, this section examines the Tripartite Alliance impact with regard to the functions of planning and financial management.

With the view of putting the analysis into perspective, a brief definition of the two concepts is deemed necessary. According to the United Nations Handbook of Public Administration (1961:91) Planning is defined as a multi-dimensional process of programming for the long-term

economic and social development of a country, through a total and co-ordinated use of all resources of a country, physical and human. Through it, a country determines "national economic and social goals for the future, with the ultimate aim of enriching the condition of human life and activity."

Although planning takes place at all levels of human activity, nonetheless, from the point of view of government in particular, it is a long-term process that is concerned primarily with investments, capital improvements and social programmes. Above all, "it has important fiscal implications and its annual stages need to be reflected in a national budget according to HPA's definition".

Viewed in this light, planning entails a process of bringing the future into focus and directing activities to achieve desired outcomes, through specific projects, resources and logistical inputs. Simply put, it is the programming of events and activities, their financing, logistics and general management, for specific socio-economic goals and objectives.

Financial management, on the other hand, can be defined as a coordinated system of the management of public monetary resources. It entails the control and direction of these resources, through hierarchical relationships of authority and accountability. In terms of the latter, the legislative, administrative and executive branches of government become mutually interdependent in their respective functions, relative to collection, dispersion and control of public funds.

Furthermore, financial management, as the basic strategy for government overall responsibility of, inter alia, providing goods and services, stabilizing national currency and payment for its operations, locally and abroad, also entails some measures of prioritization and multi valued choice in the distribution and allocation of financial resources. Consequently reliance upon the availability of accurate and reliable information through technological and administrative aids such as, for example, programme budgeting system, systems analysis and others, is of utmost importance for effectiveness and efficiency.

Over and above that, financial management is an integral part of public expenditure management which, according to Shirley (1991:294) includes assistance in budget preparation and implementation, public investment programming, accounting and auditing, procurement, tax administration and external resource management.

Quite frankly, financial management is the spinal cord of the entire government system, through coordination, direction and continuous flow of resources for ensuring the survival of public service delivery capacity.

In view of its complexity and multi-dimensional characteristics, only limited areas of concern will be addressed, relative to the impact of the Alliance on governance. In this regard, it is proposed to examine the two concepts [planning and financial management] under one heading.

Given the importance of strategic planning and sound financial management as prerequisites for viable socio-economic transformation, the Alliance impact on governance is, indeed, unsatisfactory and less innovative. First, the Alliance's shortsightedness regarding the exclusive representation of only three stakeholders in the NEDLAC (CDE 1999:46), despite its comfortable majority in the National Assembly, has contributed greatly towards its shortcomings in planning and financial management. With the dominance of labour and business alongside government in NEDLAC, many other important stakeholders such as, for example, the agricultural and informal sectors in development and macro-economic endeavours in particular have been marginalised. Hence undesirable consequences in the overall strategic and socio-economic planning for the country workers, for instance.

Bernstein's (1999:17) has articulated this issue of NEDLAC exclusivity most adequately. Accordingly, she contends that, "NEDLAC is an imperfectly representative institution where central government, organized labour and organized business make deals, many of which directly affect the vast number of interests not represented at NEDLAC." No wonder that, serious problems of retrenchments, competitiveness and

financial crises have characterized the mining and agricultural sectors, for lack of representation which could, perhaps, make their concerns heard on planning and resource allocations.

Most importantly, the exclusivity of any public forum is not in-keeping with Mohamads [1998:44] perspective of governance which, inter alia, assumes the right of all concerned in the governance of a state. In addition, Ritchken's (1997:192) reflection about antagonistic forces with material interests in the state and civil society forging alliances and thus entering into conflicts so as to access more resources to reinforce their power, has been overlooked.

Second, the ANC's seemingly restrictive code of conduct which disallows their members (inclusive of Alliance partners, who individually belong to the ANC) to vote against the organization in Parliament or provincial government, makes a mockery of the freedom of speech and association (Nyatumba 1996:16). By implication, the planning and financial management prerogative of the Parliament is rendered biased, predetermined and imposed, for lack of discretion on MPs and restrictive public debates. Consequently, either inadequate funds or unrealistic goals are approved with disastrous consequences for both the government and the beneficiaries in particular. In this regard, the shortfalls in funds and targets in the RDP projects is a case in point, consequent upon the controversial GEAR policy.

On the positive side, the Alliance is credited with two main achievements which impacted significantly on governance. First, the seemingly, realistic and seasoned analysis of the South African economy and its prospects, in the face of the world's financial crisis last year, has been quite remarkable. In this particular instance, the alliance surprised many critics and observers by maintaining a solid fiscal discipline which, inter alia, ensured sustenance of basic services (City Press 9 May, 1999:6). Effective planning and sound financial management thus characterized Alliance's handling of the economic equation. Second, the

investments in social development and infrastructure within the constraints of huge foreign debts and limited revenue resources, was indicative of sensitivity to socio-economic challenges facing the country by the Alliance. This is good news. It shows a vigorous determination by the Alliance to transform the pessimistic outlook of the country from horrendous socio-economic disparities to a sustainable development framework that generates growth, sound planning and effective financial management. This is a great achievement, given the divergent transformation perspectives emanating from the Alliance partners. The vulnerability of alliances to economic crisis, as suggested earlier under 4.2 under political parties and alliances, thus seem to be inapplicable in the South African context.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

The impact of the Tripartite Alliance on governance in South Africa has been an outcome of very unique circumstances of the administrative and general inexperience on the part of the political office bearers and the public officials. Accordingly, the first few years of governance could be described as a period of acclimatization, adaptation and gradual ascension to power for the Alliance's political authorities.

As regards the administrative arm of the government, the inherited bureaucracy from the previous regime had some shortcomings in terms of re-orientation, professionalism and commitment to transformation. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Alliance's performance on governance became somewhat provocative and inconsistent, as voted.

## CHAPTER 7

### IMPACT OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ON GOVERNANCE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

#### 7.1 Introduction

The complete interdependence of states in a global economic system, however imperfect, is the reality of the contemporary world. Accordingly, through regional and international networks of socio-economic and political groupings, technological research and international relations, for instance, global interdependence has been institutionalised. Consequently, most states, if not all, are irrevocably bound by this interdependence in their policies. In other words, national development goals demands a posture of sensitivity to global issues and responsiveness to the challenges arising thereof, on the part of the national states.

Just as it was noted in Chapter five, both the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state empower it to form mutually beneficial agreements with other states and several international organisations. Such bilateral or multilateral agreements, although generally intended for international relationships in the first instance, are for all intents and purposes, part and parcel of the broader dimension of governance. Through them, favourable terms of trades are negotiated, mutual security is enhanced, and numerous other mutual benefits are facilitated, all in the name of governance. Most importantly, government's good image in international relations is facilitative of world responsiveness in times of need such as, for example, national disasters, illegitimate seizure of political power, regional conflicts and others. Hence the implications of globalisation.

Against this backdrop, it is the purpose of this chapter to traverse

into the relative impact of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance upon governance in global terms, particularly with regard to globalisation, regionalism, competitiveness and foreign investment.

## **7.2 Globalisation**

With mankind inescapably bound by a common destiny of mutuality of socio-economic and political aspirations, through global interdependence, the imperative of the integration of world economic and political systems has become unavoidable. This is the fundamental rationale for globalisation. In its simple and basic form, globalisation, as applied in this analysis, is a process through which national economies become mutually interdependent in terms of resource and technological transfers, trade investment and several other economic interactions. As Sewell (1998:33) explains, it is "the whirlwind of technological change and liberalised trade and investment which in turn is bringing huge gains in communications and technology and affecting huge shifts in wealth and production". In terms of this perspective, globalisation is a world wide process through which countries and economies and people come closer together to derive mutual benefits voluntarily. It is thus a functional integration of economies globally.

Needless to observe that despite its inevitability and necessity, perhaps, for the contemporary national states, globalisation is certainly not without shortcomings and disruptive tendencies.

First, through the market economy which characterises the conduct of most national economies and multi-national corporations, most world currencies become vulnerable to market fluctuations and economic imbalances. Failure to stabilize the South African rand through market mechanisms over the past years is a case in point (Makhanya 1998(a):10).

