THE INDIA-BRAZIL-SOUTH AFRICA (IBSA) COLLECTIVE AND THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY

by

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Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy (Africa Studies)

in the Centre for Africa Studies,
Faculty of Humanities

at the University of the Free State
Bloemfontein

February 2017

Promoter: Professor Heidi Hudson

DECLARATION

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

9 February 2017

ABSTRACT

The focus of this thesis is on the formation and functioning of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) collective. The study aims towards an understanding of whether and to what extent the IBSA collective is socio-politically constructed with respect to its security collaboration. At the outset it should be noted that the concept of 'security' as used in this study reflects post-Cold War trends in security thinking and regionalism. As such, IBSA's security collaboration is placed in the context of evolving debates and practices related to regional security community-building and the fostering of human security. The IBSA collective's constituted form of security shows the oppositional forces of national needs and the challenges of working towards global equity, all the while providing (contested) leadership positions from within the global South. On one hand this may help to ensure greater equity in world affairs, while on the other hand vested and parochial national interests detract from this effort. These paradoxes highlight the hybrid nature of the IBSA collective's composition, an enduring theme in the study. This forms the context from which the study embarks. In the debate that surrounds the degree and manner in which IBSA can attempt to shape and enhance the elements of human-centric security, the study conceptually derives an integrated approach that is founded upon critical social constructivism and postcolonialism, compacted in the shape of 'pillars' that lay out a conceptual framework diagram.

The synthesised theories are empirically applied to three functional areas of cooperation – maritime trade, energy and defence cooperation – through the consistent application of the 'pillars' noted above. The qualitative case study design highlights the inclusion of issues that enhance trustworthiness, so that the study can ascertain if associated aspects of human security with sectoral IBSA cooperation have been enhanced. With respect to maritime trade cooperation the study finds minimal yields, although the causal link between increased intra-IBSA trade and IBSA trade cooperation efforts could not be established for certain. In terms of energy cooperation, the study determines that adequate projects have come on stream, and that the complexity of the issues requires time for knowledge transfers. The study finds that the defence cooperation presently effects a minimal enhancement of physical and/or military security, but that its very nature makes long-term dividends probable. All three (of sixteen) IBSA working groups place emphases on constitutive discourse, dialogue, socialisation and identity-formation. They not only symbolise the tenets of social constructivism at work – from the bottom up – but also define trilateral relations and provide continuity and strength to the IBSA socio-political structure. The study thus provides greater understanding of the IBSA collective's security collaboration. It confirms that – to varying gradations – sectoral cooperation enhances aspects of regional human security, and shows that the IBSA collective has had embryonic successes at international level, where great potential lies.

Key Terms: Regionalism, (Critical) Social Constructivism, Postcolonialism, Regional Security Communities, Socio-political Construction, Human Security, Global South, IBSA, Colonialism, Colonial History, Africa, India, Brazil, South Africa, Maritime Trade Cooperation, Energy Cooperation, Defence Cooperation.

OPSOMMING

Die fokus van hierdie proefskrif is die vorming en die funksionering van die Indië-Brasilië-Suid Afrika (IBSA) gemeenskap. Die navorsing poog om begrip te skep oor die graad en wyse waarop IBSA as ‘n sekerheidsgroepering sosio-polities saamgestel is ten opsigte van sekerheidssamewerking binne die gemeenskap. Die konsep van ‘sekerheid’ moet vanuit die staanspoor herken word as tekenend van post-Koue Oorlog tendense in sekerheidsdenke en regionalisme. As sulks word IBSA se sekerheidssamewerking geplaas binne die konteks van ontwikkelende debatte en praktyke met betrekking tot streekssekerheid en die skepping van menslike sekerheid binne gemeenskapsbou. Die IBSA gemeenskap se gekonstitueerde vorm van sekerheid dui die opponerende magte van nasionale behoeftes en die uitdagings van reiking na globale eenheid aan, terwyl (betwiste) leierskapsposisies van binne die globale Suide verskaf word. Dit mag moontlik help om groter gelykheid te verskaf in wêreldsake, maar terselftertyd doen gevestigde en enge nasionale belang afbreuk daaraan. Hierdie paradoks beklemtoon die hibriede aard van die IBSA gemeenskap se samestelling, die vertrekpunt en ‘n deurlopende tema in hierdie studie. In die debat rondom die graad en wyse waarop IBSA kan poog om die elemente van mens-sentriese sekerheid te vorm en verbeter, lei die studie konseptueel ’n geïntegreerde benadering, gebaseer op krities sosiale konstruktivisme en postkolonialisme en geïllustreer deur ‘pilare’ binne ‘n konseptuele raamwerk diagram, af.

Die gesintetiseerde teorieë word empiries toegepas op drie funksionele areas van samewerking – maritieme handel, energie en militêre samewerking – deur konsekwente toepassing van die ’pilare’ soos bo genoem. Die kwalitatiewe gevallestudie ontwerp beklemtoon die insluiting van aspekte wat betroubaarheid beklemtoon, sodat die studie kan vasstel of die geassosieerde aspekte van menslike sekerheid wel verbeter word deur samewerking binne die spesifieke sektore. Wat betref maritieme handelssamewerking, vind die studie minimale opbrengste/suksesse, hoewel kousaliteit tussen verbeterde IBSA handel en IBSA samewerkingspogings onseker is. Ten opsigte van energie samewerking bevind die studie dat genoegsame projekte aangepak word en dat die kompleksiteit van die saak tyd benodig vir kennisoordrag. Wat verdedigingssamewerking betref, dui die studie op ‘n minimale verbetering in fisiese en/of militêre sekerheid, maar dat langtermyn dividende waarskynlik is. Al drie (van die sestien) IBSA werkgroepe benadruk konstruktiewe diskoers, dialoog, sosialisering en identiteits-vorming. Dit simboliseer nie alleen die beginsels van sosiale konstruktivisme in aksie nie – van onder af op – maar definieer ook tri-laterale verhoudings en verskaf kontinuiteit en krag aan die IBSA sosio-politiese struktuur. Die studie verskaf dus beter insig in die IBSA gemeenskap se sekerheidssamewerking. Dit bevestig dat – in variërende grade – sektorale samewerking wel aspekte van streeks menslike sekerheid bevorder en bevestig dat die IBSA kollektief wel embrioniese suksesse behaal het op internasionale vlak, waar groot potensiaal bestaan.

Sleutelterme: Regionalisme, (Kritiese) Sosiale Konstruktivisme, Postkolonialisme, Streekssekerheidsgemeenskap, Sosio-politieke Konstruksie, Menslike Sekerheid, Globale Suide, IBSA, Kolonialisme, Koloniale Geskiedenis, Afrika, Indië, Brasilië, Suid-Afrika, Maritieme Handelsamewerking, Energiesamewerking, Verdedigingssamewerking.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to two people, who were critical and inspirational in their support of this project.

To my promoter, Professor Heidi Hudson. I rely on the words of T.H. Huxley, because your guidance provided "a flash of light, which to a man who had lost himself in a dark night, suddenly reveals a road which, whether it takes him straight home or not, certainly goes his way …". Thank you.

To my wife and life partner, Sonica van Rooyen, née Schulenburg. I have trust in these lyrics that say it all. AVO.

And so today, my world it smiles,
your hand in mine, we walk the miles,
Thanks to you it will be done,
for you to me are the only one. …
If the sun refused to shine,
I would still be loving you.
When mountains crumble to the sea, there will still be
you and me.

Thank you. Led Zeppelin

ACRONYMS

AFDB	African Development Bank
ANC	African National Congress, main South African political party
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
Armscor	Armaments Corporation of South Africa
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
ATLASUR	South Atlantic Maritime Exercise (between South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay)
AU	African Union
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India, China. Grouping formed for common position during world climate talks
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CLCS	(United Nations) Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CO2	Carbon dioxide
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries
CSIR	(South African) Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
DCS	Defence Cooperation Subgroup
DIRCO	(South African) Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DSET	Defence Science, Engineering and Technology sub-group
EEZs	Exclusive Economic Zones
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
G-77	Group of 77 non-aligned nations
G20	The Group of Twenty, the world's 20 major economies
G24	Group of 24 (subset of G77)
G4	Group of four countries (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan) that aims at a reformed UNSC which would include them as well as two African countries as permanent members and adding an additional four seats to do rotation.
G7	Group of Seven, the world's major economies
G8	Group of Eight, a grouping of the world's major economies
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, that preceded the WTO
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMDSS	Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
GSTP	Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries
HCD	Human Capital Development
HDR	Human Development Report (United Nations)
IBAS	*Índia-Brasil-África do Sul* (IBSA – in Portuguese)
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa

IBSA + C	Same as BASIC, but with an IBSA-first view
IBSAMAR	India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime Exercise
IFF	Identity Friend or Foe
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
IONS	Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IOR-ARC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IORA	Indian Ocean Regional Association (previously IOR-ARC)
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency
IRP	Integrated Electricity Resource Plan
J	Joule (unit measurement of energy)
JWG	Joint Working Group
kWh	kilo Watt hour
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR/ MERCOSUL	Southern Cone Market
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MINURSO	The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MoUs	Memoranda of Understanding
MTEU	Million twenty-foot equivalent unit (shipping containers)
MW	MegaWatt
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIEO	Newly Industrialised Economic Order
NIMO	Newly Industrialised Maritime Order
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
P5	Permanent five nations of the United Nations Security Council (Britain, Peoples' Republic of China, France, Russia and the United States of America)
PD	Public Diplomacy
PRC	Peoples' Republic of China
PSF	The idea for a combined IBSA 'Peace Support Force'
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
PV	Photo Voltaic (cell that converts sunlight into electrical current)
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RwP	(Brazilian) Responsibility while Protecting
SA	South Africa(n)
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community

SADF	South African Defence Force (up to 1994)
SADR 2014	South African Defence Review 2014
SANDF	South African National Defence Force (1994 –)
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SCO	Shangai Cooperation Organisation
SDGs	(United Nations Development Programme) Sustainable Development Goals
SDR	Software Defined Radio
SI	International System (of Measurement) (French: *Système Internationale d'Unités*)
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SLOC	Sea lines of communication, used in terms of securing sea trade routes
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 1974
SUA Convention, 1988	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
TEU	Twenty-foot equivalent unit (shipping container)
TMNs	Traditional Maritime Nations
TWh	A terawatt-hour means that power at a capacity of 1 terawatt (10 to the power 12 watts) is obtained for one hour
TWIG	(IBSA) Trade and Investment Working Group
UAV	Unarmed Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNASUR/UNASUL (in Portuguese)	Union of South American Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USD	United States dollars
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOC	*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (Dutch East India Company)
WIC	*West-Indische Compagnie* (Dutch West India Company)
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Events such as the end of the Cold War have forced a major rethink about the basic assumptions that underlie international security (Snyder, 2012:1-9). Another major effect of the post-Cold War era has been the end of an extensive division of East and West, during which regionalism was repressed as a result of the power-ideology between capitalist and communist systems (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000:457; Acharya, 1999:78-82). The vacuum provided conceptual space for "new instances of articulation and coordination involving developing countries" (Fonseca, 2011), as well as an impetus for the states in the global South[1] to collaborate in order to ameliorate transnational (human security) challenges (Alagappa, 1993:439-467; Pugh & Sidhu, 2003:1-7; Papayoanou, 1997:343-353). South-South cooperation has therefore become the foundation for international cooperation and regional partnerships, with the aim to achieve people's security through balanced sustainable development (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR), 2013:iv).

The formation and functioning of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) regional collaboration around security comprises the focus of this thesis. Although the concept of 'security' as used in this study is comprehensively dealt with in Chapter 2 (the theoretical framework), it is important to note briefly at this point that 'security' in this study reflects post-Cold War trends in security thinking. IBSA's security collaboration is thus placed in the context of evolving debates and practices related to regional security community-building and the fostering of human security. IBSA is a trilateral developmental collective developed by the three countries to enhance South-South

[1] Other terms may be 'the Less-Developed World', 'the Majority World', 'the Non-Western World', 'the Poor World', 'the South', or 'the Under-Developed World' (Rigg, 2007, n.p.). The global South comprises the vast majority of countries in the world, and includes Asia (with the exception of Japan, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East (with the exception of Israel). There are tremendous variances in global South countries' size, populations, economies and human development indices.

cooperation and achieve greater equity *vis-à-vis* the global North.[2] On 6 June 2003, the 'IBSA Dialogue Forum' (its formal title) was launched. It was a founding conclave of the three countries with dynamic democracies, industrious in international affairs, from three developing regions of the global South. Its communiqué stated that the collective's aim was to analyse themes on the international agenda and those of common concern, set against a background of the growing importance of developing nations and the need for global South discourse (Brasilia Declaration, 2003:paragraph 2). The leaders further noted

> that new threats to security … must be handled with effective, coordinated and solidary international cooperation, in the concerned organizations based on respect for the sovereignty of States and for International Law; [and]
>
> gave special consideration to the importance of respecting the rule of International Law, strengthening the United Nations and the Security Council and prioritising the exercise of diplomacy as a means to maintain international peace and security. They reaffirmed the need to combat threats to international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the legal instruments to which Brazil, India and South Africa are parties.
>
> (IBSA Brasilia Declaration, 2003:paragraphs 3 & 5)

IBSA thus developed as a unique interstate or trilateral construct of the global South. IBSA at its prime was therefore hailed as holding great promise (le Pere & White, 2008; Stuenkel, 2014a; Baru, 2015; Zondi & Moore, 2015:488-489). At its commencement and over time, IBSA has displayed a shared commitment to resolve international security challenges, particularly in support of the United Nations (UN) (Soko, 2007:12-15; Arkhangelskaya, 2010:1); as well as working to recast the IBSA region's security outlooks and actions towards the prioritisation of human security issues (Bava, 2009).

Notwithstanding a first decade of achievements, in the recent past a paucity of data indicates that the IBSA collective may have reduced its commitment to the

[2] It is generally taken that the global North includes Australia, Canada, Israel, Hong Kong, Macau, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the United States of America and all of Europe (including Russia).

construction of (state and human) security. At issue is whether IBSA is being eclipsed by Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) and other global developments, and if so, the origins of the cause. Two developments bear scrutiny. Firstly, at international level the entry of the structure on the world stage has raised questions about the continued relevance of IBSA. Launched as BRIC in May 2008 at Yekaterinburg, Russia, South Africa joined in 2011. BRICS continues to be energetically infused,[3] a fact that may contribute to IBSA's enervation. BRICS has adroitly shifted beyond rhetoric to claim "for itself the status of being a counterpoint to the Group of Seven (G7)" (Baru, 2015); where both Russia and China (that already have strong linkages via the Shangai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)) propagate a communal "soft balancing" (Flemes, 2010b:144, 145; see also Zondi & Moore, 2015:505-507; Fonseca, Jr, 2013:19-46).

Yet, Gross (2013:1) notes that although BRICS "aims to coordinate positions and work jointly towards reforming global economic governance to make it better reflect the realities of the twenty-first century", BRICS is not merely an enlarged IBSA. Whereas the economic/developmental aims may converge, the members have very different agenda politically. An analysis of the eleven points of consensus (Reis, 2013:57-58) in the joint communiqué issued at the formation of BRICS shows that it does not prioritise the normative, pro-democracy human security agenda that is set by IBSA. Officially, the BRICS demand a "multi-polar, equitable and democratic world order", but this has not been defined in precise terms (de Ouro-Preto, 2013:108). Indeed, Russia appears to require autocratic rule to function (Lally & Englund, 2011) and "needed its own, very special version of democracy, in line with the country's norms and traditions" (Bakunina, 2016:n.p.); and is per definition not a part of the global South. The Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) is not a democracy (Krishnan, 2014:n.p.). Normatively and in view of the IBSA agenda noted above, it may be ventured that the foundations of China and Russia effectively abrade the IBSA principles, and neither "has expressed an interest in seeing systemic change" (da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016:180). Further, both Russia and the PRC are already

[3] BRICS is replete with its own academic forum and functional work groups. The South African BRICS Think Tank as part of the National Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences hosted a Pre-Academic Forum workshop on 24 August 2016 (SA BRICS Think Tank, n.d.).

members of the permanent five nations (P5) on the UN Security Council (UNSC); a much sought after goal by the IBSA collective. In sum, the main difference between the two constructs is that the pursuance of common normative issues constitutes a driving force that informs the IBSA agenda, posited as a higher moral ground. Schulz (2015:261) saliently observes that "[i]n contrast to their BRICS counterparts China and Russia, the IBSA countries have democratic political systems and share major foreign policy objectives, including UN Security Council reform".

The second development applies to the national level where both the Brazilian and South African governments lead a lethal concoction of economic torpor, continuing high inequalities and ongoing corruption improprieties (Stuenkel, 2015a). Brazil faces presidential impeachment issues, entrenched corruption at all levels of government, and vast expenditures on both the Soccer World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Games 2016, viewed as ill-advised by many, where resources could or should have been spent on social welfare. South Africa faces crises of unconstitutional presidential actions, rapacious corruption, with execrable service delivery issues causing the incumbent African National Congress to have lost grassroots-level support (Verwoerd, 2016). In both Brazil and South Africa this toxic mixture appears to have effectively curtailed foreign policy drives. Indeed, seen from Delhi, neither Brazil nor South Africa currently look like very attractive partners (Stuenkel, 2015a). Yet India faces its own dilemmas, much the effect of its massive population. Among India's issues are its relative lack of economic clout, energy challenges, infrastructural shortcomings, nuclear proliferation, abject poverty and deficient service delivery. Further, India's perception of China as an economic and maritime military threat, and the associated need to devote resources to that country's containment, present dire challenges (Brewster, 2016:4-10).

Although each of these three states (as with all states) has its own national interests first and foremost, this is simultaneously contrasted and complemented by the normative leadership of IBSA to address imbalances in the global configuration of power. These examples of global and domestic challenges therefore illustrate that there are two related but often conflicting forces at work in IBSA's dynamics. Centripetal forces are internal to the three countries; the centrifugal forces relate to

IBSA's regional and international outward-bound normative thrust on behalf of the global South. Clearly each has a constraining effect on the other.

These challenges and deceleration notwithstanding, IBSA remains relevant as a trilateral construct. The collective has not been officially disbanded. The fifth IBSA maritime exercise (Exercise IBSAMAR) took place off India's coast in February 2016 (Team Herald, 2016) and the IBSA Fund still provides projects and funding to identified underdeveloped countries (da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016:180). It is too soon to tell whether this reduction in "cores of strength" of Brazil and South Africa around which regional (security) communities normally develop (Adler, 2001:147) is a temporary development or not. Replying to a question in this regard, I was assured that IBSA's current malaise was the result of re-assigning resources and structures to meet both the IBSA and BRICS diplomatic resource challenges, and that the collective would soon regain track (Rees, Adams & Mashilo, interview, 2016). Relying on this logic, Stuenkel (2015a) calls on (Indian Prime Minister) Modi to re-energise the IBSA collective in view of its (albeit fitful) track record, its normative human security agenda, and its potential. This appears to have been heeded, as noted in a post-visit statement by Indian Prime Minister Modi to South Africa, where "[b]oth leaders agreed that South Africa will host the 8th Trilateral Commission Meeting, and the 6th IBSA Summit will be hosted by India next year" (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2016).

So against this backdrop, it is appropriate to take stock of what IBSA has achieved after more than thirteen years, also to assess its prospects particularly with regard to its efforts in promoting a more secure world or at least a more secure global South. At this point it is partly a retrospective study, with the purpose of determining what may be understood from the IBSA collective experience involving security collaboration.

1.2 THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

There are three main reasons for embarking on this study which relate to (1) the specific focus on constructivist processes – the socio-political construction of security; (2) the innovative use of alternative critical International Relations (IR) and global

South theoretical lenses and what these tell us about the nature of IBSA's human security engagements; and (3) the empirical insights about IBSA's inner workings gleaned from three case studies of security collaboration, namely maritime trade, energy and defence. These three reasons work towards addressing gaps in the extant literature on IBSA, and are discussed below.

In the relatively short period of its existence, IBSA has been extensively written about, mainly in English, Portuguese, but also in Spanish[4] and less in French. I briefly list some of the most prominent works in order to situate my contribution. Studies that detail the dynamics of international organisation, alliances, historical lineages, coalitions and global governance feature strongly (Lechini Girón & Correa, 2007; de Lima & Hirst, 2009; Flemes, 2009a, Taylor, 2009; Nel, 2010; Vieira & Alden, 2011; Taylor, 2012; Flemes & Vaz, 2014; Stuenkel, 2014a; Abdenur *et al*, 2014; Schulz, 2015, da Silva, Stohr & da Silveira, 2016). In terms of human rights and the development of constitutionalism (Mohallem, 2011; Jordaan, 2015), Jordaan concludes that there are different human rights approaches by the IBSA states. Kornegay (2009) surveys the geopolitical landscape from a South African perspective, while Lechini and Giaccaglia (2014) endeavour to determine which grouping – IBSA or BRICS – is most advantageous for South Africa and Africa (see also Sidiropoulos, 2013). Lechini, Girón and Correa (2007) as well as Lechini and Giaccaglia (2007; 2009) address the developmental and regional role of IBSA in the new world order. Relatedly, South-South- and development cooperation is a further area of debate, with most papers lauding the initiative (Mokoena, 2007; White, 2008; Visentini, Cepik & Pereira, 2011; Vieira & Alden, 2011; Masters & Landsberg, 2015).

The subject area of foreign affairs and diplomacy is well-presented. A number of writings deal with IBSA from a Brazilian foreign policy and regional leadership position (Pecequilo, 2008; Fonseca, 2009; Stephen, 2012; Gowan, 2013; de Oliveira, 2013; de Faria, Nogueira & Lopes, 2012; Blindheimsvik, 2010); while the paper by Graham (2011) tracks IBSA's voting record at the UN General Assembly and determines that their positions are generally in concert with their stated positions in the

[4] The tenets of the Portuguese and Spanish works have been extracted through translations.

Brasilia Declaration. IBSA's impact and position in world trade and foreign economic affairs have a fair number of contributions, where it appears that IBSA may be in a position to make a difference if its strategy is consistently maintained (Las Casas Campos, 2009; Al Doyaili, Draper & Freytag, 2013; Nel & Taylor, 2013).

1.2.1 The need to enhance constructivist analyses of security

As stated, the first reason for embarking on this study concerns the explicit focus on constructivist processes for security. Despite the comprehensive array of issues covered above, the literature review finds that no body of literature deals explicitly, systematically and critically with this study's subject matter – the tangible and intangible (ideational) mechanisms used by the IBSA coalition in the socio-political construction of security through cooperation. Some authors go a long way: Stuenkel's (2014a) book about IBSA provides a reference history, situates IBSA in the rising South and analyses the collective's outlook. Yet it fails to perform an in-depth sampling analysis of (some or all) the working groups – which I regard as pivotal in extrapolating the security collaboration process in a constructivist manner.

In order to foreground the constructivist nature of IBSA's security collaboration in specific areas, I also draw on security community literature (e.g. Deutsch, 1957; Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998; Adler & Barnett, 1998). Although it is not my intention to assess IBSA's progress towards a mature security community, insights from this body of literature will help to assimilate the constructivist nature of the development of community. As Acharya (1998:200-201) observes, "[t]he idea of cooperation is deeply embedded in a collective identity which is more than just the sum total of the shared interests of the individual actors". The collaboration within IBSA as a trilateral diplomatic construct of leading states of the global South has formed around three fundamental issues, namely regional cooperation, South-South advancement and improved global equity (Adler & Barnett, 1998:43). Such collaboration not only promotes socialisation, but also "lead[s] states to redefine their interests or even their sense of self" (Ruggie, 1998:19). This sense of virtual "we-ness" (Deutsch *et al*, 1957:5-6) is what shapes IBSA as a regional community and hence underpins the rationale for this study.

Thus, evidence presented in this study combines to tell the story of the IBSA collective's socio-political dynamics around security collaboration. At this point it is time to reflect, and to critically analyse what has been achieved and to learn the lessons imparted so far. This tale is an incomplete one, as it is sampled with a selection of the IBSA collective's working group population, while its narrative is largely state-induced. Yet the thick description of the selected working groups provides a glimpse of how the security of the IBSA collective has been and is being fostered.

1.2.2 The need to move beyond traditional IR lenses

The second reason concerns the choice of theoretical framework. I employ alternative (critical IR/global South)[5] lenses in the form of critical social constructivism and postcolonialism to augment the sparse and largely mainstream, state-centric (neorealist) efforts to explain IBSA (Vikrum, 2008:1-27, Chidley, 2014:141-157).[6] For example, Flemes and Vaz (2014) draw on the use of soft-balancing[7] "to delay, frustrate, and undermine" (Flemes & Vaz, 2014:12) hegemonic political and economic powers. I concur with Vikrum who argues that traditional IR theories (realism and

[5] There are four general positions that may claim to be critical IR theories: Firstly, the neo-Gramscian school on international political economy (a main proponent being Cox), secondly, the Frankfurt School founded on normative and explanatory theory (Habermas and Linklater), third is postmodernist work (Ashley, Walker, Der Derian; based on the philosophies of Derrida and Foucault); and finally feminist works (Elshtain, Enloe, Sylvester, Grant and Newland (Patrascu & Wani, 2015:392). Critical social constructivism and postcolonialism are included under the integument of critical theory. Rather than one approach, critical theory is better viewed "as a *constellation* of rather distinctive approaches, all seeking to illuminate a central theme, that of emancipation" (Wyn Jones, 2001:4, original emphasis).

[6] Linklater (1990:1-7) notes that rational choice theories focus solely on interstate relations. They accept the world structure as it exists, and do not concede the role of below- and across-state political economy instruments in adjusting or transforming the potential of world politics. Probably the greatest challenge for rational choice theories lies in its (in)ability to substantively and effectively address issues as they unfold in the future. Although there are a number of variants within this "body of ideas … family of theories" (Kelley, 1995:96-97), realists, neo-realists, liberals, neo-liberals and game-theoretic or expected-utility theorists accept the wider theoretical and ontological arguments of rational choice theory. Acharya (1998:200) observes that neoliberal institutionalists desire outcomes that are "largely or primarily a function of measureable linkages and utility-maximizing transactions" (see also Sterling-Folker, 2010:117). "Neoliberal institutionalists emphasise cooperation through [international legal] regimes and institutions, … they are narrowly self-interested and concerned only with increasing their own utility. When calculating their own utility, they have little interest in the utility functions of other states" (Griffiths & O'Callaghan, 2002:279.

[7] From a realist perspective a multipolar system can be the result of the emergence of regional unipolarities that build coalitions to balance world power after the end of the Cold War (Wohlfort 1999:30). From this developed concepts and practices of 'soft-balancing' (Flemes, 2007:1-31), reaching one of its apexes during 2003 (Pape, 2005:7-45).

pluralism) are inadequate to explain IBSA, and suggests that "a composite approach is necessary" (Vikrum, 2008:26). Similarly, Chidley proposes "newer, non-traditional as well as traditional forms of co-operative partnerships as archetypes of alignment" (Chidley, 2014:156) towards a new IR framework for alliance theory. Adler and Barnett also remark in this regard that "it is important to problematize what most international relations theories assume: that the context of interstate interaction can be situated within one model of the international environment" (Adler & Barnett, 1998:8). These viewpoints suggest a type of theoretical integration which is precisely the approach that I will follow.

This integrated theoretical approach has a number of advantages. I highlight three. First, it offsets the limitations of conventional IR approaches and allows us to develop a more complete picture of IBSA's evolution in particular areas of human security collaboration. Mainstream IR approaches such as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism tend to produce analyses that are partial because they largely concentrate on state interests and power-balancing. Much of the extant literature on IBSA (e.g. Mokoena, 2007; Flemes & Cruz, 2014; Lechini & Giaccaglia, 2014) display a tendency to look at the three actors as separate entities or states, which obscures the idea that IBSA might be bigger than the sum of its constituent parts, i.e. extending towards their respective three regions and continents. The preoccupation with state-centric interests therefore tends to mask a focus on the construction of a transnational social identity through shared values, norms and symbols. Furthermore, while the more pragmatic (reformist) and interest-based dimensions of the three individual states' behaviour in international politics seem to dominate analyses (Lechini & Ciaccaglia, 2007, 2009; Vieira & Alden, 2011), these tend to obscure the more radical intent of the IBSA initiative to act as vanguard for the global South and achieve a more equitable global order through redistribution (da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016:168; Nel & Stephen, 2010:73). Nel (2010) highlights the tension between the two poles of IBSA's collective identity, namely its reformist and more critical/radical orientations. The first role flows from the individual states' ambitions to be regarded as middle powers, with an emphasis on recognition, respect and esteem as a counter to the humiliation and indifference that has endured in the postcolonial era and harking back to the Bandung Conference (1955) (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1); see

also da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016). The second role refers to the redistribution ("of power, wealth and privilege in the global economy" (Nel, 2010:953)) through discursive methodologies, particularly *vis-á-vis* the global North.

The second advantage is that different, critical lenses may produce alternative readings of IBSA. These lenses would view the collective's failures and successes in ways that are conceivably more nuanced – reflecting neither a reformist nor a radical or emancipatory identity – but rather one that reflects the complex reality of contemporary postcolonial states *vis-à-vis* the international system. Alternative, critical lenses that are attuned to unequal power relations may be more accommodating in capturing the complexity brought by the hybridity of the postcolonial condition. Critical constructivism and postcolonial IR may therefore serve to provide a more holistic analysis. And in order to understand IBSA as an integrated collective, and not as a compound case of three states, one needs to look beyond the orthodox menu of IR theories.

A third advantage involves the use of postcolonial theory, which draws attention to the IBSA states' shared postcolonial histories and experiences of colonialism. This theory challenges ahistorical analytical tendencies that privilege the history of the Eurocentric nation-state and that present the 'Other' as pre-historical, pre-scientific and tribal – and hence largely irrelevant (Rodney, 1972; Appfel-Marglin & Marglin, 1996:380-381; Nandy, 1995:44; Ahluwalia & Nursey-Bray, 1997; Jahn, 2000:1-29; Ahluwalia, 2001; Turnbull, 2003:213-214). There are many excellent accounts of the histories of India, Brazil and South Africa and their regions, as well as the powers that colonised them, and the oceans on which they conducted their enterprise (see *inter alia* Allan, Wolseley Haig & Dodwell, 1934; Giliomee & Mbenga, 2007; de Abreu, 1998; Ellis, 2012 (that deal with writing histories in contemporary Africa); Meredith, 2006 and 2007; Newsinger, 2006; Ogot, 2009; Wilson, 2009; as well as Zeleza, 2010). My study however adds to this body of literature in that I seek to identify linkages across apposite histories in order to get a sense of the socially constructed nature of ideas across the expanse of time. I therefore argue that there is continuity between shared colonial histories and experiences, (foreign) policy declarations of the three IBSA

states and the objectives or reasons for the creation of the IBSA Forum; for which the study's selected theories make creative provision.

1.2.3 The need for better insight into IBSA's inner workings

The third and last reason concerns the empirical need to better understand the socio-political construction of IBSA's security collaboration in a number of specific areas, namely maritime trade, energy and defence. The three case studies were selected to align with the content of the Kampala Document (1991) that had captured the nexus between security and development even before the 1994 UN Human Development Report on Human Security. The Kampala Document identified "[f]our areas of vulnerability or 'calabashes' … security, stability, development and cooperation" (Africa, 2015:179-180; see also Africa Leadership Forum, 1991:9-26). Aligned with these precedences (here, set for Africa, and applicable to the global South), the case studies thematically underscore trade cooperation (improved economic security and greater world trade equity downstream); alternative energy (enhanced national, regional and continental levels of sustainable development and environmental security); and security and stability through defence cooperation (the shifts from sources of insecurity to peace and cooperation advocacy enhances community and personal security in developing countries). These, I submit, align with a keystone African and global South charter for human security. These functional cooperation areas also form part of a broadened understanding of security where state security and human security are seen as complementary.

The examination of security collaboration in the areas of maritime trade, energy and defence addresses a gap in the literature on IBSA's concrete inner workings. Mokoena (2007) as well as Masters and Landsberg (2015) provide functionalist reviews of IBSA processes and achievements to date, but the sheer scale of their subject at hand means that little detailed work was possible within the space constraints imposed on their work. In general, extant literature on IBSA remains at the macro state and policy level, and very little or not enough is said about what transpires at lower levels of decision-making and enaction/implementation. In order to optimally understand IBSA's socio-political construction of security a look at the elite level is not sufficient. The IBSA working groups – although clearly not reflecting bottom-up civil society participation

– is an important middle or intermediate level where decision-making and implementation come together and which will give us a different/additional view of how security ties are developed. Hence, in terms of empirical contribution the study focuses on three of IBSA's sixteen working groups,[8] namely trade and investment (maritime trade specifically), energy and defence cooperation. The working groups denote both the relational and cooperative aspect of the construction of community as well as the contentious nature of politics with regard to power plays (Jabri, 2013:5-6).

I chose the first case study on maritime trade because it would augment an understudied link between political economy, globalisation and economic security, particularly from a global South perspective. This case study will combine critical postcolonial insights on the role of the seas in determining the shared colonial histories of IBSA with the importance of more pragmatic insights on the value of maritime trade to the development of societal and economic security. This is in line with IBSA's dual identity as critical agent of redistribution and reformer, as urged in the Brasilia Declaration (2003:paragraphs 13 & 15), described earlier. In all of this the oceans that connect the three members of IBSA serve as a metaphor for IBSA's trade relations.

Similarly, the energy case study was selected because it foregrounds the fusion between concern about the lack of access to energy resources or 'energy poverty' in the global South (see Wirth, Gray & Podesta, 2003:138) and the global relevance of IBSA's energy cooperation initiatives and use of alternative energy sources. In this regard the Brasilia Declaration notes that their states have diverse areas of energy excellence and "stressed that the appropriate combination of their best resources will generate the desired synergy. Amongst the scientific and technological areas in which cooperation can be developed are … alternative energy sources" (Brasilia Declaration, 2003: paragraph 9). The case study is therefore important not only because of its implications for greater world equity, but also since sustainable and renewable energy access is also the route to socio-economic developmental progress and the

[8] Sector working groups are established for Agriculture, Culture, Defence, Education, Energy, Environment, Health, Human Settlements, Transport and Infrastructure, Public Administration, Revenue Administration, Science and Technology, Information Society, Social Development, Trade and Investment, and Tourism. To empower the working groups and provide functional, legal and other guidelines, a number of Agreements and MoUs have been signed.

enhancement of human security.

Regarding the selection of 'defence' as the third case study, the following three points are submitted. Firstly, the IBSA founding foreign ministers raised defence cooperation at two points in the initial communiqué. They agreed that "[a]venues for greater cooperation in defence matters should also be explored. … [and] agreed upon putting forward to their respective governments that the authorities in charge of the portfolio for … defence, … also hold trilateral meetings, aiming at the creation of concrete cooperation projects" (Brasilia Declaration, 2003: paragraphs 5 & 9). Secondly, my inclusion of defence cooperation under the broader ambit of human security goes against the conventional, narrow understanding of security, security collaboration and the protection of individuals, communities, states and regions. With this more holistic approach, this case study underscores the role of identity in defence cooperation. It may be seen that identity is a potent defence cooperation facet, one that may enhance defence service coordination and improve the quality of life of individuals and communities under security threats, particularly in fragile developing states. Defence officials also have unique professional discourse skill sets that underpin their identity and cohesion,[9] which are potent critical social construction values that combine to enhance defence cooperation.

In general, the chosen functional areas therefore implicitly emphasise normative ways of managing cooperation. But whether these orientations actually manifest in practice is open to question. So far we have seen little evidence of people-centred processes, except for consultation as part of the IBSA's countries' defence review processes. Yet, an emphasis on processes and forms of communication within state-centric structures such as the working groups are equally valuable, as they offer glimpses of how ideas and identities are shaped at this level.

[9] The different services (army, navy, air force) wear similar uniforms and ranks, have the same military culture, their training and associated military experience tend to be the same, they are subject specialists and possess a range and depth of technical expertise, their countries conduct multinational military exercises and operations (that contribute to military interoperability); and they tend to be highly motivated leaders that desire positive outcomes. These attributes and attitudes contribute immensely to constructivist elements, particularly identity and communication, and enhances discourse.

To determine if the IBSA sectoral working groups that I selected for this study had indeed enhanced various areas human security, I rely on four factors. These are the 'thickness' of the information to hand, the trustworthiness of the information, the quality of the deductions that may be obtained, and the fact that – being a qualitative study – the pronouncement is subjective. That being the case, I shall determine firstly if such enhancement did indeed take place, and secondly I shall award gradations of levels of success or not; that may vary from minimal to adequate to full enhancement or somewhere in between as the case may be. Finally, this study is a critical evaluation – it raises issues of critique – but that does not infer that the overall assessment of cooperation in a particular sector need be negative.

1.3 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The triple set of reasons (regional cooperation, South-South cooperation and greater global equity through its "institutionally reformist, limited revisionist plan" (Stephen, 2012:309)) for the formation of IBSA has led to a paradox of identity (see Vieira & Alden, 2011:507). The premise of the study is that the ensuing hybrid identity of IBSA both explains and is explained by the ambiguities, contradictions and complexities of IBSA's security collaborations. On the one hand, both Nel (2010) and Flemes and Cruz (2014) argue that IBSA as a trilateral interstate coalition essentially reflects the reformist roles of the three members in international politics, influenced by their respective and differing strategic regional contexts. As reformist players within the international system, they seek to reform the system from within rather than revolutionise it, and see themselves as middle powers (da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016:179). One such example is the IBSA states' efforts to reform the UNSC through satisfying their aspirations to obtain a permanent seat on the Council. The G4 (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan) aims at a reformed UNSC which would include them as well as two African countries as permanent members and adding an additional four seats to do rotation (da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016:177). In contrast, South Africa has had to follow a more cautious route via the African Union (AU) for fear of being seen as a regional hegemon (Lechini & Ciaccaglia, 2014:394; Nel, 2010:953,959). The AU process outcome is reflected in the 'Ezulwini Consensus' where both South Africa and Nigeria are its candidates for an enlarged UNSC, replete

with veto rights (African Union, 2005; IBSA, 5th IBSA Summit Declaration, Tshwane, 2011). On the other hand, as champions of the global South, promoting its agenda as well as advancing South-South cooperation, it shares a commitment to greater equity as part of a broader struggle against coloniality. In particular in the area of development, the IBSA Facility for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger (IBSA Fund) launched as a "pioneering and flagship programme" (IBSA Dialogue Forum) became operational in 2006, while IBSA's further work on development diplomacy continues (Masters & Landsberg, 2015:347-348). White (2010:4) states that the "fund has become an unexpected success story … and delivered positive results quickly" (Masters & Landsberg, 2015:348). Here, the IBSA collective plays a critical, and perhaps more transformative role, although they do not necessarily position themselves to overthrow the Bretton Woods system.[10]

Not only does postcolonial theory help us to understand this perceived contradiction in broader historical terms as a hybrid construct but through a critical constructivist lens, we are reminded that an anarchical world is of our making (Wendt, 1992; 1999), and can be undone, albeit with difficulty. As a consequence, it is the purpose of this study to use the appropriate theoretical tools aligned with qualitative case studies to produce a more inclusive understanding of IBSA's security collaboration in specific areas and its implications for IBSA as a trilateral construct with multiple identities. Therefore I argue that other insights are indeed possible when one employs lenses from critical IR and Africa Studies, such as critical social constructivism and postcolonialism. Using a normative lens helps to draw attention to the transformative potential (albeit limited) of the IBSA construct where emphasis is placed on process rather than on outcomes alone. Where outcomes may be limited in quantitative terms, process fills the gap in terms of substance and quality. With the foregoing in mind, I contend that a process-focused (constructivist) analysis of IBSA's security collaborations is valuable not only for the lessons learnt but also for producing dividends for human security. Privileging processes over results therefore does not mean that one ignores domestic pressures

[10] The recently formed BRICS development challenges the role of the Bretton Woods system. This is premised on the statement that the Bretton Woods system has historically not lived up to the provision of an equitable world financial system, reverting to the Bandung and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) roots (da Silva, Stohr & da Silveira, 2016:177). Strictly speaking, the issue of the BRICS bank is beyond scope of this study, but it is also contentious because IBSA members support the bank in their BRICS mode (Chaulia, 2014).

(Nathan, 2006:275-299), regional dynamics and the global strategic environment, but rather underscores the fact that so-called 'progress' (or lack thereof) is something organic, fluid and hybrid, and not linear cause-effect constructs.

Hence, it is an important component of this thesis to determine what motivates the IBSA states to enter into a system of elevated functional security cooperation, as well as evaluating the extent of progress made in respect of implementation – or in the words of Adler and Barnett (1998:7), focusing on the "half-baked integrative processes" of cooperation. Therefore, the term 'socio-political construction' indicates the underpinnings, the theoretical bases and the futures-focused thrust of IBSA. The socio-political construction of IBSA consists of two interrelated elements, with the linkages established in Chapters 2 and 3. The 'political' elements consist of not only the formation of the IBSA assemblage, but also its continuance through practiced political will. The associated 'social' components are more complex, as they are at once based on the inappropriateness of traditional IR theories as well as the applicability of the dynamic theoretical foundations of critical social constructivism and postcolonialism (pursued fully in Chapter 2). The various facets of critical IR provide enduring effect through the working groups that perpetuate and enhance the IBSA construct. The socialisation workings of the functional groups involve role players that operate largely within state structures. The working groups are critical, as they provide the agency[11] that continuously enacts IBSA operations; they ensure its construction by providing the blocks that buttress and shape it.

Given the preceding logic, the research question is formulated as follows: *How can the socio-political construction of security in the IBSA collective (as both reformer and critical agent) be understood when viewed through critical social-constructivist and postcolonial theoretical lenses; utilising three select areas of functional human security cooperation (maritime trade, energy and defence cooperation)?* Answering this question would clarify the motivations ('why') for the formation, the agency

[11] The concept of agency forms an important pillar in critical IR theory. 'Agency' is developed from concepts that involve action and agents. Agency refers to "the existence of an agent with normative preferences" (Khan, 2004:20) and with the capacity to alter the development of prevailing conditions.

('how') of the IBSA collective in a global South setting, as well as the 'what' in terms of IBSA's collective hybrid identity.

Broken down, the study poses the following questions:

- Why are traditional (rational choice) IR theories not germane to this study, and which approaches are the best fit for the study? (Chapter 2)
- Do the two critical IR theories – critical social constructivism and postcolonialism – enhance understanding of the IBSA construct in the context of South-South security cooperation? In which ways do these theoretical approaches establish linkages towards a hybrid but conjoined IBSA effort? (Chapter 2)
- What are the historical, normative, endogenous and exogenous linkages that are common to the IBSA states? And how are these linkages explained through critical social constructivism and postcolonialism? (Chapter 3)
- What can we learn from IBSA's trilateral security cooperation in the areas of maritime trade, energy and defence in respect of its implications for developing community and the fostering of shared identities? Additionally, how does the interaction within working groups add enduring and cumulative value to the social-constructivist process? (Chapters 4, 5 and 6)
- Does the IBSA collective contribute to economic security through increased maritime trade? And what are the implications for the construction of a collective identity? (Chapter 4)
- Does the IBSA collective promote environmental security through energy cooperation? And what are the implications for the construction of a collective identity? (Chapter 5)
- Does the IBSA collective foster physical and military security by means of enhanced defence cooperation? And what are the implications for the construction of a collective identity? (Chapter 6)

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The central goal of the study is to provide a deeper understanding of the social-political build of IBSA's foundation and future as a trilateral collective through the lens of security collaboration. In other words, what may be learnt from the IBSA collective experience of the last thirteen years regarding security collaboration? More specifically, the aim is to critically analyse IBSA's human security collaboration endeavours in three areas (maritime trade, energy and defence) as a means of reflection on past and future practices. In answering the various questions listed above, I will seek to assess whether this IBSA interstate, regional engagement has developed into a level of South-South collaboration that brings dividends for human security. In the process I draw on four theoretical bodies of literature related to (critical) social constructivism (Wendt, 1992, 1999; Hopf, 1998; Adler & Barnett, 1998; Checkel, 1998; Cox, 1987; Fierke, 2010; Ruggie, 1998; Reus-Smit, 2002, 2005, 2008; Kurki & Wight; 2010, 2013); postcolonialism (Said, 1978, 1988, 1994; Fanon, 1963, 1967; Spivak, 1993, 2010; Bhabha, 2005; Grovogui, 2010); security communities (Deutsch, 1957; Adler & Barnett, 1998; Acharya, 2001, 2002; Risse-Kappen, 1996); and human security (Kampala Document, 1991; UNDP HDR, 1994; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007; Tsai, 2009; Africa, 2015; Richmond, 2007, 2011).

The objectives are to:

- Discuss global trends towards regional and particularly South-South cooperation as well as human security imperatives as a backdrop to the choice of theoretical framework that will guide the analysis of IBSA's trilateral security collaboration (Chapter 2);
- Develop an integrated theoretical framework, where a number of conceptual pillars are identified for application in the various areas of IBSA's security collaboration (Chapter 2);
- Analyse IBSA discourses (gleaned from founding documents as well as summit and foreign policy statements) to establish the historical, normative, endogenous and exogenous linkages that are common to the IBSA states (Chapter 3);

- Assess to what extent these linkages can be explained through critical (IR) lenses (Chapter 3);
- Critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the IBSA collective's security collaboration in three functional areas (maritime trade, energy and defence cooperation) through the prism of an integrated theoretical framework (Chapters 4, 5 and 6); and
- Develop extensive knowledge about the three functional areas (specifically in respect of working group interactions) in order to facilitate a critical understanding of the implications for collective identity-construction (Chapters 4, 5, and 6).

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.5.1 Social constructivism as the study's ontological approach

Mouton (1996:11-12) advises that ontology or "reality is referred to as the research domain of the social sciences. … [and] may be regarded as humankind in all its diversity, which would include human activities, characteristics, institutions, behaviour, products, and so on". Recast for this study, it means that within the developing sphere there may be said to exist a trilateral/transnational community comprising the IBSA countries. Contextually, one could ask, 'What is the nature of the social and political dynamics of regional communities that we desire to gain knowledge about; particularly that of developing countries?' From this, two perspectives can be distinguished. In the first place, from a positivist perspective there is a real world that exists independently from our knowledge base, and it forms the foundations for its energy. One can, in the second place, postulate that a real world does not exist as such, but that the world (regional communities, for example) is socially, discursively and iteratively constructed; which in turn means that it cannot be tied down to one particular temporal space or culture (Kratochwil, 2006a:21). I concur with the latter position, where reality is not established but constructed.

Most theories have differing schools and variants. Constructivism is no different, and variants include mainstream middle ground approaches and critical approaches.

Critical constructivists emphasise "the inseparability of social ontology *and* social epistemology" (Fierke, 2010:186, original emphasis). Critical constructivism combines 'standard' constructivism (the interaction of people and the social milieu and the derivation of socially constructed meaning) with 'critical' constructivist attributes, being the enduring effect of societal power structures which includes the normative impacts of choices made. Critical constructivism enhances the foundational potency of constructivism through the addition of two poststructuralist strands, namely language (communication and associated discursive attributes); as well as consciousness of the impact of power processes (including historicities).

1.5.2 Epistemology: How to know the postcolonial world of our making

Epistemology – the theory of knowledge – posits related questions: What can one know about the world, and how can one know it? Epistemology hones in on the nature, origin and scope of knowledge. This study utilises a normative lens and its epistemology is postcolonial in essence. As a consequence, it eschews traditional (or rational-choice) IR theories,[12] adopting a set of critical theory[13] variants instead. From a critical theory perspective liberalism and realism (and their permutations) are restrictive, and essentially aimed at the preservation of state power. This is because they accept as basis a pre-ordained world having embedded actors that fail to understand social processes based on historicity (among other factors), while disavowing alternative possibilities (Rupert, 2010:158; Grovogui, 2010:239).

Postcolonialism overcomes this defect. Postcolonial theory therefore has two ambitions: It serves to underscore the deficiencies of contemporary norms with respect to global fair play; and it aims to negate as far as possible the remains of European imperialism and colonialism. In terms of the epistemological challenges, the impact of global South discourse on Euro-American knowledge institutions is hardly discernible, whereas the opposite remains valid; raising the need for greater balance in world affairs and the field of IR. By and large, the global South are contemporary developing states. Applied to this study, one notes that most of the norms described above were

[12] See earlier, footnote 6.
[13] See earlier, footnote 5.

'inherited' at different phases throughout the global South's (varying) periods of decolonisation, marked by political independence of new states. As part of global South history, it can be stated that the (coerced) assimilation of international systems of exchange and subsequent incorporation in globalised patterns have resulted in inequitable patterns of interaction. Under the terms of forced integration, dependency modes remain albeit with neocolonial and neoliberal façades. Risking the label of generalisation, the result appears to be that global South actors underperform with respect to both IR and international relations. In many global South countries, this enervation continues to display itself in an inability to produce and enact proactive goals and strategies, so as to have a stake in the development of own futures.

1.5.3 Research design

An interpretive approach is adopted in this study. The interpretive approach relies on the tenet that "meanings and beliefs are the most important factors in the study of social processes and that social enquiry could play an important role in uncovering the deep meanings that exist beneath the surface appearance of observed reality" (Kurki & Wight, 2010:24). Linked to the goal of uncovering meaning, the case study method is deemed appropriate. This thesis therefore comprises qualitative research and makes use of the case study method supplemented by elements of critical discourse analysis (CDA). I analyse key IBSA documents situated at the interstate level (such as declarations, policy statements, constitutions, White Papers as well as minutes and related documents at the working group level).

Qualitative research involves an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons that govern human behaviour, here being the cooperative behaviour at national or state level, but particularly at regional level. Qualitative research is based on a phenomenological position (i.e. it usually analyses writings and actions of people that are presented as chronicles or in graphic ways that have a correlation to subjective experiences) (Yin, 2011:11-18; Maxwell, 2011:9-26). Positivists warn that the inherent subjectivity of the researcher "negate[s] the possibility of objectively knowing a social … world" (Ratner, 2002:n.p.). However, the realisation that the subjectivity of the researcher is a factor stretching across all the processes of the study

(from the topic, selection of methodologies to the interpretation of information) has the benefit of compelling the researcher to reflect on the values and objectives brought into the project, and their possible effect on the outcome. It is further a function of qualitative research to categorise data into patterns as the primary basis for organising and reporting results, and to attempt analyses of macro trends and improvement of standards for managing issues of regional cooperation. This does not infer generalisations or predictions. Instead these are used to highlight assets and vulnerabilities in the IBSA collective's synergistic security practices, which could provide a reference bank with respect to improving processes; that could in turn be relevant to other contexts and similar transnational arrangements.

As noted earlier, the study makes use of three case studies related to maritime trade (economic security), energy (environmental security) and defence cooperation (military and personal security). My study of the socio-political construction of IBSA's security collaboration in the areas of maritime trade, energy and defence corresponds with at least two of the types of case studies identified by Babbie and Mouton (2006:281), namely studies of countries and nations; and studies of organisations and institutions. Respectively, the foci are typically on foreign policy and comparative politics as in the case of IBSA; and then, within the IBSA procedural composition, on management practices, change, identity and similar social interactions.

Case study research is characterised by a number of principles, such as conceptualisation, contextualisation (including political, historical, sociological and cultural aspects), experiential deliberations and taxonomic classifications (Yin, 2011:14-15. Conceptualisation is primary, as it includes broad statements for guidance with respect to case study criteria. It informs theoretical constructs and sequenced events, and shows how the same theoretical constructs may involve similar situations, i.e. in this study it inferentially involves other IBSA working group environs (Yin, 2011:14-15; 100). Secondly, the context (in this case evolving regionalism and human-centric security) is important, as it stresses the unit of analysis and its setting, so that the study is appropriately situated. Contextualisation is one of the main advantages of case studies (i.e. to illustrate the applicability of theory in a specific

context). It operates against ahistorical and depoliticised accounts and allows for in-depth analyses. It serves to provide rich data for thick description to understand the phenomenon in as much detail as possible (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:277, 281).

I was further guided by the need to make a selection according to IBSA priorities regarding the relative urgency of certain cooperative functional areas, as stated in the Brasilia Declaration of 6 June 2003 (see earlier). Since not much is known about the specificities of collaboration in these functional areas, I have selected a case study approach that is descriptive and exploratory in nature. It will enable me to identify favourable and unfavourable practices within the various working groups (Burton, 2000). Miles and Huberman (1994:172) argue that case studies "increase the explanatory power and generalizability of the data collection process". However, my intention is not to treat the insights from three working groups as representative samples of the IBSA collective's overall functioning (i.e. all sixteen working groups). In order to do this, I would need to examine the workings of several more working groups, something that space constraints will not allow.

Thirdly, my case study research makes use of abductive analytical strategies. This method of reasoning was selected as it combines deductive and inductive reasoning in a particular way. The two general forms of reasoning accepted in the sciences are inductive and deductive, which at their root refers to an "inferential relationship between premise and conclusion" (Mouton, 1996:76; see also Fischer, 2001:361-383). The study is deductive in the way that postcolonialism and critical social constructivism (together with theoretical-conceptual insights from the literature on human security and security community formation) form the theoretical framework broadly guiding the questions posed related to the three case studies. The deductive focus provides a conceptual base for analysis with regard to the IBSA collective as the main unit of analysis in three areas of cooperation. The study moves deductively from the general theory to the specifics of the empirical situation regarding maritime trade, energy and defence cooperation and their respective human security impacts. Inductive analyses (from the specific to the general) in the three case study chapters take the form of an empirical analysis where the theory of Chapter 2 is modified through practice and real-world insights, particularly with regard to the interactions within

IBSA's working groups. Together these constitute a specific kind of inductive analysis. According to Mouton (1996:78), this form of induction, also known as 'retroduction' or 'diagnostic induction' or 'abduction' is when the "conclusions – in different ways – go *beyond* the premises" (original emphasis). Thus the value of abductive reasoning rests in its practice of inferring, which connects knowledge to the constructivist mindset. In sum it means that deliberative processes or events give rise to the growth of broader concepts. Proper procedures ensure that the case study material provides a focal point for evaluation of the overall study (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:281-283; Yin, 2011:21).

Lastly, with regard to data collection methods all kinds of case studies need to have a variety of sources (triangulation) – the greater the number of sources, the 'thicker' the research and the associated confidence levels. In this study I collect data through literature, individual interviews and personal observation. Firstly, the study relies largely on literature and documents as sources of data, obtained from library and electronic searches. Literature sources include seminal works by formative theorists (e.g. Deutsch, Wendt, Cox, Hurrell, Reus-Smit, Hopf, Fanon, Said, Spivak). Key documents are IBSA founding documents, minutes of meetings, defence reviews as well as academic and media writings about the functioning of applicable facets of the IBSA collective. In the case of official IBSA documents, I employ the techniques of critical discourse analysis (CDA) in order to bring key discourses regarding IBSA's identity to the fore. Rogers (2004:3) refers to the 'critical' in CDA as being associated with the study of power relations. The greatest effect of power in all societies is inequality, as "power differentiates and selects, includes and excludes" (Blommaert, 2005:2). Within this framework an objective is to unearth power correlations and show how inequality is rooted in society. Another interpretation of 'critical' in CDA is an aim to analyse and understand the link between the form and function of language (Rogers, 2004:4).[14] (See also Milliken, 1999; Shepherd, 2016:324-335). Combining information from all these sources will lead to a qualitative and interpretive review,

[14] "The form of language, … consists of grammar, morphology, semantics, syntax, and pragmatics. The function of language includes how people use language in different situations to achieve an outcome" (Rogers, 2004:4).

and trustworthy[15] conclusions.

Secondly, I conducted qualitative individual interviews with people in their functional professional environments to learn more about the inner workings of IBSA. Thus between 2009 and 2016 during research visits to India and Brazil as well as within South Africa, fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with foreign affairs or defence officials of the three governments, representatives of their 'IBSA desks' as well as specialists from research institutes. I employed a purposive sampling technique which entailed identifying respondents on the basis of their expertise and conducted direct, face-to-face interviews with them according to a semi-structured interview framework. The interview framework consisted of verbal responses to a set of designed questions, recorded *in vivo* and in writing; and were open-ended in order to explore issues that were deemed of value to the subject at hand. Although they may have been tailored for particular individuals, a typical interview framework will contain at least the questions set out in Appendix A to this thesis. The responses would indicate critical or contentious issues that need resolution, and may add value in terms of lessons learnt, both for IBSA itself and other similar (future) arrangements.

Lastly, but to a much lesser extent, I drew on my own personal experience and observations. I participated in the initiation of the IBSA trilateral biennial maritime exercise. These were in my capacity as a naval officer (South African Navy and reserves) and as a senior researcher (South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg).

At this point two limitations with regard to data collection can be noted. Firstly, the assumption that data and access to state officials in open democracies such as these three states should be readily available, is in fact fallacious. Secondly, the amount of data available in Brazilian Portuguese is impressive, but leads to various degrees of inaccessibility. It further limited interviews to Brazilians who could speak English.

[15] Trustworthiness is a mainstay within qualitative research, and goes hand-in-hand with credibility. It means that the procedures should be transparent. Yin (2011:295) further observes that this includes "attending to exhaustive searches for evidence and contrary evidence". While the term 'validity' is used (that refers in broad strokes to the soundness of a study), "many qualitative researchers reject the concept of validity as a positivist idea, substituting credibility, authenticity, or a similar term in addressing the standards for quality in their work" (Maxwell, 2011:22).

This notwithstanding, the trustworthiness of the data (Babbie & Mouton, 2006:276-278) were authenticated by interviews conducted in India, Brazil and South Africa.

1.6 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

This first chapter contextualised the study by highlighting the rise in regionalism and increased South-South cooperation. The current precarious status of the collective was noted and situated. The chapter provided the IBSA collective's background, contrasted with that of BRICS; whereafter the study averred that IBSA operated off a higher normative plane for the reasons stated. The IBSA collective's 'radical' world society outlook and its participation in international structures were reconciled; in the milieu that constructivist theory disputes that world anarchy is a fundamental condition of the international system. The significance of the study was justified, after which the research problem setting gave rise to the research question. This framing provided the basis for the research objectives, which were structured in terms of theoretical and empirical gaps that the study seeks to address. Research methodology building blocks in the form of the principles of case study design were covered, and ontology and epistemology introduced critical social constructivism and postcolonialism to justify their selection as the main theoretical approaches to understand the IBSA collective. Because they are dealt with in greater depth in the following chapter, the theoretical thrusts of the thesis were only briefly introduced.

The aim of Chapter 2 is to produce an integrated theoretical framework for the study. Its framework does not operate in a void as it is contextual. Therefore I will firstly discuss key trends, detect similarities across trends, and then use common features as guide towards the selection of key concepts from a number of theories. The trends commence with regionalism and what flows from there. The next trend comprises security conceptualisations which broadened and shrunk after the Cold War and 9/11 respectively, giving rise to state-centrism; with a concomitant rise in securitisation (the theory of which is very briefly introduced in order to enhance the context of the research). Commonalities are then identified and explored, and I explain why critical theories are the preferred choice, rather than traditional sets. A key attribute introduced is that of hybridity, also a key theme throughout the study; where IBSA is constructed

as a hybrid mix between reformist and critical positions and identities. The designated functional pillars for this study are concretised in the form of a schematic diagram, used throughout. In the next chapter and the following empirical chapters, these are linked to aspects of the identity-formation of the IBSA coalition.

