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**Topic: Brazil in Africa (since the dawn of a new millennium): A political economic assessment.**

**By**

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## **Abstract**

Brazil, the central focus of this study, has taken up a role as one of the interminably burgeoning middle-power economies in the world. The country plays a major role in redefining the new role of emerging economies in a transformed global economic system. Furthermore, Brazil's enthusiasm and rise in the globe has over the years been greatly swayed by compelling international as well as inland political and ideological nuances. As such, Brazil's position on, and conduct in, the global governance terrain and, therefore, its foreign relations approach, is increasingly exhibiting an urgent need for academic inspection. More so, the study will attempt to offer an expanded descriptive account of the nexus between Brazil's rise in the international system, as well as their growing footprint on the African continent. The study's main diagnostic tool will be the critical theory of hegemony. In consequence, the Gramscian concept of consensual hegemony (which is directly correlated to the critical theory of hegemony) will be used to gauge Brazil's international behaviour.

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## **List of Acronyms and Abbreviations**

ACAPS: Asymptomatic Carotid Artery Progression Study

ACCORD: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

ACTSA: Action for Southern Africa

ADB: African Development Bank

AEO: African Economic Outlook

AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

ARV: Antiretroviral medication

ASA: Africa and South America

AU: African Union

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Grouping

CRA: Contingent Reserve Arrangement

DIRCO: Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Of South Africa)

DLIFLC: Defence Language Institute Foreign Language Centre

EISA: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa

EMBRAPA: Brazilian Agricultural Research Cooperation

EU: European Union



FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FNLA: National Front for the Liberation of Angola

FRELIMO: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

G77: Group of 77 states nations

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IBSA: India, Brazil and South Africa

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IPEA: Institute of Applied Economic Research

ITF: International Trade Forum

Mercosul/ Mercosur: Common Market of the Spanish speaking South American Countries

MFAB: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil

MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

NAM: Non-Aligned Movement

NDB: New Development Bank

ONUMOZ: United Nations Operation in Mozambique

OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

RENAMO: Mozambican National Resistance

SABC: South African Broadcasting Corporation

SADC: Southern African Developing Communities

SAIIA: South African Institute of international Affairs

SAITEX: Southern African International Trade Exhibition

UK: United Kingdom

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNOSSC: United Nations Office for South-South

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WB: World Bank

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Introduction

The last five decades have signalled tremendous changes in the international socio-economic and political domain. These changes were mainly buttressed by the fall of the Berlin Wall (a symbol of the end of the Cold War), the unprecedented rise of globalization, the upsurge of global security issues and most significantly, the rise of developing economies, particularly in an epoch of relentless changes in the architecture of global power relations (Voronkova, 2015: 19; Dicken, 2003: 38). Most notably, developing countries have to some degree mainly undergone significant cosmetic changes, in both their ideological and structural orientations. These essential adjustments are in part abetted by the developing countries' policies of increased integration into the world economic system, but most significantly the degree to which these developing countries work together to quell a somewhat unequitable global structure (Romer, 1990: 98).

Brazil, the central focus of this study, presents itself as one of the contemporaneous burgeoning economies (alongside India and China) and is presently a dynamic participant in the global economic system. The country plays a major role in redefining the new role of emerging economies (Tony, 2009). Their commitment to and faith in the international system has over the years been heavily influenced by persuasive international and domestic political and ideological gradations. Brazil has shown a strong zeal to locate itself as a true symbol and representative of developing countries

of the global South and identifies itself as a firm defender of poorer countries, particularly in Africa (White, 2010: 221). As such, Brazil's position on and conduct in the global governance terrain and, therefore, its foreign policy, is increasingly exhibiting a profound notion that international power structures and multilateral institutions could be reformed to recreate a better and more equitable world (European Commission, 2007: 7). As a result and in order to further agitate for reform of the global system of governance Brazil has, amongst others, ceaselessly petitioned for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (de Freitas, 2016: 6).

Furthermore, Brazil is now considered to be the sixth-largest country in the entire world (some place it in fifth position), both in terms of territory and population (Costa, 2012). Apart from its territorial and population size, the country is largely the dominant economy in South America (EC, 2007: 6). Brazil was also positioned as the ninth largest economy in the world by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2015 (IMF, 2016). Even so, the country has also witnessed a great degree of inconsistencies in their economic performance in recent years, and this signals to both positive and negative economic trends since the 1990s (IMF, 2016). Table 1 gives a detailed interpretation of the variations the Brazil economy has undergone since the 90s.

**Table 1: Brazil's recent economic performance**

<b>Period</b>	<b>Economic performance</b>
1990s	Inflation of almost 2000%
1994	Gross domestic product (GDP) of US\$ 622 billion

2004	Brazil economy ranked 14 <sup>th</sup> in the world
2010	Ranked 10 <sup>th</sup> due to an upsurge of its sturdy currency: Brazil also saw 7, 5% economic growth.
2011	Brazil overtook Italy as the world's seventh biggest economy with a currency amounting to US\$ 2 089 trillion
2012	Brazil ranked 6 <sup>th</sup> largest economy
2012-2013	Economic growth declined sharply to 1%
2015	Continued economic decline and total GDP growth shrinking to 3.8%
2016	Slumped back to 9 <sup>th</sup> position in global economic rankings with 2.2% economic growth

Sources: European Commission (2007:6); Campbell (2009); Inman (2012); *The Economist* (10 November 2011); *en.Merco Press* (3 June 2013); *BBC* (3 March 2016); IMF (2016).

It is widely noted (and as Table 1 suggests) that in recent years, Brazil's economy has greatly disappointed. As it stands the country's current political economic setting is unstable (*The Economist*, 18 April 2016). The country's economy is occasioned by a massive decline in global demand and falling commodity fees. Nevertheless it is fraud and corruption that threatens to further corrode the Brazilian economy. This follows a severe political crisis in the country that saw the lower house of Congress inculcate former President Dilma Rousseff following numerous corruption accusations. State controlled enterprise Petrobras was also similarly in a perilous position, because a

number senior managers were indicted for taking illegal payoffs from construction firms. This and other incidences of corruption have contributed to the economic mess the country currently faces. As a result, there are wide-ranging declines in some of the important sectors of Brazil's economy, ranging from investments in capital goods, which declined to -14.1%, industry to -6.2%, and general services to -2.7% (Langlois, 2016).

On the other hand, much of the current (2016) political and economic crisis in the country can also be attributed to the government's expenditure patterns that brought a budget deficit of 10.8% as well as an increasing inflation rate of 10.67%, which is the highest the country has seen over the past 13 years (*en.Merco Press*, 3 June 2013; *BBC*, 3 March 2016; *SABC*, 4 March 2016; Rapoza, 2016).

Nonetheless, even with Brazil's current recession, the country's socio-economic advancements signals an 11% decrease in the level of inequality between the periods of 2003-2014, thus pushing the Gini-coefficient level to 0.515. The country also managed to alleviate 29 million inhabitants out of poverty in the same retro. Despite that, the country also remains the third largest developing economy after China and India, and Brazil still holds a dynamic transnational interest, but for the purpose of the study most importantly is its presence on the Africa continent (*The Economist*, 18 April 2016).

More so, it is pivotal to note that over the last decade and a half, the resuscitation and the renewal of relations between Brazil and Africa has been extensive (*The Economist*, 23 March 2013; Fundira 2011). Seven African counties are amongst the ten fastest-

growing economies in the world.<sup>1</sup> Africa's richness in resources, coupled with improvements in manufacturing, telecommunication and transportation industries, have generally aided the development of the continent at large (French, 2012). The continent has also in recent years attracted huge amounts of interests from other vibrant emerging countries like China and India (*The Economist*, 23 March 2013).

Furthermore, the African continent has also become a vital market for Brazil as it has in essence, even in a post-colonial era, become a continent of opportunities that champions an improved system governance with positive economic trends. Currently, the continent is frequently depicted as a new-fangled frontier for those who seek partners and markets (World Bank, 2012: 2). Additionally, whilst Brazil and its other partners of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) grouping, might advance an expedition for strategic mineral resources, as well as markets and support from African states at multilateral conferences, African states enjoys the benefit of infrastructure development, economic expansion and development assistance (SAITEX, 2012).

Beyond economic interests, Brazil's conceptual and ideological bearing that is probably rooted along anti-colonial as well as an anti-imperialistic posture may possibly be the main reason why the country drew closer to Africa. Cognizant of a somewhat nuanced neo-imperialist project disguised under an edifice of globalisation, some African leaders pliantly condemn the trade rules and economic conduct that Euro-America devises

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<sup>1</sup> The last decade have signaled tremendous changes in Africa's economic and political domain, with the top seven growing economies in the world in Africa. The seven countries are Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana, the Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Nigeria; all experienced excessive levels of growth in latest years (Africa.com, 2016).

towards the African continent. As a result, being sympathetic to Africa's predicament, representatives from Brazil are of the view that Brazil's assignment to African is informed by solidarity. They proclaim that Brazil offers Africans a progressive social and economic development partner, that is different from the Euro-American contingent which has subjugated Africa for so long (Were, 2012:12). This purported anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic posture was in many ways catapulted by President Lula da Silva. Lula has numerously used his position in the global sphere to call for an end to 'global apartheid', a term used to describe the disparity between a small minority of rich nations and a great number of impoverished states in the world. He lamented that a global human society that is largely based on large scale suppression of poorer countries by the rich and more powerful, is unsustainable (Visentini, 2009).

More so, Brazil's position as an essential developing market and one of the fundamental players worldwide has been described by some as a mission aimed at progressively driving the South-South initiative across many regions in the globe, but primarily on the African continent (*The Economist*, 10 November 2012). This new South-South arrangement is a mechanism that is particularly designed to address economic and political challenges of marginalization that are generally emanating from the contemporary wave of globalisation (Serrão & Bischoff, 2009: 373). As such, developing economies have worked very hard to ensure that bodies, representatives and institutions from the South, which includes bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 Caucus (G77), Africa and South America (ASA), BRICS, the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and Mercosur (Common Market of the Spanish speaking South American Countries) agree and adopt common positions



on issues of strategic importance such as the transformation of the global political, security and economic architecture (Landsberg, 2011: 68; World Bank, 2012: 2).

According to Stolte (2012: 4), there are many factors that may discount Brazil's commitment to the so called solidarity initiative. Brazil's resource interests might seem to be the dominant feature in the country's overall structural engagement with the African continent, and that perhaps defeats the solidarity claims made by the Brazilian representatives. Natural resources virtually make up 90% of the Brazil's imports from the African continent (Stolte, 2012: 4). Were (2012; 12) on the other hand, also proclaims that Brazil's initial leading role as a medium-sized power might be the reason why it has begun rejuvenating the nation's relations with the African continent. He further indicates that Brazil perceives Africa as a region that can augment its international standing as one of the global powerhouses.

In consequence, driven by a zeal and possibility of a so-called 'soft power', Brazil's re-established economic interface with Africa may also be driven by the country's desire to explore and reach new export markets. Given Brazil's unrelenting hunt for Africa's natural resources in the form of raw materials it might appear that, similar to Western countries, Brazil is less concerned about accelerating radical reform of Africa's economic and trade structure as well as improving Africa's standing in the international economic milieu. Besides, a large part of Brazil's trade and industrial arrangements with Africa is merely focused on a few resource-endowed countries on the continent, mainly Nigeria (32%), Angola (16%), Algeria (12%), South Africa (10%), and Libya (7%) (Were, 2012: 12-13).

Nevertheless, there are some analysts who maintain that Brazil is also too dependent on exporting natural resources (Stotle, 2012: 4). The fact that natural resources account for an important part of Brazil's total exports, unlike its BRICS partners China and India that might mean the country itself is rich in resources and is not wholly dependent on Africa's resources. Drawing from these formulations it is very possible that Brazil's involvement with Africa, even with a slight possibility of 'soft power', is not a strategy of acquiring resources, but rather forms part of their attempt to internationalize the Brazilian market and to expand South-South cooperation with the African continent (Tony, 2009).

Moreover, some African firms and industries have likewise also enjoyed some degree of success in piercing the Brazilian market in modern times; South African mining companies such as Anglo Ashanti and one of its biggest banks, Standard Bank, have established successful operations in Brazil. The sugar industry and consulting business Bosch also formed supplementary business structures in Brazil (ITF, 2010). In addition, some of the other main import products from Africa to Brazil include mineral products, chemical products, base metals, food, beverages as well as tobacco (TRALAC, 2011).

As yet, Brazil still receives aid from developed countries of the North, however Brazil is rather atypically busy cementing its position as one of the principal benefactors of poor countries in the world (Were, 2012). Africa currently reports an aggregate of 55% of payments from the Brazilian Cooperation Agency which manages aid schemes. Besides, Brazil's commitment to advancing its solidarity with Africa was primarily noted when Brazil undertook to forgive the somewhat insignificant debts of some of its African partners. This included Cape Verde's US\$ 2, 7 million debts, Gabon's US\$ 36 million

and 95% of the public debt Mozambique owed to Brazil, some US\$ 315 million in August 2004 (Pham, 2010).

Evidently, regardless of understated intentions, Brazil and Africa seem keen to maintain an extended collaborative climate that discharges both a commercial and trade association as well as a vibrant cooperative climate (*The Economist*, 10 November 2012).

Against the aforesaid, this study aims to analyse and assess Brazil's growing presence in Africa. The study aims to explain the under-lying reasons for Brazil's engagement with Africa, as well as how the African continent responds to Brazil's interest.

## **1.2. Literature Review**

The paper will generally use material that varies according to time and theory, in order to give a proper synthesis of the study that is undertaken, and these materials will include utilizing basic primary and secondary sources. The literature as well as the information sources accessed for this study will be separated into three different subdivisions, with each section dealing with its own area of focus.

Since the core assessment of the study deals with the unprecedented rise of Brazil as a developing country and its growing footprint in Africa, in the first section, the study will issue literature that will interrogate the theoretical dimensions and ideologies that will seek to explain what informs Brazil's current activities, particularly in an epoch of changing global power relations.

The subsequent section will deal with the primary focus of the study, which are the motivations for Brazil's interest and presence in Africa. The study will first offer literature

that traces the origins of this relationship. Then the literature will look at Brazil's growing footprint in Africa. In addition, the study will also give literature that will look at Brazil's ambitious international policies; its active leadership role in furthering the course of developing countries but particularly the African continent; its stout commitment to intensify and maintain South-South relations, plus the issue of resource chasing and the country's overall balancing act.

The last section will deal with literature that seeks to deliberate on the behaviour and practice as well as give an assessment of Brazil's political economic relationship with Africa, by fleetingly looking at cases of two African States, which are Brazil's political economic relations Angola and Mozambique.

### **1.2.1. Literature on theoretical dimensions and ideologies**

When analysing the research theme it becomes obvious that Brazil's behaviour on the international scene, particularly towards Africa, is subject to various ideological interpretations. There are various theoretical and ideological angles to Brazil's behaviour. Brazil's actions can mainly draw on more than one theoretical narrative, as will be explicated by various works. However the thesis' main diagnostic tool will be the critical theory of hegemony as interpreted by works of Antonio Gramsci and Robert Cox. As such according to Robert Cox (1981:132) critical theory of hegemony mainly focuses on the interface between numerous expedients, with its prevailing ethos mainly centered on the evaluation of dialectical probabilities of transformation, along with assessing the unequal nature of social affairs. Cox further notes that critical theory of hegemony upholds the notion that hegemonies frequently use their influence by setting

orders and rules dependable on its interests and those of the subordinate states. Hegemony is as a result a process of domination, however it sometimes leans more towards a consensual edict.

Furthermore, Gramsci (1971:181) proposes that control with consensus means domination of the working class above other groups, and that itself is sympathetic to revolutionary transformation. More so, when examining the core of hegemonic theory relative to Brazil's interest in Africa, critical theory mainly reveals the class oddity that it fosters, particularly because it conceals control and subservience (Burges, 2014: 195; Mahao, 2006: 1).

Drawing from the literature provided by Varas (2008:2) and Burgers (2014:195), Brazil can currently be depicted as a regional hegemony, apart from its territorial and population size the country is by and large the dominant economy of South America, which the country fosters by engaging in numerous initiatives with a vision of accomplishing a hegemony above other countries in the region. In both the literature that is presented by Varas (2008:2) and Burgers (2014:195), Brazil is considered to be a 'consensual hegemon', which transmits an askew solicitation of influence in order to certify a conception of circumstances that would ensure future policy does not depict them as a country that is obsessed with self-interest. As such, hegemony turns out to be a different level of control a state reaches the minute that it is capable to structure its vision of the domain in a manner others perceive as having universal significance. Since Brazil is a medium-sized power, it is very possible that the country may seek to influence the overall international system of governance by silently acquiring the consent of other developing countries through a consensual hegemonic project.