Second, globalisation imposes some constraints on government

autonomy in development initiatives. Unsurprisingly, therefore, as Rodrik (1997:42) rightly contents, "financial markets stand ready to pounce on any government perceived to be sacrificing fiscal prudence to social objectives."

Third, the process imposes some adjustments on the activities of national governments. Accordingly as Smadja (2000:48) argues, the role of governments has to be redefined in the face of the overwhelming power of financial markets and the need to provide, through their policies, the most conducive environment and framework for economic activity, increased competitiveness and the challenge of responding to the unrelenting pressures and requirements created by globalisation, as noted above.

From the perspective by Waltz (2000:6) globalisation is also characterised by the following constraints:

- it implies uniformity of political and economic forms and functions on states, through specific rules of the game in relationships.
- it is not about choice, but a reality that has to be confronted. In this regard, national governments are expected to respond one way or the other, in terms of participation
- it is homogeneous in character thus involving the same things across the globe – prices, products, wages, wealth, rates of interest and profit.
- it is a process without any distinctive control by anyone.

Notwithstanding these and other shortcomings, globalisation, however, creates innumerable opportunities for national development efforts world wide, through facilitation of foreign investment, trade, bilateral and multilateral aid and many other related interactions. Consequently, it is irresistible for the emerging economies, whose success in development is dependent on the injection of financial resources to a great extent.

For South Africa in particular, the integration or re-integration of its

economy into the global economic system and initiatives, after years of self imposed isolation, has certainly necessitated several adjustments in policy endeavours and governance in general. Hence the enormous challenge for the Tripartite Alliance to respond to the dictates of globalisation. This exercise is obviously not an easy one, given Makhanya's contention that the process erode governments ability to fulfil their functions of administering their economies in line with policies they themselves have formulated (Makhanya 1998:10).

The assessment of the Alliance's response to globalisation as a factor in governance is indicative of three main characteristics, namely short-sightedness, ill-preparedness and inhibitive ideological postures within the main stakeholders.

First, the Alliance's short-sightedness with regard to the implications of globalisation on the national economy precipitated fragmented and uncoordinated macro-economic policies. In this regard, very little attention was given to the inevitability of policy interdependence as a direct consequence of economic interdependence. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the necessity of adjusting programmes such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the global realities, through the adoption of appropriate domestic strategies that would be facilitative of economic integration was not taken seriously by COSATU and the SACP. Consequently, with GEAR perceived as somewhat contradictory to the RDP objectives, movement towards global economic integration became problematic.

Le Grange's (as quoted by Davos 1995:56) remarks on this dilemma are quite pertinent. For instance, according to him, South Africa faces a unique struggle to emerge from economic isolation and too much state intervention, "few people realise what those years of isolation, trade barriers, sanctions, and so on did to us... we still have the old siege mentality, the old ways of doing business behind those barriers".

Needless to suggest that many controversies within the Alliance's

partners over privatisation, restructuring, and job creation are, by and large, attributable to the Alliance's inability to come to grips with the imperatives of globalisation such as that of investment – friendly environment, reorientation of public spending and several flexibilities, for example,

Second, the Alliance's inability to come to grips with the dynamics of the national economy in terms of the impact of external factors largely accounts for its shortcomings. In other words, the Alliance's seemingly inability to relate the endless attraction of direct foreign investment as a major factor in the facilitation of the desired free market economy, accounts for its shortcomings in globalization.

With the seemingly too much reliance upon gold sales abroad for national revenue, little attention was given to the possibility and eventual diminishing returns of the sales of this product by the government. Unfortunately, however, like many other primary products of the developing world, the price of gold continued to be determined elsewhere, beyond South Africa's full control. Hence fluctuations and, subsequently, uncontrollable drift towards collapse of the industry as major source of revenue.

Three main factors are identifiable in this scenario as unavoidable effects on the national economy, upon which government has no control. These are reduced markets for exports, changes in the value of the currency and inflows and outflows of capital (Horton et al, 1998:16). Accordingly, the market ability of gold, fluctuations in the value of the rand and the movement of capital are, by and large, beyond the control of the government. Given the external factors as primarily changes in the global economy as Horton et al (1998:16-22) suggest, any indifference to their influence can, indeed, have serious consequences for the national economy. The Alliance failure in this regard is far more convincing. Undoubtedly, demands for higher wages in the mining sector, coupled with increased politicisation of the labour force in the form of protests and

protracted strikes, had a substantial effect upon its marketability. Sales thus escalated as some currency speculators took advantage. However, their sustainability remained an open question particularly in the light of market fluctuations and currency volatility. In the long-run, a combination of both the internal and the external factors, played a havoc on the gold industry. Eventually, closure of some mines and consequent retrenchments could not be unexpected.

On the factor of inflows and outflows of capital, it suffices to observe that, through globalisation, markets become highly volatile. Accordingly, as the 1997-98 in South-East Asia financial crisis, have amply demonstrated, the flow of capital internationally is highly unpredictable and, more often than not, insensitive to social objectives. In this particular instance, it was the mere over-borrowing by the private corporations and banks which precipitated a financial panic to foreign investors. As a result, the latter withdrew their investments unceremoniously and thereby caused a devastating consequence in the entire region. Hence currency devaluation, deep recession, insolvency of banks and an acute social and political unrest (Yew 1999:58).

Regarding the constraint of ill-preparedness, the following is discernible in terms of Alliance's performance. Like many other countries whose economies are supposedly being globalized, South Africa seems to have espoused the process without adopting the necessary domestic strategies which make economic integration less problematic and more sustainable (Rodrik 1997:42). In this area, domestic institutions such as social stability and skilled labour force through macro-economic reforms were never rigorously pursued. For example, the labour unrest through persistent strikes over wages by an unskilled labour force, was indicative of the Alliance's ill-preparedness to address the challenges of globalization. The latter, *inter alia*, includes an ideal environment of hardworking educated and disciplined work forces, according to Rogers (1995:64).

Finally, the ideological extremism and disinclination to compromise amongst the partners made it impossible to reach a consensus on the ideal vision regarding globalization and the strategies for dealing with it. No wonder that the restrictive positions of the SACP and COSATU on industrial policy, through the financial sector regulation and reintroduction of tariff barriers respectively, as a means to save jobs, have been counter productive (Gumede 1998(a):11). Inevitably more jobs continue to be lost whilst government financial sector regulations remain too costly in terms of investments opportunities, locally and abroad.

### **7.3 Regionalization**

As South Africa increasingly become reintegrated into the global socio-economic and political system, after years of isolation, there are momentous opportunities for development at home and a meaningful influence on both the regional and global issues. However, the success of this venture will be determined more by the manner in which it conducts its foreign policy than anything else. The forum of regional integration certainly provides a unique opportunity for such a venture. Hence the inevitable dimension of regionalization in governance as a challenge for the Tripartite Alliance.

Doubtedly, given the need for strategic planning to finance a whole range of development programmes domestically, in the first instance and the ideal of entrenching multiparty democracy for regional stability secondly, regionalization does, indeed, become imperative for the political leadership. The Tripartite Alliance's record in this regard is thus worthy of special attention.

#### **7.3.1 Definition**

In the context of the multi-dimensional characteristic of the concept

of regionalization, the meaning applied here refers to a sequential socio-economic and political process of integration of states within a geographic region. It is thus a highly dynamic process of governance on an integrated basis, whose direction and outcome is influenced by several factors and motivation among the states concerned.

The latter include, *inter alia*, open market, trade blocks, economies of scale, security and competitiveness. In the case of the Southern African Development Community which is part of the focus here, the deepening of economic cooperation and integration have clearly been the primary motivational factors (SAPEM 1999:3).

From the point of view of governance, relative to the impact of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance, the underlying motivational factor or necessity for involvement is two fold according to Mbeki (1997:14). This is the political idealism and economic consideration. "In political terms, South Africa is committed to the entrenchment of democracy as an essential condition for containing internal conflicts in Africa. This, in turn, will facilitate trade relations with Africa through minimum disruptions. Equally, the country stands to benefit from the industrialization of Africa since the more developed African economies become the more they buy manufactured goods in Africa."

Over and above that, market pressures resulting from economic interdependence do necessitate multilateral consultations on a variety of issues such as tariffs and quotas. All these matters, including several others, do have a direct bearing on the modalities of regionalisation. Hence the unavoidable implications of governance.