In Chapter 3, I apply the theoretical framework to the IBSA collective. The analytical focus in this chapter will mainly be at the persuasive, discursive level, analysing the discourses from summit statements, communiqués, foreign policy and historicity. The aim then, is to tease out common values and identities expressed through communication and discourse. The influence of histories and aspects of postcolonialism on critical social constructivism is analysed in order to arrive at common positions that led to the formation of the IBSA Dialogue. These baselines forge their future cooperation as a trilateral unit. Their transitions to constitutional democracies are emphasised, as this is a critical common normative denominator. Common positions act as potent sources of identification with each of the three states' history, present agenda and future (global South) ambitions.

Chapter 4 examines IBSA's maritime trade cooperation and its implications for (human) economic security. This chapter is the first of three that deals with aspects of trilateral diplomatic cooperation. It explores maritime trade as a specific area of human endeavour. Making use of the pillars posted in Chapter 2, it considers the extent to which shared socio-political understandings and histories as well as transnational values encourage community-building for the sake of peaceful development. It lays the foundation and analyses implications for intra-IBSA maritime trade, transport and infrastructure cooperation. The role of the states to – in a supra-regional manner – ensure access to maritime resources, markets and finances is dealt with, so as to ensure welfare and levels of state power that are sufficient, while also attempting to make inroads into established global North trade routes. A critical assessment will determine if the upturn in trade flows enhanced economic security and societal progress within the IBSA states and their regions.

Chapter 5, on IBSA's energy cooperation and the effects on (human) environmental security, elaborates how energy cooperation forms an integral part of building and

sustaining common interests. Employing the process outlined at the end of Chapter 2, this chapter makes clear linkages with the socio-economic advantages that energy has in the developing world, upon which the achievement of a number of human security issues are dependent. Energy cooperation, including conventional, alternative and nuclear sources, are discussed. The specialist capacities that still lie within each of the individual states are captured and highlighted for future joint synergetic projects, as envisaged in the Brasilia Declaration of 2003. The contribution by the three states to ensure sustainable environmental developments *vis-à-vis* human development at regional and international levels is assessed.

Chapter 6 focuses on IBSA's defence cooperation and the implications for military security. Utilising the conceptual pillars devised in Chapter 2, this chapter shows that defence cooperation involves common factors with respect to IBSA's defence mandates. The manner in which these are executed in the socio-political construction of the IBSA model are important issues that may provide links to future cooperation. The chapter reviews commonalities with respect to the three IBSA states' peace support operations in Africa. In-depth analyses are carried out along general military cooperation issues as well as defence technology cooperation projects between the three states. An overall assessment of the present and possible defence cooperation among the IBSA states is performed, based on identified commonalities, the complexity and the associated pace of technological progress that may be possible.

Chapter 7 draws the study's conclusions. In its analysis of the theoretical integration with the case studies, an attempt is made to draw a line of overarching statements that has the effect of elevating the study's conclusions to a higher conceptual plane. The intention is to capture the significance of the study; thereby avoiding the pitfall of merely restating the findings in a different way. Accordingly, the chapter draws together the implications analysed in the preceding chapters, and builds upon the various chapters' evaluations. Further, the value of the pillars is revisited, and the usefulness, value and significance of the study for other scholars are reviewed. The theoretical and empirical contribution of the research are assessed. Clearly the study does not profess to cover the subject in its totality and therefore it needs to highlight that which is still unknown. Thus the chapter includes suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

Following the detailed outline of the plan for the study in Chapter 1, I now proceed to develop and outline an integrated theoretical framework that will underpin this study. A key contention is that the intersection that lies between critical social constructivism and postcolonialism provides a space for understanding the security collaboration in select areas of three IBSA countries when combined with insights from security community and human security conceptualisations. The theoretical framing in this chapter does not take place in a vacuum, and is contextualised by situating it against the background and outcomes of global trends in security, particularly regionalism and shifts in international security since the end of the Cold War. This discussion of global trends towards regional and particularly South-South cooperation as well as human security imperatives constitutes the second objective of this chapter.

The analysis in this chapter is guided by a number of specific research questions. The first question, *Why are traditional (rational choice) IR theories not germane to this study?*, is based on the contention that these theories fail to reconcile the IBSA states' dual (hybrid) identity as leading regional yet developing countries. It then leads to the second question, *Which approaches are the best fit for the study?* The response to the latter further problematises the issue by asking, *Do the two critical IR theories – critical social constructivism and postcolonialism – enhance understanding of the IBSA construct in the context of South-South security cooperation? In which ways do these theoretical approaches establish linkages towards a hybrid but conjoined IBSA effort?*

The chapter opens with a discussion of these two global trends, followed by a bridging section that teases out commonalities as these inform and are shaped by the two interrelated theories (critical social constructivism and postcolonialism) discussed in the two sections that follow. In the final section I extract key attributes from these two

theories and related concepts, which then form the foundations that are replicated throughout the study.

2.2 REGIONALISM AND THE DYNAMICS OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

In this section I discuss the rise of regionalism and South-South cooperation as backdrop for understanding the context of IBSA's move towards trilateral collaboration.

2.2.1 Regionalism: A worldwide trend

Over the past two-plus decades, a rapid rise in regionalist programmes and constructs has become an international phenomenon (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995:1-4; Fawcett, 1995:9-36; Mansfield & Milner, 1999:589-627; Breslin, Higgott & Rosamond, 2002:6). Jordan (2001:1) states that it "appears to be a long-awaited manifestation of the perennial hopes of Wilsonian idealism; in particular, of incipient global governance through some form of representation based on popular consent. It is clear that regional arrangements have distinctive motivations and processes that vary from region to region". Seen as part of the proliferation of international activism (highlighted by the UN Human Security Report of 2005 (UNDP, 2005)), the pro-active management of regions takes a substantive amount of credit for a decline in world-wide conflict.

The efforts of diverse regional organisations to resolve political crises, enhance economic coordination and cooperation and to further development, have met with varying degrees of success. But despite their chequered record, regional organisations continue to be in the van of processes to inexorably transform international relations. Transformation also involves a new, broader and people-centred notion of the concept of security, accompanied by important changes in the norm of absolute sovereignty, which in the past has been cast in stone. This proliferation means that most states are part of at least one but more often a clutch of regional arrangements. Almost all of the

UN member states are involved in some form of regional endeavour (Page, 1998:22-42).[16]

Regionalist groupings have not only increased in number, but also in scope and diversity, and the rise of increased regionalism is a factor to contend with in the complex world order of the twenty-first century. This study concentrates on macro-regions, named international regions by Russett (1967), with specific attention to IBSA as a trilateral, transnational example. As has been seen, the 1990s brought a revival of the concept – in being as well as the invigorated field of study, known as "new regionalism" (Fawcett & Hurrell, 1995; Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998:7-21; Hettne & Inotai, 1994). This means that the term 'region' has – over time – become more complex and layered. It is therefore important to stress that the structuration for 'region' now infers a "transactionalist" (Acharya, 2012:222) process. More precisely, it is a confluence of evolutionary processes (Cooke & Morgan, 2000:62-65), which connects well with the view of constructivists and postmodernists that regions are products of human creation, hence the notion of territoriality as something that is not natural, required or essential (Tavares, 2004:4). For instance, Brazil forms an eighty per cent component of the eight nations across the world that comprise the community of Portuguese-speaking nations (Xavier, 2010). 'Region' is therefore an imprecise term that continues to evade an agreed definition by scholars and practitioners alike (Mansfield & Milner, 1997:3-19; Deutsch *et al*, 1957:27; Tavares, 2004:4; Paul, 2012:18).

Consequently, I concur with Lake and Morgan (1997:8) who argue that it is likely that regions define themselves, and it is probable that they are only identifiable after the fact. That is when they become recognisable and visible as a result of the interaction between states. Each region is unique, and in this view, explanations need to be tailored towards distinct regions. As a general rule and noted above, political and economic determinations eventually define a region. Hence a working definition for the purpose of this thesis would be that a region is composed of different states linked

[16] It is deemed to be too soon to ascertain the long-term effects and patterns of the recent – June 2016 – vote by parts of the United Kingdom (England and Wales) to leave the European Union (EU) on the regionalist movement worldwide. One opinion notes "the complete unpredictability of global politics and economics at the moment" (Allison, July 2016).

by significant and special relationships (in the IBSA case, bound by a 'virtual' South-South ideational affinity) that make conscious and continuous decisions to identify themselves as a region through their discourse and actions.

Such decisions to identify with each other are also influenced by the rather nebulous relationship between globalisation[17] and regionalism. On the one hand, globalisation facilitates cooperation and integration but at the same time also pits those on the receiving end in the global South against those who make the rules in the global North – leading to further fragmentation. Globalisation valorises the development of regionalism, in four ways, according to Hurrell (1995b:55-58). Firstly, the institutionalisation of collective management becomes a feasible requirement at regional level for tasks that are beyond the capabilities of individual states to execute, and actors at regional level share similarities in their composition that are conducive to policy and executive best practices. Secondly, many challenges that appear to be global in nature have regional solutions, and enforcement of global issues takes place at regional level. Thirdly, the dissonance between integrative and fragmentary processes is more likely to be solved at regional level. Fourthly, globalisation spurs regionalism through the potent effect that it has on policy goals adopted by states. On the negative side, there are concerns about increased economic dependency, new and unforeseen global issues, a rise in illegal migrants, unrealistic demands from developing quarters, and the fact that globalisation has a skewed effect (it tends to favour developed states or large/powerful economies).

As a result of these push and pull factors states at regional level may find it necessary to conjoin forces into larger units to increase critical political mass, such as IBSA. This would make IBSA greater than the sum of its parts – in pursuit of economic efficiency, political respect and fair trade – and accredited member states of the global South, according to Wyatt-Walker (1995:81-83).

[17] Globalisation describes a process by which national and regional economies, societies and cultures have become integrated through the global network of trade, communication, immigration and transportation (*Financial Times*, Lexicon).

2.2.2 Global South[18] regionalism manifested as South-South cooperation

South-South cooperation is a particular feature of regionalism. For the purposes of this thesis I draw on the definition of the United Nations Office for South-South cooperation, where South-South cooperation comprises a broad structure for partnerships among global South countries in functional areas that range from socio-economic to technical areas. It involves two or more developing countries, and can operate on bilateral, regional, interregional or sub-regional bases. Skills, resources and specialist knowledge are shared to address developmental goals through united efforts (United Nations Office for South-South cooperation). 'South' has validity because it potently denotes national and transnational identity:

> [It] presupposes a 'North', and, therefore, the South recognises its contingent nature, granting the term the recognition of relational dependence denied by the North, which prefers the use of 'West'. The concept's persistence, even though periodically declared obsolete by observers from the North, is representative of an identity reaffirmed by the continuous foreign policy formation inside South-based pressure groups. This identity contains the shared colonialism and imperialism experiences and the common dilemmas of developing economies. Furthermore, 'South' serves as a mobilisation strategy based on the critique of the contemporary international system owing to its power and resource asymmetries.
>
> (da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016:169-170)

Thus the term 'global South' is preferred to 'Third World' or 'developing countries' because its collective impact carries more weight in resisting hegemonic forces.

South-South cooperation is linked to the assumptions of people-centred development. With development as a kingpin, it seeks to embrace a great entanglement of processes that revolve around socio-economic metamorphoses. South-South cooperation possesses a sense of potential to be achieved and offers expectancies for improvement in the human condition, and represents a strategic historical project to emancipate peoples, nations and regions from the remains of colonialism, penury, exploitation and underdevelopment. South-South cooperation continues to be a critical operative

[18] See the definition of 'global South' in Chapter 1, section 1.1.

concept and a set of practices that strive to change historical conditions. It is driven and emboldened by the inspiration for mutual well-being and solidarity. It entails a sense of hope that these improved conditions will be induced by the disadvantaged peoples themselves, a notion that undergirds South-South cooperation (Gray & Gills, 2016:557-558). Schumacher (1973) captures this concept elegantly when he writes of development "as if all people mattered". But for the global South to interact meaningfully it is necessary to move beyond historical truisms. It is about finding new partners that can re-energise fragile groupings' development enterprise, where it "must be located within the context of increased trade and investment linkages and new forms of development assistance that can renew the impetus for socio-economic development" (Naidu, Corkin & Herman, 2009:2).

It now more than sixty years since the Bandung Conference of 1955,[19] an historic event that is viewed as the foundation stone for South-South cooperation as a world political front. It set out to confront the hegemonic world economic system of the global North. The regionalism of the 'Bandung Spirit' captured policies of non-interference and non-alignment, and has over the decades proceeded with intermittent energy along a Non-Alignment Movement (NAM)-Group of 77 (G77)-New International Economic Order (NIEO) lineage (da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016:167-184; Cornelissen, 2009:19). Various factors (including the global South's debt crisis, neoliberalism's advance and the eclipse of the UNCTAD process (through which the global South had coalesced their efforts) by the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the subsequent establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) led to the NIEO impetus losing steam after 1992 (Gray & Gills, 2016:558).

South-South cooperation however is again moving to the centre of world politics and economics, given impetus by contemporary economic and diplomatic initiatives by leading global South countries (such as the impact of China and the growing importance of Latin American countries) (Gosovic, 2016:733-743), that shape the

[19] As presented at the Asian-African Conference (with some Latin American observer states) the newly independent states of the global South stressed economic and cultural cooperation, human rights and world peace (Appadorai, 1955:207-235).

rebalancing of the financial world order (Garcia, 2016:191-208). These include the possibilities of new alternatives to the hegemony and perceived neo-colonialism of the global North, and a gradual and historical shift in the economic (production, industrialisation, trade and financial flux) order from global North to the global South, shifting the economic order. This transposition is seen as a solution to the congenital challenges that became visible within Northern capital. Yet, and referring back to the value of the term 'development' noted above, the manner in which this is being brought about has provoked much debate. Intuitively, it would ostensibly seem that 'development' would be 'a good thing' for the global South, through South-South cooperation. In the context of the 'rise of the global South' the consequential role of emerging regional powers has a new significance and polemical appeal. The debate is however polarised,

> between those who hold a (conventional) hope in the potential of Southern economic development and the project of liberation from Northern domination; reflecting a kind of neo-Third Worldism, and those radical critics who see this very success of the South as being far too profoundly subsumed within the existing global capitalist development paradigm".
>
> (Gray & Gills, 2016:559)

To make matters worse, deepening multilateralism in the South does not necessarily imply a shift in the balance of power. The strengthening of international multilateral linkages has had ambivalent outcomes for Africa; and Cornelissen (2009:24) remarks that the "profusion of South-based multilateral bodies has in fact weakened rather than bolstered Southern solidarity, as competing for representation in different planes of international engagement, the leading countries of the South follow variable agendas. This does not seem to have resulted in an autonomous voice for the African continent". This state of affairs may equally apply to the other two states in the collective – a factor that IBSA has to reckon with. It also brings into contention whether the rising power elites truly are intent on confronting the pre-eminent edifices of global capitalist progression, or whether their aim is to reinforce and replicate these structures; thereby enhancing their international status and influence in the system (Gray & Gills, 2016:558-560).

2.3 TRENDS IN SECURITY THINKING

In the language of social science, security may be referred to as an "essentially contested concept" (Gallie, 1955-1956:169). Most scholars within IR operate with a definition of security that involves "the alleviation of threats to cherished values" (Williams, 2013:1). Thematically, this section deals with the broadening of the security debate, with two focal points – the peaks and troughs of the regional security communities in the first place, and thereafter the enrichment of human security paradigms after the Cold War.

2.3.1 Broadening the security debate: The construction of security communities

The purpose of and the question of how states form into regional security communities that interact enduringly and pacifically in order to manage disputes has been a long-term human challenge. Acharya (2001:19) states that the aim of security communities is to develop their common interests. In addition, security communities neither attempt to balance forces, nor attempt deterrence, nor do they resort to (threats of) violence.

Banks (1969:336, see also Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998:6, endnote 1:20) notes the early works of pioneering scholars in the 1930s and the 1940s, having studied it under the rubric of systems analysis. However, Deutsch (1957:5-7, 23-116) and later his research team (Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, Lee Jr, Lichterman, Lindgren, Loewenheim, van Wagenen, 1957:5-7, 23-116), were among the first to develop conceptual knowledge of cooperation among states, which Deutsch (1957:17) also termed "behavioral perspectives of regions". They developed the notion of a 'security community' as well as an outline towards pro-active security management that focused on "transaction flows, the spread of transnational values, the development of shared understandings, and the generation of mutual trust" (Acharya, 2001:15). However, despite the possibilities at both theoretical and pragmatic level, the security community propositions envisaged by Deutsch failed to materialise, largely as a result of research challenges as noted by Adler and Barnett (1998:9). A further reason for setting the security community concept aside was the distraction of the bifurcated ideological dynamics inherent at the time (Adler & Barnett, 1998:9; Musumeci,

2011:1-2). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the situation changed and the concept became *de rigueur* again. The arguments put forward were that the conclusions brought about by Deutsch's studies appeared quite fitting for the post-Cold War era. Its cordial ending ushered in the possibility of orchestrating a more concordant world political order. Historically, this was rather typical for the end of bellicose eras – there tend to be many declarations and much optimism for a more peaceful world in the future. But it was also significant and

> unexpected … that statesmen and politicians were referring to the importance of social forces and values nearly identical to those remarked upon by Deutsch - the development of shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows to encourage community building and to conceptualize the possibility of peace. Similarly, these have found their reflections in the field of theory.
>
> (Ulusoy, 2003:4)

Ulusoy (2003:20-21) concludes that such reinvigoration of security community conceptual development may be ascribed to new approaches by states to fill the politically unsanctified vacuum of the post-Cold War era, as well as the associated progression of IR theory that emphasises the social underpinnings of world politics through identity and norms, among other attributes. In this respect, Pervez (2013:34-47) notes that most of the initial broadening work done with respect to Deutsch's definitive work in the 1950s, had been done by social constructivists, including Adler and Barnett (1998). These works cover a wide range, from case studies to the formation of security communities through states' change of identities.

Key to the social constructivist underpinnings of the security community concept are its pre-eminent constitutive elements. Its cohesive processes differentiated between amalgamation and integration, and could progress to 'political community' regions. Constructivists believe the structure of international politics does not only include the spreading of material resources, but also social engagements that determine, in turn, identities and interests, not merely social behavioural patterns (Snyder, 2008:231). These social formations comprise three elements, being shared knowledge, material resources and practice. Hence, "constructivists argue that such a social structure exists not only because we think it exists but also because the policy makers believe it exists

and, as such, act in accordance with that shared knowledge – thereby recreating the social structure through practice" (Snyder, 2008:231).

Definitively, Adler and Barnett (1998:37-48) analyse the framework for studying and understanding the emergence of security communities. The framework consists of three echelons, where the first level exhorts states to identify common positions to synchronise actions. It sets the scene for the enhancement of newly created social partnerships – often common goal achievements derive from dissimilar geneses. The second level comprises the natural building process of structural elements of ideas and power and the process-related aspects of transactions and social learning. At this level there are emphases on fortifying relations. These foster multilateral, complex and direct interrelationships through inter-societal communication. These arise from the dealings, negotiations and networking that take place between states and respective civil societies, and contribute to the security community's cognitive formation (Wolczuk, 2002:18-19).

For Deutsch communication is the connective bond that underpins social interaction on one hand and political community groupings on the other; it allows to have joint thinking, combined visions and directed action (Adler & Barnett, 1998:7). Deutsch's 'transactionalist' perspective entails processes of communication and market or information exchanges between regions that "become not only 'facilities for attention', but factories of shared identification. Through transactions such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and the use of physical communication facilities, a social fabric is built not only among elites but also the masses, instilling in them a sense of community" (Adler & Barnett, 1998:7). In contrast to the utilisation of material forces and the reliance on power structures that characterise realism, the Deutschian approach is premised on continuous processes of joint knowledge sharing, ideational ambitions and a compact or 'thick' normative milieu (Adler & Barnett, 1998:8).

When combined, these two levels (i.e. the precipitating conditions, as well as the factors that enable the development of reciprocal trust and a sense of community (Adler & Barnett, 1998:38)) lie at the base to form reliable expectations of pacific

change. This then culminates in the third level – the development of trust and collective identity-formation among the partner states. On this level security communities exhibit degrees of reciprocity that denote varying degrees of extended temporal interest, and there is a probability of collective altruistic behaviour. In this respect, the 'IBSA Facility for Hunger and Poverty Alleviation' (IBSA Dialogue Forum, 2013) Project, referred to in Chapter 1, is applicable. In this endeavour, the three IBSA states each commit USD 1 million per annum, with the fund being administered by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for Guinea-Bissau (UNDP, n.d.). In this regard Masters and Landsberg (2015:354) observe that IBSA's "[d]evelopment cooperation is more than just finance, and the IBSA Fund approach demonstrates this through its development diplomacy and emphasis on South-South cooperation".[20]

Ultimately the three echelons of security collaboration are conjoined through social formations and relationships that involve shared knowledge, shared material resources and shared practices. Context-specific factors will determine whether such a security collaboration can be termed an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community. In Deutschian terms amalgamated security communities are formed through the formal merger of two or more units that were previously independent into one, greater entity. During this formation process, political affiliation and orientation and other social/political forces are minimised or discarded for the 'greater good'. Pluralistic security communities comprise the second type, and they are established into a single security community, but countries' sovereign status is retained. They do not require geographic linkages, they may be defined as regions, and the numbers of joining units do not have to be numerically high. In turn, there are two sub-divisions of pluralistic security communities. Tightly-coupled security communities are multi-faceted and mature, and structurally have high levels of integration and institutionalisation. Loosely-coupled security communities, of which I submit IBSA is the case in point, maintain minimalistic degrees of institutionalisation (Deutsch, 1970:33-47; Arkhangelskaya, 2010:1).

[20] They highlighted that the IBSA Fund has concluded seven projects in Africa, the Middle East, including Palestine, and in the Caribbean, and that nine projects are under implementation in countries including Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Palestine (IBSA Joint Communiqué, 2013b).

2.3.2 Broadening the security debate: Human security and its limitations as a critical project

During an event to commemorate ten years since IBSA's founding, the collective's ministers of foreign affairs "noted with satisfaction the progress on the consolidation of the IBSA Dialogue Forum [and] underscored that IBSA has succeeded in laying a strong foundation for multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral cooperation in a wide range of areas" (IBSA, 2013). Vickers (2008:190) describes these as "IBSA's principled positions around … global peace and security, particularly the human security-development nexus".

Traditional security definitions and practices were locked into Cold War dictates. 'Security' was 'security of the state'. The traditional approach consisted of three elements: It had an emphasis on military threats and the need to defend or attack as the case may be; it was focused on maintaining the *status quo*; and its preserve was the state itself (Booth, 1991:318). In many ways, assumptions about the perpetuity of the Cold War informed and gave the state security concept a permanence that is still in the process of unbundling itself.

The end of the Cold War saw the value of military instruments decline and "delegitimized as a tool of statecraft" (Snyder, 2008:8), while diplomatic, political and economic security issues combined into multilateralism and a renewed emphasis on security cooperation. The need to examine the nature and role of security arose at a time of unprecedented optimism in world affairs that paved the way for widening security definitions and practices. This entailed an evolution of the concept of security in three aspects – its object, its subject and its agency (Burgess, 2008:61-62). This transformation towards human security is best described as both a widening (including non-military and asymmetric threats, environmental security, migration, pandemics) and a deepening (adding other referent objects to the definitions, including individuals, social groups or our planet) of the security agenda; while it needs to be clear that these are inter-linked and the state remains a critical actor in security affairs (Paris, 2001:87-102). The human security approach advocates a people-centred, universalist and non-

military focus that takes due account of threats to human life such as underdevelopment, poverty and deprivation (Commission on Human Security, 2003; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007; UNDP HDR, 1994).

Even prior to the end of the Cold War, African perspectives, for instance, probed alternative forms of human security (Leysens & Thompson, 2001:53-66). Post-Cold War security conceptualisations were ushered in by means of two valuable 1991 contributions. Both the Kampala Document (1991) and Buzan (1991), heralded African and European influences that criticised traditional modes of understanding and the practice of security. The 'calabash' priorities of the Kampala Document were listed in Chapter 1 and were utilised to guide the selection of this study's empirical chapters. Buzan proposed a new focus for the 'referent object' (i.e. "the thing that is to be secured" (Mutimer, 2008:38; see also van Aardt (1998:80) for a Southern African perspective)). As a function of rapidly-developing events after the Cold War, Wæver *et al* (1993: 21) proposed using 'society' as the referent object, a nebulous concept that faded into disuse. In essence the 'referent object' over time, became centred upon 'people' as part of the post-Cold War 'emancipation' (Booth, 1991: 315-326). The work on human security was led at the outset by the fact that there "have always been two major components of human security: freedom from fear and freedom from want. This was recognized right from the beginning by the UN. But later the concept was tilted in favour of the first component rather than the second" (United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report, 1994:24). According to the UNDP Report, the concept possesses at least four essential attributes. Firstly, it is a universal concern relevant to people everywhere. Secondly, the components of security are interdependent, while thirdly, human security is improved and facilitated through early intervention. But the most important shift is that, fourthly, the referent object has shifted from states to people. The report urged that the concept of security be changed in two basic ways: From an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater emphasis on people's security, and also from security through armaments to security through sustainable development. The list of human security threats are factored to seven, being economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP Human Development Report, 1994:22-33). These expanded conceptualisations are readily applicable to the many instances of

daily insecurity of people in most parts of the developing world (but has a universal applicability in the North too).

Support of the expanded notion of security to the greater inclusivity of 'human security' does not leave the state out of the equation as a provider of security. Indeed it is most often a democratic and constitutional imperative. As the Report of the Commission on Human Security (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003) confirms, "[h]uman security complements state security". I do however acknowledge Mack's (2004:366) contention that, while "the state remains the fundamental purveyor of security … it often fails to provide its security obligations – and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people" (see also Buzan (1991:44); Burgess (2008:61-62)).

The value of this concept lies in the fact that it signifies a (nominal) normative shift in security discourse. However, although initiated as a critical project with security as the *sine qua non* of emancipation (Booth, 1991:318), implementation continues to be problematic, because as a policy imperative it needs to factor in the interests of a number of stakeholders, each with vested interests that are often in contestation. As a result, what started off as a critical project, gradually became co-opted to the extent that today human security co-exists (uneasily) alongside state security. The success of South-South IBSA cooperation in the areas of maritime trade, energy and defence thus has to contend with the ebb and flow of international (official) thinking on the concept as both a critical project and a policy enterprise.

In this regard, Richmond (2007:458-477) observes that human security has two modes – an institutional version and a liberating approach. The institutional approach lies at the crossroads of realist and liberal thinking, and liberal peacebuilding in this mode reflects actions that are contemporarily integrated with liberal state-building. Within this setting, human security has become a legitimising concept for the liberal peace project. In contrast, the liberating approach harmonises with tenets of social constructivism, and focuses on the broad vision of human security, specifically local agency. In principle it means that governments would be pressured (in a constructivist bottom-up style) to facilitate and pro-actively manage institutions. Encouraging signs

include the positive control of 'blood (conflict) diamonds' through the Kimberley process, as well as anti-personnel landmines and cluster bomb regimes (Elshult, 2015; Dube, 2009; Garcia, 2015). That said, human security seen as individual security has limitations.

The most critical shortcoming is that, at the individual level of analysis, the concept requires a formal agent of enactment. This is due to the fact that more often than not (particularly in developing countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa) the populace as such lacks the mechanisms to induce positive developmental changes. A catalysing mediator is required. Neither the market nor the state has adequately made provision for the promotion and entrenchment of human security factors in most global South countries – the former because of its volatility and associated unpredictability, the latter due to lack of commitment or understanding of the grand ideological landscape that comprises human security. Hence, the negation of the human security threats needs to be facilitated by a securitising process, so that the concept of security has to be broadened while retaining the state as the primary security referent. Friedman provides an apt example when he observes that the "average Indian villagers cannot be like the Indian high-tech companies and just circumvent the government by supplying their own electricity, their own water resources, their own security, their own bus system, and their own satellite dishes. *They need the state for that*" (Friedman, 2006:552, own emphasis; see also Mutimer, 2008:42).

Securitisation, however, comes at a price. This is because securitisation narrows the concept of security (Williams, 2003:511-531), as it is the process whereby specific issues are constructed or elevated as security issues, and identified and declared as posing an existential threat. This threat is with respect to a designated referent-object. It requires the adoption of extraordinary or even emergency measures that usually extend the legal prerogatives of the securitising actor while trumping the freedom of society at large (Buzan & Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:26; Irondelle, 2013:4; Jacques, 2006). Most often in recent years, the 'existential threat' refers to the identification and disruption of terrorist 'safe havens' (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004:367), largely situated in so-called fragile or weak states

of the global South. These 'safe havens' then need to be secured and developed (mainly through the 'liberal peace' management model) so as to negate the "dangers it poses … to the international community" (Abrahamsen, 2005:56), i.e. the West. Critics of securitisation have been rather condemnatory of its consequences (see Wyn Jones, 1999:110; Jackson, 2006:301; Šulović, 2010:1-7; Zwitter & de Wilde, 2010:1-27).

A concluding and valid effect that I highlight is the 'confounding effect of securitisation'. Counter-intuitively, more security does not produce better security, largely because the processes are compressed in terms of time, quality and the application of thought-through cognition; the result "instead produces an unhelpful degree of enmity and urgency" (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010:83; see also Jabri, 2013:5).

2.4 TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this short section I seek to pull together the commonalities across the various trends discussed in the preceding two sections, with the aim to make a link between context and the discussion of theory in the next two sections. I also motivate here where traditional IR theories fall short and why I go against the grain in using critical IR theories as a lens for understanding what appears to be a straightforward interstate collaboration.

2.4.1 Contextual commonalities and their theoretical implications for the construction of security in the IBSA collective

The notion of security forms a common denominator across both regionalism and a more expansive security agenda. What is germane here are the positions from which 'security' is viewed, namely 'human-centric' and 'state-centric'. The notion of regionalism denotes a type of interstate relationship whereas security communities and human security approaches follow a more normative and people-centred orientation. Since one of my objectives is to produce a more inclusive understanding of IBSA's security collaboration (see section 1.3 – research problem), I consciously place IBSA

with a foot in both worlds and/or contexts described in the early part of this chapter. On the one hand, the IBSA coalition represents a trilateral and therefore state-centric initiative. On the other hand, their collaboration – although partly driven by national interest – is also guided by a normative commitment to social justice, the same force that has propelled the original shift from state and military security to human security. I argue that this dual context (together with a dual theoretical focus on constructivist and postcolonial assumptions) more accurately reflects the apparent schizophrenic (Ayoob, 1989:67-79; Acharya, 2011:118) identity of the IBSA members as both reformers and instigators.

The preceding analysis also reminds us that power (South-South, North-South) is always relational and asymmetric, and therefore the critical value lies in the realisation that these relationships are constructed, ever-shifting and multifarious. Thus more global South states now seek friendships and economic prosperity through (historical and future-oriented) identification with those who are amenable to progressive cooperation, such as the IBSA collective. Indeed, as Banks (1969:338) succinctly states, "regions are what politicians and peoples want them to be", where the irony or paradox confirms that (particularly newly-enfranchised) states engaged in the decolonialisation process are obliged to operate within world anarchical structures (Krause, 1998:126). The same may be said for security – it is also fluid and has multiple vectors – and its construction is the outcome of relations that are often deeply unequal and co-opted, to the extent that human security complements state security rather than functions as an alternative.

2.4.2 Theorising the IR of the South: Why the focus on critical, and not traditional IR theories?

This section analyses the pre-eminent theoretical positions with which to understand the IR of the South, while also justifying the non-selection of rational choice (traditional) IR theories. Donnelly (2005:29) asserts that theory is an abstract notion that is purposive because it extirpates data that obfuscates. Theory thus permits researchers to concentrate on significant issues at hand. Theories become looking glasses that permit an enhanced vision towards understanding the issues being studied

or analysed. When viewed through different mindsets or lenses, over time these naturally lead to a great diversity and a quasi-exponential expansion of IR (Kurki & Wight, 2010:15-16; Smith, 2010:4-8). Perceived negatively, these theories tend to be contested and divisive, as all theories are based on different suppositions about ontology, epistemology and methodology. Alternatively, it means that IR has, over time, become more inclusive with respect to alternative theories, such as feminism and postcolonialism; and that it continues to move slowly away from state-centric positions. Towards the end of the twentieth century, three main contending theoretical approaches dominated IR – realism, liberalism and Marxism (and multiple variants). These IR positions accept the world or the world system as it exists as a given. Yet they have difficulty "to explain *the same* world" (Smith, 2010:5, original emphasis), which disaffection led to an IR schism of sorts. With a focus on 'social' as an attribute of world politics, it describes one end of the rift as being occupied by realism

> defined by the distribution of power and thus a highly asocial environment, and observes a series of discrete, exchange relations among atomistic actors. On the other end is constructivism's recognition that international reality is a social construction driven by collective understanding, including norms, that emerge from social interactions … and allows for the possibility that under proper conditions actors can generate shared identities and norms that are tied to a stable peace".
>
> Adler and Barnett (1998:10)

This ushers in the new approach of constructivism, that ascended the debates on IR theory at the time of the demise of the Cold War. Its entry was not a coincidence and due in no short measure to the inabililities of traditional IR theories to explain or anticipate change. Constructivism, which "holds that social reality is created through debate about values, often echoes the themes that human rights and international justice activists sound. Recent events seem to vindicate the theory's resurgence; a theory that emphasizes the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks is highly relevant to understanding the post-9/11 world" (Snyder, 2004:60).

Categorised, two types of IR theories exist. On the one hand there are the empirical, explanatory or scientific theories ('what is') – its school of thought being referred to as positivism or empiricism. These theories correlate assumptions and hypotheses by

testing them with objective (positivist) reality (Weber, 2013:25). As a rule of thumb, rationalist approaches are positivist (Smith, 2010:5). Critical theories on the other hand pursue normative, constitutive or prescriptive ('what ought to be') theories, with the school of thought referred to as anti- or postpositivism, or normative, reflectivist, IR theory. Regardless of whether theories are empiricist or normative, the waters are muddied by the varieties of interpretation that exist on the meaning of theorising. Adler (2013:113) explains succinctly that "[u]nlike positivism and materialism, which take the world as it is, constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as *becoming* rather than being. Unlike idealism, post-structuralism, and post-modernism, which take the world *only* as it be imagined or talked about, constructivism accepts that not all statements have the same epistemic value and consequently there is some foundation for knowledge" (Adler, 2013:113, original emphases).

Linklater (1990:1-7) reasons that an analysis of world affairs (rational choice theories) that focuses solely on interstate relations does not concede the role of below- and across-state political economy instruments in adjusting or transforming the potential of world politics. Probably the greatest challenge for rational choice theories lies in their (in)ability to substantively and effectively address issues as they unfold in the future. In particular three problematic facets arise. The first is the challenge how to incorporate "dynamics and change" (Snidal, 2013:98), where world power equilibrium and constancy are inherent concepts for rational choice theories (Snidal, 2013:98-100; Patrascu & Wani, 2015:393). Secondly, "[e]ndogenous actors and preferences" (Snidal, 2013:100), become contentious where a rational choice position asserts that actors and their concerns are stable and permanent (Snidal, 2013:100-102). The final issue at stake is "[n]ormative and policy analysis" (Snidal, 2013:102), whereby rational choice has not as yet discharged its normative promise (Snidal, 2013:102-103). Adler and Barnett (1998:4-5) observe that there has been a meaningful shift away from realist-founded models to understand contemporary and developing security discussions. There has been a realisation that realism operated better in theory, that states are not as disposed to war as thought; and that many security engagements that purportedly had their origins in power balance were in fact skewed. With respect to cooperation, neoliberal institutionalists try to absorb assumptions of neorealism to prove that partnership associations within an anarchical system is

possible in world affairs. Regimes and institutions would therefore attenuate the outcomes of anarchy. Neoliberal institutionalism view states as "being *rational egoists* - they are narrowly self-interested and concerned only with increasing their own utility. When calculating their own utility, they have little interest in the utility functions of other states. Thus, if a cooperative endeavour is mutually beneficial, states may engage in that cooperative behaviour" (Griffiths & O'Callaghan, 2002:279, original emphasis; see also Adler & Barnett, 1998:11). Neoliberal institutionalists tend to limit their theories to economic exchanges, being of the thought that the management of security dynamics tends to be more difficult to attain (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995:14-15).

Critical theory, alternatively, endeavours to remedy the rational choice defects, as it allows for a cosmopolitan and reflexive mode towards analysing state doctrinaire (Patrascu & Wani, 2015:396). Therefore,

> [a] critical theory approach to global politics would then take a relational, process-oriented perspective, and seek to show how social forces (classes, social movements, etc.), states, and world orders are bound up together in particular constellations of historical structures. … It would seek to highlight tensions and possibilities within the historical structures of the present in order to open up political horizons and enable social agents situated within those structures to imagine, and potentially begin to realize, alternative possible worlds.
>
> (Rupert, 2010:168-169)

As indicated in section 2.4.2, the choice of this study's critical theories, combined with its South-South solidarist cooperation-centric view, leads to a fundamental challenge as these tend to contradict the subject matter – the fact that (hitherto) it is state-centric cooperation that is under the lens. States, however, like persons, have manifold identities that are functions or outcomes of what "actors collectively hold about themselves and one another which constitute the structure of the social world. Identities are the bases of interests. Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead they define their interests in the process of defining situations" (Wendt, 1992:398). Echoing these cohesive attributes, Manmohan Singh, India's Prime Minister observed that "IBSA is a unique

model of transnational cooperation based on a common political identity. Our three countries come from three different continents but share similar world views and aspirations" (Singh, 2007).

In this study, as a consequence, the critical theories comprise dual and seemingly ambivalent instruments. From one viewpoint they encapsulate the conjoined histories, shared exposures, normative values and equitable aims that capture the massive potential of this trilateral construct. From another, they emphasise – in a critical and dissentient way – the defects of state politics, dominion and authority, as well as insufficient broad-based participation[21] (limited civil society involvement. Even though the "Ministers [of IBSA foreign affairs] discussed ways and means of enhancing the visibility of IBSA and taking it to the peoples of the three countries … and the focal points were instructed to prepare proposals for this purpose, including appropriate participation by civil society" (IBSA Dialogue Forum Communiqué, 2007:paragraph 67), this seems to be quite an off-hand way to encourage civil society participation. But at least IBSA leaders appear to be aware of the inadequate civil society process. The IBSA states – in the final analysis – seemingly enhance their own economic empowerment at the expense of their Southern neighbours. In this regard Nel and Taylor contend that,

> [i]n the post-Washington consensus context there is scope for moderate revisionists such as IBSA to seek global redistribution around the rougher edges of North–South relations, and to pursue programmes of moderate local state-led redistribution. But this is done always in such a way that revisionism and moderate redistribution do not alienate the fractions of internationalised capital on which the insertion of these states into the global economy is dependent. This balancing act creates space in which to stabilise and reproduce the multi-class alliances reigning in India, Brazil and South Africa: alliances that combine representatives of protectionist groups, on the one hand

[21] The IBSA People-to-People Fora reflect the interest of the three Member States in improving interaction and relations between Government civil society 'grassroots' levels so that IBSA is not only restricted to Government efforts. The Fora meetings take place on the margins of the IBSA Summits. During the Summit, the respective Chairs of the Fora are given the opportunity to report on their work progress to the IBSA Heads of State/Governments and also assist the Dialogue Forum by proposing new direction or areas to be further explored in the Dialogue Forum. There are seven People-to-People Forums in IBSA: Academic, Business, Tri-Nation summit on Small Business, Editors', Local Governance, Parliamentary and Women's fora. Some Memoranda of Understanding have been signed to provide legal support mechanisms (IBSA Dialogue Forum (Ten Years On), 2013)).

> … and outward-orientated … capital, on the other. … [I]n all three cases it places serious constraints on domestic programmes of redistribution, but also on the pursuit of a consistent and deep solidarist approach to South-South cooperation.[22]
>
> (Nel & Taylor, 2013:1093)

These tend to characterise IBSA processes, even though they may appear to be at variance with the collective's visionary enfranchisement principles. It may be argued, however, that an effect of this juggled rendering is to strengthen the IBSA collective as regional powers, and may well lead to an improved fiscus for domestic distribution. To add to the complexity is the fact that there is an inherent yet ardent contestation between the three countries' domestic demands on one hand, and their combined and common desire to internationalise agreed-upon norms of equity, on the other. These issues are inherently part of the context of IBSA's security collaboration and need to be factored into the collective's analyses.

The next section aims to develop a line of reasoning to indicate that critical social constructivism is the most appropriate theory with which to understand the socio-political construction of IBSA security collaboration. To lay the groundwork, this section will however be required to deal first of all with the attributes that all constructivists, whatever their hue, have in common.

2.5 (CRITICAL) SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

2.5.1 Constructivists' three claims: Laying the shared foundations

There are three claims that all constructivists embrace (Reus-Smit, 2005:196-198). The first claim rests on the principle that normative and ideational structures are just as important as material structures. This infers that by not merely relying on material motivations and rewards, constructivists stress the ongoing value of communal knowledge and learning, ideational forces as well as normative and institutional structures (Hwang, 2006:66).

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[22] See Cornelissen (2009) with respect to the lack of a unified global South voice, noted in section 2.2.2.

The second assertion refers to the degree and manner in which non-material structures condition actors' identities, which resonates with similar issues raised earlier when discussing security communities (section 2.3.1). Identities inform interests which lead to actions and reactions. This claim is also called the Wendtian approach. It emphasises the value that processes add to community formation. Yet, it allows conceptual space for states' interpretation of international affairs, which would include the influence of history and culture. Three main cohesive mechanisms, according to Wendt (1994:389), lead to the formation of collective identities. The first mechanism is the structural context. For the IBSA nations the establishment of their regional formation meant conjoining their identities and interests in order to create an enhanced and foton-empowered new region. Secondly, a further mechanism comprises systemic processes that as practices encourage collective identity formation through both rising interdependence and transnational convergence. The third mechanism is labeled strategic practice, where cooperation leads to a collective identity, and from which flows the creation of communities. According to Arkhangelskaya (2010), the qualitative levels of cooperation between the three IBSA states since 2003 has been gainful, with Masters and Landsberg (2015:354) commenting that the IBSA Dialogue Forum is considered by many to be a highly valuable political agreement because it "has shown that shared experiences assist in building synergies. … IBSA is indeed a gathering of friends and what this implies is the room to agree or disagree on issues".

The third claim is that agents and structures are mutually constituted. This claim is also known as Giddens' (1984:162-168, 288-292) structuration theory, and significantly influenced constructivists like Onuf and Wendt (Khan, 2004:20). Its main objective is to explain the way in which individuals contribute to the propagation of the social system in which they operate, and the associated spiral of reinforced behaviour. When arguing this point, constructivists "focus largely on the intersubjective dimension of knowledge, because they wish to emphasize the social aspect of human existence – the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure constraining and shaping behavior" (Bozdağlioğlu, 2007:30). The agent-structure issue arises from two elementary truisms. Firstly, that human actions induce outcomes in a socially constructed world, and secondly, human agency requires appropriate and

realistic historical settings to facilitate viable alternatives for actions and desired outcomes (Hwang, 2006:67).

Adler and Barnett (1998:12) submit that constructivism "takes the social world to be emergent and constituted both by knowledge and material factors. … Consequently, constructivist scholarship is well-suited to consider how social processes and an international community might transform security politics". Applied to IBSA, this refers to the socio-political construction that grounds and develops IBSA, *inter alia* through the mechanisms of the working groups, detailed in the case studies. Constructivism in praxis may be said to be at the forefront of IBSA's efforts, and it continues to be the conceptual and theoretical path of choice (Wolczuk, 2002:19; see also Pouliot, 2008:278).

Before shifting the argument to critical social constructivism, the next section consolidates the building blocks of constructivism against the backdrop of human security – one of the security vectors in this study.

2.5.2 A constructivist perspective of human security

This section draws on the model by Tsai (2009:19-33), who asserts that constructivism may be used as an overlay with which to analyse the concept of human security. He emphasises the six observations that follow. In the first place, social structures make up knowledge areas, and in turn directs the nature of knowledge and endows it with social value. Secondly, the growing influence of human security mirrors the importance of 'soft' concepts such as values and normative behavioural patterns on security studies, and this is juxtaposed with the erstwhile importance of national security as prime consideration. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007:88-89) suggest that human security conceptualisations challenge the radix of insecurity, underdevelopment and indigence once analysed through human-centric ('people first') constructivism. Thirdly, the notion of 'human' represents and introduces new concepts and language, and is a symbol of a changed world post-Cold War. Language is made up of social facts, and hence sustain common cultural icons. It follows then that language represents associated harmony and accord, becoming the driving energy for

the formation of and continuance of institutions and agreed norms (Tsai, 2009:23). Yet, this 'changed world' is not as inclusive as it ought to be (see Hudson, 1998:16-74). Fourthly, the position of constructivism is that, as a notion that focuses upon the idea of human security, the process enables the shaping of national interests through the exchanges and associated interaction. Such reciprocal actions often link to common endeavours through the pro-active use of state agencies. In this regard, Tsai contends that "[d]uring this process, the value of human security is established when states transfer their attention to common interests", which often may lead to new parameters in terms of foreign policy (Tsai, 2009:23). This observation is especially valid in the three case studies, where maritime trade, energy and defence cooperation are analysed to confirm the socio-political construction of IBSA's 'common interests'. In the fifth place, Tsai notes that identities and issues of common concern are creations of conceptualisations. As such, they are dynamic and perpetual, and change as new and/or changed circumstances arise. In such a way, the issues that comprise human security are modified, particularly in the areas of political economy, sovereignty of states and political commonality. In the final instance, contemporary social constructivist perspectives hold that material issues operate autonomously, and are only imbued with value through ideas, belief systems and norms that are created through social intercommunication (Adler, 1997a; Wendt, 1999).

The points raised here serve to establish a firm link between human security and social constructivism. In turn, they reinforce the critical social constructivist foundations of this study; the discussion of which follows next. When coupled to the socio-political relational construction to be analysed in the three case studies, a logic arises about the understanding of the IBSA construct as a means to change in global affairs.

2.5.3 Theoretical dynamics: From middle ground to critical constructivism and discourse

Here I identify the social constructivist variants and outline in particular the attributes of critical social constructivism. The latter variant is relevant for this study, as its critical inclination dovetails with postcolonialism, the companion theory in this study. At present most of social constructivism is seen to have occupied a paradigmatic

middle ground, and its approach emphasises the importance and impact of ideas (cognition), and make the assertion that international politics involves the dynamics of social constructs (Adler, 1997a:342). Although a profusion of constructivist labels have been allocated to different types of constructivists (Barnett, 2011:154), there is no unified approach to constructivism (see also Adler's (1997a:335-336) division of constructivists into four groups). Griffiths, Roach and Solomon (2009:124) identify three schools of thought: "a 'middle ground'; a self-reflexive approach; and a pragmatic, discursive strand". I would combine their second and third approach as they both possess 'critical school', i.e. radical or non-conformist, attributes. Thus, among this plenitude of social-constructivist camps sufficient unity is discernible to identify the two main fields of endeavour within constructivism, being middle ground and critical social constructivism.

Middle ground, or conventional, constructivists have to a large degree accepted – or at least have not rejected outright – the principles of positivism and rationalism (Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner, 1998:683; Fierke, 2010:184-185; Barnett, 2011:158). Hopf (1998:182) submits that "[p]erhaps where constructivism is most conventional is in the area of methodology and epistemology". This has given conventional constructivists a sufficient degree of credibility with empiricists. The complication of this position is, however, that conservative constructivism seems to identify with the bedrock of ontology in mainstream IR theorisation. By this I mean rational choice suppositions retain their commanding position; despite their inabilities to forecast or interpret the new dynamic and structuration of global politics.

However, over time critical derivative schools of thought have emerged. Checkel (1998:327) discerningly notes that "constructivists do not reject science or causal explanations; their quarrel with mainstream theories is ontological, not epistemological. The last point is key, for it suggests that constructivism has the potential to bridge the still wide divide separating the vast majority of IR theorists from postmodernists" (see also Adler, 1997a:323; Khan, 2004:7).

Critical social constructivism combines 'standard' constructivism (the interaction of people and the social milieu and the derivation of socially constructed meaning) with

'critical'[23] constructivist attributes, being the enduring effect of societal power structures which include the normative impacts of choices made. Critical constructivism enhances the foundational potency of constructivism through the addition of poststructuralist insights drawn from language, communication and discourse. The heterodoxy of critical constructivism may be further understood by the "linguistic turn" (Fierke, 2010:185, endnote 3), which in philosophy concerns the introduction of language in the logic-world nexus. 'Discourse' refers to a representational vocabulary. This entails historically, socially and institutionally specific structures of statements, terms, categories and beliefs together with all the practices and materialities that create meaning and identity, not just words or texts (Foucault, 1972:216). Providing insight, Butler notes that

> [a]bstractly considered, language refers to an open system of signs by which intelligibility is insistently created and contested. As historically specific organizations of language, discourses present themselves in the plural, coexisting within temporal frames, and instituting unpredictable and inadvertent convergences from which specific modalities of discursive possibilities are engendered.
>
> Butler (1999:198)

This leads one to the incisive work by one of the main scholars of the critical constructivist school, Christian Reus-Smit (Griffiths, Roach & Solomon, 2009:137-143), who addresses the process by which discursivity facilitates the link between state affirmation and norms that have as an outcome enhanced principles of legality. Much of discursivity is conducted through conduits of institutions. Like neo-liberal institutionalists, constructivists view power as an important element. But they view power in discursive terms, effectively and pro-actively utilising the "power of ideas, culture and language" (Mingst, 2008:73) and where "discourse itself is data" (Willard, 1992:146). So it is all about social meaning which is constructed and reconstructed through social interaction. The latter enables mechanisms of norms, identities and interests that shape human actions and interactions (Adler, 1997a:344-345).

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[23] "Critical theory recognises that it is itself a product of society, but at the same time it tries to distance itself from society in an attempt to understand and change it. By doing so, it scrutinises the existing social order and the boundaries of knowledge" (Griffiths & O'Callaghan, 2002:59).

At the level of philosophy of science, at the kernel of the difference between conventional (conservative) and critical (postpositivist or "consistent" [24]) constructivism lies the challenge of whether constructivist ontology can be aligned with positivist knowledge systems. The middle ground of constructivism is at its essence shifted by the assertion of critical constructivism that relies on the conjointedness of both social ontology and social epistemology (Fierke, 2010:184-186). Epistemologically, critical constructivism aligns itself with postpositivist positions held by critical theory, postmodernism and feminism. Thus critical constructivism attaches value-laden theory derivation and discards a scientifically objective reality as such, of which obtaining knowledge may need to be an inherent part (George & Campbell, 1990:269-293).

In sum, the greatest differences between the two social construction variants are threefold (Devine, 2008:466). Firstly, they have different conceptions of identity and place dissimilar values on domestic and international contributions that result in that identity. The conventional variant of social constructivism deals with identity as interpretative variables, while the critical variant requires "that identities *themselves* are to be explained to make sense of the cultural productions of insecurities" (Cho, 2009:96-97, own emphasis). Secondly, identities, especially state identities, therefore are neither fixed nor essentialist. In this respect, critical social constructivism also tends to approach research differently than its conventional variant and seeks "missing variables and levels of analysis" (Devine, 2008:466). Thirdly, there are divergent perspectives on the incorporation of liberatory or radical beliefs into constructivism. Because critical social constructivism is closely allied with critical social theory, it possesses a "more consistent theoretical or epistemological follow-through" (Hopf, 1998:181). In brief, the contrasting approaches underscore the qualitative attributes of critical constructivism and accentuate the dynamics of the IBSA construct to be agents for change from a global South perspective.

[24] Fierke (2010:187) states "I use the label 'consistent constructivism' to highlight that its assumptions correct the inconsistency at the core of conventional constructivism".

2.5.4 Critiques of social constructivism

There are several critiques of social constructivism. These include disagreement regarding the essence of theory, the 'approach' moniker of constructivism and its directional thrust (Barnett, 2008:151; Guzzini & Leander, 2006; Wendt, 1999:247; Buzan & Wæver, 2003:471; Reus-Smit, 2005:202; see also Zehfuss, 2002:25; Bozdağlioğlu, 2007:142). Then, the association of conventional constructivism with rationalism enfolds a further area of criticism, with the core issue being identity (Klotz, 1995:20; Adler, 1997a:319-363). Also, the degree to which constructivism can add value to critical IR theory is questioned (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:288-289). The greatest weakness of critical social constructivism is the fact that it is perceived as a Western construct – its ideas, ironically, foisted upon the developing world (see Barkawi & Laffey, 2006:332; Grovogui, 1996:2).

Knafo (2008:26) observes in this regard that ultimately "a focus on agency is the only way to reconcile the two aims of critical theory, that is to address social change while accounting for the way structures are directly linked to power, as a leverage that social forces exploit to influence the behaviour of others". Seeking ways to utilise and maximise systemic influence is where postcolonialism makes its entry. The shortcomings of critical social constructivism as laid out are augmented and generally addressed by postcolonial studies, discussed and developed next, in the milieu of South-South cooperation.

2.6 POSTCOLONIALISM

2.6.1 Origin and development: From post-colonialism to postcolonialism

This section commences with a clarification of the difference between 'post-colonialism' and 'postcolonialism', and then describes and critiques postcolonialism. Further it will locate its foundational point of emergence, and also focus upon the major concerns and issues that arise from its study. In the sense that colonialism has had a marked effect in diminishing – even negating – local knowledge systems, this

study field would involve bringing the three IBSA states within the fold of this 'new' IR approach.

'Post-colonialism' describes a temporal position, a date or a period most readily associated with a country's independence from its colonial master, i.e. it marks its historical emergence from a dominated to an autonomous, sovereign state. Commencing in 1947 in India, the floodgates of independence granted by or wrested from colonial powers ushered in high hopes for eras of complete post-colonial freedoms, including achieving potentialities that had been denied them by their erstwhile masters. Hopes were soon dashed as it became apparent that freedom was constrained to the extent where independence was nominal and the continued hold on the new state by its (neo)colonisers became evident. Thus, "[w]hile a few have prospered, many fill a classic neocolonial niche: they are providers of raw materials and cheap labor" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006:10; see also Williams & Chrisman, 1994:3-5).

McClintock (1992: 84-98) observes that the label 'postcolonial' is in itself challenging, as it presupposes a neat linear and developmental history; yet it conceals the wide variety of colonially embedded systems in different countries/regions over history. However, 'post-colonialism' and 'postcolonialism' should not be conflated. 'Postcolonialism' can be described as the study of experiential and existential engagement with colonialism and its effects, past and present; where political identification lies more with the marginalised or the 'Other' (Petrillo, Trejo & Trejo, 2007:149; Appiah, 1991:336-357). Grovogui (2010:239) explains that postcolonialism has a number of geostrategic foundings – in Africa, Asia and Latin America, which experienced different forms of colonialism. Postcolonial Studies include canonical works by Said (1978), Fanon (1963; 1967), Spivak (1993; 2010), Bhabha (1994), Allende (1982), da Cunha (1909), Freyre (1946), Soyinka (1963; 1965; 1972), Achebe (1959) and Plaatje (1916) with origins in the tricontinental regions, and which texts cover geographical, temporal and cultural frontiers, providing enhanced understanding of postcolonial semiotics. Therefore, postcolonialism "offers new ways of knowing and thinking about the complex and fluid events that have shaped relations around the world by stressing the varying contents of power, identity and value across time and

space" (Grovogui, 2010:238). Postcolonialism is a specifically postmodern intellectual discourse that consists of reactions to, and analysis of, the cultural legacy of colonialism. Postcolonialism is also taken to mean that the condition of being oppressed commences with colonialism. Postcolonialism thus describes a continuous state of being or mind that does not or did not terminate upon the departure of the colonising state.

Making a clear link with critical social constructivism, Bignall (2010:1) states that "without an alternative conceptualisation of agency and ethical practices of social construction, attempts to transform cultures infused with the legacy of colonialism often remain in hiatus, structured by a form of agency that has been complicit with practices of Empire, and which postcolonial society must surely reject". He further describes the process of postcolonialisation as an "ongoing practice of social construction that requires the permanent cultivation of a postcolonial ethos of relation, which acknowledges and affirms difference, positively conceived" (Bignall, 2010:1). The effect of colonial methodologies and practices on the creation and depiction of identities continues. These linkages provide fertile grounds to pursue the partnership between critical social constructivism and postcolonialism.

2.6.2 Key tenets of postcolonialism

Generally, the academic foundations of postcolonial theory are founded upon the disputes between Marxism and poststructuralism/postmodernism and their modern variants. In order to frame a 'common agenda' of postcolonialism, I draw on the work of Abrahamsen (2003) and others (such as Bhabha, 1994; Grovogui, 2003, 2010; Chowdhry & Nair, 2002; Mamdani, 2001; Prakash, 1996; Williams, 1997; Williams & Chrisman, 1994; Žižek, 2009 and Whitehead, 2016). The key tenets of postcolonialism that pertain to this study involves the links between power, identity and resistance; discourse and materiality, as well as past and present through attention to hybridity, hybrid identities and ambivalence.

The first and principal tenet of postcolonialism is that it strives to emphasise and correct power imbalances through an emphasis on identity and resistance. A critique

of power relations is therefore a pre-eminent facet of postcolonialism, and hence politics runs parallel to the struggle for control in global power orders or structures. It questions how political structures derive and manage power, and how these practices give effect to equitable and sustainable development. The post-Cold War era has ushered in an enlarged definition of development, which includes democratisation and good governance, tied to developed powers' financial institutions and associated 'largesse'. Often, developmental polarities exist between 'what is' and 'what ought to be'. These conditions are not "self-evident or pre-ordained" (Abrahamsen, 2003:201); they are in fact the products of the power of underdevelopment.

Postcolonial perspectives serve as correctives and contribute to critical IR scholarship by questioning and offering alternatives where historical processes perpetuate these power bases. The origin of postcolonialism lies in the fact that imperialism remains a significant historical crossroads in which postcolonial identities are constructed at national level, identities that are opposite to European ones. The postcolonial identities are classified as Europe's 'others'. This means that the European imperial task shapes both the postcolonial position in the globe as well as that of the West (i.e. that of the 'Self'). Other binaries include "'power-powerless', 'master-servant', 'developed-underdeveloped', 'rich-poor', 'civilised-barbaric', 'core-periphery', 'natives-settlers' [and] 'North-South'" (Mamdani, 2001:654). In addition, the alliance between global financial structures and associated power bases therefore remains entrenched (Abrahamsen, 2003:195-198; Chowdhry & Nair, 2002:1-2). These are viewed as issues that perpetuate the peripheral condition of the global South, and constitute goals towards greater equitability embodied by the IBSA thrust.

In response to such oppositional identity-constructions, the 'Other' resorts to resistance. For instance, by means of various forms of resistance during oppressive historical periods, decolonisation was initiated, independence achieved, and the IBSA countries came into being – an issue that is pursued in Chapter 3. But resistance does more than symbolise the ability of the oppressed to cope with dominance. It also highlights the manner in which innovative behavioural patterns significantly changed the unilateral perspective that power was omnipotent. This element is a predominant theme in postcolonial literature, an alliance with the alienated that differentiates

postcolonialism from postmodernism (Appiah, 1991:347-348). It serves to give the marginalised a (presumptive) form of expression, and gives a sense of presence – a character if you will – to the 'Other'. Often, resistance is not direct, but refined in a manner that reduces the hegemonic, and has the beneficial effect of allowing degrees of recovery for the marginalised.