As a result the aforementioned theoretical angle explaining Brazil's behaviour fosters Brazil's position as an essential developing market that is driven by a desire for greater South-South solidarity across many regions in the globe. Mahao (2006:1-2) refers to the nature of interdependence between social authority, its institutions as well as the overall world order. All of the abovementioned suggestions are important for this study, for the reason that they underscore the social edifice of class solidarity. On the other hand the other argument is that Brazil's behaviour promulgates an ideological attitude that could possibly be rooted along an anti-colonial as well as an anti-imperialistic posture and this argument may possibly be traversed along a Third-Worldist predisposition.<sup>2</sup>

### **1.2.2 Literature on the motivations for Brazil's interest and presence in Africa**

As *The Economist* (23 March 2013), Fundira (2011) and Visentini (2009) indicate, the 21<sup>st</sup> century has seen the resuscitation of relations between Brazil and Africa. The renowned changes can partly be attributed to the rapidly changing African continent which has drawn interests of vast proportions including those of China and India, and even so Brazil has also gradually expressed more interest in growing its footprint in Africa in recent years.

Literature by Barka (2011:5-6), Harding (2011) and the African Development Bank (ADB) (2011) refer to Brazilian development projects in Southern Africa and elsewhere in Africa as focused on mining, oil and gas, and infrastructure development. These are the pragmatic gains set forth by Africa that encourage Brazilian companies to invest

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<sup>2</sup> Third-Worldism is a political theory that has its origins from the principle and notion of socialist internationalism, which sees a big mistake in the international Neo-Liberal system, and thus propagates for a global revolution that is led by Third-World countries (Nash, 2002: 95)

more in Africa and to import more from the continent, with particular focus in the resources sector. Imports from the African continent are more imperative for Brazil, than imports from Brazil are for Africa (ADB, 2011). While African countries accounted for 6.6% of Brazil's total imports in 2009, Brazil represented only 3.4% of total African imports. Like India and China, Brazil's economic engagement to some extent has been predominantly concentrated in the resource and construction sector.

It thus becomes clear that the trade balance between Brazil and Africa is enormously lop-sided. This raises a serious question of whether this relationship does conjure twofold benefits and complementarity. This also necessitates a rise of the question: What should Brazil's trading partners in Africa do to make this arrangement evenhanded?

Moreover, the study will aim to clarify this existing ambiguity, as it poses a serious conundrum for Africa. African nations have to be cognizant of these inconsistencies and seek to re-establish them in order to respond to the negative consequences of an unequitable political economic edifice.

### **1.2.3. Literature on Brazil's Behaviour and Practices in Africa**

While trade between Brazil and Africa remains varied, resource relations have become more intensive in general. Trade with resource-rich African countries in particular have been on the rise (AEO, 2011). Brazil's foremost trading associates in Africa today are Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, South Africa and Libya, and Mozambique; all of which are resource-rich countries. Collectively, these countries make up 77% of Brazil's total trade with the entire African continent (Barka, 2011: 2). Nevertheless, Brazil's relationship

with Lusophone Africa also remains significant because of the long standing cultural and historical connection between the two and in that case an assessment of Angola and Mozambique is also vital in that regard. As such, this section of the study will deliberate on the behaviour, practice as well as give a political economic assessment of Brazil's relationship with Africa, by tersely evaluating two case studies, Angola and Mozambique.

Supplementary data sources will also be utilized in order to perforate common characteristics in Brazil's general behaviour towards both Angola and Mozambique. The cases will however be analyzed separately, and for that we will also utilize the works of: Paulo Visentini's work in a piece titled Prestige Diplomacy, Southern Solidarity or "Soft Imperialism"? Lula's Brazil-Africa Relations (2003 Onwards), Leiden: Africa Studies Centre of 2009 as well as a publication by the African Development Bank Group in the African Economic Brief Journal (2011) titled: Brazil's economic engagement with Africa.

### **1.3. Problem statement and aim of research**

Coinciding with Brazil's rise as a medium sized economy is the country's interest in Africa. Therefore, the aim of the study is to assess Brazil's political economic relations with Africa, and to make this target more comprehensive the study intends to answer three main questions:

- What is the underlying motivation for Brazil's interest and presence in Africa?
- What is the nature of Brazil's engagement with Africa and how does it affect the continent?
- What are the implications of Brazil's interest and presence in Africa?



#### **1.4. Theoretical approach**

Irrespective of one's theoretical or ideological outlook, Brazil and Africa's relationship (political economic) discharges a thought-provoking speculative component that conveys a somewhat moot paradox. Therefore, as noted, the first line of argument presents Brazil as a country that may be driven by 'soft-power', and as a result the country is alleged to be pursuing a hegemonic project, that might be sustained through consensual means (Burges, 2008: 65). Thus, a consensual discourse, even when stirred by self-interest to a certain degree, represents Brazil as a humble partner in development and as a result Brazil's relations with Africa are believed to be informed by solidarity with the South, because cooperation is established through consent instead of coercion or compulsion (Lampreia, 2007).

More so, this primary cluster of conceptual approaches which relates to 'soft power' can mainly be attributed to a discourse of conventional concepts of "power" and "hegemony". In essence, according to Burges (2008: 65):

Realist, neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to hegemony privilege its coercive underpinnings, whereas a consensual approach draws on Gramscian suggestions that hegemony gains its strength through consent, not the latent threat of imposition.

As such, because Brazil appears as a medium-sized power (Taylor, 2001: 19), it is very possible that the country may seek to influence the overall international system of governance by silently acquiring the consent of lesser developing countries through a consensual hegemonic project.

More so, consensual hegemony cast-offs direct exploitation and replaces exploitation with a penchant for favoring an international structure where countries are able to find complementary collective benefits. Even when it involves a specific kind of nuanced ideological domination, its permissibility is often rooted in wide-ranging consensus (Rapkin, 1990: 3). As exemplified previously, Brazil's active participation in the world system of governance is primarily rooted in altering global power relations by challenging unilateral tendencies by some countries and promoting a rule based global order that is anchored in multilateralism, by accepting collaboration as its approach and trying to acquire validity from cooperation and consensus (EC, 2007: 7).

However, the study's main preoccupation will rest on conducting an inquiry of Brazil's behaviour, by generally employing critical theory as the main theoretical approach. According to Mahao (2006:2), Critical Theory questions the epistemological (source of knowledge) and ontological (nature of being) practicalities of the prevailing social order. For that reason, critical theory reveals the impartialities and disproportions entrenched in the prevalent order, for the reason that it examines the social foundations of knowledge, authority as well as principles. Therefore, critical theory has characteristics of both emancipation and empowerment (Burgess, 2014: 195; Mahao, 2006: 1). Furthermore, critical theory also contends that states often replicate the ideas of dominant class's at the transnational stage, and these interests are often fused together when shaping foreign policy (Mahao, 2006:13).

Consequently, Brazil can currently be depicted as a regional hegemony and Brazil's related interests at regional level obliges an unchanged mode of production at the international level and in that sense might underpin the same international hegemonic

discourse. It is thus within this context that the study will try to equate Brazil's presence in Africa to the Gramscian metaphor 'consensual hegemony' that mainly seeks to explain Brazil's behaviour in Africa and the world alike (Burges, 2008: 66).

### **1.5. Scope and limitations of study**

As can be noted, from the general orientation of the study, all the identified methods are suggestive of a new era (since the dawn of millennium) of Brazil's commitment to the prospect of internationalization in general. Africa displays one of the best relative examples of Brazil's delicate balancing act between commercial and strategic interests and external development assistance. Given the rise of Brazil as a medium-sized economy (Taylor, 2001: 19), with various national interests at heart, the study is premised on the viability of Brazil's engagement with Africa. It also interrogates whether contrary to other international interventions and different forms of political resolutions whether this relationship is any different as far as sustainable political and economic development are concerned. In addition to the overall relationship, the problem of relevant theoretical basis and analysis is also pertinent.

The study is demarcated analytically, conceptually, temporally and chronologically. On analytical demarcation, the study will attempt to give a detailed discussion of Brazil's political economic relations with Africa and will particularly penetrate the relevance and significance of this relationship. According to Mosco (2009), the employment of a political economic framework helps us advance the conjectural details of political economics in general. He also adds that the premise is firmly rooted in an analysis of the wider social totality. For Timmi (2010) assessing political economic relations is one

of the most all-embracing schemes in the globe which can become a profitable tool in combating the intricate and grave instalments which threatens to invalidate the positive gifts of globalization. As such, Brazil and Africa's twin political and economic imperatives, marked by stimuluses and changes in global power structures, will be analyzed.

The analysis will also explore the various theoretical dimensions which explain Brazil's international behaviour. Brazil's actions in the context of a changing global economic edifice will be intensely scrutinized. Also to be noted are Brazil's actions in the broader strategic BRICS fold. The analysis focuses primarily on current theoretical accounts to explain international activities. Historical aspects are in consequence measured when they have a direct influence on the model or research of the problem, however central to the analyses is to look at the revived relations between the Brazil and Africa, mainly since the dawn of the new millennium. Lastly, the study will also attempt to give a sequential record of events following the order in which they have occurred.

## **1.6. Conceptual clarification**

Clarification of concepts is important in the study in order to circumvent any conceptual confusion. Sound theoretical development is largely reliant on a proper clarification of concepts by utilizing and integrating various data sources. The study will also attempt to give an outright theoretical context of the main concepts of the study.

### **1.6.1. South-South cooperation and solidarity**

South–South cooperation is a wide-ranging context for cooperation between countries of the developing world in many areas including commercial, socio-political and cultural.

This initiative is a manifestation of solidarity between developing countries and is also initiated by countries of the global South (UNOSSC, 2016). South-South thus remains an embryonic mechanism that underpins Brazil and Africa's economic future and cooperation, through partnerships, knowledge exchange, as well as finance. Moreover this South-South cooperation between Brazil and Africa, based on knowledge sharing, trade and investment, brings important lessons to the world, because the new south-south partnership is seen as a key tool for advancing this new initiative (World Bank, 2012: 7).

### **1.6.2. Third-Worldism**

According to Nash (2002: 94-95) the concept Third-Worldism has its origins from the principle and notion that socialist internationalism has metamorphosed since its inception from Marx and Engels. Both these scholars gave idiosyncratic analysis of the ways in which shared class struggles were witnessed across many countries in the world, and this would give basis for a potential global revolutionary struggle to be waged transnationally. As such, Third-Worldism is a creation and conception of various socialist, nationalist, anti-colonial movements (Hadiz, 2004: 57).

Accordingly, the concept Third-Worldism is symptomatic of a type of internationalism where the system of colonialism was ending: an epoch where the economic influence and control of the western Neo-liberals slightly persisted whilst on the other hand its global political authority was waning and consequently was contested (Nash, 2002: 95).

### **1.6.3. Hegemony**

The concept of hegemony has no settled chronological context. This results because there are numerous conventional schools of thought who relate this notion to exceptionally varying circumstances. But some of the agreements that emanate from the various schools of thoughts are that hegemony results from a social occurrence that is exacerbated by social circumstances and as a result the concept hegemony often relates to state power and control. Though, the different theories may be at variance about the conditions suitable for the application of the concept (Mahao, 2006: 4).

### **1.6.4. Consensual hegemony**

Conceptual hegemony refers to a political concept that involves a specific kind of nuanced ideological authority, which is built primarily on common consensus (Rapkin, 1990: 3). As such, consensual hegemony is predominantly valuable for clarifying the undercurrents behind consensus formation. The concept thus grows from a created consensus around exactly how matters must be systematized and governed (Burges, 2008: 71).

## **1.7. Research methodology**

Generally, research relates to a process of engaging in numerous investigations in order to seek and find solutions to known societal problems by applying systematic and scientific tools of analysis (Rajasekar, Philominathan & Chinnathambi, 2016: 2). It also relates to a constant quest for information with an aim of acquiring knowledge in order to uncover unknown actualities. In this case knowledge denotes particular evidence

about social issues. The evidence can be gathered from diverse materials and sources. As such, research is undeniably a modification which regulates and possibly better the socio-political and economic progress of a country. Furthermore, research methodology serves an important component of the overall research process and the concept specifically relates to general application of methodical technique to solve recognized problems. It relates to the manner in which a specific research is performed. In actual fact, research methodology is well explained by the processes and the methods applied by researchers when they execute their work particularly when recounting, elucidating and forecasting phenomena. Also, the aforementioned concept is described as the study of approaches from which practicalities are gained. Its overall purpose is to provide the general work strategy of research (Rajasekar, Philominathan & Chinnathambi, 2006: 5).

The study will attempt to offer an expanded descriptive account of the nexus between Brazil's rise in the international system as well as their growing footprint on the African continent. Therefore, the methodological approach of this study will derive from a descriptive analytical point and will aim to use factual data sources. Descriptive data analysis relates to the type of investigation where data is gathered without altering the practical surroundings. Every so often this concept is also denoted to as an observational study. This technique is often very flexible and there's no need to organise data around a given premise, which relates to what needs to be observed in general. The examiner is permitted to gather information about any specific behaviour. In social studies, a descriptive data analysis can deliver a wide-ranging data

assessment about any matter ranging from health standing, conduct, attitudes and even other features of a specific crowd (Lynn & Eugene, 2016; Nebeker, 2013).

Drawing from the central subject of the study, the research methodology that is suitable for this study is a qualitative data analysis. According to ACAPS (2012:7) qualitative research tools has a probing and tentative nature in that they are often word-based documented observations that represents attitudes, views and purposes. This type of data evaluating tool is normally employed on occasion we are not sure of what to anticipate, and do not know how we should describe our problems, or when we fail to detect how emergencies might affect the general public. Qualitative data analysis similar to quantitative data analysis is founded on a pragmatic and evidence driven research enterprise. Therefore, study methods will have their core in the basic analysis of Brazil's relations with Africa.

The study will primarily be a qualitative analysis in that it will include an interpretation of observations for the purpose of discovering the patterns of relationships between Brazil and Africa, but no further quantitative data will be provided to complement the overall assessment. More generally the study will not include any extensive quantitative approaches such as structured interviews, sampling and the circulation of questionnaires. The inferences of the basic study are drawn fundamentally by looking at Brazil's vision to affect structured cooperative discourse with the African continent. More so, the methods of data collection will include scholarly journals, publications by various authors, historical accounts and specifically scholars in the field of the research topic. The basic level of analysis even when looking at Angola and Mozambique is intended to be aggregated to Brazil's strategic ties with the entire African continent.



The research plan that will be utilized by the study will also include case study research. Case study research relates to a distinctive research plan and method that can employ either a joined use of both qualitative as well as quantitative data assessment strategies, or employ either one of them in separate capacities (Aaltio & Heilmann, 2010). The objective of the study will be concerned with understanding state of affairs within separate units, in their own unique environments (Babbie & Mouton; 2008). According to Bleijenbergh (2010), the conditions for choosing a specific case are very much contingent on the kind of research problem that is presented: which can either be a descriptive, or an explanatory problem. By way of a descriptive research query, the designated cases have a duty to offer maximal data about detailed elements as well as components of a specific social occurrence.

### **1. 8. Contribution of study**

According to Petre and Rugg (2010) the creation a noteworthy impact on a study relates to adding to conventional and unconventional information and knowledge systems or even the act of supporting a vibrant discourse that seeks to validate a particular supposition.

As observed the orthodox underlying motivation for Brazil's interest and presence in Africa as well as the implications of this relationship is often described as part of Brazil's attempt to internationalize the Brazilian market and to expand South-South co-operation. The study will generally seek to re-contextualize this assertion, as there is also another dimension to explain Brazil's growing presence in Africa. Consensual hegemony also emerges as a candid concept that explains this relationship.

Furthermore, the study will seek to clarify this existing ambiguity in Brazil's behaviour towards Africa, as it poses a serious conundrum for theoreticians and academics alike. More so, in order for the study to effect any significant contribution, the study must clarify these inconsistencies and seeks to re-establish a comprehensive explanation for Brazil's presence in Africa. In doing this the study will validate all related and appropriate concepts, which will ascertain what is practicable and useful and what is infeasible and explain why it fails. For this, study will apply and expand on the critical theory, and show how it can be applied to theme of the study and how perceptible the theory is.

### **1.9. The structure of the research**

The study consists of seven chapters.

**Chapter One (Introduction)** outlines the motivation for the study, its theoretical and analytical approaches as well as its scope and limitations. The chapter also outlines the study's methodological approach and a literature review.