Needless to point out that, regionalization, as applied in this analysis implies a distinct dimension of governance, through special consultative and administrative mechanisms of orderly co-existence between states in a given geographical area.

Against this backdrop, the following analysis will be confined to three main issues, relative to the process of regionalisation. Namely,

context of regionalisation, trade and general coordination of mutually beneficiary services, as some of the matters of common interest among the regional partners.

### **7.3.2 Context of Regionalisation**

Consequent upon the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1994 as a successor to the Southern African Coordination Conference of the so-called frontline states, which had spearheaded the fight against apartheid in South Africa, regionalisation was greatly enhanced in Southern Africa. With this development, a new chapter of co-operative endeavours towards the promotion of economic co-operation and integration and resolving of regional conflicts was opened in Southern Africa. Accordingly, South African involvement in the regional affairs became more pronounced and articulated. For example, the country's involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in pursuit resolution.

Prior to this development, however, South Africa's involvement in the regional matters was rather marginal, through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which comprises of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland and Namibia (South Africa's immediate neighbours) and South Africa.

With the enlarged regional body of SADC, several issues of common concern became operative for regional stability, coherence and prosperity. These include, inter alia, democratisation to enhance good governance, privatisation of state enterprises to attract investment (local and foreign), inter-regional trade for competitiveness and the containment of political conflicts for regional security.

In the light of these pressing issues South Africa, like all other partners, became highly sensitive and therefore increasingly responsive. In this regard, the impact of the country has generally been assertive,

pragmatic and result oriented. Hence numerous successes in the resolution of the crises such as Lesotho's mutiny, the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and others. Given the operational context of governance, it is pertinent at this juncture to assess the Alliance impact upon regionalisation, relative to the processes indicated earlier.

### **7.3.3 SADC Trade Protocol**

In terms of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Trade Protocol of 1996, a programme for the gradual reduction and elimination of tariffs between the member states has been put in place. As envisaged, the ultimate goal of the protocol is the establishment of a free trade area in the SADC region (Masiwa 1999:29).

From the South African point of view, the trade protocol presents enormous obligation to operationalise the process, particularly in the light of the shortcomings of the protocol in terms of a specific institutional framework. Over and above that, given the South African share of the region's total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which is almost two thirds, as Masiwa (1992:29) suggests, several issues, such as, for example, unequal and uneven development between and within SADC countries, have to be addressed to redress the imbalances and spearhead full economic integration. Accordingly, the current fears and concerns about integrating extremely unequal partners have to be taken into account.

In the context of this obligation, the increase of South Africa's trade share with Africa to 180% between 1992 and 1996, coupled with the focus of the country's investor's beyond their own borders since 1994 does, indeed, underline the importance of interregional trade as an instrument of economic co-operation and integration (Mills 1997:15). The implication of this development is, undoubtedly, quite profound particularly in the context of South Africa's trade relations with SADC. Accordingly, as Erwin, the South African Trade and Industry Minister puts it "in the current economic

environment, it would be lunacy for countries such as South Africa to try to develop their economics in isolation from the rest of the region (Erwin as quoted by Mills 1997:15). Economic cooperation and integration is thus imperative for the SADC region. In consequence thereof, numerous challenges of functional cooperation on specific matters of mutual concern and interest are inevitable. Few of these matters will be briefly highlighted, relative to the global perspective of governance.

First, consequent upon the restructuring of its relations with SADC members in 1997, in favour of a firm commitment to a regional programme that embraces cooperation and co-ordination of policy as well as integration of markets, South Africa entered into regional talks towards the establishment of a free trade area (Mutume 1997:11).

Given the fact that political and economic priorities for the SADC region are intimately linked, as Leon (Leon 1998:14) suggests, these talks were not without problems. However, through careful diplomacy and a broader vision for the region's prosperity and stability, the talks eventually culminated into a concrete agreement. Not only did South Africa conclude this agreement with the other SADC members, but it also made another outstanding agreement with the European Union for a free trade area with the latter. In terms of the first agreement with SADC, known as SADC Free Trade Area (SADC-FTA) South African Customs Union (SACU) market will be expanded to accommodate more exports from other SADC countries over five years, with a corresponding opening up of their markets over eight years. With regard to the free trade area with the European Union (EU-FTA) agreement stipulates that 95% of South African exports will be opened to the European Union while opening the South African market to about 86% of European exports over 12 years (Fabricius 1999:10).

Notwithstanding the sensitivity and delicacy of these agreements, their guarantee for success, nonetheless, is somewhat unpredictable and therefore quite demanding in terms of policy integration among the states

concerned. Innovation and adjustments have to be made. As Fabricius rightly observes, drastic policy adaptation on SADC states are imperative, both in economic policy and in general governance. For South Africa in particular, relaxation in labour policy is unavoidable.

In short, the challenge of a free trade area within SADC and beyond extends the scope of governance much wider. Consequently, the need for foresightedness and pragmatism in the trade protocol is inescapable for South Africa in particular.

Second, with the declared African commitment to the entrenchment of democracy and the envisaged reduction of internal conflicts on the continent, South Africa stands to benefit economically through trade with Africa generally. This observation is supported by the fact that, according to the Industrial Development Corporation report entitled 'Trade and Growth' (as quoted by Kobokoane (1997:23), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) cumulative trade surplus for the first half of 1997 amounted to more than R8.1-billion. Approximately five times more than the R1.3 billion recorded for the comparable period in the previous year.

As SACU comprises only South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, it is no exaggeration to believe that SADC as an enlargement of SACU, accords South Africa a unique opportunity to expand its trade further. In other words, it is in South Africa's interests (socially economically and politically that a conducive macro-economic-policy framework be established in Africa. Understanding, this entails cautious diplomatic initiatives towards conflict resolution and democratization in general.

Given Mbeki's reflection that the more industrialised the country, the more it trades with South Africa, the importance of the country's involvement in continental affairs is undisputable (Mbeki 1997:14). Admittedly, the challenge of governance in the global and regional context is well manifested in this scenario.

Needless to indicate that other important considerations within the

challenge include issues such as, for example, commodity prices for competitiveness, food security and indebtedness; all of which constitute a great concern in the area of trade.

#### **7.3.4 General Co-ordination**

The obligation of partners in a joint venture to undertake some co-ordination of activities for ensuring effectiveness is universally acknowledged. In this regard, SADC members have certainly not been an exception. Accordingly, at the regional workshop of SADC held at Gaborone in July 1998, this necessity was well reflected. The delegates therefore, agreed, among others, as follows:

First, that the role of SADC and its institutions be changed so that they should focus on policy formulation, co-ordination and harmonization rather than project planning and implementation.

Second, the workshop recommended that the private sector and other stakeholders should have a stake in both the formulation and implementation of the SADC programme of action (SPA).

Third, that a restructured and refocused SADC should promote employment by co-ordinating relevant national policies (Leshilo 1998:5). Plainly this restructuring underlines the obligation to respond to the challenge posed by the necessity of co-ordination. Given the theory that all nations have limited resources in the first instance and the necessity to trade off levels of exports with levels of imports for balance payments, coordination in regional initiatives is mandatory. Over and above that, as markets often malfunction in both the developed and developing countries, complacency in regional co-ordination can be too costly in the longrun. The challenge of general co-ordination within the SADC region is thus an inevitable consequence of global governance which is mandatory for the Tripartite Alliance in South Africa.

## 7.4 Competitiveness

With the interdependence of states through a global economic system, competition becomes a vital instrument of global economic integration. It is facilitative of, among others, free trade, standardisation of products, foreign investment, job creation and many other activities that are associated with the system of a free market economy. By virtue of its characteristics to enhance the development of the latter, competition can indeed be a creative force for nations, depending on how it is managed.

From the global perspective in particular, many countries derive numerous advantages. For example, first, nations with quality products that are globally competitive, become more prosperous, through large scale exports, second, the production cost and exchange differentials tend to support developing countries through comparative pricing (Mokoena 1999:3). Other advantages include increased earnings in foreign exchange, diversification of markets and technological transfers. In the light of this perspective, some specific and general policy implications arise in the realm of governance for the ANC led Alliance.

In response to this challenge, the Tripartite Alliance has acted as follows.

