

**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEVELOPMENT AID IN LESOTHO FOR
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION**

by

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ABSTRACT

The thesis commences with the discussion that looks at the process of development aid as a catalyst for good governance and political transformation. This includes the practice of capacity building and reforms of institutions of governance and transformation, but also the technical introduction of institutions of accountability and development agenda. It sets also in motion the idea of policy reform agenda and capacity building to encourage the further channelling of development aid to achieving development outcomes.

The thesis sets out that development aid is still continuing in Lesotho but the country is unable to pull out of the poverty cycles or to economically and socially achieve minimum standards of development and self-sustainability. In these circumstances, it will appear apparent that overseas development aid is likely to continue as is becoming a primary source of income in Lesotho.

The study demonstrates that aid is a catalyst for development which in order to be effective, must be directed to supporting good governance and political transformation. Aid thus has been given on the belief set that it's a means for capacity building to assist the developing countries to achieve far reaching goals that would help them in attaining development, economic growth and pulling out of poverty. The tone of this study discusses aspects of aid and development that can explain these patterns of growth, building on recent critical studies of aid and development in good governance and political transformation mostly across other African countries. It points to features that are inherent in foreign aid, but have become increasingly relevant with the recent changes in development discourse that seem to produce economic gains and greater social development outcomes.

This study will make use of a descriptive and explanatory correlation method of research aimed at evaluating the contribution of development aid to good governance and transformation in Lesotho. It thus describes and seeks to understand the development aid discourse and its contribution to good governance and political transformation.

It also makes use of the theories of development, governance and transformation to draw conclusions relating to how development aid can be effective if good governance and political transformation can be achieved.

The study forms a large part of the global argument that draws relationship between aid effectiveness and good governance and political transformation.

The study's conclusion provides recommendations about how to appropriately ensure the continuation of development aid to achieve good governance and political transformation based on the case of Lesotho. The recommendations lay parameters for the success of Lesotho's aid effectiveness agenda and sustainable development outcomes.

ABSTRAK

Die tesis begin met 'n bespreking van die proses van ontwikkelingshulp as 'n katalisator vir goeie regeerkunde en politieke transformasie. Dit sluit in die praktyk van kapasiteitsbou en die hervorming van instellings van regeerkunde en transformasie, maar ook die tegniese bekenstelling van instellings van verantwoordbaarheid en ontwikkelingsagenda. Ook word bespreek die idee van 'n agenda vir beleidshervorming en kapasiteitsbou vir die verdere kanalisering van ontwikkelingshulp om ontwikkelingsuitkomst te bereik.

Die tesis stel dit dat ontwikkelingshulp steeds voortgaan in Lesotho, maar dat die land nie in staat is om uit die siklus van armoede te ontsnap nie of om die minimum ekonomiese of sosiale standaard van ontwikkeling en selfonderhoud te bereik nie. In hierdie omstandighede blyk dit dat buitelandse ontwikkelingshulp waarskynlik sal voortgaan as primêre bron van inkomste in Lesotho.

Die studie demonstreer dat hulp 'n katalisator vir ontwikkeling is wat, ten einde effektief te wees, gemik moet wees op die ondersteuning van goeie regeerkunde en politieke transformasie. Hulp word dus verleen gegrond op die idee dat dit 'n middel is vir kapasiteitsbou waarmee ontwikkelende lande bygestaan word in die bereik van verreikende doelwitte wat kan help met die vestiging van ontwikkeling, ekonomiese groei en die breek van die armoedesiklus. Die studie bespreek die aspekte van hulp en ontwikkeling wat hierdie groeipatrone kan verduidelik, gebaseer op onlangse kritiese studies van hulp en ontwikkeling in goeie regeerkunde en politieke transformasie, meestal in ander Afrika-lande. Dit wys op kenmerke wat inherent is aan buitelandse hulp, maar wat toenemend relevant geword het met onlangse veranderinge in ontwikkelingsdiskoers wat blyk om ekonomiese groei te skep en groter sosiale ontwikkelingsuitkomst te behaal.

Die studie maak gebruik van 'n beskrywende en verduidelikende korrelasie-metode van navorsing, gemik op die evaluering van die bydrae van ontwikkelingshulp tot goeie regeerkunde en transformasie in Lesotho. Dit is daarop gemik om die ontwikkelingshulpdiskoers en die bydrae daarvan tot goeie regeerkunde en politieke transformasie te beskryf en te begryp.

Dit maak ook gebruik van die teorieë van ontwikkeling, regeerkunde en transformasie om gevolgtrekkings te maak rakende hoe ontwikkelingshulp effektief kan wees in die bereik van goeie regeerkunde en politieke transformasie.

Die studie vorm deel van die globale argument wat 'n verband trek tussen effektiewe hulp en goeie regeerkunde en politieke transformasie.

Die studie se samevatting verskaf voorstelle oor hoe om die voortsetting van ontwikkelingshulp toepaslik te verseker ten einde goeie regeerkunde en politieke transformasie te bereik, gebaseer op die geval van Lesotho. Die voorstelle verskaf riglyne vir die sukses van Lesotho se hulpeffektiwiteitsagenda en uitkomste rakende volhoubare ontwikkeling.

Keywords: good governance, governance, political transformation, transformation, development aid, foreign aid, overseas development assistance, aid effectiveness, development, Lesotho

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my father and mother, Aaron Tilo Nko and 'Marelebohile Nko. Thank you for believing in me always, supporting and encouraging me to go on.

God bless you always

DECLARATION

- (i) I, Edward Rets'elisoetsoe Nko, declare that the thesis (or interrelated publishable manuscripts/published articles or mini-thesis) that I herewith submit for the Philosophiae Doctor Degree, for the Programme in Governance and Political Transformation at the University of the Free State, is my independent work, and that I have not previously submitted it for a qualification at another institution of higher education.”

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May 2017

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ACRONYMS

AAA	-	Accra Agenda for Action
AAIL	-	Action Aid International Lesotho
ABC	-	All Basotho Convention
ACTSA	-	Action for Southern Africa
ADB	-	Asian Development Bank
ADF	-	African Development Forum
AfDB	-	African Development Bank
AGN	-	African Governance Newsletter
AGOA	-	Africa Growth Opportunity Act
AMP	-	Alternative Modes of Production
ALAFA	-	Apparel Lesotho Alliance to Fight Aids
APRM	-	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	-	African Union
AUCPCCA	-	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in Africa
BADEA	-	Arab Bank for Development in Africa
BNP	-	Basutoland National Party
BCP	-	Basotho Congress Party
BPOA	-	Brussels Programme of Action
BRICS	-	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BTI	-	Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index
CABRI	-	Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative
CBL	-	Central Bank of Lesotho
CBO	-	Community Based Organization
CCA	-	Common Country Assessment
CCR	-	Country Review Report
CDGG	-	Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance
CIDA	-	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDSE	-	Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité
CIPFA	-	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
CHAL	-	Christian Health Association of Lesotho
ChRAIC	-	Connecting Health Research in Africa and Ireland Consortium
CPAR	-	Country Procurement Annual Review
CSO	-	Civil Society Organization
CSP	-	Country Strategy Paper
CSPRF	-	Civil Society Poverty Reduction Forum
DANIDA	-	Danish International Development Agency
DC	-	Democratic Congress
DCD-DAC	-	Development Corporation Division-Development Assistance Cooperation
DCEO	-	Directorate of Crime and Economic Offences
DCI	-	Development Cooperation International
DFiD	-	Department for International Development
DPCF	-	Development Partners Consultative Forum
EAC	-	East African Community
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	-	European Development Fund
EFT	-	Education Fast-Track Initiative

EISA	-	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EmONC	-	Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care
EPA	-	Economic Partnership Agreements
ESCAP	-	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
EDF	-	European Development Fund
EU	-	European Union
FAO	-	Food and Agricultural Organization
FDI	-	Foreign Direct Investment
FPTP	-	First-Past-The-Post
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GFU	-	Global Fund Unit
GIZ	-	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNP	-	Gross National Product
GoL	-	Government of Lesotho
GOLFIS	-	Government of Lesotho Financial Information System
GSGDA	-	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
GTZ	-	German Technical Cooperation
HDI	-	Human Development Index
HIPC	-	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HLF	-	High Level Forum
HAS	-	Health Service Assessment
HSS	-	Health Systems Strengthening
IA	-	Irish Aid
IA-DAC	-	Irish Aid Development Assistance Cooperation
IAEA	-	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICPF	-	International Commission on Peace and Food
ICRC	-	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	-	Information and Communication Technology
IDA	-	International Development Assistance
IDPM	-	Institute for Development Policy and Management
IDRC	-	International Development Research Centre
IEC	-	Independent Electoral Commission
IFAD	-	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI	-	International Financing Institution
IFMIS	-	Integrated Financial Management Information System
ILO	-	International Labour Organisation
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	-	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IPA	-	Interim Political Authority
IPC	-	International Poverty Centre
ISS	-	Institute for Security Studies
KfW	-	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
KoL	-	Kingdom of Lesotho
LCD	-	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LCN	-	Lesotho Council of NGOs
LDCs	-	Least Developed Countries
LENA	-	Lesotho News Agency
LDHS	-	Lesotho Demographic and Health Survey
LNCM	-	Lesotho Network for Conflict Management
LGNSP	-	Local Government and Non-State Actors Programme
LRA	-	Lesotho Revenue Authority

LUNDAP	-	Lesotho United Nations Development Assistance Programme
MCA	-	Millennium Challenge Account
MCGs	-	Millennium Challenge Goals
MDGs	-	Millennium Development Goals
MDB	-	Multilateral Development Banks
MFP	-	Marematlou Freedom Party
MICs	-	Middle Income Countries
MOLGC	-	Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy
MOSD	-	Ministry of Social Development
MSH	-	Management Health Sciences
MTEF	-	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
MTR	-	Mid Term Review
NAC	-	National Aids Commission
NDF	-	National Development Framework
NIP	-	National Indicative Programme
NEPAD	-	New Economic Partnership for Africa Development
NGOs	-	Non Governmental Organizations
NORAD	-	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
NDP	-	National Development Policy
NSDP	-	National Strategic Development Plan
ODA	-	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	-	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OECD/DAC	-	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR	-	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBB	-	Performance-Based Budgeting
PD	-	Paris Declaration
PEPFAR	-	President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
PFM	-	Public Financial Management
PFMRAP	-	Public Finance Management Reform Action Plan
PFR	-	Public Financial Reforms
PMTCT	-	Prevention-From-Mother-to-Child
PR	-	Proportional Representation
PRS	-	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSIRP	-	Public Sector Reform and Improvement Programme
RDP	-	Reconstruction and Development Programmes
SACU	-	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
SAPs	-	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SCIL	-	Support for Civil Society in Lesotho
SDA	-	Service Delivery Agenda
SDGs	-	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA	-	Swedish International Development Agency
SIPR	-	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TRC	-	Transformation Resource Centre
UN	-	United Nations
UNAIDS	-	United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS
UNCCD	-	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCT	-	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	-	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	-	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNDAF	-	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNECA	-	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCAP	-	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCO	-	United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	-	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	-	United Nations General Assembly
UNGASS	-	United Nations General Assembly Special Session
UNICEF	-	United Nations Children's Fund
US	-	United States
USAID	-	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	-	Value Added Tax
VCT	-	Voluntary Counselling and Testing
WB	-	World bank
WFP	-	World Food Programme
WHO	-	World Health Organization
WTO	-	World Trade organization

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CHAPTER 1

THE GROUND SETTING CONTEXT

1.1 Introduction

*Perpetuating Poverty*¹, a book by Bandow and Vasquez (1994), speaks of circumstances where development aid programmes have had negative impact on developing countries by putting them in situations of economic failure and provided less attention to reform the markets. Moore (1997:20) laments that in fact nations that nations that were in receipt of less sums of development and foreign aid have overtime proved to be more developed economically as opposed to those that recorded higher injection of “help” or assistance. This has been a recent outcry from all over the world, but specifically in Africa. Perspectives include, for example, that, “... while the world’s aid poured in, most of the continent’s economies floundered. Poverty spread and deepened. Africa cemented its image as the world’s basket case. Today the African continent, with almost 15% of the world’s population, accounts for less than 3% of global GDP, according to the World Bank” (Good Governance Africa, 2013:1). From this perspective, the point of contention is that development aid is not a viable option and should be discontinued. The embedded non-performance is attributed to the structural transformation of governance institutions and service delivery failures to address the needs of systems reform processes. It is Riddle’s view that discussions on providing aid should be clearly distinguished between Official Development Assistance (ODA) which is intended for promotion of development and reduction of poverty - “development aid” as opposed to the aid sanctioned for emergency response purposes or “humanitarian aid” (Riddle, 2009:2). In this regard, as a result of the indetermined nature of the intentions of development aid today, critics from Bauer (2000) painting a picture from the 1980s to Moyo (2010) affirm that they do not object to the intension and provision of emergency aid.

¹*Liberal critics of international lending and financing institutions are of the opinion that grass roots and community based movements form the basis for alternative development. Emphatically, this is premised on the argument of scholars (Moyo, 2009, Barder, 2009 and Moore 1997) who raise critical dispositions that as for the Third World, aid has perpetuated poverty that stimulate development. Instead they believe that opening gate way for corporate capitalism and free trade in place of aid and loans will enhance economic growth and development performance of underdeveloped countries. This argument while having received high volume of acceptance from a considerable amount of observers, the issue of perpetual underdevelopment still remains unaddressed.*

With this background above, the study seeks to review and unleash the vernacular of aid effectiveness in Lesotho with a specific focus on the contribution of development aid towards good governance and political transformation for enhanced social outcomes.

1.1.1 Common agenda and development aid

Although developed countries drew strategies and working approaches contained in White Papers and policy documents (ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement, 2000; Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD), Rome 2005, or the Accra Agenda for Action 2008 (AAA), The High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (4th HLF) or the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011), such strategies, especially at the phase where countries went back to the “drawing boards”, did not capture the unique characteristics of the African socio-economic orientation compared to other developing and developed regions in Asia and Latin America. Analysis of these policy documents mentioned above suggests that the agenda on development focused more on achieving effectiveness of aid for development outcomes. As demonstrated by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or Better Life Index, 2013), under the OECD/DAC with engagement of variety of development stakeholders remain the reliable international frameworks that assess the quality of aid. The substance of the Paris Declaration/Accra Agenda for Action both embraced the “value for money” principle and the “Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (an OECD/DAC led initiative) which became the most comprehensive and reliable global instrument for promotion of mutual accountability and enhanced development effectiveness.

It follows the position of the OECD above that the orthodox donor approach to governance analysed problems in developing countries looking at their deficiencies as opposed to the later ideal model espoused post the millennium era (MDG Report, 2012:3). Even so, The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which were adopted in 2000 and guided development action for 15 years ended in December 2015, and from January 1, 2016 the Sustainable Development Goals came into force. While reviewing the progress made in implementing the MDGs, one of the weaknesses observed was the lack of multi-stakeholder awareness and participation.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which is guided by the principle of openness, consensus, inclusiveness and transparency can help to overcome this challenge. The importance of having a strong national commitment and the need to apply an integrated multi-level and multi-stakeholder approach to promote transformative agenda at the local level cannot be over emphasized. Likewise, The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development calls for a robust and review process to track the progress made in MDGs hence also encapsulates the global commitment to aid effectiveness (Schwandt, 2016). This view however does not discard the long term vision of aid in helping poorer nations to establish inclusive and rule based public authority. Tapping from the assumptions built from the PD/AAA short term and medium term plans, it remains important to establish if relationship based arrangements could offer a better way to make progress. As opposed to the fundamental position in development agenda, Moyo (2010:xix) submits that aid will have to be cut in the long run, arguing that her plan will transform a poor, aid-dependent country into a prosperous free-market economy, and thus transform the perception on aid as the optimum solution to the problem of Africa's poverty. Contrary to Moyo's scepticism about development aid, Barder (2009:2) states that there are noticeable benefits of aid towards the most immediate beneficiaries (such as children who receive free primary education), even though there are incidences of abject poverty that persist. The central assumption in Barder above is that the same benefits of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) have still not provided any positive evidence on the overall impact on growth and development; although there is sufficient evidence and data sets showing that the flow of aid has increased in African states over time.

Following the above premise, the purpose of this study is to critically review the experiences and contribution of ODA, with a focus on Lesotho towards progressive political transformation and good governance. The review is based on the principles enshrined in the pillars of aid effectiveness. These pillars provide a ground-breaking path towards political transformation and good governance, which encourages the need to re-strategise the agenda of development assistance and foreign aid towards curbing poverty and enhancing social outcomes. The substance of this thesis is in line with the argument by Steinle and Correll (2008:4-6) who note that the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness essentially embraces the need to scale-up aid for

more effective results. The Paris Declaration embraces the strategic strengthening of partner countries' national development strategies and operational frameworks². This study will investigate whether the concessions of the Paris Declaration and aid modalities are the answer to good governance and political transformation. Essentially, with a strategic approach to aid effectiveness, harmonisation, alignment and results will be measured clearly, to deal further with the presumptions that Sub-Saharan Africa poses as a central locus of economic underperformance and political instability.

However, this statement appears to have become increasingly dated with the underscored 2013 GPI results (Global Peace Index, 2013:11). The Paris Declaration thus, in effect, addresses weaknesses in partner countries' priorities³. The underlying question is whether the weaknesses herein have been transformed by the injection of aid to reap far-reaching results for good governance and political transformation. On the other hand, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) on aid effectiveness is principled on structural and systemic transformation and good governance as the core towards which aid is provided and under which there is more ownership of the process and programmes. With this note above, two (2) issues surface, success of development aid is dependent on good governance principles being maintained; again where good results have been achieved in the development path, can this be also attributed to having been resultant to receiving development aid? Similarly, the Busan 4th High Level Forum (HLF-4)⁴ emphasised the global commitment of donor partners to development effectiveness; the global progress assessed improvement in the quality of aid against the agreed development plans and commitments; commitment to delivering shared global targets; and Busan Outcome document to

²Statement of resolution passed by Ministers from both the developed and developing nations, Heads of Multilateral and Bilateral development institutions who play a role in promotion of development at a meeting held in Paris on the 2nd March 2005. The statement reiterated their resolve to ensure extensive and monitorable actions to reform the means through which they deliver and provide aid ahead of the review and evaluation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) from 20 to 22 September 2010 (see Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005).

³The PD purpose as contained in the opening statement, "Statement of Resolve" emphasises the reform process in providing and managing aid for attainment of aid effectiveness as a requirement to make progress towards reaching the global agenda and goals, particularly the MDGs (see Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005).

⁴The Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) took place in Busan, South Korea, in 2011. This meeting followed a series of HLFs on Aid Effectiveness since their inception in Rome in 2003, Paris 2005 and Accra 2008. The Busan Outcome document emphasised on (a) shared principles for global partnership; (b) deepened and focused aid effectiveness commitments (c) commitments to strengthen development effectiveness, and (d) framework for a future inclusive global partnership for effective development cooperation, that includes monitoring frameworks for selective and relevant indicators.

serve as agreement to reduce global poverty and achieve the MDG targets. Similarly, the progresses made in MDGs need to be evaluated and tracked into the new global agenda for Sustainable Development which is rights based and commits stakeholders to work together to promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth, social development and sees the benefit of aid changing livelihoods for all by 2030. This study is testing this assumption with a critical review of the theorem placed upon development aid that it necessarily improves the recipient's performance in terms of good governance and political transformation.

The Development Corporation Directorate (DAC), in a statement at a sitting of Joint Process Towards Enhanced Aid Effectiveness, postulated that aid may be effective where recipient countries show reciprocal commitment to embracing the efforts that aid is intended to address (www.oecd.org). DAC statement remains correct to an extent that it reflected the views of international commitment to support reforms needed to speed up aid effectiveness and achievement of global development agenda and goals, especially the MDGs by end of 2015 (Accra High Level Forum-3, 2008), and continues a similar approach in the post 2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In effect, the aid institutions presuppose that aid should be seen to contribute to more enhanced social outcomes, which as mentioned earlier will include strengthening systems, strategies and operations, act as a catalyst to achieve MDGs⁵, curb poverty and hunger, as well as contribute to more improved social outcomes, such as political reforms and structural and systemic strengthening to improve good governance and service delivery. According to Gulrajani (2010), these are in fact the cornerstones of theoretical and practical knowledge on how to improve aid to deliver high performance.

⁵*In order to enhance the impact of development aid, the democratically sustainable ownership of development policies and the alignment of these approaches with partners owned strategies, it is subsumed that the approach in development is aimed at supporting the cropping up societal structures that are in favour of providing public goods, inclusive education and health systems, the rule of law and sustainable management of natural resources (Faust 2010:515).*

1.1.2 The resonances of development aid

A number of scholars operate from the assumption that development aid across countries, Lesotho included, implies a transition from a traditional to a modern state of existence, in which economic modernisation holds the key to political development and, in turn, political development will be secured when political modernity has been achieved (Parsons, 1951; Lerner, 1958; Almond & Verba, 1963; Lipset, 1981). These assumptions are consistent with earlier positions of the development agenda (PD; HLF-4; AAA) that development aid in itself has focused more on institutional strengthening and systems reform process, thus, good governance and political transformation respectively. These thoughts have also influenced the position of donors in Lesotho, particularly the theory of development assistance practiced by one of Lesotho's longest bilateral donors, Irish Aid, since the early 1970s. The donor's long-term experience in Lesotho and the international perspective of aid and development have set the tone for the development agenda in Lesotho. The Irish Aid Assistance Development Programme aligned its theory to the international donor perspective in 2006 by the then Taoiseach,⁶ Bertie Ahern TD, who emphatically gave his commitment to Irish Aid assistance towards the achievement of the MDGs⁷ and other specific sets of targets, to enable such goals to be measured. The White Paper on Irish Aid (2006:9) provided that

Development cooperation is an integral part of Ireland's foreign policy. Poverty reduction, to reduce vulnerability and increase opportunity, is the overarching objective of Irish Aid. Ireland will support the promotion of human development, human security and justice, the building and strengthening of democracy, the promotion of gender equality and the promotion and protection of human rights.

It is argued in this thesis that donor agencies, such as Irish Aid, have provided context to the development agenda in Lesotho and have set the tone for the school of thought on aid effectiveness, good governance, and political transformation. The first aid modality on aid effectiveness by Irish Aid in Lesotho provided a budget

⁶*This is the appointed governor, the Taoiseach by the President upon nomination of Dáil Éireann (the lower house of the Oireachtas) and must retain the support of the majority in the Dail while he remains in office. The Taoiseach role is that of the Prime Minister.*

⁷*The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight international development goals that all 192 nation members and at least 23 international organisations have agreed to achieve by the year 2015. They include reducing extreme poverty, reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease epidemics such as Aids, and developing a global partnership for development.*

support modality that strategically assumed that in order to harness results; a larger budget should be provided towards government to assist in development planning, good governance and systemic political transformation (Irish Aid, 2013). In addition, Louis Michel, a member of the Commission in Charge of Development and Humanitarian Aid for the European Community in Lesotho, indicated through the National Indicative Programme (2008-2013) that the Community Assistance Programme was premised solely on a well-defined framework for development. It put emphasis on the pursuit for economic growth as a main issue of contention, followed by improving living conditions for the poor in line with education, health and environment including public sector reforms and sustainable local governance institutions and public service (European Commission, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme, 2008-2013:iii).

From a different perspective, it appeared that the global development goals set for Lesotho in the form of MDGs had ambitious targets yet achievable. For the MDGs, the main goal was on reduction of poverty implicit in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, the Lesotho MDGs and the Country National Vision Document, the Vision 2020. At a later stage post the 2015 Development Agenda and the incoming transcendent Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, the development agenda put at its centre the reduction of poverty with 17 sustainable, less ambitious goals, 169 indicators and over 240 targets aimed at addressing all the cornerstones that represent effective development goals and outcomes. In this regard, while Lesotho PRSP envisaged sustainable economic growth through private business development, the post 2015 global Agenda 2030 aligned with the National Strategic and Development Plan to attain sustainable livelihoods and investment in key populations to reach the development targets. It cannot be left behind that the 2030 Agenda also succeeded the MDGs and took forward the *baton* of the aid effectiveness agenda. The 2030 Agenda includes 17 SDGs with 169 targets. The SDGs seek to build on the Millennium Development Goals and complete what these did not achieve. Additionally, SDGs are integrated global goals and indivisible and balance the three dimensions in the MDGs, the economic, social and environmental taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting the national policies and priorities (UN, 2015).

Scholars such as Edelman and Haugerud (2007) are of the view that development aid has evolved alongside the nature of world governance and that, at the end of the Second World War as the dominant European powers faced the end of their colonial empire, development aid was re-imagined as a way to “improve” the economies of the soon-to-be “independent” nations, essentially establishing a dependent relationship that would in many cases continue up to the present day (Edelman & Haugerud 2007:51). The point Edelman and Haugerud (*ibid.*) make is that it is important not to translate the success of developing states simply into a plea for a policy of economic liberalisation. In that respect the distinction that Kharas (2007:16) makes between “market-enhancing strategies” and “growth-enhancing strategies” is relevant to attribute to aid as a catalyst for development.

One possible consequence from the above is the affirmation of the need to address good governance and political transformation as important points of departure towards aid effectiveness and in achieving development in the form of improved social outcomes. It is implied that systems strengthening and transformation reforms form the core of development aid to achieve national priorities and development goals. In substantiating this assertion, Huntington (1969:1-8) argues that political development in a state provides an indication of the authorities’ ability to govern effectively, and to maintain political order - indeed what is non-existent in the Third World. This form of thinking from Huntington has contributed to the shift in focus from supporting political transformation to achieving political order so that the institution of governance will be in a position to deliver services effectively, hence good governance.

1.1.3 Considerations about development aid

The perspective introduced herein attempts to analyse the parameters on which development aid is to be tested in order to contribute to the effective achievement of development goals in all social outcomes and measurable targets with specific emphasis on the MDGs (political order, human rights and good governance). Although the SDGs are transcendent to the MDGs, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will also offer insights as it affirms that the follow-up and review processes of the MDGs will be attended rigorously and based on evidence informed by evaluations and data at country level. This implies that the global agenda for aid

effectiveness will identify achievements, gaps and critical success factors. Owing to the time spent and predominance in the field of development aid assistance in Lesotho, Irish Aid has set the tone for the development agenda in Lesotho for the substantive period of the Millennium Development Agenda era:

Ireland's development cooperation policy is an integral part of Ireland's wider foreign policy. Our aid philosophy is rooted in our foreign policy, in particular its objectives of peace and justice. Our development cooperation and policy and programme reflect our longstanding commitment to human rights and fairness in international relations and are inseparable from Irish Aid foreign policy as a whole (Ahern, 2008).

The same perspective was shared by other development partners in Lesotho, including the United Nations, the European Union, World Bank and the US supported Millennium Challenge Account Lesotho (MCA), suggesting that their basis for maintaining development partnerships had to do with meeting government's constraints in capacity development, weak management structures and governance systems and lack of collaborative approaches in order to meet the MDGs and achieve far-reaching social outcomes. Adding to the foundations of aid policy, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework Evaluation Report 2011 (UNDAF, 2011) provided a robust recommendation showing that the process of policy development must at all times be accompanied by a strong support system for policy implementation that focuses on building national capacity to perform and respond to set targets. The issues were addressed in the following Lesotho UN Programme Strategy 2013-2017 that leveraged on the Delivering-As-One Approach within the UN Agencies in Lesotho thus enabling complementary investment by UN agencies to achieve the common goal as aligned to National Strategic Development Plan 2013-2017. The consensual tone of these main development partners answered the question about the rationale for development aid assistance in Lesotho as a fundamental issue to understand why aid interventions were and continue to be so important for Lesotho good governance and political transformation.

With this in mind, a critical assessment on development partners' experiences and strategies in Lesotho, and especially the experiences of long-standing donors such as Irish Aid, will serve as an indication of the aims and outcomes of development aid. Based on their experience, the White Paper on Irish Aid (2006:9) developed an evidence-based foundation that international development partners use to

demonstrate strong commitment to ensuring aid effectiveness based on the principles of partnership support to locally-owned strategies for better donor coordination and policy adherence (UN, 2012:3; MCA, 2006:8). Following from the development partners' views above, Mackie (2008:143) is of the opinion that the improvements made on the management of European Development Fund (EDF) in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement⁸ in its first formal review in 2005⁹ promise to have important long term impact on the implementation of global targets. These changes now allow the European Union to review and update the Cotonou agreement to reflect new and recent international perspective on development policy and to provide room for funding needed with the cooperation of African Union.

Thus, this study argues that the country aid programmes and monitoring and evaluation frameworks serve as integral tools in evaluating the contribution of aid to political transformation and deepening good governance through political institutional strengthening. Steinle and Correll (2008:ii) support the submission stating that Paris Declaration was an attempt to put together the concepts of country led ownership of development process and accountability. This was reiterated in Busan HLF-4 (2011: 4), namely that the Paris Declaration is an instrument through which the international community made a commitment to assist developing states living in poverty to scale up their economic performance while scaling down on the number of deaths caused by disease and nutrition.

Debates around aid effectiveness across the world were influenced by the failure of developing nations to measure their economic performance and improve a country's standards. A number of scholars (Moore, 1997; Moyo, 2009; Anyangwe, 2010) are of the opinion that aid is doing more harm than good and hence it should be discontinued. Anyangwe (2010:1), however, draws a conclusion that good governance and accountability will determine Africa's future. Nonetheless, aid-giving countries and organisations, including British DfID, Irish Aid, the European Union,

⁸The Lome Conventions were succeeded by the Cotonou Partnership Agreements (CPA). The CPA represents agreement between the EU member states and the 78 African Countries, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states which are historically, for most of them, linked with the European nations. The CPA has the fundamental pillars laid in trade, aid and political dialogue. The CPA was a 20 year agreement plan signed in year 2000.

⁹ The review provided a foundation for a new provision to cooperate on ratification of the Rome Statute on prevention of mercenary activities on the International Criminal Court, the fight against terrorism as well as agreement to comply with existing international disarmament treaties among others.

etc., continue to provide evidence that there are measurable successes in the provision of foreign aid thus far.

One of the fundamental arguments in this research is that Official Development Assistance is a result of international commitment to address the problem of failure to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by developing countries. The new Post-2015 Agenda, “Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, will guide the development process for the world for the coming 15 years using lessons from the MDGs. The MDG report will serve as an invaluable resource for transition from MDGs to SDGs and set concrete measure for mainstreaming the new global goals and targets as well as tracking and monitoring the process towards the achievement of aid effectiveness by 2030.

It continues to show that the principle of aid effectiveness is premised on the development goals of achieving democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights, which lays a foundation for effective governance. It is the view of the AAA (2008) that the greatest contention of development aid is how to ensure that aid can be more effective to pull Africa out of poverty and an increasing debt crisis. The understanding advanced in this thesis is that the development agenda represents progressive transformation; thus, it has to be analysed and measured against its intended efforts and consequences to aid effectiveness (perpetuated by good governance) and political transformation.

1.2 The study's background

This study interrogates the effects of development aid on political governance (political transformation and good governance) in Lesotho. The point assumed here is that the experiences of donor roles in development assistance seek to address the deficiencies that brought about poverty, food crises, corruption and political decay, which may affect the proper functioning of the state to allocate and improve the socio-economic status of the people of Lesotho. Huntington (1968:25) argues that the lack of political institutionalisation makes it impossible for political structures to accommodate new inputs and demands. It is in this view that the theme of the study explains, describes and offers an understanding of the parameters within which both the aid-recipient country and aid-giving country cooperate towards achieving more

improved social outcomes. This may be measurable in terms of economic modernisation and political institutionalisation that accommodates new inputs and demands from the modern society. Agreeing with this position, Hartley (2010:6) postulates that enthusiasm has grown to use the political economy as a better way to analyse, identify and manage the risks associated with particular policy reforms and feasibility of implementation of political strategies.

Developing Huntington's and Hartley's work to their logical conclusion, the introduction of the country aid programmes and monitoring and evaluation frameworks serve as integral tools in evaluating the contribution of aid to political transformation and deepening good governance through political institutional strengthening. The priorities for these measurement tools evolve from individual projects to programmes, sectors, policies, countries and institutions. Within this process, country programme evaluations are becoming the unit of analysis, as country development effectiveness is the ultimate goal. As Pronk (2009:232) confirms as earlier alluded, the PD prompted the debates around aid effectiveness across the world which were influenced by the failure of developing nations to measure their economic performance and improve their standards.

A number of studies (World Bank, 2008a; NORAD, 2009) have indicated that acceptable political transformation is demonstrated by good governance, which has been an initiative of foreign aid in order to deepen democratic states that are galvanised with principles of good political governance. Moreover, these opinions serve as reference that the principle espoused in providing foreign aid is acceptable levels of political transformation. Corps Canadien (2005:1) states that where such considerations are central to development, both political transformation and good governance can be realised. By instituting responsive measures and mechanisms, Mangau (2007:36) advances the central principle that for development aid effectiveness to thrive, democracy and good governance, including respect for the rule of law, collective fundamental human rights and freedom, equality before the law, equal opportunity for all, and a democratically accountable government are integral pillars to attain far-reaching development outcomes. According to this rationale, administrative issues pertaining to political governance are about managing the state, establishing transparency and accountability to the people, and practicing a sense of nationhood (Saldanha, 2005:7).

The long-term development aid partners in Lesotho that include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Irish Aid (IA-DAC), the German Technical Cooperation (GTz) now GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft Fuer International Zusammenarbeit) and the European Economic Commission, have provided a proper foundation for a policy framework in their foreign aid policy. Many definitions that espoused the metaphor for development aid and that set the tone for a number of development partners in delving into aid provision principles were built into their statements. These values form the cornerstone of the principles of good political governance. One of these read as follows:

I believe our aid programme is a practical expression of the values that help define what it means to be Irish at the beginning of the 21st century. It represents our sense of broad social concern and our obligations to those with whom we share our humanity. Every day of the week, Irish people, through their aid programme, are providing the human and financial resources to uphold that vision (Ahern, 2006).

This statement sheds some light on the general principles and policies of development partners. The DfID reached the same conclusion in its evaluation report, indicating that governance and development in the context of ODA need to clamp down on aspects of aid inflows. The aspects of development aid must measure up to the approach to connect sizeable achievements to aid effectiveness for effective governance and social outcomes (Gayfer *et al.*, 2005:6-7). One possible consequence of this assumption is that aid should not view the world from a perspective of the prescripts set by developing countries to sustain their type of regimes in the developing nations or align the institutions of developing countries to those of aid giving countries. Agreeing with this assumption, Hartley (2010:1) writes that, the good of aid in effect includes building strong and effective, accountable and stable public institutions that can support civil, socio-economic and political institutions.

1.2.1 The aid regime

The fundamental perspective of this thesis suggests that the idea of international aid was a resultant effect of the remnants of the Second World War, when the United States issued its funds to rebuild the ruins in Europe. Muntone (2012) further

elaborates on this point, explaining that development aid came during the era of Cold War from the 1960s to the 1980s in which during this period, development aid was used to support patrol states in the developing nations. Staples and Sayward (2006:349) indicate that international aid, or development aid in this context, was a more effective strategy that has been intended to focus on human infrastructure or even more on the overall food and agricultural strategy, although even smaller programmes still qualified as programmes of development assistance. The point advanced by Muntone is that soon after the Cold War, official development aid focused more towards alleviating poverty and promoting development. Presumably, countries that were in most dire need for ODA after the Cold War were mostly poverty stricken, hence ODA became more focused on poverty alleviation.

Owing thus to the background above, aid effectiveness movement began taking shape and focus in the late 1990s. Along this, the agenda for good governance in the 1990s put emphasis in the international commitment to aid the new institutional economies (Bhouraskar, 2007:269). Based on Williamson's (1997:60-61) work, much emphasis on good governance came in during the same decade post 1990s in which neoliberal policies and market-oriented reform were the growing orthodoxy in development aid. At this time, according to Hartley (2010: 2), international financing institutions, including aid giving governments and agencies made realisation that their different approaches and conditions imposed huge costs on developing countries thus standing in the way of making aid effective. This finding gave rise to the idea of development partners a, agencies and donor governments to work with one another in the agenda for development aid, to harmonize their work in order to improve the resultant impact of ODA.

From submissions by Ehrenfeld (2009:128) it is clear that aid effectiveness for good governance and political transformation has been the subject of much investigation and debate from 2000 onwards. This new addition to the scholarship of development aid, namely aid effectiveness, triggered the attack based on the effects of aid in aid-dependent countries. One common issue was that foreign assistance is not in itself sufficient to benefit its recipients satisfactorily. This is mentioned by Akonor (2008:66), who states, "Aid to Africa is a band-aid, not a long-term solution", since aid does not aim at transforming Africa's structurally-dependent economies. Authors

such as Amin (1972), Bauer (2000), and Frank (1966, quoted in Andrews 2009:13) put blame on the global economic structures for the underdevelopment of the Third World. In 1966, Frank wrote and concluded that underdevelopment was generated by “the development of capitalism”. Bauer (2000:100) argued that development aid “promotes dependence on others” as it created the impression that “emergence from poverty depends on external donations rather than on people’s own efforts, motivation, arrangements and institutions”.

Scholarly criticism such as Bauer’s challenged the aid regime, blaming it for the protracted poverty dimension. However, other scholars (Prah, 2002:54) believe the major challenge suggests that Africa has to take responsibility for its failures due to bad governance and dictatorial style regimes, though Prah (*ibid.*) opines that the problem is caused by a mix of internal and external factors. Calderisi (2006:154) writes that Africa’s problem is indigenous, and thus cannot be blamed on globalisation, unequal international trade, colonialism, debt or slave trade. The crux of the problem, according to Calderisi (*ibid.*) is in the culture, corruption and the political correctness of donors who fail to guide African regimes on where they are getting it wrong.

This thesis suggests that the past presumption of development aid regimes has focused the blame for the position of poverty in Africa on donors, contending that aid-tying practices and conditionality have focused aid to benefit the the wealthy and technologically advanced nations of the world. Anup (2012) argues that transfer from aid from one nation to the other (bilateral aid) is structured in a manner that benefits the sponsor and not for humanitarian purposes. Anup (2012:7) writes that

Furthermore, aid has often come with a price of its own for the developing nations: Aid is often wasted on conditions that the recipient must use overpriced goods and services from donor countries. Most aid does not actually go to the poorest who would need it the most. Aid amounts are dwarfed by rich country protectionism that denies market access for poor country products, while rich nations use aid as a lever to open poor country markets to their products. Large projects or massive grand strategies often fail to help the vulnerable as money can often be embezzled away.

To this end, scholarship on aid suggests that development assistance has been premised on a valid long-term aim of creating formal democratic governments and

market institutions, while most of the informal arrangements and relationships can help stimulate aid effectiveness, improve services, connect citizens to the state and facilitate transition to more inclusive rule based governance.

Killick (2007:9) states that

Aid impact will be (decisively) shaped by the context in which it is placed, the form in which it is given, the commitment and the ability of the recipients to use it well, and the extent to which the actions of the donors are harmonized and aligned to growth and poverty reduction goals and effective policies to achieve these goals.

This assumption deepens the understanding of the meaning and value of development aid in support of the basic tenants against which effective aid was founded. This has provided the foundation on which this thesis is built, namely to investigate political transformation and good governance as pillars that support more effective aid. The background to this idea is that an aid effectiveness agenda is focused on developmental results and impacts, including the realisation of human rights (Ferguson, 2008; Robinson, 2008). In assessing the extent of aid effectiveness, it is becoming increasingly evident that improving governance has to do with more than just improving transferring formal institutions from poor to rich. Following from Ferguson's and Robinson's arguments, the emphasis on political transformation and good governance has now become the core development issue at the centre of aid effectiveness in order to assist developing countries to be more effective in executing the demand for accountable, good institutional structures that will influence the effectiveness of aid. Aid was confronted by an administrative challenge due to a lack of proper institutionalisation and political transformation in most developing countries.

1.2.2 The nexus of development aid and contributions to good governance and political transformation

This section will serve as a guide to evaluate the contribution of development aid, as well as the related political influence vis-à-vis transformation ushered in by the dictates of aid and need for development results.

Aid agencies have not only strongly suggested that aid (always) works but the manner in which they have engaged the public has provided a distorted view of the

role of aid and the role of donors. By focusing so much on aid's merits, the strong impression conveyed to the public has been that aid is the 'answer' to development – that it is aid which 'drives' the development process, that it is what donors do in developing countries which make the crucial difference to the poor, and that without aid, and aid agencies, there would be little to no development. In contrast, the evidence indicates that development occurs without aid and that the process of development is influenced predominantly by what happens within recipient countries, shaped by the commitment and capability of aid-recipient country governments and by dynamic changes to the respective power and voice of different interest groups within the national political economy (Riddell 2009:5).

The fundamental principle in the development and practice of aid, as espoused by Shivji (2007:2) states that policies and political conditions, including governance commissions must be established within governments and states in order to qualify to receive aid. Shivji (*ibid.*) writes that the recipients of this form of donor funding “reform” their governmental structures, with support of technical assistance from the “donor community” to satisfy their “partners”. From this analysis, the researcher arrives at a preliminary conclusion that the scope of good political governance within recipient countries must be seen to cover administrative action through the institutional structures of governance vested primarily with the function overseeing the conclusive, predictable, accountable and stable administration of public affairs.

In assessing other country programmes which becomes units of analysis, it becomes clear that a number of international donors have, for a long time, focused on programmatic development aid interventions based on projects with the primary focus of getting the outcomes in addressing the social outcomes. Examples include the United Kingdom's DfiD's focus on trade and economic integration, the EU's focus on water supply and sanitation, World Bank influence in Lesotho was on large grants for infrastructural development and budget support, food security, transport and land tenure and GTZ's focus on decentralisation. Programmes such as Irish Aid, the UNDP, and the EU have made significant contributions to address systemic development interventions that focused more on the transformation and capacity-building of institutions of governance and policy-making. A number of definitions on the influence of aid effectiveness on good governance and political transformation are understood better when compared to those provided by a number of aid

programmes across the globe (see discussion in detail in the following Chapters). In this regard, Cassell-Sealy (2003:4) writes that

The concept of good governance as a prescription for development is not a new one. It first surfaced in 1989 in a World Bank report and the main thrust behind its introduction in the Bank's corporate policies resides in the continuing lack of effectiveness of aid, the feeble commitment to reform of recipient governments.

According to this rationale, the general perspective is that effectiveness should focus on building institutions that could promote good governance so that these could inform the goals to which aid is tied.

Even those with experience in development aid assistance have adopted the critical belief that good governance should be a priority issue that informs all aspects of development assistance. In other words, without good governance aid effectiveness is not possible (White Paper on Irish Aid, 2006:5). The White Paper on Irish Aid (*ibid.*) defines governance as,

The political and institutional capacities of a country to elect accountable government, create and uphold laws, promote and protect people's rights, meet people's needs effectively and fairly as well as manage the resources of the state.

This donor view is that the Third World's state of poverty can be a hindrance to good governance. In an effort to remedy this situation, developing countries have used internal instruments including constitutional laws and legislation towards the promotion of good governance in appreciation of the fact that good governance can reap far-reaching rewards (Fraser & Whitfield, 2008). One can deduct that these countries in all probability opted for the definition provided by the United Nations' Development Programme (UNDP) in its Human Rights Reference Book (1997:97), which defines good governance as the "transparent and responsible assertion of authority and use of resources by government".

A strong position is taken by the UNDP policy handbook on Governance for Sustainable Human Development (1997:3), setting the goal posts for good governance as:

The exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. (...) Good Governance is, among other things, participatory,

transparent, and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law... Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision making, even the allocation of development resources.

A number of scholars however disagree with donor giants' definition of good governance. Eggen (2011:66-67) quotes Kaufmann *et al.* (2010) as saying that

The reform agenda emerged from macro-economic concerns with little direct linkage to individuals, while it may be argued that the concern for individuals partly grew out as a response to the narrow macro-economic focus. The agenda to reform individuals, however, seems to reflect trends that are not exclusive to aid and development, but are inherent in modern forms of governing. This is done by establishing strict classifications. Take good governance, for instance. A wide range of indicators have been developed by different donors (see Grindle 2004; UNDP 2007; OECD 2009), and many measurement tools are available (see, for instance, UNDP's www.gaportal.org). The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators project uses hundreds of indicators in assessing governance for most of the world's countries.

1.2.3 The advent of political governance and development aid discourse

Fundamentally, political governance is concerned with how those who govern and exercise public power allocate values to those who give their consent to be governed (Benn, 2006:ii); whereas governance is concerned with the art and skill of utilising political or collective power for the management of society at all levels (CCR, 2007:para 12). The same disposition suggests that the practice of governance is guided by availability of a social democratic Constitution that enables the government to manage the affairs of the state effectively while providing capacity to the citizens to participate in governance and have capacity to hold government accountable.

Reliance by the Third World states on instruments of policy and legislation to inform good governance also adheres to the principles of good governance. Benn (2006:iii) views the philosophy of political governance in itself as focusing on how those who govern and administer authoritatively allocate values to those who give their consent to be governed, which evolve through the process of bargaining between the state and groups within the society.

In accordance with Benn's view, the preliminary focus of government was on the development of policy frameworks, structures and systems in order to give effect to the values and principles of the Constitution. Van de Waldt (2007:239) posits that the values of the constitution in many African countries, and especially in the Third World, shifted mainly towards enhancing service delivery. Contained in this advice is the issue of service delivery, which stayed focused on the need to strengthen the internal capacity of the government to deliver goals identified to enhance service delivery. The same goals, because of capacity constraints, attracted foreign development aid. Reddy (2001:22) states that, in fact, the political and management components have a pivotal role to lay in terms of facilitating policy developments and implementation within a defined framework in the context of service delivery. Along this line of thinking, it becomes evident that the era of development aid has given more vitality to entrenching political transformation and good governance.

In order to establish applicability of the description of good political governance and to determine whether it can in fact be used as a framework for promoting aid effectiveness and political transformation in the Third World, it is important to review the principal pillars supporting the attainment of aid effectiveness through good governance.

Based on this background, it is of value to ascertain the efficacy of aid effectiveness to the development of good governance and political transformation. The effectiveness of aid and the absorptive capacity of the aid recipients have become a major subject of concern, debate and criticism in the deliberation about world development. This is a major dilemma of development aid and its intended effectiveness that has sparked the debate around putting an end to aid (Mayo, 2009; Barder, 2009; Moore, 1997):

Aid effectiveness is about delivering aid in a way that maximises its impact on development and achieves value for aid money (OECD, 2010c).¹⁰

¹⁰Canada, the 2010 G8 Chair invited the OECD to participate in the G8 Development Ministerial Meeting in Halifax from 27-28 April 2010. The meeting laid guidelines for development proposals for the Leaders' summit in Muskoka, June 2010. The OECD led discussions on the overarching theme of accountability and effectiveness of aid relationships, highlighting progress, challenges and areas where political will could make aid make a difference for the development results. (see OECD brief for G8).

It is of critical consideration to note that African development gaps and positions have attracted modalities of foreign development aid and influenced the principles of development assistance. The birth of scholarship of development aid thus finds an abundance of its theory based on the African position and the provision of development aid assistance modalities. This has influenced scholars such as Lehmil (2008:2) to suggest that this position has paved the way to the development of an aid effectiveness approach and argument, which is a growing concern for the donor community. He adds that a few years ago, development practitioners have been focusing on providing education on efficient aid delivery. With this focus, the principles and approaches to aid modalities sought more effective ways to address poverty and means of reducing inequality, addressing fragmentation of development systems, and to change the way aid is delivered, hence the principles of political transformation and good governance come into play.

Using Lehmil's statement above, it becomes clear that aid effectiveness is built upon financing principles towards accounting for the effects and ability of development aid to achieve its intended purposes, the economic or human development, and reaching development targets (Andrews, 2009:134). An analysis of Lehmil and Andrews above suggests that governance and accountability have become significant variables that influence the measure of aid effectiveness and rely heavily on smart and measurable objectives, conditionality, capacity building and support to enhance governance.

The aid effectiveness movement picked up a steam with The Monterrey Consensus in 2002¹¹ at the International Conference on Financing for Development. At this forum, the tone was set for pillars of achieving aid effectiveness (good governance and political transformation), which were influenced by the international community agreeing to increase financing for development in order for aid to be as useful and effective as possible. A commitment was also made to assist poor countries to

¹¹ *The International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico provided the final texts of the agreements and commitments by Heads of States and Governments. This meeting addressed the challenges of financing for development around the world, particularly in developing nations. The primary goals of the meeting were to build upon strategies that could eradicate poverty, achieve sustainable economic growth and promote sustainable development.*

achieve their Millennium Development Goals¹², which were agreed upon by 192 countries as the fundamental focus to halve world poverty by 2015. Similarly, for the Post-2015 Agenda, commitment was also drawn to ensure countries awareness and integration of 2030 Agenda and SDGs. The 2030 Agenda is a critical step in achieving the global targets and addressing the gaps in MDGs. This era marked a new cooperation between donor countries and recipient countries to build upon principles of aid effectiveness.

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness¹³ was endorsed by countries around the world in a move to improve upon and change the way donors and countries conduct their business. Three years later, at a third High Level Forum¹⁴ held in Accra Ghana (HLF-3), the aid effectiveness movement conducted review into the progress made and build on the PD to accelerate the pace of change in development goals (Wood *et al.*, 2008:3).

Principles of good governance and political transformation were announced at the PD. The Development Cooperation Directorate of OEDC (DCD-DAC, 2010) adopted the political governance variables through the process of international commitment agreed by more than one hundred (100) signatories consisting of Ministers of respective governments, Heads of Agencies, Senior Officials and other developmental inclined organizations to increase efforts on harmonisation and management of aid for development results. The joint process towards enhanced aid effectiveness in terms of the forum included the following areas and challenges that are to be addressed:

¹²The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the eight (8) international development goals with 21 targets and a series of measurable indicators for each target that was agreed upon by the 192 United Nations member states. MDGs are concerned with reducing extreme poverty, scaling down mortality rates in children, fighting endemic diseases such as HIV and AIDS and developing a global partnership for development. MDGs were signed in Spring of year 2000.

¹³The Paris Declaration (PD) endorses new partnership relations and coordination of donor work between countries to ensure aid effectiveness, well-coordinated spending of aid. The declaration was endorsed by 52 donor and partner countries and 30 other sectors in the development cooperation including the United Nations in Paris in 2005. (see Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration. Phase 2. Evaluation Framework and Workplan. Revised Draft, 23 Nov. 2009).

¹⁴The first phase of this evaluation was between March 2007 and September 2008 aimed at providing information on the "HOWs and WHYs" of the implementation progress of the Paris Declaration. 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Accra, Ghana, September 2008.

- Strengthening national development strategies for partner countries and their operational frameworks that include planning, budgeting and performance assessment frameworks;
- Enhancing systems, procedures and strengthening capacities of partner countries to align with aid;
- Enhancing donors and partner countries accountability to their citizens and parliaments in so far as development policies, strategies and partner governments national and performance are concerned;
- Scaling down elimination of efforts and rationalisation of donor activities to make them cost effective as possible;
- Establishing reforms and simplified methods to donor policies and procedures to encourage collaborative behaviour and progressive alignment with partner countries national priorities;
- Defining the measures and standards of performance and accountability of partner country systems in line with good practices.

Further to the goals espoused above, the parties committed to taking firm and effective actions to deal with the remaining challenges that include addressing:

- Weaknesses seen in partner countries' institutional capacities to develop and implement strategies;
- Failures to develop plans for multi-year commitments on aid receipts committed by donor countries;
- Unsystematic delegation of authority to donors' field staff and inadequate attention to incentives between donors and partner countries;
- Weak integration of global strategies and programmes in national development plans and policies
- Corruption and lack of transparency which erode national support and by in, participation by NGOs and Civil Society and impedes resource mobilisation efforts (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability, 2008).

The above limitation critically reviewed how good governance is to be attained and which areas were to be redressed to ensure aid effectiveness. Alfini and Chambers (2007:502) summarise the commitments of the Paris Declaration as follows:

To monitor indicators of effective performance from aid, donors and partners need to enhance their capacity to manage alignment and harmonisation of programmes, and capacity to also assess, measure and report on results.

Owing to the process of tracking down the commitments made by the international community in Rome in 2005, the 3rd High Level Forum in Accra, Ghana (HLF-3), otherwise known as Accra Agenda for Action (AAA),¹⁵ became responsible for the promotion of development aid governance by bilateral/multilateral means. In Accra, it was endorsed by institutions and partners in development that to accelerate and deepen the implementation of the PD was of primal importance, and stated that,

We are committed to eradicating poverty and promoting peace and prosperity by building stronger, more effective partnerships that enable developing countries to realise their development goals (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005:2).

One peculiar shortfall accompanying the instrumentalities of the Declaration is the lack of binding and legal enforceability of the values. Although regarded as powerful sources of direction and measurement to world effectiveness indicators, they only serve as important tools for member states and patron countries in interpreting general principles and the rationale of rights of benefits to recipients.

The influence of the Declaration promulgated much more influence on aid modalities in Lesotho, considering that the country has been one of the longest bilateral recipients of development aid. Lesotho's unique position sheds light to the scholarship of development aid by providing explanations about how various stages in the development process may build up to attain aid effectiveness. In practice, the Paris Declaration expressed a broad international consensus that described new partnerships, relations and ways of working between developed countries and partner countries as expressed in the resources framework essential for

¹⁵The Accra Agenda for Action represented the commitments adopted by authorities of developing and developed countries, bilateral and multilateral institutions. It covered progress made in Paris declaration and what remains to be addressed. The AAA contained also additional commitments and clarification on the PD texts (Stainle & Correll, 2008:15).

development results in Lesotho. This was based on the view that aid well spent and aid values maintained would improve the status of underdevelopment, the position of good governance, and entrench democratisation in most African countries, including Lesotho (Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, 2009:2-3).

Undoubtedly, the Declaration aimed to strengthen partnerships between donor countries and recipient countries like Lesotho to ensure that these countries are not only recipients of, but also beneficiaries from aid in more effective and sustained development results and outcomes. The processes and strategies of the Declaration ensured that countries such as Lesotho committed to provide the progress and strategies to meeting the challenges and attain results beyond the Paris Declaration implementation (Wood *et al.*, 2008:3).

At regional level, the Declaration informed the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) to track the progress of the commitments of the Paris Declaration (PD) and allow for a more informed review process based on evidence collected in the monitoring surveys of different countries. In the same fashion, Lesotho enjoined in this protocols that includes the agenda set across Africa to monitor countries' performance, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to measure an informed evaluation of the position towards attaining global commitments and goals.

According to Steinle and Correll (2008:15), the AAA served as an addendum statement that summarises progress made towards the implementation of the Paris Declaration, as well as what remains in each country. The focus was on countries that were lagging behind (red zone countries) in terms of development pathway.

Eurodad (2008b), however, made the observation that although the AAA reflected commitments made at international level to support the reforms needed to speed up effective use of development financing, the greatest shortfall contained in the forum remained that there was no timeline set for commitments at the hand of which donors could be held accountable. This resulted in critics of foreign aid (Moyo, 2009; Barder, 2009) concluding that the AAA could result in an agenda for inaction.

The AAA however provided significant improvements over the Paris Declaration by referring thoroughly to, and specifying concrete actions relating to, the widened concept of ownership (stressing parliamentary and civil society roles), domestic

accountability within partner countries, fight against corruption, and the cross-cutting issues of gender and human rights. In a statement contained in the United States Commitment to Millennium Development Goals (US Department, 2008:2), it was suggested that development assistance (technical and financial) yields best results in nations that make necessary political and economic reforms in which this responsibility to reform falls on partner countries in order to achieve their own growth and economic prosperity. According to Santiso (2001:1), achieving aid effectiveness could also be attributed to institutionalising promotion of democratic and good governance, the rule of law and setting priorities to establish the environment for foreign aid to thrive.

This emphasises the importance of the principles laid out on aid effectiveness. However, the latest school of thought claims aid effectiveness remains questionable. Critics of foreign development aid have lamented the fact that the process of aid and the *modus operandi* of the system of development aid today is exacerbating global inequality, dependency culture, increased opportunities for corruption, and negative macroeconomic effect¹⁶ (Chukwu-Emeka Chikezie, 2001:2). By way of affirmation, according to a survey spearheaded by OECD (2006:3) on monitoring the Paris Declaration, “The true test of aid effectiveness is improvement in people’s lives”.

The basic assumption to be evaluated in this study is that aid effectiveness is a result of achieving development goals along with the outcomes, such as enhanced livelihoods through good use of the resources by governments. In the above explanation, a working conceptualisation throughout this study to be followed and substantiated would posit that aid effectiveness is the degree to which development aid have improved people’s livelihood. Although some scholars (Moore, 1997; Mayo, 2009; Barder, 2009) have argued that aid is not effective, current debates around making aid effective include increasing support and leveraging of resources from the new aid regimes in Asia and Europe, illuminating on the role of aid to support progressive change in fragile states and influencing increasing aid in Africa to achieve global development goals and meet the targets set in MDGs (Institute of Development Studies, 2009:4).

¹⁶Discussion paper at a meeting held in Addis Ababa, 17-18 October 2001 ahead of the African Development Forum. African Knowledge Networks Forum “Defining Priorities for Regional Integration”.

Utomi (2009:s.a.) criticises development aid scholarship, stating that “There is not one country on earth where foreign aid has helped to pull them out of poverty” and, in contrast to Utomi and Moyo (2009, in Barder, 2009:1), that “Even the most cursory look at data suggests that aid has increased overtime, African growth has decreased with an accompanying higher incidence of poverty...”.

This researcher supports Mayo’s contention as it is apparent that the progress on aid effectiveness requires greater institutionalisation and the practice of good governance, and greater accountability by donors and developing countries for the development commitments they have. With this in mind, the researcher wishes to show the other side of the development aid coin, namely documented results worth supporting the scholarship, especially towards the contribution to good governance and political transformation.

1.3 Problem statement

The advent of development aid¹⁷ in the Third World and particularly in Lesotho has had a direct focus on the achievement of specific social outcomes. It has been evidenced by some of the recorded impacts of development aid programmes in Lesotho and the achievement of improved social outcomes. Such programmes, especially the work of Irish Aid and UNDP in Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance (2008), the Support for Civil Society Programme in Lesotho (DfID/SCIL, 2008), the Education Fast Track Initiative Cyprus Fund (2006) and the Health Systems Strengthening by Global Fund (2009), have been proclaimed by their custodians to have shown attributable improvement on social outcomes and growth patterns, and a degree of political transformation and good governance as a result of the places ODA has been working on.

Since 2005, Lesotho has been receiving similar kinds of development aid assistance. This included economic capacity building (steered predominantly by the European

¹⁷*Development aid, used interchangeably with development assistance, technical assistance, international aid, overseas aid or foreign aid is support provided by governments or other funding agencies to support the economic, social and political developments of developing countries. Its distinguishable from humanitarian aid by focusing on a long term alleviation of poverty than short term emergency response.*

Union), improvement of health and health systems (led by Irish Aid), mainly as a result of the high prevalence of HIV and the need to scale up preventative measures and education, food aid under the leadership of World Food Programme (WFP) that has been driven by the food scheme to address nutrition and poverty, as well as the World Bank role in budget support for capacity building that focused on improvement of financial and public service delivery effectiveness, human resources capacity and structural, infrastructural and environmental support by various sectors and donors.

Scholars, including Rosenberg and Weisfelder (2013), have provided an important basis, which triggered this thesis' argument, namely that Lesotho has received aid from over 30 countries and nearly 100 agencies totalling nearly 64 million dollars designated for development. Only in the 1990s did Lesotho start receiving aid for building schools and the construction of rural clinics and hospitals.

With these significant amounts of foreign aid and investment in Lesotho's development, it becomes increasingly important to evaluate and review whether aid has brought about the expected development outcomes and improvement in the vulnerable population. The contribution of the multiple million dollar programmes should be measured to ascertain if the changes that were arrived at were influenced by donor assistance aid. Rosenberg and Weisfelder (2013:114) underline the significance of this study on Lesotho as they mention that in the light of this massive flow of aid, the success of development projects can be debated, but conversely show that the loss of foreign aid has a detrimental impact on the economy.

In his seminal contribution to the development of the school of thought on aid effectiveness and development, Riddell (2007:95) observes that despite some similarities that have been identified as measurable achievements of development aid as a tool for good governance and political transformation, marked differences exist as to what donors regard as core elements of development aid effectiveness. He captures the problem of Lesotho and other developing countries as marred by underdevelopment, increasing poverty and lack of projects that could attain sustainable development impact. Riddell says that the early work of ODA focused on the impact of aid projects, understandably because the bulk of the aid was going to projects where development was needed for sustainable results. Riddell (2007:95-

96) ascertains that development aid sought to improve the living conditions of the citizens of a recipient country. In his study, Vandeninden (2011:35) emphasises that aid delivery is more effective where development gaps are more visible.

The main problem addressed by this study is to elucidate the current disagreements of the effect and the contribution of development aid to good governance and political transformation. Analysis of the effectiveness of efforts of development assistance to systemic and structural strengthening, institutional reform and political transformation, and achievement of development goals will be interrogated. Killick (2004:19) writes that “The superiority of program aid in this respect remains only a hypothesis because it rests on a presumption of the comparative costs of the respective aid modalities, which has not, so far as is known, been empirically established in any systematic way.”

The problem arising here is perpetuated by the realisation that in most African countries aid has been channelled towards support to institutional strengthening and political reform. However, the assumption about most of the African countries, including Lesotho, as concluded by Moyo (2009), is that these countries remain in situations of political instability, service delivery shortfalls, perpetual poverty, capacity constraints and political decay, and suffer setbacks on economic modernisation and governance stability.

In this regard, Dobbs *et al.* (2010:1-6) suggest that,

Africa’s collective economy grew very little during the last two decades of the twentieth century. But sometime in the late 1990s, the continent began to stir up, GDP growth picked up and then bounded ahead, rising faster and faster during 2008... Africa’s economic pulse has quickened, infusing the continent with a new commercial vibrancy. While Africa’s increased economic momentum is widely recognized, less known are its sources and likely staying power.

The assumption suggests that undesirable political developments, such as corruption, protracted civil wars, lack of institutions and systems to facilitate the management of aid, and ailing human and absorptive capacity to manage and utilise development aid are affecting the effectiveness of aid. In addition to the above premise, Santiso (2001:2) suggests that if such negative developments are cropping

hegemonic regimes, Western-replica government systems, diverted focus of development priority strategies and exogeneity of aid and other sources of development finances impact come into play.

This realisation informs a specific interest in the field of development aid and governance. It places emphasis on evaluating the reciprocal contribution of aid to growth and development, as well as the achievement of intended goals. The perception has assigned titles to the form of aid (dead aid, perpetuating poverty, etc. by Moyo *et al.*) and regimes that the said aid has created. Marybeth (2013:28) suggests these aid titles surface from concerns surrounding the methods of utilising development aid by donors, which include funding expensive feasibility studies to the detriment of recipients. This protracted spending priority has connotations for establishing the helpfulness of continued development financing and the contributions of development support to political transformation and good governance.

Against this background, the problem includes whether intended development aid has contributed to improved social outcomes in Lesotho through various efforts and strategies to address development needs, namely:

- whether development aid has helped enhance progressive political transformation and good governance within the date brackets from the Millennium Development Goals that ensued since the year 2000, across to the Post-2015 Agenda and the rise of the Sustainable Development Goals¹⁸;
- whether development aid has contributed in enhancing systems reforms and improved performance of institutions of governance and service delivery;
- whether the current approach to development aid has been effective in as far as it was intended; and
- the associated outcome and perennial effects of development aid assistance.

¹⁸ Charles Kenny with Sarah Dykstra presenting to the High Level Panel on the Post 2015 Development Agenda. *The Global Partnership for Development: A Review of the MDG 8 and Proposal for the Post 2015 Development Agenda. Background Research paper, May 2013. The paper emphasised on the language implored from the Millennium Declaration that the UN member countries resolve...to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike –which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.*

This study is informed by lessons about evaluation that offer insight into the effects of aid in Lesotho and the score for value for money in the future. The stated problem is identified within a framework of aid effectiveness for good governance, political transformation that is progressive in order to have a value for money effect, and the need for reform to new initiatives. This development context of aid is interrogated with the rise of the Millennium Development Goals, starting in 2000 throughout a ten-year reflection period ending in 2010, and the findings of the Global Partnership on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, and the post-mortem of results in 2013. The ten-year reflection measures progress made, and this thesis interrogates whether development aid that became focused and structured on eight MDGs has had any effect on Lesotho's development context in terms of political transformation and good governance.

Research question

- 1. Has the flow of aid to Lesotho effectively enhanced good governance through transformation and systems strengthening of political and governance institutions as envisaged?*
- 2. Has aid therefore attained development effectiveness or has it perpetuated a situation of underdevelopment or stagnation of economic growth?*
- 3. Has it the effective ability to govern and capacitate and strengthen systems and policies of good governance and transformation for development results?*

1.4 Aims of the study

The study aims to analyse and understand the development interventions and their contribution to Lesotho's development context. The purpose is to determine whether development aid has been effective as a tool towards establishing improved social outcomes, political transformation and good governance in Lesotho. The importance of development aid between partner countries will be discussed in an effort to provide proof as to whether aid has benefitted Lesotho and enhanced political transformation and good governance. The study attempts to enhance the

comprehension of development aid and the need for value for money in terms of the results matrix¹⁹ that measures performance as set by aid principles.

This aim of the study is mainly inspired by Mogolowondo (2005:21), who agrees that the necessity of asking these questions rests in informing the school of thought on aid effectiveness. The need to address these becomes equally pragmatic when one assesses the potential implications that these questions may hold for the current international development debate.

More specifically, the study aims to contribute to:

- a theoretical and conceptual understanding of the parameters of development aid as an instrument towards enhancing good governance and political transformation;
- As Lesotho stands as a long term recipient of development aid, the study will introduce a more coherent and harmonised approach in collectively evaluating and measuring the extent of the achieved outcomes of the country's targets on good governance and political transformation in terms of development aid effectiveness;
- With the evolution of development aid and international assistance, it is the aim of this study to provide an analysis of Lesotho's outlook on development priorities and the intended effectiveness;
- The study aims to introduce a body of knowledge that explains the baseline and growth patterns by providing consolidated data disaggregated by the area of support in good governance and political transformation outcomes. This study will also unpack the direct components that provide justification for the position of aid effectiveness in Lesotho;
- Based on the above, the study should be able to inform the priority areas and measure significant effects of development aid in Lesotho through offering data, evidence and analyses of improvements, gaps and responses of development aid in Lesotho and by providing a map on the contribution of aid to political transformation and good governance;

¹⁹ This may include among others the African Peer Review Mechanism, The Mo Ibrahim Index, The UN Human Rights Index, which assigns measures to country performances in terms of good governance and institutional development. In most cases, these parameters are used to provide the basis upon which development aid and support can be given.

- With increasing development aid, the study aims to refocus and zone in on areas that are significant to development and offers a guide to development partners to channel aid logically for enhanced effectiveness.

The study seeks to understand whether Lesotho:

- has, as a result of aid, progressively transformed or further regressed socio-politically and economically;
- has seen any returns on the investment of continued support to good governance; and
- has improved, stagnated or worsened as a result of aid's goal of deepening democracy and promoting good governance.

The anticipated outcome of this thesis is the evaluation of the contribution of development aid to Lesotho, particularly in the last decade (2000 to 2010). This will address some institutional reform initiatives that have accompanied the aid dimensions, with specific focus on the intricacies of aid, and stock taking of the progress and lessons of the development assistance agenda.

The criticality and importance of this study is further validated by the OECD in its concept paper on Aid Effectiveness and Accountability, in which it is stated that,

Aid effectiveness is about delivering aid in a way that maximises its impact on development and achieves value for money (OECD, 2005:10).

It is for this reason that this study takes stock of what the development assistance efforts have yielded in terms of political transformation and good governance in anticipation of the expected outputs being enhanced socio-economic outcomes.

1.5 Methodology

Babbie (1993:90-114) writes that the choice of the method of the study and how such a study will be executed depends on the nature of the study, the study objectives and the nature of the research problem²⁰. This study will make use of a descriptive and explanatory correlation method of research aimed at evaluating the contribution of development aid to good governance and transformation in Lesotho. Babbie and Mouton (2001:207) explains that the primal goal of qualitative research is to describe and understand, rather than to explain human behaviour.

The research objectives involve two categories of social phenomena: aid and development, and political transformation and good governance. When planning the empirical research, the researcher chose to focus primarily on political transformation and good governance, with specific emphasis on aid and development. The combination guides the curiosity about the empirical manifestations of aid as a means of political transformation and good governance. The priority of the state of political transformation and good governance in terms of aid and development in empirical research is useful in helping to analyse the nature of development cooperation. If the empirical research had been guided by a focus on aid, for instance by selecting certain aid interventions or aid relations for observation, it would naturally have drawn the focus into those locations, relations or institutions that are most directly affected by aid.

This study will rely primarily on a literature review consisting of the principles of development aid effectiveness as reported in journals, articles and discussion papers. Both primary and secondary data will be used. Data collection will consist of gathering recipient institutions' results frameworks and scores assigned to achieve development programmes. Country programmes and the beneficiaries of programmes will identify effects regarding the efficacy of development aid. Data generated from these research efforts was compared to the data generated by studies of other development programmes that have been researched, the results of which are presented in the literature. Where necessary, appropriate tables, charts, and figures were included along with narrative interview data obtained from

²⁰In the work of Babbie and Mouton (2001:647), they define research methodology as "the methods, techniques and procedures that are employed in the process of implementing the research design or research plan, as well as the underlying principles and assumptions that underlie their use".

development partners' representatives, governance institutional programme leaders, and beneficiaries of aid programmes from the community level.

The study has triangulated a sample size of 50 key informants using unstructured interviews and observation. The key informants who formed the basis for primary data were selected based on their knowledge, experience and aptitude in global development assistance work. These were from such portfolios as,

- i. Heads of donor institutions
- ii. Heads of International Agencies
- iii. Development Partners Officials
- iv. International and National NGOs
- v. Partners of the Government
- vi. Civic Movements
- vii. Government Senior officials
- viii. Project Manager
- ix. Finance and Reporting Officers
- x. Monitoring and Evaluation worker

In each of the 10 portfolios of Key Informants, 2 participants were selected for an unstructured interview. The sample size for interviews was a total of 50 at upstream level.

On the downstream, a selected sample of 50 interview respondents was selected made up of Field Officers working for the first set of the sample at the upstream level. This would ensure that there is a balance or a middle ground established in the responses.

Because development assistance and foreign aid is intended primarily to benefit and impact change at the beneficiary level, been directly the people, another sample of 50 key informants was picked who are coordinators of programmes at the community level or beneficiary level. This was made up of local councils, traditional structures, community organised groups and networks and community based organisations.

And finally, for the selection of the sample size, interviews were unstructured for randomly selected community members and beneficiaries, both at the areas where programmes and projects are designated and randomly across the 10 districts to

establish if there is an understanding, knowledge and visibility of development assistance and its effectiveness to the people, behaviour and change. This sample was analysed and informed by the measurement frameworks employed in this study.

The focus of the thesis is centred on the impact of development cooperation and aid on good governance and political transformation for development effectiveness. To this end, measurement frameworks to establish the impact was used which will follow in the discussion. The total Key Informants Interviews which were all unstructured represented a sample of 150 made up of 50 from each category at development partner/donor agency category, government counterparts and civic movements and finally the direct beneficiaries. These samples were selected seemingly because they represented all clusters of the population who are custodians, coordinators or beneficiaries of development assistance. In all the 3 categories, they possess sufficient primary information and data on the use of development assistance, its benefits and how it has been effective to reach the planned targets, to impact social and behavioural change and not the least, to attain strategic objective of the national priorities and demands of the people.

The study did not employ the quantitative methods for examining the effectiveness of aid due to the fact that there are overwhelming debates in their use and have no conclusive results (Roodman, 2007). Therefore the justification of the approach and method grasps the potential changes in aid effectiveness. In this sample size and target explained above, the study examined the main factors that can potentially be attributed to good governance and political transformation showing results of effectiveness of development aid. This took into account the international initiatives for the past 10 years (2000-2010) and towards the evaluation of the global development agenda in 2010 aimed to meet the global targets. Finally, the study examined the effects the recommendations, evaluations and findings have had on the donor and development aid discourse. What was evident in this approach is that one cannot comprehend the changes in how effective aid has become in promoting economic growth but just rather changes in political transformation and good governance brought about by aid delivery mechanisms of donors and development partners.

What came out of this methodological approach is that however the mechanisms and procedures of development assistance delivery are efficient; this does not mean aid as a whole will become more effective in promoting growth and poverty reduction.

Most of the literature on development and aid, as well as good governance and political transformation in Lesotho, was found in several books by renowned scholars, as well as development journals. Three main publications informed the study, namely *Good governance and development* (Smith, 2007), **Governance, elections and political stability in Lesotho** (Matlosa, 2001) and *Governance and development in Lesotho: An Ireland Aid Report* (2001).

Literature for the theoretical framework used academic journals and books of, among others, authors such as Moyo (2009), Pronk (2001) and Riddell (2009).

As noted earlier, the thesis focuses on the effectiveness of development aid on good governance and political transformation in Lesotho. To understand this, two theories were selected, namely the development theory and the transformation theory.

The study will take an inductive approach considering that general principles will be applied to the more specific context of Lesotho in a structural analytical manner of describing the qualitative methods of investigation. The rationale of development donor for aid should be applied to the outcomes expected; for instance, good governance. Thus, the method will review the targets reached, whether they can be defined as developmental targets, and if by such definition we infer aid effectiveness.

The study established a few key findings regarding changes in the priorities in providing development assistance. What came out of it were a few matters that related to the main goals of the donor either been in poverty reduction or aid effectiveness. The approach drew linkages with the extent of the donor use of the country strategies for programming its resources and the involvement of multiple stakeholders in drawing these strategies. Moreover, the approach illuminated on the organisational structures that deliver the aid, coordination and improved accountability between the donors and implementers. Matters of policy coherence, institutional capacity and aid programme based cultures cropped up as a result of the approach, the cooperation with other donors or competition.

With the use of the resources and results framework developed by this study, the study was able to evaluate the performance of the donor programmes and reached important conclusions regarding aid effectiveness for good governance and political transformation. In the study, it becomes clear that most donors have made poverty reduction their main strategic objective, have adopted country strategic approach and have rationalised their aid priorities to ensure impacts are realised.

From the data generated, the study was able to establish that the performance of donors is highly uneven because some aid providers focus on effectiveness of their development assistance, others been particularly concerned of efforts by the national governments to align and adapt to donor strategies and good practices, and the last set of donors have meaningful attachments to policy environments reforms and systemic transformation.

According to the aims of the study, it will assess the extent of the success of the notional contribution of development aid. This will be achieved by examining and evaluating existing principles and proposing reforms, new understanding, and future considerations. The conclusion to be reached when appraising the achievement of targets should be able to be scaled on the founding principles and commitments to aid effectiveness contained in the PD and AAA agendas which in this study, they will be will unpacked against the values of aid effectiveness. This means that projects by different development partners, programmes and interventions will be interrogated to determine if their achieved targets can necessarily mean development aid has been effective in Lesotho. The relevance of the study rests upon the fact that up to now there has never been a consolidated progress review and target measurement jointly by donor partners as they usually work in silos. The methodology of zoning in and collectively assigning target indicators will bring innovation towards measuring aid effectiveness in Lesotho.

This approach will integrate the basic founding theories on development and transformation aimed at identifying the characteristics of development cooperation, with a special focus on what might seem like processes of change in those characteristics – political transformation and good governance - regardless of any

preliminary assumptions about their relation to aid and development. Only later, in the last phases of empirical research and in analysis, there will be more focus on aid and development.

The choice of ethnographic research for this study was a natural choice given the researcher's interest in an explorative approach to the effectiveness of development cooperation. Ethnographic research allows the study to adopt a framework of harnessing first-hand information on the state of mind of development partners in execution of their mandate, studying people in their own environment through the use of participant observation method. In this methodology, participant observations and unstructured interviews allowed localisation of development aid in terms of geography, but more importantly, offers a thorough narrative in terms of which phenomena to observe.

In addition, the methodology brings about a "first-hand feel" to the effects and achievements, instead of relying on the assumptions and conclusions of the reporter of the development aid. Although analysis is equally important in academic discourse, a doctoral thesis should contribute new information to the existing body of knowledge. The empirical research should be seen as research on the effects of development aid and development cooperation, and not on governance and transformation. The study draws more inspiration from anthropological studies of good governance and political transformation than from studies of aid and development - it is not an "aidnography" (Gould & Marcussen, 2004:201).

Development aid is relatively easy to identify. Political transformation and good governance, however, are not that evident. Jamieson (2005) writes that development aid is often referred to as something quite specific and very important in almost any development intervention, whether as the cause of, or the solution to, almost any societal problem. But, it is difficult to see exactly what aid means in terms of a readily identifiable set of social phenomena that can fit most uses of the term. It is with this methodology that a physical interaction with development is unpacked and reported in order to break down the idea of development and develop a new analytical thinking towards target achievement.

This work aims to fill certain gaps in the academic literature by providing a formula for computing aid effectiveness. The study is opening a window onto the post-millennium definition of development as a process and as a concept. Developing countries mostly receive development aid assistance, and with this study, the subject of aid effectiveness receives a justifiable cause to be an academic framework to contribute to the concept of development.







In is in this context that an instrument to measure aid effectiveness for good governance and political transformation was developed, particularly standardised for the purposes of this research, the Resources and Results Matrix or Results Chain as mentioned in the preceding parts of this chapter.

According to the UNDP Handbook on Managing for Development Results (2009), Resources and Results Framework is a technical guideline by which all actors on the ground, contributing directly or indirectly to achieving a set of development results, ensure that their processes, products and services contributes to the achievement of the desired results (inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals). In this line, a measurement framework for monitoring and measuring development results was adopted to establish how the resources (technical and financial) inputted in development assistance contributed to aid effectiveness for good governance and political transformations. The *Lesotho Results and Resources Chain* for good governance and political transformation was adopted as a sub measuring instrument in Results Based Management for Lesotho good governance and political transformation in this study, purposely to inform monitoring of development and self-assessment of the progresses including reporting on performance.

This unique instrument was developed and improved, that measures the value of inputs (technical and financial assistance) to the outcomes and impacts of the progress on good governance and political transformations. A life cycle approach was adopted as development is deemed as a process that transcends through growth stages justifying the choice of the Results Chain model that starts with elements of planning such as vision and defining the results. For this framework, it is important to use as it measures the progress and provides information on decision making and lessons learned focusing on results of development assistance. The

Results Chain (RC) model in this study uses indicators, targets and baselines to provide a scientific value to the findings as this provides the impact that a given programme or project has on good governance and political transformation.

The Results Chain Illustrated:

IMPLEMENTATION			RESULTS		
					
<i>Actions taken or work performed through which inputs such as funds, technical assistance or other types of resource are mobilised produced to specific output</i>	<i>Actions taken or work performed through which inputs such as funds, technical assistance or other types of resource are mobilised produced to specific output</i>		<i>The products and services which results from completion of activities within a development intervention</i>	<i>The intended or achieve short-term or medium-term effects of an intervention's output. Changes in development conditions</i>	<i>Positive or negative long term effects produced by development intervention, economic, social, institutional</i>

The Results Chain above becomes an important tool to use as it provides an important contribution to development efforts for achieving results and increases the effectiveness of interventions for achieving sustained results.

Development primatologists owe a debt to Barrett's trail-blazing path for epistemology of development beyond the brain, arguably as the initial signs of academic inclusion of development aid as a school of thought. As a result, development aid now dominates long-term cardinal studies worldwide (Rowe, 2014).

This study on development aid effectiveness for good governance and political transformation is a search for aid as an empirical phenomenon that shapes the development of societies and influences individuals. One of the challenges of this study is to carry out empirical research on something that is seen as socially important, without knowing exactly what that "something" is.

1.5 Research layout and organisation of the thesis

Chapter 1: The Ground Setting Context

This section introduces the study by raising what is the surrounding issue and problem stating the key guiding research question that will be dealt with throughout the whole thesis document. Moreover, in this section, an overview discussion of the two key concepts of development aid and good governance and political transformation are introduced.

Chapter 2: Conceptualisation and theories of development and aid

This chapter discusses the core theoretical framework. It makes a case for the inherent need to adapt to a widened scope of theoretical approach. This involves integrating a variety of theoretical perspectives to address the research question raised in Chapter 1. The chapter continues to discuss the four (4) theoretical perspectives proposed, namely development theories; the concept of aid; the premise of good governance; and theories of transformation.

Chapter 3: The premise of good governance

This chapter dissects the core theories on good governance and the main fundamental pillars on which the theories are founded. It explains various dimensions of good governance and the importance of the use of the conceptual frameworks in the subject. It goes on to explain what theories of transformation say and how they transcended to inform the new school of thought.

Chapter 4: Revisiting the tenets of development aid in Africa

Chapter 4 presents a combined view of the theoretical perspectives with an assessment to bring to the table of discussion how these theories relate and inform the research problem.

Chapter 5: Lesotho in context: Governance, development and transformation

The position of Lesotho and the parameters on which it became the recipient of aid are covered in this chapter. It brings to light the political environment, situation analysis and baseline study of how Lesotho should be captured and seen. It

improves upon knowledge of the rudimentals of Lesotho and cultures that may influence its global standing and socio-economic performance. In this chapter, Lesotho is viewed through the lens of the new global school of thought and the country is analysed in terms of governance, development and transformation.

Chapter 6: International aid support in Lesotho

Part one (1) of this thesis is concluded in Chapter 6, which presents the research design, plans and methods. In this chapter, discussion is zoned into triangulation methods of development cooperation and action programmes with attention to specific policies and general development frameworks. Beyond this triangulation is the discussion on the empirical observations which presents analyses, trends and inherent micro and macro policy systemic methods. Engagement of donor practices forms part of this discussion as well as their interventions.

Chapter 7: Aid interventions influencing political transformation and good governance in Lesotho

Chapter 7 discusses the institutions and organisations that are actors in international development and cooperation. Discussion on aiding good governance and political transformation as a field of action development cooperation follows. Having traced the relevance of aiding good governance and political transformation as a policy issue, the study follows to explore the major reasons of development financing as a means to achieving aid effectiveness, good governance and political transformation.

Chapter 8: Putting development aid into perspective: evidence of attaining good governance and political transformation

Chapter 8 now goes deep into the country's context. Following the largely descriptive presentation in Chapter 7, here the policies of various actors are reviewed and analysed and translated into specific measures to support development aid as a positive input towards political transformation and good governance. Just as in the last section above, actors behaviour towards aid effectiveness are measured against progressive political transformation and prescripts of good governance. An overview of the actors' development cooperation forms a part of the matter. This is related to a brief overview of their conventional focus of development cooperation. A key results

discussion is analysed using primary and secondary data focusing of the formulation and key results of the development financing programmes.

Chapter 9: Tying the knots: conclusions and lessons

In this part, the research questions are brought back into the debate in light of the key findings presented and discussed in the above chapters. They are measured against the theoretical perspectives employed to drive the study. A critical analysis of the scientific contribution of the study is presented and defended in this chapter. As part of the conclusions, theoretical (political transformation and good governance) and policy implications (development and aid effectiveness) raised from this study now are discussed conclusively to measure the effectiveness of development aid.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUALISATION AND THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND AID

2.1 Introduction

Issues that relate to development and aid (otherwise known as foreign aid or development aid) have been making news in the global arena since the introduction of the MDGs (Kim & Lee, 2013). This recent school of thought that comes with the Post 2015 Sustainable Development Goals Agenda 2030 claims that development aid is a function of development in itself (UN, 2015). Although scholarship alluding to the relation of aid to development can be traced back to the period post second world war during the major global changes and the expansion of global interventions (Bilder *et al.*, 1999:153), the topic also received much attention with the inception of the MDGs (Jill, 2006:109). Jill (*ibid.*) explains that these included strategies to analyse transformations in the Third World and variety of means through which variable thinking on the nature of needed change have led to progress policy advancement. Zelaza (2012) agrees that the challenges experienced by African leaders in realising development growth were major in this year. Landsberg (2009:6, in Phago, 2013:109) adds that these challenges are well-articulated as human capital constraints, poor coordination among organs and institutions of governance and lack of technical and economic institutions to facilitate the integration and development of the continent, and which justify the need for development aid as a medium of solution.

The problem in this scenario was amplified by the pace of development in the developing countries, which affected global economic growth. As explained in the problem statement in Chapter 1, the solution was identified through injecting aid as a means through which development could be realised. This was substantiated by authors such as Niemietz (2012:23-27) who claims that societies and countries have developed vastly over the past millennium, and continue to develop as a result of the modus of development aid. Given this submission, what remains to be tested is the theory that could be attached to development in light of the number of strategies employed, essentially defining what development is or from which angle development is viewed.

Basing the central assumption on the continued assessment of the phenomenal change in the global world order, Lake's (2013) approaches to development is influenced by strategies of inquiry deeply rooted within the traditions of the modern world. He states:

The Great Debates did help clarify the differing assumptions scholars make in their theories, though this is a low bar to clear. Despite the attention they received, however, nothing was ever resolved (Lake, 2013: 568).

It is essential therefore that the study informs the understanding of change and the nature of development aid in view of the global world by isolating the linkages of development within the broader framework of the social theories. These theories are measured through the use of the Results Chain that has been developed in this study to establish whether aid have been effective or not looking at the angle of political transformation and good governance. The results chain measure the inputs against the intended outcomes and impact by analysing programmes and projects of development intervention as sources of evidence.

Considering the views above (Niemietz, 2012; Lake, 2013), it is clear that there is a theory attributed to societal change, aid and development as initiatives in this thought. This on-going debate draws attention to the founding principles and theories of development and the conceptual theories that presuppose development in today's world or those variables that aid or assist development to take place.

The central departure point by De Greiff (2009) draws on the theory focusing on the situation of African states. He writes that the process of social development has been flawed with inequality and imbalance, which have bred side-effects, including poverty and political decay:

Where they do not, there are important questions about how much effort —and how many resources —transitional societies should spend on 'dealing with the past' before operative institutions, which among other things guarantee the satisfaction of immediate and urgent needs of the population, including security, are in place. Perhaps a strategy that is more mindful of these developmental preconditions of justice would be more amenable to a 'sequencing' that is sensitive, in the long run, to both justice and development concerns (De Greiff, 2009:31).

The perspective presented here is that it is a global concern that countries need to move out of the state of underdevelopment and poverty and change or align to meet the development standards of the changing global environment (OECD, 2012a:6). It is with this in mind that Thelen's critical assessment denotes a call for development of a comprehensive theory to change the status quo and align it to the fundamentals of development theories (Thelen, 2002:15).

The scholarship of development and aid sparked debates as the analysis above illustrates that development of societal change lacks a comprehensive framework that adequately addresses the established need that effective development is premised on good governance and political transformation. It is these theories upon which the recurring definition of development is premised upon. As enunciated in the UNDP Human Development Report (2011:1-2), the shifting perspective has moved to be attributed to the universal material growth, to the contribution of non-material resources, policies of change and capacity development, explanations based on specific expressions of development attributed to political change and good governance and achievement of world global goals to beat poverty, corruption, unemployment, diminishing health, education, good governance and deepened democracy and social justice. The importance assigned to the debate draws its relevance from the effect that development aid has been proclaimed to inform development in general, and as a means through which Third World countries could address their ailing status of poverty.