**Chapter Two (Conceptual analysis and theoretical approach)** presents a conceptual analysis and exploration of the study's main theoretical approach.

**Chapter Three (The motivations for Brazil's interest and presence in Africa),** Brazil's interest and presence in Africa is explored by focusing on several domestic and international factors motivating Brazil's behaviour. The chapter also provides an outline of the historical nature of Brazil relations with the African continent and the country's current strategic position in Africa. A brief overview of the political economy of Brazil; by particularly delving on how the country has been growing in recent years and how it

attained the status it currently holds. The chapter also focus on the strategic relevance of the BRICS fold as the perfect driver and epitome of the 'South-South cooperation' among governments.

**Chapter Four (Brazil in Africa: Behaviour, Practice and Assessment)** explores and assess the manifestations of Brazil's interest and presence in Africa, as well as Africa's response to this. In order to achieve this, the study employs two African case studies (Mozambique and Angola).

**Chapter Five (Findings and Conclusion)**, contains the study's findings and conclusion.

#### **1.10. Summary**

It is evident from the overall conception of the study that Brazil's position in the international arena has changed significantly in recent years. Brazil has combined its direct action in the global arena, with a greater stress on consensual relations with developing countries from the South. As a result, they keep advancing their policy of diversification and international integration when engaging with developing countries, particularly Africa. This has steered them into a new epoch of international relations that finds them entangled in a flaring chase for global hegemony.

As discussed by the theme of the study, Brazil's presence in Africa continues to grow, and the manner in which Africans see Brazil will unavoidably be altered. There has been some difference in opinion about Brazil's growing presence in Africa, of whether this relationship is informed by commercial interests or development co-operation. The reality nowadays is that Africa has turned out to be the new venture concourse, for

many countries in the world, with developmental benefits. Whereas, Brazil continues to offers a growth model for the growing markets of Africa's produce and financing an increasing number of infrastructure projects and programmes across the continent, whilst Africa, on the other hand, continues to provide access to strategic mineral resources and markets. However, like India and China, Brazil's economic engagement to some extent has been predominantly concentrated in the resource and construction sector.

Despite the fact that its presence is still much less significant than that of India or China, Brazil needs to be cautious and try to avoid some of the mistakes made by China, who now runs the danger of being confronted by a hostile response from the African continent. The challenge that remains for Brazil is how the image or 'soft power' might generally reputed by Africans, their presence may invoke a feeling that Brazil is a true partner in development, or worse they might be seen a new colonizer who merely seeks to exploit Africa's resources, by employing soft-imperialism.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

#### 2.1. Introduction

This chapter will deal with the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. As such, the general significance of critical theory as a theoretical component is what will mainly present the study with notional implications, as a substitute to giving a mere documentation of various conjectural structures and processes. On the other hand the critical theory will be expanded and interlaced with the concept 'hegemony' and as a result the critical theory of hegemony will form the bases of the studies general examination, and this theory will be used to elucidate the central proposition of the study, as well as giving motivations that would strengthen perspectives that will be advanced at a later stage, as to what informs Brazil's presence in Africa.

Noticeably, trying to contextualize the nature and character of the relations between Brazil and Africa might seem somewhat ambiguous if the theoretical underpinnings of Brazil's international relations approach are not sufficiently understood. Orthodox studies, on the relations between Brazil and Africa have tended to focus on the relevance of these relations to countries in the northern hemisphere. Even when these North–South studies have contributed to the broader understanding of relations between Brazil and Africa in an international context, they have also to some degree distorted the theoretic, ideological and sociopolitical reasons for the links between Brazil and Africa (World Bank, 2012: 25).

Accordingly, this chapter clarifies the relationship from a different perspective and will mainly focus on the specified theoretical dimensions and to some degree how they relate to Brazil's general international conduct. As a result the Gramscian concept of consensual hegemony (which is directly correlated to the critical theory of hegemony) will be used to assess Brazil's international behaviour. And the study will also at some stage attempt to integrate, but yet discount the theory of Third-Worldism and its relevance to Brazil's approach.

The first section of this chapter will briefly outline the critical theory and the evolution of the concept. The second section of this chapter deals with the conceptualization of the notion 'hegemony'. The third section discusses the critical theory of hegemony and the fourth section deals with the concept consensual hegemony. The fifth section looks at the theory of Third-Worldism and lastly we have the conclusion.

## **2.2. Theoretical Context: Critical theory**

Critical theory still presents itself as one of the foremost schools of thoughts of the modern epoch and the theory is particularly imperative for copious academic disciplines (Rush, 2004:1). A concept which was originally devised in the 1930's, critical theory has for several years been hoisted as a convenience term for specific references to Hegelian-Marxian enquiries into metaphysical contradictions, as well as their solutions. Accordingly, this initiatives set headways for particular Marxian deliberations on historical materialism as well as fashioning a comprehensive review on political economics in consort with different theories of revolution (Kellner, 1990).

In the early days, Frederick Hegel initially assumed that the social realm was very much aligned to information and traditional knowledge systems and that as a result aided for the general growth of the social order. As such, according to Hegel the growth and advancement of social divergence, language and culture as well as science established the basic frontiers for pragmatism and theoretical substances. Hegel mainly observed that 'theory and practice' had advanced from a one-dimensional form to a more composite mode, even as theory at all times stayed inside the margins of practice, for the reason that it was simply a replication of thereof (Rehbein, 2010:2).

Besides, the basic grounds of critical theory and the conception thereof were in many ways advanced by Karl Marx's review of the works of Hegel. Marx observed Hegel's model in most respects and with the assistance of his colleague Frederick Engels established a powerful theory affectionately known as 'Marxism', which consisted of two correlated highbrow tools, 'dialectical materialism and historical materialism'. According to Mahao (2006:2)

Dialectical materialism is a theory of social consciousness; whereas historical materialism deals with social development.

Above all, Marx and Engels drew attention to the general variances that exist between theory and practice. They generally stressed that historical as well as social factors aid for the development of individual subjects and the component of analysis of all individual subjects should rest in the entire social structure. As a result, the social realm, as they indicate, should be evaluated dialectically, whilst on the other side social totality ought to be studied critically, for the reason that, and to the point that it realizes ideal

societal results. It is for this reason that Marx has entitled his account of Hegel's dialectics as a "critical theory" (Rehbein, 2010:2; Mahao, 2006:2; Apostolova, Latev & Slavov 1978).

Additionally, contained within the wide-ranging theory of Marxism other theoretical archetypes were formed. Critical Theory now came to be connected with a twentieth century neo-Marxist school of thought which was recognized as the 'Frankfurt School' (Mahao, 2006:2). The Frankfurt School categorized all concepts and theories as critical just so long as they all strive for human liberation, often from conditions that subjects them to oppression (Horkheimer, 1972:246). Furthermore, Critical Theory interrogates the various theories of knowledge, specifically with regards to its methods, validity and scope as well as the distinction between justified convictions and opinions (Horkheimer, 1993: 141). It also looks at the ontological (nature of being) physical constraints of the prevalent social edict. Hence, Critical Theory exposes the impartialities and imbalances rooted in the prevailing order, for the reason that it inspects the social basics of knowledge and understanding (Burges, 2014: 195; Mahao, 2006: 1).

The fundamental assertion that critical theory makes is that knowledge is mainly determined by historical factors in addition to politically influences. As a result, critical theory contests orthodox theoretical models which are embedded in the idea of maintaining the status quo in any state system. It mainly seeks to disintegrate the conformist models by broadening the prospects of transformation. Therefore, critical theory has characteristics of both emancipation and empowerment and it reveals the class character that it promotes, mainly because it conceals control and subservience (Mahao, 2006: 1-2).



Lastly, critical theory also makes important assertions about the hegemonic notion of world order. Critical theory points out that hegemony is initiated not merely upon the parameters of inter-state wars but also originates from an internationally perceived social order which carries associations amongst social classes of all states. (Krieger, 1984: 354). As such, hegemony at a global level is not simply perceived as an edict that seeks to look at relations between dominant states (both politically and economically), but as an order inside the global economy that also interrogates how dominant states infiltrates lesser states for outright advantages (Mahao, 2006: 16).

The next section will deal with the concept hegemony in order to effectively untangle the behaviour of states (particularly that of Brazil) in the international structure.

### **2.3. The concept 'Hegemony'**

The concept hegemony is generally imitative of a Greek term 'hegemonia', which originates from the word *hegemon* which means 'leader, ruler, often in the sense of a state other than his own'. The 19th Century epoch saw the concept hegemony being characterized as another word for 'political predominance, usually of one state over another' (Williams; 1977:144).

Whilst it is true that the concept hegemony commonly inhabits a progressively more vital place in prevalent social science inquiry and is also essential for our comprehension of the contemporary world society, the notion by description and explanation still relics an imprecise signification as result of lexicographical inaccuracies and dissimilar academic conceptualizations (Burges, 2008: 67). The concept of hegemony has no settled chronological context. This results because there are

numerous conventional schools of thought who relate this notion to exceptionally varying circumstances. But some of the agreements that emanate from the various schools of thoughts are that hegemony results from a social occurrence that is exacerbated by social circumstances and as a result the concept hegemony often relates to state power and control. However, the different theories remain at variances about the conditions suitable for the application of the concept (Mahao, 2006: 4; Williams, 1977:144).

For instance, Neo-Realist theorists assert that great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony being their final goal (Mearsheimer, 2001: 29). Furthermore, they claim that all states seek to be regional as well as global hegemonies. For them hegemony refers to domination and authority, therefore the preponderance of states is manifested politically, economically as well as militarily (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007: 87-88).

More so for realists the structure of international politics is pivotal for understanding the state of affairs internationally, therefore international politics is played out in an anarchical realm meaning that there is no government in the international sphere to enforce rules and laws (Mearsheimer, 1995: 78). Special attention is afforded to great powers in this instance as they have the most leverage on the international stage (Mearsheimer, 2001: 17-18). It is thus national interest that animates state behaviour as they are essentially rational and world hegemony seekers (Lee, 2007: 3-4).

On the other hand Neo-liberal theorists place international institutions and their embodiment in international organizations at the core of state-driven efforts to create

cooperation from international anarchy. Anarchy, they say, creates a demand for predictability in international politics, manifested in various attempts at multilateral governance (Kay, 2004). Because, neoliberal scholarship focuses on the study of international regimes and the norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures that they embody, such dynamics are seen as an important reflection of modern interdependence which creates a rationalist demand by states seeking to maximize gains through cooperation rather than by pursuing classic self-help strategies (Keohane & Nye, 2001:7).

Core components of neoliberal theory have been that international institutions, through established headquarters, staff, planning, rules and procedures help states to manage coordination and collaboration problems of collective action and make cooperation easier to achieve than in the absence of an institution. Such interaction, proximity and transparency are thought to foster reassurance and trust, thereby reducing the sense of vulnerability and fear that results from international anarchy (Jervis, 1999: 53-54).

In summary, neo-liberals argue that hegemones constantly desire to sustain their supremacy by not paying implementation outlays, thus this situation fashions a structure where they enjoy the probability to limit the yields of power and also to commit to neither dominate nor to abort this powers. This is normally prepared through establishments which are difficult to transform. These bodies usually validate the hegemon, but then again they also offer security in addition to a stable atmosphere for whole world (Ikenberry, 1999).

As a result, Brazilian diplomats are enormously prickly about any connection of their state to expressions, for example as 'hegemon' or 'hegemony'. Considerably to a great degree this disquiet is stuck in the inaccuracy and ambiguity that is deep-seated in those expressions as well as their correlation with views of strong-armed bullying and dominion in the general international governance milieu (Burges, 2008: 69). This is as Burgos (2008: 69) states results because of the general predicament of the 'neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to hegemony'. Which, as he says, seem to suggest that these models are constantly suspending the inherent basis of the concept hegemony as an edifice with a leadership that may blend a range of countries that reach a decision on a specific idea for the structure. Hegemony is significantly more complex than what is frequently proclaimed by typical neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches.

#### **2.4. Critical theory of hegemony**

As indicated before critical theory has mainly been fortified by the general theory of Marxism, and Neo-Marxist scholars like Antonio Gramsci as well as a subsequent cohort of neo-Gramscian theorist steered by Robert Cox and Gill further expanded the broad conceptualization of critical theory (Mahao, 2006: 3; Gill, 2003). The contemporary perception of critical theory has taken further steps and has made crucial pronouncements on the hegemonic notion of global affairs. As opposed to conventional methods of hegemony, which advances a stagnant idea of political affairs, the discourse generally moved in a new direction of a 'critical theory of hegemony'. Instead of proposing a problem-solving modification to prevailing social power interfaces, a 'critical

theory of hegemony' springs its utmost consideration to the interrogation and scrutiny of the dominant order of the world (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 86).

As such the critical theory of hegemony contends that the state is an essential body in the overall structure of international governance. In addition, the theory at the same time supposes that social encounters as well as the practice of structuring 'hegemonies of social classes' is done in the international domain. It also indicates that the state is very much engaged in the international sphere for the reason that the governing classes at domestic level combine their intentions and purposes at the international level. As a result, states that share comparable interests oblige and agitate for a similar style of production at a global level and also support a similar hegemonic discourse (Mahao, 2006: 13). More so, as Cox (1987: 149) suggests the critical theory of hegemony gives the idea that it is largely founded on consent and is mainly exhibited in the operationalization of certain models which are preserved by substantial resources and bodies. These bodies are primarily recognized by social powers inhabiting a prominent role inside a state, and are then propelled towards the outside world. By undertaking on such an initiative it can link social classes' from different countries.

Besides, the neo-Gramscians recognize this reflective modifications to the global edict, however numerous, though not all, preserve the context of the 'nation-state and the interstate system' in their material evaluations of hegemony, notwithstanding the attendant emphasis on international procedures and forces (Robinson, 2006: 564; Cox & Sinclair, 1996: 139). More so, the critical theory of hegemony mainly desists from the practice of underestimating societal bodies and as well as social power dealings but

instead reviews their existence and measures whether they may be in the course of changing (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 86).

Above and beyond, Cafruny (1990: 104) indicates that the critical theory of hegemony mainly underscores the subjective features of power and eliminates the prominent notion that power exist in in objective configurations. Likewise for Antonio Gramsci power and hegemony in the more generic sense relates the practice of ruling by consent, as well as the 'traditional and intellectual leadership' attained by a specific class, in a social stratum and is contained in a larger scheme of class dominance and control. Therefore, in current capitalist orders the bourgeoisie class has succeeded in ensuring that it salvages its hegemony all through stages of steady rule, even when that hegemony has fragmented in the course of hardship (Robinson, 2006: 560)

In essence the theory describes the hegemonic practice as intellectual and moral governance which merges components of consensus and persuasion. This is done by conjecturing conceptual, traditional and moral principles, which may assist in fashioning an arrangement of understanding, as well as certifying the progression of a structure of quantified values (Fontana, 1993: 140). By itself, this neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony differentiates between absolute domination and the exercise of hegemony, signifying that governance and guidance scratches across international margins involving a definite socioeconomic edict (Joseph, 2008: 127).

In consequence the central point to advance, then, is that critical theory of hegemony submits that power sifters through configurations of 'society, economy, culture, gender, ethnicity, class and ideology' (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 87). It is accordingly imperative to

observe that the veracity in Brazilian external relations method is that influence and authority was hardly ever openly applied and power may instead be pursued by distributing certain viewpoints or by trying to generate circumstances where it is covertly inefficient for other states to diverge broadly from the Brazilian standpoint (Borges, 2008: 66).

In effect, Brazil has ever since the 1990's period surfaced as a progressively powerful state in global affairs. Even when it does not have substantial military supremacy, the country is gaining stimulus by means of 'soft power'. As a matter of fact, Brazil hardly ever uses straight diplomatic coercion (whether military or economic) to attain its international goals; the country instead concentrates on creating and leading alliances of emerging states to fortify mutual standards and normative obligations (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 903).

Respectively, the critical theory of hegemony also specifies that within a global order there might be a condition of domination which may succeed provided it is based on a rational unification or is fixed amongst an alignment of substantial power. The dominant mutual spitting image of global order and conventional associations ought to manage the global edict with an assured style of internationalism (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 87).

As such, Brazil together with other developing economies have worked tremendously hard to ensure that bodies, representatives and institutions from the developing world, which includes bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 Caucus, ASA (Africa and South America), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) and Mercosur, amongst others, agree and adopt

common positions on issues of strategic importance such as the transformation of the global political, security and economic architecture (Landsberg, 2011: 68; World Bank, 2012:2).

Moreover, the abovementioned assessment points to how Brazil is utilizing the notion of 'development' and 'cooperation' to sustain and enthrall alliances, as this initiative also supports its stratagem of intensifying its global influence. Undeniably, Brazilian international enterprises that seeks to uphold the assumed 'development', assists Brazil's personal interests (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 914).

Brazil seem to have chosen the neo-Gramscian idea of hegemony, venting unity among objective quantifiable powers as well as ethico-political designs, with consensus at its pole position in which authorities are reorganized through an system that includes consensus (Burges, 2008: 71). This has heralded an innovative epoch of foreign relations that goes beyond just independence from the centers of global supremacy and practical assignation with options to gratify a nationalist-type ideology, based on new imperatives to reduce traditional economic and political power asymmetries (Barka, 2011; *The Economist*, 10 November 2012).

By itself, as a direct off-spring of the critical theory of hegemony the concept of consensual hegemony might be very expedient for depicting and clarifying the arrangement of Brazil's international affairs strategy (Burges, 2008: 74). This results because consensual hegemony respites on three perspectives: 'inclusion and cooption, ethico-political values and structural consensus' all of which are manifested in Brazil's international approach (Grau, 2011:11).



Somewhat, the main ambition appears to be the establishment of consensual hegemony as a practicable concept and then offer a preliminary presentation of the idea to the Brazilian case in order to provide a deeper theoretical basis for understanding the country's approach towards the African continent. The next section will give an analysis of the concept 'consensual hegemony'.

#### **2.4.1 Consensual hegemony**

As can be noted from the previous sections, the primary conception of the notion hegemony is inadequate in depicting hegemonies as great powers who assert their interest by all means necessary. Yet, this justification every so often overlooks 'soft power' as well as the creation of regional organizations, mainly because of their preoccupation to emphasize the tussle for control and power amongst countries in a supposed anarchical global system (Femia, 2005: 341). In consequence, opposed to this insight, the consensual hegemonic slant which is founded on Gramscian submissions denotes that a hegemony may be attained through consent, as opposed to partaking on intimidation and threats of obligations. Added to this consensus is above all an inclination to an ideological, ethic-based as well as an understanding-grounded observation of the world (Grau, 2010: 10; Arrighi, 1993: 149).

As such, consensual hegemony mainly refers to an obscure exertion of force or the establishment of circumstances that would create a policy that might appear as a self-regarding initiative to other states (Varas, 2008: 2). As a result, consensual hegemony therefore turns out to be an ideationally centered kind of diktat, for the reason that it is developed mainly from a consensus around the manner in which relationships ought to

be managed and achieved, as that implants the essential interest of the major party in the outline of agreements (Burgess, 2008: 71)

More so, this “Gramscian” narrative may possibly make for a worthy metaphor for Brazil’s global role, for the reason that Brazil thirst for global hegemony seems to be noticeably apprising its original program (Varas, 2008: 2). The argument should however not be engrossed in the notion that Brazil has prospered in forming a consensual hegemony, however the discourse should be fashioned on the fact that the idea is worthwhile for understanding the governance plan of an developing semi-powerful state (Burgess, 2008: 65).

In this instance Brazil appears as a fascinating demonstrative country for the reason that it indicates exactly how a country with inadequate military along with restricted economic power abilities may endeavor to advance his idea-generating ability to build a specific idea of the global structure and silently attain the active assent of consorting states to a hegemonic mission. This mission is particularly convenient for expounding the undercurrents of consensus ‘creation’, which is something that even Brazilian diplomats accepts as their unique recognized strength (Burgess, 2008: 65).

More so, Brazil’s present position is certainly one of regional power, which it fosters by engaging in numerous undertakings with a vision of realizing a clear hegemony above other states (Varas, 2008: 2-3). The Brazilian tactful practice of leading by dispensing concepts, proposals, draft negotiating manuscripts and continued quiet conversations of possibly prickly subjects opens the space for Brazil to pedal its hegemonic project on a global scale (Burgess, 2008: 70).

The importance of Brazil in the global system has grown to the extent that it is playing a major role in the global markets and it has a significant influence in the overall structure of international governance by promoting 'South-South' partnerships. Its foreign relations have over the years been signified by a culture of continuity and renewal with a parallel foreign policy that is more generally designed to promote basic national developmental goals (Lampreia, 2007). While Brazil's international goals remained clear, methods to achieve them are based on two concurrent approaches about development: national developmentalism built around promotion of national autonomy and a more closed economy, while at the same time seeking integration with international markets (Vaz & Inoue, 2007: 4).

Brazil's international trade relations are well-balanced and have peculiar complementarities in its relation to the different economies: the ones that have developed and the ones that are still developing (Lampreira, 2007). The other fundamental priority in Brazil's overall consensual hegemonic approach is the method of reinforcing, and enlarging its cooperation with new partners and its relations with other economic communities (Campbell, 2009).

Brazil is playing a major role in redefining the "Global South" through its slants of increased integration with international markets, which are endorsed by its policy of diversification, which generally sets the parameters for its engagements with developing countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa (Tony, 2009). Their diversification endeavour has proven to be having significant international benefits for Brazil and its partners alike.

Brazil's strong zeal and drive in intensifying its consensual hegemonic project in the African continent, is mainly displayed by leitmotifs of political diplomacy, commercial engagement and development cooperation. This is suggestive of a new era of Brazilian foreign policy and Brazil's course of internationalization in general. This is a multifaceted and inter-related, pragmatic and programmatic process that Brazil seems to have managed well through a high degree of diplomatic sophistication and open cooperation between the political, commercial and various development bodies. As such, Africa displays one of the best contextual examples of Brazil's delicate balancing act between commercial and strategic interests, as well as external development assistance and the consolidation of South- South relations (White, 2010: 221).

## **2.5. Third-Worldism**

As indicated earlier another important theoretical angle explaining Brazil's behaviour might come from Brazil's position as an essential developing market that is primarily driven by a desire for greater commonality and camaraderie in certain regions of the world. Also, as we have previously speculated, Brazil's conceptual and ideological bearing may be rooted along an anti-colonial as well as an anti-imperialistic stance and that may foster an argument that could be traversed in the direction of Third-Worldism (Nash, 2002: 95).

According to Nash (2002: 95)

Third-Worldism can be defined roughly as the political theory and practice that saw the major fault-line in the global capitalistic order as running between the advanced capitalist countries of the west and the impoverished continents of

Africa, Asia and Latin America, and saw national liberation struggles in the Third World as the major force for global revolution'.

Nash (2002:94) further goes on to note that this theory has its origins from the principle and notion that socialist internationalism has metamorphosed since its inception by Marx and Engels. Both these scholars gave idiosyncratic analysis of the ways in which shared class struggles were witnessed across many countries in the world, and this would give basis for a potential global revolutionary struggle to be waged transnationally. As such, Third-Worldism is a creation and conception of various socialist, nationalist, anti-colonial movements (Hadiz, 2004: 57).

Consequently, the concept Third-Worldism is symptomatic of a type of internationalism where the system of colonialism was ending: an epoch where the economic influence and control of the western Neo-liberals slightly persisted whilst on the other hand its global political authority was waning and therefore was contested (Nash, 2002: 95). However the current dispensation is flawed with proof and disapproval to demonstrate that the concept 'Third-Worldism', in addition to its cognates for instance like 'the three worlds', has no applicability in the modern world. As such Social sciences, have witnessed a kaleidoscopic shift on or after modernization to globalization, and all the changes have in many ways rendered the concept irrelevant. Also, Postcolonial detractors stemming from the Third World discard the fact that the concept could be an accurate analytical or descriptive theory (Dirlik, 2008: 131).

For instance, this inclination towards Third-Worldism is discounted by the fact that present-day developments in the international political economic discourse signals to

the fact that the global structure is currently no longer 'multi-polar', 'bi-polar' or even 'uni-polar'. The global political system is simply a "non-polar" system with numerous axes of power (Varas, 2008:6). The current epoch signifies transposed global political and economic settings. Among the developed countries and regions, Japan and the EU have for various reasons encountered a notable decline in their economic potency, whereas in contrast, among the emerging countries, predominantly steered by China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, South Africa and Russia, have augmented their growth and have consequently increased in importance as world players in recent years (Tony, 2009; Michelon, 2011). In essence, in this day and age "power is now found in many hands and in many places", for that reason, there might be no tangible 'power-block' to revolt against (Varas, 2008:6).

Besides, as we can subtract from its depiction, the Third-Worldist notion is primarily connected to lexes such a common colonial history, socialist internationalism, consequences of imperialism, economic dependency, as well as the crisis of interventionism (Randall, 2008: 42). The main reason why Brazil would probably not fit the description of a 'Third-Worldist sympathizer' is because Brazil chases affiliations with states of all expanses, creeds, ideologies, colours and credentials. Obviously, it is usual that more rapid dealings will happen once there are shared aims of visions and common interests, whether uttered by terrestrial juxtaposition, history or scenarios of trade with shared benefit. For that reason, countries cannot afford to only cooperate with those they agree with or those where only kinships and comradery is exhibited (Amorim, 2010: 227).

Until now, there are also at all times complications and disagreements around the issue common postcolonial standing between 'Third World' countries. The conditions of colonial preoccupation varied extensively for many of these countries. The other crisis emanates from the fact that a small number of countries who were unexcitingly incorporated in the scope of Third World were under no circumstances openly colonized (Randall, 2008: 42-43). Also, arguments that constantly desires to spread or even substitute the impact credited to colonization by repositioning the concept to neocolonialism or 'economic dependency' are likewise ever more challenging to sustain. Practically these narratives are constantly confronted by occurrences of "Third World" countries that outwardly breaks free from the rationale of 'dependency'. By themselves oil-distributing countries are a case in point (Randall, 2008: 42).

Furthermore, Third-Worldism is correspondingly the main conduit for the emergence of a socialist substitute to capitalism in the aftershock of World War I. At hand, there may possibly be a minute mystery as to why this political theme that mainly developed after anti-colonial power struggles might discover something attractive in having something of a camaraderie with those betrothed in parallel struggles (Dirlik, 2008: 136). Yet ironically, the disappearance of Third-Worldism was mainly exacerbated by the capture of Third World leaders by capital, by means of a capitalist schemes (Patel & Michel, 2004: 232). Likewise, it is misleading for bystanders and relics of Third-Worldism to equate the protruding role played by BRICS countries in contemporary global economic matters as a form of 'Third-Worldist' onslaught on global capitalism and the supremacy of the West. Existent interpretations continue to be caught up in an obstinate argument over the degree to which the BRICS countries are confronting the prevalent global

order. Truth is, international integration as well as a multinational formation of a capitalist class has progressed significantly in BRICS countries (Robinson, 2015).

Manifestly, the application and exercise of unity with those 'who are more in need' remains one of the principles of the Brazil's foreign relations policy. However such an approach might at times be inconsistent with the protection of Brazil's own interests. This conflict in the relationship between national interest and the application of commonality and solidarity remains a fundamental problem for the Brazil policy makers (Amorim, 2010: 225).

Given the numerous scrums in the analytical and descriptive range of the Third-Worldism theory as well as its irrelevance to Brazil's behaviour, some of the formulations we made clarifies why the concept should be viewed merely as a 'mobilisation myth'. If any utilization of the concept or theory of Third-Worldism in circumstances of global modernity is to be intelligible, the concept has to vary expressively from the connotation it supported previously, and it must reformulate and restructure the signification of the global scales (and relations) it formerly discussed (Randall, 2008: 42).

## **2.6. Summary**

As can be noted from the study, having analyzed how the critical theory can be interlaced with the concept hegemony, it appears that instead of proposing a problem-solving adjustment to prevalent social power struggles, a 'critical theory of hegemony' springs its utmost consideration to the interrogation and scrutiny of the dominant order of the world.



Evidently, as suggested by the study the critical theory of hegemony mainly highlights the idiosyncratic features of power and eliminates the prominent notion that power exist in unbiased alignments. In this case the theory suggests that power and hegemony in the more generic sense relates the practice of ruling by consent, as well as the 'traditional and intellectual leadership' attained by a specific class, in a social stratum and is contained in a larger scheme of class dominance and control.

Fundamentally the theory describes the hegemonic practice as intellectual and moral governance which merges components of consensus and persuasion and thus gives birth of consensual hegemony. Consensual hegemony as the reading suggests might be very expedient for depicting and clarifying the arrangement of Brazil's international affairs strategy.

Through the progression of this analysis we have constantly attempted to highlight the consensus and persuasion alignments that shape the Brazilian strategy. Instead of relying in traditional concepts of hegemony, Brazil has molded a consensus-building approach with Brazil at the core of this initiative. Brazil has also preferred to follow a hegemonic project based on dialogue and using a combination respites which rests on three perspectives: 'inclusion and cooption, ethico-political values and structural consensus' all of which are manifested in Brazil's international approach to spread its norms and values around its area of influence.

Even as Brazil's cooperation with Africa is one of the most captivating progresses of the past years. The trial for the Brazilian government will be centered on precisely how it fashions a reciprocally beneficial partnership with African countries.

In this context, as much as the for 'soft power or consensual hegemony' might suffice in explaining Brazil's behaviour, the discourse should however not be immersed in the notion that Brazil has flourished impeccably in forming a consensual hegemony, however the discourse should be fashioned on the fact that the idea is worthwhile for understanding the governance plan of an developing semi-powerful state.

As a final point, as Brazil's relationship with Africa continues to grow and lexes such as 'soft power' continues to manifest, Brazil may run the risk of being confronted by a hostile response from the African continent. The challenge that remains for Brazil is to continue its charge of being seen as a true partner, and not a new colonizer who merely seeks to exploit Africa's resources.

## CHAPTER THREE

### BRAZIL IN AFRICA: AN ASSESMENT

#### 3.1. Introduction

Since the dawn of the twentieth century, economic growth indicators illustrates an African region that links with Brazil on matters of trade and industry as well as on issues relating to the establishment of political cohesion. As the derisive tradition of the colonial era gradually begins to wane away, the nascent ascendancy of African nations draws new hordes of commercial activities, in consort with various venture relations (de Freitas, 2016: 1). The course of Brazil's current advancement of economic, political and social consensus initiatives is recognizing Africa, as being a desired partner for dual development activities (Marques, 2012: 4).

For itself, Africa devises one of the foremost facades of Brazil's global programme. The African continent is changing promptly and Brazil is continuously expressing increasing interest in assisting and enchanting African enhancement. Brazil's deepened arrangement with Africa exhibits both geopolitical aspirations and economic objectives, nonetheless its stout historic bonds and kinships with Africa places it separately from the other BRIC members (World Bank, 2012: 3). More so, in practice, modern-day political, technological and economic developments means different things to different countries, and the centrality ascribed to growth has waxed and waned across, and within, the international economic landscape. As a result, this economic explosive environment is partly aided by the developing countries' policies of increased integration

into the world economic system, and that in itself spurs as an important source of global progress (Romer, 1990: 98).

Moreover, Brazil's interest and presence in Africa should perhaps be explored by focusing on several domestic and international factors motivating Brazil's behaviour. This chapter provides an outline of the historical nature of Brazil relations with the African continent and the country's current strategic position in Africa. This chapter also provides an overview of this relationship; by particularly delving on how this association has been growing in recent years and how it attained the status it currently holds. The chapter also focuses on the strategic relevance of the BRICS fold as the perfect driver and epitome of the 'South-South cooperation' among governments.

### **3.2. Brazil-Africa relations: a historical background**

Brazil's relations with Africa can generally be traced back to the colonial periods. More specifically, it was during the Portuguese control of certain parts of Africa, that African slaves were deported all over the world; and this indefatigable trend saw the shipment of hundreds of thousands of Africans from Portuguese colonial territories to Brazil (Visentini, 2009). Significantly, the African coastline supplied slaves for colonial Brazil's sugarcane plantations. The arrival of the first Africans in Brazil dates back to the year 1530, but the rigorous transfers of enslaved Africans to Brazil became more momentous when sugarcane plantations became better systematized in the 1550s. The demand for African slaves in Brazil was so profuse that the focus of the Portuguese slave trade with the Spanish-American colonies such as Mexico, Peru, and Santo Domingo, shifted the attention to Brazil (Goulart 1949).