First, the government discarded what it regarded as expensive and inefficient export and industrial incentives beginning from 1999. Accordingly, as a substitute, a portfolio of targeted support programmes was put in place (Manuels Budget Speech 1999:). Furthermore the government has been pursuing what it termed as a responsible path of exchange control reform, through the gradual abolishing or easing of some control measures, as the Minister of Finance suggests.

Second, South Africa, as co-ordinator of the SADC finance and investment sector has taken the initiative to set up two working groups consisting of central bankers and Ministers, to set the ball rolling on the harmonization of regional policies. Among the range of issues to be

examined are, for example, a data base on the region co-operation on investment, the harmonization of macro-economic policies and examining the possibility of allowing SADC nations to tap into South Africa's capital (Dludlu 1996:12). With the agreement reached on free repatriation of bank notes, as a strategy to facilitate cross border trade, among others, the enhancement of competition has been given a boost.

Third, there has been a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35% to 30% in line with international trends and with governments strategy to make the economy more competitive in particular (Sharpe 1999:4). According to Manuel (as quoted by Sharpe 1999:4), "the reform measures will not only make South Africa significantly more attractive to domestic and foreign investors, but also translate into significant cash flow benefits for smaller and medium-sized companies. This would enhance their ability to play a leading role in job creation and economic development".

Undoubtedly, with the focus on the strengthening of domestic industrial base through sound macro-economic policies, coupled with facilitative global initiatives, the South African economy is on track for competitiveness on domestic and global markets.

## **7.5 Foreign Investment**

Like every other country in the global economy, South Africa has not been unaffected by some unpleasant consequences of globalization. Consequently, the country in its endeavours to address the numerous developmental challenges and governance in particular, has been constrained by the effect of the global financial crisis upon its economy. Notable in this regard has been the financing of the RDP and other development projects through insufficient attraction of foreign investment.

Segal's (1997:4) observation truly captures this dilemma. Accordingly, in his view the 6% annual gross domestic product (GDP) envisaged under GEAR, requires foreign direct investment of 4%-5% of GDP or approximately between R22-billion and R28-billion annually. In

other words, the successful implementation of GEAR as a macro-economic framework to attract foreign investment, among others, is dependent on the injection of foreign capital to finance numerous development projects. The realization of this goal, however, hinges upon the attractiveness of South Africa to foreign investors.

Regrettably, South Africa has a less investment-friendly environment through, inter alia, social instability, relatively unskilled labour force, inflexible macro-economic policy framework and unfavourable geographical location – all of which are regarded as impediments to global economic interdependence (Rodrik 1997:43). Ultimately, therefore, integrated domestic and global macro-economic initiatives are imperative on the part of individual states, particularly South Africa, given the seemingly intractable investment problem.

By a complex but not very surprising economic relationship South Africa, by virtue of its size as a market and its geographical location within the SADC, is not a priority area of global investors (Segal 1997:4). Again, given the turbulent environment of global financial crises and uncertainties, any success in the attraction of direct foreign investment is dependent on many factors such as, for example, social and political stability, lower interest rates and the expansion in infrastructure the majority of which may be difficult to identify. However, the imperative of joint efforts towards the facilitation of foreign investment, both in South Africa and in the SADC region, is indisputable. This is quite an enormous challenge given the seemingly escalating trade deficits within the SADC states and poor efficiency and competitiveness of their economies relatively (Laxton 1999:9). This is the crux of the matter. The extent to which South Africa and its political and administrative leadership has been successful in this venture, is an open question.

With the SADC region currently undergoing a transition of extreme importance with an unforeseeable outcome, through agreements for free trade areas within and beyond, several policy initiatives for the facilitation

of foreign investment can be expected. Few examples will suffice in this regard.

First and foremost, South Africa has stood firm with its policy of macro-economic reform (GEAR) as a strategy for the attraction of foreign investment. Accordingly, the privatization of state enterprises for the purposes of revenue and deficit financing is being vigorously pursued, despite internal quarrels within the Alliance as mentioned.

Second, the response to the market opportunities through agreement for free trade area with the European Union, has the potential to diversify the domestic economy in several ways. In other words, through the removal of trade barriers between South Africa and the European Union, South African producers will have a strong incentive to maximize their production. Hence increased investment and job opportunities.

Third, the seemingly government disposition to lower interest rates for the purposes of increased productive investment locally is, indeed, a positive pointer towards an economy boost. Undoubtedly, the reduction in interest rates will have the advantage of encouraging local investment through increased public borrowings.

Fourth, government commitment to fiscal discipline in the face of recurrent fluctuations of the rand against the world major currencies is encouraging. Quite frankly, fiscal discipline is suggestive of government's firm control on the economy's problems and attendant structural adjustments. The ability to keep the expenditure within the economy's financial capabilities, despite currency fluctuations is therefore, highly commendable. Needless to indicate that all these achievements are occurring within the burden of servicing huge debt that has been increasing exponentially since 1989 (Financial Mail 14 march 1997:4).

In the light of this capability and demonstrated expertise, there is no doubt about the positive signal being given to the expectations of the global investors. Certainly a conducive environment has been created for

the attraction of foreign investors who, by and large, are more inclined to direct their attention to economies that seem more promising in terms of socio-economic stability.

Notwithstanding the unpredictability of global investors in terms of responsiveness to demands, however, one thing remains certain, South Africa does hold the key towards the attraction of foreign investment in the SADC region. Through sustained regional initiatives, sound financial management and prudence locally, and many other activities, the Tripartite Alliance governance in global terms will become more assertive and thus effective in terms of the achievements realised. In conclusion, as it has already been indicated, the challenge of governance, both from the domestic and global perspective, is fully integrated. Consequently, there can never be any separation of the two dimensions. In other words, the process of governance is two-dimensional, affecting domestic issues as well as global challenges equally.

## **7.6 Conclusion**

The global perspective of the Alliance's performance in governance is suggestive of some specific opportunities, constraints and imperatives. Unavoidably, for the Alliance, the underlying mode of operation has been the necessity to respond to the dictates of globalization whether willingly or otherwise. Accordingly, in terms of the opportunities, globalization has provided a unique forum for numerous agreements with the world at large for fostering trade relations, enhancement of mutual security and the attraction of foreign direct investment, for developmental purposes.

As regards the constraints, the requirement of adjustments in macro-economic initiatives was unavoidable. Hence the necessity to privatise some state enterprises with the view to promote investment. Finally, numerous imperatives such as, for example, responsiveness to the market fluctuations and economic imbalances, had a devastating

effect on the South African monetary stability.

## CHAPTER 8

### OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION

#### 8.1 Introduction

The period between 1994 and 1999 can best be described as a momentous era in the history of South Africa, following the establishment of a multi-party democratic government in May 1994. As a consequence, the new government, under the Tripartite Alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU, has undergone a significant test of endurance, capability and innovativeness on the challenge of governance. Accordingly, the operations of the government system, namely, administrative activities and political imperatives, provided a unique opportunity for a scholarly analysis within a new multi-party democratic dispensation.

With the country having just emerged from a seemingly self imposed isolation and thus rejoining the global community of states, through numerous interactions and commitments, multi-party democracy, as a predominant contemporary theme of governance worldwide, has been irresistible for scholarly attention. This has been the primary motivation behind this study.

As noted from the historical review in chapter four, about two hundred years ago democracy emerged in Europe and North America for the apparent reason of the empowerment of interest groups. Hence the inevitability of multi-party groupings as a framework of multi-party democracy and the attendant challenge of advancing the objectives of the groups in question, through provision of a wide range of services and activities in governance.

South Africa, like many other states which adopted this form of government elsewhere, has not been unaffected by the irresistible urge to do likewise, despite many obstacles. In this regard numerous

achievements and temporary setbacks have been realised. Accordingly, governance as a multi dimensional and highly demanding process, in terms of challenges, resources, priorities, innovations and many other considerations, became quite problematic for the newly democratised state.

From the foregoing analysis of the impact of the Tripartite Alliance on governance in South Africa, some important lessons can be drawn relative to the overall objectives of the study. These include, *inter alia*, dynamics of the impact of political alliances on governance, contemporary realities of governance in multi-party democracy and the uniqueness of the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance.

A brief examination of these is deemed appropriate, as part of the concluding remarks.