Secondly, postcolonial theory relates to both discourse and materialities, i.e. discursive and non-discursive (material) practices. In the context of colonialism, relations between the colonisers and the colonised have often been constructed and conducted through materialities (objects, things and artifacts) as means to exercise power. Even today, material practices and communication connect the erstwhile colonial to the periphery. Along this axis the movement of 'matter' justified the colonial order within a capitalist system of production, trade, migration, communication and conquest. A concern with the mundane aspects of the everyday is therefore indicative of the postcolonial focus on the material conditions under which lives are lived as impacted by oppression and daily insecurities.

However, a postcolonial lens includes not only rethinking the conditions of the disparities between the haves and have-nots, but would also need to integrate the quality and type of discourse required to lead to more equitable outcomes. In his essay "The Postcolonial and the Postmodern", Bhabha (1994:172) observes that "[t]he transnational dimension of cultural transformation – migration, diaspora, displacement, relocation – makes the process of cultural translation a complex form of signification"; that unsettles the merging discourse of peoples' tradition and a critical notion towards understanding the postcolonial condition.

As in critical social constructivism, discourse constitutes a key element of postcolonialism, where it serves to challenge the prevailing hegemonic discourse. Postcolonial studies confirms the significance of language, where language is seen as the conduit through which social structures are produced. Shared meaning derives from interaction and places people or things in specific scenes or context which negates any idea of universality. Thus discourse and its study go beyond literary analysis, and in this way political processes and social experiences are shaped.

Lastly, the blurring of lines between the discursive and the material in the postcolonial condition therefore also gives rise to an appreciation for hybridity and ambivalence and the intertwinement of hybrid identities within a context of resistance (discussed in the previous tenet). It helps to remember that – largely of necessity – one is ingrained within the system one is attempting to undermine. It is by "writing back to the empire" (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 2002) as a form of resistance that postcolonialism tries to re-shape the notional expanse that enables new understandings of the world, allowing for improved options for existence and developmental achievement (Abrahamsen, 2003:207-209).

In this regard Bhabha (1994) captures the complex notion of hybridity, hybrid identities or cultural hybridisation, a recurring theme in this study. Drawing on the works of Fanon and Said, Bhabha views colonialism not as collective concepts imprisoned in the past, but he stresses how its histories and cultures continue to trespass into the present, insisting that transformative understanding of multiculturalism takes place. But this exhange relationship is not one of equality, and "[s]ubjects are always disproportionately placed in opposition or domination through the symbolic decentring of multiple power relations which play the role of support as well as target or adversary" (Bhabha, 1994:72). The interdependence of coloniser and colonised leads to a condition where neither can lay claim to racial or national identificational superiority. Instead he claims that identity is a space that lies between the native and the settler – representing an Osiris, the Egyptian god of transition. Time and space are compressed resulting in formations that are characterised by peculiar, mixed and conflictual identities.

Such hybrid identities have implications for how authority is exercised: "Hybridity intervenes in the exercise of authority not merely to indicate the impossibility of its identity but to represent the unpredictability of its presence" (Bhabha, 1994:114). Bhabha (1994) lays bare the inherent contradictions in colonial discourse and practice to emphasise the coloniser's ambivalence with respect to his condition toward the colonised 'Other'. The mere presence of the colonised 'Other' within the situation comprises sufficient evidence of the ambivalence within the coloniser, an ambivalence

that destabilises the 'master's' claim for absolute authority or unquestionable authenticity. Through the interaction between coloniser/colonised, the coloniser can only establish an identity in relation to a self-perception of and by the colonised as the 'Other'. This type of psychological dependency is not acknowledged, yet becomes an integral part of the fount from where control over the 'Other' springs from. Colonial authority therefore becomes disjointed and unpredictable to a degree, leading to cultural hybridisation (Moore-Gilbert, 1997:117-119). Hybridity as a postcolonial notion, has unintended consequences within colonial domination because the subjugated groups appropriated and assimilate colonial ideas and concepts, and transfigure them according to their culture and optimised usage. Hybridity as an outcome of cultural yet asymmetric exchange was therefore an inescapable outcome of the interaction between coloniser and colonised; compounded by experiences of the diaspora in the developed (colonial) world. The value of the concept of 'hybrid identities' lies in the fact that it rejects "essentialized accounts steeped in notions of ethnicity, race, or nation. … Therefore, identity is not merely constructed, it is fluid and plural" (Paolini & Elliott, 1999:92).

In sum, and seen positively, postcolonialism possesses a global ethos that is dynamic, provides transnational and cross-historical impetus to discursive exchanges at international level, while it informs policy changes that have practical effects. In this sense, the study of IBSA's socio-political construction of security is facilitated by this theory.

2.6.3 Critical studies, postcolonialism and human security

In its definition and ambit, postcolonialism is a part of the critical approaches that lend off-centre understandings of human security. It deals with the manner in which human security has a nexus with human rights, how it arose from normative identities and shaped deliverance from neoliberal peacebuilding and pre-existing modes. It stands at the fork of the tensions "between critical perspectives which discursively radicalise human security within frameworks of emancipatory possibility … and those which attempt to deconstruct human security within the framework of its necessary reproduction of power relations" (Hynek & Chandler, 2011:2). These represent two

diametrically opposed positions, where one approach seeks to reproduce the security *status quo* replete with existing unbalances and insecurities; while the other confronts this view, and instead heeds the mutuality, co-dependence, interconnectedness and frailty of the human condition with respect to security risks, and the need for joined and cohesive human-centred responses. Reverting to hybridity, postcolonialism posits that human security does not in fact constitute a solution to global South security issues. Instead, human security reinforces the asymmetrical relationship between North (developed) and South (underdeveloped) countries (Duffield, 2007:4-6). In similar vein, Chandler (2008:428) suggests that human security reflects the hyperbole of the new post-Cold War security threats and locates the threats in the countries of the global South, which links with the bifurcated positions on security (section 2.3.2).

A postcolonial lens may usher in the emergence of human security that allows for a societal agenda that recognises the diversity of global South societies. According to George and Hilal (2011:59), "[i]t is … at the level of the everyday … [where] human security may allow for a local and community-based determination of security issues and the emergence of local solutions which reflect, recognise and compose with the insecurities generated by the presence of a co-existing plurality of groups". These (creative) solutions may well operate beyond the colonial strictures of imposed bondages, so that inclusiveness may lead to pacific solutions for global South security issues.

2.6.4 Critiques of postcolonialism and moving beyond

Postcolonialism displays a rounded set of normative values that imbue it with a responsibility for action, yet postcolonialism often comes across as ambivalent and incohesive, a house of many chimneys. Consequently, there are substantial issues of critique that can be laid at the door of postcolonial studies (Bignall, 2010; Parry, 2004). This study has synthesised the critiques into two main themes of relevance, which follow.

The first theme deals with the finding that postcolonialism is seen as a Western construct (Dirlik, 1994:328-356). Abrahamsen (2003:194-195) discerns the irony that

postcolonialism is a product of Western tradition and import. It relates to capitalism as it manifests itself in modernity, which means that any benefits that accrue to its study are minimal. Commenting on this process, Žižek (2009:115) asserts that "we are dealing here with the dialectic of form and content: when colonial countries demand independence and enact a 'return to roots'; the very form of this return (that of being an independent nation-state) is Western. In its very defeat (losing the colonies) the West thus wins, by imposing its social form on the other". Postcolonialism, it is averred, is more concerned about self-absorbed Western intellectuals addressing its colonial history than having a desire to empathically understand the present post-colonial societies. Over time, this leads to new binaries, elites, neo-colonialism and new capitalism, conditions that are amply illustrated in the global South (Prakash, 1996:196-197; Mamdani, 2001:659-661; Shohat, 1992:99, Santos & Schor, 2012:13-40).

The second and related theme centres around the observation that postcolonialism not only reflects a Eurocentric perspective, but that its obscurantism results in few tangible outcomes for the affected masses of the global South. There appears to be a quasi-obsession with textual debate with "its language impenetrable and esoteric" (Abrahamsen, 2003:191). Dirlik (1994:328-356; also Williams, 1997:821-841) uses similar dismissive phrases, designed to point out the disconnect between scholars (whether they originate from the West or developing world diaspora) and those intended to benefit from the writings but who continue to endure harsh realities.

On a positive note, it is contended that the continued study of postcolonialism through the South-South socio-political construction of the IBSA collective's security would result in a more inclusive understanding, one that lies within erstwhile colonies. A collaborative approach to the continued study and convergence of thought of postcolonialism would emphasise the common heritage of resistance and (qualified) revival over time, as Chapter 3 will show with respect to IBSA.

Academic traditions of the Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian schools inform liberal democracy and its normative guidelines, and many constructivists attempt to explicate the world order in these terms. In propelling the liberal-realist discourse, areas of

studies like critical security critique essentialist conceptualisations about human freedoms, but continue to draw from the same intellectual font. Postcolonial scholars draw attention to the fact that all these traditions are at heart, Western-centric and founded upon racist presumptions. Further,

> a Eurocentric security studies regards the weak and the powerless as marginal or derivative elements of world politics, as at best the site of liberal good intentions or at worst a potential source of threats. … For liberal and some critical approaches to security studies, the weak are of interest but primarily as bearers of rights and objects of emancipation, that is, for their normative value in Western political theoretic terms.
>
> (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006:332)

The third theme refines the preceding one. There is clearly a fundamental requirement to address the vulnerable and the powerful jointly, all responsible for ensuring a developmental history. Failure to do so is an injustice, curbs attempts at understanding and changing world politics and exacerbates North-South divisions. The colonial project, which was less engagement, more subjugation as well as process dominance over peoples and cultural forms, remains constitutive of the subjects that are being interrogated. If one viewed the processes of decolonisation, for example, one can see that although political power was purportedly shifted to the formerly colonised, it "did not transform the structures of domination – that is, the institutional and cultural contexts of Western hegemony in the global international order, and African [and Third World] marginalisation within it on the other" (Grovogui, 1996: 2). What is required is an in-depth analysis of the forms of the essentialist composition of knowledge and a re-evaluation of the underlying assumptions upon which discourses and practices are then premised. In this respect, the IBSA ministers of foreign affairs' communiqué on the tenth anniversary of IBSA is significant, as "[t]hey stressed that IBSA is an important framework that provides additional impetus to further contacts between developing countries of Asia, South America and Africa, as well as strengthens the spirit of South-South cooperation. Political dialogue among the three countries has positively contributed to the global discourse on issues of common interest" (IBSA Dialogue Forum, 2013:paragraph 4).

The study and reasonable implementation of issues relating to human security is a step

in the right direction, as it seeks to redress the 'realities on the ground' – the purported disconnect of postcolonialism.

2.7 EVALUATION: PROVIDING THE CONCEPTUAL SCAFFOLDING FOR ANALYSING IBSA'S SECURITY COLLABORATION

In this final section I summarise the key points of the preceding analysis and then proceed to develop a preliminary theoretical framework which will guide the analysis in subsequent chapters, culminating in the identification of the conceptual pillars on which this study will be based. The framework will be revisited in Chapter 7 (the conclusion) to assess to what extent it facilitated deeper understanding of IBSA's security constructions.

To commence, I note that in order to be adequate, critical theories are gauged by three criteria that infer a process: Actors need to identify with and take up the cudgels of the disadvantaged majority; they need to show up the shortcomings in current world social reality; and then they need to propose and institute an enhanced world system, ideally devoid of European imperialism and colonialism. The assumptions of postcolonialism underpin South-South engagements through its concern to open up a tactical space for broadening the debate and including unacknowledged voices and founts of knowledge (Seth, Gandhi & Dutton, 1998:10).

This chapter laid the conceptual and theoretical foundations for the study, and introduced world political trends that suffuse the theories. These trends form the backdrop or context against which the development of IBSA's security collaboration in three core areas will be assessed. The growth of regionalism can not be detached from global institutions, as there are mutual beneficial interactions between various groupings. This appears to coincide with a growing consciousness that regional cooperation produces its own synergies, which can add value to an array of policy issues. Regionalism, on one hand, has the potency to augment global governance, and induce greater consonance and prosperity on a world scale. In this context, regionalism may be able to pursue positive change in world affairs founded on ideational grounds. It would include international and regional discourse and synergy, working towards a

world constructed for change. On the other hand, regionalism has imperfections – a notable one being the inexorable insertion of the free-market competition factor that causes distressing domestic structural adjustments "as *dynamic competitive advantage* … shifts kaleidoscopically across firms and nations" (Mistry, 1999:151, original emphasis), forcing global South countries to act under compulsion. Hence, the demands to remain competitive requires continuous challenges at national levels to alleviate and make allowance for its societal impact.

This study has noted that regionalism *per se* is equated with state-centric security, while exercising the praxis of the security concepts in this study – that of regional security communities and human security – is associated with human-centric security.

The analysis of international security trends highlighted the opportunities afforded by periods of peaceful development in the recent past that have broadened the concept of human security. Enriching the concept of security is associated with horizontal multidimensional expansions in human security, as well as referents (the wellbeing of the individual, the community and society-at-large). Standing in opposition, the 'narrowing' of security is aligned with reduced human securities, asymmetrical responses to non-state terrorism, with concomitant rises in unforeseen and undesirable consequences. The inappropriate use of securitisation abets this state of affairs. Not surprisingly, restrictive international security is associated with traditional, conservative IR theories. Important space was devoted to explain why traditional theories were not suited to the understanding of the phenomena such as IBSA, South-South cooperation and the 'rise of the global South'. Critical theories, it was submitted, were more inclusive in the sense that they lent understanding to the construction of new regions and to the associated fluidity and the multiple thrusts of this type of 'new security'.

The conceptual framework and pillars that I devise in order to support the socio-political construction of IBSA's security collaboration is an integrated constructivist-postcolonial one. I therefore draw mainly on the discussion on security communities (section 2.3.1), constructivist theory (section 2.5) and Tsai's principles of constructivist human security (section 2.5.2) as well as Hynek and Chandler, George

and Hilal on postcolonialism and human security (section 2.6.3). These I then further integrate with insights from the postcolonial tenets outlined in section 2.6, as these align with the foundations of critical social constructivism. I draw substantial inspiration from the work of Adler and Barnett (1998) to provide the broad scaffolding, supplemented and supported by 'bricks and mortar' from other theorists and scholars on constructivism and postcolonialism as highlighted in the chapter. The pillars aid coherence and support the girders for the remainder of the chapters. The postulations follow, where the italicised words and phrases provide cohesive links to framework integration.

Delving into Chapter 1 reminds that the ontology of the study is rooted in social constructivism (see section 1.5.1). Ontology includes the wide range and depth of areas of human endeavour, discussed in Chapter 2. Focused and synthesised it means that a trilateral international IBSA community exists. It operates across three continents; it pursues an agenda on the international stage with a mandate that it assumes comes from fellow global South states. The question arises about the determination of basic or inherent features of this grouping or collective. For the sake of this study, one can determine that the IBSA collective does not exist independently of our cognition, but that such a world is dynamically constructed and managed.

Three shared constructivist foundations come to the aid of this logic:.

- *Normative and ideational structures* have as much value as material ones.
- *Processes* add value to community formation, including degrees of independence in foreign policy actions.
- *Agents and structures* help each other to form, and is based on human actions that have effects in a world that is socially made up, as well as on proper historic bases for consequential actions.

Three mechanisms are used to derive conceptual pillars for the study. They move from formative conditionalities, to the processing and enhancement of factors that work towards mutual trust, and have as a full outcome the expectations of harmonious pacific growth. All these actions are continuously and mutually reinforced through

practice.

The first mechanism comprises the *formative conditionalities*. These are changes in the external and national conditions or *environment* that cause states to align with like-minded candidates, and hold the potential for a valuable increase in future *intercommunication*. Common agendas are shared *historical experiences, ideas and values*.

The second mechanism is critical as it is the facilitation of *mutual trust and collective identity*, and has two components.

- The first component is *structural* by design, and has two elements. Firstly, *power* is an attribute whereby states, in their role as agencies, can guide or impede the collective's stance, or the degree and direction of 'political will'. Power serves as the glue to aid the security community with a common cognition, vision and action – adding up to a 'sense of togetherness'. Power often emits an aura of attraction as a centre of successful development. The second element is *knowledge* that in large part relates to the collective's international posture. In particular it refers to the formation and development of cognition in the form of shared meanings and discernment. In turn, these practiced values would lead to the enhancement of mutual trust, cohesive identity (joint schemes, greater interaction and deeper involvement) and pacific settlements.

- The second component describes a *process* that has three actions. (1) *Transactions* comprise set exchanges, of many diverse types, between actors. They build on positive human exposures and agreed norms, and have the ability to innovate joint grounding and so shape social facts to new conditions. (2) *International organisations* add process value to security collaboration projects because security collectives are required to perform and carry out agendas under conditions of trust and integrity on public international platforms. (3) *Social learning* symbolises the abilities and inspirations of actors in their social milieu to align their convictions with the social world.

The third mechanism works towards steady anticipation of peaceful change, and consists of two factors – *mutual trust* and *collective identity*. Mutual trust develops as a function of time as states continue to identify with each other and build upon experiences and interaction. Identities are multi-faceted, and have self-reflective properties that are projected onto partner states and their reciprocal relationships.

It was noted earlier (section 2.5.2) that constructivism is also a bridge to human security. Constructivism adapts to the interpretation of human security, as it emphasises the *social construction of concepts and identity*, and as such presents a new mechanism to understand international security dynamics within contemporary international relations. The formation and development of *social knowledge and learning* is a segued and widening circle that moves from individual to community, to society-at-large and to the state in the international context. Identity forms the foundation for the recognition and role of the individual within international society. As such, it becomes a mechanism for actualising human security through de-linking the concept from state territories. Such reciprocal actions often link to common endeavours through the pro-active use of state agencies, as states focus on common interests that may often lead to new parameters in terms of foreign policy.

Reverting again to Chapter 1 (section 1.5.2), this time the epistemology of the study, the question is asked: How to know the postcolonial world of our making? Because of this study's normative lens, it has already been shown that its epistemology is based on postcolonialism. In addition, traditional IR theories were discarded in favour of the selected critical theories, and a clear link between human security and postcolonialism (section 2.6.3) has been established. Consequently, I take forward *hybridity* as a postcolonial concept that encapsulates both *emancipation/resistance/redistribution* and *recognition/reform.* In Chapter 1, section 1.3 where I outlined the research problem, I posited that hybridity as a concept is useful in that it might help to explain the complexity of postcolonial relations and identities, in this case related to IBSA's security collaborations. The premise is that the ensuing hybrid identity of IBSA both explains and is explained by the ambiguities, contradictions and complexities of IBSA's security collaborations. But to be clear, these are not to be understood as

bifurcated concepts though. The emancipatory role refers to power relations between the global North's preservation of the international security structure versus the need to infuse the agenda with an expanded agenda that allows for global South human-centric security concerns; hence a struggle (resistance) towards greater balance (see Chapter 1, section 1.2). The reform and recognition roles are intertwined in complex ways. 'Reform' refers to the reform of institutions of global governance, including the UN in order to achieve greater representation and legitimacy (IBSA Trilateral, 2009:par 5). Recognition involves the processes whereby developing regional states are confirmed as not only fully enfranchised members of the fellowship of states, but also as having special interests that do not always align with those of more entrenched countries (Nel, 2010:953).

I submit that the italicised words and phrases in the preceding paragraphs comprise the working pillars for answering the research question in two interconnected ways, namely by considering *how the socio-political construction of security in the IBSA collective (as both reformer and critical agent) can be understood theoretically as well as empirically (through the prism of three areas of human security cooperation). A conceptual diagram will facilitate the undertaking.* Hence the diagram that follows outlines a simple and generic approach (it is reviewed in the final chapter, Chapter 7). It allows for collectives such as IBSA to commence a security collaboration process and create conditions for developmental and redistributive benefits. In sum, these pillars constitute the foundational supports to socio-politically construct the IBSA collective.

Diagram 2.1: Conceptual framework



Based on the foregoing, I submit that there may be a justifiable expectation that the IBSA collective would manage ('socio-politically construct') the full range of human security elements. In turn, this would bring about greater understanding of security collaboration of the trilateral collective. All this does not infer that IBSA is a perfect collective. Indeed, it is the aim of this study to critically analyse the socio-political construction of this edifice. Therefore, the result ought to be an enhanced understanding of the dynamics of internal centripetal and the external centrifugal political forces at work in the IBSA security community; its positives and negatives. The empirical settings and practices analysed in the case study chapters would further contribute to the understanding of the socio-political construction of the IBSA South-South initiative, including its defects.

The next chapter, Chapter 3, extricates the elements of the study's two approaches to IR theory, applies its pillars to IBSA and places it in the context of South-South cooperation.

CHAPTER 3: APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO IBSA AS A COLLECTIVE

3.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

The previous chapter, Chapter 2, laid the groundwork for this chapter. It analysed two world trends (regionalism and contemporary security thinking) as contexts and then developed common conceptual denominators or pillars for application to IBSA's security collaboration. Building on this in Chapter 3, I seek to answer two research questions, namely: *What are the historical, normative, endogenous and exogenous linkages that are common to the IBSA states? And how, when studying IBSA policy documents and statements, are these linkages explained through critical social constructivism and postcolonialism?*

The objective of this chapter is therefore to capture the links that exist between the identified theoretical elements and apply it to the socio-political casting of IBSA as a collective. Consequently this chapter represents a twin bridge. Firstly, it connects the theory of Chapter 2 to the IBSA as a collective via the pillars identified in Chapter 2. The second bridge is the fact that this chapter comprises a transition between theory, concept and the practices of the IBSA collective, and the following three chapters that are made up of the three identified empirical case studies.

In greater detail, the plan for this chapter is as follows: It starts through a confirmation that the three countries share a common heritage, a peculiar set of subjugations that underscores the fact that colonial scars continue to impact on present-day societies. The tone of the three countries' histories is non-chronological. Instead it is thematic, based on guidance from theoretical tenets. In its review of the IBSA collective's histories and colonial experiences the chapter draws out the logic of its formation of identity and solidarity. This allows for common denominators that determine the process of identity-sharing. Following, the role of ideas in the formation of IBSA's hybrid identity is laid out, and its agency briefly discussed, as these are important attributes that shape the collective's reformist and emancipatory approach in world affairs. The chapter moves to the practices of IBSA in terms of communication

processes by way of diplomacy and foreign policy, from where I establish the IBSA collective's direction and leadership patterns. In the final section I offer a preliminary assessment of IBSA's potential and challenges, as well as whether the objectives for this chapter have been met. In this way Chapter 3 works towards consolidation and synthesis, while also expanding the pillars through linking theory with the socio-political construction of the IBSA collective.

3.2 FROM SHARED HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES AND IDEAS TO SOLIDARITY

In Chapter 2, I established that a key aspect of the development of community is through the fostering of shared ideas and common colonial histories and experiences. These manifest in pivotal founding documents, countries' constitutions, foreign policy utterances and the practice of diplomacy. They form the basis for cooperation, solidarity and the complex hybrid nature of their configuration. I therefore argue that there is continuity between the colonial and the contemporary conditions. But first, it is important to take note of the types of repression that existed across India, Brazil and South Africa, the countries at issue, and that formed their mould.

3.2.1 Development of a common term for the varied forms of the IBSA countries' historical subjugation

In line with the understanding that history is politically and socially constructed (Grovogui, 2001:425-448; Vaughan-Williams, 2005:115-136; Kratochwil, 2006b:5-29), I cover the histories of the IBSA countries in order to foreground the factors that form the substance of their respective struggles, the elements that have shaped India, Brazil and South Africa in their present form as well as the doctrines that provide fortitude and guidance. Histories also provide the founding chronicles, the associated political institutions and economic foundations for their statehood. Hence, it would include not only the primacy of the colonial state during the periods that led to epochal change in the histories of the three IBSA states, but also the road of the oppressed majorities towards independence and beyond. I suggest that these provide cohesive links between theory and historicities of the IBSA construct.

India, Brazil and South Africa have not had identical experiences of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, apartheid and variations of rule by the privileged and powerful few over the deprived many. History reveals vast spacio-temporal differences, and the range and depth of colonialism shows great variances. However, viewed from those subjected, the effects tended to be same – at the least – the majorities of peoples in lands having been repressed, rights-denied and abused. All three IBSA states were founded on slavery (Major, 2012; De Camargo, 1988; Mason, 2003), a condition the effects of which remain to this day; with reports indicating that enslavement remains widespread in India (*Hindustan Times*, 2014).

As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.6.2), my understanding of the postcolonial is concerned with the lingering effects of colonialism. The reason is that the age of the colonial is "not dead, since it lives on in its 'after-effects'" (Hall, 1996:248). This echoes the postcolonial notion by Bhabha (1994) that the colonial condition continues to intrude into the present. The following focused histories of the three IBSA countries have a theme of colonial exploitation that attest to this fact.

In the case of India, Britain was the last and the most dominant of a range of European colonial impositions. The British state was preceded first by a commercial enterprise ('the Honourable East India Company'), which came to dominate over half of world trade between 1757 and 1857 (Brown, 2010). The subsequent Indian Rebellion of 1857 necessitated British government (minority) rule. The hold over India could only be maintained through prolonged, large-scale and intense violence, until India's independence in 1947 (Newsinger, 2006:65-83, 141-163). The second concerns the historically irregular and unstable eras that Brazil had undergone long after it gained and accepted independence officially in 1822 and 1825 respectively. Since that date, it had lurched from one military dictatorship to another, with the masses being voiceless, the peoples' elections manipulated in favour of the powerful, people regularly tortured and sometimes becoming the *desaparecidos* – those who had vanished. In Brazil, further, there were quasi-democracies that were tolerated to limited degrees by the powerful and affluent class (including the overthrow of the popular Goulart government in 1963, with assistance from the United States' Central Intelligence

Agency) (Arnold, 2006:45). The third refers to the system of apartheid in South Africa, which is – many would argue – statutory colonialism or colonialism brought to a 'logical' conclusion (African National Congress, 1987).

The IBSA countries, amongst them, experienced a range of deprivations, including imperialism, slavery, colonialism, apartheid, military dictatorships and not-so-benign rule by the upper classes. An all-encompassing word, namely, 'oppression', is for the purpose of this study taken to mean all five of the rights-denialist conditions noted above. In addition, it is necessary to include a psychological aspect in accepting the word 'oppression'. The minds of the oppressed had become 'colonised' to the extent that inferior statuses were entrenched and internalized. Variations of sycophantic behaviour had become accepted, if not the norm, such as in the manner of India's 'untouchables' (Mayall, 2003; see also Fanon, 1963:249-250; Mbembe, 2001:1-6).

The position put forth in this section is that the similar histories of the IBSA countries with respect to oppression gave rise to elevated levels of empathy among the three subject states. This was to the extent that their identities became merged, giving rise to the collective's ambivalent hybrid (reformer and emancipator) character. In turn this realisation combined with other attributes (discussed further) conjoined in the IBSA thrust.

3.2.2 A different approach to the IBSA histories

This section on the histories of the IBSA countries seeks to adopt a different format. Instead of presenting it in a linear, chronologically abridged manner, I endeavour to interweave three premises through which, viewed from both critical social-constructivist and postcolonial angles, histories add value to the process of community-building and identity-construction. These are based largely on the three interconnected postulations put forward by Reus-Smit (2002:120-140), with infused congruencies from Adler and Barnett (1998) that relate to the formation of regional security communities. Reus-Smit favours an idealist philosophy of history – not in the traditional conception, but

> in the sense that intersubjective ideas, norms and values are considered important determinants of actors' identities, interests and actions. … Such a philosophy of history is justified, constructivists contend, on both social and theoretic grounds, resonating as it does with an established body of social and cultural theory, and explicating important aspects of international life obscured or misunderstood by other perspectives.
>
> (Reus-Smit, 2002:130)

The three assertions are that social structures form human behaviour individually and societally; that ideational structures and actors are equally important; and that roleplayers continue to improve structures.

The first assertion consists of historically "precipitating factors that encourage states to orientate in each other's direction" (Adler & Barnett, 1998:29, see also Taylor, 1979:51). Here, one can note that all three IBSA states represent and present profound historicities in terms of ancient and developed societies that were precursors to the invasive countries of oppression. The histories of India, Brazil and South Africa have deeply woven, embedded societal fabrics, which have and continue to define human behaviour. Allan, Wolseley Haig and Dodwell (1934:1-9) lament the lack of written histories of India, where the *oeuvre* is noted by its religious themes and foundational explication. However through synchronisms with Greek and Chinese chronological histories, much can be learnt about early India's societal structures, including political organisation; and deductions made. The peoples that comprise the Indus Valley is one of the world's most established cultures, inhabited by five allied tribes. In the early sixteenth century, the Emperor Babur had laid down the Mughal dynasty which governed India for more than three centuries. European explorers began making inroads into India during the sixteenth century.

In Brazil, there is evidence of hunter-gatherers dated ten thousand years ago (Levine, 1999:3). Having been 'discovered' by the Portuguese in 1500, and after more than three centuries under direct Portuguese colonial governance, Brazil was granted independence in 1822. However, it continued with its monarchy until the abolition of slaves. Most slaves were imported from Africa (Nash, 1968:3-39), as the indigenous peoples could not be induced to perform manual labour (Schwartz, 1973:147-198). Emancipation of slaves came in 1888, "but the cultural conditions upon which slavery

was premised remained" (Baronov, 2000:174), whereafter the military proclaimed Brazil to be a republic in 1889. Early Brazil was distinguished by three stratified social classes, the crypto-effect of which continue. Occupying the top position were the *fidalgo*, being the clergy and the noble classes, characterised as hard-working, assertive and combative land-owners. The middle class was formed by the mercantilist groups, while the bulk of the population were the peasants and labourers (Willems, 1970:31-49). Gomes and Moon (2000:1) note an inverse correlation between the natives and the settlers in Brazil – the former become less in number and weaker in terms of power bases, while the latter grow and attain power and wealth.

South Africa's archaeological sites have produced "abundant scientific information on the evolution of modern humans" (UNESCO, n.d.:n.p.) with the Sterkfontein area named a World Heritage Site in 1999. South Africa's first-known people comprised the group collectively called the Khoisan. Other long-term inhabitants of the area were the Bantu-speaking people who had moved into the north-eastern and eastern regions from the north, having arrived hundreds of years before the arrival of the Europeans (Wilson, 2009:11-42; Swart *et al*, 2007:6-39).

At individual level, all three IBSA states have produced leaders of quality that have embodied and executed idealist programmes that covered the period towards liberation and beyond. Looking beyond the realms of oppression – the vantage point of 'the other', from India arose Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru; from Brazil emerged João Goulart (Blum, 2003:163-166) and Fernando Cardoso; while South Africa had the benefits of Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu (all three Nobel Peace Prize winners). Much of what comprises IBSA may be thought of as the convergence of leaders' conceptualisations and actions.

The second contention lies in the value of ideational structures and actors. Ideational structures have equal status with material ones and are constituted through actors' interactions. Adler and Barnett (1998:29) refer to the "'structural' elements of power and ideas". But ideas also translate into descriptions and understanding, and together

with language provide justification for their material conditions.[25] Further, in moving through the experiences of oppression, the oppressed sought not only independence, but were possessed of the notion that normative and ideational conduct would transcend national politics and progress towards a more equitable, consummate global *entente* (Risse, 2000:10).

Lenin (1970) notes usefully that ideational relations add causal value because they pass through the consciousness of people, whereas material forces arise irrespective of whether it has gone through the same process. The question may be asked, then, how ideational forces had been articulated by the IBSA nations, prior, during and subsequent to the termination of oppression. As examples, one may look to extant guidance within founding documents or popular movements in the first place; and the three countries' post-colonial constitutions secondly.

The former moved iterative ideas from conception to the written form, encapsulated and disseminated – so that the oppressed could unify and read from the same script. In India, Gandhi's passive resistance campaign, under the slogan 'Quit India', turned violent across the land (Pannikar, 1963:103; Mason, 2000:169-177). While the politicians executed high politics during and beyond the period of the Second World War on the way to developing a constitution for India, thousands of violent deaths (mainly between Hindus and Muslims) marked the final partitioning (Khan, 2007:1-39; Collins & Lapierre, 1975). A disputed area, the Jammu and Kashmir region, soon developed into a hitherto unresolved area of discord (Bose, 2003:14-43). For Brazil, in 1984, when it became clear that the military would leave the government, the Brazilian population energised a massive campaign (*Diretas Já* or Direct Now), to change the old Constitution. In South Africa, a representative democratic conference assembled in the township of Kliptown, near Johannesburg, on 6 June 1955. The Congress of the People adopted the Freedom Charter, which "is the foremost document of African liberation. From the time of its adoption it has guided and set the goals for the freedom movement in South Africa" (Pomeroy, 1986:103). Although this remains a laudable policy document, its implementation continues to be sub-optimal, with one observer

[25] Material structures comprise *inter alia* military forces and the associated competition brought about by balance of power processes and capitalism – the fiscus, economic capacities and market influence.

noting that "that energy is still waiting to be generated" (Media Club South Africa, 2015).

Thus, pivotal utterances, movements and founding documents encapsulated the aims and ambitions, rights and duties of citizens as well as the vectors of exogenous normative thrusts in the newly liberated countries; much of its liberatory spirit transcribed into these countries' constitutions.

According to Pannikar (1963:153-163), India's Constitution underwrites three themes. Firstly, the circumstances that gave rise to its origin are noted. Then, the Constitution expresses the need to guarantee justice, rule of law, liberty, equality and fraternity. Thirdly, it is an important trait to enshrine the successes of the social struggle, so that these may serve as a departure point.

Brazil's final path to democracy stands distinct from most other transitions to democracies in the world. The reason for this is that it was not civil society that had set the process in motion, but instead it was the incumbent military who led the initiative (Haas, 1997:161-215). After some debate, the Brazilian national assembly decided on a blank slate process as the optimum methodology to produce a new constitution. The meeting of the full assembly was largely open to the public and the media; hence transparent (Chaffee, 2002:483-511). Brazil was fortunate to be under the inspirational leadership of fervent democrats and believers in social justice in the period soon after the adoption of the new 1988 Constitution and until recent times (Hunter, 1997:42-71; Goertzel, 1999:81-124, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016:3-5).

South African history records a unique path to full democracy, when the apartheid government elected to begin negotiations with erstwhile banned organisations; developing an interim constitution that was ratified after the first democratic elections in 1994. The value of constitutions is stressed in South African case law and expanded to other nations as a generalised value, as noted by the South African Constitutional Court:

> [The] Constitution is not simply some kind of statutory codification of an acceptable or legitimate past. It retains from the past only what is acceptable and represents a

> radical and decisive break from that part of the past which is unacceptable. It constitutes a decisive break … to a constitutionally protected culture of openness and democracy and universal human rights for … all ages, classes, and colours. … The past was pervaded by inequality, authoritarianism, and repression. The aspiration of the future is based on what is justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. It is premised on a legal culture of accountability and transparency. The relevant provisions of the Constitution must therefore be interpreted to give effect to the purposes sought to be advanced by their enactment.
>
> (The Constitutional Court of South Africa, Shabalala and Others v. Attorney General of the Transvaal and Another, 1996 South Africa 725 (C.C.)

Reus-Smit's (2002:120-140) third assertion is that roleplayers continue to improve structures. Stakeholders are conditioned to ensure continual development and enhancement of structures – here being the structures created by constitutional processes. Yet, an important caveat is that constitutions cannot necessarily be equated with democracy, nor ideas with implementation. The conditions that make democracy possible and allow it to thrive have been debated by thinkers through the ages. Rustow (1999:14-41) has developed a dynamic model with four propositions that predispose a state towards a democratic disposition: A sense of national unity is shaped; entrenched political positions set off the democratic process; democratic rules are consciously adopted; and assuefaction by both electorate and leadership to democratic norms and practices in a global world occur. These conditions are in a state of continuous flux, as will be briefly shown in the next paragraphs.

As an external projection, during the Cold War era India played a pivotal role in promoting international non-alignment for developing nations. India represented a rallying call in the post-colonial era, and engendered cohesion from oppressed peoples over the world. On the home front, India needs to overcome high levels of poverty, environmental degradation, inadequate infrastructure, insufficient employment as well as inadequate access to all levels of education. The causal factor to most of these challenges is India's large population (the second largest in the world), which if not checked or reduced, will aggravate social, economic and environmental issues (Bloom, Canning & Sevilla, 2003:25-36).

The result of India's last (April/May 2014) national elections led to the end of an era for the Congress Party that had ruled most of the time since independence, and swept in the Bharatiya Janata Party of Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. Congress's defeat has been ascribed to the reduction in economic growth of the erstwhile 'rising India' and its inability to defeat corruption. MacAskill and Krishnan (2014) observe that the impressive mandate heralded a mature democracy in India, with the electorate opting for development instead of class differentiation and exploitation. Political commentator Khan notes that the "mandate signals the maturing of India's democracy. Voters have backed the message of development instead of the caste preferences and parties who have exploited it for years" (Mahr, 2014:19-22).

For Brazil, its population of 202 million is the world's sixth-highest, and the country has associated developmental challenges. Racism remains an issue, where Guimarães (2001:167) summarises that "the major problem for combating racism in Brazil is its invisibility. Racism is repeatedly denied and confused with forms of class discrimination". Similarly, Reichmann (1995:35) observes that "mystification and denial of racial differences are widespread, sustained by the social construction of a supraracial Brazilian national identity". The inequality gap between rich and poor is among the world's largest (World Bank report, 2012). To assuage this condition, Brazil has affirmative action programmes and quota systems in place to promote equitable access to government employment and university education (Dávila, Zachary & Skidmore, 2008: 409-423). This appears to be gaining success – as poverty gets reduced, more people get jobs and move into higher income brackets (*Buenos Aires Herald*, 2014a).

At present though, Brazil's economy appears to be in the doldrums (*Buenos Aires Herald*, 2014b), due to global financial issues, incompetent policies and misfortunes (including a severe drought period). Hence, social unrest is prevalent; the latter related also to the need to secure the poor *favela* no-go neighbourhoods and other areas. The high cost and related concerns of hosting both the soccer World Cup in 2014 as well as the Olympic Games in 2016 constitute further sources of dissatisfaction. Protesters observe that the funds could have been more pro-actively invested in education and health sectors (*Buenos Aires Herald*, 2014c; *Buenos Aires Herald*, 2014d). The

impeachment of President Rousseff in August 2016 symbolises that country's present instability and short-term insecurities at politico-economic level (Romero, 2016).

For South Africa, the first multi-racial elections in 1994 brought an end to apartheid and ushered in majority rule under an African National Congress (ANC)-led government. South Africa since then has wrestled to correct apartheid-era imbalances. National presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2014 gave the ANC a reduced majority, compounded by poor results in the 2016 local government elections (Rossouw, 2016:n.p.). In concert with its IBSA colleagues, South Africa faces a host of formidable challenges. This was confirmed in South Africa's national planning commission's diagnostic report (National Development Plan, 2011) which "outlines in stark terms – and incredible candour – what really faces us. It is a depressing read, but it is also inspirational" (Malala, 2011). These strategic objectives for government also have normative components – it ought to be done in order to achieve equity that had been promised and are long overdue. South Africa's recent short-term economic growth forecast of zero per cent (Smith, 2016) makes the implementation of the plan fraught with risk. This parlous state is aggravated while defective presidential leadership continues to impair South Africa's potential (Maynard, 2016:n.p.).

The internal challenges that each of the IBSA states faces are not insurmountable, and it may well be that issues have leveled out. Nathan (2006:275-299) asserts that states need to maintain internal stability, which is as much a requirement as interstate security for a security community to prosper; as envisaged by Deutsch (1957). Although conditions in the IBSA states themselves are not ideal at present, and it may be argued that robust democratic actions are at play, the situation in the IBSA states has not heeled over to full-scale violence. This is an observation that aids the security formation conditionalities for IBSA.

3.2.3 Synopsis: Histories of India, Brazil and South Africa aligned under the aegis of a critical IR approach

It can be noted that the synthesised effects of oppression were the denial of pre-colonial identity and the foisting of Western thought, practices and reality upon the

oppressed majorities (Wanda (2013:1). Axiomatically, I suggest that oppressed societies cannot be totally extinguished – they tend to submerge and run in parallel to the imposed, coercive condition of the 'other', to emerge once conditions are optimal again. In the case of the developing world (Africa, Asia and Latin America) resistance only developed coherently in the latter part of the nineteenth century, leaving the twentieth century for the struggle against oppression and eventual triumph. In the postcolonial condition, Wanda (2013:23) notes a contemporary approach away from "victimhood", to one that is centred upon community-based re-invigorated cultural entitlement and "restorative intellectualism", so as to ameliorate the absences wrought by oppression and bring about the conditions that ensure greater awareness and application of the human condition (see also Makgoba, Shope & Mazwai, 1999:x; Young, 2003:25-26).

I suggest that a valid deduction is that despite – or due to – the conflictual internal versus external demands, the IBSA countries have risen above singular national aims. They have elected to embrace similar qualities derived from history that they recognise and imbue with validity in their fellow IBSA nations to travel a higher moral road. When the logic is extended, I submit that a trilateral friendship exists (Masters & Landsberg, 2015:354). This friendship is based upon its shaped collective, historically derived and developed values and visionary aims – that precede even the 1955 Bandung Conference (*Pakistan Horizon*, 2015; Mintz, 1961:170; da Silva, Spohr & da Silveira, 2016:12-173). The United States political activist W.E.B. Du Bois wrote presciently that "in another half century the colored world is going to date the beginning of its integrity, unification, and self-conscious progress" (Horne & Young, 2001:24). Skinner (2008:118-119) notes that these collective ideological histories and identities serve to "uncover the often neglected riches of our intellectual heritage". Thus, it is proposed that history aids the understanding of the socio-political ways in which strategic-political options have been constructed through friendship that spans over time and space. This linkage bolsters international political power from a developing state's perspective.

3.3 THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN THE FORMATION OF IBSA'S HYBRID IDENTITY

As discussed in Chapter 2, shared ideas and identities are critical cornerstones for both critical social constructivism and postcolonialism, as well as the practical manifestations. These are discussed next.

3.3.1 Early instances of joint political solidarity and associated identity-formation

Limited identity-formation (along Pan-African, Latin-American, Indian, West African and Irish solidarity) were initiated by leaders such as Garvey, Dubois, Reverend Mahabane and Sol Plaatje (Walshe, 1970:90; Rupert, 2011:473-483). These associations had commenced in the 1920s already, then petered out. It was more formally started in 1955, when two South Africans, Moses Kotane (one of the main architects of the South African Congress Alliance) and Maulvi Cachalia (South African Indian Congress leader) left South Africa without passports to attend the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia, as representatives of the South African liberation movement[26] (Bunting, 1975:n.p.). The African National Congress' acting Secretary General, Oliver Tambo, also sent a message of solidarity to the Bandung Congress (Mbeki, 2005). Because this was an Afro-Asian congress, a Latin American presence was not felt at Bandung. However, Bandung had laid the conceptual foundation for the formation of a non-aligned movement, i.e. a group of smaller nations that would not be drawn into the power politics of either the East or the West. A 'Bandung Spirit' calls for

> peaceful coexistence between nations; for the liberation of the world from the hegemony of any superpower, from colonialism, from imperialism, from any kind of domination of one country by another; for the equality between the races and the nations; for building solidarity towards the poor, the colonised, the exploited, the weak and those being weakened by the world order of the day [also] for their development".
>
> (Khudori, 2015:5)

[26] India granted them passports while in London, *en route* to Bandung (Bunting, 1975:n.p.)

Their espoused 'neutrality' and 'Spirit' encouraged the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961 (Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2012). NAM ironically became a strategic roleplayer in the Cold War as it continued to align its agenda in accordance with the evolving geopolitical order (Kashinath, 2016:n.p.).

The Conference of the Organisation of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, commonly referred to as the 'Tricontinental', was held in Havana, Cuba in January 1966. It was a primary and critical meeting point, "uniting them and their interests in a common perspective … and marked the initiation of a global alliance … against imperialism" (Young, 2005:18). However, the participation of South African and Brazilian ideologues at related events and activities over the next few decades were on the sidelines (as exiles in the diaspora), as they were 'unofficial' until the return of their freedoms in the last two decades of the previous century.

3.3.2 Distinguishing communal traits of the emergent collective (hybrid) IBSA identity

As newly-liberated countries, and having had solidarity with one another's identities along the margins during their time in the struggle, India, Brazil and South Africa set out to achieve the ambitions that had been laid during their period under oppression. The totality of the histories and background to the IBSA states merge towards a complex of mixed and paradoxical IBSA identities – where the three members operate on the peripheries but with non-alignment also a matter of choice; yet drawn into the global system not of their construction or preference. Together these constitute the IBSA collective's evolving hybrid character (see Chapter 1, section 1.3; Chapter 2, section 2.6.2).

I identify three defining attributes that enable a shared hybrid identity based on their often conflicting regional/continental and international leadership roles; their vision that 'the world tomorrow is a better place'; and the shared understanding that IBSA is greater than the sum of its parts (i.e. the three individual members):

Firstly, in respect of the leadership roles the IBSA states are recognised as leaders and providers of stability in their respective regions (Schoeman, 2003:353, Nolte, 2007:1-24). Equally they are recognised as emerging powers that have ascended to the position of important stakeholders in global politics and the world economy. In this regard Geldenhuys notes the attributes and mandate that a regional power possesses. Conceptual and materialist resources provide regional powers with a potent role in their own regions, with such states voicing a willingness to accept these responsibilities. Then this state of affairs allows "[o]ther countries within the region and beyond in turn, [to] acknowledge the regional power as a state performing dual-level leadership roles" (Geldenhuys, 2010:151; see also Flemes, 2007:7-18).

But while their collective reformist role is recognised, it is a role that is often fraught with contradictions. With regular intervals, it would appear that developing countries recall their encounters with Western colonialism, and thus

> were not always supportive of what they sometimes saw as Western moralistic crusading. Some in this latter grouping saw the [United Nations Security] Council's expansive and intrusive action as a form of neo-colonialism in which the same old Western powers sought to dictate the internal affairs of weaker states. It can be noted that on the 2007 vote on Myanmar and the 2008 vote on Zimbabwe … South Africa also voted in opposition. In 2011 in early Council voting on the Libyan situation, both India and Brazil abstained rather than support a Western-sponsored resolution authorising a no-fly zone for the ostensible purpose of protecting civilians from attacks by Muammar Kaddafi forces.
>
> (Forsythe, 2012:4)

In the context of their international relations they therefore display an ambiguity that is marked by high-risk transactions that are neither reciprocal nor symmetric, as hybridity intrudes on the exercise of executing regional authority (Bhabha, 1994:114, see section 2.6.2).

India aspires to be a superpower in its own right, according to Kappel (2010:6). India faces continental leadership challenges in its Asian sub-continent – superpower

competition abounds, and regional states act as detractors. These combine and serve to inhibit India's full potential. The obverse is noted by Sitaraman (2012:180) who submits a number of factors (e.g. historical – its identification with NAM, its market liberalisation in 1991, its nuclear power, its quest for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council) that continue to work in India's favour, and that have combined to move it from obscurity to international prominence. Its new political leadership (the outcome of its elections in April/May 2014) may give it greater dynamics, generally. India is accordingly categorised as a pan-Asian power.

Brazil displays high and sustained economic growth (although, as noted earlier, at a plateau presently), continues to be very assertive in its foreign and economic policies and is at the forefront of integration politics in Latin America. Brazil's selection to host world-level international sporting events in 2014 and 2016 is a trust-indicator in terms of its regional economic, infrastructural and human resources management; and these factors readily imbue it with the fact of being a regional power.

South Africa – a much smaller state – is a regional leader due to a number of interrelated factors. These elements include the formation and maintenance of security architecture, the stature of its economy in Africa, the integration of the SADC countries, and the monetary integration in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), as well as the positive yet precarious balancing role that it plays within the AU. The IBSA countries consistently exercise leadership within their respective regional economic communities and engage in regional peace missions. In addition, they engage in effective climate and energy politics (Kappel, 2010:6).

Secondly, the three countries identify with one another's goals for a better world. As an ideational force founded on shared normative values, it aligns with tenets of critical IR studies that note its formative role in identity-shaping. It follows therefore that "[t]o be successful, regionalization necessitates a certain degree of homogeneity of compatibility of culture, identity and fundamental values" (Snyder, 2008:234). Thus IBSA's identity and credibility give it the opportunities to attempt to negotiate for redistribution at international South-North level. Examples include uniting in efforts to point out food security inadequacies that impact negatively on the poorest of countries,

on WTO platforms (Thakur, 2013:n.p.). Yet the hybrid character of these exchanges is performed in such a way that international capital societies and markets deem these transactions to be inoffensive; largely by adroitly having "a populist thread, on the one hand, woven into a global pragmatism that embraces market orthodoxy, on the other" (Miller, 2005:53). The performance of redistributive acts by political hegemonies may themselves even perceive largesse as acts of goodwill or patronisation. In essence, it amounts to harmonising a complex balancing act between reformist and redistributionist approaches (Nel & Taylor, 2013:1093-4).

There are, thirdly, issues that relate to democratic ideas or assumptions underpinning regionalism, regime type and democratisation that facilitate IBSA's cohesiveness. The democratic peace theory, in respect of regionalism, is in essence that wars tend not to break out between democracies, and it imputes these qualities from studies of the behaviour of democracies (Blaney, 2001:25-44; Russett *et al*, 1993). With Brazil being a case in point, there are "certainly cases where the wave of democratic transitions … in the 1980s can be plausibly implicated in the revival of regionalism. Moves toward sub-regional co-operation in South America occurred against the background of a region-wide shift away from military and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes" (Hurrell, 1995b:69). This relates to the Aristotlean concept that the whole is greater than the parts. The IBSA states' processes of democratisation, to use an example, play to the collective's strengths and leadership at various fora in an emulatory way. As a strength of each, more may be accomplished by working together to valorise democracy than they could accomplish each working individually, an issue that is evaluated in Chapter 7 (Conclusions) of this study.

Having established viable ideational factors that contribute towards a common and shared identity, it is necessary to shift attention to the agents of change as they interact with structures. For it is one thing to share communal attributes, yet it requires audacious strategic foresight to establish and transfigure a formation that may effect positive change upon the world stage. States recognise the value of each other in histories that constitute an arrangement based on identification with 'otherness'. There are concerns, however, that social constructivism stresses the role of structures at the

risk of diminishing the role of purposive agents. Those constructivists who advocate agent-oriented constructivism, therefore posit that

> [a]n actor can hold both domestic and international identities, which are shaped by respective dialogue at home and within the international community. They credit the development of ideas in part to individual actors with the capacity for independent and critical thinking, making it far easier for new ideas to (re)construct and change the international system.
>
> (Kegley & Blanton, 2014:39)

Thus it highlights the issue that the differential (dual) identity is a hybrid one, marked by the apparent paradox of being both reformer and transformer.

In the next section I therefore shift my focus to the circumstances of IBSA's genesis, or agency.[27]

3.4 STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES: THE FORMATION OF IBSA

Having established viable ideational factors, I now analyse agency or the social actions that started to change IBSA's operative milieu. According to Cox (2001:55), "[a]gency focuses attention on the forces that change structures". I utilise Diagram 2.1, and step across from ideas and norms to structures and practices. During this process the structure is pro-actively used by states as agents in this case, initiated in order to align ideals with political reality. In turn this links to the issues of interactions, transactions and transnational relations (that were derived during the evaluation of Chapter 2) that shape the collective undertaking and gives value and meaning to social elements.

3.4.1 Establishment of the IBSA Dialogue Forum

Since one cannot assume connections between ideas and policy choices (see Griffiths, Roach & Solomon, 2009:131, on Onuf), some historical context is necessary to offer a thicker description of IBSA's establishment. However, I need to start by correcting a

[27] The concept is defined in Chapter 1, Section 1.3, footnote 11.

misconception – IBSA did not arise as a result of the South African-initiated so-called 'G8 of the South'. Although the idea for its formation had been floated by South Africa, it had met with less than lukewarm receptions from the countries that had been approached. Therefore around 2000, the then deputy foreign minister of South Africa, Aziz Pahad, gave instructions for the initiative to be abandoned (Wheeler, interview, 2010).

Brazil and South Africa shared mutual concerns on the issue of sustainable development. South Africa had taken over the flag from Brazil in hosting the 1992 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (Sandton), thus requiring liaison with Brazil. This was followed a few months later by the first bi-national commission between the two countries. It set a wide functional agenda, and included a number of sectors for state-to-state cooperation. On New Year's Day 2003, the president of South Africa and his minister of foreign affairs attended the inauguration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil's newly elected leader. South Africa's relations with his predecessor, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, were good, but Lula's working class, trade union background and his national, regional and international priorities resonated well with the tripartite alliance in South Africa (Wheeler, 2007:27).

South African president Thabo Mbeki was one of few dignitaries from beyond Latin America to attend the event. However, no special meetings, events or protocol calls were arranged for Mbeki, and "all he got to do was stand in the reception line to be presented to Lula" (Wheeler, interview, 2010). This state of affairs appeared to have been a source of embarrassment to the Brazilian government, which compensated for this apparent oversight by arranging a meeting between the new Brazilian foreign minister, Celso Luis Nunes Amorim, and his South African colleague, Nkosasana Dlamini-Zuma. Amorim invited Zuma to Brazil in June 2003, when the Indian minister of external affairs, Yashwant Sinha, would be on a visit too. This fitted in with Zuma's schedule (Zuma would be in Brazil anyway for another event). After the meeting between the South African and Brazilian foreign ministers in January 2003, Amorim was reported to have enquired of his (i.e. the Brazilian) ambassador to South

Africa, Jorgio Gama, "what do you think of my idea?" (Wheeler, interview, 2010). In this manner "history was made" (Brasilia Declaration, 2003).

The formation and the importance of IBSA's vector is encapsulated in an IBSA summit interview conducted with Amorim by Osava (2011). Amorim noted that IBSA's founding was a beacon for establishing policy identification and implementation, which would enhance South-South progress through its construct. Amorin also observed that IBSA lent itself to joint undertakings because of their striking similarities. India, Brazil and South Africa were dynamic democracies – operating with success in multicultural milieus, with each occupying primary positions in different continents. The five summits that had been held in amongst a host of ministerial interactions, together with the active participation by civil society (see Chapter 2, footnote 21), indicated opportunities for working together and reciprocal dialogue. One observer noted "people-to-people contact continues on a self-sustained path with intra-IBSA tourism, … cultural interaction and academic collaboration having solid momentum" (Sooklal, 2014).

The Brasilia Declaration shows that the formation of IBSA was not an act of randomness, impulsiveness or altruism, but a deliberative and common grand design. I would venture that it was given voice by a suppressed, unconscious notion, harking back to its established ideals, forged over decades past. This view is supported by respondents of a semi-structured interview to this thesis. The Brazilian ambassador to South Africa, Pimentel, describes

> the nineties [as] a period of great conferences and debate. Brazil and India perceived that it was important to work together, even though we did not know each other too well. From ninety-four onward the world expected much from South Africa. Although many countries wanted to join, the challenge was to maintain the spirit of the special characteristics that the three countries have. Very important leadership positions, multi-ethnic, engrained democratic countries.
>
> (Pimentel, interview, 2011)

The Indian High Commissioner to South Africa, Gupta, emphasises political economy imperatives when he states that there was

> a strong desire on the part of IBSA centre [to] join together and strengthen ties and operations. [IBSA] [r]epresent the largest developing countries in their region, [to] fill the leadership vacuum. [It would] [f]eed into economic cordiality based on good political relations.
>
> (Gupta, interview, 2011)

International defence author Heitman concurs when he explains that IBSA is primarily a political imperative to engage the major powers. The three countries talking together have more clout (Heitman, interview, 2011). The similar positions taken by these respondents emphasise the centripetal commonalities or the 'ties that bind' India, Brazil and South Africa. On one hand an informal, 'collective consciousness'[28] worked towards shared identity criteria; which, on the other hand, was formalised by the Brasilia Declaration and subsequent entrenchment actions. The commonalities of the ties may be viewed as "a shared commitment to exploring and elucidating the theme of human emancipation" (Wyn Jones, 2001:9).

3.4.2 Shaping the (hybrid) identity and agenda of IBSA

Here, I follow up on the distinguishing communal traits of the emergent collective (hybrid) IBSA identity, discussed in section 3.3.2. In essence, IBSA seeks to optimise the synergy that a trilateral approach may bring about. Its main thrusts are centred around three core agendas, being multilateral reforms; enhanced coalitions of the South and development cooperation; and integrating the divergent goals of recognition and redistribution under a hybrid IBSA identity. On the one hand, the formation of IBSA constitutes a type of activism that (also) arose out of the frustration of the countries of the South with respect to perceived failings by the world's financial and economic forums. The yearning to overcome marginalisation, move towards emancipation, achieve dignity and assert its rightful place at the world high table in their quest for global equity, remains an important constituent force for the countries' foundation and 'resistance' from a postcolonial stance. But on the other hand, it cannot

[28] The term has specifically been used by social theorists like Durkheim, Althusser and Jung to explain how autonomous individuals come to identify with a larger group, and hence, how patterns of commonality among individuals bring legible unity to those structures (Piepmeyer, 2007).

be achieved 'at a distance', i.e. without engaging with the international system. The IBSA countries therefore also actively place issues on the agenda that would attempt to lessen the effects of marginalisation from mainstream world politics as part of an ideational agenda (Nel, 2010:951-974; Bayne & Woolcock, 2011:1-16). In support of this observation Zondi and Moore (2015:499-500) note that "[o]ver the years, IBSA sought to proactively coordinate negotiating positions that placed social equity at the center of their demands during multilateral negotiations including the Doha Round of Trade Negotiations,[29] environment, climate change, and during periodic reviews of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)" (see also Shongwe, 2015:71-77).

According to Taylor (2009:45-58), the IBSA Dialogue Forum plan of action shows that its formation is a new force in international relations, that has seen three of the strongest economies of the South in a regional axis for the first time. In the contemporary international sphere, regional cooperation is a necessity to promote members' national agendas. Sotero (2009:2) argues that a "trans-regional grouping such as IBSA allows for sharing of best practices between the three member countries and strengthens the voice of the developing world as a whole". In the present recovery phase of a recent world economic crisis and evolving international relations patterns, IBSA's existence may be more pertinent than before.

This kind of regional collaboration is also significant because, when states share common values, and are engaged in the dynamics of mercantile trade and the exchange of ideas and higher-level ideals, those states may perceive that they operate according to regulative functions that tie them together, and they also ensure that institutions that were jointly created are managed together (Watson, 1991:16). Through shared ideas and practices as well as social learning separate entities come to act collectively as a single international or interstate society. In such a case, "member states, though politically independent, are not absolutely separate entities but parts of a

[29] Regarded as an achievement for developing countries, a pro-development round of negotiations was launched in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, with negotiation power fortified by China's accession to the WTO in the same year. The Doha round of negotiations aims for greater inclusivity by integrating the interests of poorer countries (interests include reducing or removing trade barriers and agricultural subsidies in the global North). Reactively, it has widened the gulf between the global South and the global North, with the heart of the issue lying in the structure of global economic power; and it remains contentious (Zondi & Moore, 2015:491).

whole. In such cases each sovereign and individual state has not achieved its civilization and standard of living, and the needs and aspirations of its people, in isolation, but has only been able to do so within the wider society" (Watson, 1991:16).