Just about 11 million Africans were transported to the American regions. Brazil assimilated roughly 4 million slaves, and as a result Brazil became the nation with the greatest number of slaves in the world during that period (de Freitas, 2016: 2). Consequently, a transatlantic trade network was created in such a manner that capital amassing was based on exploitation of cheap slave labour and that was Brazil's prime economic strategy (World Bank, 2012: 27). In as much as this transatlantic slave trade created a strong and irreversible cultural connection between Africa and Brazil. It also gave rise to validities of why Brazil became a hodgepodge of slavery. For that reason, social disparities, which forms part of Brazil's most enduring difficulties today, remains an absolute consequence of slavery (de Freitas, 2016: 2). Given the levels of inequality that are prevalent in Brazil today, Brazil's black population is subjected to various structural disparities and this black population consequently remains the largest in the world outside of Africa, and is second only to Nigeria when taking the African continent into consideration. In fact, more than half the Brazilian population of 190 million claims direct African ancestry (White, 2010: 222; Visentini, 2009).

What is known today as the Lusophone African territory, was one of the prime areas for Brazil, as witnessed upon the country's reliance upon African slave labour (Weeks, 2012: 209). Accordingly, the main stimulus that characterizes the relationship between Brazil and Lusophone Africa is said to have come in 1648, almost immediately after Portugal acquired Angola from the Dutch, with an excursion that proceeded from Rio de Janeiro. Combined with the Portuguese in the mission were said to have been the Brazilians who secured areas of Africa under Portuguese rule. The World Bank (2012:28) also stresses that over time, Angolan dealings with Portugal lessened while

its relations with Brazil deepened; they note that by the mid-1800s, the extensive line of work out of Cabinda was taking place directly with Rio de Janeiro, with no intermediation by Portugal. As a result, Angola became gradually dependent on Brazil from the sixteenth century to the commencement of the nineteenth century (World Bank, 2012: 28). In this period Brazil played a dominant role in the 'Black Atlantic matrix', a social and economic space created by Portuguese colonialism as well as slave trading (Arenas, 2011: 4). Throughout this stage slaves were re-produced in Africa, mainly in Angola, in order to be utilized in Brazil (World Bank, 2012: 28).

Brazil's staunch commitment to sustain relations with Portuguese African colonies on various fronts lasted only until country's independence in 1822, which was accompanied by several political and economic developments around the world (Visentini, 2009). By 1822, the progressive economic centre had shifted from the south Atlantic to the north Atlantic and pressures to end slavery were intensifying as Europe's penetration of Africa accelerated. Moreover, it was the 'Friendship and Alliance Treaty', which regulated relations between Portugal and Brazil, that mainly ascribed Brazil's liberation, and the agreement also had an explicit section which restricted Brazil from accepting any proposals from Portuguese colonies in Africa that Brazil should become their controllers. With the veto, as per agreement, from these African countries, Brazil put the African continent aside and concentrated instead on international relations with Latin America, Europe, and North America (World Bank, 2012: 29).

In effect the idea of slavery and its use was eliminated in 1888, and in the period after this abolition, a limited number of Africans entered Brazil's administrative spheres. Yet, traditional behaviours, ideals, and views of African origin persisted in certain communal

codes and convictions of Brazilian societies. However, the general significance of Africa as a hub to persist human trading was essentially omitted from what was to be viewed as Brazil's prevailing ethos. Social order in Brazil, also now incorporated some designs of racial affairs that were established during the times of slavery. In this period even the slaves who were freed still stumbled upon the same issues of discrimination they had confronted in the periods of slavery and bondage (World Bank, 2012: 29; Fernandes, 1969).

During the 1920s period, a shedload of Europeans crossed to Brazil, it was about 4.5 million migrants who migrated generally from Italy (1,485,000); Portugal (1,321,000); Spain (583,000); and Germany (223,000)'. The Japanese settlement stretched to 86,000 throughout that same passé. A reverse movement also happened in the opposite but different route, with countless African progenies going back to their native lands. Brazil's suave diplomatic exertions in the intervening time focused on concluding border discussions in their own continent as they also simultaneously engrossed domestic priorities (de Freitas, 2016: 2; Alston, Melo, Mueller & Pereira, 2008). The conclusion of the 1950s still saw little initiative showed by Brazil towards the Africa continent. National disorder, great civilian suppression by Getúlio Vargas, and other local problems consumed Brazil's governmental programme, and the country followed an isolationist strategy (de Freitas, 2016: 2-3).

A period that lucidly expresses a small-scale recovery of Brazil's interest in African is the 1970s after Brazil recognized independent Lusophone states in Africa. Whilst most African nations started to gain their independence in the 1960s and 1970s, Brazil began to replace its Portuguese colonial master by following closer links with the five

Portuguese colonies in Africa. Brazil first accepted the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in July 1974, just prior to it being approved by Portugal. In 1975 Brazil simultaneously established relations with Mozambique and Angola and in the process became the first 'Western' government to recognize the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government in Angola (White, 2010: 224).

All the noted initiatives were mainly in track with Brazil's independent foreign policy (1964--1985), where an African Division was created within the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, also known as Itamaraty. This initiative supplemented its national security, by maintaining respectable ties with Luso-Africa as being essential (Campbell, 2009). However, even with those sentiments continuing all the way through the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil-Africa relations declined to a comparatively low level, with irregular state visits from Brazil to Africa in the late 1980s (White, 2010: 224). Brazil's limited interaction with Africa lasted up until recently, when under the Lula Government in 2003, Brazilian diplomacy gave a privileged place to Africa; and strategic bilateral and multilateral relations became the principal focus of the South-South cooperation, particularly in the areas of trade, investments, oil, mining, infrastructure, health, science and technology. Visentini states that while some view this purely as "prestige diplomacy," many are convinced that the relations are proof of the solidarity dimension of Brazil's social program (White, 2010: 222; Visentini, 2009; Almeida, 2009: 171).

### **3.2.1. The resuscitation of relations between Brazil and Africa (new millennium)**

The administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) is greatly credited for championing and revitalizing Brazil's renewed interest in Africa and setting it on a



definite footing, as part of the quest to extend Brazil's global influence (World Bank, 2012: 26). Despite the fact that some of his countless trips to Africa may have produced a few palpable benefits, they served the larger goal to locate Brazil as a frontrunner of the South - and even Lula's detractors acknowledge today that Brazil's standing in Africa has received an unprecedented boost. As a recent World Bank – Institute de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) report points out; Lula made 12 trips to Africa, visiting 21 countries. In the opposite direction, Brazil received 47 visits of African kings, presidents, and prime ministers from 27 nations. Brazil's former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim made 67 official visits to 34 African countries during his time with the Lula government. Brazil now has 37 embassies in Africa, up from 17 in 2002 (Stuenkel, 2012).

The Lula government's international relations policy was generally branded by three dimensions which include an economic and political diplomacy, as well as a social agenda. The government's purpose of deepening relations and creating a strategic partnership with emerging powers such as China, India, Russia and South Africa, among others, generally added for economic advantages and indicated the will to contribute to the consolidation of a multi-polar international order (Visentini, 2009). Furthermore Lula's intent and ingenuity has been continued by his successor Dilma Rousseff, who maintained and educed a big prod into the African continent. Anxious that the Eurozone crisis may pose a financial threat to her country and after having noted Brazil's poor economic performance in 2012, Rousseff has established great significance in Brazil's African extension. Brazil's has recently made numerous strides into Francophone and even Anglophone African nations such as Nigeria, thus further

expanding the country's relations from just Lusophone Africa to the broader African continent (*The Economist*, 10 November 2012; Kozloff, 2012).

Evidently, Brazil's strong zeal and drive for international prestige is noted by the country's commitment to the African continent, where it has intensified its noble themes of political diplomacy, commercial engagement and development cooperation's in recent years. This is suggestive of a new era of Brazilian foreign policy and Brazil's course of internationalization in general. This is a multifaceted and inter-related, pragmatic and programmatic process that Brazil seems to have managed well through a high degree of diplomatic sophistication and open cooperation between the political, commercial and various development bodies. As such, Africa displays one of the best contextual examples of Brazil's delicate balancing act between commercial and strategic interests, as well as external development assistance and the consolidation of South-South relations (White, 2010: 221).

The resuscitation of relations between Brazil and Africa can also partly be ascribed to the rapidly changing African continent which has drawn interests of vast proportions including those of China and India, and even so Brazil has also gradually expressed more interest in supporting and participating in African development in recent years (*The Economist*, 23 March 2013; Fundira 2011). Even though there are alarming levels of poverty and political instability in parts of Africa, there has also been tremendous growth in many countries. In fact, a total of seven African countries are among the ten fastest growing economies in the world, as such Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana, the Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Nigeria; all experienced excessive levels of growth in latest years (*Africa.com*, 2016). The continent's richness in resources

coupled with improvements in manufacturing, telecommunication and transportation industries have generally aided the development of the continent and thus have drawn more interest from developing countries (French, 2012).

### **3.3 South-South partnering: BRICS and Africa**

Brazil's position as an essential developing market and one of the fundamental players worldwide has progressively driven its desire for greater South–South cooperation across many regions in the globe, but more primarily in the African continent. The global financial crisis since 2008 has had severe effects on the 'West', thus impelling leading emerging states such as China, India and Brazil to take a commanding role in global economic affairs (*The Economist*, 10 November 2012).

According to Alden (2007:12), emerging powers have in recent years made momentous inroads into the Western world's political and economic paths, more meticulously by limiting the West's dominance in the African continent. Also, driven by a need for resources and markets, the result is a diversification of external factors involved across a range of sectors of the African economy, with much of this interaction being framed in terms of new forms of multilateral and bilateral arrangements (Alden, 2007: 12). These changes, or rather shifts, in economic dynamism is supposedly aided by the new South-South arrangements that is aimed at strengthening integration between the major players of the developing world (Jjuuko, 2012).

South–South cooperation is a concept that is habitually used but rarely defined. The concept by its very essence refers to the progressions, establishments and arrangements that are designed to endorse political, economic and technical support

among developing countries in probing common development aims. It is multidimensional in latitude, covering cooperation in areas such as trade and finance, investment, as well as the exchanges in a knowledge economy, capability and technical expertise between emerging countries (EDRA, 2010: 8).

This new South-South arrangement is more like a mechanism that is particularly designed to address economic and political challenges of marginalization that are generally emanating from the contemporary wave of globalization (Serrão & Bischoff, 2009:373). As such, developing economies have worked tremendously hard to ensure that bodies, representatives and institutions from the South, which includes bodies like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 Caucus, ASA (Africa and South America), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), IBSA (the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum) and Mercosur (Common Market of the Spanish speaking South American Countries), amongst others, agree and adopt common positions on issues of strategic importance such as the transformation of the global political, security and economic architecture (Landsberg, 2011: 68; World Bank, 2012:2).

Lately, a countless array of studies have attributed most of the universal power shifts to be a direct consequence of the BRICS structural fold (Moore, 2012). Therefore there appears to be considerable faith in BRICS as the perfect driver and epitome of the 'South-South cooperation' among governments (Moore, 2012).

In 2001, Goldman Sachs advocated that in the subsequent decade the BRICS countries would have a major influence on the global economy (Goldman Sachs, 2001). Undeniably, between 2003 and 2010, trade between the BRICS countries amplified

from US\$ 38 billion to US\$ 220 billion (MFA, 2011), and additionally in 2011 BRICS countries exceeded US\$ 320 billion in the first phase of the year and the year 2012 signalled growth percentage of a staggering 6.1 % between combined BRICS members, but the figure was further estimated to grow by 6.9 % in 2013 (Tian, 2012). Additionally, Beattie (2010) further infers that, by 2032, the BRICS economies will account for more than half the world's economy. More so, BRICS countries are evidently in similar phases of economic expansion, and their trade structures are more or less the same (Tian, 2012). Thus, making this South-South Cooperation and mutual aid to be conjectured as a rational step among the members counties because together they form a logical cooperative linkage (Tony, 2009).

Currently the BRICS association of nations officially fashioned what is prevalently recognized as the "BRICS Bank" apparently as a substitute to the unopposed supremacy and monopoly of the Bretton Woods institutions the World Bank plus the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Headquartered in China's Shanghai, the Bank is made up of two new complementary bodies, namely the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). These two institutions simultaneously take on the duties similar those the World Bank and the IMF (Dunns & Dunns, 2015: 125). The Bank is primarily established on basis of a 'reserve currency pool' valued above US\$100 billion, and the Bank is expected to offer loans for infrastructure and growth projects in BRICS nations (RT, 15 July 2014).

The notion of the BRICS development bank as bookmaker's content is aimed at altering global power relations by challenging unilateral tendencies by some and promoting a global order that is anchored on multilateralism. In their dealings with the over-all global

South, including Africa, the BRICS represent a different channel of international cooperation (RT, 15 July 2014; World Bank, 2012: 18).

As a result, Africa has mainly opened its borders for the fast developing South–South systems. By itself, trade amongst BRICS and Africa raised almost double fold between 2000 and 2009, increasing from US\$ 16 billion to US\$ 157 billion, whereas global trade in the same period triplicated from US\$ 13.1 trillion in 2000 to US\$ 32.2 trillion in 2008 (World Bank, 2012: 18). Essentially, the African continent has become a continent of opportunities that champions improved system governance, with positive economic trends. The continent is currently frequently depicted as a new-fangled frontier for those who seek partners and markets (World Bank, 2012: 2). Furthermost, BRICS continue to reap the benefits of joint trade, while Africa keeps enjoying the benefits of infrastructure development, economic expansion and developmental assistance, whereas BRICS continue to advance access to strategic mineral resources, markets and support from African states at multilateral conferences (SAITEX, 2012).

Moreover, when thoroughly outlining the aforementioned formulations it becomes clear that the South–South arrangements play a key role in also reinforcing the technical, political and economic connections between Africa and Brazil. This embryonic mechanism has been visibly active, on attempts to position itself in a context of more horizontally collaborative programs related to the valorisation of this South-South perspective (Pinheiro, 2008). Furthermore, ensuing South-South arrangements, the Brazilian government's backing of the African continent continues to expand on all stages of development and implementation, practicability, technology transfer, and political economic endeavours (Deen, 2013).

The increasing trade and investment activities between Brazil and Africa have in recent years presented significant opportunities for socio-economic development, positive joint trade and economic expansion for both parties. South–South cooperation thus remains an embryonic mechanism that underpins Brazil and Africa’s economic future and cooperation, through partnerships, knowledge exchange, as well as finance (World Bank, 2012: 7). Moreover this South-South cooperation between Brazil and Africa, based on knowledge sharing, trade and investment, brings important lessons to the world, because this new South-South partnership is seen as a key tool for implementing the new stratagem.

The next section will attempt to thoroughly elucidate the economic connections between Brazil and Africa in order to give us a comprehensive and intricate synthesis of what the embryonic mechanism of South-South cooperation sets out.

#### **3.4. Brazil’s in Africa: An assessment**

The mutually strengthening movement of the Brazil-Africa engagement over the last decade and a half has dramatically altered both Brazil and Africa’s economic trajectories, by intensely influencing a commercial climate across this dual interaction. Brazil offers a growth model for the growing markets of Africa’s produce; and finances an increasing number of infrastructure projects and programs across the continent, whilst Africa continues to provide access to strategic mineral resources and markets (SAITEX, 2012). The Brazil-Africa interaction grants viable avenues to mutual advantages where the basic cause of integration has become central to the rapid acceleration of global trade growth (AEO, 2011). As such, the overall Brazil-Africa

strategic engagement needs vital acknowledgment, whether viewed from an African, Brazilian or international perspectives (Lampreira, 2007).

As indicated, Brazil's development projects in the Southern African region and in Africa as a whole are extensively focused on mining, oil and gas, and infrastructure development, amongst others (Barka, 2011:5-6). These initiatives are mainly led by a small number of large players, namely Andrade Gutierrez, Queiroz Galvão, Odebrecht and Camargo Correa which are all Brazilian private conglomerates, as well as Petrobras which is a Brazilian state-owned conglomerate, and lastly Vale which is a multinational diversified metals and mining corporation (Stuenkel, 2012). The investment strategies of this cooperation in Africa varies from solo investments to widely held equity proprietorships in local firms and even expanding to amalgamations with foreign firms (of Portugal, Africa and Austria), thus expanding their investment initiatives on the continent (Iheduru, 2012). The company Vale's coal mine in Mozambique is their biggest operation outside Brazil to date, and Odebrecht has been involved in building since the 1980s (involving the Capanda Dam in Angola), whilst Andrade Gutierrez works on ports, housing and sanitation projects in Angola (*The Economist*, 10 November 2012).

Additionally Brazil's consumer companies have also started to set their sights on Africa's growing consumer market. The vigorous growth of African economies in spite of the global economic crisis of 2009, has led Brazil to view to the continent as a favourable market for its goods and services, mainly manufactured or semi-manufactured yields, as it can offer effective technology to meet the difficulties of developing countries (Stolte, 2012: 17).