### **8.1 Dynamics of political alliances on governance**

The dynamics of political alliances on governance are limitless, given the multiplicity of democratic states that subscribe to pluralism in government. Besides that, it is important as well to realise that, different states across the globe are faced with peculiar problems which may not necessarily impact similarly on the perceptions of the stakeholders, inclusive of political alliances.

In view of this factor in perceptions and challenges, it is proposed to highlight just a few crucial manifestations of the operative elements on the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance's impact on governance in South Africa.

#### **8.2.1 Rationale and Status of Political Alliances in Governance**

Both the formation and sustainability of political alliances are influenced by people's conceptions about what government ought to do. This is the fundamental rationale behind political parties and alliances, as

it has been observed from the study so far. Quite evidently, political alliances like political parties, are the means by which people cooperate and compete with each other in pursuit of the collective well being, according to the aim which they may or may not share or the ideals over which they disagree.

As it is, in the realm of government, political alliances are, by and large, reflective of the complexity of society wherein, individuals belong to several groups with a multiplicity of objectives, simultaneously. The ANC-SACP COSATU Alliance, in terms of this framework, is doubtlessly, applicable to the condition and thus serve as a good parallel. Accordingly, individuals composing the alliance membership are associated with other groups, both within and outside the alliance. Consequently, despite the many aims which the individual members could not share and the ideals over which they have constantly been at loggerheads, the imperative of association for the common goals has provided a strong motivation for togetherness.

This characteristic of the alliance is neither peculiar nor unfamiliar to the prevailing circumstances globally. However, in the context of the South African situation, it may be too early to make any conclusive statement, as conditions are tentative and fluid in nature.

Moreover, according to Lipson (1966:27), "as society evolves from a preoccupation with necessities to the satisfaction of a vast range of desires, men undergo a profound change psychologically as well as materially". Unavoidably, therefore, some changes in the characteristic of the Alliance can be expected in the longrun. In other words, it may be rather presumptuous to make any formal assessment of the durability or otherwise of the Tripartite Alliance on governance, given the volatility of the socio-economic conditions as dictated by both the local conditions and global challenges.

Be this as it may, however, the above eventuality does, indeed, warrant an inference relative to the many changes in policy initiatives

under the Tripartite Alliance. Undoubtedly, therefore, tensions within the Alliance over privatization of state enterprises and the imperative to review the GEAR policy are mainly attributable to this inevitable phenomenon of evolutionary psychological and material changes.

Unsurprisingly, COSATU feels somewhat uncomfortable with government inclination to privatize for the psychological fear of job losses for the vast majority of its membership. The other Alliance partner, the ANC, is equally compelled by the socio-economic and political realities of public policy making, to pursue the policy despite its original goals of nationalisation.

Without necessarily purporting to speculate on the outcome of the on-going internal debates over the above issues, it suffices to predict that any eventuality resulting thereof, will most likely be reflective of the evolutionary psychological and material transformation among the parties concerned.

### **8.2.2 Institutional Factors in Public Policy Making Endeavours**

Through the unavoidable intervention of the state in multiple social services which, invariably, entails bigger public expenditures and competition or conflicts with the private sector, controversies in transparency, control and accountability, for example, do occur in governance. The unmistakable logic of these circumstances points to an inescapable effect, namely, that despite its unifying mission in society, the state is no less than the sum of its constituent elements. The latter, by and large, being generally reflective of the individual ambitions and aspirations, whose realization seldom coincide with the available budgetary provision. Unsurprisingly, therefore a constant struggle for power inevitably ensues among the groups/interests concerned, with the view to get a bigger share of the resources available. A citation of a few instances of this reality will do for clarity sake.

First, the paradoxical relationship of the Tripartite Alliance as represented by COSATU and the SACP, with the business sector and the government on economic development and labour related issues in NEDLAC is one of the cases in point. In this regard, as it has generally been observed, the parties to the negotiations tend to be more concerned with their institutional ambitions and aspirations than with an equitable solution to the problems at hand.

COSATU's frequent employment of industrial action in pursuit of its objectives within NEDLAC is indicative of these realities. Similar actions during delicate negotiations is nothing less than a show of strength and hence negation of the principle of collective responsibility in public policy making.

Second, equally undesirable from the point of view of transparency, has been government's apparent reluctance to consult meaningfully and adequately with the other partners on several policy issues. Admittedly, the partners have often engaged in discussion and reached compromise solution on a number of issues, in terms of the national framework agreement according to Bell (1996:3). However, this condition seems to have been unsustainable, through the executive branch of government failure to lobby effectively within the Alliance caucuses over intended policy initiatives. Inevitably, it was this error of commission, more than anything else, which precipitated a transparency crisis on public policy making. Unsurprisingly, government grip on the internal control mechanisms was seriously affected, as ill-feelings developed within the alliance. For example, provincial budget overruns through poor co-ordination and control could not be unexpected.

Curiously, more overexpenditures within the Department of Education in some provincial administrations occurred, presumably, due to the apparent quarrel between the Government and COSATU over the issue of retrenchment emanating from the public service restructuring. Quite evidently, government neglect of the legitimate responsibility to

enforce its regulatory financial procedures undermined its obligation towards transparency in public policy making endeavours.

## **8.2 Contemporary realities of governance in a multi-party democracy**

The complex environment of volatile socio-economic and political factors in governance does, indeed, pose a serious challenge to both the political and administrative functionaries. This reality becomes even more complicated in situations that are characterised by pluralistic stakeholders in governance. In the context of the South African situation, certain peculiarities deserve a special attention in terms of the contemporary realities of governance, under a multi-party democracy. Needless to indicate that, as it was noted in chapter six, contemporary governance of multi-party democracies entails numerous stakeholders, whose claim to governance is either constitutionally provided or implied. A brief scan of the South African peculiarities from the study will suffice for the purpose of drawing some lessons.

First, the selection of the Alliance candidates for election to the Parliament seems to be motivated more by popular sentiments than hard bargaining between the Alliance and its constituent partners. As a result of this oversight, the latter have lost some of their best people who could be more influential in steering their organizations towards a more meaningful engagement with the Alliance. No wonder that, on the side of COSATU, for example, there has been a leadership crisis whereby, invariably grassroots membership has openly and constantly been at loggerheads with the alliance over policy issues. In other words, the movement of COSATU top leadership to the Parliament has seriously affected the organizations' affairs in terms of direction and role within the Alliance. Quite evidently, it is this leadership crisis, in the longrun which creates organizational instability within the ranks of the alliance partners

and hence lack of common vision and consensus on key development issues.

Second, the Alliance decision to empower the executive committee of the ANC in the appointment of the provincial premiers was politically and administratively unwise. Besides its demotivational effect on the provincial administrations and leadership, the move was, above all, suggestive of the nepotism and favouritism tendencies. Hence its condemnation by a number of political analysts and administration experts. In these circumstances, the perennial problem of power struggles within the alliances partners and administrative irregularities in some provinces, could not be unexpected. In the longrun, therefore, the general political and administrative instability in the provinces did impact negatively on the public service delivery efforts.

From the above instances, it is quite clear that the contemporary realities of governance such as, for example, political aspirations as exemplified by power struggles and personal ambitions among political functionaries are indeed, a major factor in government stability and effectiveness. In other words both the manner in which political parties and alliances conduct their affairs and the personal inspiration of the leadership concerned do account a great deal towards effective governance.

### **8.3 Uniqueness of the ANC-SACP COSATU Alliance**

Although the formation of the Tripartite Alliance has not been unfamiliar in terms of the motivational factors behind such formations, nonetheless, it is the Alliance sustainability which has baffled many critics as well as a wide spectrum of political and administrative analysts. Notwithstanding government disinclination to act decisively over departmental irregularities at times, the Alliance endurance is ascribable to two main factors, in the opinion of the researcher.

First, the inescapable necessity of interdependence of modern societies in their function and groupings compels the Alliance to stick together. In other words, the imperative to join forces in pursuit of the individual and collective objectives, supersedes all other considerations. Over and above that, given the relative strength of the Alliance partners in terms of broad based membership, any individualistic tendencies could prove counter productive in the longrun. Quite frankly, this is the harsh reality behind the Alliance togetherness, despite the enormous tensions and differences in socio-economic and political outlook within.

Second, given the volatile status of the South African government system, through transformation and the on-going trials and errors in governance, many things remain tentative and therefore, inconclusive. As a consequence, the Alliance partners have successfully withstood the test of endurance through political tolerance and pragmatism. The name of the game in this scenario can thus be best described as unity in diversity is best for individual and collective survival.