In this section, central principles of development are interrogated and the expression of development in the different fields that respond to opportunities and challenges is traced, as explained in the Joint Commission of Public Policy (2008).

The thesis, in line with the theoretical foundation, tracks the progress of the 21st century pillar of development upon which the change is premised, namely the idea of development theories meeting global development goals (Ivanova, 2012). As the Human Development Report (2013:2-4) recommends as a methodology, it is essential to evaluate the process by which new milestones for the development paradigm are introduced by initiators (the donors), how they are imitated and resisted by recipients, how these priorities are resisted and accepted, and how they are

organised, institutionalised and assimilated into culture to achieve development targets. This approach encourages development and strategies essential thereto to accelerate response to the process of aid effectiveness. Some theorists, such as Jacob *et al.* (1998), believe that this line of argument invites questions about the shifting conceptualisation of development theories and effective strategies to accelerate the development process. Van Hullen (2012), in addition to the argument put forward by Jacob *et al.* (1998), adds the possibility of capacity and institutional building as aspects of good governance reforms that flanked, to some extent, a positive incentive on effective development.

2.1.1 Building blocks to theoretical perspectives on development aid

The World Bank states that

...the meaning of development has grown wider. Originally, development was virtually synonymous with national income increase. Access to social services and employment, including for the poor, were added in the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, absence of fear, along with reduced vulnerability and powerlessness has been incorporated into the definition (World Bank, 2000).

This line of thought was reiterated by the UNDP. It alluded to the forth coming sustainable development agenda (SDGs) that requires pursuit to economic, social and environmental objectives as main development goals. The UNDP states: "It is critical that gender equality - a human right as well as a catalytic force for achieving all development goals - is central to this pursuit" (UNDP, 2012:3-5). Moreover, the World Bank has reiterated that this view addresses development challenges embedded in a variety of sectors and global development matters including sustainable energy consumption, good health for all, education, food security, considerations to climate change, protection of human rights, consumption and production levels and urbanization (World Bank, 2010).

However, according to Banks (2011), this thought changed as far back as the 1990s when governance assumed a central and often controversial role in development thought and practice. Murray and Overton (2011) provide a further position on the idea that the era zoned more in to the neoliberal approach coupled with the Structural Adjustment Programmes precipitated in the 1990s which shifted yet again

the development discourse. Some authors (Kjaer, 2014; Whifield, 2012) agree that under the emerging good governance agenda and the need for understanding the political feasibility of possible alternative growth-enhancing governance initiatives (discussed in the next chapter), the central role of development was driven by the state apparatus again to be more targeted to poverty alleviation using more scaled up approaches and interventions (Murray & Overton, 2011: 209).

As the above analysis demonstrates, governance prominence in development discourse simply demonstrates that it does not imply agreement over what the concept means. This means that governance outside of the development context refers to the risk of markets and networks apart of the public sector's policy-making and coordination (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007:7). Given this position, Jooste (2008:67) explains that in development theory, governance does not include risk of markets. Instead, as Pomerantz (2004:3) writes, the focus is on public institutions, hierarchical bureaucratic organisations, as networks of formal and informal rules about how they function and especially their relationship to markets and economic growth. It is the assumption from the scholar's analysis that development therefore becomes transformation of these initiatives and their capacity to meet standards in order to effectively play the role as envisaged (Moti, 2010:4-5). Drawing from these assumptions, factors such as government capacity and effectiveness, clear rules, transparency, accountability and probity, citizens' participation, human rights and civil liberties and how governments are chosen and the exercise of power all come under the big tent of governance in the development context. Gruzd (2008) and Herbert *et al.* (2008) identify these new developments of the factors above with the need to transform the social authority to give way to effectiveness of institutional and structural governance to achieve the proclaimed development.

Lange (2004:12) extends the central argument and introduces a discussion of the new context of development which includes that for structural and institutional transformation and capacity-building to take off, there is a need for financial support to achieve strategies of development to arrive at good governance and political transformation. Lange's position reiterates that these standards have been placed upon the pillars of donor support to structural and institutional transformation in order to achieve good governance, political transformation, democratisation, human rights

and the promotion of justice and social order. Agreeing to this new theoretical foundation by Lange, Malamed (2012) draws a conclusion that development means transformation of political authority²¹. It is in this instance that development, taken to mean aid, had been effective for the achievement of global development goals (Keijzer, 2013:17).

As a result of these conclusions, the debate about development aid advocacy started to focus on the need to increase aggregation of aid levels through financial support. Decades ago, Hayter (1971) stated that the new approach to development was to become “basic needs”-based. This idea now dominates the development paradigm. However, later scholarship supersedes her thinking that it was essential to increase development aid where the needs of the settings became the reason for providing development aid (Tollefson *et al.*, 2009:387).

The direction of this debate invokes an essential element in the scholarship of global and international development assistance in which international aid is an integral part of international relations. Riddell (2009) supports this assumption, stating that when enquiring about the effectiveness of aid and its essence, it remains essential, owing to the fact that approximately 200 donor agencies in the world give out development aid to more than 150 countries. According to Riddell (2009), most countries in the world either receive or give aid or does both as in China and India which have become lately the major donors and recipients of development assistance. Kimura (2005:7) adds to Riddell's (2009) view that governments give development assistance to a greater extent through multilateral agencies, which are more secure and institutionalised following the establishment of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Essentially, the Institute of Development Assistance (IDA) by the World Bank has become the largest provider of soft loans as form of development assistance. This institution has concluded that achievement of the MDGs, should be the main standard of assessment for attainment of good governance. On the other hand, the new Agenda 2030 for sustainable development also provided indicators that should be measured to achieve the global targets. Unlike MDGs, SDGs clearly articulate indicators and targets (169) and measuring

²¹As contained in the Millennium Development Goals, which expired in 2015, discussions were held on defining the new global development agenda that would promote development and poverty reduction; the development of thinking and options should be based on what has been learned from the MDGs (See Malamed, 2012).

achievements through monitoring are processes that must be tailored into each country. Similarly, Kenny and Dykstra (2013) write that more aid yields a better and richer world performance. The understanding in this assumption is that this could be arrived at by shaping up policy that usually develops through transformation of political authority, capacitating institutional structures, systemic transformation to aid the law of growth (underdevelopment), and pro-poor development of institutionalisation (political transformation and good governance).

Javier (2010) also supports this central conclusion that development aid prioritises good governance as the supporting base of economic growth, and adds that a measure of standard growth-enhancing policies should be at the centre of any plans to achieve the MDGs, as poor governance is one of the key obstacles to non-attainment of the MDGs. The SDGs agenda itself espoused measurement frameworks through results matrix to establish how much would be needed to achieve the targeted results so that aid could be effective. The outcomes of the Rio 20 Plus conference in Brazil in 2012 was to set an agenda for sustainable development for the post-2015 period suggesting a far broader set of areas and targets than contained in the original MDGs (Kenny & Dykstra, 2013).

Over time, international financing institutions (IFIs) have shown that the manner in which development aid is provided has to include an assurance that the development goals are a justifiable course to provide aid (IMF and World Bank Staff, 2006). It is also Braga's (2011:14) view that the provision of development aid has become the main hypothesis to further develop and to reduce poverty, which in turn have become important pillars of good governance and political authority transformation. These all translate to development in the context of aid effectiveness.

Malik *et al.* (2000:11-17) warn that it is imperative to undertake a comprehensive discussion dealing with the origins of development theory and how it has changed over time, to the new paradigms of governance and transformation, in order to set a new motto for development. This would mean capacity building, institutionalisation and structural transformation, in other words, aid effectiveness through the achievement of global development goals.

2.2 Founding theories of development

The original view of development was in essence self-development, in which a party has the capacity to attain outcomes that enhance the standard of living and socio-economic gains. Earlier authors (Freud, 1957; Erikson, 1982; Piaget, 1957; Kohlberg, 1973) agree that development is a series of stages that are age related and happen over a course of a life time in which during this time, people unveil behavioural patterns and build specific capacities. Following this overtime improvement, development becomes sporadic with qualitatively different capacities showing in each stage and process (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2001:16).

Jacobs (1998:14) writes that development is assumed to be relative to the capacity of the society to organise productive means to respond to opportunities and challenges. His views were substantiated by Giarini *et al.* (2012), who submit that

The potential human energies of society are immeasurable. Society enhances the productivity of its energy by a progressive process of differentiation. It begins by a division of tasks through specialization of function. This makes it possible to raise the level of skill in each functional area and facilitates transmission of specialized skills from one generation to the next. Further society differentiates those functions into different segments of social activity – defence, governance, transport, communication, agriculture, crafts, commerce, education, healthcare, entertainment, religion, etc. – thereby facilitating the development of specialized expertise, systems and organization within each segment augmented by systems linking each sector with all the others. Thus, the differentiation of function into production, distribution, marketing and finance has generated the ever-expanding commercial energies of the global marketplace. Multiplicity is energy multiplied (Giarini *et al.*, 2012:1).

From this perspective, development adopts a conceptualisation of a progressive stage, passing through those stages composed of social advancement. This view was initially submitted by Lawrence Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development and their relationship to Leadership Ethics as far back as providing evidence that development and progression of social advancement could be evidenced in a series of progressive self-growth stages with the exhaustive variables. Explaining the moral development of human beings provides a perspective to consider. The EU adopted this hypothesis of Kohlberg (Jacobs, 2010) that this extends to the recognition that development could be when:

- ✓ *The world has paved a way in eradicating poverty; as a reference, over the past 5 years, the world's per capita income tripled even in the light of unprecedented population growth.*
- ✓ *There is evident differential in the widening gap of the rate of growth among nations and communities.*
- ✓ *When there is a new discovery of the new sources of energy, which were being commercialised and new types of materials.*
- ✓ *When technology newly developed responds and creates unprecedented job growth even in the light of the fear of a 100 years ago period predating industrial revolution during which there was widespread fear of machinery replacing labour from human beings as instruments of production.*
- ✓ *When employment has increased across the world in the light of the world population growing unprecedentedly faster than was anticipated. From the 1950s over one billion jobs were created and also the world population had tripled in this period.*
- ✓ *When there were governance transitions from monarchical rule to democratic forms of government following which this made possible the rapid economic advancement of countries especially in the West (The 2015-Watch Report Series, 2010).*

In the EU's contribution to the MDGs, this thought of Jacobs (1998) illustrates that even though progress has been made towards development in the last 50 years, with concentrated efforts and unprecedented achievement, issues relating to development are still at best poorly misrepresented. Conversely, in today's thinking and the contributions of the United Nations in the Post 2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, the main issue unlike representation of development, is focused on presentation and measurement of development results and outcomes. SDGs held a view that development progress has always been primarily about poor people and poor countries achieving things themselves, whereas development should be about collective efforts, accountability and mutual responsibility of all actors and stakeholders to achieve global agenda; in this SDG agenda, aid is less of a factor to achieving global progress but what matters is the global partnership to support development progress (Kenny, 2015).

It is Solow's contention that the application of development theories have worked in favour of accelerating the pace of development of all countries since the 1960s (Solow, 1956:71). This was substantiated by the UN's General Assembly in 2010 in a policy briefing discussion integrated and coordinated follow up on the major

outcomes of the United Nations conferences in the socio-economic fields (UN, 2010e:32). The World Health Organization (WHO) improved on this position and extended development further than just the material and financial aspects of the lives of the people that guides the perception of a multi-dimensional process involving the re-organisation and re-orientation of an entire socio-economic system (WHO Action Plan, 2006-2011:57-58).

Voth (2004:4) agrees with the fundamental basis of development theories as postulated by scholars and international development partners discussed above, bringing also into the equation the improvements of incomes, radical changes in institutional, social and administrative structures as well as attitudes, customs and beliefs.

2.2.1 Explaining what development implies

Todaro and Smith (2003) view development as a function of the national context. For them, they presume that the meaning of development differs across different things, different people and can be defined from different perspectives.

From a traditional perspective, development implies the capacity of the national economy which initial economic condition has been more or less static over a long period of time to be able to generate gross national product (GNP) annual growth of at least 5% - 7% or more (Todaro & Smith, 2003, in Obi & Nwanegbo, 2006). In turn this analogy implies on the other hand that development means the national capacity per capita output to be growing faster than its population.

However, Voth (2004:4) mentions that this realization may necessitate only essential alteration of the socio-economic system. This conclusion prompted the then Secretary General of the United Nation, Boutros Boutros Ghali to pronounce his emphatic stance on development implies at a summit on International Peace and Food that “reflecting on development is the most important intellectual challenge of the coming years” (Jacobs, 2010:7).

Further to that, the Commission encouraged an international collaboration to address and formulate a comprehensive theory of development, addressing human-centred

development that would realise far-reaching strategies that could accelerate development. The international effort to contextualise development gradually drifted to the inclusion of development assistance in terms of financial aid, which is accompanied by comprehensive socio-economic outcomes-centred programmes of government policies (Kanbur, 2005b:9-10).

A critical rethinking of the development agenda that is currently underway, the Sustainable Development Goals, underscores the discussion of whether goals of development policies should be focused on boosting economic growth, environmental and resilience sustainability, participation of people in human development processes and including rapid improvement in literacy, nutrition and infant, child and maternal health among the poor (Kenny, 2015; Republic of Mozambique-European Union Country Strategy Paper 2008-2013:22). It is assumed that the change in the development phenomenon to contextualise it in terms of development aid was influenced by earlier encounters which dictated what development should aim at achieving and how that should be achieved (Community Health Assessment and Group Evaluation (CHANGE) Action Guide, 2010:3). However, these views failed to explain what development actually is, leaving a knowledge gap of how set of development goals have been achieved during the earlier development pathway and inherent strategies for achieving far-reaching results.

Some scholars add that a comprehensive modification of development to include variables of support, financial and monetary indicators is essential (Patton *et al.*, 2013:117). The above submissions summarily means that development should not be viewed only as a set of policies, programmes and results, but also contains the process of making such policies and plans collectively as stakeholders. They asked questions that provide an argument of development in the national context, including how governments work, laws are passed and administrative rules are initiated (Patton *et al.*, 2013:118-124). Though it has become clear that development transformation has taken the lead through development aid, other scholars suggest that the process of development has since been taking place from within societies over considerable number of years, but has received greater attention and

progression over the past 500 years, with rapid acceleration over the past five decades (Tandon *et al.*, 1996:40).

United Nations provided a wider definition of development as applicable to societies and historical periods and can be defined as an upward directional movement of society from lesser to greater levels of energy, efficiency, quality, productivity, complexity, comprehension, creativity, enjoyment and accomplishment (United Nations, 2008b:14).

Other dimensions of human collectivity are expressed by political, social, economic and technological developments. However, the understanding is that this multiplicity of factors influences and determines the outcome of the process of development, among which are the motives and forces that drive the process of social change and conditions essential for the progressive transformation to occur, the bottlenecks that obstruct the process, as well as resource matters, including capital, technology and infrastructure (Lonti & Joumard, 2007:3). Given the need to find appropriate and comprehensive theory, these factors need to find a locus of comprehensive developmental theory. It is in this regard that Jacobs (1998) states that for development process to occur there needs to be a creation of higher levels of organisation in a society to attain higher outcomes with more efficient use of social energies. This view was substantiated by Kosseim (2011:15), who writes that

“too many who thrive on advancements and growth in the pursuit of successful change, modern improvements of shifts in U.S. lifestyles are viewed as positively rewarding aspects of what contribute to an ever changing world”.

The essential nature of the process of development and the route to transformation has been noted through the progressive transformation and the development of social organizations and institutions that provide higher levels of accomplishments by harnessing and directing the social energies. Fundamentally, the principle indicates that society develops when knowledge is organised and resources such as human energies and materials are at the disposal of society to fulfil aspirations (ICPF, 1997). In this analysis, human beings are an important source that drives the process of development. Keita (2004:1-5) agrees that, together with the growth and transformation of the national context and global development agenda, development

alludes to the process of human beings developing. By way of analogy, South Africa's RDP programmes similarly show that the driving force of development is the energy of the people to commit to fulfilling their aspirations (RDP programmes, 1990-1994). This view emphasises on the awareness and comprehension of people to determine the direction of social movement. The resultant effect would mean that efficiency, innovation, creativity, productivity and the organised capacities of people are central to determining the level of societal enjoyment and accomplishment. It is Jackson's analysis that when society progresses, it is as a result of having brought forth the potential of its members (Jackson, 2009).

If the role of the human element in development transformation is taken into account, then the extent of people's education, the intensity of their aspirations and energy, and the quality of their attitudes and values, skills and information are crucial determinants of the process of development (UN, 2010c). The UN Documents Gathering, a body of global agreements, agrees with the perspective of development posited above that in effect, the phenomenal conceptualization of development involves progressive transformation of economy and society, sustainable physical development path that is adaptable to be pursued even in a rigid socio-political setting (UN, 2002). Thus selected development paradigms only become relevant to the extent that they apply to the levels and units of human existence, organisations and individuals, the social sector as well and the international and national communities. Dewey (2008:13) concludes that in the process of development, humans acquire and express their capacities through more productive activities.

2.2.2 Development as a function of human capacity

In an effort to relate the development function to human capacity, there is a need to have a valid theory explaining the central role of undetectable factors in human development. In 2006, the UN's Forum for Social Development stated that process of development is facilitated by people but that does not mean the benefits of development reach every member of the society equally;

The popular contention that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer appears to be largely based on fact, particularly within the present global context. Moreover, extreme or absolute poverty, experienced by those whose income is barely sufficient for survival, remains widespread. Indigence levels have risen in the most affluent countries, in

countries once part of the Soviet bloc and in various parts of Africa, but have remained stable in Latin America and have declined in Asia (UN, 2006a:6).

Rapley (2007:35) contrasts the process of development with the social processes of survival and growth. He says that survival represents a social process of growth of humans in which community sustains itself at a minimal level needed for its existence (Gillespie, 2004:3). The intended social change is thus seen with strong internal authority that seeks to maintain the status quo such as a political system or religious tendencies. Froberg and Waris (2011) go even further, showing that this may infer to a society growing beyond the minimum level of survival, while remaining organised along the same lines as in the past. The assumption of Froberg and Waris is centred on the people who may be encouraged by accessibility of improved technology and expanded scope of technology available. UNICEF (2012) confirms that this is development of society via social change and behaviour.

For such human development to occur, the World Bank states that more capital would stimulate growth of construction and commerce (World Fact Book, 2008) It puts emphasis on the degree of market orientation, level of economic development, availability of natural resources and areas of specialisation. About 15 years ago, it had already been established that development is distinguished from survival and growth through the introduction of new ideas (Weick & Quinn, 1999:364-365). Introducing a function to this human development, WCED (2007:7) defines sustainable development, on the other hand, as “development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. In this case, the conclusion arrived at is that as much as there is measurable rise in the level of activity and accomplishment of results, there should also be an assessment of qualitative change in the way in which the activity is carried out within society.

It was for this reason that it was important to ensure that the shift from rural agrarian to modernised urban commercial society be invoked to service economy as a major development chain in the structure and organisation of a society (UN, 2004:3-4). Likewise, the same transitions occurred in the field of social activity, which led to a process of growth. Scholars thus see growth as the expansion of activities from archaic societies to technologically advanced societies where growth and

development form a distinct process, though not mutually exclusive (Jacobs, 1998:16; Ulleberg, 2009:3).

In 2008, the Ministry of Interior and Administration of Poland, in its paper “The strategy for the development of the Information Society in Poland until 2013”, reiterated that the government was striving to ensure rapid and sustainable economic growth and social development that would improve the living conditions of its citizens. This higher level development of a society was followed by a higher level of significant growth in different fields (Ministry of Interior and Administration, Poland, 2008:3). Sterling (2003:189) is opposed by Chua (2013) in the Philippine Development Report, showing that this assumption emerged from a more sophisticated level of commercial organisations and developmental accomplishments, which are specific fields to government, business and labour. This approach requires the social partners to work in the interest of the collective good.

One can thus conclude that human development proceeds from experience to comprehension and arrives at the assumption that society’s progress is seen through combined efforts of individuals and organised groups, most of whom are only aware of and motivated to achieve their own limited goals. Rapley (2007:3) concludes that the ultimate goal of the human development process is to raise income and give access to a range of goods and services available especially to the poorer people within societies. These strategies and shared goals by groups and individuals are meant to enhance society in order to contribute to the collective good. In this sense, according to the theory of survival and growth, the accomplishments of society are thus referred to as development (IDPM, 2012).

2.2.3 Development as a function of government initiative

Waddock (2007:557-8) writes that planned development means an effort by governments and leaders to accelerate the process in which society would formulate and implement its own policies, programmes and strategies. The author alludes to this submission, but adds that entities are to take responsibility of ensuring that their ways of operations have a progressive impact on the society and the natural environment. In addition, the issues of accountability and transparency are essential for the promotion of a legitimate government and administration (Phago, 2013:13).

Organisations should also apply sustainable means of conducting business that demonstrate inclusion of social and environmental concerns in business operations (Waddock, 2007:557).

While ascertaining the direction of planned developments, development partners renewed calls on financing development through the aid effectiveness agenda (OECD, 2008:6). The assumption is that these planned developments are usually a result of joint strategic thinking on aid effectiveness. It involves the experts, technical advisors and donor partners to initiate the process, as explained in the Paris Declaration and confirmed by the OEDC/DAC in its development paper on the overview of the results of the first survey to monitor the Paris Declaration 2007 in July 2008.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD, 2001) sees development aid theories as paying special attention to physical development, which includes roads infrastructure, water tanks, the promotion of the commercial environment, the improvement of industry, and the deepening of education. These processes are ascertained to remove the socio-economic barriers to welfare state (housing, jobs, health care policies and transparent political processes. These pillars ensure that qualified people, who are often excluded from the poverty reduction opportunities, by race, class, gender and other indices are also considered. Bradshaw (2006: 3-4) writes that

Communities utilize a range of local economic development tools such as redevelopment, business attraction, or enterprise zones to stimulate development of poor and disadvantaged areas hurt by regional isolation, economic backwardness, blight, and disinvestment. Non-profits and CDCs develop comprehensive approaches to poverty based on a multifaceted approach including employment development, education, housing, access to healthcare and social services, as well as personal networks and participation in community programs that increase social capital.

According to various scholars, the period around 1950 saw most governments taking a greater leap and leadership in embracing responsibility for providing informed guidance and direction to development in a multiplicity of fields. The fields included combating HIV/Aids, gender mainstreaming, good governance, deepening

democracy and human rights, among others (Thorbecke, 2009, in Kremer *et al.*, 2009:23). It is the premise of Thorbecke's idea (2009:23) that development evolved from "an essentially scalar concept to a multi-dimensional one entailing the simultaneous achievement of multiple objectives. Such a definition stresses the importance of growth as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for development. Political and social developments are also included."

Theories of development, growth and development aid needs have yet to make a clear distinction between the differences and similarities of planned and spontaneous development patterns in which government takes a centre role as the initiator of the process of development (Ohno & Shimamura, 2007). These authors add that in the case of development, individuals, groups of individuals and organisations are the initiators, usually called rural development or people-centred development *inter alia*. Uddin (2010:41) agrees with Ohno and Shimamura's position, adding that the fundamental principles of development persist to be the same irrespective of who initiated development and how development was initiated.

Development can consider a number of scales and development need to measure which special donor assistance support development in improving economic and financial management, strengthening justice and law, increase public sector effectiveness and developing public sector effectiveness.

This assumption is informed by the idea that for any planned development effort to be successful, it should fulfil the conditions of the natural development process. Ahsan (2012:44), from Uddin's work, concludes that planned development becomes successful to the extent that its efforts depends on the ability to afford impetus for the essential conditions and elements needed for the natural development development to take place. This is in line with Streeten (1989:62, in Ahsan, 2012:44) who writes that

Development must be redefined as an attack on the chief evils of the world today: malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, slums, unemployment and inequality. Measured in terms of aggregate growth rates, development has been a great success. But measured in terms of jobs, justice and the elimination of poverty, it has been a failure or only a partial success.

Similarly, Constatinos (1998:3) writes that the development theories are motivated by the need to contextualise mass poverty. However, Narayan and Petesch (2007) disagree with Constatinos' view, concluding that poverty has always been a persistent problem throughout the world.

Singh (1977:38) offers the basic premise in modernisation theory, writing that modernisation theories engulfed the basic precepts and thought of development in the 1950s and early 1960s. In this instance, he indicates that the earliest attempt to express the problem of development in the form of transformation from traditional Third World economies to modern economies was articulated by the modernisation school of thought. This theory of development was supported by the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Raul Prebisch. The Director and his contemporaries were uneasy that the first world economic growth did not necessitate growth in the poorer countries. Their research suggested that economic activity in the wealthier nations often put the poorer nations in serious economic problems (Ferraro, 2008:58).

After the Second World War and the rudiments of The Marshall Plan, modernisation theory advocated for a more accelerated need for economic growth through substitution form of industrialisation, a process of securing a right quality mix of savings, investment and foreign development aid. Abuzeid (2009:21) shows that even in the light of the relatively low levels of new capital in most of the Third World countries, the need for policy formulation for massive capital investment through foreign aid still remained a reality.

There appears to be emerging consensus in the international community that existing institutional quality in developing countries should be factored into donors' future decisions about aid allocation. A growing number of scholars are calling for greater selectivity in allocating aid to poor countries, because evidence seems to suggest that the 'big push' theory of foreign aid can only have an impact after countries have already made substantial progress in reforming their policies and institutions. World Bank estimates suggest that a \$10 billion increase in foreign aid flows would lift about 25 million people a year out of poverty if lending favors countries with sound economic management, but the figure drops to only 7 million people a year if lending is indiscriminate on the basis of governance quality.

The most insightful upset of modernisation theories were tabled by Marxist and neo-Marxist “dependency” or “underdevelopment theories (Singh, 1977; Bagwahati, 1977), as much as also the structuralist writers made an input as well (O'Brien, 1975). They noted clearly that the theoretical reality of the dependency perspectives was that capitalist penetration leads to and reproduces a combined and unequal growth and development patterns. These scholars skepticism comes in where policy formulation for the indigenous socio-economic development of the Third World must fundamentally be predicted upon the removal of industrial capital penetration and dominance (Taylor, 1979:46; Gibson-Graham, 2002). The theory of dependency drew its lessons from a diverse range of earlier schools of theoretical thought, showing that historical processes (Olutayo *et al.* (2007:101) consequently formulate that the founding fathers of sociology placed comparison on the “old” and “new”, “tradition” versus “modernity”, “rural” versus “urban” and so on. What they argued was that the European societies did not go through the same historical experience making this a condition not necessarily inherent to the Third World condition of underdevelopment. In Hardman and Midgely’s (1981:75) view, the dominant countries in the world’s economy form a capitalist system, making underdevelopment a condition necessary for the world system to function. According to Ghosha (2013:323), this condition leads to the development of modern economies and disadvantages those on the periphery.

The other fundamental development phase viewed the world economy in terms of necessary global interdependence. Brown and Garven (2009:xvii) disagree with the fundamental assumption that the economy can grow too big for the earth’s ecological limits, which means endless growth is an irrational goal. The belief is that fair distribution of both the economic gains and burdens means there is a window to be both rich and poor at the same time. In their view, governing the whole world economy will require a set of rules and institutions that have the support of the entire global community and that invigorate local communities and innovation, rather than stifle them.

Ghai (1977:30) also laments that it is inevitable that the poorer nations depend on the developed nations for aid assistance, foreign direct investment, technological implements and trade and the latter depend on the Third World markets for natural

resources. Sanginga *et al.* (2010:12) add to this view, stating that the policy implication of the dependency syndrome results in the rearrangement of the interdependency trade-offs between the advanced First World and the underdeveloped Third World that sets pace to achieve a whole new economic arrangement of the global order emphasises poverty eradication, sustainable development and humanitarian development as key pillars in development.

Neoliberalism takes after the modernisation paradigm, though it lacks description of the role of the state, which has been minimised in such a way that it gives the private sector a greater role in development. After many years, the Third World nations, the Latin America, Asia and Africa initiated a transition to democracy that creates conditions for the state to focus on the people (Steinberg and Van Deveer, 2012:133).

From the above it can be inferred that Apter (1987:326) was assuming that the modernisation theory refers to aspects of political transformation into democratic governance of the Third World. Guillhot (2005:103) shared the same opinion and added both the agenda of political modernisation and later the agenda of transition to democracy to have been promoted by the discourse coalition to show the changing transition of the path towards democracy and societal modernisation.

In the late 1970s, the basic needs approach, another school of thought, shifted the development paradigm from the emphasis of restructuring the global economic order to that of restructuring the domestic economy aimed at eradicating mass poverty and the societal imbalance of social injustice (Streeten, 1981:108). Clough-Riquelme (2007:65) highlights the power strategies in play in the new geopolitics of economic and ecological globalisation and advises on the need for critical analysis of how the agenda of sustainable development is being conceived, shaped and implemented. These presuppose that the Third World's challenge in the elimination of mass poverty is a result of growth in agrarian societies.

The implication contradicts Kuznets' hypothesis²² which states that there is no justification from the economic perspective for high and increasing income inequality as a basis of rapid economic growth in the least developed nations (Tisdell & Sen, 2004:2012).

From this perspective, and taking into account the need for governments to usher in development, the Third World has characteristics of sharply convergent sectors. The recent thinking in modernisation suggests that in the light of an overwhelming traditional sector, geography in the rural sector still retains less at best (Kesselman, *et al*, 2009:185).

The world has experienced a shift from a traditional political sector to a more economic sector (Constatinos, 1998:13-14). This is the Third World's position of inequality in development. Constatinos' assumption is valid when he argues that the emergence of the new modern sector is socially and economically influenced. The view, supported by Bell (2008:47), says in theory all of these would be dependent on the expansion of services in the economic sector and an increasing dependence on science as the means of innovating and organising technological change. Any analysis of the contemporary realities of Third World societies had been dominated by two models of production, the capitalism and non-capitalism mode of production where the former is becoming increasingly dominant over the latter (Aronowitz & Bratsi, 2002:24).

2.2.4 Historical perspective on development and transformation

Howarth *et al.* (2000:129), based on work done on transition as a dislocation in Romanian politics, are of the opinion that ideological attempts to nurture the symbolic picture in the perspective of political transformation are centred on making sense of this primary notion in contemporary Eastern European politics. With this in mind, Rodney (2012:xiv) says it signifies international economic discourse, which is given

²²Kuznet's U hypothesis states that in a developing country, the income of people will get more unequal before it becomes more equal. While wages become stagnant in rural economies, some people in urban economies will become more wealthy. They will pull workers out of the rural communities, but the wages in the rural economies will still not increase as quick as those in urban communities. The urban rural income becomes unequal when the rich in the former becomes more richer and the other in the latter communities remain at the same level (See Wei-Bin Zhang, 2005).

meaning by the recurring thought in development aid. For development theories, this transition and new paradigm reflect a representation of a series of economic, political and ideological disorders within various modes of production.

Following from Rodney's assumption, Bond (2006) introduces a perspective that alludes to development and transformation in the African context. Bond (2006) submits that who or what is responsible to Africa's underdevelopment can be answered at two levels, firstly the remnants of imperialistic tendencies that drains African wealth and natural resources making it impossible for the continent to have sustainable resources. On the other hand, corrupt tendencies of those who manipulate the system and benefits as agents or accomplices in the system. This realisation thus ushered in a new paradigm from which to view aid and development, as well as political transformation and good governance, as development aid effectiveness pillars. As Sandbrook (1982:17) suggests, "The specific pattern of imperialist penetration has the effect of creating uneven and restricted forms of economic development, specific to Third World social formations".

Development and transformation, according to Chambers (1992, in Hetzler, 2012:216), convey the message that they meant the recurrence of the age of globalisation, technological advances and growing global awareness, the interconnection of most things around the world, such as the situation with environmental concerns and poverty. In essence, the sustainable livelihood approach as it emerged was seen as the new development paradigm and transformation of global practices toward "the integration of population, resources, environment and development in four aspects: stabilizing population; reducing migration; fending off core exploitation; and supporting long term sustainable resource management" (Aldy *et al*, 2001).

As Singer (1970:60-61) argues, livelihood would refer to adequate resources available in stock and sufficient flows of food and cash that meet the basic needs which sustainability would require for the maintenance of such resources over a considerable period of time. Singer (*ibid.*) concludes that strategies and capacities of this productive mean maintenance of livelihood to enhance wellbeing and the future of the generations. Unlike Singer, Butler and Mazur (2007: 608-9) suggest that

diversification of livelihood is important to enhance food security and improve incomes for human development in rural communities. They indicate further that efforts to stimulate innovation are essential for to support agricultural production, technology and promotion of sustainable rural livelihoods (Butler & Mazur, 2007:614). These efforts are a reflection of a change in the community organisational structure and strategy, which owe their success to availability, stability and accessibility of options from ecological to political availability within the system of governance.

Rostow (1960:1-12) argues that classic theories of economic development provide for four approaches, which owes influence to the four major competing and dominant standards of thought (1) the linear stages and growth models; (2) theories and patterns of structural change; (3) the international dependence revolution; and (4) the neoclassical, free-market counterrevolution. The classical economic theory is assumed to be premised on neoliberal thinking and puts emphasis on superiority of the free market in the efficient distribution of goods and services. States intervenes in this instance to prevent market failures, monopolies and information asymmetries. It is in line with this thought that Escobar (2011:4) sees the classical thought advocating for limited government action and opposes large scale regulation of the state. In many parts of the world, development continues to be a main social and cultural force to contend with.

The early 21st century concept of development is a process of successive stages of economic growth that all countries must pass through (Furtado, 2010:230). His interpretation of development and underdevelopment form part of the emergence of development economic structures. According to Furtado (*ibid*) the main features of underdeveloped economic structures were their technological heterogeneity underpinned in significant differences brought by capital-labour ratio between two or more sectors and underdevelopment caused by wrong adjustments as a result of irreversible production methods. Both this realisations formed a discussion while looking for ways of integration of those economies into the international trade.

Todaro (2000:79) adds to Furtado's (2010) view by stating that this concept is integral to the economic growth theory, has elements of savings, investment and

foreign aid, which are important to enable developing nations to be on the right path for economic growth. It is Green's (2008) view that theorists of the 1950s and 1960s (Huntington, 1971; Smelser, 1964; Rostow, 1971; also see Ghatak, 2003) agreed that countries must adapt to the variables above to attain development.

One possible reconciliation of the view above is that development can also be seen as rapid and aggregate economic growth (Siddiqui, 2009:38). However, Sohail (2009:1) mentions that even though this was the case, following the end of the Second World War, economists had not readily availed apparatus to analyse the process of economic development in agrarian societies. According to this view, development can be equated to rapid, aggregate economic growth. Panth (2013:6-9) further argues that the focus of a development paradigm sharply transformed to focus more on the theories and patterns of structural change to represent the institutionalisation of sustained processes of rapid economic growth.

Similarly, Todaro and Smith (2009:87) stress that

This view has now been replaced to a great extent by what may be called the 'structural-internationalist' school of thought. This approach views underdevelopment in terms of international and domestic power relationships, institutional and structural economic rigidities, and the resulting proliferation of dual economies and dual societies both within and among the nations of the world. Structuralist theories tend to emphasize external and internal institutional constraints on economic development. Emphasis is placed on policies needed to eradicate poverty, to provide more diversified employment opportunities and to reduce income inequalities. These and other egalitarian objectives are to be achieved within the context of a growing economy but economic growth PER SE is not given the exalted status accorded to it by the linear stages model.

The proliferation of development as a function of international and domestic power relations and the rigidities of economic structures of international and domestic power relationships were first espoused by Todaro and Smith (2009).

With reference to dependence theories, the tendency in terms of development was to place more emphasis on institutional constraints, internal or external, that affected economic development. It is with this thinking that the recurring theme advocated for need for major policies to eradicate poverty, to provide more diversified employment

opportunities and reduce income inequalities came into the picture. Clark (2006:105) writes that new and more complex strategies emerged during the 1970s to reduce the dependence of poor countries on rich ones, to spread the benefits of development to lagging regions within developing countries, and to increase productivity and income of the poorest groups. These strategies were replaced during the late 1980s and early 1990s with structural adjustment policies that sought to reorder national economies with market systems, promote private enterprise and encourage international trade and investment (Rondinelli, 2009). Bates (2005:5-6) views this development as to be affected by how political forces transform economic forces, promote their differential mobilisation, and thus shape the way in which government intervenes in the process of economic growth, although economic growth is not glorified as the linear stages and structural change models would have it.

Added to the above, the neoclassical counter-revolutionary economic school of thought underscored the inherent benefit role that can be brought about by the introduction of free markets, open economies and privatisation of public enterprises²³ (Todaro & Smith, 2003). Gómez (1998:55) criticised Todaro and Smith's theory, stating that emphasis on the failure of development, according to this theory, is a result of excessive government intervention in the regulation of the economy and not as such internal and external exploitative forces as theorists in this school of thought concluded. Cleeve (2009:265) writes that the existence and continuance of underdevelopment primarily as a result of the historical evolution of a highly unequal international capitalist system of a "rich country - poor country" relationship makes the quest for underdeveloped nations to be self-sufficient and independent, challenging and close to impossible to attain.

2.2.5 Development of economic theories

One of the most influential among the development theories is known as the Stages of Growth Model of Development advocated by American Economic Historian, Walt W. Rostow. According to the Rostow doctrine of the 1960s, transition from the state of underdevelopment to progress to the state of development is explained through a

²³See "development theory" (*Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2013).

series of phases, which countries should follow to attain economic development. Rostow (in Tinbergen 1978:7) makes the point that...

It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off into self-sustaining growth, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. These stages are not merely descriptive. They are not merely a way of generalizing certain factual observations about the sequence of development of modern societies. They have an inner logic and continuity... They constitute, in the end, both a theory about economic growth and a more general, if still highly partial, theory about modern history as a whole.

Rostow draws our attention to a traditional society as characterised by mass poverty and almost no investment or technological change taking place (Dugger & Peach, 2009:16). Patterson (in Ghatak, 2003:265) writes that

The advanced countries passed the stage of 'take-off into self-sustaining growth' and the underdeveloped countries that were still in either the traditional society or the 'preconditions' stage had only to follow a certain set of rules of development. This has been frequently applied in policy issues facing developing countries, such as the Two Gap Model off in their turn into self-sustaining economic growth.

The theory suggests that the principal strategy of development necessary for takeoff entails mobilisation of domestic and foreign savings in order to generate sufficient investment to accelerate economic growth. Trubek and Santos (2006:24-25) are of the opinion that this has guided scholarly reorganisation, re-conceptualisation and reform of private law rules in what the participants understood as the apolitical rationalisation project.

Todaro and Smith (2003) write that the basics of economic mechanisms - that more investment leads to growth - has been described clearly in Harrod-Domar and Solow's growth model, also known as the AK Model. Koroma (2008: 31) adds that this has been applied to policy issues facing developing countries, as has the Two Gap Model. It assumes that every economy must save a certain proportion of its national income, to replace worn out capital goods like buildings, equipment and materials. The assumption arrived at is that the proportion of income that is not consumed equals savings; savings therefore equal investment (Gschwandtner, 2012:65).

McConnell and Brue (2005) indicate, however, that in order to grow, new investments representing net additions to the capital stock are necessary. The assumption in this model is that direct economic relationship between the size of the total capital stock and the total GNP per capita necessitates sufficient stream of GNP to generate income. The correlation between savings, investment and economic growth is developed in the context of a simplified version of the economic logic confirming that in order for growth to take place, economies must save and invest a certain proportion of their GNP (Daquila, 2007:25).

Yemane (2008:8-9) substantiates the above, namely that these models justify growth and development as it represents a model used in terms of the Cold War politics, that operated through transfers of capital and technical assistance from developed to less developed countries which became a tool for the provision of foreign aid. This builds on a similar idea encapsulated in the Marshall Plan, but with the difference that this transfer was from the rich to the poorer nations.

Another dimension in economic theories that relates to development was espoused by the Structural Change Theorists. The Structural Change Theory puts emphasis on the means through which underdeveloped economies attempt to transform their economic structures, putting emphasis on the transformation from a traditional subsistence agrarian society to a modern, urbanized, innovative and industrious, dynamic manufacturing economy. The Structural Change Theory applied the methods of price and resource allocation espoused by the neoclassical thought for this transformation to take place. This school of thought was ushered in by the two sector plus labour theoretical model of W. Arthur Lewis and the patterns of development analysis of Hollis B. Chenery, together with his co-authors (Chenery *et al.*, 2008:435).

The Nigerian Journal of Development Studies (2009:169) states that the Lewis Theory of Development represents one of the best models of development that focuses on structural transformation from a subsistence primary economy to a modern industrial economy. This theory was formulated in the 1950s by W. Arthur Lewis, a Nobel Laureate. It was later modified by scholars including John Fei and Gustav Ranis. However the Lewis Two Sector Model remained the general theory of

the development process in surplus labour for the Third World nations during most of the 1960s and early 1970s. At the same time, the early reformulation of development processes that relate structural economic change with inequality in the midstream of economic development was based on the theoretical model by Lewis (Hassan, 2004:30). A history of failure of development economies to promote racial justice and decolonization is seen in the Lewis dispositions (Tignor, 2006:11).

Based on the Lewis model, Occasional Papers (2004:4), the main proposal is that there are two sectors in the underdeveloped economy; a traditional sector that is overpopulated, rural subsistence sector characterised by surplus labour and a high productive modern urban industrial sector in which labour from the subsistence sector was gradually transferred into this sector. Hudson (2005) sees the modern sector basing its interest on the process of transfer of labour and the growth of output and employment in the modern sector. It suffices to say that presently the New International Economic Order driven by IMF and World Bank explores how America achieved its economic aims and changing the United States' attitude towards foreign aid, international investment, government regulation, the impact on important industries and the future of new economic order to tally with this opinions.

This process of modern sector development and self-sustainability including employment expansion is predicted to continue until the surplus rural labour is absorbed in the new industrial sector.

Young (2013:20) is of the opinion that the structural transformation of economic activity is characterised by a shift from the conservative, rural and traditional agrarian sector to the modern industrial sector.

2.2.6 Development theories as a function of Structuralism

Like the earlier Lewis model, Todaro and Smith (2009) explain that the patterns of development of structural changes focuses on the sequential process through which the economy, industrial and institutional structure of underdeveloped economy is transformed over time to permit new industries to replace traditional agriculture as the engine of economic growth.

Contrary to the Lewis Model original stages view, increasing savings and investment are perceived by patterns of development analysts as necessary, but not sufficient reason for economic growth. As Szirmai (2005:9) underscores, economic and social development are desired, but however, critics only pointed out the drawbacks of growth, development and modernisation in the disruption of traditional societies and lifestyles (Szirmai, 2005:9).

For this theory, accumulation of capital as a form of development assistance became essential to aid a set of interrelated changes in the economic structure, both for physical and human transition, which was necessary for the system to shift from a traditional to a modern economic system; acquiring income was one of the options exercised for the development of income and wealth (Dutt & Ros, 2008:4). These authors (*ibid.*) assume that capital injection as development aid fortifies structural changes and involves virtually all economic functions, including transformation of production and changes in the composition of consumer demand, international trade and resource use, as well as changes in socio-economic factors such as urbanisation and the growth and distribution of a country's population.

Acemoglu (2009:18) is of the opinion that empirical structural change analysts emphasise both domestic and international constraints on development. Acemoglu's principle is correct in so far as Dai (2007:1-4) adds to the idea that these constraints run from a country's resource endowments, as well as physical and population size, coupled with the institutional policies and procedures of the government. Conversely, Pepa (2013) is skeptical about doing away with the causes in international constraints on development that includes the ability to access foreign capital, technology and international trade. How countries differ in the progression of development lies in these international and domestic constraints. Similarly, Todaro and Smith (2009:120) support the issue of international constraints as huge determinants of how countries make a transition to industrialisation. The argument of international constraints, according to Mrak (2000:13), cannot be abandoned to the extent that developing countries have access to the opportunities presented by the developed countries as source of capital, technology and manufactured import as well as markets for exports. Thus, it can be concluded that this theory, as opposed to

earlier stages theories, supports to the idea that developing countries are part of the international system determines how it promotes or hinders their development (Goulet, 2006:216).

In presenting the case for development and financing structural change, the work of Hollis B. Chenery presents perhaps the best model of structural change by examining patterns of development during the postwar period (Hardman & Midgely, 1981). Eckaus (2008:4), based on both comparative studies among countries and time series analysis of countries over longer periods at different levels of per capita income, has identified several characteristic features of the development process. Goulet (1985) writes that this transition represented a shift from agrarian to industrial production, which was a reflection of a steady pattern from physical to industrial capital. This was a change from consumer demands that focused on food, other necessities and manufacturing of goods and services. This was a justification for financing for development for greater economic gains.

In the past, economic development was perceived more along the lines of planned alteration of structures of production and employment so that agriculture's share of both declines and that of the manufacturing and service industries increased (Shaniaz, 2008:501).

2.2.7 Development theories and Global Dependency Syndrome

International dependency models received increasing attention in the late 1970s when intellectuals began to voice concern over the stages and structural change models. Taylor (1979:3) writes that although the international dependence models gained support, the 1980s and early 1990s saw the theory falling out of favour as the 21st century became the term of transitional development.

On the other hand, Kay and Gwyenne (2000:50), who write about Structuralism and dependency theories, critique the existing development paradigms, showing that they were unable to uncover (let alone deal with) Latin America's problems of underdevelopment and development. While on the one hand structuralism argues in favour of an inward directed development policy through import substitution

strategies or industrialisation (ISI), dependency theory put across a new international economic order, a transition from socialism as a way out of underdevelopment (Bogopa, 2005:95).

Todaro (2000) is of the opinion that developing countries are affected by international dependency models through which institutional, political and economic rigidities both domestic and international create dominance of rich countries over poorer countries. This approach is informed by the three major streams of the neocolonial dependency model, the False Paradigm Model and the Dual dependency Theory. Baran (1985), and Todaro and Smith (1985) agree that the main stream been the neocolonial dependency model is born out of the thinking in Marxist theory. They also agree that it features the existence and continuance of underdevelopment primarily to the historical evolution of the highly unequal international capitalist system of the rich country-poor country relationships. The overall concept was founded on the idea that rich nations are at best intentionally exploiting poorer nations, or are neglectful of the perennial effects of their dominance over poor nations, where there is a clear-cut unequal power relation between the least developed nations and developed countries, making it impossible for poor nations to achieve self-reliance and independence (Baran, 1957:7-13; Todaro and Smith, 1985:78-80).

The Kubrick Theme (2011) laid the foundation in Marxist thinking which attributes the existence and continuance of underdevelopment between the rich and poor countries primarily to the historical revolution of a highly unequal international capitalist system. Furthermore, it is based on the assumption that in these system, rich countries are intentionally exploitative or unintentionally neglected and international system is dominated by an unequal power relations between the “centre” and the “periphery” (The International Dependence Revolution, 2013). Based on this, it is difficult for poor nations to develop. It is also Sabilo’s (2013:222) view that international specialist interests are in building multinational corporations and bilateral aid agencies that provide multilateral assistance through organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, which ties funding to allegiance to the wealthy aid-giving nations that are capitalist in nature.

Based on the above analysis, scholars agree that this neocolonial view continues to create underdevelopment as a large number of developing countries' policies continue to worsen poverty in the less developed countries (Leys, 1975; Todaro and Smith, 1985:56). A further elaboration suggested that for developing states to survive, they were left no choice but to "borrow heavily from both Western governments and Western private banks" (Pease, 2007:195). To this extent, underdevelopment becomes externally induced, contrary to the linear stages and structural change theories' emphasis on internal constraints, such as a lack of skills and education (Kapstein, 2004:84).

Goulet (2010:4) believes that the solution to the above phenomenon can be found if there is a major overhaul and restructuring of the global capitalist system, which require setting free the dependence of the developing countries from the economic controls of the developed world. Contrary to this view, Goldberg *et al.* (2008:480-483) show the importance of understanding international trade does not only depend on the resources the country has but also on the resources the country utilizes in a positive way that can lead a state to development. Andrews (2009:13) underscores, however that generally, there is an impact resources have on armed conflicts and underdevelopment that impacts international trade. This has direct and indirect linkages linked to income inequality and insecurity, which can generate a national discontent and eventually lead to armed conflict (Mathias, 2005:15).

An important observation about the International Dependence Theory comes from Dos Santos (1969, in Goulet 2006:124-125), who states that

Underdevelopment, far from constituting a state of backwardness prior to capitalism, is rather a consequence and a particular form of capitalist development known as dependent capitalism ... Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development. In either case, the basic situation of dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited....

Hunter (2003:24) critically analyses Dos Santos' view, adding that developed countries already have the upper hand as they have control over the technology, commercial markets, the capital resources and socio-political resources over dependent nations, which gives them leverage to exploit poorer nations' locally produced surplus. This, according to Hunter (*ibid.*), is driven mostly by the historical moment of colonialism. Hunter (*ibid.*) explains that the dependence is based upon an international division of labour, which allows industrial development to take place in some countries while restricting in others whose growth is conditioned upon the world powers.

Based on Hunter's view, it becomes apparent that in order to achieve this aim, there is a strong commitment to be acquired from the North to liberalise its domestic agricultural markets along with other markets of key interest to the South, and also provide assistance to connect developing countries to trade through technical cooperation and capacity building. Pope John Paul II, in a letter he wrote in 1988, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (The Social Concerns of the Church) declared,

One must denounce the existence of economic, financial, and social mechanisms which, although they are manipulated by people, often function almost automatically, thus accentuating the situation of wealth for some and poverty for the rest. These mechanisms, which are maneuvered directly or indirectly by the more developed countries, by their very functioning, favor the interests of the people manipulating them. But in the end they suffocate or condition the economies of the less developed countries" (in McCathy, 2009:139).

Recently, scholars, including Robinson and Acemoglu (2012), revisited this idea. They were influenced by institutional factors such as the role of traditional social structures, the highly unequal ownership of land and property rights, coupled with disproportionate control by local elites over domestic and international financial assets as well as unequal access to credit as suggested by the Lewis-type surplus labour and Cherety-type structural change models, which both serve the interests of the existing power groups, domestic and international. Additional to this line of thinking, Hall and Soskice (2001:302) show that university intellectuals, trade unionists, high level government authorities, economists and other civil servants receive training from the developed countries' institutions that continue to influence

their thinking on the justification of foreign concepts and theoretical models not aligned to their environment.

2.2.8 Finding a tie in development theories

According to Beck (2008), what is contained in the structural change theories and obvious for international dependency theories is the clarity seen in the world in which there exist dual societies broken down into rich and poor nations. He states, "The completely normal marvel makes it possible to calculate the incalculable - with the aid of accident statistics, generalizing settlement formula and through the generalized exchange principles disadvantages for all are compensated with money" (Beck, 2008:24).

It would seem obvious that what is widely discussed in development economics is dualism. In this discussion, a complete dissection of increasing discrepancies between the rich and the poor nations and people is obvious at various levels. This concept of dualism embraces four key arguments (Singer 1970:2):

1. Different sets of conditions, of which some are 'superior' and others 'inferior', can coexist in a given space. Examples of this element of dualism include Lewis's notion of the coexistence of modern and traditional methods of production in urban and rural sectors; the coexistence of wealthy, highly educated elites with masses of illiterate poor people; and the dependence notion of the coexistence of powerful and wealthy industrialized nations with weak, impoverished peasant societies in the international economy.
2. This coexistence is chronic and not merely transitional. It is not due to a temporary phenomenon, in which case time could eliminate the discrepancy between superior and inferior elements. In other words, the international coexistence of wealth and poverty is not simply a historical phenomenon that will be rectified in time. Although both the stages-of-growth theory and the structural-change models implicitly make such an assumption, to proponents of the dualistic development thesis, the facts of growing international inequalities seem to refute it.
3. Not only do the degrees of superiority or inferiority fail to show any signs of diminishing, but they even have an inherent tendency to increase. For example, the productivity gap between workers in developed countries and their counterparts in most LDCs seems to widen with each passing year.
4. The interrelations between the superior and inferior elements are such that the existence of the superior elements does little or nothing to pull up the inferior element, let

alone 'trickle down' to it. In fact, it may actually serve to push it down—to 'develop its underdevelopment'.

Hassan (2004:47) substantiates the above submission by showing that other factors include change in location in economic activity (urbanisation) and other concomitant aspects of industrialisation (demographic transition, income distribution). The end-result of Hassan's principle as it relates to developing countries calls for freer markets and the dismantling of public ownership, statist planning and government regulation of economic activities, in other words transformation (Kovel, 2007:123-127). Coupled with the loss of influence of the international institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it is evident that the neoconservative arguments of dependence theories would receive much attention (Todaro, 1985:85).

In tandem with Todaro's analysis, the neoclassicists submit that underdevelopment is a result of poor resource allocations due to too much state intervention, resulting in incorrect pricing policies (Jallow, 2011:135). The leading argument raised above arrives at the conclusion that too much state intervention results in a slow pace of economic growth. On the other hand, neo liberals argues that by allowing the market to be competitive and free in order to perform well, privatising state owned enterprises and promoting free state and passage of exports market expansion, as well as welcoming new investors while limiting government intervention in the free market economy would stimulate economic growth (Todaro & Smith, 2009, in Jallow 2011:136).

In contrast to the earlier claims of the dependence theorists, the neoclassical counterrevolutionaries claim that the Third World is underdeveloped not as a result of the greedy activities from the First World and the international agencies that it controls but rather because of the heavy hand of the state and the corruption, inefficiency and lack of economic incentives that infiltrate the economies of the developing nations (Callaghy & Ravenhill, 2013). In addition, Rindell (2009) eliminates what would seem to be needed to say that in effect the blame cannot be put on the reforms of the international economic systems, restructuring of dualist economies of developing countries or an increase in the foreign aid but more

profoundly on the misguided withdrawal policies of many adjustment programmes. In support of this argument, Kegley (2008:149) states that it is a matter of promoting freer markets and laissez-faire economics within the context of permissive governments to guide resource allocation and stimulate economic development.

Szentes (2002) concludes that the neoclassical challenge to the persistent development orthodoxy can be broken down into three components: the free market approach, the public choice approach and the “market friendly” approach. Pardo (2011:138) states the following:

Free-market analysis argues that markets alone are efficient - product markets provide the best signals for investments in new activities; labour markets respond to these new industries in appropriate ways; producers know best what to produce and how to produce it efficiently; and product and factor prices reflect accurate scarcity values of goods and resources now and in the future.

In addition, Goulet (2011:128) proposes four approaches in which the classical theories of economic development add value to Szentes' and Pardo's development orthodoxy above, namely that competition is effective, technology is freely available and information is also perfect and nearly costless to obtain. Likewise, Engel (2010:19-23) suggests that

... under these circumstances, any government intervention in the economy is by definition distortionary and counterproductive... Free-market development economists have tended to assume that developing-world markets are efficient and that whatever imperfections exist are of little consequence.

The above analysis introduced the Public Choice Theory. Public Choice Theory, also known as the New Political Economy Approach, builds on what the neoclassical counterrevolution development orthodoxy suggested, and goes further to argue that governments can do nothing right. The argument states that:

The problem for left-wingers who make this sort of response to public choice, however, is that it implies that many of the quasi-conspiracy theories that are often their most important mobilisation tactic have to be abandoned as well. Might it just be that central banks and financial regulators who pursued a policy of loose money and the lowering of lending standards did so because they believed it was the ‘right thing to do’ and not because they were in the pockets of corporate bankers? If politics is really about values

and ideas then perhaps we should look to the power of 'mistaken theories' (such as Keynesianism and Monetarism) as the cause of government failure rather than the corrupt dealings of the 'top 1%' (The Left and Public Choice Theory, 2012).

This view is influenced by the thinking in Public Choice Theory that assumes politicians and bureaucrats, citizens and the state use their power and authority to solely pursue their self-interest and to their selfish ends. Stambuli (2002:43) is in support of this notion and indicates that

African governments simply resisted reforms aimed at making state enterprises more independent, market orientated, efficient and competitive. Such gospel was perceived as a means of wresting their political control over the economy.

In a paper by the United States Institute for Peace (2010:14), it was said that citizens also play a role in this situation as they use their political power to influence decision and policymaking by securing special benefits from the government policies, for instance on import licenses or rationed foreign exchange that restricts access to important resources. The point advanced in this paper is that politicians also abuse the use of government's resources to ensure that they maintain positions of power, authority and influence. Further, it states that corruption can be perceived as beneficial in a society where patronage networks ensure that some benefits are channelled down to the poorer members of the community. Others argue that "grand" corruption is not always negative. Kelly (2012) adds that public officers abuse their position in exchange for bribes. The private gain obtained by corrupt public officials who have been entrusted with guiding and implementing public policy and service is at the expense of both the common good and of those who do not "cheat the system" (Bamidele, 2013:49).

In some instances, the states use their own power, influence, control to confiscate private property from individual ownership, which then results in the general reduction of individuals' freedom. Rose-Ackerman (2010) argues that where this happens, minimal government serves as a best government.

Another perspective by the neoclassical free market approach suggests that the opening of the national markets allows additional domestic and foreign investment to thrive thus increasing capital accumulation:

In the face of the current international disorder with respect to exchange rates and financial flows, renewed efforts need to be undertaken to create an environment in which surplus and deficit countries would both face equal adjustment pressures and where capital flows would be regulated. This could be largely achieved through an International Clearing Union where a new international 'accounting' currency would take the place of the US dollar as the main reserve currency (International Labour Organisation, 2011).

Traditional neoclassical models of growth are direct result of the Harrod-Domar and Solow's models, which both emphasis the significance of savings (Solow, 1956:79). Akeem (2011:30-31) says the neoclassical growth model in particular expanded on the Harrod-Domar formulation by adding a second factor, the labour, and introducing a third independent variable, technology to the growth of the equation,. Akeem (*ibid*) explained further that Solow's neoclassical model exhibits diminishing returns to the labour and capital separately and constant returns to the both factors jointly. It is Akeem's view that technological progress is one important factor that can explain long-term growth.

Acemoglu (2009:1) indicates that this theory is important owing to the fact that as the country grows and is richer than the other, it is at a stage that it has greater human and physical capital and technology. He explains that while the neoclassical growth approach recognises the importance of technology, it focuses on accumulation of human and physical capital to explain the dynamics (*ibid.*).

From these theories of development, it is clear that they provide a foundation for a global world order and standards of baseline data, according to which development is founded. They produce a large echo of Structuralism and policy change that, because of interdependence and underdevelopment of the Third World, has to be supported by some form of funding so that they can be catalysts for achieving development goals. It is in this regard that an assessment of aid theories is required to ascertain the extent of capacity development and support to achieve good governance and policy transformation so that development goals can be attained, in other words, aid effectiveness.

2.3 The concept of aid

Riddell (2009) highlights that in the development aid school of thought, the question that often surfaces is whether it works and whether it reaches the poor. Paxton (2013), in a discussion on the MDG debate, notes that during the first 30-year period of the 70-year-reign of the school of thought on development aid there was never a concern about the argument of development aid. However, during the mid-1970s the context of poverty precipitated even though it never formed any serious interest in discussing the merits of providing aid, or whether the said aid provided reached the poor. This thought insinuated that development aid served the purpose of filling the resource, financial and skills gaps as well as building to improve infrastructure to provide an environment for recipient countries' economies to thrive more quickly. In this researcher's opinion, this would contribute to growth that would benefit the poor.

The current thinking on the concept of aid is also highlighted in the Sustainable Development Agenda, SDGs Agenda 2030. It notes the progress made in areas of education and eradicating poverty but underscores that more remains to be done to ensure that the benefits of development are experienced by all, the environment is protected and there is appropriate protection for the family as well as the need for financing the unfinished MDGs.

Original theoretical perspectives and encounters with ODA assign little interest to the impact and effectiveness of development as opposed to its assumed need as a basis for providing it. This led Kharas (2011) to submit that efforts to advocate for development aid focused on increasing the levels of aid and the number of aid giving agencies more than expanding the benefits of aid to recipients. He writes:

The most pressing challenge of development, the effort to raise the income of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan African has hardly seen any funding increase at all (Kharas, 2011:2).

The first critique of aid did not arise from the political right, but from the left. According to Ruyper (2005), the political right and left have been known to denote that the political right favours centralising power in the hands of the leaders in government, while the political left is in favour of distributing power to the people. The

basis of this assumption is that the right is linked to conservatism while the left is often associated with liberalism. For this analogy, the terms “right wing” and “left wing” are used interchangeably to describe these two extreme versions of conflicting philosophies of government. In this regard, Terese Hayter, in her 1971 publication, *Aid as imperialism*, lodged a critical disposition on official aid, stating that it was perceived to be working well despite its failures. After Hayter’s dissatisfaction in the mid-1970s, a rather fresh paradigm cropped up focusing on the redistribution of growth and the basic needs approach as dominant development paradigms refocusing the role and purpose of providing development aid, which were central to addressing the poor and immediate needs of providing aid (Stokke 2005:3).

At a later stage, the growth and basic needs approaches were overtaken by the human development and rights-based approaches, which were the core shapers of the global agenda, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and new set of Sustainable Development Goals otherwise known as the SDGs Agenda 2030. As alluded before, achieving the targets of these global development goals remains the cornerstones of providing or giving aid today. Similarly, the World Bank holds a view that the role of giving aid grew as the idea of helping to accelerate growth persisted to address the shortfalls, causing low growth, but also to reshape growth to be more pro-poor. In this regard the World Bank (2010:3) states that...

Much more needs to be done in monitoring poverty, including obtaining a better understanding of its dynamics - how poverty evolves for individuals and groups and how it is influenced by changes in economic policies. It is also important to strengthen capacity in Africa to analyze survey data. A number of initiatives, including by the African Economic Research Consortium, are making a contribution in this area. A final critical dimension of poverty is insecurity; the poor face continued risks of further impoverishment, while the near-poor face threats of falling into poverty traps.

Following from the World Bank’s argument, Handley et al. (2009:3) elaborate that in the 1980s, more attention began to be given to structural problems and market distortions with the weakening of growth rates. These scholars are of the opinion that in the 1980s, as growth rates weakened, more attention was focused on structural problems and market distortions. With the recent slow down on growth resulting in weak institutional capacity, poor governance and inadequate infrastructure,

reprogramming of funds and more attention has been given to capacity development, good governance initiatives and projects of infrastructural initiatives and development common to the donors and aid givers of the early 1950s.

The changing perspectives on applying development aid as a source to address shortfalls in growth and eradicate poverty provide an entry point to thinking about how best aid can be effective. Scholars began thinking deeper on the values of giving aid and reasonable justification of providing it.

2.3.1 Presenting the case for development aid and its consequences

Riddell (2009) believes that donors could have drawn more attention to understanding and analysing factors that obstruct development aid's far-reaching impact by emphasising the main barriers of aid impact and dedicating higher priority results to harmonising their efforts to address these problems. Riddell (2009) states that this approach would not have ignored the real failures of aid, but would rather have prioritised aid weaknesses and failures, putting more focus on the core problems of aid. With such progress, aid effectiveness would be realised over time.

As early as the 1980s, there was a growing establishment of evaluation units and departments by the world's largest donors, which drew academics to conduct studies on aid effectiveness that were funded by the very same donors (Guidelines for Project and Programme Evaluations, 2010:2). Dollar and Burnside (2000:847) state the following:

However, the work and outputs on impact and aid effectiveness from these units and departments were never mainstreamed by the agencies. From the early 1980s, when aid impact issues were first discussed, down to the present day, the information placed in the public domain by all aid agencies, both public and private, has been overwhelmingly, and almost exclusively, evidence of aid's successes. The assumption seems to have been then - as it remains today - that as public support for aid is dependent upon aid achieving its (poverty-reducing) objectives, the best way to maintain support for aid is simply to 'feed the public the good news' - the more of it the better.

This position created a situation that created doubt about aid successes based on these evaluations and critical successes about aid that come from the agencies

(Easterly, 2008:12). For example, a study completed in September 2013 by United Kingdom's Department of International Development (DfID) that discussed the quality of aid evaluation in the United Kingdom identified defensive attitude in providing development aid from the senior management and called or recommended for a culture of change to address the problems encountered (DfID, 2009).

Based on the above assumption, Riddell (2009:3) states:

Assuming this analysis is correct, does it matter? What's wrong with aid agencies putting in the public domain evidence of aid's impact so heavily stacked with the stories of its successes? Isn't this what one would expect them to do; aren't agencies right to assume that if they presented evidence of failure then this would undermine public support for aid? My own view is that it matters greatly.

This submission contains connotations that the positive attributes of aid are measured by communication of the effects of aid agencies to the public since this would discourage a public debate on the merits of aid the critics of aid would want to pose. As seen earlier in the debates with Moyo (2009; 2010; Barden, 2009), authors who support development aid make a convincing case that it works, while on the other hand, those who are more pessimistic also advance strong examples of the failure of aid. This divergence bears testimony to the lack of effective public engagement and a debate on the subject of aid effectiveness (Handelman, 2011).

It may be worthwhile to establish how much aid is needed in order for it to work as a way of sparking more debate to justify continuing providing it. One question is that if there is evidence that less than what has been provided through development aid has worked, will it remains justifiable to continue providing aid? In light of this debate, the subject of development aid and the morality foundations of providing it seem to be dominated by performance-based management, which attaches more importance to the culture of results and value for money (Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, 2011:117). The Review by the Commonwealth of Australia suggests the following:

It is best to have a framework for the aid program which recognises this and provides direction on it, rather than to leave the point tacitly understood, but never explicitly stated (Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, 2011:117).

Welsh and Woods (2007:xi) state that donor governments and multilateral institutions sought ways to focus their development assistance on countries that demonstrated a capacity to govern well. More importantly, donors began to investigate and experiment with how they might promote good governance using foreign aid.

The argument in this view is that development transformation requires financial capacity to boost everything that has distorted a route to development regard had to the fact that humankind has the ability to build a better present and a better future for all. It is in this regard that donors' decision-making on giving aid amounts to the relationship between what resources are available and what decision could be made in light of the available resources. Djankov *et al.* (2008:169) write that at the heart of the aid effectiveness debate is aid capture, where each year donors give development assistance to developing countries, many of which fail to attain aid effectiveness and aid goes to waste mainly because of government incentives to pocket their aid for personal gain, or as a result of limited capacity of institutions to ensure that aid reaches the intended beneficiaries. The theory behind this submission indicates from the empirical work of donors that donor funding is at a great risk of aid capture perpetuated by agency problems and bureaucratic inefficiency in countries demonstrating poor governance (Dietrich, 2011:4).

As enunciated in the report by the UNFPA (2010), this view examines the method of intervention by the provider of aid, which in most cases is humanitarian emergency relief and lately development capacity-building intervention, and not to the preferences or choices of recipients.

Thomas *et al.* (2011) support this theory of development aid, indicating that for the most part, aid is given in the form of technical and financial assistance to developing countries in order to enhance these countries administrative and managerial capabilities and strength as well as strengthen institutions of governance entrusted to implement projects and programmes of development. Thomas *et al.* (2011:23) further state:

Real aid – the kind of aid that contributes to ending aid dependency – benefits and empowers poor people, either directly or indirectly. It supports developing countries to lead their own development, in their own way. It is accountable, transparent and

predictable. Wherever possible it uses developing countries' own spending and monitoring systems, not parallel procedures.

Tracing back to the beginning of the American Foreign Assistance Programme, development aid placed much emphasis on institutional development as an essential element. This put much more focus on the problems of development administration and management in the post-millennium era. The Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters (2010:3 (m)) reports that international cooperation on capacity-building in the area of taxation has as its goal to provide various aid agencies with an idea of the types of assistance available for organisations to reach development effectiveness. Michielse and Thuronyi (2012:11-14) state that more than 25% of all aid field programmes are aimed at improving and strengthening the institutional performance of Third World countries.

Michielse and Thuronyi's approach to aid is confirmed by scholars such as Crawley (1965:169) who showed that debates on aid have included how to stimulate its management, how it could be analysed for its impact, the change it brings to behaviour, and how it remodels thinking. However, there are persistent differences between those who think about aid as a technique and a process, and those who advocate for participatory, behavioural and structural approaches. This is confirmed by Macrae *et al.* (2004: xiii) who say that decisions about aid engagement strategies and allocation are propelled by a wide range of factors and that there is often too little emphasis on development performance as a whole in these decisions.

2.3.2 The recurring thought on aid

The current thinking on recent development aid modalities rests on substantial body of negative experience concerning the institutional effects of previously dominant modalities ((Advisory Board for Irish Aid, 2008:vi). New thinking on the modality of aid directs the theory to the idea that aid effectiveness depends heavily on conditions in the recipient country and fundamentally on its governance and politics. Agreeing with this assumption, Warmerdam and De Haan (2011:3) show that the point of departure in investigating the politics of aid is to consider the domestic influences and determinants of aid:

Foreign aid policies are, like domestic and foreign policies, formulated in consideration of domestic political realities and the context of international circumstances. This means that as domestic political situations change and the international context changes, foreign aid policies are reformulated to adapt to the new set of conditions.

What remains the question is whether domestic conditions can be improved and if donors can play a part in improvement of conditions is essential to scaling down poverty using new aid modalities. This theory is substantiated by Gerster (2004:10; NORAD, 2008:7) who states that decentralised systems can be more resource effective. Gerster (*ibid.*) agrees that this can result in higher poverty reduction with the same amount of capital expenditure.

The experiences of the founding theories of aid in relation to development management recognise that the theories of development administration and how they apply to the school of thought of development aid underwent immense change over the last 30 years.

We believe that perspectives on aid must change in two ways to deal with this situation. First, there must be broader and more refined awareness of the implications of coexistence between public and private investment in developing countries. A second priority for more effective aid complementarity would be official multilateral initiatives to improve public/private communication on development priorities. Obviously, institutions like the IMF and others have been contending with this 'partnership' for a long time, but it is not clear that more traditional bilateral and multilateral aid agencies have awakened to the realities of aid and globalization or made the strategic adjustments necessary to more fully exploit complementarities with private capital markets (Roland-Host & Trap, 2002:17).

The theory of aid has contributed to the institutionalisation of public administration structures in many of developing countries, which in turn capacitated thousands of administrators from Third World countries by giving them training and education developed in these aid-giving countries. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the methodology of training did not focus only on transferring systems and tools of developing countries into recipient countries, but also highlighted ways that could promote fundamental political modernisation and administration:

We are relatively agnostic about the political implications of our analysis and recommendations, striving foremost for intellectual honesty and objectivity. Having said this, a few salient aspects of this work seem worthy of emphasis. For this reason, we believe that aid research and resources should be targeted accordingly (Roland-Host & Trap, 2002:17).

The argument advanced here is the opposite of that of Killick (1998), who believed that it would be wrong to assume that the choices of development partners are autonomous over the growth process. He assumed therefore that the literature on aid forms a substantial body of research justifying aid modalities, including the effectiveness of development goals (Killick, 1998:12)²⁴. Aid thus becomes a condition for economic gain and institutional reforms (Clist *et al.*, 2012:268).

The rise of new opinions and facts began developing from Deci and Ryan (1985) and Lefcourt (1976), who stated that there are three broad categories that validate the decision of giving aid, which fall within the choice-determined characteristics. These authors agreed that these categories range from the economic and the rational choice approaches to institutional design. Shah (2012) agrees in principle and adds that aid often comes with a price of its own for the developing nations namely that:

- The recipients must use overpriced goods and services from donor countries thereby wasting aid due to this condition
- A bulk of aid received does not go to the beneficiaries, or the poorest who need it
- Rich countries use aid to open poor countries markets for their products whereas the rich countries protectionism denies market access for products from poor countries

Shah (*ibid.*) further maintains that large projects or massive strategies often fail to help the vulnerable as money is often embezzled. This submission fits into that of Frey's crowding out effect²⁵, which Lane (1991) terms the "hidden cost effect". It assumes the idea of hidden cost of rewards, as Lepper and Green (1978) would put it. The central idea is that the goal of the donors in development aid assistance is to help themselves and not the recipients.

²⁴ See discussion and reference in the World Bank (1998) and Killick *et al.* (1998).

²⁵ Motivation crowding theory, in labour economics and social psychology, suggests that extrinsic motivators such as incentives or punishments can undermine (or, under different conditions, strengthen) intrinsic motivation. For example, if the imposition of a fine or other concrete penalty results in an increase of a prohibited behaviour, the penalty is said to "crowd out" the intrinsic social disincentive by associating violations with a more psychologically acceptable cost. The theory contrasts with the relative price effect on which mainstream economics is based (Frey & Jegen 2001).

2.3.3 Validating the traditional school of thought

Another theory on development aid is focused on an external development agency that intervenes in a less developed country with the aim of helping to bolster economic development. Milner (2005:836) assumes that development organisations are established to help the developed countries create a cooperative and stable world economy in a non-globalised world. This theory hinges on the idea of the enhancement of development projects that involve changing human institutions and not the physical reconstruction of projects *per se*.

However, the question remains how the development institution can induce the desired action by designing packages of incentives to the recipient country. According to Molund and Schill (2004:13), development assistance has ample experience of trying to assess the performance of development aid interventions. They show that for a long time development economists have tussled with complex and at times seemingly insurmountable issues concerning how to evaluate the performance of aid. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (2007:15) adds that many of the findings in respect of both evaluation methodology and the actual results from assessing aid are freely available yardsticks to development aid effectiveness as theory. According to Ellerman (2006:100-101), this is the economic theory of agency in which development aid takes a sophisticated form of the carrot and stick approach to the development context.

As mentioned earlier, this confirms Killick's (1998:40) assumption that the desired changes (e.g., institutional development) are the objects of direct choice rather than the indirect "byproducts of other actions".

The process of development experience as a function of aid corporations has informed the development context in that when the external development partners alone acquire, analyse and process information about the needs relating to the recipient country's social contexts of development gaps, the intended social change does not occur. However, in this form of social change when development agencies participate in social learning involving stakeholders in the implementation of development activities, social change often occurs (World Bank, 1996:5; Gutas, 2005:59).

Presently, development agencies are actively rethinking the effectiveness of development assistance in the form of aid. According to Gramont (2013:12), induced participation rests on an inherent paradox that requires top-down efforts to encourage citizens to stand up against power holders. Such efforts are unlikely to be effective unless they are supported by at least some elements of the state. The theory suggests that there have been many small or local successes, but the goal of sustainable scaling-up has been more elusive. Ellerman (2013:44) suggests that the helpers could be individuals, NGOs or official bilateral or multilateral development agencies, and the doers could be individuals, organisations or various levels of government in the developing countries. Ellerman (2001; 2002a) arrived at the decision more than a decade ago that the relationship is the helper-doer relationship.

As he adds to the scholarly thought on development aid, Ellerman (2013) suggests the Standard Theory-in-Use - which takes into consideration the problem of development agency in attempting to enhance the capacity of groups in need of support, mainly policy makers and government officials - is the right path that a development agency should take to provide knowledge-based assistance as opposed to financial and material aid alone. In line with Ellerman's view, Rist (2013:176) says that the theory's one prominent case in point is this behaviour, which forms the basis of the vision behind the establishment of the World Bank as a knowledge institution. Ellerman (2013) does not hesitate to highlight the theoretical problem contained in this principle as a shortsighted standard of knowledge-based development assistance, which assumes the Bank has sufficient development knowledge and answers to be taught and transmitted to targeted trainees in the developing world. Ellerman's and Rist's views are persuasive as Garcia and Moore (2012:1) attest that the theoretical methodology on development aid is assumed to be authoritative on how to deliver results and knowledge and scale-up knowledge sharing mechanisms to recipient countries in order to evaluate the impact of these efforts.

Kropotkin's well-known publication, *Mutual aid*, maintains that cooperation within a species has been a historical factor in the development of social institutions, and that, in fact, the avoidance of competition greatly increases the chances of survival and raises the quality of life. He contended that mutual aid is a factor that is both

biological and voluntary in nature and is an enabler of progressive evolution (Guess, 2010:147). Kropotkin (1989:117) provides clarification that the theory advanced in his scholarship argues that aid policy is often confused as a result of bureaucratic decision-making processes as aid is a predisposition to help one another, and we do so without governmental coercion.

Kropotkin's point seemed to attract questions from other scholars. For example, Szirmai (2005) asks why poor countries are poor and rich countries rich. How are wealth and poverty related to changes in nutrition, health, life expectancy, education, population growth and politics? This modern, non-technical introduction to development economics takes a quantitative and comparative approach to contemporary debates, examining historical, institutional, demographic, sociological, political, cultural and ecological factors. Szirmai (2005:1-2 states:

The Social Engineering Approaches to development assistance as a theory assumes that developing countries are trying to find their way through to attaining set development standards while the donors are in effect technically and financially assisting the recipients in giving out directions (disseminating knowledge) as well as incentives (providing motivation) to go in one direction rather than another.

The theory of development aid in this regard draws closer to the assumption that in the end, this strategy of assistance fails because both the motivation and the knowledge are external (Forghani-Arani, 2013:161). Further to that, Cotula (2009:25) tries to reconcile both scholars' assumptions by offering answers that assume "knowledge" acquired from outside experts is likely to be ill-adapted to local conditions, loaded with unshared value assumptions, devoid of the tacit skills and, above all, only a borrowed opinion rather than the owned knowledge that could be the basis for determined policies. He (*ibid.*) adds that sustainable transformation towards developmental ends needs to be based on motives that come out of the recipients' own internal values and knowledge needs to be grounded on the doers' own learning experiences (increases in FDI are directly linked to global demands).

2.3.4 Development aid and autonomous status

Since Cotula (*ibid.*) is of the opinion that recipients' autonomy of development aid is the answer to aid effectiveness, this also brought in another view in which

development aid as a theory was also contextualised in the ambit of autonomous development and, at best, should be autonomous development²⁶ (Beasley *et al.*, 2012:3). This idea suggests that autonomous action cannot be externally motivated and one's own cognitive judgment cannot be based on external authority. To improve development effectiveness, it submits that there should be a continuous wrestle with this basic challenge (Torpey, 2006:32).

As a theory of development transformation, autonomous development bases its thinking on the purpose of evaluation in development assistance (World Bank Publications, 2011:65). The difficulty in applying this theory is explained by Schön (1971; 1983). He shows that reasons including but not limited to complexity, genuine uncertainty, unique circumstances, conflicting values and structural incapacities take this theory beyond just a stable state. Schön calls this “dynamic conservatism”, the ability of organisations to continually adjust so as not to really change (Schön, 1971:48). Other scholars substantiate this by indicating that the problems of development evaluation should be reconceived more broadly in the context of the problems of organisational and social learning as it is recognised that development aid is an agent of change (Uphoff, Esman & Krishna, 1998; Sen, 1999; Ellerman, 2001; Senge, 1990).

Given the above, Flint (2012:6) suggests that the development aid movement is simply a community movement of aid-giving agencies that usher in political development and institutional approaches; and the practice of sustainable community development that encourages alternative actions at community level to promote widespread change, while fostering local choices that lead to more self-sufficiency and to the buffering of communities from the impact of business as usual.

Developing Flint's work to its logical conclusion, Khan and Hildreth (2002:1) view the late 1960s and early 1970s as an era during which scholarship on aid proliferated. Many management science theories on administration, planning, programming and budgeting owe their rise to this phase of development in the developing countries. In 1973, the American government adopted what was termed “The New Directions Mandate” and undertook a deep analysis on the understanding of the American

²⁶See Orlando Fals-Borda and Anisur Rahman (1991), Rahman (1993), Raff Carmen (1996).

foreign aid approach on the needs of poor countries. With this development, development aid became instrumental in exploring the fundamentals of how to apply local capacity-building and behavioural change theories to institutional and management development (Lin, 2012:11).

The approach to this theory was also based on the importance of understanding the type of political system and the way its particular logic affects choice of policies and the implementation of reforms. These theories and practices of development management provided impetus for the evaluation of the development context (World Bank Publication, 2011:66). Sachs (2011:7), influenced by the argument of the World Bank, in principle provides additional justification to the thought above that these approaches amplified what was certainly the need and existing conditions in developing countries at different times, which formed a body of knowledge on the successes and failures of past attempts by development assistance to enhance administrative capacity within developing countries. The submission arrives at a conclusion that the primary emphasis of the aid theory was focused on the administrative challenges that include institutionalisation and systemic administrative processes, organisational structure, management of resources and other contextual human resource and behavioural changes (McNeil & Malena, 2010:185).

Another perspective on and analysis of the developments around the provision of aid is offered by Menzel and White (2011). They write that in the 1950s and early 1960s, the technical assistance provided through aid was influenced more by the rise of economic theories that owe their origin to the Marshall Plan and Point Four Programme that primarily focus on the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and industrial plants, feeding programmes for scores of people who lost income as a result of ramifications of the Second World War, and an attempt to revive the economies of large industries. Menzel and White (2011:445) further state:

Much of international technical assistance has taken the form of providing technical specialists ... This meant a shift in technical assistance from the provision of operational experts to the provision of advisers... who addressed the problem in the mid-1980s. AID's technical assistance for development administration during the 1950s and early 1960s was heavily influenced by the prevailing concepts and theories of economic development.

Kingston (2002:7) is of the opinion that the Point Four Programme requirement was for poor countries to seek large amounts of foreign capital to build their low comparative advantage in the manufacturing industries of raw materials for exporting to able countries and also to apply capital intensive technology in agricultural production. Martin (2013:130) supports this opinion, referring to the importance of the inherent principle of political modernisation of development intervention provided by aid capital. For much of the post-war period, the view of development economics was that of a deficiency model, in which poor countries suffered from a savings gap, which prohibited development, and aid was intended primarily to provide investment funds (Moosa, 2002:2). Brown concludes that this, tied with the political considerations of the Cold War, led to command economy-style planning, state-led industrialisation, nationalisation and protectionism. According to Brown (2008:1),

The creation of money has been 'privatized', or taken over by a private money cartel. Except for coins, all of our money is now created as loans advanced by private banking institutions - including the private Federal Reserve. Banks create the principal but not the interest to service their loans.

In light of the analysis above, the modern aid modalities come into play, namely that, as a general rule, it is better for countries' development in the medium and long run to channel development aid assistance through their official budgetary and accounting systems (Advisory Board, 2008:4). The process of development assistance is attached to modern government ability to align national strategic plans and policies to the global development agenda. This has been the new proposal going into the Post 2015 Agenda to ensure that all support for global goals is ascertained. Similar approach by multilateral organization and International NGOs is put to use following concessions made in 2015 during the launch of the SDGs; that all efforts are to be drawn to support the global agenda for development from international level, regional and country context. The human rights based approach in the new global development goals works to ensure that the benefits reach the intended recipients for development to be nationally owned and goals to receive attention by all stakeholders. Although the step-down approach reaches to the many, governments remain largely influential on how development assistance should be utilized, which is by large against the mandates of donors and development partners but under pretense of nation building and people centered development.

Recognition of these facts has grown steadily in the international community, reaching a formal culmination in the signature of the Paris Declaration in 2005 and the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. However, it is only in the last few years that serious efforts have been undertaken to undo the previous damage to controlled development in the MDGs to shared processes and support ushered in by the SDGs.

Donor countries generally give aid because it is in their own interest to do so (Fraser & Whitfield, 2008:3). Undoubtedly, some aid is given with humanitarian motives in mind; however, most foreign aid is given for a variety of political, strategic and economic reasons that benefit the donor countries in the longer term. Brown (2007:3-4) is of the opinion that Official Development Assistance (ODA) is often based on theory, where it was designed to achieve political objectives other than increasing prosperity in the recipient countries. He adds that there are competing motivations for foreign aid and influencing policy priorities in developing countries (*ibid.*). To this end, the earlier thinking was based on grounds that countries that give more development assistance are automatically powerful and have political influence over recipients policies, practices, trade and resources, which by tying aid, gives them control interests, which in the latter agenda, redistribution of growth implements maximises development targets because of shared effort thus detaching development gains from the provider but to global efforts.

At the Annual Conference on the Economic History Society held in March 2008, it was agreed that other donors have their own objectives. For example, the Economic History Society concluded that for many years Sweden targeted aid toward “progressive” societies. In France, governments have sought to promote the maintenance and spread of French culture and the French language, as well as the preservation of French influence. In Japan, aid has historically flowed disproportionately to neighbouring Asian nations in which Japan has the greatest commercial interests and has often been tied to purchases of Japanese products (Economic History Society, 2008).

2.3.5 Justification and test for theory of development

Mehta and Nanda (2004:3-4) hypothesise that providing development aid to Less Developed Countries (LDCs) ensures that the savings gap and the foreign exchange

gap are filled. In this regard, development aid is imperative, as for domestic investment to take place, domestic savings must also occur. The assumption from scholars is that if these are absent then the flow of development assistance can help finance investment projects. The theory is substantiated by Premchand (2007:89) who submits that there should also be technical assistance to ensure that the capital is used in an efficient manner.

Economists such as Moti (2010) state that development is synonymous with the creation of a sizable, modern manufacturing sector, as opposed to reliance on exports of primary products. This submission is furthered by Von Feigenblatt (2010:26-38) who writes that it is inclusive of macro issues (such as patterns of a nation's growth) as much as it refers to the meso problems or micro problems (such as local community development). Thus the development aid assistance in essence should be understood as a process, not a product (Barbanti, 2004). Scholars reached consensus that the international product life cycle theory suggests that as countries industrialise they off-load more labour-intensive industries to countries in the earlier stages of industrialisation, suggesting that the track record of development aid does not indicate any gains in terms of increased economic growth, improved governance or reduced poverty (Doucouliagos & Paldam 2008; 2011; Chong *et al.*, 2009; Rajan & Subramanian, 2007; 2008; Nowak-Lehmann *et al.*, 2012; Easterly 2003; Easterly *et al.*, 2003; Knack 2001). Winters (2004) and Wooster *et al.* (2006) are in agreement, and view this theory as providing some support for the notion that the development of manufacturing industries frequently accompanies increasing prosperity in the developing world.

However, other scholars (Blattman, 2013; Potrafke & Unsprung, 2013) argue that development aid for capital investment can be anti-developmental as more capital-intensive production in countries may contribute to increasing levels of unemployment and consequential poverty. Potrafke and Unsprung (2013:1) ask why then do donor countries still provide aid with the expressly stated purpose of pursuing long-run development objectives.

Following from the questions above, Stiglitz (2007:2) suggests the answer would be that the inflow of foreign exchange might also enable LDCs to import foreign capital considered necessary for economic growth and development. He continues that, on

the other hand, there may be a role for research in discovering ways in which the good governance agenda might be adjusted to the specific needs of African development. Irish Aid, in its view on aid modalities and poverty, postulates that it might include helping to identify novel institutional solutions and ways of getting past typical collective-action problems that would be attractive to future generations of political leaders (Irish Aid, 2008a:10).

Radelet (2006:6) puts forward a theory that less and less development assistance is given in the form of outright grants and increasingly interest is being charged albeit at concessionary rates. As a theory, tied aid is becoming more prevalent. Tied aid occurs where conditions are placed by the donor upon the recipient about what they use the aid assistance for. Barder (2012) says there are reasons why aid might be made conditional, including that conditions on aid might increase incentives for policy reform by developing countries' governments, allocating aid to countries with good policy environments might increase the impact of aid spending, or aid conditions might increase the ability to account for how the money was used and what effects it had. In this theory, the recipients are required to purchase the exports of the donors, which may be a more expensive option than purchasing the capital from sources other than the donors (Osei *et al.*, 2005). Ackah *et al.* (2013) provide econometric analysis of the fiscal effects of aid in Ghana. According to their findings, aid has been used as a substitute for domestic borrowing in Ghana. In addition, they have found evidence that aid led to increased tax efforts for Ghana. In support of this analysis other scholars also submit that aid to Ghana increased government spending and reduced tax revenue and domestic borrowing. Specifically, Asem *et al.* (2013:14) support the assertion that aid to Ghana helped shape policies in a good way.

From the above it can be surmised that the theories suggest that the best development aid is that which helps countries to assume ownership of their development (Ellerman, 2006; Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005). The implications for aid modalities and their management need to be more closely specified than what has been the case up until now. The theories analysed suggest that donor agencies need to be persuaded to pull back and become less control-oriented when delivering financial aid, but to become more actively as well as more intelligently engaged when it comes to both policy and governance (Green, 2013).

This may seem paradoxical and counter-intuitive, but that is because we are accustomed to a theory of aid as being about resource and knowledge transfers. A new feature is drawn into play in which the claim is that most of the time the most important impacts that development aid have, for better or worse, are institutional (OECD, 2010a:70-73).

2.4 Conclusion

From the analysis above, it is apparent that there is no single theory that commands more authority than the other as to what development may infer (Sparks, 2007). Although a large number of these empirical studies focus on socio-economic growth, they say little about development and the significant improvement of GDP per capita as instigated by development aid, which forms the pillar of development aid effectiveness's post-millennium development agenda after 2000 going through to the Post 2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As discussed in Chapter 1 by Shivji (2007:2), and substantiated in the 2010 Economic Survey of South Africa, an evolution of the fiscal policy framework could help reduce the likelihood of doubt regarding the detail, nature and discourse of systemic development and the advent of aid. The 2010 Survey also recommends that the Treasury continue to refine its estimation of the cyclically adjusted balance and put increasing emphasis on it in its analysis and objective-setting (OECD, 2013b). These theories suggest that there could still be widespread poverty at grassroots level even when a country is perceived to have attained appreciable levels of macro-economic growth measured in line with development goals as defined in the MDGs, the Paris Declaration, the AAA and other development agendas, including the Brundtland Commission of 1972 (Andrews, 2009:14).

Given this latitude in terms of what development and aid effectiveness could imply, the theories have signified that aid in the form of assistance to systemic, policy and structural change can lead to development (Collier, 2007). Globalisation as an economic phenomenon has been the dominant force for economic integration and the main driver of growth worldwide for many decades, although the speed of globalisation, taken to include trade, finance, flows of information and technology and offshoring, is unprecedented in modern economic history (Collier, 2008). The OECD Observer (2005) stipulates, however, that the main argument raised in these theories

signify that aid or development may positively affect and incorporate socio-cultural factors in order for foreign aid to deliver development.

A constant return to culture-development discussions is emancipated as development literature. According to Escobar (2005:341), this conclusion is reached against the backdrop that in as much as GDP growth rates matter, policies and institutions work in some socio-cultural milieu, which has mostly been ignored by donors: the focus is too often on money alone, to the detriment of aid performance. Escobar (2005:341-342) states the following:

The seemingly inability to imagine a new domain which finally leaves behind the imaginary of development, and transcends development's dependence on Western modality and historicity raises a number of questions.

Appolinario (2010:4) explains that development, good governance and aid dependency form the rationale that, if not entrenched, bringing negative returns to state institutions as aid has a potential to undermine the very principles and goals that it aims to promote.

The failure of development especially in the Third World made necessary the emergence of a new aid paradigm, which inaugurated the era of the Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers and later on the Paris Principles for Aid Effectiveness. Though these theories attempt to change the approach in which development is conceived through aid impetus, perverse outcomes on central and sectoral institutions continue to exist. Brinkman (2013:4) states the following:

Development is a gradual process that continues over decades and is formed and forged by local history, culture, and politics. It is shaped through continuous formulation of ideals, the search for matching opportunities and hard work of involved people. Nothing in the process of development points towards a 'one silver bullet solution' that works anytime, anyplace for anyone. Quite the opposite, it is obvious that a successful approach at a certain time and place works for some people, but is hard to replicate for others or at a different moment. The Renaissance, its gradual development and impact over decades in Europe, isn't taking place in the Middle East despite the many references made in that direction. There is definitely a change process on-going in that region, but it is a process undertaken by people confronted by and committed to their own social, political and economic reality. Development is rooted in social, economic and historical pasts.

It was mainly argued that because development is viewed in a multidimensional way, a number of effects impact governance issues and reduce the capacity of the government to strengthen institutions, and ultimately, ownership. Consequently, in the Bangkok Declaration of 2000, it is demonstrated that the present form of globalisation is largely shaped by the rules advanced by one part of the world – namely the most influential – and these rules do not necessarily favour developing countries and countries in transition. According to UNCTAD (2000),

Globalization can be a powerful and dynamic force for growth and development. If it is properly managed, the foundations for enduring and equitable growth at the international level can be laid. For that, it is essential to persevere in the search for consensual solutions through open and direct dialogue that takes account of the fundamental interests of all.

In the following chapters, a discussion on improving effectiveness and measuring rewards to development assistance will be discussed. Some scholars attached the solution to the problems identified in the development discourse to about three contextual issues, i), been sensitive to the context of the countries will earn good results of development; ii) involvement of the key stakeholders will be integral to global development framework; and iii) adopting an adaptive management approach to the distribution, utilisation and monitoring of development assistance (Schwandt, 2016).

However, despite changes ushered in by the aid paradigm, which has focused change on governance and transformation outcomes, there are diverse schools of thought supporting the basis of this paradigm shift. Smith (2013:1415) supports this motion and adds that, consequently, governments adopt strategies for maintaining the paradigm and the beliefs that constitute it, and thus their own legitimacy, under conditions of disagreement. Such strategies can fail. As noted, their failure can sometimes lead to a “paradigm shift” in which one paradigm of legitimacy is replaced by another.

The purpose of this chapter was to find the basis of the founding theories of development and aid, the problem in the interaction of aid, and previous unequal power relations between donors and the recipients. From the onset, the official conceptions of the Bretton Woods Institutions, as well as in North America and Western Europe, identified “development” with economic growth (or economic

development) in the industrialised countries. An early attempt was made to distinguish between “growth” and “development” by Joseph Schumpeter (1934). According to him, growth was the gradual extension of the capital apparatus and increasing production. Development, on the other hand, could occur only when technical innovations introduced new production techniques, new products or means of organising production (Sachs, 2011). The logical form of the described argument challenge the idea that this approach can serve as evidence in favour of formal and historical theories. Modern social science typically aims at formal theories that describe a social logic or law like regularity that follows from the essential properties of a type of actor, institution or situation (Bevir, 2010), while Dewey (2012) is of the opinion that social scientists are inclined to define governance by reference to one or more essential property, such as multiplying networks.

This context coupled with previous weak governance favoured a dynamic where aid dependency became multidimensional. That means different levels of dependency, namely financial, political and structural, where each level engenders and is engendered by the other levels. The new arrangements aimed at improving aid effectiveness emerged within this dynamism.

As mentioned above, Schumpeter (1934:6) postulated that growth was the gradual extension of the capital apparatus and increasing production. On the other hand, Ajei (2007:25) believed that development could occur only when technical innovations introduced new production techniques, new products or means of organising production. The salutary point for us is that the utilisation of production factors in new ways does not change the economic focus of this conception of development.

In conclusion, Scott (2004) writes that these theories result in development being extremely fragmented and reproduced inside internal structures, creating a number of negative returns to efficiency of some main planning institutions. In addition, due to the high number of actors and the absence of an overarching and strong strategy, instead the existence of several and conflicting plans create a huge institutional gap between central and sectoral administrations. It is in this regard that the pillars of good governance in the Third World need to be discussed to draw a line of similarity or a new thinking to the advent of the development paradigm in the eyes of good governance and, later, political transformation.

CHAPTER 3

THE PREMISE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the issues to be covered relate to good governance as a process for making and implementing decisions. It is said that the premise of good governance does not begin and end with making “correct” decisions, but stretches to explore the best possible process for making these decisions.

Good decision-making processes, and therefore good governance, share several characteristics. All have a positive effect on various aspects of governance and poverty, including consultation policies and practices, meeting procedures, service quality protocols, councillor and officer conduct, role clarification and good working relationships. It has become pertinent to discuss the current schools of thought on good governance as it affects development aid and financing modalities. Punyaratabandhu (2004) delineates the issues discussed in this chapter by reasoning that it is of interest how the issue of governance grew in popularity since the beginning of the 1990s; yet, despite agreement on how it should be operationalised, no fundamental consensus was reached on its application. Since the 1990s, governance has not received any standard meaning and similarity in the way in which donors utilise its meaning as a development framework (Punyaratabandhu, 2004:2).

Several attempts, four to be precise, characterise the inability to conceptualise governance as cited in the Common Country Assessments (CCAs) under the UN's Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF), the OECD/DAC incubator strategies, given effect by World Bank technical assistance, the MDGs roadmaps and the UN Statistical Commissions (Orkin, 2002). Similar sentiments were echoed by scholars who are in agreement that variables measuring governance were similarly attempting to measure good governance. It was then difficult to ascertain whether these instruments were substituting one another or were intended to converge in their basic analogy about the premise of good governance and governance as a general theorem.

As a result of this confusion, this chapter presents the premise of good governance as analysed by Bevir. He maintains in his argument that the preoccupation of the 1990s with governance was not only the result of structural adjustment and unfolding political events. In these circumstances, he claims, there was new coverage of development influenced by a number of theories (Bevir, 2011a:162). For instance, a key question raised by Doornbos (2003:8) provoked the question whether good governance was the answer to the eradication of poverty, the enhancement of economic performance and far-reaching social outcomes. Hope (2008) still banked on the tenuousness of the correlation between governance and poverty, indicating conversely that weak governance results in poverty prevalence. He was of the opinion that some scholars suggest the public generally has a “two-dimensional” understanding of aid and development, which holds governments and individuals in rich countries responsible for assisting passive and helpless people in developing countries (Bevir, 2011:162). Glennie *et al.* (2012:8) write that

These views are often underpinned by stereotypical attitudes towards poverty, or particular countries, and a strong moral sense that at times appears close to superiority and contrasts between ‘us’ and ‘them’, which can work to undermine a sense of shared empathy.

Scholars (Glennie *et al.*, 2012) direct the discussion contained herein by ushering in a new thinking in development assistance in which a number of theories in governance and development have introduced new public sector reforms and patterns of rule as the main topics of discussion in works on governance. In terms of Phago (2013:116), a consideration in this regard requires that good governance should be primarily applied within member states to ensure not only compliance in terms of donor funds, but also as indicators of how ordinary members of society are benefiting from government programmes. Equally, however, the reforms and resulting patterns of rule emerged in part precisely because people acted on beliefs such as those associated with rational choice theory.

Accordingly, the theory that relates and justifies this approach contained in this chapter was developed by Campbell (2004:11), a neoclassicist, who argues that it is reasonable to assume, at least for purposes of formal mathematical modelling, that people are motivated by self-interest and operate according to a cost-benefit rationality. He adds that institutionalists, on the other hand, view this as a result of

the human motivation element and rationality, which are more complex, though it affects how people perceive themselves (*ibid.*). Owing to this submission, scholars such as Brown (2005) and Crawford (2007) have criticised the fact that neoclassicists and institutionalists introduce specific instruments to promote good governance, ranging from positive and negative conditionality to financial and technical assistance and political dialogue. The extent to which these instruments have been effective in promoting good governance reforms, however, has remained controversial (Brown 2005; Crawford 2007). Scholars such as Kono *et al.* (2015) note that the role of neoclassical economics play a greater role in development aid and good governance in inspiring greater reliance on market structures, and the role of the principal-agent theory in inspiring aspects of the new public management (Bevir, 2011b:7).

The concept of governance evokes a more pluralistic pattern of rule than does government. As Unsworth (2010) suggests, governance is less focused on state situations and more focused on the processes and interactions that tie the state to civil society. It is submitted that civil society organisations (CSOs) engagement play a critical role as an intermediary between the government and the population through engaging parliamentarians and political parties in debate and providing effective and responsible opposition (Interpeace, 2010). The concept of governance has spread because new lines of thinking relating to politics and public sector reforms were influenced by these theoretic schools, which have precipitated to a new form of crisis of faith in the state as an institution. Habermas, on the other hand, states that “national community does not precede the political community, but it is the product of it” (Habermas, 2004:76). The European Union has identified governance reforms as a key priority of its support to the approach of democratic governance (Borzel & Hackenesch, 2013:546). The assumption was that governance and the crisis of faith in the state made the image of representative democracy implausible; while on the other hand policy actors have responded to the challenge of governance in ways that are constrained by the image of representative democracy and a faith in policy expertise. Behagel (2012:9) writes:

As discussed so far, governance can be understood as providing an answer to a crisis of faith in the central state that has changed the political landscape and the mode in which society is steered. The democratic norms articulated in governance discourses are

therefore different than those articulated in discourses of the central state. Indeed, democratic governance is often contrasted with the traditional democratic norms that are tied to the central state.

O'Connor (2009:23-27) states that the twentieth century theory subsumed that there was a rise of all kinds of new, and often formal, approaches to social science. This, Chhotray and Stoker (2009:97) say, was prompted by the idea of governance that has come to occupy the centre stage when thinking about development. They add that, as it spread, so political actors increasingly tried to introduce reforms to deal with self-interest to mitigate its adverse consequences, to regulate it and keep it within limits, or to harness it to improve efficiency. In this way, Fligstein and McAdam (2012:77) arrive at the conclusion that it was perpetuated by new theories that inspired both the recognition and the active formation of apparently new features of governance. Equally, of course, social science theories have often struggled to catch up with some of the apparently improvised changes in governance.

Even though Pedro (2006) concludes that the theories that can help to articulate the discourse of development theory have little meaning apart from practices, this chapter will attempt to explore governance as practice, while aid and transformation are analysed as theory.

3.1.1 Justification of the foundations of good governance theory

Argumentative theories of governance ushered in by Herbert Gottweis placed profound focus on constitutive forces and formulative conditions for the rise and operation of certain governance regimes. Fischer and Gottweis (2012:1) operate from the premise that argumentative approaches towards governance have similar orientations in policy analysis and planning; a shift from the dominant empirical, analytical approach to problem-solving to the one including the study of language and argumentation as essential dimensions of theory and analysis in policy-making and planning.

It would seem that Fischer and Gottweis's premise influenced Hajer, who notes that policy framework as a theory is premised on development aid efficacy, which provides epistemology with social theory and methodology to encompass theoretical

approaches such as discourse analysis, post-structuralism approaches, frame analysis and interpretative policy analysis.

Hajer (2003:35) states the following:

Large-scale social and political changes have revolutionized policy-making. Traditionally, policy analysis has been state-centred, based on the assumption that central government is self-evidently the locus of government. However, policy-making is often carried out today in loosely organized networks of public authorities, citizen associations and private enterprises.

The epistemological orientation dictates that institutions of governance were not simply established for citizens and policymakers' use, but that the strains of rapid economic change and the tension between an increasingly liberalised economy and the partially reformed institutions of an authoritarian polity have become increasingly severe (OECD, 2004:1). In the context of this tradition of thinking, theories of governmentality (Dean, 1999) and critical discourse theory (Foucault, 1971) also play an important role and have shown that governance is inseparable from argumentation, discourse and the construction of political identity. Adding to the conviction, Lambi (2004:135) concludes:

While it is correct that associations promote social capital, the expectation that this will promote democratic change should take into consideration how institutional factors dampen political capital. For associations to enhance democracy, support to them should specifically target advocacy activities, as well as initiatives that challenge norms, laws and cultural codes which dampen their engagement with the political.

On the other hand, another scholar is of the opinion that the cultural aspect should be addressed before the discourse of governmentality. The cultural theory, espoused by Andreas Pribersky (2004), arises from the premise that in order to gain influence on the social sciences there ought to be a cultural turn that would lead to complete over-reorganisation of the humanities as a representation of the second wave of qualitative approaches in the development and governance perspectives of the 1980s (Pribersky, 2004:299-300). However, Wydra (2007), through his examination of a series of pivotal historical events, argues that democratisation is not just a matter

of institutional design, but rather a matter of consciousness and leadership under conditions of extreme and traumatic incivility.

The reintroduction of cultural theory was linked to the key issues of contemporary politics, the changing behaviour of consumers and voters, the loosening of traditional social relations, as well as political affiliations and transformation of societies. All these variables became an important tool for political analysis. This matter invited back into the discussion of good governance the relevance of democratic governance (Heyes, 2012). The establishment of stable democracies across the world was premised on global attempts for democratisation and decolonisation (Huntington, 1991; Diamond, 1999). Rub (2002:95) saw this as the unfinished business of democratic transformation. However, the increasing problems associated with nationalisation and right-wing populism presented a problem in the process of integrating and enlarging Europe's democratic influence on good governance (Pribersky, 2001; Pribersky *et al.*, 2006) and in the positioning of European politics in the global arena (Ohner, 2005; Pribersky *et al.*, 2004).

For these democratic and legal theories, efficiency and effectiveness formed variables that were neglected over time when presenting the implications of various modes of governance for democracy to thrive in given arrangements. It goes to show that the problem of the EU indeed is seen in the accompanying challenges in democratic governance. The promotion of good governance has become a centrepiece of the EU's relations with African states. Whilst the EU has sought to promote primarily effective government in the 1990s, since the early 2000s, the scope of the EU's approach has broadened towards democratic government with some inception of democratic governance. Influenced by debates in international aid architecture and reforms in EU foreign policy-making, the EU has also developed its instruments to support governance reforms, prioritising dialogue, assistance and positive incentives over negative incentives and sanctions (Borzel & Hackenesch, 2013:541). Habermas (2011:81) argues that the crisis is primarily due to an inadequate institutional underpinning of the common currency.

Although Habermas argued that the eminent matter is weak institutionalisation, the assumption is that the new modes of governance have the potential to increase

participation and citizen involvement and they may enhance the capacity of institutions of politics and governance in problem solving and addressing these weaknesses (IK Vienna School of Governance, 2013:2). The IK Vienna School of Governance set a principle that established modes of evaluating governance by standards assigned to liberal democracy, invoking variables that include that equality is secured when informal networks of actors flourish. However, democratic deficit in the context of the EU's perception of democratic governance structures has intensified over the past two decades, stimulating debate on how the EU structures can best achieve democratisation (Democracy Around the World, 2008).

3.1.2 Good governance and democratisation

Representative democracy, direct democracy, participatory and deliberate democracy, feminism and constitutionalism are theories that sparked a debate about the democratisation of governance (Majone, 1998; Schmitter, 2000).

In this context, the premise of governance assumes that there is a pervasive, shared, global perception of governance as a topic far broader than "government"; the governance approach is seen as a "new process of governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed" (Stoker, 1998:17). Similarly, in scholarship that followed the "reinventing government" themes of public effectiveness, much has been written on new public management practices by which governance theory is put into action (Mathiasen, 1996; Lynn, 1996; 1998; Terry, 1998; Kelly, 1998; Peters & Pierre, 1998). Accordingly, in this theory and in the newly-found belief in liberal economic theories, the unit of analysis becomes policy formulation related to the cost and effectiveness of government programmes (Costantinos, 2011:2).

3.1.2.1 Structural governance

A set of theories portraying government agencies as tightly structured hierarchies isolated from market forces and effective citizen pressure owes its origin to the reform surges that serve the personal and institutional interests of bureaucracy (Ruhl & Salzman, 2009). Anwar (2003:6-10) states that development aid as a facilitator of good governance plays a role in macroeconomic stabilisation reforms that are aimed at making government more stable, disciplined and competitive, and less socially

burdensome. Anwar (*ibid.*) says the reforms are, however, widely criticised for removing local reform and governance autonomy and weakening the ability of individual nations to chart their own reform paths.

The centrepiece to the theory has been a fundamental transformation, not just in the scope and scale of government action, but in its basic forms. Instead of relying exclusively on government to solve public problems, a host of other actors are being mobilised as well, sometimes on their own initiative, but often in complex partnerships with the state (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2008).

As O'Toole (1986:18) concludes in his review of the literature on multi-organisation policy implementation,

The field is complex, without much accumulation or convergence. Few well-developed recommendations have been put forward by researchers, and a number of proposals are contradictory... two reasons for the lack of development are analyzed: normative disagreements and the state of the field's empirical theory. Yet there remain numerous possibilities for increasing the quality of the latter. Efforts in this direction are a necessary condition of further practical advance.

In 2001, Salamon reviewed this thought by stating that a fundamental re-thinking was underway throughout the world about how to cope with public problems (Salamon, 2001:345). Stimulated by popular frustrations with the cost and effectiveness of government programmes and by a newfound faith in liberal economic theories, serious questions were raised about the capabilities and even the motivations of public sector institutions (Large & Sisk, 2006:23). The World Bank report, *Entering the 21st century: World development report 1999/2000*, mentions that between 1974 and 2000, the number of democratic countries more than doubled. Further, the emergence of the so-called Arab Spring during 2011 also contributed significantly to the increase in the embracing of democracy in the world, including in African countries where these developments were initiated. This circled out to other parts of the world, releasing a multiplicity of debates around this thought and theories. Large and Sisk's assumption informed Masum's (2009:37) opinion that planning is restricted by the lack of feasible means to ensure implementation, anticipate market reactions, as well as the means to consider the cost-implications

for various government agencies and the economic impact on various income groups.

Masum (2009:37) quotes Stoker (1998:17-18), who describes it as the theory which leads to the analysis that therefore

...governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on mechanisms that do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government ... Governance for (some) is about the potential for contracting, franchising and new forms of regulation. In short, it is about what (some) refer to as the new public management. However, governance ... is more than a new set of managerial tools. It is also about more than achieving greater efficiency in the production of public services.

Peters and Pierre (1998:232) agree with this analysis, stating that governance is about process, while new public management is about outcomes. The bottom line, as enunciated by Milward and Provan (2000), is that governance theory ultimately is concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action. It therefore seems to synthesise the literature drawn from theories found in the separate traditions.

Berman (1998:17), in reference to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975; 1976) and Goggin *et al.* (1990), among others, agrees that the outputs of governance are not different from those of government; it is instead a matter of a difference in processes (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:167-168). Stone *et al.* (2010:417) suggest that the theory assumes that governance exists within various levels of analysis, including single or unitary organisations, inter-organisational networks and entire societies or communities.

Another dimension to structural governance is envisaged in the works of Ansell and Gash (2007:545), invoking another dimension of collaborative governance in which they claim that state governance is also about collective decision-making and specifically about collective decision-making that includes both public and private actors. Collaborative governance is therefore a type of governance in which public and private actors work collectively in distinctive ways, using particular processes to

establish laws and rules for the provision of public goods (Stoker, 1998:18). Even defenders of government (Castells, 2003; Florida, 2002) maintain that the existing structures of government are not fit-for-purpose as they are sluggish and decentralised in light of the current industrial era, and are at best stuck in their own agenda and preoccupation with regulations and hierarchical chains of command (Burnheim, 2006:18).

3.1.2.2 Good governance: A restructuring phenomenon

The extent to which structures of modern government seek reforms to implement far-reaching changes to governance is largely overlooked in the theories of good governance and political transformation (Salamon & Elliot, 2002:1). Anheier and Toepler (2009:1549) add to this by stating that few people recognise the recent technological revolution that has taken place in the public sector at an increasing pace to enhance the operation of the sector. This revolution has brought about fundamental transformation in the scope and scale of government action and more on the basic forms of governance and transformation.

Various scholars are of the opinion that earlier governance activity was restricted to the delivery of goods and services alone, and the later scholarship of governance now incorporates a much more profound scope of operation that includes an array of loans, guarantees, grants, contracts, socioeconomic regulation, insurance and tax expenditures, among others (Burki & Perry, 1998; Karkkainen, 2004).

Goldfinch and Wallies (2009:336), in regards to the thought on the dimensions of new governance to development aid assistance, postulate that the Autonomous Development Theory calls upon a conceptualisation of the phenomenon to introduce the “new institutionalism” theories linked to the work of Williamson (1975), and the “public choice” theories, linked to the work of Tullock (1965). As stated by Teixeira and Dill (2011:156), the theoretical emphasis in the above emphasises problem-solving mechanisms for laying a foundation for the future in a collaborative nature, and reliance on third parties to support the government in addressing public problems and pursue public purposes.

The shift from public agency or individualist programmes to a distinct tool through which public purposes are pursued represents a new policy dimension in governance approaches (Morgan & Yeung, 2007:110). This shift has altered the nature of public management and patterns of public problem-solving acknowledged partly in existing theories and approaches to good governance (Morgan & Yeung 2007:111).

The fundamental theory in this submission draws attention to the new tools and technologies of public action, departing from the classical public administration that emerged in the 1970s. It transcended to the progressive era of governmental agencies to legitimise government action to deal with the shortcomings of an unregulated market system (Gross, 2013:1). This classical theory ushered in a new type of institution, the democratic public agency associated with the American mind bureaucracy that places emphasis on excessive administrative discretion, special interest capture and inefficiency (Salomon and Elliot, 2002). Galbraith (2007:10) explains that recurrent American leaders are captured by the thought that if the system is to survive, there must be better education as to its character.

Generally, scholars building upon the foundational theories in this field suggest that there has not been a shift from the basic principles of good governance. There has been only an addition in its conceptualisation to ensure that the principle is not been limited to fixing on public administration that focuses on public agency as a basic unit of analysis; a preference for clear administrative responsibility and control, among others. This premise presents an improved framework for the development of a successful administrative apparatus for achieving good governance (Salomon and Elliot, 2002:10). The typical assumption is that the funding and provision of public services should be carried out by the same public entity institutionalised for steering good governance. In Salomon's analysis above, this is direct governance through which public action can take place. Phago (2013:109) adds that within the individual member states, challenges include both the creation and maintenance of the institutions of democracy, which are meant to facilitate and uphold citizens' rights, such as universal access to justice, freedom of expression and media freedom, and access to social welfare services. This debate is concluded by pointing to the traditional concerns of public administration (personnel systems, budgetary procedures, institutional dynamics), which have been eroded by the new theory of

governance which supports the growth of financing institutions for realising good governance and development (McNabb, 2009).

Salomon and Elliot (2002:12) write that focusing on public agencies distinguishes the theory of governance from traditional public administration. This theory distinguishes this thought from the privatisation and re-invention of government's perspective that resurfaced in recent years. This thinking acknowledges the importance of indirect forms of government action, where traditional public administration advocates for government action and the later thought on the growth of financing institutions as a means to incentivise these actions (Chhotray & Stoker, 2010).

3.1.3 Good governance and institutional variables

According to privatisation theories, the private sector is viewed as instrumental to the delivery of public services that serve the public's interest more than relying on public agencies themselves (Novak, 2009:9; Freeman & Minow 2009:27). Büthe and Mattli (2011:5) elaborate that the power of public-private governance as a technology of public action flowed from its ability to counter the twin evils of public corruption and private coercion.

Privatisation advocates (Vogel, 2009; Abbot & Snidal, 2009) claim that because public structures that are supposed to provide public services mainly serve to protect and insulate bureaucrats from political pressure, the role of the private sector would consequently be to free them from pursuing self-interests instead. Eichengreen (1999) writes that the commitment of governments to use international rather than domestic standards has enormous economic significance. In this view, it is indicated that governments adopt various new revised regulatory measures each year in which product standards are embedded or referenced in support of development initiatives that normally require funding and aid assistance, as indicated by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in its Fourteenth Annual Review (2009:3-4). Against this background, privatisation becomes the key to effective governments through which the size of the public sector is reduced by shifting responsibilities to the private sector and establishing alternatives that are driven by the private sector to support government programmes. Additionally, another way to leverage the public sector for innovation is through public-private partnerships, where the government and private

sector work jointly with clearly defined roles on a public purpose (Eimicke *et al.*, 2008:280).

In support of the privatisation theory, the network theory provides a rich menu for understanding inter-organisational coordination in complex events. Policy networks are characterised by four main attributes that make the tasks of network management in general and those of managing indirect tools particularly demanding (Kapucu, 2012:4-5).

Characterised by extensive collaboration among levels of government and between government and the private sector, this new approach to solving public problems presents important new issues that serve as the fundamental pillars of engagement of third parties as actors in providing development assistance:

First, their pluriformity - the fact that they engage a diverse range of organizations and organizational types, many of which have limited experience cooperating with each other; second, their *self-referentiality* - the fact that each actor has its own interests and frame of reference and therefore approaches the relationship with a different set of perspectives and incentives; third, their *asymmetric interdependencies* - the fact that all the actors in a network, including the state, are dependent on each other, but rarely in a fully symmetrical way...; and finally, their *dynamism* - the fact that all of these features change over time even as the network seeks to carry out its mission (Santomero, 1997, in Salomon & Elliot, 2002:13).

In so far as the view above is concerned, Eagleton (2011) believes it is also justifiable to indicate that good governance and development support pose an argument that, as subsets of these theories, only methods such as observation, interviewing and discourse analysis can reveal the rich texture of human life in application to this analysis. Advocates defend interpretive studies either as a means of checking and fleshing out broad generalisations or as the only way of discovering the facts²⁷. Dewey (2012: 82) indicates that the theory makes an informed conclusion that several states are democracies without their being democracies explains other features they have in common, which in this case is tendencies to cooperate with third party actors in development assistance.

²⁷ *The tension between interpretation as method and philosophy refers (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006).*

This central premise flows from classical public administration, which is designed to ensure that administrative officials are empowered to respond to public needs and not only to the will of private groups (Morgan & Yeung, 2007:111). This clear distinction of the role enhances the accountability of public funds and the exercise of public authority when there are no private interests overriding the public will. These authors indicate that “keeping private interests and private organizations at arm’s length thus becomes a central motivation of organizational design. This notion of a sharp divide between the public and the private sectors also figures prominently in the privatization theories” (Morgan & Yeung, 2007:111-112).

The combination of the private sector and the state becomes effective when the state plays the role of raising resources and setting broad goals for societal direction, and the private sector, on the other hand, especially through non-governmental organisations, best delivers services at a human scale and in an innovative manner (Rawls, 2009). Rawls (*ibid.*) adds that the state is designed to advance the good of its members, but only when it is effectively regulated by the public conception of justice. The theories assume that an effective state is vital for the provision of the goods and services and the rules and institutions that allow markets to flourish and people to lead healthier, happier lives. Without it, sustainable development, both economic and social, is impossible (Rosser, 2013:5).

The pluralist thinking of governance becomes relevant in this argument where team members apply a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of governance. Barma et al. (2012:7) submit that a pluralistic understanding...

focuses on the political economy surrounding the detailed decisions that governments make at each step of the value chain for natural resource management. From the perspective of public interest or good governance, many resource-dependent developing countries pursue apparently short-sighted and sub-optimal policies in relation to the extraction and capture of resource rents, and to spending and savings from their resource endowments.

As far back as 1995, the World Bank Conference on the Evaluation of Development stated the following:

What is needed to be effective is not simply command of resources, whether financial or legal, but also the intangibles of knowledge, vision, persuasiveness to ensure that theories of governance translate to practice (World Bank, 1995:29).

Moran *et al.* (2013:8-12) indicate that though this is the case, in deciding the applicability of development finance the theory envisages that the exercise of public authority and spending of public funds in the hands of third parties, over which public officials have authority, comes with substantial discretion. It is in light of this finding that Van Keersbergen and Van Waarden (2004) conclude that governance contains some elements of accountability in which the actors are involved in setting goals, and must be held accountable for their actions in society while attempting to reach such goals.

Peters (2012:17) writes that the need to support good governance and the institutionalisation of development efforts are essential as social and economic problems require a collective action to cope with the common problems. Failed state syndrome would emanate from a situation where there is absence of capacity for collective action, even in the presence of an effective private sector to manage the economic and social function (Niemann, 2007). This form of governance is seen as developing the collective good even if it comes with some impositions of policies to the populace. Accordingly, governance theories see effective governance as a function of state involvement with an element of political involvement that requires state actors' participation in policy-making (Peters, 2010).

3.1.4 Good governance implies collective responsibility

The democratic style of decision-making is the basis for development assistance in support to good governance, even though it is also slow and results in poor decisions at times. The functionalist argument, from the Parsonian Framework of Governance²⁸ that emanated from the work of Harold Kaplan (1968), envisaged a society as that polity is assigned the task of “goal attainment”, developing

²⁸ *Parsonian Framework indicates that development is given to Parsons' notion of influence as a generalised medium of exchange which circulates in the social system and which, for sociology, performs the same functions as money in economics. It assumes that the analogies between the conceptual systems of economics and sociology go beyond the simple notion of exchange, which, in fact, constitutes a key concept with which to study the workings of the social system (see La Valle, 2012).*

mechanisms for making and implementing collective policy choices to achieve important goals (La Valle, 2012). According to Parsons (1967; 1970), the aim of social theory is to develop a meta-theoretical complex that would eventually be applicable to any given social phenomenon. In the course of pursuing this aim, his own work sought inspiration in such different traditions as Freud's psychoanalysis, Malinowski's anthropology, Durkheim's functionalism, and Weber's comparative institutionalism (Rodrigues, 2009:1). Thus, in this approach to the organisation of society, the public sector is responsible for providing effective guidance to the other institutions such as the economy (adaptation) and even socialisation (integration).

With the structural functional approach, basic decision-making is composed of rule-making, rule application and adjudication (Levi-Faur, 2012:22). Wilson (2011) adds to this by stating that governance also contains a relatively similar set of functional requirements to the structural functional approach, although it expresses greater detail and specificity.

Peters (2010:7) concludes that successful governance requires fulfilling at least the four following activities:

1. Goal selection: Governing is steering and steering requires some knowledge about the destination toward which one is steering. This function can be performed by state actors alone but also may involve social actors.
2. Goal reconciliation and coordination: The multiple actors within government all have their own goals, and effective governance therefore requires each one's input.
3. There were also other functions such as interest articulation and interest aggregation that occurred more on the input side of the political system rather than within government itself.
4. Feedback and accountability: Finally, individuals and institutions involved in governance need to learn from their actions. This is important both for improving the quality of the decisions being made and also important for democratic accountability. Therefore, some well-developed method of feedback must be built into the governance arrangements.

The above relays the basic functions to the process of governance and can similarly be explained further by considering the process involved, including but not limited to, decision-making, resource mobilisation, implementation and adjudication (Yu & Guo, 2012:22). These functions can be conceived in a broad sense, but the process

elements involved in them can be detailed to give tone to the school of thought of political science. This in sum says governance approaches thus integrate empirical and normative questions in political science theory (Kamieniecki & Kraft, 2010:710). Nitze (2006) subscribes to the same thought, placing his argument on the normative content in which the assumption would be that governance remains important for maintaining the quality of life of citizens and the success of the state in nation-building at domestic and international role-playing functions.

Mephram and Lorge (2005:17) relate the assumption above as a stepping-stone to achieving the MDGs. These goals largely depend on governments' capacity to govern effectively through the provision of a range of public services. It is suggested in Kenny and Dykstra (2013:2) that the capacity of governments forms a compact partnership agenda specific for post-2015 sectoral goals on the role for aid to impact global public good goals and numeric targets. The global public good is crucial for states to play the role of organising the provision of public services, whereas the normative element of governance becomes similarly important when the parameters of good governance are used and put in to practice (Delcour & Tulmets, 2008).

The World Bank emphasises good governance as an important function to bolster its programmes in developing countries (Goodsell, 2004). Goodsell's statement is based on the emphasis of the World Bank on what constitutes good governance, namely the control of corruption. These views by Goodsell and the World Bank infer that where government performs its functions with minimal or no corruption, it is likely to achieve the public good. Borzel and Hackenesch (2013) write that this conclusion has inspired a narrow understanding of good governance that is still reflected in the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. These authors say the definition of good governance is restricted here to the proper functioning of state administration. Good governance is established as a "fundamental element" and is separate from democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Borzel & Hackenesch, 2013:542).

Since governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented, an analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved in decision-making and implementing the decisions made and the formal and informal structures that have been set in place to arrive at and implement the decision (Nzewi, 2012). Good governance is one of the actors in

governance. Other actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government that is under discussion. In rural areas, for example, other actors may include influential landlords, associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, NGOs, research institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions, political parties and the military (Mehler *et al.*, 2012).

Scholars and authorities agree that good governance has eight major characteristics, namely, that it is participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and that it follows the rule of law. Good governance ensures that corruption is minimised, the views of minorities are taken into account, and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.

- ✓ Participation represents a scenario where all men and women have or should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or indirectly through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. This participation is built on freedom of association and speech, one of the internationally proclaimed fundamental human rights and more so on the capacities to participate constructively.
- ✓ Rule of law maintains that legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights. Governments must in this respect exercise laws to govern the nation and not by arbitrary powers and the decisions of selected government officials.
- ✓ Transparency as a function of good governance is built on the easy and free flow of information, which is accessible to those who consume it, and that enough information is available to understand the message and monitor the actions. Another element is responsiveness of institutions and processes that serve all stakeholders, particularly at local governance level, which are vested with serving all the needs of stakeholders, which are accountable and responsible to the nation to achieve public governance through consensus.
- ✓ Consensus-orientation denotes that good governance mediates differing interests to reach broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the group in relation to policies and procedures.
- ✓ Equity is when men and women have equal opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. This is determined by whether the distribution of wealth and resources is fair to all the concerned parties.
- ✓ Efficiency and effectiveness require processes and institutions to be able to produce results that meet needs while making the best use of the resources that are

available. This relates to whether selected strategies are set to produce expected results for the system to function in the best possible manner.

- ✓ For accountability, decision-makers in government, the private sector, and civil society organisations are accountable to the public as well as institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on the organisation and whether the decisions are internal or external to the organisation.
- ✓ Strategic vision says that leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which the perspective is grounded (UNDP, 1997a; Ritzen, 2005:25).

However, the approaches used to strengthen good governance in developing countries remain strikingly similar to those used to promote economic reform. Aid conditionality, i.e. conditioning aid on a number of prerequisites and promises of reform, has been extended from the economic realm to the political arena. During the 1980s and 1990s, the scope of these conditionalities both widened and deepened as IFIs attempted governmental and social re-engineering (Santiso, 2001:2).

It is now believed that the effect of aid on growth tends to increase with the quality of policy. Consequently, aid would be more effective if it was either more systematically targeted at poor countries with sound economic reform programmes or used to promote good policies. The influential research by World Bank economists, Craig Burnside and David Dollar (1997; 1998), on the impact of aid, policy and growth shows that aid has been highly successful in reducing poverty and promoting growth in countries with sound economic management and robust government institutions.

3.1.5 Good governance and political dimensions of development agenda

The adoption of good governance models is overshadowed by political actions, even though there is still failure to recognise the perennial outcomes of these political acts. Death (2011) notes that in fact good governance systems is an attempt to depoliticise the agenda for development and governance. He looks at this analogy as merely an enlightenment of technical problems that have their own technical solutions. His analysis is therefore that the separation of the notion of governance and democracy is not only dangerous, but highly inaccurate in the school of thought of good governance and political transformation. By analogy, good governance

translates to better public administration and technical know-how that are sufficient to implement technical fundamental changes in government policies and its social impacts (Lohmann & Lohmann, 2002:109). By the same token, if poverty could represent deprivation of capacities of systems, it means there is a related phenomenon in the global history that identifies international mal-governance (Herrera, 2005:17). Bendana (2005:53) writes that the global trade and finance regimes are unequal in global political regimes and at best not transparent and more disproportionately weighted. He states that the idea of exploring other development and political models that prioritise the elimination of poverty and hunger is closely linked to good governance by governments that propose a system of elimination of poverty and hunger, counter-policies to deepening inequalities and political apathy (*ibid.*).

Huntington (2012), together with Tujan (2005) and Bendana (2005), is of the opinion that a good governance agenda has since been included in the struggles of democratisation including participation, accountability and transparency, with the difference being that today the struggle of democratic governance goes beyond the local and national level. Good governance deepens its thought in tackling the unjust distribution of power and ensuring basic services to the population. It entails resisting privatisation of public services to donors and governance as fundamentals to transparency and accountability (Bendana, 2005). If good governance does not therefore address the core causes that create instability, hunger and poverty, like the agenda for the MDGs, then the school of thought remains at best irrelevant (Bendana, 2005:53).

According to the above rationale, the school of thought would be contradictory to its claims as promoted by multilateral agencies. It thus rests on the premise that rapid economic growth will address the ills of underdevelopment if it follows directions set by IFIs and the agenda for development, be it the MDGs or SDGs (Green, 2008). Rondinelli (2007) adds another criteria that could be applied to what poverty is and what represents appropriate governance, which if not invoked, leads to unsatisfactory social results. He agrees with other scholars that good governance methods are anti-direct interventions by governments to regulate and mitigate negative social impacts. What is contradictory is what poverty reduction is in terms of

good governance and what defines development strategies as a function of good governance (Ubels *et al.*, 2010). These contradictions require further analysis to provide a positive discussion about possible means of attaining good governance and a development agenda.

As mentioned earlier, the concept of good governance has been broadened by the operation on international institutions and corporate capital. However, Cornwall and Eade (2010:19) assume that a profit-driven strategy as a fundamental thought of the West, and followed by the South, can empower the poor and heal the social ills of poor governance policies that fail to feed into development and growth strategies.

At an International Conference on Climate Change held in Oslo in 2013, good governance was equated to good interventions by the MDGs that enhance the structures and systems of policy-making and implementation as opposed to those structures that generate greater inequalities between global consumption and state oppression. This is referenced in a system that lacks neo-liberal global and national governance, a system that is designed to enrich a few and is thus unable to eradicate poverty but rather increases inequality gaps and economic struggles (Prahalad, 2005).

3.1.6. The international institutions/agencies debate on good governance

The key theme for most of the multilateral and bilateral policies is to pursue good governance initiatives. What dominates debates around these agencies and donor partners is which aspects of good governance should be promoted, irrespective of whether good governance precedes or follows from economic development (Schmitz, 2007). They show that aid providers frequently present the four concepts, namely accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion, which in recent years have become nearly universal features of the policy statements and programmes of international development organisations as a unified agenda. Yet in actual programming they may only pursue or prioritise selective parts of the set, engendering tensions among the different principles (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014). These debates also evoke the discussion on development itself and whether it is worth it to place their hopes on governance as a key variable in the management

of development outcomes. Indicators of good governance vary enormously as aid agencies are at best not neutral. They make policy choices by choosing a particular set of governance criteria (CIDSE, 2006).

What remains evident is that the choices of the criteria for good governance have a political connotation to these donors' interventions, which have never been considered neutral. Pattanayak (2001) and Hollander (2014), writing on the Post-2015 Common Africa Position, demonstrate at the hand of the work of anthropologist James Ferguson that practitioners in the development school of thought have made great strides to translate intrinsically political realities of poverty and powerlessness into technical incapacities that have solutions in awaiting development practitioners.

A publication of a report in 1998, *Assessing aid: What works, what doesn't work, and why* (Dollar & Collier) adds a key dimension to the debate on good governance. While criticised at the time, the central argument raised in the report has since been accepted widely.

Carvalho (2006) argues that for aid to be effective it has to be applied in an environment where good governance is practiced. He states that where there is bad governance, aid addresses only the underlying causes of poverty and deprivation (Carvalho, 2006:76). The recommendation made to development policy-makers was that channelling aid to very poor countries with good governance will earn them perennial results just as much as thrice the aid budgets to countries already receiving development assistance in the form of aid (World Bank, 2006; UN, 2013b).

Subsequent to the release of the Dollar-Collier Report of 2002, the United Kingdom's Department of International Development commissioned a study to validate the results of this research. The study concluded that reallocating aid to countries with good governance achieved far-reaching results and potentially high significant outcomes.

It should be noted that governance indicators are not all based on economic reductionism. In the last ten years, a variety of governance indicators emphasised the economic, political and security aspects of good governance (Sundaram &

Chowdhury, 2012:2). These variables affect the conceptualisation of good governance, making it difficult to assign a single definition to it. Governance became a rhetorical notion than can be used to measure differences in governance. This is because the concept of good governance has been pioneered by development agencies which provided particular parameters of how the concept should be translated in practice for its application (Schmitz, 2007).

Freedom House gathered data related to political rights and civil liberties to construct its own measure of good governance. Indicators in this study include elements of the process of electoral fairness, the degree of political pluralism, the responsiveness of government to civil society, freedom of expression, adherence to the rule of law and freedom from state oppression (Auclair, 2006). The Freedom House measure is independent from the economic approach and yet forms a solid basis as a good governance indicator. The difficulties in reaching a global agreement in the ongoing negotiations over the post-2015 development agenda highlight this continuing fissure. Major Western donors, including the EU, the US, Canada and Japan, have argued persistently for the inclusion of a goal that would incorporate governance principles in a substantial way - particularly since the MDGs fell short of addressing the developmental role of governance, democracy and the rule of law (Levy, 2014).

Another NGO, Transparency International, introduced yet another variable to measure good governance. It focuses all its efforts on measuring only indicators related to corruption practices (EU, 2006). Transparency International was established in 1963 and became the main advocate to mainstream anti-corruption initiatives within the programmes of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Hout & Koch, 2006).

The EU measures good governance through elements of economic, political and environmental governance. Human rights and parliamentary debate have dominated the discussions of the EU since 2000 (EU, 2006). The subject of the EU's focus was the political aspects of good governance, although it still attaches great importance to the economic aspects, such as the promotion of economic growth that has importance in its intervention strategies (Earle & Scott, 2010).

With regard to the debate on the different interpretations of good governance, Hoebink (2010) associates good governance with the means to increase the effectiveness of aid and to improve the functioning of democracy. Thus for him, good governance is the basic criteria used to select the eligibility of countries to receive development aid (*ibid.*). Donors' concern places a great deal of attention on aid effectiveness as a measure to ensure that their funds are being put to good use (CIDSE, 2006). Good governance thus is a means to ensure that development assistance funds are not misappropriated and that they offer far-reaching outcomes to the direct beneficiaries (Majoro, 2007). Although thoughtful attention is paid to governance issues that set a level playing field for aid to be effective, a missing link to the equation is the minor emphasis on poverty reduction, which is the other significant detail in development cooperation (Joubert *et al.*, 2008).

According to these debates, the underlying consensus is that good governance is mainstreamed within the policy frameworks of development cooperation, stretching from how policies are formulated to how they are implemented. In their study of Dutch development cooperation, Hout and Koch (2006) concluded that while good governance has been central to Dutch development policy since 1998, it has played only a limited role in the selection of countries to receive Dutch aid. The Dutch selection criteria were influenced by the mixture of reasons advanced above, which made it impossible to select a large number of countries to meet the criteria in the arguments raised in the discussion above.

3.2 Theories of transformation

Transformation and transition theories play an important role in the discourse on change from one regime type to another, for example from authoritarianism to democracy or the opposite. These theories also play an important role in understanding the problems of governments that are involved in such changes (Beyer & Stykow, 2004). This was enunciated at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (2012) on the theme of accountability and transparency for development.

Of central importance to the problem of governance, according to the school of thought on transition, is the simultaneity of economic, political and social change

(Beyer & Stykow 2004). Development actors' conceptualisation play an important role in the analysis of systemic transformation and change. This approach was ushered in by the "Transitions to Democracy" school, later in the German discourse of the "Systemwechsel" group (Merkel, 1996; Merkel, *et al.*, 1996; Merkel & Sabdschneider, 1997). At the International Conference held in Korea in 2009, a broad consensus was reached during a discussion on the transformation of socialist systems. It was agreed that the fathers of the theories of transformation and transition are Dieter Segert, Rudiger Frank and Weigelin Schwierdrzik.

In terms of the Marxist theory of transformation, the biggest issue is what is being transformed and to what end has it been addressed, and how far the transition from one economic order to a political order has taken place. Foster *et al.* (2011:3) opine that the idea of transformation for development is premised on the political defence of capitalism in that economic power is diffuse and cannot be aggregated in such a manner as to have undue influence over the democratic states. This was an early contribution by social science to bring into the picture a teleological conception of post-Communist transformation (Stark, 1992). The term "transformation" thus signified an open-ended process of change, which along the way has been substituted for transition (Csaba, 2001).

3.2.1 Changing regimes

The history of South Africa came up with a better understanding of the theories of change. The revolutionary essence and significance of the Red October Campaign by Solly Mapaila was an apt crystallisation of, among others, the ongoing challenges that confront the democratisation and transformation project of a democratic South Africa after more than 20 years (Mapaila, 2013:3). These theories emphasise the need to understand regime change. The differences between socialist regimes are of particular importance, mainly the long-term effects of the pre-socialist heritage, two different types of path dependency, and recently, the question of post-socialism. Bunce (2006) addresses the legacy of state socialism and highlights the importance on governing institutions and transition processes in the region.

Fearon and Laitin (2003), in their analysis of transformation as a theory, indicate that transition, which is related to transition in the Western model, is politically influenced

and underpins the new body of knowledge that is now referred to as transformation. Similarly, transformation theory in this instance needs to identify major agents of change and, in the political sense, transformation theory has to mobilise and empower certain groups (Pickel, 2002:109). The champions of transition, according to neo-liberal transformation theory, are enlightened technocrats, the rising middle class and economic elites (Pieterse, 2009:31).

The realities of systemic change in the past decade as mapped out by social science strongly suggest, however, that this political programme ignores many of the real agents and sources of change (Jones *et al.*, 2013:95).

The late nineteenth century saw the rise of modernism in which the study of politics was dominated by a diverse and evolving stream of comparative-historical scholarship that had emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and that persisted well into the early decades of the twentieth century. The grand narratives of this developmental historicism inspired narratives centred on the nation, the state and freedom (Bevir, 2010:18-24).

Bevir (*ibid.*) explains that as early as the late nineteenth century, an evolutionary positivism, associated with Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, began to give way to a neo-positivism that in time would come to exert a major influence on modern social science. Modernism modes of knowledge became a significant feature in the early twentieth century and deployed new approaches to gather, summarise and analyse data.

Adcock *et al.* (2007) advance a principle that modernist social science broke with developmental historicism's reliance on national narratives that situated the study of some significant events in institutions and politics with an order of developmental continuity, hence transformation. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006:3) add that transformation, as associated with a change to modernity, has invited developmental historicism in formal terms, turning from historical narratives to a range of more a-historical techniques. Bevir (2010) explains that the modernists were attracted to models that classified development and governance over time across different locations and places. These models were a subset of functional requirements of a transitional system, psychological theories or types, a general human rationality, and formal analyses of process. In substantive terms, modernist social science

overlapped with a pluralist challenge to the state as conceived by developmental historicists (Adcock *et al.*, 2007).

New topics from political parties, interest groups and policy networks that support the rationale for transformation came to the fore in the discussion. These new topics helped to inspire pluralist theories of the state and democracy. Kapp's argument is that the substantive and formal aspects of modernist social science could reinforce one another through the new techniques that made it possible, or at least in exploring some of these matters that were associated with new data gathering techniques, to substantiate the rationale for transformation (Kapp, 2012:6). His views influenced Dahms (2011:230), who agrees that the rise of modernist social science was associated with transformational change that drew attention away from the more usual focus on the behavioural aspects of revolution of the 1950s. This was dominated (contemporary social science) by variables of modernism, which stand in contrast with the nineteenth century understanding of history as progressive or rational transformation (Kalberg, 2013:xi-xii). The transition referred to above relied on different formal, a-historical and various governance and democratic analyses (Bevir & Trentmann, 2007). Added to the above, Ruccio and Amariglio (2003) also depose that the shift from developmental historicism to modernist modes of knowledge ushered in the route to political authority and transformation discourse by altering the concept and nature of state.

Helleman (2009:11) concludes that modernists transformed this original thought and brought about the formal patterns, the new regulations, or modes of action and institutions. Thus, modernists discarded the practical emphasis on the state that brought into the equation of development transformation the functionality of political parties, interest groups and policy networks (Cox & Schechter, 2002:96).

3.2.2 The rise of modern thinking in political transformation

Modernist social science ushered in the thought of transformation by creating the conditions not only for the welfare state but also the bureaucratic narrative (O'Connor, 2001). The need to deal with the abuses and irrationality of the democratic processes was one justification offered for the creation of isolated and

centralised bureaucracies. Bridgman and Davis (2003:98) submit that a permanent and neutral bureaucracy promised to divide politics from policy or, more accurately, to divide decisions about which policies to adopt from decisions about how to implement those policies. Hallsworth *et al.* (2011:13) emphasise that this is in essence good governance and political transformation in which bureaucracy evoked a means of preserving the fundamental basis of democratic systems and ensuring that it gets rid of the ills of inability, irrationality and factionalism of daily governance matters. By analogy, this would mean that what forms governance is the interconnectedness of the theories and reforms that responded to the crisis of the state and its malfunctions (Bevir, 2010:25). These new ideas abandoned the earlier expertise associated with the post-war state.

The transformation principle evolved through a series of stages, which first saw transformation theories associated with rational choice theory. Another trend of reforms was associated with neo-liberalism (Campbell & Pedersen, 2001). According to Bevir (2010:5), the argument raised by neo-liberals maintains that the state is inherently inefficient when compared with markets. Bang (2003:201) substantiates this argument that the post-war state cannot be sustained any longer, especially in a world that is now characterised by highly mobile capital and vigorous economic competition between states.

Thus, the critique of the concept of the public interest theory came with the rational choice theorists who largely influenced the perception of the neo-liberal attitudes towards the conception of governance (Bevir & Trentmann, 2007:4). As Nye and Donahue (2000) submit, they adopted the concept of governance to refer to the transformation norms and patterns of rule that arise and persist even in the absence of an enforcing agent. The neo-liberal reforms fragmented service delivery and weakened the central control of the state without putting in place proper institutions to manage the environment for good governance and transformation. This approach rolled back the state to the reforms of the public sector (Lenard & Simeon, 2012; Bevir & Trentmann, 2007; Bevir, 2010:31).

In this regard, the reforms have led to a proliferation of policy networks in both the formulation of public policy and the delivery of public services. The 1990s saw a massive transformation outpouring of work that conceived of governance as a

proliferation of networks (Wacquant, 2009:47). Firth's claim is that the theory of transformation suggests that a range of processes have left the state increasingly dependent on other organisations for the delivery and success of its policies (Firth, 2006:409). According to this approach, which also introduces the new tools of policy networks, transformation as a new dimensional tool in governance offer an analysis of new patterns which leaves the state's influence over these new partners very minimal and no longer sufficiently influential to control (Nitze, 2006).

Mossberger, Clark and John (2012) insist that transformation consists of networks in which the state and other institutions depend on each other for the proper functionality of local governments and private and voluntary organisations, though it does not *per se* constitute fundamental transformation. It would seem that the proliferation of such networks still command a great degree of autonomy from the state (Gomez & Korina, 2008).

3.2.3 Political transformation: some new thoughts

The theories discussed in previous sections and the recurring emphasis on good governance as a framework and pillar for development aid assistance gave rise to systemic transformation and the inherent principles of democratisation (Heider, 2009).

This new school of thought envisioned an increase in the role of non-state actors to deliver public services, while the role of the state was that of oversight over the functionality of these actors. This saw the transformative role of the state as a mere manager of networks and partnerships, and as Fountain (2001:194) puts it,

The puzzle is even more interesting because institutional theorists seek to explain the very phenomena and processes deeply affected by the diffusion of new organizational forms, the role and transformation of symbolic orders, and the structuring of organizational fields. Researchers, including institutionalists, have become greatly interested in a phenomenon variously referred to as collaboration, cooperation, social capital, inter-organizational networks, and strategic alliances.

In principle, the new political role of the state became that of an auditor and regulator of public interests that are guaranteed by other non-governmental actors. There has

been a large transformation and audit explosion where the increased role of unelected actors in policy-making suggests that the theory of transformation ushered in a new approach to democratic governance (Isakhan, 2012). The primary principle is accountability and good governance. Similarly, accounts of growing transnational and international constraints upon states suggest that the state machinery needs to rethink the nature of social inclusion and social justice. Bevir (2010: 33) concludes that the leading lending and donor institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, now tend to use the concept of good governance to advance their thoughts on their aspirations for a better coordinated world system.

With this in mind, the idea is to balance the rational choice theory with the new institutional calling by multilateral agencies and development partners to go down a road of political authority and transformation. In the past, representative democracy was only a historical achievement (Chakrabarty, 2009:9), even though on this point, Bevir (2010:34) agrees that it would be the right analogy as modernists themselves portrayed the nation as a fragmented one in which democracy could not be functional to express the common good. For Owen (2004), the answer is in the new forms of social science that guide policy-making. The main argument rests on the rise of the concept of responsibility, which transformation theorists view as less relevant than accountability of public officials and accountability of politicians to their electorate.

Sachs (2005) mentions in the official overview of the flagship publication, *Investing in Development*, that the essential reference work for all governments, policy-makers, aid and donor agencies, development practitioners, researchers and students worldwide is the official action plan for ending poverty, providing practical investment strategies and approaches to financing these and an operational framework that will allow even the poorest countries to achieve the MDGs within ten years.

This is the political authority required to embrace the route to transformation in the new global world order. Lewis (2006) writes that the result of this transformation has now shifted the decision-making process to involve diverse policy actors overriding the previous means of governance by the state that evoked procedural accountability, organisation theory and network theories.

To conclude, political transformation is a transition in which there is a substantive systemic reform process. The World Bank agrees, through the work of Joseph Stiglitz, the Bank's former Chief Economist, that where the system makes substantive forms of transition, transformation of the political system is likely to take place (Koschnik, 2007:17-18). Transformation of a systemic nature represents a model for the future, in which social science tends to stress the open-ended character of largescale processes of social change. Urbaim (2010) warns that all this does not represent a scientific form of transformation theory, but rather illustrates the superiority of another element of transformation theory of social science basics. Hash-Gonzalez (2012:3) says that any form of transformation comes with decisive and major agents of change.

The rising middle class, supported by enlightened technocrats and liberal reformers, remain the champions of transition who owe their thinking to the fundamental theories of neo-liberal transformation. Anderson and Anderson (2010) put an end to this topic, saying that although this political process is substantive, during the past decade it has ignored many agents and sources of social change.

3.3 The rise of postmodernism

Theories of good governance and political transformation have become more dependent on the extent to which development aid is effective and is applied to institutions of governance and systemic transformation. This ushers in the rise of the school of thought of postmodernism. There is not a clear and defined definition of postmodernism because of little agreement on the concepts, characteristics and ideas associated with it. Reichl (1989) writes that postmodernism is a tendency in contemporary culture that involves the belief that many, if not all, apparent realities are only social constructs, as they are subject to change inherent to time and place. Reichl (*ibid.*) continues to emphasise the role of language, power relations and motivations; in particular postmodernism attacks the use of sharp classifications such as male versus female, straight versus gay, white versus black and imperial versus colonial.

Yilmaz (2010) is of the opinion that postmodernism holds realities to be plural and relative, and dependent on who the interested parties are and what their interests consist of. He says it attempts to problematise modernist overconfidence by drawing into sharp contrast the difference between how confident a speaker is of their position versus how confident they need to be to serve their supposed purposes. Postmodernist thought is an intentional departure from modernist approaches that had previously been dominant. The term “postmodernism” comes from its critique of the “modernist” scientific mentality of objectivity, particularly as an academic movement, which can be understood as a reaction to modernism in the humanities (Hatuka & D’Hooghe, 2007). Whereas modernism was primarily concerned with principles such as identity, unity, authority and certainty, postmodernism is often associated with difference, plurality, textuality and scepticism. Literary critic Fredric Jameson describes postmodernism as the “dominant cultural logic of late capitalism” (Jameson, 1991). Late capitalism refers to the phase of capitalism after World War II, as described by economist Ernest Mandel (1967). The term refers to the same period sometimes described as “globalisation”, “multinational capitalism” or “consumer capitalism”. According to these scholars, Jameson’s work studies the postmodern in contexts of aesthetics, politics, philosophy and economics. Since then, postmodernism has involved theories that embrace and aim to create diversity, and it exalts uncertainty, flexibility and change (Hatuka & D’Hooghe, 2007).

It becomes apparent that since the transition into new development thinking, development came to be viewed in the ambit of postmodernism. It purports a transformation on the premise that postmodern theory itself is an attempt to make sense of the age in a way that transcends the traditional forms of understanding and ideologies of development. It presupposes the concomitant of yet another systemic modification of capitalism itself in which the players have transcended from states to institutions that provide capital and development aid (Henk, 1999).

These developments influenced the good governance agenda and political transformation to pave the way for development aid to be effective. The modern perspectives of development are reduction of poverty and inequality, which form the contemporary theory of development with its approach based on how societies should move away from abject poverty and eradicate inequality. Bringing people out

of poverty remains the most fundamental and crucial area of development strategies (Cynamon & Fazzari, 2013).

According to Irvine (2013:2-4), the postmodernism attribute of transformation is premised on the three most salient reasons:

- ✓ Savings are highly reduced by inequality as the middle class has more potential and continuity for saving. While development increases investment in a higher quality of education, inequality comes with bias in education.
- ✓ Cronyism, bribes and corruption are precipitated by inequality where the elite uses bribes that destroy social capital. However, some economists claim that an element of inequality is necessary for development to reduce incentives for working hard.
- ✓ Inequality is generally considered as unfair, especially to those who are poor and have no social and economic capacity to bargain for equitable access to resources and services. This position is probable to those with lower incomes and those with higher incomes and affects them differently.

These guidelines determine a country's assessments on development processes (Bourriaud, 2009). Concern about difficulties to reduce inequality and scale down on poverty traps arises more from modern explanations than classical explanations of development (Hutcheon, 2002).

Develtere and De Bruyn (2009) indicate that postmodernism represents transformation into another pillar of development, essentially exponential growth as undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges in the development co-operation sector. It is an opportunity that can contribute to achieving the MDGs (Walter, 2008). However, it simultaneously calls into question the definition of development cooperation, the conditions for quality development cooperation, and the ethics of philanthropy and international cooperation (Drolet, 2003). However, there appears to have formed a completely new set of development paradigms as defined by achievement of development goals, which will be seen later as a source of transformation of the locus of capital.

3.4 Conclusion

Naidoo (2011), writing about the role of monitoring and evaluation in measuring good governance, captures the discussion above by indicating that the proliferation of measuring instruments of good governance and political transformation are none other than poverty reduction and development performance. In an attempt to capture aspects of good governance and political transformation, different methods used illustrate that good governance is a multi-dimensional concept (Farazmund & Pinkoski, 2011). In addition to multi-dimensionalism, predictability and participation are variables through which good governance and transformation can be assessed (Razzaque, 2013). Naidoo (2011) arrives at a conclusion that more work needs to be done in ascertaining the measurement of good governance, especially in establishing new instruments and indicators that address consistency and reliability of various forms of measurement of development aid effectiveness.

This chapter captured the debates on good governance and political transformation, showing that the failure of one paradigm called for the creation of a new one. As Khan (2008:107) suggests, the essence of the discussion claims that aid policies, governance and transformation have been constantly reinvented under new strategies and principles to guide donors and recipients. Khan (*ibid.*) states the following:

It is important to highlight that this link between the 'good governance' concept and development is far from finding a theoretical and empirical consensus. Rather, a number of scholars such as Appolinario (2010) argue that the 'contemporary good governance agenda is based largely on governance capabilities that are required to create the conditions for markets to be efficient' and it is misleading to suggest that this model will per se sufficiently result in better development outcomes. According to him, what countries need to grow is a type of governance structure that could be defined as state-led developmentalism, which accelerates resource allocation to growth sectors.

In essence, structural and systemic transformation for aid effectiveness has achieved development outcomes.

The discussion is summarised by Evans (2012), who highlights that the definition of good governance should receive more in-depth attention since it has often been

formulated by donor institutions. The premise of good governance and development disposition is to separate their various components or dimensions and concentrate on the net effect of their application (Evans, 2012:6). The discussion shows that although the concepts differ, in essence they measure that which they purport to measure.

From the submissions made herein above regarding good governance and political transformation from a theoretical perspective, it suffices that from the divergent views, significant efforts to improve good governance and political transformation can be made where there is targeted interventions, development of sound, monitorable and result focused interventions, adequate resources and political will to guide the process of human based approach to development as will be discussed in the following chapters. It is evident that good governance and political transformation can be achieved with intended effectiveness if efforts are redoubled to meet unreached global development goals and the Sustainable Development Goals. The solution is located in the commitments both from the government, development partners and non-state actors to jointly contribute their comparative efforts to meet the global development agenda.

Punyaratabandhu (2004) concludes the discussion above by stating that they all highlight the importance of ensuring the consistency of these measures to arrive at an informed decision on what the new thinking in governance purports to explain. The chapter has presented some lessons that good governance equates to instrumental good that has far-reaching outcomes to reap the perennial outcomes for the beneficiaries that include the eradication of abject poverty and the maintenance of development performance. **It is the conclusion of the UN (2004:73) that even the countries that are not ranked high in economic performance can, with the right mix of growth and equity focused plans for good governance, processes and outcomes, improve their performance even if good governance may not turn out to be the only condition for the eradication of poverty.**

The focus of good governance is mostly on the separate measurement of process and outcome and on how to boost both of these governance dimensions. Shah (2007) writes that if the frameworks and determinants of good

governance are channelled towards strengthening governance institutions, there would not be any failures in attaining the outcomes which good governance are intended to achieve, including the eradication of poverty and the bolstering of economic performance.

The main points in good governance and the scholarship of aid effectiveness deal with the elimination of poverty and the enhancement of desired social outcomes, which are basically poverty reduction and the promotion of economic performance. In the next chapter, further attention will be paid to the operationalisation of good governance, a concept that is associated with development institutions and donors (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012). **Good governance is thus not only a matter of beneficial outcomes; outcomes that provide institutional good, such as poverty reduction and development performance, but also good, efficient and effective government processes that enhance participative, responsive, transparent and accountable governing processes.**

CHAPTER 4

REVISITING THE TENENTS OF DEVELOPMENT AID IN AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

Nejad (2011) writes that Mao Zedong developed the Three Worlds Theory²⁹ in which he alluded to the fact that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Third World has been used interchangeably with least developed countries and somehow conveys poverty-stricken countries. Lesotho's situation has led to its inclusion in the broad definition of "Third World countries" along with many other African countries, including Togo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Guinea, Ethiopia, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and Burundi, in which the International Monetary Fund's 2011 gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita) report reflects the countries with the lowest purchasing power parity (PPP) as Third World and the poorest. According to the UN's *2011 Human Development Report*, these are countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with little or no progress, largely due to the HIV epidemic and civil wars. Lesotho has shown signs of impoverishment to the extent that the country has failed to meet its social outcomes and to perform the basic duties of the state, including offering social protection and welfare to citizens. Because of the situation of poverty, Third World countries enter into debt with International Financing Institutions (IFIs) in an attempt to remedy the poverty situation and address the social needs. This situation of indebtedness further reduces the countries' position to meet development challenges and creates yet another pathway to address the status of development plans. Reported in the MDG report 2015, Lesotho is off track to meet poverty reduction (Goal 1), in reducing maternal mortality by $\frac{3}{4}$ and in combating HIV and other diseases (Goals 5 & 6) while slow progress has been made with regard to universal primary education (Goal 2), promoting gender equality and empowering women (Goal 3) and promoting global partnership for development (Goal 8). Very slow progress has been observed in reducing child mortality (Goal 4 and ensuring environmental sustainability (Goal 7). In

²⁹ Chairman Mao Zedong's Theory on the Division of the Three Worlds and the Strategy of Forming an Alliance Against an Opponent stated that "From the perspective of the changes that have taken place in international relations, the world today in fact has three sides or three worlds in existence which are mutually related as well as contradictory. The United States and the Soviet Union belong to the first world. Developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions belong to the third world. And the developed countries in between the two belong to the second world" (See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Resources 1998-2014).

sum therefore, the major unfinished business in Lesotho relates to poverty and hunger, inequalities, improving maternal health and reducing child mortality (KOL, 2015).

. Kremer *et al.* (2009:15-16) states:

A big debate is taking place on the effectiveness of foreign aid. While people such as Jeffrey Sachs (2005) try to seduce us to believe in ending world poverty by doing more, several former World Bank employees are questioning whether we are actually doing good after all. Paul Collier (2007) argues that, although global poverty is falling, the world's poorest people face a tragedy. In his analysis, the bottom billion is caught in four traps: the conflict trap, the natural resource trap, landlocked with bad neighbours, and bad governance. He therefore proposes to shift the focus of development policies to a set of instruments to set them free. Aid itself will not help much: 'The constituency for aid is suspicious of growth and the constituency for growth is suspicious of aid' (p. 183). Military interventions, trade policies that also affect the Western world and international charters that bind the bottom-billion countries are thought to be more helpful. William Easterly – also previously at the World Bank – is outright disillusioned. In his best known book, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good*, he claims that aid has been doing wrong rather than good (Easterly, 2006). None of the plans to reduce poverty have succeeded. After 60 years of reform models, dozens of different plans, and \$ 2.3 trillion spent, the aid industry has not been able to achieve its goals.

The IMF seeks solutions to ensure that no poor country is faced with a debt it cannot manage (IMF HIPC, 2015). This initiative supports Kremer's assumption that the effort to address and respond to the global financial crisis and the situation of underdevelopment of the Third World has been crystallised by urgent attention to resources, financial need and lending capacity. Pointing to scholars such as Sacks and Collier, it would seem that Kremer's views were such that the baseline towards the establishment of the need for development assistance was coupled with a systemic development niche for institutionalisation and structural reform processes that would necessitate the functioning and coordination of the mandate to promote economic performance and alleviate poverty. This was recognised in the Republic of Gambia's Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment:

The Government recognises the need to strengthen institutional capacity with regard to policy-making, and the implementation of national development objectives. It is fully committed to strengthening its public institutions to better implement PAGE and reach the MDGs. It recognizes the need to strengthen ongoing reforms and institutional development across the board. The main areas to be reinforced are the following: judicial services, the Gambia Bureau of Statistics, the National Assembly, the civil service, the Independent Electoral Commission, the office of the Ombudsman, The Gambia Revenue Authority, Gambia Public Procurement Authority, Gambia Competition Commission, National Audit Office, and the Gambia Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (The Republic of Gambia, PAGE, 2012:xxii).

With this in mind, an example is drawn from South Africa that the most appropriate pathway out of poverty by national governments would be a major progressive transformation that would ensure the establishment of sustainable development projects within countries and the creation of employment opportunities to address the striking underdevelopment and poverty crisis.

A critical assessment of assistance programmes resulted in the need to address the fundamentals of global poverty and crisis, namely, events that impact the world as a whole, the human race, civilisation or something related to environmental threat. There was a need therefore to implement systemic changes that would inculcate reform of institutional changes. Van Waeyenberge *et al.* (2010:4) point out that there is an urgent need to identify how countries can most effectively employ macroeconomic policy frameworks to implement equitable development strategies and poverty reduction. About a decade ago, staff at the World Bank and IMF similarly developed a presumption that the principles of aid assistance and pillars through which aid was given prompted an urgent need to identify how countries can most effectively implement policies and reform frameworks to view aid effectively and achieve equitable development strategies to end or reduce poverty. In their study, Niersbach and Evenett (2014) state that in 1996 the IMF and the World Bank jointly launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, designed to release developing countries from their unsustainable sovereign debt burdens. One primary objective of this debt relief initiative was to reduce poverty levels in the participating countries. This represented a major departure from past practices in dealing with the debt problems of developing countries; it focused on achieving overall external debt

sustainability with comprehensive participation by all external creditors for the most heavily indebted countries with good track records (HIPC, 1999).

Rondinelli (2007) and Adera *et al.* (2014) pronounce that it is critical to analyse how the dynamics of poverty can change over time and postulate that the issue of poverty reduction is not new, but creates a discourse on the inherent role of the state and the moral responsibility of the government to its citizens. Aid is thus seen as relevant by the international community to seriously reinvigorate the process toward attaining sustainable development, to create a platform for setting up institutions through which aid could be channelled, and to align developing countries' strategies towards the attainment of the MDGs by 2015. Influenced by scholarly views such as those of Rondinelli and Maharajah (2011:27-28) on dealing with post-racial South Africa, there is a need for reformed, capacitated institutions of political governance and transformation forming a primary requirement to address the historic ills of structural imbalances and deeply vested institutional interest tied to the unequal distribution of power and wealth that pre-dated colonial independent movements. In contrast, Baines (2003:13) earlier and Marais (2013) later agree on the issue of the political economy of post-Apartheid South Africa, both insisting that the quality of the country's transformation to democracy can be improved through dealing openly with the past. This is also evident in Crush and Tavera (2011), when writing about the situation of the Zimbabwean exodus of migration as perpetuated by forced silence, forgetting that it might derail the process. With this theoretical background, development aid therefore became a medium to build capacity and institutionalisation so that funds could be channelled through institutions of change for political transformation and to achieve good governance.

The contents of the 56th Commission Session of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific³⁰ provides the impetus to strengthen local governments to sustain and raise the quality of economic growth. While governments are involved fully in the design of comprehensive reform packages and the related

³⁰ *The 56th session of the Commission on the Status of Women took place at the United Nations' Headquarters in New York from Monday, 27 February to Friday, 9 March 2012. The closing meeting was held on 15 March 2012. Priority themes included the empowerment of rural women and their role in poverty and hunger eradication, development and current challenges, financing for gender equality and the empowerment of women (agreed conclusions from the 52nd session) and engaging young women and men, girls and boys, to advance gender equality (See Report on the 56th session of the Commission on the Status of Women, United Nations' Headquarters in New York from Monday, 27 February to Friday, 9 March 2012).*

legislation, their inability to ensure implementation limit the impact of such reforms (ESCAP, 2000). The main issue is to enhance the capacity of the state to perform and deliver such changes and reforms that could address socio-economic gains while alleviating the ills of poverty. The strategic framework of the MDGs³¹ prompted that “the MDGs and their accompanying 18 targets and indicator frameworks were based on historical trends”. Likewise, as mentioned earlier, the contemporary thinking on the SDGs provides a better view on global development targets with at least 169 targets and 17 Goals that will be applied differently from the MDGs, based on the country context and owned and led by the countries themselves. SDGs provide a platform for mutual cooperation and partnership by all stakeholders to meet the global targets. Similarly, Pitcher (2012:11) states that it was not only the business of the UN as Africa itself indulged in the significant transition of economic and social reforms as seen in the earlier example of South Africa. As noted by the International Poverty Centre ³²(IPC),

They (MDGs) were set on the premise that progress observed at the global level over the previous 25 years would continue for the next 25 years –the period from 1990 to 2015. Thus, the MDGs are essentially an extrapolation of global trends of the 1970s and 1980s and projected forward till 2015 (Vandermoortele, 2007:1).

Paloni and Zanardi (2007) indicate that the issue of poverty and defining the intervention thematic areas for MDGs redirected the international debate on micro-economic policies, which was under discussion in the era in which countries were financed by International Banking Institutions to scale-up aid to meet domestic resources for the achievement of the MDGs. These authors further submit,

³¹. As noted in the 2006 MDG Report “...disparities in progress, both among and within countries, are vast, and the poorest among us, mostly those in remote rural areas, are being left behind. Much more can and must be done...” Initially, efforts by UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and governments concerning the MDGs were focused on raising awareness about the goals, undertaking national level needs assessments, and incorporating the goals into national frameworks such as Poverty Reduction Strategies and others. Yet, while national level efforts are crucial, there is growing attention being paid to the MDGs and the role of the local level in their achievement. The MDGs and their accompanying 18 targets and indicators frameworks were based on historical trends, as noted by the International Poverty Centre (IPC) (Millennium Development Goals Report (United Nations, 2006:3).

³²The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), formerly the International Poverty Centre, is a partnership between the Poverty Practice of the Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP and the Government of Brazil. Located in Brasília, IPC-IG facilitates South-South learning with the aim of expanding developing countries’ knowledge and capacities to design, implement and evaluate effective policies towards the attainment of high inclusive growth. IPC-IG is a hub for South-South dialogue on applied research and training on development policy. IPC-IG’s work aims at equipping policymakers from developing countries with the skills necessary to formulate socially inclusive policies and to learn from successful policy experiences in the South. Strengthening capacity for policy analysis and implementation in the field through South-South learning is one of the services provided by IPC-IG to the development community and UNDP Country Offices. See *International Policy for Research and Growth*, 2012.

“Globalization is presenting the World Bank and the IMF with new challenges by imposing a rethinking of the nature of development and a reassessment of the appropriateness of current development policies. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have responded by redefining their international roles, their priorities and their forms of intervention” (Paloni & Zanardi, 2007:1). This was also the issue in Africa, as Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) mention that sustainable infrastructure development was vital for Africa's prosperity as it was time to begin the transformation of economies and governments. This rethinking on the process and nature of development at a global level prompted the sustainable development agenda and a precursor for the signing of the SDGs in 2015 which laid foundation for international cooperation to achieve far reaching development outcomes by 2030 and attend to the unmet target of the MDGs.

Based on the above one can conclude that if countries were to attribute the transformation and reform made through aid interventions to political transformation and good governance, the next approach would be to assess the possibility of engagement of the newest pillar of development in the context of development aid that supports institutionalisation and systemic transformation, unlike the outcomes, but measured by results (effectiveness). Rodney (2012) maintains that the phase to the attributed newest pillar of development is influential in understanding African impoverishment and how the imperial countries of Europe, and subsequently the US, bear major responsibility for impoverishing Africa. Rodney (2012) maintains that they have been joined in this exploitation by agents or unwitting accomplices, both in the North and in Africa. In this context, development aid has reshaped a pillar of development transformation according to which necessary measures should be invoked to contribute to good governance and the improvement of social development outcomes (Evans, 2007:57-58).

4.2 Framework and pillars of aid towards the Third World

The general conception is that active humanitarian aid should prevail, even though more structural forms of aid also receive attention. Scholars below believe that short-term projects have been defended over time while also making an argument for long-term programmes, technical assistance aid or budget support (Develtere & De Bruyn 2009:912).

Based on the above, Wangwe (2007:3) is of the opinion that

The G8 summit in Gleneagles addressed the recommendations of the *Commission of Africa Report 2005*³³ and came out with financing commitments by leaders of the rich world to increase aid to developing countries and to adopt aid delivery and management approaches and practices that would enhance the quality of aid with a view of making aid more effective in meeting the development goals.

Kirton *et al.* (2013:137) also criticised Europe and North America, stating that they should address the issue of poverty in Africa as it caused frustration in the global community as a result of the fact that humanitarian and development funding had to be increased to downscale poverty and improve economic growth in highly impoverished countries. The Hunger Project in 2005³⁴, as well as the Millennium Declaration, called for a special focus on Africa within the ambit of the four social conditions that give rise to the persistence of hunger and poverty in Africa. The conditions are the marginalisation of female farmers, poor leadership, too little investment in building people's capacity in rural areas, and HIV/Aids and gender inequality that fuels the epidemic (The Hunger Project, 2005). This saw a foundational shift towards the need for foreign aid as a tool to speed up growth and development. The OECD-ODA (2010b:146) states that this was a period in which the quality and quantity of foreign aid needed to be defined to scale up its expected contribution in meeting the financing gap. This was to achieve development goals and, on the financing partners' side, more effective use of aid. The test was to verify whether the African crisis could be minimised through additional resourcing through aid.

A clear disposition towards the fundamental pillars of aid in the Third World was described by Develtere and De Bruyn (2009). In their work, it becomes apparent that

³³The Commission for Africa, also known as the Blair Commission for Africa, was established to examine and provide impetus for development in Africa. Its objectives include the generation of new ideas for development and to deliver implementation of existing international commitments towards Africa. At the G8 summit of world leaders in Gleneagles, Scotland, that year, the report was seen as a blueprint for action by the G8. The Gleneagles summit pledged what the Commission report had asked for in terms of a doubling of aid and significant extensions of multilateral debt relief. But it failed to deliver what the Commission had demanded on trade - including an end to agricultural export subsidies by rich nations and an end to 'reciprocity' in world trade negotiations.

³⁴The Hunger Project (THP) is a global, non-profit, strategic organisation committed to the sustainable end of world hunger. In Africa, South Asia and Latin America, THP seeks to end hunger and poverty by empowering people to lead lives of self-reliance, meet their own basic needs and build better futures for their children (http://www.thp.org/who_we_are).

landmarks in development aid evolve through three phases. Develtere and De Bruyn (2009:915) write that African states receive bilateral and direct aid in the form of loans, technical advice and material aid that contribute to setting up modern government bodies with efficient government departments, national banks, customs services and public utilities. Eisele (2007:5) and Beeson and Bisley (2013) confirm that the fundamental dimensions come with growth awareness, and these scholars depose that the emergency of multi-lateral development aid constitutes the era of the second pillar in development aid. This was the era during which development aid was channelled through the United Nations or other international institutions, such as the European Commission. Adding to Eisele's remarks, Simensen (2008) states that these forms of aid regimes were and still are dictatorial and authoritative in nature, focusing on the recipient countries' macro-economic and social policies.

Nelson (2007:17) writes that as a result of global accountability, the growth of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is associated with the fundamental pillar of development in Africa. NGOs would specialise in supporting initiatives that are closely linked to the principal of people-centred development through working with the local communities. Lewis (2007:12) writes that the question of what NGOs do can be summarised in terms of three main sets of activities that they undertake, and these can be defined as three roles: implementers, catalysts and partners. These authors agree with Bellamy (2014) who states that in this pillar, financing is enhanced in basic infrastructure such as schools, health services, farmers' associations and women's associations with the aim of sensitising populations in rich countries to these issues. For Mitlin *et al.* (2005:316), a justification for their fundamentality in development would be that:

NGOs exist as alternatives. In being 'not governmental' they constitute vehicles for people to participate in development and social change in ways that would not be possible through government programmes. In being 'not governmental' they constitute a 'space' in which it is possible to think about development and social change in ways that would not be likely through government programmes ... they constitute instruments for turning these alternative ideas, and alternative forms of participation, into alternative practices and hard outcomes.

Vieira (2012), in his World Bank briefing on the growing inequalities, affirms that it is noticeable that the fundamentals towards African support still dwell in all three pillars of aid, with the coming into play of a fourth pillar.

Table 1: The Four Pillars of Development

PILLAR	DESCRIPTION	PURPOSE
First Pillar	Governmental Donor	Occurred mostly after WWII where countries of the First World supported its fellow governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America by what was referred to as 'direct and bilateral aid'. Loans, technical advice and material aid contributed to setting up modern government bodies with efficient government departments, national banks, customs services and public utilities.
Second Pillar	Multilateral Development Aid	With the growing international cooperation between countries and the rise of the United Nations and multilateral bodies in the 1960s, the World Bank, the IMF and other international financing institutions, all donor countries channeled a part of their development aid through the United Nations or other international institutions, such as the Directorate-General for Development Cooperation of the European Commission.
Third Pillar	Rise of Non-Governmental Organisations	Following the global debt and economic crisis suffered at the hands of the World Bank and the IMF, multilateral corporations imposed conditionalities that were stringent to be met and forced a relook at structural transformation and alignment. The 1990s saw the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes, where governments were encouraged to develop national plans through which indirect, private or civil-lateral development aid

		would be channeled. These would act as technical advisors and priority catalysts for development needs in line with international concessions. They finance basic infrastructure such as wells, schools and health services or collaborate with movements such as farmers' associations, women's movements, unions and co-operatives. NGOs are additionally typified by the fact that they advocate greater solidarity with the Third World population, and aim to sensitise populations in rich countries to these issues
Fourth Pillar	Rise of Institutionalism and Private Initiatives	The rise of non-specialists like associations, groups and private entities based on their experiences in their own communities and economies in the North. These new actors are forging ties with their colleagues and communities in the South.

(Source: Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009:914-915)

It was mentioned in the *Evolution Report* of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration (2008) that the fourth pillar towards development aid assistance is characterised mostly by a mixture of modalities throughout the three pillars with alternative frameworks towards enhancing development aid. Wood *et al.* (2008), who authored the annexure to the Implementation Plan of the Paris Declaration, suggest that although circumstances in African countries are peculiar, redefining the strategies suggested that channelling aid through already existing institutions and bodies could see to the transformation of aided structures through experimental lessons and stock-taking of the institutions, such as ministries, companies and clubs basing themselves in the experiences of their own constituencies. This was a good governance process instigated under this pillar in which the anticipated outcome would have been improved coordination of aid for results. Radalet (2010) singles out these African countries showing outcome of this approach in the 17 emerging African countries that have undergone dramatic economic and political changes since 1995. He mentions Ghana, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Mali, Tanzania, DRC, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, among others, which contain a blend of Sub-Saharan

countries. Radalet also shows the outcome of this good governance process that Ghana's economy has grown by only 5% for over 15 years, despite the country being politically stronger than, for example, Mali, which despite being landlocked saw a GDP growth of 5.5% per year since the mid-1990s. As for the cluster composed of Ghana, Mozambique, Mali, Tanzania and Cape Verde, these countries are part of the growing and dynamic group of African countries that have broken away from the history of economic decline and political decay (Radalet, 2010:9-13).

In their analysis of Radalet's perceptions above, Develtere and De Bruyn (2009:916) insist that this fourth pillar consists of development aid initiatives that are not instigated by development aid specialists, but instead by government departments, private persons, companies and organisations that are confronted with certain needs in the Third World in order to take action in their own way. Although this is a different process, it still remains questionable how effective it would have been considering the fact that the same aid is given by institutions that have their own approach and biases towards their principles of giving aid and to whom aid should be directed. The approach only formed an upstream coordination mechanism without changing the basis of the problem in poor countries. What still remained unchanged in this pillar is that poor countries governments needed thus to improve their institutions to be able to manage the aid that comes with the ideological ties from the aid giving institutions or countries.

4.2.1 Institutionalisation of development aid, good governance and political transformation

Various African countries including Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria and Lesotho have drawn up visions and plans (Vision 2020, 2004; Pathway Out of Poverty, 1996; Public Sector Reform and Improvement Programme, 2003; Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2008; Interim National Development Framework, 2010; National Development Strategy Plan, 2012) that are focused on solutions for the challenges they are confronted with within their scope of development discourse. Busse *et al.* (2011:69) write that this incorporates objectives from the African Union Strategic Plan (2009-2012), fostering the deeper integration of African economies to create incentives for development aid innovation. This good governance process was

influence by International Financing Institutions like the World Bank and IMF arguing that for aid to be effective, national governments must have sound development plans and growth strategies which will serve as a basis for giving aid. However, according to the World Economic and Social Survey (2013:1), even though these strategies exist, and significant progress has been made in the new millennium in achieving global development goals, a mere continuation of current strategies will not suffice to meet all the MDGs and to achieve sustainable development after 2015. Even though national government developed these plans, they at best remained glorified as they did not receive fully fledged funding priorities, while the budgetary gaps were addressed by development aid, which acted as a pillar of support in taking these initiatives forward. It is demonstrated below that the cross-cutting funding matrix for the contextual Third World countries focuses development aid in specific sectors for both institutional support and systemic transformation, a solution that mainstreamed priorities and developed a set of targets to be met read with global development goals.