According to Stolte (2012:4), Brazil's resource interests might seem to be the dominating feature in the country's overall structural engagement with the African continent, because natural resources virtually make up 90% of the country's imports from the African continent (Stolte, 2012:4). However, Stotle (2012:4) further notes that some analysts maintain that Brazil is too dependent on exporting natural resources. The fact that natural resources account for an important part of Brazil's total exports, so unlike its BRICS partners China and India, means the country is itself rich in resources and is not wholly dependent on Africa's resources. Drawing from these formulations it becomes clear that Brazil's involvement in Africa is not a strategy of acquiring resources, but rather forms part of their attempt to internationalize the Brazilian market and to expand South-South co-operation with the African continent. However, truth is Brazil's engagements with Africa profits Brazil more, thus giving better propensity to the notion of consensual hegemony (Tony, 2012).

Barka (2011:2) also adds that the relations between Brazil and Africa are more varied, since it includes trading in agrarian produces (sugar, dairy, meat, and cereals), vehicles and parts, nuclear reactors and machinery, ores as well as ash. The top import products from Africa to Brazil include mineral products, chemical products, base metals and food, beverage and tobacco. The top ten export products from Brazil to Africa include food, beverage and tobacco Mineral products; live animals and animal products; transport equipment and Animal or vegetable fats and oils amongst others (TRALAC, 2011).

However, the strategic importance of resource trading is that it presents pragmatic gains that primarily encourage Brazilian companies to invest more in Africa and for African counties to export more to Brazil (Harding, 2011). Expressively, and as figures from the

African Development Bank illustrates, imports from the African continent are more imperative for Brazil, than imports from Brazil are for Africa (ADB, 2011). Despite the fact that African countries accounted for 6.6% of Brazil's total imports in 2009, Brazil represented only 3.4% of total African imports. While trade between Brazil and Africa remains varied, resource relations have become more intensive in general (AEO, 2011). Brazil's foremost trading associates today in Africa are Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, South Africa and Libya, which are all resource rich countries. Collectively these countries make up 77 % of Brazil's total trade with the entire African continent (Barka, 2011: 2).

The Brazil-Africa engagement has moved beyond commercial interest towards investment in the knowledge sector. Brazil's expedition to position itself as the foremost manufacturer and exporter of renewable energy has also been the main conduit for its agricultural focus in Africa. As a result of the African continent's large probability for agricultural invention the Brazilian government has vowed to support African countries to develop the invention and export prospects of agriculture and bio-fuels, through trade, cooperation, technology, and skills transfer (Barka, 2011:3).

As such, agriculture presents itself as another expanse to further the Brazil-Africa economic relationship. Additionally, and as an instance of agricultural technological transmission, Brazil's agriculture research organization, EMBRAPA (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária), opened an administrative centre in Ghana in 2008, with emphasis on assisting the motherland to grow its ethanol productiveness (Barka, 2011:3). Since then EMBRAPA began to spread its proficiency to each corner of the African continent, thus attaining 35 projects in the continent, which ranges from

reinforcing Angola's National Research Institute to aiding Senegal develop its rice subdivision and to help Tanzania with evolving its dairy industry (Pham, 2010).

Food production in Africa ties in with all facets of Brazil's global ambitions and foreign policy intentions. Food, energy and security equally feature as significances on the multidimensional program, which is the locus of Brazil's present-day activity in global decision-making. As such, movement of global food and energy production to the African continent flows with Brazil's wider tactic of leveraging South-South cooperation and market integration (White, 2010: 234).

Let alone some of the great strides they have made China and India on the other hand have always primarily seeded to clamber for natural resources in the African continent (Ndlovu, 2013). Both countries have unlike Brazil always attempted to distance themselves from the formal co-operation terms of the African continent (Taylor, 2010: 20), and have constantly seemed to resemble Western nations, whom are largely motivated by personal interests (Alesina & Dollar, 1998).

Evidently, Brazil and Africa seem keen to maintain an expanded investment climate that ripples out into a commercial association as well as a vibrant co-operative climate (*The Economist*, 10 November 2012). Brazil's Africa arrangement should thus not be perceived as an economic scheme and even less as an artless plan (like many observers recognize India and China) to secure resources. More so, Brazil's envelopment and growing presence in Africa mirrors the country's larger foreign policy drive of being acknowledged amid the key players in world politics. As such, the

acquisition of economic presence and conquering developing markets has been only one component of the country's majestic strategy towards Africa (Stolte, 2012:18).

From 2003 to 2010, Brazil invested more than US\$ 10 billion in Africa, while Africa's exports to Brazil increased from US\$ 3 billion in 2000 to US\$ 18.5 billion in 2008 (Iheduru, 2012). Interestingly, Lusophone (Portuguese speaking) Africa is clearly the main destination for Brazilian direct investment in the region; its oil-rich trade partners in Northern Africa are of only minor importance in this regard (Fundira, 2011).

### **3.5. Summary**

The chapter clearly elucidates that Brazil-Africa relations have been renewed in a remarkable way in recent years. This revitalised approach effectively followed the 1822 period, which generally signified the gradual limitation of Brazil Africa contacts. Steered by President Lula, Brazil began to be noted as a developing power with new-found affluence, with a great commitment to establishing a viable engagement in the global arena with a bigger emphasis on bilateral relations with developing countries from the South. Dilma Rousseff's administration has sought to further deepen Brazil's commercial dominance and diplomacy, and to expand Brazil's presence in the African continent, from a previous focus on Lusophone countries, to include Francophone and Anglophone countries.

As noted, all these approaches are suggestive of a new era of Brazil's commitment to the anticipation of internationalization in general. This is a multifaceted and inter-related, pragmatic and programmatic process that Brazil seems to have managed well through a high degree of diplomatic sophistication and open cooperation between the political,

commercial and various development bodies. As such, Africa displays one of the best contextual examples of Brazil's delicate balancing act between commercial and strategic interests and external development assistance

Furthermore, the study also meticulously indicated that the increasing trade and investment activities between Brazil and Africa has in recent years presented significant opportunities for socio-economic development, positive joint trade and economic expansion for both parties. South–South cooperation thus remains an emergent mechanism that underpins Brazil and Africa's economic future and cooperation, through partnerships, knowledge exchange, as well as finance. This has heralded an innovative epoch of foreign relations that goes beyond just independence from the centres of global supremacy and practical assignation with options to gratify a nationalist-type ideology, based on new imperatives to reduce traditional economic and political power asymmetries.

Brazil seeks to shape a new trade arrangement that will place emerging countries at the pole position of energy and food security, and resource management. However, the Brazil Africa arrangement should thus not be perceived as an economic scheme and even less as an artless plan to secure resources (like many would perceive China and India). More so, Brazil's envelopment and growing existence in Africa mirrors the country's larger foreign policy drive of being acknowledged amid the key players in world politics

Given its recent progress and global emergence, Brazil's role in this wide-ranging engagement seems encoded. But, Africa is also bound to also play a fundamental role in this engagement and in Brazil's global agenda.

Agriculture is another obligatory factor in Brazil's engagement with Africa. It is also an area where Brazil has achieved impressive results with its highly competitive agricultural and biofuel energy sectors, and on the multilateral level. Brazil's direct engagement with African governments and development co-operation in the realm of agriculture has been progressive. Agricultural development is clearly a point of juncture that provides a refreshing consistency in Brazilian foreign policy, mainly in Africa.

Brazil's foreign relations objectives provide for growing opportunities for South-South cooperation. In both economic and political circles, Brazil is seeking to expand its influence. Accordingly Brazil continues to expand its diplomatic and economic relations with its African counterparts. Facts dubbed from the graft clearly indicate that Brazil and Africa seem keen for to maintain an association that spans a vibrant co-operative climate.

However, what remains more significant in this Brazil- African relationship is the fact that Brazil's has a sense of 'historical indebtedness' to the African continent. The next chapter will attempt to look at Brazil's particular relations with two of the Lusophone countries (Angola and Mozambique) so as to unearth the economic and political trends that informs this relationship.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CASE STUDIES: BRAZIL IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

#### 4.1. Introduction

The new millennium has signalled a noticeable opening in links between Brazil and Lusophone countries in Africa, particularly Angola and Mozambique. The reinstatement of peace and security initiatives in both these African countries has allowed the respective governments to pay more attention to social, political and economic development enterprises (de Freitas, 2016). In addition, an examination of Brazil's administrative, political economic and progressive co-operation initiatives, divulges a critical component of practicality in Brazil's approach to both Angola's and Mozambique (Alden, 2007: 16).

Brazil's current zeal to achieve worldwide prominence and influence has positively been improved by its historic ties with Africa and its fresh efforts at consolidation of closer political relations with numerous African countries. As such, the homogeneity of Brazil's Africa policy today, particularly towards Lusophone Africa, has moved away from just culture and heritage to economics, trade and investments, agriculture, oil, mining, infrastructure, health, and science and technology (Barka, 2011: 1).

The range of ventures and loans in recent times bound for Lusophone African countries signals to Brazil's growing impetuses of bulging more influence in the developing countries and its intentions to further grow the commercial attraction of Africa (Romero, 2012). There are about five African Lusophone countries which include, Angola,

Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, which are basically all former Portuguese colonies (Harding, 2011). However this chapter only aims to elucidate Brazil's political and economic connection with two Lusophone African countries - mainly Mozambique and Angola. As part of its objective this chapter will firstly examine both Angola and Mozambique's historical trends, as well as their past and more recent political and economic inclinations. The chapter will then later delve deeper into their current political economic considerations, and mainly explore the significance of Brazil's approach towards both these countries as well as the significance this relationship holds for the entire African continent.

## **4.2. Section A: Angola**

### **4.2.1. Angola's political history and development**

Angola, officially the Republic of Angola, is a country which is geographically located along the shore of the South Atlantic Ocean, on the central west coast of Africa, bordered by Namibia in the south, the Democratic Republic of Congo in the north and Zambia in the west, placing it directly on the trading route and slave trade corridor from the 16th to 19th Centuries. In geographical area, it is the second largest country south of the Sahara, after the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the twenty-third largest country in the world, covering almost 1, 25 million square kilometres, which is bigger than South Africa and about three times the size of California in the United States (MOW, 2013a).

However, with 17, 9 million people, it is only the 70th largest country in terms of population (MOW, 2013a). The official language is Portuguese, however, there are



approximately 100 different ethnic languages spoken. These include the likes of Ovambo, Tchokwe, Kikongo, Mbunda and Kwanyama, which are the most dominant indigenous languages (DLIFLC, 2011:5). Angola derives its name from the Kimbundu word for 'king', namely "N'gola" (Pedro, 2007:85).

According to the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in the United States (2011: 16) no Europeans had ever set foot on the central west coast of Africa until the Portuguese arrived about 500 years ago. At the time of their arrival N'gola Kiluange was in power and through trade alliances held out against foreign domination for several decades. However, with the arrival of Paulo Dias de Novais in 1575 to settle in Luanda with about 100 families and 400 soldiers, Angola was colonized to serve as a link in trade with India and Southeast Asia and endured four centuries of Portuguese colonialism, until it was incorporated as an overseas province of Portugal in 1951 and gaining independence in 1975 after a prolonged war of independent.

However, the main stimulus that characterizes the relationship between Brazil and Angola came in 1648, almost immediately after Portugal regained Angola from the Dutch, who occupied Luanda in 1641. Combined with the Portuguese in the mission were the Brazilians who secured areas of Africa under Portuguese rule (World Bank, 2012: 28). Furthermore, Angola was also the source of slaves to new colonies of Portugal and in this instance Brazil was explicitly one of the driving forces. Paradoxically, Angola became more like a colony of Brazil (another Portuguese colony) and Brazilian trading ships were the most numerous in the port of Luanda (Arenas, 2011: 4).

Inevitably, Angola, like many of the other states which under colonial rule eventually fought for independence. In the struggle for independence, the principal protagonists were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), founded in 1956, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) of 1961, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), founded in 1966. After many years of conflict, the nation gained its independence on 11 November 1975, seeing the end of fascist dictatorship, following a coup d'état in Portugal in 1974, establishing General António de Spínola as president of Portugal. Subsequently, Portugal's new leaders began a process of democratic change at home and acceptance of its former colonies' independence abroad (Zorgbibe, 2003).

President António de Spínola's government agreed to grant independence to all Portugal's colonies, including Angola. Of, arguably, academic interest in this process, the power was handed over through the Alvor Agreement to a coalition of the three largest liberation movements who in their own right fought for independence, often against each other, namely the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA (Meijer & Birmingham 2004; Accord, 2004; Zorgbibe, 2003).

Unsurprisingly, the coalition broke down mightily, with the ideological differences between the liberation movements eventually leading to a full-scale civil war that only ended in 2002. The political propaganda of one movement against another gave rise to unprecedented racial and tribal hatred. As a result towns and factories were bombed, water supplies sabotaged and villages attacked and ravaged (DLIFLC, 2011:20-26). The MPLA gained control of the capital Luanda and much of the rest of the country. With the support of the United States, Zaïre and South Africa intervened militarily in

favour of the FNLA and UNITA with the intention of taking Luanda before the declaration of independence. In response, Cuba and the then Soviet Union intervened in favour of the MPLA (Meijer & Birmingham 2004). The Angolan civil war pleased to a greater extent the Cold War protagonists, this was precisely because they found in MPLA and UNITA organizations to promote their ideologies which were capitalism and communism through what became known as proxy wars (Accord 2004; Le billon, 2001: 57-59).

Despite a number of agreements which were reached between the opposing parties, several obstacles remained and in actual fact exacerbated the civil war up until 2002 when the 27 years civil war at last came to an end, with successful democratic elections held in 2008 (DLIFLC, 2011:20). This saw MPLA gaining a massive 81, 64% of the votes, which translate to 191 out of the 220 seats in the National Assembly (Freedom House, 2013). One can safely argue that the Angolan political spectrum had been stagnant from independence until the end of the civil war, and it has just started to develop in recent years, due to the changing international arena and a rejuvenated civil society (Thomson, 2004: 234).

#### **4.2.2. Angola's economic history and development**

The Angolan economy has been devastated by decades of a civil war. The 27 Years civil war has negatively impacted on the most important economic and social sectors of the country. The country is now attempting to restructure its devastated infrastructure and economy, remove refugees, and achieve stability. However, Political corruption

remains rife, and thus prevents the implementation of social and economic reforms (DLIFLC, 2011:21).

According to Neto & Jamba (2006: 2), after the end of the Angolan civil war, the process of consolidating democratic institutions has shown good results. They argue that this is due in large part to the government outlining its goals to aid economic and social reconstruction and the transparency of the ruling party in respect of its agenda for elections. The Angolan government has been intensively engaged in diplomatic initiatives to expand the country's international relationships and to diversify its economic partnerships; contacts have been strengthened significantly with South Africa, China, Israel and Brazil. Considerable stability in the currency markets and the revaluation of the national currency has been achieved. . For example there was a slowdown of inflation rates (annual accumulated inflation dropped from 2001 to 2013). Moreover, in 2013 inflation dropped further to a record low of 8.90 % in January (TE, 2013).

Angola's economic backbone lies in its major exports and these include inter alia oil, diamonds, coffee, fish, timber and cotton and she imports consumer goods, machinery and vehicles from countries like Portugal, Brazil, the United States, South Africa and Spain (DLIFLC, 2011: 5). Other minerals such as diamonds notwithstanding, according to Le billion (2008, 22), oil makes Angola the "hottest" market in the world for the petroleum industry and contributes some US \$3 billion in annual revenue to the MPLA controlled government. Angola became a member of OPEC (Oil Producing and Exporting Countries) in 2006 and its current assigned a production quota of 1.65 million barrels a day and its supporting activities, contribute about 85% of GDP Diamond

exports contribute an additional 5% (Cohen, 2006; Flower, 2010). The United States and Brazil are at the centre of this revenue through oil imports from Angola (ADB, 2011: 1).

Thus, following 27 years of civil war which engulfed the Angolan economy, the recent years have seen remarkable development in the Angolan economy and several other African states. Rosenblum (2011), states that according to recent estimates, many nations in the African continent now number among the world's fastest-growing economies. Countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria and Rwanda are found in tables listing the top ten such economies for the period 2001-2012. Furthermore, each country registered an annual average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of between 7.5 and 9.0%. Notwithstanding the significant economic growth of the aforementioned countries, none of these African, or other global economies, can match the rapid growth of Angola. During recent years, the Angolan economy averaged an annual GDP growth rate of almost 10 % from 2000 up until 2015, reaching an all-time high in 2007 of 23.20%. However, the global recession of 2008 has stalled economic growth and current growth estimates reflect an overall decline to 4.9 % (TE, 2016).

Of course the Angolan economy has seen some peaks, driven by the high international oil price; however, there are many challenges yet to face. The majority of people make a living from subsistence agriculture, but still, more than half of Angola's food is imported, and resettlement of displaced people is taking its toll in high construction costs. These factors may contribute to a further slowing down in the near future and Angola will continue to face the problems of the 'resource curse' – inflation, income

inequality and a homogenized economy (AFDB, 2016; Musacchio, Werber & Schlefer, 2010).

There does not appear to be a quick fix for the Angolan economy and some economists are predicting there will not be a strong period of economic growth for Angola moving forward. Unfortunately, the potential solution of diversifying the economy is made more difficult the longer Angola remains dependent on oil exports. The forecasts predict an economy that will continue to grow over the coming years, but it does not appear to be a healthy type of diversified economic progress that could begin to bring Angola off its oil dependency and lack of food production and job creation to some 40% of the population who live below the breadline (Rosenblum, 2011).

In addition, according to some estimates, Angola's GDP grew by 3.8 in 2015, and remains subdued in 2016 at 3.3% behind averages for the same year in other emerging and developing countries (non OECD members) as a group (6.7%) and sub-Saharan Africa (5.4%) (Rosenblum, 2011; AFDB, 2016). The most recent statistics paint an even gloomier picture for Angola's economy, as growth is estimated at 3.5% in 2017 because of low crude oil prices (AFDB, 2016).

### **4.3. Brazil-Angola relations**

As noted before, Angolan-Brazil relations began in the sixteenth century against the background of Portuguese colonisation. In this instance, under Portuguese rule, the African coastline supplied slaves for colonial Brazil's sugarcane plantations (Goulart 1949). The relationship between Angola and Brazil is further strengthened by their common language and their shared colonial past – both countries were colonies of the

Portuguese Empire – and the cultural ties that stem from this shared history. Brazil was the first country that formally recognized Angola as an independent state in 1975 (White, 2010: 225). Angola and Brazil have since enjoyed strong bilateral relations, which grew under Brazil's previous president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. To ensure that these shared historical and cultural ties remain intact today, the Brazilian government's Africa policy reaffirms these strong linkages through improved technical cooperation, trade and investment and technology transfers. Brazil, the dominant economy in Latin America, has significantly strengthened its relationship with African countries during the past decade. In 10 years the number of embassies on the continent has increased from 17 to 37 (Stuenkel, 2012).

Furthermore, trade between the world's 5th largest economy (Brazil) and Africa has reached US\$ 27.6 billion in the same period. Lusophone Africa is the recipient of most of this share, more particularly Angola, which is also the second largest Brazil trading partner in Africa. As such, today Angola is one of the principal destinations for Brazilian investment and franchising in Africa (Stolte, 2012:5). Brazil's previous President Dilma Rousseff also re-emphasised the benefits of closer economic ties between the two countries and said that their relationship was a calculated one, based on strong historical, cultural and economic links. She told the National Assembly "Angola's relaunch was a paradigm for other countries in Africa in terms of economic and social stability" (AFP, 2011).

Angola currently stands at 16% of Brazil's trade with Africa, second to Nigeria at 32% in terms of trade partnership (ADB, 2011: 1-2).

Moreover, economic ties flanked by the two countries are apparently getting stronger. It is projected that investments by Brazilian companies in Angola are worth roughly \$4 billion. Angola is the second largest importer of Brazilian goods in Africa; Angola is the fourth largest African exporter to Brazil, most of which is oil (ACTSA, 2012). Brazil also supports projects in education and health and is involved in the government's national reconstruction programme. Angola also has over 100 Brazilian companies which are in commission there, which is by far the largest number of all African countries, and Brazilian brands are also widespread athwart the Angolan civilization (White, 2010: 224-225).

Odebrecht, for example, has been highly involved with infrastructural project, such as: dams, hospitals and housing. Moreover, Odebrecht has succesfully concluded 16 projects in Angola and currently has 47 in process. The same company has also demonstrated interest in oil, biofuel and diamonds, making itself the biggest employer in the Angolan private sector. Petrobras, the world's 10th largest petroleum company, has focused on the exploitation of oil, and last but not least, Vale has been focusing on the mining sector. The two biggest Brazilian private televisions, TV Globo and Record, have been active in Angola in terms of spreading the Brazilian culture and lifestyle. As a result of the cultural and historical ties, the 100 or so Brazilian companies established in Angola, from small to medium-sized enterprises, have not encountered any serious stumbling blocks in the Angolan market, and do not face any language barriers (PCSA,2012; White, 2010: 224-225).

However, as the study previously assessed this prodigious relationship might also be marred by a series of criticisms and scepticism. As indicated before most critics argue



that Brazil is an evolving economy, which wants to be professed as a “consensus builder” for progress, and therefore only use Angola to improve its international standing by furthering their aim of securing a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (PCSA, 2012). According to Action for Southern Africa ACTSA (2012) what further qualifies the abovementioned assertion is that Brazil agreed to expand the supply of credit available to Angola, if Angola agreed to continue its support of Brazil’s bid to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Additionally, White (2010: 225) from a different angle infers that it is ostensible that Brazil’s recognition of self-governing Angola was not so much an act of political altruism as one of strategic interest. He further notes that during the oil crisis in the early 1970s, Brazil concluded a mutual agreement of oil for Brazilian manufactured exports with Africa’s significant other partnering countries through the state-run petroleum company, Petrobras. He notes that in 1979 Petrobras also made its first investment in Angola. This, he says is an example of autonomy through distance and diversification. Again he adds that this marked the start of Brazil’s strategic interests in Africa, which is plainly linked to energy and which he says also is undoubtedly evident today not only in terms of Brazil’s trade with Angola but also with Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa (White, 2010: 225).

However, as emphasised in the study before, even when Brazil’s resource interests might seem to be the dominating feature in the country’s overall structural engagement with the African continent, natural resources also account for an important part of Brazil’s total exports, so unlike its BRICS partners China and India, the country is also rich in natural resources and is not wholly dependent on Africa’s resources (Stolte,

2012:4). Drawing from these formulations it becomes clear that Brazil's involvement in Angola and the broader African continent is probably not a strategy of acquiring resources and prestige, but rather forms part of their attempt to internationalize the Brazilian market and to expand South-South co-operation with the African continent through consensual means (Tony, 2009). Then again, it should always be clear that with Angola supporting Brazil's mission of securing permanent membership in the Security Council is also a means of reinforcing South-South cohesion, since the inclusion of Brazil in the Security Council will also allow the advancement of the entire global South (PSCA, 2012). Thus, whatever the reasons, the relationship is mutually beneficial and will benefit Africa as a whole.

#### **4.4. Summary**

What is evident from the study is that Angolan-Brazil relations are by their very nature strengthened by the existence a common language and a shared colonial past – as indicated both countries were part of the Portuguese Empire – and the cultural ties that stem from this shared history.

To ensure that these shared historical and cultural ties remain intact today, the Brazilian government's Africa policy reaffirms these strong linkages through improved technical cooperation, trade and investment and technology transfers. Brazil generally views Angola as a relaunch paradigm for other countries in Africa in terms of economic and social stability.

Although some critics noted in their analysis that Brazil's involvement in Angola is largely based on Brazil's mission, of advancing their strategic interest, particularly in the

resource sector, what the prophets of doom fail to note, is that although this arrangement of economic assignation seems to indicate clear resource interests, Brazil's involvement in Africa is more multifaceted and are of mutual benefit. As such, this type of engagement epitomises a genuine operationalization of the concept "consensual hegemony". In this instance Brazil as the hegemon derives more benefit from the engagement than their counterpart.

Moreover, Brazil has pooled its direct action in the multilateral arena with a greater stress on consensual relations with developing countries from the South. This has steered them into a new epoch of international relations that goes far beyond independence from the centres of global supremacy and shifting the traditional economic balance of power from the north to include the south. They have successfully managed to propel themselves to new priorities, which includes the intensification of traditional, economic and political reunions with its old Lusophone partners.

#### **4.5. Section B: Mozambique**

##### **4.5.1. Mozambique's political history and development**

Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique, is geographically located on the eastern Indian Ocean shoreline of southern Africa, bordered by Tanzania in the north, Malawi and Zambia in the northwest and Swaziland and South Africa in the southwest (ASC, 2012). From about the 5th century AD the country boasted major Swahili, Somali and Arab trading ports until the arrival of the Portuguese in the 15th century (MOW, 2013b).

With a land expanse of about 800,000 km<sup>2</sup>, approximately equivalent to the joint area of Italy and Spain and about two-thirds the area of South Africa (EU, 2012), it is the 35th largest country in the world (Sandu, 2013). The country has a population of 24 million people, (GTA, 2013) making it the 36th largest nation in the world (WFB, 2010). The official language is Portuguese, although a significant percentage of the population speaks Portuguese as a second language, with Swahili, Makhuwa, Ndaou, Shangaan and Sena being the major indigenous languages (Calitz, 2010). Mozambique was named by the Portuguese after an Arab trader 'Mossa Al Bique' (ICA, 2013).

The very first occupants of Mozambique were San hunter and gatherers, who were descendants of the Khoisan peoples. Between the first and fifth centuries AD, the first waves of Bantu-speaking peoples migrated from the north through the Zambezi River valley and then progressively settled into the highland and coastal areas of the Monomotapa Kingdom, which became modern day Zambia and Mozambique, and as a result became one of the most notable societies of the country (USSD, 2013; RGS, 2008).

The area was explored by the Portuguese explorer, Vasco da Gama in 1498 and was colonized by Portugal in 1505 and throughout this period Portuguese influence in Mozambique gradually expanded (RGS, 2008). However, the Portuguese grip on Mozambique intensified after World War II. Despite the fact that numerous European states were permitting independence to their colonies, Portugal instead chose to adhere to the concept that Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies were overseas provinces of Portugal and as a result, relocation to the colonies rose substantially (USSD, 2013).

Mozambique eventually gained its independence from Portugal in 1975 after a long and bloody war of independence, becoming the People's Republic of Mozambique. The main motivation for Mozambican independence, in point of fact, advanced in 1962 when several anti-colonial political groups formed the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, also known as FRELIMO. This organization mainly started an armed campaign against Portuguese colonial rule in September 1964. Upon the ultimate attainment of independence in 1975, Mozambique became a socialist state governed by FRELIMO under the leadership of Samora Machel. With the growing international backing from socialist countries and federations, FRELIMO began to engage in communal changes, socialist education of the masses and a variety of agricultural and economic reforms (MCR, 2012; USSD, 2013).

Shortly after independence however, Mozambique became the scene of a fierce and cruel civil war during which RENAMO fought a guerrilla war against the ruling FRELIMO, lasting from 1977 to 1992. More than 900,000 people lost their lives because of the war and related scarcity of food and basic commodities. The conflict and all related difficulties were mainly triggered when FRELIMO outlawed rival political activity, eliminating political pluralism, religious educational institutions, and the role of traditional authorities (EU, 2012; MCR, 2012). Also marking this epoch was the mass migration of Portuguese natives, frail infrastructure, nationalization, and economic malpractice (USSD, 2013).

In the third FRELIMO party congress in 1983, President Samora Machel accepted the fiasco presented by socialist policies and began to acknowledge the need for major political and economic reforms. He died, along with several advisers, in a suspect 1986

plane crash. His replacement, Joaquim Chissano, continued the modification initiatives and also began peace talks with RENAMO. Mozambique's new constitution was enacted in 1990 and provided for a multi-party political system that included a market-based economy, and free elections (Sitoe, Matsimbe & Pereira, 2005:6; MCR, 2012:3).

The civil war ultimately ended in October 1992 with the Rome General Peace Accords. Under supervision of the ONUMOZ peacekeeping force of the United Nations, and peace returned to Mozambique. Subsequent the Peace Agreement, FRELIMO controlled the political system and has never left government, captivating all executive elections (1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009). In the year 2004, President Armando Emilio Guebuza was elected as successor to Joaquim Chissano, and in 2015 the presidential office was acquired by Filipe Nyusi, with Carlos Agostinho do Rosario serving as Prime Minister (Sitoe, Matsimbe & Pereira, 2005:6; MCR, 2012:3; Allison, 2014).

#### **4.5.2. Mozambique's economic history and development**

Mozambique's economy is largely based on agriculture, but the country is endowed with rich and extensive natural resources, including vast natural gas reserves and coal, with a growing industry in chemical manufacturing, aluminium and petroleum production. Recovering from the devastation and isolation of the war, its tourism industry is also growing in leaps and bounds (EP, 2010; IFC, 2013).

Successful economic reorganization has led to a high growth rate in Mozambique and consequently the country has enjoyed a remarkable recovery since the end of the war, which, when joined with agreeable rebuilding methods and a steady political system, makes Mozambique one of Africa's success stories (AEO, 2008: 461). However,

according to the World Bank (2012) social inequality is still very high and about half of the populace still lives beneath the national poverty line. As a result, Rodrik (2004: 2011) notes that this indicates that the liberalization plan, which the country has been following for so long, is not breeding good results as far as income per capita is concerned, or even in diversifying the economic structure of the country.

Much of the economic recovery which has followed the end of the Mozambican Civil War is being led by investors from Brazil, South Africa and East Asia. A number of returning Portuguese nationals have also invested in the country as well as some Italian organizations (Smith, 2012). Although the country remains as one of the poorest in the world (EU, 2012), the country so far ranks amongst the fastest growing African countries, making it feasible for us to further observe any growing trends in the country (Rosenblum, 2011).

Unfortunately, economic growth is still primarily driven by foreign-financed “mega-projects” and large aid influxes (AEO, 2008: 461). The *Economist* (29 November 2007) notes that some pundits are sceptical, as to whether the economy of Mozambique is truly developing. They infer that some economists claim that Mozambique’s growth is determined by foreign aid and ‘big capital-intensive foreign investments’, which they maintain, creates few jobs and contributes little to the public benefit. They lament that even after two decades, Mozambique has leaned so heavily on foreign aid, while its local economy has been ineffective as far as development and expansion is concerned and that many of the businesses that do exist, depend on political patronage. Krause & Kaufmann, (2011:6) further adds that Mozambique’s economy is also largely pigeon-holed by subsistence farming which captivates most of the labour force, with a small

number concentrated around manufacturing events, a low variety of exports, uncompetitive small and medium-sized companies, high import dependence and a burdensome officialdom.

Nonetheless, even with these drawbacks and scepticism, supplementary evidence does indicate that Mozambique still remains one of the apex reference points for post-conflict transition, with notable economic growth of around 8 per cent from 2000 to 2006 and constant macro-economic and political stability (AEO, 2008: 461).

Further evidence also indicates that Mozambique's growth is boosted by prosperous investments in mineral resources, production, services, and agro-industry, as well as by the good enactments of the construction subdivision as a consequence of donor-financed groundwork ventures (AEO, 2008: 461). The *Economist* (29 November 2007) indicates that Mozambique has become a lodestone for foreign stockholders mainly because of its minerals. According to AEO (2013) the year 2011 struck a defining moment in Mozambique's economy, with the first foreign export of coal, thus making Mozambique a global exporter of minerals, and paving the way for the country to attain its forthcoming fiscal sustainability over earnings from natural resources. Additionally, according to AEO (2013) the extension of high foreign direct investment (FDI) influxes in Mozambique, mostly in mining industries, together with stout agrarian development and infrastructure speculations, sustained the country's growth to between 7.5% and 7.9% in 2013.

However, even though Mozambique has experienced significant economic recovery in recent years, the country still has flaws which need to be worked at. Thus, international



complementarity with forums such as the South-South may best help Mozambique to quell some of its deterrents.

#### **4.6. Mozambique's relations with Brazil**

Although of much shorter historical duration, the relationship between Mozambique and Brazil is similar to the Angola-Brazil relationship and clearly epitomizes the traditional basis of engagement for Brazil in Africa. As such, up-to-this-minute, and as noted in the previous chapters, this connection stems from its very foundation, based on historical connection, as well as strategic alliances of selective political diplomacy and engagement (White, 2010: 224). However, it is also imperative to note that Brazil's involvement in Mozambique has been less dramatic than that of Angola in the recent past, and as such, literature and studies which more explicitly focus on Brazil-Mozambique relations have remained scarce. This relationship has only started to gain considerable momentum over the course of the last decade as political and economic ties between the two countries, has been expanded and consolidated at a considerably rapid rate (Cau, 2011).

Brazil's relationship with Mozambique started to gain ground just months after Mozambicans won their independence, when on November 15 1975, Brazil officially established diplomatic relations with the inexperienced southern African country (World Bank, 2012: 28). Nevertheless, from 1975 up until the end of the century the degree of interaction between the two countries remained moderately low, and was largely grounded on unsteady political and diplomatic contracts. Trade and the enlargement of public and cultural programs and interactions between the two countries remained

insignificant. Mozambique generally presented a small market for Brazilian exports and also presented few opportunities for Brazil's growing extractive industry to expand. This is all because major mineral deposits and reserves of natural gas and coal had yet to be discovered in the country (Penha, 2011).

Besides, Brazil's hopes to extend relations with Mozambique received a further setback in 1991 when President Collor de Mello visited Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The objective of these visits was to make a first-hand touching base with a view to initiating joint projects which would benefit the African states' development (Campbell, 2009), but Mello's commitment to Africa had not possessed the necessary will nor political basis to implement these modifications to full effect and mutual trust suffered. In addition, even with President Mello's successor, Cardoso's government, there were still no qualitative changes to drive relations. It was only during the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva that Brazil started to act with confidence and political determination, by continually initiating political initiatives on the international scene. The administration of Lula (2003–10) is responsible for championing and revitalizing Brazil's renewed interest in Africa and setting it on a definite footing, as part of the quest to extend Brazil's global influence (World Bank, 2012: 26).

According to Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012), ever since Lula took over, the emergent ties between Brazil and Mozambique have taken on evident fresh proportions with Mozambique quickly becoming a 'hotspot' for Brazilian investments in Africa. Trade among the two nations has since grown rapidly, reaching a staggering US\$ 85.3 million in 2011. Additionally, according to Mozambique's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012) there was a total US\$ 85.3 million in properties traded between the two countries in

2011. Also, Brazil's exports to Mozambique accounted for US\$ 81.2 million of that sum and Mozambique, conversely exported US\$ 4.1 million in goods to Brazil in the same period.

In addition, Brazil's fundamental obligation to advance its commitment to Mozambique was primarily noted when the government of Lula undertook to forgive the moderately insignificant debt of Mozambique. Lula wiped out 95 % of the public debt Mozambique owed to Brazil, some \$315 million, in August 2004, and renegotiated the outstanding balance of \$16 million (Pham, 2010).

This commitment would see the Brazilian firm, Vale do Rio Doce, one of the world's largest iron and steel companies, venturing into its most momentous project in the Mozambican Moatzie coal plant, planning to invest \$1300 million. Consequently, this project was anticipated to produce roughly 11 million tons of both metallurgical coal and thermal coal to be exported not only to Brazil, but also to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This mission required the involvement of twenty other Brazilian firms, and would probably turn Mozambique into Africa's next principal coal producer, after South Africa. Its employment was expected to create 3,000 new local jobs and its ultimate production would employ 1,500 Mozambique nationals permanently. Vale's coal mine in Mozambique is its biggest operation outside Brazil (*The Economist*, 29 November 2007; Pham, 2010).

Progress was also made on the energy sector cooperation, with another Brazilian company, Camargo Correa, a construction company participating in the Nkuwa hydroelectric dam project and also Odebrecht, which is involved in the mining sector.

Their establishments have fixed out most important parts for themselves in the turfs of energy, mining, and infrastructure in Mozambique and other African countries (Barka, 2011:5).

Agriculture is another area where Brazil was and still remains uniquely positioned to help African countries. Among others, Brazil's Agriculture Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) is cooperating with Mozambique's agricultural research institutes (Schläger, 2007). From the year 2010 Brazil's own agricultural sector has gone from virtually colourless levels to \$250 billion, accounting for 35 % of the economy, by a mixture of targeted investments in research to increase yields. Thus Brazil can provide valuable lessons to Mozambique in this regard (Pham, 2010).

Other areas of these carefully nurtured relations are in the area of Biofuels, where Brazil and Mozambique signed two accords in November 2009 for a US\$ 6 billion investment in biofuel exploration in Mozambique. Correspondingly in the health division, Brazil has undertaken US\$ 21 million in assistance in the direction of construction of the continent's first public plant for ARV's in Maputo, Mozambique, to help that country's fight against AIDS (Barka, 2011: 4-7).

All the above stated numbers and facts clearly indicate that President Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva, completely, moved the attention of Brazil's Africa policy from a merely cultural and heritage perspective to economics, trade and investments, as well as agriculture, oil, mining, infrastructure, health, science and technology (Barka, 2011: 1). This is precisely what the leadership of Dilma Rousseff, carried forward, because with her

administration Brazil has continued to place great significance on African extension (Kozloff, 2012).

Over and above Brazil's economic growth, its starring role as a global player, its accomplishment in reducing social inequality, and its development knowledge, continues to offer lessons for African countries. For these reasons, African countries are increasingly seeking Brazil's cooperation, technical assistance, and investment at all times (Michelon, 2011).

#### **4.7. Summary**

As noted in the study, Mozambique encountered a long period of fierce and cruel civil war which saw more than 900,000 people losing their lives because of the war or related scarcity. Other factors that have marked this epoch were the mass migration of Portuguese natives, frail infrastructure, nationalization, and economic malpractice.

After realizing the growing concern presented by socialist policies, Samora Machel began to acknowledge the need for major political and economic reforms. When he died, his successor Joaquim Chissano continued the modification initiatives. All these new initiatives resulted in successful economic reorganization as well as a high growth rate in Mozambique and the country started to enjoy a remarkable recovery over the years. Mozambique has thus from that period onwards disbursed a remarkable development record, which, when joined with concomitant efficient rebuilding methods and a steady political system after decades of war, makes Mozambique one of Africa's success stories.

One of the leading investors that still continue to follow Mozambique's economic recovery is Brazil. Brazil's presence in the country can be connected to the terrain of energy, mining, and infrastructure, agriculture, biofuels and health. Additionally, Brazil's economic growth, its starring role as a global player, its accomplishment in reducing social inequality, and its development knowledge continues to offer lessons for African countries. All these initiatives are clearly indicative of the fact that Brazil still remains uniquely positioned to help African countries and yet again further advances its own ambitious policy of international re-insertion and its active leadership role of furthering the course of African development as well as its stout commitment to intensify and retain the South-South relations.

However, their relationship with Mozambique, as with Angola, Brazil continues to indicate how they have successfully managed to propel themselves to new priorities, which includes the intensification of traditional, economic and political reunions with its old Lusophone partners.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Chapter one of this thesis outlines the motivation for the study, its theoretical and analytical approaches as well as its scope and limitations. The chapter also outlines the study's methodological approach and a literature review. Chapter one additionally goes on to detect and explore Brazil's position in the international arena. What is apparent from the research is that Brazil's foreign relations have changed significantly in recent years. Brazil has combined its direct action in the global arena, with a greater stress on consensual relations with developing countries from the South. As a result, they keep advancing their policy of diversification and international integration when engaging with countries on the African continent. This has steered them into a new epoch of international ascendancy that finds them entangled in a flaring chase for global hegemony.

By aligning itself with the theme of the study, the Chapter also gives a brief dissection of Brazil's presence in Africa. There has been some difference in opinion about Brazil's growing presence in Africa, of whether this relationship is informed by commercial interests or development co-operation. The chapter also sockets the reality that nowadays Africa has turned out to be the new venture concourse, for many countries in the world, with developmental benefits. Whereas, Brazil continues to offers a growth model for the growing markets of Africa's produce and financing an increasing number of infrastructure projects and programmes across the continent.

Chapter Two (The role of critical theory) of the thesis deals with the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. The thesis' main diagnostic tool in this regard was the critical theory of hegemony. In view of that, this chapter elucidated the Brazil global behaviour from a different perspective. The general significance of critical theory as a theoretical component mainly presented the study with notional implications, as a substitute to giving a mere documentation of various conjectural structures and processes. Alternatively the critical theory was expanded and interlaced with the concept 'hegemony' and as a result the critical theory of hegemony formed the bases of the study's general examination, and this theory was used to elucidate the central proposition of the study.

Evidently, as suggested by the study the critical theory of hegemony mainly highlighted the idiosyncratic features of power and eliminated the prominent notion that power exist in unbiased alignments. In this case the theory suggests that power and hegemony in the more generic sense relates the practice of ruling by consent, as well as the 'traditional and intellectual leadership' attained by a specific class, in a social stratum and is contained in a larger scheme of class dominance and control.

Fundamentally the theory describes the hegemonic practice as intellectual and moral governance which merges components of consensus and persuasion and thus gives birth of consensual hegemony. Consensual hegemony as the reading suggests might be very expedient for depicting and clarifying the arrangement of Brazil's strategy for international affairs strategy.



Through the progression of this analysis we have constantly attempted to highlight the consensus and persuasion alignments that shape the Brazilian strategy. Instead of relying in traditional concepts of hegemony, Brazil has molded a consensus-building approach with Brazil at the core of this initiative. Brazil has also preferred to follow a hegemonic project based on dialogue and using a combination of respites which rests on three perspectives: 'inclusion and cooption, ethico-political values and structural consensus' all of which are manifested in Brazil's international approach to spread its norms and values around its area of influence.

Nevertheless, as much as 'soft power or consensual hegemony' might suffice in explaining Brazil's behaviour, the study stressed that discourse should however not be immersed in the notion that Brazil has flourished impeccably in forming a consensual hegemony. However the study emphasized that the discourse should be fashioned on the fact that the idea is worthwhile for understanding the governance plan of a semi-powerful state.

Chapter Three gives an assessment of Brazil-Africa relations, which have been renewed in a remarkable way in recent years. Steered by President Lula, Brazil began to be noted as a developing power with new-found prosperity, with a great commitment to establishing a viable engagement in the global arena with a bigger emphasis on bilateral relations with developing countries from the South. On the other hand, Africa is destined to also play a pivotal role in this and in Brazil's global agenda. What transpires from the study is that Brazil continues to offers a growth model for the growing markets of Africa's produce and financing an increasing number of infrastructure projects and

programmes across the continent, whilst Africa, on the other hand, continues to provide access to strategic mineral resources and markets.

Chapter four explicates Brazil's political and economic connection with two Lusophone African countries - mainly Mozambique and Angola. In attempting to give an effective answer to the above investigation, research indicates that the relationship between Brazil and Lusophone Africa clearly epitomizes the traditional basis of engagement for Brazil in Africa. Brazil's strategy of focusing first on Portuguese-speaking Africa (Angola and Mozambique, among others) is often portrayed as a shrewd idea, which expands the intensification of the traditional, economic and political re-establishment of strong ties with countries of a similar heritage to that of Brazil.

Furthermore, Brazil's interaction with both Mozambique and Angola grants viable avenues to mutual advantages where the basic cause of integration has become central to the rapid acceleration of global trade growth. Additionally, Brazil's economic growth, its starring role as a global player, its accomplishment in reducing social inequality, and its development of knowledge, continues to offer lessons for African countries. All these initiatives are clearly indicative of the fact that Brazil remains uniquely positioned to help African countries, as they also, however, simultaneously seek to advance their own self-interest. Brazil aims to achieve its goals by perusing an ambitious policy of international reinsertion by furthering the course of African development by showing a strong commitment to intensify and retain the South-South relations.

Moreover, the study copiously endeavoured to analyse all the set targets and aims of the study throughout the different chapters. Essentially, to aide-mémoire the aims and targets of the study can be delineated as follows:

- What is the underlying motivation for Brazil's interest in Africa?
- What is the nature of Brazil's engagement with Africa and how does it affect the continent?
- What are the implications of Brazil's interest and presence in Africa?

In the main, for the purpose of clarity let us give a synopsis of the manner in which the different aims of the study were addressed. To address the first aim, the study meticulously indicates that Brazil's deepened arrangement with Africa exhibits both geopolitical aspirations and economic objectives. On the other hand, sympathetic observers are more inclined to talk up political economic solidarity as well as cultural sensitivity in this relationship. As the study indicates, there is some degree of truth to both these claims. But truth is Brazil's development projects in Africa as a whole are extensively focused on mining, oil and gas, and infrastructure development, amongst others. As such and as the reading specifies, Brazil's engagements with Africa profits Brazil more, thus giving better propensity to the notion of consensual hegemony. However, regardless of the lopsided nature of relations, the strategic importance of resource trading is that it presents pragmatic gains that primarily encourage Brazilian companies to invest more in Africa and for African counties to export more to Brazil.

More so, instantaneously addressing the second aim, increasing trade and investment activities between Brazil and Africa has in recent years presented significant opportunities for socio-economic development, positive joint trade and economic

expansion for both parties. South–South cooperation thus remains an emergent mechanism that underpins Brazil and Africa’s economic future and cooperation, through partnerships, knowledge exchange, as well as finance. This has heralded an innovative epoch of foreign relations that goes beyond just independence from the centres of global supremacy and practical assignation with options to gratify a nationalist-type ideology, based on new imperatives to reduce traditional economic and political power asymmetries.

Brazil seeks to shape a new trade arrangement that will place emerging countries at the pole position of energy and food security, and resource management. However, the Brazil Africa arrangement should thus not be perceived as an economic scheme and even less as an artless plan to secure resources (like many would perceive China and India). More so, Brazil’s envelopment and growing existence in Africa mirrors the country’s larger foreign policy drive of being acknowledged amid the key players in world politics.

Brazil’s foreign relations objectives provide for growing opportunities for South-South cooperation. In both economic and political circles, Brazil is seeking to expand its influence. Accordingly Brazil continues to expand its diplomatic and economic relations with its African counterparts. Facts dubbed from the graft clearly indicate that Brazil and Africa seem keen to maintain an association that spans a vibrant co-operative climate.

Furthermore, the overall implications of Brazil’s presence and interest in Africa is that the betrothal itself goes a long way in furthering Brazil’s internationalization initiative in general. As the reading indicates, this is a multifaceted, inter-related, pragmatic and

programmatic process that Brazil seems to have managed well through a high degree of diplomatic sophistication and open cooperation between political, commercial and various development bodies. As such, Africa displays one of the best contextual examples of Brazil's delicate balancing act between commercial and strategic interests and external development assistance as well as historical affinity.

Besides, Brazil's web of relations all the way through African nowadays extends beyond the longstanding affinity for the continent's Lusophone countries. Brazil's has recently made numerous strides into Francophone and even Anglophone nations such as Nigeria, thus further expanding the countries relations with the broader African continent. More so, as Brazil continues to consolidate its position in Africa through massive investments, this seems to create a new source of development subsidy for the African continent.

In summation, Brazil seems keen to continue and advance its presence through all the corners of the African continent. Given its recent progress and global emergence, Brazil's role in this wide-ranging engagement seems encoded. But, Africa is also bound to also play a fundamental role in this engagement and in Brazil's global agenda.

### **Observations and Recommendations**

- It is evident from the overall conception of the study that Brazil's position in the international arena has changed significantly in recent years. Brazil has combined its direct action in the global arena, with a greater stress on consensual relations with developing countries from the South. As a result, they

must keep advancing their policy of divergence and international incorporation when engaging with developing countries, particularly Africa.

- As discussed by the theme of the study, Brazil's presence in Africa continues to grow, and the manner in which Africans see Brazil will unavoidably be altered. There has been some difference in opinion about Brazil's growing presence in Africa, of whether this relationship is informed by commercial interests or development co-operation. However, like India and China, Brazil's economic engagement to some extent has been predominantly concentrated in the resource and construction sector. Brazil should thus work tirelessly to ensure that its arrangement with Africa is not perceived as an economic scheme and even less as an artless plan (like many observers recognize India and China) to secure resources.
- Despite the fact that its presence is still much less significant than that of India or China, Brazil needs to be cautious and try to avoid some of the mistakes made by China, who now runs the danger of being confronted by a hostile response from the African continent.
- The challenge that remains for Brazil is how the image or 'soft power' may be generally reputed by Africans, their presence may invoke a feeling that Brazil is a true partner in development, or worse they might be seen a new colonizer who merely seeks to exploit Africa's resources, by employing soft-imperialism.
- As a final point, as Brazil's relationship with Africa continues to grow and lexes such as 'soft power' continues to manifest, Brazil may run the risk of being

confronted by a hostile response from the African continent. The challenge that remains for Brazil is to continue its charge of being seen as a true partner, and not a new colonizer who merely seeks to exploit Africa's resources.

- Regardless of the structural improvements formerly being discussed, the utmost trial for the impending future of Brazilian arrangement with Africa will be the understanding of the purposes and practices of development cooperation and economic collaboration, as well as the advancement of a method that reflects the primacies of the African states in which Brazil gets involved.
- Another step in the right direction that may quell any impending criticism of this relationship could be the designation of a monitoring structure for international collaboration – which may possibly comprise the formation of a new assistance agency – as well as the formation of a detailed approach which oversees Brazil's overall involvement with Africa.

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