Needless to indicate that, in the longrun, the constitutional clause which perpetually confines an MP to his/her party during the life of Parliament, regardless of the circumstances, may be politically debatable within pluralistic party groupings and realignment of parties. In this regard, it may be somewhat speculative to ascribe the unity of the Tripartite Alliance to this particular clause. However it suffices to suggest that, with time, the unfolding of events through either socio-economic and political stability or otherwise, will indicate whether this particular clause is both politically and morally defensible, from the point of view of MP's freedom of conscience and good governance.

As a general conclusion, it is deemed fitting to consider the ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance as one of the most fascinating political entities, both in terms of its complexities and impact upon governance in South Africa. By and large, the complexities of the Alliance lie in its inexplicable terms of reference, power equation between the partners, mode of

consultations and decision making processes in general. Regarding the challenge of governance, two sets of circumstances seem to have been identifiable, relative to the impact of the Alliance on governance.

First, the South African seemingly intractable problems of crime, jobless growth and related unemployment, attraction of foreign investment and the public service delivery mechanisms, to name but just the most outstanding, have tested the ability of the Alliance to the utmost.

Last but not the least, the on-going socio-economic and political transition in South Africa has certainly been quite significant, though with unforeseeable outcomes. Hence the difficult task of effective governance. How the Alliance has fared is quite debatable. Nonetheless, a definite impact has been felt on the South African government system by the Alliance, according to the findings made so far.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Primary and Secondary Sources

#### **ABCARIAN, G. and MASANNAT, G.S.**

1970. **Contemporary Political Systems.** New York. Charles Scribner's Sons.

#### **ACKNOFF, R.L.**

1994. **The Democratic Corporation.** New York. Oxford University Press.

#### **ADKINS, N.F.**

1966. **Thomas Paine Common Sense.** New York: Pyramid Publications Inc.

#### **ALLEN, L.A.**

1983. **Common Vocabulary of Professional Management.** Sixth Edition. Johannesburg Louis A. Allen Associates.

#### **ANC.**

1994. **The Restruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework.** Johannesburg Umanyano Publications.

#### **BALL, A.R.**

1993. **Modern Politics and Government.** Fifth edition. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

#### **BALLENGER, J.**

1997. **The Right to Strike is not Absolute.** Business Day 3 October 1997:6.

**BEER, S.**

1998. **Roots of New Labour.** The Economist February 7<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> 1998.  
PP23-27.

**BEETHAN, D.**

1974. **Max Weber and the Theory of Politics.** OXFORD. Alden Press.

**BEINSTEIN, A.**

1997. **Gearing up for great challenge.** The Star 22 May 1997:19.

**BELL, T.**

1998. **Gordian Knot binds Tripartite Alliance.** Business Report 3 July,  
1998:2.

**BELL, T.**

1996. **Pact silences Privatization Protests.** Business Report, February  
15 1996:3.

**BERGMAN, T AND STROM, K.**

1992. **Sweden Social Democratic Dominance in One Dimension in**  
M.J. Lover and Ian Budge, Party Policy and Government Coalitions.  
London: St Martins Press.

**BERNSTEIN, A.**

1999. **NEDLAC Needs to assess its role in the Changing S.A.**  
**Economy.** The Star 27 August 1997:17.

**BHAGWAT, J.**

1995. **The new thinking on Development.** Journal of democracy 6(4):  
50 -63.

**BIRTCH, A.**

1992. **The British System of Government.** Ninth edition. London.  
1993. HMGO.

**BOADEN, V. GOLDSMITH, M. HAMPTON, W. AND STRINGER, P.**

1982. **Public Participation in Local Services** London: Longman.

**BROWN, J.**

1979. **Management in Central and Local Government** London:  
Pitman Publishing Ltd.

**BOER, J.H.**

1995. **Re-engineering the Consultative Process between Industry,  
Labour and Government Trade Authorities in South Africa**  
*International Review of administrative Sciences.* 61:343-354.

**BOTES, P.S.**

1994. **Aspects of Supervision.** Halfway House. Southern Book  
Publishers.

**BOTHA, F.**

1997. **Public Service Numbers on the Increase.** Business Report 24  
February 1997:5.

**BOWMAN, J.B. AND WILLIAMS, R.L.**

1997. **Ethics in Government: From a winter of Despair to a Spring of  
hope.** *Public Administration Review* 59(6): 517-525.

**BULGER, P.**

1998. **Will South Africa become a nanny state?** *The Star* 14

September 1998: 10.

**BUSINESS DAY.**

1998. **70% of Eastern Cape Principals fail the Test.** Business Day. 3  
July 1998:1.

**BUSINESS DAY.**

1998 **SACP is told to follow the party line.** Business Day 3 July 1998:  
11.

**BRAIBANT, G.**

1996. **Public Administration and Development.** International Review  
of Administrative Sciences. 62(2):103-176.

**BRUCE, D.**

1997. **Corruption now rates much higher on the world's hit list.**  
Business Day 29 October 1997:16.

**CASTEL FRANCO, S.**

1996. **Despondent Italians wonder whether to Bother voting.** The  
Star 18 April 1996:27.

**CATHOLIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

1992. **South Africa – Breaking New Ground.** London: Russell Press  
Ltd.

**CHRISTIANSON, D.**

1997. **South Africa After Apartheid.** Finance Week 9 April 1999: p.9-  
10.

**CLARK, S.**

1993. **Nelson Mandela Speaks.** Cape Town: David Philip Publishers (Pty) Ltd.

**CLOETE, J. J. N.**

1996. **Public Administration and Management Pretoria:** J.L. van Schaik Publishers.

**COKAYNE, R.**

1998. **South Africa now a job-loss Economy.** Business Report 29 April 1998:3.

**COPPEDGE, M.**

1997. **District Magnitude, economic Performance and Party System Fragmentation in Five Latin American Countries.** Comparative Political Studies. 30(2) PP156-185.

**COXALL, W.N.**

1986. **Political Realities: Parties and Pressure Groups.** Second edition. London: Longman.

**DAVOS, J.B.**

1995: **Forecast: Expansion ahead but beware of a backlash.** Time, 145(10).

**DLUDLU, T.**

1996. **Erwin, stals give details of involvement in SADC.** Business Day 29 April, 1999:12.

**DUMBAULD, E.**

1966. **Freedom and the States.** New York. Pyramid Books.

**DU TOIT, D.F.P. AND VAN de WALDT**

1997. **Public Management. The Grassroots.** Kenwyn: Juta.

**DU TOIT, F.P. et al**

1998. **Public Administration and Management for Effective Governance.** Kenwyn: Jute Co.Ltd.

**DU TOIT, DFP, van de WALT, G, BAYAT, M.S. AND CHEMINAIS, J.**

1998. **Public Administration and Management.** Kenwyn: Juta & Co. Ltd.

**DUVERGER, M.**

1963. **Political Parties.** New York. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

**DYE, T.R.**

1987. **Understanding Public Policy.** Sixth edition Englewood Cliffs. Prentice Hall Inc.

**EASTON, D.**

1965. **A Systems Analysis of Political Life,** New York. John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

**ENNIS, R.W.**

1966. **Accountability.** London: AR Mowbraw and Co. Ltd.

**EWING, K.D.**

1994. **Freedom of Association** in Christopher Macrudden and Gerald Chambers, *Individual Rights and the Law* pp.239-263. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

**FABRICIUS, P.**

1999. **Trade Instead of Aid might just work.** The Star, 3 September 1999:10.

**FINANCIAL MAIL**

1997. **Ideological Dispute over capitalism:** 146 (11):40.

**FRANKL, V.E.**

1967. **Psychotherapy and Existentialism.** New York. Devon Lithographers, Inc.

**FRASER, J.**

1998. **Foreign Direct Investment Fall to R1.9 bn in the First Quarter.**  
Business Report 11 May 2000:1

**FREARS, J.K.**

1997. **Political Parties and Elections in the French Fifth Republic.** London:  
Harts and Company.

**FRIEDMAN, S.**

1998. **Government deluded if it thinks it can bring in crassroots.**  
Business Day 2 November 1998:13.

**GABRIEL, R.H.**

1966. **Hamilton Madison and Jay on the American Constitution.** New  
York: Pyramid Publications Inc.