In July 2015, the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and the IMF signalled plans to extend more than \$400 billion in financing over the next three years and reconfirmed the need to work more closely with private and public sector partners to help mobilise the resources needed to meet the historic challenge of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These institutions, the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank Group (referred to as the MDBs) and the International Monetary Fund - announced their plans in the lead-up to the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in July 2015 (Hoyer, 2015).

Table 2: Common Areas of Financing by International Financing Institutes of Aid and Good Governance

Key related projects financed by development partners: sectors with development partner support in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

SECTOR	DEVELOPMENT PARTNER
Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Irish Aid; FAO; IFAD; Germany; Japan; USA
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AfDB; Ireland; Japan; UNICEF; World Bank
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AfDB; Japan
Governance (PFM, decentralisation, public service delivery, legal and justice reform, human rights)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AfDB; EC; Germany; IMF; Ireland; UNDP; World Bank
Health (incl. HIV/Aids)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> US; Global Fund; Ireland; Japan; WHO; UNAIDS; US; World Bank
ICT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AfDB
Private Sector Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EC; World Bank; IMF
Trade and Industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> World Bank; IMF
Transport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EC; BADEA; Kuwait Fund; World Bank
Water and Sanitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AfDB; BADEA; China; EC; Kuwait Fund; UNICEF; US; World Bank
Cross-cutting Sectors (including Gender and Environment)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EC; Germany; Japan; UNDP; UNFPA; World Bank
Programme-based Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EC; AfDB (2009)' WB

(Source: African Development Fund. Institutional Support for the Enhancement of Public Financial Management Project (ISEP), September 2013: Appendix 3)

In general, support from development partners has acted as a flight for development throughout all the phases of progress since the 1960s when the development agenda surfaced strongly. It is with such developments that the fourth pillar of development aid approach is in essence an intervention from aid modalities that were practiced throughout the first to the third pillar. Seemingly this time, the players are delving deeper into the roots and sources of development shortfall in which they provided support towards areas of political transformation including strengthening institutional capacity experiences in commonality to bureaucratic strategies, plans towards enhancing economic development, deepening democracy, as well as speeding up service delivery initiatives. Severino and Ray (2009:5) argue that

International development assistance is today tasked with three conceptually distinct subsets of objectives: first, accelerating the economic convergence of developing and industrialized countries; second, providing for basic human welfare (guided predominantly by the MDGs); and third, finding solutions for the provision and preservation of global public goods.

The rise of these non-specialist groups approaches good governance and political transformation from the angle of addressing lack of innovation and prescripts of socio-economic development, including infrastructure and communication modes which forms the basis for solutions proposed for aid effectiveness.

In this analysis, it has been charged that bilateral aid (aid transferred from one single state to another), as the first pillar of development aid has suggested, is especially capable of being structured to reap the gains for the benefactor state and not for humanitarian purposes (Ehrenfeld, 2009:128). This position has verified the rationale behind one of the approaches to pillars of aid as opening markets for the benefactor and not humanitarian intervention. Gutman (2013) agrees with Radelet (2006:4) and the OECD (2010a) that the standard strategies of aid would generally be shaped by these pillars of development to usher in systemic political transformation and institutionalise good governance through financial flows, technical assistance and commodities that are, (1) designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective, and (2) are provided as either grants or subsidised loans (OECD-DAC, 2010:16). These were the strings attached in this approach by the

leading development agencies, approaching the giving of aid from what they perceived as an effective strategy to meet global targets.

4.2.2 The rise of the new aid regime

The phase of development aid and the resultant effect, which is of importance in the current development era and the aid effectiveness, according to the discussion above (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009), is gauged at the hand of the three pillars and the birth of the fourth pillar, either in combination of any of the models or individually, depending on the aid modality of each donor. However, the discussion above has indicated that the last ten years has seen the growth of other institutions and organisations that are coming up with alternative models.

Sumner and Mallett (2011:33) provide a range of factors relating to the phenomenon in which aid is to be effective, such as levels of corruption and the composition of public expenditure (cf. Mosley *et al.*, 2004; Bhushan *et al.*, 2013; Kharas, *et al.*, 2013); the extent of social expenditures (cf. Verschoor & Kalwij, 2006; OECD, 2012a); the growth elasticity of poverty (cf. Heltberg, 2002; Ahmad, 2014); social capital and institutions (cf. Balamoune-Lutz & Mavrotas, 2009); the commitment to poverty reduction and orientation of the political class/elite (cf. Angeles & Neanidis, 2009; Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; Moreno-Badia & Presbitero, 2014); as well as the kinds of domestic policies adopted, notably macro-economic policy (cf. Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 2002). Although this finding has been criticised by Dalgaard *et al.* (2004; cf.; Easterly *et al.*, 2003), Hansen and Tarp (2000) assume that the spirit suggested in the aid commitments made in Paris in 2005 and in Accra in 2008 subsequently deposed that for aid to be effective good governance parameters that involvement and ownership of the local authorities to further their claim to development is analogous to aid effectiveness. In the words of Develtere & De Bruyn (2009:919):

The fourth pillar of development aid initiatives were not instigated by 'development aid specialists', but instead by government departments, private persons, companies or organizations that were confronted with certain needs in the Third World and wished to take action in their own way.

The African Development Bank's Strategy on Kenya 2014-2018 in principle shows that this pillar forms a justification as it acts to address the closing of gaps between the effectiveness of performance results, the financing gaps towards domestic needs, as well as the foreign exchange gaps. In these early years of the 21st century the scale of the challenges of international health, security, environmental degradation or poverty is such that making a difference in any of these fields implies bringing into motion a constellation of actors (Severino & Ray, 2010:5). These impinge positively on the stability of financing institutions in order to contribute towards enhancing social outcomes.

As many are grappling with the question of how aid can be done better via transparency and accountability (see Barder, 2009a), others are stepping back from the aid paradigm altogether and are beginning to explore possible alternatives to international development cooperation (Severino & Ray, 2009; 2010). Fischer (2010), for example, asks whether contemporary aid effectiveness debates have missed the point by focusing solely on the quality or quantity of aid rather than discussing wider structural issues. Ehrenfeld (2009:128) attempts to respond to Fischer in stating that the circumstances may have been influenced by the Nordic countries, where development and humanitarian aid have been prominent in the allocation of aid even though altruistic behaviour may be more towards the allocation of bilateral aid, political and strategic motivations, such as security goals, access to military bases and strategic natural resources. This is confirmed by Kanbur and Sumner (2011), who state that the four reasons for development assistance to Middle Income Countries (MICs) (pockets of poverty; spill-over effects; knowledge transfer; exploitative global relations/moral obligations) have shaped the intention of development aid along with deepening diplomatic cooperation and alignment to features of aid policy for the governments of states. Thus, influence of the current fourth pillar as substantiated above is motivated by the need to align and adapt organisations and institutions to the dynamics in a globalising society.

Wangwe (2007:8) suggests that development paradigms and ideologies have been associated with different ways of conceptualising the impact of aid on development. Bamikole (2012), writing on development in African societies, deposes that the need for ideology as catalyst for the social and political development of African societies

has been central to the efforts of colonised African people to attain nationhood, where leaders in these countries cannot achieve this goal if they still lean heavily on the ideology of their colonial masters. Thomas (2013:2) writes that past development paradigms were the result of demands by one sector model of growth in which foreign aid was seen as a source of capital. In effect, this position was to trigger higher growth through higher levels of investment, where four major trends were significant. Thomas (2013) offers a discourse of good governance process trends analysis in which he submits that the first trend was the change accelerated for poor and marginalised people; second, the development professionals who are increasingly isolated from poor people; third, tensions that have become more intense between the Newtonian paradigm of things, design, planning and predictability; and the fourth trend, the quiet revolution of proliferating participatory methods (PM). By and large, development aid became fillers towards investment and the foreign exchange gap. This is demonstrated even in the basic and fundamental ideology of Nigeria's Vision 2020, indicating that African leaders' development paradigm is about the quest to join the league of 20 industrialised nations by 2020. The thematic areas of the Nigerian Vision include agriculture, foreign policy, minerals and metals, health, education, water and sanitation, culture and tourism, business environment and employment in such a way that it could be established along the line of development as dialectical transformation, where policies emanating from these institutions are directed at furthering the goals of African people (Akintona, 2007).

As far back as the 1970s, the development of the idea of transformation and sustainable development grew stronger and was defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 (Brundtland Commission 1987). However, over the past 10 years concerns about employment, basic needs and income distribution shifted the focus of aid towards enhanced social outcomes around the standard of living of the poor, largely through increased employment along with foreign exchange and the investment gap (World Bank, 2005b). Adjibodou (2007:17) writes that the most effective development programmes embrace a social change agenda that focuses on equity in the decision-making process, as well as equitable outcomes (by-products) of the process. Accordingly, community-driven development theories and practices are potential antidotes to uneven and inequitable

development, offering a critical analysis, process skills, varying development strategies and development outcomes for the most excluded populations. For instance, the outcome was that in Ghana, over 50 years of development aid, strategies and efforts have apparently not succeeded in improving the standard of living of the majority of the population. This shows that development aid was not seen to be a pillar to strengthen governance but served more as poverty alleviation methods. Attempts over the last three decades by the government, the IMF and the World Bank to implement programmes, policies and strategies designed to halt the declining trends of poor living standards of the people and create a conducive atmosphere for sustained economic growth and prosperity, achieved minimal success (Bonye *et al.*, 2013:80).

The OECD Strategy on Development (2013) recognises that the changing landscape of global development requires a new and more holistic approach. By integrating the diverse perspectives of developing countries and leveraging the wide range of expertise across the OECD, in fiscal matters, investment, trade, governance and education, integrating poverty concerns of development aid towards comprehensive models of development brought a multidimensional perspective to development. Rwandan President Paul Kagame indicated in the foreword of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2013-2018 of the Republic of Rwanda that Rwandans have benefitted from rapid economic growth, reduced poverty, more equality and increased access to services including health and education, which was made possible only through the hard work and dedication of millions of Rwandans supported by friends of Rwanda. This was whereby aid modalities were becoming of concern albeit alignment of development plans towards strategies. The strategies were addressing already existing institutions that dealt with poverty reduction and service delivery. The thematic sectors on which development aid work focus on the recipient country's need to own up to development efforts and demands, as well as the quality of good governance deduced to impact on aid. This means concern towards development of goals that could improve livelihoods and circumvent poverty (Eliminating World Poverty, 2006:1). It is Booth's (2011:7) hypothesis that aid could be a positive factor in the emergence of the kinds of leadership arrangements that poor countries need.

4.3 Governance, political transformation and moral discourse

Burnside and Dollar (2004:18-20) conclude that the impact of aid on growth is positive in countries with a good political environment and sound institutions for policy-making. Juselius *et al.* (2011) reviewed the long-term impact of aid on 36 Sub-Saharan countries from 1960 to 2007. Their results provided broad support for a positive long-run impact of ODA flows on the macro economy. These authors found a positive effect of ODA on investment in 33 of the 36 countries, but hardly any evidence supporting the view that aid had been harmful. In 2012, Policy Makers in the Green Growth for Developing Countries substantiated the above submission that development aid results are positive in the light of Green Growth, a matter of both economic policy and sustainable development policy. Supporting the above, the OECD confirmed that it tackled two key imperatives together, the continued inclusive economic growth needed by developing countries and the reduction of poverty and the improvement of well-being (OECD, 2012c:6). The IMF provided variables such as growth on incomes that indicated a significant and positive coefficient of the aid policy interaction on growth regression (Pattillo *et al.*, 2007:4). Examples include Brazil, where the new participatory governance councils have been significant in improving access to and quality of health care services provided; Kenya in which social audits tools established a feedback loop between fund managers and ordinary citizens and communities who demanded and obtained proper use of money and services; and Cambodia where social accountability programmes under the Demand for Good Governance Project were effective.

According to Bhargava (2012:7-11), this bore the repetition of improvement of good governance in terms of the assigned measurements³⁵ in which resources or aid should mostly be allocated to. Mbaku's point of view is that the question of development aid in Africa and the challenge of aid effectiveness do not solely rest on general economic growth, humanitarian purpose and improved standards of living, but certainly good governance has since been the cornerstone towards allocating aid and achieving effective outcomes (Mbaku, 2000).

³⁵John Shea (1997) discusses how measurement of the relevancy of instruments used to estimate the coefficients of a linear multiple regression model is used. He makes an estimation of multiple regression models as a method for computing the measure using only standard results from ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares estimation. The method is illustrated using an empirical example.

Santiso (2001:2) and Bellamy (2014:93) suggest that the promotion of democratic institutions, good governance and the rule of law have progressively become both an objective and a condition for assistance towards developing countries as one of the priority areas for foreign aid. This leads to the assumption that good governance as a condition for aid is a moral obligatory standard against which direct and bilateral aid, in the form of loans, technical advice and material aid contribute to setting up modern government bodies with effective government departments, national banks, customs services and public utilities³⁶. Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia became a set of countries with credible milestones towards qualifying for aid with examples of recruitment of essential health workers and teachers as a good governance initiative (Lawson, 2008:17; Burnley, 2010). The African Development Bank Group in 2013 exemplified the issue of pillars of development aid and credibility with Somalia. They stated that, to consolidate the progress Somalia has made to date, the Bank, as a strategic and trusted partner, needs to play a significant role in supporting, amongst other things, the proposed PFM reforms (ADB, 2013). As justification, the ADB states that these reforms will help build the necessary track record for arrears clearance and debt relief, and will also prepare the ground for donors to use country systems in accordance with the Somali Compact (ADB, 2013:10). As an example, former American President Bill Clinton called the promotion of democracy and human rights (both fundamental aspects for good governance) the third pillars of these foreign policies. In his words (quoted in Ehrenfeld, 2009:129),

if we work together to strengthen democracy and respect for human rights, we can help this continent reach its full potential in the 21st century - its true greatness, which has too long been denied³⁷. Foreign aid programmes such as the support for the Eastern

³⁶This was statements and sentiments passed at the Seventh Meeting of the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination (IGAC) held at the Queen Sirikit Convention Centre in Bangkok, Thailand from 21-22 April 2005, in conjunction with the Eleventh UN Congress for Crime and Prevention and Criminal Justice. The meeting was jointly organised by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Office for Internal Oversight Services and the Asian Development Bank. Originally, the interagency coordination initiative on anti-corruption was launched by Louise Fréchet, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, who convened two meetings in New York in late 2001 calling for enhanced collaboration and coordination of anti-corruption efforts within the United Nations.

³⁷See, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Kampala, Uganda, "Remarks by the President at Entebbe Summit for Peace and Prosperity", Imperial Botanical Beach Hotel, Entebbe, Uganda, March 25, 1998., 1-2.. This was cited by Korwa Adar, 1998:39. *The Wilsonian Conception of Democracy and Human Rights: A Retrospective and Prospective*

European Democracy Act of 1989 and the African Conflict Resolution Act 1994 were especially geared towards promoting democracy and good governance.

Adding to Ehrenfeld, the OECD (2011:4) suggests the following:

Another aspect of political motivation for aid donations has been the provision of assistance for democratic political reform, institutional building and better governance. There are self-reflecting causes for the disbursement of foreign aid and conditionalities including the 'Pacific Thesis' which argues for the impossibility of the existence of warring democracies, where a world populated by democracy would enhance the potential for natural securities.

It enshrines that most of the aid is channelled through the existing ministries, and adds that the 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) call for broadening ownership of national development processes to include state institutions as well as other key national stakeholders. The UNDP (2011:4) proposed that good governance approached that will yield perennial outcomes would seemingly be in providing development aid with national institutions in capacity-building and transformation processes, where interventions in those areas have contributed to improved capacity in various institutions, while enhancing interactions and relationships between institutions and the constituents they serve. Accordingly, the strategic intervention for institutionalising development aid contributes to strengthening and capacity-building, especially for enhancing good governance and deepening democracy. This is exemplified by the structural transformation in Rwanda where there was a fundamental redefinition of the development aid approach and resultant redistribution of wealth through tax and wage structures for community development are consistent outcomes that addresses the improvements to be made in the post 2015 development discourse (Ryan, 2013:125).

From this analysis, attention should be drawn to the fact that political or civil rights play a significant role in determining bilateral aid without influencing the allocation of humanitarian aid (human rights) in the allocation of multilateral aid.

4.3.1. Meeting the prescripts of development aid

Goulet (1992:474) writes that foreign aid has the potential to generate needs to encompass more than simply an increase in annual GDPs. The National Pro Bono

Resource Centre (2011:4) adds that aid is a moral discourse looking towards the creation of the equitable distribution of wealth and increased well-being (health, education, employment), the liberal perspective, while Ehrenfeld (2009:131) states that the respect for human rights and political freedoms, the reduction of cultural identity and the over-elusive life purposes and meaning also form a cornerstone as to why development aid is a factor, which rests on government potential to instigate political transformation. Governments have in this approach been put at the centre as recipients of aid and need to transform their conventional way of doing things to adopt the contemporary think for aid to be effective.

Amuwo (2012) picks The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as yet another initiative which locates aid at the hands of the administration of government for good governance purposes and states that Africa's heads of state and governments such as Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt need to have a platform on which their collective strengths can be used for the collective interest of all member states intended to reverse, for good, the image of the continent as a beggar through a "sustained engagement" with the developed world. NEPAD in this assumption is envisaged to have ushered in political transformation, which becomes a resultant effect of good governance, an initiative of foreign aid to deepen democratic states which are galvanised by principles of good political governance. Warmerdam and De Haan (2011:9) are of the opinion that above all the principles espoused under giving foreign aid with political transformation aid will assume acceptable levels of effectiveness. Tingely (2010), on the other hand, says that conservative governments commit more to trade and geopolitics than development assistance, which is especially the case with aid allocations to poorer countries and multilateral organisations where the people are supreme to the government and have a controlling influence on the decisions and affairs of the state. Although there are also relatively high levels of support for foreign aid, the government should then led the institutions of transformation that are responsive, provide measures and mechanisms that ensure that the people are treated with equal respect and of equal worth in the exercise of their controlling influence (Johansson 2011). Szent- Iványi and Lightfoot (2015:159) refer to the high volume of European Aid going to Sub-Saharan Africa and particularly Kenya, Afghanistan and Ethiopia, which demonstrate visible priorities for the development agenda.

One of the political conditionalities imposed on African governments by the International Funding Institutions (IFIs) and the donor community is good governance (Shivji 2003). This thought is also a process of the outcome of the Evaluations of the MDGs in 2015 and proposal of how to make the Post 2015 development agenda more effective. Shivji (*ibid.*) further states that “the struggle for democracy is primarily a political struggle on the form of governance”, suggesting that a balance between good governance and political transformation must be struck to improve the contemporary problems identified in development discourse post 2015. Such governments include Swaziland (power-embroiled conflict area), Zimbabwe (protracted political conflict), Democratic Republic of Congo (post-conflict wars) and high levels of violence in Angola (Gebrewold, 2013:56). The liberal discourse and the new institutionalists contemporary approach laid foundations of development agenda on democracy and good governance including respect for the rule of law, collective fundamental human rights and freedoms, equality before the law and equality of opportunity for all, and the provision of a democratically accountable government (Mangu, 2007:36). Saldanha (2005:7) adds that administrative issues of political governance are about managing the state, establishing transparency and accountability to the people, and practicing a sense of nationhood. Afegbua and Adejuwon (2012:149) apply Saldanha’s thoughts to the African perspective, deposing that the problem that troubles Africans most is the failure of political leadership. Adeola (2007) demonstrates the outcomes of the dimensions of governance and transformation from the Nigerian perspective of political development in which the nature of the Nigerian state involved a predatory political class that was concerned with power struggles, consolidation, alignment and realignment in the context of hegemonic control. This was linked to the lack of ideology in the political space, monetisation of the political process, expansion of the basis of political participation, and the canvassing of alternative policy agendas.

The outcome of this approach in the development and practice of aid as espoused by Shivji (2007:2) is the policies and political conditions, as well as multi-party governance commissions, which must be put in place for the state to qualify to receive aid. As Abrahamsen (2004:1455) puts it:

The recipients of this part 'reform' their government structures, with aid and technical assistance from the same 'donor community', to satisfy their, what these days are called 'partners'.

Carothers and De Gramont (2011:5) support the view of Abrahamsen, stating that many of the aid organisations that are deeply involved in governance work believe that the attention to governance constitutes a major and long overdue paradigm shift in development aid and reform of governance structures. Thus, the scope of good political governance within recipient countries must be seen to cover administrative action through the institutional structures of governance, primarily with the function overseeing the conclusive, predictable, and stable administration of public affairs.

The overview of the White Paper on Irish Aid (2006:5) signifies good governance as a priority issue that informs all aspects of development assistance; hence, without good governance aid effectiveness is not possible. It defines governance as

The political and institutional capacities of a country to elect accountable government, create and uphold laws, promote and protect people's rights, meet people needs effectively and fairly as well as manage the resources of the state (Irish Aid, 2006:5).

This definition clarifies that the mandate of aid in order to see to its effectiveness should focus, from the start, on building institutions that could promote good governance so that they inform the goals under which aid is given. Believing in the rightful course of action to institutionalise good governance as a function of development to meet the global agenda, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, provides evidence that with the introduction of EU's Aid to Somalia, Somalia that was without a functioning state for 22 years saw its new government urgently needing more of EU assistance to help it build strong state institutions (EU Parliamentary News, 2013):

The concept of good governance as a prescription for development is not a new one. It first surfaced in 1989 in a World Bank report and the main thrust behind its introduction in the Bank's corporate policies resides in the continuing lack of effectiveness of aid, the feeble commitment to reform of recipient governments (Cassell-Sealy, 2003:4).

In September 2015, the Coordinator for Economic and Social Development at the Food and Agriculture Organisation, Jomo Kwame Sundaram, said the outcomes of

adoption of good governance frameworks have become a convenient way to explain away the failure of the development economics orthodoxy of the last two decades of the 20th century (Inter Press Agency, 2015). It is apparent that the Third World's state of poverty can be a hindrance to good governance, but also the lack of effective institutions of governance and political transformation may see the negative outcomes of development where aid is not managed and used effectively to meet national and global targets. However, Third World countries have used internal instruments including constitutional laws and legislation as a tool towards the promotion of good governance. These countries perhaps have opted for the definition provided by the UNDP in its Human Rights Reference Book (1997:97), which describes good governance as the "transparent and responsible assertion of authority and use of resources by government". The Presidential Elections Act 16 of 2005 of Uganda gave theorem to the good governance principle under governance and the administration of accountable elections and the financing of presidential elections as good governance outcomes (Dundas, 2014:439). Here, the focus of the government was on development of policy frameworks, structures and systems in order to give effect to the values and principles enshrined in giving development aid. As a result, as seen in Tanzania, the values of the constitution shifted mainly towards providing impetus for enhancing service delivery as a form of attraction to development aid assistance (Van de Waldt, 2007:239). Constitutional reform in Tanzania in 2011 was seen not as a choice, but a change that came with development aid. Nchalla, a legal scholar, termed it a "knock on the door" to allow development aid to thrive (Nchalla 2013, in Mbondenyi & Ojienda, 2013:43). Within the issue of service delivery was the need to strengthen the internal capacity of governments to deliver the goals identified to enhance service delivery. The same goals, because of capacity constraints, attract foreign development aid. Reddy (2001:22) states that the political and management component has a pivotal role to play in terms of facilitating policy developments and implementation with a defined framework in the context of service delivery. The era of development aid thus could be seen to usher in political transformation and good governance.

In conclusion it can be said that the quest for dedicating aid to the promotion of good governance and the moral obligations and improved public service delivery is vital for meeting MDGs and providing a better planning to achieve the Sustainable

Development Goals by 2030 using indicators and targets of global development. Chong & Gradstein (2008), in their analysis of the factors that influence popular support for foreign aid based on World Values Surveys, found that satisfaction with own government performance and individual incomes had a positive influence on the support for foreign aid. In addition, richer and more egalitarian governments provide higher levels of aid, while inefficient governments provide lower levels. The outcome is that in practice aid has induced availability of funding acting as a catalyst for speeding public spending and moral obligation for the nation's state security, education, health, employment, etc. In effect, out of the eight MDGs, two are related to education, three to health and one to infrastructure, while for the SDGs the three goals are cross cutting indicators under each goal.

4.4 Aid and the idea of the nation-state

Development partners at a high-level plenary meeting on the MDGs (2010) emphasised and affirmed that good governance and the rule of law at national and international level are essential to sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth. In essence, it means that improving the quality of the public's lives and access to resources and opportunities are planned outcomes of development aid, the sustainable development agenda and they depend on the decision that the society makes (and who makes those decisions) about the allocation and distribution of scarce resources.

This position invites an entirely new school of thought on political change and the development notion of political transformation, laid in the foundations of Sustainable Development Goals. Adebayo (2003:15) confirms that understanding the transformations currently taking place under the rubric of partnership demands a novel analysis of power relations. Speaking of the third wave of partnerships in global democratisation, Huntington (2012) agrees that most assessments of partnerships have tended to analyse power as the capacity of certain actors to control (more or less) directly the actions of others. Kotze (1988:11) says that development policies should be responsible to the environment and should be clear to its end results. With the sustainable development agenda as the post-millennium goals' global commitment, Bernstein (2012:47) reiterates that promotion and maintenance of a liberal economic order is shifting emphasis to the environment on

which development policies are to apply to. More than two decades ago, Barsh (1991:339) wrote that the whole issue of aid effectiveness was an instrument to steer states on the right development path in which all the states share responsibility for creating conditions, through internal cooperation and development policies, for the full realisation of human rights development. Herrero (2015), commenting on EU development assistance, agrees with Barsh that it informs political economy analysis which helps decision-making.

However, the development efforts intended to affect the transformation of systems and deepen good governance, as mentioned almost two decades ago by Duvenhage (1998:20), espouse that they need to address transformation caused by the urge to embrace rapidly changing environmental circumstances and increasing the influence of foreign aid on the nation state (UNDP, 2008:49-50). The radical changes occurring as a result of the flight of development aid increasingly transforms the nation-state role more towards social security and service delivery outcomes, unlike in the past. Coming with a solution in the current thinking, it is deposed that states, due to the threat of the demise of the nation–state, will be better equipped while working with others to deal with the changing environment (Duvenhage, 1998:1-2). The outcome of the protectionist nature against the demise of the nation-state in Africa is attributed to prior mismanagement and organisation, unequal distribution of wealth and political power, corruption and misappropriation of funds, misallocation and misdirection of resources and efforts that added to the development dilemma. Noor (2009:40) adds that this decay renders the orderly rule of society near to impossible. If the orderly rule in a state is extinct, the problem of governance ultimately becomes a problem of politics. Marred interaction between the state and society ultimately leads to a low level of governance in the state. According to Fukuyama (2014), this is precisely what has been happening in the United States in recent decades, as many of its political institutions have become increasingly dysfunctional. A combination of intellectual rigidity and the power of entrenched political actors is preventing those institutions from being reformed. And there is no guarantee that the situation will change much without a major shock to the political order as we see today the American voting in 2016 Elections, the Republicans in power. American elections posed questions and predictions on what would come next looking at instability of majorities in democracies. This poses a question on the need to understand how

power shifts impact global governance, but it is also important for reacting and directing what comes next.

This conviction has invited the scholarship of aid to support the state initiative. Hout (2004:597) states that political transformation was influenced by the demands of the principles of development assistance and foreign aid, which was a move towards greater and more substantive development. Centred on good governance, Cadry (2009:23) says that the quality of institutions with an emphasis on good policies was thus the recurring primary role of the state to attain good governance as IFIs pushed for policy transformation:

The degree to which certain international organizations influence global economic stability (and to some extent, the foreign relations of various states) in the twenty-first century is unprecedented. The amplified roles of multilateral economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have allowed these institutions to extend their policies beyond the traditional tools for attaining economic sustainability in developing countries. In addition to its highly-controversial structural adjustment policies, for example, the IMF has adopted a tougher stance against political malfeasance, asserting that greater fiscal transparency and accountability of government finances is crucial to maintaining market confidence. Thus, the Fund has incorporated good-governance standards into its conditionality requirements for monetary assistance.

The outcome of this statement shows that unless dramatic improvement is made towards good governance, political transformation will not be achieved. The Strategic Framework for IFAD 2002-2006 (2013:3) indicated in addition that in the Monterrey Consensus adopted at the conference, developing countries agreed that the solution is to seek to mobilise greater domestic resources for development and to strengthen governance and their policy frameworks. Statements in this nature were made by representatives of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mozambique, Slovakia, Cameroon, Venezuela, Mongolia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Toga as developing nations. This asserted support towards the promotion of democratic institutions, good governance and the rule of law as one dimension of the political purpose towards desired political change and reform.

Owing credit to the political ideas of veteran scholar Max Webber, McCandless and Karbo (2011:86-91) show that the development of political transformation is a

solution for the nation-state in order to preserve territorial value through beefing up internal and external institutions of governance the outcomes of which are pursuance of sovereignty; independent on the outside and forceful on the inside. They mention Webber's famous definition of the nation-state as...

an organization composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state leadership (executive authority) that has the authority to make and implement rules for all the people on the parameters of rule-making for others socially organized in a given territory using force, if necessary to have its way (Webber, 1964:156).

The USAID in the Morocco Development Cooperation 2013-2017 (2013) has supported the role of the nation-state in seeking assistance through development aid intended to strengthen the institutions of governance to usher in a politically transformed nation with the ability to maintain its institutions. In essence, invoking the political role of the nation-state in the transformation era of development aid would be concerned with the capacity to mobilise and organise support within society (in whatever way the term defines) and for the consolidation of the political power base (mostly institutional) that allows the taking of binding decisions, the allocation of values with regard to society or a section of the society or institutional power bases to enforce their decision/ values on society or sections thereof (Coetzee, 2008:22).

Faust (2010:516) says the reform agenda sketched out by some well-identified political indicators of intended aid effectiveness in an effort to enhance the impact of development aid to provide democratically sustained ownership for development policies, align the interventions with ownership strategies.

4.5 Enhancing development goals: The era of the MDGs

Note should be taken that this thesis was written partly during the review of the progress made by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) from 2010-2015. During this era, the development partners and respective recipient countries had already embarked upon discussions of the proposed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that were adopted in September 2015 to replace the MDGs. The United Nations' Sustainable Development Summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda, now commonly referred to as "Agenda 2030," was held from

25 to 27 September 2015 in New York. Heads of state and governments that endorsed Agenda 2030 made statements that focused on the lessons learnt from the MDGs and reiterated that the most important success factor for the elimination of poverty, the reduction of inequalities, and the protection of the environment is global implementation of Agenda 2030.

Pope Francis of the Roman Catholic Church, in his address to the UN's General Assembly on the first day of the UN Sustainable Development Summit, noted that while progress was made in the areas of education and poverty, more remains to be done to ensure that the benefits of development are experienced by all, that the environment is protected and there is "appropriate protection for the family." He also referred to life as "sacred and inviolable from conception to natural death" (*The Guardian*, 2015).

MDGs and the accompanying 18 targets and indicator frameworks were based on historical trends. Vandermoortele (2007:1) observes that the mission of research carried at the International Poverty Centre (IPV) in 2005 states the following:

The (MDGs) were set on the premise that progress observed at the global level over the previous 25 years would continue for the next 25 years, the period from 1990-2015 ... the MDGs are essentially an extrapolation of global trends of the 1970s and 1980s and projected forward till 2015.

MDGs are means to an end with effects focused on the formulation of local development plans with the aim of achieving long-term goals, of which this is a fundamental pillar for least developed countries. Sustainable Development Goals offers a solution joint international, regional and national cooperation for inclusivity in development assistance for far reaching development outcomes by 2030.

The 2007 Millennium Development Goals Report of the United Nations has documented some noteworthy progress towards achieving the MDGs. At global level, life expectancy, literacy, infant survival and caloric intake continue to increase. Democratisation, good governance, improved macroeconomic management, trade liberalisation and an improved investment climate are driving growth (The United States Commitment to Millennium Development Goals, 2008:1).

The MDGs paved the way towards instilling a catalyst strategy of impacting on social livelihoods. The OECD in 2001 mentioned that development aid as a result was seen as a way through which informed social outcomes can be met in mainstreaming the process towards development. It stated that the OECD shall promote policies “to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy” (OECD, 2001:2). Focus on the goals presented a foundational pillar through which development efforts could be concentrated. The UN Strategy for meeting the MDGs (2010:9) noted that:

If we are to meet the MDGs by 2015, we must make full use of innovation, which can be powerful force multiplier. By ‘innovation’ we mean three things:

- ✓ The development and application of new technologies, approaches, and methods to address human development needs;
- ✓ The development of new ways to deliver existing solutions to more people, more cheaply, and more quickly;
- ✓ The introduction of new business models to make aid agencies and the international development architecture more effective

This is proclaimed to generate benefits in supportive environments. Nation–states have raised their “eyebrows” since the Monterrey Consensus in 2002 and Paris 2005 concerned with improving the effectiveness of aid. These were generally about mobilising and increasing the effective use of financial resources and achieving the national and international economic conditions needed to include the MDGs (UN, 2007:11-12). More so, commitments of nation-states to deliver “more” and “better” aid, sustainable debt relief and coherent funding of policies in the name of support to development and consistency towards meeting the MDGs were secured.

Commitments were made in fora like The FAO Corporate Document Repository (2013) that African governments are to implement concessions and national development plans that were aimed at reducing poverty and enhancing MDGs thus strengthening the growth component. Kharas and Rogerson (2012) put it on record that what seemed apparent was that secondary sourcing and funding was a

necessary tier for development aid to help accelerate growth for domestic sources and support for effective national development plans. They state

This is why donors agreed to focus efforts on Africa when they pledged to increase aid volumes at Gleneagles in 2005, and they have had some success. But given the challenges of poverty in Africa it is disappointing that the continent receives only about one third of total net ODA, and that total aid to Africa divided by the total number of poor people has only just returned to the level it reached in 1990 (Kharas & Rogerson, 2012:9).

The outcomes in Malawi were that the portion of aid at country or regional level now sits at 25.98% of national income, with Liberia at 27.13% and the least at 10.94% (Mali) and 11.45% (Lesotho) respectively (Park, 2011). This implies that the locus of global poverty will remain in fragile, mainly low-income African states (Malawi, Gambia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Lesotho, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Somalia and Zimbabwe), contrary to current policy preoccupations with the transitory phenomenon of poverty concentration in middle-income countries. Moreover, a smaller share of industrialised country income than ever before will potentially close the remaining global poverty gap, although direct income transfers are not yet feasible in many fragile country contexts (Agbaje, 2013).

The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation³⁸ opened a new chapter to address falling levels of aid and widespread weaknesses in the aid system. This was an era in which new policy documents in the context of national development strategies were initiating efforts to break the donor-driven agenda and its fragmentation of aid (Hayman, 2012:1). Recipient or partner countries relied more on strategies of existing institutions and procedures, their needs and priorities were at the centre of achieving global goals. A statement by the Executive Secretary of the Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI), Neil Cole, says African governments are seeing the process of building strong institutions as a key priority through adoption of sound public finance systems, budget processes that serve the

³⁸*The 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness took place in a very different world to the first major international meeting held in 2002 to attempt to address the poor performance of aid. In contrast to its predecessors, the Partnership was negotiated with strong input from developing countries, from new donors, and from civil society. It represents a break from an agenda dictated by a few large OECD donors. However, the price of inclusion is a document that offers few firm commitments and that proposes a vision of development which will disappoint many civil society activists and which spells the end of aid effectiveness as we know it (4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011).*

welfare goals and accounting systems that have integrity and respect for institutions in the development of democracy. These solid institutions are the foundation upon which nations can develop and prosper. Cole stated that such countries included Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. An additional 35 countries from various regions were covered with funding from the World Bank, including two North African countries, Morocco and Tunisia, whose results were included in his analysis (CABRI, 2008).

In the same light, The UN Millennium Project (2005) recommended that the known intervention in development aid must be interpreted in the context of MDG-based poverty reduction strategy; one that relies on the scale of investment needed to achieve goals. This was a message to heads of state who signed up to the commitments, reminding them that leaders must establish a way within the internal and external system to scale up for MDGs as national priorities. For the SDGs, the development aid interventions propose a solution to meet sustainable futures in 17 priority goals given similar attention across the international, regional and national bodies, applied according to the particular environmental context. That means the goals are not static but are flexed according to the conditions and progress of development.

The message to the governments was to identify synergies and linkages so that multiple interventions with the same governments could be coordinated. More so, the perspective of MDG-based planning requires taking into account the trade-offs between scaling up to services as rapidly as possible and building the system that requires meeting all goals, which concentrated its efforts on the outcomes. Similarly, the SDGs have delineated good prospects for achieving development outcomes but most of the 169 targets are superficial at developing country contexts and thus require localisation and domestication in order for development aid to be effective.

4.6 Conclusion

Based on the above, one can arrive at the conclusion that development partners view development aid as a vehicle for achieving political transformation and good

governance. Donor aid partners proposes shifting priority from tied aid on conditionalities³⁹ to an inclusivity model based on the assumptions of the Paris Declaration, AAA, MDGs and the new thinking now espoused in the SDGs. Heintz (2010:200) agrees with Hout (2004:3-4) that an analysis of the development agenda donors have been operating over the past decade, particularly the agenda's focus on good governance, demonstrates that it was a particular change in the discourse on development assistance towards selectivity and its implementation in the policies of international donors.

The donors have thus opened room for clear pillars, ideology and political elements toward the prerequisites of reforms, transformation and good governance. From the above submission, the argument is put forward that changes in the idea about development-enhancing pillars and variables have brought about transformation in development assistance. The change of policies and reforms is deemed to be the solution for donors and partner countries to enhance mutual accountability and cooperation on the effectiveness of development assistance.

As noted in the strategic definitions of the pillars of development aid, O'Neill (2006) writes that donor partners are instrumental in arguing that aid will be more effective and make a difference in terms of development only in situations where good policies and governance prevail. Good policies were understood primarily in terms of those policies that address development challenges and that were particularly geared towards achieving the MDGs by 2015. Several aid donors (EU, IA, GTZ, DfID, SIDA) adopted alignment strategies to achieve MDGs priority goals and today have aligned with the SDG harmonisation processes. In line with the Paris Declaration Alignment Principles, for Africa as a continent the adoption of Accra Agenda meant that nations had to align their strategies along with the development priorities to qualify as development aid needing recipients. Nowels (2003) says the Bush Administration has been influenced by a number of factors, including the Millennium Development

³⁹International research has shown that the tying of aid is costlier and less effective than untied aid. The tying of aid is a practice which privileges donors and national priorities in the aid programme. Aid is tied in three ways: nationally-tied – aid money is provided on the condition that the receiving country buys goods and services from the donor country; project or programme-tied – aid which must be spent on specific projects or sectoral programmes determined by donors; or performance or condition-tied – aid tied to particular performance outcomes or conditions (Clay, Riley & Urey, 2005).

Account, and good governance features as a prerequisite for developing countries pre-qualification.

This discussion has introduced a new fundamental dimension of the policy agenda of major aid donors and it is clear that there are certain ambiguities in contemporary development policies aimed at good governance. It has also redirected attention to fundamental dimensions that obstruct the effective contribution of development aid assistance. Martin (2012) suggests that what is clear is (i) the lack of clarity in the development policies, resulting in lack of alignment and harmonisation, (ii) the absence of strategies to improve governance in developing countries, and (iii) the lack of attention for the structurally disadvantaged position of developing countries, which also manifest in the domain of governance.

From the discussion above, one could conclude that donor assistance sees good governance as instrumental to economic growth and thus, aid effectiveness. Lundsgaarde *et al.* (2010:734) add that international trade and foreign aid are the two main instruments for generating and reallocating wealth in the world economy and represent important ways through which industrialised countries can contribute to the development of poorer nations. Figaj (2010) states that an assessment to establish whether the allocation of aid to developing countries is determined by at least as much the political and strategic motives of the donor countries, as opposed to the needs and performance of partner countries, needs to be done. The following chapters will also deal with the measurement frameworks to assess the effectiveness of development aid as proposed. Finally, the question of policy coherence of industrialised countries in the wider sense needs to be explored to determine whether development assistance is provided to developing countries against the background of the persistent protection of the markets of industrialised countries.

In the next chapter, the route to political transformation and good governance will be discussed, with specific reference to the experiences of sub-Saharan countries, and in particular drawing thoughts from Lesotho over the past two decades. The main emphasis will be on exploring the empirical evidence to determine whether development partners and agencies are assessing if good governance should be seen as an instrument (to economic growth or to greater effectiveness of development assistance), or as an end in itself.

CHAPTER 5

LESOTHO IN CONTEXT: GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION

5.1 Introduction

The Kingdom of Lesotho is a mountainous country completely surrounded and landlocked within the Republic of South Africa. Located in the Southern Hemisphere, the country's land area measures 30,355 km² (ADB, 2006). According to the World Bank Report, Lesotho is one of the world's least developed countries with a per capita income of US\$1879 (World Bank, 2012a). According to the *Encyclopaedia of the Peoples of Africa and Middle East* (2014), Lesotho culture's is homogenous and the country professes to be Christian-oriented. Lesotho endured British protection from 1868, and later its administration was appropriated into the Cape Colony. The Kingdom of Lesotho, or Basutoland, was founded by Paramount Chief Moshoeshe I (1786-1870). Scholars such as Shaperd (2015) and Lelimo (1998) write that for about a 100 years, British rule still prevailed in Basutoland. In October 1966, Lesotho attained political independence and was known as the Kingdom of Lesotho (Lelimo, 1998).

The Lesotho Constitutional Act of 1996 provides for a clear separation of powers in the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of government. Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy, making the King the head of state and the elected Prime Minister the head of government. The country administers under the Prime Minister a dual legal system consisting of customary law and common law (Gill, 1993:258; Pholo, 2013:3-7). The Constitution of Lesotho (1993) provides for the executive authority to rest in the hands of the King who has been authorised by law to exercise his powers through officers and authorities of the state. The Connecting Health Research in Africa and Ireland Consortium (ChRAIC) (2010:10) states that the legislative branch in Lesotho is composed of two chambers with the lower house, the Parliament, composed of 120 seats and the upper house consisting of 33 Senators, 22 of which are principal chiefs and 11 other senators appointed by the King on the advice of the incumbent Prime Minister. KOL (2000) writes that Lesotho practices a system of *trias politica*, a separation of powers in the third tier of government, the judiciary, which is headed by the Chief Justice. The judiciary is composed of the

Court of Appeal, headed by the President of the Appeal Court, with other courts forming the legal system, being the High Court, the Magistrate Courts, Commercial Court, Labour Court, Judicial Commissioner's Courts and the local courts (Mafisa, 2010).

Since the 2002 elections that ushered in the Mixed Member Proportional System of Parliamentary Representation, Lesotho has been institutionalising democratic systems within a fragile political context, which was time and again tested on political stability and tolerance. According to Lijphart (2013), Lesotho achieved political stability through the adoption of an inclusive electoral system, the Mixed Member Proportional System, which focuses on strengthening the democratic institutions and culture that had, since Lesotho's return to democracy in 1993, threatened political transformation and development (ADB, 2006). During this time, according to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (2003), the BNP (Basotho National Party) government was orchestrating protracted differences with the BCP (Basotho Congress Party), the King and his supporters. Motsamai (2015:2) agrees with the statement of the ISS, noting that at this time, the country's first elections in 1966 were won by the BNP. The period was fraught with tension and violent confrontations between the BNP and its rival, the BCP. The country was ruled as an authoritarian one-party state. In part, the antagonism between Dr Leabua Jonathan (the then leader of the BNP) and the King was attributed to conflict that has endured since the early 19th century (BTI, 2014). The ISS (2003) reports that at this time, the BNP government forged strong relations with the South African Apartheid administration, especially in the domains of finance and commercial assistance. The arrangement between the BNP government and South Africa was suitable for the BNP to advance its plan to alienate the middle classes and "intelligentsia". Matlosa (1997) writes that it was during this time that the BNP was able to entrench itself in power through collaborative policies with its allies to the detriment of the stagnant living conditions of the Basotho. Matlosa and Sello (2006) add that this situation created a swing in votership in which disgruntled voters once again switched sides to see the BCP in the running for the polls in the 1970 national elections, winning 35 seats, with the BNP securing only 23 and Malebo's MFP retaining one electoral seat. During the electoral process, Jonathan refused to accept defeat and instead suspended the Constitution and declared a state of emergency. The BNP authoritarian regime

placed King Moshoeshoe II under house arrest, but later allowed him to go into exile in the Netherlands. These developments negatively affected the power base of the BNP and entrenched the regime's relationship of dependence with South Africa (ISS, 2003).

Lodge *et al.* (2002) further the claim that this situation presented similar characteristics in the Southern Africa region, where countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, among others, delayed their capacity to transform their political system into a multiparty democracy. It was at this time during the 1990s that international pressure and the end of the Cold War gained momentum towards democratisation. Supporting the above, Hawkins (2012:1-2) writes:

Superpower rivalry was a major cause of the continuation of devastating armed conflicts in Mozambique and Angola, and it was thus no coincidence that the end of the Cold War also saw the realization of major peace agreements in both cases... but there were positive outcomes of the Angolan peace process as well, not least the Tripartite Accord of 1988, which not only saw the withdrawal of foreign troops in Angola (South African and Cuban), but also the independence of Namibia, a territory that had remained under apartheid South African rule despite UN Security Council resolutions calling for the decolonization of the territory.

The repercussions of this situation saw the coming into being of the country's military government, which took the reins from the previous civilian *de facto* government of the BNP in 1986. However, it did not last long as the Military Junta was forced to initiate its own exit from power (ISS, 2003). Following these developments, Lesotho hosted its first multiparty elections in 1993, since the annexure of power by the BNP in 1970. It is worth noting that the period between the end of authoritarian rule and the transition to a democratic dispensation was characterised by turbulent power relations affecting the authorities in charge. Matlosa (2006:17) is of the opinion that...

although it was relatively easy for the small Kingdom of Lesotho to shake off military authoritarianism and institutionalise a multiparty democracy in 1993, democratic governance has been a rather fragile and enfeebled one due to a variety of both exogenous and endogenous factors.

The Lesotho News Agency (LENA, 2013) reported that in 2013, the Kingdom of Lesotho marked 20 years of its return to multi-party politics. From 1993 to date, the country has held six rounds of parliamentary elections (1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2015) with the next election planned for June 2017 after a Motion of No Confidence succeeded against Prime Minister Mosisili in February 2017. These developments have restored power to the citizens of Lesotho to elect their own representatives and rulers. However, only in three instances have the outcome of the elections been accepted by all political parties, namely the elections of 2002, 2012 (SADC, 2012) and 2015 (SADC, 2015). Oseni (2012:122) says that the other electoral outcomes have been mostly contested in courts of laws by the parties that lost. Though Oseni may allude to some political turmoil, Matlosa (2005) states that after the introduction of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system in 2002, Lesotho experienced unprecedented levels of political stability. Lesotho managed to attain the peaceful alternation of power and the establishment of a democratically-elected coalition government in 2012 (Lerotholi & Pütz, 2013) and in 2015 a second coalition government was seen. Kabemba (2003) posits that the reduction of political risk and the improvement in good governance in Lesotho are directly related to changes in the electoral system, the restructuring of the armed forces, and changes in South Africa's regime, which had great influence over Lesotho's political transformation and path towards good governance.

5.2 Issues surfacing in Lesotho

Saunders (2002) views challenges related to post-independence Lesotho as directly speaking to major sources of political instability that bore negative consequences for economic and human development. It remains a fact that Lesotho experienced a significant period of undemocratic rule from 1970 to 1986, which was extended by autocratic military rule from 1986 to 1993. This was the same military rule that paved the way for the restoration of a multi-party democracy in 1993 with the BCP's landslide victory. The reign of the BCP only lasted for one five-year term until 1997 when the party split and the majority of the members of Parliament parted ways with the BCP to form a new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), led by the Prime Minister (Gale, 2005). Likoti (2006) writes that the events led to the formation of the LCD and the command of authority after the 1998 elections in which the LCD

won 79 of 80 constituencies; it also saw the rise of political unrest in the country. Observer missions reported that the 1998 national elections were free and fair even though the main opposition parties, particularly the BNP, disapproved of the election outcome and mobilised its supports to reject the results. The rejection of the electoral result was followed by political unrest, which caused extensive damage to the capital city Maseru. The Southern African Development Community, through South Africa and Botswana, deployed troops to Lesotho to restore order (ABD, 2006). Van Nieuwkerk (2012:2) adds that it was around this period that contested elections in Lesotho were also the subject of regional concern. Lesotho now however appears to have achieved some measure of political stability.

5.2.1 Systemic transformation

Influenced by political developments in Lesotho, the experience of the 1990s revealed that there was more work to be done in building and institutionalising foundations for good governance and an urgent call for political transformation (Letuka *et al.*, 2005). Agreeing in principle with Letuka *et al.*, Call and Cousens (2008) write that the main concern was a complete systemic overhaul of the electoral system, which was the major cause for failing political stability and good governance.

The prevalence of political infighting in Lesotho was attributed to the electoral model used at the time, namely First-Past-The-Post (FPTP), which was blamed for its failure to offer smaller parties representation in the National Assembly in terms of national vote appropriated. This caused political infighting among competing political parties. The International Development Association (IDA) and the IMF report that followed this state of affairs, led to a political body being set up, which paved the way for the espousal of a new electoral system, The Mixed Member Proportional Representation, which combined FPTP and Proportional Representation (PR). The political authority, the Interim Political Authority (IPA), was a litmus test to ensure that the national vote would be shared proportionately to allow each party to secure a seat in the National Assembly (IDA, 2005). The Constitution of Lesotho provides that legislative elections be held every five years.

In May 2012, the electoral outcome resulted in a hung parliament and saw the formation of coalition parties taking over the reins of government from the former Prime Minister, PB Mosisili, who had been the Prime Minister for 14 years (Public


Eye Newspaper Online, 2013). The result of the national elections was approved internationally, demonstrating a strong commitment to advocate for the democratic principles of governance that laid the foundation for political stability (ISS, 2012). However, following a fallout with the then Prime Minister Dr Motsoahae Thabane's main parties' dispensation, a snap election was held in February 2015, which saw Mosisili bounce back to power with a coalition of seven political parties. SADC Mission Leader Elifas Dingara said the 2015 National Assembly Elections were snap elections called for in the context of the on-going SADC mediation aimed at establishing permanent peace and security in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The Mission therefore commended the intervention by SADC and urged all stakeholders to commit to the process for the good of the country (SADC, 2015). However, even for the new dispensation the strengthening of the democratic institutions and culture still posed serious challenges to the country's stability.

5.2.2 Human and economic standing

Lesotho is completely landlocked by South Africa, one of Africa's largest economies. The Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL) states that Lesotho's Human Development Index (HDI) registered as low as 0.450 in 2011, with incidences of prospective growth anticipated for the future. In the Economic Review Report, the CBL concluded that Lesotho experienced a steep decline in the HDI rankings from 141 in 2010 to 160 in 2011. Though the decline affected Lesotho's performance, in some aspects, such as the gender equality index which was at 0.532 in 2011 (CBL, 2011), the country's performance seemed much more stable and was steadily increasing. The HDI has since shown an improvement in statistics, recording a ratio of female to male enrolment at 97.6%, 136.2% and 124.5% at primary, secondary and tertiary education respectively (BTI, 2014). The gross enrolment ratio by 2012 stood at 103%, 46.4% and 3.5% for primary, secondary and tertiary institutions, which indicated a tremendous improvement in performance (UN, 2012a). The African Human Development Report of the UNDP (2013) recorded that the country's estimated figure of citizens living under the poverty line was at 56.6%, where the poverty line is assumed to be at \$2 per day. The urban areas are prone to more growth, but with an estimated 76% of the country's population residing in rural areas, Lesotho is one of the world's most unequal countries, with a Gini coefficient of 0.53 at the end of 2003, and 0.525 by 2013 (World Bank, 2013b). Bearing this statistic in

mind, the slow growth has had a negative effect on infrastructural growth, which in turn enabled protracted inequality gaps, especially between the urban and rural populations. It is Bouchat's (2010) view that owing to the country's extreme reliance on customs revenue, the performance of Lesotho is likely to decline should customs revenue continue to drop. The World Bank agrees, noting that the country's main source of income for a lengthy period was based on remittances from workers in South Africa. This situation is continually influenced by ever-rising poverty, as well as a barrage of socio-economic barriers that continue to affect Lesotho and other African citizens, forcing them to look beyond their borders, especially to South Africa, for sources of incomes (WB, 2012). It is worth stating that remittances form a large part of Lesotho's GDP. By 2011, an estimated 28% of Lesotho's GDP was emanating from remittances. However, the negative impact of HIV/AIDS on the economically active population affects the ability of Lesotho to improve upon income-generating activities as the pandemic mostly affects the workers aged between 15 and 49 (World Bank, 2012b).

Figure 1: Economic indicators/performance: previous five years



(Sources: Reports compiled by The World Bank on Development Indicators, 2013; International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Economic Outlook, 2013; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPR); Military Expenditure Database 2013)

For a number of years, issues of monopolies and dominance over economic activity have proven to contribute to slow economic growth, which the government of Lesotho appears reluctant to address (IFAD, 2014). Although Lesotho is one of the countries supported under The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), during its country assessment study, it was concluded that Lesotho is one of the most open economies among the least developed countries that have a small manufacturing base. According to Letuka *et al.* (2004), Lesotho, as a member of SACU together with South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia, has received much of its major sources of government revenue from SACU.

However, projections from this data suggest that by 2015-2016, Lesotho's economy is expected to grow at about 4.9%; this, despite the constraining factors related to subdued growth in mining and quarrying and the effects of delayed renewal of the US's African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which expired in 2015 (Nseera *et al.*, 2015). As the table above indicates, the country's revenue has dropped as a result of the effects of the global financial crisis that went as low as 14.4% of GDP in 2010 to 2011. With the anticipated increase in SACU revenue, with an estimated 28% in the 2012 to 2013 fiscal year, the economic performance was projected to significantly improve (KoL, Budget Speech, 2012-2013). The economy registered growth of 4.3% in 2014 and average growth of 4.9% is expected in the following two years (KoL, Budget Speech, 2015-2016). Ngalawa (2013:176) attributes the anticipated positive growth to the deepened and renewed commitment of SACU member states to seek more ways through which the union can be sustainable. One way to accede to Ngalawa's positive outlook at SACU was confirmed by SADC in its praise of SACU member states for their unity in establishing national tariff boards in order to have national bodies to protect their industries and regulate the import and export of restricted commodities. SADC further credited this unity to ensuring that the national bodies work collaboratively with the SACU tariff board (SADC, 2012).

Although other countries have established these national bodies through parliamentary acts, Lesotho has still not regulated its own body by legitimation of parliament. Asche (2008:218) confirms Lesotho's lack of political commitment to institutionalise its regional commitments. Although Lesotho was one of the first countries in the Sub Regional Bloc to sign the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU in 2007, the country has been struggling with economic development.

In addition, Lesotho has not made any progress in its trade services under the World Trade Organisation's guidance, which suggests the country may still not be capable to explore the advantages of trade benefits. To bring more action to this commitment, SADC as a regional integration body has taken the lead in negotiating intra-regional trade in services for member states (BTI, 2014). Even after the two successive changes in government in Lesotho, the three-party coalition government of 2012 and the seven-party coalition government of 2015, there is still no significant change on Lesotho's commitment to trade liberalisation. More than a decade ago, Blomstrom and Lundahl (2001) already expressed doubts about the readiness, safe the capability of the private sector to export goods and services to developed countries. They (*ibid*) were looking at over reliance of Lesotho on Foreign Direct Investment geared by (FDI), especially under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Blomstrom and Lundahl (2001:6) add that should the expiration of AGOA in 2015 become a reality, the future of the textiles industry in Lesotho faces enormous challenges as it will undoubtedly affect the country's economic performance. However, Hinshaw (2015) wrote in *The Wall Street Journal* that the US Congress had renewed a 15-year-old law that allowed made-in-Africa goods to sail into the US duty-free. This made Africa the latest continent wrapped up in a spree of trade legislation-clearing through the US Congress. AGOA gives sub-Saharan African nations' duty-free access to US markets for certain goods, such as textiles. It was packaged with another bill to extend a programme of assistance to American workers, who are shown to be hurt by overseas competition (Hinshaw, 2015). Both BTI (2014) and AGOA (2005) reports show that since the expiration of the Multi Fibre Agreement in December 2004 there has been a significant decline in textile exports into the US (BTI, 2012).

The *Encyclopaedia on National Economies* (2002:235) refers to the danger of Lesotho's economy's high dependency on remittances in view of the unsettling global economic situation. Because of low wages and the lack of employment opportunities, many Basotho resort to seeking wage employment in South Africa. However, South Africa's high unemployment rate means that the South African economy is unable to absorb the high influx of job seekers from Lesotho and neighbouring countries (Wilson *et al.*, 2001).

In terms of the OECD (2012a), due to massive declines in government revenue, Lesotho is struggling to finance government expenditure. Natsios (2010) attributes this incapacity to the country's challenge to increase the indicators for better economic performance and improvement on the HDI.

5.2.3 The era of post- May 2012 governance

Lesotho newspaper *Public Eye* in November 2012 reported that some of the recurring governance revelations under the first coalition regime of May 2012 were that during the previous LCD government, the then Minister of Natural Resources, Monyane Moleleki, (later the opposition leader in Parliament 2012-2015 8th Parliament), practiced mal-governance by running a charitable trust of which he was the only signatory. The new coalition government of 2012 orchestrated robust police investigations, which claimed that Moleleki⁴⁰ and his trust held almost 400,000 USD (LENA, 2014). However honourable the initiative of the new coalition government was to curb corruption, the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) Report revealed that the change of government discarded institutional transformation plans that saw the abolishment of the Ministry of Gender and Youth, Sports and Recreation plan to form umbrella civil society organization for civic groups (UNGASS Report, 2013). Speculations were that even though the institutional move was aimed at coordinating civil society organisations within Lesotho, it had devastating effects that would undermine existing civil society groups (Hercules, 2009). This proposition of a new umbrella organisation came as a surprise as the

⁴⁰ Monyane Moleleki was the Minister of Natural Resources before the 2012 National Assembly Elections. He became the Leader of Opposition, representing the newly formed Democratic Congress (DC) led by former Prime Minister Mosisili after DC failed to retain power in 2012. Moleleki is now the leader of a newly breakaway party, Alliance for Democrats that split away from the ruling Democratic Congress in 2016.

government had failed to provide due institutional support to the existing institutions, including the Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN) and the Lesotho Youth Federation, yet it initiated another coordinating organisation (World Bank, 2012b).

Most of the institutional and structural transformation efforts were deemed to have been sources of conflict related to the electoral process. Since the formation of the IPA (Independent Political Authority) in 2002, which paved the way for an inclusionary form of government, such conflicts occurred at a reasonably low intensity (Letsema, 2012). World Election (2014) stated that the build-up to the 2012 general elections came with much more protracted pre-election conflict. An ISS strategic survey report (2013) released after the 2012 elections' observation captured moments of intra and inter-party conflict. The cause of riots was attributed to claims by opposition members blaming the governor of malpractice by attempting to mobilise voters from opposition strongholds. However, unlike in the 1998 political riots, no lives were lost or any significant damage to property was suffered. According to Solwandle-Ntelo (2015:14), the snap elections of 2015's observation mission depicted a conducive environment where a general calm reigned.

With this in mind, some of the issues surfacing in Lesotho were recorded in eight Afro barometer surveys initiated for SADC countries over the last couple of years (Hendricks & Musavengana, 2010:81). In these surveys, Lesotho indicated the lowest levels of embracing democratic principles and ways. About 40% of the Basotho interviewed and observed however preferred democracy to prevail over any other kind of government system. In the eight countries surveyed (Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Kenya and Tanzania, including Lesotho), 69% preferred democratisation and good governance principles (Robert *et al.*, 2000). The results of these surveys suggest that Lesotho has a long way to go towards entrenching democracy in the popular consciousness of the Basotho (US Department of State, 2008). Thamae (2015:7) indicated that after the 2015 elections it became evident that participation in democracy had increased by more than half, compared to previous elections, which had brought the Basotho closer to a consolidated form of democracy. In the era before 2012, there was passive political participation and little interest from the populace to support democratic principles of

governance. This was attributed to a lack of understanding of democratic methods by political parties (Kabemba, 2003).

Matlho (2015:15) states that it cannot be overemphasised that unlike in previous years, the 2015 election came about unexpectedly. That meant that there was limited time available to ensure effective voter education, especially if the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had to do it alone, but when looking at Lesotho's electoral landscape in the run-up to the 2015 national elections it is clear that there were activities which showed that the citizenry were "at least aware" that there was going to be an election in the country. Some of the issues influencing such developments were attributed to enigmatic behaviour by voters. Before the 2012 coalition government, it was assumed that politicians took the platform with a motive to pursue bread and butter politics (EISA Research Report, 2012:2). This was the result of a lack of knowledge and information by voters on how to maximise their interests through expression at the ballot by their leaders. Given the social construction of Lesotho's citizenry, the homogeneity of Lesotho, the dominance of political ideologies of one party and the activeness of urban areas participation, it was likely to translate into electoral dominance (Kabemba, 2003). Gross and Juncos (2010), reporting on behalf of the European Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, write that the government of Lesotho's IEC sought to address the complicated nature of voter behaviour piecemeal without having due understanding of its complexity.

As part of the efforts to enhance the electoral processes ahead of the February 2015 National Assembly Elections, the UNDP and USAID jointly cooperated and provided support in providing electoral training for IEC staff. The programme focused on improving public understanding of the electoral processes in order to increase confidence in the fairness of the results. It included training targeted at polling officers, area chiefs, and political party polling agents, observers, call centre staff and journalists (UNDP, 2015:8).

5.3 Good versus poor/bad governance

According to the World Bank Institute (WBI, 2012),

... governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of government to effectively formulate and implement policies; and the respect of citizens and the state institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

Hout (2013:44) advocates for good governance by stating that the contrary, bad governance, has such devastating consequences for people's lives and fuels poverty, negative population growth through diminishing life expectancies, sparks of violence and loss of personal and civil liberties, which are all consequences of poor governance. Hout is influenced by Bertucci and Alberti (2001) whose assumption is premised on the idea that good governance places power in the hands of laws and institutions, while bad governance finds its locus of power in the hands of individuals. This approach of good governance potentially minimises the risk of abuses of power when implemented successfully. In this regard, Lesotho enacted The National Anti-Corruption Strategic Action Plan 2014/15-2017/18, which confirmed that through the introduction of policies, good governance could be achieved if such policies become codified laws. It envisaged that corruption must be fully prevented and combatted to promote service delivery, and promote the rule of law and economic development in Lesotho. The following strategies were set:

- a) Ensure transparent and accountable systems;
- b) Be aware and know of the scourge of corruption and its implications;
- c) Legislation and prosecution to be improved to deter corruption practices, and
- d) Relevant bodies to be fully capacitated (KOL, 2014a:11).

Endres (2013) offers some of the basic premises of a country that is governed well. He proposes that good governance is firstly when citizens have a say in how the country is run; in this instance, his reasoning strongly confirms that the principles of democracy are preserved when government is sanctioned by the people. In his analysis, good governance is being accountable and transparent, exercising the rule of law where human, civil, minority and property rights are maintained by a legitimate

government through a practice of *trias politica* (the separation of powers and existence of three tiers of government) and that government should pursue inclusive, growth-oriented policies. These sentiments are echoed in Kapa (2013:33-34), namely that Lesotho has been traversing the recommended pillars of good governance and offers significant reference to the entrenchment of the Constitution of 1993, which owes its pillars to that of 1966 on key democratic principles. He motivates his argument by referring to the format of Lesotho's Constitution, which has entrenched fundamental human rights following a consultative process in which the main political actors participated. It can therefore be regarded as legitimate (Kapa, 2013). Kapa (*ibid.*) goes on to provide evidence of his positive submission on Lesotho's position of good governance that follows a parliamentary system based on three branches of government – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, with each performing its constitutionally defined role. Wilkinson and Pickett (2011:26) provide the second requirement, which they believe is a function of good governance, envisaging that with good governance, human well-being rises with income, including health, life expectancy, education and happiness.

According to the Washington Consensus⁴¹, good governance is the result of a well-maintained political administration of economic policies (Serra & Stiglitz, 2008). This implies that when all measures necessary to complement and reinforce neo-liberal economic policies while leaving the social model untouched, are maintained, then poor governance is eradicated. The chief requirement of good governance is offered by Schmitz (2007), who posits that the ability to attract investment and “aid” is critical to long-term development and that good governance is the link between the two. Schmitz (2007:91) states the following:

Everyone is in favour of good governance. But what exactly does it mean? Should it be promoted in order to enhance democracy? Or to create markets? Should we look only at formal institutions or also at civil society? Beyond the technical definitions lies a much more complex political debate, involving notions that are usually not considered by politicians and policy makers.

⁴¹ Williamson's Washington Consensus centres on ten reforms: (i) fiscal discipline in order to eliminate public deficits; (ii) a change in the priorities of public spending: withdrawal of subsidies and increased spending in health and education; (iii) tax reform: broadening tax bases and reducing tax rates; (iv) positive real interest rates, determined by the market; (v) exchange rates determined by the market, which must guarantee its competitiveness; (vi) liberalisation of trade and opening of the economy (Williamson did not attach any priority to the liberalisation of capital flows); (vii) no restrictions on foreign direct investment; (viii) privatisation of public enterprises; (ix) deregulation of economic activity; (x) a solid guarantee of property rights (Williamson, 2002)

Similarly, the new coalition government formed after February 2015 in Lesotho announced through a Budget Speech that the government was poised to attain good governance under the theme “Restoring Good Governance through Efficiency, Accountability, Transparency, Effectiveness and Equity.” According to the Minister of Finance then, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Mamphono Khaketla (2015:4),

.... stability must not only translate into accelerated and sustainable economic growth, but also reduced poverty levels. We can only achieve these important goals through institutional reforms, effective use of our natural resources, infrastructure development, and more foreign and domestic private sector investment.

Regardless of the intentions of the government, Lesotho still registered weaknesses in governance as Ms. Lucy Liphafa, the Auditor-General announced in the “Governance Beyond Borders” Seminar held in Maseru in October 2013. She insisted that the concept of corporate governance is a topical issue defined as the way in which organisations are directed and controlled, therefore there is the need for organisations to implement principles or standards of corporate governance to improve business behaviour. She cited attitudes of resistance and lack of understanding of the importance of good governance by departmental heads in both the Lesotho public and private sectors as being among some of the obstacles to improving good governance in the country (Kotelo, 2013).

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) suggested the notion of bad governance. It assumes that bad governance includes governments that are ineffective and inefficient, not transparent, not responsive to the people, not held accountable for their actions, inequitable and exclusive to the elites, non-participatory, that do not follow the rule of law, and that lack policies that are consensus-driven (UNESCAP, 2012). Contrary to the fundamental premise exemplifying good governance, it may thus be an assumption that in a badly governed country, citizens have little influence on what happens in their country. Good Governance Africa (2013) shows that poor governance is fuelled when people cannot express their wishes at the ballot box and civil society is not heard or not permitted to speak. In this instance, laws are poorly crafted and applied arbitrarily, while the administration is inefficient. Good

Governance Africa (*ibid.*) says that the judiciary practice in poor governance or bad governance is usually biased and corruption is evidently high.

Most of the issues raised above characterise common attributes in African governance ways, which fall within a circuit of poor governance, although slight improvement has been seen of late. For instance, in October 2015 Lesotho was categorised at position 7 amongst the most democratic countries in Africa (How Africa Rise, 2014). The 2011 Failed States Index by *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Fund for Peace concluded that all African countries are on the border between poor and good governance (Bloom, 2011). However, scholars such as Chigara (2014; cf. Kelly, 2014; Rudman, 2014) agree that in the last 12 years, there has been a significant drop in the occurrences of coups. Between 1960 and 2000, only eight coups (out of the average 20 coups per decade) took place. Greenberg *et al.* (2013) conclude that this improvement may be relative to the common practice of holding national elections and entrenching democratic rule and the peaceful transfer of power (Lesotho May 2012 and February 2015) has increased. Some countries still have a weak state of citizen rights, including Zimbabwe, Burundi and Sierra Leone. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Kingdom of Lesotho, Mohlabi Tsekoa, reiterated the same sentiments, deposing the commitments of government to good governance. After the African Peer Review Mechanism Report (APRM) topped Lesotho in 2009, Tsekoa showed that the government is committed to good governance and takes governance and democratic processes seriously. This commitment is manifested in the quality and content of the APRM country review report, which documented the voices of Basotho, good or bad, without being censored (Tsekoa, 2009).

5.3.1 Good governance parameters

The debate around the MDGs and the more recent SDGs and good governance has become an increasingly important factor in this era of development. Even though the MDGs have reached the end of their set period, the new agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) was activated in September 2015 to take forward the MDGs, as set out in the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Akyuz, 2014). However, it is worth noting that with the end of the MDGs in 2015, countries of the world

gathered again to look for long-lasting solutions to global economic development. In 2015, countries adopted a new development agenda that would build on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). United Nations Member States adopted the Sustainable Development Goals as part of a new Sustainable Development Agenda that must finish the job and leave no-one behind. The process of arriving at the post-2015 development agenda was Member State-led with broad participation from major groups and other civil society stakeholders. The UN also played a facilitating role in the global conversation on the post-2015 development agenda and supported broad consultations. It also supported Member States by providing evidence-based inputs, analytical thinking and field experience (UN, 2015b). In this regard, the Minister of Development Planning of Lesotho as he then was, Mr Mokoto Hloaele, delivering his opening remarks at a session of ministers and principal secretaries in October 2015, urged that the Post-2015 Development Agenda should be aligned to Lesotho's national priorities. Hloaele (in Boloetse, 2015:6) stated the following:

The key messages that I am putting across are that the Post-2015 Development Agenda should be aligned to our national priorities as outlined in our country policies and plans, for example, the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). The success of this new agenda will depend on deepening cooperation with civil society, private sector and other stakeholders, and investing in the areas that empower women and other vulnerable groups. As members of the UN (United Nations) we should commit ourselves to integrating the new agenda by domesticating and implementing it.

The Post 2015 Agenda was a reminder on Lesotho's past pathway to development as in the past, the state suffered much criticism at the hand of post-Cold War ideology and culture (Bendana, 2004). To some extent, this labelled governments as responsible for the wrongs of the world order and the sole reason for things going wrong. However, the more recent conviction is that these assumptions are not correct as other role-players, including the markets, have a role to play in the world order (Lehmann, 2013).

Donor rediscovery of the lead role of the state in good governance is somewhat flawed. Donors have spent a considerable time on policy fixing and states still suffer protracted intra and international conflicts and on-going poverty that have left the

multilateral agencies looking for explanations as they hit rock-bottom (Clark *et al.*, 2012).

Reporting on the progress made on MDGs by Lesotho and other countries, Hailu and Tsukada (2011) write that Gambia, Lesotho and Malawi are not likely to achieve their targets, yet they have substantially improved their pace of progress. Miller (2014) compiled a report on Lesotho MDG progress in which he showed that Lesotho has the biggest challenge in reducing poverty, hunger and income inequality. Currently, Lesotho cannot produce enough food to meet domestic demands and a large section of the rural population is still caught in poverty due to the high rate of unemployment. A decline in agricultural productivity and inflation also contribute to high poverty levels. More than a decade ago, Singh (2003:16) noted that the international community developed a new fixed position of MDGs and governance; for example, the conclusion arrived at in the 2002 Human Development Report proclaimed that good governance and strong institutions are the solution in fostering economic growth. In reality, the upsurge in the concern over governance responds to the need to provide answers to the inevitable question of what to do in the light of the failure of structural adjustments and “economic reforms” to deliver political stability (Bendana, 2005:44). Former Lesotho Prime Minister Thomas Motsoahae Thabane (2014), in his address at the Joint United Nations Country Team in Lesotho, announced the following:

It is also notable that the MDGs bear close relationship to the seven pillars of the National Vision 2020. Thus, for those goals we have faltered, we are off the trajectory to accomplish the vision we have set for ourselves. For the goals we will likely achieve, we will make efforts to consolidate achievements including by focusing on quality and human capacity. For those goals for which progress has been slow or absent, we will redouble our efforts going forward to deliver a better future for Basotho and also extend our focus to include consideration for people with disabilities. In the post-2015 period, we will mobilize more development partnerships and exert decisive leadership to ensure traction of our efforts to attain our goals.

It would seem Bendana’s hypothesis was influential, as Tandon (2005) suggests that there is a mainstream theory seeking “to hide the systemic causes of poverty and conflict in Africa”; accordingly, the dominant discourse on the causes of conflict in Africa will emphasise the lack of economic growth and poor governance. Tujan

(2005:5, quoting Tandon, 2005) says that the conditionality of development aid is premised on good governance. It is not for this reason alone that African states in dire need of development aid are pursuing programmes of good governance, but because it has also been evidenced that African states have prioritised respecting and valuing life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It was reiterated by the then Minister of Finance Senator Moeketsi Majoro that Lesotho had been implementing financial management reforms, including performance-based budgeting (PBB), since 2005 in an effort to increase accountability, transparency and effectiveness in governance, yet little is known about how these efforts are affecting the health sector (Vian & Bicknell, 2013).

It is essential to recognise that the MDGs and SDGs in the Post-2015 Development Agenda, like An Agenda for Peace and Development and perhaps Good Governance⁴², no longer remain the agenda for the United Nations system alone but its ownership is located in the global states as chief concerns for a more development-focused agenda of the world (Camdessus, 2007).

5.3.2 The scholarly versus international perspective/consensus on Lesotho's milestones

It is clear from the discussion above that the purpose of governance is to protect and promote the well-being of citizens. Political authorities work together with non-state actors to steer the rules for the exercise of power and to guide the interactions between the state and citizens, civil society and the private sector (Kjaer, 2014; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007; Brinkerhoff & Bossert 2008). Vian and Bicknell (2013) are of the opinion that when governance works well, citizens are better able to achieve individual and common purposes, but when governance is poor, even if a country has financial resources and technical assistance; it may fail to achieve development goals. For governance to work, public organisations must have sufficient institutional capacity to design and implement policies in ways that are “effective, transparent,

⁴²*Good governance has ignited contradictions between the stated goals of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, and the development policies promoted by donors, IFIs and the UN. These policies and strategies are often emphasised by IFIs, regional banks, and bilateral donors/creditors which may as such not be aligned to UN conventions on development and human rights, and often also undermine the UN's commitment to the MDGs (Focus on the Global South, “Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor: The Millennium Development Goals and the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger”, Bangkok, 2003).*

impartial, and accountable” (World Bank, 2001). A main channel to accomplish this is through reform of the budgeting system.

Public Financial Management (PFM) institutions are integral to governance (Andrews, 2009). Within the public budgeting process, policymakers decide priorities, set goals, and allocate resources. While institutions and decision-making structures may vary, governance experts generally believe that budgeting systems function better when they are transparent, provide opportunities for stakeholder participation, exercise control on discretion of agents and assure accountability for performance (Diamond, 2003; Deininger & Mpuga, 2005; Ebdon & Franklin, 2006; Gilmour & Lewis, 2006). ADB policy (2006) placed special emphasis on five overarching elements of good governance. These include but are not limited to

- ✓ Accountability
- ✓ Combating corruption
- ✓ Stakeholder’s participation
- ✓ Transparency, and
- ✓ The legal and judiciary framework

Lesotho has prioritised governance issues since 2005 and the government’s agenda rests on both the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2005-2007) and the National Vision 2020, working towards achievement of socio-economic development (Ministry of Development Planning and Department of International Development, 2005). The same governance agenda which is placed high in policy-making owes its foundation to the National Strategy Development Plan (NSDP 2013-2017). The Central Bank of Lesotho (2006) stated that the main objectives of the government were to ensure the deepening of democracy, enhancing of governance at all facets, improvement of safety and security, as well as scaling up efficiency of the justice system. Reporting on the public financial management component, Government of Lesotho, GoL (2006) said the key to addressing governance challenges in the country rests on the government engaging in more robust planning reforms as recommended by technical support from development partners such as the DCI, DfID, EU and GTZ/KfW. It verifies that these programmes have various fundamentals to them, which carry similar objectives of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of delivery by the

public service, as well as professional public financial management for economic growth and the reduction of poverty.

5.3.3 Some of the lessons of good governance in Lesotho

The structural reforms and systemic transformation among the identified elements of good governance include the judicial and legal reform. ADB Lesotho Country Profile (2006:29) states:

The Lesotho Law Commission, as an example, has reviewed and updated several outdated laws with a view to modernising and bringing them in accord with current conditions. These included: the Judicial Education Institute Bill proposed and intended to provide professional training to judicial officers; the Council on Law Reporting Bill; and the Administration of Justice Bill that seeks to improve the role of the JSC in the appointment of the Chief Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal and envisages the appointment of an Administrator of the judiciary in order to remove the judiciary from direct political control. Five elements of good governance are emphasised in the Bank Group Policy on Good Governance, namely: accountability; transparency; combating corruption; stakeholder participation; and legal and judicial framework. Based on this assessment, it can be concluded that, albeit haltingly.

This bears testimony to the progress Lesotho has made in establishing new and comprehensive institutions and mounting institutional reforms that are needed for good governance and political transformation. Lesotho is among the 77 countries that the United States selected as qualifying and in dire need of Millennium Challenge Account assistance. It is worth noting that the criteria for qualification for Millennium Challenge Account assistance are based on the satisfactory embrace of democratic rule and principles, among which are respect of fundamental human rights, the rule of law and efforts in human development (Lesotho has since been trying to establish a Human Rights Commission under Irish Aid funding), as well as adopting policies to promote sustainable development (UNDP, 2004). Mohidin (2006) recognises that although progress has been recorded, currently Lesotho still has a considerable number of challenges to improve and promote good governance as a pillar for development effectiveness. The European Commission has since recognised that Lesotho has made tremendous efforts towards the attainment of good governance; one of the indicators was the country's Constitution, which

ensured the restoration of civilian rule to take the reins of government in 1993, which evidenced a pathway to progressive political transformation following years of undemocratic and autocratic rule. The Constitution of Lesotho became an important instrument for the deepening of democracy and the promotion of transparency and accountability in handling the country's public affairs (*The Courier*, 2002). In 2014, Lesotho renewed efforts to improve the performance of the public service. A paradigm shift in the management of the public service was contemplated as a means of creating an empowered public service to enhance service delivery and strengthen the country's socio-political and eco-environmental governance (Nseera *et al.*, 2015:10).

The United Nations Country Assessment has noted that Lesotho is well positioned to embrace democratic governance as it administered regular free and fair elections as confirmed by observers in all its electoral processes. Even though this assumption is not a litmus test for good governance, the people of Lesotho are able to demand the legislature be accountable to its citizenry (UNDP, 2004). Lesotho's six national elections since 1993, in one way or the other, provided influence on shaping government's policies.

5.3.4 Good governance in Lesotho

In the discussion above, it is apparent that Lesotho is committed to strengthening efforts in entrenching transparency, accountability, rule of law and participation in the affairs of government by the public, although some scholars still believe that the democratic fundamentals of the country are weak at best and need consolidation (Matlosa, 2006). Tsikoane *et al.* (2007) mention that the current fragile democracy owes its foundation to the historic influence of military regimes and, weak civil society actors. This was coupled with inexperienced and weak opposition in Parliament without the skills to hold government and its administration accountable. Daemane (2011) suggests that the weak social context of the country in holding government accountable towards the use of its power presents problems that influence the status of low civic culture as an important fundamental to the consolidation of democracy and political transformation. The previous finding of the European Union serves as an indication that it has been problematic for Lesotho to accelerate the process

towards consolidation of the democratic principles, as well as the strengthening of governance institutions. Civil society organisations (CSOs) are also a challenge, to ensure that they are accountable to the needs of the populace, even in the light of the adoption of a programme of decentralisation (LGNSP, 2009).

The EU LGNSP initiative provides that decentralisation is a necessary form of political transformation to enable the transfer of authority and power to the local structures. The Local Government Amendment Act of 1997 lays down the institutional frameworks for the Local Governance System and the corresponding Local Government Elections Act of 1998 lays down the procedures, rules and regulations for conducting elections. Lesotho held its first local government elections in April 2005. Paleo (2009) states that the Ministry of Local Government was committed to ensuring participation and capacity-building of communities to enhance their participation in local governance. In 2015, Lesotho held another round of local government elections. Good governance parameters have demonstrated that decentralisation is meaningful as it bestows financial responsibility on the decentralised structure, the councils. This illustrates an urgent need for government to develop a long-lasting framework for decentralisation, accountability and transparency, for the utilisation of funds to be allocated to local and institutional structures for accountability purposes (Kalusopa *et al.*, 2010).

The Constitution of Lesotho (1996 as amended) sets a clear mandate for all tiers of government, namely the executive, legislative, and judiciary. Darrock (2007:87), reporting on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, focuses on the judicial system, reasoning that the fight against corruption depends upon the judicial system as there has been an outcry, as reported by the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliamentary Cluster, of protracted disregard by the executive of the policies, procedures and rules of parliamentary checks and balances. The judiciary stood firm on maintaining its independence from the executive wing of government. BTI Country Report (2014) has postulated that in this current period, Lesotho is making tremendous efforts to advocate for greater parliamentary independence, as evidenced by its efforts to establish the Legislative Service Commission for employing parliamentary workers, representing visible signs of good governance. Adding to the above, the 2012 BTI Report also indicates the progress made on the

judicial tier of government in which the judiciary, largely, has attained relevant independence, even though its functions are still dependent on the executive power over issues, such as parliamentary capital and recurrent budgets, deployment of functional and parliamentary support staff. On the other hand, as an example of good governance efforts, judges of the High Court are appointed by the head of state, the King, upon advice from the independent Judicial Service Commission (KoL, 1996: Section 120, Sub-section 2; cf. Ibpus, 2009:174).

Saha (2010:56) submits that the practice under the Constitution, which guarantees basic civil liberties and their enforcement at times, is circumvented by the state executive. Through this transformation of political and legislative authority, scholars were appreciating that they ought to have been instigated as studies provide the empirical evidence, which supports the argument that bad governance and corruption are symptoms of leadership and institutional failure. In Lesotho and other African countries, indications of bad governance are supported through incidences of civilian reports regarding security forces' brutality and reported cases of intimidation (Owoye & Bissessar, 2012). Probert (2013) suggests that this situation of brutality and torture prevailed across the continent over some years, during which Lesotho recorded a considerable number of human rights violations.

At the 107th Conference of US Joint Committees in 2010, it was noted that one of the human rights elements affecting Lesotho is harsh conditions in the prisons with overcrowding as a result of a lack of prison and correctional facilities (Committee of International Relations, 2010:325). As Forere (2011:593) indicates, the state of human rights remains questionable as the government of Lesotho continues to pay off victims of human rights prejudices.

The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 has criticised staffing criteria for the civil service, with much more observation of functional and competency mismatch resulting in people being employed in areas outside their specialisation (US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 2013). This is evidence of bad governance, which has disadvantaged the country, making it susceptible to criticism in respect to public expenditure accountability. Evidence has also shown the repercussions of this matter that has frustrated some cabinet

ministers to account before the Ombudsman on the misappropriation of public funds, of which the blame was shifted to an inappropriate staffing complement (*Sunday Express*, 2010).

The oversight role of the accountability of public funds is vested in the Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly. The Committee is chaired by Moeketse Malebo, one on the longest-serving leaders of the minority party in Parliament (GoL, 2013; GoL, 2015). The European Union reports that it has provided funding for budget support since 2002, but the government is still experiencing backlogs in producing financial statements. This affects functionality and the role of the Public Accounts Committee (ADB, 2013). However, the Public Sector Improvement and Reform Programme (PSIRP), working concurrently with the National Strategy Development Plan (NSDP), lay the foundation for the transformation of the civil service to become more functional and effective. The Ministry of Finance still commands control of its operations and functionality, which has a bearing on the long-term objectives of efficiency for other sectors (World Bank, 2013a). During the 2012-2015 dispensation, there were incidents that showed cracks in the coordination of the incumbent government of that period on what systemic transformation requires in order for strategies and systems to be more effective. One example advanced by regional bodies was conflicting roles and goals that emanated from one ministry. The example provided was that of the Ministry of Agriculture in which the Minister and his assistant at the time pursued conflicting policies (African Union Conference Centre, 2013:4).

Although the government took the initiative to provide necessary capacity building for the Auditor-General's Office, the issue of human resources capacity and staff complement greatly affects its effectiveness. It has been one of the challenges of reliance on the Accountant-General to release financial statements in time for auditing (BTI, 2012). The Report (BTI, 2012) added that for almost a decade a similar problem was experienced where there was lack of capacity to identify persons who misappropriated public funds. Moreover, because of capacity issues, even when individuals were reported for misappropriation, the Office was unable to produce coherent audit evidence for actions to be taken; hence, corruption and political

interference intensified with clear disregard for law and accountability (Nkhahle, 2005:12).

In addition, there is inadequate protection for civil servants when reporting cases of corruption, making it difficult for them to exercise integrity due to the lack of protection of their liberties at work (BTI, 2014). Corruption is so deeply rooted in the civil service, to the extent that even the DCEO is unable to expose corrupt officials. The DCEO's main function is bringing offenders of financial and economic offences before the law, although it does not have a mandate to prosecute offenders, as that role is solely for the National Director of Public Prosecutions. One major crisis of this institution of good governance and anti-corruption is its limited resources to cover its scope of operations fully (Andrews, 2004:322-324).

Kapa (2013) offers insight into some of the good governance initiatives and singles out the national scholarship programme of the government, which provides resources for people to attend tertiary institutions. He provides yet another positive political transformation in which the government has taken deliberate affirmative action measures to appoint women to senior positions in the public service. In the post-2007 elections Cabinet, women constituted 39% of the overall Cabinet. Following the 2012 elections, five women were appointed as Ministers and three as Deputy Ministers. This means that the Cabinet of 2012 is populated by 27% female representation, which reflects a decline of at least 12% from the previous Cabinet (IDRC, 2013). The same set of statistics have been maintained in the current 2015 Cabinet with a slight drop of 0.1 percent of female to male representation in the National Assembly.

Kapa (2013:2) suggests the following:

So far, these affirmative-action policies have not made much impact on national politics. In most instances, women are selected or appointed for public-service positions for a given period, after which they simply return to their previous positions in society.

He recommends that more studies need to be commissioned on South–South learning on what needs to be done to inculcate the interests of women to defend and advocate for their involvement in major roles and decision-making forums.

5.4 The age of transformation in Lesotho

Lesotho is currently enjoying a stable democratic dispensation and a constitutionally monarchical rule. As mentioned earlier, in 1993, in as far as good governance and political transformation is concerned, Lesotho held its first-ever democratic elections after 23 years of moratorium of political activity, which included seven years of military junta (APRM, 2010). The political transformation was influenced by pressure exerted by external and international donors. The military control over governance was also weakened by the political pressure placed on South Africa to democratise. The military council received its backing from the apartheid regime of South Africa (BTI, 2010). Messeiner (2005:190) writes that the first elections in 1993, after authoritarian regime, saw the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) winning all 80 electoral constituencies. Although this was a democratic election, the country became a one-party-dominant state. This poses the question whether this was a result of correcting the political wrongs of the 1970s.

Following the restoration of democratic governance after the national elections in 1993, Lesotho traversed the route of internal political instability and a fragile democracy. For instance, a military coup associated with King Letsie III, who was the head of state then, was orchestrated. Letsie appointed an interim government led by Advocate Hae Phoofolo, which lasted only 28 days (BTI, 2010). Mufamadi (2011) stated that, following these developments, civil society groups sought support from inside and outside of Lesotho to put pressure on the King to restore the Constitution together with the BCP government. Mufamadi (2013), Rosenberg and Weisfelder (2013:264) write that a year later, in 1996, Moshoeshe II, King Letsie's father, lost his life in a car accident with King Letsie III returning to the throne soon after. Five years after the 1993 return to democratic governance, Lesotho held its second democratic elections that were won by the year-old Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), which was formed as a result of a leadership split from the BCP by Ntsu Mokhehle, the then leader of the BCP and Prime Minister. According to Saoana (2011), the LCD achieved a similar landslide victory in 1998, winning 79 out of 80 constituencies. It should also be noted that international observers declared the 1998 poll as free and fair.

Following the cessation of riots, all political entities came back to the drawing board, which resulted in the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA), a multiparty body formed to oversee the negotiations on a suitable electoral model for Basotho. The IPA sitting resulted in a new model for elections, the Mixed Member Proportional System (MMP), which eventually led to the pathway to the next democratic elections in 2002. The outcome of the 2002 elections was peaceful, free and fair (Matlosa, 2008). The first-ever local government elections in 2005 were also declared free and fair. The next round of elections was in 2007 and also served as a test for the MMP system. These elections were also declared free and fair (Likoti, 2008).

Lesotho has a history of an uncertain and unstable democracy. On 29 February 2012, the Basotho were presented with a new political development, namely the formation of the Democratic Congress (DC) under leadership of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister crossed the floor with 44 MPs to form the DC (Manoeli, 2012), remaining Prime Minister in the process. The LCD was left under the leadership of Mothetjoa Metsing, the then Secretary-General. The May 2012 general elections saw no political party winning an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. The three-party coalition led by the All Basotho Convention (ABC), the Basotho National Party (BNP), and the LCD formed the government. In October 2014, the SADC Peace Facilitator to Lesotho, South Africa's Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, after a fallout in the governing coalition, called for re-elections in February 2015. On 28 February 2015, Lesotho held parliamentary elections. The elections were brought forward more than two years earlier than scheduled due to political tensions and security concerns in the country.

5.4.1 Structural constraints: Why transformation

As a result of the country's immense reliance on South Africa's economy, Lesotho continues to suffer structural weaknesses as it depends on the economic power of the South African currency and is susceptible to fluctuations of the rand (African Economic Outlook, 2013). Chibamba (2011), writing about the role of community-based CSOs in Botswana, picked Lesotho as a comparison, reiterating that the structural history has limited the character of civil society to advocate and transform

the socioeconomic ills since independence. This has limited the capacity of civil society in Lesotho. The country's civil society remains informal and limited to advocacy for rights and more stronger on influencing policy on behalf of ordinary people to cope with the dire effects of poverty and the HIV pandemic (BTI, 2012). While developing proper governance programmes to strengthen the Lesotho Health System, Mwase *et al.* (2010) were convinced that the post-independence democratic history was still not mature enough to foster good governance and was at best limited in terms of size and financial resources. Sachikonye *et al.* (2007), dealing with civil societies and the consolidation of good governance in Africa, advance as an example Tanzania's experiences by indicating that formal civil society organisations are capacitated and given an active role in policy dialogue with government, such as voter education and human rights training, which makes cooperation very efficient.

On the other hand, political transformation has been most prominent on the agenda of the government, despite the challenges presented by the territorial sovereignty of Lesotho. Such challenges to political transformation emanated from internal infighting. For instance, the April 2009 attack on the Makoanyane barracks and the August 2014 attempted coup at the Prime Minister's state house presented a wake-up call to government to tighten its grip on the army (BTI, 2014). Likewise, in August 2014, there was an attempted coup against former Prime Minister Thabane. Early in 2015, the army chief was murdered.

Despite the events described above, and unlike other countries such as Burundi and Zimbabwe, Lesotho still commands reasonably acceptable political stability, and acquires its credit from the homogeneity of the nation which neutralises any protracted division within it. Even though Lesotho's economy depends largely on South Africa, the maintenance of the Constitutional monarchical rule has assisted the country's sovereign legitimacy and independence from its only neighbour, South Africa (Hamilton, 2009). Despite some internal rifts, the Basotho have common ground to respect the nation-state and its sovereignty. Riep (2013) suggests that the quest for political transformation increased even more between 2009 and 2013 in order to influence the Basotho to reconsider their relations with South Africa.

Transformation efforts in Lesotho were undermined by capacity challenges because of the ailing infrastructure and the availability of skilled manpower. As demonstrated earlier, the country's heavy reliance on the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenues jeopardises its efforts to find its feet in terms of financial and economic freedom. However, this does not undermine the effect on increasing collection of SACU revenue, which rose from 2.8 billion maloti in 2010 to 2011, to 50 billion in 2012 to 2013 (GoL Budget Speech, 2014).

One scholar returns to the issue of government cooperation with civil society as affecting good governance and political transformation (Kapa, 2010). There has, however, been an attempt to improve this sphere as government has on several occasions consulted and involved civil society in the formulation of key policies (e.g. NSDP) and in the way in which earmarked donor funds can be utilised (CDGG, 2009). Even though this has been the case on several fronts, there is no pre-consultative process prior to decision-making as the process of public policy formulation remains solely the business of the government and civil society organisations are better placed and informed regarding the decisions. One of the umbrella CSOs has alluded to the fact that civil society organisations were excluded in the development process of the National Strategic Development Plan 2013-2017 (LCN, 2013). This has been the tradition and history of Lesotho as politicians, on several occasions, have left structures that are contrary to the government's plans out of the planning cycles. In addition, it was suggested during the review of the donor joint programme (Irish Aid/DfID Support to Civil Society in Lesotho-SCIL) that civil society organisations still face the challenge of accessing information that will support their actions as a result of the negative response of government to share planning with CSOs (SCIL, 2006).

5.5 The need for aid intervention

The need for development aid was accentuated by increasing poverty in Lesotho. Aid was to act as a means to capacitate structures and programmes that could see Lesotho address the country's poverty position (World Bank, 2008:23). Poverty in Lesotho is deeply entrenched in rural areas, where about 70 per cent of the people live (Marsland *et al.*, 2004). More than half of the population in rural areas is poor,

with more than a quarter of these qualifying as extremely poor (IFAD, 2014). In Lesotho, the presumption is that poverty is closely linked to lack of income and unemployment, as well as the severe degradation of the natural resource base on which the livelihoods of many rural poor depend to a varying extent (Mulkeen, 2008:110). Gross national income per capita in Lesotho is relatively high for sub-Saharan Africa, but there is a high level of inequality in income distribution (IFAD, 2013).

The dramatic drop in remittances from migrant labourers in South Africa has thrust many rural households deeper into poverty. Tsehlo (2012) notes that as demand for migrant labour declined and unemployed migrant workers returned to Lesotho, remittances shrank from about 60 per cent of the GDP in the 1980s to about 20 per cent in 2005. It is also important to note that most Basotho who are in search of wage employment migrate from rural to urban and peri-urban areas within the country, unless they find an opportunity to work in South Africa or elsewhere. Some people, especially younger women, have been able to find employment in the country's new industries, mainly the textile industry. Di Dono (2014) notes that available job opportunities cannot keep up with the demand for wage employment. Up to 2013, Lesotho enjoyed good economic performance on the back of the government's prudent macroeconomic policies and favourable external environment. However, economic performance deteriorated in 2009 as the global economic crisis had a considerable adverse impact on Lesotho's economy through falling exports (including garments and diamonds), revenues from SACU, and remittances. The government's medium-term economic programme was aimed at responding to the impact of the reduction in SACU revenues through fiscal adjustments and structural reforms to restore fiscal and external sustainability, promote sustainable growth and reduce poverty (Coleman, 2015:71).

Due to insufficient financial resources perpetrated by the Low Income Status of Lesotho, this has caused it to provide an enabling setting for establishment of a well functional social welfare system (MFDP, 2011). This leaves the majority of Lesotho's population marginalised in terms of access to resources. Donors (DfID, EU, and UNDP, IA) have played an important part in the provision of social welfare, while local and international NGOs (CHAL, HSS 2020, etc.) have contributed to the service delivery agenda of the Ministry of Health and Social Development (UNDP, 2013).

The coalition government of 2012 split the Ministry of Health and Social Development and established an independent Ministry of Social Development, claiming that this move will tighten and advance the coalition manifesto towards a more pronounced commitment to social development. It was established against this background that economic growth was not sufficient to bring down the country's high poverty rate, with HIV/Aids becoming the single biggest burden on the social safety net (BTI, 2014:3). Continuing to justify the need for aid intervention, the government of Lesotho stated that the lack of social security infrastructure and protracted HIV-prevalence justifies the call for improvement of life expectancy, which now is at 48 years, while HIV-prevalence accounts for approximately 23.2% of the country's population between 15 and 49 years, leaving more than 140,000 orphans in need of social care and protection (KoL, 2006b). Nkhoma (2013) concludes that this situation is perpetuated by government's lack of strong political will and their inability to capacitate community-based support groups, which may serve the purpose of carrying out the social protection function and advocate for the rights of vulnerable groups.

The WHO Country Strategy to Lesotho 2008-2013 mentions that the country has proven incapable of maintaining sustainable projects following the introduction of universal primary healthcare in 2008, which suffered from inefficiency due to large-scale shortages of drugs and poor health service delivery. According to BTI (2014), this situation was perpetuated by the pressure on the Christian Health Association of Lesotho (CHAL) to bear the brunt of providing health care services for free, even in light of the 70% subsidy it receives. The outcome of these circumstances jeopardised a thriving health system in Lesotho, and the health system eventually collapsed. The US government intervened to resuscitate it, which saw Lesotho receiving investment in health care of approximately 364 million USD (US State Department, 2013). The focus of the investment was on the decentralisation of primary health care under full supervision and ownership of local authorities (Lesotho Health Policy, 2011).

5.5.1 The challenges of development aid

The World Bank (2014a) states that the challenges relating to Lesotho's development are linked to unemployment, incessant poverty and the inequality gap,

coupled with HIV/Aids prevalence, with the government incapable to address and meet these challenges. In the light of the challenges recognised by the World Bank, the DfID notes that the introduction of the key national and growth strategy paper, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the National Vision 2020 document, has been developed in line with the UN's MDGs and other partner's country strategy programmes, including the EU, DfID, IA, WB, GTZ (DfID, 2009). However, most of the development partners, as mentioned above, are of the opinion that there is no proof that the primary aim of all stakeholders is geared towards eradicating and minimising inequality and poverty (Holmes, 2014).

Foreign governments and multinational corporations have a much more controlling effect because of the country's position, which limits its bargaining power towards advancing long-term development goals. This position compromises Lesotho's ability since it does not have the substantive financial influence or the human resource complement to freely set objectives towards becoming a full market economy (Mhone, 2000). The situation persists as the country's priorities are not pursued fully to allow it to address challenges through a thorough consultative process with donors providing technical and financial support.

Over the past decade and a half, Lesotho managed to produce the National Development Strategic Plan 2012-2013, which was approved by an act of Parliament in December of 2012. This was an agenda since 2004, beyond the Interim Poverty Growth Strategy. The Ministry of Development Planning was established to ensure that it champions inclusive and sustainable development programmes and subsequently established the National Planning Board to feed into this commitment (PEPFAR, 2012).

Although the government of Lesotho had introduced, through the EU Budget Support Fund, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), up until the review of the MDGs there has not been any substantive results in forming the government policies and the ability to plan effectively (GoL, 2012). One influencing factor in terms of Lesotho's inability to develop policies of good governance and political transformation is attributed to internal political conflict within the government structures that results in parallel policy implementation. The change of government

and the new political order of the coalition government of 2012 brought about a significant policy overhaul that hindered implementation of development policies (BTI, 2014). During that time, what was evident was the inherent need for the government to take charge and ensure proper coordination, which because of internal strife became a challenge in terms of the implementation of policies of good governance and political transformation (UNDP/DPCF, 2013). On several occasions, development partners' pressure towards the pursuance of policies of good governance and political transformation has worked positively to squeeze the hand of the government to change policies or implement them. The UN has envisaged that changing the government sphere should be seen as an advantage to afford authorities the opportunity to prioritise on scaling up service delivery and policy implementation (UN, 2008a).

The country is considered to have a considerable lack of skill from its public service human resources who are unable to identify developmental challenges and address them within provided time frames. This matter was also clear when the European Union announced the freezing of Lesotho's budget support fund to the tune of 483 million Euros in 2015 due to lack of sufficient reporting and implementation in the previous years. Such matters have been influenced by the shortage of critical management and technical skill to make the functions more efficient and put to use performance management systems (CDGG, 2012). Lack of appreciation to take stock of lessons learned and its inability to meet challenges have not helped the country to take corrective action. Lesotho has placed its confidence in intergovernmental organisations and international financial institutions to provide it with recommendations for a working solution to incapacity issues. Scholar state that Lesotho's policy is not based on research, but rather on intuition of what could work, which lacks scientific verification and validation (Nkuebe *et al.*, 2012). This has hindered the ability of the government of Lesotho to develop innovative interventions to address these recurring challenges (Kimaryo *et al.*, 2004). When Dr Pakalitha Mosisili was the Prime Minister of Lesotho, he was often criticised that his command failed to respond to development growth patterns and the challenges of the 21st century.

Development partners have expressed concern over the lack of data and evidence for technical specialists to generate informed plans and strategies for far-reaching development outcomes for Lesotho (EU, 2010). Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) for Lesotho peaked post-2012. Akhter *et al.* (2009:99) state in the report of the ODA on the poorest and hungry countries that there has been fluctuations of development assistance in Lesotho since 1992, when donors doubted the stability of the fragile democracy and it further declined as the country was clouded by political disputes and riots between 1998 and 2000. However, following the establishment of a political consensus-seeking body, the Independent Political Authority, as well as attempts to reorganise the country's fiduciary systems, donors' commitment improved markedly (GoL Hansard, 2013). Lesotho has gained significantly from ODA since 2001 (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2013:14).

By 2010, Lesotho had received an equivalent of per capita ODA amounting to \$118.00, which represents a marked increase from the \$58.47 in 2009. Since 1992, this was the highest per capita ODA received by Lesotho (BTI, 2014). Brewer (2013) posted in the Poverty Reduction Category Blog for Africa that with the adoption of the Millennium Challenge Account approach, Lesotho could further improve its share of ODA. Whilst DCI (2005) questioned the government's financial management system, it offered yet another solution, namely that the involvement of civil society in the use of development aid can improve efficiency in accelerating government's development effectiveness agenda significantly. Through the approved NSDP, the development partners find it more effective to align their support to Lesotho's development targets. This resulted in the United Nations' Delivering as One initiative committing a significant amount of about \$180 million in support of the implementation of the national plan (Gatti *et al.*, 2014). Although the international community expressed some concerns about the stability and absorptive capacity of the country in recent years, they still support the establishment of humanitarian initiatives that include regularisation of policies to guard against growing human trafficking (Tacoli, 2011:115; US State Department, 2010).

Lesotho was hit by a series of corruption scandals and misappropriation of funds, which affected its credibility as a reliable donor recipient country. As an example, Lesotho failed on a number of occasions to implement the national identity

registration programme due to bureaucratic malpractices in tendering processes (MCA Lesotho, 2014). This delayed the implementation of this donor-supported initiative, which was approved in 2013. The change of regime in 2012 was anticipated to bring hope to the many Basotho who were aggrieved as a result of the long-term rise to governance of the then former Premier Mosisili (GoL Budget Speech, 2014). However, this was short lived as Lesotho held snap elections in February 2015 and Mosisili bounced back to power. The new coalition government of 2012 attempted to bring to justice all the authorities who had been implicated in corrupt dealings, which was a sign of commitment to bring about necessary political transformation (Public Eye Online, 2013).

Hadebe (2011), writing about regional cooperation and hegemony with Lesotho as a case study, notes that Lesotho is still undecided, like many other sub-regional members of SADC, whether to follow in the adoption of SADC's regional integration project. SADC is confident about this project based on the previous success of another of the world's longest living regional integration customs unions, SACU, which was 103 years old in 2010 (Paliwal, 2010:208).

5.5.2 The role of development aid


Lesotho is among a few African countries (Botswana, Uganda, Zambia, etc.) that receive a significant amount of foreign aid to make up its national budget - approximately half of the entire national budget (Jeans & Kay, 2013). However, foreign aid has not supported substantially the programmes towards the consolidation of democracy due to lack of donor interest in the field of democratisation in Lesotho, compared to its regional counterparts (World Bank, 2012b). The government has shown commitment in funding governance processes, including electoral expenses, while receiving budget support towards election administration from donors. This realisation has improved the importance and visibility of donors as important players in political transformation in Lesotho (Kabemba, 2003). *Lesotho Times* reported in November 2014 that the country had a budget deficit of around M300 million for elections that would take place at the end of February 2015. The source of funding, as mobilised, would be solicited from regional

bodies such as SADC and the AU, including other local resident donor/development partners, such as the UNDP and EU (*Lesotho Times*, 2014a:4).

The international donor community remains important in influencing the political environment of Lesotho (Strategy, 2009). The outcome of the implementation of democratic rule in Lesotho was influenced by the donor community, which saw the abandonment of the military autocracy and the ushering in of democratic governance in 1993. Matlosa (2003) notes that this move precipitated political diversity, which was influenced by external pressure mounting on Lesotho to institutionalise a more inclusive model of good governance and political transformation. Although the donors precipitated this move towards political transformation, they did not commit much funding to support the process, as donor interest in Lesotho has been significantly low towards institutionalising a democratic government. Mwanza (2012:10-11) believes that this was not influenced by the instability of a fragile democracy since 1993 alone, but also the competing priorities of donors in Lesotho. In reality, what influenced many changes were the regional changes that would affect Lesotho should it not subscribe to the good governance agenda as envisaged. The apartheid system in South Africa had worked positively to mobilise donor support, but with the demise of the system, most donors shifted their focus in the hope that good governance and democratisation will automatically prevail (Mohiddin, 2002).

In the last half a decade, donors started losing interest in Lesotho. These include DfID, GTZ, and Irish Aid, which put an end to their long-term support and relocated to South Africa. Those that are still in residence in Lesotho have since decreased their donor support and assistance funding. This is illustrated in the table below, which demonstrates the scale of bilateral and multilateral assistance in Lesotho per donor contribution since 1999.

Figure 2: Net Official Development Assistance in \$m



(Source: *The Economist* Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Lesotho 2001)

As this chart indicates, Lesotho received net official development assistance of US 31.1 million in 1999. The International Development Association was the largest donor, contributing almost US\$ 8.1 million, followed by Ireland, contributing US\$7.5 million during this period.

Despite being one of the world's largest aid providers, donors such as Japan have extrapolated that even though the development assistance provided will be maintained, its future sustainability casts doubts, with a considerable number of donors affected by in-land austerity measures thus cutting back on their contributions (Ichihara, 2013). Development assistance in Lesotho since 2001 has focused much attention on improvement and laying the ground for good governance and political transformation through supporting the facilitation of electoral processes, procedures and mechanisms, their management and coordination (especially during the May 2002 elections), electoral education, and civic and voter education (Thornton *et al.*, 2010). The government of Ireland together with the UNDP in Lesotho have contributed substantially to electoral processes (Irish Aid/UNDP, 2008b). Their mandates as development partners dovetailed, with the UNDP focusing more on support for civic education (UNDP, 2013). On the other hand, the EU as the largest

multilateral aid givers provided budget support to the government of Lesotho worth around € 8 million for the period 2003 to 2007 (GHA Report, 2011). The German Foundation provided some form of assistance relating to democratic consolidation. Data below shows levels of assistance related to pro-democratic projects from donors.

Table 3: Major donors of democratic assistance and area-based pro-democracy projects since 2001

Name	Foreign Backers	Levels/Amounts (US\$)	Duration	Target Groups/ in US and implementers
Elections	Britain (DfID)	2,797,582.65	2001-2003	IEC, ERIS
Administration/IEC	Irish Aid, EU Public (EDF), India, Administration DANIDA, People (PAI), Scribe Republic of China,/Communications South Africa/ Commonwealth Secretariat/German Civic Education/UNDP	379,746	2001-2003	IEC, UNDP
Local NGOs Voter Education	Danida/Canada	487,341	2001-2003	IEC
Local NGOs Voters	Finland	87,201	2001-2003	IEC
Local NGOs, Disability Political Party, NDI	IEC/UNDP	395,000	2002-2003	Political Parties Development/ Parliamentary Development
Local Governance	GTZ/UNDP	210,126	2001-2003	IEC, Lesotho Management, British (DFID)

(Source: IEC/ERIS Capacity Building project progress report EISA RESEARCH REPORT NO 2 43 2003)

As much as internal politics played a role in the continuous decline in aid flows to Lesotho, it has also defined the present direction and nature of democratic assistance to the country. Compared to other African states (Nigeria, Tanzania and Malawi), Mbondenyi *et al.* (2013) note that the flow of aid was influenced by the need for democratic assistance, which was influenced by the new electoral system.

In their analysis of the behaviour of donor assistance after the May 2012 elections, the UNDP states that a large percentage of donor assistance was dedicated to building institutions of good governance and political transformation and to maintaining the electoral processes and reforms, structural review process and parliamentary reforms (UNDP, 2012). In 2015, the UNDP indicated that the UN has been providing targeted technical assistance to the IEC in preparation for the national elections held in February 2015, based on the UN's electoral needs assessment mission undertaken in October 2014 in response to an invitation from the Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho. Technical assistance has been focused on the areas of voter education and public outreach with special attention to the inclusion of youth, women and other disadvantaged groups, the coordination of observer missions and logistics pertaining to planning and preparation of voter materials. It does not include support for the distribution of voter materials within the country, which is handled by the IEC directly (UNDP, 2015).

The CDGG Action Plan on Electoral Process stipulates that the need to strengthen democratic programmes and democratisation for effective government institutions guide the donor development interventions (UNDP/IEC, 2012:13-17). This provides justification for the strengthening of parliamentary institutions and human rights structures, including the Office of the Ombudsman, local government structures, and conflict resolution processes. Lesotho's political transformation and good governance rested on parliamentary democracy and the resultant outcome to bring stability to the new electoral process (Work for Justice, 2009). Prominent NGOs were involved in the process of preparing the road to political transformation and good governance in support of stable democratic processes. This included the Lesotho Council of NGOs and Transformation Resource Centre, the most senior democracy consolidation institutions in Lesotho.

The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) provided impetus for conflict management and political tolerance⁴³. The LNCM has received a substantial amount of funding from the Open Society Institute, the American Government Embassy in Lesotho and the German Institute for Development (GTZ). The expectation of the funders is to see social change and conflict resolution activities (LUNDAP, 2012).

⁴³*The Centre for Conflict Resolution aims to contribute towards a just and sustainable peace in Africa by promoting constructive, creative and co-operative approaches to the resolution of conflict through training, policy development, research and capacity building (see <http://www.ccr.org.za>)*

Additionally, UNDP Lesotho launched its Electoral Support Programme in December 2014, focusing on the key areas of voter education, public outreach, training, logistics and coordination of observer initiatives. The project was envisioned to include both short-term electoral support activities as well as longer term enabling-environment support, with a total budget of \$899,999 funded jointly by USAID and UNDP. USAID-supported activities included the components of voter education and public outreach, as well as the training of various stakeholders (polling officers, party representative, chiefs, NGOs). The main project objectives were to support and promote the building of a conducive environment ahead of, during, and after the early elections in February 2015, leading to the acceptance of the results as well as addressing longer term structural, legislative and capacity issues to create a conducive environment for future elections (UNDP, 2015:3).

As mentioned by Kabemba (2003), ensuring sustainability of development assistance remains a challenge for Lesotho and its donors, while guarding against its effectiveness not to be overridden by the country's incessant poverty. The situation still prevails with the claim by the National Strategy Development Plan 2012-2013/2016-2017 that other factors outside of donor support programmes affect the effectiveness of current aid modalities, especially those earmarked for democratic assistance (GoL NSDP, 2012).

Although much of donor aid may be directed to democratic assistance, issues that address poverty are still affecting a share of development aid in Africa (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2010). Although development partners' focus is on the transformation and institutionalisation of political structures, their efforts might also be undermined by recent political instability in Lesotho and boosting an enabling economic environment for sustained development outcomes. The Institute for Defence Analysis' (IDA) team of African researchers indicate that the economic environment must be given a reasonable amount of support in order for development assistance to respond positively (IDA, 2013). Bilateral and multilateral donors operating in Lesotho after 2012 are aware of the country's urgent economic needs, and, as Biesman (2012) writes, Lesotho's main barrier to development is not precipitated by insufficient aid but by the country's slow absorptive capacity to respond to aid interventions.

5.6 Reflections: Conclusion

Tsikoane *et al.* (2007) show that the status of development and the need for development in Lesotho in light of increasing political intolerance since 2012 indicate that the country's future is troubled in terms of good governance and political transformation. The Lesotho Country Report also concludes that there is a marginal gap between the state's prioritisation of the poverty needs and political frustrations that erode the national vision of having a well-nurtured society, in peace with itself and its neighbours (BTI, 2014). The National Strategic Development Plan mostly builds the capacity of state-owned institutions like the National University of Lesotho (NUL) to provide skills to empower the Basotho to take the lead in addressing development challenges. This was a good move by Lesotho, demonstrating its commitment to addressing capacity constraints (APRM, 2010).

LCN (2014), in unpacking the Lesotho Budget Speech 2014/2015, emphasised the need for the government to focus attention on sectors that could benefit and support the country's marginal income for more improved social outcomes. The focus of this statement pointed towards sectors such as water, mining and tourism, which have proved to have the potential to provide capital for Lesotho's challenges by 2020. Bottlenecks⁴⁴ to Africa's development are precipitated by lack of capacity and financial muscle to invest in sectors that can contribute to the generation of income and budget support for the country's initiatives of democratisation and good governance, including poverty alleviation, which undermines development aid effectiveness (Simensen, 2008).

From the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that the implementation of Lesotho's NSDP 2012-2017, and the one year extension into 2018 could serve as a guide to provide answers to the question whether the country will remain deeply impoverished and positioned as the most affected poverty stricken nations amongst the LDCs. The chapter alludes to the fact that the government should create more opportunities for

⁴⁴Wangari Maathai enlists the following as causes of bottlenecks to Africa's development: *The absence of peace and security, destructive style of political and economic leadership, a frustrated democratisation process, inadequate international cooperation, little technology transfer, international debt, corruption, the international market injures Africa, poverty, population pressure, sustained hunger and poor health, illiteracy and ignorance, overuse of foreign languages, destroyed traditional knowledge and spiritual heritage. She suggests that the panacea for these bottlenecks will be if the political leaders of modern Africa identified three major objectives as they became the first post-colonial African rulers: to decolonise the entire continent; to promote unity; to effect economic and social development (Maathai, 1995).*

building state institutions. It is already a positive move towards commitment to good governance and political transformation for the country to embrace the coalition government as a means of cooperatively coming together by political authorities to address the needs of the nation. Based on the nature of the governance of the 2012 coalition government of Lesotho, the conclusion arrived at suggests that the success or failure of the new political era rests on its ability to implement the shared vision and campaign manifestos that complement the development and social needs of the country (Matjama, 2012). The litmus test will be to ensure the stability of governance and to secure continued confidence to development partners on the sustainability of the government and accountability to the citizenry, civil society, donor partners and the private sector (BTI, 2014). For good governance and democratisation to prevail, the new era of governance needs to ensure complete access to information to boost participatory decision-making and monitoring of Lesotho's development engagements.

During 2014, when the three-party coalition government was still in power, it was perceived by the World Bank in its analysis that the political stability of Lesotho is vested in the hands of the three coalition members to cooperate and work together. The World Bank had predicted that Lesotho would hold snap elections if the coalition government of 2012 failed to cooperate with one another. Indeed, the World Bank's political analysis came true as the country held snap elections in February 2015 (World Bank, 2014b). It would seem the World Bank was correct as the demise of the tripartite coalition government was affected by lack of political cooperation and tolerance of one another amongst the three members of the coalition government. Nonetheless, Lesotho still made tremendous progress in terms of democratic consolidation (CDGG, 2012). However, with the issues of political uncertainty and diminishing resources to deal with these challenges, development assistance may be derailed much more in the circles of humanitarian interventions.

The situation seems to have remained the same since Matlosa (2007) alluded to the challenges facing Lesotho having being vested in the rapid growth on new political leadership and the quest for gradual multi-party democracy. Similarly, the economy continues to face numerous challenges. These include a lower degree of diversification, low domestic savings leading to over-dependence on foreign capital

inflows, high unemployment, widening inequality and poverty, as well as spatial exclusion. Added to this is the burden of HIV/Aids, particularly on the young generation. Together with high inequality (Gini Index of 0.52) these have implications on social spending to protect the vulnerable population (ADB, 2015). This does not exempt Lesotho from improving its political system for effective representation both inside and outside parliament (UN, 2013a). Civil society must be empowered to breach the gap in the consolidation of democracy and strengthening the democratic processes (Irish Aid, 2010).

With these developments in mind, Lesotho continues to be hampered by a fragile democracy (BTI, 2012). On the other hand, efforts for systemic political transformation and consolidation of good governance are seen, with the political leadership attempting to work together for the collective good of Lesotho and the Basotho (UN, 2014). The next chapter will highlight how aid in Lesotho affected its development effectiveness for political transformation and good governance.

CHAPTER 6

INTERNATIONAL AID SUPPORT IN LESOTHO

6.1 Introduction

As discussed and conceptualised in Chapters 2 and 3, development aid interventions constitute contemporary foreign relations between development/donor partners and the recipient countries. The resultant basis has demonstrated that, as Riddell (2009) put it, practically every country gives and/or receives aid. Cockett (2008:8) clusters this phenomenon in the school of thought of neo-liberalism where the foundation of development aid interventions has moved from the theoretical margins to the political mainstream in which governments channel some of their aid funds to and through multilateral agencies. Cockett (*ibid.*) is of the opinion that institutions like the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions are the most prominent, the World Bank International Development Association (IDA) being one of the world's largest providers of aid funds. Alexander De Croo, Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium, speaking at a High-Level Plenary Meeting of Assistants and Prime Ministers, said that every year in which people live in extreme poverty is a lost year. To support one global agenda of equitable sustainable development, resources should be focused, first, on the least developed and fragile states, to which Belgium directs over half its Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA remains the most important source of development financing for many countries, particularly the least developed (UN, 2014).

In the same light, as demonstrated in Chapter 5.5, Lesotho has a considerable need for development aid as a result of the country's contextual position. It has been the general feeling of a number of donors that the situation in Lesotho that resulted in almost 725,000 people facing dire food shortages has put them under pressure to provide more funding (UN Country Report, 2013). Michelle Carter (2012), the Country Director for Care Lesotho, said:

At the beginning, donors pledged money despite emergencies in Syria, the Sahel and Gaza, but they have not come through ... It's a small country, not strategically located, so it has trouble getting the world's attention and funding.

She alludes to the fact that various donors had their reasons for intervening in the diminishing state of affairs in Lesotho, particularly basing their donor funding on the issues of poverty and poor economic performance that cripple provision of basic standards to cater for societal social and economic needs. For instance, the World Food Programme (WFP) supplemented its programme by providing cash vouchers of \$67 from 2012, as Lesotho is also confronted with the issue of a cash shortage over and above poor harvests. The WFP reached 200,000 people in 2012 with the distribution of food parcels, especially to the most vulnerable, the elderly, expectant mothers and breastfeeding women, together with children under the age of five (WFP, 2013). The EU, Irish Aid and US development partners deem as an emergency situation the issue of lack of follow-through on the pledges made in 2012 after the UN launched a \$38.5 million appeal for the food crisis for September 2012 to March 2013. The situation led to the declaration of a state of emergency in 2013 (UN, 2012b).

In light of the situation, the Deputy Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mothetjoa Metsing, when accepting the disaster response plan early in January 2016, noted that there was a need for an immediate response to mitigate the impact caused by the El Nino phenomenon. The interventions were organised, measured and monitored into immediate/short-term interventions from January 2016 to March 2016 and medium-term interventions in the next two months from April to May 2016 (Metsing, 2016).

Flooding, early rain and frost caused Lesotho to suffer a drop of about 70% in agricultural production by end of 2012. In addition to the natural calamities, there have been long-term agricultural problems, including a lack of access to technological inputs and a reduction of arable land through soil erosion and overgrazing (Tran, 2012). Another obstacle to Lesotho's development is the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which has affected almost a quarter of the population, estimated at 23% by the end of 2010 and 23.6% by the end of 2015 (LDHS, 2010; LDHS, 2014). The combination of these natural disasters, together with low household production and the prevalence of HIV/Aids, has forced people to make choices whether to buy food or lifesaving commodities (EU, 2013a).

Catherine Bragg, the then UN Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, warned in 2012 of the need for development partners to strengthen their efforts to promote disaster preparedness judging by the situation advanced above (Bragg, 2012). Following the early warning signs of El Nino in Lesotho, UN Resident Coordinator Ms. Karla Hershey further pointed out that climate change was threatening to reduce resilience in Lesotho, and added that the projected El Niño conditions between October 2015 and March 2016 would negatively affect agricultural production, causing food and nutrition insecurity in the country.

It is in this regard that this form of development aid responses is intended for promoting development and poverty reduction, as well as responding to a humanitarian crisis for a good cause, promoted by donor funding (Warmerdam & De Haan, 2011). As noted in earlier discussions, almost all the major critics of aid, from Peter Bauer in the 1980s to Dambisa Moyo in 2009, focus their attacks on development aid, and say little about the morality of humanitarian intervention even though it still represents development aid in one form or the other (Riddell, 2009).

In this chapter, attention is drawn to development aid interventions in Lesotho. The question that is of particular relevance is whether development aid works to address the enhancement of development initiatives and scaling down poverty as a major area of interest, while improving economic and social development as envisioned (OECD, 2009c:10). The objective of this chapter is to highlight the potential contribution of aid to economic growth and development, the challenges of realising that potential, and the role of aid in addressing those challenges. This will be assessed and evaluated using a Results Chain Model of the Resources and Results Framework to evaluate the contribution and effectiveness of development aid in Lesotho for good governance and political transformation. The chapter thus seeks to provide a new school of thought that confirms the net effectiveness of development aid interventions to improved social outcomes. The absence of development aid has provided development gaps and no meaningful contribution to Lesotho's economic growth. The research presents a rationale for donors and both local and international financing institutions, government allies and bilateral relations to provide "more and better" aid, and explains why aid can be an important instrument in a pro-poor development strategy. It is in this light that the starting point is that development aid

does not only allay poverty, but enhances the country's institutional and reform programmes to achieve political transformation and good governance. According to the Ethiopia MDGs Synthesis Report (2005:55-56), the major focus in provision of aid remains whether aid helps the poor to move out of the situation of poverty and underdevelopment. The question would thus draw a picture of the applicability of the concept of good governance in the area of development aid and systemic political transformation.

Development aid thus recognises lack of capacity for institutional performance, systemic transformation and wide-ranging disparities through which aid is channelled. This thought on disparities dates back a couple of decades when scholars, for example Rigby (1993:1), stated:

While experts may hail the global spread of democracy and the lifting of the threat of nuclear war, political and economic instability has reached an unprecedented level. One need look no further than the Third World. Developing countries remain mired in economic crisis as the disparities between North and South become increasingly pronounced. The gap between rich and poor has doubled in the past 30 years, so that we now live in a world in which 20% of its people consume more than 80% of its wealth.

The measurement framework, the Results Chain Model offers guidance and insight to substantiate or discard claims made by and on behalf of development assistance by measuring its outcomes and impacts against the planned intervention and inputs.

The Results Chain

Investment by all stakeholders

INPUTS	Human capital	Personal inputs	Time	Plans	Resources inputs
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What will all stakeholders achieve, used to determine the state of something to show changes or measure progress in achieving some aim, goal or target.

INDICATORS	Increased number of development programmes	Percentage of programmes benefiting the people	Enhanced national planning and coordination	Improved capacity of national governments to absorb development assistance
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What all implementers achieve

OUTPUTS	Good services	Change in skills and capabilities	System evaluations	Continuous investment on environment
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Changes in capacity and performance of the primary duty-bearers

OUTCOMES	Change in behaviour or attitudes	Institutional efficiency	Policy formulation competencies	Social action & Decision making
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In this measurement framework, there is an embedded linkage to development assistance in Lesotho that shows overall situation, needs, issues and priorities of the key stakeholders, the donors, development partners and recipients of development assistance. This is influenced by a diversity of factors that range from political, social, environmental and economic that may affect or precipitate achievement of results. By nature, results chain varies from country to country based on the situation, government structures and capacity. It measures whether the results reflect the inputs, resources and capacities.

In this study, the expected outcomes can range from whether,

- Results are relevant, representative, and strategic for program management and operational effectiveness;
- They are relevant, planned outcomes, and strategic
- Are sustainable national achievements
- Results-based policy dialogue and decision making offer representation of good governance
- There is adequate accountability on results
- Good performance of public policies and programs and development results
- Adaptive, inclusive and context sensitive

In the same light, the donors still find the gap wide and unachievable in the wake of the 2015 endeavours and show that less than two years before reaching the target date of the MDGs, it was clear that some goals were out of reach (MDGs, 2013a). Meale (2013:6) directed attention to the non-achievability of the goals by 2015, focusing on and stating that much more remains to be done all over the world to save the lives of young children and their mothers, to stop violence against women

and children, to guarantee access to health care and to decent work, and to protect the environment. Fuelled by this assumption, the global crisis in terms of food, fuel and financial shortfalls have increased the financing requirements of developing countries, which make them more vulnerable and fragile, and requiring deeper and larger resource allocations. Consequently, the OECD (2009b:28) said the following:

Even before the financial crisis, the gap between aid commitments and delivery was large. Global ODA was USD 15 billion short of expected ODA in 2008 if development partners had been increasing aid at a constant rate since 2004 to meet their 2010 commitments. Preliminary findings of the latest OECD-DAC survey on aid allocation policies suggest an almost USD20 billion shortfall in the country programmable aid (CPA) required to meet 2010 targeted increases.

This called for an agenda for change in which a comprehensive National Development Framework with a few well-focused themes would drive for growth and therefore achieve the MDGs and the post-2015 development agenda, including poverty reduction (agriculture, food security, affordable energy, roads, health, and education, good governance, deepening democracy, decentralisation and service delivery). A press release by the Council of the European Union set the tone for reconsidering the priority of development aid as aid effectiveness in terms of results orientation, strong policy dialogue, coherence, transparency and mutual accountability, hence political transformation and good governance (EU Press Release, 2012b).

The World Bank Lesotho Review (2013) confirms that Lesotho is one of the largest beneficiaries of aid programmes, and it has the highest levels of assistance programmes. The Joint UNDP/Irish Aid Programme, the CDGG, clarifies that through aid programmes in Lesotho in the past decades, efforts of development aid addressed the negative effects of HIV/Aids, poverty reduction and the improvement of the livelihood of the Basotho, the education challenges, health and access to basic services such as rural water and sanitary services, and other cross-cutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and good governance (CDGG Programme 2008-2009, 2009). Other development partners, including the European Union, reiterated that it was the effect of this intervention that needed to be put under a microscope to assess its effectiveness and the contribution to political transformation and good governance (EU 10th EDF, 2006).

A country-based process for reviewing and analysing the national development situation and identifying key issues as a basis for advocacy and policy dialogue promulgated programmes such as the Lesotho Public Sector Reform and Improvement Programme (PSIRP), which was introduced to provide training for service delivery efficiency, accountability and good governance (UN, 2013a). The basis for these interventions in a generic assumption is that they will grow the economy and benefit the poor. The UN provided the principle of providing aid, demonstrating that when this aid was provided against the assumption above, there was little interest attached to its effectiveness. Certain conditions attached to aid can also be ideologically driven, for example, the World Bank President, Jim Yong Kim, referred to how European and American farm subsidies “are crippling Africa’s chance to export its way out of poverty”.

Truell (1995:47) maintained:

While this criticism comes from many perspectives, Wolfensohn’s note on export also suggests that some forms of development assistance may be on the condition that nations reform their economies to certain ideological positions. Structural Adjustment has been one of these main policies as part of this neoliberal ideology, to promote export-oriented development in a rapidly opened economy.

As far back as 1971, Hayter attacked official aid not because of its failures but because she believed it was attached to the wrong perception that it was seen to be working well (Hayter, 1971:36).⁴⁵ In approaching the issue of aid effectiveness and its contribution to good governance and political transformation, focus is put on trying to understand the intervention areas and different features impeding aid for a greater impact, giving prominence to the main constraints and giving high priority to working areas of interventions (Wood *et al.*, 2008). These authors state:

The Paris Declaration is relevant to some of the main issues regarding the effectiveness and strategic use of aid, and it encourages greater impetus toward development goals. At the same time the Declaration is not necessarily designed to offer any tailored solutions to some of the other most pressing development preoccupations, such as: The

⁴⁵*The notion that official foreign aid is in reality intended to alleviate poverty in the Third World dies hard. The actual function of aid from Western governments and their agencies, the World Bank and the IMF, is to subsidise the operations of the private corporations and banks of the West. This is not a conspiracy theory. It is a conclusion painfully and slowly reached after many years of research (Hayter, 1971).*

management of devolution and de-centralisation; human resource and capacity issues; new thematic thrusts in development; sustainability of the results of development projects and programmes; environmental issues; gender concerns; or better management of non-aid financing for development (Wood *et al.*, 2008:xii-xiv).

The same opinion was embedded in the OECD experience, revealing that development aid prioritised reforms of formal institutions, structural transformation and relationships to forge synergy, harmonisation and cooperation; this is the angle of political transformation against which the effectiveness of aid is measured. According to Daley (2008), the key to success of the decisions that govern collective action rests in the agencies' willingness to monitor themselves and each other. Kreibich (2013:38) confirms the point that the 12 indicators of the Paris Declaration could be used as a basis for an analysis of the collaboration efforts of development agencies. Sharing the results with all parties involved guarantees maximum transparency and allows for meaningful feedback and improvements.

Similar sentiments were echoed by Levine & Savedoff (2015:275-293), who insisted that foreign aid can be helpful in many ways, but it is particularly useful for learning how to make public programmes more effective. They were referring to public programmes financed through any combination of domestic and external resources and operated by government agencies at either national or sub-national level or by NGOs.

Speaking at a tour of three schools as part of the first assessment of the progress made by the WFP in the construction of kitchens and storerooms at 23 schools in the five districts of Maseru, Mhale's Hoek, Leribe, Butha-Buthe and Mokhotlong, WFP Country Director Mary Njoroge reiterated that aid is uniquely suited to finance the impact evaluations that provide strong evidence and policy-relevant knowledge that can benefit many and that can help build and reinforce trust between governments and citizens (*Lesotho Times*, 2014b). She demonstrated that with development assistance, output yielded contributing in building efficient institutions of education for social action. At one time, aid served to fill a financing gap that held countries back, providing the resources that would otherwise not be available for large infrastructure and energy projects, manufacturing investments and later to construct and supply schools and health facilities (Hjertholm & White, 2000; White & Dijkstra, 2013).

This chapter draws together a reflection on aid interventions in so far as which entry points were utilised for the promotion of good governance and political transformation in Lesotho to achieve aid effectiveness, accountable public authorities, rule-based democratic and market institutions, and how elements of effective public authority are actually being created in a variety of ways. It calls for an in-depth discussion on the approach of development interventions, institution-specific capacity building programmes and incentives that underpin the approach to strategies to change and develop.

6.2 Early development aid interventions in Lesotho

As mentioned in the Lesotho Donor Matrix in Chapter 4, during the post 1950s new democracies in many parts of the world, especially in Southern Africa, were characterised by a growing need to strengthen democracy and good governance. These were influenced by conditionalities bilateral donors espoused at that time in exchange for giving foreign aid, grants or loans that would assist less developed countries to strengthen institutional and systemic transformation in conformity with the donor country principles of political transformation, democratisation and good governance. The UNDP Human Development Office reported as follows:

The countries of the global North have responded to the increasing power of the global South as a global policy shaper with growing sovereignty concerns of their own. They have followed a strategy of venue shifting, taking issues of importance to them into forums like the Bretton Woods institutions, in which decision-making is still weighted in their favour, or by setting up informal, smaller negotiation venues where they can define the agenda as well as the circle of participants ... The better strategy would be for all to realize their national public policy interests in establishing fair and effective international cooperation (Malik & Kugler, 2013:302-303).

The premise above was influenced by Santiso (2001:386) who earlier pointed out that after a decade of democracy assistance and considerable resources expended, the strategies pursued by international donors appear to have fallen short of their initial expectations, especially in Sub-Sahara Africa. This became a primary pillar of strength to facilitate institutional building. As a result of countries' cooperation, some scholars envisaged this as democratic aid, which includes activities oriented towards administrative and political institutions. Administrative and political institutions are

meant to improve the functioning structures for implementation, where of primal importance is the consolidation of democracy, activities oriented towards institutional forms, such as support in writing constitutions to have effect on political transformation and systemic reform (Agnes, 2008:18). However relevant the importance of support towards institutionalising reforms, USAID (2013) states that over the past ten years, the Building Local Capacity project, an initiative of USAID and Management Science for Health (MSH), has worked closely with the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) involving local authorities, traditional structures and civil society organisations to advocate for implementing policies and services that support access to community-based care for those infected and affected by HIV and Aids. With this programme the primary target was to reach 68,150 orphans and their caregivers with six types of services (legal and protection; education, health, psychosocial and spiritual support; food security and nutrition; and economic strengthening) in five target districts including Mphahle's Hoek, Mokhotlong, Quthing and Thaba Tseka. This was a show of the contemporary thinking in development assistance which touches upon aid inclusivity and cooperation by all stakeholder, and the results as seen, was increased number of beneficiaries reached with effective policies to deal with the factors that affected community development and to build capacity of beneficiaries to change behaviour. Although despite these efforts, Lesotho further declined and dropped to position two in terms of HIV prevalence, failing to establish the effect of donor funding. MSH (2014) expressed concern that Lesotho has the second highest prevalence of HIV in the world, estimated at 23.6% in terms of the Lesotho Demographic and Health Survey 2014. This was a result of the unmet targets of the MDGs which required system evaluation as addressed under the contemporary thinking in the SDGs Agenda 2030. UNAIDS added to this diminishing status by confirming an estimated severity of HIV infections in which at the end of 2013, 28,000 children under the age of 15 were estimated to be HIV-positive. Meanwhile, results of the report on the situation of orphans and other vulnerable children in Lesotho completed in 2011 estimated that 33.8% of all children under 18, or 363,526, were orphans (MSH, 2014).

Similarly, a rather institutional perspective saw a shortfall in focusing attention on building political substance as opposed to ensuring stability of governance institutions by state building capacity and promoting positive change (Carothers,

2009:9). This background also affected Lesotho's context when donors began to take centre stage in the development of structural and systemic transformation for better social outcomes in the country. This resulted in capacitating institutions of governance to ensure that implementers produce good quality of services having consideration to the country context. Lesotho's response to development interventions were influenced by the country's unique geographical context (e.g only 13% of cultivatable land), resource endowments (abundance of flowing water for income), colonial history (constitutionalising and governance structure of Westminster), developments in neighbouring South Africa, as well as regional and global developments (SACU revenues and dependency of currency) (ADB Kingdom of Lesotho, CSP 2008-2012, BTI, 2014).

Handley *et al.* (2009: 11-12) agree that aid interventions are geared towards support to poverty reduction initiatives and growth strategies, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, which includes Lesotho. With this in mind, the development aid in Lesotho carried out structural improvement and reforms that would enhance speedy service delivery and effective governance following the structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s⁴⁶ to enhance relevancy and effectiveness in planning for results. Sharing the same sentiments, the then Minister of Development Planning, Senator Moeketsi Majoro, speaking at an awareness session of the Post-2015 Agenda, reiterated that poverty in Lesotho has increased since the turn of the 21st century. According to Majoro, as of 2013, more than half of the population was living below the poverty line on a dollar a day (USD1).

The 1996 *Pathway out of Poverty* report⁴⁷ presented the first fundamental framework focused on the reduction of poverty. The report advocated for the alignment of multi-donor strategies, the inclusion of NGOs and the Government of Lesotho (GoL) as partners in aligning policy transformation and institutional strengthening. The

⁴⁶Structural Adjustment Policies are economic policies which countries must follow in order to qualify for new World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and help them make debt repayments on the older debts owed to commercial banks, governments and the World Bank. Balancing national budgets can be done by raising taxes, which the IMF frowns upon, or by cutting government spending, which it definitely recommends. As a result, SAPs often result in deep cuts in programmes like education, health and social care, and the removal of subsidies designed to control the price of basics such as food and milk (Bird, 2001).

⁴⁷The report explored the evidence of poverty in Lesotho, its geographical distribution and forwarded practical priority policy change necessary to reduce poverty (*Pathway Out of Poverty: Action Plan for Lesotho, 1996*).

Strategic Economic Options Study⁴⁸ followed suit, giving way to efforts to effect economic outcomes and good governance. The outcomes showed improved government capacity to develop relevant development plans that are aimed at achieving sustainable national outcomes.

6.2.1 Call for humanitarian aid in Lesotho

One of the earliest development aid interventions in Lesotho was in the form of food aid⁴⁹. Food aid was provided on the development aid modality of bilateral agreements, especially those that have been influenced by political consideration. Steets and Hamilton (2009:3) confirm that food aid was the result of the surplus disposal programme of the US in the 1950s and has since evolved conceptually, politically and institutionally. Food aid dependence still exists in Lesotho as we saw the then Prime Minister Thabane in 2012 declaring a food crisis and calling a state of emergency (Thabane, 2013). The situation, with the protracted drought and El Nino conditions since October 2015, is likely to continue for a considerable period. Rosen *et al.* provide evidence that in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Eritrea and Lesotho nearly 100 percent of the population is projected to remain food insecure throughout the projection period (Rosen *et al.*, 2012:14).

Scholars have confirmed that food aid efforts in Lesotho have been the combined efforts of foreign governments, organisations and agencies, most importantly USAID, the EU, the WFP and the United Kingdom through Save the Children Fund, among others (Makenete *et al.*, 1998:254). This has influenced development partners to supplement dietary requirements as plans of action and disaster response strategies are mounted to assist Lesotho to manage the food crisis and reduce dependence on development and humanitarian aid (Harvey *et al.*, 2010:45).

In 2013, the then Prime Minister of Lesotho, Motsoahae Thabane, stated the following:

⁴⁸The report examined a number of strategic options that could be considered in addressing and dealing with critical issues limiting economic development in Lesotho (*Strategic Economic Options Study Phase II: Final Report- Summary Document*, 1997).

⁴⁹ Food aid is a form of transferring food from one country or organisation known as a donor to a recipient country or agency (Food aid is intended to fill the food gap experienced by countries that are unable to produce or commercially import enough food to meet residual local demand (Makenete, Ortmann & Darrock, 1998).

Lesotho has experienced declining levels of food production from 2005/06 to 2008/09. The level of production peaked in 2009/2010 and then started to decline in 2010/11 due to the devastating heavy rains that destroyed infrastructure, crops and housing. The Vulnerability Assessment that was conducted by the Disaster Management Authority (DMA) concluded that an estimated 725,519 people will need humanitarian assistance this year, 2012/2013. Both of these assessments confirm a food crisis for 2012/2013 cropping season (Thabane, 2013:1-2).

With the realisation of Third World countries' dependency on food aid, the fight against global hunger has taken centre stage in the design of development partners' country assistance frameworks. Since 2000, for instance, the government of Ireland has contributed €5.8 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) (European Report on Development, 2013):

There has been significant development progress over the past 20 years. While the world's population has increased by a third, world GDP has tripled, helping millions of people to work their way out of poverty (OECD, 2012b).

The World Economic and Social Survey (2013) indicate that donor expenditure suggests that there is a strong poverty focus from the global development agenda. Ireland pledged to commit to an integrated approach to development focused on the poorest countries, and especially on the poorest people and communities. This has since influenced donors' perspective to focus on an integrated approach to development, with particular concentration on the poorest countries, poorest people and communities by providing basic services, social sectors (education and health), local development and food security, which remain at the centre of humanitarian interventions (Cohen, 2010).

Similarly, almost all donor specific targets in Lesotho look to reach consensus that relates to the priorities situated around poverty alleviation. The 2003 OECD DAC Peer Review of Ireland bears testimony to the fact that the programme had a sharp focus on poverty reduction, a point reiterated strongly in the 2009 Peer Review of Ireland, which recognised the concentration of Ireland's development assistance on a limited number of poor countries as one of its strengths. This constitutes the foundation of aid interventions in Lesotho in which other donors joined in to assist in support to similar initiatives, enhancing the mutual cooperation to ensure aid is effective.

6.3 Background towards principles of development support (institutional strengthening, reform processes, review performance, etc.)

Evidence and previous discussions have in various ways demonstrated that development support towards Third World countries in Africa is premised on the fundamental pillars of attainment of good governance, poverty alleviation and political transformation, also the main principles of the MDGs and the new Agenda for 2030 sustainable development. Although the claim is that development aid has responded to poverty, slow economic growth and poor governance in Sub-Saharan Africa still remain a challenge in several ways (Handley *et al.*, 2009:34). However, another perspective posits that poverty in Lesotho is deeply entrenched in rural areas, where about 70 percent of the population lives. For instance, more than half of the rural population is poor, and more than one quarter of these are considered extremely poor (AAIL, 2015). Suggestions from donor partners link poverty to lack of income and unemployment. Although Lesotho's gross national income per capita is relatively high for sub-Saharan Africa, there are however visible signs of the high level of inequality in income distribution (IFAD, 2013).

The African Development Bank Report (2006) dissected Lesotho's Country Governance Profile⁵⁰, equating the injection of development aid as relative to good governance. The basis of this presumption was premised on five cardinal principles of financial accountability, namely to monitor and evaluate expenditure control; transparency by access to information to fundamental human rights; stakeholder participation including local authorities; combating corruption through reforms; legal and judicial efficiency to speed up processes of the judicial sector and capacitate its ability to perform. The main pillars of performance were based on the Lesotho government's framework explained in the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the National Vision 2020 that set the tone for early aid interventions in the light of realising the socio-economic development of the country. Lesotho's Vision 2020

⁵⁰The promotion of good governance in Regional Member Countries (RMCs) has become central in the implementation of the Bank Group's mandate of poverty reduction. Both the Bank Group Vision Statement and Strategic Plan for the period 2003-2007 emphasise the promotion of good governance in RMCs as one of the important building blocks for the fight against poverty. In order to effectively implement the Bank Group's Policy on Governance, the production of Country Governance Profile (CGPs) has emerged as the main analytical instrument for operationalising the Bank's policy agenda. The overall objective of the Lesotho CGP is to present a comprehensive analysis of major governance issues in the country and to identify possible areas for the Bank Group's intervention (ADB Country Profile, 2006:2).

document identifies seven pillars of development as key components of the vision statement. These are democracy, unity, peace, education and training, economic growth, management of the environment, and advancement in technology. Based on an assessment of past development trends and an analysis of the pertinent strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, the document identified factors that are pivotal to Lesotho's development (KoL, National Strategy Development Plan, 2012/13:vii).

Table 4: Areas of Intervention on Good Governance by Key Development Partners

DONOR COORDINATION IN GOVERNANCE AND POTENTIAL AREAS	
1. Development Corporation Ireland (DCI)	
1.1	<p>On Governance Focused on strengthening the role of the civil society in</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. PRS b. Parliamentary Reform, Office of the Ombudsman and c. Election Issues
1.2.	<p>On PSIRP Assistance towards</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Training for budget and finance officers in ministries and local authorities; b. Establishing resource envelop for financing local authorities; c. Establishing appropriate legislations for all financial operations; d. Strengthening internal controls within the public service; e. Restructuring the Central Tender Board and improving public service management
2. United Kingdom's Department of International Development (DfID)	
2.1.	<p>On Governance Is providing support through PRS Foundation Programmes for</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Strengthening the government's poverty monitoring function; b. Development of a dynamic and sustainable civil society engaged in monitoring and shaping the implementation of PRS; c. Strengthening GoL's Public Finance Management Systems, including accountability; d. Strengthening government revenue collection through the establishment of LRA; and e. Supporting GoL to coordinate activities around PRS and PSIRP more effective issues; f. Enhance Financial Management and Reforms of the procurement System
2.2	<p>PRS Priority Support Programme Is focusing on mitigating the impact of</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. HIV/Aids; b. Job creation by improving investment climate, and c. Improving food security
2.3	<p>Lesotho Justice Sector Programme Assistance for development of the Justice Sector</p>
3. European Union	
3.1	<p>On governance Complementing its ongoing capacity building in</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. MOFDP and falling within the government's PSISP; b. Capacity Building in Economic Planning Project (CBEPP) aimed at addressing institutional and analytical constraints within MOFDP; c. To strengthen GoL's capacity in macroeconomic management, the collection and analysis of statistics, sectoral planning, demographic research and population and manpower modelling
3.2	<p>PSIRP</p>

To provide support for

- a. Improving macroeconomic planning;
- b. Strengthening the capacity of the Bureau of Statistics; and
- c. Developing decentralised Financial Management Systems

4. German Technical Assistance/ Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau

4.1 European Donor Agencies (EDAL)

Provided a framework for Development Partners through the PSIRP to

- a. Provide assistance to GoL in a harmonised and coordinated manner;
- b. Prepare costed matrices by income and outputs as regards the PSIRP;
- c. Pledge to provide some assistance to GoL to enable it to successfully implement the PSIRP

4.2 Support GTZ to focus on

- a. The decentralisation process as regards governance issues

5. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

5.1 On governance

Through its governance programme UNDP is supporting Lesotho to

- a. Deepen democratic governance by providing support to
 - i. Strengthening internal organisation of the Legislature and training Parliamentary members and staff for better oversight roles;
 - ii. Putting in place National Decentralisation Strategies and developing gender-sensitive local-based planning, and
 - iii. Strengthening public sector reform and transparency and accountability institutions
UNDP is providing support for
 - i. Assisting the Office of the Speaker;
 - ii. Supporting the establishment of portfolio committees and Parliamentary Reform Committees;
- iii.** Assisting key line ministries in the development of sector decentralisation plans.

(Source: Kingdom of Lesotho Country Strategy Paper 2008-2012, Regional Department, September 2008)

Based on the submission as tabled above, it is concluded that development aid in Lesotho has been clustered more on achieving good governance and poverty reduction, strengthening initiatives to deepen democracy, improvement of governance at all levels and to improve security, safety, as well as the efficiency of the justice system (KoL PRS 2004/05-2006/07, 2010).

In 2006, the government of Ireland released its position statement on the reasons why they find it prudent to provide aid to Lesotho. In the Irish Aid White Paper (2006) the main priority for giving aid has been alleviation of poverty, reducing vulnerability and increasing opportunities for development (Irish Aid White Paper, 2006:3). The Irish government furthermore supported the promotion of human development, human security and justice, the building and strengthening of democracy, the promotion of gender equality and the promotion and protection of human rights. The 2008-2012 Country Strategy Paper supported institutional capacity in Lesotho that focuses on promotion of good governance, democracy and human rights. Ireland

provided aid to the value of €9.3 million in assistance to Lesotho in which spending was to grow in line with the commitments of the UN target of 0.7% of GDP. Ireland's philosophy was based on the level of need in which it ascertained that almost a quarter of the nation lives on less than \$1 a day, which disempowered and marginalised people, increased vulnerability and limited opportunities (Irish Aid, 2010b). Their purpose for providing aid was largely to avoid weak governments and societies, helping children to survive, and providing settings to give people enough food to eat and clean water to drink. Nonetheless, Makoa (2015:6) insists that Lesotho remains a weak state, as in 2014 the government lost control of the most powerful institution of government which does not recognise the government. He alludes to the military as an institution at the core of the security of the country. Makoa writes that when the army is more powerful than other forces, the state is a praetorian state (*ibid.*).

As discussed above, poor governance is a problem in Lesotho and many developing countries, characterised by lack of capacity to build institutions and systems that are accountable and effectively meet the needs of most of their citizens (Evaluation of CDGG Programme, 2013). One particular challenge arises with the strengthening of civil society advocacy work. The CSP of the Irish Aid support to Lesotho required clarity by way of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) on the objective to support civil society advocacy, which requires active citizen participation in Lesotho's development. The White Paper on Irish Aid (2005) indicated that in line with the approach of the Africa Strategy of September 2011, Ireland's official engagement in Lesotho should have a strong political and, to the extent possible, an economic dimension in addition to its development focus.

The DfID led the UK government's focus on development assistance to promote efforts of poverty reduction in poorer countries, particularly targeted at achieving targets set in MDGs (KU DfID Country Strategy Paper, 2002-2006). The DfID contributes to the implementation of the service delivery agenda in Lesotho, which forms an agenda for a number of development partners in Lesotho as a far-reaching approach to exploring deepening democracy, improvement of good governance, and attaining democratisation; while the Voice and Accountability Programme focuses on capacity building of the civil society programme (Gayfer *et al.*, 2005). Hershey (2015)

emphasizes that through bilateral and regional programmes, concerted efforts have been put together to support the GoL to provide more efficient and effective services to its citizens, increase the public revenue, scale down the HIV/Aids pandemic, and ensure a productive workforce, while supporting orphans and vulnerable children.

The DfID in turn operates a sectoral support, which comprises aid modalities that strengthen good governance (DfID, 2009). This includes areas of improving revenue collection and achieving international standards in service delivery and revenue collection, as well as providing budget support for strengthening planning, procurement, and auditing. The final expected outcome will be for development assistance to improve the investment and business climate in Lesotho to sustain efforts of socio-economic growth and development (DfID, 2013).

The DfID continues to support the programme Apparel Lesotho Alliance to Fight AIDS (ALAFA) to educate, prevent and provide treatment to over 48,000 women who work in the garment industry. Ellis *et al.* (2009:211-213), writing on social protection in Lesotho through a regional behavioural change programme, confirm that the stated programmes above were intended to reach out to vulnerable people and support the system of protection of children. At district level, UNICEF leads a programme that coordinates civil society organisations working with vulnerable children (Khubotle, 2015). Njoroge's (2015) reiterates the commitment of donor partners in Lesotho to support humanitarian interventions, with the WFP committed to providing food security. The WFP also provides technical advisers to assist with vulnerability assessment to be in a better position to focus on future hunger gaps in order to inform policy responses.

DfID funding in 2009 was £700,000 and will sharply increase to about £6.7 million, as projected in 2015 (DfID, 2011). As a member of the Development Partners Consultative Forum (DPCF) in Lesotho, significant funding was channelled to aligning the programme to national priority areas, especially strengthening democracy and supporting the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). This support spearheaded relationships with development partners with relevant and actual interventions with NGOs and CSOs (SCIL, 2010). This multi-sectoral support ensured positioning of the DfID as a leader in bilateral aid programmes to Lesotho's development impact. However, the withdrawal of the British Council from Lesotho

(the High Commission was moved to South Africa) negatively impacted on the situation. Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) Director Tony Dykes had the following to say:

It seems Lesotho has being singled out for being small. This decision will hit the country hard and the people it will most affect are the ordinary people of Lesotho. There is no logic to the decision on the grounds of poverty. The British aid programme was one of the largest to Lesotho and we urge a rethink of this decision (Dykes, 2011:1).

There are a number of areas where the DfiD's performance might have been improved. However, the DfiD's strategy and programme has been insufficiently focused on the HIV/Aids crisis. The DfiD also made large contributions to the improvement of donor coordination and harmonisation, even though there were signs of a lack of the strengthening of government coordination of donor activity and lack of a clear strategy for advancing donor harmonisation (GoL, 2012). An internal drive in DfiD Southern Africa (DFIDSA) to work regionally has caused regional programmes to struggle to relate effectively to the special development challenges and needs of Lesotho (with the notable exception of ComMark, or Making Commodities and Service Markets work for the Poor) (DfiD, 2013). According to the 2013 MDG Status Report, issued jointly by the government of Lesotho and the United Nations, the prevalence of HIV/Aids in Lesotho is preventing the country from attaining its development goals. The impact of the HIV/Aids epidemic in Lesotho has lowered the life expectancy to just 48.7 years (UN Report, 2014).

The European Union's approach to aid in Lesotho entails a focus on the rural poor. Following a protracted process of consultations and wide participation by the people of Lesotho, representatives from government, CSOs and development partners, the county presented its first Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2004/2005 and 2006/2007 with the assistance of the EU (EU Relations with Lesotho, 2006).

The EU contributes approximately 75% of grant aid to Lesotho (UNDP, 2012). Apart from the European International Bank, other financial and technical donors are the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the International Monetary Fund, AfDB/AfDF, BADEA, Kuwait Fund, GFATM and the UN agencies. China, Japan and the United States' contribution to Lesotho is much more significant. The

10th EDF (2008) provided 136,000 000 euros to Lesotho. The indicative allocation of the 11th EDF is 142,000,000 euros for 2013-2017. This envelope covers long-term programmable development operations under the strategy in which reduction and eradication of poverty remain the key priority areas (EU, 2014).

The UNDP plays a prominent role in orchestrating the technical assistance and programme support received from the UN family, major development partners and from small contributions from NGOs. The UNDP, together with EDF, will also support the decentralisation process (EU Country Programme, 2006). This follows the SWAP (Sector Wide Approach Programme) with multi-donor participation financing under a single agreement. In terms of the EU development mandate, infrastructural development and systemic transformation form the cornerstone of the Programme (EU, 2013c).

The mainstream approach of the EU programme is seen in four cross-cutting approaches of democracy, good governance, human rights and the rights of the children and indigenous people, gender equality and environmental sustainability (EU, 2010). Within this framework, the EU strategy provides for the promotion of sustainable development in areas of

- ✓ promoting peace, security and good governance for sustainable development;
- ✓ supporting regional trade integration and promotion of economic development; and
- ✓ improving access to the basic social services, health and education, in particular.

The 9th EDF in similar fashion concentrated on macro-economic support and capacity-building initiatives for systemic transformation and good governance (United Nations Action Plan for Lesotho, 2010a).

The UN programme in Lesotho reflects an integrated approach across poverty reduction, environmental management, democratic governance and the cross-cutting areas of HIV/Aids and gender based on policy support and strengthening of institutional capacities (UN, 2013b). The UN's approach to development aid builds on and scales-up innovative approaches to building capacities for service delivery. The programme strategy is to support Lesotho in leveraging its development opportunities and resources to transform the economy, empower the Basotho people, and build resilience (UNDAF, 2010). The UNDP addresses three key areas

that lie at the core of the development challenge, namely capacities, coordination and collaboration in each of the three pillars of sustainable development (economic, social and environmental). The key pillar of the UN's work in Lesotho is governed by the Country Programme Document 2008-2013 and more recently the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF, 2013-2017). In these papers, the UN supports the promotion of transparent, accountable and effective governance at all levels, managing environmental changes and adopting an integrated approach to the sustainable management of natural resources, and using the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy as the main tool to reduce poverty. The UNDP is trying to eradicate poverty through the empowerment of youth, men and women in order to ensure that decent, sustainable jobs are created (Country Programme Development Plan, 2013-2017). The UNDP is focusing on supporting the promotion of transparent, accountable and effective governance at all levels. Specific emphasis is on capacity strengthening of governance institutions, as well as supporting the decentralisation process. Since the restoration of democratic rule in 1993, the UNDP has worked hand-in-hand with all the stakeholders to strengthen the country's democracy and to promote a culture of dialogue and negotiation for resolution of national issues (UNDP Resident Coordinator Annual Report, 2010). Lesotho has made great progress in deepening democracy, including successfully coordinating and holding the country's first local government elections in April 2005. In this area, UN support emphasis is on three interlocking issues that will enable the Basotho to effectively respond to challenges, such as a humanitarian crisis, devastating drought and the protracted shortage of food (UNDP Country Programme Action Plan, 2008-2012).

Since 1974, the UNDP has worked in Lesotho to support activities that would help the government reach its targets, mainly in the areas of democratic governance, energy and environment, and poverty reduction. Mostly it ensured implementation of projects that ensured governance institutions were functioning effectively. The elections were better managed and mediation processes were arranged at the highest possible level to overcome any disputes resulting from elections, as elections disputes appeared to be part of Lesotho's culture (Revised UNDAF, 2010).

One primary interest of intervention for UN Lesotho is to make sure that there are ongoing projects that could assist the government to be ready for environmental

changes. In terms of the United Nations Assistance Framework, these have a significant negative impact on the day-to-day lives of citizens, as food production is not possible (UNDAF Action Plan for Lesotho, 2010).

Poverty reduction, as another main goal in collaboration with the government of Lesotho, is being approached from all possible angles. This is realised through empowering the youth to be in the lead to address poverty. This is influenced by the socio-economic challenges of adult HIV/Aids prevalence that stands at 23% (the second highest in the world), climate change-induced weather conditions and drought, which too are causing serious food insecurity. Therefore, the principal objective of the UN Country Team has been to assist the government together with its development partners to address these concerns (UNCT Report, 2015:6).

Under the Lesotho United Nations Development Assistance Plan (LUNDAP, 2013-2017) the UN Country Team in Lesotho agreed to mount efforts to work in partnerships for the development progress and prosperity of all Basotho. The Delivering as One approach (DaO) espoused by the UN system in 2009 with support from the government of Lesotho has been adopted to deliver LUNDAP results (UNDP Capital Development Fund, 2013). This in turn positions LUNDAP as One Programme through which all UN agencies will make their contribution to the targeted areas. This is advantageous as each agency has a special comparative advantage and resources over the other to confront and tackle the following areas:

- investment climate, manufacturing, trade and financial services;
- agriculture;
- governance and institutions;
- skills and innovation;
- environment, natural resources and climate change;
- health and nutrition;
- social protection; and
- HIV/Aids.

Table 5: Distribution by Donors in Lesotho

Development Contribution by Donor for Lesotho in UN Programmes of Governance

Fiscal Year	Donor	Total Contribution
2008		\$1,712,382.66
		Total Contribution
2008	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	\$340,000.00
2008	GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND	\$238,669.60
2008	GOVERNMENT OF LESOTHO	\$138,901.94
2009	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	\$1,917,908.79
2009	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	\$303,771.75
2009	GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND	\$727,101.62
2009	USAID	\$449,999.00
2010	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	\$1,913,889.51
2010	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	\$203,666.17
2010	GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND	\$690,321.27
2010	GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN	\$2,975,000.00
2010	UNDP AS AA FOR JP PASS THROUGH	\$385,713.00
2011	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	\$1,518,185.61
2011	GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND	\$946,337.33
2011	USAID	\$1,050,000.00
2011	MDTFO/JP_Lesotho_one_UN_Fund	\$154,995.00
2012	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	\$1,489,631.88
2012	GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND	\$430,909.13
2012	EUROPEAN COMMISSION	\$1,652,579.15
2012	USAID	\$240,606.92
2012	MDTFO/JP Lesotho one UN Fund	\$137,200.00

Programme Delivery for Lesotho Good Governance LUNDAP Results 3 Cluster

Programme Delivery 2008	Programme Delivery 2009	Programme Delivery 2010	Programme Delivery 2011	Programme Delivery 2012	Programme Delivery 2013
\$3,217,663. 51	\$3,877,446. 59	\$5,525,528. 62	\$4,415,026. 30	\$4,860,768. 44	\$4,259,049. 31

(Source: UNDP Lesotho: Delivering As One. Governance Results 3 Budgetary Framework. UNDP Lesotho One Fund 2013)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the chairman of the Development Partners Consultative Forum that also includes the Non-Resident Agencies in Lesotho. According to the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) Report 2016, 16.28% of the budget of \$26,155,480 in 2015 went to support institutional capacity building in Lesotho and good governance initiatives. This budgetary allocation went into improvements in development and national and local governance structures, coordination of stakeholders and institutions of good governance to promoting voice and accountability, development of governance policies and frameworks for local, traditional and community structures, an overall strategy of accelerating service delivery and enhancing leadership through inclusive reform; improved legislative and policy environment for decentralization resulting in increased transfer of functions from central to local governments; as well as other capacity building measures such as foresight and scenario building initiatives (UNCT, 2016). This amount is expected to increase precipitated by the forth coming elections in 2017 in which the DPCF contributes to improving capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission to provide training and vote education to hold effective elections. The contribution in Results Group 3 of the Lesotho United Nations Development Assistance Programme (LUNDAP) rose from \$3,897,051 in 2014 to \$4,018,345 in 2015. The increase was resultant to the February 2015 snap elections

Germany has engaged in international cooperation with Lesotho since the country gained independence in 1966. Since 2002, the priority area for cooperation has been strengthening local governance and a decentralisation system. The direct support for a decentralised system was under the stewardship of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for an overall term from 2003 to 2015. The donor approach on development aid at this time was based on institutional and systemic strengthening based on the belief that centralisation in Lesotho and the

provision of basic public services were limiting better service delivery (MoLGC, 2009).

The GIZ development focus lies in institutional decentralisation and coordinating of the work of other German development cooperation organisations in this priority area (MoLGC, 2009). In the final phase of the programme, the GIZ developed an enabling setting and environment for decentralisation, supporting various sectoral ministries, ensuring greater and more effective use of the community centres built by the KfW Development Bank and ensuring the fight against HIV/Aids is perceived as a cross-cutting task (MoLGC, GIZ, UNAID, 2010).

According to BMZ Lesotho (2003), the GIZ has co-financed the EU programme on the promotion of non-state actors with a total of EUR 3.5 million in support of the Lesotho decentralisation and institutional building programme. With GIZ support, some of the results from the monitoring and evaluation include the responsiveness of the government of Lesotho to citizens' needs and that the country has advanced decentralisation; thus, improving the provision of basic services to the Basotho people (Local Government District Information Handbook, 2007). Some of the tangible results achieved include, but are not limited to, the first municipal elections held in 2005, followed by a second round of elections in 2011 and local government elections in 2016 (LCN, 2015). The purpose of institutional decentralisation is to allow local municipal councils to develop and incorporate their own planning priorities into the district plans to enable them to deliver special services for people affected by HIV and Aids (MoLGC, Strategic Plan, 2009:27).

In turn, the Australian Agency for International Development and the UK DfID are making significant efforts and contributions towards ensuring institutional transformation (LGNSAP, 2005). Additionally, at regional level, much support comes from the Transboundary Water Management in SADC where GIZ plays a leading role in water governance, water management and infrastructure development. Lesotho's Minister of Local Government, Pontso Sekatle, has confirmed that GIZ also advises the SADC secretariat on knowledge and information-based management systems, which complement development partnership efforts (MoLGC, 2007). This assistance strengthens the institutional and organisational capacity of SADC to deliver demand-driven services to member states (SADC, 2012). At local level, GIZ fuels

development partnerships with the private sector to safeguard water supply and water quality improvement and other sources of energy, as well as to identify regional investment opportunities to the water infrastructure (GIZ, 2013).

The evolution of this background in Lesotho was contained in the PSIRP, supported by a basket of donors. The main objective of the programme is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery and public financial management in order to facilitate economic growth and reduce poverty. According to the UNDP (2010:13), with systemic and structural transformation, aid could be managed better in addressing the fundamental challenges to good governance and political transformation. In terms of the results, Lesotho has demonstrated a good commitment to policies that promote political and economic freedom (WHO, 2008:1). The sustainable use of natural resources, the control of corruption, and the respect for civil liberties and the rule of law are also demonstrable achievements as measured by indicators of the World Bank, the IMF, Freedom House, the WHO, UNESCO, and the Heritage Foundation. UN member states reaffirmed their commitment to sustainable and equitable human development at the Rio +20 conference, stating:

We acknowledge that democracy, good governance and the rule of law, at national and international levels, as well as an enabling environment, are essential for sustainable development, including sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development, environmental protection and the eradication of poverty and hunger (UN, 2012c:3).

In addition to the High-Level Panel, the UN Secretary General also established the UN Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda to provide analytical inputs to the process. A Special Advisor to the Secretary General on Post-2015 Development Planning was also appointed (UN, 2013a).

This epitomises Lesotho and other developing nations as the changing face of Africa. Lesotho has ratified a number of pacts including the Millennium Development Goals of the United States, which represent the development grant aimed at reducing poverty and further supporting economic growth, contributes to improvement of the lives of ordinary people by strengthening assistance through bilateral programmes

that accelerate a development pathway on the ground, and attainment of the MDGs (UNDP, 2012).

6.3.1 The working phases of development aid

As early as 1970, Irish Aid introduced its bilateral programme in Lesotho, including projects focused on rural development, education, institutional support and capacity-building programmes. The Irish Development Programmes formed the cornerstone of principles for provision of development aid in Lesotho.

In terms of the Irish Development Policy there are inherent criteria used to provide aid. Dr Helen O'Neill, expert analyst of Irish Development Aid, lists some of the criteria used in Irish Aid's selection process:

...relative poverty, ability to absorb and make effective use of aid, and suitability of social structures and policies to facilitate the flow of assistance to the 'neediest sectors' (Marony, 1997:12).

Proponents of the good governance agenda (Good Governance Wider Working Paper)⁵¹ saw the Irish Aid basis and influence on this school of thought as providing impact to a variety of outcomes in economic growth and development (Gisselquist, 2012:3). UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan agreed, stating that "good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development" (UN, 1998). Good governance is at the centre of development policy, even for Lesotho where donors provide positive support to governance reforms, ensuring that they maintain a high quality of governance in decisions about the distribution of foreign assistance. Yet there is also another dimension to it that attests to the fact that good governance raises political conditionality and imposes liberal models of democracy (Nanda, 2006:271; NEPAD, 2007:3-4). Seeing the emphasis on development aid effectiveness, the World Bank (1989; 1992) summarises the four

⁵¹ *While methodological discussions are often esoteric, the study argues that this one has real-world relevance to development policy because donor agencies regularly measure and assess the quality of governance, condition assistance on these measurements, seek to design evidence-based policies and justify their focus on good governance partly on the basis of claims that better governance promotes economic development. The weakness of the good governance concept calls into question each of these projects. Future work would do well to disaggregate the concept of good governance and refocus attention and analysis on its various disaggregated components, such as democracy, good governance, etc. (Gisselquist, R.M. UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) Katajanokanlaituri Helsinki, Finland).*

elements of good governance that are important to Lesotho and other developing countries:

- ✓ Public sector management with a strong need for effective management and human resources, budgeting, accounting and reporting.
- ✓ Accountability in the public services, effective accounting, auditing and decentralisation for actions.
- ✓ Predictable legal framework, reliable and independent judiciary, and law enforcement mechanisms.
- ✓ Transparency and availability of information for policy analysis and public debate (UNECA, 2003:18).

This background influenced the role of the state, also in Lesotho, which experienced a long transition to democracy, the new institutional route to economic expansion, especially in privatisation and private sector foundations (Göran, 2011:12-13). This saw administration authority and political liberalisation align to the frameworks and pillars of development to meet these challenges (UNCCD, 2013).

Owing to the above assumptions, the PSIRP of Lesotho became one of the frameworks used to align donor support in implementing the National Vision 2020, the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and the National Development Framework. In a briefing on the Brussels Programme of Action, the GoL announced that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the National Vision, the government prepared the 2004/05–2006/07 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), outlining strategies and programmes that were needed over a three-year period to put Lesotho on a sustainable path towards poverty eradication and also achieving the Vision priorities. The programmes that were targeted at achieving the MDGs were also integrated in the PRS (GoL, 2009).

These instruments were donor-aided and the focus of the PSIRP was on addressing systemic problems in terms of poor service delivery. Efforts were to be directed to areas of good governance, financial management, human resources, decentralisation and the administration of the justice system and restrictive rationalisation of government expenditure (IMF Country Report, 2006:46).

The principal concern of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) presented to the Cabinet of Lesotho in November 2004 was job creation, having been identified as

priority number one. To accede to alignment and commitment to greater development outcomes, the PRSP (2004) noted that the overarching development goal of the PRS was to provide a broad-based improvement of the standard of welfare for the current generation of Basotho, without compromising opportunities for future generations. The PRS formulation process identified eight priority areas, agreeing with the donors on an added emphasis on the cross-cutting and interdependent nature of the relationship between poverty and HIV/Aids, gender, and children and youth. The eight priorities areas are:

- 1) employment creation;
- 2) improvement of agricultural productivity and food security;
- 3) infrastructure development;
- 4) deepen democracy, governance, safety and security;
- 5) improvement of access to healthcare and social welfare;
- 6) improvement of quality and access to education;
- 7) management and conservation of environment; and
- 8) improvement of public service delivery (PRSP, 2004)

These eight priority areas are in line with the MDGs, which proclaimed to assist developing countries to take them out of poverty and achieve good governance (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2005b). The perspective on governance and development aid was inclined to improve their aid effectiveness, and in a statement by the African Development Bank Fund, the development partners stated the following:

Development partners (bilateral and multilateral) in Lesotho have outside the government framework established mechanisms for consultation and coordination on a wide range of intervention areas. The UNDP is charged with the responsibility for convening all donors for consultation and coordination on governance issues. In addition to this, all European development partners with a field presence in Lesotho, namely DCI, DfID, European Union (EU), and German Technical Assistance/Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (GTZ/KfW), have come up with their own mechanism, known as European Donor Agencies (EDAL), which enables them to effectively coordinate their activities in the country (ABDF, 2008:37-38).

Further to this, the UN Resident Coordinator to Lesotho at that stage, Hodan A. Haji-Mohamud, in addressing the Context of UN Coordination in Lesotho, stated that the fundamentals of good governance must be established to give effect to development aid. He specifically mentioned that “in a bid to contribute to the further deepening of

governance, the UN System in collaboration with the development partners supported the creation of a peaceful atmosphere for the country's first local government elections since independence" (Address by the Resident Coordinator, UN, 2005b). To this end, the Resident Coordinator facilitated high-level dialogue between the government and major opposition parties in Parliament to settle contentions concerning the preparations for the local government elections. Because of this neutral role, among others, the local government elections were held in a peaceful and transparent manner, and in accordance with the law (Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team, 2005).

Subsequently, the UN put in place a specific project to enhance effective civil society participation in local governance through advocacy and civic education programmes. The Statement of the Office of the Resident Coordinator, in a report on the progress of capacity building and decentralisation in Lesotho, noted that

This, Your Excellency, is premised on the need for local communities to begin to recognise the role of the newly elected councils in addressing their needs and aspirations. To accelerate progress in this area, the UN will support the Government to develop the much needed institutional capacity through the Ministry of Local Government to decentralise local governance and establish a framework for the promotion and adoption of gender sensitive policies at the national level. Through this effort, the Government will be able to implement better, the decentralisation policy and facilitate accountability in the use of resources by the elected councils (UN, 2006a:2).

With this in mind, following the completion of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) 2012⁵² of the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and National Indicative Programme (NIP)⁵³ of the European Community to the Kingdom of Lesotho (2001-2007) during 2004, which took into account an assessment of current needs and performance, it was agreed with donor partners to modify the country strategy without altering the total amount of

⁵² See *Irish Aid Lesotho Country Strategy Programme (2008-2012) Evaluation*. In early 2012, Irish Aid commissioned an independent evaluation of the Irish Aid Lesotho Country Strategy Programme. A detailed assessment of CSP results was carried out by a task team in Maseru comprising of the Embassy, Maseru staff and task team members representative of partner organisations.

⁵³ See *Kingdom of Lesotho European Community Country Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for the period 2001 – 2007*. It established that cooperation between the EC and Lesotho aims at contributing to the achievement of the international development targets in accordance with the principle of national ownership of development strategies and in the context of the above objectives, with particular attention being given to the reduction of poverty, justice for all, recognition of the right of access to clean water and basic social services, job creating economic growth and strengthening the institutions necessary for the consolidation of democracy and good governance.

financial support (UN, 2009b:3). These were project-type interventions since the conditions for providing this support were not met and the funds thus freed were re-allocated to the following sectors, namely water and sanitation, road transport, HIV/Aids, and PFM (EU/Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004).

The idea was to aid institutional reform and capacity building. According to CIPFA (2011:19), the main donors operating in the sector are the EC, the World Bank, Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI), the African Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund, and the Arab Bank for Development in Africa (BADEA). The EC's task was to lead institutional reform and promotion of the PRS in order to coordinate effectiveness of donor aid. The EC stated the following:

The context for SWAPs has become more favourable, but also more complex, with the advance of poverty reduction strategies, and coordinated action on a national scale to address systemic issues (including PFM and national capacities) that have previously been addressed within sectors. Governments and donors can draw on their experience at the sector level as they develop a collaborative framework for the PRS, while this may provide a helpful framework for addressing some of the 'difficult' areas where challenges more often arise (EC, 2007:2).

It is the assumption of the EC that development aid has been aligned to principles of aid effectiveness that would see the eradication of poverty in terms of the prescripts of the MDGs, as well as the promotion of good governance (MDGs, 2007). It was in this sense that the strategic donor approach ascertained that aid would in effect improve the livelihoods and quality of lives of all Basotho, improve public sector management, enhance the service delivery and efficiency of the public service, and decentralise service delivery. Donor partners would support partner governments in addressing the "supply side" of good governance under the priority areas highlighted above (Irish Aid, 2010a).

This includes partnerships with government ministries and local authorities, parliaments, human rights commissions and other oversight institutions. As such, the main entry point at country-level would be the country strategy planning process, which sets out a mid-term strategy for at least five years (ADB, 2007).

6.4 Political transformation and good governance: A ten-year reflection

Lesotho began instigating economic reforms, mainly in the financial sector, as proponents of good governance and transformation. The Financial Institutions Act was introduced in 2012 to improve the regulatory environment as well as the public financial realm (BTI, 2012). Lesotho's main overarching sector has shown a commitment to increasing the role of the private sector in its economic growth strategy. However, the regional growth declined in 2013 to 4.8%, as opposed to 2012 when it grew by 5.2% (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2013:5).

The UNDP's Human Development Report (2011) explicitly indicated the need to have growth led by the private sector, instead of allowing the government to dominate the economy. Matlosa (2006:81) agrees and reiterates that this was a direction of the political transformation that ushered in participation by the donors and stakeholders following the 25 year moratorium on political participation that had suspended the Constitution and participation in all political activities in Lesotho since 1970. The move to transform the political decay was influenced by donor intervention, which preconditioned their much-needed donor financial aid on political transformation, good governance and deepening democracy (Konings, 2009).

The UNESCO Commission (2008:5) envisaged that Vision 2020 and the Poverty Reduction Strategy were the key strategies to be used to guide all other strategies. Through these and others that followed, Lesotho underwent significant democratic reforms, aligning its transition with the prescripts of donor funding requisites to pave the way for political transformation and good governance. Mpho 'Meli Malie, the then Minister for Industry, Trade, Cooperatives and Marketing, at the Monterrey Conference on International Financing, stated that not only was it prudent to transform the nature of authoritarian undemocratic regime, but it was also necessary to undertake systemic transformation to necessitate service delivery and good governance, and these would be achieved when Lesotho forged relations with international donors (Malie, 2002).

These reforms were echoed through statements of state commitment to practical strategy papers. In a speech by the former Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili at the launch of the Parliamentary Reform Programmes in 2004, he stated that one of the

fundamentals to attaining Lesotho's long-term vision and institutional democracy was the systemic reform process of Parliamentary Programmes (Mosisili, 2004).

However, Lesotho has not been able to achieve significant progress towards attaining the prescripts of the Paris Declaration targets (OECD, 2012a). There are indications that Lesotho has met only two out of ten indicators for which there were targets, with the remaining indicators requiring considerable work. The goals not met include the goal of ownership (UN, 2015). Majoro (2014) states that Lesotho's relatively slow performance in achieving these goals is related to the lack of human and financial resources of the government.

After 2004, this vision seemed to have tallied with the theories of development, governance and transformation, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Lesotho's development challenges were contextualised in the form of poverty and inequality and the government's inefficient capacity to overcome capacity issues. As seen in previous chapters, the key development issues contained in PRS and Vision 2020, which are aligned with the United States' MDGs, articulate the Lesotho government's long-term vision and strategies. These are to bridge the inequality gap and incessant poverty on the way to political transformation and good governance. As Allard and Martinez (2008) write, the direction of political governance and transformation was influenced by the foreign policies of donors and the mandate of multinational corporations. This is seen also in the pressures mounted by development partners to advocate for Lesotho to undergo policy and systemic reforms following the SADC Peace Facilitation Mission Headed by South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2015 into 2016. The European Union and the United States had single-handedly withheld over \$483 million funding for budget support and a suspension on the extension of AGOA (Africa Growth Opportunity Act which has provided over 40,000 jobs for Basotho in textile and manufacturing industry) respectively in Lesotho should the country not undergo recommended reforms from the mission (Public Eye, 2016).

This was premised on the notion that the country's weak financial and human resources left Lesotho in a state of underdevelopment, which disabled the reaching of the targeted goals of a regulated market economy and private sector improvement (Waterman, 2013:8). Makoia (2004:75) has suggested that political developments in Lesotho have "boxed and sealed the Basotho nation into non-interactive and

mutually antagonistic blocs” as evidenced in the Motion of No Confidence that succeeded in February 2017 against Prime Minister Mosisili following the opposition and other members of the Prime Minister’s government tabling a motion against the Prime Minister to fail to instigate the recommended policy reforms by SADC Mission in Lesotho. In addressing these weaknesses, donors aligned their strategies with the PRS and the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). The joint UN team requested an extension of the Lesotho United Nations Development Assistance Programme by one year following the government’s announcement of the extension of the NSDP to 2018. In an effort to pursue cooperation in implementing the development goals, United Nations Country Team requested to align their programme with the extended programme of the government (Hershey, 2016). Some of the shortfalls were tied to a lack of strong policy dialogue and the inability to develop the implementation of country strategy roadmaps (Thahane, 2012). Another growth strategy that addressed public accountability, institutional growth, and political and structural reforms was contained in the PSIRP, which provided the ideal framework within which donors could channel such interventions (ADB, 2006). Donors announced in 2008 that in order to provide results and record of aid effectiveness in Lesotho, they will align their strategies with the National government growth strategy and this saw the first signature of the Lesotho Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2008-2010 that was jointly developed by inclusion of all mutual stakeholders and the Government of Lesotho. The Results Framework offered a guidance to show which donor was working in which area with which partners (WB, 2011). This was the first insight into dissecting the allocations per development outcome in Lesotho and the contribution put forth to achieve such outcomes. Through these frameworks, Lesotho was demonstrating a willingness to promote good governance and political transformation. The principles of good governance through which donor alignment could be realised are all aligned and contained in the PRS which recognises good governance as a fundamentally important link missing in the efforts by government to reduce poverty. Lesotho’s EU Ambassador, His Excellency Mr. Hans Duynhouwer addressing a high-level workshop on Public Finance Management Reforms, reiterated that donors supported the efforts by Lesotho in implementing good governance and political transformation frameworks (Duyhouwer, 2013).

The gains from improved public financial management are potentially very important. These gains are of a financial nature (more efficiency) and of a good governance nature (more transparency and accountability). The improvement resulted in the policy reform with the introduction of the Lesotho Central Tender Border following the revision of Financial Policy and Regulation in 2010 to enhance effective financial management in Lesotho and the establishment of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and Public Accounts Committee in the Legislative Structures of Lesotho.

....this was done through designing joint programmes that could support the governance issues in the country; Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance (Irish Aid, Country Strategy Paper, 2008).

At the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government, Building Trust in Government, donors emphasised five elements of political transformation and good governance as programme areas for the Lesotho situation. These areas include i) consensus orientation means mediating different interests to reach a broad. This was seen in government stakeholder involvement in establishing District Planning Teams and decentralisation structures of Local government to plan district development needs and programmes consensus on what is the best interest of the group on policies and procedures (GIZ,2012); II) Equity, where all men and women have opportunity to improve or maintain their well-being. The NSDP target indicates the creation of 50000 jobs- 10,000 jobs per annum for five years towards creating high, shared economic growth and employment creation. The United Nations System, through the LUNDAP committed to contributing to 10% of the target for the duration of the LUNDAP and NSPD. This indicates the NSDP target and LUNDAP contribution (UN, 2016); II) Efficiency and effectiveness where processes and institutions produce the results that meet needs while making best use of resources. In this scenario too, major accomplishments towards supporting the most vulnerable segments of Lesotho's population have been achieved. Interventions focussed primarily on safeguarding the environment and rural livelihoods; emergency response to the El Nino induced drought; and on facilitating the articulation of a national Resilience Framework as well as building capacities of national institutions to increase preparedness and response to reoccurring emergencies. In response to the El Nino drought, the UN provided support to more than 37,000 affected and targeted populations across all districts. Further, fortified supplementary food was provided to

13,000 children aged 6-23 months and 6,800 pregnant and lactating women for prevention of stunting in four districts. Finally, the UN provided technical and financial support for national dissemination of guidelines for the Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAM) LVAC, 2016); IV) Accountability- decision makers in government, civil society and the private sector organisations are accountable to the public as well as the institutional stakeholders; V) Strategic vision- leaders and the public have a long and broad perspective on governance and human development. Since the post-2012 elections, politics have divided divide the Basotho nation, resulting into tensions, marginalization and victimization. In direct response to governance and political stability challenges, several development partners have made efforts to assist Lesotho address these challenges. The UNDP and the Government of Lesotho organized a High-Level Roundtable in July 2016 to “discuss the development agenda of the country focusing on current mutually reinforcing challenges confronting the country and identify the underlying contributing factors to the challenges and recommend policy initiatives to address them”. The event brought together and for the first time since the country got plunged in the current crises, key stakeholders in Lesotho’s political system to highlight key issues to be addressed. The Commonwealth provided an expert to advise the post-2012 elections Coalition Government on key public service reforms to enable Lesotho to adapt to a new political dispensation ushered in by the MMP voting system. It also facilitated a study trip for a 25-member delegation composed of representatives of the executive, legislature (including opposition Members of Parliament) led by the Deputy Prime Minister to observe the following: (a) how the MMP system works, (b) the nature of non-political public service (c) mechanisms for managing successful coalition procedures for government formation after elections (Prasad, 2015). In this light, it is confirmed that Lesotho has made good progress in establishing institutions that allow for good governance and political accountability to be practiced (UNDP/Irish Aid CDGG, 2009).

6.4.1 What has been transformed?

Lesotho underwent several governance and systemic transformation assessments in the last decade, funded and supported by various donor partners as mentioned in the previous sections, including the African Peer Review Mechanisms. In view of the above needs assessments, evidence suggests that the public service is still

characterised by a lack of capacity and skills to address the realities of the country's overwhelming development challenges. This was established from interviews in the recent study on the Lesotho Common Country Assessment in which 60% of government partners key informants (from various departments) and 20% of high ranking authorities interviewed were clearly stating that they either lack capacity to implement the development programmes or are at best not aware of the development plans and documents, although they have been working with specific development agencies in the past 2-3 years (UN, 2016). Additionally, the capacity of communities to actively participate in demanding their rights and in the implementation and monitoring of development activities is also an issue of governance and development in Lesotho. To build communities' capacities the Ministry of Development Planning is working with the Ministry of Local Governments (MoLG) to establish the modalities of fiscal decentralization, promote accountability and transparency, as well as account for funds to be disbursed to the newly established local institutions (APRM 2010). As reported by Mapetla (2010) in the *Lesotho Vision 2020* and relating to the Poverty Reduction Strategy, a restructuring process was orchestrated to induce systemic and political transformation.

The then Minister of Public Service, Honourable Motloheloa Phooko, advanced that Lesotho's public service reform and systemic transformation was seen as a response towards increasing public service efficiency and the attainment of Vision 2020 targets and the National Strategic Development Plan 2012-2017 (Phooko, 2012). Although the reforms were mounted, the CDGG Evaluation Paper recognised failures of the government to adapt to change and transformation, thus making the process of efficiency very ineffective (CDGG, 2012). At the time of reviewing the targets of NSDP 2012/13-2016/17, PSIRP was deemed at best to be off target and failed to bring the results intended (Phooko, 2012).

Assigning importance to the development aid effectiveness agenda (bilateral and multilateral), Lesotho continued to push for the establishment of mechanisms for consultations and coordination on a wider range of interaction (OECD-DAC, 2006).

The UNDP, through the DPCF,⁵⁴ is commissioned to convene all the donor coordination meetings to ensure harmonisation and alignment.

The final analysis indicates that the government of Lesotho demonstrated commitment in promoting the route to political transformation and good governance (BTI, 2014). It embarked on joint assistance programmes in which donor partners (CDGG, 2009) supported the frameworks that were deemed necessary to contribute to good governance and political transformation. Additionally, donors based their commitments on measurable results so that they could achieve aid effectiveness.

6.5 Conclusion

The inflow of aid in Lesotho has been both systematic and structural over a considerable period of time, addressing the intricacies of good governance and political transformation as the framework attempts to make aid effective (UN, 2008c). Mitchell (2013) insists that throughout the motto of intervention, capacity building and guidance on the pillars of good governance have been echoed as integral to achieving long-lasting results. Development aid was responding to the development needs identified by the development partners for reasons of enhancing aid effectiveness and accountability, and addressing capacity constraints in terms of financing government authority to deal with issues of poverty and improving socio-economic livelihoods by the recipient partners (Handley *et al.*, 2009:65-66).

The OECD (2010a:8) indicates that not much emphasis was placed on the political front as also important in transforming and echoing change to give effect to development aid interventions. A renewal of the OECD's 2005 Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance will help to crystallise a shared understanding and provide a benchmark against which future efforts can be measured. An awareness of priority areas and early intervention gaps was evidenced by a growing need to institutionalise good governance and political authority change necessary to ensure the engagement of government and society in planning for transformation

⁵⁴The Development Partners Consultative Forum (DPCF) in Lesotho was established in 2005, and it represents resident and non-resident development partners, including the UN agencies. The overarching objective of the DPCF is to improve effectiveness of development cooperation in line with the principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration (PD), Accra Agenda of Action (AAA) and the Busan High-Level Forum on Development Cooperation. A future Partnership Policy will guide coordination of development partners with the appropriate national and sectoral level governmental and non-governmental bodies within the context of the NSDP.

discourse ushered in by aid, improving mutual accountability for mutual benefits and placing the agenda for development before the public. Much more energy in aid interventions has been devoted to providing evidence on the need for aid interventions in areas that require systemic improvement to lessen weaknesses that affect good governance and political transformation (Sherriff, 2014:2).

Laying bare and drawing together some of the systemic measures for improving development initiatives in giving official aid is the only step in creating a system that is more reactive to fit the purpose of good governance and transformation. The central assumption therefore draws attention to the fact that development cannot be achieved without good governance and political transformation, systemic, institutional and structural, which incorporate a model through which aid can be channelled and its effectiveness measured (Andrews, 2009:15).

The introduction of the reform agendas within the policies of major aid agencies and multilateral development institutions signals an increased willingness to take the political dimensions of development and aid effectiveness into account. A genuine political will and a strong commitment to democracy can justify the need for development aid based on mutual accountability and transparency in addressing the gaps in development. Riddell (2007:3) argues that “if donors wish to make a real difference, they will need to focus more explicitly and more rigorously on issues of power, politics and interest groups, as they have tried to do that in the past...”. The same thought was expressed in the process of Evaluation of the Paris Declaration by the ADB (ADB, 2011:149).

Lundeen (2013) arrives at the conclusion that to promote good governance, donors will have to address the underlying interest and power relations in which institutions are embedded. This will entail thinking about development capacity as a stepping-stone to endeavour and establish development partnerships grounded in the pacts for governance reforms. Development aid can influence the direction of political transformation and good governance reform processes (Vanheukelom, 2012). Among others, analysed later in this thesis, there are questions such as how development aid will engage in fostering consensus and compromise influencing reform agendas and changing the incentive structure (OECDc, 2006).

The current development aid programmes on aid effectiveness should have a significant and decisive influence on political transformation and good governance by giving shape and direction to achieving results on socio-economic aspects and far-reaching goals on addressing the MDGs targets not met and the new SDGs.

CHAPTER 7

AID INTERVENTIONS INFLUENCING POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN LESOTHO

7.1 Introduction

Since the inception of the new theme of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the early 1990s,⁵⁵ Lesotho has embarked on a number of frameworks, as seen in the earlier discussions. These frameworks were aimed at shaping the way towards the adoption of socio-economic reform programmes that would necessarily inform the need to aid the country in achieving specific programmatic interests in line with the development aid pillars. These programmatic interventions were enunciated in the Busan 4th High-Level Forum held in Korea in 2012. Lesotho continues to embark on initiatives that would support its course in political transformation and good governance. Through a case study on service delivery⁵⁶, the inherent objective was to achieve the goals towards the attainment of good governance as equated with an improvement in service delivery and economic performance. On the other hand, the main idea was to boost institutional reform programmes that would be more inclined to democratic principles, addressing the human rights and economic reforms to manage poverty alleviation and improving socio-economic livelihoods. In 2013, the then Minister of Trade, Industries, Cooperatives and Marketing, Temeki Tso'lo, stated that the national services strategies should be developed through a greater coordination of cross-sectoral institutions for greater impact on services growth (Government of Lesotho, 2013).

⁵⁵Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are economic policies for developing countries that have been promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the early 1980s by the provision of loans conditional on the adoption of such policies. Structural adjustment loans are loans made by the World Bank. They are designed to encourage the structural adjustment of an economy by, for example, removing "excess" government controls and promoting market competition as part of the neo-liberal agenda followed by the Bank. The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility is an IMF financing mechanism to support macroeconomic policies and SAPs in low-income countries through loans or low interest subsidies. SAPs policies reflect the neo-liberal ideology that drives globalisation (Greenberg, 1997).

⁵⁶Enhancing Service Delivery is a programme under the Ministry of Public Service supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The project commenced in February 2010 under the leadership of Ordu Obibuaku, a change management and capacity development specialist attached to the Ministry under the UNDP support. The project is designed to support the government of Lesotho in implementing the previous efforts and to support the establishment of a sustainable capacity to continue its programme in enhancing service delivery through leadership and culture change, business process improvement, communication, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation (CAPAM Library in the Public Service of Lesotho; Malinda Domela, Department of Public Administration and Human Resources a Development, Lesotho Institute of Public Administration and Management, Lesotho).

Maema (2010) indicates that Lesotho is primarily in a position in which a necessary political transformation process needs to be inculcated to facilitate a pathway to these strategic systematic and policy structural reforms. This is in agreement with the earlier conviction indicating that the SAPs provided a pathway to the development of strategic frameworks to address the fundamental pillars of support towards good governance and political transformation. Support for programmes of human rights, democracy and the promotion of good governance started receiving much attention with the inception of the SAPs (which are economic policies and pillars against which aid relief is given to countries). During this period, Lesotho developed, in consultation with its development partners, a number of frameworks to match up to the economic policies in a bid to qualify for the New World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans (UNDP/Irish Aid CDGG, 2009).

The review of the African Economic Outlook by the UNDP reiterated that African countries, which include Lesotho, responded to calls to address changes and reflect increased globalisation of activities to overcome economic crises and imbalances caused by internal and external shocks and past mismanagement of the social, political and economic platforms (UNDP, 2012). Kapa (2010:8-12) writes that the main dialectical issues covered by the introduction of this theme have been seen in the transformation of structures and institutions for more enhanced service delivery and good governance, as seen in later efforts of the government to establish structural and legislative reforms, including the Human Rights Commission and Lesotho Law Reform Commission. The European Union verified this idea in a press release, stating that this also included dictates by donor-directed reforms, including support for decentralisation headed by the EU in its Decentralisation Programme, as reported in 2012 (EU, 2012b). The Lesotho Operational Plan for PEPFAR⁵⁷ noted, in addition, that the key objective of the Programme was to accelerate the process of decentralisation in Lesotho. Key features of the Programme include promoting decentralised service delivery for social and economic growth (e.g. water, education,

⁵⁷In 2010, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) developed a Health Sector policy on comprehensive HIV prevention. The overall goal of this policy is to halt the spread of HIV infection, leading to HIV-free future generations in Lesotho. The policy provides a framework for implementers in the health sector to support scale-up of a coordinated and integrated combination of HIV prevention interventions within the health sector. The policy supports the establishment of appropriate coordination mechanisms to effectively plan, implement, monitor and evaluate, and document national HIV and Aids prevention interventions, and provides the platform for updating the Health sector HIV and Aids Strategy (Lesotho Operation Plan Report 2012. PEPFAR).

health) supported by funding mechanisms and improving the accountability of local authorities (PEPFAR Lesotho, 2012). The Government of Lesotho recognises the preventive, protective, promotive, and transformative function of social protection in reducing poverty and inequality, guaranteeing human rights, promoting human development and economic growth. It has made impressive strides towards a system approach to social protection. The key steps include, establishment of policy framework, strengthening of institutional capacity, high level of spending, and application of innovations in programme implementation.

Lesotho spends about 9% of its GDP or 16% of the national budget to social protection programmes and is the highest social protection spending rate in Africa (Smith, 2013). The Government established the Ministry of Social Development in 2012, to provide leadership on social protection issues. The National Information System for Social Assistance (NISSA) has been established to serve as a central repository for social protection programmes and increase operation efficiency by reducing duplication. In order to provide social services more efficiently and effectively, the National Decentralization Policy has been approved. A Community Development Model introduced to facilitate sustainable economic self-reliance by more structural efforts to transform livelihoods and increase productivity in the context of the evolving economic landscape. According to the Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee (LVAC) 2016, around half of the rural population are at risk of livelihood and food insecurity between May 2016 and April 2017. An estimated affected total of 679,437 people (113,240 HH) are at risk in the absence of all other safety nets except school feeding and cash for- work (fato-fato). Of the above 476,842 people (79,474 HH) require life-saving and livelihood protection interventions in next 9- 12 months and 202,595 people (~33,765 HH) require only emergency livelihood support in the same time period. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) estimates 510,258 to be in a state of food security crisis or above from July to October, covering all 10 districts of Lesotho. From year to year Lesotho has a significant proportion of its population in a state of food insecurity. Food insecurity is a perennial problem in Lesotho with almost one in every five Basotho facing chronic food insecurity annually. Food insecurity in Lesotho is intrinsically tied to the risks in volatility of climate change in part due to the widespread dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Government has built strong

partnership with UN organizations, World Bank, bi-lateral donors, NGOs and private organization to strengthen the implementation of the social protection strategy. Among the NGOs, Catholic Relief Service (CRS) has been supporting disadvantaged children through programs focused on health, education, nutrition, protection, HIV prevention and food security and agriculture. The Ministry of Local Governance and Chieftainship was supported in its mandate to enhance the capacity of district and community councils in acting as catalysts for local development. This was the EU supported Local Government Non State Actors Programme (LGNSP) in which the European Union provided support to establishment of the community councils and Electoral divisions. The Bureau of Statistics of Lesotho is now able to generate data in the local communities disaggregated by age, race, sex, gender, education, health and economic activity. The infamous fato-fato (community building) projects that deal with infrastructural improvement and road networks are a results of this support. It has. The project also supports line ministries that are committed to promote the decentralisation process, good governance and democracy in line with the UN policies (EU, 2012a:3). The model of decentralisation designed and implemented in Lesotho combines elements of devolution and deconcentration. The Local Government Act of 1997 and the Local Government Elections Act of 1998 (both amended in 2004) provide the legal framework for the establishment and functioning of local authorities. The Act created three types of devolved structures for local government consisting of community, district, and municipal councils. Central government is represented at the local level through —decentralised ministries and by district administrators (DAs), who also supervise the work of other public sector agencies and officials at the local level. The relationship between the central government and decentralized structures in terms of funding, implementation and monitoring of development programmes and projects also still needs to be clearly defined and operationalized for effective delivery of services and development in general.

Local councils have low technical and administrative capacity and are also not able to meet the needs of the communities. A new decentralization policy has been developed and remains to be implemented. Fiscal decentralisation framework ensures that the fiduciary responsibilities of the councils match their capacity. District Development Coordination Committees (DDCCs) have been established to

enhance collaboration and coordinated implementation of programmes but their capacity and effectiveness are considered insufficient to meet local development objectives (Setsabi, Selinyane, and Tsoeu 2008). The programme of decentralisation was supported with over 15 million euros between 2010 and 2013 to ensure local governance and decentralisation is fully integrated into national planning cycles. The Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance (UNDP/Irish Aid, 2009) covered human rights reforms, the Commission for Just Administrative Action falling in the Office of the Ombudsman, legislative reforms, and the introduction of bargaining bodies like the Law Reform Commissions and Labour Tribunals. Specifically, the CDGG provided support for the (1) harmonisation and streamlining of electoral legislation to ensure that elections add value to democratic governance and political stability; (2) parliamentary reforms to improve the effectiveness of the legislature in its three-pronged mandate of law-making, representation and oversight; and (3) the promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The mandate would be achieved through strengthening the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Parliament, Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Correctional Services and the Office of Ombudsman (UNDP Lesotho, CDGG. 2012). This was one of the latest moves towards addressing political change, where society was made part of the reform process and good governance through institutional building to strategically implement the reforms (Philander, 2000). Having committed itself to gender parity through the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women, the African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women, 2003, and the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, 2008, Lesotho has taken measures towards these commitments. One was to make it legally mandatory for political parties to ensure equal representation on the PR party list submitted to the IEC for contesting elections, and the reserving 1/3 of the local council elections for women in 2005 elections, and the adoption of the MMP system at local government level. The passing of Legal Capacity of Married Persons, Act, 2006 was another measure to address gender inequality in the family and the social sphere. Besides, appointment of women in key positions in the public sector has been another observable measure. Representation of women in Cabinet has been nine (9) out of 22 or 40.9% in 2011; eight (8) out of 30 or 26.7 % during the post-2012 ABC-led Coalition Government; and eight (8) out of 35 or 22.85% in the post-2015 elections Coalition

Government. This trend indicates a steady worrying decline in the representation of women in the country's executive arm of the state. The figure was far below the SADC quota of 50% women in legislative assembly by 2015.

The total number of women in the post-2007 Parliament was 37 out of 153 members (seven in the Senate and 30 in the National Assembly), thus constituting 24.18% of the whole membership. The figure increased marginally after 2012 elections to 40 or 26.14% of the entire legislature (nine in Senate and 31 in the National Assembly). In post-2015 elections Parliament, there are still 37 women in the whole Parliament (eight in the Senate and 29 in the National Assembly). This shows that Lesotho's performance in this regard is not impressive. However, there are exceptions. The Speaker of the National Assembly has been a woman before 2012-2014 Parliament and after the 2015 elections Parliament and it has been the same person. For the first time also, the head of the Judiciary, the Chief Justice, is a woman, appointed by the ABC-led administration. Similarly, from 2003, Lesotho had its first woman as a member of the IEC and later in 2008 she became Chairperson of the Commission. One of the current three Commissioners is a woman. On the other hand, The IEC presents a relatively promising picture in terms of performance evidenced notably by no more claims of election maladministration from the its key stakeholders; political parties. The IEC works very close with the development partners on its performance (Kapa, 2013). As such there are no more claims of fraud or malpractice in Lesotho's elections (Kapa, 2015). Some gaps remain however. These include a predetermined threshold of whatever percentage, as it is a key feature of the MMP system to prevent proliferation of parties in parliament; two-votes, two-ballot principle to give voters rights to choice candidates of their choice separately from political parties, again as a hall-mark of the mixed system; and a clean and credible voters' roll (Sejanamane 2015).

The chapter explores some of the aid interventions by development partners and how they influenced good governance and political transformation in Lesotho. Based on the theoretical foundations of the theorem of aid in Lesotho, in this chapter an application of how development aid is applied will be explored, as well as measures that contributed to systemic transformation and good governance parameters as a result of development assistance. The study analyses these

interventions, linking it with literature in the conception of aid in Lesotho. From this analysis, the researcher expects to see which theories apply to Lesotho's development initiatives as influenced by development aid and how such interventions influence the conception of development in general in the context of Lesotho.

It is worth noting that there is a knowledge gap and insufficient academic literature surrounding the debate about development aid. The subject of development aid has been echoed by information from development financing institutions, with fewer scholars providing sufficient academic literature and empirical studies to substantiate the direction of the development aid debate in relation to political transformation and good governance. Krohwinkel-Karlsoon (2007) is of the opinion that knowledge and learning are important aspects in many empirical studies, although few discuss in detail the underlying definitions of these concepts or assumptions on how they relate to, or impact, performance. Efforts have been made to provide advice regarding the effective design of knowledge and learning about development aid; however, there is still a gap in empirical data to substantiate the thinking on development aid (Easterby-Smith & Lyles, 2003).

Rao (2013) confirms that there is an abundance of literature on technical assistance, even though a lot of it addresses issues around knowledge and capacity gaps in lower and middle-income countries. In this regard, this study has relied on documentation produced by International development partners whose policies and the way of administering development aid have significant influence on funding for economic and social policy in developing countries. The IDRC states:

Donors are increasingly concerned with studies that address the real and immediate problems faced by these countries - and in particular by the poorest among them. As a consequence a crucial component of any knowledge body is being missed: learning about others (IDRC, 2013).

Lesotho is characterised by the same gap in which a glut of information derives from Country Papers by development partners, with less reference to theory from scholarly contributions. In the same vein, much analysis is based on the assumptions and conclusions of development partners. This will form the main basis for analysis

of Lesotho's reaction to development finance and how it affects good governance and political transformation.

7.1.2 Political influence on the development aid progression

The OECD (2013b:15) operates from the premise that around 15 years ago, the programme for development aid started changing after the realisation that development partners focused on controlling projects that had no significant effect on addressing the development needs, while recipient countries were faced by impending humanitarian crises. Anderson and Olson (2003) relate that although development aid has political influence, the most significant contributions focus on donor assistance for peace more than socio-economic outcomes, giving donors yet another conception that their programmes represent solutions for effectiveness, which do not have any sustainability once donor assistance ceases. Irish Aid (2010a:6) has established that this has led to the rethinking of a more effective framework on political transformation in support of democratisation, human rights and good governance to aid institutional and service delivery, stating that:

Support for good governance must be informed by cogent, clear and comprehensive analysis. Donors need to understand the political, social and economic context when planning and prioritising support. They need to take account of external factors that can impact on the quality of governance such as regional and international conflicts, the arms trade, and the influence of organised international criminal networks. Sound interventions call for careful planning and coordination based on well-informed local knowledge (Irish Aid, 2010b:6).

These were followed by reforms towards the establishment of strategic frameworks through which donors preferred to channel aid. The Chief Trade Officer in the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Lesotho, Ms Lerato Ntlopo, confirmed that these reforms supported the government in the development and implementation of more effective and sustainable development policies and strategies:

Performance of the services sectors is highly dependent on the quality of policies, regulations and institutions maximising positive contributions and pro-development outcomes of services trade requires; good, credible and predictable policies, adequate regulations and strong institutions together with an enabling environment (Ntlopo, 2013).

This is premised on the move towards strategic harmonisation of donor efforts, which have accelerated over the past five years. The Kingdom of Lesotho Country Portfolio Report (2009a:10) showed significant influence on the need for the process of political transformation. Similar sentiments were shared by the then Minister of Finance, Moeketsi Majoro, during his address on Lesotho's conformity with the SADC Free Trade Agreement. Majoro said that such issues bring peer pressure between countries to tolerate donors' behaviour while ensuring that their aid becomes more effective through harmonisation with each other and the alignment of this assistance with the policies, strategies and systems of their developing country strategies partners (Majoro, 2014). Similarly, the United Nations Agencies under the Delivering as One Modality, enshrined in the strategy document Lesotho-UNDAF (2013-2017), contains Lesotho's development assistance framework by the Joint United Nations Agencies. The Lesotho-UNDAF noted that as development partners' aid would be utilised in promoting good governance and political transformation (agreed between key partners such as the Irish Aid and UNDP), it places significant focus on governance agenda as a salient component for the country to attain sustainable human development and accountability (Lesotho-UNDAF, 2013). This approach on delivering as one acted as a catalyst for promotion of good governance and political transformation and raises two issues:

- The Lesotho United Nations Development Assistance Programme should be fully aligned to the National Strategy Development Plan; and
- The UN and its partners should provide technical support in policy-making and public sector specific areas (National MDG Report, 2012).

As seen in the earlier chapters (Chapters 4.2.1; 6.3), a number of donors partnered with government in the promotion of policy development, especially around good governance as well as economic and budgetary policy to maintain focus on poverty and more on cross-cutting issues (HIV, gender mainstreaming) as the pillars in attaining good governance (Chapter 6). These were the new aid modalities to improve good governance and political transformation and to respond to demands for aid effectiveness. The philosophy for most donors is clearly vested in the principle that in order for aid to be a pillar of good governance and transformation, it should be able to maximise the impact of development and achieve value for results (World Economic and Social Survey, 2013). Governments have a vested leadership role to

demonstrate greater accountability to the development partners and stakeholders so that the achievement of results for aid resources could be easily attained. The influence of political transformation on the development agenda was summarised a few years ago by the former Budget Director of Uganda, Ms Margaret Kakande. She had alluded to the fact that a variety of development partners in combination contributed significantly to good governance in one way or another under different hats, including DfiD, USAID, AFD, CIDA, SIDA, NORAD, the World Bank, the IMF, the UNDP, the FAO, and UNEP, among others. Although she recognised their role, she was sceptical about their effectiveness as she critiqued their functionality as, in her opinion, they were ignorant of the positive effects of doing a similar job together and not in silos as agencies. In this regard, it would be correct to say that coordination in development assistance is most rewarding and effective when development partners together pursue similar activities which influence political transformation as a basis of good governance and aid effectiveness (Ngaire, 2011:66).

These strategies and approaches ushered in mutually agreed-on frameworks for results, namely the Lesotho United Nations Development Assistance Framework, as mentioned earlier, with much more credibility, mutual accountability and improved development effectiveness. Vähämäki *et al.* (2011:4) are of the opinion that this direction was as a result of the realisation that aid needed to drive influence for political transformation and good governance so that the recipient could gradually introduce frameworks of measurement to ensure buy-in by mutual stakeholders. This was the fundamental basis of aid effectiveness and political influence of policies and strategies towards these programmes. It was later stated:

Renewed scrutiny has intensified calls for accountability to taxpayers both in donor and recipient countries, and the need for results information to improve planning and analysis of what works. Also important to the discussion is that without demonstrable results, or effective provision of value for money, there is a risk of undermining the credibility of development cooperation, and that otherwise willing financiers might stay away (*ibid.*).

7.2 Evaluation of transformation process: Systemic reforms

Aligning the theories upon which the study is based, Huntington (1955:17), quoted by Duvenhage (1998:56) alludes to the transformation of values from what he refers to as “natural will” to so-called “rational will”. O’Brien (1975:32) refers to this shifting of the goal posts as “a shifting from ‘democracy’ to ‘order’ as a political goal and ideal”. In his publication of 1968, he continues to show that this transformation is “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability”. He states that strategic planning is one of the processes that determine successful reforms (Huntington, 1968:12, 344). He also says that transformation occurs as a result of a well-orchestrated and well-led change strategy and transition plan. Kotter (2013:4) indicates that the result is a metamorphosis to the desired state in which there is a deep-seated adoption of the changes and the associated values, principles and/or processes, which lead to an embedded and marked change in organisational culture and reinforces a journey of continuous improvement.

Lesotho, however, followed the same path and initiated a number of transformation programmes as a result of development aid initiative on the systemic reform process.

Table 6: Some of the most important Lesotho Transformation Programmes and Strategies between 2008 and 2012

Programme Name	Strategy	Donor
1. LGNSAP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance service delivery at local councils Promote an inclusive and empowered society in partner-countries to facilitate non-state actors and the local authority Participation in poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Union DCI
2. Human Rights Commission and Law Reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishment of Human Rights Unit Support to systemic reform of all laws and setting up the Law Reform Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Irish Aid UNDP
3. Health Systems Strengthening	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To enhance the capacity of health staff Train health technical staff Set up mobile and filter clinics across the districts and communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Global Fund MCA Irish Aid
4. Health Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To increase health facilities and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MCA

Programme	clinics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Fund • PEPFAR
5. Private Sector Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve quality of private sector engagement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP • IDA • EU
6. Budget Support Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To improve speedy PFM, accountability and CTB procurement and payment procedure, IFMIS system and training • Improved service delivery through the establishment of an effective public sector and sound fiscal policy management including improved transparency and accountability in public financial management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Irish Aid • EU
7. Skills Enhancement Project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adapting and improving training to produce workers with marketable skills 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP • ALAFA • GTZ
8. Deepening Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen democratic institutions accountability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID • Irish Aid • UNDP

(Source: Lesotho Country Strategy Paper 2013-2017; Kingdom of Lesotho/EU National Indicative Programme 2008-2013; Country Strategy Papers of various donors)

From this programmes the major outcomes and results included among others ability to engage in policy dialogue to advocate for development effectiveness. Lesotho embarked in a policy dialogue with regional bodies, including SADC, which came up with a model suitable to transform the political system so that it could be more legitimate and accommodate new ideas. This was a challenge in strengthening democratic institutions and cultural buy-ins to strengthen and institutionalise democracy (TRC, 2011). The Poverty Reduction Strategy covering the period of 2004-05/2006-07, and later the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2012/13-2016/17, were the most fundamental documents that embodied Lesotho's path to articulate prioritised strategies for poverty reduction, economic growth and empowerment of the poor (IMF, 2006; NSDP, 2012). Countrywide strategies were adopted to provide a framework and baseline survey of the needs assessment that could complement a strategy to inform aid coordination and the alignment of plans from donor partners and recipient countries. The PRS and NSDP are based on three priority areas, which translate into the establishment of a framework of good governance and the role of the nature of state with the overall purpose for the

government's long-term policies to be focused on poverty reduction. Since more than a decade ago, the government started prioritising strategies that consolidate democracy and help the poor (2000/2001 budget speech), while laying the basis for strong economic growth. In 2016, the Minister of Finance reiterated and focused the budget on addressing the devastating effects of the economic slump, while seeking means of acquiring self-sufficiency in the light of an embedded humanitarian crisis and the negative effects of El Nino since October 2015 (Khaketla, 2016:5-6). According to Daemane (2011:2), that there is a need, therefore, for good local governance that is responsive to the needs of the rural and urban citizens, particularly the poor. Good local governance ensures that everyone, regardless of status, gender, race, age, or religion, is enabled to participate productively and positively in the opportunities available.

The Government of Lesotho continued to ensure it provides good service delivery and continued investment on the people of Lesotho. Systemic transformation process resulted in addressing the policy planning and budgeting process that was lacking, and to ensure that there was synergy between initiatives such as National Vision 2020, the MDGs, the Paris Declaration and AAA in reflecting long-term goals and targets. One important contemporary development is the government's will in integrating the SDGs in local planning and policy making. It placed employment and income generation through higher economic growth as essential in creating an attractive environment for foreign and domestic investment (MCA, 2006). The Lesotho Budgetary Policy, the Medium-Term Sustainability of Fiscal Policy in Lesotho, is designed to encourage domestic savings and foreign capital inflows; ensure that Lesotho experiences low and stable inflation; encourages rapid economic growth; influences the structure of economic growth to support the creation of productive employment opportunities; and sets tax and expenditure policies which have a beneficial impact on the distribution of income and wealth (Lesotho MDGs Status Report 2013; 2014:1-4). These were the outcomes of inclusive planning and improved capacity of the government to institutionalise efficiency and policy formulation. Assumptions drawn a decade ago through the KoL Poverty Reduction Strategy (2006:x) were that the main aim of the systemic initiative of a comprehensive macro-economic policy framework was to ensure economic stability by maintaining acceptable levels of fiscal deficit, inflation and external balances (EU,

2013c:6). These benefits of growth needed to be demonstrated through areas such as health and education standards and the conservation of the environment. As Court *et al.* (2007:2) write, it was necessary to implement systemic transformation programmes for improving good governance and public sector performance. Majoro (2014) reiterates that such systemic measures were lacking and their implementation would add value to development initiatives and benefit service delivery and effectiveness as a whole.

In this regard, the PRS created the first-ever strategic move of alignment to the announced principles of governance through systemic transformation, while creating institutions and structures for political governance and participation and transformation, for improved accountability and harmonisation of development aid efforts. The social conditions in Lesotho reflect high incidences of abject poverty and inequality. The Household Budget Survey 2002-2003 that showed the basis for the need to re-strategise, indicated that 50.25% of people lived below the poverty line. The Livelihood Income Analysis 2015 showed that at least 33% of the population is food insecure, equating to more than 786,000 people affected by extreme poverty (Disaster Management Authority (DMA), 2016:5). This resulted in Lesotho actively promoting the creation of employment by joining the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA).⁵⁸ It has remained a challenge to promote good governance so that social and economic transformation could be institutionalised properly through the promotion of governance, democracy, human rights, participatory engagement and strategic alignment to enhance the performance of the state (ECOWAS, 2008).

Reporting on the APRM African Mission, a panel of representatives from Lesotho stated that the government continued to take strides to address the weaknesses highlighted by the country's profile through the PSIRP (APRM, 2008). This is a donor programme meant to address the public operation in service delivery to improve good governance, effectiveness and efficiency of public service delivery and to enhance public financial management. Similarly, it was espoused that Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam underwent

⁵⁸*African Growth and Opportunity Act – AGOA. AGOA III was signed into law in July 2004, extending the overall programme to 2015 (from original expiry in 2008) and the LDC status (through which countries were allowed to use third country raw materials in textile industry) to 2007 from the original expiry in September 2004. The textile sector in Lesotho has overtaken the public sector as the biggest employer in the country (with around 50 companies and more than 50,000 workers) (Lesotho EU Country Profile Strategy Paper 2002-2006).*

systemic reform to improve the thinking between structural and systemic transformation, based on the pillars of mutual accountability, service delivery, participatory policy-making and results-based strategies for enhanced social and economic outcomes, the link between a transformation guideline espoused in the PRS and annual aid allocation and budgeting process. Moreover, the donor community capacitated the government to introduce a three year Medium-Term Expenditure Framework in six pilot ministries (education, health, agriculture, employment, gender and tourism), which ushered in a route to good governance and political transformation (Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994–2004, 2006:15). Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi (2010), the then Minister of Public Service of South Africa, indicated that with systemic transformation, the precepts of good governance are achievable, including fighting corruption, building democratic systems of government, building effective systems for service delivery, promoting and protecting human rights, building a strong civil society, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening the media and access to information, and strengthening global and regional governance. Performance Management Reform was introduced in Lesotho in 2005 to put into operation initiatives that could serve as a framework towards governance transformation. Fraser-Moleketi's submission is similar to Olson's (2008) view. Olson explained these recurring shifts in good governance and the variables that accompany relative positions of democratisation and political transformation (Olson, 2008).

The first step was to put into operation a new Integrated Financial Management System (IFMIS) to replace the government of Lesotho's Financial Information System (GOLFIS) (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2009). This was a move to enhance the legislative framework of public accountability and improved service delivery. In tandem with the Performance Framework, reforms oversight institutions, including the Public Accounts Committee and the Auditor-General's Office, were introduced or capacitated to enhance performance (CDGG, 2009). The introduction of IFMIS was supported with about \$1,000,000 which resulted in efficiency in budgetary and payment system for Lesotho government. The capacity-building programmes, as mentioned above, were fully donor-supported to ensure proper implementation and the alignment of the goals of development and development aid (World Bank, 2012a).

The EU (2012a) reported in its evaluation that a Country Procurement Annual Review (CPAR) to beat corruption and poor service delivery as the aims of development aid and good governance identified some improvements that should be pursued by the government in areas of the legislative and regulatory framework, institutional framework, management capacity, integrity and transparency. Scholars in Lesotho also advised that with this progress, greater attention to governance reforms, including water resources infrastructure strategies, could help advance sustainable development, reduce poverty, and contribute to the global fight against poverty (Haas *et al.*, 2010).

7.3 Systemic reform in support of transformation

Table 7: Governance Reform Programmes in Lesotho

Programme	Reform Description	Donors
1. LGNSAP	Decentralisation and service delivery	EU GTZ
2. PSIRP	Systems and management principles	Irish AID ADB
3. PRS	Performance frameworks and strategic planning	ADB World Bank Irish Aid UNDP
4. PFR	Financial management systems	MCA EU ABD World Bank IMF
5. HSS	Health services reforms	MCA Global Fund PEPFAR ALAFSA
6. EFA	Teaching staff reforms and training; feeding programmes	Cyprus Fund Irish Aid
7. LLRC	Courts, laws and judicial reforms	EU Irish Aid UNDP

(Source: Public Sector Reform in Lesotho, 2012)

In order to strategically achieve transformation processes and political change through donor-aided concessions, such as the Local Governance Non State Actors

Support Programme funded by the EU,⁵⁹ there was significant support towards political reform to decentralise systems and functions, resources and distribution of authority from the central to the local authority. Daemane (2011:4) indicates that the rationale for decentralisation's worldwide adoption, encompassing Africa and Lesotho, generally includes being seen as a means of developing the administrative capacity of central and local institutions in order to promote more effective planning and implementation of developmental projects and programmes. This decentralised governance for development (DGD) was to speed up the delivery of services needed by the rural and urban poor. A report presented at a meeting of Ministers of Local Government during the Pan-African Conference⁶⁰ in September 2006 held in Maseru indicated that as a strategy to political transformation and good governance, the EU supported the first-ever local government elections in 2005, which resulted in the transformation of legislative and regulatory frameworks with the establishment of the Local Government Service Commission and capacity-building institutions for district and community councils. Kelly (2012) states that the first-ever local government elections, supported by the EU in Lesotho, presented more democratic transformation and represented the will of the people.

Similarly, the route to systemic reform in support of transformation processes was rubber-stamped by the Commonwealth Secretariat Report 2011-2013⁶¹, which additionally indicated that some of the achievements seen in support of reform included the legislative enactment which furthered the route to political transformation and good governance, In Lesotho, the introduction of the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act which came into being in 2006 was of paramount importance in reforming the systems.

⁵⁹*It is aimed at deepening local democracy, improve local governance and reduce poverty through the creation of the supporting and enabling environment at community and district level, which strengthens dialogue and efficient social change and furthers citizens' participation in Lesotho (10th EDF Country Programme, Lesotho, 2009).*

⁶⁰*The Pan-African Conference of Ministers of Local Government, entitled "Leadership Capacity Building For Decentralised Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa," was held at Manthabiseng Convention Centre, Maseru, Lesotho, on 30 August to 1 September, 2006. The conference was hosted by the Ministry of Local Government with the support of MDP-ESA, UNDESA, UNDP, and UNCDF. The theme of the conference was "Strengthening Competencies for Participatory Planning and Budgeting for Effective Local Level Delivery of Services." The objective was to deliberate and share experiences on: (i) critical issues in the area of capacity-building for decentralised governance and poverty reduction, and (ii) promotion of participation of citizens in local level development planning and budgeting.*

⁶¹*This report covers the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat for the two-year period from July 2011 to June 2013. It marks a time of transformation for the organisation, following recommendations made by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in its report (see A Commonwealth of the People: Time for Urgent Reform in 2011). In response to the changing times, the Commonwealth Secretariat embarked on a process of restructuring and repositioning. It finalised its 2013/14 – 2016/17 Strategic Plan in May 2013 after a broad-based two-year consultative process.*

In terms of the European Report on Development (2013), these indicators were a clear route to political buy-in to the improvement and development of systems that support good governance and the effectiveness of donor funding and support. The overarching intention of systemic reform was to enhance the impact of donor assistance to the government of Lesotho in order to achieve the MDGs, reduce poverty and inequality, and the series of reforms undertaken were proclaimed to be the drivers of change towards political transformation, democratisation and good governance to enhance the impact of development assistance in the 21st century (Servaes, 2008). Across most African countries these reforms were and are all contained in similar strategic documents. For Lesotho, these include the LGNSAP, Vision 2020, the PSIRP, the PRS, the PFR, Pathway Out of Poverty and the NSDP, which serve as the planning framework for development funds, programmes and agencies that reflect common areas of engagement to respond to mutual development needs (Webber & Labaste, 2010).

In line with Kopinak's (2013) analysis of humanitarian action policy, the strategies were agreed to support the government of Lesotho with programme frameworks characterised by collaboration among mutual stakeholders to increase the impact of development assistance and donor coordination and coherent planning. The reforms also took the shape of rehabilitation/development as conceptualised by Cornell (2007), who substantiates the process in the developing countries reform processes as follows:

Rehabilitation/Development (R/D); a multi-dimensional and proactive with broad, complex parameters that focus on the rehabilitation and development of a vulnerable population through addressing bio-psycho-socio-economic factors within the cultural milieu. Building capacity is a key component of development and can be defined as the transfer of knowledge and resources through mentoring, workshops, trainings, infrastructure development, etc. Sustainability is the ultimate goal of all development aid and is the ability of host country entities to continue to apply new and evolving capacities and sustain achievements through providing reliable resources generated from a country's own efforts (Cornell, 2007:12).

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) confirmed that Lesotho's National Development goals and overall economic strategies have undergone a series of reforms of transformation and structural changes, all aimed at

poverty eradication, attaining self-sufficiency and developing the standards of the country's profile (UNCTAD, 2011). Motsamai (1993:246) writes that Lesotho was following a pathway to systemic and structural reforms. Similarly, De Grauwe *et al.* (2011), in their analysis of inherent transformation needs, reiterated the importance of systemic reform management in such sectors as education and finance. The 1996 Pathway Out Of Poverty Report was the landmark approach focusing on poverty reduction, while the 1997 Strategic Options Study targeted improved performance of all sectors of the economy. With the approval of the NSDP in December 2012, together with these frameworks, the process of political transformation and good governance was facilitated in Lesotho (Lesotho UNDAF 2013-2017, 2012).

7.4 Good governance and institutionalisation

Good governance is viewed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) as one of the key ingredients in shaping the political landscape and economic development in Africa, particularly in the last decade (Janneh, 2012:208).

In general, good governance must be seen within the ambit of the way in which government exercises its political authority and, as Matlosa (2001:2-3) puts it, as also simply the modalities and processes of governing. While Lesotho arrived at a reality that it needs to address certain aspects of socio-economic outcomes, but lacked the capacity to drive the reform process, the development partners' approach was that in order to achieve the standard, good governance and political transformation needed to be addressed (World Economic and Social Survey, 2013). This was focused on political aspects referring to the decision-making and policy implementation, structures and processes of legitimate state authorities, consisting of the transformation of the three arms of government (legislature, executive and judiciary). The economic aspect included promotion of decision making directly and indirectly affecting the country's economic activities and its relationship with other economies. The transformation of administrative aspects to achieve good governance referred to the system of policy implementation based on an efficient, independent, accountable and transparent public sector (European Aid Cooperation, 2007).

As discussed in the Chapter 4.2.1, the background towards support for good governance acknowledges a condition based on sustainable human development

and its importance for economic, political and social inclusion. According to the United Nations (2012c:2),

Good governance and human rights are mutually reinforcing. Human rights principles provide a set of values to guide the work of governments and other political and social actors. They also provide a set of performance standards against which these actors can be held accountable. Moreover, human rights principles inform the content of good governance efforts: they may inform the development of legislative frameworks, policies, programmes, budgetary allocations and other measures. On the other hand, without good governance, human rights cannot be respected and protected in a sustainable manner. The implementation of human rights relies on a conducive and enabling environment. This includes appropriate legal frameworks and institutions as well as political, managerial and administrative processes responsible for responding to the rights and needs of the population.

Table 8: Joint Governance Programmes Outcome Areas

Programme	Description	Outcome	Partners
1. Programme for Democracy and Governance (2005-2007)	The Programme was meant to deepen peace and democratic institutions building by supporting the process of establishing an settled parliamentary democracy in Lesotho with a legitimate government.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthened democratic institutions, civil society organisations, transformed leadership and increased civil liberties and human rights by enhancing the IEC's capacity to plan, prepare and conduct polling, reduce political confrontation and antagonism, while fostering dialogue. Established a coordination mechanism to maximise the effective use of donor financial and technical support, including international 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Irish Aid DfID UNDP

		electoral monitoring.	
2. Deepening Democracy Programme (2007-2009) (2013-2017)	The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Lesotho collaborated with the Government of Lesotho, Irish Aid, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID), and UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) as part of the country's efforts to vigorously respond to the challenges of electoral administration in the country and, thereby, to strengthen democratic governance in Lesotho.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic strengthening of accountable and responsive governing institutions, strengthening the Independent Electoral Commission through technical advice, training, and increased regional cooperation. • Helping to develop conflict transformation capacities within the IEC and among stakeholders, in particular political parties. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IEC • IPA • GoL • UNDP • DFiD
3. Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance (CDGG) UNDP IRISH AID 2009	Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance in Lesotho (CDGG) was a five-year programme jointly funded by the government of Ireland and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) designed to build on the existing multi-donor support whose main purpose is to institutionalise and deepen democracy and good governance through improved electoral processes, effective functioning of parliament and enhanced promotion of human rights.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratic governance through strengthening accountable and responsive governing institutions; grounding democratic governance in international principles. • Governance institutions strengthened ensuring gender equality, public service delivery and human rights for all. • Governance institutions strengthened, ensuring management of credible elections, improved oversight role of the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNDP • Irish Aid • Ministry of Finance and Development Planning • Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) • National Assembly • Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Correctional Services • Ombudsman

		parliament and inculcation of the human rights culture.	
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(Source: Deepening Democracy Programme (UNDP Lesotho), UNDAF 2006-2009 Programme for Democracy and Governance 2005-2007 Consolidation for Democracy and Good Governance (CDGG) 2008-2012)

As seen in these governance programmes of Lesotho mentioned above, the country committed the leadership and government to encourage and strengthen good governance through various initiatives, including the adoption of protocols and principles, policy guidelines and other mechanisms geared towards enhancing the practices, institutions and processes of good governance. SADC shows that among the MDGs, the development of poverty reduction strategy programmes (PRSPs) and the introduction of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) formed a network of protocols and synergies which, if properly implemented, should result in the entrenchment of good governance and economic development of the continent (SADC, 2010).

ThuoGathii (2009) envisages that the initiatives of good governance premised upon conceptualisation and approached by the development partners are seen effectively as the route to reducing poverty and equal, democratic, corruption-free societies. Economic growth and efficiency is the backdrop against which this could be achieved. Thus, governance remains an act of gauging how accountable, transparent and inclusive/responsive governance institutions are to the citizens in order to improve the performance of the institutions of governance. This is the first stage that brings us to the institutionalisation as a subset of aid interventions to achieve political transformation and good governance (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007).

Like most Third World countries, Lesotho lacks both capacity and technical expertise to implement and influence a change in the political authority that would drive good governance. According to the Ministry of Tourism (2007:32-33), in its presentation to implement the Rio Convention and Multilateral Agreements in Lesotho, it aligned itself with the MDGs as a baseline framework for achieving good governance and poverty reduction and combating institutional capacity-building constraints.

Such goals espoused in the National Development Framework for Lesotho 2012⁶² and the MDGs include eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality, combating HIV/Aids, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for the development process. These were all calculated to achieve good governance to curb capacity constraints (Africa Adaptation Programme – Lesotho Project, 2009). The NDF was building upon the poverty reduction strategy in addressing a changed development climate, while Vision 2020 was reflecting the long-term aspirations of Lesotho. The implementation of Vision 2020 was based on the 2004 PRS, which outlined the required development efforts to put Lesotho on a pathway towards achievement of the vision priorities. Ntema and Ramashamole (2009, in Zuhui & Hongyun, 2009:39) mention the following:

Ever since 1970 after Lesotho gained independence from Britain in 1966, planning and budgeting processes have resulted in the formulation of five year rolling plans referred to as National Development Plans (NDPs). Problems led to the sixth National Development Plan not being published. The disadvantage with the NDPs was that they were ministries' wish-lists where every intervention would be included whether there was adequate funding or not. After that, the IMF and the World Bank came with the idea of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) as a way out of poverty for Africa. The Lesotho PRS was a three-year medium term development framework (2004/2005-2006/2007) for Lesotho.

7.4.1 The route out of poverty

As outlined in the review in the previous chapter on the Poverty Reduction Strategy process made in late 2007⁶³ and the UNDAF programmes from 2012 under the auspices of Joint United Nations Agencies both resident and non-resident in Lesotho, many of the programmes and projects contained in these policy documents were implemented and continue to be rolled over during the period of their existence. While the PRS describes how, over the three years, the government will join forces

⁶² *The Strategic Development Plan marks, as a point of departure, the need and urgency for Lesotho to radically transform its economy, intellectual and skills profiles by taking advantage of its location and defining a future that is characterised by the capacity to produce goods and services for the large Southern African markets, the African continent and global markets. This requires political and social stability as well as world class technical skills and institutions that are capable of technical innovation and meeting the challenges of global competitiveness, as it pursues overall economic and social goals of high broad-based and sustainable economic growth and employment generation that will lead to poverty reduction (National Strategy Development Framework, 2012-2017)*

⁶³ *Progress Report, Government of Lesotho, 2007*

with the private sector and civil society to translate ideals into action, the UNDAF aligned the national priorities to the funding patterns to deliver the global mandate mainly in poverty reduction, good governance and humanitarian intervention. The foundation of the plan has been laid by communities throughout the country. Their priorities are clear and reasonable for alleviating poverty, including such variables as the introduction of the old age pension in 2004 for all Basotho over the age of 70, which still continues; roll-out on free antiretroviral therapy for combating HIV/Aids and now led by the United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids; investing in “social infrastructure” to directly improve the quality of life and access to services like electricity; improving the Local Council Community Centres, and passing legislation intended for improvement on the Human Rights Index, including Child and Gender Protection Units (World Bank, 2003; IMF, 2004:16; UNDAF, 2012).

These successes and failures of the programmes mean that in many areas new development activities need to be identified to build upon those implemented over the PRS period and existence of the current UNDAF. Indeed, the evaluation of the MDGs (2013b) indicated the country has been off-target to meet MDG5A and B, namely the prevention of maternal deaths and aversion of maternal mortality. The aid interventions thus focused upon accelerating cross-government reforms in order to create a more conducive investment climate for Basotho entrepreneurs, domestic investors and Foreign Direct Investment (Lesotho UNDAF, 2009). Although the United States Embassy has swept away the good governance efforts by threatening to withdraw its development aid in Lesotho in 2015, such incidences continue to threaten the country’s efforts to attaining aid effectiveness. Aiding these initiatives also created the provision of complementary physical infrastructure to ensure investment is productive (including the development of a “minimum infrastructure package”) (ILC, 2008). This would follow the need for creating good institutions and support services to ensure sustainability of growth; for example, the development of a sound financial system, hence the investment climate in health and education to ensure a highly qualified, skilled and healthy workforce. In essence, these covered a transformation process toward good governance.















The route to good governance saw the introduction of structural and institutional reforms in Lesotho (Lesotho Vision 2020, 2004:3). The SDP 2015 reported the introduction of the availability of commodities for family planning in health facilities,

although Lesotho continued to experience significant stock out of life-saving commodities in almost 92% of health facilities across the country (SDP, 2015). The government, in line with the donor partner's priority areas for Third World development, introduced the implementation of free primary education in Lesotho in 2000 (Sunal & Mutua, 2008). Lesotho further implemented the policy of inclusive education across all levels of the country's education system. By 2012, a total of 19,862 pupils were enrolled at primary school level and of the 127,852 secondary level pupils 82% represent the youth with gross enrolment rate at secondary school now standing at 55.2% (UNDP, Lesotho National Human Development Report, 2015: 83).















7.5 Support towards transformation

The World Bank's Review on Development Effectiveness (2004) and the United Nations Paradigm Shift on Aid Effectiveness (2014) focused largely on the development effectiveness of the recent growth and poverty reduction experience of client countries (Day, 2014). It assessed the extent to which World Bank interventions have contributed to growth and poverty reduction and the effectiveness of different types of interventions. The Review uses the key elements of the World Bank's 2001 poverty reduction strategy to examine the extent to which these elements respond to the needs of the poor, are actually being carried out, and are having an impact (World Bank, 2005:29). In line with the 2004 Annual Review by the World Bank, as stated above, Lesotho embarked on a similar exercise involving all major stakeholders, including representatives of civil society and government institutions undertaken through joint government-donor initiatives. A commitment from donors (Irish Aid, UNDP, EU, etc.) indicated that they would continue support for the government in its efforts to improve and enhance governance in all sectors through interventions in the following areas: the electoral process, decentralisation, law reform, human rights, anti-corruption, gender mainstreaming, and Public Sector Reform (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2012a).

Table 9: Donor Support in Systemic Transformation Programmes in Lesotho

														
African Development Bank		+	+			+				+				
DfiD	+	+	+	+	+								+	
EC		+	+					+	+		+			+
PEPFAR (US)					+									
Global Fund					+									
GTZ	+													+
IA	+	+	+		+				+					+
IFAD					+		+							
Japan				+										
RSA									+					
IFAD/IFD		+	+					+	+			+		
UN					+					+				+
WB		+	+				+	+	+					

KEY:

- | | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
|  | Capacity building and institutional support |  | Budget support |
|  | Investment climate |  | Education |
|  | Health (HIV/Aids) |  | Other health |
|  | Agriculture |  | Food security development |
|  | Water sector |  | Energy sector |
|  | Transport |  | Public private partnership |
|  | Trade |  | Governance |

(Source: GoL, ADB Kingdom of Lesotho Country Strategy Paper 2013-2017; Southern Africa Resource Center (SARC) February 2013; and other donor partners)

The table above confirms that support towards transformation represented a commitment by development partners and a buy-in by the recipient (Lesotho) to enhance, firstly, human rights as a core element of the fight against poverty (Handley *et al.*, 2009:6-7). This principle is elaborated upon amongst other donors, including Ireland's White Paper on Foreign Policy and in the Guidance Notes on Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance (1997), which form the basis of Ireland AID's programmes in Lesotho. The Kingdom of Lesotho Country Profile developed by the ADB in June 2006 indicated that several donors have provided extensive support to the governance sector in Lesotho, although this assistance remained rather *ad hoc* and reactive. Matlosa (2007:61-63) notes that the fragile democracy and the political crisis of 1998 served to highlight serious weaknesses in the institutional capacity of Lesotho's young democracy, and created a compelling need for more support in the governance sector through a well-coordinated, systematic and comprehensive strategy. To this end, strategies were developed which streamlined the governance sector in Lesotho and fed into the Country Strategy Planning process. As Moran (2011:236) indicated, the starting position for Lesotho has been unfavourable and adversely affected by regional and international global developments in light of the government facing human and institutional capacity constraints.

7.5.1 Systemic support and consolidation of democracy in Lesotho

Mwangi (2013:106) hypothesises that the main threats to the consolidation of democracy between 1994 and 1998 were the intermittent conflicts among key organs of the state (i.e. the monarchy, the executive, the legislature, the bureaucracy, the security establishment and political parties), which were sometimes punctuated by violence. As opposed to other African states like Cameroon and Nigeria, Quainoo (2008:37) suggests that imperial evidence on ethnic conflicts in Africa have caused ethnic carnage in different countries by ethnic borders. This is not always the case, as the recent wars in Burundi and Rwanda were not about the creation of separate states, but gaining equal access to political processes where one group had monopolised political power. The main cause of the conflicts has been the political party bias of security organs, lack of political tolerance, lack of transparency and poor access to justice, and a poor civic and human rights inculcation in the populace.

UNDP (2010:243), through its Human Rights Institution, adds that the issues surrounding democratic consolidation were further compounded by the absence of other key prerequisites of democratic governance, namely respect for and observance of fundamental human rights, constructive management of conflicts, gender equality, decentralisation and democratic local government and effective partnerships between key stakeholders in governance, increasing crime levels and corruption. The absence of these fundamentals make governance dysfunctional and further undermines efforts aimed at sustainable development, such as poverty elimination, environmental protection and regeneration, job creation and the advancement of women (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007).

Scholars relate SADC's position of the state of the consolidation of democracy in Africa as follows:

Even if democratic governance in a number of SADC countries is yet to be sufficiently institutionalised, there is consensus in both academic and policy discourses that the majority of countries have undergone political transition away from authoritarian politics and towards multi-party democratic dispensations (Lodge *et al.*, 2002:2; Landsberg & Mackay, 2004:16).

The SADC commitment to the consolidation of democracy in Lesotho was witnessed following the 1998 political disturbances in the country. South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe helped Lesotho to take a number of steps to re-establish consensus, including the establishment of an Interim Political Authority (IPA) with representation from all 12 parties that had contested the elections. In the EU/SADC Joint Communique it provides that:

The two sides reaffirmed the importance they attach to respect for human rights and the principles of democracy and recalled their commitment to build, consolidate and strengthen democratic institutions founded on accountability, transparency, good governance, and the rule of law. These fundamental principles form an essential element of and the basis for co-operation between EU and SADC (Tsikoane *et al.*, 2007:13).

After the political instability of 1998, caused largely by the electoral model in use, the necessity to institutionalise ways to manage electoral processes became even more imperative, culminating in the creation of the Interim Political Authority (IPA), which was given the mandate to review the electoral structure in the country. This was a

move towards political transformation. Tsikoane *et al.* (2007:16) posit that several positive attributes for a stabilising democracy in Lesotho can be cited. One of these relates to the creation of appropriate institutions and frameworks of which the IEC, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Offences (DCEO) are good examples. Quite a number of other authorities and commissions have been established, all of which are indicative of a move towards a culture of democratic governance. A new Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was put into place following the 1998 elections. A legislative framework for local government, the Local Government Act 1997, was also introduced, while Transitional Community Councils were nominated to replace the former Village Development Councils at local governance level. Matlosa (2005) adds that following the above systemic support, the national elections were thus held in an atmosphere of peace and transparency and the results were accepted by all parties, held under the auspices of the IEC, with the establishment of regional/district councils as part of a new decentralisation strategy. On the other hand, the court system was capacitated to be more responsive to the needs of the poor with a more rapid turnaround of cases and a substantial reduction in the backlog of cases in the country (EU, 2009b). Lesotho has continuously enjoyed the support of development partners in establishing stable institutions for good governance, democracy and political transformation. This is also witnessed in the re-establishment and enactment of the Act that supports the National Aids Commission in 2016. In an effort to address these challenges, the government of Lesotho dissolved the National Aids Commission (NAC) Secretariat in December 2011, with the view of restructuring the National Aids Commission and the secretariat. The closure of the NAC Secretariat was re-evaluated through commissioning an Independent Sector Institutional Assessment (ISIA) for the HIV and Aids sector introduced by the government (Muchuri, 2015:4). The NAC now includes on its board civil society, the representation of local NGOs, and youth organisations. Not only can the resuscitation of the NAC be recorded, but also the establishment of the SADC Commission that sat under Justice Phumaphi to resolve the political rifts that led to protracted killings of civilian and military authorities after the February 2015 elections. The SADC Double Troika Summit decided on long-lasting solutions for the political rifts in Lesotho in January 2016 after the Prime Minister called for support by SADC to assist the country in ending politically-motivated security threats that ensued since August 2015 (SADC, 2016).

7.5.2 Institutional change and support

One of the key issues in relation to the successes and failures of this transformation and change programmes is the commitment of government to the Public Sector Improvement and Reform process, which warranted that...

The government of Lesotho embarked upon a large-scale public sector reform exercise from the early 1990s (Public Sector Reform and Improvement Programme - PSRIP). It was driven by the realization that the public sector was bloated, inefficient with regard to poor service delivery, with corruption constituting a drain on budget. The influence and 'persuasion' of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) played a significant role in this exercise. Policymakers and implementers in the public service have to note that public sector reforms aim to improve the lives of the citizens. It should be emphasized that these reforms are not an end in themselves but the means to enhance relationships between the steward and the master (Sefali, 2012:12).

However, within the ambit of these successes there were recorded failures, especially the failure of the country to make progress towards meeting the MDGs. Following the announcement by the UNDP on the bad performance of Lesotho in the MDGs during the MDGs Status Report Meeting in 2013, civil society continued to express these failures as resultant of a lack of coordination between the government, the private sector, and civil society organisations. As mentioned before, Lesotho has the second-highest HIV prevalence in the world with 23.2 percent of the adult population affected, as well as 1155/100,000 maternal mortality rate (Sello, 2014). The Lesotho Demographic Health Survey 2014 further established that the prevalence of HIV amongst the adult population has increased to 24.6%, leaving the country in the state of fragility and ill performance in the health sector (LDHS, 2014).

Donors continued to liaise closely with the government with regard to the implementation of turnaround strategies to address development issues in line with good governance and political transformation for outcomes of aid effectiveness and enhanced socio-economic outcomes respectively. In terms of governance, most of African states, Lesotho included, have made significant progress towards strengthening governance institutions since their transition to democracy (McNeil & Malena, 2010). The World Bank (2012a) reiterates that the Lesotho government has embarked on an ambitious programme of Public Sector Improvement and Reform

(PSIRP) in an effort to address and strengthen governance with the aim of achieving accelerated growth and poverty reduction. The PSIRP has been strengthened by the alignment of the NSDP 2012/13-2016/17, which was developed in consultation with development partners in Lesotho and supported by the UNDAF. The UNDAF is a UN multi-agency sectoral plan in response to poverty reduction, good governance, development plans and strategies of the MDGs and other international commitments (Lesotho, UNDAF, 2012). Alongside this is the ongoing monitoring of the governance programme through regular contact with the partners and meetings between donors and the Ministries (DPCF, 2012). In keeping with the donor aid programmes, Lesotho moved away from the traditional project-based approach to one of support for national social and economic programmes implemented by government ministries and other public agencies. This is contained in the contemporary Agenda 2030 and as recommendations from the MDG report that there is a need to improve inclusive planning. Lesotho is now undergoing a global programme integration in the NSDP and domestication/localisation of the SDGs to improve planning capacity and development assistance effectiveness (KOL MDG Report, 2015, UN SDG Domestication Strategy, 2016). Turner (2009:1) indicates that, as seen in the Priority Support Programme (PSP), Lesotho has been funded by the DfiD in support of the two top priorities of the Poverty Reduction Strategy drawn up in 2004 by the government of Lesotho. Those priorities are job creation and food security. However, the DfiD informed Lesotho in October 2008 that it wished to close the food security component. This was precipitated by the new Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy which advocated for joint donor contribution to food security. DfiD, would thus only become a contributor to budget support against food security implemented by WFP.

Though governance is a cross-cutting issue, focus of support for transformation include, and is not limited to, specific and appropriate interventions in such components of development and good governance that include election processes, the decentralisation of government administration, law reform, human rights and anti-corruption measures and gender mainstreaming (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2006; UNDP, 2015) The UNDP as a leader in this component mobilised \$ 1,28,963.00 to ensure that at the end of the current NSDP, national and local governance structures deliver quality and accessible services to all citizens respecting the protection of human rights & access to justice, and peaceful resolution of conflict. The country has made

some progress over the past decade towards its national vision of stable democracy and a united and prosperous nation and went through a democratic transition at the 2012 and 2015 national elections. The country built through this support, democratic institutions with impressive representation of women in politics and ministry posts. Notably, it also established key policies and legislation for a conducive environment to transform society, and embarked on public-sector reform to enhance institutional effectiveness. It also largely overcame the disputes from the 2007 elections through dialogue, culminating in the adoption of an improved electoral law. Governance institutions, however, are not optimized and lack capacity to deliver services to the satisfaction of all citizens. Service-delivery remains highly centralized, with accountability mechanisms not fully functional and the weak capacity of non-state actors. The Lesotho United Nations Development Assistance Programme still embraces the same values that will be priorities until 2017. Capacity building throughout the administrative structure was seen by all donors as crucial to the success of their support efforts; logically, therefore, any delay or disruption in implementing the public sector reform programme would, in light of the above support to transformation, certainly have a negative impact on future donor involvement (Bujra, 2000).

Continuing donor involvement in Lesotho's development, Ireland Aid, EU, UNDP and DfID, are jointly and inextricably bound up with the success of the political reform programme and governmental stability (UNDAF, 2002:7). This include the strengthened capacity of governance institutions that now have knowhow on exercising their oversight and legislative functions, taking the Office of the Auditor General and the Public Accounts committee which have now produced up to date reports on public financial engagements. Structures that respect, protect and fulfil human rights including the Gender and Child Protection Unit are fully functional and enhance the capacity of the justice system, promote gender equality and reduce the gender based violence and sexual offences. The government through support of the DfID and joint UN Agencies published the first even Gender Based Violence baseline study in 2016 to enhance good governance and effectiveness of development assistance to maintaining, promoting and protecting human rights. At policy level, the implications of the recent political and socio-economic trends dictated a shift in UN assistance to support the country's efforts to restore stability in the aftermath of the 1998 conflict. The same commitment continued with the 2013 political rift with the

decaying legitimacy of the then coalition government under former Prime Minister Thabane (*The Herald*, 2014). The UNCT interventions have centred on facilitation of political dialogue and providing catalytic technical and advisory services. As Motsamai (2012) puts it, the importance of the 2012 general elections was as follows:

The outcome of Lesotho's 2012 general elections was historic for three main reasons. While international and domestic observers stated that the elections were free and fair, it is too early to determine if the new coalition government will continue to bring stability into the reformed political system in Lesotho thereby causing aid to be effective in achieving its outcomes (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2012b).

7.5.3 Strengthening systemic and structural transformation

The context of systemic strengthening was expected to carry decentralisation forward following the election, enabling the lower tier of government to become effective as soon as possible in line with the overall political reform programme (UNDP, 2012). A report on the Commonwealth Observer Group in Lesotho has indicated that, in general, the IEC has done commendable work in preparing for elections at a time when these were to be held, and has managed to satisfy most political parties by putting in place transparent procedures of registration and other preparations for the elections (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2013).

This support for transformation, systemic, structural and institutional growth tallied well with the definitions provided on development in the context of good governance in Chapter 4.3. These efforts and measures were an initiative to attain good governance so that developmental attributes could be effective as well as donor aid. It remains clear that governance encompasses the methods that societies use to distribute power and manage public resources and problems. The UNDP's Human Development Report (1996) concluded that humane governance provides an enabling environment for human development and the eradication of human deprivation (Olowu & Sako, 2011:49). It furthered this conclusion in its statement that the goal of governance initiatives should be to develop capacities that are needed to realise development by giving priority to the poor, advances women, sustains the environment, and creates needed opportunities for employment and other livelihoods

(UNDP, 1996). As such, the United Nations Country Team strategised on how the United Nations could contribute to enhance the quality of the service it provides to the people of the Kingdom of Lesotho (UNDP, 2013). Such commitments to governance were contained in the three essential qualities:

- Ownership - it is participatory and in the interest of all the people;
- Equity - it is conducive to building a society that offers equal access to opportunities;
and
- Accountability - it is embodied in structures that are transparent and accountable to people (UNDP, 1997:9).

When people's interest, needs and human rights and not the pressure for economic efficiency, are at the centre of governance institutions and practices, there can be real progress in combating poverty. Humane governance provides the setting for equitable distribution of resources from growth (UN, 2010:12).

7.5.4 The legal framework

The government of Lesotho continued to engage actively in a law reform process which was aimed at modernising the laws of the country. This was evidenced by the introduction of the Lesotho Law Reform Commission⁶⁴. Acting Chief Justice Monaphathi reiterated that some of the laws that were either under review or to be presented to Cabinet included Juvenile Justice, Administration of Criminal Justice and the Sexual Offences Act. A Justice System Development Project aimed to improve safety, security and access to justice for the people of Lesotho by developing the Lesotho Justice Sector⁶⁵ so that pro-poor policies were formulated and implemented. Assessing the position of Lesotho, Peabody (2011) noted that the Irish Aid programme in Lesotho was stalled as the Human Rights Unit in the Ministry of Justice had not taken off, as commitment towards establishing such a unit was commendable and would dovetail well with the principles of development espoused under good governance initiatives.

⁶⁴The Lesotho Law Reform Commission (LLRC) is a statutory body enacted under the Law Reform Commission Act 1993. Its main purpose is to review the laws of Lesotho in order to modernise and bringing them in accord with current conditions, eliminating defects and simplifying them. The Commission is governed by eight part-time Commissioners with a full-time secretariat headed by a counsel. In line with this mandate, LLRC reviews out of date laws (African Development Bank, Kingdom of Lesotho Governance Country Profile, 2009:29).

⁶⁵The State Justice Sector in Lesotho includes the police, the courts including traditional courts, the judiciary, the associated structures of the Ministry of Justice and Prisons. Additionally, the justice system includes non-state mechanisms for ensuring public safety and customary systems of dispute resolution.

From the development of the Interim National Development Strategy Plan 2010-2012, it was concluded that the key element of governance was the efficient and cost-effective use of public resources, the appropriate utilisation of public assets, and sound management of the economy (Djurović-Todorović & Djordjević, 2009:281). The same elements were rubber-stamped by the UN Resident Coordinator in Lesotho, Ms Karla Hershey speaking on democratic consolidation and deepening democracy as catalysts for integrated economic development (UNDP, 2013). Comparatively, a presentation by the International Federation of Accountants (2001) indicated that similar experiences from America's statutory bodies exist to oversee this element of governance, such as Parliament, the Auditor-General, and the Ombudsman. Alongside these are a large number of civil society organisations that provide a variety of monitoring functions that contribute to transparency and accountability (WHO, 2008; LCN, 2014). Many development partners and donors are supporting the government in the health sector, law reform processes and capacity-building as seen in most of the Country Strategy Papers discussed in previous sections. Lesotho has a large NGO sector, mainly the Christian Health Association of Lesotho (CHAL), which is involved increasingly in providing primary health care. The private sector is diverse, ranging from modern facility-based state-of-the-art services to indigenous medical practitioners, village pharmacists and non-qualified practitioners. The development partners and donors support various areas of the sector's programmes and activities (UNDP/Irish AID, 2009:12; UNDAF, 2012).

7.5.5 Parliamentary Reform Process and transformation

Parliament is a key agent in the governance process in Lesotho. It thus needed assistance in order to discharge its overall mandate. Englin (2000:11) states:

The budget is a critically important document in insuring transparency, accountability, comprehensiveness and good governance. By providing a detailed description of proposed expenditure, it allows Parliament and the general public to 'know where the money goes' and thus increases transparency. In addition, the budget requires approval by Parliament before the government can spend money or raise revenue, making ministers accountable to Parliament and its committees. Finally, it provides a regulating and disciplining framework within which government departments must be managed and must perform their functions.

Similarly, in Kenya, it was stated that Parliament bears the ownership of government budgetary processes. Parliament sets procedures and controls in the spending patterns of the government (Warui, 2014). Lesotho's Parliament has shown signs of the need to enhance its capacity in relation to human resource and infrastructural capacity. Abaza (2008) does not dispute the fundamental objectives of the Consolidation of Democracy and Good Governance Programme (CDGG, outcomes framework) as to provide good governance support and capacity-building (UNDP CDGG, 2008-2012). CDGG also recognised capacity-building as a priority to develop and improve national capacity and related development outcomes. It provided that Parliament needed assistance in the establishment of portfolio committees as instruments for checks and balances over the executive as it envisaged that the Business Committee or the House may establish the portfolio committees, move ministerial portfolios from one portfolio committee to another, or add further ministerial portfolios to any portfolio committee. Therefore, the establishment of portfolio committees needed to be expedited so that the legislature could check the executive at all levels and on a regular basis (GoL, 2008).

The innovative support was meant to empower Parliament and enhance its effectiveness, while encouraging accountability and openness. A number of oversight bodies exist that should hold the government of Lesotho to account. These include the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG), the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament, the Ombudsman, and the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Offenses (DCEO). However, these oversight bodies lack the requisite capacity to fulfil their responsibilities to hold the state accountable (APRM, 2010). Lesotho's internal audit function is relatively new and underdeveloped, which limits the government's ability to fully monitor and check financial reporting, the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and internal compliance with laws, regulations and contracts (EJC, 2011:77). The African Development Fund noted that the Lesotho 2011 PFMA Act (Public Financial Management Act) legitimised the function, but it does not elaborate on the mandate, authority, reporting and accountability modalities of the function. While the Treasury regulations addressed some of these issues, challenges remain in terms of developing the organisational and operational capacity of the internal audit function. The ambition is to build capacity to extend the internal audit coverage, in particular into new areas such as

procurement audits, which would also serve as an important tool to monitor progress on the implementation of procurement reforms and the Public Finance Management Reform Action Plan (PFMRAP) as a whole (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2013b:4).

In general, the PSIRP 2004, PRS 2004-2007 and the UNDP CDGG 2008-2012 programmes coordinated the offices of human rights, good governance and democratisation, including that of the Attorney-General (AG), Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Human Rights and Parliament (CDGG, 2009:5-7). Through these initiatives the road to political transformation and good governance was paved by donors in order to achieve development results (Venkatesan & Yarrow, 2012).

7.6 Support towards institutional strengthening

Support towards institutional strengthening and capacity-building must necessarily be based on the key goal of poverty reduction towards the achievement of the MDGs (Cali *et al.*, 2008). The two development partners, UNDP and UNCDF, have supported the government of Lesotho in putting in place the institutional mechanisms for sustainable reduction of poverty in an effort to beef up the reform and improvement of the public service in Lesotho, support to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and the implementation of the National Development Strategy Plan 2012 of the reform process (Mbetu & Tshabalala, 2006:4). At the start of the new millennium, Lesotho and other developing countries were in a position of economic crisis and a considerable slowdown in economic activity and a drop in Direct Foreign Investment (Lin, 2008). In the social sectors, including the provision of basic health and education services, early achievements were reversed with a loss of confidence in the capacity of government to deliver services to the people (UNCTAD, 2013:10-14).

The events led to a considerable shift towards greater levels of integration with government structures, ensuring that the government has the responsibility for planning and implementing interventions that would instil good governance and political transformation. It remained inevitable that institutions of political authority needed to be supported and strengthened in this regard (UNDP, 2010:6). This introduced a considerable scope for significant reform and refocusing of the public sector so as to provide a business-friendly environment and deliver quality public

services efficiently and effectively. Mpela (2008), commenting on the Lesotho 2020 Poverty Reduction Strategy, indicates that the reform efforts in the past have resulted in a number of important lessons for the public service. These include the need to identify and further refine the core functions of government, improve the capacity of managers in the public service, and ensure political support for reforms at the highest levels. These lessons meant that Lesotho needed to institutionalise good governance, as evidence presented in the previous sections in this chapter (7.5.1) indicated that although the country established the institutions of good governance and capacity-building programmes, it still experienced failures in attaining development goals and meeting set targets in the NSDP and UNDAF. One core lesson learnt by the government was that lack of coordination in the institutionalisation of national priorities resulted in shortfalls in achieving expected outcomes, including the eradication of poverty, democratisation of political institutions, and human rights attainment. The EU Ambassador to Lesotho also reiterated that implementing the PFM Reform Action Plan needed commitment from what was loosely called other stakeholders (EU, 2013b).

Of equal importance are the lessons from experiences in other countries, including the need to shift the focus from the content of public policy to the way in which policy is implemented, addressing a broad range of mechanisms to promote reform, emphasising a participatory approach involving all stakeholders, and establishing a frequent monitoring mechanism. The UNDP (2013:9) stated:

Different project evaluations, notably those carried out for deepening democracy and the youth employment project (YEP) have recognized the significant contribution by UNDP in promoting democratic institutions and promoting strong partnerships with other agencies and the Government by building trust ... Notwithstanding this, the learning gleaned from the current programme points to inter alia, fragmentation of interventions which limited impact; the lack of effective cross-sectoral coordination; and the ineffective integration of cross-cutting issues of gender and disaster risk management ... There is a need for an environment of transparency, openness, regular consultation and dialogue to ensure timely and effective implementation of work plans.

The World Bank Report on Public Sector Reform and Governance noted that in Lesotho, while initiating this process would be relatively straightforward, its success would be determined by strong leadership and top political will (World Bank, 2012a).

Political leaders and authorities identified the reform process as a priority and indicated a preparedness to introduce the necessary legislation to facilitate change (Tsekoa, 2012). This strategy committed the government to improve the quality and efficiency of the public service through rightsizing the civil service, introducing a transparent performance management system, concentrating on core functions and ensuring an integrated approach to service delivery. Some progress has already been made with the establishment of the Ombudsman Office, the Labour Court, new training programmes in law, and the sign-off to establish the Prevention of Corruption and Economic Offences Act of 1999 (Tlakula & Kagga, 2012:39-40).

The DfiD (2006) suggested that efforts had been made to strengthen the centre of government and improve cabinet effectiveness (funded by DfiD) (The 2006 White Paper on Irish Aid)⁶⁶. The reform process has been implemented in part, but without the benefit of a well-developed strategic framework (Pholo, 2013). Santho (2009:3) focuses on institutional strengthening of the Public Service, indicating that:

A major pillar for sustaining democracy and development in emerging democracies such as Lesotho is the crucial need to promote a citizen focussed public service that will ensure the attainment of inclusive, shared development which will benefit all citizens in the medium to long term. This process should seek to ensure a dynamic interaction between the State and Non-State Actors (NSAs), organised civil society, the private sector and markets, so that growth and development outcomes are more pro-poor, inclusive with safety and security being assured.

The role of the state, especially in relation to service delivery, had to be well-defined to address inefficiency. However, the government has been engaged in a process of addressing these issues with Vision 2020, the PRS process, the PSIRP and the National Development Strategic Plan 2012/3-2016/17, as envisaged in the earlier discussions. Mokuku *et al.* (2001:171) however reported in a publication on the International Conference for Sustainable Development that the service delivery agenda had failed to take off in Lesotho.

⁶⁶The 2006 White Paper on Irish Aid commits Ireland to help build government systems and to strengthen capacity to plan, deliver, manage and monitor services.

The Capacity Development Policy 2010⁶⁷ set the tone for capacity development to improve the standard of public service in Lesotho, making it more responsive to the needs of the Basotho. Support to institutionalisation recognised by all concerned stakeholders and donors predetermined that this process would take many years to achieve, with a plan which would run over a twelve-year period (UNDP, 2009:2). Similarly, the Irish Aid Annual Report verified that, as a development partner, the primary aim of Ireland's programme (2009-2012) was to improve services which directly benefit the poor, with the focus on basic education, primary health care, HIV and Aids treatment, rural access to water and sanitation, and food security. The programme was to help to strengthen governance and public financial management (Irish Aid, 2008b).

Roberts (2003:3-4) stated that institutional support to Lesotho in the areas of human resources management, financial management, awareness raising and improved service delivery (health and education) as part of the Irish Aid Country Programme were donor-assisted with the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which the government recognised its linkages to the reform process. Verified by the EU, these involved the review of financial and budgetary processes and the introduction of improved instruments, the development of adequate human resource management capacity within the public service, improving access to justice through strengthening the courts and rule of law and improving the management and leadership skills at a senior level (EU, 2004:35). In 2016, the EU continued to pledge its commitment to support the development process in Lesotho, although it made a decision not to pay budget support to the tune of 26.85 million Euros after failure by Lesotho to comply with the conditions for payment. However, the European Union launched a package of technical assistance to support public financial management for implementation of the development reforms programme (EU, 2016).

7.6.1 Capacity-building of human resources

Donors and development partners' support towards strengthening institutional performance contributed towards training senior civil servants, establishing systems

⁶⁷*The success of translating financial and human resources into better public services, reduced hunger and greater opportunities for poor people is dependent on the capacity of individuals and institutions to use these resources effectively (Irish Aid 2010 Policies on Capacity Development).*

based on performance, and supporting a career development scheme for employees.

Since 2006 CIPFA has been working with stakeholders in Lesotho to professionalise PFM in the country. By the end of 2010 more than 350 students had enrolled in the programme from a target training population of around 500. Although initially student performance was good, subsequently performance declined, and it has been necessary to put in place a formal student performance improvement plan (GOL, 2012:31).

Support was provided to improve the financial management systems, which were envisaged to increase efficiency and lead to improved expenditure accountability. The World Bank (2014a:22) reported that through capacity-building programmes, the capacity for timely and transparent financial management was increased and training was provided to the government along with technical assistance by the World Bank. Key to institutional transformation success is demand-driven change, which stems from members of the public being aware of their rights and demanding improved services (Hudson *et al.*, 2011:12). Related to capacity-building of institutions was an initiative to ensure that personnel in the public service at all levels understand the process, their role and responsibilities and their rights as government employees. An ongoing campaign to alert the general public to the reform process was established, and of equal importance, a communication mechanism to inform government personnel of plans for change (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2013b).

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Action Plan, 2008-2012 (2009:16) states:

The UN will coordinate its programmatic and operational activities through a number of structures. The revised version equivocally stated that building awareness of the Poverty Reduction Strategy process through support for workshops and assistance to civil society to strengthen their involvement in the process was also essential in institutional support to enhance performance and aid effectiveness.

Assistance was provided for consultancies on key areas of the poverty reduction strategy and finally support provided to the Ministry of Planning with the publication of the final document, including summarising it in Sesotho. The World Bank (2011) indicated that there was support provided to a new poverty monitoring unit, which was established under the process.

Gayfer *et al.* (2005:29-31) write that institutional support was about making the government more responsive to the needs of the people and creating an environment where the democratic process is more firmly rooted in society. The design of the programme of support for capacity-building and institutional strengthening itself involved senior civil servants and political leaders over the process of transformation in deciding their needs and the needs of their institutions. The institutional support programme was supported by the Basotho and submitted to the donors in fora where frank and open dialogue took place in relation to problems that have existed for the past two decades (EU, 2012a). In relation to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the government made considerable efforts to involve civil society in developing the strategy and mechanisms that would be put in place to facilitate a process of consultation with the poor, especially those in rural areas. The EU Local Governance and Non-State Actors Support Programme observed the following:

National institutions able to implement sustainable pro-poor economic development, environmental management and household food security policies and strategies with special focus on vulnerable groups including women, young men and women and the disabled (EU, 2009b:35).

The government through donor funding showed significant commitment to develop the PRSP document through a process of consensus-building within government structures and comprehensive consultations with the rural poor, civil society organisations, members of Parliament and Senators, local authorities, the business community and other relevant interest groups. Madavo *et al.* (2001: 1-2) had earlier provided that Capacity Building and Institutional Support for Human Resources represented efforts in the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) by Lesotho and its commitment to reduce poverty and has thus established the Technical Working Groups within the offices of the Deputy Prime Minister, as well as negotiated with NGOs to develop a comprehensive strategy for poverty reduction. The approval of the National Strategic Development Plan in December 2012 further reiterated the continued commitment of Lesotho to developing far-reaching programmes towards poverty reduction. The Head of Delegation of the European Union, Hans Duyhouwer, remarked that Lesotho's efforts are focused on poverty reduction despite the challenges it continues to face, including lack of capacity for

the government to support projects of economic benefit (Duyhouwer, 2013).

NGOs also established a Civil Society Poverty Reduction Forum (CSPRF) that would link the Technical Working Group with civil society and other stakeholders at district level, sub-district and grassroots level (Kingdom of Lesotho, 2013a). The Global Fund Coordination Unit (GFC, 2013) addresses issues of good health at district level and continues to reach out to many Basotho with sufficient health support and capacity-building programmes. According to GFC, poor health service delivery contributes to the incessant poverty witnessed in Lesotho. In addition, a number of evaluations were carried out by donors in relation to the effectiveness of public service education and capacity building in Lesotho, all indicating that reform was urgently required (LCN, 2013).

7.7 Conclusion

The focus of the work of donors in the area of good governance is to enhance support for government actions to achieve aid effectiveness where donor funding is engaged (Lesotho-UNDAF, 2013). Good governance, as envisaged by development partners, stands to be an inclusive subject that plays a role through which recipient governments lead the way while leaving other responsibilities to the citizens, society and the private sector for collective accountability (Molenaers & Renard, 2001; Bevir, 2010). The international community has a responsibility to ensure that it not only prioritises, but also promotes good governance.

Mahama's (2008:74) argument supports the discussion in this thesis that indeed good governance is about creating conditions that empower citizens to participate freely in policy formulation and socio-economic development, and in so doing, achieve the goals set for aid effectiveness and development capacity⁶⁸. The findings of the United Nations in Lesotho confirm the arguments raised in this chapter that efforts were made to re-organise Lesotho's route into systemic and structural transformation; the pillars of good governance, which have been placed to achieve expected results on aid effectiveness through proper mobilisation and the allocation

⁶⁸Capacity development is a process whereby people, organisations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time. The definitions for capacity development are drawn from the OECD-DAC.

of public funds, and the effective delivery of public finances (UN, 2010d). The submission of the DPCF in Lesotho contributed to the conclusion that the political transformation and good governance initiatives build upon society to help citizens by creating enabling systems and structures for them through which they can exercise their rights and lead fulfilling lives. Essentially, as discussed in this chapter, fighting corruption is one of the vital elements of promoting good governance. The indicators on increased development intervention and enhanced planning capacity come up clearly as the government evidently enjoined stakeholders and efforts of donors to enhance aid effectiveness.

The results chain presented early shows that some of the outputs yielded were good service improvement and institutional efficiency to develop policy frameworks and social action. Lesotho's case for aid effectiveness has confirmed that it has become evident that in order to achieve standards in good governance, there is an inherent need to transform systems and create structures through planning mechanisms to boost and support the capacity for institutions and create an enabling foundation for socio-economic development. As Ahrens (2006:3-7) notes:

Today, it appears to be conventional wisdom that institutions matter and that 'good governance' has played a key role regarding the success cases in economic transition, whereas 'bad governance' has been responsible for the failure of transition programs. What, however, is far from being agreed upon is what exactly determines good governance and how can it be achieved in a highly complex political economy in which not only economic institutions but also political structures and informal constraints to individual action have become endogenous variables which are subject to significant change within a decade or less.

Levi-Faur (2012) states that governance is now a big concept that is central to development effectiveness, order and disorder, efficiency and deficiency. The political authorities in Lesotho reiterated that the political economy and economic vulnerability required a more robust approach to address the MDGs, as read together with the NDF and other founding strategies such as the PRS and PSIRP, to build a strong foundation on which good governance and political transformation could be maintained. Adejumobi (2006:6) agrees with the conclusion herein that the implications of the above-mentioned political and economic realities are that public

policy and implementation are largely vulnerable to external forces over which Lesotho has no control. He adds:

The focus is on the governance import of the new poverty reduction strategies being promoted by the international financial institutions of the IMF and the World Bank referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which many African countries have acquiesced to. How far do the PRSPs promote the culture of good governance and serve as effective poverty reduction strategy? (Adejumobi, 2006:7).

The results of development aid in Lesotho envisaged in this discussion is that Lesotho's case envisaged political transformation, whereas the capacity displayed by institutions to regulate conflicts among social forces and provide solutions contributes to the legitimacy and credibility of political institutions. This may serve as a sign of political development, and thus breed good governance, the relevant, sustainable and efficient results for progressive transformation.

Compared to Ghana, the politics of institutionalisation cannot be separated from the goals of institutionalisation to achieve governance and transformation; lack of development of policies and strategies result in poor governance as a result of improper political transformation to allow more fluid interventions of the systems to cater for reform processes (GSGDA, 2010:1). It therefore encouraging to see a picture in which political change programmes are a determinant of good governance without which the principles espoused in this discussion on good governance are essentially non-achievable.

Following these interventions by development partners, especially regarding alignment strategies to the Lesotho National Development Framework and other instruments of political change, the study is yet to assess how far these resources have been effective to usher in much needed socio-economic change and outcomes, enhance the performance of government and political institutions, and deepen good governance and political transformation. Donor aid should be in a position to clearly articulate its contribution to improvements in political, structural and systemic transformation that aid citizens and countries to achieve better livelihoods and employment opportunities, reduce the incidence of poverty, and boost capacity-building for sustainable social outcomes.

To make or break this theory of governance and political transformation upon which aid is premised, this thesis is yet to take stock of supported initiatives through aid in the name of political transformation and good governance to assess the process based on the fundamental pillars of aid. What is important is to assess how institutions transformed and which path they took as a result of the need to align and harmonise strategies to deepen donors' good governance principles. As will become clear in the next chapter, the conditions of facilitating institutional capacity, and the principles through which they were supported and the contributions of receiving aid, enhanced the achievement of goals in political transformation and good governance to necessitate development and aid effectiveness.

CHAPTER 8

PUTTING DEVELOPMENT AID INTO PERSPECTIVE: EVIDENCE OF ATTAINING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

8.1 Introduction

A number of scholars, including Chandy (2013), Ingram (2013) and Kharas and Lin (2013), as well as members of the Development Assistance and Governance Initiative⁶⁹ are of the opinion that development assistance faces new challenges in this recurring phase of development. This is founded on earlier theory discussed by the likes of Rodney (2012) and Bond (2006) who based their theory on the imperialist theory that the First World should be blamed for Africa's economic retardation since it drained Africa's resources, making it impossible for development to be more rapid. It is for this reason that Lesotho also evolved through the phase of development assistance that has been confronted with challenges including state fragility and conflict in order to develop local capacity, improve national governance and address transnational threats.

This chapter provides evidence, results and outcomes of the work of new actors under the circumstances, such as emerging middle-income countries, multinational corporations, mega-philanthropists and an energised global public led by high-profile advocates and civil society organisations who have taken centre stage when engaged with development over the last decade. Sandbrook (1982:17) suggests that the specific pattern of imperialist penetration has the effect of creating uneven and restricted forms of economic development, specific to Third World social formations. Chandy (2013) verifies that similarly, development interface is confronted with the rise of the enormous power of individuals and corporations with global reach.

As the theory in this study suggests, Hetzler (2012:216) conveys that the theory meant that the recurrence of the age of globalisation, technological advances and

⁶⁹The *Development Assistance and Governance Initiative at Brookings* aims to influence how aid and development policies are used to tackle global poverty and today's pressing development challenges. Through its target areas of research, including global aid effectiveness, governance, anti-corruption efforts, and US global development reform, the initiative offers critical recommendations to policymakers with the goal of improving development outcomes for millions around the world (*Development Assistance and Governance Initiative. Brookings Institutions: Washington DC*).

growing global awareness, the interconnection of most things around the world, such as the situation with environmental concerns and poverty, called for new rules, indicators and tools that are required to robustly engage in what works, involving extensive use of modern technology, transparency and evaluation. Lesotho acceded to these new rules by adopting the United Nations' reforms and other development partners' pathway to test the theoretical assumption espoused in the UNDAF and Country Indicative Programmes. The research question still remains relevant, namely, *Has the flow of aid in Lesotho effectively enhanced good governance through transformation and systems strengthening of political and governance institutions as envisaged?* With the evidence yielded from the results chain, the question will have significantly clear answers at the end of this chapter. Ulleberg (2009) in his theory proposes the hypothesis that the implications of this line of reasoning on what works raise the question of the role of the state in its own development process and the risk that NGOs may become instrumentalised or co-opted by donors or governments. It suffices that the study on Lesotho has to continue aiming at analysing and understanding the development interventions and their contribution to Lesotho's development context. The theories above as basis of the study suggest from the central argument of the neo-classical counterrevolution that underdevelopment results from poor resource allocation due to incorrect pricing policies and too much state intervention by overly active developing-nation governments (Jallow, 2011:135).

As described earlier, this study is based on the perspective of the 4th Pillar of Development in which NGO involvement with national institutions and governments is central to the development agenda. A study commissioned by the World Bank reaffirms that NGO involvement has a real impact, both on the demand and supply side of development as well as in terms of fostering government and civil society capacity.

The evidence from a number of World Bank operations suggests that civil society participation can contribute to better targeted, more effective and sustainable projects. The involvement of civil society also favours 'social control' of government programs by communities and the development of participatory democracy. Moreover, participation in government projects can engender benefits for civil society itself by strengthening its organizational capacity (Siri, 2002:4).

What has been the real problem is echoed by Radalet (2006:3), who notes that controversies surrounding aid effectiveness go back decades. Critics, including Milton Friedman, Peter Bauer and William Easterly, have criticised aid, charging that aid has enlarged government bureaucracies, perpetuated bad governments, enriched the elite in poor countries, or has just been wasted. Their conviction is the result of the continued record of widespread poverty in Africa and South Asia even when aid continued to flow over decades. Many countries that have received substantial aid have disastrous records such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Papua New Guinea and Somalia (Moyo, 2009). This led to the conviction that there is a need to reform aid programmes in Africa if aid was to have far-reaching results or, better yet, that aid should be eliminated altogether. Rajan and Subramanian (2007), however, point to the fact that evidence suggests absorptive capacity constraints continue to be a real problem in the Third World, but should not be seen as a barrier to growth.

Even though the theories discussed in Chapter 2 suggest that the impact of aid on growth diminishes as aid increases, in countries with stronger institutions or better health, more aid can be absorbed effectively (Collier, 2007). The next section will deal with institutionalisation as evidence for aid effectiveness and development with a suggestion that efforts to strengthen institutions and build human capital can increase returns on aid and help countries effectively absorb larger amounts of aid.

As seen in the previous chapters, Lesotho has one of the longest histories of receiving of bilateral aid, starting in 1970 and with resumption with the foreign aid assistance from Irish Aid. Lesotho received foreign assistance as a result of its under development position that exacerbated poverty thereby failing to provide the nation with capacity and skills to sustain itself. In this regard, Avellaneda (2006) writes that poverty and underdevelopment would affect the extent of achieving good governance and political transformation. The logic behind financial and technical assistance to Lesotho and other poverty stricken countries was exclusively at promoting the economic and social progress of these developing countries. Thus policy discussions should not focus exclusively on determining the limits of aid on growth but rather on how those limits can be expanded, and how aid can be made

even more effective in supporting growth and development. African Economic Outlook (2011:1) suggests that

Africa, a continent endowed with immense natural and human resources as well as great cultural, ecological and economic diversity, remains underdeveloped. Most African nations suffer from military dictatorships, corruption, civil unrest and war, underdevelopment and deep poverty. The majority of the countries classified by the UN as least developed are in Africa. Numerous development strategies have failed to yield the expected results. Although some believe that the continent is doomed to perpetual poverty and economic slavery, Africa has immense potential.

This submission brings our attention to the foundation of the theories in this study. The structural change theories provide support to Killen's (2009:2) statement that integrating aid theories into countries' planning systems and budgets, rather than using parallel systems or organisations, is crucial for the emergence of sustainable local capacity to manage all public expenditure and the engagement of parliaments and citizens in demanding accountable government. He further adds that likewise, transparency supports effective decision-making at all levels and predictability of aid essential to enable governments to commit to development programmes that entail long-term financial implications, such as expanding the teaching or health workforce. This is consistent with the Lewis model that premise its theory on the patterns-of-development analysis of structural change focusing on the sequential process through which the economic, industrial and institutional structure of an underdeveloped economy becomes transformed over time to permit new industries to replace traditional structures as the engine of economic growth as seen in chapter 2.2.1.

Furthermore, the development theory as a function of government-led initiatives (see Chapter 2.2.3) assumes that the success of any planned development effort depend on government's ability to provide the necessary conditions and elements required for natural development (Ahsan, 2012:44). This relates to the OECD submission that donor use of partner country's established institutions and systems as seen in the development partners' efforts in Lesotho helps to strengthen the partner's long-term capacity to develop, implement and account for its own policies both to its legislature and to its citizens (OECD, 2009d). Evaluations of donor support to public sector

reforms confirm that channelling aid through country systems strengthens budget processes and improves the country's own administrative and financial systems (Independent Evaluation Group, 2008).

8.1.1 Country systems and alignment

Development policy briefs outline the benefits of using country systems for the aid effectiveness community, oversight institutions and sector audiences. Among other issues, the briefs highlight the fact that the use of country systems potentially lowers donors' transaction costs and can lead to ultimate savings and thus greater development impact (OECD, 2009a). In line with the structuralist writers, this study shows that Lesotho agreed to development partners' frameworks (UNDAP, 2013-2018) in which the main assumption is that institutionalisation and systemic reform delivers results that achieve development for the Third World and eventually aid effectiveness for donor or aid giving entities (Carey *et al.*, 2010). There has been considerable publicity about and attention to the agreement of major development partners (donors) to uphold these theoretical frameworks of aid effectiveness in designing and implementing development assistance activities (Smoke *et al.*, 2011: 2). Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke (2010) insist that the path from alignment and harmonisation to aid effectiveness is essential in many developing countries where the systems with which donors may wish to align are poorly designed, weakly developed and trumped by informal mechanisms and procedures that undermine their potential for good developmental performance. It is for this reason that Williamson identifies the real question as often not whether it is possible to use national systems, but whether it is possible to help develop national systems without creating fully parallel mechanisms (Williamson *et al.*, 2011).

The discussion in this chapter is sparked by the commitments and declarations made and conceded to by the aid-giving countries and aid-receiving countries that base this assumption on dualism theories that suggest development goals could be achieved through alignment of strategies, harmonisation of donors, coordination of aid as well as mutual accountability by partners in development agenda (PD, 2005; AAA, 2008). As seen in the Lesotho NSDP, Svensson (2008) confirms that aid agencies have moved into the social sectors (as illustrated in Chapter 5.5.2 on UNDP and EU support to local sector), as the underdevelopment writers would put it,

and as they have seen recipient countries unable to supply recurrent funding, and overwhelmed by too many projects, they have moved away from the project-based approach in two directions and stressed the importance of having a country strategy, of individual interventions being consistent with that strategy and of evaluating success at the country rather than project level. This view influenced Howes (2006) as he came to agree with the second dimension in that it purports to stress the need for broad and long-term support, including for recurrent funding, provided through programmes rather than projects (Howes, 2011:4). Easterly (2006) agrees with the view that the main determinant of domestic success is domestic institutions. Though he concedes that aid has some good results to its credit, his concurrence with the view that aid “probably worsens” bad governments represents the fourth possible combination of views: aid as a minor but negative determinant of development (Easterly, 2006:157). It would seem that scholars of development aid are in agreement as the United Nations submitted in the case of Lesotho (UNDP, 2013) and Pettersson and Van de Walle’s (2008) contribution that the relevance of aid through country strategies and institutions is to provide evidence that aid can help take the Third World out of situations of continued poverty and achieve economic prosperity and political transformation.

The World Bank and organisations such as Oxfam⁷⁰ argue that doing away with agricultural subsidies and protectionism in industrialised nations would significantly reduce poverty in the developing world (Rodrik, 2007).

It is stupid to provide aid with the objective of promoting development and then adopt trade policies that impede this objective. Nor is it coherent to help foster regional co-operation among developing countries in order to strengthen shared infrastructure and trade while, at the same time, concluding preferential trade agreements with some members of a regional grouping and not others (Heydon & Woolcock, 2009:136).

This chapter establishes that aid has helped the Third World, Lesotho included, to move towards prosperity in its development agenda when certain parameters are implemented through which aid can be seen to work towards attainment of

⁷⁰ Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organisations working in approximately 94 countries worldwide to find solutions to poverty and what it considers as injustice around the world. In all Oxfam’s actions, the ultimate goal is to enable people to exercise their rights and manage their own lives. Oxfam works directly with communities and seeks to influence the powerful to ensure that poor people can improve their lives and livelihoods and have a say in decisions that affect them (Muller, 2012).

development outcomes (BPOA, 2009). As seen in Chapter 4, Lesotho has been able to attain good macroeconomic performance at least in the latter half of the decade. It is at the close of the decade with the impact of the global economic crisis that now macroeconomic stability is being threatened. Evidence suggests that Lesotho's performance on MDGs largely mirrors the impact of efforts made on the seven BPOA commitments in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals; there are indications that Lesotho performs well in terms of promoting gender equality and empowerment of women, universal primary education and access to water (World Bank, 2012a). According to a statement delivered by Lesotho's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohlabi Tsekoa, at the 57th Regular Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Austria, the main challenge for Lesotho lies with poverty eradication, combating HIV and Aids and the reduction of child and maternal mortality, despite an increased roll-out of basic health infrastructure and Prevention-from-Mother-to-Child (PMTCT) programmes. In light of these challenges, bilateral framework agreements such as the Millennium Challenge Account II and financing of Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation will be negotiated and further South-South cooperation⁷¹ promoted (CBL Economic Review, 2012). Clearly, from the above submission, the aid agencies and development partners have contributed jointly both the technical assistance and the financial assistance to ensure that the country yields results. Mainly the results that were addressed in the earlier chapter were in a number of good services development and implemented including the decentralisation of the governmental functions to the district level, the enhance intergrated financial planning and performance system, the accountability measures by instilling institutions of governance and public accountability, dealing with social policy formulation that ensured that planning reaches the beneficiary at community level and continuous investment in the people, not the least, enhance policy implementation especially for human rights, special development, political system and institutional. In effect their contribution responded to the indicators proposed that dealt with evidence of increased

⁷¹ *South-South cooperation is a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains. Involving two or more developing countries, it can take place on a bilateral, regional, sub-regional or interregional basis. Developing countries share knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts. Recent developments in South-South cooperation have taken the form of increased volume of South-South trade, South-South flows of foreign direct investment, movements towards regional integration, technology transfers, sharing of solutions and experts, and other forms of exchanges ("United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation". ssc.undp.org).*

number of relevant development programmes, human rights based approaches to development enhanced, at least the government having capacity to develop effectively planning (NSDP) and ability for the government to streamline environment to absorb more aid as we see aid increasing from year to year. In the last year, as part of the Country Coordinating Mechanism of the Global Fund, the UN facilitated and participated in the grant signing of US\$66 million for HIV and TB programmes, additional funding of US\$2.35 million from PEPFAR and US\$800,000 from Global Fund to improve nutrition status of those on treatment in Maseru, Leribe, Mofale's Hoek, Mafeteng and Berea.

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) has been able to raise around US\$39 million to cover the needs of around 520,000 affected people in the areas of agriculture and food security, health and nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene as well as protection. Furthermore, the HCT has provided the necessary assistance in terms of coordination and normative guidance to the government and development partners to ensure a timely, effective and efficient response. Finally, the United Nations in Lesotho has succeeded in resuming the Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee (LVAC) processes which have proved to be key to informing the humanitarian response. Also, progress has been made in supporting the government develop an Early Warning System as well as a national resilience framework to ensure the right preparedness measures to reduce the impact of future natural shocks. The establishment of a functioning early warning system is still pending.

The debate around effectiveness of development aid and its application to political transformation and good governance was discussed and revisited by several donors through their aid modalities. This included the funding by development partners of joint projects only to bring concerted efforts and comparative advantage in aid effectiveness. A recent example is the funding by the British Government DfID project of the Joint Multi-sectoral Response Programme to Lesotho Humanitarian Crisis which amongst to \$ 5, 4 million. The development assistance was offered on condition that the World Health Organisation, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Children's Programme, World Food Programme and Food and Agricultural Organisation join in efforts to address the state of el nino induced drought in Lesotho. Since joint donor programming has been deemed to conflict with

the interest of other development partners, this resulted to in some of the development partners exiting from recipient countries like Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and in the case of Irish Aid and DfID in Lesotho as resident agency, discussed in Chapter 6.3, even in light of requests against processes of sustainability of investments. Common justifications for such exits are found in donors' changes in aid policy, cuts in overall aid budgets, and/or alleged misconduct by the recipient. Adding to the above, Slob and Jerve justify the basis of this type of exit as likely to become more common with the increased coupling of aid policy to foreign and security policy concerns, and further concentration of aid and division of labour among donors and agencies (Slob and Jerve, 2008:38).

8.2 Institutionalisation

More than a decade ago, the World Bank argued that underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance (World Bank, 1999). This part thus delineates the indicators of institutionalisation of good governance and political transformation. This indicators ranged from showing that poor quality institutions, weak rule of law, an absence of accountability, tight controls over information and high levels of corruption still characterised many African states today (Knack, 2004:255). This formed the fundamentals of the new theory, as seen in Chapter 2.3.4 by Lin (2012) that the Management Science Approach and Directions Mandate assumed that the baseline to curb these underlying development ailments would be for development assistance to be refocused on the poor and institutional transformation for allying local capacity-building. Amongst the reasons that justified the need for institutionalisation in Africa and why governance is poor in much of Sub-Saharan Africa was such variables including colonialism, which results of which was weakness to develop strong, indigenously-rooted institutions that could tackle the development demands of modern states (Grindle, 1997). Some of the most striking results in the last decade of development assistance was economic crises and unsustainable debt, civil wars and political instability which have all taken a toll over the past two decades and more. The governance crisis in Africa continues more than ten years after the World Bank identified it as a major contributor to Africa's development problems.

Governance' has been added to the conditionality imposed as a requirement for funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and bilateral donors. Corruption receives the lion's share of the press but related problems include inadequate official information, weak mechanisms of accountability, poorly enforced rule of law, and bureaucracies that are ineffective and unresponsive (World Bank, 1989:60).

The move for institutionalisation in Africa was influenced by contemporary thoughts on progressive and moral stage theories to human development. In their theory, Giarini *et al.* (2012:1), Cuervo-Cazurra (2001:16), Freud (1957), Erikson (1982), Piaget (1957) and Kohlberg (1973) agreed that institutionalisation was a result of poor governance, which has multiple causes, and once governance begins to decline, a vicious cycle of inadequate revenue, low morale and poor performance all too easily created (Brautigama & Knack, 2004). According to Ajuku (2002), Institutions of good governance and political transformation emerged in Africa as a sort of alternative to international multilateral financial institutions. He states that the purpose of these institutions was and still is to give a human face to the worldviews of hegemonic neo-liberal as well as neo-conservative institutions. Ajuku (2002) cites the multilateral financial institutions in which the World Bank and multi-lateral financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, are to improve management, integrity, and functioning governments' economic and financial institutions. Another scholar suggests that these institutions have not been providing loans to African governments who pursue African-modelled policies to redeem the stricken train of development (Mhaka, 2013).

According to the African Governance Newsletter (AGA) (2011:8), the speculation above could be conceived as a formal way in which the fundamentals of institutionalisation of good governance could be premised upon to give way for a well-developed governance and institutional structuralism, mechanisms and embodiments to give operational expression to the African continental vision of good governance. Lesotho became a signatory to these same charters as influenced by the theories that good governance and political transformation could only be effective if it adopts a similar position as expressed in the findings from these schools of thought. In terms of the African Union Commission Strategic Plan 2009-2012, the institutions that make up the African Union (AU), its organs and initiatives have put much weight behind pursuing the democratic mandate, attaining good governance

and human rights so as to achieve the efforts towards the consolidation and institutionalisation of democratic governance in Africa. These results and targets can be achieved through enabling and facilitating the globalisation of the AU's parameters of good governance that bind the member states of the AU. In ensuring coherence of the governance agenda for Africa under the flagship of the AU, harmonisation of regional and continental plans must be attained (AU, 2009). The institutional and alignment modalities were adopted by national governments, even though they were not limited to the parameters mentioned above.

According to The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the AU attached much more commitment to good governance as a pillar of shared values to its member states, with relevant indicator on the improvement of democratisation and elections (ICRC, 2012). On the other hand, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated that this idea originated from the belief that institutionalisation and development were the driving forces towards the commitment of African states to governance and democracy within the Constitutive Act of the AU and the deliberations at the inaugural Summit of the AU in 2012. Combining these two scholarships, the East African Community (EAC) said that the African Charter had long been concluded and detailed that African states should align their policies on the establishment of institutions that could align to the sovereignty policies (EAC, 2012).

Most of the African countries were mandated to adopt human rights institutions in line with the recommendations of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, which mandated for an agenda that could support partnership of institutions like the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to that of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), which are working together to develop a Human Rights Strategy for Africa. Kiraso (2011) notes that the strategy for this recommendation was to facilitate cooperation and coordination and achieve more effective collaboration for institutions and actors that are commonly committed to the improvement of human rights in Africa. She included in her discussion the importance of The Pan-African Parliament as a legislative body of the AU. Malhotra and Fasel (2005) justified this inclusion, stating that this body cultivated human rights and democracy in Africa, which essentially ensured that the member

states adhered to democracy, transparency and good governance. Jalata (2014) posits that values are essential to set up normative standards that are indicative of the qualities of governance, and it is for this reason that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) states that the fundamental point of assessment for fulfilling this function is premised upon embracing the African vision. It is through this conviction that Ssonko (2010:1) assumes that the APRM planned to achieve its results based on institutionalisation of the structures and systems of good governance and political transformation, values of a shared African vision, norms and standards of political governance and human rights, the rule of law and ownership of the governance process. This hypothesis tallies with the theories in Rapley (2007:35) that contrasts development with two other social processes, namely survival and growth of humans.

Landsberg (2010) is of the opinion that the APRM represents a mutually agreed instrument for the AU and that it serves as a reminder for member states to self-monitor their progress towards attainment of mutually agreed African goals. Landsberg and Mackay (2004), in Adebayo & Rashid, (2004:118) maintains that the APRM as an institution of good governance illustrates a unique yet innovative initiative to design and implement Africa's wider vision of good governance. The approach was influenced by the linear stage theories, which found its results to be based on the relevance of the state to lead in monitoring participating countries' progress towards adopting and implementing the new context of development. Its baseline theory suggests that for structural, institutional transformation and capacity-building to take off, there is a need for financial support to achieve strategies of development to arrive at good governance and political transformation, authority and the achievement of good governance standards. Moore (2003) institutionalises development and the rise of NEPAD, which prioritised programmes relating to democracy and governance. It also emphasised the prescripts of the Agenda 2030 by forging close strategic partnerships among African states so that they, and not outsiders, would take the lead in crafting the AU, and become the chief architects of a new continental developmental paradigm in the form of NEPAD. NEPAD set out to promote "a holistic approach to development", governance promotion became a key feature, and it would be enhanced through the APRM. Tanaka (2013) says NEPAD ran concurrently with the AU Advisory Board on Corruption, which insisted that Africa

is still marred by corruption which remains the most urgent challenge towards the promotion of good governance, sustainable democracy and peace and security. The assumption to institutionalise corruption was based on the premise that it had a corrosive effect on building effective institutions of good governance in Africa. In the African Governance Newsletter of 2011, it is stated that corruption needs to be institutionalised. This needs to happen since it has a tendency of eroding the trust and confidence that is enshrined in public institutions with the effect of dislodging the credibility of public institutions, political leaders and the quality of delivery of services and resource allocations. Adejumobi (2011), in an interview with Julia Joiner of the African Union of Political Affairs, stated that corruption needs to be given urgent attention as it is the major issue affecting political stability and distorting resource distribution in African countries.

It is for this reason that Dada (2007) assumed that the establishment of the ECA Regional Anti-Corruption Programme had to do with the need for effective implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption and the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in Africa (AUCPCC). This was reiterated by the Division of Governance and Public Administration (GPAD) that institutionalisation was a necessary end to achieve a holistic programme, which would cover policy-based research, training and capacity-building in Africa (GPAD, 2011).

Africa utilises Election Management Bodies as leaders in the consolidation of democracy. They are entrusted with the role of ensuring democratic electoral processes. In realisation of this role, the AU's contribution to the output of good governance is in strengthening the capacities of national electoral authorities. Darnolf (2011) postulates that these bodies paved in this way in order for a comprehensive approach to eliminate unconstitutional approaches in the change in governments, as they emphasised zero tolerance for coups and the violations of democratic standards (Decision of the AU Assembly/AU, 2010). Scholarship in Development Stage Theories (Dewey, 2008:13) calls these principles expressions of the same process by which human beings acquire greater capacities and express these capacities in more productive activities.

8.2.1 Evidencing institutionalisation

Following the fundamentals of institutionalisation in support of good governance and political transformation, Lesotho has had many blueprints over the last ten years to demonstrate the country's commitment towards democratisation, good governance and the rule of law. This does not negate the fact that the country performed poorly in absorbing development assistance, which thus led to some of the failures in achieving the MDGs, especially 4, 5 and 6, where the country's performance results are off target (MDG Report, 2015). However, where there were notable successes. The Economic Justice Network Lesotho (2011), in a contribution to the OECD Country Report, confirmed that the process towards institutionalising aid was given top priority in 2001 at the Vision 2020 discussion. The Vision document spelled out equivocally indicators on Lesotho's proposed path, to entrenching peace, political stability and economic growth, with the target of improving the country's underdevelopment. Muloongo *et al.* (2005) state that Lesotho welcomed the IMF's proposal on eradicating poverty through support to the Poverty Reduction Strategy, although the government never gave the strategy due diligence. These authors also stated that Lesotho's association with the APRM provided sufficient evidence of efforts towards entrenching good governance and the country's ambition to ensure the practice of good governance. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation confirmed that since 2011, the country has shown improvement in good governance with an overall score of 61.1% and a ranking among the top ten countries in Africa in terms of good governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2015:4). Compared to Cambodia, the UNDP (2011) has adopted institutional programmes through a strategy plan (National Plan of Action, 2011), in which these intentions of the attainment of good governance were endorsed. Joint Development Partners and UN Agencies offered financial and technical support to build capacity to implement the country's targets.

McGee *et al.* (2002) and Falayajo (2015) agree that implementation of the above capacity building programmes was premised on the country's assessment of its poverty levels. Referring to the review of the Lesotho Development Assistance Programme (LUNDAP) by the UN, Falayajo (2015) stated that since the LUNDAP was approved in 2012, some important developments took place domestically and globally that would warrant a strategic review of the outcomes and targets stated in

the LUNDAP document. Such a review might well lead to adding objectives, reviewing others or assigning them lesser priorities, and providing a new sense of direction for future activities to align LUNDAP more closely with current national development priorities. The implementation of a human rights-based approach, gender equality and women's empowerment, results-based management, environmental sustainability and capacity development, as the five UN programming principles and cross-cutting approach, have still not provided substantive success in Lesotho's development context (Falayajo, 2015). The UNDP in Lesotho has since collaborated with the Disaster Management Authority under the Office of the Prime Minister to address the issues of the country's resilience abilities. Through LUNDAP, other UN agencies and development partners provide guidance on these plans (UNDP, 2012).

Lesotho has followed suit in aligning and harmonising similar structures and institutions of good governance within its state mandate. It adopted programmes that institutionalised good governance and greater development outcomes. The CDGG Programme Lesotho (2009) defined how institutions of good governance were a priority to the progressive political transformation of the country. The CDGG's work provided support to key electoral processes, including voter registration and education, parliamentary reform processes, MP's education, the portfolio committee office of the clerk, human rights promotion, including strengthening the Office of the Ombudsman and establishing the LHRC. This covered the broad mandate of the originating institutions of the continent that were included in the country's settings (Joint Evaluation of CDGG, 2012).

Institutionalising good governance has to do with achieving such outcomes as political stability, the rule of law, democratisation and the promotion of human rights and good governance. Nyane, in his presentation during the Human Rights Training Workshop in Maseru, citing *Mohamed P in Attorney General vs. Swissbourgh* (1995), noted that...

Respect for the rule of law is crucial for a defensible and durable civilization ... Those victimized by transgressions of the law must be entitled to full and unreserved protection ... No government, however powerful be its military arsenal, however awesome its police power and, indeed even however popular be its actual or perceived support ... dare be permitted to invade such fundamental rights (LAC, 1995-99:224).

This provides evidence that good governance is intertwined with the rule of law and human rights protection. Nyane's emphasis was premised on the conviction that human rights' institutionalisation has been evidenced as the best tool for human rights promotion and good governance, for without the knowledge of human rights, people may not be able to vindicate against any violations (Nyane, 2012). In contrast, Murombo and Mokones (2012) state that even though it is clear that institutions of human rights are a priority area to support good governance, human rights education in Lesotho is at a low level.

On the other hand, Lesotho took much effort in focusing donor support on the new legislation, systems and procedures, in particular the professionalisation of financial accounting, audit improvements and procurement systems through commencing with capacity training in an effort to institutionalise and deepen good governance and systemic transformation. In reference to the Kenyan experience, Mutakha (2011) writes that the failure of Lesotho is evident in its sluggish implementation of IFMIS as attributed to poor change management, despite leveraging support for technical assistance. The outcome of this shortfall in the system was failure for the country to fully implement an effective financial management system, partly attributed to poor change management, despite the involvement of technocratic expertise to steer the process of change management. This outcome demonstrated that insufficient attention was paid to change management. Drawing lessons learned from the assessment report of the PFM reform programme, and mostly the MTEF programme, it has been evident that the processes of transformation were not owned by the Cabinet as the body that sets the tone for the implementation of government policies. Reforming the PFM was a strategic move to deepen good governance as proclaimed to bring sustainable results (OECD, 2011).

The success story of the institutionalisation of good governance was mainly in the support provided by Irish Aid, who placed much emphasis on strengthening the IEC, the Office of the Ombudsman and Parliament, and the establishment of a functional Human Rights Unit under the Law and Human Rights Ministry (Irish Aid White Paper, 2006). The UNDP (2012) shared similar sentiments in which they affirmed immense failure of the government administration to own up to the process of the establishment of institutions of good governance and systemic transformation.

Moreover, the EU focused on budget support in the programmatic areas of water development, privatisation, health education and decentralisation. The UN was strictly confined to the deepening democracy programme, while the GTZ was strengthening institutions of local governance and improving decentralisation. The Lesotho government concluded that considerable efforts were seen in development partners' strategic alignment to the priorities of the government's plans and policies (KoL, 2011; UNDAP, 2012). This is also evidenced in the establishment of the Development Partners Consultative Forum (DPCF) in which all the resident and non-resident development partners active in Lesotho harmonised their priority areas to gain a comparative advantage in achievement of far-reaching goals in Lesotho (UNDP, 2010). The resident DPs include the DfiD and Irish Aid, operating from South Africa since 2013, the European Union, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the Libyan Government, the US Government, the World Bank, the IMF, the People's Republic of China, the French and Danish Honorary Consulars and the UN Agencies. The non-resident DPs include the African Development Bank, IFAD and Japan who are members of the DPCF.

Lesotho generally embraced the alignment of donor development strategies to national plans, as evidenced in the inclusion of such plans in the National Development Programmes (NDPs) (Daemane, 2011). The Lesotho government embraced the National Strategic Development Plan 2012, which succeeded the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy 2010-2012. The NSDP represented a new wave of national planning processes and welcomed the alignment of development partners' programmes, including the European National Indicative Plan (2009) and the Lesotho United Nations Assistance Development Framework (UNDAF, 2013). This new plan provided the basis for DPs' Country Assistance Programmes (EU NIP, 2009). Despite attempts and efforts at alignment, Lesotho still has not achieved efficiency in the coordination of the system that registers aid effectiveness, despite efforts by the Ministries of Finance and Development Planning (MoF and MoDP respectively) to establish aid coordination units and harmonisation of the achievements of development financing (DPCF, 2014).

8.2.2 Outcomes of the support

In assessing the process outcomes of the institutionalisation of good governance and political transformation, donor support has showed significant contributions in matters concerning good governance, in which the process of strengthening electoral systems and the processes of democratic participation were enhanced. This gave way to effective participation and representation, especially in gender mainstreaming (the quota for women representation in 2007 (30%); 27% in 2012 and 29% in 2015). Lesotho has taken measures towards these commitments. One was to make it legally mandatory for political parties to ensure equal representation on the PR party list submitted to the IEC for contesting elections, and the reserving 1/3 of the local council elections for women in 2005 elections, and the adoption of the MMP system at local government level. The passing of Legal Capacity of Married Persons, Act, 2006 was another measure of success to address gender inequality in the family and the social sphere. Besides, appointment of women in key positions in the public sector has been another observable positive outcome. Representation of women in Cabinet has been 9 out of 22 or 40.9% in 2011; 8 out of 30 or 26.7 % during the post-2012 ABC-led Coalition Government; and eight 8 out of 35 or 22.85% in the post-2015 elections Coalition Government. This process of institutionalisation found its origins in the structuralism theories that argue in favour of an inward-directed development policy largely through import-substituting industrialisation (ISI), and the dependency theories that propose a new international economic order and, in one of its strands, a transition to socialism as a way out of underdevelopment (Bogopa, 2005:95). These were manifestations of the road to political transformation, which resulted in a peaceful transfer of political power in 2012 and in 2015 respectively. At this stage, one could attribute these results on systemic transformation to the transparency and credibility of development support as seen in Lesotho's peaceful electoral process and the improvement in good governance and political participation (UNDP, 2013).

It suffices that the donor aid to institutionalisation resulted in the Independent Electoral Commission's (IEC) capacity enhanced in planning, organising, managing and supervising the processes and coordination of elections, as the elections observer missions evidenced in the 2012 post-electoral outcome (Muluzi, 2012).

Ebrahim attributes such efforts to the improvement that has been witnessed through the accelerated participation of political parties, civil society and the media in areas of good governance, legal reforms, conflict management and seeking effective means of political tolerance (Ebrahim, 2012). Jean Ping of the AU Electoral Observer Mission in Lesotho released a statement on 26 May 2012, stating that the efforts of development partners in institutionalising and deepening good governance and democracy, such as the initiatives of the EU in supporting the electoral processes and civic and voter education, have had far-reaching outcomes to promote transparency and credible elections (Ping, 2012).

The CDGG programme also contributed towards electoral assistance to the IEC between 2011 and 2012. The UNDP developed an action plan for electoral assistance, which is in itself a nationally implemented project that is galvanised by strong technical assistance from the UNDP Lesotho Country Office for deepening democracy and good governance programmes running concurrently with the National Strategic Development Plan. It supports activities of the IEC and institutions of governance and democratisation, including ensuring a well-functioning Parliamentary Portfolio Committee System (UNDP/CDGG, 2011).

Significant effectiveness has also been recorded on the issue of PFM reforms, which brought results to the country's development perspectives. Duyhouwer (2013) says that the total government expenditure is equivalent to 45 percent of GDP, excluding parastatal companies, while the government wage bill is close to 19 percent of GDP. At the Fifth Annual Conference of the Lesotho Institute of Accountants (23/10/2013), the Head of Mission of the EU in Lesotho His Excellency Mr. Hans Duynhouwer announced that due credit should be accorded to the institutional framework that saw the public sector accounting for about half of total investment on recurrent budget, showing that improving the budget process, enhancing efficiency, eliminating waste and rooting out corruption had a positive non-negligible macroeconomic impact (EU, 2013). This is the sole reason for the institutional importance of public finance reform contributions. With limited government resources, this is in the end the positive results the aspirations enshrined in the country's Vision 2020 and the current National Strategic Development Plan.

Referring to the positive results of development aid interventions for good governance and political transformation in Lesotho, the Resident Coordinator of the UN in Lesotho Ms Karla Hershey at the UNDAF Steering Committee Meeting in April 2016, highlighted the fundamentals of the implementation of the UNDP Governance Sub-Programme, which provided ground-breaking impetus for deepening democracy and strengthening democratic institutions and structures and systems of good governance. The Democratic Governance Sub-Programme⁷² presents a success story in which it delivered on the components of good governance (UNDP, 2007). However, Lesotho still experienced a lack of appreciation of its efforts towards democratisation, with the period following the 2007 elections up to 2012 marred by conflict between the then opposition party, ABC, and the ruling LCD. Lesotho is still battling with conflict that was sparked by the SADC report on the investigation into the murder of the Army General and members of the armed forces in 2015. This report has sparked division between the Lesotho government and the Basotho, especially on the rule of law. The major development partners, including the EU, continue to put pressure on the government to adapt the roadmap towards implementation of the SADC report (*Public Eye*, 2016).

Although there were capacity-building programmes that were intended to institutionalise good governance and political transformation, efforts towards institutionalisation and the transformation of political processes were threatened by incidences of political conflict (CPAP 2005; EU, 2013c). In a joint institutional strengthening initiative in Lesotho, Deepening Democracy in Lesotho, the UNDP provided for structural establishment and institutional strengthening in advancement of democratisation and planning for local governance (UNDP/Irish Aid, 2006). Democratic governance and open political dialogue, facilitated by regional integration structures (such as SADC) after 2007 and post-2012, mitigated protracted political conflict through the facilitation of peaceful political dialogue. The EU contributed

⁷²The CPAP, which translated the CP into implementable projects, covers four sub-programme components, one of which is fostering democratic governance in Lesotho. The goal of the Democratic Governance Sub-programme is to deepen democracy, governance, safety and security and contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of the Basotho. The implementation of the Governance Sub-programme has covered January 2005 through to December 2006 and continued until December 2007. As part of the implementation arrangements, in line with the requirements of the Results-Based Management (RBM) approach to programming, and at the request of the Kingdom of Lesotho and UNDP, an evaluation of the Governance Sub-programme was carried out in December 2006/January 2007 (United Nations Development Programme Country Programme Action PLAN 2005-2007; Saidou, 2007).

much to the process through strengthening service delivery, especially by leading the process of the decentralisation of governance structures and political authority (EU, 2007). In 2016, the third round of local government elections were held, further deepening the success of electoral management and political transformation that allows greater participation and policy dialogue. The Director of Elections, as he then was Mr. Mphasa Mokhochane (2012), applauded the maturity of the IEC in having held three general elections and local government elections successfully since 2002 and continuing to perform its functions well. Although some development partners doubted the time allocated to ensure that the IEC handled electoral logistics before the 2007 and subsequently the 2015 snap elections, the preparedness plans of the IEC improved with the successful 2012 elections (UNDP, 2012). Voter education for both the 2012 and 2015 elections were strengthened to allow maximum participation of the electorate. The 2015 election outcomes also reflected preparedness and efficiency of the development partners in assisting Lesotho to have the capacity to hold elections, even at short notice.

8.2.3 Deepening democratic governance

Institutionalising good governance and political transformation is entrenched in Parliament where Members of Parliament are capacitated with skills through comparative study tours and workshops under the support of development partners, including the EU and Irish Aid. Parliamentarians and civil society organisations, for example, attended learning visitations to New Zealand on the prospects of the suitability of Coalition Governance for Lesotho (*Public Eye*, 2014). At that stage, the capacity of the National Assembly and other institutions of systemic transformation, including the Bureau of Statistics (BOS), was enhanced. The specific focus was on human resources and institutionalising good governance (Motanyane, 2013).

Some of the projects aimed at further entrenching good governance dates back to 2006. Aspects, such as the proposed establishment of the National Human Rights Commission and the agenda for service delivery using e-governance, were explored (UNDP, 2007). This tie in with the human development theories that emphasise human processes and strategies by these individuals and governments to utilise and elevate society to fulfil the underlying intentions of the social collective development.

The project document proposing the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission was accepted as far back as 2006 (Irish Aid, 2010a). To date, the Human Rights Commission has not been set up, registering failure on the part of government to institutionalise this agreement.

The UNDP's Sub-governance Programme, discussed in Chapter 7.5.5, has seen positive outcomes towards deepening democracy and providing citizens with the opportunity to participate in the political processes in Lesotho. When perusing the reviews of the functional effects of project-related reports of the National Assembly, one notable effect was the institutionalisation of the Parliamentary ICT programme in which parliamentarians were introduced to the use of IT aides (GoL, 2012b). The government of Lesotho continued to provide evidence of institutional building with UNDP support, which provided a computer-based parliamentary centre that has been fully equipped with ICT services and aides for both Houses of the Legislature. Some of the milestones recorded by this initiative was the launch of the parliamentary website in 2005 (UNDP, 2008). In addition, more than 70 percent of the National Assembly and Senators were capacitated with courses in ICT and applications related thereto. The formation of the Joint Parliamentary HIV and Aids Committee represented yet another milestone towards inculcating parliamentary planning on national governance issues (Rakuoane, 2007).

Olsen (2007) states that the UNDP partnership with GIZ, under the Capacity Building for Effective Local Government intended for strengthening the Ministry of Local Government also showed the effects of good governance initiatives. This is a complementary programme that supports on-going jointly-funded programmes of the UNDP and the DfID. It focuses on capacitating the Ministry of Local Government in its decentralisation and the strengthening of local councils in advocacy and planning. Robinson (2008), relating experiences of Halvetas Lesotho (GIZ, 2012), a German firm consulting on decentralisation, was enthusiastic about the capacity of development aid in the provision of a platform to roll-out new local government structures that addressed development bottlenecks, such as the high prevalence of HIV/Aids in communities, coupled with chronic incidences of poverty.

The UNDP has been involved in capacity-building processes to ensure the alignment of the government's national priorities to strategic development goals (UNDP, 2007). Dorji (2015), in his pre-qualification review of the Lesotho United Nations Assistance Programme, states that it is no surprise that Lesotho did not perform well in achieving the MDGs. Tidemand and Olsen (2006) state that development assistance programmes have zoned into focusing efforts on people-centred development, as well as individual and institutional capacity-building, but forgot to build capacity to afford opportunities to acquire new knowledge and skills to improve socio-development outcomes. EC/EuropeAid (2006), GIZ (2013) and the DfID (2013) agree that although there has been substantial evidence of institutionalisation based on the realisation that locally established structures and community networks ought to receive sufficient capacity strengthening to complement activities that would empower them to fully be accountable of their own actions and engagements, the failure of local structures to be effective originates from a lack of effective planning and budgeting for improved service delivery.

Institutional and structural theorists supporting the Lewis model, including Todaro and Smith (2009), explain that the patterns-of-development analysis of structural change focuses on the sequential process through which the economic, industrial and institutional structure of an underdeveloped economy is transformed over time. Matlho (2012) states that institutions of governance, including the National Assembly, Senate and IEC, received similar capacity-building support geared towards providing impetus for operational functionality, the installation of equipment, and aides to facilitate a working environment. For her there was no excuse when these institutions failed to coordinate the development aid received, leading to poor results in the MDGs at the end of 2015.

In 2012, the IEC provided a pathway for the review of the institutional evaluation of the UNDP's approach to development assistance as contributing effectively to development assistance for good governance and political transformation. The UNDP remains the most influential player with respect to its efforts towards good governance and political transformation. Lowe and Nyakujarah (2008) posit that the strength of institutional support provided by the UNDP's partnership with other development partners (DCI, DfID and GTZ) has been able to fund projects and

collaboration in monitoring and evaluation. This relationship needs to be maintained to harness meaningful development results in Lesotho (DPCF, 2014).

Deepening democratisation and the service delivery agenda were contextualised within the ambit of the LGNSP. The final evaluation concluded that the LGNSP contributed to enhancing the capacity of Local Community Councils (CC) and CBOs in the three selected districts for participatory planning, budgeting and monitoring (LGNSP, 2010). It also enabled civil society to engage with communities in small projects in the areas of governance, women's rights, the fight against HIV/Aids, and natural resources management. Burian (2013) notes that there has been increased media coverage of the decentralisation process and local governance issues, in particular at the time of the 2010 local government elections. According to Burian (*ibid.*), the LGNSP also contributed to strengthening mechanisms and capacity for multi-stakeholder dialogue, dispute resolution and consensus-building with traditional leadership at community and district levels, although downward public accountability was not structurally enhanced. The Programme mainly addressed the traditional governance side of local governance, which strengthened capacities in the communities to resolve conflicts (EU, 2009a).

8.2.4 Achievement of relevant objectives

Todaro's analysis places dualism at the centre of the argument relating to why there is a necessity for development assistance. The neo-classical counterrevolution hypothesises that underdevelopment results from poor resource allocation due to incorrect pricing policies and too much state intervention by overly active developing-nation governments (Jallow, 2011:135). This provides justification for development aid. According to these theories, development aid assistance remains relevant as it is intended to work through national strategies and objectives with the ultimate outcome of achieving appropriately defined global goals, including the MDGs. It should be kept in mind that despite these theories, Lesotho still failed to achieve development goals in terms of the MDG Report 2015. Lesotho's country needs were assessed to ascertain what steps were needed to reach greater development outcomes (Fay, 2009). Among the most important as defined in the NSDP was privatisation. The Central Bank Report (CBL, 2005) notes that through development

aid assistance, ten enterprises out of 32 were successfully privatised for a project that was intended to support the privatisation of at least four enterprises each year. Other projects did not receive due institutional reintegration, which led them to die a natural death. These include the Youth Enterprise Project that was to be spearheaded by the Lesotho National Development Corporation and Basotho Development Corporation (LNDC and BEDCO) respectively. However, the past years have seen intensified project activities with marked signs of accelerated progress. For example, negotiations with Standard Bank of South Africa led to an agreement according to which Standard Bank Lesotho took over control of Lesotho Bank (with a 70 percent shareholding) (WB, Country Assessment Programme, 2014).

The Lesotho Commercial Court was established in 2013 and has started reviewing cases. The Investment Promotion Centre (IPC), supported by the project to promote foreign investment, made several attempts to promote enterprises to be privatised, but could not yield positive results. In 2000, Sechaba Consultants' estimated training extended to 486 retrenched workers through the Entrepreneurship Training Programme in which 60 percent of those trained are utilising their newly acquired skills. This component also experienced slow progress due to a limited number of profitable enterprises, a weak financial system, and a lack of technical capacity (ICR Review, 2001). Since 2005, Lesotho received support for the implementation of financial management reforms supported by the EU, including performance-based budgeting (PBB) since 2005, in an effort to gear up accountability, transparency and governance effectiveness (EU, 2013a). In 2013, Lesotho received almost 18.8 million euros in budget support from a basket of development partners in external resources

Lesotho has been implementing financial management reforms, which include performance-based budgeting (PBB) since 2005 in an effort to increase accountability, transparency and effectiveness in governance. Supported by several development partners, \$24 million in external resources have been utilised to strengthen government's capacity to manage funds and especially aid funds directly targeting projects of pressing social issues (social development, infrastructure, water and sanitation). BTI (2014) appreciates these efforts to promote and support national reforms, but recognises that there is still failure on the part of the government to

promote the necessary skills, especially in hospitals, to achieve the development outcomes. This is witnessed in the growing numbers of maternal and child mortality indicators for Lesotho, which rose to 624/100,000 births and 1155/1000, 000 for mothers due to the lack of skills in basic and emergency obstetric care, despite the women attending health facility services (EmONC, 2015). This finding on Lesotho's reform experience suggests that the failures may be attributed to complex designs of reform processes, which have not adapted to the local realities of sectors in developing countries. This called for improvements to address these bottlenecks (Thabane, 2012). One important aspect that contributed to this failure was the planning and performance reporting reforms, which used complex designs that were unable to map budgets as a critical component of MTEF (Thabane, 2012). An important failure in the reform processes in Lesotho was attributed to budgeting and planning that contained excessive detail, which failed to make a connection between resources and outputs evaluation (Strachan, 2007).

The Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Finance as he then was, Mr Mosito Khethisa has indicated that even though development aid support to reform processes has mostly met the targeted results, entrenching and institutionalising performance-based budgeting is still very weak and acceptance and ownership of the budget process is still very low from bureaucrats (Khethisa, 2013). The Minister of Finance then, Dr Leketekete Ketso evaluating Lesotho's Performance to Finance Reforms in a Parliamentary Session in February 2014, added that the lack of transparency regarding the intelligence and mechanisms of budgeting processes prevents them from being effective in making decisions about resources allocation, while monitoring and reporting on the use of the budgeted resources to achieve targeted results remains a cause for concern (Ketso, 2014). Key informants at the Ministry of Health also presented their opinion about the role of budget reforms in the improvement of budget allocations of resources. The Ministry of Health and Social Development was one of the pilot ministries in introducing a budget reforms system. Similarly, they were of the opinion that allocation was affected by the size of human resources at the health facility and not the size of the population it served, which led to failure in launching successful systemic transformational processes (Nyathi, 2014). Vian and Bicknell (2011) conclude that it would suffice to say that even human

resources at the health facilities were unaware of budgetary reforms and allocation processes that affected performance of the agenda for development effectiveness.

8.2.5 The donor position regarding progress

Development and donor partners remain strong in their conviction that ending poverty and the provision of development aid are top priorities on the international community's agenda for sustainable development. Development and donor partners' position with regard to aid effectiveness is that financial and technical assistance have lifted millions of beneficiaries out of poverty over the last decade, due to the fact that the world's poverty incidence, based on a US\$1 per day metric, declined from 28 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 2001 (Celasum, 2007). Even with protracted calls to increase development assistance from China, the situation remains the same (Takamine, 2012:83). The World Bank Global Monitoring Report (2005) indicated that an estimated 1 billion people lived below a dollar a day between 2005 and 2010. This was the source of agreement in Monterrey in 2002 that development financing should increase by 0.7 of GDP by 2015. However, with the declining economies of scale, even though many development partners increased their support, they could not meet the target as a result of the economic recession from 2012 to 2014. The UN Secretary-General then, His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki Moon reiterated that ODA fell by 4% in 2012 and, since reaching its peak in 2010, it fell by 6% in real terms (Ki-Moon, 2015). Despite the promise in Monterrey, the increase was still premised on the ability of recipient countries to be able to ensure effective use of development aid. Additionally, it must be noted that development partners and donor countries still identify their own weaknesses in their methodologies of aid delivery mechanisms, which they committed to tackle if they were to live up to this commitment. It is for this reason that after the Monterrey Consensus in 2000, donors continued to commit to availing more and better aid in their declaration during a high-level forum of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation (OECD) in Paris in 2005. The forum agreed on a set of 12 indicators to measure progress, harmonise aid and improve its quality. These indicators are in addition to the 159 indicators agreed upon by the 173 nations that acceded to the Sustainable Development Goal and Agenda 2030, approved in a High-Level Forum of SDG Agenda 2030 (UNGA, 2015).

Celasun and Walliser (2008) say that it would seem that governments have acceded to much more harmonisation and alignment of donor aid as decisions on how governments should spend are based on the modalities of the form of aid governments receive and how it is meant to be utilised in order for aid to be effective and achieve greater development outcomes. According to OECD (2011), governments' allocation of budgets were mostly on recurrent budget spending and investment spending as part of the philosophy to apportion spending appropriate to investment so as to attain specific results. As an example, educating children needs both human resource budgeting for teachers and investment infrastructure for classrooms. Talaat Abdel-Malek, the outgoing chairperson of the OECD/DAC, postulated that different modalities of provision of development aid have placed pressure on governments to align their budgetary and national plans to sources of development aid, even though in some instances aid was unpredictable (Abdel-Malek, 2012). According to Kharas *et al.* (2011) this proves correct dependency theorists like Engel (2010) and Pardo (2011) in their assumption that development aid effectiveness is affected by the way in which governments respond to various aid-giving modalities and the period of decision-making to give aid by donors also affects the nature of government's response to development aid. This posed greater difficulties to manage budget shortfalls. In other instances, when the budget is withdrawn unexpectedly, especially if it is during the annual approval cycle, the government faces major cuts in recurrent expenditure, investment outlays and mobilising other forms of financial support (Koeberle, Stavreski & Walliser, 2006). This was also experienced when the EU decided to withdraw 26 million euros in budget support to Lesotho in 2016, making the government susceptible to budget cuts.

Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) argue that, as seen in Lesotho's budget cuts, the litmus test remains the country's resilience in manifesting a response plan where aid commitments and disbursements remain low and unpredictable. The OECD-DAC based its development financing on donor-reported commitments and disbursements. Fengler and Kharas (2010) agree that OECD data gives important insights into predictability of donor funding, but even so, it does not allow for measuring fully the impact on aid recipients as information on donor commitments may not coincide fully with the development financing expectations that are fed into

the recipient country's internal planning process. In contrast, Park (2011) evidences that data provided by the IMF takes into account the government's discounting of aid promises. Even though Kragelund was influenced by Park, he states that, at the same time, it is difficult to arrive at this decision since at times disbursement data of recipient countries may not fully capture aid that bypasses the government's systems, such as direct support to NGO or technical assistance funds disbursed to foreign consultants (Kragelund, 2010).

It must be noted though that, under the circumstances, Lesotho has continued to register positive progress towards policy formulation and implementation in line with PD. However, Mothepu (2013) writes that the challenge of the progress is the processes of formulation and implementation of policies, which are not transparent and excludes stakeholders in planning. Shale (2010) agrees, stating that the platform for policy participation in Lesotho suggests that there are few platforms to debate the aid dialogue and its integration in national policy planning mechanisms. Development partners are not eager for multiple stakeholders to join in policy dialogue for planning development aid as they believe that this process of involvement may reduce the government's capacity to engage in policy and to formulate their own advocacy strategies. Nyane (2010) confirms the need for oversight bodies that can only hold the government accountable to this donor funding. These bodies should also have primary allegiance to the same government they should hold accountable. Over time, CSOs and the media in developing countries have shown to have weak capacity to provide the required checks and balances, making this commitment to good governance and political transformation challenging (Voeten, 2005). Lesotho has thus embarked on an inclusive roadmap after the outcry by the CSOs that the country performed badly in the MDGs because of a lack of collaboration and coordination of development aid assistance. The Human Rights Bill was tabled in Parliament to ensure that government can be held accountable for its actions, including individuals who have been given power to administer government authority (Maema, 2016). Likewise, a restructuring of governance structures of major policy and good governance institutions has laid a foundation for including representation by ordinary citizens to ensure accountability and good practices (Muchuri, 2015).

8.3 Systemic transformation

In line with the Lewis model theory (Todaro & Smith, 2009), the patterns-of-development analysis of structural change focuses on the sequential process through which the economic, industrial and institutional structure of an underdeveloped economy is transformed over time to permit new industries to replace traditional agriculture as the engine of economic growth. Hassan and Ojo (2002:106) write that the government of Lesotho embarked on a series of structural adjustment programmes supported by the IMF. As discussed in Section 8.1, the IMF and the World Bank emphasize key structural reforms, including privatisation, parastatal reform and deregulation of agricultural markets. In their initiatives, the results on these reforms were guided by Lesotho's Vision 2020. Although the GoL developed an Interim National Development Plan 2010-2012, it was only launched by the Prime Minister in January 2011 ahead of the process to adopt a fully-fledged National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) in 2012. As noted earlier, the NSDP was approved by Parliament in December of 2012 (GoL, Budget Speech, 2012-2013). It should also be stated that the process of systemic transformation started with the PRS in 2001/2002 and the coming into being of the PSIRP 2001/2002, which was fully implemented in 2004. In the Budget Speech of 2013/2014 the most notable results recorded were in Public Financial Management Reform that improved budgetary planning, accounting and accountability of the public service. Furthermore, the decentralisation process which followed brought services closer to end users with the Civil Service Reform improving the ability of the public service to deliver quality services (GoL, Lesotho Government Portal, 2014:5).

Grafton (2010), reporting on behalf of Commonwealth countries, of which Lesotho is one, said that the inception of the PFM programmes realised a number of fundamental changes, which included the incorporation of the Ministries of Finance and Planning since 2005 to have a better fundamental perspective on planning and budgeting. Wangui (2009), in his research on the impact of IFMIS in African countries, agrees that IFMIS in 2009 was a sign of improvement, changing business processes and expenditure commitment control procedures. He indicates that the ultimate result of this assistance programme was to decentralise the processing of payments, which proved effective to achieve service delivery (EU, 2013b). Through

much needed donor intervention, the government has also managed to transform the system and ways of modernising the procurement system and decentralisation of the procurement function to line ministries (Beck *et al.*, 2011).

The White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Small Business in Lesotho provided evidence that the input of donor funding and support to capacitate tax collection and revenue generation saw the new tax collection giant, the Lesotho Revenue Authority (LRA), positioning itself as a leader in revenue collection and tax education, collection and auditing VAT (GOL, 2012a). The LRA supports the PFM and the regulation of a number of development partners' funding modalities. Case studies on Supporting Capacity Development in PFM in Lesotho, Mali, Morocco, Nepal and Rwanda, presented by OECD (2011) at the Busan High-Level Forum, provided proof that results on systemic transformation were realised through:

1. DfiD support to PFM reform processes (January 2005 - September 2010) with additional funding from the EU and Irish Aid amounting to £6.25 million;
2. Support for the GoL PFM programme with DfiD, CIPFA training, as well as CSOs improved service delivery, transparency and accountability;
3. EU support funding the Integrated Financial Management System for about £7.5 million for capacity-building for economic performance and planning;
4. The US Treasury with technical assistance for preparation of MTEF estimates for 2011/2012 piloted in six line ministries for programme management and definition of budget needs;
5. GIZ support for PFM-related programmes, including decentralisation processes, local governance administration systems and management of organisational governance; and
6. The Country Assistance Strategy of the WB offering leeway to support the professionalisation of good governance parameters (CIPFA, 2010).

8.3.1 Other sectoral progress

The Service Delivery Agenda (SDA), an initiative of the Prime Minister's Office, announced that following the development of the Health Systems Assessment Methodology, the Health Systems 20/20 developed systematic and rapid assessment of the National Health Systems, and a platform was created for policymakers and programme managers with information on how to strengthen the system as a whole (GoL, 2009). The HSA 2020 still continues to buffer the health systems,

strengthened by the Global Fund Unit in the third trench of health development assistance to Lesotho (GFC, 2014). In line with Lawrence Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development, the programme for development led by the Global Fund Coordinating Unit represents progression of social advancement as evidenced in a series of progressive self-growth stages the Kingdom of Lesotho acceded to. The then Government Secretary, Mr. Tlohang Sekhamane, emphasised that the approach contributed towards comprehensive key health systems functions organised around six technical modules, namely governance, health financing, health service delivery, human resources, pharmaceutical management and health information systems (Sekhamane, 2009). The methodology was adapted and applied at both the national and sub-national levels in more than 14 countries, with Lesotho having initiated important health sector reform measures and health system strengthening that promoted a major priority for development. The World Bank's International Development Association Programme of 2008 provided a document for a proposed grant and credit facility to Lesotho, dedicated for a First Poverty Reduction Support Credit under the development partner. The document arrived at an informed analysis that the programme was set up against the envisaged goal of the Lesotho's National Health Plan (1995-2000) and later the Health Sector Strategy 2012-2017, which underscored the importance of systems strengthening with major efforts aimed at institutional strengthening, organisational development, and restructuring human resources for health, health financing, service delivery and improved donor coordination. Furthermore, Varallyay *et al.* (2010) confirmed that the January 2010 Health Systems 20/20 data collection as a part of the health system assessment process reported key findings of the assessment, showing that there had been dramatic improvements in the outcome areas and health system service delivery improved significantly.

Additionally, HS 2020 (2009) provided evidence that through the USAID-funded Systems for Improved Access to Pharmaceuticals and Services (SIAPS) Programme, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) built on the achievements of the Strengthening Pharmaceutical Systems (SPS) Programme by working to ensure the availability of quality pharmaceutical products and effective pharmaceutical services to achieve desired health outcomes. Similarly, the World Bank reported that the Health Sector Project attracted USD122.398 million of donor

financing. It strengthened and mitigated all the negative economic impacts associated with poor maternal health, HIV/Aids, tuberculosis (TB) and other diseases by systemic strengthening of the country's health care infrastructure. The President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), working with other development partners, including the Global Fund, in developing the Health Sector Project, successfully addressed these issues. The Director of Non-Communicable Diseases in the MOHSW has, Dr. Llang Maama confirmed that the government of Lesotho proposed salary reforms and PEPFAR provided assistance to improving training curricula and programmes, reduce red tape in hiring new graduates, and rationalising Ministry of Health and Social Development (MOHSW) staff positions. It is worth noting that in the success stories collected by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Lesotho provided further evidence that the health centre activity delivered quality services and availability of health centre clients, including the 90 percent of pregnant women who seek prenatal care. Moreover, more than 90 percent of infants and young children who are immunised against childhood infectious diseases form approximately 9000 TB patients treated at health centre level each year. A further 34,000 people receive Anti-Retroviral Treatment (ART) services at the health centre (MCC, 2013).

Reportedly, Lesotho's Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision (VMMC) programme has reached more than 10,000 Basotho men who have undergone the procedure as part of a comprehensive package of HIV prevention services (Manamolela, 2014). The Principal Secretary for the Ministry of Health as he then was, Mr Lefu Manyokole acknowledged the support of USAID's global Maternal and Child Health Integrated Programme (MCHIP), which has been working with the Ministry of Health to provide free VMCC services in the country since early 2012. As of February 2013, the Programme has provided access to circumcision for 11,300 men, a milestone in the country's efforts to prevent the spread of HIV/Aids. One HIV infection is estimated to be averted for every five circumcisions, which means Lesotho has helped prevent an estimated 2,000 HIV infections (Manyokole, 2014). With the second highest prevalence rate in the world, a persistently high rate of new infections and a low rate of male circumcision, Lesotho is among the countries with the most to gain from VMMC services (PSI, 2013). The high and increasing demand for VMMC shows that

Basotho men clearly require these services (MCC, 2013). Jhpiego⁷³ in its newsletter of December 2013, confirmed that in all of Lesotho's districts, men have been lining up (sometimes throughout the night) for the chance to access medical male circumcision, which is provided along with HIV counseling and testing, screening for sexually transmitted infections and education on sexual and reproductive health (Jhpiego, 2013).

Similarly, the Water Sector Project that totalled USD164.028 million has improved water supply for industrial and domestic needs. In this regard, the Project provided infrastructure to deliver water to garment and textile operations (World Bank, 2012). In terms of the Lesotho Water Sector Improvement Project (2011), the project activities were in line with the construction of a bulk water conveyance system and the establishment of a programme management unit for the Metolong Dam and construction activities. It also looked into the possibility for extension and rehabilitation of the urban and peri-urban water network, provision of improved sanitation services to rural households through construction of ventilated pit latrines and water systems, as well as restoration of degraded wetland at three areas in the highlands pastures. This project set the tone for the preparation of environmental assessments to support the development of a national watershed management and wetlands conservation plan. The Implementation and Status Report noted that the above-mentioned objectives were met and are being rolled out (WB, 2011). Currently, the government of Lesotho is working towards a provisional programme, which will improve water distribution through the Maluti Water Transfrontier Project, to be rolled out from 2017 to 2022.

The Lesotho Revenue Authority reported that the Private Sector Development Project was financed to the tune of USD36.105 million, aimed at increasing investments in private sector economic activity in Lesotho. This would be realised through improving access to credit, reducing transactional costs and increasing the

⁷³Jhpiego has been working in Lesotho since 2008, assisting the Ministry of Health (MOH) to address the national HIV/Aids epidemic. With the second highest HIV prevalence in the world, Lesotho has an urgent need to effectively prepare health workers to assist in HIV/Aids care, treatment and support as well as to provide large-scale prevention impact within a short period of time. In addition, under the USAID-funded Accelovate project, Jhpiego is working hand in hand with the MOH to support HIV prevention through the scale-up of Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision (VMMC) services for men in Lesotho. Mathematical modelling forecasts that a coordinated, rapid scale-up of VMMC by 2025 stands to avert as many as 100,000 HIV infections, which equates to one HIV infection averted for every five VMMCs performed in Lesotho. Jhpiego's VMMC partners in Lesotho include the MOH and Lesotho Planned Parenthood Association (Jhpiego Alumni Network. Lesotho Country Profile (<http://jhpiego.org/content/Lesotho>)). .

participation of women in the economy. This reflected commitment to deepening good governance and systemic transformation. The activities of the Private Sector Development Project presented the country with an essential component of the government's major policy reform programme. These are designed to contribute to the broader efforts to attract foreign investment and stimulate growth of Basotho-owned companies (LRA, 2014). In terms of the Lesotho Revenue Authority, the Private Sector Development Project offered security to at least 2000 people and companies operating in the formal sector through a more efficient commercial court system that guarded the rights of employees. The reform in the Land Administration System gave at least 55,000 households titles to their land..

8.3.2 Has the system's reform agenda lived up to expectations? Assessing the Six Results Clusters.

The plan towards the implementation of development aid is generally expected to result in a change in the structure of the economy and the transition to a more sustainable growth path. Significant benefits from the proposed reforms were sought to achieve a growth rate that will remain higher through to 2020/21 (NSDP, 2012). The Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Mr. Mosito Khethisa said that development aid interventions in so far as formal employment improvement was concerned had established opportunities for this sector by an annual average rate of 3.0% (Khethisa, 2013). Additionally, CBL (2013) shows that from a fiscal perspective, government will be able to expand current expenses in real terms and to finance several years of exceptional allocations to capital projects, while still achieving small fiscal surpluses and satisfying all critical debt sustainability indicators. This is based on the assumption that the most effective way out of poverty is through the creation of opportunities for employment and greater social development outcomes, seen within the ambit of good governance and political transformation. As the NSDP 2012/13-2016/17 assumed, development aid thus sought to establish the pre-conditions for high, sustainable and private sector-led economic growth, coupled with faster job creation up to 2016/17 and beyond. The then Government Secretary, Mr Tlohang Sekhamane, now the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new coalition government of 2015, indicated that the objective was to be achieved if the expected investments take place and if government maintains stability, implements the key reforms, improves allocative efficiency and

absorptive capacity, and if there is effective leadership and management that yield results (Sekhamane, 2012). He also noted that for this reason, funding necessitated the government to draw up the National Strategy Development Plan and take into account the main risks that can affect the implementation of the NSDP.

The World Bank Group assistance took the lead in the systemic reform agenda that focused more attention on increased public sector efficiency and a better performing public financial management for institutional capacity for good governance (Thahane, 2013). As the World Bank (2010) put it, the Results Cluster dealt with Fiscal Adjustment and Increased Public Sector Efficiency with the aim of ensuring macro-stability, which saw the increases registered above 27% of GDP. This was a result of reprogrammed capital expenditures and improved capital budget execution on selected investment projects (World Bank, 2010:12).

The African Development Bank together with the World Bank gave a country brief which indicated that through donor assistance, fiscal consolidation on the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) series closed financing shortfalls that were a result of meeting the SACU receipts that would support policy reforms and systemic transformation for providing additional resources. The PRSC ensured that government expenditure was restructured to ensure alignment and compliance with the Public Expenditure Review, as agreed on by the World Bank and the government (World Bank, 2012b).

Another cluster of results of development aid facilitated the strengthening of good governance as aligned to statistics, institutional capacity and service delivery by the public sector. In a study commissioned by the DfiD, it was expected that at the end of the fiscal year 2014 the support provided would improve policy-based budgeting, financial reporting, external auditing and oversight through improving the quality of the sectoral strategies and budgetary frameworks. As envisaged in the plans, this would enhance timely and better quality financial statements and legislative scrutiny of audit reports, and above all, support on-track implementation of the Nations Strategy for Development of Statistics and Data Action Plan (Swainson, 2014).

As mentioned before, 2015 saw the end of the MDGs and the UN called for countries to prepare for the development of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, which is informed by the disadvantaged and marginalised groups who do not normally participate in mainstream development (LCN, 2014). LCN was requested to do the consultation on behalf of the Ministry of Development Planning and the UNDP on a consultancy basis. NGOs and CBOs, including women’s associations, HIV/Aids support groups, youth, people with disabilities, farmers’ associations, chiefs and community councillors in the ten districts were consulted on what they believed should be Lesotho’s priorities beyond 2015. The report of these consultations formed part of the Prime Minister’s presentation to the UN General Assembly as the contribution of Lesotho to the Post-2015 Development Agenda (BTI, 2014). Below is a table that reflects on the donors that supported the projects, as explained above.

Table 10: Support of Grant Projects towards Lesotho Priorities Beyond 2015

Project Donor	Period Grant	Total of the Support
Capacity-building	ACBF 2007 – 2013	USD1,420,525.18
HIV/Aids Technical Assistance Project	World Bank 2011 – 2014	USD290,494.30
Public Participation and Capacity-building for NSAs	European Union 2012 – 2015	E178,000.00
Post-2015 Development Agenda	UNDP 2013	M217,000.00
Deepening Decentralisation Programme	European Union 2013 – 2016	E1,350, 000.00

(Source: Financing the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Domestic Revenue Mobilisation in Africa, 2013)

8.3.3 The results of the donor-assisted programmes

In this section, the results on the lessons learned on the contribution of development partners in as far as good governance and political transformation is concerned will be scrutinised. An examination of the programmes and results pertaining to the achievement of Lesotho’s long-term development objectives is presented below as a consolidation of the progress measured against key country indicators. An analysis is

drawn in this section, dissecting it by the pillars of the development targets. This section also presents achievements against expected results in more detail.

As described in Chapters 6 and 7, the main yardstick of development assistance in Lesotho had to do with increasing the capacity of the government, the private sector and NGOs to manage the adherence to and implementation of development goals and targets, as well as national and locally defined priority programmes, including the HIV/Aids programmes. The work of the development partners with reference to HIV/Aids programmes under the MDGs in Lesotho presented high significance and relevance towards support for the country's development targets. Lesotho's high significance of development aid was in support of the implementation of the government's development plans, especially towards the implementation of its programme and support to resource mobilisation from the Global Fund and other development partners (Chobokoane, 2013). This was justified through the \$5 million IDA grants that was focused on improving the capacity of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, the Ministry of Health, and the National Aids Commission (NAC). In 2015, the Parliament revived the NAC and enacted the Act towards its re-establishment and new fit-for-purpose function.

International Development Assistance funding to Lesotho has served more to assist with the attainment of development objectives and indicators. With improved spending capacity to implement and utilise resources under the Global Fund for Aids, TB and Malaria (GFATM), the national response to development goals substantially increased for both governmental and non-governmental institutions (GoL, 2014). According to the then Minister of Finance, Dr. Leketekete Ketso, the above project disbursed 94 percent (32.25 million USD) on the Second Round of the Global Fund for Aids, TB and Malaria that made up at least 80% financing on national targets, and providing evidence of good performance and response to addressing global goals and national targets (Ketso, 2014). Over and above this, the World Bank's assistance contributed directly and indirectly to the design and approval of the National Aids Strategy, with the out-of-school Comprehensive and Sexuality Education targeting at least 490,000 young people, condom programming and distribution to adolescent and youth corners, and improving testing and antiretroviral treatment. Following the anticipated pace of implementation of the HIV/Aids Strategic Plan, which showed

significant improvements, the number of testing sites functional in VCT had reached 102 in 2013, almost doubling the projected 55 sites, and with 50% of these sites fully equipped. This culminated in the number of people receiving ARV treatment reaching 23,000 and exceeding the project target of 20,000 by 2013 (WB, 2013). Although the development partners were of the opinion that the escalation of the pandemic appeared contained, the DHS 2015 concluded that the prevalence rate of HIV remained at 23.2%, accounting for almost a quarter of the population. The major gaps in prevention accentuated by these statistics were noted by professionals in the Ministry of Health (Maama, 2012).

The Chief Executive of MCA-Lesotho, Sophia Mohapi, reporting on the progress made against the MDGs, announced that the strengthening of sustainable Pro-Poor Growth and Job Creation was aimed at reducing constraints and associated costs to private sector development and costs associated thereto (Mohapi, 2012). In tandem with the above, improving the business environment was essential, thus donors aligned their support with the National Strategic Plans to support the government's ongoing efforts behind the development constraints. More results were seen in sustaining the process of private sector diversification through grants for economic projects. In this instance, the dialogue strengthening within financial and private sector development increased with much more agreement from development partners to coordinate the process of socio-economic development (Majoro, 2014).

The seminar held by Lesotho Cabinet Ministers on Reshaping Lesotho's Position in SACU in meeting the challenges of sustained and shared growth, is in line with the Public Choice Theory, which highlights the development orthodoxy suggested during the seminar that governments can do nothing right unless guided by development theories. In this regard, the World Bank emphasised its support to fiscal challenges for options towards systemic economic reforms, the effective use of public resources with capital expenditure, and agricultural challenges to diversify foreign direct investment and exports. The World Bank (2010) confirmed that following the development partners' investment in climate and infrastructure, ongoing operations in support for Waters Sector Improvement Projects (WSIP1) and Lesotho's Utility Reforms (LURP) received favourable attention from the EU co-financed institutional budget reforms programme. This followed the co-financed project on rural roads to

address market needs (PEPFAR, 2013). PRSC support for decentralisation focused likewise on improving service delivery. To reiterate, the World Bank's assistance in creating conducive investment platform in the country remains outstanding (World Bank, 2010).

Accordingly, and in agreement with the neo-colonial view of underdevelopment, a large part of the developing world's continuing and worsening poverty is ascribed to the existence and policies of the industrial capitalist countries. The Marxist thinking of underdevelopment between rich and poor countries primarily attests to this long history of the World Bank support to developing countries and the preponderance over the water sector, which began in the late 1970s with water supply provided to seven towns in Lesotho. This history continued with the World Bank's involvement in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which supported the implementation of engineering studies in 1986 (Majoro, 2013).

While considering the long-term development goals of Lesotho, the water service coverage has remained at approximately 80% of the population need in the last five years. What remains questionable is the quality of services improvement. Out of 24 countries in Africa, Lesotho ranks high (third) in moving populations away from surface water to higher levels of service (SADC, 2014). Lesotho's peculiar circumstances presume that while the population increases through migration, the challenge of providing these services to new migrants in areas increases (GoL, 2014).

8.3.4 Sustainable outcomes

According to Annan (2014), the highlands of Lesotho are populated by a majority of people living in poverty and receiving poor services. Given the limited arable land in the fragile highlands, the strategies enunciating sustainable development initiatives are thus targeted at enabling the local communities and authorities to better make use of their natural assets that include land and animals for subsistence consumption. It is in this light that Buscher (2013:7) justified that donors support the implementation of the Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Project (MDTP). The Project was meant to develop and test the mechanisms to empower communities to manage their socio-economic assets for sustainable livelihoods. It focused on development

initiatives that ascribed to community-based planning principles, which were adopted in the Lesotho highlands to facilitate the management of natural resources. This Project was a result of good cooperation between South Africa and Lesotho and helped to address the threats to biodiversity and conservation, such as veld fires. Moreover, the MDTP facilitated the development of a 20-year bio-regional transfrontier conservation strategy, development of a tourism strategy, and conservation measures for protecting threatened species. Chapeyama and Lets'ela (2006) however stated that some of the challenges surfacing from these sustainable projects and initiatives are a result of the inability to expand achievements beyond targeted areas under the Project. The evaluation of the Lesotho United Nations Programme 2008-2012 held similar views (UNFPA 5th CP Evaluation, 2013). These realisations reflected negatively on the success of the decentralisation strategy and the effective empowerment of local communities.

Even though the work and progress in putting in place the new institutional arrangements that emphasise local responsibility for services in Lesotho were given due consideration, the full impact on the ground has not yet been realised fully. The country still remains behind in meeting the MDG targets, especially MDG 5a and b (maternal mortality and child/infant mortality). This status has been influenced by low life expectancy, high child mortality and the highly growing HIV prevalence in the world (Carpenter, 2007). Between 2005 and 2010, Lesotho had the third highest HIV prevalence in the world, with 23% of the population affected.

Some of these statistical illustrations above were espoused in Lesotho's long-term Vision 2020 as key issues to address. In relation to the matter above, Vision 2020 envisaged that education for all (EFA) by 2020 would make a positive contribution to some of the alarming statistics. The overall education and basic knowledge in Lesotho would develop and education policies would be implemented, which would ensure the acquisition of functional literacy among all Basotho and the development of a productive, quality human resource base through education and training (Towle & Lende, 2008). The World Bank has provided support for the country's education efforts since 1975; while Irish AID and the Cyprus Fund supported the Ministry of Education and Training to implement the EFA 2005-2010 strategy, which has registered significant progress, especially with regards to basic education. EFA

(2008) report that free primary education was introduced in Lesotho since the year 2000. The progress in access and retention of learners in the programme led to gross and net enrolment rates of 118% and 82% respectively in 2008, while the completion rate for the same year rose to 93%. Addy (2008), a thematic expert on Gender and Education in Africa, introduces yet another issue of gender parity, which he claims has been achieved in Lesotho, and is expected to reach the MDGs targeted ration by 2015 for the education on time initiative. Through the World Bank's support to the Education Sector Development Project (ESDP), the two sequential grants in the EFA Fast Track Initiative and the Catalytic Fund, Timothy Thahane, the then Minister of Finance and Development Planning, acknowledged the USD 20 million grant for having bolstered basic education in Lesotho. The results of these interventions were seen in the construction and renovation of classrooms and the new campus of the Lesotho College of Education in the Thaba Tseka district, the provision of primary school textbooks and learning materials, an increased number of teachers, including qualified teachers, and the introduction of a distance education teacher training programme (Thahane, 2010).

Although it is important to focus on continuously addressing capacity constraints and the objectives of national development plans, the matter of aid effectiveness and assuming a proactive advocacy role on shared growth and ownership of development, and good governance must equally take top priority (Chuhan-Pole & Angwafo, 2011). In Lesotho, as with most countries, the central government is expected to take the lead in terms of commitment and ownership in the allocation of political priorities and economic resources which remains the lead in the delivery of successful country results (Mosisili, 2010). In his address to the Joint Sitting of Parliament, Mosisili did not hesitate to show that ownership is not automatic, even when authorities have made public statements on desired outcomes. In this regard, the World Bank concluded that if internal dialogue is improved among the Basotho through technical assistance provided by development partners, more effective results on political transformation could be realised (WB, 2010).

8.4 Conclusion

Reflecting on the theories that informed the analysis above, it becomes evident that the submissions show that underdevelopment and dependency can also affect the development and growth of countries, irrespective of the amount of support they receive in development assistance. The classical theories and neo-classical counter-revolutionaries perceive the perspective of Lesotho and other underdeveloped countries as a global concern. The linear growth model suggests that countries need to move out of the state of underdevelopment and poverty and change or align to meet development standards. On the basis of the above findings, development agencies are found to have aided the successful application of good governance and political transformation. In the first place, the agencies' professional outlook leads them to see development in primarily technical terms (Hout, 2012). Albeit stumbling, the evidence provided above shows that Lesotho has made progress in its adherence to principles of good governance, especially since about a decade and a half ago. The new Constitution, in terms of which a democratically-elected civilian administration acceded to power in 1993, is a major achievement in the country's quest to lay a firm foundation for the democratic principles of representative government. In recent years, Lesotho has strengthened its commitment in terms of the principles of transparency, accountability and public participation. Although significant progress has been made, Lesotho's democracy remains fragile and in need of consolidation (Omotoso, 2000; UNDP, 2012). Although these represent some of the results, according to the World Bank's Survey, Lesotho ranks 136 out of 185 economies in the overall "ease of doing business" ranking. In 2008 it ranked number 119 and in 2009 it was at number 123. Thus, Lesotho has declined on these rankings (World Bank, 2013b).

Regarding the results above, even if aid is fully invested, it may or may not increase output. The inflow of aid will affect government decisions on expenditure, tax efforts and even borrowing, a phenomenon widely recognised in the theoretical and empirical literature on the fiscal consequences of foreign aid (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2004). Scholl (2005:6) states that foreign aid effectiveness depends on the political institutions and economic policies in recipient countries. A measure of political liberties used in the literature shows Lesotho's more ambitious attempts in

recent times to get some indication of value for money in aid is the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) done by the DfiD (2011). Rajan and Subramanian (2008) recognise these issues and adopt a slightly different approach based on donor-recipient pair characteristics instead of just using recipients' characteristics. From the analysis above, donors choose aid allocation based on poverty considerations, but also because of history and influence.

The failure to utilise aid has led the development partners to re-evaluate the problems related to the relevance, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of development aid, especially in the incoming Agenda 2030 for sustainable development. This re-evaluation was hyped by the data collected by development partners, indicating that today at least 1.4 billion people are living in abject poverty and that every day people die of starvation and hunger, the majority of which are children hard hit by malnutrition before their fifth birthday. The World Bank (2012a) and the United Nations Millennium Project of 2010 pledged to ensure that development aid is spent effectively to address the current critical concerns. The development partners agree that aid is one of the most suitable approaches to tackle the world's poverty problems, even though aid should not be seen as a replacement of countries' own economic development plans. Lister (2013), however, indicates that based on experience, when aid is effective, it can play a supporting role in enhancing sustainable socio-economic development and assisting poor and vulnerable people to enjoy improved well-being and opportunities. Leppo *et al.* (2013) conclude that the problems associated with aid ineffectiveness offer harder solutions that are at best still difficult to implement. During the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in 2011, development partners and countries agreed on a number of commitments to ensure that development aid becomes effective. The signing of the Sustainable Development Goals have taken up these commitments, but it remains to be seen how they translate into concrete aid reforms for donor partners and recipient governments' structures, practices and results (UNDP, 2012).

This chapter demonstrated that the approach to aid management that involves recipient partners and development financiers poses an accountability measure of the basic responsibility of recipient governments for aid coordination and ensuring that aid is seen as an aspect of resources management. The most salient feature of

the work of donors in Lesotho has to do with focusing on the commitments by development partners and implementing partners in the country to ensure energising improvement of aid predictability and greater use of the country's system in delivery of aid priorities and targets.

Briefly summarised, the chapter concludes that good policies are democratically legitimated, effective and credible, whereas bad policies are unpredictable, costly, and corrupt. Such properties are created not only by the formal institutions and their implementation, but to a considerable extent also by informal institutions, attitudes and the culture of the social capital. Good governance implies good order and good policies. These developments in Lesotho that saw wide-ranging achievements of donor assistance implied that Lesotho should rely entirely upon formal and informal institutions and policies for aid to be effective. In the case of transformation the problem of causality can perhaps be solved in favour of good governance. Weder (2001:7) holds that "richer countries have a higher quality of institutions for a variety of reasons", including improvement of the voice and accountability mechanisms, scaling up accountability measures, attaining political stability, ensuring government's effectiveness, providing impetus for regulatory quality and the rule of law and control of corruption.

The Country Strategy Paper for Lesotho (2002-2007) under the 9th European Development Finance (EDF) concentrated resources in four key result areas, as mentioned earlier, and the programme has necessitated achievement of good governance and political transformation through institutionalisation. The European Commission's (EC) assistance to the government of Lesotho continues to support poverty reduction through economic growth and better provision of basic services, which is an indication of good governance. This complements the achievement of targets specific to the maintenance of stability-oriented macroeconomic policy, progress in implementation of the National Strategic Development Policy, improved public financial management and public sector reform. Furthermore, it consolidates the ongoing decentralisation reforms, to improve governance and strengthen non-state actors, as well as support trade-related economic growth.

A global partnership for development is essential for a flourishing development plan. This is reflected in the fundamental theories of development discussed in Chapter 2, namely that development is a series of stages or a series of age-related changes that happen over the course of a lifespan in which people exhibit typical behaviour patterns and establish particular capacities. Lesotho's precarious situation regarding the diminishing level of income from the Southern African Customs Union means that a stronger global partnership must be created in order to replace the dwindling funds (Ketso, 2014). The Public Sector Improvement and Reform Programme (PSIRP) was established to deal with financial management, decentralisation and public service reform in conjunction with a set of bilateral and multilateral agencies. The PSIRP also promotes alternative trade strategies, including diversifying exports and sustainable investment (Sekhamane, 2010). It is in this regard that the final chapter will assess an analysis of this donor funding and its effectiveness to the extent in which it provided development and aid effectiveness, as well as its contribution to good governance and political transformation.

CHAPTER 9

TYING THE KNOTS: CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

9.1 Introduction

Throughout this thesis, the main argument raised has been the need for foreign aid as a catalyst for development in order to fulfil the requirements of good governance and political transformation. This study has shown that aid has been given to achieve goals of development. The main idea discussed in the study is the effectiveness of development aid for good governance and political transformation. This chapter attempts to demonstrate the necessity and effect of foreign aid on good governance and political transformation. Throughout the study, Shah's (2012) view echoed that development assistance in the form of foreign aid has been regarded as too much, ending up being wasted on corrupt government activities despite good intentions from the donor countries or development partners. However, Fatima (2014) states that the reality may be that both the quantity and quality of aid have been poor, and donor nations have not been held to account.

In **Chapter 1**, it was indicated that this study's main purpose is to provide both a technical and conceptual analysis of the contribution of development assistance and foreign aid to Lesotho's route to political transformation and good governance, and similarly how the development assistance and foreign aid influenced socio-economic growth, institutional development and systemic transformation. Within the ambit of the scholarship of aid, the study has made reference to several forms of development aid, ranging from humanitarian emergency assistance, technical assistance and food aid to military assistance, which all contribute to development assistance. *The main question remains, namely, has this development aid achieved the expected effectiveness in order to promote, enhance and contribute to good governance and political transformation? Has development aid assisted in alleviating poverty and achieving economic growth, especially for the poor countries of the world, and how far has channelling aid enhanced the attainment of the global development agenda as mainstreamed in such principles as the MDGs, PD and AAA?* These questions can be answered in line with the research questions laid in the first chapter of this thesis.

For the first set of question, whether development aid has achieved expected effectiveness for political transformation and good governance, it can be answered as simply, yes. This is premised on the facts deposed in this study showing that the country adopted *an adaptive management strategy for navigating complex systems* where donor agencies, policy aims, programme objectives and multiple actors interacted to enhance the outcomes of planned development. The country developed working papers and strategies of ensuring aid is effective and adopted them in the planning route to achieve targets in MDGs and plans for the Agenda 2030. Although the evaluation indicated in some areas (MDG 4 & 5A) that the country was off track, there were significant progresses made using knowledge and evaluation to develop new ways of acting. Through development aid, we saw new understanding and new ways of acting that involves partnership between stakeholders (government, development partners/donor agencies, civil society and communities) tracking indicators and progress towards targets for improved action. The country was able to build understanding seen in some of the key informants submissions that enable evidence based informed adjustments to plans, actions and resources informing development adjustments to its context that deserved attention. Lesotho led the discussions regarding the development of the new National Development Plan (NSDP 2, 2018-2022) to which, for example the health contribution would be core to the next Health Sector Strategic Plan. As seen in Chapter 8, the Ministry of Development Planning developed a planning guideline that is flexible enough to allow incorporation of the new global agenda of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) including Universal Health Coverage (UHC). One of the influences of development aid was performance assessment to undertake sector joint annual reviews consistently. Based on the information from the review of relevant secondary sources as well as discussions with government and non-government stakeholders contacted by the study through key informant interviews, the study indicates that the focus on outcomes of good governance and political transformation were largely relevant and still remain so to Lesotho's development needs and priorities.

Coming to the next question, whether development aid has assisted in alleviating poverty and enhancing economic growth can also be answered positively. The Lesotho GDP increased by 0.4% between 2012 and 2014 showing a positive response to efforts to enhance economic growth. Lesotho's real Gross Domestic

Product (GDP) is about 2.5 billion Dollars and the economy grew on average by 4.5 per cent in the last 5 years. Modest growth in the economy was affected by poor crop production due to adverse weather conditions, uncertainty over the future of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) that supports approximately 40,000 jobs in Lesotho and slow growth in South Africa on which the country heavily depends as well as the poor growth in Europe, a key trading partner. Following a slower growth of 1.7% in 2015/16, real GDP growth is expected to be 3.3 % in 2016/17 owing to positive growth in the mining, construction, wholesale and retail trade and transport and communications sectors. This was responding *to the sensitive context of Lesotho focusing on matters that were a priority to alleviate poverty and enhance economic performance.* The Government of Lesotho has developed myriad strategies to address poverty. It has partnered with development agencies to improve and expand access to sustainable financial services in the urban and rural areas. Credit schemes have been introduced to commercialise agriculture. In order to improve food production, we saw the Government of Lesotho introducing block farming and promoting youth employment as a long term strategy for reduction of poverty. Through the donor support, it implemented strategies as Nutrition and Childhood Care and development with support of WFP. To this end, governance of policies and strategies improved in the sensitive context of Lesotho by creating an enabling socio-economic and political environment that is necessary to address the causes of poverty among the population sectors. Having adopted the Agenda 2030 which clearly acknowledges that all countries are different and thus not all indicators will be equally relevant, Lesotho sought support to utilise its water resources and mining to invest in job creation through multiple donor support especially the World Bank and EU. The achievement included creating employment for more than 2000 Basotho at national and sub national level. The total number of jobs created with the joint development partners support in 2015 remains at 2, 526 being 50% of the committed contribution of \$121,327,928 by 2017. Under this outcome, only milestones related to access to finance were achieved as planned. Key development partners such as the EU, withdrew parts of its budget support, due to concerns of public financial management. Lesotho is characterised by public sector-led growth, low diversification of the economy and a small and weak private sector which constrains growth and job creation and limits government resources for development purposes. Poverty and inequality are widespread with 57.1% of the population living

below the poverty line and a Gini coefficient of 0.54 in 2011. The bulk of the poor reside in the rural areas. Unemployment rates have also remained high (around 29 % in 2010/11), especially among the youth. UN provided technical and financial support to development of the surveys on access to finance among Medium and Small Market Enterprises. Lesotho, like many countries in Sub Saharan Africa, has been exposed to many forms of vulnerability and risks, which are environmental, economic, political and social. These are critical achievements that reflect strong governmental leadership and collaboration with development partners. As Lesotho begins its work in the Post-2015 Development Agenda, it will strive to build on these hard-won achievements. The risk to Lesotho's economic survival has been largely due to global economic recession, increased food prices, competition from imported textile products (effects of liberalisation) and reduced employment opportunity in the mining sector in South Africa. Additionally, as of 2015, more than half of Lesotho's population is living below the poverty line. While unemployment has decreased from 34.2% to 28.7% in 2015, it continues to contribute to the high level of poverty, particularly among youth, who constitute almost half of the population. South African mines once provided over 100,000 jobs for Basotho whose remittances strengthened Lesotho's economy. With the decline of jobs in South African mines, Lesotho's economy has weakened remarkably. Added to this, recurring droughts have caused pronounced food insecurity.

However, aid has been effective for governance and political transformation owing to the fact that Net ODA has played a critical role in Lesotho's ability to address MDG challenges. This was a result of the commitment of Lesotho's global partners, Net ODA to Lesotho more than doubled during the period ending 2015. The largest share of ODA (78% in 2013) goes to the social sector to mitigate the persistently high impact of HIV /AIDS, amongst other diseases including Tuberculosis.

The financing of the SDGs is going to be increasingly challenging for Lesotho, given its current heavy dependence on ODA for meeting the global target of reducing global poverty by more than a half. The continued support of the global community is vital to prevent reversals of Lesotho's developmental achievements and ensure the country's success in meeting the SDGs.

Finally, has aid has an effective ability govern, capacitate and strengthen systems and policies of good governance and political transformation? From the evidence presented in Chapters 7 and 8, we saw the development partners putting much weight in transforming the systems and institutionalising structures of good governance. Aid has been effective in this instance and evidence suggested, for example that, with support of development partners, Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission capacity was enhanced as an institute of good governance to manage and hold elections. In this period of the evaluation, we saw the country successfully holding of national elections and one local governance elections. The answer to this part *is the involvement of the key stakeholders and inclusive policy planning, formulation and implementation that was highly advocated and supported by key development partners.* Stakeholder's engagement has been integral to political transformation and good governance in Lesotho as a global development indicator. Lesotho involved the civil society, the private sector and beneficiaries in planning, formulation and implementation of policies of good governance and political transformation to tailor the indicators to their own context and priorities. Continued stakeholders involvement saw the reintroduction of such institutions as the National Planning Board for the development of the next National Strategic Plan and the National AIDS Commission to coordinate donor funding to combat HIV/Aids in Lesotho. These were supported by the development partners. Additionally we saw when the development partners institutionalised decentralisation of service delivery and financial management to ensure that the benefits reach the communities. Stakeholders shed light on which indicators are more relevant and in setting targets and establishing related pathways that will involve many people local, sub national and national levels. In particular, decision influencers such as parliamentarians, government officials, programme managers and other people with power have succeeded to make changes and provide accurate information for effective decision making.

The UN in Lesotho is continuing to play a key role in supporting the Government in rolling out the SDGs Agenda for meeting priorities in good governance and political transformation. Such processes are intended for development agenda into national policies and plans. The UN has also provided a number of capacity building and technical support initiatives to the Government on multi-stakeholder inclusion in SDG

outreach and prioritization, including activities all ten districts of the country. Capacity building of CSOs around issues of political transformation and good governance, youth, gender and human rights has strengthened partnerships with civil society. Mainstreaming Agenda 2030/2063 and SDG modelling for government, stakeholders and civil society strengthened institutional capacities. There is a broad recognition for a stronger partnership between both houses of Parliament, and also between Parliament and the government, civil society, media and national key stakeholders. Recognition that the lack of resources and limited capacities, authority, autonomy of the Parliament is one of the major challenges the Parliament is facing in order to carry out its functions effectively, including in relation to institutionalising all processes of good governance and political transformation.

Building on the experiences from the MDGs, the strengthening of M&E capacities is paramount to ensure tracking and monitoring of government expenditures and achievements of the goals. Further, systematic monitoring and evaluation mechanisms must be established to prevent similar problems in achieving the SDGs. To support these efforts, the UNCT mobilized US\$ 1.4 million from the European Union for Lesotho data for sustainable development project to be implemented by UNDP from 2017 to enhance national M&E systems, institutional capacities, data collection systems, coherence, and innovations. One of the other critical challenges that remain is also the problem of coordination and communication.

In this questions, Lesotho endured the outcomes as delineated in the results chain that ranged from changes in behaviour in doing things, (inclusion of multiple stakeholders), inputting relevant planning mechanisms for sustainable development outcomes (that are context sensitive) and not the least ensured measures of efficiency in results based policies, accountability for results (that are adaptive to management practices that involve utilisation of development aid). In a nut shell, this framework confirms that aid has indeed been effective in the context of good governance and political transformation in Lesotho.

It was Shah (2012) who developed a hypothesis that development assistance in the form of foreign aid has always been associated with an important element in assisting and helping poor developing nations to grow out of poverty.

The problem that influenced the development of this study was arguments by scholars who believed that Lesotho and other underdeveloped countries were marred by development shortfalls, despite the substantial amount of aid flows and development assistance they had received. In this instance, countries in this category, including Lesotho, remain underdeveloped, affected by increasing incidences of poverty and a lack of programmes that could attain sustainable development impact (Riddell, 2007). Additionally, an observation of what the country received in terms of development assistance was to be evaluated and reviewed against whether such vast support to Lesotho has brought the expected development outcomes and improvements for the vulnerable population. This study has thus explored the contribution of these multiple million-dollar programmes to ascertain whether donor assistance aid has been positive or negative (Rosenberg & Weisfelder, 2013:114). To substantiate this submission, following a report on the Doha Conference on Financing for Development in Qatar 2008, donors noted that developing countries have enjoyed increasing development aid assistance through, for instance, the European Union that pledged to spend 0.56% of GNI on poverty reduction by 2010 and 0.7 by 2015. The conference concluded that there is an ongoing belief that donor assistance is able to alleviate poverty and achieve greater development outcomes as it is recognised that some 40 years ago, development partners and donor governments also promised to spend 0.7% of GNP on ODA (Official Development Assistance) during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1970. These sentiments present the problem addressed in this study that is perpetuated by the realisation that aid has been channelled to most African countries to support institutional strengthening and political reform. However, the assumption in most African countries, including Lesotho, is that these countries continue to dwell in situations of political instability, service delivery shortfalls, perpetual poverty, capacity constraints and political decay and suffer setbacks on economic modernisation and governance stability (Moyo, 2009). Therefore, the study's aim remains relevant since throughout this thesis, an interrogation of theoretical perspectives to advance the idea that development aid is an appropriate subject to enhance good governance and political transformation has been maintained, and more precisely based on the long-term standing receipt of developed assistance and foreign aid in Lesotho. *It purposely aims to show the effect*

of the contribution of development aid to Lesotho's growth and outlines significant effects made by aid on the development discourse in Lesotho, with a special focus on good governance and political transformation.

The foundation of the theory of development assistance is premised on the UNGA resolution in which specific reference was made to the key paragraph that insisted that...

In recognition of the special importance of the role which can be fulfilled only by development assistance, a major part of financial resource transfers to the developing countries should be provided in the form of official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 per cent of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the decade (UN General Assembly Resolution, 1970:par 43).

As seen in **Chapters 4.2.1 and 5.2.2**, Lesotho has a long history of receiving bilateral aid, starting in 1970 and resuming with the foreign aid assistance from Irish Aid. The foreign aid was a result of Lesotho's position of underdevelopment and poverty, with the country failing to provide for the nation as a result of poverty and a lack of skills. In this regard, Avellaneda's (2006) noted that poverty and underdevelopment would affect the extent to which good governance and political transformation could be achieved. The logic behind financial and technical assistance to Lesotho and other poverty-stricken countries has been premised on promoting the socio-economic sustainability progress of these developing countries. The UN General Assembly has advised that technical and financial assistance to developing countries should not be used by the providers of development finance to the detriment of the national sovereignty of recipient countries. It stated that developed countries should be able to provide the increased development assistance on a long-term, continuous and sustainable basis (UN General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), 1970:para 45-47). Basing the study's logic on the above assumptions and submissions, the first note made in **Chapter 1** provided a baseline for the effects of development aid on political governance (political transformation and good governance) in Lesotho. **Chapter 2** advanced a single position in which the experiences of donor roles in development assistance sought to address the deficiencies that brought about poverty, food crises, corruption and political decay

that might affect the proper functioning of the state to allocate and improve the socio-economic status of the people of Lesotho. However, as a basic assumption, an exploration of various theoretical foundations formed a major subject of debate in **Chapter 2**, which provided impetus for what had to be tested in these theories that could be attached to the development proclaimed in light of the number of strategies employed, essentially defining what development is or from which angle development is viewed. Theories such as the Linear Growth Models and Interdependency theories formed a subject of debate as they state that development assistance has a correlation to growth patterns and significant socio-economic outcomes from giving and receiving aid, especially among poorly placed and underdeveloped recipients, including Lesotho.

Similarly, because of the initial thought that development aid assistance has the potential to breed good governance, **Chapter 3** went on to explore what the premise of good governance entails. It is worth noting that it based its submission of theories on governance, institutionalisation, democratisation, good governance and political transformation. The main reasoning behind this was that good governance should be seen as institutional and structurally good. The analysis did not only focus on the measures of good governance but also on how to enhance good governance based on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks. In light of the above, **Chapter 4** introduced the tenets of development aid in an African context. It mentioned that African governments recognised the need to strengthen institutional capacity with regard to policy-making and the implementation of national development objectives. In so doing, what was needed was institutions that could provide capacity, both technical and financial, to strengthen sustainable development projects within countries and the creation of opportunities to address the striking underdevelopment and poverty crisis. This thought introduced the fundamental background of giving and receiving aid laid in international financing institutions and bodies such as the European Union, the World Bank, the Millennium Challenge Account and the African Development Bank. The pillars of aid were also discussed, which showed that development assistance had evolved through four pillars, from governments' bilateral economic reconstruction post-World War II to international non-governmental bodies post-Millennium Era in order to instil development growth. This chapter also included

a discussion that attempted to persuade a further exploration of the rise of new regimes in global development, the Agenda 2030.

Having discussed this background, **Chapter 5** delved deeper to interrogate Lesotho's context in light of the previous discussions. It highlighted issues that surfaced in Lesotho's development context, including poverty, humanitarian crises and the socio-economic context of Lesotho in the light of development aid assistance. The political context, systemic transformation and institutional governance provided the impetus to analyse where the development assistance was targeted for developmental needs in Lesotho's context. It was concluded that Lesotho has a dire need for development aid as a result of the country's contextual position. It has been the general feeling of a number of donors that international donors are under pressure to provide more money for Lesotho, where 725,000 people, almost one-third of the population, are short on food following the worst harvest in the last decade. This was the foundation of **Chapter 6**. The chapter raised issues on Lesotho's need for development assistance and offered an explanation on the need for aid in Lesotho. It showed that this form of development aid response is intended for promoting development and poverty reduction, as well as responding to the humanitarian crisis for a good cause promoted by donor funding. It based its argument on the Results Chain as a suitable framework to measure development aid against planned outcomes.

Therefore, in **Chapter 7**, several aid interventions in Lesotho were analysed to prove or disprove whether aid has done more good or bad to Lesotho. In the context of the chapter, Lesotho embarked on a number of frameworks as seen in the earlier discussions. The frameworks were aimed at shaping the way towards the adoption of socio-economic reform programmes that would necessarily inform the need to assist the country in achieving specific programmatic interests in line with the development aid pillars. A real practical situation was drawn closer in the context of this support for transformation and systemic, structural and institutional growth, which would substantiate the dynamics of development assistance provided on the context of good governance, as seen in **Chapter 4**. These efforts and measures were an initiative to attain good governance so that developmental attributes could be effective, as well as the donor aid. The analysis tested the certainty of the

assumption that governance encompasses the methods that societies use to distribute power and manage public resources and problems. **Chapter 8** provided data and evidence of the effects of development aid assistance on good governance and political transformation in Lesotho. The work presented therein outlined the role of the state in its own development process, and the risk that NGOs may become instrumentalised or co-opted by donors or governments. Having analysed the evidence, the chapter continued to analyse and develop an understanding of the development interventions and their contribution to Lesotho's development context.

Basing the central assumption on the continued assessment of the changes in the global world order, Lake's (2013) development approaches responded to Lesotho's context. In this instance, it drew upon strategies of inquiry which are lodged deep within the traditions of a modern world to enquire on development aid assistance's relevance and significance in the context of a developing country such as Lesotho.

Looking at the prescripts in **Chapter 6**, Lesotho benefited significantly in the ODA programmes from various development and donor partners to address the ills in development aid financing, as offered by wealthy nations. This conclusion excludes private contributions or private capital flows and investments. Thus, it cannot be ignored that Lesotho was affected by the inflow of development aid assistance and the focus in this chapter is to arrive at a conclusion on how this affected, benefited, or disenfranchised the country's route to political transformation and good governance. According to the Scientific Council for Government Policy (2006), the overall objective of overseas development assistance (ODA) remains the promotion of development, the deepening of good governance, and the promotion of political transformation. A conclusion on ODA's contribution to Lesotho's development in the context of political transformation and good governance remains a litmus test to measure the key priorities of development that governments pursue as a matter of national key indicators and priorities (SCGP, 2006). In this chapter, it is discussed whether development assistance has made any significant improvements to the processes of good governance and political transformation in the country. In previous discussions it was noted that Lesotho had received considerable development assistance, and it cannot be ignored that such assistance went to programmes of

systemic transformation and the institutionalisation of good governance as seen in development partners' aid modalities.

9.1.1 Revising the predicament of development aid assistance

As discussed above, this study indicated that foreign development aid in Lesotho was intended to serve the purpose of promoting economic and human development. Throughout most of the African countries explored (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Namibia) in **Chapter 5**, the study has indicated that the ability of development aid to serve this purpose has been questioned by scholars, including Moyo (2009) and Barder (2009). However, the conception still stands for some scholars that in fact development aid is ineffective (Williamson, 2009). Relating this finding to the context of Africa, Williamson found that the motivation and incentives of aid effectiveness, faced with benevolence or worse, were often overlooked. Leeson (2008) and Heckleman and Knack (2008) substantiate that the philosophy of development aid involves individuals who are inclined to put aside their own interests and act in the best interest of the recipient country. Similarly in **Chapter 6**, significant work on the development aid fundamentals were found to have placed much emphasis on the development programmes' context, in contrast to scholars such as Moyo (2009), who advocated that aid should be stopped. For submissions such as Moyo's, the findings in this chapter presented an agenda to rethink the focus of aid effectiveness for agencies involved in giving and receiving aid to be more proactive and derive effective means of achieving intended results for development aid. This line of thought has influenced scholars to believe that the agenda for development aid is absurd in assuming that donor countries, development partners or aid agencies are unbiased in their initial decision to provide development finance to a specific country (Sachs, 2005).

Williamson (2009) provided evidence that development aid to recipient countries allocate values in an effective way to meet their required tasks. This finding provided Tullock (2005) with the foundation to posit, as referenced in **Chapter 7**, that the decision-making process in the allocation of development aid is inclined to take into account the position of different stakeholders, special interests and the priorities of national governments. Other scholars, including Prokopijevic (2006) and Rashid (2005) found that the process of giving aid contains dynamic layers of decision-

making, mostly protecting the interests of actors and recipient governments, aid-giving agencies and interest groups that are mostly beneficiaries. Williamson (2009:4) states that countries giving development aid and providing development assistance and foreign aid put their own incentives first when developing foreign development assistance policies designed to serve the interests of special interest groups, bureaucrats and government strategic interests. Having explored the theories on how these incentives shape the effectiveness of development aid, the case of Lesotho provided evidence that political actors associated with development partners and aid-giving agencies are constrained to some extent by public opinion and the special interests of the population they serve. It was found in the study that it is for this reason that Hackett (2013:1) reverted back to the theoretical discussion seen in **Chapters 2 and 3** that governments and individuals have become ignorant of the aid rationale and its intended effects. However, Coyne and Ryan (2009) assume that the theory advanced by scholars necessarily says that special interest groups within aid-giving countries do gain incentives in becoming informed in order to yield large benefits while giving assistance to the population. This foundation arrives at a conclusion that the fundamentals of development aid do not depend on politicians, but on the special interests of aid-giving structures to advance policies that will promote the development of special influence and interest. Bauer (2000) argued that the structure of development aid has facilitated failures in structuralism as many aid incentives go to the rulers and not the people, which in this arrangement supports bad policies and promotes damaging governments,

About a decade ago Easterly (2006c) indicated that despite countries' failure in initiating development progress, they still receive loans that they fail to repay. Even in Lesotho, the EU in 2016 showed that the country failed to live up to its concessions on the utilisation of aid, but despite this realisation still received development assistance. Easterly (*ibid.*) writes that the problem with this scholarship has been enshrined in where the money goes, to the rulers and not the people, thus supporting unworthy policies that end up elevating poverty. Easterly (2006a), in his writing that seems to influence Lesotho's case, shows that the proclaimed technical assistance presents even worse forms of tied aid as seen in Chapter 2, since it is always accompanied by donor country conditionalities. Going back to Moyo's (2009) theory, this idea can support the conception that while Lesotho has received billions in

development assistance, as seen in **Chapters 5 and 6**, the country is still drowning in immense debt and poverty, while countries rejected by aid are realising economic gains. The European Union in 2016 announced that Lesotho had failed to meet its debt relief and that the EU would be forced to “pull the plug” on the year’s round of credit facility for budget support. This implies that development aid has promoted corruption and ill-governance in Lesotho, it has worked towards destroying the process of economic growth and further exacerbated poverty. Lesotho is an example of a case where the process of receiving development aid has created and exacerbated corruption, lack of accountability and the unethical use of aid as seen in the European Union’s outcry. In Lesotho’s case, development aid has created a dysfunctional prospect towards good governance and political transformation.

Hout (2012) indicated that as a result of the problem recognised by the scholars mentioned above, during the 1990s, donor agencies started to realise that development policy involved more than adherence to macro-economic fundamentals, which had been the major precept of the Washington Consensus⁷⁴. Painter (2009) stated that the awareness that non-economic factors were important produced a wave of publications on the centrality of “governance” and led to a focus on institutions. According to the Post-Washington Consensus⁷⁵, which was a response to the exclusive emphasis of its predecessor on macro-economic policies, the proper organisation of social and political life became the focal point in the thinking about governance and development. Hout (2010) is of the opinion that the main reflection of the change of focus in development aid discourse since the late 1990s was the increasing popularity of the term “good governance”. He says despite the adoption of the term, a lot of literature in governance and policy formulation was ushered in by the World Bank and still remains essential in forming a ground-breaking theory of

⁷⁴ The term *Washington Consensus* was coined in 1989 by British economist John Williamson to refer to a set of ten relatively specific economic policy prescriptions that he considered constituted the “standard” reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries by Washington, D.C.–based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the US Treasury Department. The prescriptions encompassed policies in such areas as macroeconomic stabilisation, economic opening with respect to both trade and investment and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy (*Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, Berg, World Bank, 1981).

⁷⁵ For many supporters, the *Post Washington Consensus* differs fundamentally from the original prescripts. While the *Washington Consensus* made economic growth the main goal of development, the new consensus moves away from the neo-liberal, market-friendly approach, and places sustainable, egalitarian and democratic development at the heart of the agenda. It includes a more poverty-focused approach that protects and supports the poor and prioritises social spending on education and health. Others argue that the original neo-liberal agenda still underpins the *post-Washington Consensus* saying that the social safety net aspects of the new policies are put in place as an add on to deal with market failure (WHO, 2014, <http://www.who.in.trade>).

development assistance (*ibid.*). As Hatcher (2009) puts it, policymakers are still faced with the challenge of shifting focus from systemic transformation to the institutionalisation of markets. This concern was epitomised in the title of the 2002 edition of the World Bank's flagship publication, *The World Development Report* (WB, 2002). It is in this regard that the effect of development aid for good governance and political transformation is epitomised in the case of Lesotho.

9.1.2 The meaning and interpretation of the argument

Development aid in Lesotho is seen as effective to the extent that it continues to pull the country out of poverty. In light of the enormous aid pull into Lesotho, there is evidence of significant systemic transformation and the creation of an investment climate to attract even more aid. Development aid in Lesotho has been provided to areas where intervention was aimed at relieving the intricacies caused by a heavy disease burden, a fast-growing population, lack of infrastructure and bad governance, which have over time prevented Lesotho from getting the boost in wealth needed to attain development.

It will thus be correct to assume that development aid has been geared most towards helping impoverished countries in the light of the vision to prevent the world from being divided into low-income earning countries, found mostly in Africa, and the world's wealthy nations, including those in Europe, America and Asia, by 2050 (UN, 2009a). The fundamental goal of development aid is to ensure that they achieve proportional development, in which the premise is through achievement of good governance and political transformation.

Development aid impetus demonstrated ways that could be implemented to help these poorest nations escape from their poverty trap. As demonstrated in Lesotho, these development assistance programmes are a combination of foreign policy reforms within Regional Trading Blocs (SACU) and from Rich World Nations (European Economic Partnership for Trade) that were presumed to play an integral role in helping the country's extremely poor societies (Sheriff, 2014). This stood on the concessions made in Monterrey in 2002 in which more than 50 heads of state gathered to address the challenges of financing for development around the world,

particularly in developing, impoverished countries in eradicating poverty, achieving sustainable economic growth and attaining sustainable development.

In essence, the message for these impoverished countries was the following:

Official development assistance (ODA) plays an essential role as a complement to other sources of financing for development, especially in those countries with least capacity to attract private investment ... increase in ODA and other resources will be required if developing countries are to achieve internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration (Monterrey Consensus, 2002).

Lesotho continued to learn lessons from the scholarship of Jeffery Sacks, Colombia University economist. Sacks (2005) posited that the world could eradicate extreme poverty in 20 years' time if international aid to Africa was roughly doubled over the course of the next decade.

Having said this, and in tandem with the Ladder Theory of Economic Development⁷⁶, it was an affirmation that countries need a sudden boost of wealth to escape from poverty in which governments and donors were encouraged to invest the new wealth in human health, education, infrastructure and technology to increase productivity and make countries more attractive for foreign aid (Harack, 2005). Lesotho followed suit, as demonstrated in **Chapter 8**, aligning itself with this wealth regeneration through programmes and projects that ushered in good governance and political transformation through investing in the economy. It is submitted that with the continued investment in the economy, systemic and structural transformation, the process should continue to see impoverished nations rise out of poverty and become rich, examples of which include countries like South Korea and Taiwan, with China and India currently climbing to reach the world's wealthiest nations.

Sub-Saharan countries including Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia and Malawi, from evidence in **Chapter 7**, have shown signs of trouble in getting the boost in wealth as a result of "poverty traps", including prevalent disease, civil conflict, lack of

⁷⁶ *The ladder of development is a useful concept that we first found in Jeffrey Sachs' book 'The End of Poverty'. This concept provides a useful framework for the discussion of economic development with regards to poverty reduction. This is a conceptual tool, not necessarily a framework for understanding all of economics. This idea is intended as an illustration of other major ideas (Harack, 2005).*

infrastructure and poor governance, agricultural productivity or foreign investment (World Bank, 2010). It is in this regard that the development aid path in Lesotho (**Chapter 5.2.1**) was seen as effective as it supported as its first priority institutionalisation and systemic transformation so that good governance and political transformation could be realised to achieve the development goals. In reference to Sacks' theory, this is relatively simple: It basically states that extremely impoverished nations should be given the sudden increase in wealth through foreign aid, which would allow them to enter into a cycle of prosperity, such as treatments for HIV/Aids, vaccines, seeds to plant, support for rainwater harvesting technology, clean water, investments to promote health, money to build schools throughout Africa, computer technology, investment in basic infrastructure and electricity for rural homes (Sacks, 2005). Lesotho seems to have aligned itself with this fundamental thought and thus it could rightly be argued to be on the way out of poverty as a result of foreign aid (**Chapter 7.3.1**).

9.1.3 Relevance of the discussion on development aid

The concept of development effectiveness is on everyone's lips. But despite the popularity of the term, there remain different perceptions of what the concept actually means in practice. When assessing the concept, there is constant mention of good governance and political transformation. This led the North-South Institute (NSI) Development Cooperation to issue a brief in September 2009 which made a first attempt to track the occurrence of the concept and to contribute to its conceptualisation by proposing a systematic approach that distinguishes between four different categories and how the term of development effectiveness has been perceived by different stakeholder groups (Kindornay & Morton, 2009). This attempt builds on and further elaborates that possible implications arising from the different notions of development effectiveness may include scholarship of good governance and political transformation. This study argues that development effectiveness could become an actual source of the new perspective in transformation and development for the emerging future policy agenda - with far-reaching implications, for example, on the future form of partnerships between donors, partner governments, civil society and the private sector. Civil society organisations (CSO) are urging for a reformulation of the international aid effectiveness agenda towards one of

development effectiveness (Kindornay, 2010). In Lesotho, civil society took it upon themselves to be included in the Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee and Millennium Development Goals Evaluation to have a stake in development assistance effectiveness for the next cycle of programming for development results (LCN, 2014). These NGOs organised themselves to advocate for the rights of ordinary Basotho to be well-represented and their wishes to be interpreted in the National Development Policy (NDP).

With this in mind, this chapter and **Chapters 7 and 8** have tested the study's objectives by analysing whether Lesotho has, as a result of development finance and foreign aid, progressively transformed or further regressed socio-politically and economically. Judging from the evidence presented in **Chapter 8.1.1 to 8.2.2**, Lesotho demonstrated progressive transformation and positive response on good governance and institutionalisation with the support provided through development aid assistance. It introduced new institutions of governance and aligned its systems to allow political transformation to thrive. Having ushered in this environment, the landscape of how things are done (governance) and how effective the things been done (transformation) became effective in the performance of the economic and social outcomes. Although there were some noticeable shortfalls, including entrenched poverty and underdevelopment, it cannot be ignored that development assistance provided a better way through which the country operates and provides support to good governance and political transformation.

In terms of another important objective, at the hand of which it can be ascertained whether the continuous inflow of aid reaped any positive returns for Lesotho, this study has found that, despite scholars such as Moyo (2009) arguing that aid creates a situation of dependency and underdevelopment, the country's performance with continued development assistance helped it to improve its good governance ranking and produced far-reaching results on service delivery. The improvement seen in the systemic transformation of the health sector and the trade systems recorded evidence of the effect of development partners' assistance to good governance and political transformation. The Mo Ibrahim and APRM reviews provide evidence that there was a positive response to development aid interventions in Lesotho as the good governance barometer improved and the institutions of political development

were responsive in structuralism and good governance practices. This saw the coming into being of such institutions and structures as the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, Law Reform Institutions, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Directorate of Prevention of Crime and Economic Offences.

One objective that was answered related to the continued support to good governance that was intended to produce perennial returns. Lesotho's development outcomes addressed a discussion on development assistance's ability to deepen democracy and promote good governance that aid sought to address. The objective of this study was to determine whether development assistance had contributed to the improvement, stagnation or worsening of Lesotho as a recipient of development assistance. These objectives from the arguments raised in **Chapter 6.3** discussed the key areas of intervention by various donors, have provided evidence in **Chapter 7.3 to 7.4.1** that the country addressed the objectives of development aid and indeed implemented them in line with the plan. This made the country improve its position in socio-development outcomes as we saw policy reforms, discussed in **Chapter 7.3**, take place including decentralisation, law reforms and social protection reforms. As the objective is to ascertain whether these were reached, it means the systemic transformation and new policies helped Lesotho achieve some of the standards, including those mentioned by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, that the country's context of good governance improved. In line with the theory enunciated in **Chapter 2.2**, Lesotho saw progressive transformation, which necessarily arrives at a conclusion that it progressed, not worsened or stagnated.

While the study provides value in terms of assessing good governance and political transformation, it envisages its relevance in the thought that "... the true test of aid effectiveness is improvement in people's lives" (Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, 2006; OECD, 2007). People-centred initiatives, including rite of passage policies, improved inclusion to develop systems of political transformation and good governance as civil society stood together to be at the forefront of policy-making in Lesotho.

It denotes that indeed a substantial share of official development assistance (ODA) goes to middle-income countries. While these countries often need to step up their

efforts for the achievement of the MDGs, they usually have other options for funding (OECD, 2007a). The final analysis still brings us to the causal link of foreign aid required for achieving development outcomes for good governance and political transformation. This is premised on the belief that the poorest, least-developed countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, need to receive much greater priority in the allocation of development aid, especially grants (Malouf, 2010). A greater injection of development assistance could still be functional to respond to boosting economic development in underdeveloped countries, as seen in the argument advanced in **Chapter 6.3**. Lesotho's development partners have not been hesitant to show that the donors of the country have made progress on this front.

The above has provided an important link to the study as foreign development assistance in Lesotho has shown a peak since 1992 during preparation for a path to democratisation. Political transformation and good governance became units of analysis, judging by the performance of Lesotho during the course of the events between 1998 and 2000. BTI (2010) states that, subsequent to 2000, Lesotho maintained an improved relationship with the donor community, resulting from the country's successful attempts to restructure and strengthen the fiduciary systems of governance and political transformation. Available data on ODA shows that Lesotho stood to be one of the countries that experienced declines in ODA (BTI, 2012). Although these declines meant that some of the development aid targets would not be adequately addressed, Lesotho remained focused on finding alternative means to ensure that the indicators were met. The highest ODA received by Lesotho was an amount of about USD86 million in 1992 (BTI, 2014), which was sufficient to supplement the budgetary constraints in capacity-building in terms of the institutionalisation process and good governance. It was at that moment that the country was seen as having the potential to improve its use of ODA, especially with its embracing of the MDGs that gave the Basotho full control of the implementation of the Millennium Challenge Account (Matlosa, 1999).

According to Chuhan-Pole and Manka Angwafo (2011), as explained in **Chapter 5.2**, Lesotho learnt important lessons in that the government's inefficiencies bypassed the development programmes that were implemented by professionals and not the government itself. Effectively, these are signs of bad governance that ODA needed

to address. It is the conclusion of the BTI (2014) that the country has a credible record of absorbing ODA-facilitated peaceful democratisation and good governance over the years, which led to much needed stability since the 1998 political rift. Later on, the BTI (2016) also provided similar evidence following the 2014-2015 political impasse in Lesotho that saw the country hosting snap elections in February 2015, after the collapse of the coalition government formed in 2012.

Vian and Bicknell (2013) make a case for good governance and political transformation by positing that the country reacted well in the implementation of systemic reforms, including that of financial management since 2005 with the introduction of performance-based budgeting. The discourse was seen as efforts to increase accountability, transparency and the effectiveness of good governance. These reforms have been supported by at least USD24 million, with a basket of partners contributing in external resources to strengthen the government's capacity to manage development aid funds and to target pressing social priorities (DfID, 2013). One of the fundamentals of good governance and political transformation was enunciated by Lipsey (1997), who supported the theory that the purpose of the promotion of good governance was solely to protect and promote the well-being of the citizenry. As Lesotho ratified the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and further acceded to the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, it still subscribed to the fundamentals of aid effectiveness for good governance and political transformation, indicating that to be successful in governance, the inclusion and ownership of political authorities and their cooperative work with non-state actors are the basis to steer the rules for the exercise of power, and to guide the interactions between the state and its citizenry, civil society and private sector (Kjaer, 2004). Lesotho did live up to the ideal through the introduction of the Interim Political Authority (IPA) in 1998 that provided a platform for social inclusion of all forms of representation. Kaufmann and Kraay (2007) confirmed the basis of the founding theories in this study that indeed governance works well when citizens are provided with enabling settings to better achieve individual and common purposes. This was also seen in the inclusion of youth representation in the National Assembly since 2002. Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008) confirm this theory, stating that when governance is poor, even if a country has financial resources and technical assistance, the state may fail to achieve development goals. The underlying theoretical agreement is that for governance to

work, public administration must be capacitated with sufficient institutional building to design and implement policies in ways that are effective, transparent, impartial and accountable (World Bank, 2011). When Lesotho failed to launch the Human Rights Commission under the Irish Aid support in 2006, the performance of the country's Human Rights Index declined and further positioned it as non-complaint country in terms of receiving aid from joint development partners' support.

9.2 Findings

9.2.1 Third World countries are underdeveloped

According to the analysis in **Chapter 4.2**, the interrogation of underdevelopment led to the conclusion that it was a necessary premise to offer development assistance. Owing to this conclusion and considered against the situation of Lesotho, Nielson (2011) refers to the abject poverty and underdevelopment of Lesotho and clusters it under the bracket of poor countries. It is in this chapter that Lesotho was categorised as a country in urgent need of development assistance, as it still experiences financing gaps even though there are development and growth strategy plans in place; the term Third World thus relates to its situation of underdevelopment. In general, the finding in the chapter suggests that Third World countries are less economically developed compared to their counterparts, the First World and Second World (Shaohua & Ravallion, 2010). These findings show that Lesotho is hampered by numerous problems such as poverty, unemployment, uncontrolled population growth, high infant mortality rate, and lack of industrialisation. From this conclusion, for governance and political transformation to thrive in the context of development aid assistance, there needs to be an injection of aid to support programmes that would enhance institutional performance, capacity-building and good governance in order for Lesotho to achieve its development outcomes (IMF, 2010). This will thus put Lesotho in the same category of Third World countries.

The reasons for Lesotho's problems are many, and there are various theories which have attempted to explain the Third World's underdevelopment, as explained in **Chapter 2** (Ray, 2010). One finding pertaining to Lesotho was the lack of fundamental processes as described by the theories of modernisation and

dependency, and discussed in **Chapter 2.2.3**. The conclusion of these theories in **Chapter 2** provided support for the finding that Lesotho, and other Third World countries, presented a common position that these incidences of underdevelopment were caused by flawed Third World economic policies and practices (Ogbaji & Obiozor, 2010). This assumption places Lesotho under the same microscope as poor nations that are seen to hold on to traditional social and economic development models that are not conducive to economic development. In **Chapter 2.2.5**, Rostow's assumption is that the modernisation theory asserts that Third World countries lack the initiative, capital, access to technology and democratic institutions necessary for economic development (Rostow, 1971). His main findings were that having satisfied this basis, good governance and political transformation would thrive, even though it would create a situation of dependency for the poorer nations as a result of development aid support to these initiatives. On the other hand, as Offiong (1981) stated, Lesotho also demonstrated a situation found in dependency theory which matched the need for Lesotho's development assistance support to good governance and political transformation, confirming that Third World underdevelopment is not entirely the fault of Third World nations. It is also as a result of the stronger economic well-being of the countries of the First World, a position that exacerbates the impoverishment of the Third World.

From the discussion in **Chapter 4**, it is clear that neo-classical theorists are of the opinion that for good governance and political transformation to thrive in the Third World, including Lesotho, the solution is in providing aid for poverty relief. It has been found that the solution to poverty in Lesotho and other Third World countries lies in institutionalisation, democratisation and systemic transformation (Morvaridi, 2008). These are the prescripts of good governance and political transformation linking the study to aid effectiveness. Aid and debt relief, when given to governments through agreed-upon development goals, may achieve greater development outcomes, assisting the country on the road to good governance and political transformation (Ray, 2010). Ray (*ibid.*) provides an analysis that states that poor countries have weak institutionalisation of good governance, otherwise they would not be poor. From this perspective, development assistance and debt relief associated with giving aid, when it is offered to autocratic systems of governance, have a tendency to exacerbate civil wars, genocide, arms purchases, and a resultant increase in poverty.

The underlying pattern of growth in Africa is that foreign development aid and assistance has united governments of the Third World in Africa to achieve a single goal of sourcing more development assistance (Carter, 2010). The Lesotho United Nations Assistance Development Programme is one of the instruments found to be effective in joint resource mobilisation in pursuance of good governance and political transformation.

9.2.2 Poor countries (Lesotho) are failing to achieve development outcomes and goals

Abuzeid (2009:21) points to the institutional transformation of recipient governments to contribute significantly in determining the effectiveness of obtaining results from aid-led development practices. In **Chapter 4**, it was the finding of scholars (cf. Burnside & Dollar, 2006) that the injection of development aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies, although this aid has little effect on the transformation of their political policies and ideologies. This was the reason for institutionalising good governance in Lesotho, seen in the discussion in **Chapter 5.2.1** and **Chapter 5.2.3**, in which the state authorities called for systemic transformation so that aid could be effective and achieve development outcomes. Based on the above, Lesotho embarked on processes of good governance and political transformation, considering that the external actors could do more good if the processes were to be institutionalised through development projects and programmes that addressed poverty and underdevelopment, as discussed in **Chapter 6.2**. These initiatives were found to be the pathway to foster internal institutional reform in the Third World (Bertucci & Alberti, 2001). As noted, the failure of attempts to impose Western reforms in Lesotho following the Washington Consensus on developing countries can be attributed to the lack of development assistance to ensure that development programmes do not become a “cut-and-paste” exercise, but is instead tailored to the local context as much as possible (Rosenthal & Wong, 2010). In Lesotho, the situation remains situated in the need to ensure that development assistance addresses poverty and underdevelopment, which has affected its economic performance and low-income country status, as seen in the Human Rights Index. As such, Lesotho diverted efforts to cater for the strengthening of local civil society, and

empowering people by helping them to learn how to help themselves. Taking cognisance of the fact that institutional reform is not an overnight exercise, one can conclude, together with scholars in this institutional line of thinking, that the country joined the Development Partners' Consultative Forum to come up with a priority matrix that would enhance Lesotho's National Strategic Development Plans (2012-2017) and Vision 2020 to ensure continuity and sustainability of long-term interventions and solutions, diligence to implement them, and patience to yield more sustainable results (Burnside & Dollar, 1997a).

It is important to note that foreign aid and development assistance, as confirmed in Lesotho's situation in **Chapter 7**, produce evidence that it provided solutions to address Third World poverty. In support of the solutions rendered by development aid in Lesotho, Abuzeid (2010) arrived at the conclusion that development aid will always be forthcoming and play a significant role in engendering the morally hazardous problems that plague many aid-dependent countries. According to Easterly *et al.* (2003a), aid is portrayed as a temporary form of financing that will gradually be phased out over time.

9.2.3 Development aid is a catalyst to improve the performance of poor countries

The recent successes of Third World countries in articulating development assistance for good governance and political transformation establishes that even though development aid has made significant efforts, especially in boosting Lesotho's good governance and political transformation, it should not be considered as the only solid hope that developing nations will develop by virtue of receiving aid when they have not developed strategies of absorption in order to address and grow out of poverty. **Lesotho's case provides a strong argument that aid has built industries and structural content towards good governance and political transformation, but has still left the country disenfranchised as underdeveloped with more than 56.6% of the nation living below \$1.25 per day at 43.4% and those living in multiple poverty at 49.5% according to the Lesotho National Human Development Index, 2015** (UNDP, 2015). The Multiple Poverty Index Indicators support the conclusion that poverty in Lesotho is linked more to poor standards of living than education and health related deprivations. The analysis

highlights the level of deprivation in basic services, including lack of access to clean water (18%), no access to electricity (34.4%), not having access to improved sanitation facilities (31.1%), living in poor housing (23%) and not having basic assets related to livelihood (26%) (LDHS, 2014; UNDP, 2015). One of the findings of this study is that the developed countries of the First World have no major consequences to providing and giving aid to address issues of underdevelopment, and yet the provision of development aid and assistance still does not offer solutions to heal underdevelopment (Bruce, 2012).

The Central Bank of Lesotho (CBL) in 2013 found that economic disparity between prosperous countries and the bottom layer on the poor and overpopulated periphery, of which Lesotho forms part, has significantly increased (CBL, 2013). Lesotho enjoyed slow growth with the GDP increasing by 0.4 % between 2012 and 2013 (Budget Speech, 2013-2014), which affected the growth of globalisation in least developed countries (Sharma, 2003). Through this analysis, solutions for decreasing the wealth gap in Lesotho are fundamental to development partners' strategies; therefore developed countries should assist poorly developed states in all respects. In the same light, Lesotho and other countries under the microscope have pushed policies which assisted the MDGs to help sustain support for development aid because they provided a new outlook and policies that directed development aid in their outcomes statements. Countries' contributions also provided useful tools for leveraging resources and providing country contextual achievable targets broadly agreed upon by leaders from countries rich and poor, numerical and time-bound. The MDGs became a global brand, at least in the development community. The appeal by the Ministry of Development Planning in **Chapter 7.3.2** that, while establishing the importance of development assistance for the implementation of the NSDP and meeting of the MDGs, as stated in the MDG Status Report, development partners should continue to help developing countries unselfishly. Although the European Union found Lesotho to be unreliable in terms of debt repayment, Jackson (1985) states that the continued globalisation of aid is to not demand and compel poor states to repay debts, because having huge arrears will not improve their situation. Instead, such policies will lead to the decreasing economy of developed countries, which will be hugely compensated for by the benefits that Third World countries will receive. In **Chapter 7** it was this conclusion that recommended that Lesotho engage

in the Education Fast-Track Initiative (EFT) to improve education in the country and provide generous scholarships for tuition at top Western universities. For instance, the United States Embassy in Lesotho provides full grants for students from Lesotho to improve their capacity in good governance and political transformation. As Sacks (2005) puts it, developed countries have an essential duty to help non-industrialised countries because countries which did not participate in the Cold War have huge difficulties with their economies and standard of living. In conclusion, UN-DESA (2013) presented its findings in Lesotho, which stated that the situation of a low GDP and Gini co-efficiency pre-empted the donors to develop strategies for interventions, including the UNDAF and EDF, to support the poor country's dire need to improve good governance and political transformation.

9.2.4 The four pillars of development as a fundamental to provide aid assistance

Kharas and Birdsall (2010) state that the Quality of Official Development Assistance is comprised by annually updatable objectives and indicators assigned to its assessment. Lesotho, as seen in **Chapter 5.3** and **Chapter 5.4**, has undergone the peer review process in which it was found that it responded well to development aid assistance. Benn and Steensen (2010) write that results assumed that by measuring performance of development aid in a quantitative way, the assessment would put a spotlight on countries that perform well and those that are perform below their peers. They agree that this assumption pushes the aid argument away from how much, but to how frequent aid is given. This study found that Lesotho continues to receive development assistance. Recently €483 million and \$364 million was received by Lesotho from the European Union and the United States Embassy respectively, meaning the study has also attached importance to how much and how frequent development assistance is received to establish the consistency of the results and the progress realised in good governance and political transformation. Cohen and Easterly (2009) summarise that donor actions can lead to better donor practices, ultimately resulting in more sustainable development. The MDG Status Report in Lesotho, though it recorded bad performance in MDG 3 and 5, still reported markedly good progress and effectiveness of donor funding in Lesotho towards political transformation and good governance. According to Kharas and Birdsall (2010:4),

ODA rates 31 donor countries and multi-lateral agencies across four dimensions or pillars of aid quality built up from 30 separate indicators. The four pillars of aid quality are maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing burdens and transparency and learning.

Findley *et al.* (2010) add that each of these pillars is consistent with international standards of aid effectiveness, as outlined in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, both of which Lesotho constitutionally embraced as policies towards creating a pathway out of poverty. The quality of development assistance in Lesotho was demonstrated in the institutional structures, such as the parliamentary reform processes, the establishment of the Prevention of Crime and Economic Offences Institution, and the Office of the Ombudsman as initiatives for good governance and political transformation (Rodman, 2009).

Between November 2011 and June 2012, Lesotho joined world leaders, policy makers and representatives in almost six international conferences on economic development, including the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan and the two World Bank and IMF committee meetings, to provide evidence of how development aid assistance helped in building institutional structures of good governance and political transformation. At these events, it was evidenced that such countries as Lesotho were of essential need for development assistance as the Prime Minister had pleaded with the UNDP that economic cooperation would improve Lesotho's ability to meet development goals. In the context of Lesotho discussed in **Chapter 7**, this can be viewed as the fourth pillar of an international architecture for development cooperation. From pillar one to four, they present a case of Lesotho which was overwhelmed by shifts in form and focus to respond to changes in the global context for development that partly reflect successful development processes in many parts of the country's programming context. For example, only 30 percent of the population in Lesotho was found not to be poor in terms of the findings in the MDG Status Report 2015. 40% of the poor in Lesotho live in fragile or abject poverty, representing a humanitarian crisis in terms of the Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Report 2015. These findings are articulated in light of the provision of continued development assistance since the 1970s. The study found that the broad challenge for the global governance of development was how to build

consensus, mobilise resources, align incentives and obtain effective implementation across these multiple groups. There is no denying the need for some form of global governance to coordinate efforts better. In addition to the challenge of meeting the MDGs 2015, broad-based development has now become a key mechanism for achieving other global objectives in Lesotho. “Strong, sustainable and balanced global growth,” the G-20 objective, depends on the performance of dynamic emerging markets. In all these cases, the coordination of global action to some degree is probably desirable. Overall, to achieve results at scale, some degree of coordination and alignment of incentives is necessary.

The National Strategic Development Plan emphasizes the necessity of achieving sustained and broad-based economic growth as the most effective approach to poverty reduction (NSDP, 2012). With the programmes that form part of this strategy, it is clear that this can only be sustained if economic growth has been translated into employment opportunities. The focus of the National Strategic Development Plan is to develop strategy that is sustainable and can attract an investment climate to ensure economic growth that is high, shared and generates employment. The contribution of development partners in Lesotho, as set out in **Table 7, Chapter 6.3**, made an overall direct contribution of creating 2652 jobs, which is about 5% of Lesotho’s national target between 2012 and 2015. The study established that this was realised through development aid contribution to governance and transformation in which the government improved the business environment for the Basotho people.

The development partners have contributed to governance and transformation by increasing the number of people with access to financial services in a strategy to enhance the private sector in development planning by the government of Lesotho. Outcome indicators to measure these results are the percentage of eligible people with access to financial services. Through the LUNDAP (2012-2017), the UN system supported the economy to be more resilient to external shocks/volatility through the generation of inclusive employment and the creation of an enabling environment for investment. The unemployment rate steadily declined until 2012, when it stagnated, and appears to be on the verge of increase. This may be largely due to the fact that while efforts to create employment may be increasing in some sectors, the data suggests that unemployment in the manufacturing sector is increasing. This is largely

due to the global recession and economic downturn of the main target export countries, which has a direct impact on the manufacturing sector.

The strategic intervention of development assistance was its contribution to democratic governance, peace building and effective institutions. The European Union and the UN system in Lesotho contributed to political transformation and the strengthening of electoral systems. The study has provided evidence that voter turnout in the past three elections have been close to the target, until the last elections in February 2015. While the voter turnout is still below target, there has been moderate progress in the increase in voter turnout in the past three election years. In this way, development assistance and contribution to good governance and political transformation aided the country to be able to uphold democratic processes, and the country's stability was safeguarded, ensuring that other development processes continued uninterrupted.

9.2.5 The new regimes of good governance and political transformation

Global aid scholarship is undergoing significant changes and transformation as provided by the data and evidence above. Broader shifts in the world economy and structural transformation is giving rise to contestation over ideas, norms, rules, best practices and lessons learned about development cooperation between the traditional donors and the rising states, as well as changes in the institutional structures of the aid system (Chin & Quadir, 2012). In **Chapter 7.7** it was indicated that a multiplicity of states are gaining more resource leverage to support development aid interventions as a function of achieving good governance and political transformation (Chaturvedi, Fues & Sidiropoulos, 2012). As seen in **Chapter 1.2.1**, representatives of the (re)emerging aid senders and new financing institutions supported Lesotho's development programmes as they found the need for aid to be commensurate to healing abject poverty and the underdevelopment status that was deposed by forums such as the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2015) and the African Peer Review Mechanism on Lesotho's LDC status. The findings of these organisations suggest that their national experiences offered better alternatives to the predominant models that can pull Lesotho out of this situation, especially through joining financing organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank,

the so-called “Washington Consensus” or “neo-liberal” models (Walz & Ramachandran, 2011).

Relative to the findings discussed in **Chapter 7**, developed countries arrived at a final analysis about development aid effectiveness that the dynamism of the emerging economies include heavy doses of economic liberalisation and integration into the world economy, and that these models offered by the rising donors are actually a solution to the Third World poverty crisis. This includes Lesotho, where these organisations played a significant role in financing for development. The analysis of the proponents of emerging economies verified this finding, as seen in **Chapter 5.3**, when Lesotho began to receive much more donor support from various institutions as an alternative to supporting good governance and political transformation, the very basis on which development aid rests (Chin & Hein, 2011:6).

From their support and as discussed in **Chapter 7.3.2** it was the conclusion of the government of Lesotho through its Ministers of Finance and Development Planning that the country gained significant benefits from aid interventions and has made significant improvement towards transition, transformation and progression. These findings on Lesotho are supported by Woods (2008), who adds that the country reflects a rise of new centres of growth, production, consumption, trade and finance. The emerging economies (Zhang, 2011) worked well in Lesotho with the realignment processes seen in the NSDP and UNDAF in which the success stories were reiterated by the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations in Lesotho. Lesotho embarked upon the structural realignment and attracted scores of aid providers, including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), as seen in testimonies from Zhang (2011) and Chin and Heine (2011). The finding therefore is that having made good progress in institutionalising good governance and political transformation, the country attracted more development assistance as a result of a positive response to foreign aid. The improvement that saw China investing in Lesotho as a creditor and net donor, as well as Brazil and South Africa, and potentially India, underpins the new influence in global development (Manning, 2006).

The growing influence of the BRICS⁷⁷ countries in Lesotho as new donors contributed to improved development indicators, such as performance in good governance. The indicators in Lesotho were found not to be only quantitative, with the efforts in external capital contributions, but they also increased the gross domestic product by at least 4% between 2013 and 2014. In reference to Klomegah (2012), Lesotho's response to development aid positioned it in the global development, and have pushed for reforms in the country through participation in global consultative mechanisms for global development. Lesotho has now become a major recipient of aid once more, due to the effectiveness of development aid to good governance and political transformation.

9.2.6. New regimes' development aid principle

Chin and Heine (2012), in agreement with Currie-Alder *et al.* (2014), submit that since the early 1990s, G7 governments and Northern donors had grown accustomed to setting the global development agenda. Together with the World Bank and the IMF, and as part of the DAC, G7 foreign aid agencies emphasized that developing countries should undertake economic liberalisation reforms; this was also followed by promotion of a "pro-poor" model of development. Development aid saw Lesotho leap into instigating governance and political transformation reforms, as illustrated in **Chapter 6.3, Table 8**. Institutions in Lesotho were built with donor support, including the Office of the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission structure (though it does not officially function yet), the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Offences, the establishment of the Central Tender Board, and the internationally financed Private Sector Competitiveness Approach Fund, which function as state-guided economic growth, industrial modernisation and infrastructure investment necessary for conditions for sustained national development.

⁷⁷ BRICS is the acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The grouping was originally known as "BRIC" before the inclusion of South Africa in 2010. The BRICS members are all developing countries, but they are distinguished by their large, fast-growing economies and significant influence on regional and global affairs; all five are G-20 members. As of 2014, the five BRICS countries represent almost 3 billion people, which is 40% of the world's population, with a combined nominal GDP of US\$16.039 trillion (20% world GDP) and an estimated US\$4 trillion in combined foreign reserves. As of 2014, the BRICS nations represent 18 percent of the world economy (World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2013).

This study concludes that the new development aid principle is based on a positive response to foreign aid, which sits as a precondition to giving more aid. The main submission in this work is that development aid still rests on the precondition that meeting the selection criteria of aid-giving institutions by performing well in other funded initiatives serves as a foundation for providing more development aid. Where Lesotho reacted well to development partners' assistance, it led to a competitive advantage of receiving more from a multiplicity of donors and even the new financing institutions.

Te Velde (2011) substantiates that the new regimes in aid advocate for good governance and political transformation and, likewise, submits that institutional giving, social impact investment and global health promotions are significant funding sources where donors have to improve their financing. Lesotho's good performance was on the alignment of government priorities and their success in securing development assistance that meets those priorities was a key aim for aid effectiveness, as discussed in **Chapter 5.2**. As an example, countrywide strategies were adopted and aligned to the NSDP, which was the basic document that donors and development partners used for programming their priority interventions with the government. The country prioritised resources and donor key priorities in relation to the terms and conditions of financing ownership, alignment and speedy implementation to be prequalified as in need of financing for good governance and political transformation (**Chapter 5.3**). The African Development Bank on Country Governance Profile defined the aim of development aid as relative to good governance based on the five cardinal principles of financial accountability, transparency, fundamental human rights, stakeholder participation, and combating corruption through reforms, legal and judicial efficiency to speed up processes of judicial sector and to capacitate its ability to perform. Similar experiences were seen in Cambodia and Ethiopia; Zambia also had a wider set of priorities around the Paris and Busan agendas, and the promotion of budget support (Republic of Zambia, 2005). Since these new approaches to supporting national policy plans, Lesotho's government did not appear to be setting different priorities for different groups of providers, but instead appeared to be assessing all providers against a similar set of criteria. All countries, including Lesotho, were found to perform well against these

criteria as the discussion in **Chapter 6.4.1** on the route out of poverty in Lesotho evidenced (Fraser & Whitfield, 2008).

In summary, Lesotho's positive response to development aid effectiveness arrives at a finding that development is the extent of achieving aid effectiveness in which the pillars of aid effectiveness are, among others, good governance, democratisation, political transformation, poverty reduction and deepening health, education and human rights. Lesotho channelled its development finance into the sectors above, as seen in **Table 6, Chapter 6.3**, and from this discussion it is clear that the support provided in the designated areas achieved development, meaning that aid responded well to good governance and institutionalising political transformation. The finding shows that there has been six rounds of free and fair national elections in Lesotho and the institutions of political authority have been well-regulated through donors' programmes, including that of European 11th EDF and Irish Aid, which were implemented jointly by the CDGG programme of governance by the UNDP in Lesotho.

9.2.7 The substantiation of a new development pillar (the fifth pillar): Aid effectiveness

It is the conclusion of this study that following the four pillars of development aid (Pillar 1: Governmental Donor, Pillar 2: Multilateral Agencies, Pillar 3: Non-Governmental Donor Agencies, Pillar 4: Institutionalism and Private Agencies), there is evidence that the new development agenda and the rise of the new global aid regimes have transcended into a fifth dimension of development aid, which for the particularity of this study, will be referred to as the **fifth pillar of development**, the new dimension of development aid effectiveness suggested by this thesis. The fourth pillar of development (Develtere & De Bruyn, 2009) saw the rise of non-specialist associations, groups and private entities which ushered in the process of development assistance based on their experiences in their own communities and economies in the North, forging ties with their colleagues and communities in the South. The emergence of the **fifth pillar of development aid demonstrates the new school of thought** in which development aid assistance is given upon adoption of reforms in good governance and political transformation. Avellaneda (2006)

concedes that these represent the state-guided reforms in industrialisation, economic growth and sustainable national development programmes in which aid should be given when recipient countries have institutionalised structures of good governance and political transformation that would own the development outcomes driven by recipient countries themselves. As we saw in **Chapter 7.1**, there were new aid interventions influencing the giving and receiving of development assistance, which included alignment of development plans and national programmes to the donor priorities. Far from ownership and alignment as fundamental to the PD and AAA, which entitled donors to agree jointly with recipients on similarity of strategies, the fifth pillar of development says that in order to continue down its recipient continuum of development assistance, Lesotho ought to develop and own its strategies and create an investment climate to attract foreign aid. Goldin *et al.* (2002:108) agree that aid becomes effective only when the country starts to drive its own capacity to attract donors to agree to their development agenda through aligning with donor strategies and establishing foundations for political transformation and good governance.

The fifth pillar of development thus comes up with a new principle of aid effectiveness. The Lesotho situation enables this study to come to the conclusion that, whereas good governance and political transformation are central to achieving aid effectiveness of greater development outcomes, the measure of the extent of effectiveness should no longer rely on attaining joint development goals, but instead, the ability of countries to attract more foreign aid on their own based on country-founded national development strategies. In December 2012, Lesotho approved the National Strategic Development Plan, pushing its agenda to align with the donor assistance programmes, such as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2013-2017. This is in line with the principle set out by the UN (2008) that in order for Lesotho to achieve far-reaching results and avert abject poverty and underdevelopment, the country needs to align with development partners' frameworks that would give it a competitive advantage in attaining the MDGs set out in 2000 and the new Agenda for 2030.

However, this thesis demonstrates that since Lesotho aligned its development plans, as set out in the PD (2005; AAA, 2008), it attained a simple growth in development gains and established institutions of good governance and political transformation.

OECD (2013a) in its summary paper ascertained that the ability of recipient countries to attract more aid required to grow these impoverished Third World countries out of poverty means they have adopted reforms of good governance and political transformation that are able to create an investment climate for foreign aid and development (infrastructure, industrialisation, sustainable development and economic growth). In the same light, such programmes as the Lesotho Water Sector Project, which was funded by donors such as the World Bank to a total of \$164,028 million, as seen in the discussion in **Chapter 7.3.1**, underscored the country's ability to be effective in the use of aid as it created employment for more than 4000 Basotho and boosted the tourism sector. Ivanič and Martin (2008) confirm the effectiveness of aid in Lesotho as it means that the planning of an enabling setting and the promotion of structural reform and systemic transformation will have the ability to attract foreign aid effectiveness and thus see the country receiving more aid to pull itself out of poverty and underdevelopment. With Lesotho having adopted these plans, its good governance barometer in terms of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation rose to position 7 in the 49 African states in 2012 and declined slightly by the end of 2014 to position 10.

9.2.8 Improving governance

The government of Lesotho has shown its commitment to promoting good governance by embarking on several legal and financial management reforms under the PSRIP, the NSDP and Vision 2020 that are aimed at improving the framework for implementation of Lesotho's good governance agenda. In addition, the principles of good governance are included in the country's PRS and now the NSDP 2012, which recognises that governance is one of the missing and weak links in the Lesotho government's efforts at poverty reduction (Ketso, 2014). While some of the reforms are already well advanced, there are others whose implementation has been proceeding slowly. In its analysis of the impediments facing Lesotho's transformation and economic development, the TRC noted that although the recent initiatives by the government to improve governance are commendable, there is scope for further intervention by donors to continue to improve the investment climate to meet the MDGs (TRC, 2014). It is for this reason that this thesis concludes that what is more fundamental in its finding is that even if there are signs of development in Lesotho's efforts and despite notable progression on good governance and political

transformation, as evidenced in **Chapter 5.3**, there is still much work to be done for the country's capacity to build onto the commitments by the government to address the governance issues by continuing to lend its support for the purpose of improving governance.

The introduction of the democratic governance agenda within the policies of major bilateral aid agencies and multilateral development institutions signals an increased willingness to take the political dimension of development and aid effectiveness into account (Kusack & Rist, 204). On a broader level, there is increasing recognition that international assistance to the development agenda can only have limited impact unless there is commitment to improve the country's ability to achieve global development goals. As Riddell (1999:333) argues,

If donors wish to make a real difference, they will need to focus more explicitly and more rigorously on issues of power, politics and interest groups, as they have tried to do in the past messy and difficult though these things often are.

It is this study's conclusion that the traditional thought on development aid has operated by ignoring the realities of power and the intricacies of politics and instead relying on technical solutions to address political problems, adopting somehow a humanitarian approach. The finding from evidence presented in **Chapter 6.3**, which also made a comparative advantage to other countries that receive development assistance, has informed this thesis in that technical assistance or training can see Lesotho further attracting development aid for enhanced outcomes. This study concludes that development aid should be continued as it continues to create an environment that will in future assist recipients on their own to develop an investment climate for more development aid.

From the analysis and findings in this study, Lesotho has received development assistance in almost eight goals of the MDGs in the last 15 years, which all presented mixed experience in achieving them, especially with regard to systemic transformation and institutionalising development needs. While the country has made progress in good governance and political transformation and thus rendering development aid effectiveness successful, for some of the MDG targets and

indicators the progress has been relatively slow. The country has been particularly delayed in the case of meeting its poverty, nutrition and health-related targets and indicators, as discussed above. It is the finding of this study that the country has made progress with regard to universal primary education (Goal 2), promoting gender equality and empowering women (Goal 3), ensuring environmental sustainability (Goal 7), and developing global partnerships for development (Goal 8). The discussion in **Chapter 7.2.4** shows how investing in trade provides opportunity for empowering women through education, and developing partnerships for sustained growth of the private sector.

The country has been less successful on achieving goals relating to:

- The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (Goal 1);
- Reducing child mortality (Goal 4);
- Improving maternal health (Goal 5); and
- Combating HIV and Aids and Tuberculosis (Goal 6).

A fundamental lesson learned is that, as influenced by Santiso (2001), to promote democracy and good governance in emerging democracies, donors will need to address the underlying interests and power relations in which institutions are embedded. This will entail thinking about development cooperation as a political endeavour and establishing development partnerships grounded in pacts for governance reform. In **Chapter 6.3**, these pacts of governance reforms were seen through the missions of the European Union, APRM, and later the MDGs and now the SDG Agenda 2030. The United Nations Global Issues Agenda confirmed that development assistance can have a real influence in the shape and direction of economic growth by facilitating an environment conducive for economic investment, to attract donors to further deepen the reform agenda, and changing the incentive structure. However, as Hackett (2013) states, it must be accepted that many of the most important results of development assistance programmes are intangible, indirect, and time-delayed, with their greatest impact often being the transmission of ideas that will change the country's economic index. The current crisis of development aid and debate on aid effectiveness should not overshadow the significant and decisive influence international assistance has on political

transformation and good governance in shaping the direction of Lesotho's development outcomes.

9.3 Conclusions of the above discussion

It would thus be correct, as seen in **Chapter 4.3.1**, to arrive at a conclusion that Lesotho's response to development aid and the achievement of good governance and political transformation indicates that the study has met its objectives as evidence was provided that the injection of aid has progressively transformed the country's socio-economic outcomes. Another contribution is the transition from the fourth pillar of development, in which the central theme was attaining global development goals to pull the Third World out of poverty, to the fifth pillar of development. This conclusion is consistent with the findings in Lesotho that claim that since the country received development aid, and even though it failed to meet some of the MDGs, development and economic growth was witnessed where aid has created and institutionalised good governance and political transformation, enabling it to rely only on more foreign aid. It is by this conviction that, where sufficient funding to transform and improve structures and systems of institutions of good governance and political transformation, such as the Parliament, Office of the Ombudsman, the Anti-Corruption Unit, the Human Rights Commission, among others, is available, then development aid becomes more effective. This branch into the fifth pillar of development; namely the capacity to success and effectiveness of Lesotho's underdevelopment status to keep attracting foreign aid for investment and economic growth.

This findings in this thesis are in line with Santiso (1998; 2001), namely that promoting good governance entails democratising the state and building genuine institutions of good governance. Indeed, there are signs that Lesotho has improved its standards towards achievement of development and aid effectiveness, as evidenced in **Chapter 8**.

From the evidence presented by this study, it is possible to establish and reach conclusions, some of which confirm earlier theorists' views, which are:

- The success of good governance and political transformation depends on the commitment of the government to build institutions of systemic transformation and governance.
- Governments must take the lead in providing plans for development growth and resilience that will be able to maintain and attract continued development assistance.
- A well-designed strategic plan contributes to directing all activities towards achieving aid effectiveness, thus creating a vision to direct decisions and actions in an effort to improve upon good governance and political transformation

These conclusions are in effect signposts for good governance and political transformation to see the success of aid effectiveness and development.

In the last instance a literature study was conducted, analysing the trends of development aid assistance to political transformation and good governance in Lesotho. The analysis contained standards and theories to integrate and harmonise the existing quality of development assistance as applied to political transformation and good governance. It was concluded in the study that development aid continued to build the capacity of institutions of good governance and strengthened systemic political transformation in Lesotho. On this basis, there was a marked improvement in development growth patterns in this scenario with the emphasis on the progress made by Lesotho to achieve aid effectiveness, hence development. It is concluded that Lesotho substantially progressed to achieve its development needs, although it still performed badly in the MDGs with recommendations to improvements in areas critical to the success of any service-oriented institution or good governance pillar. The aim of this thesis was mainly to explain the nature and scope of aid effectiveness to political transformation and good governance in Lesotho and to develop an appropriate conclusion as to the contribution of development aid to good governance and political transformation. This has so far been achieved through discussions about the dimensions of aid effectiveness, the development of good governance and political transformation in Lesotho, and the provision of contextual information about the effect of development assistance in the empirical part of the study, as well as an in-depth analysis of the results obtained from the latter.

Looking at the theory of development and governance and an initiative of government discussed in **Chapter 2.2.3**, Lesotho was found to have attained

pertinent development goals as the country developed calls for Institutionalising systems and initiating transformative measures for a robust follow-up and review process to track progress toward the attainment of global development agendas and goals (MDGs to targeting on SDGs). Basing itself on the historical perspective of development assistance and experience with implementing the earlier MDGs, the theory of structuralism (**Chapter 2.2.6**) taught Lesotho the lesson that indicators are essential for tracking development progress. However, from the findings in this thesis, it could also be concluded that there were recurring problems with what should be measured and how. Lesotho implemented systemic measures at national level and provided impetus to measure indicators that needed more attention to be well-linked to decision-making.

Lesotho maximised its efforts, relying on the recurring thoughts in theories of development aid in that, in order to maximise effectiveness, the basis would be to understand the politics of providing aid and consider the domestic determinants of foreign aid, institutionalisation, political transformation and good governance. The aid effectiveness agenda for Lesotho has promoted a more robust, voluntary, effective, participatory, transparent and integrated follow-up and review framework that has impacted a change in the understanding of aid effectiveness as an agenda for good governance and political transformation. The global dependency theory, structuralism and economic growth theories have all been used to understand that the attainment of good governance and political transformation will make a vital contribution to the implementation of the global agenda and will help Lesotho to maximise and track progress ahead of Agenda 2030. The central platform for the development agenda has emphasised for Lesotho that it should establish follow-up and review processes from the outset as an attempt to achieve the SDGs and address the MDGs whose targets have not been reached yet.

9.4 Recommendations

This concluding chapter has focused on making practical and appropriate recommendations for the effective operation of development aid in order to achieve good governance and political transformation based on the case of Lesotho. The suggested recommendations made in this study are essential for the successful

programme for Lesotho's aid effectiveness agenda and sustainable development outcomes. In this chapter, the recommendations stretch from the findings and range from improvement of commitment to political leadership of the management process of development assistance, the presentation of a framework and an action plan that can be fully monitored towards implementation of country programme indicators and targets.

The study suggests that it is possible to evaluate the nature and scope of development assistance implementation based on a framework as an internal organisational arrangement for the government of Lesotho. The study has arrived at practical findings (in 9.2 above) on what can be done to eliminate failures of development finance caused by specific deficiencies. In an ever-changing world, however, no research can ever claim to be the last word on a specific topic. In this regard, areas for further research have been identified, which include the relationship between the global development index and the frequency and amount of development assistance as the study saw that with increasing aid influx in Lesotho, the good governance barometer improved. In addition, there is a relationship between compliance with policies because of the need for development assistance and the extent of commitment and buy-in by governments as influenced by the amount of development assistance. All this forms subjects for further debates that can show that development aid becomes the face of the context for the giver and not the wish of the recipient's best interests.

The study provided results on the principles of good governance and political transformation by focusing on Lesotho and depicting a valuable tool in the quest for institutional excellence.

The last chapter of the thesis addressed specific and appropriate recommendations and conclusions, based on the theoretical sub-structure (**Chapters 1 to 6**), as well as the findings that came to light in the research results as discussed in **Chapters 8 and 9**.

Therefore, it is recommended that there is a need for Lesotho to lower its development assistance dependence while it establishes ways and means to

diversify the development aid it is receiving. This is especially with regard to strengthening an environment for trade capacities that will supplement more resource leverage for institutionalisation of good governance and political transformation. This recommendation is based on the finding that development aid has been effective in the much needed strengthening of Lesotho's development context. This recommendation suggests that it is essential for the government to identify new revenue sources, especially the domestic resource mobilisation to strengthen the private sector performance, as discussed in **Chapter 6.4.1**, where leveraging domestic resources through the private sector can yield better results in the route out of poverty, thus attaining development effectiveness.

It is also recommended that for the country to be more progressive in development aid effectiveness, it needs to address various bottlenecks and challenges that are constrained in the MDG achievements and redouble its efforts to meet the unfinished business of the MDGs, along with the SDGs, so that it can achieve more profound political transformation and good governance. This finding was made in **Chapter 8.2.2**, in which the failure of countries to meet the MDGs was seen as a bottleneck to achieving development and already the anticipated SDG agenda that carries 17 goals, nine more than the MDGs.

The preceding recommendations contain a strong emphasis on the country's need to prepare for a smooth transition from the MDGs to the SDGs by drawing upon the experience from its MDG achievements, challenges and lessons learned. In order for good governance and political transformation to be achieved at its highest targets and expectations, Lesotho has to develop a well-articulated programme on the New Agenda 2030 that has been approved by the United Nations. From evidence presented in **Chapter 7.3.3**, the country's efforts to address the MDGs through development programmes have yet to be improved to meet realistic targets enshrined in the new development agenda of the SDGs. In the discussion in **Chapter 6.3.3**, this proved to guide the development process and address bottlenecks that saw the country fail to attain targets in the MDGs and hampering the process of aid effectiveness in that instance.

Lesotho should address poverty reduction as its biggest challenge as it perpetuates bad governance, as seen in **Chapter 3**, and can be the biggest challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustaining political transformation and good governance. To ensure the country's success in developing financing effectiveness, Lesotho has to address the unfinished business of the MDGs, and simultaneously put in place robust data gathering and monitoring systems to track progress toward the implementation of the SDGs. The views below underlie the discussion and findings, put as evidence in **Chapter 6.3**, which delineated programmes that aligned the MDGs global programme and the national plans for extrapolating the future of attaining far-reaching development goals and the Sustainable Development Agenda. Additional recommendations include that Lesotho must:

1. Promote countrywide buy-in for SDGs to improve upon institutionalising good governance and political transformation.
2. Integrate the unfinished business of the MDGs/SDGs in its national development strategy and sector-wide approach programmes to create a more investment-friendly climate for aid to be more effective.
3. Gear up in domestic resource mobilisation and involvement of all partner stakeholders to create an internal resource flow to support programmes of good governance and political transformation.
4. Reduce reliance on foreign resource endowments in order to facilitate country ownership on development plans and programmes.

Lesotho continues to require international donor support and engagement to support the country in addressing its persistent socio-economic challenges. Having relied on technical and funding support from the global community to supplement domestic efforts in addressing the chronic problems of poverty and inequality, health-related challenges and ensuring sustainable improvements in living conditions and human development can hinder the process of development, growth and systemic political transformation and good governance. It is important therefore to recommend that Lesotho has to promote partnerships globally, regionally and nationally in achieving good governance and political transformation for assisting any form of investment climate for development to be effective. Besides the government and international donors, other stakeholders such as the private sector and civil society have a critical role to play in helping countries achieve political transformation and good

governance. This should not be only the government's commitment for strengthening such partnerships to achieve the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

Development plans and interventions are recommended:

1. To focus on increasing domestic resources, national ownership and political will. The issue of national ownership and political will has shown that there are huge pay-offs where there has been national ownership and political will to implement effective policies, strategies and programmes for MDG achievement and SDG effectiveness. It is recommended that the country's leadership lead the process of development and engage all facets of the economy to reap perennial outcomes.
2. To be more government-led as the process of introducing innovative policies and programmes has proved effective in ensuring that all sectors of the nation are involved. Through innovation, multiple stakeholder participation is realised which ensures that programmes are country wide owned and effective.
3. To follow a global partnership and financing programme that has had far-reaching effects, especially in supporting efforts towards combating HIV/Aids, tuberculosis and aversion of maternal deaths. Currently, Lesotho has the second highest HIV prevalence rate and the fourth highest prevalence rate of TB and maternal deaths in the world.
4. Development of sustained advocacy and monitoring will help focus its efforts on what needs to be done to reap demographic dividend and global development targets.
5. Development processes are not only a government-led initiative. In order for Lesotho to attain global goals and subsequently achieve good governance and political transformation, it must involve key stakeholders. Stakeholder engagement has been integral to developing the SDGs global indicator framework. Since the country is in a process of domesticating the SDGs, it must conduct an open consultation on the domestication agenda and indicators that are country-focused, regionally-agreed and internationally acceptable with civil society, academia and the private sector.

There are, however, several other recommendations that relate to aid effectiveness and how it can boost the country's good governance and political transformation that still contain high dependency on development assistance vis-a-viz leveraging of local resources. The findings on Lesotho recommend that the country should embark on the more comprehensive cover, balancing the trade-offs on aid dependency that come from prominent donors and square it off with institutionalisation of policies and

structures from the donors and partners in order to create its own resource management and mobilisation for its own development targets and agenda. Such high reliance on aid, in its various forms, has seen underdevelopment in some of the country's sectors. For example, the UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has been supporting agriculture in the country since 1983, while the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) has been feeding people in Lesotho since 1965. By 2010, about a quarter of the population was still in need of food assistance, whilst 40% of the population needed food aid in 2013. Continued food and agricultural support, coupled with falling production and droughts, led some to believe that aid might actually be at the root of the problem in the country. To this end, an adaptive approach for Lesotho to keep up with the global agenda will sustain development aid and its effectiveness to attain good governance and political transformation through exploring emerging and alternative ways to meet objectives and targets, and using knowledge from monitoring and evaluation to develop new understanding and new ways of acting.

9.5 Final Remarks

This thesis attempted to make a contribution, in general, to the insight into development aid effectiveness in Lesotho and its implementation and, in particular, how this is to be achieved within the operating country programmes.

The use of the term “development” now seems to imply the effectiveness of development aid assistance to have achieved good governance and political transformation. Although Lesotho has not satisfactorily performed in terms of the MDGs, because of its achievement of good governance standards, it would mean by analogy that development now means a country that has attained development goals in which a comprehensive modification of development includes variables of support, financial and monetary (Patton *et al.*, 2013:117). Scholars, including Shah (2013) and Vandaele (2008), moved away from seeing development as a set of policies or programmes or results alone, but rather as a process of policy-making and planning. Lesotho embarked on the process of policy reform, as seen in **Chapters 4 and 5**, when it adopted the Law Reform Commission to review all legislation to have a stronger element of good governance, adopted the Married Persons Equality Act

2010, the Domestic Violence Policy 2013 and National Youth Development Programme 2015-2020. From this movement, it means development has now entailed achievement of globally agreed goals (MDGs and SDGs) in which a set standard of good governance and political transformation lay a foundation to this conviction. These goals for Lesotho meant deepening democracy, achieving gender equality in policy-making and key decision-making processes (women in key political roles accounted for 27% in 2013, 30% in 2014 and 28% in 2015) and combating poverty through employment creation and building domestic business resources through the Private Sector Foundation that offers loans to establish businesses in the economic sector. Moving away from the school of thought that defined development in **Chapter 2.2.1** as an upward directional movement of society from lesser to greater levels of energy, efficiency, quality, productivity, complexity, comprehension, creativity, enjoyment and accomplishment (United Nations, 2008a:14), another recurring face of development in Lesotho was seen in the effectiveness of development aid to have capacitated, transformed and reformed institutions, structures and systems to have been able to attract, on their own, foreign aid so that they achieve values of good governance and political transformation. The findings in this thesis posit that Lesotho's experience in political transformation and good governance necessitated its change in the nature of capacity-building driven by development aid alone, which means development for the country responding positively to donor financing. Agreeing with this assumption, Lozovanu (2014) adds that achievement of good governance and political transformation means development aid has been effective as a result of the recipient having developed systemically and structurally to attract development/foreign aid assistance.

It is believed that through this research a contribution has been made to both the theory and practice of good governance and political transformation, which can possibly be used as a point of departure for further research directed at improving the establishment of a fully effective good governance practice and systemic transformation. Most notably, this study has contributed to providing a new narrative for what aid was for in the post-Cold War world (the first pillar through to the evolution of the four pillars, as seen in **Chapter 3**). For all they were a non-binding aspirational statement, they provided a useful tool of leverage for campaigners and politicians by providing a concise and easy to communicate programme of (broadly)

achievable progress, a consensus of leaders from countries rich and poor that was numerical and time-bound.

The contribution of this study is in positioning the development agenda as a global brand that is defined by the development community and not by development partners alone. At some point around 2003 development became more frequently referenced in published books than the MDGs provided as a guide to what development goals means. As Elisabeth *et al.* (2012) states, this contribution of foreign aid breeds new thinking that countries/recipients of development aid cannot pull out of poverty if more aid is not provided based on their ability to have reformed structures and systems of good governance and political transformation. **On the other hand, the study has provided a new fundamental thought depicting that aid effectiveness now represents achievement of global development goals in which foreign development assistance cannot be effective without good governance and political transformation** (cf. Andrews, 2009). The ability to attract financing for the processes of structural and systemic transformation means aid is needed and its effectiveness can be seen to the extent of recipients on their own prepping their environment for economic gains against foreign aid investment. As long ago as 1951, Parsons stated that the working principle was that development aid implies a transition from a traditional to a modern state of existence, in which economic modernisation holds the key to political development, and in turn, political development is secured when political modernity has been achieved, but the recurring thought dictates the scholarship to be phased out as evidence has now shown that (in the case of Lesotho) it is not only modernisation, but the strategic capacity of the country to attract foreign aid (Abuzeid, 2009; Arimoto & Kono, 2009).

The thinking ushered in by this study says development means aid effectiveness in today's principles where receiving will represent development aid and the result of giving aid should no longer represents development but transformation, and good governance thus aid effectiveness. This is consistent with Tran (2013) and Kindornay (2011) who agree that development in this age means aid effectiveness. In the same light, Steer *et al.* (2009) and Ngwira (2010) verify the study's assumption that aid is effective if it has established new institutions and structures or systems that work efficiently so that programmes can achieve results. It is this thought that the rise of

the new regimes and the scholarship towards its foundations can verify that once this has been achieved, it is safe to branch into the fifth pillar of development in which the recipients will attract continued flow of foreign aid based on their new capacity and entrenched abilities to create opportunities for investment, improvement and sustainable development outcomes.

In essence, the fifth pillar of development may refurbish the global perspective and Millennium Development Agenda from channelling technical and foreign aid assistance to capacity to attract investment climate for donors to support economic growth through investment. Where the MDGs were essentially about focusing aid on the poorest and most disadvantaged in a few narrow areas, *this study contributed to the new belief that development means new goals that are and should be universal, applied in a context sensitive matter at national level, inclusive for all stakeholders and implored an adaptive management approach to development assistance.* Not just about poor people in poor countries but about everyone on the planet. Not just about a few narrow areas, but a holistic vision of human flourishing that is inclusive of the myriad concerns of sustainability. The first step of course is good governance and political transformation, which are the fundamental mechanisms to create a platform for economic growth. It was the UN Millennium Development Project's conception on the discussion of the Agenda After 2015 (SDGs Agenda 2030) that the development of an investment climate (SDG 13) in Lesotho supports the conviction that foreign aid can and still will be received or given by any country, provided that there is sufficient capacity to attract and attain economic growth for far-reaching development outcomes (GPF, 2013). While the previous scholarly convictions saw development as achievement of globally agreed goals by partners (MDG, 2013), the fifth pillar shows signs that development will be attributed to capacity to attract more aid for investment and achievement of economic growth, thus making aid effective (UN Millennium Project, 2005). If good governance and political transformation represented financed global aid effectiveness, the fifth pillar puts investment climate before financing and capacity to absorb aid flow, then, as Gledhill *et al.* (2011) would suggest, the improved donor support will represent aid effectiveness as there will be absorptive capacity for investment and economic growth. This is a move away from controlling the ills of poverty, but providing a platform for enhancing the outcomes of economic development and investment.

Finally, the new thinking expressed in this section means development is integral to good governance and transformation, measurable by results predefined by development partners; without good governance and political transformation scholars like Nkurayija (2011) agree that aid cannot be effective in achieving the new development goals which are now represented in the agenda for new regimes. Wood and Newton (2005) have predicted the rising of the new age in the aid regime that qualifies both the welfare and social policy as concepts, and to assumptions about the nation-state in terms of internal integration and social cohesion, as well as the disarticulation effects of globalisation, the capacity to absorb foreign aid through creating an investment climate that will see the end of poverty, underdevelopment and global inequality.

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