IBSA's 'common positions' postulated in the preceding paragraphs (section 3.3.2) do not go unchallenged within their respective regions. The nature of international relations means that it is fraught with political conflict. It has become clear that regional leadership may be presumptuous, and contestation tends to undermine the three IBSA states' leadership claims (Kornegay, 2013). Flemes and Wojczewski (2010:1-34) note that these tend to detract from regional powers' position on the global stage. All three countries have placed the eradication of poverty in prime position on its national agenda. Here, some formidable challenges await: all three IBSA countries have high unemployment figures, do poorly on corruption indices and have high income disparity levels; which tend to foment regular (often violent) social unrest (Qobo, 2013:8). The IBSA countries also face challenges that relate to accountability in a democratic society. In this virtual IBSA region, there are often debates about the quality of elected and appointed officials, where nepotism, cronyism, corruption and incompetence may serve to erode democratic institutions and structures. (At continental level Cornelissen (2009:21) observes with respect to South Africa that it has been "alerted … to the difficult diplomatic path that still lies ahead for it in establishing its prominence on the continent" (see also Alden & Schoeman, 2013:111-129)). These authors conclude that its management – i.e. to regionally and continentally ensure the amiable achievement of convergent goals at international level – will remain an important challenge, and one not to be underestimated.

IBSA continues to be an expansive construct that extends beyond conceptual borders into enactments (White, 2009:1; Amorim, 2006:9-11; Sotero, 2009:1-23; Masters & Landsberg, 2015:343-357). These issues are subjected to critical evaluation in Chapter 7. Masters and Landsberg (2015:354) draw the conclusion that "the IBSA Dialogue Forum is considered by many supporters to be a highly valuable political agreement. It has shown that shared experiences assist in building synergies", where they also note increased participation by the business sector. Thus, IBSA has extended beyond a mere foreign policy and diplomatic construct to the level of diplomatic practices,

interactions and transactions, discussed in the next section.

3.5 PROCESSES OF COMMUNICATION: IBSA'S DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN POLICY DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES

This section further progresses along the pillars developed in Chapter 2. It moves along the foundation set earlier as part of structures and practices by highlighting the interactions and transactions of agents. The net effect as the communications processes get enacted. The communication processes comprise the transactions of diplomacy, foreign policy and the shaping of discourse, and such permeate social learning. This section firstly analyses diplomacy as a mechanism that forms part of discourse and move towards a socially constituted world that states can make their own. As a function of diplomatic endeavour, secondly, IBSA was created which in turn arose from IBSA's foreign policies, the management of which are integrated into this section. The part that follows elaborates on the theoretical tenets of discourse and language that were discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.5.3) and draws on the work of Epstein (2013:499-519; 2008:1-16). I show the manner in which diplomacy and foreign policy work towards shaping and converging the collective's hybrid identity. The section ends by reviewing the management structures and it analyses how management dynamics build upon the construct that is IBSA.

3.5.1 An overview of diplomacy and foreign policy

Both these areas of study are notoriously elusive, and scholars note that foreign policy's broad swathe and its subjects contribute to its complexity (Graham Fry, Goldstein & Langhorn, 2001; Walt, 2005:23-48). Diplomacy (political instruments) is but one of several in the foreign policy toolset to enable the achievement of foreign policy objectives. Other instruments or methods of implementation include economic techniques (persuasion and coercion), psychological techniques (propaganda, subversion, intimidation) and military techniques (war and armed force that is short of war) (du Plessis, 2002:116; Hughes, 2004:114). The complexities of these subjects are due to a compelling range of factors. Societies and the political conditionalities change constantly, and the question is raised about the circumstances under which

they change. This comprises a major theme in terms of the 'radical' contribution of constructivism, namely that the international system is socio-politically constructed and a product of qualitative human composition and interaction. Given this perspective, it follows that "[m]ost societies, leaders and led, have been incapable of adapting themselves voluntarily and peacefully to fundamentally new conditions *by anticipating the necessary changes*" (Fromm, 1961:4; original emphasis).

Both foreign policy and diplomacy suffer from definitional ambivalence. Vale and Mphaisha (1999:89) propose a broad functionality to foreign policy, by noting that it "is the sum total of all activities by which the international actors act, react and interact with the environment beyond their national borders". From this, two important deductions need to be made: firstly, that foreign policy is the articulation of a country's distinguishing traits and identity, therefore the 'what'; secondly, that sovereign states are not the only members of the international network (Dunne, 2010:144) and therefore need to interact and communicate – and this regulates the 'how' activities of their diplomacy.

3.5.2 Situating IBSA within the global diplomatic environment

Diplomacy is a form of interactive and reciprocal dialogue, and I stress three attributes of diplomacy: As it relates to states; the role that it plays in communication and negotiation; and the qualities of process that it possesses. Diplomats continue to perform five base functions that relate to ordering its state's mutual interactions, namely communication, negotiation, intelligence gathering, minimisation of friction and performing the symbolic actions demanded by the protocols of world affairs (White, 2005:397). In reference to the 'classic' functioning of diplomacy after IBSA's first decade, the three IBSA ministers of foreign affairs "underscored that IBSA has succeeded in laying strong foundation [*sic*] for multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral cooperation in a wide range of areas. They noted with satisfaction the positive results of IBSA coordination in various organizations and groupings, including: UN, WTO,

WIPO,[30] Group of 20 (G20), Group of 24 (G24), BRICS and BASIC" (IBSA Joint Communiqué, 2013; Shongwe, 2015:2).

The twenty-first century has heralded new and more inclusive approaches to diplomacy, noted further in this section. Many of these functions lie within the domain of critical social constructivism, as they are the means by which the identity of a state is conveyed through its discourse and speech acts. Austin (1961:220-239) notes that utterances are dialogue in action, and that such "performative" (Austin, 1961:220) sentences stated by an authority can change the state of the world.

The sources and impact of diplomatic innovation, much of it as a result of globalisation, has seen innovative forms of diplomacy. The various types of diplomacy can be envisioned as being placed along a continuum that starts with unilateral diplomacy on one end, and moves through to polylateral diplomacy at the other end. The various types of diplomacy are not immutable or discrete, but tend to contract and expand, overlap and form lacunas. I submit that these changes represent clear linkages to critical social constructivism. The more intense involvement by a multidimensional set of (transnational) actors highlights the iterative mutuality and accrual of benefits that can be derived from interactive and innovative processes. Those that follow all have IBSA participation to varying degrees.

Niche diplomacy tends to originate from smaller or middle powers that have specialised areas of knowledge, which are then gainfully utilised to effect positive outcomes. Examples includes water diplomacy (van Genderen & Rood, 2011), human rights (Smith, 2001:77-94) and diamond management diplomacy (Cooper, 2013:45). A vital form of niche diplomacy is energy diplomacy, which comprises the use of foreign policy to enable sustainable energy sourcing beyond national borders, so as to ensure multi-sectoral energy cooperation. De Jesus (2013:505) records that "[a]t the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, memoranda of understanding issued forth regarding cooperation on biofuels, wind energy, and solar energy. Also, through

[30] World Intellectual Property Organisation.

IBSA, Brazil began efforts in biofuel technical cooperation in Africa". This topic will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5.

Economic diplomacy in a narrow state-to-state context refers to states seeking investment and economic growth and development in their territories. But in a collective (trilateral) state effort such as IBSA it also shows how economic diplomacy can be quite an effective instrument of change or advocacy for states. Collectively, soon after its formation, the IBSA countries led opposition to developed-world positions at the WTO summit in Cancún, Mexico. This position was in line with the IBSA Brasilia Declaration that "emphasized how important it is that the results of the current round of trade negotiations provide especially for the reversal of protectionist policies and trade-distorting practices, by improving the rules of the multilateral trade system". In the process, former Brazilian minister of external affairs Amorim notes that since 2003, IBSA helped to create a developing-world bloc within the WTO that had an important role in changing the WTO's model of negotiation. Furthermore, the participation of developing countries (including the poorer ones) gave the process more legitimacy (Amorim, 2010:219; see also du Preez, 2007). Diplomacy in the service of development has become an important instrument and to a degree a necessity for less-developed countries, with the proviso that it is sustainable (Pigman, 2014). Masters and Landsberg (2015:343) are of the opinion that "it is in the area of development cooperation that IBSA has found its niche in demonstrating the possibilities that development diplomacy and South–South cooperation avail". Lastly, to broaden the field of economic diplomacy the recognition of firms as actors in international relations, and associated state-firm and firm-firm negotiations (Strange, 1992:1-15) present (hybrid) opportunities for IBSA's domestic and endogenous expansion.

Diplomacy also has preventative aims – where "detection and early intervention should be as honored in international relations as crisis management and political negotiation" (Cahill, 1996:4; see also Lund, 1999:3-30; Ramcharan, 2008:10-24, 149-174; Babbitt, 2012:349-388). This applies to IBSA and its global South outreach, where it continues to issue joint declarations concerning its position on international conflict-related issues (see for example, the IBSA press statements on the situation in

Syria (10 August 2014) and the Middle East peace process (23 August 2013) (IBSA Dialogue Forum)). The IBSA countries' 2010-2012 imbricated terms in the interchanging positions on the UN Security Council presented them with new opportunities to direct world affairs in a joint manner.

Du Plessis (2008:87-119) draws attention to a paradox, the concept of 'defence diplomacy' that fuses two apparently incommensurable extremes, namely violent-coercive (armed force) and pacific-persuasive (diplomatic) means to pursue policy objectives. The IBSA Declaration calls for defence cooperation, and defence diplomatic efforts commenced with their navies' cooperation in 2008 with Exercise IBSAMAR.[31] Taking the three countries' regional defence capabilities into consideration, much has been done, and there remains much untapped work in the area of defence diplomacy; a subject explored in Chapter 6.

Viewed from the perspective of the socio-political construction role of diplomacy, public diplomacy (PD) consists of three layers, in essence a shift from monologue to dialogue to collaboration, where the correct application may bring about "social capital" (Cowen & Arsenault, 2008:23; see also Wolf, Jr. & Rosen, 2004:1-23; Snow & Taylor, 2008). Its positive outcomes can buttress democracy, enhance reciprocal trust and reduce inter-cultural or tribal conflict. The convergences between PD and social constructivism are noted, as neither accepts the primary position of material forces in determining results. Both present "an alternative model of practice that understands the normative and ideational structures underpinning audience identities and gains influenced by engaging through the shared understandings of this intersubjective dimension, including social interaction and interplay" (Byrne, 2012:2). Byrne concludes that "[b]oth deal in the currencies of identity, ideas, culture, values and norms" (Byrne, 2012:7). This may be applied to the IBSA construct, where a number of summits and other high-level conclaves have confirmed its common position in pursuing global South agendas that do not prioritise the primacy of material forces for developing nations. With regard to new initiatives with the Middle East peace process, IBSA noted "[w]e hope this renewed effort will lead to the full and

[31] IBSAMAR stands for India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime Exercise.

overdue realization of a two-state solution based on 1967 border" (IBSA, 2013a). In respect of the ongoing Syrian situation, and

> [r]ecalling the IBSA initiative of August 2011 to send a joint delegation to Damascus to engage the Syrian government, the Ministers maintained that the crisis in Syria should be resolved through an inclusive Syrian-led political process supported by the United Nations and the international community, in the interests of the Syrian people, the region and the world.
>
> (IBSA, 2013b)

Although the IBSA Syria initiative did not lead to success, Gowan (2013) notes that it "raised the possibility that these non-Western democracies could play a pivotal role in global crisis management" (see also Deen, 2011:n.p.; Badie, 2012:158; Bhaduri, 2013:n.p.).

While trilateral diplomacy is a unique form of multilateral diplomacy, two other terms for the new diplomacy has been noted by Hocking and Kelly (2002:208), namely 'associative diplomacy' and 'minilateralism'. In addition, Alcides (2009:slide 1) puts forward the term 'plurilateralism'. In a sense it captures the spirit of the cooperation within this particular trilateral construct of diplomacy between India, Brazil and South Africa. IBSA as a plurilateral forum commits to the global South, and their status as developing middle powers imbue them with the legitimacy to intercede where required in regional and international processes. Thus, it is apparent that the "political leverage and normative legitimacy for IBSA and the new plurilateralism, will lie in their collective understanding if they use this power for greater common interest of as many people and countries as possible. The potential of this form of plurilateral network can help form a bridge between G-20 and G-77" (Chenoy, 2010:5). This practice of trilateral global South-based diplomacy is facilitated by the hybrid nature of the IBSA collective. Its hybridity assists in the reclamation of cultural spaces. The deconstruction of intangible barriers through the attributes of hybridity, gives rise to potential of enhanced public policy that could positively affect social and other human security elements. Constructs such as the IBSA collective also facilitate the notion that context/location is a critical component in identity analysis (Yazdiha, 2010:36-37).

One can therefore assert that pro-active management of these new diplomatic energies, including the IBSA collective participation, can induce positive changes. Tying this to social constructivism, Davenport (2002:19) observes that "the spread of democracy around the world has created a greater sense of expectation, even entitlement, in policymaking of all kinds … the power of ideas, … has come to the fore". As mentioned in the introduction to this section – accentuating the importance of intercommunication and the sense of community (from Chapter 2, sections 2.3.1 and 2.7) – diplomacy can therefore be seen in two contexts. Primarily, it energises the ideational forces of states. Secondly, it foregrounds the global South and South-South cooperation in terms of world politics and to a degree with respect to IR theory. As matters progress, these forces expand to encompass civil society and economic activities. Change wrought by diplomacy itself become discursive items, which when agreed upon are engendered by foreign policy. Accordingly, the three IBSA countries' foreign policies are reviewed in terms of their convergences for creating a community of sorts.

3.5.3 Foreign policy as discursive expressions of collective but hybrid state identity(ies): Indian, Brazilian and South African convergences

Due to the fact that IBSA seeks to speak and act 'as one', this section underscores the merging of the individual states into the collective. This is done by reviewing the IBSA states' foreign policy, with the aim of identifying common positions that aid the conjoined voice of the collective. So, although diplomacy and foreign policy are inextricably linked, they are not interchangeable notions. Gibson (1944:2) too, notes that "the best possible policy is lifeless without a competent diplomacy to make it work. Diplomacy, on the other hand, is aimless without a recognized policy to guide it". Copeland (2009) expands the notion of foreign policy, and uses the term 'international policy' broadened to include all the actions that national governments perform beyond their borders. This concept forms part of international discourse that is utilised to understand contemporary communication and to make projections of future trends. Copeland (2009:7) contrasts this with "an older and more familiar term, *foreign policy*, which was transacted exclusively between states and was primarily the domain of foreign ministries and heads of state or government" (original emphasis).

Within the context of this study I equate Copeland's notion of foreign policy with the traditional approach. The second-generation approach to foreign policy was a product of the expansion of states in the 1970s, challenging the assumptive positions of realism and Western thinking in foreign policy. These approaches utilise different methodologies; they espouse critical alternatives (including postmodernism and gender perspectives); embrace comparative studies that look beyond solely Western viewpoints; and include creative factors, such as those in parentheses, that had previously not entered the subject area. As such, it is an emergent approach, but developing rapidly.

If I note the factors that make up the 'critical foreign policy approach', it equates to foreign policy that reflects the position of peripheral or less developed states (du Plessis, 2002:122-124). In line with the theoretical foundation of this study, the same author notes that "[m]ost peripheral states did not develop organically, but were imposed from outside … Consequently, in the periphery state, foreign policy becomes an instrument to achieve domestic goals, driven by the imperatives of capital accumulation, state legitimacy, social stability and government maintenance" (du Plessis, 2002:123). Without an understanding of these weaknesses and tactics, the voice of the peripheral states can not be heard. How the IBSA states seek penetration and change into the global South and also affect global governance, is a function of their respective and joined foreign policies.

How does India exercise its foreign policy in a manner that is commensurate with its constitutional and normative principles, and in view of the challenges that it faces as the world's largest democracy? Ganguly (2010:1) notes, among others, systemic factors that created a phase of "ideational foreign policy", which included adhering to the principles of non-alignment, non-colonialism and non-racialism. Modern India, however, embraces innovative approaches and has adapted to changed circumstances. Examples include securing relations with neighbouring states, a propitious 'Act East policy', enhanced relations with the United States, Germany, Australia (a civil nuclear agreement) and Japan, as well as a regular Africa Summit that hosts African leaders (Sajjanhar, 2016). India's minister of external affairs also gave notice of India's

perceived vision of being at the table of the world's major powers, when she said in May 2011 that "India has a keen sense of our potential to be a great power by virtue of our population, our resources and our strategic location" (Rao, 2011). Having had national elections in 2014, the dynamics of India's foreign – and domestic – policies may well change. However, it is anticipated that for the time being India will stay the course, not least because the country is bound by many protocols and regimes (written and unwritten rules) that limit foreign policy adventurism.

Ribeiro (2001:12-30) gives a succinct summary of both the development and the dynamics of Brazil's extant foreign policy. Occupying almost half the area of South America and having borders with nine neighbours, has meant that from the early stages of Brazil's history, diplomacy has had to be a large part of establishing its frontiers during often delicate border disputes, thus completing its sense of national identity. The great social challenge for Brazil is the struggle for inclusive and sustainable development so as to achieve a more just society, and reflect these principles in its international dealings as a 'good world citizen'. The requirement to confront domestic issues is a key driver. Over recent years, the focus had shifted to the attainment of greater balance in world affairs by, among others, ensuring that unilateralism becomes disempowered (by combining with other nations in 'soft balancing'), by attempting structural change of the UN (discussed in Chapter 1) (Brazilian Ministry of External Relations: 'Meet the Ministry', 2014). Concomitantly it enhances bilateral, trilateral and multilateral relations that add value to its political, economic and regional power bases. The new direction entrenches relations and draws benefits from such exchanges; and ensures that agreements augment the country's developmental agenda.

South Africa's foreign policy has developed significantly since the advent of democracy in 1994. Since then, South Africa has consistently played a more expansive role in international relations, when compared to other states with similar country data. Hughes (2004:1-5) puts forward reasons for this eminent position, being the post-apartheid dividend, based on the singularity of its success in achieving democratic status through skilful use of conflict resolution, reconciliation and constitution-building. Further, there are opportunities presented by changed global

circumstances to reconstruct multilateral forums in order to achieve greater equity, i.e. to effect agency. This new role also presents challenges in ensuring consistency and the application of human resource capacities. In a multiplexed environment, change demands pro-active management. Hence, it emphasises that "[c]entral to South Africa's national interest is the challenge of eradicating poverty, developing its people and creating prosperity, not only in South Africa, but also in the region and on the Continent. … The success of South Africa's foreign policy is also the sine qua non for achieving South Africa's domestic priorities" (DIRCO Strategic Plan, 2013-2018:11). The strategic objective for International Cooperation (Programme 3) is to actively take part "in international organisations and institutions in line with South Africa's national values and foreign policy objectives" (DIRCO Strategic Plan 2013-2018:18-20 (Programmes 2 & 3); IBSA Joint Communiqué, 2013).

This overview underscores that when viewed separately each country's foreign policy already reflects the hybrid character of IBSA, made even more potent through their convergence into a collective. All three exercise their inherent power at various levels – regional, continental and also in cross-cutting political economy dimensions. Yet they also actively pursue the intangibles such as values, norms, morals and the ideational achievement of global equity. Their foreign policies reflect these aspirations to a level that is remarkable in its degree of coherence.

The final part of this section analyses the value that discourse and language brings to maintaining the energy (not only its continuance, but also its expanding functions) of the IBSA construct and the principles and values upon which it was founded. Adding to the discussion on 'discourse' in Chapter 2 (section 2.5.3, under critical social constructivism), Epstein defines discourse as

> a cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations about a specific object that frame that object in a certain way and, therefore, delimit the possibilities for action in relation to it. It is a structured yet open and dynamic entity. … A *powerful* discourse is, quite simply, one that makes a difference.
>
> (Epstein, 2008:2; original emphasis)

In a manner of speaking, discourse and language provide the bond that connects the 'what' of foreign policy with the 'how' of diplomacy; it shapes reality. It calls to mind the powerful and spiralling effect that denotes important attributes of social constructivism, namely that ideas and meaningful, consistent language influence government leaders, mercantilists, political activists and other stakeholders. This, I submit, provides validation for the observation that discourse embues social and material realitities with meaning. Via discourse the trajectory of individuals, communities, states and regions garner perspectives of themeselves, their cultural constructs and their world (Epstein, 2008:2). Epstein also reminds us that

> [l]anguage thus continues to provide precious resources for breaking open the corsets of universals and returning to the contingent, the particular and the empirical. The signifying systems at play in specific historical contexts, or discourses, thus constitute the focal points of constitutive theorizing concerned with the making of the social.
>
> (Epstein, 2013:515)

For IBSA it means that their trilateral diplomacy and security collaboration (as linked to the pillar of communication processes (Chapter 2, section 2.7)) serve as an important means not only for forging a common identity but also to challenge Western universal knowledge of how the world should work. Such collective meaning-making through IBSA's foreign policy exchange does not imply that the three countries always speak with one voice (as homogeneous agents). In fact, in a postcolonial understanding the individual and collective hybrid character of IBSA is ever present, fluid and always constitutive of both reformist and emancipatory aspirations and practices. Thus in critical-constructivist fashion (imbued with the tenets of postcolonialism), the discursive practices discussed in this section generate renewed structures that create and develop the identities of the actors and their interests intermestically.

3.6 CONSOLIDATION OF IBSA'S SECURITY COLLABORATION: FROM TRANSACTIONS (STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES) TO SECURE DEVELOPMENT

This section draws together all the pillars that have been utilised in this chapter in order to synthesise the concepts into a cohesive process. Specifically the section analyses both the 'Structures and Practices' and 'Communication practices' blocks from the conceptual pillars developed in Chapter 2 (section 2.7) to analyse whether and to what extent agency was effected through interaction and transactions; and whether it had led to social learning as well as mutual trust and collective identity. This activity would also serve as a precursor to the final section of the chapter, the evaluation.

It was noted in Chapter 2 (sections 2.4.2, 2.5.3 and 2.7) that IBSA's security is enhanced by the actions of agents that transform the structural attributes of power and knowledge into transactional communicative experiences and altered social facts. Thus, shared ideas and processes of communications (including foreign policy and diplomacy) translate into concrete actions, interactions and joint projects (transactions). Within these interactions transnational social learning occur, which in turn reinforces a beneficent cycle that aids the collective's developmental aims. Accordingly, I next synoptically explore the structures and the associated IBSA methodological and communication processes that agents use to actualise ideation.

The IBSA Dialogue Forum centres around four pivots. These are political consultations, multilateral cooperation agenda, trilateral sectoral and person-to-person cooperation; and the IBSA Fund.

Political consultations involve high-level interactions among the IBSA partners, at which common positions on issues of mutual interest are formulated. They occur generally during ministerial and Summit levels, but also at other international gatherings including on the fringes of the United Nations General Assembly or among IBSA officials in Geneva and New York. A Trilateral Commission of Foreign Ministers advises heads of state. Their support lie in each country's ministry of foreign

affairs, vested in senior officials that comprise 'focal points'. No permanent secretariat exists.[32] Although the secretariat structure is non-permanent, it still effectively utilises the embedded elements of power and knowledge within the collective, and it ties in with the loosely coupled security community notion (Adler & Barnett, 1998:37, 47). The foreign ministers meet on an annual basis, with the hosts rotating among the three countries. After the first three-year round, the interaction was elevated to Summit level, with the first being hosted by Brazil in 2006. Further Summits were held, with the foreign ministers' meeting preceding the summit level engagements.

For leadership to gather as required at summits and ministerial meetings demonstrates political will and commitment to the IBSA collective. Five Summits have been held thusfar.[33] The paucity in IBSA's transactions were noted in Chapter 1 (section 1.1), with the idea that these hitches may be a temporary state of affairs. To this end, the statement by both the Indian and South African leaders that they agreed that "South Africa will host the 8th Trilateral Commission Meeting, and the 6th IBSA Summit will be hosted by India next year [2017]" (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2016) is a welcome sign of rejuvenation.

Multilateral cooperation reflects the IBSA collective's joint views on an array of issues, with an emphasis on the enhancement of global governance. Included are issues that relate to UN reform, globalisation, public international law, international peace and security, sustainable development, a collective voice at the WTO (Qobo, 2013:2), as well as global environmental issues. According to Zondi and Moore, "[f]inance and economy ministers of IBSA hold caucuses ahead of all G20 summits and advise their leaders during their own caucuses on the sidelines of the summits as to how to practically advance and defend their common agenda for global reform" (Zondi & Moore, 2015:500). These interactions highlight IBSA's continual support for multilateral fora.

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[32] This system has advantages and drawbacks. The main advantages are that rotation gives each country the opportunity to flexibly facilitate joint progress, and the cost of a permanent body is negated, resulting in optimised resources. The main disadvantage is that some continuity and the associated momentum that the collective requires may be lost.

[33] 1st IBSA Summit – 2006, Brasilia, Brazil; 2nd IBSA Summit – 2007, Tshwane, South Africa; 3rd Summit – 2007, New Delhi, India; 4th Summit – 2010, Brasilia, Brazil; 5th Summit – 2011, Tshwane, South Africa.

Trilateral sectoral cooperation has been covered (Chapter 1, section 1.2.3 and footnote 8), and this study focuses on three of the sixteen working groups. The working groups act as a mainstay to energise trilateral cooperation and projects in specific areas. An important objective is to exchange experience, technical prowess and complementary resources (John de Sousa, 2007:4).

The identification and involvement of (trilateral) people-to-people contact is another area of specialisation. There appears to be ongoing attempts to bolster bottom-up civil society participation, geared towards greater inclusivity and participative democratic validity, and the details are noted in Chapter 2 (footnote 21). In such interpersonal contact arenas social influence, persuasion and the desire for acceptance all form constitutive elements of the socialisation process (Barnett, 2008:161). Yet, while official communiqués list the civil society interaction, there is sparse data of progress and levels of involvement. This indicates that this facet is deficient in its ambit and application; and that much more engagement is required for this sphere to be successful. The irony is that IBSA's constructive baselines is predicated upon a bottom-up, inclusive network.

Different facets of the IBSA Fund have also been dealt with (Chapter 1, sections 1.1 and 1.3; Chapter 2, section 2.3.1), and stand out as a beacon project for the collective. Masters and Landsberg (2015:343-357) provide a noteworthy overview of the process and achievements (see also Sotero, 2009:11; IBSA and UNDP press release, 2011), and observe that "[o]ne of the challenges facing development diplomacy is that diplomats and development specialists often worked in silos, with their own distinct practices and aims. This is what makes the IBSA Facility for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger (IBSA Fund) a unique instrument indeed, as it brings together these emerging development assistance partners and their respective diplomatic and development experiences" (Masters & Landsberg, 2015:348; see also Zondi & Moore, 2015:494). At the same time, through the IBSA Fund, the collective is demonstrating its hybrid character, as the domain of development diplomacy has traditionally been a preserve of the global North. The fact that the Fund is administered via the United Nations reiterates its active support of and trust in international multilateral institutions; while also establishing sound intercommunication.

I submit, in view of the foregoing, that there are credible linkages between the structures and practices of IBSA through enduring communications processes. I also argue that the actions of agents ensure that interaction and transactions take place regularly at various levels, so that social learning occurs in cycles of mutual reinforcement, which Hurrell (1995b:64) calls "cognitive interdependence". Over time discursive practices amalgamate towards mutual trust and identity, so that new forms of co-operation and community can emerge, that in turn lay potent foundations for the formation of hybrid identities. The end result makes IBSA's hybridity more than merely the recognition of differences within the collective. It also means "recognizing affiliations, cross-pollinations, echoes, and repetitions, thereby unseating difference from a position of absolute privilege" (Felski, 1997: 12).

3.7 EVALUATION

In this final section of the chapter, I offer a preliminary evaluation of IBSA's processes and nature of identity/community building. These insights and conclusions will be revisited in Chapter 7 (Conclusion). I first summarise the content (that comprise much information, making for 'thick' input levels) and main conclusions of the chapter as these align with the pillars of Chapter 2, after which I reflect on whether the key objectives of the chapter have been met.

I utilise the theoretical framework pillars identified in Chapter 2, detailed in Diagram 2.1 at the end of that chapter to shed light on the nature of IBSA's socio-political evolution and identity convergence. In essence, the pillars span the bridge to the practices of IBSA. Thus I commence with IBSA's pre-social formative factors and then proceed to issues that served to build upon common histories. This serves as basis for the reinforcement of identity, and I locate the source of the collective's formation (from ideation to fruition). Thereafter I dwell on its merging, social learning and collective actions as a unit. I end with its inner workings that are founded upon mutual trust, show how subjectivities are formed through power relations (Ozkazanc-Pan, 2009:18), and its collective but hybrid identity.

Much of the bridge-span is therefore provided by the enduring theme of the hybrid nature of the IBSA construct. The collective's hybridity was shown to be a durable trait. It facilitates the collective's task since it provides it with credibility when viewed by both the global South partners and global North 'adversaries' and eases movement through the international arena. But on the other hand, such international engagements are also complex and paradoxical because they often display a reformist and legitimising role rather than a transformatory posture. In theory, the latter can only work optimally if the IBSA collective 'dislodges itself' from the global system – an option that clearly is not feasible. The duality therefore is a 'given' which has to be iteratively (re)negotiated, balanced and evened-out.

First to be reviewed, was the shared historical experiences and the subsequent ideational shift towards solidarity. The establishment of a common term of oppression that encapsulated the various types of subjugation that the IBSA states faced, lay the groundwork for the building of mutual recognition and identification with one another. Looking through the IBSA states' histories in a non-linear way provided significant perspectives. In particular it showed that similar histories energise community-building and the construction of identity; whereby common issues caused actors to view others in the same condition, with solidarity. Having had leaders of quality aided the enactment of ideational processes, prior to and after liberation. Parts of these enactments were also articulated in written form, in democratic processes that culminated in national constitutions that are living documents and ideational beacons. The fact that IBSA (as with much of the world) is at present in unsettled conditions, has not detracted from constant improvements to structures, both at national and at IBSA level. This is evidenced by the fact that – even despite the 'intrusion' of the BRICS edifice – IBSA displays durable energy levels (the IBSA Fund continues, plans are afoot for a Summit in India in 2017, the latest edition of the maritime Exercise IBSAMAR took place in February 2016).

With respect to the influence of ideas on the formation of IBSA's hybrid identity, I noted the following: There have been early impacts on the political comradeship and the creation of a robust identity among the elite, passed on to their peoples, giving rise to the 'spirit of Bandung'. Even to today 'the spirit' remains a potent cohesive force.

IBSA was created to lend credence and reinforce conceptual positions closely linked to that of the global South. This connection has sustained the concept over time and distance, and its universality has given rise to the possibility of world reform – an issue that is a core value. In the period where the IBSA states as self-appointed champions of the Southern world are not tethered to the colonial struggle any longer, the opportunity to use its collective strength is a potent force for change. Their often-conflicting leadership roles at various levels, together with the vision of an emancipated world having greater balance, testify to the fact that the IBSA collective is a hybrid and evolving construct that is more than the sum of the individual states.

The impetus of IBSA was highlighted, showing how the collective developed from ideation to actualisation through the actions of agents. In many ways it was an audacious move, recognition that it was time for voices of the global South to be heard; to reconceptualisation of human-centred security and solidarist leadership.

Having seen to the formal establishment of IBSA, by now viewed and experienced not as three separate states in this chapter, but as a converged hybrid identity collective; it was appropriate to look at its processes of communications. Specifically, the processes related to diplomacy and foreign policy were analysed. Firstly, it was confirmed that IBSA favours multilateral-type diplomacy, as this style of diplomacy accords it a full voice in open fora. It was also established that a number of innovative new types of diplomatic endeavours had in recent times been implemented, much of these efforts quite specialised. It is to the credit of IBSA that the collective is actively involved in a range of these diplomatic undertakings, both widening and deepening its impact.

Further, the chapter reviewed the consolidation of IBSA's security collaboration, particularly transactional processes that energise given structures (structures that possess knowledge and power). The four fulcrums – political consultations; multilateral cooperation agenda; trilateral sectoral and person-to-person cooperation; and the IBSA Fund – were surveyed. Generally, it was found that in the thirteen years of its existence, much had been done; both horizontally (in terms of the scope of activities) and vertically (in terms of the depth and specialised – even technical – areas

of endeavour).[34] The IBSA Fund came in for praise, even though its contribution may be somewhat modest when viewed from hegemonic powers' stance. The Fund has made inroads into development diplomacy, previously a niche area for the global North. The Fund's curatorship under the UNDP underscores IBSA's commitment to and faith in international multilateral institutions. It was also, however, noted that much energy has been lost in recent years, which probably coincides with the rise of BRICS, as well as internal turmoil (notably in South Africa and Brazil) that dissipated IBSA's focused energy. There appears to be a chance that IBSA is not all at sea though, what with the next Summit mooted to be held in 2017 in India.

In sum, this chapter has aligned the pillars that had been devolved from the previous chapter onto the IBSA countries, separately and as a cohesive, hybrid-identity global South grouping.

In the final section of this evaluation, I revisit the two objectives and/or research questions related to this chapter. The overall aim is to apply the conceptual pillars identified in Chapter 2 to the various areas of IBSA's security cooperation. This I sought to do by meeting two specific objectives, as follows. –

Firstly, I identify the historical, normative, endogenous and exogenous linkages that are common to the IBSA states through analyses of historical information, IBSA policies and declarations. There are clear historical patterns that resonate among the trilateral collective and provide touchstones. Supported by Said's observation on the "interdependence of various histories *on* one another and the necessary interaction of contemporary societies *with* one another" (Said, 1994:38 original emphasis), I aver that hybrid identity formation became intertwined into their particular historical relationship. A number of normative issues in the form of statements, founding documents, intent and agency, noted above, attest to the collective's consistent principles of behaviour. Endogenously, all three IBSA states show principled positions *from within* their states that provide the states with mandates and the resources to perform actions to enhance socio-economic equity beyond the confines of their own

[34] More detail to be provided in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

borders and within the global South. These positions are both inferred and explicit. Exogenously, the assumptive leadership within their regions and presumptive as global South champions, provide the IBSA states with reinforcing linkages; which are mutually strengthened (as indicated by the two-way relationships (in Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1) between hybrid identities formation and redistribution, resistance, emancipation, recognition as well as reform).

Turning to the second objective and/or research question, I submit that a qualitative correlation exists between the theoretical tenets and the values, knowledge and power that IBSA displays in the conduct of their transactions and their states (and others) as agents. There are clear linkages with (critical) social constructivism in the collective enactment of human-centric security and post-Cold War regionalism. An attribute that stands out are the rivulets that flow towards and constitute the stream of hybrid identity formation, providing consistent linkages with a foundational postcolonial tenet. The processes are geared towards gaining traction in their quest for a greater distributive justice, their aims work towards social learning that develops into mutual trust and a collective identity. It may well be that the hybrid nature of the IBSA collective is moving towards optimal functionality, which may be enhanced if and when the re-energisation of the trilateral construct takes place in the short-term future.

Its hybrid character allows the IBSA construct to draw in both global South partners and global North participants in pursuit of their common agenda. Much of the issues in this chapter underscore the issue of the hybrid identity of IBSA, which in a way is the equivalent of a 'diplomatic passport', allowing the collective ingress and egress into regions, the global South and the developed world. Combined, the IBSA collective represents a potent global South change agent. Thus this chapter, I submit, has succeeded in lending an enhanced understanding to the IBSA concept and practice, exactly because of the alignment between the integrated theoretical pillars and the subject matter of this chapter.

In Chapter 1, section 1.2.3, I motivated the choice of the three case studies. Chapter 4, which follows, is the first of the three empirical chapters, and deals with IBSA's maritime trade cooperation as it relates to the promotion of economic human security.

CHAPTER 4: IBSA MARITIME TRADE COOPERATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY

4.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

In the previous chapter I described how the theoretical pillars integrated and enhanced the subject matter of that chapter as practiced in the construct of IBSA. Although I tilt the balance towards the empirical side of the scale in Chapter 4, I also extend theoretical insights from Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I critically analyse the functional area of maritime trade[35] cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa through the prism of an integrated theoretical framework, based on the conceptual pillars that were identified in Chapter 2 (section 2.7, Diagram 2.1). I further determine the implications for economic (human) security. This chapter works towards meaningful understanding of this sectoral contribution, in order to evaluate the socio-political construction of the collective's security collaboration. In so doing, it aims to answer the study's related research questions (see section 1.3 in Chapter 1): *What can we learn from IBSA's trilateral security cooperation in the area of maritime trade in respect of its implications for developing community and the fostering of shared identities?* And more specifically, *Does the IBSA collective contribute to economic security through increased maritime trade?*

These questions point towards two objectives, namely firstly, to critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the IBSA collective's security collaboration in maritime trade through an integrated theoretical framework; and secondly, to develop extensive knowledge about the maritime trade sector (working group interactions in particular) in order to facilitate a critical understanding of the implications for collective identity-construction.

The pillars used to support the reasoning in this chapter bring out issues that relate to the premise in Chapter 1 (section 1.3) where I postulate that the IBSA identity is made

[35] Excluded are landwards trade (as this is clearly impractical), and air cargo trade (which is severely limited in quantities when compared to maritime transport and a very expensive option).

up of multiple ambiguous and often contradicting aspects which can only be explained if viewed as a hybrid construction. In this chapter we see a reflection of this in the tensions between individual IBSA members' economic interest and co-option into a neoliberal world and the collective regional and international aspirations of IBSA to transform the global system. It follows that maritime trade may (or may not) generate trust and collectively work towards achieving greater balance between South/North maritime power relations. These factors combine in this chapter to provide a holistic understanding of the role and importance of maritime trade among the three IBSA maritime states and the possible effect on economic security.

Oceans' connectivity studies tend to resort in the margins of academia (Wigen & Harland-Jacobs, 1999:ii), and it is trusted that this chapter will highlight this defect in relation to sea blindness and its implications for economic security. Speller (2014:8) expresses it forcefully when he observes that the "public tend not to understand the use or importance of the sea, and politicians often share this handicap … This is … an inability to understand the sea or recognise … the importance of maritime trade to national and international well-being". In this way, the case study seeks to provide a greater understanding of the socio-political construction of economic security, a hallmark of both human security and security communities, by stressing the critical role of maritime trade and political economy in this sphere. For this purpose, I will identify and track progress of the IBSA working group's relevant historical and legal foundations for maritime and trade cooperation; including the processes and practices.

As a case study, the chapter involves the application of the methodology of case study research issues raised in Chapter 1. A large part of the chapter is devoted to outlining the maritime context of the colonial as well as its contemporary condition. I further engage in a 'thick' description of IBSA trade-related documents and intra-IBSA trade. The multiple information sources include observation, interviews and document analyses – interpreted through critical (discourse) analysis that is loosely applied. A positive effect is that this type of analysis would ensure that trustworthiness (Chapter 1, footnote 15) of this type of qualitative research is enhanced.

In terms of structure the chapter starts by providing context. I define and extrapolate appropriate observations of key maritime and trade concepts so that common understanding is achieved from the outset, with the inclusion of the delimitations of the two (main) oceans used for trade among the IBSA states. This is followed, in the second place, by an analysis of recent (contextual) developments in the maritime sphere, and how these changes and related challenges impact on the global South and Africa specifically. The third section on maritime histories avers that maritime histories are, in fact, economic histories. Further, this section explores the two oceans that India, Brazil and South Africa share as well as its colonial origins that forged the IBSA maritime foundations, and the manner and quality in which these were transferred to the post-colonial states. In pursuance of its postcolonial theoretical tenets, the fourth part focuses on IBSA maritime identities and the commonalities that lay the bedrock for present and future maritime trade cooperation – public international law. The latter includes the potential of international treaties to which the IBSA states are collectively bound, which may benefit developing countries through IBSA's intercession. This section also analyses experts' views with respect to maritime trade cooperation among the IBSA countries, to determine if a common identity exists, and if so, how it is being constructed. The final operative section of the chapter comprises the institutionalisation of legal foundations through IBSA's practices and analyses intra-IBSA maritime trade information that debates functional progress.

4.2 CONCEPTS AND CONTEXT: OCEANS, MARITIME TRADE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

The parameters laid out in this section aid the unfolding of this chapter, as it is necessary to situate it with respect to the ambit of economic security as it relates to maritime trade, the oceans' delimitation for this chapter, and what is meant by a maritime perspective. Globalisation navigates the world's oceans, and it brings value to the understanding of the chapter by referring to it by way of maritime trade and the international political economy.

4.2.1 Maritime trade and economic security

Maritime trade has to do with relations and connections across the seas. Maritime trade is therefore facilitated by maritime transport, safe and secure (i.e. under good governance regimes) regional and international sea trade lanes, quality port operations and maritime services, professional human resources and associated landward infrastructure. The subject matter therefore aligns well with concepts derived from regional security community-building such as maritime knowledge, power, agency, intercommunication and transactions that morph into transnationalism.

The United Nations maritime organisation states a clear link with economic security by noting that "[m]aritime activity has a key role to play in the alleviation of extreme poverty and hunger as it already provides an important source of income and employment for many developing countries …" (International Maritime Organisation, n.d.:n.p.). The Kampala Document (1991:9; Chapter 1, section 1.2.3) states that the "concept of security goes beyond military considerations; it embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, and community, local and national life". The Document also refers to South-South cooperation in the context of African states and other developing countries. It notes that there exists a great potential for the promotion of cooperation, and that the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP)[36] already serves as a framework for accelerating South-South trade. African countries should identify specific areas of benefit in the GSTP in the context of the continent's structural weaknesses. A shortcoming of the Kampala Document, however, is that it (naturally) stresses inter- and intra-African security and development, and in terms of maritime trade only refers to coastal (not inter-continental) shipping (Kampala Document, 1991:22) and makes only occasional references to South-South and North-South cooperation.

This perceived defect was rectified by the UN's critical report that noted the linkage between human development that is sustainable and stimulates economic growth, but

[36] GSTP is a preferential trade agreement (PTA) acceded to on 13 April 1988. Its aim is to increase trade between developing countries in the context of UNCTAD. Its came into effect on 19 April 1989, and its notification to the WTO was on 25 September 1989.

that at the same time ensures equitable sharing of its advantages. It renews the environment instead of harming it; it entitles people rather than diminish their worth and dignity; it empowers them rather than marginalise them. Thus "[e]conomic security requires an assured basic income – usually from productive and remunerative work, or in the last resort from some publicly financed safety net" (UNDP Human Development Report, 1994:iii, 25). As discussed in Chapter 2 (sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), a more expansive conceptualisation of security was required. One of the first to embrace the widened concept of security was Buzan (1991:19). He observed that economic security "concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power". In essence then it involves a greater number of actors that pursue the correlations between trade, productive yield and economics (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998:7). Thus, seen from various levels of analysis, economic security may be viewed as a situation whereby a steadfast source of financial income permits the continuation (and ideally, a rise) of an acceptable standard of living at present and in the medium-term future.

4.2.2 IBSA's oceans

This empirical study is geographically delimited to include the two great oceans, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. These oceans were traversed and explored, and ports were established by the European colonisers during the early modern history; and that still form the bulk of present world maritime trade routes. More specifically and contemporaneously (in terms of public international law conventions), I review the oceans that form the offshore of India, Brazil and South Africa, being the South Atlantic in the case of Brazil and South Africa, and the Indian Ocean for India and South Africa. Yet, a third, the Southern Ocean, needs to be noted. It comprises the southernmost seas of the world Ocean, south of 60°S latitude and enclosing Antarctica (Prescott & Schofield, 2005:531). I consider the IBSA interfaces at economic level within the Southern Ocean to be negligible at present, and hence it is not debated in this study. The Antarctic is increasingly becoming an area of dispute (Shapley, 1985:xi), for which further research will be recommended in Chapter 7 (Conclusion). South Africa is in a geostrategically central position as it shares these three oceans

(Bryer, 1997). The benefits that may accrue due to this fact will be evaluated, also in Chapter 7.

4.2.3 Maritime: A wide perspective

A common dictionary definition for 'maritime' is "[c]onnected with the sea, especially in relation to seaborne trade or naval matters" (Oxford), although I submit that its ambit is defective. This is because it is contemporary practice to make reference to the air and space above the sea, the sea bottom, as well as to the inclusion of the electro-magnetic spectrum; as these may relate to countries' maritime domains in terms of public international law.

Looking at further attributes of 'maritime', the authoritative naval scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan noted that the

> first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common … but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the world.
>
> (Mahan, 1890:25)

The oceans are, in many ways, socio-politically constructed. Steinberg (2001:209) saliently observes that the ocean is not a place, but it is a space "where social contradictions are worked through, social change transpires, and future social relations are imagined". The 'wide common' has five attributes, which feature an increasing focus on human development and interaction. It is a resource, a medium for transportation, a source of information, a means of dominion and has zones of sovereignty (van Rooyen, 2011:5; Brits & Nel, 2015:51). For millennia, the oceans were thought to be inexhaustible and boundless, and the doctrine of 'the freedom *of* the seas' was the established norm. Since the mid-twentieth century, this notion has changed to the extent that the concept of the 'freedom *for* the seas' now stands in opposition to erstwhile unilateral actions of usurpation and exploitation. The

difference between the two concepts also infers the inexorable and increasing regimes of new rules and standards that prevail in oceans governance. The progression of management regimes for 70 per cent of the world's surface covered by water continues to be a challenge to the international community, and one that has only really been focused upon in the last three decades (Hansen, Mengerink & Sutton, 2009:12-19). Its international treaties and conventions (one of the main ones being the 1982 UNCLOS) create littoral and land-locked states' rights and obligations, an important component of which features in this case study.

4.2.4 Waves of globalisation

Globalisation is the subject of much discussion, together with a plethora of definitions. It has already been subjected to some discussion in relation to regions in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.1). This section highlights the fact that globalisation is largely a maritime endeavour, as it "creates new economic and cultural zones within and across nations" (Giddens, 2013:23).

Beginning from the first period of interaction between the industrialised nations and (mostly) their colonies, the maritime sector developed economic and political hegemonic bases. This form of influence has historically been associated with the traditional maritime nations (TMNs) in Europe, North America, Japan (and possibly China (Menzies, 2002)), as well as oil-producing states. In 2013, the distribution of maritime merchant power was slanted in favour of the TMNs. India and Brazil are reflected at positions 16 and 17, while no African country features in the selection. Brazil is the largest ship-owning country in Latin America and the Caribbean. In South Asia, India controls the largest fleet, while in Africa Angola, Nigeria and Egypt are the largest ship-owning countries (a situation that clearly presents a challenge to South Africa) (UNCTAD, 2016:n.p.).

The last few decades have seen rapid and significant trade changes, most of it affected by the wave of globalisation. Globalisation has engendered international trade growth, especially by multinational corporations. This also means that trade hubs are now situated in more countries and in a greater number of cities. These require pro-active

and productive management, with profits being a critical driver. Two main requirements are to provide oceanic transportation at the lowest cost possible and to do so safely and timely.

Generally, trade (facilitated by the maritime sector) is the functional area that produces the greatest degree of asymmetry between the North and the South. Although exacerbated by globalisation, the cause of this frictional imbalance is often hidden, as "[w]hat has not been emphasized is the role of shipping, as the artery through which this trade has traditionally been on, in the development and perpetuation of this asymmetry" (Iheduru, 1996:21).

4.2.5 The maritime trade sector and the international political economy

Given that 90 per cent of world trade is carried by ships, which is the most energy-efficient and environmentally low-risk mode of transporting cargo, the maritime sector naturally is represented by a wide array of sectors (International Maritime Organisation; Mortensen, 2009:38-46); and means that "the global economy floats on the sea" (Knight, 1999:3). The maritime sectors comprise public and private companies whose activities supply innovative products and services related to the traditional maritime trade sector. In general,

> maritime industries include all enterprises engaged in the business of designing, constructing, manufacturing, acquiring, operating, supplying, repairing and/or maintaining vessels, or component parts thereof: of managing and/or operating shipping lines, and customs brokerage services, shipyards, dry docks, marine railways, marine repair shops, shipping and freight forwarding services and similar enterprises. This emerging sector also includes a significant component of traditional oil and gas and renewable energy (particularly wind, but also marine turbines).
>
> (European Commission, 2013)

This leads to the holistic, integrated study and practice of joint ocean transportation, the optimisation of port and terminal management, and global supply chain management – all shaped towards the singular purpose of facilitating maritime trade.

4.3 MARITIME DEVELOPMENTS AND IBSA'S COMMON GLOBAL SOUTH CONTEXT

In pursuance of the principles of case study research (Chapter 1, section 1.5.3) this section provides contextual detail as well as in-depth description of the subject to hand. Accordingly, it looks at world maritime developments generally, with a particular focus on the sector viewed from the global South. It then hones in on the marginalisation of the developing maritime trade world, and the changes being brought about.

4.3.1 The maritime trade sector and perspectives from the global South

Taking the machinations of modern globalisation into account, it is axiomatic that this conventional model has been overtaken by mostly exogenous developments beyond the maritime sector's control. Nevertheless, the sector is obliged to deal with these changes in order to survive. These actions require a greater surging effort, cohesion and cooperation by the global South, as the challenge lies in "how to manage the network of far-flung overseas activities as a single, effective unit, … search for ways to convert worldwide production, marketing, research and development, and financial presence into a competitive advantage" (Gourdin, 2001:14). Because contemporary reflection views the maritime sector as an integrated component of the value-added logistics chain, it is one into which the developing world of India in Asia, Brazil in Latin America and South Africa in Africa need to take a quantum leap for the global South.

Iheduru (1996:22-35) notes that, in order to effectively participate in the world economy, three variables affect the quest for newly industrialised maritime countries of the global South. These are the timing of the entry of these countries into the world maritime sector, intra-regional competition, and the nature of state-society interchanges surrounding the making and enforcement of national and regional shipping policies. Iheduru's main argument is that the failure of the newly industrialised economic order (NIEO) and its maritime offspring, the newly industrialised maritime order (NIMO) are linked to the impositions of 'late

industrialisation'. This is specifically the case with respect to technology transfer, the arrangement of world maritime hegemony, competition and the non-involvement of civil society in the policy production process. In recent times India and Brazil have led the attempt by the South to develop national merchant fleets to change the liberal shipping regime. Although they have not been successful in this complicated endeavour, India is re-attempting through renewed merchant fleet legislation (ACJ, 2010; World Maritime News, 2016). There are two causes that include the global South's inability to match the rapid change in the maritime sector; failure to overcome the head start of the traditional maritime states in world trade; and the contradictory task to consciously reduce national ambition for the sake of regional efficiency.

But a positive result is the formation of collaborative security formations such as the IBSA construct. In this respect, groups that harmonise accord in a shared enterprise, tend to apply these in practices and hence abide by its rules, all the while having to contend with the hybrid nature of their composition. Constructivists have taken the lead in a 'bottom-up' action plan that confirms the opportunities to transfigure world politics in a positive manner at the various levels of analysis, to the extent that it offers viable alternatives (Adler, 2008:195; Adler & Barnett, 1998:13). Although there are recent developments in the three IBSA states towards prioritising the maritime trade, tourism, mining and industry sectors (the 'Blue Economy'), and also to provide local communities greater say and share in their own maritime communities (Kolver, 2014; van Wyk, 2015:153-169; Abdenur & de Sousa Neto, 2013b; Duarte, 2015:1-15; Singh, 2015:205-219; Kornegay, 2014), these are ambitious projects in for the long haul and would require continuous processing energy.

4.3.2 The global South and its marginalised but changing maritime background

Iheduru's 1996 *The Political Economy of International Shipping in Developing Countries* is one of the few resources available to study the skewed maritime scenario. It keeps the developing world centrally situated, and extrapolates conclusions from worldwide maritime data. The data that Iheduru used in 1996 will be updated from the same sources as far as possible in order to determine whether his observations and conclusions remain valid.

As my study is set against a developing country backdrop, it is necessary to determine the global South's contemporary position in the world maritime industrial complex and the associated economic security potential of this sector. Munro (1990:163) notes that although there were exceptions, history shows that the global South has been uninvolved with respect to maritime issues, and have ignored the oceans and the continent's potential synergy with it. Attempting to ascribe reasons for this, Gilpin (2007:1) observes that in the first place "security has been associated with the perpetuation of a regime and not necessarily the welfare of a country and its inhabitants. Secondly, the focus has been primarily land-centric, because regime security has seldom had maritime dimensions". The latter concept is described in contemporary terms as 'maritime blindness' – an inability or sheer ignorance – with respect to the strategic role the oceans and maritime power has in securing economic prosperity (Haydon, 2010:2-3), also referred to in the Introduction (section 4.1).

The Global Ocean Commission has identified five issues that have destructive impacts on the world's oceans. These comprise an exponentially rising demand for resources; greater exploitative capabilities; reduction in fish stocks; climate change, biodiversity and loss of habitat; together with poor governance of the high seas. In combination, these "drivers of ocean decline" (Global Ocean Commission, 2014:16), have critically negative effects on developing states (Kimani, 2009:10). Although there is an increasing awareness that the maritime sphere represents an extensive resource and has immense economic prospects, it continues to be underdeveloped through a range of distractive issues.

But there have been qualified positive maritime outcomes in developing countries, even if there was much delay since independence before these were enacted. From 1960 onward, the number of ships' berths along coasts have risen; a number of new ports were built, some purposively for general or bulk minerals or container terminals, while oil exporters have ensured the construction and utilisation of oil terminals, even as the maritime sector was undergoing momentous changes (Ogundimu & Iheduru, 2003:109-120). Many of the developing world's harbours are under public management, and these ports are not "subject to the full rigour of the market, are

unable to respond effectively to the new competitive pressures of globalization" (Rodrique, 2004:63), the inference being privatisation. Often, the implementation of this type of policy is an unpalatable option. Reflecting further on the power imbalances from a global South perspective it is noted that "[d]eveloping countries, especially in Africa and Oceania, pay 40 to 70 per cent more on average for the international transport of their imports than developed countries. The main reasons for this situation are to be found in these regions' trade imbalances, pending port and trade facilitation reforms, as well as lower trade volumes and shipping connectivity. There is potential for policymakers to partly remedy the situation through investments and reforms, especially in the regions' seaports, transit systems and customs administrations (UNCTAD Revision of Maritime Transport, 2015:47).

In 2014, the GDP in developing economies expanded at the slower rates of 4.5 per cent. Although developing countries continued to provide the impetus for growth, contributing three quarters of global expansion in 2014 (International Monetary Fund, 2015), a slowdown in GDP growth shows a weaker expansion in major industrial nations, such as the United States of America (USA) and China, which affect developing countries downstream. Although it is from a low base, the economies of the least developed countries (LDCs) continued to expand at a rapid rate (5.3 per cent) (UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, 2015:2).

The notion of the 'blue economy' resulted from the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012. Two themes dominated: furtherance of the institutional framework; and the advancement of the "green economy" concept, with the 'blue economy' punted as its complementary model that places the oceans at its centre. The developing world has been the driving force behind the blue economy, with small island developing states (SIDS) at the leading edge. The blue economy is also of great value to other coastal states and to countries with an interest in waters beyond their national borders. Indeed, many developing states have always been highly dependent upon the seas for their livelihoods and well-being. The blue economy goes further than merely the concept of ocean-based economies; it also identifies the oceans as development spaces where spatial planning integrates conservation, sustainable use, oil and mineral extraction,

bio-prospecting, sustainable energy production, marine transport and maritime (eco)tourism. The oceans also offer impressive prospects for renewable energy production from wind, wave, tidal, thermal and biomass sources. The potential of the "blue economy concept has wide relevance, as the oceans, including humankind's common heritage of the high seas, represent in many respects the final frontier for humanity and its quest for sustainable development" (Lesperance, 2016:8). This new project has seen the development of a strategy by South Africa (also India (see Singh, 2016:n.p.) and Brazil (Duarte, 2016:97-111)) for 'blue' economy strategic planning.

It should also be viewed in the context of the AU's long-term sustainable developmental goals, captured in its Agenda 2063 (Kolver, 2014). At the "African Maritime Domain Conference 2014" held in November 2014 in Nelson Mandela Bay, South Africa, bold plans were announced to sustainably energise the blue economy. Ramatji (2014:n.p.) stressed the importance of the fact that "Africans' share of transportation revenues though our seas is significantly low. African participation in the shipping sector is very important if we are going to create an inclusive blue economy that transforms the continent. We cannot build a blue economy in a way that excludes the majority of the people".

This case study argues that an integral part of resolving these challenges, identifying and utilising maritime trade strategies, lie in looking into the past; so as to discern the foundational value imparted by maritime trade histories for future endeavours. This aligns with an important conceptual pillar in Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1. In this chapter similar maritime histories lay the foundation for social learning, mutual trust and collective (maritime) identity. In addition, it would be important steps to initiate greater cooperation by commencing within the neighbourhood of one's region. Puri (2007:37) in an UNCTAD report notes that "[a]s IBSA countries are themselves hubs of complex regional agreements and engagements, any institutionalized IBSA cooperation will have to carefully maintain the balance between the logic behind IBSA and the geo-economic and political rationale of these other agreements, as well as legal compatibility". A viable option might be for the three IBSA states to take up regional leadership roles and bolster maritime trade initiatives within their respective economic security community.

4.4 IBSA'S SHARED MARITIME HISTORIES

In Chapter 2 the significance of histories was emphasised in both the critical IR theories of this study, also included in the diagram at the end (Diagram 2.1). In postcolonial theory it was underscored that histories are not collective colonial memories that remain locked up in the past. From the tenets of social constructivism comes the acute observation that human agency requires appropriate and realistic historical settings to enact processes. Hence, this section strives to elevate this important facet with respect to the foundations for identity in IBSA maritime trade. This is done by averring that maritime histories constitute economic histories, in view of the fact that the two key 'IBSA oceans' were at the forefront of colonial exploration. I then record and analyse appropriate historical European exploitation in respect of the IBSA countries and end by noting degrees of mimicry and hybridity in IBSA's current maritime composition.

4.4.1 Maritime histories are political economy histories

In its inaugural edition, the editors of the *International Journal of Maritime History* (1989) note the perception that maritime history is at the periphery of the study of history, and that it ought not be the case. They argue that, in fact, it ought to be at the kernel of this subject, because "maritime history is uniquely placed to provide crucial linkages between other sub-disciplines" (Fischer & Nordvik, 1989:ix). Evans (1993:203) similarly makes the link when he observes that "[e]conomics is an essential foundation for the study of maritime history. Every route travelled; every cargo carried, every plank, nail, pulley or block; every design of masts and hulls and sails are economic phenomena with histories" (see also Paine, 2013). Naturally, it provides linkages to the main medium for globalisation, being merchant shipping and its associated industries. Here, the pioneering work of Fernand Braudel on the Mediterranean (first published in French in 1949, reprinted in 1995) made an important contribution (see also Pearson, 2010:7-14).

Braudel's exhortation to view the value of the seas and oceans as zones of economic and cultural exchange was rapidly adopted in other regional accounts. Further, the famed Scottish economist, Adam Smith, in his 1776 book *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, was one of the first to draw attention to the economic principle that the effectiveness of the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market. Therefore, the logical extension of productivity was the acquisition of new markets and that "by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort of sector than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that sectors of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself" (Smith, 1776: Book I, Chapter 3:3).[37] Even with the past maritime trade linkages well-established, it is important to also note the continuance of changes that are being galvanised as the twenty-first century unfolds, situating maritime trade within the contemporary international political economy (IPE) and economic globalisation contexts (Cohen, 2012:195-210; Schirm, 2012:211-236; Nottebaum, 2012:237-268; Maaike, 2012:269-286).

At this point, it is vital to insert an imperialist mercantilist principle, namely that 'trade follows the flag', meaning that the colonial navies secured the colonies for casuistic trade which favours the 'home' country, most of it facilitated by the colonisers' country merchant navy activities. Interestingly, this 'imperialist' notion endures. In this respect, the outcomes of (economic) diplomacy on trade and commerce remain contemporaneously significant. Here Pollins (1989:477-478) concludes after his empirical study that "trade does indeed follow the flag despite the efforts of academics … to consider economics and politics in isolation from one another". For the IBSA states, it would seem more appropriate and in line with their social-constructivist ethos to approach this in a bottom-up manner, whereby the (security) community is built up through maritime trade, rather than inducing competitive spirits in a top-down way – a slow inversion of the process would tilt the balance.

[37] See also Munro (1999:1-27) for a cost-benefit analysis of the seaborne trade.

4.4.2 The Indian and the Atlantic Oceans: The distant colonial origins of the IBSA construct

The Indian Ocean has been a zone of human interaction throughout world history. Pearson (2003:3) states that the Indian Ocean has the most ancient of inter-cultural traversings and trade, and can be dated back for more than 5 000 years. Kearney (2003:1) makes the point that the Indian Ocean has not necessarily "floated the economy of every state or region that reached a top position, but that a major presence in Indian Ocean trade has always indicated a level of economic health essential to world leadership". The maritime states that have had active and enduring participation in the Indian Ocean region, have tended to be those that have made lasting impacts to world advancement and cultural progress. In a manner of speaking, it had become an enlarged maritime Silk Road, but having more states and cultures in active trade over a greater expanse.

Standing in contrast to the Indian Ocean, the human involvement of the Atlantic is a mere 1 000 years, if one includes the explorations of the Vikings; while the entire geospatial sphere of the Atlantic is a tad more than 500 years old.

Up to the end of the Second World War, the Atlantic maintained the world's highest mass of shipping. The Suez and Panama canals and the production and export of hydrocarbons in the Middle East and the increased market value of Pacific Ocean trade has seen a decline in (North) Atlantic trade. Nonetheless, the location of major consumer supply and demand markets in Europe (and mainly North) has ensured a constancy in terms of merchant traffic patterns (Pearson, 2003:3; Greene, 2009:3-34; Chaplin, 2009:35-52; Kupperman, 2012:1-3). To end, Winchester (2010: eBook locations 288 and 296 of 8183) surmises that the Atlantic

> had surely also become a focal point, a fulcrum, around which the power and influence of the modern world has long been distributed. … The Atlantic existed in equipoise between the blocs of power and cultural influence that have shaped the

> modern world. It is an entity that links them, unites them, and in some indescribable way also defines them.
>
> (Winchester, 2010)

4.4.3 Select European maritime colonial histories

Three of the main colonising countries involved in the colonialisation process in the Middle Ages were Britain, Portugal and the Netherlands. As an adjunct they were the main colonising states with respect to India, Brazil and South Africa. They left behind a (maritime) legacy that these three states have nurtured and built upon.

This section commences with the maritime history of Great Britain and its colonial patrimony. A powerful concept that Herman brings to history is the realisation by the British that the sea was, in fact, the factor that united Britain and its colonies. Herman notes that

> [t]he navy's dominance allowed England's trade to boom and prosper; it sustained its colonies and reshaped its politics; it drew England, Scotland, and Ireland together into a single United Kingdom ... While Britain itself maintained a polity based on limited government and the rule of law, its empire increasingly relied on trade rather than dominion, and cooperation with rather than conquest of, other sovereign states. Sea power … removed the need for large standing armies and hence large intrusive government; it established safe and secure trade routes.
>
> (Herman, 2004:xviii-xix)

Power, however, was not displayed in quite a benevolent manner by the British and other colonial states as the centre part of the above quotation would have it. In terms of geopolitical power, by the mid-sixteenth century England was a minor player on the world stage, but not content with its status. The Spanish and the Portuguese controlled the oceans, and were the major powers in Europe. The British were not only 'a nation of shopkeepers' (industrialists and businesspeople), they were also warriors; they adopted a way to trade and fight. They learned to generate prosperity through economic activity rather than just extracting it or expropriating it by military superiority. In this way, India and South Africa (among other nations) succumbed to British colonialism.

The development of a foreign policy reliant to a large extent on its merchant shipping trade was allied to Britain's expansions and foreign acquisitions. Merchant trade essentially kept their empire in being, and conversely it was due to its empire that merchant shipping remained widespread and active; so that the two spheres became irrevocably mutually constructed. The growth of both their merchant and military navies affected Britain's economy in multiple ways. The reasons are that they ushered in concomitant features – within the realms of maritime defence, mercantile, technological, logistical and scientific pursuits – that enabled it to lead from the front; and enabled the establishment and maintenance of colonial dominion.

As the focus shifts to Portugal, it is worthwhile to note that Portugal was the first global empire (*Império Português*) in history. Dating from the early fifteenth century, much of its effects endure (Newitt, 1986). This European country had spread its cultural and institutional influences to Africa, Asia and the Americas. This section concentrates on the Atlantic world, and mainly the inroads of Portugal into Brazil, lesser so on its impact in South Africa. A range of historical expansionist factors necessitated Portugal (and other European states) to seek alternative routes to Asia, so as to sustain and build their economies; which was executed through maritime expansion. For the Portuguese, "the Atlantic was an opportunity rather than an obstacle" (Russell-Wood, 2009:96; see also Page, 1995:35-37).

Thus, from this period forwards, numbers of sailors, merchants, migrants and missionaries issued forth from Portugal. Monteiro (2011:1) sums up this incursive pattern by noting that though the Lusophone Atlantic "involves brutal processes of separation … [n]onetheless, … the history of the Lusophone world is also that of diverse peoples and polities who engaged the Portuguese as allies, enemies and colonial master" (see also Levine, 1999:31-52; Keller, 1908:131-167; Rogers, 2010:1-18; Kirkpatrick, 1939:34-45).

Portugal left its mark on India via the Indian Ocean too. Indeed, it is reckoned to have been Portugal's first colonial empire (Mathew, 1986). History shows the confluence and competition of European imperial expansionism during the same timeframe in the

'discovery' of the southern tip of Africa, now South Africa, by Bartholomeu Diaz in 1488, and Vasco da Gama five years later. In 1601, British ships commenced infrequent anchorings and limited trade at the Cape, and in 1620 the flag of King James I was hoisted at the Cape (Millin, 1954:11-12; Allighan, 1960:89-91). However these attempts by the Portuguese and the British failed to establish a hegemonic presence. This was left to the Dutch to settle more substantially in terms of maritime economics.

The sixteenth century saw the maritime-associated economies of a number of European states on the wane; even England experienced a downturn. During that time – arising from the commercial conflict – the power brokerage over markets, trade routes and merchandise was taken over by the Dutch. The Dutch (a territorially diminutive state, with a small population, very limited natural resources and a short history as a nation) developed maritime industries that headed the international system of exchange commerce. The country became the fulcrum of monopolised trade, "the first and, for most of early modern times, the only true world entrepôt"[38] (Israel, 1989:6). The Dutch introduced innovative and productive maritime management systems that gave them mercantile superiority and which radically transformed international trade. Aside from Britain in the period subsequent to 1780, no other state had managed such superiority for an extended period – from the end of the sixteenth to early eighteenth centuries (Israel, 1989:12-37; Clark, 1999:191).

It was the ships of the Dutch East India Company (VOC – *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* – comprising a complex hybrid business model (Israel, 1989:16)) that, from 1652 onward, met the indigenous peoples and established a half-way station and fort at the Cape of Good Hope, which eventually led to an expansion of the hinterland.

But India, too, lay within the arc of Dutch interests. For much of the 1660s the ports of India were contested between the Portuguese, the British and the Dutch, as these harbours represented lucrative trade routes and centres of commercial activity. Dutch

[38] Warehouse.

victories in southern India were also viewed with antagonistic disfavour by Portugal, France, Britain and other European states.

The setting up of the Dutch West India Company (WIC – *West-Indische Compagnie*) in 1621 helped sustain expansive Dutch colonial interests. It had legislative and executive powers to maintain military outposts and bases, operate men-o'-war, acquire armaments, appoint governors, and enter into such alliances as were deemed to advance the WIC and the country. The first WIC mercantile ventures were not successful. However, with the taking of Recife in the north of Brazil, the WIC gained an important foothold in Spanish America. Thus commenced the control of a large percentage of Brazil's sugar trade with Europe in the 1630s, whereafter it achieved profitability. Hence, the Seven United Provinces that formed Holland in years of VOC- and WIC-led economic bloom, were "the most hated, and yet the most admired and envied commercial nation of the seventeenth century" (Heckscher, 1935:351). A series of Anglo-Dutch wars during this period – won over time by the British – led to the decline of the Dutch influential sphere, including that in the Cape of Good Hope (Israel, 1989:197-291; Israel, 1995:326-328; Kindleberger, 1996:89-104; Bulut, 2001:86-97; Bonney, 1991:212-214).

The three European countries in this short survey were eminent seafaring nations that bested the geopolitical challenge of their age to conduct maritime reconnaissance beyond their areas of comfort. Britain, Holland and Portugal had all left lasting merchant marine, industrial and colonial heritage imprints.

I submit that the conclusion of the foregoing elaboration firmly establishes the constitutive for maritime social learning, collective identity and mutual trust for the IBSA collective. The colonial imprint also resulted in mimicry, and in the postcolonial condition the newly liberated IBSA states were thrust into a hybrid condition – all the while striving to not bow to neo-colonialism with respect to maritime issues. The next section gives an overview of the establishment of a maritime identity among the IBSA countries *vis-à-vis* the international community, as it follows the contours of its commonalities.

4.5 TOWARDS AN IBSA MARITIME IDENTITY IN RESPECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The rationale for this section is that it builds upon the previous section through case study analysis. Having affirmed a collective maritime identity in the previous section (much of passed on in the colonial condition), I now insert IBSA's maritime dealings with the international community. Hence I portray the IBSA collective as a maritime reformer, a good seafaring citizen, one that espouses an identity that advocates enhanced multilateral governance and other human security elements with respect to oceans governance and its links with facets of public international (maritime) law.

4.5.1 Maritime commonalities: The bases for cooperation

India, Brazil and South Africa have much to share in terms of maritime common denominators. I venture to note that commonalities make for shared identities which in turn lead to cycles of greater dialogue and an enhanced security collaboration. This section underscores the commonalities that serve to strengthen identity-formation between the IBSA countries, and bolster sustained economic security between the three IBSA states. In order to advance maritime trade cooperation among the IBSA states, and viewed from social-constructivist values, at least three feats are required. Firstly, there needs to be concord about the route to be followed to add value to maritime trade cooperation. Secondly, the three countries require practical cooperation with respect to trade, infrastructure, economic exchanges, as well as empathy in terms of the different countries' ideas, customs and social behaviour. Thirdly, cohesion of thought must be achieved in terms of maritime policy, particularly in relation to oceans governance, climate change as well as maritime catastrophe management (Ciqui, 2014). These requirements symbolise not only intra-IBSA maritime cohesion, but also represent a qualitative leap towards the international community. It is an element of the IBSA composition that deals with its interaction and intercommunication (see Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1; also see Adler & Barnett, 1998:41-42). The duality of IBSA's collective agency operates transactionally beyond the confines of the IBSA collective *vis-à-vis* the global community, while at the same

establishing its *bona fide* with respect to its emancipatory character, confirming its hybrid composition.

I argue that, to achieve the above, the management of resources is key and can be made possible when the three IBSA states interact pro-actively with one another in the conduct of their obligations and the pursuit of their collective rights. As noted above, global trade has become an integral trait of world interaction, where its absence would limit or negate many actions of critical importance to the global community. At the same time, international law reacts or is pro-active (ideally) and adds value to the constructivist positions of normative bases for cooperation at sea, thus ensuring that littoral and land-enclosed states are provided with the required instruments and regimes to enable directed policy actions. Hence there is a sharing of policy and international law within the same frame, and this provides cement for the socio-political construction of identity.

Three policy implications, put forward by Townsend-Gault (2012:7-22), are applicable. His arguments are bolstered by the views of authoritative functionaries (diplomats, researchers and media contributors) in reply to the interview framework (referred to in Chapter 1, and Appendix A), related to the issue 'In terms of economic security cooperation, what projects may be pursued trilaterally in terms of the maritime sector?' Firstly, maritime trade cooperation needs to be viewed as an integral function of a state's responsibilities in relation to oceans. In this respect, the Brazilian ambassador to South Africa (Pimentel, interview, 2011) observed that "maritime cooperation is an important component of the IBSA agenda. It presents many areas of common concerns on an economic front". Then, secondly, in cases where there are distinct degrees of inequality with respect to capacity, maritime cooperation should be stimulated. This reasoning is apt not only in the IBSA case but also in the larger global South case, that exemplifies disparities. This view is supported by the Indian High Commissioner to South Africa (Gupta, interview, 2011) when he states that "maritime cooperation presents with a variety of international cooperation projects between the three countries. It can improve intra-IBSA trade and research". Further, international defence author Heitman (interview, 2011) puts forward the view that "there can be virtual integration, as well as shared technologies when resources are pooled,

investigate the economies of the transshipment industry". Roy (interview, 2010) puts the intra-IBSA maritime cooperation potentialities as being "very important. There should be direct shipping links with each other. There should be a three-country partnership. Transshipment hubs is a[n] issue that can be actively pursued. The establishment of a free-trade area should be feasible". Thirdly, some of the respondents note that international legal foundations facilitate cooperation, especially when states are advantaged by the acquisition and exercising of their rights. For example, Kumar (interview, 2010) suggests that "a legal framework needs to be established and from there aims and objectives can be set jointly".

An analysis of the above points on maritime trade cooperation reveals that all the respondents draw on the maritime commonalities of the IBSA states, and are of the opinion that maritime (trade) cooperation between the IBSA countries is vital for growth and enhanced economic security. Leapfrogging towards the next sections of the chapter, it will be seen that these ideational and policy declarations have been enacted to some degree. I submit that these are clear statements, the effect of which shows that maritime trade cooperation is an important facet for IBSA, and that its proper management is an instrument that contributes to IBSA's economic security in a sustained and increasing pattern.

4.5.2 Public international law: The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) membership and utilisation

In this sub-section, the hybrid nature of IBSA's identity is operative. This implies "the overlay of multiple identities and ideas, and their transmission without necessarily resulting in the domination of one core identity or idea" (Richmond, 2008:147). As will be seen, the IBSA states support universal international frameworks in their capacity as reformer agents. Yet this is contrasted with their view of themselves as being agents of emancipation and redistributors. It links with the collective's maritime trade because of geostrategic interests and concerns regarding its maritime security

projection, as well as 'sea lines of communication' (SLOC, the securing of sea trade lanes)[39], and its perspectives towards security and maritime cooperation within IBSA.

All three IBSA countries have ratified the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which became an international convention in 1982 after obtaining the requisite number of signatories. It introduced new international law processes based on consensus and universal participation, even by landlocked countries. UNCLOS is generally claimed to provide a universal legal framework for all ocean activities (Harrison, 2011). UNCLOS provides for a system of laws that applies from internal waters (between bays and estuaries) to territorial waters (12 nautical miles offshore), and a cultural or contiguous zone (24 nautical miles offshore); whereby sovereign law applies inversely proportional to the distance offshore. The rule of reciprocity at international law is operative here – in return for granting vast areas of oceanic estates to countries, the international community expects qualitative oceans governance.

Importantly for this study, UNCLOS provides vast offshore estates (exclusive economic zones (EEZs) that may be enlarged by the depth of the continental shelf; the latter being dependent on technical hydrographic and oceanographic data. Recognition of these enlarged deep-sea area claims is contingent on a submission studied and accepted by the UN (UN Convention of the Law of the Sea). EEZs mean exactly that: Within 200 nautical miles offshore (plus, dependent on technical data, up to 350 nautical miles for approved continental shelf claims) littoral states have exclusive rights to the extractive industries (fishing, mining, hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation). Littoral states may sub-contract these activities under license to third parties. I submit that not only does UNCLOS provide the IBSA community with maritime zones for economic development and cooperation, but the collective may do so at national, regional and international levels. In this respect Adler and Barnett (1998:42) saliently observe that there is a need "to be attentive to and attempt to isolate the actors that are not only constituted by that structure but also might transform it".

[39] An issue discussed further in Chapter 6.

EEZs continue to produce geopolitical tensions internationally (see as an example, Smith & Eisenman, 2014). In many cases, countries' EEZs are larger than the land portion, and the following data includes the IBSA countries' respective island EEZs. India has an EEZ of 2 305 143 square kilometres, and has submitted claims to the UN to enlarge its EEZ to 350 nautical miles (United Nations; Indian Ministry of Earth Sciences, 2014). Brazil has an EEZ of 3 660 995 square kilometres, and has submitted a claim to the UN Commission of the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to extend its maritime continental zone (Suarez, 2010:152-153); which has been granted (Ortiz, 2015, more detail in Chapter 6). South Africa has an EEZ of 1 535 538 square kilometres (larger than the country size).[40]

The economic, defence and prestige values of EEZs are not to be underestimated, yet may be difficult to quantify in value, as much data lies in hitherto un-researched domains, such as the locations, quantities and qualities of the hydrocarbons, minerals and fish stock.

4.5.3 Other maritime treaties enhancing IBSA's identity as responsible members of the international community

There are a number of maritime issues within the domain of public international law that the IBSA countries are signatories to, and that provide additional areas of commonality and the prospects for cooperation. These include but are not limited to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention, 1988; United Nations, 1 March 1992); the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1974, acceded 25 May 1980); the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS);[41] and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (United Nations, registered with the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) on 27 August 1985). These four are

[40] South Africa too has submitted a claim to the UN to extend its zone to the continental shelf in collaboration with France (the countries share a sea border along the Prince Edward Island group and the French Crozet Islands), with a finalisation date of 13 May 2009. Due to the large number of claims in process at the UN, South Africa's claims will only be considered within a decade of submission (United Nations, 13 September 2013).

[41] Amendments made to Chapter IV of SOLAS were adopted in 1988 and entered into force on 1 February 1992 to become the GMDSS.

fundamental, common conventions that provide much foundation for cooperation for IBSA. Their importance lies in the fact that these conventions ensure the security and safety of trade at sea, a level of cooperation that lies even beyond IBSA. They also lay the foundation for the penultimate section of this chapter.

These international public law issues are relevant connectors for enhancing IBSA's maritime cooperative endeavours. This is so because the collective has the knowledge and power with respect to UNCLOS, SUA, SOLAS and GMDSS which they can turn into a useful instrument for global South cooperation and the accrual of rights for dispossessed states (see Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1). In particular, I suggest that the IBSA collective can champion the cause for the landlocked states of the global South. These treaties provide landlocked states with rights-of-access to maritime trade and maritime trade safety through partner littoral states. However much ignorance exists, that IBSA may be in a position to dispel should it take up the cudgels. These actions may bolster IBSA's image as a good world citizen, and also progress its emancipatory agenda.

4.6 IBSA'S PRACTICES: THE FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME TRADE COOPERATION

In this section, I identify and analyse the maritime trade practices of IBSA, framed in terms of regional security community development processes, as laid out in Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1. In general transactions, interactions and communications are covered, and specifically noting the legal bases, the working groups and the implementation processes; while taking the hybrid nature of IBSA into consideration.

It was noted in Chapter 3 that IBSA had established a number of working groups. Their objectives are to enhance trilateral knowledge, as well as explore and pursue collective points of interest in sector areas. Two of these sectors concern this chapter, and they deal with (maritime) transport and infrastructure, and (maritime) trade. The functioning of the working groups is underpinned by a number of Agreements and MoUs that have been ratified so as to provide legal support for the cooperation. As a complementary course of action it highlights the political will that is embraced by the IBSA states.

4.6.1 Memorandum of Understanding and its Action Plan on Maritime Projects

Two IBSA-founded documents are critical to the construct's maritime cooperation planning, legal footing and associated execution. These are an MoU entitled "Trilateral Agreement concerning merchant shipping and maritime transport" (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 13 September 2006)[42] and its associated "Action plan on maritime projects" (Indian Ministry of External Relations, 15 October 2008).

Article III of the MoU anchors the document and represents a functional overlap with the definition of 'the maritime sector' noted in the introduction, and reads as follows:

ARTICLE III
DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION

(1) The Parties shall co-operate with each other to develop a mutually beneficial relationship in the field of Merchant Shipping and other related maritime matters on the basis of sovereign equality and reciprocity.

(2) The Parties shall -

(a) encourage and facilitate the development of maritime relationship between their shipping organizations and enterprises and also co-operate very closely in the task of enhancing and stimulating the steady growth of maritime traffic among their countries.

(b) encourage and facilitate the exchange and training of staff and students from various maritime establishments such as Maritime Educational Institutions.

(c) encourage and facilitate the exchange of information necessary for accelerating and facilitating the flow of commercial goods at sea and at port and encourage the strengthening of the co-operation between merchant fleets, subject to the provisions of the respective domestic laws concerning tax secrecy.

(d) strive to eliminate obstructions and other conditions tending to prevent the development of mutual maritime co-operation.

[42] Its year of establishment merely notes the start of its functional dynamics – it does not infer a 'dated' or an obsolete document.

> (e) encourage and/or facilitate their private sector to collaborate with each other in the field of maritime transportation and other related maritime matters.

The MoU also promises the establishment of a Maritime Liaison Committee:

> **ARTICLE XI: MARITIME LIAISON COMMITTEE**
>
> (1) The Parties hereby establish a Maritime Liaison Committee (herein after referred to as the "Committee") with the purpose of promoting sustained co-operation among the Parties in the field of merchant shipping and maritime transport related matters and to enhance the implementation of this Agreement by making recommendations to the Parties.
>
> (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 13 September 2006)

However, no evidence could be found that this potentially valuable committee was in fact established. In terms of the process diagram outlined at the end of Chapter 2 (also see section 3.6), the 'Maritime Liaison Committee' would have been a repository of maritime sector knowledge and power, which could have been used by IBSA agents to facilitate enrichment processes.

The details of the "Action Plan" are in the public domain and in its preamble the plan states that

> **Recalling** further the Trilateral Agreement on Merchant Shipping and other maritime related matters signed by India, Brazil and South Africa on 13 September 2006;
> **Wishing** to further strengthen these maritime relations and consolidate them on the basis of equality and mutual benefit;
> **HAVE DECIDED** to conclude the Action Plan on Maritime Transport which is attached herewith.
>
> (Indian Ministry of External Relations, 2008)

In a general guidance issued in 2007 already, the Ministers stressed the need to draw up Plans of action with time-bound deliverables (IBSA Dialogue Forum, Communiqué 2007, paragraph 66). Yet, a schedule of these time-frames could not be determined either, and it is indicative of poor process design which of course negatively impacts

on social learning and mutual trust. This ought to have been a primary function of the mooted Maritime Liaison Committee.

When one applies critical discourse analysis to these extracts from the above documents, one notes that a general theme is one of (maritime) trade facilitation. Typically, similar words or phrases, such as 'cooperate', 'encourage and facilitate', 'relationship' and 'exchange' emphasise the coherency of the ideological framework within which the MoU is structured and how it reflects representation of the parties involved. These relate to shared beliefs and actions towards commonly agreed goals. On one hand therefore, I submit that the MoUs on merchant shipping and maritime transport and its action (both referred to at the start of this section) encapsulate both the collective (hybrid) identities and prospects of maritime (trade) cooperation, as well as the enhanced economic security alluded to in the previous section. Yet on the other hand, the documents do not display a wider global South emancipatory ideal, as its preamble states only that it is "[c]onvinced that the strengthening and development of relations in merchant shipping and maritime transport will contribute to the growth of trilateral economic and commercial relations among the three countries" (IBSA Trilateral: MoU on Merchant Shipping and Other Maritime Transport Related Matters, 2006). It reflects a parochial and relatively restricted maritime trade vision, incommensurate with its idealist and transformational aspirations, yet positions that confirm the hybrid nature of their composition.

Initially, much work has taken place to ensure that the documents continue to be enacted (IBSA Trade and Investment Working Group (TWIG), 2012), but it appears to have tapered off, in line with the general enervation with respect to IBSA, noted in Chapter 1 (section 1.1). In this regard Woolfrey notes

> [o]ne area in which IBSA cooperation has been hailed as a particular success is that of trade. From the outset, one of the major aims of the IBSA Forum was to boost trade flows between the three countries. … In addition, the IBSA countries have collaborated prominently at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in order to push for multilateral trade rules that are more responsive to the particular needs and circumstances of developing countries.
>
> (Woolfrey, 2013:5)

4.6.2 Intra-IBSA trade

At the outset it needs to be noted that the relationship with respect to intra-IBSA trade is marked by duality and hybridity. On one hand the individual IBSA states pursue their own national interests, while on the other they strive to implement increased cooperation at intra-IBSA level; which reflects a tension between the reformist and redistributive or critical roles of IBSA. Taken at face value, statistics of improved intra-IBSA trade communicate a positive narrative but discourses and evidence of practices often reveal a more ambivalent picture.

In this section I address the aspect of economic cooperation that guides the second set of documents – the Action Plan for maritime trade that is being executed. A prime goal of the IBSA Forum is to improve trade among the IBSA states. To this end, the IBSA Plan of Action was adopted in New Delhi in 2004. It set out the framework for its trade promotion schedule. It included a number of issues, including identifying and bolstering commercial ties, moulding intra-IBSA preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and their associated regional organisations, and considering other linkages that could provide further intra-IBSA impetus. A long-term target of achieving trilateral trade to USD 25 billion by 2015 was undertaken by the IBSA ministers involved in trade and industry (IBSA Dialogue Forum, 2008).

Efforts to enhance intra-IBSA maritime trade face some challenges. These include the lack of availability of significant IBSA domestic merchant fleets (for the South African case, see Lamb, 7 November 2013) and the allied need to increase national shipping registers – and persuade shipping owners to discard the flag-of-convenience system[43] through incentives. There is also a need to penetrate the maritime market dominated by the industrialised nations as well as rectify imbalances in intra-IBSA trade. Long and expensive transits – especially between Brazil and India – remain a

[43] Flag-of-convenience is a practice through which a merchant ship is registered in country other than that of the ship's owners, and the ship flies that country's civil ensign. For ship owners the system reduces operating costs, including taxation and avoids punitive regulations of the owner's country; in effect making merchant trade more competitive. However, the system is also open to abuse and sub-standard operating practices. It is also known as an 'open registry'.

challenge, with the concomitant need to lower the costs of bulk maritime transportation ((Brazilian) National Confederation of Industry, 2008:27-29). These challenges have given rise to a number of initiatives, designed to realise the targets. These incorporated an IBSA Working Group on Trade and Investment, the signing of an IBSA Action Plan for Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment (IBSA, 2006), and the creation of an IBSA Business Forum (which included public and private sector partners). Clearly, much work lies ahead to ensure that the intra-IBSA maritime transport issues are pro-actively managed. These will be noted in Chapter 7 as required further research.

Despite the formidable challenges there is evidence that the trade among IBSA states has been increasing steadily and (generally) at the agreed-to rates. Graph 1 of intra-IBSA trade for the period 2003 to 2012 supports this assessment:

Graph 4.1: Intra-IBSA trade (2003 – 2012)



(Figures in USD billion; Woolfrey, 2013:6)

From the graph, it can be seen that trade continues to grow at apparently impressive rates. Between 2003 and 2007, intra-IBSA trade has more than doubled, representing an annualised expansion of 21.8 per cent. Data also indicates that maritime trade has exceeded between each country and the rest of the world, and this incremental forecast

is expected to hold up in the forthcoming years ((Brazilian) National Confederation of Industry, 2008:11). Also noting that intra-IBSA trade had increased substantially, Puri (2007:37) forecasts that "in an MFN [Most Favoured Nation] scenario, UNCTAD's simulation show that intra-IBSA trade could double on an annual basis in full liberalization scenario, and this is without taking into account dynamic effects", while Sharma (2011) predicts the achievement of the aforementioned target under this liberalised structure. This clearly reverts to the dual character of IBSA – here the collective is coopted into the international trade system, which works against the 'liberation' or transformation of the international maritime sector and the progression towards greater equity for developing countries.

That said, there has been an impressive upward shift in the transportation of cargo containers within the three IBSA partners. Over the period 2004 to 2007, the quantity and mass of this segment of maritime transportation had increased from 10.7 MTEU[44] to 12.7 MTEU ((Brazilian) National Confederation of Industry, 2008:25). In 2007, the initial voyages, that (then) involved eight container ships, commenced a route that linked the three IBSA countries. Ten ports in six countries (including Persian Gulf countries) are included; with the voyage being 56 days long. There are also direct container ship links on the Brazil-South Africa and the South Africa-India legs, with transshipment taking place in Durban (infrequently in Cape Town) (Campbell, 2008). In this respect, the utilisation of the South African port of Ngqura, a world class deep water transshipment hub, needs to be prioritised.

Attempts to upgrade PTAs to free trade agreements (FTAs) between the three IBSA states is an important initiative. The three countries have sought to liberalise tariffs, but at present most IBSA trade takes place under the MFN WTO rule. This has seen relative successes, but has also given rise to complaints that Brazil and India continue to impose high tariffs (Mutumbara, 2010:39), again accentuating the national interests and tending to place those above that of the collective. One of the main barriers is that the three countries tend to produce and trade in similar goods, and all three states strive to gain access to the OECD markets. In this respect Flemes (2009:416) observes

[44] Twenty-foot equivalent unity – TEU. MTEU – million twenty-foot equivalent unit.

that although a trilateral trade agreement is a regular IBSA agenda issue, "such an ambitious undertaking is unlikely to materialize because all three countries are technically linked to regional trade blocs. A more realistic approach should concentrate on trade facilitation and improvement of transport and infrastructure links between the three states". The trilateral trade agreement's overdue resolution may be due to the unforeseen complexities involved in a 'beyond-the-region' state (for example India and MERCOSUR) negotiation with an IBSA partner's regional security community or customs union. Further, it is noted that the IBSA countries have developed different strategies concerning their trade policy, and it is proposed that dialogue, target dates and greater political will, can bring about greater cohesion; and hence improved trade (Stuenkel, 2014b; Kornegay, 2014:9).

Although a wide range of product groups is traded, it is significant that mineral products (oil, coal, mineral ores) and mining equipment had become an important component of the IBSA trade pattern (Mutumbara, 2008:6: Woolfrey, 2013:9). It is noteworthy because it links directly to the need for energy and to ensure energy security and associated developmental requirements that is a function of trade (see Chapter 5).

In the period after the establishment of the IBSA Forum, the prevalent view has been that these and other IBSA enterprises have "been enormously successful in improving trade among the three nations" (Bratzel, 2 August 2011), yet figures do not always correlate with causality. In the first instance, increased trade between the individual IBSA countries and the rest of the world and/or bilaterally between the members of IBSA does not necessarily mean a success for the IBSA collective as a whole. It does not automatically imply a causal relationship between the improved trade outcome and intra-IBSA processes, transactions and sense of community. In this regard Saran (2015:628) postulates that the trade forum has met with limited and qualified success. Although there has been significant intra-IBSA trade growth, "it would be hard to argue that this upswing is a result of institutionalized cooperation under IBSA, particularly in the light of the failure of the IBSA countries to formally conclude a proposed trilateral trade agreement" (see also Woolfrey, 2013:4). On the one hand it may suggest that in some respects IBSA is not yet operating at a level where the whole

is bigger than the sum of its parts. Yet, on the other hand, a critical constructivist position also reminds us that 'change', actors and structures are mutually constituted.

Secondly, available trade target information indicates that intra-IBSA projections were only made until 2015. The fact that no new targets had been set is indicative of the doldrums that IBSA has found itself in over the past four years or so; which period in turn coincides with the interior turmoil experienced by especially Brazil and South Africa and associated lack of political will. It also aligns with the BRICS engine being accelerated, an effort that (possibly temporarily) removed resources from IBSA (see Chapter 1, section 1.1).

Lastly, Woolfrey (2013:6) observes that the increased intra-IBSA and IBSA-China trade growth has meant that less trade now takes place with traditional trading partners – "[i]ndeed, between 2003 and 2012, the share of total IBSA imports originating in Organisation for Economic and Development (OECD) countries declined significantly, from 54.3% to 39.9%". While this may appear to be a positive development, because it surmises that South-South trade cooperation is benefiting at the expense of the global North, Nel and Taylor (2013:1091-1110) advance a different argument. They do not see the perceived successes as feeding into South-South cooperation. The feelings of solidarity among nations of the global South is given prominence by the IBSA countries. It posts the collective as being in the van with respect to South-South cooperation, yet this is undermined by IBSA's foreign economic policies. The effect is that these policies then tend to have the opposite effect where

> these three states deliberately but also unintentionally create sub-optimal conditions for the development of some of their Southern neighbours. This outcome reflects the policies that emerging centres of accumulation in the South are promoting, as well as the material interests of the dominant class alliances in the aforementioned states. There is a need for close scrutiny of the foreign economic policies of dynamic developing economies, and for closer multilateral coordination among the states of the global South. … To date, and despite some advances, IBSA have also not yet managed to qualitatively distinguish their intra-South foreign trade policies to such an extent that they deserve congratulations in

> terms of living up to the demands of SSS [South-South Solidarity].
>
> (Nel & Taylor, 2013:1091, 1096)

Furthermore, these authors point out that not one of the IBSA states is the most valued trading nation of the other, and there has also been intense trade friction between the three, despite the proclaimed solidarity. This summation is supported by Flemes (2007) who observes that although an IBSA trade agreement has been broached at regular intervals, the negotiation and implementation of an initiative such as this (on such a scale, and one that would detract from the individual IBSA states' national economically privileged positions) is unlikely to see the light of day. This is entrenched by the fact that India, Brazil and South Africa are (almost inextricably) bound to their own regional security communities. Instead, he suggests that "[a] more realistic approach could be directed towards trade facilitation and the improvement of transport and infrastructure links between the three players" (Flemes, 2007:24). For the foreseeable future, this non-redistributive position seems the likely scenario – confining so-called critical, emancipatory statements to the rhetorical level.

4.7 EVALUATION

This chapter was structured along the study design principles laid out in Chapter 1, and linked to the conceptual pillars that had been developed in Chapter 2 at Diagram 2.1; which were used to advance the resolution of the research question. I note that insufficient maritime work group data emanating from IBSA itself was available to provide for a thick analysis. As this chapter follows the structure of empirical case study, it offered the first opportunity to apply concept to practice. In order to commence the analysis, a common understanding of the wide concept of maritime trade was introduced. The notion of 'sea blindness' often prevents the realisation that maritime trade provides the lifeblood for each IBSA country's economy. Shared ideas include the fact that the IBSA countries, as maritime nations, have vested cooperation and developmental interests at stake in enhancing maritime trade. This facet is one in which the hybrid nature of the IBSA collective came to the fore – it attempts to balance emancipatory and redistributive driving forces with the insular national interests. Often this had not been successful, indicative of the non-alignment of

discourse and economic diplomacy. Had this been done, and ideally, their conjoined efforts ought to lead to greater trade and positive effects downstream and improved economic security in the IBSA countries and their regions.

I noted the effects of globalisation and the need to attempt to manage this phenomenon in terms of international political economy, that present resistance for the IBSA collective as they try to streamline extraneous events that are mostly beyond their sphere of influence. Nevertheless, it was further concluded that recent maritime developments record the shifting perspectives and actions from a global South perspective, with the observation that the developing world was embracing its maritime future; although its genesis can not be attributed to the IBSA collective.

Then, common historical and identity-formation colonial linkages that laid the keel for contemporary maritime values were emphasised. In this respect, the veracity of the saying that 'maritime histories are economic histories' was confirmed. The European colonists utilised their maritime skills and authority in such ways that its risks were balanced by the ample rewards. A further deduction is that the European colonial powers, from the early modern era until the process of decolonisation that commenced after the Second World War, had effectively displayed and executed trade that was underpinned by force. Once the postcolony was in place, this condition had led to a maritime economic power vacuum, unfortunately regularly filled through neocolonialism.

The chapter then moved to structures, in this case put into place by means of MoUs. Each of the IBSA states continues to utilise its maritime sector power and knowledge to energise and provide direction to this particular working group, specifically through its action plan. Yet, process defects with respect to time-lines and the apparent non-establishment of the Maritime Liaison Committee has an adverse effect on the ability of agents to use their potential embedded knowledge and power to actuate the working group.

A summation in this respect would be that intra-IBSA trade has to a great extent aligned with the targets that had been set, but that the application of innovative

processes, adherence to time-lines, formative instructions from the IBSA leader group, among other issues, could facilitate even better results (Wyatt-Walker, 1995:81-83). It would be important to draw in the various IBSA regional economic communities, as well as revolve the processes in order for them to achieve greater 'bottom up' engagements.

Here I refer not only to the difficulty that was inherent in the transfer of maritime skills from the colonising states to their subjects, but also to how this contributed towards 'maritime economic cooperation' within IBSA. It is important to be reminded that the European colonisers had had the comparative advantage of ingrained knowledge of the integration of maritime trade with the principles of commerce. Not only was there a stream of new merchandise, but of greater value – also transferred to the colonised via mimicry – was the flow of new ideas and technical development (Coclanis, 2009:347-350). Yet, for those in the postcolony, there were numerous obstacles (particularly conditionalities) in gaining access to the innards of the maritime economic market. For instance, in South Africa, the apartheid laws – such as the Job Reservation Act – severely curtailed access to skilled jobs for blacks; serving among other factors to suppress peoples' potential and subjugate them to menial labour. In India (Kutty, 2015a) and Brazil, there were (and vestiges remain) the caste system and racial discrimination respectively that precluded entry into the formal maritime labour sector, so that only unskilled positions were available for decades. The fact that 'decolonised' independent states (like the IBSA states) continually grow and prosper in the regional and global maritime markets is an indication that much self-sufficiency and maritime productivity has been successfully inculcated.

The maritime trade sector therefore plays an important role in the socio-political construction of security of the IBSA community. It had strengthened and changed from colonial rule's state, civil society and private enterprise interests to establish new ones in the postcolony. The increasing value in maritime trade and the optimistic growth forecasts have benefits for all three IBSA states, as increased trade has concomitant positive effects on the countries and their regions' socio-economic and in the long-term, human development indices.

Yet, the available evidence also shows that the proclamations of South-South solidarity (and the presumptive leadership position) by IBSA is effectively eroded by the shortsightedness of the members' foreign economic policies. The impression that one may be left with, not having any opposing evidence, is that IBSA has usurped this solidarist leadership role for itself and self-serving economic (and possibly political) interests. Hence, the issue of national interests being often prioritised over that of the IBSA collective is vexatious, as it effectively appears to negate the uniformity of their reformist approach, and also highlights areas of tension in the collective. Given the nature of IBSA (transparent, discursive and solidarist traits) the tensions should be identified in order to be resolved, an issue that is eminently feasible. The solution, somewhat ironically, may be to enhance the level, scope and quality of discourse *within* IBSA in order to establish common positions. These should take place preferably before private issues about collective approaches become public polemics for IBSA.

A further observation is based on the relative sizes of their economies, particularly their maritime sectors. It is likely that too much knowledge and skills lie embedded within the three countries individually, rather than being shared in a pro-active manner in order to shape their mutual knowledge through social learning and interaction. This can be changed through discourse, as well as directed and disciplined security community leadership.

Returning now to the research questions, and as noted earlier in this section on the chapter's evaluation, I contend that a number of processes found application in this, the first empirical chapter, to a degree whereby it implies that the construction of a collective identity is enhanced. Maritime historical identities are strong in the three IBSA states, mimicry and knowledge transfer were linked towards maritime knowledge, and shaped the collective hybrid maritime character. Through maritime economic cooperation between the IBSA countries, this sector continues to take up the slack to equitably bring IBSA into the mainstream of the world economy, albeit at a much slower pace than envisaged, and dragged down by distractive national economic priorities. Intra-IBSA maritime cooperation is based on impressive inherent levels of knowledge and sectoral power, and its common basis lends itself to social learning,

that in turn through continuous interaction shapes identity, and effects mutual trust and collective identity, much of it illustrated through intra-IBSA maritime cooperation.

The net effect of these efforts was that the development of the IBSA collective in terms of one of the facets of security collaboration was enhanced. It was a difficult feat, performed under the handicap of its hybrid identity. I submit that the other facet of security collaboration, namely human security enhancement (and economic security in particular), is minimal. The main facts – that causality between the targets for intra-IBSA trade is difficult to extract (but then it was a goal set by IBSA), and that a vital trade agreement is doubtful in the medium- to long-term future – give rise to this submission: That the maritime trade sector, does – but to a limited degree – presently contribute to economic security in the IBSA countries and their associated regional economic communities. Much can be done to rectify this state of affairs, and remedial propositions will be dealt with in Chapter 7 (Conclusion).

The next chapter, Chapter 5, deals with energy. This is a critical base requirement for not only the IBSA partners, but for all developed and developing nations; so as to ensure economic and environmental security and prosperity.

CHAPTER 5: IBSA ENERGY COOPERATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

5.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

The previous chapter provided an understanding of the value of maritime trade to the IBSA collective and its contribution to enhance economic human security. This chapter (and second case study) discusses a fundamental foundation of the human condition, as the subject matter deals with the socio-political construction of energy security as a sub-set of environmental security. Energy cooperation is a causal contingent of energy security, as it directly influences IBSA's developmental progress and indeed South-South cooperation. I therefore concur with Dincer's (2000:157) statement that "[e]nergy is the convertible currency of technology. Without energy the whole fabric of society as we know it would crumble". For the global South in particular access to energy in its manifold forms is a foundation stone for socio-economic advancement. However, obtaining sustainable energy remains a future goal, and it is an issue that continues to starkly divide the world along energy-rich and energy-impoverished faultlines.

In this chapter I seek to address the following questions: *What can we learn from IBSA's trilateral security cooperation in the area of energy in respect of its implications for developing community and the fostering of shared identities? Does the IBSA collective promote environmental security through energy cooperation?*

Addressing these questions would assist me to take the resolution of the overall research question a step further, in that I determine whether the socio-political construction of security in the IBSA collective, in its roles as reformer and critical agent, can be understood when viewed through the integrated critical IR theories, using energy as the focus of this case study. To expand, my objectives are firstly, to critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the IBSA collective's security collaboration in respect of energy; and secondly, to develop extensive knowledge about IBSA energy cooperation (specifically through the actions and interactions of

the relevant working group) to facilitate a critical understanding of the implications for collective identity-construction.

The principles of case study research (from Chapter 1) are applied here. I include information from a variety of sources (including country energy shapes and long-term projects, MoUs, and select commentaries from semi-structured interviews). I buttress credibility and trustworthiness by making it a 'thick' case study, and loosely apply CDA and content analysis. Combined, this makes for a properly-founded evaluation.

As with all the case study chapters, this chapter follows contours of the pillars (refined in Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1). Thematically, I surmise in this chapter that the IBSA identity is made up of a number of complex and apparently incongruous facets which are only really understood when the collective is examined as a hybrid construction (Chapter 1, section 1.3). The IBSA collective's hybridity is viewed as a tension that arises between national economic interests (which would include the continued use and export/import of dirty energy sources and technology) at the expense of their critical role to champion environmental justice as well as sustainable development for the South (including the alleviation of hardships wrought by the actions of others (see structural violence, further)).

I commence with contextualisation, which provides the functional environment of shared histories and developed ideas and norms that are shaped through the focus on energy. I examine the energy condition in which developing states found themselves upon liberation in the latter half of the twentieth century. I also discuss how this condition gave rise to a foundation of relative energy poverty. I relate this condition in terms of marginalisation, and give an idea of the different levels of energy poverty when viewed from the global South and developed North respectively. Having to overcome the energy deficits of the inherited colonial condition situates the study, particularly with respect to South-South cooperation. This is followed by the potential and common trends within the global South for renewable, sustainable energy. The efforts being made by IBSA to overcome this chasm provide the essential thrust of this chapter.

I then shift to the conceptualisation of the place and value of energy, the shared ideas, values and discourse of energy and the shaping of identity. This includes four pertinent issues: The collective's (plus China) active participation in the form of the BASIC[45] geopolitical grouping during the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit and further global climate change diplomacy, the IBSA collective's energy work within the IBSA Fund; the focus on the issues and barriers which need to be addressed in achieving millennium development goals (MDGs); and the possibility of alignment around the idea of energy as a human right. Shifting to power and knowledge, and in order to work from a platform some (technical) concepts are explained, followed by a review of the types and energy production of the IBSA countries, while points of convergence are noted. These provide valued information in terms of structures concerning IBSA energy practices. Still following the diagram from Chapter 2 (Diagram 2.1), the diplomacy that initiated IBSA energy cooperation and associated foreign policy positions are reviewed, based on founding statements and legal base documents. In moving towards the chapter's denouement, the section that follows deals with the IBSA MoUs on energy and the work group on energy, that provide the structure, power and process. The collaborative actions also underscore interaction and transactions, as these identify common positions but also highlight national priorities (as already also illustrated in Chapter 4), but at the same time tend to undermine the reformist collective position. CDA on its available documents are loosely applied, and achievements to date and future energy plans are noted, whereafter the chapter is evaluated.

5.2 CONTEXTUALISING ENERGY DEBATES: THE GLOBAL SOUTH'S ENERGY CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL

In order to consider the background to the energy debate, I note the legacies that the newly liberated states were confronted with at independence. It provides an indication of the energy divide that continues to exist between the developing and developed worlds roughly six decades after liberation. It highlights the challenges that are faced

[45] The BASIC countries are a bloc of four newly industrialised states (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) formed by agreement in November 2009. BASIC committed to act jointly at the Copenhagen summit and have been active in climate fora since.

in the postcolony and the role of neocolonialism, with Kwame Nkrumah being one of the first to write about this in *Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism* (1965). In its quest to achieve energy equity, the global South's immense natural potential and scientific innovation provide abundant sources for energy potential.

5.2.1 Global South development and colonial legacies

There are diverse perspectives on the colonial legacies, and I highlight three. One view by dependency theorists and radical nationalists asserts that the European 'conspiracy' between power politics and economic exploitation directly contributed to the poor state of development (including infrastructure and energy systems) in the late twentieth century (Rodney, 1972). A variation of this theme is the second perspective, namely that colonial powers were engaged in extractive industries to the degree that colonial immigration, institutional structuration and national infrastructural development were neglected. A third view is that the 'white man's burden' was carried out to improve the lot of those in the 'dark continents and world regions of underdevelopment', often with the connivance of local elites; and that colonialism set the stage for capitalism (Austin, 2010:14-17). I submit that a common denominator is at work in all three positions, namely that the colonial legacy was unequally skewed towards a wholly inadequate system of institutions and infrastructure for those that remain in the postcolonial condition. This means that even after decades of liberation, massive energy challenges remain.

It is axiomatic that the main priority of most of the developing world would be to utilise its ample energy resources in order to accelerate the socio-economic progress of its inhabitants. Indeed, a growing number of developing states gain much revenue especially from fossil fuels. Yet the so-called resource curse (the confounding, inverse correlation between resource affluence and poor economic growth (Auty, 1994:11-26)) ensures that only the elite benefit; while the lives of ordinary people are not enhanced. In fact, many developing countries are replete with accounts of how exploration, development and industrialisation of new-found natural resources have led to insecurity, armed and factional disputes and environmental destruction (Eze & Nwaiwu, 2012:263-274; Amechi, 2009:107-132). Added to this state of affairs is the

fact that underdeveloped or even developing countries do not possess the wide range and depth of resources to transform its potential energy sources into contemporary and viable forms of energy (Dadwal, 2011:9-12).

To exacerbate the developing world energy condition, the global North – a traditional energy roleplayer – is increasingly being joined by new energy seekers from emerging economies (including China, Brazil and South Africa), in an apparent 'new scramble' for energy resources (Scholvin, 2009). (This incongruity lays bare the hybrid nature of the regional powers, including the IBSA states that seek to buoy their national fiscus, often at the risk of being viewed as usurpers and not emancipators of the global South condition.) Linked to this is the impending depletion of hydrocarbon and nuclear power resources and its odious link to climate change, due to unprecedented growth in energy demand from developed and developing countries alike (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2007; Nelder, 2009). These have resulted in major and emerging economies changing their attention to not only harnessing alternative, sustainable energy sources, but also to finding new locations that have greater security of supply. The renewed foraging for alternate sources of energy has a number of negative consequences. These include the insecurity distresses over the disruption of energy supplies arising from political instability from traditional sources such as the Middle East. A further negative effect has been that the exogenous global North and emerging states noted above have opted for the short-term gains of hydrocarbons and minerals extraction, instead of resource production from sustainable, renewable resources (Dadwal, 2011:1-14; Shikwati, 2009:31-48; Brown, 2007:4); presenting another example of hybridity. It also has an effect on world economies and has given rise to the emergence of 'energy nationalism' (increased state support for energy production in order to ensure or enhance national self-sufficiency (Hughes & Kreyling, 2010)) in some energy-producing states. In turn, this underscores the heterogeneously polarised discourse between equity and the gains from ecological development (Bina, 2013:1023-1047).

This brief prologue has highlighted energy challenges extant in the developing world, and showed that the dilemma reaches beyond the legacy of natural energy resources. It implies understanding the depth and width of the postcolonial history and the current

(lack of) progress in the developing world, as energy access is driven by economic development and the requirement for an equitable re-dispensation of developing countries' wealth across their populations. Similarly, seen from an IBSA collective and its regions' viewpoint, energy potential is an asset. This energy capital is one that needs to be built upon to ensure the further developmental construction of the three underdeveloped parts of their respective continents (Khennas, 2012:21-26).

5.2.2 The global South's renewable energy environment: Towards common trends

For developing countries, increasing the share of energy that is powered by domestic renewable sources is a vital component to improving energy security and access. It strengthens national and regional economic futures, and facilitates the transition to a more sustainable energy sector. This section gives brief general overviews of the global South (by region) and draws together common factors.

Southeast Asia is growing fast – its population is expected to grow from around 615 million in 2014 to over 715 million by 2025, and its economies at a rate of five per cent per year. All of this growth is expected to fuel a four per cent annual growth in energy demand, raising the region's share to over 7.5 per cent of the world's total. Deploying more renewable energy is not cost-free, but the region is rich in renewable energy resources — particularly bioenergy, hydropower, geothermal and solar. Further deployment could create huge savings when accounting for reduced costs that result from replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy. The reduced input costs from indoor and outdoor air pollution resulting from the use of renewable energy technologies identified in the study, could create savings 10 to 50 times higher than their cost (International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2016, n.p.).

Latin America is benefiting from the effects of rapid technology cost reductions and the optimisation of renewable energy policies. The region offers some of the world's most enterprising renewable energy fields, as it has the chance to "accelerate the uptake of renewables across all sectors … The proven business case of renewables, combined with the imperative to decarbonise the energy sector, provides a compelling

rationale for Latin American countries to continue deploying more renewables, including solar and wind" (IRENA, 2016:n.p.). Further, it is also recognised that renewables are drivers for job creation, GDP growth, development of local industries, energy access – in short, socio-economic upliftment. Latin America holds some of the most cost-competitive hydropower, solar and wind resources globally and today, more than a quarter of the region's total primary energy comes from renewables, twice the global average (PV Magazine, 2016:n.p.).

In all regions of Africa except the North, hydropower will be an important component of energy provision. Africa can also derive renewable power from other sources, such as wind energy, while solar power will matter specifically in North Africa. Additional renewable power capacity is expected from geothermal sources in East Africa, while solar photovoltaics (PV) will be important in the North and Southern regions. Within respective regions, biomass, geothermal, hydropower, solar or wind resources have among the highest potential in the world. The abundance and high quality of renewable-energy resources render renewables economically competitive, in particular as the costs of renewable technologies are rapidly decreasing. Recent renewable-energy project deals concluded in Africa will deliver power at some of the lowest costs worldwide (IRENA, 2015, n.p.).

Clearly much of what can be produced is a function of states' and regions' geophysical attributes, which to a degree limit the commonalities. Yet, as this short overview has shown, most of the range of renewable energy sources are within the potential capacities of the nations of the global South. As costs decrease, the renewable options become cost-effective and require less financing. The most important value that one can derive, however, is that the global South has the potential to achieve developing states emancipation within renewable and sustainable energy access. This potential state of equity would mean that socio-economic progress does not come at a prohibitive cost, is not accompanied by unacceptable risks and that it would obviate neocolonial intrusions.

Having explored the context of the global South, I turn now to the specifics of the global South and IBSA's energy condition and conceptualise the shared foundations.

5.3 CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE IBSA COLLECTIVE'S ENERGY CONDITION: THE FOUNDATION OF SHARED IDEAS AND DISCOURSE

I commence the section to show the state of energy within the global South and the IBSA collective. I then proceed with an explanation of the term 'energy poverty' so that a general understanding of the term is understood. This condition tells two tales: Firstly, that of the absolute and relative condition of energy in the global South and the IBSA states, respectively, in relation to the developed North; and secondly, it provides the narrative for the foundation of IBSA 'energy empathy', a recognition that normatively the energy area of human endeavour ought to be a prioritised field of IBSA cooperation. Energy poverty gives clear indications of the gaps and the associated challenges that exist to overcome the shortages. The concept provides agency for political leadership, civil society (ideally) and the IBSA working group on energy with cooperative targets. It also provides a springboard for the section that follows upon this one, namely the postcolonial condition that gave rise to energy poverty.

5.3.1 IBSA and the global South: Energy knowledge

The following information gives an overview of the state of energy in the global South, and includes the regions inhabited by the IBSA collective states. Table 5.1 shows the number of people without access to electricity, and dependent of traditional fuels.

Table 5.1: Number of people without access to electricity and dependent on traditional fuels for cooking and heating

		Number of people lacking access to electricity (millions)	Number of people relying on the traditional use of solid fuels for heating and cooking (millions)
Africa		**587**	**657**
	Sub-Saharan Africa	**585**	**653**
Asia		**799**	**1937**
	China	**8**	**423**
	India	**404**	**855**
	Other Asia	**387**	**659**
Latin America		**31**	**85**
World		**1 417**	**2 679**

(Sovacool, 2012:275)

To provide an energy setting: By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century and from the countries of the global South about 1.4 billion people still lived without electricity; another one billion had spurious access to electricity grids; while another 2.4 billion fully relied on wood, charcoal, animal ordure and solid fuels to supply household energy (Sovacool, *et al*, 2012:715). Included are the citizens of the IBSA collective. Hence the table provides valuable information as it sets out the extant energy situation, and the tremendous challenges that are faced in achieving universal energy access.

5.3.2 Towards shared ideas: The concept of energy poverty and its dynamics

Defining 'energy poverty' (Sharma & Ganesha, 2011:12) is much debated and contentious, particularly from a human security 'most vulnerable individual' viewpoint. The main issues of contention are energy poverty indicators (outputs, i.e. lack of energy services, rather than outcomes, i.e. socio-economic gains from energy

consumption).[46] Over time, some consensus emerged, namely that "energy poverty has referred to the way in which an individual in the global South's well-being is negatively affected by the lack of access to fuel, including the use of high polluting fuels or the need to spend extensive amounts of time collecting fuel" (The Homeless Hub, n.d.:n.p.). I concur with the observation that after the global South's liberation and the onset of the often 'unseen hand' of neocolonialism "Western Europe and parts of North America had become fabulously wealthy. Almost everywhere else was horribly [energy] poor. Economic historians refer to this as the 'Great Divergence'" (C.W., 2013:n.p., own insertion).

Conversely, and highlighting the differences between developing and developed countries, 'fuel poverty' or 'fuel precariousness' is used to describe people in the global North. They have access to energy but the lack of resources to pay for it, and its concepts relates more to fuel costs and household incomes. Table 5.2 stresses this dichotomy and the energy gap that exists between energy elements viewed from the global South and global South perspectives.

[46] Ironically, the community that writes about the economics of energy continues to give much less attention to the pressing issue of energy among the world's most destitute people. Birol (2007:3) affirms this state of affairs by noting that "[o]ver the past five years, less than 20% of the articles that have appeared in the major international energy journals have focused on developing countries, and only a tiny fraction of these have addressed energy-poverty issues".

Table 5.2: Principal elements of 'energy poverty' and 'fuel poverty'

Element	Developing world 'energy poverty'	Developed-world 'fuel poverty'
Recognition	Explicitly acknowledged in isolated documents during the early 1970s. Subsequent debates mainly focused on technological expansion. More recent research addresses participation and governance challenges.	First mentions date back to the late 1970s and 1980s, principally referring to rising energy costs and 'the right to fuel' in some liberal or social democracies. Later research allowed for a wider understanding of the problem.
Driving forces	Primarily low levels of electrification and other forms of networked energy provision due to economic underdevelopment and non-functional institutions.	High or rising energy prices vs. low household incomes. Inefficient housing, heating systems and appliance stocks.
Expression	Lack of access to adequate facilities for cooking, lighting and electric appliances, but also other services such as space cooling and heating.	Mainly inadequate heating in the home; importance of other services (particularly space cooling, lighting, appliances, increasingly information technology).
Consequences	Detrimental impacts on health, gender inequality, education and economic development more generally.	Long and short-term mental and physical health, inadequate participation in society.
Principal policies	Support for transitions to 'modern' energy fuels, investment in power grid expansion or micro-scale renewables; income support.	Combination of income support, provision of energy at lower costs, and energy efficiency investment.

(Adapted from Bouzarovksi & Petrova, 2015:32)

This table is of significance for a number of reasons. Firstly, when CDA is applied it shows the contrasting nature of discourse (challenges/understanding; low levels/inadequate income; lack of access/inadequacies; detrimental impacts/inadequate participation; remedial policies pitched at different levels) that represents facets of the postcolonial condition. In a sense the situation depicts parallel energy universes,

between developing and developed worlds. Secondly, it accentuates the energy gap, literally an energy chasm between the well-off and the impoverished, between those that thrive relatively and those who endure. Thirdly, analytically Table 5.2 also depicts the type of energy and developmental diplomatic language and discourse required. For the IBSA collective this also underscores the hybrid character and the two knowledge worlds that they need to become familiar with. The IBSA collective ought to inhabit the power spaces of energy discourse and – as ideational agents – pursue this discourse for the sake of their reformatory and emancipatory agenda. Lastly, it indirectly underscores the greater amount of pollution that is produced by developed countries, as the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions emitted by the conversion of fossil fuels to energy is the most consequential contributors to climate change (International Panel on Climate Change, 2013; International Energy Agency, 2016). After extracting data from several authoritative sources, Kapila (2014:13) draws the conclusion that "historically and at present, the developed world, i.e. OECD-group of countries, are the primary contributors to climate change". This gives the developing world a basis from which to negotiate with developed countries on international climate change fora.

As mentioned, a key issue that drives both environmental and energy security (the concepts discussed in sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, further), is climate change and its associated care. The natural environment and the economy are mutually dependent, where economic progress is reliant upon sufficient and reliable (energy) resources, and the proper operation of structures are foundations for societal development. Pollution and other byproducts of human energy production activities constrain environmental processes and systems. This means that the criteria for sustainable development lie within the durability of livelihoods for all (Opschoor & Reijnders, 1991:7-28). In this regard Roy (interview, 2010) confirms the link when he remarks that "energy cooperation brings about security. From this development". Hence climate change and its sustainability management inform all levels of developmental cooperation, such as that between India, Brazil and South Africa. Goodman (2012:n.p) refers to this type of cooperation as "social capital – how human networks come together. ... In the future, it might be part of climate adaptation planning. As we try to build a smarter society and a smarter planet, with a lighter footprint, the planning is really essential. Reducing our

dependence on any one source of energy is in our interest" (see also Chalecki, 2013:59).

The implications of energy poverty are multiplex, of which four stand out: Direct and indirect economic costs; the aggravation of health conditions; environmental effects (deforestation, smoke pollution); and the gender factor – the task of collecting biomass and unhealthy cooking conditions tend to fall to women and young girls (Behrens *et al*, 2011:7). These negative effects also underscore the asymmetry of developing/developed world energy access and distribution, and the associated redistributive desire. A factor that further exacerbates the energy situation is the effect that the inexorable process of urbanisation has on energy consumption and planning, a dire global South condition (Jones, 1991:621-630).

Yet the situation is not as monochromatic as it may first appear. This state of affairs denotes complexity, fluidity and ambivalence – those elements that make up hybridity. It is not a small, hegemonic grouping of developed nations versus a majority of less-empowered developing nations. The new multipolar world order that continually develops is radically different from the bipolar world of the latter half of the twentieth century. Increasingly, the world system is interdependent at economic and environmental levels, and it applies to both the global North and the South (which harks to the development of regionalism after the Cold War (described and analysed in Chapters 1 and 2)). Our globalised world has many vociferous supporters: Globalisation, they proclaim, has advantages for all in the long-term, as it increases world-wide collaboration, connectivity and works towards forms of global equity (Norberg, 2003). Standing in opposition is a growing chorus of caution and conscience, with one set of scholars noting that globalisation is a "race to the bottom promoting a destructive competition, not just between developing and industrialized countries but also among the countries of the Third World" (Brecher, Costello & Smith, 2000:5; Shiva, 1999:19).

This observation confirms the position that both the global South and the developed world exhibit layered, complex hybrid constructions. Development and globalisation result in seemingly inextricable levels of interdependence between peoples of

industrialised and developing worlds. These are worlds, constructed of their own making, where the "poverty curtain" (Ul Haq, 1976) replaces the 'iron curtain'; and where levels of inequality are growing. A better correlation between energy provision and development is therefore key towards the economic well-being of developing nations.

The challenge, synthesised, is to identify and to meaningfully confront and turn around those policies and practices that create impoverished conditions, and work towards shared values and common obligations that enhance normative standards. These ought to ameliorate tensions by following an evolutionary methodology. In response to the challenge, what follows are three methodologies that originate from both postcolonial studies and (critical) social constructivism. Firstly, the voices from those on the world periphery must be listened to. For this, two main reasons suffice – colonial history gives a different perspective, and the forces of globalisation can not be assumed to aim towards the establishment of a wholly more equitable, non-partisan world. Hence the outcome needs to be the result of dialogue. In the second place, the centripetal forces of globalisation take place from above, whereas the values contained in (critical) social constructivism serve as a guide to act from below. Rights exist for participative processes and leaders need to be held answerable. In this way governments and civil structures combine efforts in an inclusive way. Third, an emphasis on human rights and associated human security provide the moral standards by which to assess the process of globalisation, so as to ensure that movement towards greater social development is constructed (Thomas-Slayter, 2003:281-314; see also Axelrod, 1986:1095-1111; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887-917; Fiorini, 1996:363-389).

In this respect, Persaud (2001:36-37) pertinently observes that, intermestically "[the] world order does not stand in high heaven above domestic social formations, and outside of history … nor are societies impervious to world order pressures. On the contrary, not only do world order, forms of state, and domestic social forces interact as a structural reality; but each is produced through historically conscious action". Such a two-pronged approach to resolve issues would primarily involve the vigorous engagement of people in the understanding and absorption of the workings of processes (in the case IBSA, the active participation of civil society). Secondly, it

would entail being active participants in the re-development of systems that yield energy in such a manner that it allows for the simultaneous utilisation of the ecosystems combined with energy conservation, for present and future use. This approach relies on providing the individual and his or her community with the capacity to be part of inclusive solutions (Barken, 2000:163-180). This approach would dovetail with the study's theoretical tenets, in particular discourse (that includes international and regional communication and synergy, working towards a change-constructed world), shared histories (that become "shared horizons of reality" (Honkanen, 2004:10)) and norms (being shared and social beliefs about appropriate behaviour (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891)). Cumulatively this approach would be a classic case of bottom-up processes involved in the socio-political 'construction' of energy cooperation.

Accordingly, the energy case study stresses the link between the relative inaccessibility to energy resources and 'energy poverty' in the global South. In this regard the IBSA leadership recognised

> that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed in future to sustain energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world. In this regard, the availability of energy and access to it are vital to human development, and they recognized that renewable energy, as well as nuclear power play an important role in the energy mix of countries and also contributes to mitigate the risk of global climate change.
>
> IBSA Dialogue Forum, 2011:14)

The case study is therefore important not only because of its implications for greater world equity and for world energy emancipation and redistribution. It is also relevant because sustainable and renewable energy access is also the route to socio-economic developmental progress and the enhancement of human security, from a developmental countries' perspective. This illustrates one facet of the duality of IBSA's hybrid identity and serves as a background to its discussion further in this chapter.

5.3.3 The IBSA energy environment: The shaping of shared identities

As inferred above, three issues have aided the formation and subsequent maturation of IBSA's shared identities in the field of international environmental climate governance, while I moot a fourth that has the potential to achieve the same.

The first issue is a UN-guided climate conference in Copenhagen in 2009 which represented an important geopolitical watershed in multilateral negotiations, led by IBSA plus China. The conference failed to reach an anticipated accord in world climate change management. The associated negotiations were made significant by the establishment of BASIC. The BASIC countries went about "achieving progress in determining the future direction of the climate change regime. In other words, these negotiations were significant for the role taken by countries of the South in shaping the negotiation outcomes (Copenhagen Accord) and in defending key principles enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol – particularly the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities" (Masters, 2012:1-2). BASIC has met a dozen times in the four countries up until August 2014 (Masters, 2012:2, Dobrovidova, 2014:n.p.), providing structured continuity and refined climate diplomacy positions. Viewed as more than merely 'club diplomacy', BASIC is deemed to be representative of the global South (Masters, 2012:3; Hallding *et al*, 2011:2). Even though challenges exist around its incohesive structure and also the possibility of competing interests, BASIC (or IBSA+C) "offers a point of leverage against industrialised country positions" (Masters, 2012:3) and displayed "tight, functional cooperation [as a] a weighty group" (Hallding *et al*, 2011:2). Further, BASIC emphasises

> the importance of collective identities in shaping norms of 'appropriate association' – the social bases of whose one's friends and allies are. It highlights the regional basis for many of these negotiating groups that cut across shared material circumstances, and draws upon historical institutionalist insights on critical junctures and path dependence to place this larger pattern of Southern coalition formation in the appropriate historical and institutional context of the UN system.
>
> (Chan, 2013:n.p.)

At present it appears that quality leadership is required to ensure that this collective action endures (Besharati, 2013:23-24; Masters, 2014:2-3). Yet I submit that these actions have raised the international stature of IBSA and the global South at climate diplomacy level. Further I venture that this initiative has reinforced the solidarity of IBSA, and it may have consolidated, and even vindicated, a form of global South leadership.

The second issue also relates to development diplomacy, interwoven with IBSA energy cooperation. Specifically, it refers to the IBSA Fund, where the IBSA collective has been working hand-in-glove with impoverished global South countries and the UN in the field of energy-provision. Over its period in existence, the IBSA Fund has spent 5.3 per cent on renewable energy projects, with these spread over Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America (Grobbelaar, 2014a:30-31). Doubtlessly, this continues to be a source of achievement for the IBSA collective as it has won a number of awards; and I suggest it adds significantly to the collective's identity-shaping.

The third issue is a more indirect form of identity-formation, and is in relation to the UN Millennium Development Goals[47] and its follow-up programme, the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The UN is also working with governments, regional constructs (including IBSA), civil society and others to build upon the MDGs and continue with an aspirational post-2015 development agenda. Although the MDGs do not explicitly refer to energy, "none can be achieved without the availability of adequate and affordable energy" (Sovacool, 2012:273). Two of the MDGs (ensure environmental sustainability and global partnership for development) are the target of the IBSA collective via the BASIC grouping. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG) calls on countries to begin efforts to achieve the seventeen SDGs over the next 15 years[48]. SDG7 (affordable and clean energy) and

[47] The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which range from halving extreme poverty rates to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015 – form a blueprint agreed to by all the world's countries and all the world's leading development institutions (United Nations, 2015).

[48] The SDGs address the needs of people in both developed and developing countries, emphasising the unity of a world effort: "Broad and ambitious in scope, the Agenda addresses the three dimensions of

SDG13 (climate action that relate directly to affordable and sustainable energy access), have direct, but most of the other 15 have indirect bearings on energy access (United Nations, 2015). From its inception and in line with their reformative programme, IBSA has been working behind the scenes, together, to pursue these goals (India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (Summit Declarations, Ministerial Communiqué, Meetings of IBSA Foreign Ministers, 2004-2011); Flemes, 2007:11; Agarwal, Besada & White, 2010:333, 351; UNCTAD, 2012:10; Mashala, 2013:7, 10). However much this indeed contributed to identity-shaping in amongst the IBSA collective, it appears that – as noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 – this aspect has also become a tepid issue of late.

The fourth issue around which identity can form, is based on ideas and norms. It refers to ascribing access to energy as a basic human right. At present, none of the IBSA states have this enshrined as a right in their respective constitutions. South Africa grants access to electricity (but not all forms of energy) as a right via its national legislation, provided that a prospective consumer can pay for it. The citizens of both India and Brazil have this right too, albeit in an indirect route via their countries affirmation of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), into which various aspects of energy rights-of-access may be inferred (Holland & Ordóñez, 2015, 57-77; Shankar & Sharma, 2015:1-20). This idea appears to be a contemporary normative issue around which the IBSA states can coalesce, and links back to the human security elements of this study (Chapter 2, section 2.3.2).

The first three issues that relate to identity-shaping in IBSA with respect to environmental change management are also of value because the first two take place in the eyes of the world, whereas the third takes place within IBSA itself (it excludes China) and occurs out of sight, highlighting the ability of the IBSA collective to work together under various situations of exposure. All three occur within an environment where shared ideas and normative patterns lead to interaction and transactions that in turn enhances social learning and contributes significantly to hybrid identities formation, while the fourth offers much potential.

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sustainable development: social, economic and environmental, as well as important aspects related to peace, justice and effective institutions" (United Nations, 2015).

Whether IBSA has similar common understandings with respect to the terms used in this chapter, is discussed next.

5.3.4 Shaping IBSA's knowledge base: Understanding environmental security

There is a paucity of information that reveals the IBSA collective's position or conceptualisation with respect to environmental security. In its absence, I resort to the human security basis upon which this study is founded. Protecting the environment is critical to human security. Environmental security is a pivotal issue in economic growth, and basal to individual and community health and welfare; exceptionally it is a condition to survival. Hence, all human endeavour depend upon a protected environment, making its guardianship a moral and ethical commitment (Elliott, 2000:158-159).

Although the concept of environmental security is contested, there are two main issues that scholars concur with and which lie within the ambit of environmental security. Firstly, environmental security has become accepted as a concept that expands orthodox IR thinking (addressed in Chapters 2 and 3). 'New' thinking in this realm arranges and analyses threats in a systematic manner, whereby growing interdependence is contrasted with escalating environmental degradation and over-exploitation. The second part of this paradigm sees a nexus between environmental differentials and the means of securing the necessities of life at various levels of impact (Chalecki, 2013:1-25; Biswas, 2011:1-27; Wilner, 2006:169-181). Pro-active coordination and cooperation can mitigate the impacts. These two dimensions help define environmental issues as important factors of security.

Environmental security relates to economic security, where it is addressed as energy security (Floyd, 2008:62). The Kampala Document reiterates this point, and although its reference is the African continent, the global South can be inferred when the Document notes that

> affordable resources to achieve self-reliance in energy is as much a security matter as it is an economic priority. As a matter of regional security and socio-economic necessity, existing regional efforts … should be pooled … into two separate major centers – one to be charged with the responsibility of ushering in a 'green revolution' for Africa and the other with the task of achieving a major breakthrough in specific renewable sources of energy especially solar energy.
>
> (Kampala Document, 1991:110)

Another related linkage is that between the development and production of bio-energy and food security which impact reciprocally, as they cross lines with critical global factors, such as water usage, land utilisation, development and the right to food (Swaminathan, 2013).

The discussion concerning environmental security also involves structural violence (Galtung, 1969:167-191), which refers to the creation of societal conditions under which others endure hardships. At geopolitical level, "climate change could be considered an act of structural violence caused by the energy-intensive industrialized world that increases its wealth at the expense of the more vulnerable developing world. This conception of climate change raises questions of liability and justice" (McArthur, 2013:179-180). At local level, this would entail extraction of resources, including hydrocarbons, where foreign syndicates conducting operations can produce distressing, and often lasting, consequences. Often these have such negative impacts that reactions lead to demands for justice. Accordingly, this notion of achieving environmental equity is substantial, especially among developing countries (Nelson, 2004:615-652).

How environmental security is conceptualised, therefore has implications for energy and the pursuit of equity in this realm. Environmental and energy security are linked because sources of energy are extracted and managed from the environment or nature; which needs to be nurtured in order to ensure sustainability and renewability.

5.3.5 Energy security

Often, energy and environmental security are debated as discrete subjects, yet the

amelioration of climate change is put forward as a critical component in achieving energy security, and hence serves as an important and logical linkage between its securitisation and sustainability. Processes of securitisation inform identities about the nature of energy security. Sustainability provides strategic and predictive value and associated actions; and may determine prospective social practices and policies (Boulanin, 2012:15). Sustainability planning requires the creation of "a credible, practical and effective framework for cooperation on climate change [that] should be the primary means of making an immediate impact by addressing energy and environmental security in a coherent policy" (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2007:2).

Lying within the study of physics, 'energy' is expressed as the capacity of a physical system to perform work. Work, in turn, is the integral of force over a distance of displacement. Energy is found in many forms, which include heat, kinetic or mechanical, light, potential, electrical and others. The total energy of a system remains constant, though energy may transform into another form. The International System (SI) of units measure of energy is the joule (J) or newton-metre, which is also the SI unit of work (Zimmerman Jones). The physics-based definition of 'energy' is counterbalanced by the functions and applications of energy that lie firmly in the vibrancy and dynamics of the human and social sciences. Energy covers a vast and expanding continuum, from geopolitics to labour, from security to human well-being and what lies in between; and its availability, use or abuse has effects across a range of endeavours.

A subset of energy security is 'security of energy', being the safety and defence means taken to remedy energy supply risks (India's maritime military strategy, 2007:46-47). Yergin (2006:75-76) notes four principles that countries need to comply with in order to ensure energy security. They comprise variety in sources of supply; the ability to effectively predict and adapt to change in circumstances; recognising the inevitability of globalisation; and acknowledging the potency of efficient data frameworks. The IBSA working groups collectively generally factor these principles into their management systems, as is evidenced by the IBSA sectoral objectives as well as the

prologue to signed MoUs on energy matters (IBSA, 2015).[49]

Types of energy are placed in two dynamic spheres being the old or 'dirty' technologies (mainly hydrocarbons – coal, diesel, petrol, gas – for generation of energy) and the new or 'clean' technologies (solar, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, biofuels and others). The latter provides extensive added value (to varying degrees) to the climate, health and economies of humans and do not have risk-laden by-product. Each of these (renewable) energy technologies also has different benefits and impacts, with the ideal being processes that assuage or avoid the negative effects completely. In an important way, this establishes the hybrid condition of both developed and developing worlds, as there is a universal need for sustainable energy futures, but there is a belief that one side should supply while another side demands, along colonial fracture lines.

Since cooperation between states and their energy agencies contributes towards the discourse that shape more comprehensively sustainable solutions, it is encouraging to note that the transition to the latter is becoming more apparent (United Nations, 2015:1-8). The traditional energy model is undergoing profound transformations, set to disrupt or – alternatively viewed – invigorate the market for energy, as the gradual shift from old to new energy generation takes place. Voices from the global North and the developing world illustrate this. Hence, in a valuable way the words uttered by former United States President Obama during his inaugural address underscores the energy path that lies in the future, not only for IBSA, but viewed geostrategically for the world. He stated that "[w]e will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories" (Obama, 2009). In the context of the global South

[49] As an example: The MoU on Solar Energy, signed at Brasilia on 15 April 2010 notes the following under "Areas of Cooperation. 1 a) Solar energy technologies resource assessment using various measurements and modelling methodologies in order to identify the technical and economic potential of solar energy; b) The exchange of information relevant to the areas of cooperation, institutional agreements, regulatory frameworks and Government programmes that focus on solar energy; c) Design and development of various solar energy technology systems and devices; d) Standards, testing and certification procedures for various solar energy devices, equipments or components; c) commercialization and deployment of various solar energy equipment and devices; f) Setting up of large-scale local commercial manufacturing facilities of solar energy equipment and devices; g) Skills and technology transfer; and h) Implementation of solar energy projects".

Dlamini-Zuma (AU Chairperson) has a projected 2063 vision of "the future Africa … [as] a leader in renewable energy, with war a thing of the past. 'We lit up Africa, the formerly dark continent, using hydro, solar, wind, geothermal energy, in addition to fossil fuels'" (Dlamini-Zuma, 2014).

'Dirty' energy arose from the industrial revolution that began over two centuries ago. Moving beyond its main point of origin, Britain, the world has increasingly ignited and consumed vast quantities of coal, oil and gas. Industrialisation, population growth and globalisation fuel the ever-expanding energy required for economic development; and often the hegemony that accompanies these political power bases. Those in favour of the orthodox energy model would have it that the fossil fuel and nuclear[50] industrial supply chain have been proven over time. They contend that the processes are dependable and comprise an imperative that underpins low energy costs and predictive and sound economic development. Yet traditional energy suffers from severe and increasing disadvantages. These include nuclear radioactive waste management, pollution from burning, limited and dwindling supplies, as well as increasingly severe extractive methodologies. A contemporary illustration would be shale oil drilling, or 'fracking', which requires the consumption of a mixture of other resources. The process has toxic side-effects and further leaves vast areas despoiled (Western Resource Advocates, n.d.). It is unable to cope with rising demands and hence increasing outages; and importantly, is subjected to the economic dilemma imposed by those with vested economic interests in perpetrating the dirty energy model.

In contrast, 'clean' or alternative fuels are characterised by low or nil pollutants and have superlative attributes. They are versatile, adaptable, abundant, constant and usable in one or more form by most countries. Clean energy systems ameliorate the concentration of power grids through the spatial distribution of sources of energy,

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[50] All three IBSA states have nuclear capacities. India has 21 nuclear plants, with more to be added to the grid by 2020 (World Nuclear Association, 2015a). Brazil has two operational nuclear plants, with four being planned for commissioning by 2020 (World Nuclear Association, 2015b). South Africa has two nuclear generators in the same location (van Wyk, 2013:7). South Africa too, has plans for further nuclear plants (World Nuclear Association, 2015c). Although its (unique) construction of a pebble bed modular reactor has been abandoned, some analysts indicate that the technology remains feasible (Vermeulen, 2013), while its intellectual property rights are retained (van Wyk, 2013:24-25).

limit price surprises, reduce transportation costs and dependence on other countries for supplies, and tend to be resilient during temporary loss of power. A constant threat to the research, development and implementation of clean energy lies in the business plans of energy companies that at present have monopolies over power generation and supply patterns. Hence, the most important barrier for clean power systems is of an institutional nature, rather than lying in the technological sphere of functionality (Sovacool, 2008:73-164). Although the IBSA states make use of hydro-generation, the fact remains that it is a risk-prone source of energy and probably not as 'clean' as its many proponents would have it. Droughts and socio-cultural upheaval due to relocation and environmental damage are among the factors that negatively impact on the notion of hydro-power being a 'clean' energy generation process (Duran, 2013).

Worldwide, there is a critical requirement for energy conservation, as well as implementation of clean energy systems that are efficient, and that operate autonomously from those who seek to maintain the fossil fuel status. A primary cause of the excessive dependence on extractive enterprises is the relative ease of and access to fossil fuels. This highlights an inherent hybrid condition, where its ease stands in contradiction to ideational and emancipatory goals. Yet, "[u]ltimately, all stakeholders must embrace change in technology and business models in order to maintain a viable utility industry" (Kind, 2013:19). IBSA can and ought to be regional or potential global leaders in the clean energy field, where it and its regions can harvest immense and lasting industrial, economic and employment values by utilising the application of its technologies. In developing countries, now more than ever, energy forms the foundation for sustainable progress.

As the focus of the next section shifts from the global South towards IBSA, I review the contemporary energy situations of India, Brazil and South Africa as individual countries; and determine how its common issues contribute to cooperation in the energy security sphere, that in turn forms a basis for the fostering of collective identity and community.

5.4 INDIA, BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA: THE STATES' KNOWLEDGE WITHIN ENERGY

I now review the energy types and capacities of the three IBSA states, and useful tables display information. Then energy planning is laid out briefly, common positions are identified and some key future energy patterns noted.

5.4.1 Short to medium term energy positions of the IBSA states

In order to know where IBSA's energy pathway lies, it is necessary to have an overview of the three states' energy sectors. The prevailing power generation and management sectors in all three IBSA states are characterised by large vertically integrated multinational companies that significantly overshadow the entry into the energy market by other stakeholders. The incumbents tend to use their entrenched position – large scale production and distribution capabilities – not only to optimise economic values and ensure continuing profitability, but also to keep competitors out or beyond the grid.

In India, energy requirements are rising at impressive rates, with an inability to cope with demand – a severe energy deficit (Sharma & Ganesha, 2011:8) and subsequent underperformance of its economy as the net result. The 1 128 tera-watt hours (TWh, Oxford Dictionary of Abbreviations, 1998) total produced in 2012 was more than triple the 1990 output. Yet it only represents about 750 kilo-watt hour (kWh) *per capita* for the year. Large transmission losses,[51] which amounted to 193 TWh, or 17 per cent in 2012, resulted in only about 869 TWh consumption. Overall generation for 2012 is laid out in Table 5.3.[52] Coal provides more than two-thirds of India's current electric energy. While India's coal reserves are very limited, South Africa is that country's main supplier by a wide margin (Sharma & Ganesha, 2011:6).

[51] Power generated passes through large and complex networks and equipment, and are distributed to reach end users. Energy transmitted does not equal energy distributed, as a percentage of the units is lost in both the transmission and the distribution networks.
[52] The latest data to be obtained.

Table 5.3: India's energy production for 2012

	Category	**TWh**[53]
1.	Coal and coal gases	801
2.	Natural gas	94
3.	Oil and oil products	23
4.	Nuclear	33
5.	Hydro	126
6.	Other renewables (various programmes listed by Confederation of Indian Industry, 2009: 4)	50
Total		1 127

(World Nuclear Association, 2015a)

The *per capita* electricity consumption figure for India is expected to double by 2020, with 6.3 per cent annual growth. It would be between 5 000 and 6 000 TWh by 2050, requiring about 8 000 TWh/yr at that stage. There is an acute demand for more reliable power supplies. One-third of the population is not connected to any grid. Pollution is bound to increase by 115 per cent. A very slow unfolding of its energy blend is expected to take place over the next two decades, yet fossil fuels will predominate (British Petroleum, 2015; World Nuclear Association, 2015a). Here, it is significant to note that India was the first country to introduce a Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, which highlights its priority to this field (Confederation of Indian Industry, 2009:1). I submit that this action shows political commitment by the Indian government; one that should have clear policy and implementation outcomes. Should the other IBSA states follow suit, the IBSA collective may derive benefit from this initiative, as it would add social learning value that would enhance collective identity processes.

Brazil is the world's tenth largest energy consumer, and the largest in South America. It is a significant oil and gas producer in the region and the world's second largest ethanol fuel producer. As Brazil's economy slowly recovers, its energy consumption is increasing and its supply is insufficient at present, to the extent that the country imports about 40 TWh annually. Like India, it suffers from high transmission losses, currently about 94 TWh annually, thus reducing consumption to about 473 TWh or 17

[53] Quantities are in terawatt hours (TWh). A terawatt-hour means that power at a capacity of 1 terawatt (10 to the power 12 watts) is obtained for one hour.

per cent per year. *Per capita* electricity consumption in Brazil has shown rapid expansion, from less than 1 500 kWh/yr in 1990 to nearly 2 700 kWh/yr in 2011. Brazil's energy production for 2012 is as laid out in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Brazil's energy production for 2012

	Category	**TWh**
1.	Hydro	415
2.	Natural gas	47
3.	Biomass and wastes	35
4.	Oil and oil gases	20
5.	Nuclear	16
6.	Coal	14
7.	Wind and solar	5.3
Total		552.3

(World Nuclear Association, 2015b)

A global energy stakeholder (British Petroleum Energy Outlook 2035, 2015) predicts that Brazil will transmute into a clear exporter of energy within two decades. Production is anticipated to increase threefold for oil, gas and renewables; at which point it will exceed domestic requirements. Interestingly, Brazil auctions renewable projects[54] which makes for corporate participation worldwide (Förster & Amazo, 2016:1-19).

Electricity usage in South Africa has been expanding at full tilt since 1980, but production and usage figures pale when compared to its partners, India and Brazil. South Africa is an integral and critical component of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) (International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2013). Most of the power generation – about 80 per cent – is produced by South Africa (see Table 3). Energy generation is largely under the control of the state utility Eskom (World Nuclear Association, 2015c). Three main drivers underpin South Africa's soaring energy demands. These are a fast-growing population increase and influx, a deteriorating energy production base, and an intensive social and regional development programme that has two imperatives – extensive energy structures and associated technical

[54] Moving from state control of the market, the first reform model (with auctions that commenced in 1995) had as its aim a market for privatisation. In the new model (implemented in 2004) the emphasis is on public-private partnerships (Förster & Amazo, 2016:3)

programmes (van Wyk, 2013:6). Table 5.5 lists South Africa's energy production for 2012.

Table 5.5: South Africa's energy production for 2012

	Category	TWh
1.	Coal	239
2.	Nuclear	47
3.	Hydro	4.9
Total		290.9

(World Nuclear Association, 2015c)

The South African Department of Energy recently updated its Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). The IRP extended the original timeframe from 2030 to 2050, an important strategic planning input. The new IRP factors in the economic growth put forward in the National Development Plan (noted in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2) so as to improve employment levels and reduce poverty. Variables include the potential of shale and other gas developments in the region, the irresolution of nuclear options and the cost of future fuels and its availability (particularly coal and gas). The new IRP suggests that in view of improved capacities, the nuclear capabilities decision can be postponed until at least 2025. The IRP proposes that regional hydropower projects (Mozambique and Zambia) be actualised. The advantages include infrastructural development that could be catalysts for other initiatives in the region. Regional coal options are also agreeable because emissions would not accrue in South Africa, and the pricing could be competitive. (This latter situation is a clear indication of the country's hybridity, where it displays a mercenary approach to ameliorating its national condition at the expense of parts of the region.) The IRP plans to proceed with its current renewable auction programme with additional annual rounds (of 1000 MW photovoltaic (PV) capacity; 1000 MW wind capacity and 200 MW concentrated solar plan capacity, with the potential for hydropower at competitive tariffs (Serfontein, 2013:2-3). The IRP update notes that "flexibility in decisions should be the priority to favour decisions of least regret. This would suggest that commitments to long range large-scale investment decisions should be avoided" (South African Department of Energy (IRP Update), 2013:9).

5.4.2 IBSA energy trends: Working towards cooperative endeavours

The IBSA energy sector, present and future, shows the trends that follow. Firstly, although the energy models of the IBSA countries are highly varied (it reflects their unique status based on population and industrial requirements, economic models and geophysical attributes, among others), joint energy issues may be determined. Then, despite the fact that India and South Africa presently share a common dependence on coal, a future point will see a variety of alternate energy models as a result of common IBSA requirements and the availability of renewable resources (where common dependencies facilitate identities as the countries process issues which they face jointly). Thirdly, the IBSA states, like most developing and developed states, face immense and rising energy requirements not only for themselves but also as leaders within their regions; and much pressure is applied to achieving reliable demand requirements. (This comprises a further source of hybridity – on one hand they need to work towards not only self-sufficiency, but also beyond these capacities in order to facilitate regional cooperation and development; in a sense acting as neo-regional powers.) Fourthly, the inclusion of market forces in Brazil and South Africa are of value, and India may use their colleagues' 'lessons learnt' as a model to work towards public-private partnership to ensure inclusivity and renewable energy ownership. Lastly, although van Wyk (2013:8-10) refers to South Africa, aspects of nuclear futures evaluation may be a trend that applies to India and Brazil as well. Van Wyk emphasises a tendency by developing nations to view standard nuclear energy as a catholicon that would solve short- to medium term energy requirements; seemingly defying scientific reports that punt the power of renewable energy (Wright *et al*, 2016:1-30). Nuclear power futures are special cases and need to be managed in an accountable manner, failing which such projects are condemned to be high-risk endeavours (Fabricius, 2014; de Wet, 2015; Faull, 2015; Whittles, 2015).

Reinforcing the bases for common position, Dadwal, a researcher at India's Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (interview, 2010) counselled that "[t]here must be investment in joint projects. The three countries must use their strengths in the energy field to mitigate others' weaknesses". In concert, Kumar, a senior official in India's Ministry of External Affairs (interview, 2010) concurred by noting that "there is a

need to get to know people, work together [in energy]". Accordingly, I suggest that these trends clearly converge on a common cause that gives effect to cooperation that lay the foundation for energy development on the basis of mutual agreement, and as pointed out in the extract from the Brasilia Declaration (2003). Cooperation in the sector presents a significant opportunity for IBSA to work together in de-carbonising their economies and provide sustainable and renewable energy. Cooperation is the foundational building block to reinforce the priority that is placed on communication, social learning and the interaction (facilitated by agents) among inter-IBSA processes, structures and processes; as debated in Chapter 2 (Evaluation).

5.5 IBSA'S ENERGY WORKING GROUP

In terms of the pillars developed in Chapter 2 (Diagram 2.1) this section details the origins, structures, knowledge, power, results and futures of the IBSA JWG on energy. By its nature, this section is concrete and non-discursive. Yet, it is not only the 'objectivity' of the 'legalese' of the MoUs that is at stake here. This is because the MoUs and the JWG that deal with the complex issues is the spindle from and around which much of the IBSA interaction takes place. It forms the basis of exchanges, "through which actors learn the relative value of things, establish new bonds, convey the centrality of reciprocity; exchanges are a constitutive factor in all social relationships and provide the foundation for trust" (Adler & Barnett, 1998:416). Thus, the MoUs mandate agency from which the interaction and transaction flows, and upon which mutual trust is founded.

5.5.1 Origins, processes and establishment of MoUs

The three IBSA states claim to "have diverse areas of excellence in science and technology and offer a broad range of potential … the appropriate combination of their best resources will generate the desired synergy. Amongst the scientific and technological areas in which cooperation can be developed are biotechnology, *alternative energy sources*" (IBSA Declaration, 6 June 2003; own emphasis). While the 'excellence' claim is vague and not verifiable through research, the first Brasilia statement of 2003 did indeed lay the legal foundation, based on shared histories and

ideas, for further work. The 5th IBSA heads of state summit stressed "the importance of encouraging joint research and studies to promote cooperation and information exchange in the field of development of sustainable and alternative energy" (IBSA Dialogue Forum, 2011:15; noted as "a pivotal area of cooperation" by Flemes, 2007:21). Accordingly, and noted in Chapters 1 (section 1.2.3) and 3 (section 3.5.2), cooperation in the energy sector resulted in the creation of a trilateral JWG on energy.

When the IBSA states work together in their energy endeavours, it presents a substantial opportunity to create a healthier environment for their energy-based economies. The objective of the working group is "to promote and facilitate cooperation on energy matters among the IBSA countries, that being done on mutual agreement" (IBSA Energy Working Group). In this respect Roy (interview, 2010) submits that processes and institutions, such as the JWGs need to ensure that proper methodologies are adhered to. Heitman (interview, 2011) similarly reasons that technology transfers (especially where each country has a niche energy specialisation) would accelerate cooperation and economies among the IBSA countries. Although, as will be seen later in this chapter, three specific MoUs have been signed (all three relate to renewable energy), the JWG has expansive functional areas of cooperation. These are renewable energy, energy efficiency, carbon trading, hydrogen energy, biofuels, grid-interactive power, electrification from remote areas, synthetic or alternate fuels, as well as wind and solar energy.

The MoUs indicate that a greater focus is on the interchange of knowledge systems with respect to new forms of energy and also on renewable energy. In interviews conducted respondents confirmed that environmental and energy security were high priorities for IBSA as developing nations; that there needed to be a focus on renewables (interactive transfer of associated technologies); and that areas should include biofuels, solar, wind, swell technology (the IBSA countries have long coastlines) and hydropower (see Kumar, interview, 2010; Gupta, interview, 2011; Heitman, interview, 2011). The activation of renewables would provide an output of an environment that becomes less contaminated over time.

To date, seven meetings of the JWG on energy have been held, as follows: March 2006 (Brazil), July 2006 (India), July 2007 (India), May 2008 (South Africa), September 2008 (India), October 2011 (South Africa) and May 2013 (India). Added to this intense programme are technical workshops that intersperse JWG meetings; two having been held in Brazil and South Africa in September and December 2010[55] respectively. This indicates a high level of activity, showing that it is not a moribund JWG (IBSA Energy – Introduction, n.d.).

Loosely applied, the CDA and content analysis of the minutes of the last two JWGs and the last technical workshop (December 2010) reveal three areas of interest for this study:

- Firstly, they list a number of areas of action, centred around the three MoUs on biofuel, wind and solar technologies (discussed in the next section). It appears that biofuels technology has shown most progress, while wind technologies had been implemented in South Africa, ready for technological exchange with the other two countries; which were demonstrated at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 17), held in Durban (2011). Solar technology specialists produced papers to indicate levels of solar energy research that had been undertaken in each country that would serve as a basis from which to work.
- Secondly, the minutes also indicate that the IBSA states are resolute in their commitment to the JWG, as they "reaffirmed that their Governments are committed to the IBSA trilateral, in making all the sign (*sic*) MoUs a reality" (7th IBSA Energy Working Group, 2011:1). This commitment is further evidenced by the fact that two technical workshops had been held to detail and exchange the respective

[55] This workshop was held at the Birchwood Hotel, Johannesburg, South Africa from 2-3 December 2010. It was attended by 52 persons, experts in their fields, business people and government office bearers; including observers from Zimbabwe and Malawi. The proceedings are available online, which makes access pleasantly different. The Workshop discussions were focused on harmonising specifications from a trade perspective. This would enable the importation of biofuels among the regions, using intra-IBSA standards only.

standards and regulatory frameworks; and the fact that teams draw in other techno-scientific roleplayers, such as the South African Bureau of Standards, the *Agência Nacional do Petróleo* from Brazil and the Indian Bureau of Standards. Further, it can be discerned that a qualitative level of dialogue is present, the delegations know and understand one another, and they share and work towards the achievement of the meetings' expectations.

5.5.2 IBSA MoUs on energy cooperation: Biofuels, wind and solar energy

Closer cooperation in three areas of energy cooperation among India, Brazil and South Africa is reflected in the MoUs that have been signed. Each MoU functional area appoints a task team that operates under its tutelage and reports to the JWG.

The first to be signed was an MoU on establishing a trilateral working group on biofuels, done during the first IBSA Summit at Brasilia, Brazil, on 13 September 2006. Synthesised, the eight main areas of cooperation are to:

- Allow for technology transfers, encourage biofuels usage and create an international commodity market, align biofuels processes;
- Facilitate cooperation at technical level and promote joint policy formulation;
- Ensure capability enhancements related to all facets of production and downstream processes and logistics;
- Develop combined research programmes for production and utilisation of biofuels; and
- Facilitate technical information sharing with respect for use of biofuels in engine design (MoU on Biofuels, 13 September 2006: Article 2).

Progress on the first MoU is a result of joint (technical) workshops and the exchanges of knowledge that take place in between, with consolidation at various pivotal project points. Subsequent to the 2010 workshop, the IBSA JWG on energy reported that "there seems to be a fairly high degree of alignment of parameters across the three

countries" (IBSA Trilateral – Energy, n.d.:2). It was resolved after the September 2011 meeting in South Africa that specialist task teams would in future involve the three countries' respective national bureaux of standards (IBSA Trilateral – Energy, n.d.:2). Further, the conference aimed at technical patterns and specifications for biofuels that was held in South Africa in December 2010 led to the creation of a protocol to synchronise data standards in all three IBSA states (UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2012:19).

Brazil is the acknowledged biofuel leader among the three IBSA states. It has a successful track record in biofuel production and specialises in bioethanol (White & Costa, 2009:1-4; Fig, 2010:17). Based on Brazil's long history of sugar production, it had commenced bioethanol research in the early twentieth century already. It has since extended the sources to a variety of animal and plant products, that allow for a number of biofuel products – including ethanol, biodiesel (the two main substances), methanol, biogas, vegetable oil and charcoal (Duran, 2013). After the international oil crisis of the 1970s, continuous steps have been taken to ensure the sector's progress: Production is aided by national stratagems to improve rural development, vary energy bases, minimise reliance on oil imports and combat climate change. Research and development and collaboration with partners bring down production costs and have resulted in cleaner and more effective processes.

Recognised throughout the signed MoU, this is a definitive area of energy technology partnership among the three countries. The interchange of technology in progressive stages can enhance energy cooperation (Gupta, interview, 2011). However, many of the prospects to exchange technology data and process are counterpoised by a need to carefully evaluate the hazards of poorly conceptualised and applied strategies. A South African certification by the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials with respect to the Solaris tobacco plant for use as South African Airways Boeing jet biofuel has seen these strategies pay off. Further this certification was completed through the mitigation and management of associated risks (including rural development, no genetic plant modification and no impact on food security) (Campbell, 2015; Steyn, 2016:4). White and Costa (2009:1-4), although addressing the South Africa-Brazil biofuels situation, raise issues that would also impact on India. These authors note that "gains from co-

operation will depend on the country's capacity to elucidate its own strategy, define priorities and develop institutions and policies equipped to manage biofuel development" (White & Costa, 2009:1-2). In this regard Heitman's (interview, 2011) observation, namely that a protocol for cooperation in energy resources is a requirement, is valid as it would facilitate improved management. Issues of concern are food security as a result of land utilisation by biofuel processes (in India and South Africa); the initial need to subsidise production and hence divert taxation from other requirements; and some increase in food prices.

Lastly under this discussion of biofuels it is worth noting comments from the technical workshop of 2010:

> Overall. … The day and a half workshop was very technical and informative. The real identity is important and it must be clear that we are talking about fuel ethanol. There were lots of commonalities and the differences are not too big. All the members have shown the willingness to move forward and converge. We all recognise that we are not doing this for our own purposes, but that we are opening trade. We are looking forward to the outcomes of the workshop taking a step in this direction. The technical teams are encouraged to work speedily to reach agreement. The inter-laboratory program is a great idea and hope that we continue to work together to make this happen.
>
> (IBSA Dialogue Forum, 2010:14)

These communicative words and phrases could have been taken from, for example, Adler and Barnett (1998). It harmonises in many respects with the diagram extracted in Chapter 2 (Diagram 2.1) and associated theoretical tenets. This is a clear example of the IBSA states continuing to identify with one another so as to transcend barriers and achieve IBSA's goals.

The second MoU that has been signed formed the foundation for IBSA cooperation in wind resources, and was done at Pretoria in 2007 (IBSA Trilateral - Energy). Its main areas of cooperation are the:

- Assessment, through various measurement and modelling methodologies, of wind power resources in order to identify the technical and economic potential of wind power;
- Standards, testing facilities and certification procedures – for wind resource systems, subsystems and components;
- Optimisation of deployed wind power systems; and
- Design and development of wind power systems to allow for low wind regimes.

The document also calls for the identification and appointment of research organisations and experts to underpin technical cooperation (IBSA MoU on Cooperation in Wind Resources, 2007:3). This links up with the theoretical position regarding transactions. Communicative processes involve contributors dealing with specialised enterprises, such as mutual discussions in often complex technical scenarios that involves practical grounding. As Adler and Barnett (1998:417) observe, transactions build communities through joint learning activities, where "'doing things together' becomes an important component of 'knowing together'".

Latest progress has been the participation in JWG activities and associated task team work, and the exchange of knowledge systems in between formal gatherings. A general comment would be that these gatherings improve social learning through transactions that occur in organisational situations, and that it involves the core power of the group. Effective communication leads to changes in others, while learning is "connected to functional processes that are traceable to a general improvement in the state's overall condition" (Adler & Barnett, 1998:44). At the seventh JWG on energy held in India in May 2013, it was resolved that an experts' workshop needs to be convened in order to commence the identification and resolution of this complex field of endeavour (IBSA Trilateral – Energy, n.d.:2).

In Africa, the African Development Bank (AFDB) completed an initial wind power plan in mid-2012, at which stage the continent had had almost no wind farms (some exceptions were in South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). In the three years since, wind power has become a substantial growth sector. During this period, the

private sector has made increasing investments in this business segment, a fact that bodes well for future market improvement. In South Africa, the Jeffrey's Bay wind farm was inaugurated in July 2014. The 138 megawatt (MW) wind farm is one of Africa's biggest. Over 700 people were employed during its construction, 45 per cent of whom came from the local community. Some of the wind farm's revenues will be reinvested there through various skills-enabling plans, which will further support the renewable energy sector in South Africa (SAinfo, 2014). In India, wind energy contributes two-thirds of the country's renewable energy resources. In terms of advantages, wind energy supports rural employment and the economy, and it consumes no water; a critically insufficient natural resource in India and South Africa. In Brazil, wind is less expensive to produce than solar or biofuel, and the input costs have been reducing steadily over the recent past. Yet, apparent vested interests in the Brazilian construction industry (hydro-electrical dams and plants) have caused wind power to be underutilised, despite its huge potential. It is ironic that the maximum wind energy potential in Brazil lie within poverty-ridden areas. This fact underscores the need for Brazil to re-assess the management of its endowed natural resources (Ortiz, 2014).

Wind power can not be the sole solution to developing (or developed) nations, it needs to be part of integrated energy systems. Although it is a growing enterprise worldwide, even the Wind Energy Council does not predict greater than a twenty per cent provision of energy systems by 2030. Some negative factors that influence wind power is the fact that it is unpredictable, and its construction and maintenance makes it a relatively expensive option. The positives are that its outputs are carbon-free, and its source is free. Further, costs of the resource have been reducing while energy efficiency has increased due to enhanced designs (Christianson, 2015:50-54).

The third MoU on cooperation in solar energy was signed during the fourth IBSA summit in Brasilia, Brazil, in April 2010. The MoU on solar energy makes provision for three main areas of cooperation. These are:

> Promotion and facilitation of cooperation in the development and commercial application of solar energy;

> Bringing on board [of] relevant research institutions, expert organisations and industry partners to strengthen linkages and cooperation; and
> Establishing working groups in order to identify scope, modalities and terms of reference for various cooperation activities to enhance cooperation in the solar field.
>
> (IBSA MoU on Solar Energy, 2010)

Solid progress is occurring in Guinea-Bissau. IBSA, under the aegis of the UNDP has initiated a rural solar electrification programme in an initial five villages. IBSA's project aims at the installation of solar energy equipment in a further twenty villages, and will ensure that the practice and experience from the first phase of five villages will be incorporated. This particular project formed part of the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (see Chapter 1, sections 1.1 and 1.3; Chapter 2, section 2.3.1; Chapter 3, section 3.6) that commenced in 2011 and was completed in 2012 (UNDP, June 2011).

At the heart of solar energy lies the PV cell that converts sunlight into electrical current, built into panels of varying sizes; often passed onto grids or stored by means of various technologies (batteries, charge controllers and inverters). The installation of PV panels is rapidly growing and the power generation potential of PV panels is promising, while its efficiencies are increasing and costs are less. Massive solar panel farms can supply electricity to national grids. Although small, in rural areas that are not linked to main electrical grids, they provide sufficient power to cool medicines; heat water through solar thermal energy; preserve foodstuffs; provide lighting; provide running water; and permit communication and entertainment (Goldemberg, 2012:51-52) It therefore forms the basis of developing countries' socio-economic upliftment programmes.

5.6 EVALUATION

The evaluation consists of three parts. The first not only summarises the chapter, but also appraises the content by adding appropriate deductions. The second identifies patterns that are beginning to play out with respect to critiques of IBSA energy cooperation. In the final part I attempt to determine if the methodology had been followed sufficiently; to the degree where ('thick') information given had contributed

to the chapter's trustworthiness. The thrust of the evaluation is to determine if and to what extent I have answered the research questions and objectives; culminating in a determination as to whether IBSA energy cooperation contributes to (human) environmental (energy) security.

My argument commenced with shared ideas, in particular the development of a common definitional language – in a chapter that is technical to a degree – so that the same script is to hand. To this end, the concept of energy was defined where it lies in the natural sciences, whereafter its application shifts to the human and social sciences. Shared histories then followed, where the postcolonial condition and neocolonialism effects with respect to energy came into view. Here, the idea of the global South and the asymmetry of with respect to energy security (including the new 'scramble' for Africa' and parts of the developing world as a source of energy, and the associated 'resource curse' that frequently accompanies poor energy supply management) was discussed. This included a brief debate in which the state of the global South's infrastructural (notably energy) colonial legacies were determined, as these elements contribute towards mutual trust, collective 'energy' identity and cooperation in the long haul. The chapter then explored the knowledge base of each of the three IBSA countries, with a brief analysis of the individual IBSA states' energy consumption and forecasts by type and consumption, followed by the energy sources and potential that resides within the IBSA collective. These inputs underscore not only sources of identity, commonality and discourse, but also the complex hybrid nature of IBSA. The chapter then shifted to the practices of this sector, where it identified and examined the structures, foundations, functioning and progress of IBSA energy cooperation, and in so doing highlights paradoxes that exist. I endeavoured to clarify the schism that exists between the progression of collective IBSA 'clean' energy being developed and implemented on one hand, with parallel national efforts by the three states that continue to use (and even expand) the use of 'dirty' energy on the other.

In terms of a general summation, this chapter presented a review of energy security cooperation from a developmental perspective. It noted that the developing world is lagging behind the rest of the world in terms of energy provision. To overcome this state of affairs sustained political will and the reliable allocation of appropriate and

sufficient resources are paramount. Without these qualities universal access to energy in the global South will remain in a state of delay.

Abetting the energy cooperation is the establishment and functioning of various work groups, of which the JWG on energy is a critical component. This institutional arrangement is crucial not only for sustained development at country and regional levels, but also to assist the shift towards greater energy equity when compared to the developed world. An appraisal at this point would determine that the JWG on energy continues to be an important instrument in the socio-political construction of this particular facet of IBSA cooperation. The integrative, cooperative management of the three MoUs with respect to energy cooperation intra-IBSA as well as the progress in terms of collaboration and technical knowledge and skills transfers were noted, and subjected to elementary forms of CDA.

In general, the progress (in terms of the JWG on Energy's main objective "to promote and facilitate cooperation on energy matters among the IBSA countries" (IBSA Dialogue Forum (Areas of Cooperation – Working Groups – Energy, n.d.:1)) may be seen to be somewhat disjointed, hampered to a degree by the highly technical subject matter. In addition it appears that at present insufficient 'grassroots level' projects have been enacted or commissioned. However when the complicated operating environment and the specialised technical knowledge skills sets are factored in, some empathetic understanding of the immenseness of the task is possible. Much deliberation has taken place, although a degree of deceleration has been noted over the past three-plus years. I submit that a normative product (here – renewable energy) continues to be promoted and developed, albeit slowly; where deliverables in terms of the MoUs are works-in-progress. The JWG optimises the use of highly skilled knowledge and structured processes from all three IBSA states. This allows social learning to the degree that mutual trust and a collective identity may well be operative in this cooperation sector. Dialogue facilitates the process, technical details are synchronised to ensure aligned processes, potential products and the maintenance of standards that are benchmarked by the working group.

I submit that the processes identified at the end of Chapter 2 and graphically laid out in Diagram 2.1, have seen its application in this chapter on IBSA energy cooperation. Energy histories and the minimalistic energy bases from which the global South and its self-appointed emancipatory advocates (the IBSA countries) had been forced to operate, have been shown as bases for strong cohesion. At this juncture, the end of the second case study on IBSA cooperation, I have shown that the energy sector dynamically provides a layer of bricks in the construction of the edifice; to the extent where an enhanced understanding of IBSA's socio-political construction in the energy cooperation sphere has been obtained. Both mimicry and an associated technical skills transfer is inherent and strongly inferred in the chapter, and contributes to identity-formation. This chapter has made a strong case for identity-formation for the IBSA collective, based on four kernels of cohesion: Their work in BASIC, background MDG and SDG cooperation, their energy function as part of the IBSA Fund and the potential of having energy access elevated to a basic human right. A theme pursued throughout the chapter is the hybrid nature of not only the IBSA collective but also the global North. As shown, through energy cooperation on many levels among the IBSA countries, this sector continues to equitably bring IBSA into the power stream of world energy. IBSA energy cooperation is based on qualitative levels of knowledge and sectoral power, and its common basis lends itself to social learning, that in turn through continuous interaction shapes identity, and effects mutual trust and collective identity. Importantly, it draws in other countries via the IBSA Fund and attendance at IBSA energy workshops.

With respect to the two other chapter objectives, the following: Firstly, I determine that the IBSA collective, wearing its mantle of reformist and political agent, has been given an enhanced understanding. As noted at the outset of the chapter, this could largely be understood when the hybrid nature could be exposed. I submit that this contrasting element of IBSA was a recurring theme in the chapter, and one that was gainfully used to grasp its juxtaposed character. This facet was optimally utilised through the diagram 2.1 that captures the integrated critical IR theories, with IBSA energy cooperation used as an overlay. Secondly, the essential substance and defects of the IBSA collective's energy security cooperation was interpretively analysed, so that substantial knowledge about IBSA energy cooperation was made possible. In turn

this led to a greater, nuanced, understanding of the effect of IBSA's collective identity-construction.

The energy sectoral cooperation and the anticipated environmental (energy) security that it provides, dovetails into and forms a support base for the construction of IBSA's collective interests over the strategic term. Further, in terms of achieving the set-out research objective: I contend therefore that IBSA's energy sectoral cooperation gives positive effect to this facet of human security to a satisfactory degree. In this way IBSA energy cooperation also enhances South-South cooperation (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.3 for evaluation criteria). I submit that the case study aligns itself in an elegant way with the theoretical tenets, in that the type and functioning of a working group such as the one under review lent itself to understanding via the integrated theories of the study.

Another issue within the South-South accord which deserves attention is the IBSA collective's defence cooperation. This area of synergy, too, has a back-link to human security. Accordingly, the next chapter deals with defence cooperation between the IBSA states.

CHAPTER 6: IBSA DEFENCE COOPERATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY SECURITY

6.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

In the previous chapter it had become clear that ensuring human environmental – energy – human security would need to involve much cooperation in energy. This would be the case especially to harness the abundance of sustainable and renewable energy resources that lie within the global South and the IBSA states. Another IBSA area of endeavour also seeks to overcome facets of human insecurity, and that involves defence or military cooperation; aims to enhance personal human security. The third and final empirical case study deals with the IBSA collective's cooperation in the field of defence. The overarching objective for this chapter is to progress the resolution of the research question that seeks understanding of the socio-political construction of security in the IBSA collective (in its dual role as reformer and critical agent) by linking military security as a dimension of human security and defence cooperation.

Two research questions are therefore relevant: The first question asks, *what can we learn from IBSA's trilateral security cooperation in the area of defence in respect of its implications for developing community and the fostering of shared identities?* The second question is: *does the IBSA collective foster physical and military security by means of enhanced defence cooperation?*

In performing this task, I apply the theoretical tenets as outlined in the pillars founded in Chapter 2 (Diagram 2.1) I utilise the tenets and processes laid out in this schema to develop, analyse and achieve the following objectives: Firstly, to critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the IBSA collective's security collaboration in the functional area of defence cooperation through the prism of an integrated theoretical framework; and secondly, to develop extensive knowledge about this area (specifically in respect of working group interactions) in order to facilitate a critical understanding of the implications for collective identity-construction. As a general process, the schema moves from historical-identificational issues, along a knowledge- and value laden path that adds to social learning, to where it culminates in hybrid

identity-formation. As with the other empirical chapters hybridity is an important theme that weaves through the chapter, as its attributes describe the apparently irrational position of the IBSA collective in a number of acute ways.

This chapter aligns with two types of case study, namely the study of countries and nations, as well as studies of organisations and institutions. As a case study within qualitative research methodology, it applies values appropriate to this chapter. All case studies need informational input that enrich the study (the environment, knowledge, shared histories, ideas, structures and practices, as well as communication processes). The more sources, the higher the viscosity level of the research quality that in turn imbues the outcomes with high levels of integrity. This adds up to using triangulated sources (see Chapter 1, section 1.5.3). As some of this type of collaboration is not in the public domain, I have obtained various sources of information (MoUs, government White Papers, minutes of JWG on defence meetings, defence science, technology and engineering cooperation studies and interviews) that detail the inner workings of the collaborative effort.

The chapter's plan is as follows. I start with the context that stresses the setting within which the case study takes place. Here the hybrid nature of the IBSA collective places it in the milieu of global South leadership while attempting to effect change in a scenario that is not its creation, but within which the collective is obliged to work. I develop, briefly, common issues of historicity and knowledge structures in defence that contribute to identity-formation and that aids discourse and social learning. The context proceeds through analyses of the geopolitical and defence settings for India, Brazil and South Africa. A brief comparative review of the IBSA partners' defence capabilities follows, and I endeavour to extract commonalities from within variances. Having established the milieu, I shift to conceptualisation that draws similar paths to those followed in Chapters 4 and 5. As an important value it introduces complex issues related to defence cooperation. I discern the appropriate legally established foundations that permit cooperation between the three countries, interspersed with appropriate comment from information obtained from authoritative respondents (including senior officials in all three countries and research institute staff). In terms of peace operations the chapter will review the impact that the IBSA states may have on

the peace missions process, as individual countries and collectively. Thereafter, the establishment and progress of the IBSA JWG on defence-related matters are tracked. The chapter concludes with an evaluation. Here I critically analyse the information sets obtained through the chapter's building block pillars, the logical steps of the applied theoretical framework, and the qualitative and quantitative ('thick') value of their inputs. All these work towards an overall grade that constitutes an appraisal of defence cooperation between the IBSA countries and a determination as to whether said cooperation in fact promotes military security.

6.2 CONTEXTUALISING THE IBSA COLLECTIVE'S DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT

This section deals with the complex defence histories of the IBSA states first, as it establishes postcolonial tenets (hybridity, mimicry) and determines issues that may contribute to identity-formation. The section secondly reviews the geopolitics[56] of each of the IBSA countries, and then links the security and defence condition of each country's setting as regional powers. The value of regional (security) alliances, strategic policy shifts, defence economies and armed forces' configuration are analysed comparatively, while defence convergences in the collective become apparent. In terms of the pillars' theoretical application (from Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1) this section therefore addresses the environment, shared histories, structures and practices. It stresses issues that contribute to social learning and identity-formation.

6.2.1 Compacted defence histories and structures of India, Brazil and South Africa: Subjects for identity formation

As with many countries, the Indian military has colonial origins in the contemporary period (the past two centuries). After a bloody mutiny in 1857, the British Indian Army came under the control of the British Crown and the Viceroy, and it fought in both World Wars. Having achieved independence in 1947, India's first years were

[56] Use of the term 'geopolitics' *prima facie* infers acceptance of the world as a given in a realist manner. Yet, it reiterates the schizoid hybrid identities of the collective – the IBSA countries are integrated into the world structure, one that is not their construct; yet which they are committed to change.

marked by tempestuous events – the division with Pakistan, the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947 and the integration of over 500 princely states to form a united, secular and democratic state. The uniformed services comprise the Indian Army, Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force, supported by a coast guard, with an integrated defence staff headquarters. India's constitution provides for the establishment and control over use of its armed forces, an accepted key constitutional principle for a modern liberal democracy. The President of India is the supreme commander of the Indian Armed Forces, while being under the management of its government. Having over 1.4 million active personnel, it is the world's third largest armed force and has the world's biggest volunteer armed service. The Republic of India has fought three wars and one incursion battle with Pakistan and one border war with China. During the Korean War (1950 – 1953) a newly independent and avowedly non-aligned India displayed its hybridity *in extremis* by at different times giving support to both sides (World Factbook, 2014; Wahn, 2010:21-37).

The Armed Forces of the Empire of Brazil were the overall unified military forces of the Empire of Brazil. The Brazilian military was first formed by Emperor Dom Pedro I to defend the new nation against the Portuguese in the Brazilian War of Independence, and in 1822 had the objective of defeating and expelling the Portuguese troops from Brazilian soil. A sense of national unity and identity was forged out of the War of the Triple Alliance (1864 to 1870).[57] Internal conflicts between the executive government and affluent landowners led to the abolishment of the Brazilian Empire in 1889, and the rise of the current republican government, albeit under a range of dictatorships and military rule that finally ended in 1985. Modern activity includes participation in both World Wars (although Brazil pledged its support for the UN during the Korean War, it never acted upon it (Edwards, 2013:168-169)) along with internal struggles due to military rule, and participation in right wing military operations, such as Operation "Condor".[58] The Brazilian Armed Forces comprises the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Marinha do Brasil (Navy) and the Brazilian Air Force. Brazil's armed forces are the third largest in the Americas, and the second in Latin America with 318 480 active-

[57] Fought between Paraguay and the Triple Alliance of Argentina, the Empire of Brazil, and Uruguay (1864 to 1870).
[58] A combined anti-communist alliance, clandestine by nature, of the Southern Cone states from about 1967 to 1975; aided by successive US administrations.

duty personnel. Over recent times the Brazilian military has become more involved in civil engagement programmes including the construction and maintenance of infrastructure. Although the 1988 Constitution preserves the roles of the armed forces, it places the military under presidential authority and regulates its powers constitutionally (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014:371-375, World Factbook (Brazil), 2014).

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) comprises the armed forces of South Africa (SA), the force having been established and regulated by the South African constitution. The Minister of Defence and Military Veterans is its political head. The military as it exists today was created in 1994, following South Africa's first post-apartheid elections and the subsequent development of a new constitution. It replaced the South African Defence Force, which had participated in both World Wars and the Korean War. Together with the regional 'bush' war (1973 – 1989) and the internal war (quasi civil war against apartheid); these had fundamental influences on South African society. At the end of the first conflict (1902) and at the end of the most recent conflict (1989), the difficult task of integrating the former enemies into a single combined force had to be confronted. The SANDF took over the personnel and equipment from the SADF and integrated forces from the former Bantustan homelands forces (named statutory forces), as well as personnel from the former guerrilla forces of some of the political parties involved in South Africa, such as the African National Congress' Umkhonto we Sizwe, the Pan Africanist Congress' Azanian People's Liberation Army and the Self-Protection Units of the Inkatha Freedom Party (named non-statutory forces). As of 2004, the integration process was considered complete, with retaining personnel, structure and equipment from the SADF. The SANDF comprises four services – the SA Army, the SA Air Force, the SA Navy and the SA Military Health Service. The Joint Operations division is responsible for co-ordinating all joint operations involving any or all of the four services. The South African special forces brigade is a separate unit under the direct command of the Joint Operations division (DefenceWeb, 2013; Wessels, 2009:131-152).

Noteworthy from the preceding briefs are the issues that point towards elements of commonality. All three IBSA states have long military histories going back centuries,

much of these through colonial structures. At any one time India, Brazil and South Africa had been involved in wars against occupiers, whether they were colonial forces, other oppressors or belligerents from beyond its borders or wars fought for international peacekeeping (Barany, 2012). The IBSA states have fought wars outside their own borders. Their foundations are mandated and managed through respective constitutions. Civil control of the military is firmly in place, with the defence forces seen to support democratic principles. Their structures are similar, except for South Africa that has its medical as a separate service. Two deductions are considered valid: At face value, these may not seem like commonality of substance. However, to those within the military structures, the foregoing provide the actors with a type of legitimacy and credibility ('defenders of the democratic faith', particularly in their roles as peacekeepers (see further, section 6.4)) as these represent potent and actual sources of not only identity but of hybridity too. Accordingly, I submit that these issues help to shape IBSA defence cooperation identity, even in an unassuming way. Secondly, both the wars that have been fought by the three countries and their defence structures are mimetic of their colonial parentage. Part of the civilizing mission and strategy of the colonisers was to require the colonised (the Other) to normalise or 'standardise' actions by repeating the norms, values and behaviour of the Self. Yet, the Self requires the authority vested in itself to be maintained, so that its replication is something different. In other words, the Self is reflected in its otherness (Bhabha, 1994:49, 91, 106, 111). Thus the military structures, rank insignia and traditions of IBSA resemble that of their respective colonial masters (bar South Africa's addition noted above), and the wars perpetrated are reflections of sub- or regional colonisation – a continuation of the old in the new – thus hybridity in action.

6.2.2 The IBSA geopolitical landscape: Knowledge and power

Although this section deals with material power and select relations of the IBSA states in select geopolitical spheres, there are normative and other discursive issues that are also present. This section problematises the image of power and its projection versus individual identity that are somehow commensurate with a common IBSA identity, and anticipates an understanding based on this study's theoretical positions, inserted at the end of the section.

India is situated in Southern Asia, it borders the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and lies between Burma and Pakistan. The area enclosed by land is 3.29 million square kilometres (World Factbook (India), 2015). The length of its coastline (including those of its Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal and Lakshwadweep Islands in the Arabian Sea) is 7 517 km. It gives rise to an EEZ of about 2.3 million square kilometres, where India has the exclusive right at public international law to utilise all living and non-living resources (Indian Ministry of Earth Sciences, n.d.).

India's geopolitics are inherently contradictory – although dynamic and fluid, it is also locked in place. Viewed in terms of its subcontinent (one that includes Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan), India is contained on all sides by irregular, inhospitably stark terrain (massifs, jungle or deserts) or by ocean; and may be described as an island, geopolitically. Unsurprisingly therefore, Indian strategic conceptualisation has traditionally taken a powerful landward stance. Thus, the ongoing menaces on India's western and northern borders and from internal insurrections have led to the Indian army maintaining an unchallenged position within the Indian defence hierarchy. The result of this landward bias is that the Indian air force and navy continue to have less strategically authoritative impact (Brewster, 2014:33), leading to an unbalanced military force.

India's internal borders are demarcated by its river systems, around which major cities are established; that also gives origin to its many distinctive cultures and religions. The people of India have a strong sense of national pride and cohesion that effectively negates contemporary separatism, and the country maintains a democratic balance between central and provincial power. As an indication of regional volatility, India hosts almost 800 000 refugees and internally displaced persons. Its continuing negotiations with Pakistan and to a lesser extent, Bangladesh, are sufficiently strong to ensure that it does not need to engage in risk-prone military regional expeditions. Past military conflicts with China (a border dispute in 1962) and Pakistan (mainly as a result of the unresolved Kashmiri condition, in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999) contribute to continued tensions, uphold nuclear-arms contestation and buttress the Indian army's

position. Any alliance that a future independent Tibet may have could pivot the axis towards India and away from China (or *vice versa*) and so escalate friction in the region. India's Cold War alliances involved complex relations with the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). These shifting alliances have left remaining effects, including the United States/Pakistan counter-alliance and the subsequent standardisation of its nuclear power arrangement with the United States (World Factbook (India, 2015)).

India's interest in the ocean named after it, is enduring and is characterised by waves of diplomatic efforts to expand and consolidate naval and economic security in the Indian Ocean region (Scott, 2006:97-129; Brewster, 2015:12-13). Its population of 1 238.9 million people (Trading Economics, 2015) provides much dynamics (A.R., 2014). These factors ensure that "India's fundamental interest will always come from within – from its endless, shifting array of regional interests, ethnic groups and powers (Friedman, 2008:12). In sum, the *status quo* in the South Asia region is one of latent hostility and increasing rivalry, while India's partnerships are based on its national interests or conveniences (Friedman, 2008:1-12).

A significant part of India's diplomacy is aimed at security cooperation, much of its energy devoted to regional formations. Of interest to this study, these include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), newly granted observer status in the expanding Central Asian Shangai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Daly, 2014:15-17); the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA, previously the IOR-ARC); the IONS; and IBSA. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration, a distinctively vibrant foreign policy style emanates, one designed with India's success in mind (Malone, Mohan & Raghavan, 2015:17-19). Referring to India and its region, Cohen (2015:354) poses a conundrum – "[c]an India forge regional integrative institutions while simultaneously promoting economic growth under conditions of political democracy? … It is a task of awe-inspiring magnitude. It remains the strongest basis for an Indian claim for support, sympathy and assistance".

Global Security Watch (2012) is among a number of analysts that sees India as being among the world largest economies in the short-term, with a concomitant growth in defence capabilities; underwritten by the country's foreign policy strategies. This would consolidate India's expanding role at regional and international level together with the associated compulsion to establish and deploy its defence proficiencies that exist over a wide area of specialities (Gupta, 2012:vii-viii). Being amongst the top of the world's economic tier also entails a constant involvement in arms contestation, which also involves the regeneration of military capabilities across its three arms services – army, air force and navy. The armed forces can thus be deployed and utilised as technologically advanced regional and international stabilisers. What sets India apart from her IBSA partners, is the country's nuclear triad[59] arms capability.

India's defence budget was USD 36.4 billion, excluding pensions (The Military Balance (Asia), 2015:220), averaging 2.4 per cent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) for the period 2010-2014 (World Bank, n.d.). Largely in reaction to China's defence spending, India's defence budget – although down from previous years – still accounted for 14.2 per cent of the fifteen Asian countries that were analysed (The Military Balance (Asia), 2015:211). Forty-one per cent of the budget was allocated to capital expenditure, with the Indian army having the only budget that increased in real terms – entrenching the landward strategic priority noted above. Being the third largest military force in the world (by the end of this decade) (World Atlas, 2016:n.p.) means that the Indian armed forces have unique ranges and depth of professional skills, that may be used in foreign policy tasks, such as peacekeeping (see section 6.4). Despite formidable rivalry in its geopolitical neighbourhood – that includes Japan, China and South Korea – India reserves for itself a place as a regional leader. This putative stratified role is not an assumptive position but rather one that the country has continuously struggled for. In terms of interactions and transactions, India covers this struggle across a range of actions that include bolstering knowledge and practices using a variety of communications processes.

[59] A nuclear triad comprises the nuclear weapons delivery of a strategic nuclear arsenal which consists of three components: Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Wellerstein, 2016:n.p).

The Indian success story, however, also has systemic drawbacks. In the first place, its armed forces are not adequately representative of all its peoples, thus perpetuating cultural inequities. Although it is unlikely that the military will overthrow a democracy that the nation is justifiably proud of, the defence institutions that are in place display an unwieldy and time-consuming command-and-control system that does not execute its functions well in war or periods of escalated tensions (Wilkinson, 2015). Then, secondly, it is important to note a great chink in India's defence industrial armour. The country's defence procurements are still dominated by imports. Its national industry continues to suffer from inefficiencies and further constraints such as civil-military strategic policy alignments and an inadequately trained work force. Military personnel view civilian advisers in the Department of Defence as "woefully ignorant on military matters" (*The Economist*, 2013:n.p.). A significant number of parts, components and raw materials is supplied by other countries for defence-industrial manufacture. These constraints are borne out in Graph 6.1 that features the dependency pattern that India finds itself in with respect to strategic defence imports.

Graph 6.1: India as an importer of armaments

(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2013. Obtained from *The Economist*, 30 March 2013)

Goosen, as a member of the JWG on defence, observed during a defence industry visit to India a tendency to consider a completed hardware product, for instance a military aircraft, as a fully-Indian indigenous product. This perception is pervasive, despite the fact that critical components are clearly marked as originating in other countries, and

therefore imported (Goosen, interview, 2015). Thirdly, state-owned enterprises have productivity challenges that create a disparity between defence requirements and production. This negative trend is inexorably being reversed, as private companies continue to make inroads into the Indian defence market – which boosts productivity and ensures joint capital schemes through foreign direct investment (The Military Balance (Asia), 2015:220-221). Finally, the imbalance in the relative value given to different geostrategic attributes constitutes another systemic flaw. The asymmetry in question here is India's imperfect ability to maintain significant and extended maritime power projection in its eponymous ocean. This may be a defence defect open to exploitation by other powers in the Indian Ocean region. Thus, an important factor is that any significant geographic expansion of Indian influence can arguably only take place in the maritime domain. Brewster (2012:6) records that there is a "developing vision among Indian strategists of India as major *maritime* power – and perhaps even that India's geographic position gives the Indian Ocean a preponderant influence over India's destiny" (original emphasis). Thus, aside from filling a strategic defence gap, there appears to be a marked relationship between India's oceanic aspirations, its image as a regional leader and its karma as a world power. These utterances give a clear indication of the hybrid world that India appears to inhabit – a staunch member of the global South, yet seeking a seat at the high table of world politics.

The geopolitical facts that comprise Brazil are impressive. It has a population of almost 205 million people that makes it the world's sixth most populous country. Its position in the world economic hierarchy places it in the top ten, as it has a GDP that approaches three trillion USD. Its borders of almost 17 000 kilometres enclose an area of more than 8.5 million square kilometres (including islands, archipelagos, atolls and islets), making it the world's fifth largest country. Its coastline of 7 491 kilometres gives rise to an EEZ of 3.5 million square kilometres. The UN's CLCS has awarded Brazil an additional 771 000 square kilometres, with a further claim pending (Ortiz, 2015). Its urban population of 85.7 per cent means that vast tracts of land are sparsely populated (World Factbook (Brazil), 2015). This, together with its large oceanic estate, present attendant governance and hence defence challenges. In view of the foregoing information, it would appear logical and commensurate with its hegemonic geopolitical status that Brazil is Latin America's foremost military power.

A number of interrelated incentives are drivers for Brazil's geopolitical ambitions. These include ongoing regional tensions and hegemony in the South Atlantic; its desire to ensure access to Antarctica; a need to promote its regional leadership; as well as a need to assert its role as an international great power.[60] An overriding goal is to collaborate in security issues with states and entities that have extensive powers, while retaining decision-making autonomy (Parodi, 2002:112-113), an objective that in itself displays hybrid traits – merging two geopolitical cultures in a way that gives birth to an alternate third hybridised culture. Over the past three decades – since civilian democratic government ascended from military rule – Brazil has moved beyond self-sufficiency towards an assertive world position. It has constructed (soft) power bases within international institutions (including the areas such as clean forms of energy, sustainability, food security, world trade, international labour, social empowerment and linkages with Lusophone countries (Trebat, 2013:137-139). As the most powerful country within the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP in Portuguese), Brazil has a distinct and substantial voice plus a unique position from which to launch soft diplomacy and project power "with energy and security matters at its core" (Sanches, 2014:1) in the South Atlantic Basin and beyond). It seeks to increase the ambit of its cooperation and aligns policies across a range of endeavours, encapsulated in the phrase "autonomy through diversification" (Franko, 2014:5).

Other geopolitical objectives are to externally maintain a southern hemisphere that has no access to weapons of mass destruction, to act upon broad South-South cooperation development, as well as to defeat terrorism and drug trafficking. Internally the objectives are to overcome the legacies of intermittent military rule, achieve greater racial equity and eradicate poverty (Chapman, 2011:30-31). A supplementary, controversial aim is the eradication of criminality and the pacification programme so as to regain state control over impoverished *favela* slums. This has led to the continued use of Brazilian armed forces internally in support of law enforcement operations (The Military Balance (Latin America and the Caribbean), 2015:369).

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[60] The United States cited Brazil as one of the world's "Emerging Centers of Influence" (United States National Security Strategy, 2010:44). This phrase is not used in the latest national security strategy, dated February 2015 (United States National Security Strategy, 2015).

Its geopolitical facets become national objectives when they are captured in the White Paper on defence (*Brasil - Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional*, 2012); one which heralded a first public release in the history of Brazil. As such it offers an open analysis of the strategic objectives of Brazil's defence forces. The new transparency has effected enhanced civil-military relations within the country and acted as a confidence-building mechanism for its bordering states. A Brazilian complementary law prescribes that its Congress and the Ministry of Defence share accountability for defence strategy and implementation. Future requirements are that the document is updated four-yearly, and that strategic information, budgets, institutional data, implementation methodologies, its defence industry and cooperation management, UN peacekeeping, as well as equipment figures are included as they apply to the country's military. In terms of nuclear power development Brazil plans to operationalise a submarine powered by a uranium-enriched reactor (Taylor, 2009:1276-1280). This endeavour is flagged as an area of possible future cooperation particularly with India, which is involved in similar projects, and possibly involving the South African nuclear industry to complete the triangle (Pretorius, 2011:319-339). Innovative internal plans relate to the safeguarding of Brazil's 'green' and 'blue' Amazons, the latter being its oceanic oil reserves. The increased significance of the "Blue Amazon" and the South Atlantic basin as a regional security sphere signals three additional changes that affect the control and influence of Brazil's defence policy:

- A cross-regional concentration on both South America and West Africa, with the aim to reinforce and assist in the provision of security in the regions. This focus had a large part of its origins in 1986 with the formation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. Thompson and Muggah (2015:n.p.) observe that "[t]he unstated goal then, as now, was to minimize external meddling in the region, especially by NATO". Having fewer outsiders in the region also makes for a more captive commercial market.
- Given Brazil's huge offshore oil and gas reserves, its export-focused economy and the associated need to secure maritime and energy trade

lanes, Brazil has an active defence stance with respect to the South Atlantic.

- Drawing on past links has given new impetus to South American and African regional security cooperation strategies; and has additional military maritime and maritime trade benefits that accrue through the development of new markets (Abdenur & de Souza Neto, 2013a:1-4; Abdenur & de Souza Neto, 2013b:182-183).

Further, contemporary issues such as outer space and cyber-security and the need to assist in the provision of security for the 2016 summer Olympics were successfully addressed. In sum, Brazil's *Livro Branco* (White Book) addresses the country's need to be quietly assertive in a shifting multipolar world. It emphasises the requirement to have effective defence deterrent capabilities, and the need for a forward-looking focus on asymmetrical and non-conventional conflict management (Hulse, 2011; The Military Balance, 2015:369-370).

The current, largely negative, world economic outlook and its impact on Brazil has obliged the IBSA partner to revise its defence budget, down from USD 7.3 to 5.4 billion for the current financial year. These defence strategic reductions place Brazil in a tenuous position, as substantial budgetary allocations have led to commitments and also represents high values in terms of international cooperation and foreign direct investment. The cuts will also impact negatively on Brazil's contribution to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), as its troop strength will be reduced from 1 343 to 850 (Guevara, 2015; Tomkins, 2015). Of interest to the IBSA construct is the fact that Brazil will continue with its acquisition of Gripen fighter jets (similar to those obtained by South Africa), as well as be the first export customer of the South African 'A-Darter' air-to-air missile (jointly funded by the two countries) (The Military Balance, 2015:370; Martin, 2014).

Brazil, too, devotes much effort to a foreign policy that actuates security cooperation with its neighbouring states, the region and its continent, as well as the world-at-large. Of interest to this study are the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR or MERCOSUL in Portuguese, a common market for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and

Uruguay), IBSA, BRICS, UNASUR (UNASUL in Portuguese) and its affiliation with three UN peacekeeping operations – MINURSO (the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara), MINUSTAH and MONUSCO (the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) (World Factbook, 2015).

The management complexities of Brazil's defence organisation infer systemic constraints, one of which follows. Earlier in this chapter (footnote 60) it was noted that Brazil occupies an important yet relatively unstable position in world affairs. Franko (2014:1-5) asserts that its progress in international economic, political and ecological realms has not been realised in the defence domain and that 'hard' power needs to augment and align with its soft power status. He presents this as a modern defence trilemma. When a country has three strategic objectives – sovereignty/autonomy versus grand democratic aims versus the economic pillar of a defence modernisation acquisition strategy – it needs to forfeit one in order to attain the goals of the other two. Franko suggests that Brazil's "broadly democratic commitment to a responsible defense acquisition strategy constrains the country" (Franko, 2014:3). I would however rebut that this perceived faultline is in fact consistent with Brazil's position, because it aligns its national objectives with its 'soft' diplomatic posture; one that plays to the country's recognised power.

A continental hegemon in various spheres of endeavour, yet compared to its IBSA allies South Africa is a minnow in the geopolitical and defence domains. The country's land border of 5 244 kilometres encloses an area of 1.219 million square kilometres. It is bordered by six neighbouring states, while a maritime border is shared between South Africa's Prince Edward Island group and France's Crozet Islands, approximately 1 000 kilometres south-east off mainland Africa. As mentioned in Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2), but now from a defence angle, South Africa and France have conducted a collaborative exploration of this islandic region so as to delimit the extended continental shelf, and presented a joint submission to the CLCS. Should the claim be successful, its potential of 940 000 million square kilometres (Petroleum Agency South Africa, n.d.) will add considerably to its extant EEZ of 1.535 million square kilometres (SANGP 100). As with India and Brazil, this vast area makes surveillance, governance and defence vexed strategic issues.

To fulfill its regional security role, South Africa is a member of the SACU, the SADC, the AU and the UN. It attempts at times to underplay its hegemonic status, often when a situation requires dynamic and pro-active leadership. South Africa faces challenges in reconciling its role as an African country while attempting to be an international citizen of good standing. The futile attempt to institute sanctions against the Abacha military regime in Nigeria in 1995 (Abegunrin, 2009:30) and the case of Zimbabwe's past fraudulent elections and other excesses (Schoeman & Alden, 2003:1-20) are two prime examples of the complexity of its hybrid status in world affairs. Flemes (2009:143-144) notes seven defence spheres at the time of writing (ranging from destroying its nuclear stockpile to the ban of landmines) where South Africa has played a leading role yet coyly eschewed any esteem.

The country's socio-economic priorities (with high unemployment and growing inequalities) have an effect on the defence budget. Averaging just over 1 per cent of the national budget over the past two decades, the desired level is 2 per cent (Mapisa-Nqukula, 2015). A varying but substantial proportion of the budget is spent on continental peace missions and African crisis response preparedness. The present allocation is seen as inadequate for a country with the assets that South Africa has, and leads to a diminished ability to fulfil all its defence and peacekeeping obligations and potential (Vollgraaff, 2014).

The instrument of state that provides the defence component of national security is the national defence force. Its previous mandates (the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review) had not kept pace with strategic changes. Accordingly, a new national defence review was mandated in 2011, and completed in 2014. Ratified by government in March 2014, it has become known as the South African Defence Review 2014 (SADR 2014). The extensive work that lies ahead has been detailed in a 30-year implementation plan that will be reviewed periodically. SADR 2014 is aimed at the strategic level, with less attention devoted to the operational and tactical levels.

The defence strategic planning process is designed for participation by parliament, the cabinet and the defence force, and is required to support government priorities and

realities. An increased budget needs to operate in concert with the strategic defence security planning process. SADR 2014 identifies five core indicators:

- Dealing with challenges in its operations and providing a budget of 1.1 per cent of GDP;
- Restoring the equilibrium of the SANDF by 2018, and have the budget increased to 1.6 per cent of GDP;
- Increasing the capacity of the SANDF by 2023 that would ensure that current missions could be achieved, with an anticipated increase in the defence budget to 2 per cent;
- Developing the SANDF's capability in order to respond effectively to new challenges, with a budget increase to 2.4 per cent of GDP; and
- Ensuring the contingency for the SANDF to deal with situations of war, which would require a budget increase to 3.3 per cent of GDP (South African Defence Review 2014, 2014:xiii-xiv).

South Africa's national security has national and regional dimensions. At national level its focus is the maintenance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and principles of democracy and governance, as well as the development of its citizens through a growing economy. Sustained economic growth requires rapid and secured maritime trade (especially for high-value products) where maritime trade has a regional security linkage. As a developing nation most of the challenges being confronted were noted earlier in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.2). Externally, South African national security is indivisibly linked to the stability and growth of the Southern African region, and the African continent at large, as well as South Africa's capacity for providing leadership in the military domain.

In this context the nexus between security and development is viewed as axiomatic, and represents the foremost dual challenges on the African continent. South Africa and its partners have valid interests in positive outcomes that the furtherance of democracy and economic development can bring about. This state of affairs is made more complicated by the presence of a range of threats such as intra-state conflict, religious or ethnic zealotry, terrorism, transnational crime and cyber threats (South African

Defence Review 2014, 2014:vi). To a significant degree these conditions represent insecurities that are reflected not only in Africa, but also within the security construct represented by IBSA.

In sum, the defence capabilities of India, Brazil and South Africa are impressive in terms of size, qualities and potential. It also infers a latency to perform other tasks, not only within national borders (e.g. natural disaster management aid), but also as a foreign policy instrument in the performance of peace support operations, to be discussed in section (section 2.3.2). In the sphere of foreign policy and defence diplomacy (see Chapter 3, sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3), the countries' defence capabilities can be and are therefore put to gainful use.

As this chapter will show further on, the socio-political construction of defence cooperation within IBSA is one that this study deems to be conducted pro-actively and professionally. First however, it is necessary to complete the picture. In the next section I capture the extent of or how IBSA acts as an agent using its structures and practices to enhance the collective through communication, such as foreign policy endeavours like peace operations in Africa.

6.3 CONCEPTUALISING IBSA DEFENCE COOPERATION

As noted in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.2), since the end of the Cold War security is no longer the concern solely of defence forces and humanitarian agents. The security debate has become part of the international development agenda. Increased attention is now being paid to other actors within 'systems of security' and the human-centric side of security including governance of security institutions, the links between security and insecurity, access to resources, providing safe and secure conditions for well-being and socio-economic development. Many of these issues are being gradually incorporated into work undertaken through regional, continental and international structures (UN). These critical changes has seen the emergence of regional security frameworks supported by intergovernmental organisations, whose creation is also advocated civil society. This is particularly the case in the spheres of community and personal security (United Nations Human Development Report,

1994:30-32); where they are outcomes of the provision of physical/military security (see also Kampala Document, 1991:2-4). The IBSA collective may be in a position to contribute to military security through defence collaboration.

6.4 THE IBSA COUNTRIES AND THE PRACTICE OF PEACE SUPPORT

This section is a discussion of the involvement of the IBSA states as individual states in peace support operations (PSOs)[61] on the African continent – as most PSOs take place in this geopolitical terrain (Institute for Security Studies, 2015:n.p.). As the manifestation of the IBSA foreign policies as discrete states, PSOs also comprise points of defence congruency that may facilitate collective cooperation. After I review India, Brazil and South Africa's PSO roles in Africa, in this part I then problematise two issues. Firstly, I consider the implications of these individual IBSA PSO involvements, and secondly, I attempt to determine commonalities – viewed as shared practices – and the extent to which these exposures can be used as a foundation for collective practices in the PSO sector and the more general defence sector. In terms of progressing the conceptual diagram (Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1), I suggest that answers to these issues would lead to forms of social learning. This could enhance mutual trust and collective identity in an area of human endeavour (PSOs) that is fraught with risk of physical harm to the peacekeepers themselves but that – when managed well – can induce a reinforcing cycle of hybrid identity-formation. The section ends by identifying PSO matters that can produce greater IBSA cohesion with respect to African peace and security cooperation.

6.4.1 The IBSA states' contributions to PSOs in Africa

Worldwide, while the number of conflicts has declined, those remaining are often obdurate, with some enduring their second or third upsurge, particularly in Africa. As at the end of December 2016, UN peacekeeping operations number sixteen. It involves

[61] PSOs are multifunctional operations in which impartial military activities are designed to create a secure environment and to facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to establish a self sustaining peace. PSOs may include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian operations (Institute for Security Studies, 2000). See also de Coning (2014:163, note 1) who prefers the term 'peace operations'.

100 376 uniformed and 16 471 civilian personnel respectively, and a further 1 716 are volunteers, and has a budget of about 7.87 billion USD (UN, 2016a: n.p.). All three IBSA members participate in these PSOs (UN, 2016b: n.p.).

India has been involved with UN peace missions in Africa and elsewhere, since 1960. India has contributed troops, airmen and -women, sailors, medics and civilian personnel as the UN has wedged itself between foes in order to keep the peace. India was present, too, in the rebuilding of countries and communities afterwards. As at the end of April 2015, India had the third most peacekeepers on African soil, numbering 8 112 (Renwick, 2015:n.p.).

India's participation in PSOs is driven by different motives and incentives. Some of the motives can be explained along Cold War and South-South solidarist, non-alignment faultlines; as peace missions remain an integral and foremost part of India's foreign policy. For India, the incentives are clear:

- The planning, training, execution and post-war reconstruction keep their troops focused under realistic combat conditions. The experience gained from peace missions is utilised in a feedback loop to maintain the highest states of readiness and adapt to the latest battle conditions (van Rooyen, 2010:3-26). Further, peace operations ensure that the world's third largest military force (by the end of the decade (World Atlas, 2016:n.p.)) is occupied in a pro-active and directed manner;
- The UN funds countries for troop contributions, and this remains a predictable and opportune indirect source of financing for its armed forces;
- India's armed forces have unique skill sets (such as de-mining), as well as proven employability in all types of terrain, that make them an asset to the UN in Africa; and
- India has over the past decade increased its peace missions in Africa by 338 per cent (Banerjee, 2013:n.p.) as it redoubles its foreign policy efforts on the continent to ensure Africa's support (Mampillly, 2012:n.p.).

In line with this high-profile foreign policy push, India and the United States agreed recently to train troops in six African countries before they are deployed to UN peacekeeping missions (Reuters, 2015:n.p.). An overview of India's identities shows two distinct yet hybrid traits – magnanimity played off against opportunism, combining to place India in a superior position, in both moral and material terms.

Brazil has over the past two decades developed the hallmarks of an emerging middle power. The country differentiates between emerging and traditional middle powers, siding with the former (Jordaan, 2003:165-181)). The country's contribution to the UN's peace missions and its diplomatic, economic and environmental relations with the developing world in general and specifically Africa, play a key role in its international standing and posture; and it flows naturally that it is a crucial element in the planning and pursuit of its foreign policy. Kenkel (2013:275) articulates the pinnacle achievement when he observes that "[i]ndeed, for Brazil the key objective has become the rapid realization of its long-held dream of a permanent, veto-endowed seat on a reformed United Nations (UN) Security Council" (see also Flemes, 2009b:176). To execute its foreign policy aims Brazil implements a parallel set of actions. Firstly, it forms interstate coalition blocs that buttress coordination of political positions and concerns in multifaceted settings; and secondly, it conjoins greater commitment to UN peace missions, while simultaneously engaging in a range of bilateral and multilateral engagements with the developing world. However, as the world moves into ever more complex situations, especially with respect to peace missions, the success of this double-pronged approach appears questionable (Hirst, 2015:359-372; 2009). As in the case of India, it becomes evident that Brazil too seeks to display an altruistic diplomatic and foreign policy stance that is patently counterpoised by actions that prioritise its core national interests and thereby undermine this soft diplomatic stance. This ambivalence ultimately exposes the hybrid nature of its configuration.

When it comes to peace missions, Brazil strikes a different chord though with the assumptive implementation of the liberal peace approach[62] model for UN peace

[62] The liberal peace process, or liberal peacebuilding, stresses human rights, democratic values, the removal of controls in order to encourage economic development and the rule of law. These

missions; one that is different to India and as will be seen, South Africa. With respect to peace missions Brazil commits to the peaceful resolution of disputes and negotiation only. By logical extension, it does not support military interventionism. Chapter VII UN use-of-force operations are deemed intrusions onto the sphere of non-intervention. It interprets sovereignty as sacrosanct, and the country commits to democracy and human rights. Further, it favours multilateral arrangements for peace missions and strives for a peacebuilding diplomatic niche role. In recent years, as it has moved from the region to the international scenario, Brazil's normative commitments have come under criticism. In this regard, since 2004 an emerging Brazil has had to confront the notion of responsibility-to-protect (R2P), attempt to reconcile it with its own internal history of over a million lost to armed violence over the past three and a half decades, and re-consider its international R2P obligations on an enlarged stage. To this end Brazil has indeed negotiated and introduced a compromise position, that it calls "Responsibility while Protecting", or RwP (United Nations, 2011:1-4). This attempt has not been received favourably by Brazil's developed nation partners, including the United States. It is probable that it garners respect if not cooperation; as Brazil has made it clear that the position also marked a Latin American stand from which they do not intend to deviate. Hence, Brazil continues to offer its strength at peacebuilding, such as in Haiti where it took a leadership role; as an example of what it could achieve in Africa. The outcome of an assessment to this effect is that Brazil's peace mission presence in Africa will remain tangential, unless it involves a Lusophone country and UN Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) peace missions. Nevertheless its actions comprise the elements to confront the liberal peace in a meaningful and constructive way in future (Kenkel, 2013:272-292; Napoleão & Kalil, 2015:87-112; Stuenkel, 2015). The limited and selective nature of Brazil's PSO practices reinforces the ambivalence of its identity, as mentioned before.

For South Africa, its foreign policy is perceived and conducted with Africa front and centre. Its foreign policy is often viewed as value-driven and shaped towards pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity; while it assists in qualitative, enduring governance and provides peace as well as stability (de Carvalho, 2014:2). Yet, foreign

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prescriptive processes often ignore the complexities of the conflict within local communities (Opongo, 2014:94).

policy is not merely a question of applying normative values; rather "these decisions are often complex, needing to calculate trade-offs between competing domestic and international imperatives, as well as short and long term interests" (Lalbahadur, 2014:n.p.). These are particularly applicable in the international, continental and regional peace missions settings. The balancing of concessions with strategic positioning also has the hallmarks of hybridity – the anticipatory solutions can "provide a way out of binary thinking, allow the inscription of the agency … and even permit a restructuring and destabilizing of power" (Prabhu, 2007:1).

South Africa is gradually being perceived as a key peace operations roleplayer, even though it has only participated since 1998. With its contribution of 1 500 to 2 000 troops per year, South Africa has become the eighth largest provider in Africa (Lucey, 2013:n.p.; South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 2012:20). Two key documents assist in understanding the background against which South African participation in peacekeeping operations is based. The 2011 "White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy" is the first, and it provides a critical understanding that the stability of Africa in turn provides secure grounding for prosperous development for South Africa. The second is the "White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions", dated 1999. It is a valued instrument that aids the understanding and origin of participation in peace missions, and its revision commenced in 2014. The document also lends understanding to the changing nature of peace missions, and underscores the vision of prioritising peace missions on the African continent (de Carvalho, 2014:1-3). In a hybrid manner it highlights how South Africa has engendered sufficient confidence to accept this role in recent times. Whereas previously the country may have perceived itself as an interloper, it had become accustomed to the need for leadership, but without the hegemonic accoutrements.

It is also necessary to understand not only the ways, but also the means that contribute to peace missions. Out of an approved budget of USD 7.06 billion for the period of 2014-2015, South Africa contributes 0.07 per cent. South Africa provides less of a contribution than the other IBSA states (which have greater economies and populations), yet it provides more to the UN PSOs coffer than any other African

country. Table 6.1 provides comparative financial contributions for select countries.

Table 6.1: Financial Contributions to UN PSOs – Select Countries

Country	Contributions (percentage)
Nigeria	0.01
Egypt	0.02
Colombia	0.05
Indonesia	0.06
South Africa	0.07
India	0.133
Turkey	0.265
Brazil	0.58

(Data from the United Nations General Assembly. *Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236: Report of the Secretary General*. A/67/224/Add.1 27 December 2012. Table adapted from Carvalho, 2014:10)

South Africa has participated in fifteen peace missions in the period 1998 to 2014, where at least one (Lesotho, 1998) was peace enforcement. South African troops have served in UN and AU missions in Burundi, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan, Comoros and Liberia, among others (Garb, 2010:44-63).

SADR 2014 (2014:4) notes that "[m]any of these operations have not required the Defence Force to engage in significant combat operations. But when the Defence Force has had to fight, these operations have been characterised by hard and dangerous combat in complex human and physical conditions". Its counterpoint is the fact that the valuable work being done by soldiers, police officers and civilians is effectively undermined by the ill-discipline of a minority who stand accused of human rights abuses themselves (Mail & Guardian, 2015).

6.4.2 Hybrid identity-formation through defence cooperation: IBSA PSOs in Africa

As indicated in the beginning of the section, I now analyse the implications of IBSA PSOs in Africa. The preceding parts of the section dealt with the IBSA countries' contribution to peace missions in Africa. The major implication is that it demonstrated that all three were actively involved, but in their individual capacities, whereas IBSA can and should *collectively* improve on its performance. A further, more subtle, implication is that – despite being executed in their capacity as individual countries – the exposure to and experience of PSOs by military uniformed citizens of India, Brazil and South Africa contributes to identity-shaping and imbues them with a sense of credibility among one another. This could set a viable foundation for discourse.

That much greater coordination with respect to peace cooperation among the IBSA states can take place is clear. The present fragmented approach does not fulfil IBSA's potential. What is also apparent is that, in the world of peacekeeping, each of the IBSA countries is very well aware of the degree of commitment that each IBSA partner invests in PSOs; social learning based on knowledge exists. The key issue lies in a lack of agency, moving from structures and practices to communication processes; in particular the discourse complexity of PSOs. Here I submit that the issue of conjoined IBSA PSOs has not been elevated to being a discussion point on any defence agenda. There may be a number of reasons for this, and I speculate upon some: This type of collective-tri-national combined force (for the sake of argument let it be known as the 'IBSA Peace Support Force' (PSF)) has not been attempted before and the leap from concept to practice may be prohibitive; an IBSA-type PSF may not be politically expedient as national pride would be usurped by the collective (which would be a classic hybrid situation); other political obstacles may be the issue of 'R2P' versus 'RwP' and also the need to send peacekeepers beyond the interest spheres of the own continent. Brazil prefers Lusophone countries and situations where UN Chapter VII enforcement rules do not apply, while South Africa prefers not to send its troops beyond African soil. Yet the main question may well be whether an IBSA PSF will be more effective than individual national forces under UN command.

This notwithstanding, the IBSA countries have already engaged in exercises (quite successfully) at being a conjoined military force – through the biennial Exercise IBSAMAR that commenced in 2008 (discussed further in section 6.4.1.1). This sets a precedent. A plausible option may be that IBSAMAR is reconfigured to be used for maritime peacekeeping in the South Atlantic/Indian oceans or used for anti-piracy operations (where anti-piracy is the subject of a number of United Nations Security Council Resolutions[63] that mandate actions off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea (UN, 2012:n.p.)) – oceanic areas within the spheres of influence of the IBSA collective. The cooperation – albeit often grudgingly, but for the 'greater good' – that sets great powers such as the present UN Security Council members apart, can be emulated by emerging powers. From a normative viewpoint, cooperation is critical to the practice of social constructivism; it is a commitment to progressive development and sustainable prosperity; it behooves the human-centric security principles of India, Brazil and South Africa. The analysis of concord at global macro-level in turn, is dependent on the fundamental inner workings that construct the socio-political make-up of the collective that is IBSA, at micro level.

A noteworthy observation is that India appears to be more at ease with defence cooperation as an IBSA activity, rather than within BRICS structures; where the latter grouping has competing states (China and Russia) in this sphere of activity (McDuling, interview, 2015). It ties in, unfortunately, with a subjective case study observation, that – as is often the case – individuals with professional interests tend to 'drive' issues, for a variety of motivations. At present, there appears to be a lack of 'drivers'; with some having retired, replaced by others that have no particular interest in furthering IBSA defence cooperation (Anonymous, electronic communication, 2016). A combined trilateral approach holds the promise of an optimised outcome – not only for Africa's peace, stability and growth, but also for the IBSA states' objective of making a difference in world affairs, particularly their stated ambition of being veto-assigned members of the UN Security Council.

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[63] UN Security Council Resolutions on piracy off the coast of Somalia: 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008), 1846 (2008), 1851 (2008), 1897 (2009), 1918 (2010), 1950 (2010), 1976 (2011), 2015 (2011), 2020 (2011). UN Security Council Resolutions on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: 2018 (2011), 2039 (2012). (UN, 2012:n.p.).

It is an important juncture that leads this study to examine the details of the IBSA JWG on defence, so as to gain understanding of the potential that it may have.

6.5 STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES: THE IBSA WORKING GROUP ON DEFENCE COOPERATION

Drawing on the theoretical schema outlined in Chapter 2 (Diagram 2.1), I insert the agency that energises IBSA's structures and practices (with much of the power and knowledge laid out and analysed earlier), the communication processes, and the reciprocal interaction and transactions that result. I depict the workings of the JWG on defence, using its MoUs and other documents that mandate and empower its workings and aim to show discursive patterns that are cyclically synthesised. Checkel (2001:560) suggests that reinforcement of this type of "state compliance results from social learning and deliberation that lead to preference change. In this view … the environment … is one of social interaction between agents, where mutual learning and the discovery of new preferences replace unilateral calculation". In this section therefore the chapter culminates through an analysis of the foundation and potential that the JWG on defence has. I therefore underscore the JWG's value in the construction of this socio-political element of IBSA cooperation. As the analysis proceeds, an important IBSA combined study ("Executive report of the IBSA workgroup on Defence Science, Engineering and Technology (DSET) Collaboration, May 2012 – May 2013") that was carried out, shows that the JWG on defence had constructed a creatively different approach to their work. Its stratagem ought to have productive, strategic and possibly human security beneficent results, and the outcomes of this study are factored into this section.

6.5.1 Defence diplomacy: The IBSA JWG on defence

The JWG on defence was created in 2004, soon after IBSA itself was formed. The details of the first two meetings could not be made available for this study. Table 6.2 lists the further meetings, the dates and their locales.

Table 6.2: IBSA JWG on Defence Meetings

IBSA JWG on Defence	Date	Place (Host nation)
3	14-15 July 2009	Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)
4	11-12 October 2011	Pretoria (South Africa)
5	23-24 May 2013	New Delhi (India)
6	17-19 November 2014	Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)

The next meeting was scheduled to take place in New Delhi in February 2016 (Kutty, interview, 2015), but it appears that it did not take place (McDuling, electronic communication, 2016; Boucher, electronic communication, 2016). At this point, it is important to note that, in concert with much of the IBSA (non-) progress (see Chapter 1, section 1.1), no details of further meetings of the IBSA JWG on defence have become available. This apparent inertia is disconcerting, as it effectively erodes the progress to date, as well as the target dates set out in the CSIR documentation (Anonymous, electronic communication, 19 July 2016).

The minutes of the four sets of meetings reveal a wide array of issues that are worked on, and records the progress. The purpose of this section therefore is to extract issues that are discussed in order to not only affirm the nature, but also the wide range and specialised/technical depths at which these issues are dealt with. A selection of these issues follows, with CDA loosely applied where applicable.

With respect to the minutes and the actual management of the meetings, some general observations are apposite. Attendance from all three IBSA states were impressive, in number, ranks represented (both military and civilian), and a variety of professions. Participants and leadership were of both genders. With respect to CDA, there are numerous recurring words, phrases and references to 'explore avenues of cooperation', offers of visits to defence and research institutes and access to information and data bases, while the word 'agreed' appeared frequently. I cite at length from the minutes of the JWG No 4 meeting in order to convey the tone of mutuality that is reflected in this engagement:

> The South African chief delegate warmly welcomed both the Indian and the Brazilian delegates and referred to the significance of the formation of IBSA in

> 2003. He urged the three countries to continue exploring ways to better the quality of life of their peoples through the IBSA forum. [He] reiterated the importance of the core values of the South-South cooperation and expressed the hope that the deliberations would be productive, open, frank and yield positive outcomes… [The] head of the Indian delegation … stated that India was committed to its strategic partnership with both South Africa and Brazil. He reiterated the importance of the three countries to identify strategic areas of cooperation and work towards peace and security in the respective countries and regions and towards global peace and stability… [The] head of Brazilian delegation, concurred with both … views on the need for enhanced relations between the three countries. He recalled that the three countries shared a history of colonialism and today's generations carried the responsibility to rescue countries of the Southern region from poverty. Lt Gen … concurred with his … co-chairs that the JDWG [Joint Defence Work Group] could significantly contribute to the development of capacity for employment towards a better and progressive life for their peoples. … Lt Gen … concluded by stating that the deliberations would be constructive, successful and enhance cooperation, especially in the area of joint ventures and projects. … [At the closing of the plenary session] the Brazilian Co-Chairperson … indicated his belief that the friendship ties among the three countries will be strengthened and that the IBSA members will search for partnerships among themselves, in order to consolidate the South-South strategy. He added that he believes that the trilateral forum may contribute significantly towards the construction of a new world order and a better world for the new generations. … the South African Co-Chairperson, … concluded by expressing his satisfaction with the outcome of the deliberations. He commended the delegations for their valuable and immense contribution in the session. He added that Brazil, India and South Africa each occupy an influential position within their respective regions, and hold similar views on key global issues. He concluded that [*sic*] DJWG is in a position to make a significant contribution to the global debate and engagement.
>
> (IBSA JWG No 4, 2011, Pretoria:1-2; 6)

This excerpt provides an unequivocal indication of the level and quality of defence cooperation, because the expressed views capture most of the identificational, ideational and discursive attributes outlined in this study.

In terms of classified defence information, the first matter to note is that the minutes do not have a security classification (the same applies to the minutes of the JWG on energy). This is gratifying as it infers that the accessibility of the data is in the public

domain, and that civil insight is possible. However, it may be certain that classified information and doctrine are exchanged but that it remains beyond the purview of the minutes. The JWG also coordinates the exchange of Special Forces visits, training exchanges and technical knowledge transfers. Without revealing details that are in fact classified, most of these exchanges had been executed, to the trilateral satisfaction of all (IBSA JWG No 3, 2009:2; IBSA JWG No 4, 2011:5; IBSA JWG No 5, 2013:3; IBSA JWG No 6, 2014:2).

Concepts and defence doctrine are also abiding areas of professional interest and cooperation. The three countries offered and accepted trilaterally a range of information from which the partners could benefit, which was required for deeper knowledge integration, to understand previously elusive concepts and doctrine that the other parties practice in their defence or military organisations. Examples of information exchanged include "Doctrine of Joint Employment of Armed Forces", the "Structure and Doctrine of Joint Command and Control of the Armed Forces".[64]

The three sides exchanged information on training programmes or military courses that could be studied by the other parties to determine participation. Each of the three states gave presentations about their defence forces' mandates, key documents, hierarchies, structures and processes; so that the other two countries would understand key elements of one another's armed and auxiliary forces (IBSA JWG No 3, 2009:2,3; IBSA JWG No 4, 2011:2; IBSA JWG No 5, 2013:2; IBSA JWG No 6, 2014:3).

In terms of PSOs a number of issues recur. Visits to each member state's peacekeeping centre would be explored and exchange visits encouraged. This would include the valuable 'UN Missions Lessons Learnt' objective. A peacekeeping map exercise was mooted. India gave a presentation about the role of their armed forces in UN peace missions. (This is in line with the requirement for trilateral IBSA coordination, noted above). Brazil invited India and South Africa to a workshop themed 'Peace maintenance operations', completed in July 2014 (IBSA JWG No 3, 2009:1,3; IBSA JWG No 4, 2011:2; IBSA JWG No 5, 2013:2, 2; IBSA JWG No 6, 2014:3).

[64] Access to documentation other than the four sets of JWG minutes (2009, 2011, 2013, 2014) and the Defence Science, and Engineering study report, was not possible.

Current and future defence and security challenges were noted. These included cybernetic security ('cyber-security'), where information was exchanged with the view to future cooperation after issues of common concern were identified. Further information exchanges included 'Piracy at Sea' and 'International Terrorism'. Brazil and South Africa were invited to a conference on 'Aerospace Medicine' in India. Trilateral sporting codes were identified to form the basis of an IBSA Military Games. These games were scheduled for convenient dates (IBSA JWG No 3, 2009:2-4, IBSA JWG No 4, 2011:2-3; IBSA JWG No 5, 2013:2-4; IBSA JWG No 6, 2014:3-4).

The functional area of logistics was explored. This included benchmarking codification systems, in which Brazil were in possession of advanced classifications, and from which the other two partners could benefit. In the absence of a standing JWG secretariat it had become standard procedure to nominate one of the three IBSA partners to coordinate the implementation of the decision taken at the meetings ('Action Plan'). This is an arrangement that appears to have functioned well – it transfers this responsibility without an onerous long-term secretarial commitment, and it ensures continuity and maintains corporate knowledge structures. Issues that could not be completed for any reason remained open until they could be resolved or cancelled (IBSA JWG No 4, 2011:4-5; IBSA JWG No 5, 2013:3; IBSA JWG No 6, 2014:3).

The fourth meeting, held in Pretoria in October 2011, called for the establishment of a joint team to identify possible areas of collaboration and for visits to be carried to the defence industries of the IBSA countries. The joint team to investigate collaboration then accordingly performed their task over the period May 2012 to 2013. A report-back was held during the fifth meeting, and after time to absorb the DSET report, the sixth meeting of the JWG identified two sub-groups that were appointed to deal with issues separately according to their agreed work schedule and professional interests. The first sub-group has the title 'Defence Cooperation Subgroup' (DCS) and the second is the 'Defence Science, Engineering and Technology' (DSET) sub-group.

Accordingly, the remainder of this section deals with two distinctive issues elicited from the minutes and related documentation. The first is Exercise IBSAMAR (that

now resorts under DCS, managing general defence cooperation issues), the second is the work of DSET (the subgroup that deals with science and technology). The issues are significant, because they demonstrate deep commitment from dedicated resources in all three IBSA states, and are aimed at the strategic long term. It may also be said that these two issues to be discussed are a source of pride – they contribute to *esprit d'corps* and continued motivation to not only the working groups, but indeed their respective defence organisations. In terms of the discursive attributes of social constructivism, these two 'projects' have commendable socialisation value. These two projects epitomise the value that the IBSA agency has in extracting knowledge and power from MoUs and its working groups.

6.5.1.1 Exercise IBSAMAR

In a number of important ways, the founding and management of Exercise IBSAMAR represents a track record of the practice of IBSAMAR, its social learning, the building of mutual naval trust and a collective military maritime identity. Much speculation abounds with respect to the formation of Exercise IBSAMAR, but as I was involved, the issues that are listed constitute a first-hand report. In 2006, the navies of India and South Africa held bilateral navy staff ('management' in military parlance) talks in New Delhi. The Indian Navy queried their possible participation in Exercise ATLASUR, a biennial exercise held between the navies of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and Uruguay, with different host nations. Upon return, I ascertained that the Indian Navy's participation was not feasible, as the MoU between the four South Atlantic navies excluded exogenous involvement. However, the Brasilia Declaration of 2003 (that founded IBSA) specifically encouraged defence cooperation. On the basis of this understanding, I convened meetings with the Brazilian defence attaché and the Indian defence adviser (both naval captains). The directorate foreign relations of the SANDF was involved from the outset. All agreed that this was a great idea whose time had come. The issue was then formalised in a letter to this effect (SA Navy Headquarters/VSH/R/311/10/11 (IBSA), 10 January 2007). An internal memorandum details the exchange of letters between the three governments and the South African state attorney (SA Defence Headquarters/DS/R311/1/IBSAMAR, 10

December 2007).[65] Thus, after the roleplayers had motivated and raised the issue with their principals at the respective naval and defence headquarters, their respective ministers of defence ratified this initiative (a bottom-up initiative to foster South-South cooperation that involved normative values and socialisation), it became official and planning commenced; while my professional involvement terminated at that stage.

As a result of these efforts, the first Exercise IBSAMAR took place in May 2008, and every two years since. Generally, planning takes place in odd-numbered years, with the Exercise the year after. All three navies rotate the planning cycles. As it is more productive for both India and Brazil in terms of cost and time, the Exercise generally takes place off South African waters (although this is not fixed). In 2016, the Indian Navy hosted an International Fleet Review, followed by Exercise IBSAMAR off Goa in Indian waters (Kutty, interview, 2015; Wingrin, 2015). The *Times of India* (2010:n.p.) noted during the period of Exercise IBSAMAR II that the "trilateral naval wargames, IBSAMAR, will be part of the strategic initiative launched under the IBSA framework to bring together the maritime forces of three dynamic democracies and economies from three continents under one umbrella".

Exercise IBSAMAR continues to expand in a number of ways. These include the involvement by more armed forces personnel and assets (drawing in air force, army, special forces and medical participation) and military/naval sophistication (anti-air, anti-piracy, visit-board-search-seizure drills) and civilian components (a disaster exercise involving security personnel, firefighters and medical staff), while Special Forces conducted a hostage release drill. In essence it is no longer a 'navies-only' exercise (Vaz, 2015:170-183; Mhlongo & Mushayi, 2016:30-31; DefenceWeb, 2016).

6.5.1.2 DSET Subgroup

Following, I analyse and assess the DSET Subgroup ('DSET')'s prospects for their task. The pivot that changed this task team came about when they realised, under probing leadership, that trilateral visits to one another's facilities, defence research

[65] I was given access to the related correspondence. Copies are available.

establishments and defence industry would be stimulating. But, the output would be a mere visit report, which really satisfied only bureaucratic administration; it would in the final analysis amount to – not much. No further action would result. This was deemed insufficient and rather unprofessional. The task team to identify areas of collaboration then decided to amend their orientation and perform a research task, and to change the visits into data gathering activities.[66]

Consequently, their 113-page report entitled "Executive report of the IBSA workgroup on Defence Science, Engineering and Technology (DSET) Collaboration, May 2012 – May 2013" was produced. In large part, because the management research approach is quantitative and scientific, and represents an opposite research methodology than this study does; the DSET report is captivating, especially when read with a social sciences lens. This part of the section draws on the DSET report, and should be understood as its source.

The DSET report is based on the visits to India (May 2012), Brazil (August 2012) and South Africa (November 2012) by IBSA delegations from all three countries. Delegates comprised Defence Force personnel, as well as staff from research institutes and industries. The aim of the visit was to increase DSET collaboration among all three countries using management research methodologies. The secretariat for the DSET Research Team was funded and supported by the SANDF's directorate for Technology Development and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor). The director was also the chairperson of the DSET Research Team for the period, appointed by the Deputy Director-General for Defence Logistics. The South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) comprised the secretariat, and coordinated the activities together with defence attachés and defence organisations in the three countries. The following presents a redacted version of the report.

The DSET report describes the ambit, aim and stakeholders of DSET as "the systematic creation, management and creative application of knowledge, tools and processes (innovation) for the purposes of defence, national safety and security, taking

[66] For the purpose of this study, I refer to the research team as the 'DSET Research Team', and the DSET Research Team report as the 'DSET report'.

cognisance of the environment (social, economic and natural) within which the change or impact is required. The key stakeholders in DSET are the national defence forces, research institutes, academia and industries" (DSET report, 2013:10).

In order to clarify the complex DSET organisations and processes in each of the IBSA countries, the DSET report employed the 'viable systems model', from which a metastructure was developed (DSET report, 2013:Appendix C). The "Grounded Theory" (DSET report, 2013:Appendix B.2) method was developed after the research methodology called for questionnaires and literature studies. The DSET report recognised six categories of mechanisms for its research methodology, namely the:

- Incorporation of requirements, strengths and capabilities that are needed to isolate fields of collaboration and recognise interactions;
- Provision of security for political and structural support from the three states, where governments need to set objectives and enabling mechanisms;
- Identification of joint projects that require clusters of experts for functional environmental analysis and selection, knowledge audits and prediction of developments;
- Identification and utilisation of synergies as the "creation of virtual capabilities by combining existing lower level systems/capabilities" (DSET report, 2013:17). Here, of further value, would be transnational procurement links, reduction of redundancies and joint information capacities;
- Strengthening of commercial interactions as well as full life cycle integration; and
- Continued recognition of state sovereignty, as well as those 'corporate' IBSA common values that may be used to construct its structures without denigrating or reducing autonomy (DSET report, 2013:10-11).

The DSET report introduces three reinforcing loops to achieve the level of sustainable collaboration (DSET report, 2013:Appendix D.1.2). In so doing, it seeks to incorporate

a successful archetype that would emphasise "the close relationship between the level of competition and level of sustainable collaboration" (DSET report, 2013:Appendix K).[67]

The system archetype allows common behavioural templates in organisations to be noted and analysed over specific time frames. In turn, these lead to directed actions, which could underscore the degree of realisation for projects and activities, refine the goals of IBSA DSET collaboration, and generate cognisance of "the mental model to 'independence through IBSA collaboration'" (DSET report, 2013:12, 13, 19, 27, 77).

The archetype expands to seven action steps that progressively shift from identifying and utilising collaborative energies to the facilitation of learning and sustainability for the organisation; that tend to conjoin and interconnect (DSET report, 2013:Appendix C.4).

The action steps were followed by strategic level procedures, which would actuate three actions. These are to create proposals for Human Capital Development (HCD); establish awareness activities that identify trilateral requirements and associated capabilities aimed at an envisaged IBSA Institute of Defence Technology; and to negotiate special or free defence trade agreements. It is foreseen that these activities, once executed, will ensure an empowered environment (DSET report, 2013:6, 13, 20).

The DSET report culminates with the envisaged projects. Although a number of projects were mooted during the country visits, all the proposals could be synthesised into the following six (recalling the 'diluted' nature of this redaction): Software defined radio (SDR); surveillance systems (specifically for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and border safeguarding); cyber-warfare; electronic warfare (EW); aerospace platforms (aircraft and helicopters – specifically light utility – and small unarmed aerial vehicle (UAV) engines); and Identity, Friend or Foe (IFF) (mode 5 – similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) systems) (DSET report, 2013:22-26).

[67] Appendices provide greater detail about specific tasks, and are listed in alphabetical order.

The road map for the DSET Research Team (after the team's recommendations and target dates were approved by the JWG) is to:

- Establish the enabling IBSA DSET collaboration environment agreement;
- Confirm the project list;
- Identify the IBSA DSET contracting agencies and national activity coordinators;
- Establish activity working groups;
- Ensure additional high-priority activities are HCD and exchanges;
- Create awareness and reinforce the mental model of "independence through IBSA collaboration";
- Consider a virtual secretariat; and
- Establish a workgroup with a legal mandate to manage the proposed processes, activities and initial project(s) (DSET report, 2013:27).

6.5.2 Analysis of the functioning of the IBSA JWG on defence

I begin by outlining two challenges and then proceed to highlight more positive aspects related to the functioning of the JWG on defence. Firstly, the DSET report is of a very technical nature. It represents leading-edge technology, and is an integral part of rational theory thinking and processes. In critical theory terms it is often seen as being technicist, problem-solving, anormative and ahistorical, based on the argument that technology itself can not address the inequities of unbalanced power distribution and relations. Rational technology purportedly offers a type of objective neutrality that does not affect human cognitive and emotive processes. It appears to pit reason again humanity, and represents a struggle between a dominant forces of technology and societal progress, where technological progress seems to fit the agenda of the elite. The issue then is to determine whether the resolution need to be of a binary nature. Feenberg argues that what is at stake

> is not technology or progress per se but the variety of possible technologies and paths of progress among which we must choose. Modern technology is no more neutral than medieval cathedrals or The Great Wall of China; it embodies the values of a particular industrial civilization and especially of its elites, which rest their claims to hegemony on technical mastery. We must articulate and judge these values in a cultural critique of technology. By so doing, we can begin to grasp the outlines of another possible industrial civilization based on other values.
>
> (Feenberg, 1991:3)

This study and its critical IR theory foundations, as well as its human-centric security approach would – as a project – require more creative conceptualisations about the most optimal way to integrate these two apparently irreconcilable approaches, so that the dominance of technological rationality does not prevail at the cost of human development.

The second challenge lies with CDA. In terms of CDA I aver that in a report of this magnitude (written in rational business science language) only a surface level reading is feasible. Yet, in spite of this state of affairs, this type of overviewed analysis did in fact bring forth many affirmations throughout the length of the document that confirm IBSA collective's defence group cohesion and synthesis, discursive practices, transnational transactions, common values and joint ventures. The golden thread that runs through this brief analysis is the actions that contribute towards the construction of IBSA defence cooperation. A particular trait noted above is the traction that appears to exist between state sovereignty and common values – again striving to move beyond the binary but having caveat options that still preserve privileged or national positions. These have a direct bearing on social learning and as a function of time, mutual trust and collective identity becomes ingrained. It is probable that this type of continual interaction would result in hybrid identity-formation.

Along similar lines, it is significant that he JWG on defence is an active group that meets regularly, despite logistic and time-zone constraints. Inter-personal communication, identification and socialisation are noticeably robust and collectively results-driven (McDuling, interview, 2015; Goosen, interview, 2015), with an active

participant describing the IBSA JWG as being "on the up-and-up" (Kutty, interview, 2015). These positive statements indicate that the work of the JWG on defence aligns with diagrammatic tenets on identity-formation and discourse (Chapter 2, Diagram 2.1).

As noted above, the high ranks, large number of participants and gender representation are gratifying, and provide momentum and politico-defence upper level support for its actions. It indicates vertical and horizontal participation that stands the JWG in good stead. The range of functional interests represented on the JWG is impressive. It counts in its number scientists, technologists, logisticians, combat officers and more. These provide much variety and adds to creativity in both input and output of the JWG and contributes significantly to socialisation and dialogue processes.

The DSET Research Team continues to action a massive task within a limited time allocation. Their product (the DSET report) is a laudable document, as it encapsulates the complexity of drawing out commonalities from the defence scientific community in three countries. Furthermore, it provides a pathway towards future tasks and projects and in important ways are also bottom-up social-constructivist initiatives.

The defence scientific community clearly collaborated on their first (of many) actioned tasks, to a degree that is illuminating. In their collaborative endeavour, they demonstrated professional skills, gave business model values to concepts in order to ensure that the principles of collaboration would be acceptable to all as a common platform from which to work. In this way it not only gave credibility to the process, but is also an enduring source of identity with their image of themselves as professional defence, science, engineering and technology specialists. In turn this is a positive control feedback loop that ensures social learning, builds mutual trust in sensitive military/defence collaboration and works towards a collective entity – a technically specialised elite.

With respect to Exercise IBSAMAR it can be noted that it appears to possess social-constructivist elements. It is a historical maritime endeavour that is expanding, and its extension includes civil society that bridges the military component and those whom

they are constitutionally mandated to protect and serve. Exercise IBSAMAR, I would contend, actually represents a maritime security link between the South Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, a cohesive defensive force of the global South. These actions symbolise a more united, formerly repressed, grouping of IBSA, solidarist at its base. The maritime actions are seen and heard, and are independent of developed hegemonies. This was underscored when the JWG decided against extraneous involvement in Exercise IBSAMAR. The evolution of Exercise IBSAMAR is liberating in its own way, in the same way as it is oppositional in a broad manner towards imposed cooperation.

The Economist (2013) reflects that "[i]t is easy to mock the idea of meetings for the sake of meetings. But they can create webs of mutual trust and even friendship that leaders can draw on in a crisis – and conversations over late-night drinks can do more to draw countries together than all the diplomats in the world". This observation captures the spirit of cooperation, identity and dialogue; and perceptively formulates the mainstay of JWGs in general as well as important attributes of social constructivism.

6.6 EVALUATION

This evaluation comprises two sections. Its summary firstly captures the development and flow of the chapter in terms of themes, as it built the contents along the contours of the conceptual road map laid out at the end of Chapter 2, and attempts to enhance the observations through appropriate deductions. The second part of the evaluation deals with the achievements of the chapter in terms of the research questions and associated objectives; whether the dynamics of defence cooperation has been understood to a greater degree, and determines if IBSA defence cooperation does contribute to physical and/or military security.

This chapter has dealt with the geopolitics of IBSA, the countries' regional obligations, their politico-strategic objectives, defence policies and budgets. There are remarkable similarities across the IBSA states, although the magnitude and impacts vary greatly (as a function of their population and each country's wealth) – a definitive

factor for collective identity-formation. These variances and commonalities make for great complexity, and provide continuous challenges. From a defence standpoint, these common denominators are valuable tools with which to identify, prioritise and collaborate on tasks in a professional way. Much of what this chapter has determined to be lacuna are in fact already on the JWG's agenda, and issues are being progressed accordingly. This is noteworthy.

Barring India (it is on a quasi-war footing) the countries of IBSA have defence budget issues. Although there are (relatively) clear pathways to move beyond the contemporary quagmire, it requires monitoring, also by civil society.

The JWG deals with two issues that this chapter highlights. The first is the fact that the three IBSA states have large land and oceanic areas that pose immense challenges for surveillance, governance and of course defence. The JWG has prioritised this common requirement through its scheduled work on MDA surveillance, from which all three IBSA members can derive direct and long-term benefits. This system could be linked to an intelligence-based system that provides early warning of (attempts at) territorial breaches by opposing forces, so that defence forces can be vectored to neutralise imminent risks. With respect to the second issue of PSOs, I would contend that this subject is not being dealt with in a cohesive manner. There are at least three issues that underpin my view. Firstly, a great source of debate is the polemic stance that Brazil displays with respect to non-involvement in UN Chapter VII peace operations. This, together with Brazil's 'RwP' notion and the reasoning behind the concept, ought to be open for fruitful deliberation, within the contention that Brazil's position is probably more aligned with the reformist character of the IBSA collective. Secondly, the fragmented management of this important facet of securing regional peace needs to be addressed. IBSA as a collective can do more than the three individual states. Thirdly, the academic input into a possible IBSA Institute of Defence Technology could pursue this important issue as part of a more systematic process.

The chapter consists of contributions that cover a wide variety of detail, done in sufficient depth that allows for credible information from which to draw deductions about nations' cooperation, organisations and institutions – to the extent that a 'thick'

knowledge is supplied. This has led to an enhanced understanding of IBSA defence cooperation, achieving one of the objectives that has been set. It is a tangible and continuing contribution to IBSA defence cooperation.

Whether this chapter has succeeded in its aim, i.e. to determine if IBSA defence cooperation actually contributes to or enhances military security is an altogether more complex issue to verify. I therefore, for the sake of assessment, divide it into two areas of endeavour.

The first leg is general cooperation. It may be stated that in terms of the individual countries' contribution to PSOs in Africa, the contributions are solid and verifiable. Cooperation by the collective to conjoin efforts in PSOs would make for a potent and effective effort. A critical factor that would need to be resolved though is the 'RwP/R2P' issue (Gardner, 2015). Although there are no joint PSOs at present, this concept is eminently practicable and ought to be on the agenda of the JWG on defence. Unfortunately this leaves one with the final conclusion that – as a collective – IBSA does not presently enhance military security in the field of PSOs. In this particular sphere, the IBSA collective appears unable to develop sufficient agency to act upon discourse/rhetoric; hence it may be viewed as an unfocused approach. General cooperation improves in other facets, like Exercise IBSAMAR, which assists in giving it a 'minimal' level military security enhancement.

In terms of the other leg of the IBSA JWG on defence, the defence, science, engineering and technology, there appears to be solid tasking and programmes in the offing. Specific details of achievements are not known at present, largely due to the nature of the research programmes, long time-lines and the present state of inaction. Suffice then to draw the inference that there appears to be a 'sufficient' degree of enhancement of military security at this point in time.

The two gradations (the assessments for general and defence scientific legs), when combined, were deemed as 'acceptable'. It is probable that renewed vigour will be added to the IBSA JWG on defence effort when the ministerial conclaves and the presidential summit are held in India in 2017.

Next is Chapter 7, the final chapter of the study. In this conclusion I assess what the study set out to achieve, whether the path towards conclusions was marked by a golden thread that consistently linked themes, and capture the theoretical and empirical contributions.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1 GENERAL ORIENTATION

In this final chapter I reflect on whether the study has provided a deeper understanding of the socio-political construction of security in the IBSA collective (as both reformer and critical agent), when viewed through critical social-constructivist and postcolonial theoretical lenses; having utilised three select areas of functional human security cooperation (maritime trade, energy and military cooperation). The expectation was that answering this question would clarify the motivations for the formation of the IBSA collective, the nature of its agency in a global South setting, as well as the nuances of its hybrid identity.

The plan for this chapter lies in three phases.

- The first phase commences with an enhanced synopsis of the main findings of the study, which draws deductions and discussions from syntheses of the chapter evaluations. It is important to note that some findings may appear to be obvious or have little intrinsic value, yet cumulatively they comprise valid building blocks that combined, gave direction and provided logical strength to the flow of the argument in the study.

- The second phase involves an evaluation of the theoretical and empirical contributions of the study. I commence with the goal and objectives, and interweave the process and information gained throughout the study, highlighting the extent to which the gaps in the literature review have been surmounted and the way in which this study contributed theoretically as well as empirically to the debate.

- In the third and last phase I deal with the limitations of the study, both in terms of theory and empirical subject matter. In this section I address areas for

further research, clustered along common themes, showing how attention to these issues might enhance the theoretical and empirical project of the present study.

7.2 MAIN FINDINGS AND SYNOPSIS OF THE STUDY

7.2.1 The study's background

In essence, this section draws on the highlights and follows the logic of the reason for, and the foundation of, this study; as depicted in Chapter 1.

A pivotal event at the end of the twentieth century was the end of the Cold War. The end of this era dissolved an extensive bifurcation, marked by communist and capital ideologies, and it had indirectly affected regional initiatives. The post-Cold War period provided a gap for new ways of conceptualising and enacting involvement in world affairs. This was especially the case for developing countries that could now explore innovative alternatives which would improve human security in the postcolonial condition. South-South cooperation had become a base from which to explore and develop new partnerships, particularly among like-minded allies. A general finding – insufficiently recognised – was that the end of the Cold War was the catalyst for many changes in world dynamics, including issues that surround the IBSA collective.

Set upon the milieu of global South cooperation, the formation and functioning of IBSA and its security collaboration – i.e. the socio-political construction of security – comprise one of two main foci of the study. IBSA's security collaboration is thus firstly placed on the bedrock of evolving debates and practices related to regional security community-building and the enhancement of human security. IBSA is a distinctive trilateral developmental collective developed by the three countries that are leading regional democracies on three continents. A basal finding was that IBSA strives to enhance South-South cooperation and achieve greater equity in relation to the global North. More importantly, and linked to this, a further finding was that achieving this goal as a collective – while simultaneously balancing each country's

national interests – is more convoluted than it would appear. Hence, the complexity of navigating these tempestuous waters point to the second focus of the study – the hybrid nature of the IBSA trilateral construct.

Despite a perceived lull in the activities of the IBSA collective – likely to be BRICS-induced, and exacerbated by difficult domestic conditions in Brazil and South Africa – there remained a need to gain understanding of the dynamics of the IBSA construct. Accordingly, it became apparent that a qualitative study and interpretive approach would best suit this purpose. Qualitative research involves an in-depth understanding of human behaviour, here being cooperative behaviour at national or state level, but particularly at regional level. Qualitative research categorises information into patterns and attempts analyses of macro trends and improvement of standards for managing issues of regional cooperation. This does not infer generalisations or predictions. Instead these were used to highlight assets and vulnerabilities in the IBSA collective's synergistic security practices, which lent itself to understanding issues that could be of value in other contexts or similar transnational arrangements. A further research design issue to note is that this study made use of case studies. Case study research is characterised by a number of principles, such as conceptualisation, contextualisation (including political, historical, sociological and cultural aspects), experiential deliberations and taxonomic classifications. This case study research makes use of abductive analytical strategies, the value of which rested in its practice of inferring, which connected knowledge to the constructivist mindset. In sum it means that deliberative processes or events give rise to the growth of broader concepts. Information was obtained through a variety of resources, all of which added to the trustworthiness of the study overall. Data collection methods included literature and document access, interviews and personal experience and observation. The expectation was that it would lead to reliable, yet subjective, evaluations with respect to the degree of enhancement for particular facets of human security.

The critical social-constructivist ontology and postcolonial epistemology of the study guided this research design as well as informed the motivation of the choice of study. The study was substantiated on three grounds. In the first place it relied on the socio-political construction of security which would give a distinct way of understanding

the collective's edifice. Secondly, the innovative use of a fusion of critical IR theories – combined with global South theoretical perspectives – would inform the study about the hybrid nature and functioning of the IBSA collective. For this purpose I fused insights from four bodies of literature related to (critical) social constructivism, postcolonialism, security communities and human security. Thirdly, three case studies that offer in-depth analyses of three IBSA sectoral working groups would not only show its inner workings, but also potentially corroborate the selection of critical IR theories. 'Maritime trade cooperation' and its link in this study with economic human security involves an understudied linkage between international political economy, globalisation and the oceans; viewed from a global South perspective. The 'energy cooperation' case study was selected because it analyses concerns due to 'energy poverty' in the global South and the global relevance of IBSA's energy cooperation initiatives and use of alternative energy sources. 'Defence cooperation' was chosen because it was named an area of potential cooperation in the first IBSA communiqué. It also drives home the fact that military security remains a key part of a broader human security conceptualisation. Furthermore, the unique skill sets of uniformed military staff accrue benefits in terms of identity-formation and community-building. The three empirical chapters were assessed against the degree to which each facet (of IBSA's engagement of South-South security collaboration) had enhanced its associated human security element.

As explained in Chapter 1, the term 'socio-political construction' captured the social elements of collaboration, interactions, transactions, communication and exchange. These community-building 'tools' underpin South-South cooperation, regionalism and its associated human-centric collaboration, including the pivotal socialisation within the working groups. The 'political' part reminds us that all social interaction is inherently political. It refers to both the formation and functioning of IBSA through the practice of political will and emancipatory lineages stretching back many decades. The two components that make up the term were extensively explored in Chapter 2 (theoretical foundations) and Chapter 3 (Application of the theoretical framework to IBSA as a collective) respectively; dealt with further.

7.2.2 Theoretical foundations and application of the theoretical framework to IBSA as a collective

In this section I deal with the study's theoretical foundations and lay out how the theory was applied to IBSA in its mode of a collaborative security construct.

In Chapter 2 the focus was on two global patterns that firstly work towards regional (and particularly South-South cooperation), and also human security dynamics. These provided the background against which the theoretical framework was chosen, that in turn directed the analysis of the IBSA collective's security collaboration.

With regard to the first trend, I found that recent history has seen expansive increases in regional programmes and new constructs, to the point where most UN states are involved in one or more regional endeavour. There exists an ongoing intertwinement between regionalism and globalisation, and dependent upon one's stance, tend to have positive or negative effects (negative, largely because 'the unseen hand' favours developed states and strong economies). South-South cooperation in its regionalist mode is associated with a people-oriented approach to development, and broadly its aim is to foster dramatic and enduring socio-economic improvement in the countries of the global South; so as to achieve degrees of parity with the developed world. There are fears though that the profusion of global South multilateral bodies will dilute its impact, rather than produce focused and potent outcomes. A finding that I view as valid is that contemporary regionalism offers much in terms of collective collaboration, particularly the movement towards enfranchisement.

In respect of the second trend, I have showed by looking at security communities and human security how security as a contested concept attempts to negate threats to commonly-held values. A brief overview of two security issues follow: The fall and rise of security community concepts as well as the advances in human security thinking after the Cold War. Early work on security communities by Deutsch *et al* in 1957 had focused on transactions, the growing of transnational values, and the spreading of shared understandings that would culminate in mutual trust in the community. For a number of reasons the work had lost its thrust. Yet, when studied

under the aegis of social constructivism after the Cold War, security communities showed all the societal values that take place among and between states and also their civil societies. A number of precipitating conditions and factors contributed to a sense of community within IBSA so that it became a collective in the true sense of the word; where the IBSA Fund symbolises this spirit. The next facet of security involved the development of human security. The Kampala Document of 1991 was a forerunner to the UN human development report of 1994 that formalised human security conceptualisations. Human security embraces notions that are people-focused, universalist and incorporate threats to individual well-being; even though the role of the state is not obviated. The dual nature of this idea has great impact on this study because it provides the understanding of the 'schizophrenic' hybrid nature and composition of the IBSA collective in their role as reformers and agitators for global change. 'Collaborative' security was therefore identified as a common denominator across the contexts as discussed, namely regionalism and human security. It became apparent that human-centric and not state-centric type of security aligned logically with normative values and commitments to social justice.

In relation to the first research question of Chapter 2, this study established that traditional IR 'rational choice-type' theories (realism, Marxism and liberalism and their many variants) have as foundation – and main point of critique – one main contention, namely that their orthodoxy accepts the world as it is. Yet, they have inordinate difficulty in explaining this same world, a finding that necessitated a search at alternative conceptual approaches. Critical theories are 'what ought to be' type constructs. They posit a world that is in being; and they remedy the defects that rational choice theories have. Hence critical IR theories were accepted for aiding understanding of the subject of this study.

Based on the foregoing, the second objective required that I develop an integrated theoretical framework, where a number of conceptual pillars were identified for application in the various areas of IBSA's security collaboration. The analyses identified a number of concepts – based on the integrative work of Adler and Barnett (1998) and identified tenets of postcolonialism – that became the 'pillars' supporting the study's foundation. An overview of the pillars' selection and development

commenced with three constructivist shared foundations, followed by the incorporation of postcolonial and constructivist thinking on human security, as shown in the following paragraphs.

- Social constructivism was motivated as the study's ontological foundation, where reality is not established but constructed, and the emphasis shifted to critical social constructivism. The latter variant normatively adds language (communication and discourse) and the influence of power processes (including historicities) that enhance the theoretical foundations; and align some tenets with that of postcolonialism. In terms of the study's epistemological basis postcolonialism was then introduced as the most apposite way of acquiring knowledge of the world within this study.

- The normative lens of postcolonialism provided further pillars to the conceptual framework, as its approach optimises this study's way to know and understand the postcolonial knowledge-world of our making. The concept of hybridity – as an aid to understanding the complexities and paradoxes of IBSA's relations and identities – incorporates the notions of emancipation/resistance/redistribution and recognition/reform. Thus, postcolonialism strives towards two great goals: To work towards global justice and also to assuage – in so far as this may be possible – vestiges of Euro-American imperial and colonial knowledge systems.

- Human security links with constructivism were established to provide for those in the pillars. Therefore, social construction of concepts and identity provides understanding of security dynamics, social knowledge and learning. The construction represents an expanding wave that moves from individual to community, to society-at-large and to the state in the international context. In this manner it succeeds in de-linking human security from state territories.

The study found that this evolved and integrated system works through a series of mechanisms and processes, as well as agents and structures assisting community formation, reinforced through practice. The yield lies in peaceful change, and relies

on two factors: Mutual trust (that develops as a function of time as states continue to identify with each other, and build upon experiences and interaction) and collective identity (these are multi-faceted, self-reflective, projected onto partner states and engender reciprocal relationships). I found that the systematic utilisation of the pillar-process throughout the study gave rise to an enhanced understanding of the socio-political construction of the IBSA collective's full range of security collaboration endeavours. These pillars were arranged into a diagram at the end of Chapter 2 (Diagram 2.1) and consistently used as an *aide memoire* to progress the study and also to continuously link theory and practice.

Chapter 3 dealt with the theoretical application to the IBSA collective. The objectives of this chapter were to establish and validate the links that exist between the identified theoretical framework and IBSA as a socio-political construct on one hand, and to assess the degree to which the critical IR lenses can lend understanding to the linkages, on the other. As envisaged earlier, I utilised the theoretical framework pillars identified in the diagram at the end of Chapter 2 to examine the nature of IBSA's socio-political formation, evolution and identity convergence.

I confirmed IBSA's pre-social formative factors and then extracted valid linkages that continue to be built upon common histories. It reinforced identity and confirmed a potent source of the collective's formation (from ideation to fruition).

I found that much of the bridge-span is provided through the theme of the hybrid nature of the IBSA construct. Hybridity facilitates the collective's task since it provides it with credibility from a global South perspective. Yet, international engagements are paradoxical because the IBSA collective often displays a reformist and legitimising role rather than a transformatory posture. In theory, the latter can only work optimally if the IBSA collective 'dislodges itself' from the global system – an option that clearly is not feasible. The duality therefore is a 'given' which has to be iteratively (re)negotiated, balanced and evened-out. The non-essentialist nature of the collective at various levels, combined with a vision for a world of greater equity confirm that the IBSA collective is a hybrid and evolving construct that offers more than the sum of the individual states.

I confirmed that a non-linear way to review the IBSA states' histories produced understanding of their postcolonial conditions. It showed that similar histories work towards community-building and the construction of shared identity – when joint issues allow actors to empathise with others that are in the same condition. I confirmed that the quality of leadership also helped the ideational processes, prior to and after liberation. Important parts of these actions were also articulated in democratic processes that produced constitutions that continue to be dynamic living documents.

With respect to the influence of ideas on the formation of IBSA's hybrid identity, I concluded the following: There have been early impacts on the political comradeship and the creation of a potent identity among the leadership, as peoples' representatives that gave foundation to the 'spirit of Bandung'. This continues to be a potent rallying force. IBSA was created in a spirit of ideational continuity to reinforce conceptual positions of the global South. This connection has sustained the concept over time and space, giving rise to the enduring possibility of world reform.

In terms of diplomacy and foreign policy, I confirmed that IBSA prefers multilateral-type diplomacy, as it affords a Southern voice in open public space. Linked, are new types of diplomacy where IBSA continues to participate in this type of innovative form of dialogue; and these actions reinforce the collective's impact. These actions validated the conceptual framework in that the actions work towards mutual trust.

Transactional processes that give life to structures that possess knowledge and power were reviewed in pivotal IBSA political thrusts – political consultations, multilateral cooperation agenda, trilateral sectoral and person-to-person cooperation, as well as the IBSA Fund. In the almost fourteen years of its existence, much had been achieved. Actions were performed over a range of endeavours, and these actions also exhibited impressive levels of specialised knowledge. Rightly, the IBSA Fund was lauded for its modest but important contribution to global South development diplomacy.

I am of the opinion that Chapter 3 delivered on its objectives by aligning the conceptual pillars so as to confirm its application to IBSA as a viable global South construct; and further that its cohesiveness was shown to exist, despite or due to its hybrid identity. Further, I found that the theoretical framework provides unequivocal ways to enhance understanding of the linkages to the IBSA construct. It also set the stage for the first of the three empirical case study chapters.

7.2.3 IBSA maritime trade cooperation

Chapter 4 had two objectives: To review the strengths and weaknesses of the IBSA collective's security collaboration in a critical manner in the area of maritime trade sectoral cooperation, viewed through an integrated theoretical framework; and to gain in-depth knowledge about the sector and its group interactions in order to develop a critical understanding of the implications for collective identity-construction.

Maritime trade comprises an important yet under-studied sub-set of economic security, particularly from a South-South cooperation perspective. It became evident in the chapter that not much information was available, especially from official sources, and its also appeared that the formation of an important maritime trade liaison group – that could have facilitated maritime trade and coordination to a greater extent – was not executed and the instruction from political leaders apparently ignored by the relevant officials. Although, naturally, this reduced the information from which to provide for a properly 'thick' analysis I deemed that sufficient information and work group activity data was available to proceed with an analysis of intra-IBSA trade and its effect on economic human security. A first step involved the introduction of a common understanding of maritime trade. The concept of 'sea blindness' showed that ignorance or assumptive values often reduced the optimisation of maritime trade benefits.

To work towards identity-formation, I showed historical colonial linkages upon which present-day maritime principles were based, thereby confirming the adage that 'maritime histories are economic histories'. European colonial powers had effectively displayed and carried on maritime trade that was underpinned by force. The vacuum

left upon their departure was largely temporary and remains the subject of degrees of neocolonialism, that confirms a principle in postcolonial studies namely that the postcolonial condition does not evaporate upon the departure of the colonists.

Still utilising the conceptual framework diagram, the structures that were given legal status through MoUs were reviewed, from which the JWG had been established and direction provided based on its action plan. It became apparent, as noted earlier, that the JWG was not as functional as it could and normatively, should, be. This affected the ability of the IBSA collective, as agents, to properly energise the working group and its outcomes.

So, although intra-IBSA trade had to a remarkable degree (through mimicry, technical skills transfers, the setting of trade targets, identification of trade routes and cargoes) achieved its set targets, much of the causality for improved trade could not be shown definitively. Although I concluded that security collaboration, namely human security enhancement (and economic security in particular), was minimal at present, maritime trade could be further enhanced. This could be done by activation of structures as directed, through active inclusion of the IBSA collective's regional economic communities, the integration of civil society and business leaders to an even greater extent, the identification and marketing of new markets – especially South-South maritime trade, and the opening-up of more and greater access to global North markets. Again, the hybrid nature of IBSA was illustrated as the collective attempted to balance reformatory and redistributive agenda with their maritime trade national interests.

In Chapter 4 I deduced that maritime trade plays a minimal but potentially valuable role in the socio-political construction of (economic human) security of the IBSA community. The new states have taken ownership of their maritime trade and it had become an area of enterprise that changed from the period of oppression to the point where it is a strength without which the IBSA collective's economies cannot do. Increased trade forecasts and application will have benefits for all three IBSA states, and has beneficent outcomes also for their regions, the global South and emancipatory

economic human security. But a primary task is to overcome the lassitude that characterises the IBSA collective at present.

7.2.4 IBSA energy cooperation

Similar to its predecessor, Chapter 5 had two objectives: Determine, in a critical way, the strengths and weaknesses in the area of IBSA energy cooperation, applying the integrated conceptual framework. A further objective was to throw light upon the group dynamics so that an understanding of the implications for collective identity-construction could develop. These factors would allow for a critical assessment of the degree to which the IBSA collective promotes (environmental) security through energy cooperation.

As noted above, I applied the pillars of the conceptual framework as laid out in Diagram 2.1, and followed the principles of case study research design. I started the chapter through contextualising energy debates. For this I noted the energy legacies of the new states at independence, a condition that established the energy chasm that continues to exist more than sixty years after the first waves of liberation; between the developed world and the states of the global South. It provides an idea of the challenges that energy cooperation and development faces in working its way to a state of parity. Yet, the global South's immense natural potential, scientific innovation and improved financing options provide abundant sources for energy potential. To a degree this potential is under attack from both developed countries and aspiring emerging economies (including India, Brazil, South Africa and China) that see the potential of energy resources in the global South as low hanging fruit. This condition also exposes the hybrid nature of the IBSA states that erodes their emancipatory agenda through the prioritisation of national energy agendas that also manifests in 'energy nationalism' (where state subsidies augment their energy sectors, making competition much more complex and unfair). I then gave an energy overview of the three global South regions (Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa) and pulled out common factors. The latter includes the wide range of energy resources being pursued, an affirmation that the South has the potential – and is in fact slowly acting upon it – to achieve various degrees of energy freedom through renewable and

sustainable energy access.

In terms of the conceptualisation of energy, I focused on the notion of 'energy poverty' that gives the relative and absolute condition of energy 'states' in the global South and the IBSA states within. Relieving energy poverty calls for innovative political leadership, of which the IBSA JWG on energy may be a potent instrument. The notion of 'energy poverty' from the human security viewpoint of the most vulnerable individual means that their quality of life is regularly adversely affected, and it underscores the implications of energy poverty (economic, health, environmental hazards and the gender factor).

I pointed out, however, that the situation is not as black-and-white as it appears at first glance. The energy state of affairs is marked by various degrees of complexity, ambivalence and 'grey' areas of fluidity – in sum those aspects that denote a hybrid condition. I ascertained that the global North is responsible for most pollution in the world (although India and China are making inroads as their economies shunt forward), which also provides the developing world with a negotiation tool in international climate debates. I then turned to the shaping of identities in this regard, and highlighted three issues. The first is the formation and functioning of the BASIC group in 2009 and since, pointing out their successes. I found that it reinforced IBSA solidarity, and confirmed global South leadership in select spheres. The second is the energy projects that are done via the IBSA Fund, for which IBSA has received a number of accolades. The third issue I point to is a quite indirect – but invaluable – form of identity-formation, that refers to the continuous inputs from IBSA states and their security collaboration on progression towards both the MDGs and the SDGs. Both these sets of goals had and have (respectively) levels of energy targets to achieve. These three stages confirm that both in public debate and behind the scenes, IBSA has a shared (energy) identity.

I briefly discussed the energy domains for each IBSA state, followed by deductions based on IBSA's energy trends. I noted the highly varied energy states and models. Although India and South Africa show a reliance on coal at present, there are alternate and viable renewable energy models. Further I determined that the IBSA states too

have rapidly rising energy requirements, not only within their borders but often as energy sources for their regions, which of course increases pressure on leadership and capacities (a further source of hybridity).

Next, the attention shifted to the IBSA JWG on energy. This linked up with the elements of the conceptual framework diagram, in particular origins, structures, knowledge and power. The IBSA mandates were a number of political directives and the legal bases of MoUs (on biofuels, wind and solar energy), that coordinate and exploit the potential of the diverse areas of excellence in science and technology. The seven meetings held by the JWG on energy reflect the value of working together in terms of social learning and mutual trust. Unfortunately, the last one was in 2013 in India; which date roughly coincides with the perceived enervation of facets of the IBSA construct. Two technical workshops have been held, and this section drew attention to the minutes of the one held in South Africa at the end of 2010 in particular. When CDA is applied to the latter case, an array of phrases and words indicate unambiguous alignment between the communication of ideas, identity, normative values and working 'for the greater good' by achieving IBSA energy human security goals. I highlighted the progress of the JWG and found that it has been steady but difficult, as social learning also involved many technically intense issues, with an associated delay induced by a necessary learning curve. I also identified the introduction of a number of renewable energy projects under the auspices of the IBSA Fund, and the positive difference that it makes to the most vulnerable.

7.2.5 IBSA defence cooperation

The objectives of Chapter 5 were to critically analyse the strengths and weaknesses of IBSA's defence cooperation by applying the integrated conceptual framework; and to show the inner workings and group dynamics of defence cooperation and their implications for collective identity-construction. Together, these would permit a critical assessment of the degree to which the IBSA collective promotes military/physical security through defence cooperation.

Here again, I applied the pillars of the conceptual framework as laid out in Diagram 2.1, and complied with the principles of case study research design. The section on contextualisation set the scene by dealing with the defence histories of the IBSA states. It highlighted postcolonial tenets (hybridity, mimicry) that exist, but equally important are the issues that contribute to identity-formation. These include commonalities related to shared histories that go back centuries (large periodic tracts through colonial powers), of wars being fought outside their borders as well as for their own liberation. Then, I showed how their structures are similar, being military forces under civil control. All this may not seem much to outsiders, but for those within such systems it provides potent symbols of credibility (especially as peacekeepers). The wars that have been fought I consider to be mimetic to a degree, by which the states tend to emulate their colonial parentage. I reviewed the geopolitics of the IBSA states, the countries' regional obligations, their politico-strategic objectives, defence policies and budgets. I found that the IBSA states show an array of resemblances, the width and depth of which may differ greatly. Yet I submit that the cohesive factors are of such significance that they contribute towards collective identity-formation. These common denominators are assets to identify, prioritise and collaborate on tasks in a professional way.

The conceptualisation commenced with the IBSA countries' peace support practices. Viewed as (separately) shared practices I suggest that it could, and at normative level, should, lead to social learning – the beginning of a mutual trust-hybrid identity cycle in an area (PSOs) that are fraught with risk (but which, interestingly, provide further sources of collective identity). The section then shifted to a review of the individual IBSA states PSO contributions in Africa (as most PSOs take place on the continent), while I noted that all three countries provide funding to the levels of their abilities to the UN. The section found that all three countries take part in PSOs, but that Brazil's involvement in Africa is largely symbolic and a part of doing PSOs 'the Brazilian Way'. Yet the major finding from this section is that the countries participate as individual nations, not as a putative 'IBSA Peace Support Force (PSF)'. It involves much debate and conjecture to determine if a so-called IBSA PSF would be more successful as a combined force than in their capacity as individual countries. I found, however, that Exercise IBSAMAR had set a precedent of sorts in that it is in actual

fact a combined force that could for example perform maritime PSOs for the UN as part of a larger force in IBSA's area of influence (the South Atlantic/Indian Oceans).

The next section dealt with important conceptual pillars, namely the structures and practices (power – that includes political will and direction – knowledge, MoUs and the JWG) that underpin defence cooperation. Created in 2004, the IBSA JWG on defence has had six meetings in all three countries. The minutes reflect impressive figures in terms of levels of attendance, types of items on the agenda, gender representation and leadership. I highlighted the values and principles of security community through a valid extract from the 2011 JWG meeting, that – in terms of CDA – provides a fascinating insight into the levels of cohesive knowledge portrayed, the understanding that exists for the importance of IBSA cooperation at a number of levels: From technical, to tactical to politico-strategic level. I discussed the minutes in line with thematic principles. I then reviewed Exercise IBSAMAR in some detail, from its formation (a classic bottom-up initiative) to its implementation and successful biennial frequencies since 2008, with the latest version having taken place off of Goa, India, in February 2016. Since its inception, the exercise has continued expanding, and now includes the three countries' navies, air forces, medical and special-forces staff, and involves issues such as disaster control ashore. I then reviewed the Defence Science, Engineering and Technology (DSET) cooperation. The defence scientific communities of the three countries had produced an extensive report after visiting the three countries defence forces and industries in 2013. The summary of the 113-page report revealed its very technological orientation, in ways that are anathema to critical theory. But at the same time it also revealed a further facet to the hybridity of the IBSA collective's composition. In terms of an assessment whether the IBSA collective enhanced personal/military security through defence cooperation, the response had two legs, that managed to obtain a combined score of 'acceptable'.

In conclusion with respect to the three empirical chapters, I submit that the research objectives for these empirical chapters were reached. Strengths and weaknesses with regard to each of the three sectoral cooperation areas were weighed up by presenting detailed knowledge of the inner workings against the backdrop of the integrated

theoretical framework. This exposed key motifs such as hybridity and drove home the finding that the cumulative effect of information and processes in the three empirical chapters provides an interesting and encompassing understanding of the socio-political construction of the IBSA collective's security collaboration, with varying degrees of enhancement of associated aspects of human security.

This brings the enhanced synopsis of this study to a close. In terms of the plan for this chapter, an evaluation of the contributions of the study follows.

7.3 EVALUATION OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY

7.3.1 Research questions and objectives

As stated already in section 7.1 the key research question driving this study was: *How can the socio-political construction of security in the IBSA collective (as both reformer and critical agent) be understood when viewed through critical social-constructivist and postcolonial theoretical lenses; utilising three select areas of functional human security cooperation (maritime trade, energy and defence cooperation)?*

This section reviews the theoretical and empirical contributions of the study by considering this overarching question as well as the specific questions posed in relation to the respective chapters. The section there also assesses whether, or to what extent, the related objectives were met. Thereafter the section aims to determine whether the knowledge and understanding gained in the study had bridged the gap identified in the literature review of Chapter 1.

7.3.2 Theoretical contributions

The first set of theoretical contributions centred around firstly, reasons why traditional (or rational choice, orthodox or problem-solving) IR theories were not deemed to be appropriate for this study; and secondly – its counterpoint – whether the two

integrated critical IR theories employed in this study provided greater understanding of the IBSA construct given a South-South cooperation milieu. Lastly, I consider whether the study contributed theoretically – through this study's integrated critical IR theories – to the understanding of hybridity inherent in IBSA collective's efforts.

Firstly, traditional IR theories take the world as it is, replete with its social structures, power relations and the institutions that were established, as the inherent framework for activity. The overall aim of traditional theories hark back to their 'problem-solving' moniker, and it is to ensure that the three components (and their myriad sub-systems) as listed, operate harmoniously. In a manner of viewing therefore, the system is a given and it is made to work in the manner in which it was inherited. In sum, orthodox theories are reduced to being office-bearers in the maintenance of the (existing) social and political order. Yet, this order was shown in the context to have undergone dramatic and irreversible changes in recent years to the extent that the state of affairs does not allow for a 'business as usual' approach, nor can 'problem-solving' IR theories actually perform such duties: Propitious IR theories were called for.

Secondly, critical IR theories, on the other hand have a different approach. The milieu for theory selection was influenced by a rise in post-Cold War regionalism that in turn engendered and provided an environment for South-South cooperation and the development of transnational communities and structures such as the IBSA collective. The second trend that influenced the milieu for theory selection was the evolving change in security thinking that provided an expansive development for the concept and practice of human security that came to stand in for state-centric security. Human-centric security demanded a different theoretical approach, one that rational choice IR theories are unable to supply, while a social constructivist approach provided much alignment in terms of explicating security community understanding. Thus, the changing context of our contested security (social and political) world emphasised that this study subscribes to human-centric security and security community identities, optimally associated with critical IR theories. Critical IR theories tend to view the world as one in progress, in the process of changing, one that can be made or constructed. They work towards a world shaped to be more holistic, inclusive and one that tends towards a utopian end-state of sorts. In many ways,

critical IR theories see to relations previously not recognised, listen to voices from the margins, strive for a more equitable world. The study's integrated critical IR theories (the combination of critical social constructivism and postcolonial IR) allowed views through lenses that showed extant world iniquities (injustices, inequalities, historical continuities, the 'poverty curtain', 'energy poverty' as well as aspects of oppressed and hybrid identities). But they also offer visionary and ideational processes that lead to greater inclusivity (the potency of identity, social learning, communication, the value of discourse, identity-formation) where the expectations of peaceful and enduring change are a world of our own making. I submit that the study made a theoretical contribution in this sense because it allowed for the possibilities of transformed worlds to be realised.

A third factor that contributed theoretically is the analysis of the paradoxical nature of the IBSA composition. In this context, these conceptualisations apply to the global South, the dynamics of South-South cooperation and the IBSA construct. The preceding paragraph also highlighted a pivotal postcolonial tenet, namely hybridity. The IBSA collective is composed of hybrid elements, where the collective plays dual roles, both as reformers within the world system, yet also as resisters and emancipators. This 'schizophrenic' condition is explicated when it is understood that state identities are neither fixed nor essentialist. It is based on the fact that IBSA's foundations and interests lie in two worlds, one of reformation, the other of critical or radical agency, yet the collective seeks a third way. It represents a classic hybrid situation where the two worlds clash often and appear incongruous; yet it is a conceptual bridge that needs building, and one that required a theoretical set that would lend understanding to this uniqueness.

Flowing from the theoretical development and fully integrated into the study was the logical development of the conceptual framework (at the end of Chapter 2, and used in every other chapter except this one). In order to encapsulate the ideas that gave effect to the integration of human security and security community into the two theoretical approaches, a diagram was produced. As noted in Chapter 2, in essence it comprises a graphic representation of the work on community identity (structures and processes) by Adler and Barnett (1998). Yet the diagram contributed other elements

that indicated the ramified roles of IBSA and the hybrid nature of its functioning. Thus, portions of the schematic representation align with the reasons for choosing the study (Chapter 1, section 1.2). Specifically I note the insertion of alternative and critical lenses (MoUs, Working groups, IBSA Fund, reform, recognition, redistribution, resistance, emancipation), and their illustrative reciprocal links to 'hybrid identities formation'. This focus on unequal power relations captured the complexity brought by the hybridity of the postcolonial condition. Critical constructivism and postcolonial IR may therefore serve to provide a more holistic analysis, laid out as part of the theoretical schema. I submit that this idea and its application was a contribution that added to the debate and facilitated understanding of a complex study, and I confirm that Diagram 2.1 has in fact been validated as trustworthy.

7.3.3 Contribution of Chapter 3: Application of the theoretical framework to IBSA as a collective

The contribution with respect to Chapter 3 – like this insertion and the chapter itself – straddles theory and empirical approaches. It calls for linkages in respect of historical, normative, endogenous and exogenous factors common to the IBSA states. It further requires an understanding of the linkages viewed through critical social constructivist and postcolonial lenses.

Starting with histories, three assertions shaped the non-linear alignment of the IBSA countries' histories: Firstly, social structures form human behaviour individually and societally (all three IBSA states have intense histories in terms of ancient and developed societies that were precursors to their colonialisation). Their collective history is one of political kinship, based upon its historically derived and developed values and visionary aims – that precede even the 1955 Bandung Conference. Secondly, ideational structures and actors are equally important (different types of oppression occurred in the IBSA states over prolonged periods. In moving through the experiences of oppression, the oppressed sought not only independence, but were convinced that normative and ideational conduct would transcend national politics and progress towards a more equitable, consummate state of world affairs). Lastly,

role players continue to improve structures (largely, these may be perceived as structures created by constitutional processes). But constitutions cannot be equated with democracy, nor ideas with implementation. National unity needs formation and 'maintenance', political positions set off the democratic processes and rules are consciously adopted; and both electorate and leadership conform to democratic norms and practices in a global world.

The positions above are essential moral and ethical groundings of democracy, human rights, human security and rule of law. These elements constitute driving forces that inform the IBSA agenda, posited as a higher principled ground. Although each of these three states has its own national interests first and foremost (e.g. socio-economic upliftment, health, personal and community security), this is simultaneously contrasted and complemented by the normative leadership of IBSA (i.e. to address imbalances in the global configuration of power). There are two related but often conflicting forces at work in IBSA's dynamics: Centripetal or endogenous forces are internal to the three countries; the centrifugal or exogenous forces relate to IBSA's regional and international outward-bound normative thrust on behalf of the global South; the three countries identify with one another's goals for a better world. As an ideational force founded on shared normative values, it aligns with tenets of critical IR studies that note its formative role in identity-shaping.

The tenets and attributes of (critical) social constructivism and postcolonialism have lent themselves to clear and deeper understanding of the rise and development of the IBSA collective. As shown in the above, constructivism shows linkages with respect ideational forces and identity-formation and bottom-up process. Critical social constructivism places greater emphasis on the roles and function of identities. It stresses – very importantly for this study – the non-essentialist character of statehood (as it lends understanding to the apparently paradoxical state behaviours in the IBSA collective), and the critical variant tends to adopt a more 'radical' approach to emancipatory projects. The notion of hybridity is linked to and fused with the latter. I submit that these linkages are profound and that the formation and practice of the IBSA collective is elegantly applied through the tenets of the selected, integrated critical IR theories.

7.3.4 Theoretical contribution in perspective

This study has laid out the two theories used in this study in Chapter 2, and via the conceptual framework had linked it through the foundation and anticipated thrust of its objectives, in Chapter 3. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 (that dealt with IBSA maritime trade, energy and defence cooperation) these theories were used as foundation throughout, once again applying the developed conceptual framework. In fact, they provide the golden thread that weaves through the study. In this section, I seek to determine – briefly and with the aid of hindsight – what apparent or intangible issues present themselves when I combined critical social constructivism and postcolonialism. In other words, what did not work through the employment of this integrated theoretical construct?

In response it may be confirmed that no theory or combination of theories can claim universality. Incorporating Cox's (1981) injunction that 'theory is always for someone and some purpose', I note that the two integrated theories assisted in the achievement of each chapter individually; and contributed to the understanding of the study. The only matter that I would rectify, were this possible, was to – from the outset – use critical social constructivism as a theory or a critical IR approach in its own right. Instead, in this study, critical social constructivism had had to be extracted and developed from having social constructivism as its base. I suggest therefore, that critical social constructivism has the potential as a separate critical IR approach. It possesses sufficient perspicacity, credibility and has ontological and epistemological trustworthiness.

To return to the crux of this section, I suggest that a contribution to the academe is that the eclectic combination of critical social constructivism and postcolonialism provides an insightful and relatively novel approach to the socio-political construction of security collaboration within global South regional constructs, such as IBSA. The reasons for this become clear once the attributes of critical social constructivism together with postcolonialsm (both critical IR theories) are studied in-depth and understood in the 'radical' context. Thus, this study confirms the analysis that both

these amalgamated theories aggrandise the study of socio-political construction of regional security collaboration efforts. This allows for the ambit and depth of understanding of the issues at stake to be enhanced.

7.3.5 Empirical contributions

This section seeks to determine the manner in which the information provided and analysed in the empirical chapters changed the theoretical framework. In other words, applied theory viewed through the case study lenses ought to look different through application of abductive reasoning. This style of reasoning involves deliberative processes that give rise to the growth of broader concepts to ensure that the case study material provides a focal point for evaluation of the overall study.

To resolve this intricate issue, the plan for this section is as follows. I will firstly address the generic and then the specific empirical contributions of each chapter. Thereafter I briefly determine the contexts for all three case studies, followed by the conceptualisations for all three. I then review the collection of information sets, and tracked through a review of the analytical strategies. The measuring standard for empirical contributions would consist of qualitative 'full' information sets augmented by fecund analyses.

Case study methodology involves extensive use of research principles that include conceptualisation, contextualisation and triangulation. It involves the use of a variety of sources that 'thicken' the research through providing more quality information and hence leading to enhanced levels of trustworthiness in the development of deductions, evaluations and conclusions. Although a decided advantage of case studies is that it aids contextualisation, the inference from the particular or small sample can not be made to the general. In other words, the analyses of three functional case studies (out of sixteen IBSA sectoral working groups) does not mean that all sixteen can be understood in the same way. In finalising this part on research design, I chose a triangular method of information-gathering. The first comprises literature, documents and electronic foraging, the second was individual interviews that I conducted in India, Brazil and South Africa, with government officials (including ambassadors),

research institute staff – those whom I deemed possessed specialist knowledge about IBSA and its workings. In the final instance, I drew on my personal experience and professional three-decade career as a naval officer and a two-year spell at the South African Institute of International Affairs.

In terms of generic empirical contributions across the three case study chapters, I submit the following: Sustained references were made in the empirical chapters to the theory to reinforce and confirm the linkages, much aided by the diagram referred to before. In this way, the study overall contributed to a thorough and enduring understanding of aspects of IBSA cooperation. I provided in-depth information to the limits of what I could achieve in terms of academic research, electronic searches, interviews and utilising personal and professional contacts to obtain access to information that is not ordinarily in the public/academic domain (although much of the data was available in the public domain – but it had been unsynthesised). This provided information not hitherto seen within the functioning of the IBSA collective's JWGs. Thus through analyses of a selection of sectoral cooperation, the study translated informed opinion in order to reach understanding through reasoning and information. I find that the study had determined and critically assessed the socio-political processes of IBSA JWG interaction. The conclusion is that groups' interaction had added – and may continue to add – enduring and cumulative value for the IBSA collective's security collaboration This is particularly valid when all the IBSA JWGs and other work being done by IBSA is factored in.

Turning now to the empirical contributions per chapter, I begin with Chapter 4. First of all, the use of the conceptual framework aided the logical unfolding of theory and linked to empirical information in this chapter, intertwined with the consistent application of the research design. This chapter contributed much in terms of an understudied academic area – the value of the maritime component to trade, here specifically intra-IBSA trade. I collated and established maritime historical linkages and identity-formation. I provided and analysed as much data that I found to be available with respect to the formation, legal mandates (MoUs) and functioning of the maritime trade work groups, and provided IBSA trade targets that had been set. I noted that the present deceleration in IBSA activities was observable through poor

progression of issues and targets. I noted that this chapter lacked a comprehensive portrayal of maritime trade. This I would ascribe to two reasons: The non-establishment of the IBSA 'Maritime Liaison Committee', i.e. the apparent non-compliance with a political directive at officials' level, proved to be a setback; both in terms of information-gathering and in terms of optimising the functioning of the JWG on maritime trade. Secondly, the fact that I placed too much emphasis on the 'maritime' component of 'maritime trade', meant that 'trade' was somewhat neglected. In view of the rise of many states and regions that now engage the 'Blue Economy' more pro-actively, with hindsight this chapter would have benefited more by incorporating and amalgamating the workings of two IBSA JWGs – Transport as well as Trade and Investment. Greater regional attention to the 'Blue Economy' would also serve to off-set the effects of 'sea blindness'. Yet, in the evaluation of the chapter I submitted that maritime trade had in fact contributed to economic human security, but to a minimalist degree. I asked a straightforward question: Would the maritime trade targets have been achieved had IBSA not been in the mix? Due to an inability to apportion causality for increased intra-IBSA trade, the answer I submit is a qualified 'no', which means that economic security was enhanced.

The case study on energy (Chapter 5) was comprehensive in its range, as it filled the conceptual framework pillars with rich information. In its provision of a wide range of information it covered historical energy legacies, the state of energy neocolonialism, 'energy poverty' and the energy gap that exists.. Three high-value issues that contribute to identity-shaping were noteworthy. The JWG on energy's meetings were analysed (insofar as they could be made available) and applicable and valid CDA analyses (particularly from the December 2010 technical workshop in Durban, South Africa) could be formed that confirmed high levels of identity, as well as shared learning and social integration. The projects that IBSA continues to be involved in via the IBSA Fund were briefly covered. The subject area and its functioning were well-covered, so that 'thick' information together with the consistent application of the theoretical framework worked effectively towards this empirical chapter enhancing understanding of the IBSA collective. When the foregoing is reviewed, it becomes clear that a contribution was made with respect to IBSA energy knowledge and functioning; as well as the application of the theoretical tenets on the

chapter; which also explains why I gave a 'satisfactory' grade to the IBSA collective in terms of its enhancement of energy human security.

The final empirical study elaborated upon the implications for military security as an outflow of IBSA defence cooperation. Chapter 6 too provided a range of information, the pillars of which were supplied by the conceptual framework of Chapter 2, and followed the research design contours. It identified common issues, extrapolated identity-shaping issues (long histories, much served through colonial structures, similar organisational structures and symbology, and the potency of 'working for democracy'). The IBSA geopolitical situations were analysed (see the caveat with respect to the term 'geopolitics', above), and White Papers studied (those of Brazil and South Africa). Although there were the expected variances based in populations, economies and other factors; remarkable similarities were observed to exist. These are deemed to be factors that contribute to cohesion. All three are involved in PSOs as individual countries. The question was asked whether a combined 'IBSA PSF' would be more effective and also contribute to greater cohesion and *esprit d'corps*. I submit that this contributes to the level of debate by problematising the issue. The issue of RwP versus R2P was noted as source for discourse, while it was also noted that Exercise IBSAMAR had the composition and experience of a combined IBSA (maritime) force and the potential of this. The inner workings of the JWG on defence were noted via minutes of four of the six meetings that had taken place by 2014. An important informational asset was the extensive report that the IBSA defence scientific community had produced in 2013, which added considerably to the range and depth of information available. The drawback was that it was written in the language and style of technology, being representative of rational choice theory and research, and therefore incommensurate with this study's theoretical orientation. Yet it provided an (extreme) example of IBSA hybridity. The origin and workings of Exercise IBSAMAR were detailed, which extended the breadth and scope of the information that had been made available in this chapter. CDA proved to be difficult on one hand (the defence scientific report does not lend itself to CDA), but informative on the other, as an extract from one set of minutes proved. In sum, the chapter on defence cooperation and its implications for military security was well-covered, in range and in depth, so that the knowledge value was significantly

increased. This chapter allocated to the IBSA collective a human security enhancement score of 'limited' for defence cooperation at present. Future prospects may improve as and when some of the long-term projects are realised.

7.3.6 Literature review: To what extent was the knowledge gap overcome?

The literature review (section 1.2) noted that much scholarly writing has seen the light of day in the relatively short period of IBSA's existence. In order to facilitate assimilation of the wide range of issues, the works were clustered into themes. Generally and holistically, the literature review found that a great proportion of the data is available, but scattered throughout information domains. Yet it became apparent that no body of literature captured IBSA, its foundation, dynamics, theoretical underpinnings, ancillary issues (regionalism, security community, human security elements, sectoral cooperation, outputs and the construct's future) in a unitary manner. More specifically and germane to this section, there are no studies that view IBSA security collaboration through constructivist lenses, none move beyond traditional IR lenses, no studies on IBSA provide rich data on inner workings, nor are the conceptual wealth that postcolonialism offers exploited in any studies. The bodies of literature are founded upon mainstream orthodox contributions that are limited. Their traditional conceptual approaches refuse to recognise and qualify valid social and political relationships or things, which was why an alternative – an approach that disputes the 'traditionally sensible' – was required. This study has provided new evidence that embodies an innovative approach. This process utilises integrated IR theoretical approaches, links these to the formation and functioning of the IBSA collective, and provides new information sets that detail the workings of a selection of IBSA's sectoral cooperation, and then abductively loops back to determine how theory was affected. This combined endeavour has provided a novel and advantageous methodology to effectively overcome the literature gap that has been noted.

7.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

A number of issues are deemed to require additional research. These have been assembled along broad themes. Broadly, the themes seek to address security collaboration, socio-political construction, global South cooperation and IBSA regionalism and uncover other issues pertinent to the section. I endeavour to establish themes' linkages to the study's research question and determine the manner in which these identified areas might amplify the research question. This first section is followed by a review of the limitations of the study, and ends with a few concluding remarks.

7.4.1 Maritime and geopolitical research

Research is required to optimally increase merchant fleet national registers, tied in with the need to penetrate developed maritime markets. The IBSA countries have a requirement to increase the number of merchant ships on their national register, and move away from the flags-of-convenience system (section 4.6.2). There are manifold advantages, including increased maritime economic activity, increased national taxation, improved labour conditions, as well as enhanced application of national and public international law. In concert, there is a requirement for the developing world to ensure viable strategies to penetrate the maritime market of the developed world, which appears locked into place. Innovative skills application need to be instituted to achieve this form of economic equity. An expanded JWG can deal with this issue as a matter of trilateral importance, so that conjoined strategies can be developed to achieve said advantages. However, the methodology would be intricate and would require the co-option of stakeholders from government, civil society and the public sector. Once again, this would be a governance strategy that employs the principle of IBSA being more than the sum of its parts.

There is a need to review and enhance islands stewardship. All three IBSA states have islands, which are increasingly important economic bases, and that also extend the countries' EEZs and continental shelves. The commonality in amongst the challenges

faced ought to be an area of intensive study, from which all three states can derive collective and individual benefit.

Maritime security is another issue of commonality that needs to be on the research agenda for further cooperation, coordination and possibly execution via an operative platform such as Exercise IBSAMAR. Such research can make a contribution to IONS and the IORA, especially if it should be enacted.

7.4.2 IBSA sectoral cooperation and leadership

I suggest that exploratory research about how to expand bilateral issues to trilateral actions within the IBSA collective is overdue. Although this study has noted a few areas, the presumption is that there are a high number of issues that are subjects for debate at diplomatic levels, but these exist at bilateral level only. There is a requirement to identify issues that could be elevated to trilateral level. Space, goal and research objective constraints meant that this was not within this study's ambit. A survey would be required to note shortcomings and propose the inclusion of issues worthy of trilateral IBSA pursuit. This would increase the scope of functional areas for exploration, and also deepen knowledge bases.

Research is needed to overhaul the participation by civil society in IBSA. Throughout the three case studies, it became clear that civil society is inadequately represented on JWGs and other fora. Civil society makes meaningful and sustainable contributions across a range of principles and positions within the purview of security collaboration and the socio-political construction of security. Civil society participation is also a normative and democratic requirement, and it represents a critical infusion that ought to be ameliorated. This would require dialogue and research. By casting a template of both critical social constructivism and postcolonialism over the mechanisms of the JWGs one can determine the optimal ways to ensure a people-centred approach. By ensuring participation by all stakeholders in a new JWG design process, one can ascribe criteria that involve identity, the socialisation process, but foremost determine the manner of including civil society.

The optimisation of the JWGs is proposed as a further area for research. The study noted that some aspects of JWG workings were sub-optimal, and could be made more cohesive and productive. Generally, a lack of common oversight principles and associated time scales are prevalent; there are varying rates of progress. Improvement in the functioning of sectoral cooperation would be in the interest of the IBSA collective's security collaboration. I propose that this aspect be elevated to a point of discourse for the three countries, at senior officials' level. Its outcome may well produce significant results towards the achievement of conjoined IBSA objectives.

State-firm and firm-firm diplomatic initiatives are diplomatic stratagems, outlined in section 3.5.2. I suggest that these be included for research, as there could be significant advantages for IBSA, in that they may be the foundation for tri-partnership models that the case studies of this thesis explored in the chapters on maritime trade, energy and defence cooperation. Respective IBSA states may need to involve a coordinating government department, such as Trade and Industry, or Energy (if or when innovative issues such as 'energy auctions' – as operated by both Brazil and South Africa – are included).

7.4.3 Defence cooperation

As noted in Chapter 6, Brazil has an innovative approach that negates territorial infringements and maintains state sovereignty during PSOs. Brazil calls this approach RwP. It is an approach that its IBSA partners could conduct research on, for both India and South Africa subscribe to the UN's Chapter VII 'use-of-force' principle, for which Brazil's approach might offer a viable alternative. This approach, particularly with respect to peace enforcement, could share a closer affinity with the unofficial (articulated largely in academic works) African and developing world position.

Noted in the evaluation of Chapter 6, it had become evident that, although the IBSA states have much experience of PSOs, there appears to be no coordinating mechanism that could maximise their efforts. This ought to be an area for further research, and most likely an additional task for the JWG on defence, underpinned by an appropriate MoU (that may require UN involvement or coordination).

7.4.4 Energy cooperation

The Antarctic continent is increasingly becoming an area of dispute in many areas, but ultimately the issue of its potential resources has primacy, hence it is labeled under energy cooperation. Much research at different levels (e.g. geostrategic, geopolitical, scientific, hydrographic and oceanographic) needs to be conducted in order to avoid a resources-led 'Scramble for Antarctica' in this century. India, Brazil and South Africa are members of the (somewhat beleaguered) Antarctic Treaty organisation and can take the lead, with its IBSA credentials as reference. Further, South Africa is in a geostrategically central position as it shares three of the Antarctic's oceans, from where to put any theoretical outputs into practice. The benefits that could accrue due to this fact may indeed benefit humankind.

Research into 'energy poverty' alleviation presents a potent area for the IBSA collective's emancipatory agenda. This study has reflected on the valuable work done in Guinea-Bissau with respect to renewable solar systems for villages. If one views this effort as a pilot project, I suggest that further research be done so as to determine other worthy projects for such implementation; where they need not only be in Africa.

I submit that exploration of these proposed areas for additional research can extend the range and plumb new scholarly depths, and in addition can explore and exploit the hybrid character of the IBSA collective and extend benefits to other areas of human security collaboration.

7.4.5 Limitations of the study

The initial observations concerning limitations with respect to data collection were noted in Chapter 1, section 1.5.3. Here, a brief reference is made to a case study limitation followed by theoretical limitations, focusing on the conceptual framework.

With respect to the case studies: Of the almost a dozen-and-a-half JWGs (among other tasks at different levels) that have been activated by IBSA, only three were

analysed in some detail in this study. Clearly this limited the study, yet also gives a broadened vista of the scope of activity that IBSA is involved in, together with further research possibilities.

At theoretical level I endeavour to (briefly) identify and problematise any such lacunas. I note two issues: Firstly, critical social constructivism *per se* did not appear to be approached in IR textbooks and academic writings as a discrete subject. It tended to become available and understood only as an extracted adjunct of social constructivism; which made the accessibility of critical social constructivism – in its capacity as a particularly valid 'bridging' approach more difficult than it ought to be.

Secondly, the perceived intersection between critical social constructivism and postcolonialism – as part of critical IR theories – could be made more tangible or substantial. This would occur when an effort is made to elevate and treat their combination as a valid, separate, approach to the academic genre. Hence I suggest that critical social constructivism combined with postcolonialism could be excised and studied together. Such a conjoined effort would be an interlocutor. Instead of being quasi-binary positions it would enhance the importance of theory for the generation of practical knowledge.

7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

To a degree this chapter set out to dis-assemble the research question. Once unpacked, it made for an improved analysis. To rebuild, in sum, I venture that the study did in fact contribute to a deeper understanding of issues, much of it through the provision of knowledge, deductions and conclusions. This range of issues includes socio-political construction, trilateral South-South cooperation, and the global South. Also included in understandings are the internal and foreign policy drivers for India, Brazil and South Africa. Accented was the fact that present economic issues, together with the BRICS diversion, enervate the potency that IBSA offers, and tend to divert attention to domestic issues.

Clearly some JWGs are more successful than others, by the very nature of leadership and social and professional interaction. Nevertheless I posit that tangible changes for the better are being achieved across a landscape of human security enterprises in the three IBSA countries and beyond; that these enhancements benefit more people daily. Due to their communal identities and historically-founded solidarity, India, Brazil and South Africa take an active role in their regional dynamics so as to shape it towards a renaissance of the global South.

Until recently the collective has displayed vigorous regional, continental and even international influence, attaining levels of leverage and impact beyond what they as individual countries could have achieved. The collective displays a wide ambit in the exercise of their stature, work well together as partners who also do not hesitate to disagree – a potent indicator of friendship – and they focus on the redistribution of colonial heritages, having a greater say in international affairs; and their agenda is one of world reform; all of which describes the intricacy of their hybrid identity.

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APPENDIX A: TYPICAL INTERVIEW FRAMEWORK

FRANK CHARLES VAN ROOYEN
UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE: THESIS TITLE:
THE INDIA-BRAZIL-SOUTH AFRICA (IBSA) COLLECTIVE AND THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY

What were the factors that led to the formation of IBSA?

What is the management plan for IBSA?

Is IBSA's progress proceeding according to plan – if not, why not?

To what extent would each of the three IBSA states' parochial interests detract from the collective effort?

What is the ideal end state for IBSA?

Should IBSA grow and / or be absorbed by another (South-South) regional construct, e.g. BRICS formation?

How can the three respective regions benefit from IBSA?

What are the critical success factors for IBSA?

Which factors may lead to IBSA's demise?

To what extent can IBSA advance human rights as an extract of political security, not only nationally, but within respective regions and internally also?

How would the 3 states focus its organisational abilities and government resources – given their respective ideological platforms – to sustain and develop political security?

In order to achieve many of these objectives, and noting that states remain the "dominant units" (Buzan, 1991:19) in international intercourse, to what level is the stability of the state a requirement for development?

In terms of economic security co-operation, what projects may be pursued trilaterally in terms of maritime trade, maritime infrastructure and maritime transport?

Seen from the personal security aspect of human security, what extant and future military defence co-operation is possible that would enhance this facet?

Looking at energy security, what trilateral co-operation can you envisage for the IBSA countries?

How would the states balance their military capabilities with its foreign policy objectives?

To what extent, if any, will the formation of BRICS, the recent formation of the Union of South American Nations (USAN, [UNASUL – Portuguese; UNASUR - Spanish]) detract from the priorities/energies/resources that Brazil (or India, for Indian respondents) and other similar fora (e.g. BASIC) have towards/for IBSA? (Resource allocation, etc?)

For Brazilian respondents: To what extent, if any, will the hosting of the **FIFA SWC in 2014** and the **Olympic Games in 2016** detract from the priorities/energies/resources that Brazil has towards/for IBSA?