**GALL, G.**

1998. **Trade Unions and the ANC in the New South Africa.** Review of  
African Political Economy. 24(72):263-217.

**GILDENHUYS, J.S.H.**

1993 **Public Financial Management**. Pretoria. J.L. Van Schai. K.

**GINTHER, K et al.**

1994. **Sustainable Development and Good Governance**. Dordrecht:  
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

**GINTHER, K.**

1995. **Sustainable Development and Good Governance**. Dordrecht.  
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

**GOLDEN, M.**

1986. **Interest Representation party Systems and the State Italy in  
Comparative Perspective**. *Comparative Politics*. 18(3): 279-301.

**GRAWTZKY, R.**

1997. **Labour and Business Pushing Government to take a stand**.  
*Business Day* 10 July 1997:12.

**GRAWITZKY, R.**

1998. **A Foundation for Job Creation**. *Business Day* 2 November  
1998:13.

**GREYBE, D.**

1998. **Public Service Systems unable to come up with the goods**.  
*Business Day* 15 May 1998:8.

**GREYBE, D.**

1997. **Corruption Unit to probe 2000 cases**. *Business Day* 1 December  
1997:1.

**GUMEDE, W.M.**

1998. (a). **What GEAR is all about and where the major players in the controversy stand.** The star 3 July 1998:11.

**GUMEDE, W.M.**

1998(b). **Can SACP Dinosaur Reinvent itself?** The Star 3 July 1997:11.

**HABIB, A. AND TAYLOR, R.**

1999. **Parliamentary opposition and Democratic Consolidation in South Africa.** Review of African Political Economy. 26(80): 261-267.

**HANEKOM, S.X.**

1991. **Public Policy: Framework and Instrument for Action.** Pretoria: Southern.

**HARRISON S. AND POLLIT, C.**

1992. **Handbook of Public Service Management.** Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

**HASENFUSS, M.**

1998. **Government Digs Deep into its Soul to root out corruption.** Business Report 12 November 1998:2.

**HARTLEY, R.**

1997. **Mbeki out of gear as Ministers bicker and job creation stalls.** Sunday Times, Business Times 16 November 1997:24.

**HAYSOM, F.**

1998. **Defending Regional Democracy.** The Star 14 October 1998:16.

**HEADY, F.**

1966. **Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective.**  
Englewood\_Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc.

**HILLIARD, V.G.**

1996. **Contending With Public Sector Wrongdoing.** Board Room April  
1995 16-17.

**HINTON, P. AND WILSON, J.**

1990. **Public Services and the 1990's.** Dunton Green: Hideler  
and Stoughton Ltd.

**HOBBSAWN, E.**

1996. **The Future of the State.** Development and Change. 27(2):267-  
278.

**HOROWITZ, I.L.**

1989. **The Private Costs of Private Blessings. Fundamentals of the  
Economic Role of Government.** Studies in Comparative International  
Development.24(1):39-46.

**HORTON, C. TREGENNA F. AND NGQUNGWANA, T.**

1998. **After GEAR: Changing Economic Policy.** South African Labour  
Bulletin 22(6): 16-22.

**HUNT, M.**

1994. **Openers and Civil Service Ethics.** International Review of  
Administrative Sciences 61: 11-16.

**JACOBS, S.**

1998. **Prepare for Lengthy Tubs-Thumbiny Bout.** The Star 16

February

1998:12.

**JEPPE, C.**

1997. **Privatization Robs Working Class.** The star 2 January 1996:10

**JUPP, J.**

**Australian Party Politics.** London: Melbourne University Press.

**KARPEN, U.**

1993. **The Significance of a legal Framework for Democratic Development.** Law and State. Volume 47: PP93-101.

**KELLY, R.M. PALUMBO AND KOGAN N.**

1992. **Encyclopedia of Government and Politics** London: Rontledge.

**KERNAGHAN, K.**

1997. **Values and Professionalism in Public Service.** The International Review of Administrative Sciences. 63(3).

**KHAKETLA, B.M.**

**Lesotho 1970.** London: C Hart & Company Ltd.

**KICKERT, W.J.M.**

1997. **Public Governance in the Netherlands: An alternative to Anglo-American Managerialism.** Public Administration Volume 75 1997. P.731-752.

**KITCHKEN, E.**

1999. **The RDP Governance and Rural Development** in Patrick Fitz Gerald, Anne Mc Lennan and Berry Munslow Managing:

Sustainable Development in South Africa. Second edition pp.192-218 Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

**KLINGERMAN, H.D. and VOLKENS, A.**

19 . **Coalition Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: does Policy Matter?** In M.J. Laver and Ian Budge, Party Policy and Government Coalitions. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

**KOBOKOANE, T.**

1997. **Customs Union Trade Surplus looks healthy, but all's not well.** Sunday Times, Business Times, 16 November 1997:23.

**KPUNDEH, S.J.**

1995. **Politics and Corruption in Africa: A case study of Sierra Leone.** Lanham: University Press.

**KUNERT, D.**

1991: **Glosnot, New thinking and the ANC SACP Alliance.** Bryanston: International Freedom Association.

**LANE, J.N.**

1991. **Understanding the Swedish Model.** London: Frank Cass Co.Ltd.

**LAPALOMBARA, J.**

1993. **Politics within Nations.** Englewood Cliffs Prentice Hall.

**LAVAR, M.J. and BUDGE, I.**

1991. **Party Policy and Government Coalition.** New York. St. Martins Press.

**LAWLOR, P.**

1997. **NEDLAC may strike out after COSATU withdrawal the Bill.** Business Report 18 June 1997:2.

**LAXTON, C.**

1999. **Erwin says Free Trade in SADC won't hurt jobs.** Business Report 11 February 1999:9.

**LEON, T.**

2000. **SADC must prioritise Economics.** Business Day, 16 Octobe1998: 14.

**LESHILO, T.**

1998. **SADC to give priority to Intergration.** Business Report, 31 July 1998:5.

**LEVINE, H.M.**

1982. **Political issues Debated: An Introduction to Politics.** Third Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

**LEWIS, G.**

1997. **Tackling the Education Crisis.** The Star 25 August, 1997:14.

**LIDOVHO, N.**

1998. **Trying to muffle the watchdog.** The Star 22 April 1998:16.

**LIPSON, L.**

1966. **The Great Issues of Politics.** Third Edition Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc.

**LODGE, T.**

1999(a). **Consolidating Democracy.** Johannesburg. Witwatersrand

**LODGE, T.**

1999(b). **South African Politics Since 1994.** Cape Town: David Phillip Publishers.

**MAINWARING, S.**

1993-94. **Presidentialism Multiparismus and Democracy. The Difficult Combination.** Comparative Political Studies 26.

**MAKHANYA, M.**

1998(a) **Markets erode power of Governments.** The Star 13 July 1998: 10.

**MAKHANYA, M.**

1998(b) **Hand-Picked Leaders a poor idea.** The Star 21 August 1998:12.

**MBEKI, M.**

1997. **South Africa Needs prosperity in Africa.** The Star 21 April 1997:14.

**MAHLABE, C.**

1998. **Tripartite Alliance will hold it needs Examination and Renewal.** The star 16 December 1997:9.

**MASEBE, T.**

1998. **These is only one ANC- The People's.** The Star 31 August 1998:10.

**MASIWA, N.**

1999. **SADC quest for a free Trade Area.** The Southern African Economist  
August 1999:29-31.

**MATSHEZA, P. and KUNAKA, C.**

1978. **Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Strategies in Southern Africa.** Harare. Human Rights Research and Documentation Trust of Southern Africa.

**MATUME, G.**

1997. **Towards Harmonizing the rights of workers in SADC.** Business Report, 29 August 1997:11.

**MILLS, G.**

1997. **'North' and 'South' likely to be heading off in new directions.** The Star, 18 Novmeber 1997:15.

**MOHAMAD, M.B.**

1998. **State Governance.** Public Administration and Development. 18(5): 441-446.

**MOKOENA, M.**

1999. **Globalization is a fact so make it work for you.** City Press, 5 December 1999:3.

**MOSHABESHA, M.**

1998. **Relationship between the Public and the Private Sectors in Development.** Unpublished MPA dissertation. Bloemfontein. The University of the Free State.

**MPATI, N.**

1998. **COSATU Election Levy: Minorities Still Respected.** The Star  
July 1998:8.

**MSOMI, S.**

1999. **SADTU vows to fight retrenchments.** Business Day 27  
November 1997:2.

**MVOKO, V.**

1997. **SADTU vows to fight retrenchments.** Business Day 27  
November 1997:2.

**NYATSUMBA, K.**

1997. **Communists will have to toe line.** The Star 17 February  
1999:12.

**NYATSUMBA K.**

1996. **Alliance is suffocating the ANC.** The star 29 May 1996:16.

**NYATSUMBA, K.**

1995. **Government and Media. It takes two to tango.** The Star 28  
August 1995:10.

**NXUMALO, F.**

1998. **2.8 million work days lost to strikes.** Business Report 24 May  
1996:3.

**OUMA, S.O.A.**

1997. **Corruption in Public Policy and its Impact on Development.  
The Case of Uganda since 1971.** Public Administration and  
Development. Volume 11 PP447-490.

**ORPEN, C.**

1981. **Behaviour in work organization**: Braamfontein. Jonathan Ball Publishers.

**PARSONS, R.**

1996. **The NEDLAC Needle**. Business Report 24 may 1996:3.

**PATON, C.**

1997. **COSATU set to take a hard line on Employment Bill**. Business Times 20 April 1997:1.

**PATON, C.**

1998. **Weaving a Red Flag to the ANC**. Sunday Times 5 July 1998:8.

**PHILLIP, G.**

1999. **The Dilemma of Good Governance. A Lating American Perspective**. Government and Opposition. 34(2): 226-242.

**PIERCE, R.**

1968. **French Politics and Political Institutions**. New York: Harper and Rour.

**POTTER, D.**

1997. **Explaining Democratization** in David Goldblast, David Potter, Margaret Kiloh and Paul Lewis, Democratization. Malten. Blackwell Publishers Inc.

**POPHAN, G.T.**

1969: **Government in Britain**. London: Pergawon Press.

**PRICE, E.S. and MCADAMS L.P.**

1996. **Bringing Accountability for Results to Government in British Columbia.** Public Administration and Development 16:305-315.

**QUIRK, B.**

1997. **Accountable to Everyone.** Post Modern Pressures on Public Managers. Public Administration. 75(3):569-586.

**QWELANE, J.**

1997. **COSATY Pushes Rulers into a Corner.** Saturday Star 27 June 1998:8.

**RADEBE, H.**

1998. **COSATU Ready to fight ANC over Job Cuts.** The Star 3 June 1998:10.

**RANTAO, J.**

1997(a) **Committee System Which Questions Bills is True Test of a Democratic Parliament.** The Star 8 April 1997: 9.

**RANTAO, J.**

1997(b) **Few are spared as counter-accusations fly in "the great corruption debate:** The Star 9 June 1997, P.15.

**RANTAO, J.**

1998(a) **Corruption Queen Exposed.** The Star 8 July 1998:1.

**RANTAO, J.**

1998(b) **Fraud Investigation Unit recovers R10 billion.** The Star 24 August 1998:3.

**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

1995. **White Paper on Transformation of the South African Public Service.** Pretoria: Government Printer.

**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

1995. **Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.** Act 108 of the 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer.

**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

1997. **Batho Pele White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service Delivery.** Gazette no.18340 of 1997. Pretoria: Government Printer.

**ROCKEY, S.H.**

1999. **What stage has been reached in the Reform and Transformation of the Structures and Systems of Government? The Case of South Africa.** International Review of Administrative Sciences. 65(2):169-182.

**RODRIK, D.**

1997. **Upside, Downside.** Time 7 July 149(27):42.

**ROGERS, J.**

1995. **Investing: Back to Basics: Raw Materials are on the rise.** Time, 145(10): 64-65.

**SANCTON, T.**

1998. **Here we go again.** Time 152(16):41.

**SAPA.**

1999. **ANC Official Suspended over Missing R4000,000.** The Star 21

October 1998:5.

**SAPLEM.**

1999. **Regional Integration.** P.3.

**SARTORI, G.**

1976. **Parties and Party Systems.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

**SECHABA KA NKOSI**

1999. **Mphumalanga warms ANC not to Oust Premier Phosa.** Sunday World 18 February 199:1.

**SHARPE, S.**

1999. **Manuel aims to make South Africa comparative.** Business Day, 18 February 1999:4.

**SHIRLEY, M.**

1991. **Public Sector Management Activity at the World Bank.** Public Administration and Development. 11(3):293-294.

**SEGAL, S.**

1997. **More Foreign Investment Vital for South Africa to reach growth goals.** Sunday Times Business Times. 16 November 1997:4.

**SEWELL, J.W.**

1998. **The Politics of Aid and Development in a Globalizing World.** Development, 42(3):31-35.

**SMADJA, C.**

2000. **Global Turmoil.** Time, 153(4):47-48.

**SMITH, R.**

1987. **The Black Trade Unions. From Economics to Politics in  
Jesmond Blumen/eld South Africa in crisis.** New York: Croom Helm.

**SMITH, C.**

1998. **Lazy MPS slide the ANC into a disaorganized morans.** The  
Star 2 September 1998:14.

**SMUTS, S.**

1998. **Auditor uncovers virtual anarchy in Provinces Financial  
Management.** Sunday Times 8 March 1998:3.

**SOLE, S.**

1999. **Mbeki's Grand Coalition for Future.** Saturday Arguns 29/30 May  
1999:23.

**SONO, T.**

1998. **Sarafinagate Needs deeper probe.** The Star 24 November 1998.  
P14.

**SOUTHERN AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS SURVEY**

1998. **Difficulties in Governance.** Goodwood: National Book  
Publishers.

**SOUTHERN AFRICAN LABOUR BULLETIN**

1997. **Social Dialogue – The South African Experience.** South African  
Labour Bulletin 21(6):79.

**STERLING, C.**

1973. **Can Democracy Survive in Italy?** Readers Digest December

1973. PP. 48-53.

**STEWART, J. AND RANSON, L.**

1995. **Management in the Public Domain Halrow:** Longman.

**STONE, C.**

1981. **Innovative Organization require innovative managers.** Public Administration Review. Volume 41. Pp 508-509.

**SULLIVAN, P.**

1978. **Spring clean the Public Service.** The Star 28 August 1995:10.

**SUNDAY TIMES**

1996. **ANC Bungles Have National Significance.** Sunday Times 15 December 1996:22.

**SUNDAY TIMES**

1998. **Watershed speech has changed our Politics Sunday** Times 5 July: 1998:18.

**SUNTER, C.**

1987. **The World and South Africa in the 1990s.** Cape Town. Human and Rousseau Pty and Tafelburg Publishers.

**SWILLING, M AND WODRIDGE D.**

1997. **Governance, Administrative Transformation and Development in South Africa: A Normative Approach** in Fitzgerald et al managing Sustainable Development in South Africa. Second edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

**THAKATHI, D.L.**

1993. **Public Service.** Boardroom 3/95: 14.

**TURNER, M AND HULME, D.**

1997. **Governance, Administration and Development. Making the State Work.** Hongkong. Macmillan Press Ltd.

**UNITED NATIONS**

1961. **A Handbook of Public Administration.** New York: United Nations Publication.

**VAN DER WALT, G. AND HELMBOLD, R.**

1997. **The Constitution and a New Public Administration.** Kenwyn. Juta & Co. Ltd.

**VICK, C.**

1997. **A vital moment for the SACP.** The Star 15 December 1997:9.

**WARE, A.**

1996. **Political Parties and Party Systems.** New York: Oxford University Press Inc.

**WESSELS, D.**

1997. **South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Programme.** Journal of Social Sciences. 3 (4) 235-243.

**WORLD BANK.**

1992. **Governance and Development.** World Bank. Washington D.C.

**YEW, L.K.**

1999. **Fix the Global Financial Systems.** Time, 153(4): 58.

## **NEWSPAPERS**

Business Day (Cape Town)

Business Report (Johannesburg)

Business Times (Johannesburg)

City Press (Johannesburg)

The Economist (Johannesburg)

Saturday Star (Johannesburg)

The Star (Johannesburg)

Sunday Times (Johannesburg)

Sunday World (Johannesburg)

Financial Mail (Johannesburg)

Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg)