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**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS  
OF SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION IN THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS  
FROM A DETERMINISTIC TO A DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION  
SYSTEM**

by

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Dissertation submitted in accordance with the requirements of the degree of

**PHILOSOPHIAE DOCTOR**

in the

**FACULTY OF THE HUMANITIES**

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF EDUCATION**

Bloemfontein

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MAY 2000


## DECLARATION

I hereby declare that:

*A critical analysis of the ideological foundation of South African education in the transitional process from a deterministic to a democratic education system*

is my own work, that all the resources quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this dissertation was not previously submitted by me for a degree at any other university.

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.....  
ADRÉ LE ROUX

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the contributions of the following in the completion of this study:

- ◆ The Almighty God who gave me the strength and perseverance to complete this study.
- ◆ Special gratitude and acknowledgement are due to my promoter Dr. Daniella Coetzee, Head of the Department of Philosophy and History of Education, University of the Orange Free State. Daniella, thank you for your expert guidance, assistance and encouragement throughout the duration of this study. It was not only inspirational, but also played a profound role in keeping me motivated to complete this study. Also a special thank you for your willingness to undertake the task of language editing this dissertation.
- ◆ Acknowledgement is due to my co-promoter Prof. Gerhard Zecha of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Salzburg, Austria. Thank you for the opportunity to study at the Institute under your guidance - your provoking questions on Critical Rationalism assisted in exposing the way in which this method of criticism could contribute to the uncovering of ideological thought-patterns in educational theories and practices.
- ◆ To my family, friends and colleagues, my sincere gratitude for your continuous support and encouragement during the years of study.



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# Chapter 1

## Statement of the problem and aims of the research

### 1.1 Introduction and statement of the problem

Since the first democratic elections in 1994, South African education has been set on the road to radical transformation. Various White Papers on education have since been published, new legislative measures regarding education have been introduced and a newly adopted policy on the implementation of outcome-based education, in the form of Curriculum 2005, has been proposed as the alternative to the former oppressive and unequal education system. However positive these measures may appear, it seems that reincarnations of ghosts of the apartheid era still subtly (and often not so subtly) plague schooling in South Africa. Although the process of transformation is founded upon the legitimate ideals of *inter alia* equality and equity, severe difficulties have been encountered in the pursuit of the goal of a non-racial, equitable and democratic education dispensation. Apart from a growing dissatisfaction amongst teachers with the way in which new policy initiatives, such as Curriculum 2005, have been introduced, corruption and reports of alleged incompetence in education departments seem to arrest the process of true transformation (Jansen 1999b:145ff; cf. also Schreuder 1999:126). When one is also confronted by the reality of the continued lack of physical facilities (Bishop 1997:1; cf. also Mboyane 2000a:2), growing financial burdens (Pampillas 1998:2; cf. also Radebe 1999:238) and poor matriculation results (ANC press *Statement on Education* 12 January 2000), the transformation picture indeed appears to be bleak.

At this point one would have to review the situation briefly:

- ♦ radical transformation of the former education system that did not satisfy the educational needs of all the South African people, is not negotiable; and
- ♦ it seems that the (unsatisfactory) way in which school-typical education functioned in the period prior to the current transformation process, should be an indication of pitfalls that ought to be avoided in the reconstruction of the way in which school-typical education ought to function in South Africa.



When considering the above, scrutiny of both South Africa's educational past, as well as the process of transformation seems to be inevitable. Since schooling during the previous dispensation had been driven by the ideology of ethno-nationalism (apartheid), and was subsequently counteracted by a revolutionary ideology, the question exists whether ideological forces continue to play a role in the process of education transformation.

While an ideology relates to the tyranny of a totalitarian regime (cf. Dooyeweerd 1979:48), it simultaneously reminds of the arresting of the transitional process from a closed to an open society (cf. Popper 1998:108). However, because it appears that school-typical education is often misused for non-educational purposes in a totalitarian regime, the exposure of ideological belief-systems and their impact on the school appears to be imperative. The possibility also exists that by exposing ideological thought-patterns and their impact on education in a previous South African dispensation, certain important conclusions might be drawn that could indicate the way in which education transformation should take place. In addition, possible thought-patterns and suppositions that hamper the current process of education transformation would also have to be exposed.

Exposure of ideological manipulation and indoctrination during the indicated periods in South Africa's educational history would, however, require the use of specialised methods of criticism. Through a preliminary study of relevant methods, the critico-rationalist attitude (originating from Karl Popper (1996b:225)) and transcendental criticism in the Dooyeweerdian tradition (1984/I:37) were identified as possible methods by which to conduct the research. These methods have to be critically evaluated in order to determine to what extent they would be suitable to assist in exposing thought-patterns that may lead to ideological indoctrination and manipulation in the sphere of education.

The following questions consequently arise with regard to this research:

1. What is the relation between the transitional process from a closed society to an open society, the emergence of ideologies and the impact thereof on the school as an educational institution?
2. In what way can the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude and the application of transcendental critique assist in exposing ideological thought-patterns and presuppositions determining such thought-patterns?

3. What ideological thought-patterns caused the distortion of apartheid education for other than school-typical purposes?
4. What was the nature of the struggle for liberation and how was education utilised in order to assist with this struggle?
5. Do current attempts to establish a democratic South African education system exhibit the presence of ideological thought-patterns that might prove to be detrimental to the transformational process itself?
6. What recommendations can be offered to counteract a repetition of ideological thought-patterns that may impede the transformation of South African education from a deterministic to a democratic system?

## 1.2 Research aims

The broad aim of the study is to determine, (against the background of possible ideological thought-patterns in apartheid education and the struggle for liberation), to what extent the current process of education transformation is based upon the assumption that the school, as an educational institution, should be allowed to function according to its distinct sphere of sovereignty. From this aim the following specific objectives have been derived:

- ◆ to arrive at a general exposition of the transition from a closed to an open society, with specific reference to the emergence of ideologies and the impact of the latter on the school as an educational institution constituted by a distinct school-typical structure;
- ◆ to investigate the method of transcendental criticism, as well as the features of the critico-rationalist attitude in order to determine to what extent the application of these tools can assist not only in exposing the presence of ideological thought-patterns, but also in determining the roots by which such patterns are driven;
- ◆ to give an exposition of the emergence of the ideology of apartheid and to determine the way in which school-typical education was supposedly mobilised as an ideological state apparatus in order to promote a particular ideological belief-system;
- ◆ to investigate the nature of the struggle for liberation, in order to determine whether education was ideologically distorted;
- ◆ to present a critical analysis of the present process of educational transformation, not only to determine whether school-typical education is misused for non-educational purposes, but

especially to identify possible emerging ideological thought-patterns that might impede the process of transformation; and

- ♦ to draw conclusions from the exposition of the stated periods in South African education, especially in order to recommend a course of action for educational transformation, lest the mistakes of the past be repeated.

### 1.3 Research outline

Having defined the research problem, and in order to achieve the stated objectives, the research will evolve as follows:

In *chapter 2* the transitional process from a closed to an open society will be placed within the context of the Dooyeweerdian tradition (the differentiation of culture into various life spheres) and the Popperian tradition (the freeing of the critical powers of man). By linking the tendency to cling to the closed society (as a result of the strain of civilisation) to disharmonious cultural differentiation, the emergence of an ideology, as well as its characteristics, will be presented as part of the transitional process itself. Against this background, the presenting of the school as a structurally given will be considered in relation to the impact of an ideological belief-system on the functioning of school-typical education.

*Chapter 3* will focus on two possible methods that could be utilised to achieve the aims of the research. In the first instance transcendental critique will be put forward as a method of critical inquiry into the foundations of knowledge, in order to expose the nature of presuppositions underpinning scientific thought. In addition, the possibility of adopting the critico-rationalist attitude will be debated. An in-depth evaluation of this attitude will be undertaken since it could possibly assist in exposing the presence of ideological thought-patterns that may lead to the ideological manipulation and indoctrination of education.

*Chapter 4* deals with a critical exposition of education during the apartheid dispensation (1948-1994). In this chapter the ideological nature of this era will be exposed by virtue of its subjection to critical questions stemming from critical rationalism, as well as the application of transcendental critique. An attempt will be made to illustrate the way in which apartheid ideologues mobilised South African education as an ideological state apparatus.

In *chapter 5* the emphasis will be on the period of struggle for liberation, with specific reference to the way in which school-typical education was utilised as a tool of critical opposition. In order to expose ideological thought-patterns, as well as the nature of presuppositions by which such patterns were determined, critical rationalism and the method of transcendental critique will be applied.

*Chapter 6* will focus on the transformation of the South African society and education, to a democratic and non-racist society and an equitable education system. In order to critically analyse this period, the transformation process, especially educational transformation, will be subjected to critical rationalism in order to expose the existence of possible ideological thought-patterns that may have a detrimental effect on the transformation process. However, since the mere exposure of such thought-patterns does not reveal the presuppositions by which they are regulated, the process of education transformation will also to be subjected to transcendental critique.

*Chapter 7* will contain an overview of conclusions drawn from the previous chapters. In addition, recommendations will be made and areas for further research will be indicated.

#### **1.4 Stating the hypothesis**

The previous dispensation has been characterised as racist, oppressive and aimed at sustaining a separatist South African society in which school-typical education reflected the same policy of separatism (apartheid). In this regard the emergence of the apartheid ideology has been associated with the elevation of certain ideas, norms and values to the status of a supreme source of authority (hypernorm). Due to the existence of a supposedly supreme authority, school-typical authority was not only regarded as being derived from the supreme source, but the school, as a social institution, had been misused for ideological (other than school-typical) purposes. However, by exposing and relativising such hypernorms, the process of transformation was indeed made possible. Thus, contrary to an education dispensation that was manipulated by a deterministic and exploiting ideology, the current transformation process envisages the establishment of an open and democratic education system. However, the process of transformation seems to have become entangled in a series of difficulties, as indicated previously (infra:1.1). When keeping in mind that human experience and interpretation of the society in which we function remain continuously exposed to the ever-present danger of ideological

contamination, it seems possible that the current process of transformation may, have fallen prey to the subjection of school-typical education to a supposedly supreme authority. If the latter can be determined, it can indeed be anticipated that the new South African school will once again be deprived of its "lawful" right to function (in a relative autonomous manner) within its own (and distinctive) sphere of competence.

## **1.5 Research methods**

### **1.5.1 Literature study**

In the first instance the research will comprise a study of relevant literature (primary as well as secondary sources). Data gained from literature will be analysed, synthesised and placed within the context of the research problem. Relevant literature will subsequently be subjected to the following methods of criticism:

### **1.5.2 Critical rationalism**

In supplement to the critico-rationalist attitude that pertains to the readiness of a person to criticise others and to be criticised by others, critical rationalism is a scientific methodology (meta-theory) indicating a way in which to (objectively) solve scientific problems and approximate truths within the context of science. Through this metatheoretical position about rationality, the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude assists in exposing deterministic rational thinking that can be linked to ideological (anti-democratic) thought-patterns. In supplement to the critical rationalist appeal to become more resistant to ideological indoctrination and manipulation, Popper's (Salamun 1999:88-89) six questions in the critical analysis of a social (or political) world-view, appears to be significant for this research. Although the subjection of a particular belief-system to these questions could assist in exposing the presence of ideological thought-patterns, it also proposes to be helpful in relativising so-called unquestionable judgements. Simultaneously, however, the influence of tradition in rational thought is not denied, since it is assumed that man does not possess an *a priori* understanding of reality. Thus, proceeding from the assumption that (total) reality cannot be rationally comprehended, the critical rationalist does not pursue the elimination of tradition from science. Imperative to science is, however, liberation from dogmatism, ideologies and other forms of determinism. It therefore appears that critical rationalism could contribute to open and critical discussion in order to

expose and eliminate personal biases, hidden agendas and ideological thought-patterns that stand in the way to an open system of education. The implication is that the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude in this study could contribute to exposing the nature, essence and role of ideology with regard to the establishing and preservation of structures of domination, as well as to the disclosure of the relation between educational theory and ideology.

### 1.5.3 The structural-empirical method and transcendental critique

This method rests on the assumption that the orderliness of reality enables the scholar to examine the foundational structures of institutions (spheres of competence), within creation. An attempt will therefore be made to investigate the role of spheres of competence in the elimination of hypernormative rationality, and consequently to focus upon the misuse of school-typical education for ideological purposes. The research therefore entails, amongst other things, a critical scrutiny of the nature of the ontological structure of the school as an educational institution, especially with regard to the educational sphere of competence as a possible anti-ideological force. The structural-empirical method is well-suited for attempting to investigate ontological structures, because it involves transcendental critique of the universal conditions which determine and limit theoretical thought and the existence of (*inter alia* educational) institutions. Simultaneously, this method of criticism appears to complement critical rationalism: while critical rationalism assists in the exposure of ideological thought-patterns, it is by means of applying transcendental critique that the presuppositions at the roots of ideological thought-patterns can be revealed. Although critical rationalism plays a significant role in revealing thought-patterns that might lead to ideological indoctrination and manipulation, it seems that this method should be supplemented by the application of transcendental critique - if the presuppositions that determine ideological thought-patterns remain hidden, then the justification for such patterns are left uncriticised. It can therefore be agreed with Schoeman (1998:(i)): "[i]f we shrink from the difficulties of unravelling the intricacies of human thoughts, aspirations, ideals and ideas 'from the inside', we will have to be content with a very *superficial* understanding and interpretation of human conduct".

## 1.6 Demarcation of the research

The primary focus of this research will be the unmasking of ideological thought-patterns, as well as presuppositions at the roots of such patterns in relation to school-typical education during the following periods:

- ♦ South Africa under Nationalist rule from 1948 until 1994;
- ♦ the struggle for liberation, also from 1948 until 1994; and
- ♦ the period after the first democratic elections in 1994.

The investigation will consequently be done by linking the emergence of an ideology to the disharmonious nature of the transitional process from a closed society to an open society, and identification of the role of ideology on school-typical education.

## 1.7 Defining the terminology

*Absolutisation* - the elevation of a particular aspect of reality to the status of a supreme authority where all other aspects are reduced to mere parts and therefore derivative authority structures of the absolutised aspect (Dooyeweerd 1984/IV:1 and cf. also Clouser 1991:252). The absolutisation of modal aspects is regarded as the source of all *-isms*.

*Africanisation* - the serious quest for a radical change of paradigm; a process for defining African thought, philosophy and identity. The incorporation, adaptation and integration of other cultures into, and through the African vision and interpretation of reality to provide the dynamism that is vital to the success of peoples of African origin in the global village (Makgoba 1998:4).

*African Renaissance* - the call to Africa to accept responsibility for its own fate, to recognise its past failings and for its leaders to co-operate in pursuit of the greater good of the continent.

*Afrocentrism* - the elevation of the African vision and interpretation of reality (Afrocentric paradigm) to the status of a supreme authority.

*Analogy* - an analogy (metaphor) refers to the definite points of resemblance which exist between two aspects of reality. While the analogical relatedness of all the aspects of the horizon of human experience guarantees the coherence and integral unity among the various aspects of reality, it simultaneously refers to the differences between the modes of human existence. Schoeman (1980:33) illustrates an analogical moment with the following example: the similarity between the two analogical concepts *biotic life* and *social life* is *life*, whereas difference is that in the first instance *life* has a *biotic* qualification, while in the second case life is attributed a *social* connotation.

*Antinomy* - originating from Greek *anti* = against and *nomos* = law, antinomy refers to a logical contradiction that arises out of a failure to distinguish the different kinds of laws valid in different modalities. Although the laws as such are never antinomic, the usurpation of

different modalities and the explanation thereof by an absolutised aspect results in the conflict of laws (Dooyeweerd 1984/IV:6; Kalsbeek 1975:346 and Schoeman 1980:13).

*A priori* - prior (before) to experience, although not completely independent from what it rules, but as a correlative of what it rules, rooted in the structure of human subjectivity (cf. Hart 1984:438 and Kalsbeek 1975:347).

*Archimedean point* - a vantage point from which reality can, in principle, be perceived in totality.

*Aspect* - synonym for *modality*.

*Certitudinal* - see *pistic*

*Closed society* - see also *undifferentiated society*. A society caught up in a circle of unchanging taboos of laws and customs that are inevitable and unalterable; characterised by the lack of a clear distinction between natural laws and norms (Popper 1998:57ff). Refers in Dooyeweerdian tradition (1979:74) to the undifferentiatedness of society where there is no room for the formation of life spheres characterised by their intrinsic nature.

*Coherence* - the interrelation of the elements of a multiplicity.

*Cosmos* - all of created reality; creation.

*Critical Rationalism* - an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience (Popper 1996b:225).

*Differentiation* - the historical process whereby various life forms acquire a degree of complication that coincides with specialisation as the development of new structural kinds (Hart 1984:443).

*Ding an sich* - German for 'things in themselves'; to be linked to the absolutisation of something in human experience to the absolute status of something self-sufficient and a substance in itself.

*Disclosure* - see *opening process*.

*Essence, nature* - the configuration which determines the existence of an entity in order to constitute the thing that it is.

*Eurocentrism* - the elevation of the European vision and interpretation of reality (Eurocentric paradigm) to the status of a supreme authority.

*Experience* - the totality of human functioning, embracing all the modal functions as modes of human *experience*; the active awareness of man's place in the world.

*Historical* - synonymous in Dooyeweerd in terms of technical and 'cultural-historical', which not only denotes the aspect of 'formative power', but is pivotal in the *opening-process*.

*Individuality-structure* - a general name used to indicate the applicability of structural laws for the existence of individual relationships and entities such as *inter alia* the state, the school,



the church, the family, arts, mosquitoes, and sodium chloride. The individuality structure of an entity determines its individuality and identity, and as such should be distinguished from the modal structure (Dooyeweerd 1984/III:79 and cf. also 1996:113-114).

*Irreducibility (irreducible)* - the negative way of referring to the unique distinctiveness of things by implicating the incapability of theoretical reduction. Insofar as everything in reality has its own unique and typical character, along with many others, it cannot be understood in terms of categories foreign to itself (cf. Walzer 1983:4 and Kalsbeek 1975:349).

*Meaning* - refers to the non-self-sufficient character of reality that constantly points from and beyond itself to the origin of reality itself. Since meaning is regarded as "the being of all that has been created" (Dooyeweerd 1984/IV:155), it can be stated that reality *is* meaning and does not *have* meaning.

*Modality* - one of the fifteen fundamental ways as modes of being, sharply distinguished from the concrete things which function within these modalities. A word used to refer to sides of the ordered world, as well as the world order.

*Naïve experience* - the non-theoretical and everyday human experience within which theory is embedded.

*Norm (normative)* - in distinction from unalterable natural laws, norms pertain to the cultural domain of reality and can be transgressed by human conduct.

*Object* - something qualified by its correlation to human subjective functions in order to become an object of human experience. A work of art will therefore be qualified by its correlation to the human subjective function of aesthetic appreciation.

*Opening process* - the cultural development of society from a primitive (closed and undifferentiated) stage to a civilised (open and differentiated) stage by the disclosure of various life spheres, such as *inter alia*, science, the fine arts, commerce and industry, politics and religion.

*Open society* - see also *opening process*. Refers in Popperian tradition to a society which sets free the critical powers of man, contrary to the closed society and its submission to magical forces (cf. Popper 1998:1).

*Particular* - subjective existence that exhibits both individuality and evidence of being ordered. "A particular is always individual, but never individual throughout, since each particular is of some kind. A particular is an individually existing member of some kind. Only a singular term can be used to name it. And a genuine singular term names only it. What are called abstract singular terms are not really singular terms. They can better be called abstract specific terms" (Hart 1984:450).

*Pistic, certitudinal* - the human function in which certainty through faith or through committing the self is acquired (Hart 1984:451).

*Reduction* - to give a theoretical explanation of one thing in terms of another. In a pejorative sense, it means the reduction of modalities to become mere derivative parts of an absolutised modal aspect. Reductionism can be linked to a disregard of the *irreducibility* of the various

aspects of human existence, and thus the violation of the principle of *sphere sovereignty* (differentiated responsibility).

*Relative* - refers to the fundamental reality of relationships as, in the sense of "it all depends" and all is "relation".

*Religion* - in distinction from religious faith that refers to a sphere of human experience, religion is linked to the total commitment of the human selfhood to an origin that ultimately directs human experience (Schoeman 1980:7). The meaning of reality is ultimately founded in, determined by, and originating from its origin - all things, all functions stand in relation to the ultimate origin of reality (Hart 1984:453).

*Science* - embraces the natural sciences as well as the social sciences and the humanities, including Theology and Philosophy. Coupled with modal abstraction, science is always the result of the identification of one modal aspect by theoretically isolating it from all the other aspects from which it was distinguished (Strauss 1978:4; cf. also Clouser 1991:54-55 and Schoeman 1998:27).

*Selfhood* - the central depth-dimension and the focal point where all the various modes of human existence are concentrated. Philosophical equivalents for selfhood are *ego*, *heart*, *I-ness* and *I*.

*Sphere sovereignty* - the various distinct spheres of reality, such as family, church, school and state, each structured according to its own nature. Exhibiting its own responsibility and decision-making power, no sphere was structured to usurp the task of another, differently structured relationship (Dooyeweerd 1996:117; Kalsbeek 1975:353 and Schoeman 1980:36).

*Subject* - being subject to conditions - anything in particular can consequently be referred to as a subject.

*Subjective* - not personal and arbitrary, but indicates the existence of material objects in space and time (people, animals, plants and minerals), as well as their actions, functions and behaviours, and the relations between these. All these are what they are in subjection to order. Also designates some existing entity as subject, to be distinguished from another as object.

*Substratum* - the aggregate of modalities not only preceding a given aspect in the modal order, but also the necessary foundation of the proceeding aspects.

*Superstratum* - the aggregate of modalities proceeding a given aspect in the modal order.

*Time* - a wide application of universal time that manifests itself in all modalities and which is therefore not to be equated with any specific modal aspect. As such, not the co-ordinate of space, but used to indicate the relation between the world order and the ordered world (Hart 1984:455).

*Transcendental* - the *a priori* structural conditions which make the theoretical attitude of thought possible. In sharp distinction from transcendent, the transcendental ground-idea refers to a common ground for discourse and communication among adherents of divergent philosophies (cf. Brümmer 1971:16 and Van Riessen 1972:116).

*Tirisano (Call to Action)* - a document (*Tirisano: Working Together to Build a South African Education and Training System for the 21st Century*) issued by the Minister of Education, Kader Asmal, in July 1999. It included nine priorities to be addressed over a period of five years, aimed at the improvement of South African education. These priorities include co-operative government, political leadership and professional collaboration between the national and provincial education departments; school improvement and teacher professionalism; HIV/AIDS-programmes and literacy; Further and Higher Education (cf. Asmal 18 April 2000).

*Truth, validity* - refers to a successful, intended and proper relationship between subjective existence and the obtaining conditions. Does not only refer to statements or arguments, but anything in the world that measures up to its standards can be true and valid. Whatever is true, conforms to its standards.

*Ultimate* - foundation which has no ground itself but is the ground of all grounds. Accepted not on the grounds of, but as the ground (foundation).

*Undifferentiated society* - see also *closed society*. An undeveloped and closed stage of human culture and civilisation in which the distinct spheres of human life have not yet clearly separated out (Kalsbeek 1975:354).

*Universal* - refers to the universality of a specific condition; the scope with which some condition holds for subjective existence - condition which determines all possible existence of this kind (conditions obtained without exception). Means no exception to the condition within its scope.

*Whole* - unified totality whose diversity consists of elements without which the whole could not exist. Elements cannot exist outside of the whole and are defined by their presence as constitutive elements of the whole.

### 1.8 List of abbreviations

AA	-	Affirmative Action
ANC	-	African National Congress
ATASA	-	African Teachers' Association of South Africa
AZAPO	-	Azanian People's Organisation
CA	-	Constitutional Assembly
CACE	-	Centre for Adult and Continuing Education
CBO's	-	Community-based Organisations
CNE	-	Christian National Education
COSAS	-	Congress of South African Students
COSATU	-	Congress of South African Trade Unions
COTEP	-	Committee on Teacher Education Policy

DET	-	Department of Education
DP	-	Democratic Party
GEC	-	General Education Certificate
GNU	-	Government of National Unity
HSRC	-	Human Sciences Research Council
MEC	-	Minister of Education
NP	-	National Party
NNP	-	New National Party
NDR	-	National Democratic Revolution
NECC	-	National Education Crisis Committee
NEPI	-	National Education Policy Investigation
NEUSA	-	National Education Union of South Africa
NGO's	-	Non-governmental Organisations
NQF	-	National Qualification Framework
OBE	-	Outcome-based Education
RDP	-	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SABRA /SAIRR	-	Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse-aangeleenthede/South African Institute for Race Relations
SADTU	-	South African Democratic Teachers' Union
SAOU	-	Suid-Afrikaanse Onderwysunie
SAQA	-	South African Qualifications Authority
SPCC	-	Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee
SRCs	-	Student Representative Councils
TRC	-	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDM	-	United Democratic Movement

### 1.9 Concluding remarks

As already stated, in order to critically reflect on current transformation of South African education, reasons for a previous dysfunctional education system should first of all be exposed. However, since the possibility exists that such a dysfunctional system may be linked to a particular belief-system that leads to ideological thought-patterns, and since the latter may have a detrimental effect on school-typical education in the form of impairing critical reasoning, the

focus in chapter 2 will be on the reasons for the emergence of ideological belief-systems, as well as its impact on school-typical education.

# Chapter 2

## Ideology and the Differentiated Society

### 2.1 Introductory remarks

Discourses on modern society often involve reference to an *open society* in which democracy and democratic principles play a decisive role. However, reference to the existence of an "open" society, in the first place implies a distinction from, and thus the existence of a "closed" society, and secondly a transitional process from a closed society to an open society. Thus, in order to determine the nature of an open society, an exposition of the character or essence of the closed society, as well as the transitional process itself, is required. Since education can never exist in separation from the society it serves, it can be deduced that the "closeness" or "openness" of a society will necessarily have an impact on the way in which educational practice is undertaken. Simultaneously, it can also be anticipated that educational reality will not be left untouched by the *nature* of the transitional process itself.

The aim of this chapter is to determine to what extent the emergence of an ideology can be attributed to the *nature* in which the transitional process from a closed to an open society takes place. Since the main focus of this study is a critical analysis of the ideological underpinnings of educational practice, the emergence of an ideology and the impact thereof on educational reality will necessarily have to be elucidated.

### 2.2 Features of the closed society

#### 2.2.1 An undifferentiated condition

The first general characteristic of the closed society lies in its *undifferentiatedness* whereby all of those tasks and functions for which open communities come into being, are being carried out by a single totalitarian bond (Strauss 1991:98-99; 1992:99; cf. also Althusser 1971:150-151; Clouser 1991:317; Dooyeweerd 1996:44-45; 1984/II:183 and Walzer 1983:27). This implies that the intrinsic nature of differentiated life spheres such as, *inter alia*, science, fine arts, commerce and industry, politics and education are reduced to a totalitarian and undifferentiated condition. Since all communal activities, including man in all his/her cultural relationships, are drawn together in

one totalitarian bond of kinship, tribe or folk, it is impossible to distinguish the "intrinsic nature" of the various life forms. The undifferentiatedness of the closed society, therefore, indicates the absence of radically distinct societal relationships and life forms.

The totalitarian nature of the closed society further resides in a hierarchical view of society whereby all communal activities are regarded as originating from a single leading structure (cf. Clouser 1991:252 and Strauss 1991:99). Acquiring the well-defined position of a caste in society, the nature of this leading and total structure agrees with the specific historical organisation at hand - it might be the tribe, the guilds of the middle ages, the pre-feudal and feudal communities and lordships. Mannheim (1940:9) refers to this leading structure as the intellectual stratum that enjoys the special task of providing an interpretation of the world for the particular society. Due to the status of less sophisticated levels of social development, the closed and organised stratum of intellectuals relishes a monopolistic control over the moulding of this society's world-view. Authority and privilege are therefore not regarded as the outcome of struggles for power and economic control, but rather "enactments of meaning, where social goods are conceived in hierarchical terms" (Walzer 1983:26 and cf. also Susser 1995:2).

### **2.2.2 Submission to the natural domain of reality**

The totalitarian and undifferentiated condition of the closed society is further enforced by an irrational submission to deterministic magical forces. Functioning in "a charmed circle of unchanging taboos of laws and customs", the closed and primitive society exhibits an inability to distinguish between regularities in social life and those found in nature (Popper 1998:57; cf. also 1,172, 294 and Bergson 1935:5,14). By virtue of ascribing the characteristics of natural laws to laws of normative nature, the latter are considered to be unalterable and beyond human control. In an attempt to make social order an imitation of the order observed in nature, all laws, whether they'd be social or moral laws, appear as laws of nature and consequently assume the form of commands. Obedience to these laws is believed to be enforced by a supernatural will and is aimed at greater cohesion to the community. Primitive humanity appears to be literally surrounded and completely controlled by the restless forces of nature (Visagie 1996:130). Due to their intimate co-existence alongside nature, the people of the tribe often experience themselves as the extension of natural forces. Any breach of the social order would therefore assume an anti-natural character.

Characterised by a predominantly vital, organic appearance, the primitive society thus relates to the binding of community members in terms of semi-biological ties. Since the closed society leaves no room for the formation of various life spheres, a concrete group of individuals remains related by concrete physical relationships and not by abstract societal relationships. Placed within the context of a rigid cling to the natural domain of reality, cultural development in the primitive society proceeds only in terms of biotic analogies of phases of birth, growth, maturing, ageing and decline (Dooyeweerd 1996:60). By reducing culture to the organic development of communal life, culture remains in an undifferentiated state.

### **2.2.3 Presence of a rigid individuality**

Bergson (1935:1-5) couples the rigid role of the individual within the boundaries of the closed society, with the organisation of the free wills. Once the free wills of society are organised, society not only assumes the guise of an artificial organism, but the life of the individual becomes completely absorbed by the primitive community. The status of the individual therefore depends entirely on his/her membership of the kinship, the tribe or the folk. As such, the all-powerful collective, the tribal tradition forms the basis for "institutions". There is consequently no concern or room for personal responsibility. Any form of group responsibility is also not based upon the principle of reasonable accountability, but rather on an outcome of activities within the compass of a single unchallenged way of life (Popper 1998:1,172ff.; cf. Dooyeweerd 1979:74-75; 1986:104; 1996:44,60 and Susser 1995:3).

The conflation of social norms and natural laws in the primitive society has a totalitarian and deterministic impact on the habits of the individual. Equating the role of social habits with the role of necessity in nature, social habits will not only correspond with the demands of the society, but consequently evoke a sense of obligation by the members of the community (Bergson 1935:6;15-16). However, since social habits correspond with each other as an integral part of obligation in general, the whole is constituted by the contributions of the various parts, conferring upon each other the undivided authority of the totality. Obligation, therefore, takes the form of a categorical imperative which in turn is instinctive - reflection is roused long enough to take form, but not long enough to seek for reasons. Consequently, the individual seldom finds him(her)self in the position of doubting his/her own actions.



Divergent thought-processes also do not exist in the closed society: whilst the same meaning to words are inculcated into every member of the group, restriction on cultural interaction isolates members from divergent world-views. In order to arrest any changes within this "world of boundaries", prohibitions and prescriptions are explicable by vague associations of ideas, by superstition and by automatism (Bergson 1935:14; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1996:44). By imposing strict social restrictions on the cultural interaction of tribal members, tribal leaders not only guard fearfully against infiltration of foreign influences, but also ascribe to a notion of social immobility by which culture remains in an undifferentiated state. Since the variety of life forms are all bound together in an undifferentiated manner, the process of cultural differentiation is subsequently retarded by the absolute and exclusive power of the undifferentiated bond. In this regard Popper (1998:294; cf. also Strauss 1991:99 and 1992:99 on *the undifferentiated society*) states that the transition from a closed to an open society takes place "when social institutions are first consciously recognized as man-made, and when their conscious alteration is discussed in terms of their suitability for the achievement of human aims or purposes".

## **2.3 Transition from a closed to an open society**

### **2.3.1 Social tension as an internal cause of the breakdown of the closed society**

The insulation of the individual within the group and the isolation of the closed society guaranteed not only the security of its members, but also the existence of the tribe. Since there was no need for society members to make any rational decisions based upon an estimate of possible consequences, tendencies such as competition for status, the invention of critical discussions and thought, and freedom from magical obsessions, were initially unknown to the closed society. Although the closed society was characterised by social immobility, social mobility *within* the static society assumed a horizontal nature. Horizontal mobility refers to movement from one position to another whilst remaining attached to customary ways of thinking (Mannheim 1940:6-7; cf. also Walzer 1983:27). Within the sanctuary of horizontal mobility, the "correctness" of traditions of thought was guaranteed by isolating society members from divergent world-views. However, as a place of security the closed society was not so much threatened by surrounding enemies and hostile magical forces, but by population growth (cf. Popper 1998:176; 295).

Population growth within the closed society not only led to the emergence of social problems within the thoroughly organised collectivity, but horizontal mobility became gradually

accompanied by vertical mobility. Involving a certain social circulation between the previously isolated strata of the hierarchical order, vertical mobility thus led to a shaking of the belief in the validity of traditional thought-forms (Mannheim 1940:6-7; cf. Popper 1998:176). Although social prestige was accorded to the achievements of the upper strata on the basis of a "natural" hierarchical order of authority, the intensification of social mobility led to a situation whereby the thinking of the lower strata acquired public significance and validity. The emergence of social tension within the closed and primitive community consequently incited the collapse of the monopolistic control of the intellectual strata, as well as the breakdown of the static society.

### **2.3.2 Social intercourse as an external cause of the breakdown of the closed society**

The breaking down of the closed society also appears to involve the eradication of the "organic borders" by which the sovereignty of taboos, social restrictions and the rejection of the modification of thought processes were guaranteed. The growth of the population was therefore not the only factor that played a decisive role in the breakdown of tribalism. As noted previously, an important characteristic of the closed society is the social restriction imposed on the cultural interaction of people (cf. *infra*:2.2.3; Dooyeweerd 1996:44; 1979:75; Plamenatz 1979:108 and Popper 1998:172). In an attempt to keep this closed condition in tact, the tribe is isolated from social intercourse, although simultaneously regulated by taboos, set by the undifferentiated leading structure.

The development of sea-communications and commerce, however, contributed largely to the eradication of the isolated nature of the primitive society. Cultural contact with civilisations that had already been disclosed, not only engendered the breakdown of tribalism, but allowed the supernatural awe to give way to "active interference, and to the conscious pursuit of personal or group interests" (Popper 1998:294; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1996:61). The concomitant recognition of social institutions as man-made and the alteration of such institutions to the benefit of human aims, encompass the escalation of personal decisions and personal responsibility. Since magical tribal institutions are confronted by critical considerations, the alteration of taboos coincides with personal decisions based upon an estimate of possible consequences. Hence, Popper's (1998:1,173; cf. also Ashley 1980:2) association of the open society with the freeing of critical powers.

From the outset it becomes apparent that the destruction of the undifferentiated and exclusive power of primitive communities should be regarded as part of the process of cultural differentiation, balanced by increasing cultural integration (Dooyeweerd 1996:44,61). In this regard the opposite can be argued: any attempt at arresting tribalism will therefore entail the isolation of a group from social intercourse with "foreigners". However, since the demand for cultural traffic is latent in the norm for historical development, every form of cultural isolationism stands condemned. When the cultural isolation of a society places it outside the history and the cultural traffic of the world, the existence of the group is ironically enough, not safeguarded, but runs the risk of extinction.

### **2.3.3 Distinction between natural laws and social norms calls for cultural formation**

Marked by conformance to an image of inviolable and unalterable social norms, the closed society exhibits an imitation of the order observed in nature (infra:2.2.2). However, the freeing of critical powers in the open society not only acknowledges critical reflection on the deterministic and totalitarian nature of the undifferentiated society, but simultaneously allows for the development of a theoretical understanding of the distinction between laws of nature and norms (cf. Popper 1998:57).

The distinction between laws of nature and norms implies the possible identification of a natural (nonhuman) realm of reality where laws of nature are applicable, and a human (cultural) realm where (cultural) norms are exercised (cf. Clouser 1991:232; Popper 1998:57-58 and Wolters 1990:14-15,36-37). Laws of nature refer to those laws that have already and directly been imposed on the cosmos. These laws are immediate - planets are in their orbits, seasons come and go, plants cross-pollinate, while animals reproduce without mediation. Such laws of nature describe an unvarying regularity that is inflexible without exception, as they can neither be violated nor enforced. Being beyond human control, the ignorance of natural laws can have ravaging effects on the natural and human environment. In distinction, although not separable from the nonhuman realm of natural laws, mediate norms (laws) for culture and society are enforced, obeyed, violated and transgressed by man within the human (cultural) domain (cf. Schoeman 1998:133 and Veenhof 1939:15). Contrary to the rigid control of human actions and decisions by magical taboos in the closed society, it is in the open society that man, although subject to inviolable natural laws, takes control of normative laws. By virtue of human control

of the human domain of reality, the fulfilling of the task of developing creation takes shape. Freire (1979:5) indicates in this regard that the historical-cultural "tidal wave" of the transition from one historical epoch to another, can only take place when social or cultural mobility permits man to create, to re-create and to make decisions.

It seems that the task of developing created reality is directly related to the transitional process from an undifferentiated society to a differentiated society. For the undisclosed society to lose its undifferentiated condition, the undifferentiated leading structure within which all the various life forms are drawn together, should be disclosed or unfolded to exhibit radically distinct life forms, each according to its own criterion of "intrinsic nature" (infra:2.2.1). This transitional process consequently harbours the opening out of culture into various life spheres such as, *inter alia*, the state, the church, the business and the school. It therefore becomes apparent that culture does not refer to regularities in nature, but to whatever owes its existence to human formation. Cultural formative activity thus consists of giving form according to free formation, implying free control over the material (Clouser 1997:84 and Van der Walt 1994:187; cf. also Freire 1979:5). Human formative activity therefore refers to the continuous societal and cultural development of creation in terms of human control of cultural norms. Because numerous natural and human potentialities are hidden in created reality, the unfolding and opening up of these possibilities lay claim on man's cultural mandate (Dooyeweerd 1979:64-65; Van der Walt 1994:6 and Wolters 1990:36).

In this regard it can be argued that since the process of creational unfolding of culture involves the emergence of various life spheres, this process must necessarily take place according to the cultural norms applicable to every particular life sphere. The opening up of the economic sphere of life, for example, requires the application of norms for frugality, while norms of justice refer to the juridical sphere of life. The producing of art, the making of tools and the pursuing of scholarship are all examples of tasks entrusted to mankind. When arguing that the aim of the development of creation is civilisation, it becomes evident that human civilisation is normed throughout. This implies that the transitional process involves human control of cultural norms, however, not of natural laws, as they have already been implemented in reality. In this regard Wolters (1990:15; cf. also Van der Walt 1994:137-138) indicates that all of human life, "in all its vast array of cultural, societal and personal relationships, is *normed*". Consequently, the deterministic and totalitarian nature of the closed society coincides with a view of society where

cultural norms acquire the status of natural laws. Placed outside the realm of human control, the closed society remains static and any contribution towards the development of reality remains subject to a supernatural will.

### 2.3.4 Sphere-sovereignty as a prerequisite for cultural differentiation

As previously indicated, the transitional process from undifferentiatedness to differentiatedness requires the unfolding and opening-up of culture into various distinguishable life forms or spheres. The identification of differentiated life forms such as science, art, the school and the church, is only possible in terms of certain constant features exhibited by each life sphere. The constancy of these distinguishing spheres must therefore refer to the universal structure that constitutes the intrinsic nature of the different life spheres (Wolters 1990:23,49-52; cf. also Clouser 1991:249; Dooyeweerd 1979:79-81; Kalsbeek 1975:137-142 and Puolimatka, 1995:47). Every life sphere is not only attuned to the law that holds for it, but exhibits its own sphere of justice that is rooted in the constant, inherent character of the life sphere itself. Every distinct sphere therefore possesses its own sphere of formative power, its own sphere of sovereignty and competence (cf. Dooyeweerd 1979:43-48; Schoeman 1980:34-36; Veenhof 1939:39; Visagie 1995:5 and Walzer 1983:19). The significance of this relative sovereignty of each sphere lies in the fact that it not only guarantees the intrinsic nature of every life sphere, but provides the basis for its original sphere of authority and competence.

Since the various life spheres can be distinguished from each other, it can be argued that the universal, creational law of each must, *in principle*, be knowable. The various life spheres arise out of man's natural interest in social matters, in economic and aesthetical issues, in matters concerning justice, love and the exercise of faith. Because these aspects of human life are natural, man cannot entirely suppress them, but rather render them so important that people "inevitably form communities to promote and protect them" (Clouser 1991:251). Since the universal laws of the various life spheres are sought and acted upon, the process of transformation from an undifferentiated to a differentiated phase is brought into motion. It is evident that only in the differentiation of culture can the unique nature of each creational structure reveal itself fully.

However, because creational law refers to the universal norms that constitute the intrinsic nature of all human affairs, the existence of any human affair outside of the creational law is impossible.

Since all areas of human life are bound to given norms or standards which have to be implemented in specific ways in the various life spheres, it can indeed be argued that the involvement of human control must presuppose personal power. It is only through personal, cultural power, entrusted to man as a creature, that the task of cultural formation as the differentiation of the various life spheres can take place. Power can therefore be regarded as the motor of cultural development (Dooyeweerd 1979:67). Whereas the creational law constitutes the order for creational structures, the implementation of creational norms determines the orderliness of such structures. The subjection to law, however, does not imply restriction, but free and healthy functioning. The creational law is therefore a condition for freedom of implementation (cf. Wolters 1990:35,43). The differentiation of culture into the various life spheres consequently entails the implementation of creational norms by which the free functioning of the particular sphere is made possible. Because there are right and wrong ways of implementation in every area of human endeavour, the decisive question concerns the direction in which cultural power is applied.

### **2.3.5 Transition as a historical process**

Since human formative activity involves the opening up of creation through the historical process, the formation of various institutions can be conceived of as historical differentiation (Wolters 1990:38; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1984/I:191). Because the development of creation is aimed at civilisation, the stages of development must correspond with the stages of civilisation. Creational unfolding therefore, not only takes place in history, but it is being fulfilled in history. In this regard an exposition of the historical mode of human existence becomes imperative.

Dooyeweerd (1996:39; also 1979:64 and Clouser 1991:206-207) draws a fundamental distinction between the historical aspect of temporal reality that constitutes the *how* of history, and history in the concrete sense of *what has happened*. The identification of the core meaning (the *how*) of the historical aspect is of profound significance for the unfolding and differentiation of culture into various life spheres. Since universal norms constitute the intrinsic nature of all human affairs, the deduction can be drawn that the meaning of history will be determined by the structure of the historical aspect of reality. When considering that the differentiation of life spheres is fulfilled in history and that culture relates to human formative activity, it can be stated that history concerns "the transmission of culture-forming power" (Clouser 1991:206; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1979:65

and 1996:41; Van der Walt 1994:6; Wolter 1990:22-23). Consequently, the term "historical" refers to the ability of man to form new things from already existing material. This implies that the notion of *free formative control* (as the cultural way of being) not only qualifies the historical aspect, but also guarantees its irreducibility in relation to all other modes of human existence.

It has been shown that *culture* can be understood in terms of man's historico-cultural activities, qualified by free, formative power. However, the concept "culture" signifies the domain of human formative activity that can be coupled with the application of norms corresponding to the various spheres of life (Schoeman 1998:133; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1979:69). Thus, with the differentiation of culture into various life spheres (formative activities, language, social relations, economic enterprises, art, jurisprudence, morality and faith), the closed society not only starts to lose its undifferentiated closed condition, but enters "the cultural traffic of world history" (Dooyeweerd 1996:44).

Against the background of the implementation of norms, any argument stating that the course of historical events is determined by laws of history, should be opposed. In an attempt to equate the whole of reality with the historical mode of existence, the philosophy of historicism subsequently diminishes human decision-making and responsibility with regard to the way in which culture unfolds (Clouser 1997:84 and Dooyeweerd 1979:42; cf. also Strauss 1991:71 and Visagie 1995:10). The acceptance of this argument limits the task of science, in general, to the making of predictions, whilst the task of the social sciences in particular refers to the bringing of long-term historical prophecies to the fore. In this regard Castoriadis (cited by Thompson 1984:21) argues that while "what is given in and by history is not a determinate sequence of the determined", the traditional ontology of determinism should be rejected. It is an empirical fact that concrete historical events do indeed display a historical character. However, if the historical mode of experience is to be viewed as being identical with the empirical reality of human society, how then must we account for, *inter alia*, the social, economical and moral characters displayed by these historical events?

The demarcation of reality within the historical mode of existence not only subjects the transitional process from a closed to an open society to inviolable natural laws, but subsequently curtails the normative character of the historical aspect of reality. Dooyeweerd (1996:42; cf. also 1979:69) argues that the foundation of the historical aspect in the logical aspect guarantees the normative character of the modal meaning of history. The logical/illogical contrast presupposes

logical norms that can be transgressed by man who is capable of a rational distinction between what *ought to be* and what *ought not to be*. The rational distinction historical/unhistorical therefore not only presupposes a logical foundation, but the application of norms as standards of evaluation. Popper's (1998:175) characterisation of the breakdown of tribalism as revolutionary is therefore a historical value-judgement that presupposes the application of a norm for historical development. Even though appealing to the judgement of history indicates the ignorance of the normative meaning of history, man could never but recognise (if then unintentionally) the normative meaning of history. The diminishing of the normative meaning of history therefore not only denounces normative contrasts, but can be associated with a kind of rigid cultural determinism, similar to that of the closed society.

The normative nature of the historical transition of cultural differentiation thus involves certain norms as standards of evaluation. Since cultural differentiation requires the disclosure of all life spheres in accordance with their own intrinsic nature, the *norm of differentiation* becomes apparent. In addition to this norm, the *norm of cultural economy* "requires that the historical power sphere of each differentiated cultural sphere should be limited to the boundaries set by the nature proper to each life sphere" (Dooyeweerd 1979:81). Placed within the context of these norms, the recognition of the essence by which every life sphere is constituted, appears to play a regulative role in the transitional process to a differentiated society. The acknowledgement of the distinctive structural purpose and internal organisation of each life sphere not only guarantees the right of each sphere to fulfil its structural purpose, but also protects it from interference by other spheres. Walzer (1983:26) describes the closed society as a society where "dominance and monopoly are not violations but enactments of meaning, where social goods are conceived in hierarchical terms". In the *extended family*, for example, the patriarch maintains internal order and peace by assuming a leading role which rests on a particular historical form of *power organisation* (Strauss 1998a:98). However, notions such as monopoly and dominance, including a hierarchical view of the open society, will consequently signify a possible violation of the norms of differentiation and cultural economy. When the differentiation of culture coincides with the blurring of the boundaries of the various life spheres and the confusing of one sphere with another, it is the differentiated society that will have to cope with antinomies and tyranny (cf. Dooyeweerd 1996:42; Clouser 1991:250 and Walzer 1983:19).



### **2.3.6 Fallible differentiation leads to the arresting of the closed society**

In summary it can be concluded that the formation and exercise of power with regard to the unfolding of culture into various life spheres is not subject to natural laws, but guided by norms applicable to human beings. Simultaneously, human beings are responsible for their own behaviour and are accountable for conduct that transgresses norms. Man, however, is fallible and the application of norms implies the possibility of error, of anti-normative behaviour (cf. Dooyeweerd 1979:43; Popper 1996b:374-376; Visagie 1988:7 and Zecha 1995:81-82). The transitional process from an undifferentiated phase to a differentiated phase thus leaves open the possibility of unhistorical behaviour, which implies the application of personal power in an anti-normative manner.

#### **2.3.6.1 Shock of the transitional process equals the strain of civilisation**

In Popperian (cf. 1998:1,174-176) terms, unhistorical behaviour with regard to the transitional process will be coupled with the attempt of modern society to return to the "secure" seclusion of the closed and totalitarian society with its regulated individuality. The transitional process not only involves a process of increasing cultural integration and differentiation, but simultaneously concerns increasing individualisation in human culture. Accompanying the transitional process, therefore, is a "new" individuality whereby human actions are no longer regulated by taboos. Individuality now assumes true historical significance because every individual contribution to the disclosure of culture refers to the historical task of bringing individual cultural dispositions and talents to fruition (Dooyeweerd 1996:62). However, since historical development involves the adhering to, or transgression of historical norms, the rational person in the open society has to accept personal responsibility and accountability for his/her participation in the process of historical development.

Drawn from a "secure" position provided by the undifferentiatedness of the closed society, modern man is burdened by a quest for rational decisions and the acceptance of ownership of the consequences of such decisions. Popper (1998:176) defines this strain as the price to be paid for "every increase in knowledge, in reasonableness, in co-operation and in mutual help, and consequently in our chances of survival, and in the size of the population". In an attempt to not only escape the burden of personal responsibility, but to reconstruct a place of refuge, modern

man tends to arrest magical attitudes and all kinds of taboos. It appears therefore that whilst determination by taboos decreases the necessity of making rational decisions, it simultaneously smoothes the strain of modern civilisation. Modern man's tendency to cling to taboos might serve as a mechanism to escape into a situation where the responsibility of making rational decisions is regulated by certain totalitarian ideas. As such, it becomes evident that by appealing to historical judgement as if the course of world history is inevitably subject to historical laws, the rational person aims at escaping his/her responsibility and accountability with regard to historical development.

### **2.3.6.2 Absence of a consciousness of essence involves disharmonious disclosure**

In the advancement from an undifferentiated phase, historical development refers to the differentiated disclosure of unique structures such as science, art, the state, the church and the school, each with their intrinsic power spheres (cf. *infra*: 2.2.1 and 2.3.4). Since this process of disclosure involves the application of (fallible) personal power, the unfolding of such structures can easily be retarded in an "unhealthy" way. In this regard Visagie (1995:18; cf. also Clouser 1991:249) refers to a "consciousness of essence", indicating that, in the process of disclosure, the essence of each life sphere must be recognised. The absence of a consciousness of essence thus not only retards the unfolding of the unique nature of each structure, but holds certain consequences for society.

Dooyeweerd (1979:43; 1996:60) attributes unhappiness in modern society to the tendency of the human heart to eradicate, level and erase the boundaries between the peculiar and intrinsic natures of the various life spheres. The eradication of such boundaries is however only possible in a society where differentiation of culture has commenced, and is as such not possible in the closed and undifferentiated society. Because the power of a certain life sphere can only be overexpanded if it exists alongside other life spheres, the overextension of power consequently presupposes a process of differentiation. There is, however, no doubt that any extreme expansion of the historical power sphere of a specific life sphere will always occur at the expense of the other life spheres. The overextension of power therefore not only retards the unfolding of life spheres in an unhealthy way, but ultimately gives way to disharmony in the historical process of cultural development. The anti-normative nature of the extreme expansion of power therefore indicates not only a disregard of the intrinsic nature of the various life spheres, but also a

transgression of the norms of differentiation and cultural economy (Dooyeweerd 1979:86-87). From this follows that the attempt to seek sanctuary within a totalitarian society in order to minimise the strain of personal and rational decision-making and the acceptance of personal responsibility, coincides with the eradication of sphere boundaries.

Recognition of the intrinsic nature of a life sphere involves the appreciation of a concomitant distinct type of authority. Consequently, the transitional process from a closed to an open society involves the unfolding of various spheres and their corresponding authority structures. However, as Clouser (1991:251) clearly highlights, "the spheres of sovereignty do not correspond to different groups of people". The same society members may have responsibilities in more than one sphere of authority; while a father has certain responsibilities with regard to his family, he might simultaneously be a member of a school board and a business board, each requiring different kinds of responsibilities. A differentiated society thus implies differentiated responsibilities. Authority, however, involves rational decision-making and the acceptance of responsibility and accountability. From here it can be argued that the unfolding of the various spheres of life opens up the possibility for ever-increasing rational personal involvement. This indeed not only brings about strain upon the individual, but tends to encourage man to take refuge in a totalitarian society where authority resides in one supreme life sphere (cf. Popper 1998:174). Once the notion has been accepted that one specific aspect of human life, for example the state, is the source of all authority, it appears as if the strain of civilisation is slackened. The implication is that the acceptance of one supreme authority not only reminds of the closed society, but is the outcome of an eradication of boundaries that are determined by the inner nature of each sphere of life. However, the relaxation of personal responsibility is deceptive, for the arresting of the closed society claims retribution in the form of the retarded and unhealthy unfolding of culture (cf. Visagie 1995:5 and Walzer 1983:10 on *tyranny*)! Such retribution does not curtail the process of cultural unfolding itself, but takes its revenge by disharmonising the transitional process.

Since the disclosure of the social mode of existence plays such a profound role in the dismantling of cultural undifferentiatedness, the arresting of the closed society runs the risk of resulting in a situation where groups are not only marked off by their principles and possessions, but where they compete with each other in a struggle for supremacy (cf. Walzer 1983:12). Because supremacy is uneasily shared, society still has a need for what Bergson (1935:21) calls the

"primitive instinct" that is hidden under the accretions of civilisation. He defines this instinct as the necessity for a community to protect itself against others. The mere existence of such a necessity can be regarded as an indication of disharmony that can be linked to cultural isolationism - an anti-normative manifestation of the norm for historical development (Dooyeweerd 1996:44).

#### **2.4 Disharmonious transition leads to the emergence of an ideology**

From the above it can be stated that contrary to the restricted and static undifferentiatedness of the closed society, modern society reveals the distinction between differentiated communities that promote and protect social needs, economic concerns, aesthetical needs, concerns with regard to justice, love and the exercise of faith (cf. Clouser 1991:251 and Susser 1995:2). Thus, the absence of one undifferentiated and leading organisational form and the presence of a variety of structurally typical life forms imply that modern civilised society can no longer be described in terms of an undifferentiated condition. However, neither can modern society be unconditionally defined in terms of a *complete open society* where:

- ◆ all spheres of life have been unfolded according to their creational structures;
- ◆ the various spheres of life have been disclosed according to the norm of differentiation; and
- ◆ according to the norm of cultural economy, no sphere boundaries have been violated.

If it were possible to define modern society in terms of the above-mentioned, the implication would be that the historical process of cultural development had come to an end. The ultimate stage of cultural disclosure would then have been reached and Popper's (1998:175) assumption that the transition from the closed to the open society is still in its beginning, would indeed be relativised.

However, if the process of cultural disclosure had been fulfilled, how then should we account for a society characterised by totalitarian ideas and endless attempts to arrest the closed society? It appears that as long as society remains "a distributive system for the allocation of scarce resources - wealth, status, and power - and these resources, except in the yet unfulfilled promises of utopians, are distributed unequally" (Christenson, Engel, Jacobs, Rejai & Waltzer 1971:2), then cultural disclosure will continuously give way to disharmony in the historical process of cultural development. This situation of disharmony can be ascribed to an uneconomical

distribution of authority and power, a state of affairs that Visagie (1996:129 and 1995:4) attributes to certain "hypernorms" that take the form of *ultimate* values.

#### 2.4.1 Hypernorms constitute ideologies

Schoeman (1998:61, cf. also Schoeman 1995:98; Van der Walt 1994:355; Van Niekerk 1990:97 and Visagie & Pretorius 1993:54) defines a hypernorm as a label for the unlawful exaltation of an entity from a familiar social context, such as *inter alia* science, economics, ethnicity and culture to the status of an ultimate purpose. The result of such a hypernormative elevation is the extreme expansion of the historical power sphere of a specific life sphere at the expense of other life spheres. The "closed", although not undifferentiated, nature of the open society, resides in the enclosing of all of man's cultural relationships within the sphere of the hypernorm. Plamenatz (1979:74) indicates that whilst the criteria for the assessment of descriptions and explanations of natural events and human behaviour are not defined in the primitive society, it can equally be stated that neither are they defined in the advanced society. Although not defined, the persuasiveness of these criteria are not to be underestimated. While the persuasiveness of such criteria rests with the magical forces and taboos regulating all walks of life in the closed society, it is the particular *hypernorm that dictates the criteria for the interpretation of life in modern society* (cf. Schoeman 1998:56 and also Goduka 1996:27; Van Veuren 1991:35 and Visagie 1995:4-5). This extreme expansion of power not only relativises the rightful mandate of the various spheres of life, but ultimately results in the dominance of one sphere of justice over another. Walzer (1983:10-11) defines dominance as "a way of using social goods that isn't limited by their intrinsic meanings or that shapes those meanings in its own image". The conversion of such a dominant good into another good may appear to be a natural process, but it boils down to a kind of social alchemy. The claim to monopolise such a dominant good, the attendance to these hypernorms, constitutes an ideology.

#### 2.4.2 Conceptions of ideology

The term *ideology* has been characterised as one of the most elusive and controversial concepts in the history of social sciences (cf. Browning 1979:6; Christenson *et al.* 1971:3ff; Heywood 1992:6-8; Leatt, Kneifel & Nürnberger 1989:273; Schoeman 1998:1; Susser 1995:9 and Van Straaten 1987:12-14). Originating from the French Enlightenment, different meanings have been attributed to the concept - both positive and negative. Thompson (1984:3-4; 1994:5-6 and also

Van Veuren 1994:38-39) refers to two fundamentally different conceptions of the term; a *neutral* conception whereby ideology is defined as a "system of thought", and a *critical* conception, preserving the negative connotation linked to a process of maintaining relations of domination.

#### 2.4.2.1 Neutral conception of ideology

In order to illuminate the original positive, progressive and neutral concept of ideology, attention should be drawn to Antoine Destutt de Tracy's proposed science of ideas (ideo-logy) in 1797. In an attempt to free rational investigation into the origin of ideas from metaphysical prejudice, De Tracy explains that all ideas are based upon physical sensations (cf. McLellan 1986:6; Plamenatz 1979:15; Van Veuren 1994:39 and Thompson 1994:30). The analysis of ideas therefore, involves the investigation of individual sensations, and simultaneously reveals the coincidence of the natural and social as the common origin of universal human needs and desires. The positive conception of ideology lies, according to De Tracy, in its potential to not only place all sciences on the "true" foundation of "first science", but to present "authentic" knowledge by relativising all forms of metaphysics, theology and sentimental morality and prejudice in scientific endeavours (Susser 1995:17). By distinguishing genuine human needs from false impersonators, the task of ideology was to place knowledge on a secure and incontestable foundation.

Van Veuren (1994:38; cf. also Heywood 1992:5 and Thompson 1994:8) explains the neutral conception of ideology with the metaphor of "social cement": an ideology is a system of ideas that establishes social relations, fosters social coherence and integration, and ultimately stabilises societies by unifying its members through providing them with collectively shared values and norms. This view of unification through values and norms coincides with Van Niekerk's (1990:94-95; cf. also Leatt *et al.* 1989:281 and Plamenatz 1979:17) understanding of ideology as a life and world-view that provides a framework of normative principles as guide-lines for everyday life. In this regard ideology is understood as a system of ideas in order to interpret reality from a specific perspective. This neutral concept of ideology is also sustained in the Marxist tradition from Lenin through Lukács and Gramsci to Althusser, although within the tradition of class-relations (cf. Heywood 1992:7 and Van Veuren 1994:38). Whereas Lenin maintained that every class holds an all-encompassing world-view as an idea-system that is useful to analyse the social order, Lukács contrasts the false consciousness of world-views (ideologies) with the class-consciousness of the proletariat. However, in both cases the "social cement" of ideology unifies the members of a class on the level of class-consciousness. In continuation of this

tradition, Gramsci and Althusser look upon ideology as all-inclusive, reaching beyond economic conditions in society. Gramsci introduced a concept of ideological hegemony as a set of assumptions, theories and activities applied by the ruling class to exert its dominance through the workings of institutions such as the family, the church, the press and the school (Sharp 1980:102; McLellan 1986:30 and Leatt *et al.* 1989:283). Althusser (1971:150; cf. also Leatt *et al.* 1989:276-277 and Schoeman 1998:7-9) argues that by virtue of a large number of ideological state apparatuses - the educational apparatus, the religious apparatus, the family apparatus, the political apparatus, the trade-union apparatus, the communications apparatus, the cultural apparatus - ideology functions by binding classes together in positions of domination and subordination. The function and efficiency of an ideology does not reside in its truth or falsity, but rather in its ability to bind classes together in statuses of hegemony. According to the critical positivist stance, which promotes a "value-free" science, the unification of groups and sections of society by a particular set of value-systems and norms is unavoidable, however irrational, subjective and non-scientific (Leatt *et al.* 1989:273-274). While the existence of such "ideological" mind-sets need not be argued, it should be analysed for its impact on social processes.

The positive or neutral concept of ideology allows for an analysis of the way in which members of a particular group are unified and the impact of such an ideology on a given historical moment. Thompson (1994:5) states that, armed with the neutral conception of ideology, the analyst can aim at describing the major systems of thought that animate social and political movement, without distinguishing between the kinds of action that ideology actuates. However, the attempt to cast the concept ideology in a neutral wrapping presents certain problems. De Tracy's assumption that the formation of human ideas can be coupled with the anatomy and physiology of biological species, reveals a reductionist view of reality whereby the disclosure of the logical aspect is reduced to the biotic aspect. This reductionist view not only agrees with de Tracy's apriorism that the natural coincides with the social, but is coincidentally sustained by the promise "that reason triumphant would mean an end to social strife and suffering" (Susser 1995:17). De Tracy's positive presentation of ideology becomes less neutral because the irrational *belief* in reason not only renders all forms of metaphysical presuppositions (not necessarily prejudices) as worthless, but enforces the more-than-rational scope of ideology. Because the trust in reason is indeed not a rational matter, but rather a matter of faith, a particular commitment becomes inevitable when ideology is presented as an exposition of what is true and what is false.

Critical positivism is confronted by a similar problem: Visagie (1988:6; cf. also Bhola 1992:107) characterises positivism as "the ideal of building theory on nothing but verifiable facts". In the tradition of critical positivism, the study of the impact of ideology, as the epitome of everything that is irrational, subjective and non-scientific, on social processes will consequently result in a theory built on verifiable facts, constituting everything that is rational, objective and scientific! However, the positivist's trust in reason is not a matter of rationality, but rather a matter of faith, once again constituting a commitment that ultimately relativises the attempt to remain uncommitted. Mannheim (1940:79) noted that positivism, despite its anti-metaphysical prejudices, did commit itself to certain metaphysical and ontological judgements - its faith in progress and its naïve relativism in specific cases are indeed examples of such ontological judgements. The apparent neutral stance of the critical positivists is further abolished when it sanctions and supports the ideological and social *status quo* of an imperfect reality as the norm, without a critical reflection on reality's foundation in terms of more basic human values (Schoeman 1998:9-10 and Leatt *et al.* 1989:274).

With regard to the theory of ideology as a kind of "social cement", Thompson (1994:8; cf. also Plamenatz 1979:15) argues that there is little evidence to suggest that certain values and norms are shared by *all* members of modern societies. If ideology serves to unify people with collectively shared values and norms, and all members of society do not adhere to the same set of values and beliefs, various ideologies must therefore generate solidarity and enable different groups of people to interpret reality from divergent perspectives. While the closed society is governed by an implicit and unchallenged value system, it appears as if the modern pluralist society requires the self-conscious services of an ideology to foster cohesion and to serve the sectional interests of rival groups (Susser 1995:24 and McLellan 1986:3). When coupling ideology with a world-view, it becomes apparent that without a common ideology, social solidarity would be unattainable. Without a collective ideological idiom, communication with fellow citizens would not come easily. As all people do dispose of a world-view, it can be agreed that the mere understanding of ideology as a world-view can indeed be neutral and universal. However, since there is no guarantee that a world-view is necessarily correct and unbiased, is it possible to regard ideology as essentially positive in the sense that it provides to integrate man as a *balanced* personality and a *responsible* member of society? Wolters (1990:2-3; cf. also Schoeman 1998:35 and Troost 1983:113) defines a world-view as a comprehensive framework of basic committed beliefs, involving matters of general principles serving as a guide to life. Given



its pre-scientific nature, a world-view thus belongs to an order of cognition more basic than that of science. Ideology as a world-view is therefore indeed part of a complex realm of presuppositions that underscores human thoughts, including any conception of ideology. No conception of ideology can thus be completely neutral since it remains situated within an ideological culture.

#### 2.4.2.2 Negative conception of ideology

Contrary to De Tracy's appreciation of the study of ideology as a search for truth, Napoleon Bonaparte attached a pejorative connotation to the concept. This negative conception of ideology was later enforced by Marx when ideological ideas were labelled as basically false, partial and misleading (Heywood 1992:6; McLellan 1986:10; Thompson 1994:32-33 and Van Veuren 1994:39-40). De Tracy's influential identification of "true ideas" with revolutionary staples such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press subsequently became a threat to Napoleon's dictatorial aspirations. The liberal intellectuals of the Institut de France was denounced as "ideologues" who believed in social romance, and the "science of ideas" was labelled as a "metaphysical" system (Browning 1979:7; Christenson *et al.* 1971:4; Mannheim 1940:64; Susser 1995:17 and Van Straaten 1987:13). Not only did the concept "ideological" now enter the political arena, but the negative shade of meaning has accompanied it ever since.

#### A. Marx and Engels

In Marxist discourse two features of the theory of ideology can be identified: the *illusionary and misleading* nature of ideological ideas pertaining to the notion of false consciousness, and the *functional* nature of the ideas in sustaining relations of domination and exploitation (cf. Goudzwaard 1984:31; Heywood 1992:7; Leatt *et al.* 1989:273-274; Plamenatz 1979:23 ff; Schoeman 1998:3-5; Sharp 1980:91; Van Veuren 1994:39 and Van Straaten 1987:14-15). The tensions and contradictions produced by the division of society into classes gave rise to the conception of ideology as an effort to resolve contradictions on the level of consciousness. However, ideological resolutions of social conflict can never be real solutions, since ideological thought and conceptions are regarded as distorted and false representations (false consciousness) of true reality. The illusionary feature of ideological conceptions is identified with an "ideological" body of ideas that produces the illusion that it constitutes a separate "reality" that is completely divorced from concrete human praxis (Ricoeur 1986:21; Van Veuren 1994:40).

Although the autonomy of ideas divorced from praxis are illusionary, they do refer to something in reality, though refracted and transfigured in consciousness.

Sharp (1980:92; cf. also McLellan 1986:14-15) indicates that ideologies, in the Marxist tradition, are viewed as systems of representations that signify a set of relationships that is real, but simultaneously hide another set of relations between people that is no less real. Because Marx has moved beyond the view of society as an expressive totality to a mode of production characterised by political, ideological and economic levels, ideas are no longer mere epiphenomena emerging from real economic relations, but apprehensions of real underlying relations. These refracted and transfigured ideas are only to be found in the consciousness of the "ruling classes" and were employed to not only conceal the realities of class exploitation and oppression, but to legitimise, rationalise and sanction the economic arrangements from which the ruling class derived its privileges. Marx (Susser 1995:19; cf. also McLellan 1986:13) contends that the dominant class controls the production and consumption of ideas no less than they control the wealth and power of a society. Since the ruling class accepts ideological deceptions uncritically as the truth, the collective illusion remains that the *status quo* is the only reality, claiming that "a proportionate share is attributed to everybody according to his status in society or level of education" (Leatt *et al.* 1989:275; cf. also Schoeman 1998:5).

In the Marxist tradition only those elements in the superstructure of ideas that served to perpetuate relations of domination were considered to be ideological. Van Veuren (1991:33) explains that, due to its confidence in its own ability to get a theoretical grip on the totality of historical processes, the Marxist theory never made provision for its own failure. The beliefs and ideas of the masses, as the representatives of the genuine socialist consciousness, were never regarded as being illusory and therefore ideologically confined to the surface appearance of the ruling class. The course of social change, the needed revolution that would enable the masses to rise above false consciousness and the accompanying structures of domination and relations of subordination, were regarded as true per definition and never "ideological" in nature (cf. Schoeman 1998:3; also Goudzwaard 1984:31 and Plamenatz 1979:26-27). Although Marx and Engels did not distinguish between the elements that make up an ideology, the term was now attributed a derogatory meaning, associated with the concept of totalitarianism.

## B. Mannheim

In an attempt to disentangle all the different shades of meaning, Karl Mannheim distinguishes between two different approaches to ideology: the "particular" and the "total" (Mannheim 1940:49-51; cf. also Browning 1979:11-12; Leatt *et al.* 1989:279 and Susser 1995:20). The "particular" conception is implied when the ideas and representations of the opponent are disguises of the true nature of the particular situation, aimed at discrediting a specific enemy. Only those parts of an opponent's thought that are regarded as not being in accord with his own interests, are presented in the form of conscious and half-conscious disguises. In this regard Mannheim (1940:54) identifies a phenomenon intermediate between a simple lie and an error as the result of a distorted conceptual apparatus. As the "particular" conception never departs from the psychological level, the analyses of ideas remain on a purely psychological level. Although the point of reference is always the individual, the opponent is not necessarily excluded from discussion on the basis of a common theoretical frame of reference as common criteria of validity may be shared (Mannheim 1940:50-51).

In contrast to the "particular" conception, the "total ideology" determines the whole of the opponent's thought. Within the realm of a "total ideology" fundamentally divergent thought-systems and differing modes of experience and interpretations are involved. While the analysis of statements in the particular ideology operates only on the psychological sphere, it is evident that we touch upon "the theoretical or noological level whenever we consider not merely the content but also the form, and even the conceptual framework of a mode of thought as a function of the life situation of a thinker" (Mannheim 1940:51). Because Mannheim considers the particular and total conceptions as two distinct currents of historical development, these forms can easily be freed from ideology. In this regard Leatt *et al.* (1989:279; cf. also Susser 1995:20-21) allude to Mannheim's general concept of ideology, referring to the problem surrounding human thought that is inevitably ideological. If all ideas, according to Mannheim's *sociology of knowledge*, are equally conditioned by historical regularities and sociological laws and bound to certain social realities, how can one escape the threat of relativism? To counter a relativist view of reality, Mannheim (1940:87; cf. also Van Veuren 1991:31) introduces his relational view when he states that thought "should contain neither less nor more than the reality in whose medium it operates". Mannheim (1940:33; cf. also Leatt *et al.* 1989:280; Susser 1995:21) hereby relativises the relativism of historicism by showing that the relatively classless

middle-stratum of intellectuals are equipped to put all ideological pieces together from a detached viewpoint, rather than viewing all ideologies from a fixed (ideological) position.

The foregoing exposition of the history of the concept of ideology reveals an oscillation between a positive and a negative connotation. However, the initial critical connotation and function signifying ideology as a tool of the search for truth, was largely forfeited when it generated into a receptacle for all forms of social and political thought. The emergence of the Nazi movement, disillusionment with Stalinism, Communist Russia and China's distrust of ideologically uncommitted men, and the attempt to eliminate ideological heresy by purge and terror, have indeed promoted a concern to explain the origin and power of ideological ideals (cf. Christenson *et al.* 1971:4-5 and McLellan 1986:7). However, as Schoeman (1998:10) indicates, whereas some ideologies are equated with science and others are taken as belonging to the realm of non-scientific knowledge, the eventual proof of what is ideological and what is non-ideological, becomes a highly un-neutral matter of truth and falsehood.

#### **2.4.3 Idols, idolatry and ideology - an intricate relation**

In order to argue the legitimacy of a negative concept of ideology, Sir Francis Bacon's theory of idols, indicating that society and tradition may become sources of terror, may to a certain extent be regarded as the forerunner of the modern term 'ideology'. In his *Novum Organum*, Bacon (Devey 1864:389; cf. also Mannheim 1940:55 and McLellan 1986:4) alluded to idols and false notions that are so deeply rooted that they "not only so beset men's minds that they become difficult of access, but even when access is obtained will again meet and trouble us in the instauration of sciences". In the tradition of Bacon's (Devey 1864:393-394) assumption that man believes more readily what he prefers, Van der Walt (1994:340-355; cf. also Goudzwaard 1984:17-24) gives an exposition of how idolatry (worshipping of idols) can be linked to ideolatry (worshipping of ideas).

As a result of the rigid condition of the cultural domain of the primitive society, the whole takes part in actions similar to activities performed by independent life forms in differentiated societies (Dooyeweerd 1984/III:345; Strauss 1991:99). Due to the closed condition of the primitive society, it does not reveal the rich variety of reality, and consequently idol worshipping remains limited to gods of nature. However, as the variety of life forms come to the fore in the gradual

process of cultural-historical differentiating and disclosing, these magical and deterministic forces start to lose their control over human life. Although human needs and desires are taken care of by the various social communities in the differentiated society, man has lost the absolute anchor and rational certainties provided by the undifferentiated leading structure in the closed society. Whereas modern society lies claim on personal rational decisions and responsibility, modern man has to a certain extent been left stranded and disorientated. It is in this regard that Van der Walt (1994:343) argues that modern *fabrica idolatorium* manufacture *cultural* gods as idols.

According to Van der Walt (1994:348; cf. also Leatt *et al.* 1989:284) an idol is "created" when "a fragment of creation is blown to the stature of a god". The rich variety of life spheres that have come to the fore in the process of cultural disclosure, escalates the possibilities for idolatry. Economic goods, technology, science, the own nation, the general will of the people and the state are all examples of possible idols in which disorientated modern man might place his trust for human happiness and peace. However, idolatry is hard work - man has to make his gods, he has to maintain them and then he has to bear with them when more and more sacrifices are demanded for idolatrous survival. Idols promise salvation, they explain things that are difficult to cope with and they also feed on dreams of a "perfect" future (Van der Walt 1994:354-356; cf. also Goudzwaard 1984:21 and Schoeman 1998:11).

By drawing a parallel between primitive idol worship and modern idol worship, Goudzwaard (1984:22; also Van Niekerk 1990:99 and Van der Walt 1994:355) indicates the important role of fear in idolatry. While man is creator of his/her own idol, the roles are soon reversed when the idol imprints its image on its maker. Although the idol worshipper begins to resemble the idolatrous obsessions, there is no guarantee that salvation necessarily lies with the particular deified aspect of life, and not in another. Idolatry can never offer complete and final satisfaction, only fear of the wrath of the idol. Idolars are thus not free people, because they have become enslaved to idolised, elevated and absolutised ideas and ideals.

At the root of all ideologies lie legitimate, honourable and praiseworthy social objectives. As such, the resistance of oppressive and alienating powers; the preservation of cultural uniqueness and heritage; the conservation of prosperity and the protection against any attacks from outside, are all legitimate ideals that may be pursued in good faith. However, the moment the chosen end relates to only one "*idolized* (absolutized, deified) aspect (cultural, social, economical),

*relationship* (race, nation, state, church) or *activity* (science, technology, worship) of our many-sided social world", an ideology is called into being (Schoeman 1998:11; cf. also Goudzwaard 1984:20; Leatt *et al.* 1989:284; Mannheim 1940:36; Strauss 1998b:1; Van der Walt 1994:377 and Visagie 1995:4). The obsession with a particular ideal provides the gateway for idolatry to take form in the pursuit of a legitimate end. Once an ideal becomes so important that it is an idol, the worshipping of the ideal can be labelled ideology - ideology is indeed a contemporary form of idolatry, a notion that legitimates and justifies the negative connotation the concept has attained.

#### **2.4.4 Anatomy of an ideology**

Various definitions of ideology can be found in modern literature: Christenson *et al.* (1971:5) refers to an ideology as a *belief-system* that explains and justifies a preferred *political* order for society. Lifton (1969:419) adds a sensitive-psychical nuance by characterising ideology as a set of *emotionally-charged convictions* about man and his/her world, carried by its adherents in a totalist direction. Adams (1990:257) reflects on ideology as a form of ethical belief that presents a moralised conception of humanity, while Van Straaten (1987:12; also Plamenatz 1979:15, 28) explains an ideology as "a set of ideas with some practical influence, shaped by specific social interest". Degenaar (1983:1; cf. also Ashley 1989:2; Goudzwaard 1984:18; Heywood 1992:7 and Van der Walt 1994:357) continues in the same direction, defining ideology as "an action-oriented set of beliefs which tend to function in a totalitarian way and which reflects the interests of a certain social group". Although a highly controversial concept, all ideologies nevertheless appear to exhibit certain basic characteristics.

##### **2.4.4.1 Importance of a condition of crisis**

Van der Walt (1994:35; Christenson *et al.* 1971:9 and Goudzwaard 1984:26; cf. also Browning 1979:4) refers to conditions of crisis as the most fertile breeding ground for the emergence of an ideology. However, by proposing that an ideology originates in a threatening situation merely explains the cause for its emergence, not the reason for the condition of crisis itself. This problem is addressed by Christenson *et al.* (1971:9) who attributes conditions of crisis to periods of intense social strain where the status of certain people are threatened by fundamental changes in society. According to the strain theory, a high degree of social instability and disequilibrium appear in a situation where socio-historical transformations render traditional social norms and

modes of thought antiquated (Browning 1979:17; cf. also Ashley 1980:1). Marx (1970:20-21 as cited in Sharp 1980:87-88) on the other hand, relates conditions of social crisis to a certain stage of the social production of human existence when the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production. Popper (1998:176) considers such a crisis as the outcome of the shock of social change that is caused by the transitional process from a closed to an open society. There thus appears to be a connection between social change and crisis: the way in which social change is brought about will result in certain conditions of crisis.

Social change, however, is an indication of the process of cultural differentiation, brought about by social contact with other civilisations - e.g. the contact of a civilisation that is technologically more advanced may cause traumatic social changes when more and more people are drawn into the networks of technological atrocities. The implication is that old assumptions and traditional patterns are often challenged in times of social change, leaving mankind disoriented and confused. Thus, the process of cultural disclosure appears to harbor conflict between the guardians of tradition and the propounders of new ideas (Dooyeweerd 1996:60; 1979:70; cf. Floor 1974:17 and Freire 1979:7). Because cultural development in the closed society is restricted to the narrow bounds of an undifferentiated cultural community, tradition remains all-powerful and any attempt at renewal is rejected. However, the transitional process from a closed to an open society is dynamic and affords, in subjection to the norm of historical continuity, a rightful place to progress and renewal *alongside* tradition and the power to conserve. This means that every generation is historically bound to former generations by its tradition. Progress and renewal are, however, never possible when such a cultural community remains isolated. The cling to tradition at the expense of renewal is not only unhistorical, but reminds of the closed and undifferentiated society where tradition is regarded as absolute. At the same time, it is not possible to destroy all bonds with the past and begin with a clean slate as if the order of creation could be overturned. It therefore appears as if the event of crisis in the transitional process can be associated with the struggle between the power of tradition and progressive ideas. This implies that a disregard for the coequal position of both powers can be linked to the human tendency to eradicate and relativise boundaries between the intrinsic natures of the variety of life spheres (Dooyeweerd 1979:43). For the sake of clarity it seems inevitable at this point to elaborate on a structurally pluralistic view of society in contrast to a hierarchical view.

A structurally pluralistic view of society coincides with the harmonious disclosure of culture whereby all spheres of life have been disclosed, each according to its own intrinsic nature and structural principles (infra:2.3.4). By virtue of the distinct nature of such entities, each is not only granted the lawful right to decide on its own affairs, but simultaneously enjoys a relative coequal status and coequal position in horizontal relation to each other. This means that the plurality of types of communities not only enjoy internal sovereignty, but exhibit a specific competence and authority to decide on the way in which to fulfil its structural purpose. At the same time, as suggested by Clouser (1991:250), the differentiated society exhibits a great variety of social communities, each promoting and protecting the diversity of human needs and desires. The competence and authority of the various communities to take care of human needs and abilities consequently resides in the intrinsic nature of the community itself. It thus becomes clear that the nature of authority is relational in the sense that it is limited by the boundaries of the specific aspect of reality which it constitutes. Authority and competence within the realm of the economic enterprise can be distinguished from juridically qualified authority; while school-typical authority may never be identified with the authority of the parents (cf. Schoeman 1980:38-39,138 and also Clouser 1991:252; Mentz & Van der Westhuizen 1992:30 and Walzer 1983:10). Placed within the context of the principle of sphere-sovereignty, a structurally pluralistic view of society thus *in principle* cancels any tendency to view the various kinds of authorities and competencies in society as subsidiary authorities derived from a supreme all-encompassing authority.

Consequently, the tendency of a particular group of people to reject the specific authority of a community to take care of its own needs and purposes, relates to the eradication of the boundaries between the intrinsic natures of the various life spheres. Such an eradication not only violates the structural integrity of the life spheres, but subsequently relativises the competence of the communities to adequately address relational human needs and desires. In this regard Walzer (1983:11) claims that history reveals "no single dominant good and no naturally dominant good, but only different kinds of magic and competing bands of magicians". However, by regarding a single community as the highest, as the dominant good, society is no longer regarded in structurally pluralistic terms, but in hierarchical terms, depriving communities of their lawful right of deciding on their own affairs (cf. Clouser 1991:253; Schoeman 1980:141 and Strauss 1998b:1). A hierarchical view of society is therefore indeed a reductionist view of reality as it "obstructs comprehension of a reality which is the outcome of constant reorganization of the



mental processes which make up our worlds" (Mannheim 1940:84; cf. also Christenson *et al.* 1971:11).

Conditions of crisis can thus be ascribed to a hierarchical view of society where the needs and objectives of certain groups of people are no longer addressed in an adequate and satisfactory fashion. Walzer (1983:12) refers to the ideological seizure of a dominant good, resulting in a monopoly of the good itself. The ideological justification of such a seizure is only believed to be true by a particular group. Those who believe the seizure to be an usurpation, place their hope and trust in a specific ideal or life sphere in order to provide deliverance from an unjust and threatening situation. Modern society thus appears to be caught up in a Catch 22-paradox: a hierarchical view of society causes a particular situation of crisis as a result of which a particular group elevates (idolises) a particular ideal, goal, value or interest to a position of domination over other goals, values, norms and practices, thus sustaining a hierarchical view of society. In this regard Browning (1979:17) refers to an ideology as "both a symptom of and a remedy for the overwhelming anxieties created by social disequilibrium". The hatching of an ideology can ultimately be identified with a totalitarian conception of society as the *outcome* of an already existing totalitarian perception of society. The paradox continues: the presentation of one aspect of reality as the totality of all other aspects, not only causes new conditions of crisis in society as a result of which the intrinsic nature of spheres are once again relativised, but also calls up its antipodes in the form of counter-ideologies (Dooyeweerd 1979:180; cf. also Christenson *et al.* 1971:25; Leatt *et al.* 1989:284; Lifton 1969:435; Mannheim 1940:207; Schoeman 1998:102 and Van der Walt 1994:339).

#### **2.4.4.2 Ideology involves a more-than-rational scope**

Despite the variety of definitions, there appears to be consensus on defining ideology as a "belief-system" or a "set of basic beliefs". However, can an ideological belief-system as a framework of basic beliefs concerning man and the world, be linked to a theory of knowledge? Adams (1990:258; cf. also Christenson *et al.* 1971:6 and Heywood 1992:2,7) is of the opinion that "all ideologies have some kind of theoretical structure which purports to tell us how the human world is, explains how it came to be in its present condition and what its potential is for the future". Illiterate groups of people, incapable of constructing theories can nevertheless possess ideologies. In the same way all followers of an ideology in a literate group, cannot be

theorists. Susser (1995:13-14) draws the difference between (political) theory and ideology in terms of debate: while debate in political theory is never closed, ideology tends to be presented with a finality and conclusiveness that attempts to close debate. An ideology as a set of basic beliefs, refers to the shared and naive everyday experience of a particular social group. It can therefore never be linked to a particular theory of knowledge as it belongs to an order of cognition that is *more basic* than theory or science. The belief-system that constitutes an ideology is not only pre-scientific in nature, but it is also part of a realm of presuppositions which *underpins* all human theories (Schoeman 1998:10, 23ff; Wolters 1990:9). All theories of knowledge will ultimately reflect the status of the belief-system (whether it be of ideological nature or not) by which it is underscored.

However, if we were to assume that all belief-systems are of ideological nature, it would not have been possible to qualify such a system as ideological, but merely as a belief-system. As all belief-systems are therefore not necessarily of ideological nature, what then constitutes the difference between an ideologically coloured set of beliefs and a belief-system that is not of ideological nature? Plamenatz (1979:31) argues that beliefs are ideological when they constitute a system of beliefs which serves to either hold a group of people together, or to justify their activities and attitudes or to promote their interests. He (1979:31) further postulates that the ideological nature of a belief-system relates to its acceptance "regardless of whether or not its constituent beliefs satisfy the criteria of truth". However, for a belief-system to be of non-ideological nature it thus has to serve the criteria of truth. It now becomes imperative to approximate what should be regarded as the *criteria of truth*.

In order to determine what criteria of truth should be satisfied by a (non-ideological) belief-system, attention should once again be drawn to the association of an ideology with a hierarchical view of society (infra:2.3.5). Contrary to the hierarchical view of society which constitutes an ideological belief-system, it appears as if the structurally pluralist view may be regarded as non-ideological. As previously argued, it can be stated that belief-systems involve a system of metaphysical presuppositions (*a priories*) that "colour" judgements concerning reality (cf. Mannheim 1940:86 and Puolimatka 1995:125). In this regard the question can be raised whether there exists a relation between the nature of these *a priories* and the ideological (or non-ideological) status of a belief-system? Dooyeweerd (1984/II:547-548; cf. also Kalsbeek 1975:174-175) distinguishes between *structural a priori* and *subjective a priori*. In the

cosmological sense, the *structural a priori* refers to the structurally pluralistic view of reality as constituted by an irreducible plurality of distinct spheres of life that co-exist on the basis of horizontal interlinkages. This *a priori* has the character of law in the sense that every life form is unique and constituted by its own type of "law" that guarantees the internal sovereignty of the particular life form in its own sphere of competence. As such, it can be stated that the school exhibits a distinct structural purpose and internal organisation that differs, in principle, from that of, *inter alia*, the state or the business enterprise (cf. supra:3.2 on *the universal horizon of human experience*).

According to the structurally pluralistic view of reality the *structural a priori* cannot be true or false - as stated, it has the character of a law. Any belief-system involves and is thus driven by a particular (thus subjective) insight into the *structural a priori*. This insight (*subjective a priori*) will consequently be true when the irreducible plurality of life spheres is recognised, or it will be false when a particular life sphere is elevated to the status of supreme authority, while the others are placed in a position of subordination. In this regard it appears as if there is a definite link between the nature of the subjective insight into the *structural a priori* and the ideological or non-ideological nature of a belief-system. If a belief-system is determined by a *subjective a priori* that acknowledges a structurally pluralistic view of life spheres, then it will indeed be of non-ideological nature. However, when a *subjective a priori* relates to a hierarchical view of life spheres, then a belief-system will be of ideological nature. It consequently appears as if the *criteria of truth* lies within the *structural a priori*, which can be linked to the notion of a structurally pluralistic society. Since an ideology encloses the irreducible plurality of life spheres in an elevated and absolutised aspect of reality, it is apparent that the "ideological insight" into the *structural a priori* does not recognise the internal character and structure of the distinct spheres of life - it does not satisfy the *criteria of truth*.

As belonging to a prescientific realm of presuppositions, an ideology is indeed more-than rational - whatever precedes a belief-system, refers to all the aspects of life, irrespective of a structurally pluralistic or a hierarchical view of reality. An ideological belief-system should consequently never be reduced to a mere emotionally-charged (rational or irrational) understanding of reality, nor, although it appears to be highly suitable for political exploitation, should it be confined to the political realm which refers to only one side of the many-sided reality (cf. Visagie 1995:3;

Schoeman 1998:20 and also Chisholm 1981:135; Christenson *et al.* 1971:10 and Heywood 1992:8).

#### 2.4.4.3 Ideologues claim a monopoly on truth

Ideas and ideals not only exert a very powerful and positive influence on the lives of individuals and the community, but can also provide social groups or even whole communities with a set of *unifying* beliefs and values (Heywood 1992:5 and Van der Walt 1994:337). As a unifying belief-system, based on a particular subjective *a priori*, it provides a group of people with a coherent and all-inclusive interpretation of reality and simultaneously affords a perspective through which the world can be explained and understood (cf. Mannheim 1940:86). As such, a view of life and the world acts as a form of social motivation, not only providing the motive and justification for social behaviour, but most importantly, introducing certainty and security into the life of individuals and the community. The collective sharing of a totality of insights regarding the type of life a group of people considers worth pursuing, promotes solidarity and compatibility amongst all members of a community (Schoeman 1998:36; Van Niekerk 1990:95).

However, once placed in a situation of social disequilibrium where the perspective of a particular group is challenged, the group may suffer a loss of orientation. In order to defend the ideas and practices of the group in question, the once plausible ideals are idolised to pursue self-realisation in a totalitarian way (cf. Susser 1995:13; Goudzwaard 1984:24; Lifton 1969:419; Van der Walt 1994:337; Van Niekerk 1990:97 and Van Veuren 1991:35). Since the integration of a pattern of ideas around one or a few basic premises assumes hypernormative status, the adherents of an ideology claim to be the sole and exclusive possessors of "truth". In terms of its own hypernormative logic, an ideology legitimates not only the standards by which a particular life style is chosen, but consequently contains its own rules of change and development by dictating the "true" principles of progress and justice. An ideological belief-system is not only regarded as self-sufficient, but becomes a variable blend of fact and value, description and diagnosis, normativity and prescription, all fused in a powerful driving force constituted by self-justification (cf. Adams 1990:259; Christenson *et al.* 1971:11,15; Heywood 1992:7 and Lifton 1969:421). Disoriented and confused by social disequilibrium, the ideological belief-system becomes the embodiment of the sole solution to turn disequilibrium into equilibrium. Consequently, the

meaningfulness of an ideology lies in its duty to create an environment that contains no more and no less of what is regarded to be the "ultimate truth".

#### 2.4.4.4 Disregard of criticism

As the exclusive possessor of reality, the rules and arguments justifying ideological choices are not negotiable: neither are rival views, or self-criticism tolerated (Christenson *et al.* 1971:11; Heywood 1992:7; Van der Walt 1994:338). The rejection of opposing theories can be coupled with Morrow's (1989:156ff) perception of external criticism as criticism of the doctrine (ideology) as such. The problem with external criticism is that the adherents of an ideology does not recognise it as criticism, but rather as insanity, disobedience and ignorance. By disregarding external criticism in terms of these stratagems, the ideological belief-system is effectively isolated and insulated from criticism. In fact, the assumption of omniscience even provides the ideology with the "right" to provide criteria for evaluating the beliefs, goals and conduct of other groups, individuals and nations. The disregard of external criticism is further strengthened by the dichotomy housed in an ideological belief-system: although an ideology emerges for the benefit of a selective group only, it is framed in universal terms when the group's interests are legitimised as being good and true for all (Christenson *et al.* 1971:12; cf. also Goudzwaard 1984:24-25; Schoeman 1998:60 and Van Veuren 1994:45). Ideological critique will therefore always be regarded as criticism against other ideologies, since ideology "is someone *else's* thought, seldom our own" (McLellan 1986:1; cf. also Althusser 1971:175; Ricoeur 1986:2 and Van der Walt 1994:338).

Self-criticism should be distinguished from internal criticism: the latter refers to the criticism of problems within the framework of the belief-system, in adherence to rules and conventions laid down by the ideology itself (cf. Morrow 1989:157). Internal criticism, therefore, is not so much an opponent of the ideology, but serves as a co-worker of the ideology. Self-criticism, however, entails the critical questioning of the entire system of values, conceptions, convictions and norms that are fused together to constitute an ideology. Existing states of affairs are therefore not taken as given, but subject to appraisal. Such appraisal indeed implies an opposition to simply acquiescing to the *status quo* (Puolimatka 1995:74; cf. also Soudien 1995:38). Venturing beyond the familiar and the false security of derived authoritarianism towards unexplored possibilities, a tension between the existing state of affairs and a world which could rationally be conceived as

becoming reality, emerges. However, it appears as if a belief-system attempts at regulating human liberty by setting the parameters of expectations and choices. Although totalitarianism often professes a love for "true" freedom (cf. Popper 1998:107), individual freedom of choice remains determined by ideological rules, regulations, and subsequently by ideological taboos. The underestimation of human liberty and the disregard of external criticism, and also self-criticism, ultimately culminates in "a fundamental denial of the value of the individual personality in the opening-up process of history" (Dooyeweerd 1996:62; cf. Schoeman 1998:141).

#### 2.4.4.5 An ideological belief-system and the role of the individual

Since an ideological belief-system presents a reasonable case to legitimise the standards for ideological choices and also maintains "an aura of sacredness around its basic dogma, holding it out as an ultimate moral vision for the ordering of human existence", followers are only required to passively adapt to the ideologically coloured environment (Lifton 1969:427). By appealing to a "higher purpose", the adherents of the ideology become part of "the chosen people" who have been *chosen* to pursue the ideological ideal that supersedes all other ideals and considerations. Since the ideological ideal gives *certainty* and a *sense of self-justification* to those who adhere to it, criticism from within such a closed view of reality does not only become virtually impossible, but is simply disregarded as unnecessary.

According to Popper (1998:9), there is no doubt that the doctrine of the "chosen people" stems from the tribal form of social life. In the closed society individuality retains a certain traditional uniformity. The rigid dominance of tradition not only encloses the entire life of the members of the primitive society, but also ensures that the same individual features are displayed from generation to generation. Popper refers to two elements of modern society that reminds of the closed and primitive society: the element of *collectivism* and the promotion of a *particular end*. Although the differentiated society displays an individuality where every individual contribution to the process of cultural disclosure is a contribution to the development of humankind, ideologies display an element of collectivism that annihilates the process of cultural development. Coupled with a closed world-view, an ideological belief-system that presents part of reality as total reality, isolates its adherents not only from external criticism, but also from social intercourse with those who adhere to different belief-systems. Claiming a monopoly of truth, an ideology attempts, based on a norm of righteousness, to provide an all-embracing answer to

ultimate questions (Goduka 1996:28; Heywood 1992:7; Lifton 1969:421; Schoeman 1998:21; cf. also Christenson *et al.* 1971:16, 41 and Walzer 1983:11). As the truth resides in the ideology, whatever is false must reside outside the ideological parameters. The polarisation between true and false, between the pure and the impure, shifts any association with insanity, disobedience and ignorance to the "enemy" who threatens the realisation of the (ideological) solution to social crisis. Goudzwaard (1984:25; cf. also Christenson *et al.* 1971:40-41 and Van der Walt 1994:339,365) argues that this image of the enemy will never be accurate as its suitability lies only in its usefulness to the ideological goal. Not only does the image of an enemy provide a scapegoat for all that is wrong in society, but it consequently enforces the perception that the ideological struggle is worth pursuing.

Providing a sense of certainty and security, the ideological faith becomes a sanctuary where the individual personality merely has to be subjected to a set of rules regulating all walks of life. Parallel to the rigidly controlled life of the individual who had to operate in a single intellectual frame of reference in the primitive society, stands the modern individual who allows the ideological belief-system to intercept the demands for rationality and differentiated responsibility in the open society. Since the ideology defines permitted and prescribed outlets for all ambitions and because rights, privileges and obligations are stipulated, the individual personality, similar to the tribe member, rarely finds himself in a position of doubting how to act (cf. Christenson *et al.* 1971:15; Popper 1998:172; Susser 1995:2-3 and also Van Veuren 1991:35). While the "right" way is determined, the only responsibility of man is it to make an absolute polarisation of the real (the prevailing ideology) and the unreal (everything else). Once the "right" choice has been made, man undergoes a personal disclosure that frees him from the "incessant struggle with the elusive subtleties of truth" (Lifton 1969:421; cf. also Soudien 1995:37). Being part of the "chosen", the collectively shared sense of omniscience assumes a "God's-eye view" of the universe. This element of collectivism not only reminds of tribalism where the individual is nothing without the tribe, but poses to contribute towards arresting the closed society, while simultaneously exerting a negative effect on the transitional process from a closed to an open society.

Since the polarisation between the pure and the impure highlights the necessity of an ideological struggle, the responsibility of the individual becomes oriented towards a contribution to the "noble" struggle to search out and eliminate impurity. The value of the individual personality is consequently enclosed in the orientation of the ideological group towards a particular end where

purity will reign. However, because the final state of the ideology appears to be remote, the ideology claims to be "transitory phases in a development to an end-state" (Van Veuren 1991:42; cf. also Popper 1998:9 and Van der Walt 1994:340). In the light of the fulfilment and perfection of the envisioned future and by virtue of being the sole possessors of truth, adherents of an ideology are persuaded and moved to work, to serve, to sacrifice and to endure with passion, certainty and conviction. Ideology works with a "controlled" future - it takes out a draft on the future by setting the parameters of choices and expectations. Propelled by a blind faith in the inevitable becoming of the ideological end, the utopia, individual and collective choices remain oriented towards the ideologically determined future. In this regard it becomes apparent that utopian elements in ideology not only function as supportive legitimation from the future to the present, but are also operative in integrating the past and present of a group from the future (Van Veuren 1991:42). Utopian legitimation therefore contributes to the establishment of unity in the group. The role of the individual personality in this unified group may be regarded in conjunction with Lifton's (1969:421; cf. also Puolimatka 1995:18 and Schoeman 1998:151) argument that the controllers of a closed ideological system are also "engineers" of the human soul. To ensure that the future choices of the follower will be to the satisfaction of the ideology, milieu control appears to be the only way in which domain over the individual's communication with the "outside" world and with the self, can be established. Once the individual personality stands in service of the ideology, no *sacrifice* is deemed too important - the eventual *becoming* of the ideological end serves as a dynamic driving force in the individual and collective life (Schoeman 1998:22; cf. also Goudzwaard 1984:25 and Susser 1995:6).

#### 2.4.4.6 Means of mobilisation

It has become customary to refer to ideology as the justification of the *status quo*, and utopia as the negation of the *status quo*; ideology as the position of the others and utopia as a kind of social dream, advocated by the self (Ricoeur 1986:1-2 and Van Veuren 1991:39; cf. also Mannheim 1940:173ff). However, since all ideologies stem from and propagate a particular ideal, the presence of utopia elements in ideological thought is evident - the social dream of a society where the present social crisis will no longer be a factor, legitimises not only the ideological struggle, but constitutes the transitional phase of the present. Even when the ruling ideology justifies the *status quo*, the ideological end is still to be accomplished. As the *status quo* plays a profound role in the searching out and eliminating of "impurity", the justification of the present in terms of a



transitional phase, indeed serves the ideological utopia. Only when the utopia has come into existence, all those guilty of insanity, disobedience and ignorance will ultimately be able to grasp the abstraction of the "true" reality (cf. Adams 1990:259). However, since the ruling ideology calls up its antipode in the form of a counter-ideology, the *status quo* will indeed be negated. Regarded as an "impurity" in the transitional phase to the utopia, the *status quo* needs to be removed and overthrown. For Erikson (in Browning 1979:19) an ideology involves more than a world-view, it involves an utopian outlook that is shared by all the adherents as self-evident and thus beyond any need for demonstration. Utopian legitimation appears therefore to play a profound role in ideology, irrespective whether it justifies or negates the *status quo*.

Placed within the context of utopian legitimation, ideological carriers are required to provide adherents with the necessary ideological cues for the purification of society in totality. Due to the totalitarian character of ideology, literally all spheres of life, all institutions, societal relationships and activities need to be utilised in the transitional phase from social impurity to proposed social purity. Institutional carriers such as political parties, group interests, the church, trade unions, education and communication media are only but a few examples of institutional carriers without which an ideology will outlive its utility (cf. Christenson *et al.* 1971:10-11 and Leatt *et al.* 1989:76). However, to mobilise and manipulate the adherents and simultaneously dominate those who still cannot grasp "true" reality, all ideological carriers must employ certain means for the realisation of the final aim.

#### **A. Perversion of norms**

Adams' (1990:258) reflection on ideology as a form of ethical belief suggests a particular moral vision carried by an ideology. Such a moral vision not only implies a moralised conception of humanity in a moralised universe, but is consequently preceded by the development of a vocabulary legitimising the moralised conception. Terms of obvious moral content, such as exploitation, oppression, justice, truth and love are used to define other terms that usually have no moral content. Awarded with moral content, terms such as class, race, nationality and state embody moral viewpoints. Generally accepted norms and values are distorted and redefined to become instrumental in motivating people to pursue the ideological end (Goudzwaard 1984:18,24-25; Schoeman 1998:12 and Van der Walt 1994:362-363). These norms and values

are transformed from *guidelines* into *means* that contribute to ostensibly "objective" explanations and justification.

Since people need principles and values to give direction to life, man cannot live without them. Important though is the assumption that values should grow out of the nature of reality itself. Predetermined values and principles will consequently not only correspond with the "true" reality as proposed by the ideology, but will also legitimise and strengthen their position in, and claim on the hearts of men and women.

### **B. Ideological symbolism**

The development of a vocabulary within the ideological framework highlights the connection between ideology and language. Various levels of ideological discourse can be distinguished, all active in the establishment and sustaining of relations of domination. Thompson (1994:59) explains domination as systematically asymmetrical relations of power where a particular group is endowed with power in a durable way that excludes, and remains to a degree inaccessible to other groups, irrespective of the basis upon which such exclusion is carried out. These relations of power are established on the levels of discourse which rank from operational codes that serve to direct the controllers of the ideology in their choices of concrete policies and practices; to mindless sloganeering and stereotyping aimed at the mobilisation of a populace to action and sacrifice (Susser 1995:12; cf. also Christenson *et al.* 1971:11; Thompson 1994:145 and Van Veuren 1994:42). Symbols play a profound role in the formation of insight and perceptions concerning the world we live in. In fact, Du Preez (1983:2ff) argues that symbols should be regarded as the most important elements that make social actions possible. Identification with the most prominent symbols of a society, not only provides the individual with status and respect, but plays a profound role in the establishment of group identity. The intimate relation between identification and manipulation refers to the impact of the identification with certain symbols, on actions. Controllers of ideology often use symbols in such a way that they are completely incomprehensible and inaccessible for those not subject to the ideological system of interacting symbols. Conforming to a symbol not only strengthens it, but adds a notion of immortality unto it. The acceptance of a symbol is now no longer a personal choice, rather a moral obligation. Within the realm of "immortal" symbols, stereotypes offer to be excellent manipulative tools (Du

Preez 1983:6). While a fixed concept of a person, group or happening can be employed to devaluate, it can also contribute towards the maintaining of the *status quo*.

Symbolic forms are therefore constructed in such a way that they not only become co-workers in a moralised perception of reality, but also sustain and establish relations whereby those who still cannot truly understand their human situation, are dominated. As "facts only say what people believe them to say" (Visagie 1988:6), it is to be expected that facts will be interspersed with symbolic forms coloured by various preconceptions, prejudices and power interests (cf. also Devey 1864:393-394; Puolimatka 1995:97 and Schoeman 1998:154). Consequently, those who "truly" understand their human situation are also dominated in the sense that what they ought to do and how they ought to live, ought to interpret, ought to explain and ought to understand are determined by ideological discourse, predetermined by the absolutised ideological goal. When associating language as an instrument, with the Wittgensteinian idea of language games, it can be stated that domination occurs when the language game of *prescription* invades all other spheres of life with *description* (cf. Van Straaten 1987:93-94 and Visagie 1995:6). The actual discourse of a group can consequently be viewed as a screen hiding the underlying ideological structure of their words and actions.

### C. Hypernormative rationality

Placed within the context of a system of interacting symbols, *rationalisation* is identified by Thompson (1994:61; cf. also Adams 1990:259; Schoeman 1998:17 and Visagie 1995:4) as one of the strategies of symbolic construction by which relations of domination are defended or justified. By constructing a chain of reasoning by which an audience is persuaded of their worthy support, an ideology exhibits a logic and structure of its own. The argumentative structure in ideological reasoning not only establishes and justifies relations of domination, but is potentially misleading as it often encourages "double thinking", hides inconsistencies in its premises and consequently tends to run in closed circles (Van Veuren 1994:43; cf. Morrow 1989:164-169 on *doctrinaire thinking*). Since domination and exploitation have no inherent sanction, it needs to be derived from a particular subjective *a priori* that underpins all ideological thinking. Ideologies are indeed more than pure intellectual systems - they are ideas in pursuit of self-realisation determined by a belief-system that lays claim on the human heart. Whereas a particular chain of reasoning is considered to be irrational to those standing "outside" the ideological argumentation,

the followers are committed to appreciate rational superiority based on "well-grounded", "intelligent" and "wise" criteria. Feelings of superiority are further strengthened when an appeal to public interest is incorporated in argumentative discourse. Because of the assumption that true reality is the exclusive possession of the members of a particular group, institutional arrangements are established and justified as if it were to the benefit of all. Consequently, from a position of superiority and omniscience, the interests of a particular group are *universalised* as if they were in the public interest. Not all ideological reasoning should however be regarded as devious and incorrect - it is often created from structures, values and goals that are harmless in themselves. However, the legitimation of the pursuit of certain emancipatory goals may in fact lead to incorrect reasoning that exhibit the appearance of correct reasoning. The readily acceptance of such "incorrect" reasoning accords with Bacon's (Devey 1864:393-394) assumption that human understanding resembles "a tincture of the will and passions, which generate their own system accordingly; for man always believes more readily that which he prefers".

#### **D. Power**

The establishing and sustaining of relations of domination in terms of a vocabulary and a rationality understandable only to the adherents of the ideology, spells the overt drive to power. Since an ideology ascribes to a hierarchical view of society, a monopolistic control of a particular community or life sphere will indeed stand, as a supreme authority structure, atop all other spheres. However, as Walzer (1983:11) recognises, domination is always incomplete and monopoly always imperfect. Consequently the instability caused by such a system of domination and monopolisation not only calls for various measures of power to stabilise the social crisis, but acquires "more legitimacy than the amount it can actually generate" (Van Veuren 1991:42).

While the ruling ideology monopolises all spheres of life and relativises the competence of the various communities to protect and promote the needs and abilities of all, the ruling ideology is continually challenged by other groups who find themselves in a situation of dissatisfaction. Although external criticism is not recognised as criticism, the pressure exercised by the challenging groups can simply not be ignored as it becomes increasingly difficult to uphold a system of domination and monopoly. However, while the ruling ideology enjoys an almost religious status of infallibility (Heywood 1992:190; Goudzwaard 1984:18; Leatt *et al.* 1989:284

and Van der Walt 1994:359), imperfections of the present are only experienced by those who are excluded from the "true" reality. Driven by an omniscience and even a paternalistic attitude, the ruling ideology is prepared to employ virtually any means to uphold the present. In this regard, the webbing of ideological convictions with power works two ways: whereas the ruling ideology incorporates power to not only conceal new realities by "thinking of them in categories which are inappropriate" (Mannheim 1940:86), but also to sustain the *status quo*, the opposing ideologies pursue power in order to bridge the substantial gap between their position of crisis and their proposed utopia.

McLellan (1986:62) argues that relations of power are "reciprocal and realized mainly through authority and bargaining, both of which are sustained by a general commitment to the 'rules of the game' ". These "rules" are laid down by the internal structures of the various social communities, and power is directly related to the internal structure of the community in question. However, once the rules of the game are laid down by a totalitarian section of society, power becomes not only a scarce commodity, but coercion, domination, exploitation and manipulation are liable to be more important than bargaining. Power now resides in a supreme authority which is assumed to be "basic" to all other spheres of life. This unlawful violation of every sphere in society, implies not only invalid and unlawful authority and power which degenerates into despotism, but a lack of legitimacy. And as Susser (1995:8; cf. also Leatt *et al.* 1989:284 and Schoeman 1998:61) reflects, what the ruling ideology lacks in legitimacy, needs to be made up in coercion. The ruling ideology can no longer depend on the persuasiveness of its arguments alone; to sustain its role as a commanding and dominant public agenda, an ideology needs to use massive coercion and repression to control all spheres of life. Integrated into a pervasive ideology, the various spheres of life become institutional carriers that are continuously misused to confirm and reinforce the ideological end to become a social reality.

#### **2.4.4.7 The school as an important ideological carrier**

Althusser (1971:142-145; cf. Chisholm 1981:135; Leatt *et al.* 1989:277 and Schoeman 1998:8,142-143) distinguishes between (1) Repressive State Apparatuses (such as policy, army, laws, and decrees) that function predominantly by repression and secondary by ideology and (2) Ideological State Apparatuses (such as *inter alia* public and private schools, churches, family, political parties, legal institutions, trade unions, mass media, cultural institutions in the fields of

literature, the arts and sports) that function primarily by ideology and secondary by repression. Since the ruling class holds state power, it can be accepted that apart from having the repressive state apparatus at its disposal, the ruling class will also be active in the ideological state apparatus. While the repressive state apparatus is primarily utilised to secure political conditions, and ultimately the relations of exploitation, it also secures the political conditions for the action of ideological state apparatuses. However, the rule of the ruling ideology is heavily concentrated in ideological state apparatuses which secure relations of domination and exploitation behind a "shield", provided by repressive state apparatuses.

Apart from a relatively large variety of ideological state apparatuses, it is the educational ideological apparatus which, according to Althusser (1971:153; cf. also Shapiro 1981:99 and Soudien 1995:45), occupies the most dominant position in drumming a certain amount of "know-how", wrapped in the ruling ideology, into the child - five to eight hours, 5 days a week. Although Althusser fails to recognise the contradictions within the educational ideological state apparatus that could lead to resistance, his theory exposes the way in which the ruling ideology can be veiled and concealed by presenting the school as "a neutral environment purged of ideology" (Althusser 1971:156; cf. also Christenson *et al.* 1971:11-12; Sharp 1980:125 and Soudien 1995:44). Parents entrust their children to teachers who are to open up the path to freedom, morality and responsibility - a seemingly natural action, unaware of the "indispensable usefulness" of the school in maintaining and sustaining the ruling ideology. However, while education can never be understood in isolation from the social context in which it operates, it is to be expected that formal state schooling will be profoundly affected by ideological considerations with regard to its nature and purpose. As a system of beliefs and values, the ruling ideology not only legitimises itself by its moralised conception of reality, but will consequently serve the society in prescribing and describing the way things in everyday life ought to be. Beliefs about the nature of social, economic, political and religious reality are expressed and transmitted through the agency of formal schooling (Ashley 1989:3). In this regard Robertson (1973:10-11; cf. also Christenson *et al.* 1971:46-47) states that the educational process may be interpreted as an attempt to socialise children into an ideology which legitimates the interest of a dominant group, and simultaneously inculcates false consciousness into subordinate groups.

To fully grasp the significance of schooling as an ideological state apparatus, a distinction between school-typical education as constituted by the intrinsic nature of the school as a societal

relationship, and education as a tool to promote ideological hegemony, is imperative. Shapiro (1981:100) refers to the functions and the dysfunctions of education: functions regarding the provision of basic skills such as reading and writing and encouraging thinking and questioning; dysfunctions that are linked to the misuse of education to ideologically maintain the subordination of the masses.

#### **A. The school as a structurally given**

According to the structurally pluralistic view of society, all social communities, including the school as a societal relationship, whereby people have bound themselves together to realise a shared interest, exhibit constant features that distinguish it from other institutions or communities (cf. Clouser 1991:256; Schoeman 1980:143 and Wolters 1990:23). This constancy of the distinguishing features of the school refers to the distinct structure of the institution that not only determines its structural purpose, but also limits its authority and consequently constitutes school-typical competence. While the special character of the school exhibits an independent sphere and its own internal logic, it can be argued that the relative autonomy of the school cannot simply reflect the patterns of the economy and the political order. As Walzer (1983:198; cf. also Schoeman 1980:141) states, "the goods in question are different goods". From here it should be emphasised that the school not only constitutes its own school-typical environment and normative structure, but by virtue of its own sphere of justice, it is protected from tyrannical intrusion by external authorities. The recognition of sphere sovereignty consequently not only guarantees the coequal existence, status and position of the school alongside all other societal and cultural relationships, but rules out the illegitimate elevation of any life sphere to a position of hegemony.

The task of the school is therefore determined by the structure of the school itself and not by any external authority. To determine whether the school is misused for other than educational purposes, the following question should be opted: does the school, as a specifically individually structured and typified life form, play its role correctly within its structural limits? In order to conclude if the school functions sovereignly in its own school-typical domain, the distinctive nature and structural purpose of the school should be clarified. The typical ontic structure of the school can be distinguished from the ontic structures of other societal relationships in terms of a qualifying aspect that determines the internal destiny of the individual whole (Dooyeweerd 1986:64 and Schoeman 1980:39). The internal leading function not only qualifies the whole

idionomy, but gives direction and leadership to the societal relationship itself. The leading function ultimately points to the core type of an aspect from which the original meaning of the societal relationship is derived. Therefore, in order to reflect on the teaching-educational task of the school which directly relates to the school-typical ontic structure, a typical founding function and a leading function should be determined.

Whereas all communal activities in the closed society were drawn together in one undifferentiated totalitarian bond, it is evident that the school as an individually structured societal relationship did not exist in the undifferentiated society. However, since the school only appears once the primitive community begins to show signs of differentiation, it can adequately be argued that the school, as an educational institution, exists only in the open (differentiated) society. Since the school thus emerged from the cultural (historical) development of man, the typical foundational function of the school refers to the historical aspect upon which it is founded. While the parents themselves function as the "school" in the primitive society, the appearance of the school in the open society can be ascribed to the inability of parents to comply with new educational demands. Because people form social communities to promote and protect their needs and abilities, the formation of the school consequently coincides with the protection of certain educational needs. Van Veuren (1993:276-277) recognises the need for the development of cognitive skills such as interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation and self-regulation. The most important task of the school is thus regarded as the providing of a context for "the development of critical understanding and the production, as well as the reproduction, of social critics" (Walzer 1983:198). In this regard Van Schalkwyk (1985:8) places emphasis on equipping the learner with knowledge and skills to identify and solve problems, to disclose and evaluate information and information systems. However, as the learner can only acquire the necessary insight into and knowledge and comprehension of the contents of the various schools subjects in compliance with the disclosure of her/his logical function, it is evident that the school must be disclosed-logically qualified (Schoeman 1980:39,142ff; 1990:177; cf. also Clouser 1991:254 and Mentz & Van der Westhuizen 1992:30). The deduction can be drawn that the disclosed-logical aspect gives direction with regard to the activation and disclosure of the logical function of the child as the primary function of the school. With reference to Popper's (1998:176) assumption that the strain in the open society is created by the continual demand to be rational, it appears as if the (formation of the) school should not only take care of the cognitive needs of the learner, but



should simultaneously prepare her/him to cope with the strain caused by the increase of knowledge.

Although the primary task of the school refers to the disclosure of the logical function, school-typical *education* can never be reduced to the opening-up of the logical function only - such a reductionist view negates the role of the school to be pedagogically active in orienting the educand with regard to all other aspects of reality. In this regard Puolimatka (1995:54) associates education with the tendency of the human act-structure to open up its potential. As a dynamic process of maturation (the opening-up of potential) education involves the differentiation of the human act-structure and the integration of the human personality. This normatively qualified process of differentiation and integration has a formative effect on the many facets of the educand's life: such as *inter alia* religious life, ethical relations, linguistic and intellectual skills, as well as emotional and physical facets (Van der Walt 1994:529; cf. also Schouls 1972:39ff on *the formative power of the teacher* and Strauss 1991:125). The unfolding and opening-up of the various possibilities of the educand refer to human formation and cultural formative activity. Whereas the teacher masters and controls reality in a particular office that requires particular competence and qualifications, the process of education not only contributes towards the realisation of human potential, but subsequently enables the educand to master and control reality in terms of *inter alia* knowledge, skills, attitudes and norms.

As a historically based and (disclosed-) logically qualified structure, the school (and all other institutions which offer education) exhibits itself as a relatively independent and self-reliant societal relationship that exercises authority based on competence in knowledge (Clouser 1991:254; Mentz & Van der Westhuizen 1992:29 and Walzer 1983:199). As such it can be stated that the school as a societal relationship co-exists on the basis of horizontal interlinkages and therefore does not belong to any particular community. Neither can it be viewed as part of a supreme community. However, although the school is radically and typically distinct from the other societal relationships, it cannot exist in isolation, since the members of the school may also be members of other communities. Dooyeweerd (1986:67; cf. also Schoeman 1980:34-36, 141-143) stipulates that by virtue of an enkaptic function, the school can be closely or loosely tied to specific institutions, especially the parental home, the church and the state. While the parental home constitutes the origin of the child, and the parent-child relationship is pre-eminently suitable for education, a very close bond exists between the school and the family who is also

involved in the process of education. Nevertheless, neither the family nor the school touches upon the inner nature and typical structural characteristics of the other - placed within the context of sphere sovereignty, each community remains subject to the normative internal laws by which it is constituted.

### **B. The school as an ideological state apparatus**

While the existence of the school as an educational institution is made possible by structural laws through which it is constituted, the conclusion can be drawn that all schools must share certain qualities by which they are identified and distinguished from other social communities. These shared qualities indicate the *universality* of the school, hence the structure that typifies the essence or nature of the school (Mentz & Van der Westhuizen 1992:36; Wolters 1990:49). At the same time, however, the school exhibits certain qualities which render it unique. The *individuality* of the school thus refers to the different needs and nature of each school and a distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary education becomes possible. An additional distinction in terms of specific kinds of education, such as academic, agricultural, domestic and technical distinguishes one school from another.

Apart from the structure of the school which allows for universal and individual traits, another distinction is imperative - that of *direction* (cf. Strauss 1998b:4; Van der Walt 1994:529 and Wolters 1990:73). While the structural nature of the school constitutes the existence of the societal relationship itself, its foundational structural principle simultaneously offers a criterion that allows for distinguishing school-typical aims from *non school-typical* aims. In this regard it becomes apparent that all school-typical aims are founded upon the structural-typical principles of the school which must identify and which delimit the nature of each aim. While the typical structural nature of the school determines the school-typical goals, the school cannot simply be defined in terms of these particular aims (Strauss 1991:121). Consequently, the school can exercise a particular choice of direction - either the rules and decisions made by the school are directed towards fulfilling its structural purpose (as determined by the distinct structure itself), or the school becomes redirected by an external authority towards fulfilling a supposed purpose. The deduction drawn here is that only when the internal sovereignty of the school is recognised, will it be allowed the lawful right to decide on its own affairs and can structural integrity be retained. However, as Dooyeweerd (1986:67; cf. also Schoeman 1980:144 and Walzer

1983:226) indicates, the violation of the principle of sphere sovereignty will exert a degenerating influence upon the structural characteristics of the various social communities, including that of the school. When one societal relationship begins to dominate the others, the structural integrity of the school will not only be violated, but the life-form itself will be regarded as part of a supreme authority. While the structural-typical principles of the school remain universal and uncorrupted (cf. Shapiro 1981:99 and Wolters 1990:82), the directional choice can involve the levelling of the inherent structural borders. This directional perversion indicates totalitarianism.

### **C. The school in the grip of totalitarianism**

Since totalitarianism involves a hierarchical view of society, the school, along with the other social communities, are regarded as parts of a supreme authority. The dominating structure will not only overextend its boundaries and consequently surpass the sphere limitations of its own authority, but will ultimately utilise the school as an ideological apparatus. While this hierarchalising impulse of ideology places the school in a position of subordination, school-typical (educational) functions are turned into dysfunctions of education - the provision of basic skills such as reading and writing, thinking and questioning are exerted to serve the interests of the ideology (Shapiro 1981:100). Once the goals and aims of the ruling ideology is coupled with state power, the school not only becomes an important ideological state apparatus, but the philosophy of *positivism* appears to be a very handy tool for the entrenchment of school-typical competence and authority (Soudien 1995:44 and Schoeman 1998:144ff).

#### **(i) Positivism**

Since the school poses to be a neutral environment detached from the subjective description of facts, parents are willing to entrust their children to the school in order to "open up for them the path to the freedom, morality and responsibility of adults by their own example" (Althusser 1971:157). However, once operating as an ideological state apparatus, the school transmits conscious and unconscious ideologically pre-interpreted facts that prepare learners for the practices and routines constituted by the ruling ideology. Adhering to the epistemological position with regard to positive, non-hypothetical knowledge, positivism claims that an objective, scientific-rational approach is the only means of acquiring knowledge (Higgs 1994:303 and Popper 1996a:88). Final and absolute statements are introduced in the classroom as irrefutable

answers to ultimate questions. Prescribed state curricula are not only swarmed by so-called "law" statements that are regarded to be the ultimate findings (judgements) of so-called specialists, but even the will of the teachers are bent to be the will of the ideology. In this regard Sharp (1980:124) indicates that the teacher as the pivotal authority has not only the power to define what is to be regarded as knowledge, but to exercise control over classroom norms and regulations. Patterns of integration are consequently regulated in terms of ideologically interpreted facts that are regarded as the necessary positive knowledge to retain the starting-point and foundation of school-typical education. Blinded by faith in the ideological interpretation of reality, facts justifying the ideological interpretation of man and his world, are not only regarded as reasonable and real, but also involves the replacement of moral and legal values by positive facts. Hence, Popper's (1996a:88) reference to the difficulty in distinguishing the normative from the factual when placed within the context of a culture of positivism.

In this regard Zecha's (1994:6576) prescriptive concept of education might shed light on the conflation of facts and values. Whereas education suggests an ideal of the "educated person", a certain set of definite and implied values are spelt out in the corresponding educational goals. Linking this prescriptive conception of education with the school as an ideological state apparatus, the following deductions can be drawn. Since an ideology works with a particular conception of reality, the ideal of the educated person, as well as the implied values will consequently correspond with this conception. Because ideology, however, involves a self-induced tunnel-vision and the creation of illusionary expectations in coherence with the pursuing of the ideological utopia, educational ideals and values become subject to the ideological end. The interpretation of facts and the (re)defining of values to serve ideological expectations contribute towards stifling the inculcation of a critical consciousness. By transmitting a *supposedly positive* mixture of values (norms) and facts, and by virtue of methods such as the stockpiling of facts, memorisation and uncritical acceptance, the ruling ideology ensures that the future choices of the child in the classroom will contribute towards the sustainment of the ideological *status quo*. The educand who complies with the demand for a particular identity product, will indeed enjoy certain advantages when proceeding from the ideologically driven school environment to life in a society equally directed by the same ideology. Within the realm of the school as an ideological state apparatus, certain emotional benefits are provided: strong identifications and also an experience of personal trial and initiation that is nostalgically recalled forever after (Lifton 1969:445).

As an ideological state apparatus, the school is no longer granted the lawful right to decide on its own affairs. This serious disturbance in the functioning of the school within the sphere of its own competence, involves a perception of the "ideal" educated person and the implied values which no longer correspond with the structural purpose constituted by the inherent and distinct nature of the institution itself. Employed for ideological purposes, the school becomes a tool through which the state reproduces ideologically qualified agents who can ultimately be slotted into suitable positions in a hierarchical division of society (Shapiro 1981:102; cf. also Schoeman 1998:147; Soudien 1995:44 and Walzer 1983:226).

### **(ii) Indoctrination**

Placed within the context where ideological beliefs are imparted to educational subjects, indoctrination becomes one of the most uneducational practices in the classroom. Indoctrination (Dahl & Lindblom as cited in Puolimatka 1995:122; cf. also Lifton 1969:422) refers to a method of indirect control that is regarded as essential to maintain the stability of the social system. The controlling of the learner in the classroom involves the production of certain responses. Although a positivist approach considers elements such as commitment, imagination and value to be less important (cf. Higgs 1994:303), the intention accompanying indoctrination involves the adherence to a certain belief-system without conclusive evidence for, or proof of the system itself.

Since the loyalty of the indoctrinated person coincides with the adoption of beliefs without a proper understanding of their grounds, indoctrination of the learner, who possesses an unreasoned inner conviction of rightness, is of profound importance. Whilst the amassment of ideologically interpreted facts is aimed at the justification of the *status quo* with its accompanying structures of domination, the grounds for such a legitimation remain shaky - because a hierarchical view of society involves monopolistic control, resentment and resistance soon render the rule of the ruling class unstable (cf. Walzer 1983:11). In this regard the function of indoctrination becomes two-fold: a critical analysis of supposedly positive and ultimate facts will undoubtedly expose their dubious grounds, thus the uncritical acquisition of knowledge and values become essential. From here the long term dividends of indoctrination can be calculated in terms of the guarantee that potential resistance to the ruling ideology will ultimately lack the support of the great mass of ordinary citizens and contribute towards the maintenance of stability in the social system.

One of the main characteristic of indoctrination, namely to not only insulate the learner from foreign ideas and external criticism, but to discourage the critical scrutiny of the presented world of facts, is further underlined in Bheeler's (1985:266) view of the conduct of the teacher who tends to indoctrinate. Such a teacher will not encourage learners to appreciate the difference between statements and opinions, nor will he/she self-critically display the justification for the beliefs the learners are expected to accept. By merely drumming a certain amount of "know-how" wrapped in the ruling ideology into the learners, the need to think on their own and the assessing of already acquired knowledge, are not required. Consequently, the primary task of the school to disclose the logical function of the child is not necessarily negated, but rather redirected towards satisfying the ideological goal. Misusing school-typical education for ideological purposes implies a determinism whereby the educand's fundamental freedom of choice is ignored. As facts and values are already pre-determined, the learners become mere receptacles. The consequences for those who obediently accept and reproduce the ideologically pre-interpreted facts are detrimental - rational stagnation, the prevention from the unfolding of certain dimensions of the personality and the absence of the capacity to acquire a personal world view (Puolimatka 1995:125; cf. also Morrow 1989:164ff and Schoeman 1998:147). This determinism is the result of neglecting to distinguish between the universal structure of *the* school and the particular direction of *a* school. Whilst the structure of the school remains universal and applicable under all circumstances, it is the direction that refers to a particular interpretation of the structure itself. However, without a clear distinction between structure and direction, the structure is not only reduced to mere elements of human knowledge concerning reality, but is consequently placed within the realm of subjective human freedom of choice (cf. Stafleu 1989:26). Harnessed with subjectivity, the structure of the school is equated with human experience. Placing the universal structure within the context of subjectivity, the objectivity inherent to the structure itself, is not only relativised, but the violation of structural integrity becomes a definite possibility when the school is abused to enhance goals of ideological nature.

## 2.5 Concluding remarks

From the foregoing exposition it has become clear that modern society can no longer be described as being closed. Contrary to undifferentiated societies (*inter alia*, the *guilds* of the middle ages, the *pre-feudal* and *feudal* communities and *lordships*) where one *undifferentiated organisational form* takes the lead, modern society rather exhibits a variety of independent life forms, each possessing its own and univocally differentiated sphere of competence and authority.

However, since remnants of the closed society, such as the tendency of modern man to seek comfort in belief-systems that regulate human life in terms of totalitarian ideas (thus a supreme authority), remain present in modern society, the *nature* of the transition process from a closed to an open society is placed in the barrage.

It has been affirmed that the transitional process holds, as a prerequisite, an awareness of the distinct essences of the various life forms. The unfolding of life forms is thus only possible in accordance with each form's distinct structural purpose and internal organisation. The transitional process from a closed to an open society can thus only be labelled as of a harmonious nature when each life form enjoys the authority to make its own rules of operation and its own decisions about how to fulfil its structural purpose. However, by linking the remnants of the closed society with the modern tendency to attribute supreme authority to one life form (for e.g., the state), the *nature* of this process needs to be questioned. The moment a life form assumes the status of a supreme authority, all other forms of authority are not only regarded as derived from the supreme authority, but life forms themselves, are placed in a position of subordination. Such a hierarchical view of society not only constitutes disharmonious disclosure of culture into a variety of life forms, but reveals a negation of the principle of sphere sovereignty. From this chapter it has become clear that the violation of the latter coincides with the emergence of an ideology.

Linked with a belief-system that not only groups people together to pursue a particular goal in life, an ideology assumes a totalitarian nature. However, since any totalitarian tendency implies a hierarchical view of society where an assumed supreme authority takes the leading and authoritative role, *ideology* appears to be the modern term for remnants of the closed society within modern society. Given the association between a hierarchical view of society and an ideological belief-system, it can be argued that the school, as a distinct life form, will not only be placed in a position of subordination to the supreme authority, but will subsequently not enjoy the authority to make its own rules in accordance with its own unique authority structure. In a society where an ideological belief-system regulates social life in terms of totalitarian ideas, it can be anticipated that the school will also be utilised as a means to pursue a particular ideological goal.

Although it has been argued that modern society can pride itself of its differentiated nature, it can simultaneously be stated that the presence of ideologies have a paralysing effect on the functioning of life forms according to their distinct spheres of competence. Since the emergence

of ideologies coincides with the differentiation process of culture into a variety of life forms, and since this process has not been completed, modern society will indeed continuously be confronted with ideologies and its accompanying totalitarian ideas. In this regard it remains imperative that an effective method of critique should be utilised in order to expose ideological thought-patterns and its impact on educational practice. In the following chapter the critico-rationalist attitude and the method of *transcendental critique* will be suggested as possible methods in assisting, *inter alia*, the educational scientist to identify ideological thought-patterns and to penetrating to the root of theoretical thought itself. It is only by penetrate to such roots, that the (ideological) nature of presuppositions and prejudices underpinning educational theories can be exposed.



## Chapter 3

# Transcendental Critique and the Critico-Rationalist Attitude

### 3.1 Introductory remarks

In the previous chapter it has been established that when the directional choice of the school coincides with the levelling of its inherent structural borders, assumed school-typical (educational) functions appear to be not only turned into dysfunctions of education, but are also exerted to serve the interests of the ruling ideology (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.7). Given the hierarchising impulse of an ideology to place the school in a position of subordination, issues such as legislation on education, educational policy and also the content of learning can be utilised to establish the school as one of the most dominant ideological state apparatuses. In this regard Mouton (1993:122; cf. also Schoeman 1995:99) alludes to the relation between ideology and science (thus also educational science) when he states that the "ideologization of science occurs when a dominant group (class, race, gender) produces and appropriates certain knowledge in order to legitimate and, hence to sustain, its position of power over other groups". It can therefore be derived that an ideological belief-system appears to have a profound impact on educational theories, as well as on educational practice. In order to illustrate the role of the school in upholding a network of hypernormative socio-cultural discourses with corresponding relations of domination, it is imperative that errors in educational theories be detected and eliminated. However, if the ideologically coloured prejudices underpinning educational theories are not exposed, the mistakes made on the level of the formation of such theories will continually be justified in terms of these prejudices.

The aim of this chapter is two-fold: in the first instance transcendental critique will be proposed as a method that enables the educational scientist to transcend to the roots of theoretical thought itself. It is only when man penetrates to these roots that those presuppositions and prejudices that underpin educational theories aimed at serving the educational interests of one group in society at the expense of other groups, can be exposed. In the second instance, and in addition to

transcendental critique, the aim of this chapter is also to argue in favour of the Popperian attitude to criticism (the critico-rationalist attitude) as a possible form of liberation from the ideological appropriation of knowledge pertaining to educational reality. Although in the critique of South African education in subsequent chapters the critico-rationalist attitude is adopted prior to the application of transcendental critique, it is essential to give a detailed discussion of transcendental critique in this chapter before elaborating on critical rationalism. Since the term "transcendental" embraces the foundation of knowledge, thus everything that is given prior to knowing, and because transcendental critique involves an account of theoretical thought itself, it is essential to initially give an exposition of the universal horizon of human experience, as well as non-scientific and scientific experience, with special reference to the difference between philosophy and special sciences. The implication here is that an exposition of transcendental criticism is fundamental for a discussion of critical rationalism since the latter relates to the critique of one's own theories and those of others.

### 3.2 Universal horizon of human experience

As a set of basic beliefs belonging to an order of cognition which is more basic than theory or science, ideology cannot be coupled with a theory of knowledge (infra:2.4.4.2). However, as part of a realm of presuppositions, ideology not only has a profound influence on the non-scientific experience of its adherents, but ultimately regulates the theoretical attitude of thought. It can therefore be deduced that empirical phenomena and the analysis thereof, can be placed within the context of a post-ideological domain as directly influenced by ideology (cf. Schoeman 1998:24-25). While a belief-system is a framework of convictions concerning man and the world, an ideological belief-system entertains a particular explanation of the human world, its present condition and its potential for the future. The *particularity* of such an interpretation of reality will not only correspond with the ideological end, but contributes towards the legitimation of dogmatic formulas and structures of domination employed to sustain a reductionist view of reality.

However, in continuation of the totalist polarisation of good and evil, followers of an ideology claim to be the sole possessors of the ultimate truth (Lifton 1969:425). Since a particular conception of reality is only shared by a selected social group, the existence of a diversity of such "ultimate" views becomes evident. Antithetic statements concerning man and the world can

consequently be attributed to the influence of ideological belief-systems on non-scientific and scientific accounts of reality. The antithesis between statements and interpretations, however, implies that the truth of the one must necessarily refute the truth of the other - since only one statement can be true, the other must be excluded as being not true. The implication of this is, as Brümmer (1971:20) clearly states, that two assertions can refute each other only when they ascribe to the same state of affairs. Divergence of statements supposes a common state of affairs. Hence, a common state of affairs (shared properties) appears to be a pre-requisite for conflicting interpretations.

Conflicting non-scientific and scientific accounts of reality consequently presuppose *one reality* that offers itself in exactly the same way within the horizon of human experience. In this regard Dooyeweerd (1984/I:116; cf. also 1996:7) enunciates that the structures of temporal reality, the "cosmic order with all temporal laws and structural states of affairs founded in it, is indeed the same for every thinker, no matter whether he is a Christian, a pagan or a Humanist". The various modes in which temporal reality can be experienced, must therefore be *universal* - the framework of modes of human existence (modalities) does not only belong to the structure of the human horizon of experience, but is consequently basic to all empirical reality in time.

Dooyeweerd (1984/I:3; cf. also Clouser 1991:56; Hart 1984:190ff; Kalsbeek 1975:40-41; Schoeman 1980:24ff; Spier 1972:33ff and Van der Walt 1994:144) approximates a modal framework that affords man with the various modes in terms of which reality can be understood. This approximation of the modal aspects of our experience (areas of functionality), however, should not be understood as a dogmatic declaration about all genuine aspects. Intended as an exposition of the "permanent" basis upon which all of reality rests, the structure of fundamental analytic distinctions remains open. Although many scholars might distinguish less or more modalities, it appears that in the main they are in agreement. The structure revealed by temporal reality itself, may also be termed the *cosmic law-order*, referring to a multiplicity of laws by which every universal mode of existence is constituted (Schoeman 1980:23; Veenhof 1939:58ff and Wolters 1990:21ff). The fifteen law-spheres (according to Dooyeweerd's exposition thereof), each with its own meaning-nucleus by which its typical nature is constituted, are the following:

**ASPECT OF REALITY**

pistical aspect  
ethical aspect

**MEANING-NUCLEUS**

faith and certainty  
moral love

juridical aspect	adjudication
aesthetical aspect	harmony
economic aspect	balance
social aspect	social intercourse
lingual aspect	symbolic meaning
historical aspect	controlled formative power
logical aspect	analytical thought
psychial aspect	sensory feeling
biotic aspect	life
physical aspect	energy
kinematic aspect	motion
spatial aspect	continuous extension
numerical aspect	discrete quantity

The sequence of the modal aspects is not arbitrary, but is constituted in such a way that the substratum spheres (earlier modalities) serve as the foundation for the superstratum spheres (later modalities) (Kalsbeek 1975:95 and Van der Walt 1994:146). For instance, the social aspect is the superstratum sphere with respect to the lingual, the historical, the logical, the psychial, and the other spheres preceding it, each of which is the substratum sphere of the social. The social aspect itself is a foundational aspect, and thus a substratum sphere with respect to the economic, the aesthetic, juridical, the ethical and the pistical spheres. Placed within an irreversible cosmic order, and simultaneously constituted by its internal law, no aspect of reality can be reduced to the other - a social "law" differs in principle from a lingual "law", or a historical "law". In addition to the uniqueness of each modal aspect, there exists an unbreakable coherence among the modalities that is basic to all empirical reality as an *a priori* datum of its intrinsic diversity of meaning (Dooyeweerd 1996:7; cf. also Hart 1984:157). As such, it can be argued that the functioning of a modality always refers back to the order of all modalities, while, at the same time, this order determines that the various modes of existence are ways of being subject to the order of things. Arranged in an order of complexity, the framework of modalities should therefore never be regarded in hierarchical terms - hence, the reference to the horizon of human experience as the transcendental framework without which human experience is not possible.

While the aspects of reality afford man with avenues of access to knowledge of reality, it also constitutes the modal framework within which phenomena are encountered (Schoeman 1980:3; cf. also Kalsbeek 1975:42 and Strauss 1978:3). As such, phenomena and aspects cannot be regarded as synonymous. In this regard it becomes evident that insight into the structure of reality is totally dependent upon a particular conception of the modal aspects in terms of which all phenomena are understood. As every view of reality can only offer itself within the horizon of

human experience, experience under the ban of ideology, will consequently reflect particular conditions of insight into the universal framework of modal aspects.

Since the distinction of a variety of modalities provides the basis from where insights into this framework of modalities are drawn, it can be stated that this distinction holds important significance for the presentation of a particular view of man and the world. While humans reveal the richness of all the modalities, material things participate only in the first three modalities, plant life function only in the first four modalities, while animals participate in the first five modalities (Van der Walt 1994:151; also Kalsbeek 1975:100ff). The insight drawn from this exposition is that a viewpoint whereby a human being is identified with only one of the modalities, will result in a one-dimensional image - by defining man as a rational being, man will be impoverished because of the disregarding of him/her as a multi-dimensional creature. The variety of one-dimensional views of man can consequently be attributed to distorted perceptions regarding the modal aspects in terms of which man as a human being can be understood. Since a particular image of man held by an ideology reflects a distorted insight into the framework of modalities, such an image can only be refuted by a "balanced" insight into the structure of reality. "Balanced" in this instance pertains to a structurally pluralistic view of reality, opposed to a hierarchical view of the same reality.

Van der Walt (1994:151; cf. also Rouvoet 1992:37) reflects that the distinction between modalities affords an important insight into the tasks of the different social communities responsible for protecting divergent human needs. When considering that the different social communities are qualified by different modalities and consequently distinguished in terms of different intrinsic natures and different tasks, each should be allowed to function within its own limited sphere of competence (infra:2.3.4). The presence of a totalitarian view of reality where one supreme authority usurps the tasks of other communities, indeed reflects a disharmonious and reductionist conception of the various modes of existence. The distinction between modalities can, in principle, prevent a distorted view of reality. Since all ideologies can be linked to the absolutisation (excessive emphasis) of a particular aspect of reality, distortions can only be laid bare on the basis of the assumption that the cosmic order with all temporal laws and structural states of affairs founded in it, is the same for all (Brümmer 1971:23). While a common framework of modalities appears to be the supposition for divergent views on reality, it simultaneously allows for a common basis for discourse and communication between adherents of

different Schools of Thought. By first determining such a universality, the playing field is not only levelled for discourse, but it decreases the danger of overemphasising the meaning of the divergence of opinion.

### **3.3 Experience of reality**

Placed above the level of human arbitrariness, the temporal law-order can be experienced intuitively in a non-scientific manner, while the "laws" can only be systematically discovered by scientists (Schoeman 1980:23; cf. also Clouser 1991:56ff and Kalsbeek 1975:161).

#### **3.3.1 Non-scientific experience of reality**

The non-scientific experience encompasses the total existence of the "world" in which man exists as a totality (Dooyeweerd 1984/I:43; 1996:9; Kalsbeek 1975:162; Schoeman 1998:25ff and Stoker 1970:184). All the different modes of human existence, the world in which we love, hope, suffer and act are all experienced in its total interwovenness. The naive formation of concepts is therefore not directed at the various modes of existence itself, but at things, events and relationships as individual totalities. In empirical totality-structures, all aspects of human life, including the logical function and the non-logical modalities, are bound in an indissoluble coherence and remain in the midst of empirical reality. By virtue of a relation between man (as the human subject) and objects, all aspects are implicitly experienced in relation to the individual and integral totalities experienced in everyday life.

Dooyeweerd (1984/I:42; 1996:9; cf. also Spier 1972:141-142 and Strauss 1978:2-3) explains the subject-object relation as follows: an object-function is ascribed to things and events in those modal aspects in which they cannot function as subjects. For instance, although water by itself is not alive, it can be stated that as a vital "means of life", it must have an essential object-function in the biotic modality. Naive experience not only makes a distinction between subject-functions and object-functions, but grasps these subject-object relations as structural relations within empirical reality itself. Without a conceptual and explicit understanding of the aspects, object-functions are experienced in unbreakable relation to possible subject-functions in the aspects concerned. Where the modal aspects remain grouped together as a whole, and since the naively experiencing person does not analytically distinguish between the modal aspects,

non-scientific experience of reality remains devoid of any antithetical structure. As such, it can be stated that non-scientific experience does not know any epistemological problems (Dooyeweerd 1996:9 and Kalsbeek 1975:163). Accompanied by an implicit awareness of the modal aspects, the structures of empirical experience are not only left in tact, but no object-function is absolutised and accredited as a so-called *Ding an sich*.

Although complex, concrete and uncritical in nature, non-scientific experience is profoundly essential as it represents "the most unfathomable knowledge that human beings have access to" (Schoeman 1998:26). Since non-scientific activities are also rooted in the integral domain of pre-scientific experience, the influence of a distorted view of reality will also be reflected in the everyday life experience of a particular group. The argument of Leatt *et al.* (1989:284; cf. also Goudzwaard 1984:24-25) that ideology "is false to the degree to which it makes part of reality the total reality", allots an indication of the reductionist nature of ideologically coloured insight into not only the structure of reality, but into all temporal phenomena that form part of this reality. Non-scientific knowledge should, however, never be mistaken for a theory of reality. The construction of a theoretical attitude of thought is not only an essentially scientific venture, but is under all circumstances related to and underpinned by non-scientific experience of reality. Because non-scientific experience remains the point of departure for every theoretical reflection, it becomes evident that the hypotheses from where all scientific explications of encountered phenomena are launched, must be provided by non-theoretical experience of reality (Schoeman 1998:27; also Kalsbeek 1975:165).

### 3.3.2 Scientific experience of reality

Because all human experience is founded upon the cosmic law-order and remains bound to the possibilities offered by this law-order, the critical theoretical attitude of thought will take theoretical issues from the primary diversity of meaning that is basic to all theoretical distinctions (Dooyeweerd 1996:7; also Kalsbeek 1975:162). However, although both founded upon the cosmic law-order, the inner nature and structure of the theoretical attitude of thought can only come to the fore once juxtaposed to the pre-theoretical attitude of naive experience. In contrast to non-scientific experience where the analytic function remains enstatically embedded within the continuous coherence of cosmic time, science is characterised by "a deliberate acquisition of knowledge as such by an intentional investigation of the 'what?', the 'how?', the 'why?' and the

'wherefore?' of the knowable as such" (Stoker 1970:184). When considering that the various aspects of reality can be regarded as the standpoint of describing what is experienced aside from any theorising, the inner nature of the theoretical attitude of thought can be linked to the theoretical abstraction of a particular modal aspect as a distinct field of investigation.

Given modal abstraction as the fundamental difference between the attitude of naive experience and the theoretical attitude of thought, Strauss (1978:4; 1989:16; Strauss, Smit & Schoeman 1978:5; cf. also Clouser 1991:54-55 and Schoeman 1998:27) explains abstraction in terms of analysis: certain individual properties and patterns of the totality structures, or even entire aspects are identified by distinguishing them from each other. A particular property or aspect is therefore set apart or extracted from the wider context of the modal framework by theoretically isolating it to form a distinct domain of scientific inquiry. The display of special sciences is representative of the variety of modal abstractions, *inter alia*, biology that relates to the abstraction of the biotic aspect, history to the abstraction of the historical aspect, sociology to the abstraction of the social aspect and linguistics to the abstraction of the lingual aspect. The theoretical attitude of thought is consequently not focused upon the total coherence of the different modal aspects, but upon the coherence of actual phenomena that function within the abstracted and isolated modal structure.

However, does this abstracting of an aspect from the meaning-coherence with the other aspects not obscure an opposition between the thinker (knowing subject) and the isolated aspect (knowable object), thus eradicating the coherence of the modal diversity? Dooyeweerd (1996:7; cf. also Kalsbeek 1975:174) argues that since both the logical aspect and the non-logical aspects belong to one and the same reality, the coherence of the modal diversity remains intact. Theoretical, conceptual knowledge of the non-logical aspects of human experience is only possible in a theoretical synthesis of the logical function of thought with the non-logical functions of experience. Because every analytical act refers to all datum that are logical objectivable, analysis must therefore presuppose a more-than-logical diversity - because reality in totality passes beyond logical conceptualisation, it should therefore be approached in terms of a totality (Strauss 1978:7). The coherence of the framework of modalities will consequently not be eradicated because the theoretical synthesis is only possible through theoretical, intuitive insight into the modal nature of the non-logical functions of experience. Clouser (1991:58; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1996:10; Spier 1972:143 and Van Riessen 1970:116) indicates in this regard that modal abstraction does not lead to the "emptying" of the thinker's experience or thought of



everything but the abstracted aspect. Since the scientist can only abstract from the objects of pre-abstractive experience, the isolation of an aspect is consequently added to human experience and thus indispensable for the enterprise of scientific theorising. While the theoretical attitude of thought serves to confirm the naive experience of reality in a theoretical manner, the indissoluble coherence of the modal dimension of the horizon of human experience of reality is never replaced by an intentional isolation of the various aspects of reality. Modal abstraction therefore always takes place in accordance with the recognition of the fact that each unique aspect of reality reflects all the other aspects (cf. Van der Walt 1994:148).

From the outset it has become apparent that the naive attitude of thought differs in principle from the theoretical attitude: while the naively experiencing person intuitively resists the effort to disunite the integral and coherent nature of reality, it is evident that modal abstraction contributes toward the intentional separation of reality into the diversity of its modal aspects. Without annihilating the integral structure of the horizon of our experience, theoretical insight into and the subsequent scientific interpretation of the modal diversity of meaning is only possible by virtue of modal abstraction (Dooyeweerd 1984/I:40). However, modal abstraction should never be confused with the absolutisation of a modal aspect.

### 3.4 Abstraction versus absolutisation

The attempt to distinguish abstraction from absolutisation requires insight into the intimately interwovenness of the various aspects of reality. The unbreakable coherence among the modalities of reality indicates that within the structure of one aspect, there are moments that refer to all the other modalities. Various examples can be taken from everyday life where the irreducible meaning-nuclei of all modal spheres become manifested in the form of analogical moments within the limits of every other aspect of human experience (Schoeman 1980:32; cf. also Hart 1984:153ff; Van der Walt 1994:148 and Strauss 1978:28). Linked together by a system of analogies, points of resemblance among the modalities of human experience are exhibited: *cultural feeling* refers to an analogical moment between the historical aspect and the psychical aspect; whereas a point of resemblance between the historical aspect and the logical aspect is exhibited in *intellectual power*. It seems that everyday language is interlarded with analogical moments (such as *inter alia* artistic feeling; moral feeling; religious emotion; juridical causality; economic viability and social security), which means that no purely ethical, economical, juridical,

social, lingual and historical reality, amongst others, does in fact exist. However, as the similarity between two aspects always imply a difference, the uniqueness of each aspect remains intact within the primary interlacements among the various aspects of human experience. From here it becomes apparent that the inability to recognise the unbreakable coherence among the modalities of reality, together with the disregard of the uniqueness of internal law by which each aspect is constituted, can easily result in the reducing of the different modalities to just one or two. At the same time, however, "theoretical absolutisation and reductionism are possible precisely because everything is connected with and related to everything else" (Stoker 1970:198). Due to the unbreakable coherence of the framework of modalities, all *-isms*, as an indication of absolutisations (such as *inter alia* economicism, socialism, rationalism, historicism and psychologism), will always exhibit elements of truth, hence explaining why *-isms* can so easily appear to be attractive.

The elevation of some or other aspect of reality from the unbreakable coherence which exists among the modalities of the horizon of human experience, leads to the violation and domination of all other aspects (Schoeman 1998:13; Strauss 1978:29; Visagie 1995:4-5; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1996:11; 1986:35; Kalsbeek 1975:113 and Walzer 1983:10-11). Once an abstracted and isolated aspect is deemed to be absolute and all-sufficient, absolutisation, reductionism and usurpation set in. This implies that the rest of the knowable reality is reduced to and theoretically usurped by the view of the absolutised knowable. Although Walzer (1983:4,19) argues that there has never been a single decision point from which all distributions of social goods are controlled, he simultaneously indicates that the confusion of one sphere with one another, and the disregard of the internal principles by which each sphere is constituted, may indeed lead to tyranny. Any attempt to explain and interpret one aspect in terms of another will without any doubt result in the arresting of theoretical thought by two opposing laws which cancel one another in principle (Schoeman 1980:37 and Strauss 1978:39). Due to a conflict between the irreducible laws by which each aspect of reality is constituted, the theoretical disclosure of a particular facet of reality will indeed go astray. The emergence of antinomies, as contradictions in the theoretical attitude of thought, can therefore be ascribed to the unlawful absolutisation of a particular relativity to a position of hegemony.

From the foregoing exposition it can be deduced that an absolutisation not only constitutes an ideology, but that it also supplies the theoretical axiom of autonomy that functions as the

starting-point, preceding and controlling all theoretical reflection within the realm of the ideology. Although the ideological process of absolutisation remains bound to the theoretical attitude, a curious system of metaphysical presuppositions plays a decisive role with regard to the emergence of an ideology. Whereas a belief-system is directly related to a system of *a priori's* according to which a particular view concerning man and the world is concretised, the non-scientific experience of the adherents of an ideology will be determined and undermined by the slanted and prejudiced perspectives regulated by a pre-scientific insight into the structure of reality (cf. Schoeman 1998:37 and also Stoker 1970:165). Since only objects from our pre-abstracted (non-scientific) experience can be abstracted, the theoretical attitude of thought will also be regulated by the same insight into the universal structure of reality. However, considering that non-scientific experience does not know any epistemological problems, any theoretical picture of reality will therefore always be the product of theoretical abstraction (cf. Dooyeweerd 1996:10). The implication is that discourse and communication between the adherents of conflicting Schools of Thought will remain bound to the theoretical attitude of thought. In order to establish a relatively "neutral" ground for such discourse, the merits of transcendental critique may be proposed. However, since transcendental critique relates directly to the philosophical basis of all special sciences, a distinction between philosophy and the special sciences is imperative.

### **3.5 Philosophy and the special sciences**

While modal abstraction involves the identification of one aspect by distinguishing it from another, it is obvious that theoretical analysis will always consider at least two aspects that differ from each other. In this regard Strauss (1989:16) argues that if the boundaries of a special science is founded upon one aspect only, the identification of a specific field of scientific investigation can never be regarded as an analysis that takes place within one aspect. This is simply the case because the identification of an aspect involves more than one aspect. The identification of the historical aspect of human existence is therefore only possible in distinction from all the other aspects. However, as the distinct field of scientific investigation involves a particular aspectual delimitation, special sciences remain bound to limited and limiting perspectives of the modal boundaries (cf. Schoeman 1998:32 and also Dooyeweerd 1996:7). The implication is that no special science can demarcate its own field of study without a coherent view

within which the differences, as well as the resemblance among the diversity of modal aspects can be observed.

Philosophy, however, aims at an all-encompassing overview of temporal reality: it offers theories which not only seek to explain the cosmic interrelatedness and coherence of phenomena, but also the general connection of all the different sciences (Clouser 1991:60; Kalsbeek 1975:35; Schoeman 1998:33 and Wolters 1990:9). Where a special science requires a totality perspective of temporal reality to delimit its field of scientific study, and philosophy can be described as the cosmological science of totality, it becomes evident that modal abstraction implies that all sciences must rest on a philosophical basis. Since philosophy endeavours to account for a theory regarding the dimension of modal aspects, differences in the various schools of philosophy "can only arise with respect to the question of how one should view the mutual interrelation and coherence of these modal aspects and, in this connection, how they may be distinguished theoretically" (Dooyeweerd 1996:7).

Whereas a belief-system focuses in a pre-scientific manner on both the structure and the interpretation (direction) of reality, it is philosophy as the totality-oriented scientific discipline, that provides the special sciences with theoretical insight into the unity and diversity of reality. As such, philosophy not only provides the answers to questions that transcend all modal boundaries, but it also attunes the theoretical attitude of thought towards the transcendental pre-requisites for theoretical thought.

### **3.6 Transcendental critique of theoretical thought**

To establish a common ground as the basis for discourse and communication between thinkers from divergent Schools of Thought, Dooyeweerd suggests the subjection of the theoretical attitude of thought to transcendental criticism. Transcendental criticism has been defined as the "critical inquiry into the universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possible, and which are required by the immanent structure of this thought itself" (Dooyeweerd 1984/I:37; cf. also Brümmer 1971:16-17 and Kalsbeek 1975:172). In this regard conditions of universal nature must refer to those conditions that are applicable to all thinkers, regardless of divergent conclusions. Hence, the postulation that all antithetical statements and interpretations presuppose a structure of reality that must be the same for every thinker (infra:3.2). The more

fundamental the antithesis between two statements, the more fundamental the common questions must be to which alternative answers are proposed. Because contradictory and conflicting statements and judgements are only possible when the theoretical attitude of thought is aimed at the same reality, universality appears to be not only the basis for discourse and communication between thinkers, but also the transcendental pre-requisite for antithetical pronouncements.

The universally valid conditions for theoretical thought consequently imply a truth that is not only common to all, but involve common transcendental pre-requisites without which antithetical statements will, in principle, be impossible. Brümmer (1971:24) alludes in this regard to a particular "neutral" basis within which shared properties for all thinkers enable discourse and communication between thinkers from various Schools of Thought. Three transcendental questions that are not only common for all philosophers, but simultaneously provide the common ground for discourse and communication, are proposed:

1. What do we abstract in the intentional theoretical attitude of thought from the integral structure of human experience?
2. From what standpoint can the aspects of human experience, which were theoretically abstracted, be reunited in a theoretical synthesis?
3. How is critical self-reflection, namely the concentric direction of theoretical thought toward the self possible, and what is its origin? (cf. Dooyeweerd 1996:11,14,18; also Söhne 1973:107-108; Strauss 1973:152 and Van Riessen 1970:114).

Although the concrete answers to the above-mentioned questions will differ and might even lead to conflicting statements, the assumption is that these questions deal with the insight exhibited by a philosopher into the universal structure of reality. In this regard Dooyeweerd (1996:7) argues that the structure of reality not only refuses to be ignored by the critical attitude of thought, but it provides the structural *a priori* that is a pre-requisite for the existence of theoretical thought itself. Because the modal aspects confer on experience the primary diversity of meaning that is basic to all theoretical distinctions, the answers to the mentioned questions will reflect the status of the subjective *a priori*, which in turn, is based on insight into the structural *a priori* of theoretical thought. Ultimately, the three basic transcendental problems of the theoretical attitude expose the particular transcendental theoretical idea of a philosopher concerning the meaning-coherence in the modal meaning-diversity and the origin thereof (cf. Dooyeweerd 1984/I:69; Kalsbeek 1975:173; Strauss 1973:154 and Van Riessen 1970:114). Since all special

sciences exhibit a philosophical foundation, the transcendental ground-idea of philosophy will have a profound influence on the theoretical attitude of thought.

### **3.6.1 The first transcendental question: what do we abstract in the intentional theoretical attitude from the integral structure of human experience?**

Placed within the paradigm of the *Philosophy of the Cosmological Idea*, Dooyeweerd (1996:12; cf. also Spier 1972:57ff; Strauss 1973:152-153 and Van Riessen 1970:120) poses the answer to this question as the inter-modal coherence of time. Universal time is not to be equated with one of the modal aspects. The identification of universal time with one of the modalities of reality will lead to the predicament whereby certain aspects would have to be regarded as preceding time, while the others proceed time. Neither would the distinction between *inter alia*, physical time, biotic continuity of organic development, the duration of feeling and the continuity of time in history be possible (cf. Dooyeweerd 1996:12 and Spier 1972:59). However, placed within its inter-modal continuity, universal time not only precedes every theoretical distinction, but expresses itself in a typical way in all the modal aspects of the horizon of human experience. As such, universal time exhibits a continuous depth-dimension that not only reaches beyond the boundaries of the modalities, but simultaneously brings all modalities into an unbreakable coherence of meaning. In this regard it becomes conclusive that universal (cosmic) and integral time resorts to the structure of reality and can as such, only be approached in a theoretical survey of the distinction of the various modal aspects in the theoretical attitude.

Although the fundamental modes of time are brought into view by virtue of modal abstraction, the process of abstraction itself remains enclosed within the universal horizon of time. In this regard Dooyeweerd (1996:13) reflects that philosophy, in order to be critical, "has to arrive at an explicitly theoretical concept of the distinguished, that is, analytically set apart, modal aspects of the temporal horizon of our experience in order to grasp them in an all encompassing theory". One can therefore not escape a totality perspective of the horizon of human experience - every aspect contained in the theoretical attitude displays a foundational modal structure in which an inner coherence with all other modal aspects comes to expression (infra:3.2). Although we abstract modalities from the continuity of the modal meaning-coherence in the theoretical attitude of thought, this continuity is not abolished but remains present in the theoretical discontinuity of the abstracted aspects.

However, any critical reflection on the answer to this transcendental question will therefore reveal the insight of the philosopher into the meaning-coherence of the modal meaning-diversity. Either modal abstraction proceeds from the recognition of the inter-modal coherence within which the modal aspects reveal their own inner nature, or modal abstraction degenerates into the absolutisation of a modal aspect. The implication of the latter will be the replacement of the structurally pluralistic view of reality by a hierarchical view of the very same reality. In this regard it appears as if the universality of this transcendental question not only provides a "neutral" ground for discourse among various philosophers, but it also enables special sciences to critically reflect on the transcendental theoretical and pre-theoretical presuppositions underpinning the theoretical attitude of thought.

**3.6.2 The second transcendental question: from what standpoint can the aspects of human experience which were theoretically abstracted, be reunited in a theoretical synthesis?**

The answer to this question relates directly to the exposure of a fixed point of departure from where a thinker comes to a totality perspective on the modal meaning-diversity. Through subjecting every possible starting-point to transcendental critique, it can be determined whether such an Archimedean (vantage) point (cf. Kalsbeek 1975:57; Söhnge 1973:108 and Van Riessen 1970:114) remains grounded in the inner nature of one of the modal aspects, or whether it transcends the theoretical attitude of thought. Dooyeweerd (1996:14) argues that in order to function as the central point of reference for the theoretical synthesis, the Archimedean point must necessarily transcend the theoretical attitude of thought itself. The only way in which the modal diversity of the aspects of human experience can be related to a deeper radical unity, is when the point of reference is taken beyond reality itself.

Proceeding from the argument that the theoretical point of departure needs to point beyond reality itself to find the concentration point of the modal diversity of meaning, it can be argued that the logical subject function cannot qualify to propose a meaningful account of the Archimedean point itself. The disregard of any support that is found in something which transcends the boundaries of theoretical thought as such, will place the concentration point of the modal diversity of meaning within the boundaries of an absolutised aspect of reality. By virtue of the subjection of the theoretical attitude of thought to the transcendental critique of theoretical

thought, hidden absolutisations will not only be revealed, but the untenability of the viewpoint whereby the vantage point of theoretical thought is placed in an absolutised aspect of human experience, will be exposed (cf. Dooyeweerd 1996:15; 1984/I:12 and Strauss 1973:153). While the absolutisation of a modal aspect strives to reduce all of the remaining aspects to mere parts of the one that has been absolutised, *-isms* will indeed provide a starting-point that remains bound to reality itself.

If the vantage point is not to be found within the coherence of time and it is not a matter of purely rational thought, it must therefore be posited by an act of critical self-reflection in which the self transcends rational thought (cf. Van Riessen 1970:114; also Dooyeweerd 1984/I:12 and Kalsbeek 1975:58). Since no human action or experience can be divorced from the selfhood of man (the nucleus of the whole personality), it becomes evident that all modes of human existence, including the theoretical attitude of thought, must ultimately be concentrated in the selfhood (heart) of man (Schoeman 1980:88; also Dooyeweerd 1984/I:55). Knowledge of the self, and therefore the concentric direction of the self, however, relates directly to knowledge of the origin. The concentration of the self upon what is regarded as the origin of all meaning, will ultimately provide the Archimedean point that enables man to relate the modal diversity of the aspects of human experience to a deeper radical unity that is fundamental to every act of thought.

### **3.6.3 The third transcendental question: how is critical self-reflection, namely the concentric direction of thought toward the self, possible, and what is its origin?**

While critical self-reflection transcends the boundaries of the theoretical attitude of thought, it can be agreed with Schoeman (1980:88-89; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1984/I:57; 1996:19; Troost 1983:120 and Van Riessen 1970:114) that no scientific investigation of the selfhood of man is possible. Any attempt to theoretically grasp the selfhood as a self-enclosed "independence", will dissolve into the utter negation of all its definitions (Dooyeweerd 1996:20). The authentic understanding of the selfhood as the concentric focal point of all temporary functions must therefore pertain to pre-scientific knowledge. The implication is that the origin of the meaning-coherence in the modal diversity of meaning relates to presuppositions that transcend the horizon of human experience itself.



Regarded as the root-unity of human existence, the self cannot exist in itself, but reaches beyond itself to find not only itself, but also its origin (root). By virtue of transcending the modal diversity of the temporal horizon of human experience, the self concentrates all that is relative upon the origin which is regarded as absolute (Dooyeweerd 1996:21). However, identifying the concentration point of all existence with one aspect, the concentration point for the theoretical act remains bound within the cosmic spectrum of the meaning-diversity. Placing the origin of reality within the domain of cosmic diversity, the absolutisation of an aspect constitutes the emergence of an ideology.

The argument that the root-unity of the modal diversity of meaning should transcend this diversity, establishes the boundary between transcendental critique with its universal character, and the religious pre-suppositions exhibiting a particular and un-neutral character (Brümmer 1971:16 and Van Riessen 1970:114). While the religious pre-suppositions transcend the theoretical attitude of thought, it becomes apparent that theoretical thought can never be self-sufficient and autonomous as it is always regulated by religion. In this regard Dooyeweerd (1984/I:57; cf. also Hart 1984:191; Kalsbeek 1975:352 and Schoeman 1980:7) explains religion as *the innate impulse of the human selfhood to direct itself towards an origin of all diversity of meaning*. As the total commitment of the human selfhood to an origin, religion grants stability and anchorage to literally all modes of human existence. The radical and integral nature of religion can consequently be distinguished from faith that is only one aspect of human existence. Being the last and most complex aspect, faith should be regarded as the temporal limiting aspect through which the religious tendency of the selfhood imparts itself to all the modes of human existence. Associated with faith, creed and cultic ritual, the pistic or certitudinal dimension involves surrender to the origin of the universe as the ultimately secure foundation of reality in which we can rest securely. Activities, typically qualified by this modal dimension such as worship services, rites, prayers and confessions, ground us in the ultimate to which we are committed. As such, the pistical function of life provides man with a functional avenue through which the radical relation to the chosen origin and the integral totality of all of human experience become functional. Consequently, according to the nature of religion, all modes of human existence are "at the bottom radically one in being ways of subjectivity, while subjection is the character of religion" (Hart 1984:191). Whereas all people function certitudinally and are religious as being subject to the one order of reality, the faith aspect cannot be regarded as the root-unity itself. Although all people are in functional contact with the ultimate meaning of the

order of reality through faith, the pistical aspect also requires the supra-modal point of reference which is only to be found in the selfhood (Dooyeweerd 1996:21; cf. also 1979:8).

Linking ideology to the tendency to find an absolute starting-point in an aspect or an analogical concept, the belief in the central starting-point must therefore come about through an essentially religious driving force. However, due to a lack of true self-knowledge (that presupposes knowledge of the origin), the religious motivation goes unacknowledged. Even when remaining oblivious of the religious motivation, it is evident that a distinction between the post-ideological domain and the pre-ideological suppositions regulating ideology, is possible (cf. Schoeman 1998:24). While non-scientific and scientific experience are directly influenced by the ideological belief-system to find its point of departure within the modal diversity of meaning, the ideological belief-system is ultimately regulated by a "belief" in an absoluteness constituting the concentration point of all of human existence.

Since the absolute has a right to exist in religion only, the religious starting-point constitutes the absolute ground of all temporal and relative existence. Given the absolute and transcendent nature of this religious starting-point that penetrates behind theory itself, it becomes obvious that no theoretical attitude of thought can be neutral. While ultimately regulated by the religious starting-point that constitutes the origin of theoretical enterprise, antithetical statements made by different scientists to the same question, will ultimately reflect the status of the particular root-unity. Whereas transcendental critique provides a common ground for discourse among followers of divergent Schools of Thought, irrespective of divergent religious suppositions, the supra-theoretical realm of religious commitment provides no such common ground (Brümmer 1971:17; cf. also Van Riessen 1970:115). In this regard it can be argued that since the absolute exists in religion only, differences in theoretical enterprises will in the last instance exhibit an absolute character. In distinction from transcendent critique that "confronts ... Christian faith with the results of modern science and with the various philosophical systems and thus ascertains, whether or not factual conflicts exist" (Dooyeweerd 1984/I:37), it is transcendental critique that touches the inner character and the immanent structure of the theoretical attitude of thought. As such, transcendent critique is valueless to science and philosophy because it leaves the inner connection between religion and science in the dark.

Transcendental critique, however, exhibits the ability to hit upon the inner connection between religion and science. As the cosmological science of totality, philosophy not only provides science with its necessary presuppositions, but by virtue of the third transcendental question, it becomes possible to penetrate to the inner structure and nature of the theoretical attitude itself. Two important issues are clearly highlighted by transcendental criticism: all theoretical thought are necessarily regulated by religious suppositions and can as such, never be neutral, and transcendental critique lies the foundation for discourse and communication among philosophers of divergent Schools of Thought, irrespective of divergent religious suppositions.

### **3.7 The significance of transcendental critique for the criticism of ideologically underpinned educational theories**

The merits of transcendental critique can be coupled with the ability to penetrate not only to the inner structure, but also to the root of theoretical attitude of educational thought itself. In order to investigate the intentional structure of educational thought, the appeal to universally valid states of affairs becomes imperative. Although the structure of human experience and educational thought is the same for all educational scientists, a central point of reference is required in order to actualise the activity of theoretical thought (Dooyeweerd 1996:22-23). While divergent and antithetical statements presuppose universally valid conditions for educational thought, the exposure of the religious roots underpinning these statements, appears to be the only way in which an account for divergent interpretations of the same state of affairs can be presented. The three transcendental questions, pertaining to the coherence of the modal diversity of meaning and the origin of meaning itself, appeal to the theoretical account of the same educational reality. The concrete answers to these transcendental questions will not only reflect the insight into the structural *a priori* concerning the horizon of human experience, but will ultimately reflect on the religious suppositions motivating the particularity of these answers (cf. Brümmer 1971:17). The implication is that although every educational scientist works with the same formal transcendental ground-ideas, the concrete content attributed to these ideas will differ in accordance with the various religious starting-points.

The significance of transcendental critique for the study of ideologies is apparent when it is taken into consideration that an ideological belief-system harbours a particular, although reductionist, conception of man and the world (infra:2.4.4.2). Influenced by this ideological view of reality,

non-scientific experience provides the hypotheses from where all scientific explication of phenomena are launched. Philosophy, however, gives Education, as a special science, its necessary presuppositions that relate directly to the inner connection between religion and science. It is only when a critical inquiry into the universally valid conditions for the theoretical attitude of thought is undertaken, that the nature of the subjective *a priori* in the ideological attitude of thought can be exposed. The inquiry into the transcendental ground-ideas pertaining to a particular ideological attitude of thought, enables the exposure of the theoretical axiom that is taken as the centre and the starting-point of theoretical thought (cf. Dooyeweerd 1996:23). However, the subjection of this starting-point to transcendental critique, indicates the final stages of this criticism when the supra-theoretical presuppositions that ultimately determine the theoretical view of the mutual interrelation and coherence of the modal aspects of experience, are drawn into the open.

It is consequently by virtue of the subjection of an ideological belief-system to transcendental critique that the theoretical attitude of ideological thought can be linked to the tendency to reside its absolute starting-point in an aspect (or analogical concept) of reality. Since education, as is the case with all special sciences, exhibits a philosophical foundation, a particular transcendental ground-idea will ultimately have a profound influence on all scientific ventures. The implication is that a transcendental ground-idea pertaining to an ideological attitude of thought, will lead to ideologically underpinned educational theories. It is known that social theories are often neutralised by the fact that human actions end up in undesired relations of domination and hegemony (cf. Magee 1974:104 and Popper 1998:158ff). This is also true of educational theories: knowledge pertaining to the science of education can easily be mobilised and distorted to serve the interests of one group in society at the expense of other groups. Although the detrimental impact of an ideological belief-system on educational theories relates to evidence of injustices and human suffering within the realm of education practice, it is imperative that whatever lies at the roots of such theories should be exposed. By subjecting the ideological attitude of thought to transcendental critique, it becomes possible to expose the presuppositions at the root of the ideological production of educational knowledge. It is thus only when such a root is exposed, that it becomes possible to account for diverse (*inter alia*, neo-Marxist, Socialist, Pragmatist and Post-Modern) interpretations of the nature of education.

The following schematic presentation (cf. Van Riessen, 1970:125) gives a concise outline of the way in which the application of transcendental critique can assist in the exposure of an ideological axiom:

<b>Transcendental questions</b> Refers to the <i>same</i> reality, constituting a "neutral" ground for discourse, irrespective of religious suppositions. <i>Neutral</i>	<b>Theoretical answers</b>  Concrete answers as regulated by religious suppositions.  <i>Un-neutral</i>	<b>Transcendental ideas</b>  Exposes the subjective insight into the structural <i>a priori</i> .  <i>Un-neutral</i>	<b>Exposure of a ideological axiom by virtue of transcendental criticism</b>
<b>1. What is abstracted for the theoretical attitude of thought?</b>	The coherence of inter-modal time.	The <i>coherence</i> of meaning.	Absolutisation of an aspect or an analogical concept of reality.
<b>2. What enables the totality of the diversity of meaning?</b>	Archimedean point as the fixed point of departure.	The <i>totality</i> of meaning.	Absolutised aspect as the point of departure.
<b>3. What enables self-reflection?</b>	The origin.	The <i>origin</i> of meaning.	The last and ultimate appeal regarding truth.

**Table 1: The application of transcendental critique**

### 3.8 The critico-rationalist attitude

In the foregoing exposition transcendental critique was proposed as a method enabling the educational scientist to give a critical account of the nature of those presuppositions that play a profound role in determining the nature of educational theories and practices. However, as the educational scientist's own scientific endeavours are also profoundly influenced by certain presuppositions, he/she must be prepared to adopt an attitude of criticism and openness: a permanent willingness to criticise (also one's own theories) and enter into open discussions. In this regard the next chapter will be devoted to argue in favour of the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude.

Since the transformative agenda of scientific practice is often distorted through the ideological production of scientific knowledge (cf. Mouton 1993:122), Popper (1989:26; cf. also 1968:16; 1996b:224ff) proposes the criticising of not only our own theories, but especially those of others as an effective way in which man can hope to detect and eliminate errors from theories. This proposal sums up a position called "critical rationalism". As a meta-theoretical position critical rationalism pertains to an *attitude* that seeks to solve as many problems as possible by an appeal

to reason. However, keeping in mind the possibility that any aspect of reality can be elevated to the status of hypernormativity, the critical reflection on critical rationalism should proceed from an *ontological framework* within which the legitimate role of rationality (to provide the conceptual grasp of the structure of things) is both recognised and relativised (Hart 1984:98 and cf. infra:3.2). It is consequently imperative that the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude as a possibility to detect and eliminate errors in ideologically underpinned educational theories, should be accompanied by the conviction that the educational scientist has the prior task of orienting her/himself in the world. Man can only become aware of the role played by reason in the world after gaining a particular perspective of reality in totality. Since reason refers to only one mode of human existence, it can be argued that as the world is more-than-rational, the task of determining what the world is really like, cannot be left to reason alone - what is true is not the same as what is rationally justified.

### **3.9 Basic features of the critico-rationalist attitude**

#### **3.9.1 Reason as a common medium of communication**

While transcendental critique suggests a reality that offers itself in exactly the same way within the horizon of human experience as a commonly shared property, it appears as if Popper (1996b:239; cf. also 1968:16) prioritises the rational aspect as an instrument for a common medium of communication. Although people speak different mother tongues, mankind is unified by the fact that the "different mother tongues, in so far as they are rational, can be translated into one another" (Popper 1996b:239). The prerequisite for such a unity of human reason is the adoption of rationalism. The adoption of the latter implies two important characteristics of critical rationalism, i.e. an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience, and a moral obligation to keep up the standards of clarity.

The basis of the rationalist attitude, also labelled the *attitude of reasonableness* (cf. Popper 1996b:225), is thus formed by criticism and the art of listening to criticism. Advancing from the assumption that a person owes his/her reason to intellectual intercourse with certain concrete individuals, man can never lay claim to authority. The implication of the fact that we can never excel others in our reasonableness, is that the critical rationalist will always consider the argument rather than the person. Two important deductions can be made from this: every person with whom we communicate should be regarded as a potential source of argument and reasonable

information, and, as a means of rational communication, the clarity of language is essential. As such, the rationalist attitude establishes what Popper calls a "rational unity of mankind". By linking the attitude of reasonableness with the scientific attitude, the realisation of the aim of science, i.e. to find satisfactory explanations of whatever is in need of being explained (Popper 1972:60; cf. also Zecha 1995:73), requires the inter-subjective co-operation of scientists. In this regard it can be stated that the rational unity of mankind not only underscores reason as a common medium of communication for scientists all over the world, but it underwrites the "universal" task of science to rationalise the world. By ascribing the rationalisation of the world to the task of science, Popper (1996b:357; 1972:196; 1989:29-30) recognises two important assumptions that underpin critical rationalism: the world is not rational, and although the critico-rationalist attitude strives for rational clarity, the rational grasping of an ultimate essence of the world remains beyond reach.

### **3.9.2 Irrational grounds for the choice of rationalism**

Placed within the tradition of critical rationalism, the subjection of the non-rational world to reason requires a rationalist position. In this regard Popper (1996b:229ff; cf. also O'Hear 1980:148) argues, in distinction from "uncritical rationalism" or "comprehensive rationalism", in favour of critical rationalism. Ascribing uncritical or comprehensive rationalism to an attitude pertaining to the disregard of anything that cannot be supported by argument or experience, Popper elucidates the logical untenability thereof. Since the principle of avoiding all presuppositions cannot be supported by argument and experiment, any attempt to argue that the rationalist attitude is constituted by logical argument or experience, relativises itself. However, assuming that all arguments must proceed from assumptions, the rationalist attitude must first be adopted before argument or experience can be effective. Since an argument necessarily presupposes a particular assumption, rationalism can never be self-contained or comprehensive. In this regard it becomes imperative that in order to detect and eliminate errors as a result of the ideological production and appropriation of scientific knowledge within the field of education, the critico-rationalist attitude must first be adopted. As such, the critical rationalist does not proceed from logical argument or experiment, but from an attitude driven by the readiness to criticise, be criticised and to learn from mistakes.

Given the untenability of uncritical or comprehensive rationalism, critical rationalism proceeds from the assumption that the person who adopts the rationalist attitude, needs to irrationally adopt some belief. Thus the recognition of the critico-rationalist attitude as a result from an irrational faith in reason, explains Popper's (1996b:231) foundational choice for rationality as irrational. Therefore, by admitting that the choice for a critical form of rationalism finds its origin in an irrational decision, the critico-rationalist must adopt a minimum concession to irrationalism. The idea of rationalism as an ultimate matter of irrational faith not only coincides with the recognition of the untenability to produce a reasoned defence of reason itself, but involves the assumption that "we have no guarantee that rational methods will bring us the truth either in science or elsewhere" (O'Hear 1980:147). However, the irrationalist belief of the critical rationalist in the unity of human reason, should be distinguished from irrationalism that can, in the absence of any rules of consistency, be linked to any kind of belief (Popper 1996b:232; cf. also 1994:180). By linking the irrationalist belief of critical rationalism to a trust in reason, as well as the demand for the rationalisation of society, rationalism obtains an almost omnipresence for Popper. The priority of rationalism is further enforced when Popper (1996b:238) argues that it should be linked up with the recognition of the "necessity of social institutions to protect freedom of criticism, freedom of thought, and thus the freedom of men". Although rationalism appears to acquire an omnipresence within the critico-rationalist attitude, and although it seems as if an absolutisation of the subject-object relation is at stake, the merits of a modest and self-critical rationalism that recognises certain limitations, including the relativising of a self-contained notion thereof by virtue of adopting a minimum concession for irrationalism, ought to be positively considered.

### **3.9.3 Recognition of human fallibility in the search for truth**

Advancing from an irrationalist belief in human reason, the critical rationalist admits, by linking rationality with the readiness to learn from mistakes, not only to the fallibility of man, but also to the idea that "truth is beyond human authority" (Popper 1989:30; cf. also 1972:265 and 1996b:374-375). Man is fallible and since science is human, it can never be exempt from human fallibility. Accepting the fallibility of human knowledge, it is clear that there cannot exist any general criterion of truth. If truth were to be manifest and people would therefore have known what is good and just, then no errors need to occur. However, as human knowledge remains fallible and scientific theories are prone to fall short of the truth, the belief in scientific certainty



will subsequently also fall short of the truth, which means that well-established theories may turn out to be false and in need of correction.

Insight into the fallibility of man has certain important implications for the subjection of educational science and educational practice to criticism (cf. Zecha 1995:90ff). The emergence of man from the closed, tribal society not only signifies the beginning of the critical tradition, but also the differentiation of the various life spheres. Once the transitional process from the closed society to the freeing of critical powers had been set into motion, the emergence of new educational needs called for the formation of educational institutions. Since this transitional process involves the beginning of the critical tradition (Magee 1974:88; cf. also Popper 1998:173ff), and given the disclosed-logical qualification of the school (infra:2.4.4.7A.), the educational institution aims at the disclosure and evaluation of information and information systems. In this regard Frankena (1961:4ff) links education to the cultivation of desirable dispositions (abilities and traits) as condition of the "good life". Although the acquisition of such dispositions require certain knowledge, knowledge itself is not innate, except in potentiality. Thus, if the task of education is the fostering of such dispositions, the science of education must necessarily involve a search of educational knowledge.

Brezinka (cited by Zecha 1995:99) identifies the aims of the science of education as the growth of knowledge and the search for truth. Placed within the context of man's cultural mandate to master and control reality, the link between the science of education and the growth of knowledge is further underscored: the distinction between laws of nature and cultural norms implies the mastering and controlling of the natural domain (pertaining to unalterable natural laws), as well as the cultural domain (where alterable norms are exercised) of reality (cf. infra:2.3.3). Such mastering and controlling are, however, not possible without knowledge of the natural laws and cultural norms. Wringe (1988:45) points out that "the making of valid choices also entails possessing both a good deal of information about the world and the options it has to offer and the likely consequences of one's various options". While ignorance of unalterable natural laws can lead to devastating consequences (such as the result of jumping from a high building or placing the hand on a hot stove), the choice between a normative and an anti-normative action presupposes knowledge of the norm involved. As such, man masters and controls reality in terms of knowledge transmitted through, *inter alia*, educational practice. However, as human knowledge is fallible, no educational theory should be regarded as the

ultimate and final say on education. In fact, due to the fallibility of the educational researcher, and in the light of the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude, all educational theories should be regarded in terms of the possibility that they may fall short of the truth. As the search for truth is a permanent venture in coming closer to the truth (Popper 1972:47; also Visagie 1983:12), no security is to be found in any theories, not even in those that have best withstood harsh criticism.

Popper (1972:134) atones that although we may fall short on objective standards such as the standard of truth, content, validity, among others, all sources of information should be welcomed, since not one single source can be characterised as being infallible. Due to human fallibility it can be argued that because no educational theory can stem from any authoritative source of knowledge, it is simply not possible to accredit any such theory with the ultimate truth. If theories were to be assigned with absolute truth, the growth of knowledge will simply not be possible. However, arguing that truth remains unattainable and that educational theories can subsequently not be justified, it is the idea of an approximation of the truth that contributes to a belief in the growth of knowledge. In the attempt to comprehend as much as possible of educational reality, we reject one educational theory as being less close an approximation to truth in favour of the tentative adoption of those theories that seem to best withstand our criticism. Since the finding of the ultimate truth remains unattainable, criticism must consist of the search for contradictions and their elimination. While we can learn from our mistakes and eliminate them once they have been detected by criticism, our knowledge grows. Thus, the mere accumulation of instances to confirm a theory would never give us any reason to doubt or replace it, nor would our knowledge grow unless "in our search for confirming instances we accidentally hit upon a counter-instance" (Magee 1974:26). In order for educational knowledge to grow, the propounding of educational theories must go beyond existing knowledge regarding educational reality.

From here it becomes clear that the growth of knowledge in the scientific field of educational research must hold certain repercussions for the educational practice: whereas the growth of knowledge in the science of education leads to the transmission thereof in the classroom, man becomes better equipped to master and control reality. The opposite can, however, also be argued: the enclosing of knowledge as the absolute and proven truth may result in the introduction of supposedly final and absolute statements as irrefutable answers to ultimate questions (infra:2.4.4.7C.(i)). In this regard it can be agreed with Popper (1972:194; 1989:vii)

that since human knowledge is characterised by fallibility, it is the task of science to constantly renew itself by explaining what has so far been accepted as satisfactory explanations. Placed within the context of the science of education, in order to detect and eliminate error, all educational theories should constantly be submitted to criticism.

The educational researcher who adopts the critico-rationalist attitude will, in addition to the recognition of the fallibility of human reason, also proceed from the assumption that all educational theories are uncertain. Since no educational theory ought to be accepted as certain and final, it is only by virtue of open and critical discussion that growth in knowledge can contribute towards the transition to an open education system where the critical powers of man have been freed (cf. Popper 1998:1,173). Thus, once the critico-rationalist attitude has been accepted, the educational researcher will also accept the challenge to provide the criticism upon which the improvement of educational theories depend.

#### **3.9.4 Recognition of the relative nature of knowledge**

The critical rationalist's important insight that man is fallible and prone to be biased, emphasises the relativity of human explanations. Since truth is not manifest, man cannot draw any authoritarian conclusions by which the fundamentalist application of timeworn principles are conclusively justified. As such, all casuist interpretations that do not endorse the time and situation independent validity of the applications of values, have not come to respect the authority of truth. It is by virtue of our respect for the authority of truth, that we can learn to listen to one another, criticise one another, and thus get nearer to the truth (Popper 1989:375). The attempt to penetrate deeper into the secrets of our world is a modest, discreet and circumspect affair - by recognising the fallibility of human reason, we not only admit to the impossibility of ever laying claim to obtaining any form of certainty, but we acknowledge our indebtedness to each other in the approximation of the truth.

Although placing the emphasis on "relative" truth, critical rationalism never degenerates into a relativism with respect to truth supported by the doctrine of human fallibility. Popper (1994:48; cf. also 1996b:221,369ff and Zecha 1995:87) does not deny the possibility of truth, but rather the existence of a general criterion of truth. The possibility of error does not imply that the search for truth is mistaken or that truth is "relative". On the contrary, "the idea of error implies that of

truth as the standard of which we may fall short" (Popper 1996b:375). Arguing against the kind of absolutism that claims to possess absolute truth, it is the doctrine of fallibility that emphasises the possibility of absolute mistakes. Theories are indeed absolutely false when they fall short of the truth. This notion of fallibility may also be of decisive help as a kind of steering compass in the challenging of "supposedly" conclusive and ultimate answers. Thus, without succumbing to a relativism, and in the absence of a general criterion of truth, the educational scientist must criticise educational theories by searching for mistakes. The attempt to justify educational theories must necessarily advance from a claim to possess truth. However, since man does not possess an *a priori* understanding of reality, the justification of theories cannot contribute to the growth of knowledge. Popper (1972:196; cf. also 1968:16 and 1996b:376) argues that every time "we proceed to explain some conjectural law or theory by a new conjectural theory of higher degree of universality, we are discovering more about the world, trying to penetrate deeper into its secrets". Thus, by searching for mistakes, the educational scientist does not only falsify educational theories, but simultaneously learns from mistakes. Since the truth concerning educational reality cannot be justified, the method of trial and error appears to be the only way in which we can approximate the truth by explaining what we know by what we do not know (cf. Popper 1972:191; also 1989:63). The educational scientist must therefore almost have knowledge as if (s)he does not have it, otherwise it will be extremely difficult to dissociate oneself from theoretical "sanctuaries" in order to continuously subject your own theories to critical scrutiny.

### **3.9.5 Rejection of all forms of determinism**

Although determinism appears to be an essential part of rationalism, in the sense that everything is determined by reason, the critical rationalist pertains to an indeterministic frame of mind. Aimed at removing all vestiges of determinism from rational thinking, the philosophy of historicism is rejected without reservation (Popper 1998:7ff; cf. also *infra*:2.3.5). The contention that future developments can be predicted as they are already pre-determined by laws of historical development, signifies not only a dependence on historical necessity, but preaches "the impotence of reason in social life" (Popper 1998:5). Assuming a certainty regarding the ultimate outcome of human history, the passive submission to a world controlled by specific historical laws proves to be detrimental to the development of satisfactory theories that will grow and progress with the passage of time. Whilst the doctrine of historicism can assume many forms, it retains the element

of totalitarianism, accompanied by collectivist planning. As previously mentioned, these two notions not only remind of the closed and tribal society where the "right" way determines personal responsibility, but appear to be remnants of the closed society that equally determines personal decisions in a collective claiming of the truth. In an attempt to bring change under rational control by predicting it, historicism aims at arresting change by planning it. The use of scientific knowledge obtained by some and utilised in a totalitarian way, along with power to coerce others into a path that they might not choose to follow, stifles the open criticism that ought to underlie decision-making in the open society (Ackermann 1976:164). This implies that the phenomenon of scientific development cannot be accounted for in terms of a deterministic rationalism such as encountered in the philosophy of historicism. Popper (1994:136) suggests that instead of a *plot to history* characterised by the omnipotence and omniscience of historical determinism, "one can say that the story of the growth of different kinds of human knowledge - ... - is a plot that we can discover in history".

Advancing from the assumption that scientific theory is, at best, an approximation of the truth, the anti-totalitarian stance of critical rationalism includes the unconditional rejection of empiricism and the method of verification (cf. Popper 1994:75; 1968:27ff). The fundamental thesis of empiricism, i.e. that experiment alone can decide upon the truth or falsity of scientific statements, is characterised by the use of inductive reasoning. The truth of observational statements are based on experience, and as such, leads to scientific universal statements. The growth of scientific knowledge is consequently based on the verification of conclusions by experience. Popper (cf. 1968:34ff), however, argues that because there is no general criterion of truth, the logical justification of universal statements about reality is not possible. Since we have never sufficient reason for the belief that we have attained the truth, scientific statements referring to the world of experience must be refutable; "and in so far as they are irrefutable, they do not refer to the world of experience" (Popper 1996b:13). It is true that the scientific descriptions of facts are highly selective, and in general, we do select facts that have a bearing upon a preconceived theory. However, the collection of such facts should not be aimed at the confirmation of the theory, but we should rather be on the lookout for facts which may refute the theory. The scientific character of a theory consequently refers to the possibility of falsification that constitutes the possibility of testing the theory. In this regard Popper (1996b:260) alludes that "the overthrow of theories is indeed the vehicle of scientific progress".

Proceeding from an anti-totalitarian stance, the critical rationalist aims at detecting error accompanying authoritarian certainty founded on an appeal to manifest truth. However, as the appeal to manifest truth coincides with the claiming of the possession of truth, and as the possession of the ultimate truth is illusory, the upholding of such an appeal can only take place in terms of an essential irrational (as an irrational passion for the claimed truth) rationality (cf. Visagie 1995:4ff). While the totalitarian notion of ideological reasoning exhibits a logic and a structure of its own, it is only rational to the adherents of the proclaimed truth, but irrational to those who have not yet grasped the "truth". Once the ruling ideologues claim to be the sole possessors of the truth, all life-forms, including science, are drawn into a chain of reasoning by which an audience is persuaded of the worth of a particular conception of man and the world (cf. *infra*: 2.4.4.6C.). Driven by a rational superiority based on an omniscience regarding "true" reality, the task of the science of education becomes redirected. As the truth about educational reality is already known, the main purpose of the science of education is to find confirming instances. Aims such as the growth of knowledge and the search for truth with regard to educational reality are not necessarily negated, but are placed within parameters set by a particular conception of educational reality. From here the role of positivism in the upholding of ideological beliefs within educational practices becomes significant: pre-interpreted facts and values are relayed via state-prescribed curricula as the ultimate findings of so-called specialists in the scientific field of education. As ultimate findings, these interpretations are not only presented as supposedly "law" statements, but they are regarded as unquestionable (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.7C(i)). Thus, the uncritical accepting of supposedly irrefutable facts and values would contribute towards stifling the inculcation of a critical consciousness.

Placed within the context of ideological reasoning, rationalisation can be identified as a strategy by which a particular conception of educational reality is explained and justified. Constituted by a search for confirming instances of an already known truth, the attempt to defend ideological reasoning in terms of argument and experience consequently proceeds from the assumption that the ultimate truth concerning educational reality is already known. This assumption, however, cannot be supported by either argument or experience as it precedes the latter. However, while such an assumption pertains to a particular ideological belief-system that adheres to a particular conception of reality, argumentation and experience within the post-ideological realm of scientific endeavour can be linked to the justification of the manifest truth involved. The impact of an ideological belief-system on educational theories is hereby once again endorsed. While the

submission to transcendental critique exposes the nature of such a belief-system, the commitment to critical argument and experience contributes towards the casting of the vicious circle of confirming a pre-determined conception of educational reality. The educational researcher who adopts the critico-rationalist attitude will proceed from the assumption that "what we call our knowledge is of its nature provisional, and permanently so" (Magee 1974:26). The indeterministic view of this attitude disposes therefore with ideologically blinded conceptions regarding educational reality. In contrast to the scientist that "satisfies himself with cheap rationalizations" (Popper 1996b:245), aimed at the confirming of particular instances, the critical rationalist adheres to a permanent willingness to enter into critical discussion. Thus, only once the attitude pertaining to critical argument and experience has been adopted, can the interpretation of facts and the (re)defining of values to serve ideological expectations be drawn into the open.

### 3.9.6 Recognition of the role of tradition and presuppositions

The *principle of falsification*, namely the method of science to look out for facts that may refute the theory (Popper 1996b:260), not only underscores the disposing of supposedly irrefutably and unalterable truths, but advocates that scientific investigation is possible by virtue of preliminary rational interpretation of certain universal structural features. Whereas scientific theories can be amended at any time, science is never to be equated with truth *per se*. However, contrary to the anti-metaphysical idea of building theory on nothing but verifiable facts (cf. infra:2.4.2.1 on *critical positivism*), a critico-rationalist attitude recognises the significance of tradition for the initiation of scientific investigation. Since tradition brings "some order and rational predictability into the social world in which we live" (Popper 1989:131), its role in the tackling of practical problems by means of methods such as trial and error and the invention of hypotheses that can be tested, needs to be elucidated.

Because education can never be understood in isolation of the social context in which it operates, and since the social context owe a great deal to tradition, the conserving power of tradition in the science of education ought not to be underestimated. Placed within the context of the closed and undifferentiated society, tradition obtained an all-powerful position regulating the everyday existence of primitive man. However, once the transitional process from the closed to the open society had been set into motion, the introduction of the critical tradition brought about new demands: not only was the individual now confronted with personal decisions, but the assuming

of personal responsibility appeared to have left man disorientated (Magee 1974:88ff, cf. also Dooyeweerd 1979:75 and Popper 1998:173). The implication is that the threatening of the unchanging certainties of the closed society leads to the quest for assurances that often result in totalitarian notions. It can subsequently be argued that a tradition of reaction against the freeing of the critical powers of man can be identified within the developing tradition of civilisation. When tradition coincides with a totalitarian notion, and given the tendency of such a notion to proceed from a particular conception of a supposedly perfect society, then rigid social control assists in the arresting of the process of change. Since the conserving power of tradition also underpins scientific endeavours, the reduction of the science of education to the mere accumulation of justifications regarding a manifest truth, contributes toward the perpetuation of a "closed" education system. In such a closed system the tradition of the uncritical acceptance of pre-interpreted facts and values can be linked to an acceptance of a particular tradition as a matter of course, without taking stock of its intrinsic worth or unworth.

Education placed in a system of thought that proceeds from a particular blueprint as the manifest truth concerning the way educational reality ought to be, contributes to the cultivating of a dependence on education determined by a course that corresponds with a particular ultimate end. Such education ensures that learners are educated in a way determined by the false securities of derived authoritarianism. By setting the parameters of expectations and choices, a "closed" education system attempts at regulating human liberty (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.5). Popper (1996b:209) argues that because man is capable of self-criticism, we can indeed concentrate our critical faculties on bringing up the next generation in a better way than that in which we have been brought up ourselves. Self-criticism, however, entails the critical questioning of an entire system of values, convictions and norms, and consequently also the preparedness to venture beyond familiar assurances towards unexplored possibilities. As such, it appears as if self-criticism poses to be a threat to the arresting of the process of change. In this regard repressive state apparatuses enforce rigid control in terms of legislation on education and educational policy that describe an educational reality within the context of a particular conception thereof. Simultaneously and shielded behind repressive state apparatuses, an ideological educational apparatus assists in securing the ruling ideology in terms of learning content that prescribes a certain amount of "know-how" wrapped in the ruling ideology (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.7). Enclosed within the tradition of reaction against processes of change, a curious cycle of pressuring education in a preconceived



mould is set into motion: it is in this regard that the abuse of knowledge in the service of domination constitutes the ideological use of the science of education (cf. Mouton 1993:122ff).

Placed within the context of historical development, it appears that the transitional process cannot exist without tradition. Thus, it seems that tradition plays an important role in the transition from the ideological abuse of the science of education to science aimed at the continuous approximation of truth concerning educational reality. Since historical development is not subject to rigid historical laws, but calls for the normative intervention of man, it can indeed be argued that either an attempt to destroy the past, or the arresting of the process of change does not comply with *the norm of historical continuity* (Dooyeweerd 1979:71ff; cf. infra:2.4.4.1). Popper (Magee 1974:99; cf. also O'Hear 1980:161) concludes that because it is man who drives history forward, man has to accept responsibility for choices made. Subsequently it becomes apparent that the ideologisation of scientific knowledge in order to arrest processes of change, serves as an escape from man's responsibility for the course of historical development. In this way the ideologisation of educational knowledge provides the womblike security of an uncritical sustaining of the unequal distribution of educational "goods" among different groups in one society (cf. Walzer 1983:26). From here it becomes evident that the merit of critical rationalism resides, in addition to an acknowledgement of the important role of tradition, in the rejection of any perception of tradition as sacrosanct. Such a rejection, however, requires critical thinking about tradition. In order to get rid of an attitude that considers tradition as valuable in itself, the term "tradition" should be analysed in concrete relations (Popper 1996b:226). Given the power of conservation by which any process of change is confronted, it can be concluded that the wealth of tradition is indeed richer than the share which an individual can appropriate. However, by analysing tradition in concrete personal relations, it can be rationalised by ultimately placing it in an attitude that considers "traditions as valuable or pernicious, as the case may be, according to their influence upon individuals" (Popper 1996/b:226). It is therefore, only after the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude, that we can "free ourselves from the taboos of a tradition; and we can do that only by rejecting it, but also by critically accepting it" (Popper 1989:122; cf. also 1996b:226). The critical rationalist will therefore never submit blindly to any tradition, but will, by virtue of criticism, contribute to the growth or the suppression of a tradition, alongside progress and renewal.

The transition from an attitude where scientific knowledge is ideologised to sustain a position of power, to the critical tradition is not only a matter of methodology, but also entails a moral dimension (cf. Mouton 1993:122 and Zecha 1995:82). In addition to the moral responsibility of the educational scientist to further the growth of knowledge and search for the truth, stands the ideal that knowledge will transform and change things by alleviating suffering within the sphere of education. Since scientific endeavours may and do indeed produce results which may affect the lives of many people, attention should be drawn to the responsibility of the scientist to mankind (Popper 1994:123). This is especially applicable with regard to the science of education that has an obligation to oppose the manipulation of education for other than educational purposes. Not only does the educational scientist have the responsibility of constantly trying to anticipate and guide against the possible misuse of the results of educational studies, but it is imperative that priorities in order to avoid suffering should constantly be reconsidered. The implication is that the educational scientist has a particular moral responsibility to not only discover tools of power by which scientific results can be misused, but also to warn against such misuse (Popper 1994:128). This moral responsibility further implies that the discovery of the abuse of educational knowledge must be accompanied by a devotion to discover effective counter-measures. Although such an abuse constitutes the ideological use of science, it relativises not only the search for an approximation of truth concerning educational reality, but also the alleviation of avoidable suffering. Thus, when the idea of an approximation of truth is replaced by the ideological production of scientific knowledge, the distortion of educational reality coincides with the suspending of the moral contract of the educational scientist. It can therefore be stated that in order to oppose the manipulation of scientific knowledge through the misrepresentation of educational reality in order to serve relations of domination, the educational scientist needs first to adopt the critico-rationalist attitude. Such an adoption is of the utmost importance not only with regard to the critical approach of tradition underpinning personal scientific research, but in order to scrutinise other educational theories that might be prone to ideological mobilisation. In this regard it can be agreed with Magee (1974:39) that whoever fights criticism in order to maintain a particular position, is clinging to the no-growth of knowledge. A changeover towards the Popperian attitude to criticism would thus constitute a liberation from the ideological appropriation of educational knowledge.

### 3.9.7 Role of imagination in the critico-rationalist attitude

Such a changeover, however, would not only require the adoption of the Popperian attitude of criticism, but would indeed involve a willingness to go beyond existing knowledge. Magee (1974:26) underlines Popper's (1996b:239) assumption that the attitude to criticise and to be criticised by others, involves a readiness to use "imagination". Proceeding from the assumption that there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, Popper (1968:32) argues that "every discovery contains 'an irrational element', or 'a creative intuition' ". In the process of finding satisfactory explanations and because the growth of science coincides with the falsification of scientific theories, the claim to offer something new in a particular field does indeed involve a real effort of imagination. Whilst a particular discovery requires the ability to imagine a change in existing conditions, arresting of the process of change calls for a suppression of imagination. Within the context of the ideologisation of educational knowledge, it seems that there is no need for an educational scientist to venture beyond the "security" provided by monolithic structures and absolute authorities towards unexplored possibilities (cf. infra:2.4.4.4). Subsequently the moral responsibility of the educational scientist, as well as the ability to imagine a change in the conditions of education, become regulated by parameters set as a wilful act by ideologues to sustain a position of domination.

Contrary to the totalitarian approach of the social sciences in terms of ready-made explanations for everything that actually happens, Popper (1989:125) explains the task of the social sciences as the analysis and explanation of the way in which unintended consequences of human actions arise. It is only by explaining those things that nobody wants, such as for example war, oppression and exploitation, that we can analyse "the existence and the functioning of institutions (such as police forces or insurance companies or schools or governments) and of social collectives (such as states or nations or classes or other social groups)" (Popper 1989:125). Thus, in order to shed light on the ideological abuse of educational knowledge, an educational scientist needs to almost imaginarily reconstruct those educational experiments that lead to human suffering. In addition to such a reconstruction, imagination and intuition may assist the educational scientist in understanding the states of mind of those scientists that had been involved in educational experiments. Such an understanding may not only assist the educational scientist in formulating scientific hypotheses, but should be extended to an understanding of the states of mind of the subjects (other educational scientists and the learner in the educational situation) that would be

involved in further educational experiments. The criterion for success, however, resides in the ability of the scientist to predict the behaviour of the subjects (O'Hear 1980:161).

From the foregoing exposition two important issues relating to the task of educational science to analyse the functioning of an educational institution can be deduced: In order to predict the behaviour of the subjects to be involved in educational experiments, the educational scientist must have an understanding of the beliefs, attitudes and traditions underpinning the way in which these subjects orientate themselves in the social world. The second issue refers to the fact that since scientific theories are often based upon prejudices that are taken for granted, the educational scientist him/herself may be victim of a particular system of prejudices. In this regard Popper (1996b:217; also O'Hear 1980:114) couples the emergence of prejudices with the uncritical clinging to presuppositions in such a way that the progress in knowledge is obstructed. However, contrary to Kant and Hegel who assumed that presuppositions can neither be changed or refuted, the critical rationalist proceeds from the assumption that any presupposition can, in principle, be criticised. If criticism were to stop short of our presuppositions, the intellectual basis of any discussion, i.e. the identification of contradictions within the theory to be criticised and between it and some fact of experience, would be minimised.

### **3.9.8 Dedication to rectify existing social evils**

Constituted by an awareness of the limitations of fallible human reason, the educational scientist recognises that theories and actions of educational scientists and educational practitioners often lead to the ideological abuse of educational knowledge. Since the abuse of educational knowledge (in order to serve the educational interests of one group in society at the expense of other groups), leads to unhappiness within society, the need for the reform of educational institutions becomes imperative.

By linking the observation that one ideology always calls up counter-ideologies (Van der Walt 1994:339; cf. also Popper 1989:123ff on the *conspiracy theory of society*) with the human tendency to make mistakes, the need for a critical approach of educational theories, as well as the continuous renewal of educational institutions appear to be imperative. An important critical feature of the critico-rationalist position is that social change *ought not to be taking place in terms of utopian projects aimed at the total and all-inclusive reconstruction of society.*

Proceeding from a particular blueprint for the perfect society, the methodological approach of utopian engineering involves means that are not only determined in accordance with the ultimate end, but also aimed at the realisation thereof (Popper 1998:157ff). However, because there is no rational method for determining an ultimate aim or blueprint for society as a whole, the utopian engineer needs to claim a degree of detailed sociological knowledge which (s)he simply does not possess. The reconstruction of society in "one fell swoop" eliminates the possibility to learn from mistakes made on a small scale. As such, the utopian approach to social renewal proceeds from limited experience. In this regard Magee (1974:103) indicates that "the more wholesome the action the more plentiful the unintended consequences". Since these consequences may easily be at odds with the blueprint, the inconvenience suffered by such an utopian project may lead to an intolerable increase in human suffering.

In contrast to utopian social engineering, and against the background of the issue of true/false social theories as the outcome of fallible human endeavours, Popper (1998:158ff; cf. also Zecha 1998:70-71) suggests *piecemeal social engineering* as a way in which social problems are tackled one by one. The implication is that because blueprints for single institutions are comparatively simple the damage would not be as extensive if the renewal attempt goes wrong as it would have been in embarking upon society as a whole. Consequently, educational reform ought not be undertaken a part of an utopian project aimed at the total and all-inclusive reconstruction of society, but in terms of "a reasonable agreement about existing evils and the means of combating them" (Popper 1998:159).

It appears thus that the science of education has a decisive role to play in the process of the reconstruction of educational institutions. In this regard Mouton (1993:122) distinguishes between the epistemological dimension and the sociological dimension of science. While the epistemological dimension of the science of education refers to the search for truthful (approximate) representations of educational reality, the sociological dimension embodies the ideal that this knowledge will transform and change things. Placed within a critico-rationalist framework, the latter will be aimed at the fighting and reducing of human unhappiness and suffering. Educational research, according to Zecha (1998:68; cf. also Popper 1968:37) is nothing but rational and critical problem-solving in a scientific manner. By putting forward and testing educational theories, the educational scientist contributes to the development and growth

of educational knowledge, which can be applied through the method of piecemeal engineering to improve the lot of man through educational reform.

An important condition of social piecemeal engineering is that the social world must continue to function during any construction; existing social structures provide a great deal of stability as their very existence prevents social chaos from emerging (cf. Popper 1989:130ff). Because institutions must be reformed little by little, such reconstruction can only materialise within the parameters that are afforded by the educational structure itself. The latter relates directly to the fact that the educational institution is recognised in terms of teaching as the *prima facie* social function that serves the propagation of knowledge as a *prima facie* social purpose (Popper 1989:133). However, under certain circumstances the educational institution functions in a way which is in contrast with its *prima facie* or proper function. In this instance Popper recognises the perversion of the proper function of social institutions. This perversion relates to the fact that institutions are controlled by fallible people. Consequently, the utilisation of the educational institution as an ideological state apparatus can be attributed to fallible human control. Since there is no end to human fallibility, and because social institutions will always be controlled by fallible humans, the task of the reconstruction of society must be of a continuous nature. It thus becomes apparent that the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude necessarily involves the *principle of critical examination* (cf. Zecha 1998:62). According to this principle the educational scientist should constantly search for relevant contradictions in educational theories. Simultaneously such a search can indirectly contribute to determining whether institutions are used for their proper purpose. The misuse of educational institutions for other than educational purposes "can undoubtedly be much reduced by carefully constructed institutional checks" (Popper 1989:133). Consequently, institutional checks presupposes the critical examination of institutions in accordance with their proper social purposes. From here two important conclusions can be drawn: the reconstruction of the educational institution presupposes careful and continuous analysis of existing educational theories in order to detect and eliminate those mistakes that may negatively affect the proper function of the educational institution; and, in order to perform an institutional check, there must be an awareness of the proper function of the institution itself.

### 3.10 Merits of the critico-rationalist attitude

Against the outline of the basic features of the critico-rationalist attitude, the importance of the adoption of this position can be summarised as residing in the acceptance of human fallibility. Accompanying the acknowledgement of human fallibility, is the rejection of human bondage to deterministic powers that originate from forms of totalitarianism, dictatorship, dogmatism and finality vested in so-called "specialists". The educational scientist who adopts this position will consequently proceed from the assumption that no certainty concerning educational reality is to be found in relative human explanations. Because reason remains a fallible instrument in the search to penetrate deeper into the structural properties of educational reality, the educational scientist cannot expect too much from it. The realisation that truth is above human authority relativises not only any attempt at exhaustive logical analysis, but discourages self-righteous claims to know with certainty and authority. A clinging to supposedly incontestable "truths" and an appeal to authoritarian certainty will therefore not only delude people into becoming uncritical slaves of "authorities", but will impede the growth of knowledge. Such an impediment appears to coincide with a coherent and all-inclusive interpretation of reality that affords a particular group of people with a particular perspective through which educational reality is explained (infra:2.4.4.3). Proceeding in an environment that contains no more and no less than what is regarded as the ultimate truth, the science of education now becomes reduced to the mere search for confirming instances of a manifest truth. When educational theories are "enclosed" within the assumption that their truth is justified in terms of oracular revelations and authority vested in a person or institution, it can be anticipated that educational practice will run in a "closed" circle: the transmission of pre-determined facts and values not only leads to learners becoming mere receptacles of the uncritical acquiring of knowledge and values, but may indeed result in rational stagnation.

By giving up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge, the quest for knowledge and the criticism of our conjectures remain possible, and demand a permanent willingness for open discussion of existing educational theories and institutions. The adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude consequently calls for a decisive step away from the tradition of reaction against processes of change towards the critical tradition (cf. Magee 1974:88-89). There is thus no doubt that critical examination is of profound importance in the transitional process to the open society. If the open society refers to the freeing of the critical powers of man (cf. Popper

1998:173), the open educational system and the "openness" of the science of education will subsequently be recognised for the significant role criticism plays in the exposure and elimination of errors. In line with the critico-rationalist attitude, all educational theories ought therefore to be regarded as hypotheses that have to be tested against reality and corrected in the light of experience. Such corrections, however, relate directly to the insight that social change should not take place on terms of utopian projects aimed at the total and all-inclusive reconstruction of society. In this regard Magee (1974:75) notes that the detecting of "mistakes and inherent dangers by critical examination and discussion beforehand is an altogether more rational procedure, and one as a rule less wasteful of resources, people and time, than waiting till they reveal themselves in practice". The process of social piecemeal engineering consequently allows for the tackling of social problems one by one.

Whereas the critico-rationalist attitude pertains to a permanent willingness to enter into open and critical discussion, it simultaneously appears to be resistant against ideological indoctrination and manipulation through ideological thought-patterns. Salamun (1999:88-89) thus refers to certain questions which Popper proposes ought to be asked in the critical analysis of an ideology:

1. To what extent can we recognise in social conceptions, political doctrines, religious belief-systems etc. assertions to the effect that specific insights and basic principles are infallible and true once and for all?
2. Are there in connection with such assertions elite groups or individuals (charismatic political leaders, religious prophets etc.) that claim to have a monopoly on some basic exclusive knowledge or a privileged right of interpretation of certain basic ideological principles?
3. To what extent can we recognise tendencies toward immunising the central assumptions of the belief-system against criticism, and how are the strategies constructed so that this immunisation can take place?
4. To what extent can we find in a political doctrine, social philosophy or religious belief-system categorisations and value-judgements that are determined by rigid dogmatic dichotomies and bipolar labels for the interpretation of social and political reality?
5. Can we find highly emotional enemy-stereotypes and, along with these, tendencies toward utilising scapegoat strategies and conspiracy theories?
6. To what degree are value premises in the ideological thought-patterns openly declared to be such, and to what degree are they disguised as matters of fact?

### **3.11 Shortcomings of the critico-rationalist attitude in relation to transcendental critique**

Although the merits of the critico-rationalist attitude exceed the weaknesses inherent in this attitude, the latter, however, ought to be construed in order to indicate how these shortcomings can be overcome by the joint application of transcendental critique.



### 3.11.1 Exposure of presuppositions

From the outset it has become apparent that the critico-rationalist attitude coincides with the willingness to detect and eliminate errors in *inter alia* educational theories in order to contribute to the delimiting of human suffering within the realm of educational reality. However, since the ideological abuse of educational knowledge relates directly to an ideological belief-system that precedes scientific endeavours, it has been established that these errors stem from a pre-scientific realm. While the critical rationalist draws the distortions on the realm of theorising to the fore, it is by virtue of transcendental critique that the roots of ideologically-coloured theoretical thought itself can be exposed. In addition to the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude that pertains to the recognition that presuppositions can in principle be criticised, the subjection of the latter to transcendental critique illuminates the relation between errors in educational theories and presuppositions.

Since all arguments proceed from presuppositions, it can be argued that while presuppositions cannot be based on argument, they must necessarily transcend the theoretical attitude of thought. Whereas scientific theories can be submitted to scientific tests in order to be falsified and thus give way to new scientific hypotheses, presuppositions cannot be falsified in the same way. However, because presuppositions and prejudices can in principle be criticised, it is possible to challenge one point of view with a competing viewpoint. Thus, only by subjecting our presuppositions to criticism, those prejudices that obstruct progress in knowledge can be exposed (cf. O'Hear 1980:114). Once the underpinning presuppositions, and especially those prejudices that obstruct the growth of knowledge have been exposed, the educational theories that have been ideologised to sustain relations of domination and hegemony, can be tested and falsified. The latter can be coupled with one of the major objectives of the critico-rationalist attitude, i.e. the falsification of as many as possible educational theories in order to prevent them from negatively affecting the reformation of educational institutions. However, if prejudices are not exposed and challenged by opposing views, the mistakes made on the level of the formation of theories will continually be justified in terms of these prejudices. As such, the search for the truth and the growth of knowledge within the educational realm will be retarded by and enclosed within the accumulation of confirming instances.

Since presuppositions transcend the theoretical attitude of thought, we need to penetrate to the roots of theoretical thought itself. In this regard the insufficiency of the rational function is

underscored by the fact that it remains in relation to and fully dependent on the presuppositions from which it proceeds. Simultaneously, the tendency to adhere to the critico-rationalist attitude in order to excessively emphasise the rational faculty is exposed as an untenable elevation of the logical aspect from the unbreakable coherence of the modal diversity of human experience. In this regard it appears as if transcendental critique contributes to holding the critico-rationalist attitude in check by warning against the absolutisation of a particular relativity, such as the rational function, to a position of hegemony.

### **3.11.2 Exposure of a starting-point**

Contrary to Popper's (1972:104) statement that the choice of a "starting-point is not decisively important because it can be criticized and corrected like everything else", it can be argued that such a choice appears to be of utmost importance. This relates to the exposure of the theoretical axiom that is not only taken as the starting-point of theoretical thought, but ultimately provides the supra-theoretical basis for the justification of the ideological production of educational knowledge. Consequently it can be argued that divergent and conflicting interpretations of the same educational phenomena relate not only to a diversity of presuppositions, but also to different Archimedean points that serve as starting-points from where a total view of reality can be obtained (cf. *infra*:3.6.2). Since all ready-made conceptions of educational reality stem from a particular starting-point, the subjection of such conceptions to transcendental critique will reveal the nature of these starting-points.

It can further be argued that since divergent interpretations of the same state of affairs can be attributed to different starting-points, a starting-point must indirectly contribute to the growth of knowledge. However, such a contribution is only possible if the critico-rationalist attitude that ascribes to a permanent willingness to listen to critical arguments and learn from experience, had first been adopted. Without such an attitude, the uncritical clinging to presuppositions and prejudices, will indeed obstruct the growth of knowledge and be detrimental to open discussion. In this regard the decisive role of the choice of a starting-point appears to be two-fold: While the starting-point that goes uncriticised may play a decisive role in retarding the growth of knowledge, its subjection to a transcendental critique appears to be a pre-requisite for entering into an open discussion. While transcendental critique provides for a "neutral" ground of

discourse, it simultaneously enables the scientist to reflect on the theoretical and pre-theoretical presuppositions underpinning the theoretical attitude of thought (cf. *infra*:3.6ff).

Since the role of presuppositions in the theoretical attitude of thought cannot be relativised, but only critically reflected upon, it can be stated that scientific methodology cannot be presuppositionless and unbiased. All scientific theories, especially in the social sciences where norms play a decisive role, not only relate to a particular starting-point, but are ultimately determined by religious presuppositions that exhibit a partial and un-neutral character (cf. *infra*:3.6.2). Since theoretical thought can never be self-sufficient and autonomous, the principle of value freedom/neutrality becomes problematic. According to this principle "the result of research studies must not contain evaluations and norms and may not lead to any appraisals or recommendations" (Zecha 1998:70; cf. also 1995:76 and Popper 1998:59). This principle involves a two-fold problem: given the influential role of presuppositions in theorising about educational reality, research studies within this realm will unavoidably contain evaluations and norms related to the underpinning presuppositions. Zecha (1998:70-71) refers to the second problem with this principle, namely that the whole purpose of educational studies may be defied if no relevant conclusions for the delimiting of human suffering is drawn from the educational studies. If the purpose of educational studies refers to the search for evils and the fight against suffering in the educational realm, and if such a study is indicative of the way in which the ideologisation of educational science and educational institutions can be delimited, then relevant recommendations must necessarily be drawn from the results.

### **3.11.3 Rejection of the essence of an institution**

Because the critico-rationalist attitude involves the readiness to theorise about reality as it *is*, there is no concern with the state of affairs that *ought* to prevail in society. By exclusively concentrating on mistakes in the existing educational reality, there is no attempt to penetrate to the essence of educational institutions in order to approximate the distinct nature, structure or conditions by which these institutions are constituted. Although Popper (1972:195) concedes that much is hidden and much of what is hidden may be discovered, he advocates the giving up of the view that "in every single thing there is an essence, an inherent nature or principle (such as the spirit of wine in wine), which necessarily causes it to be what it is, and thus act as it does". By

rejecting a gradual accumulation of essential information and all *what-is* questions, Popper finds explanations in relational properties and not in inherent properties.

The rejection of the search for the distinct nature of institutions has profound implications for the renewal of educational institutions. If institutional checks are aimed at determining whether institutions fulfil their proper function (cf. Popper 1989:133), then there must be an awareness of the proper social purpose of the institution involved. However, in the absence of an attempt to determine the essences of institutions, the only direction Popper (1989:134) proposes with regard to institutional checks is institutional control by those (fallible) persons (if there are any) who intend to use the institutions for their proper social purpose. He continues by arguing that tradition may provide these persons with the background and certainty concerning the long-term proper functioning of institutions. Since tradition, however, may also be corrupted by ideological belief-systems, the possibility exists that the proper purposes of institutions will most probably be continuously perverted. Thus, by making use of a method of trial and error, we may or may not accidentally become aware of the proper functioning of an institution.

Popper's hostility to *essentialism* can be linked to the fact that an absolutisation of the essences of things is aimed at framing untestable theories in terms of the justification of an apparent manifest truth. However, the attempt to determine the essence of an institution does not dispense of the producing of testable theories and their testing, nor does it claim a manifest truth. Since there can be no claim to ultimate explanations, such an attempt should be regarded as an approximation. The continuous approximation of the essences of educational institutions affords an important insight with regard to the renewal thereof: while the misuse of the proper function of the educational institution for other than educational purposes distorts the proper function of the institution itself, the possibility of renewal resides in the calling back of the institution to its proper function as determined by its intrinsic nature (essence). As such, the approximation of the proper functions (essences) of institutions contributes towards the approximation of truth concerning educational reality. Furthermore, it provides a particular direction with regard to scientific endeavour in an attempt to penetrate, by virtue of the method of trial and error, deeper into the secrets of educational reality, thus providing insight into the way in which institutions *ought to* be reconstructed.

Although the critico-rationalist attitude involves readiness to criticise and to listen to criticism, it is by virtue of transcendental critique that criticism can be forthcoming with regard to the question why things are as they are. While the championing of value-free scientific results may be indicative of an interest in educational reality as it "is", critical scrutiny of the ontological structure of the educational institution appears to be imperative with regard to institutional renewal. However, an equal focus on the proper function (structure) of an educational institution and the way (direction) in which this function is fulfilled, is of utmost importance in the renewal process. Whereas the critico-rationalist attitude pertains to the willingness to critically investigate existing perversions of the proper functions of institutions, it is by virtue of transcendental critique that it is possible to expose the nature of assumptions and presuppositions contributing to such perversions. Simultaneously, however, it can be stated that since the transcendental condition for all knowledge is the meaning-coherence in the modal meaning-diversity (cf. Kalsbeek 1975:173), the application of transcendental critique seems to be useful in the educational scientist's attempt to approximate the ontological structure of an educational institution. Such an approximation appears to be of extreme importance since it gives an indication of the proper function of an institution. Thus, in order to provide direction to the transitional process from a closed to an open educational system, the renewal of education institutions should continuously be aimed at determining the proper function at stake, and whether such institutions are allowed to fulfil their proper functions within their relative spheres of sovereignty. It has however been indicated that such an attempt has the approximation of the proper functions of institutions as a prerequisite.

### 3.12 Concluding remarks

Mannheim's (1940:8; cf. also Söhnge 1973:106) question of "how is it possible that identical human thought-processes concerned with the same world produce divergent conceptions of that world" is also applicable to educational reality: how is it indeed possible to come to divergent and even conflicting interpretations of the very same state of educational affairs? An investigation and exposure of the structure and presuppositions of theoretical thought, thus also concerning educational reality, appears to be imperative in order to penetrate to those "hidden" points of departure that eventually determine diverse interpretations. Since ideological-belief systems belong to a realm of *a priori* suppositions that undergirds human (thus also educational) thought, a method is required to engage in the "gradual uncovering of the irrational foundation of

rational knowledge" (Mannheim 1940:28). It is only by virtue of penetrating to those (ideologically determined and non-rational) presuppositions that an account can be proposed for a particular interpretation of educational reality. In this regard the method of transcendental critique appears to be well-suited since it involves the universal conditions which determine and limit theoretical thought on education, and the school as an educational institution. Thus placed within the context of South African education, this method enables the educational scientist to penetrate to those presuppositions that profoundly influence educational theories in South Africa. Simultaneously, the application of this method appears to be appropriate in order to critically expose the relation between ideologically coloured presuppositions and educational theory and practice. The assumption is that by exposing this relation, the implications of totalitarian thought upon South African education will not only be exposed, but it can also contribute towards warning against the replacement of one set of totalitarian thoughts by another.

In addition to the application of transcendental critique (as a possible liberatory tool to disentangle South African education from hypernormative rationality and to prevent future ideological hijacking), the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude can contribute to open and critical discussion on those hidden agendas and ideologically coloured presuppositions that may impede the transition from a deterministic to a democratic education system in South Africa. While this attitude entertains the relativisation of so-called unquestionable judgements, it simultaneously favours the liberation from absolute truths, dogmatism, ideologies and other forms of determinism that impede the process of transformation towards establishing a democratic system of education.

For the purpose of this study therefore, the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude, in conjunction with the method of transcendental critique, will be applied to South African education in order to determine the presence of possible ideological underpinnings. Discussion of the South African education system will be addressed in three sections: the first section covers the period from 1948 when the Nationalist Party assumed political power in South Africa up to the 1994-elections (cf. supra:chapter 4), the second period relates to the struggle against the apartheid regime until 1994 (cf. supra:chapter 5) and the third period relates to the current transitional process that had been set into motion when the African National Congress (ANC) obtained political power in 1994 (cf. supra:chapter 6).

# Chapter 4

## Apartheid Education in South Africa

### 4.1 Introductory remarks

Since the first democratic elections in 1994 the South African education system has become an important roleplayer in the transitional process from what is often referred to as a closed society to an open and democratic society. As such, the education system has also been drawn into this process that is aimed at empowering "people to participate effectively in all the processes of democratic society, economic activity, cultural expression, and community life" and to help "citizens to build a nation free of race, gender and every other form of discrimination" (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:17). However, references such as the "first democratic election" and a "nation free from discrimination" clearly imply that prior to 1994, the South African society was known for undemocratic practices and discrimination. Since an education system is part of society, it can be argued that the South African education system must also have been characterised by undemocratic and discriminative features. In this regard it appears that the nature of the education system prior to 1994 played a profound role in necessitating the present reconstruction of South African education. Thus, in order to critically reflect on the reconstruction of South African education (cf. infra:chapter 6) it is necessary to critically expose the nature of South African education between 1948 and 1994.

In the first instance the exposure of South African education involves an attempt at approximating the impact of possible ideologically driven presuppositions on educational theory and practice. Once ideological thought-patterns have been exposed, it is imperative to penetrate to the roots of the most prominent belief-system that played a profound role in determining such thought-patterns not only in the South African society, but especially within the realm of education. In this chapter transcendental critique will consequently be applied in an attempt to expose the presuppositions that underpinned South African education until 1994. This endeavour will however be initiated by the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude which entertains not only a permanent resistance against ideological indoctrination, but also the willingness to analyse those thought-patterns that contributed to sustaining ideologically driven educational goals.

## 4.2, Critical exposition of the emergence of the ideology of apartheid

### 4.2.1 British Imperialism and the birth of an ideology

South Africa was first occupied by an European power in 1652 when Jan van Riebeeck arrived in Table Bay with the instruction to settle a half-way station for ships *en route* to India (Robertson & Whitten 1978:xi; cf. also Mbere 1979:27; Pomeroy 1973:11 and Williams 1990:9ff). Although the initial intention was not to establish a colony, the course on which future developments in South Africa were to be set, had been laid down. In this regard Mbere (1979:28ff) gives an exposition of the earliest attempts to separate and isolate the Cape Peninsula from contact with the indigenous Khoi-Khoi and San peoples. Although attempts to establish boundaries between the African peoples and the Dutch settlers failed, the directors of the Dutch East Indian Company agreed to experiment with colonisation at the Cape.

The introduction of slaves into the Cape, as well as the emergence of a particular mentality of slave-owners, have been suggested (Robertson & Whitten 1978:xi-xii; cf. also Mncwabe 1990:8) as constituting the origins of the race and colour consciousness that were to play such a profound role in the history of South Africa. However, it has also been argued that the roots of the ideology of Afrikaner apartheid (also referred to as the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism) are to be found in a particular interpretation of the Calvinist religion that accompanied the White settlers to the Cape of Good Hope (Hexham 1981:1; cf. also Ashley 1989:7 and Mbere 1979:32). This interpretation relates to an artificial link that was formed by a particular nation between the Calvinist faith and an intense belief that the Bible provides the necessary justification for racial segregation and white superiority.

As a political concept, "South Africa", however, dates back to the time when Britain pursued a policy of colonialism, intent on becoming the dominant power in Southern Africa. In the wake of British colonialism, the annexation of the Cape area in 1759 ultimately resulted in the merging of the Cape, Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal in a British Colony (Jooste 1972:1; Pomeroy 1973:13 and Rhoodie & Venter 1959:117). However, the history of the white Dutch-Afrikaners (later known as the Afrikaner nation), preceding the commencement of a period where the constitution of the Union of South Africa (1910) placed the administrative responsibility for the entire territory in the hands of the white population, had been characterised by fundamental threat. In this regard Goudzwaard (1984:40; cf. also Hexham 1981:10 and



Mbere 1979:48ff) highlights the flight of the Dutch-Afrikaners from the harsh conditions of British colonialism. The introduction of a state schooling system that reduced the influence of the church, as well as the proposing of a more liberal racial policy in order to incorporate blacks in the colonial system, were, among others, reasons why British rule was unacceptable to the Dutch-Afrikaner. The threat to this nation became even worse when the British launched the imperialist Boer War of 1899-1902, claiming the lives of 26 000 men, women and children in British concentration camps. Under these circumstances the legitimate struggle to protect the Afrikaner nation, its identity and its Calvinist religion, culminated in an all-encompassing end that promised deliverance in a "Christian nation" (Goudzwaard 1984:41; Schoeman 1998:55; cf. also Christie 1991:173; Mncwabe 1990:8 and Van der Walt 1994:378).

#### 4.2.2 Setting the scene: separate development for different nations

In 1948, when the Afrikaner-dominated National Party (NP) came into power, it obtained a position from where the South African society could systematically be moulded by virtue of the introduction and implementation of "formal *apartheid* ("separateness") in every conceivable sphere of public and private life" (Robertson & Whitten 1978:xiv; cf. Williams 1990:9ff). This meant that the Afrikaner people were in a position to not only safeguard and promote their own cultural identity and religion, but also to fulfil their "God-given" task to "safeguard the national identity of separate nations in free and sovereign states with full independence and self-determination" (Mulder 1972:50; cf. also Stimie 1975:4). Classifying the entire population in four "racial" groups (Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Indians) under the Population Registration Act (1950), the Afrikaner Nationalist Government took "control" of the "independent" lives of the black population group by introducing segregated African rural homelands. The rationale behind the homelands system was a policy that insisted that all the Republic's people were entitled to self-rule. It was argued that because black African people refused to be pseudo-European and insisted on Africanisation as self-expression not to be watered down by a foreign (European) influence, the African and European personality could not be accommodated in *one* political system. Thus, apartheid "safeguards the long-established nationhood of the White people in that part of South Africa which has always been theirs and which they did not take from anyone. At the same time apartheid provides for the progress of all the separate Bantu peoples to full self-government" (Beherec 1998:1). However, the envisaged existence of self-governing Bantu nations in co-operative association with the white nation culminated as part of a plan to fabricate

a permanent white political majority by purging the voter's role of the black population. By creating homelands, blacks were thus not only excluded from the electoral franchise and representation in the South African Parliament, but their future expectations were also determined when Verwoerd (Minister of Native Affairs and later Prime Minister from 1958-1966) proclaimed that: "We should not give the natives an academic education, as some people are prone to do. If we do this we shall be burdened with a number of academically trained Europeans and non-Europeans, and who will then do the manual labour in this country?" (cited in Robertson 1973:157; cf. also Bavinck 1954:7 and Pomeroy 1973:19).

However, the legitimation of the system of separate development not only lies in the historical experience of the Afrikaners, but can also be linked to their belief that God divided mankind into nations and that all walks of life should reflect these national differences. Mulder (1972:52ff; cf. also Mervis 1972:79) argued that since South Africa was a country of minorities (as there are, apart from Whites, Indians and Coloured people, also various Bantu nations), the concept of majority rule of the entire South Africa was not only impractical, but also meaningless. However, advancing from this argument, various questions were left unanswered: if the policy of separate and parallel nations was aimed at the safeguarding of minority rights in a country of minorities, why then were there no homelands provided for the protection of the rights of the Coloured and the Indian populations? If majority rule was not practical, how then should we account for white domination and institutionalised racial discrimination? Although the theory of separate development concerned national groups, why then did the practice never go further than the juxtaposition of whites and non-whites?

#### **4.2.3 Separate development as a sacred affair**

The religious element attributed to the history of the Afrikaner nation not only entailed a particular concept of God inherited by the Dutch Calvinist religion from the Old Testament, but also clarified the definite purpose of the Afrikaner nation's presence in South Africa. Verwoerd (cited by Moodie 1975:284) explained this purpose by stating that the Afrikaner nation "should here be an anchor and a stay for western civilization and the Christian religion". Verwoerd's words, however, were merely an echo of an already generally accepted assumption that non-whites did not possess the necessary insight to know what was in their best interest. Justified as a Christian principle, it was stated that it was the duty of the white man to guard non-whites

against the "evil" in their own civilisation - as a Christian, it was the responsibility of the white guardian who enjoyed a privileged position, to contribute towards the well-being of the non-white peoples of South Africa. Regarded as a calling from God, trusteeship had to be undertaken, bearing in mind that God would ultimately demand an account of the way in which the interests of the less privileged (non-whites) were handled (Cronje 1947:122ff; cf. also Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk 1997:11). Dr NPJ Steyn (MacLennan 1990:114) underscored this perception when he proposed the following two questions: "Why are Europeans more advanced, enlightened and educated, civilised and richer and better placed on the whole than the natives if not by God's intervention, supervision, rule and providence? Who are we to change what God has ordained"?

By drawing a parallel between the history of the Afrikaner nation and that of the Old Testament Covenant nation, Afrikaner history obtained a sacred and salvational nuance. Proceeding from the assumption that the deliberate distinction between nations is part of a Godly plan, the Afrikaner nation was encouraged to continuously call upon the Holy Scriptures for the justification of separate development. Abraham's exodus from Ur, the command of God that Israel is not to mix with other nations, the failure of attempts to build the tower of Babel are all examples quoted from the Bible in order to justify that "God wil die gelijkchakeling niet" (God is not in favour of the equalisation of nations) (Bavinck 1954:4; cf. also Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk 1997:6ff on the justification of *apartheid*). Placed within this context, suffering acquired the image of a manifestation of God's favour (cf. Mbere 1979:62; cf. also Strauss 1978:266). Consequently, the Afrikaner nation found comfort in the agony of suffering not only in anticipation of the coming glory, but more specifically, in the future power and glory of Christian Nationalism. As God's "chosen people", destined to rule South Africa, the convictions of the Afrikaner, drawn from the fact that God not only willed the diversity of peoples, but had thus far preserved their cultural identity, coincided with the assumption that the truth was their sole possession (cf. Mbere 1979:63; Moodie 1975:3 and Tikly 1993:11). The Reverend D.J. Vorster (cited in Robertson 1978:106), head of the Dutch Reformed Church, claimed that:

Our policy and outlook on life are based on the Bible. We firmly believe that the way we interpret it is right. We will not budge one inch from our interpretation to satisfy anyone - in South Africa or abroad. The world may differ from our interpretation, This will not influence us. The world may be wrong. We know we are right, and will continue to follow the way the Bible teaches us ...

It is true the Bible teaches that all men are equal. But the Bible also teaches that there are differences between men. We believe in the Bible, thus we believe, accept and teach both concepts equally. That, in brief, is the racial theology of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Based on certain fundamental, unshakeable and immovable beliefs and attitudes, the policy of separate development was considered as the necessary outcome of not only a historically legitimated "state of affairs", but of a natural and God-given heritage as the birthright of God's people (cf. Cohen 1986:3,11; Bavinck 1954:4 and Schoeman 1998:159). The ascription of a natural and "given" gradation to the specific role of the Afrikaner nation in South Africa, reminds one of the philosophy of historicism. Starting from the position of the absolute individuality of a socio-cultural community, historicism ascribes to a determinism by laws of history (infra:2.3.5; also Dooyeweerd 1996:61; cf. also Derrida 1985:292). Given the sacred duty of the Afrikaner nation, the prohibition (whether or not explicit) against the questioning of basic assumptions and in the reverence that is demanded from the bearers of the Word, and the Word itself, the task of science was limited to the fulfilling of historical prophecies. Placed within the context of historicism, the power and glory of Christian Nationalism was regarded as the historically determined guarantee for cultural survival.

#### **4.2.4 Separate development as an unhistorical venture**

According to Mulder (1972:52; cf. also Cronje 1947:124 and Nicol 1947:22) the nations of South Africa ranged from a highly sophisticated Western-type urban-technological society, to unsophisticated types of peoples pertaining to witchcraft and primitive practices of subsistence agriculture. Whilst the primitive types depended on the advanced societies for progress, they remained attached to their age-old cultural patterns. In this regard the policy of separate development not only claimed to be based on the recognition of national differences, granting every nation the lawful right to preserve their own cultural patterns and traditions, but was regarded as the *only* guarantee for cultural survival. Bavinck (1954:9) thus draws the attention to the close relation between the racial policy and the future of South Africa: "Zou ... dit beleid op den duur faalt, dan is Zuid-Afrika verlore, en gaat, zoals men zich gaarne uitdrukt, de 'christelijke beschaving' in dat werelddeel ten onder". The survival of the Christian civilisation was consequently dependent upon the success of the policy of separate development. However, considering that the rigid walls of isolated primitive communities can only be broken down once the process of cultural differentiation and increasing cultural integration is set into motion, any attempt at isolation (segregation) must be regarded as *unhistorical* (cf. Dooyeweerd 1996:61). Since the borders of a nation are fluid and open and not fixed by birth and racial descent, it is indeed a historical fact that modern nations, including the Afrikaner nation, are the product of a

merging of people from several distinct and separate nations. Considering that the South African policy of separate development was aimed at cultural isolation, it can be stated that the process of differentiation and integration must have been severely curtailed. Since the distinction between national identities presupposes the commencement of the process of differentiation and integration, the South African society as a whole, cannot be defined as a closed society with an undifferentiated condition. Although the process of the dismantling of cultural undifferentiatedness had already been set into motion when Western civilisation and indigenous inhabitants were brought into contact in 1652, the history of South Africa should be viewed within the context of the *nature* of this process of differentiation.

Contrary to the "blood and soil" trademark of the Afrikanerdom in the forties (cf. Goudzwaard 1984:45), Dooyeweerd (1996:62) argues that a real natural cultural whole is "not a product of blood and soil, but the result of a process of differentiation and integration in the cultural formation of human society". While all ethnical differences between the various population groups should be integrated into a new individual whole, the overemphasis on national differences in South Africa not only deprived the various nations of fruitful contact and mutual exchange of cultural life, but resulted in a totalitarian (white) regime, impeding free cultural contact by virtue of cultural isolation. By "safeguarding" the various nations in terms of cultural isolation, the situation of the individual was similar to the fate of the individual in the closed society (who remained subject to the rigid dominance of culture) (infra:2.2.3): the South African individual was now equally deprived of not only individual contributions to the opening up of the cultural aspect of human society, but also of the fruition of individual cultural dispositions and talents.

Ascribing the conditions of social crisis to the conflict between the guardians of tradition and the propounders of new ideas (infra:2.4.4.1), the idea of segregation can be attributed to reactionary measures relating to the perception that cultural isolation guarantees the survival of a cultural heritage. Mncwabe (1990:10) underwrites this reactionary nature by indicating that the policy of separation involved an attempt to reverse the historical processes set into motion by the arrival of the white man in South Africa. Issues such as the awakening of blacks into a new economic destiny, the rise of the coloured peoples, and the emergence of a syncretic Western-oriented culture in Africa, are inherent to these historical processes. However, since these changes cannot

be reversed without grave danger to the policy as a whole, the reactionary measures of a totalitarian regime can never be sustained in the long run.

### **4.3 Apartheid ideology as the manifestation of a retarded disclosure of human experience**

#### **4.3.1 Conditions of crisis at the root of the apartheid ideology**

The mere existence of cultural isolationism and the employment of extreme measures to sustain a totalitarian regime were not only indications of an anti-normative manifestation of the norm of historical development, but constituted an ideology. When linking an ideology with the emergence of a hypernorm (infra:2.4.1), it appears that the former South African regime (1948-1994) fits the ideological bill.

Placed within the context of a condition of social crisis, the Dutch-Afrikaner people found themselves in a situation where social communities no longer exhibited the competence to take care of and promote their own interests. The British not only annexed the Cape area for the first time in 1795, and then again in 1806, but ultimately instrumentilised social communities, especially the school as an institution, to conform the Dutch people to British colonial policy (cf. Christie 1991:173; Hexham 1981:20 and Mbere 1979:47). A growing insistence on Anglicising the Dutch-Afrikaners and various attempts to break down the nationalist spirit of this group, involved the introduction of a different schooling provision, the abating of the prominence of the Dutch language and the promotion of the language of the British. By bringing education under state control, the influence of the church was reduced. This was resented by the Dutch-Afrikaners who believed that the Calvinist religion should not only exert a major influence in the school, but should be reflected in all areas of life. From the subsequent disharmonious historical development, thus emerged a legitimate ideal aimed upon the preservation of the cultural identity of the Afrikaner nation. Van der Walt (1994:378; cf. also Botha 1972:113-114 and Mulder 1972:50) indicates that the freedom of the nation was linked to a separateness of nations on the basis of a horizontal distinction between nations standing *next* to each other. However, this positive and legitimate ideal soon degenerated into nationalism with a pertinent emphasis on ethnocentricity - hence, the reference to apartheid as the ideology of ethno-nationalism (cf. Schoeman 1998:55,131ff; also Davies 1978: 33).

#### 4.3.2 Absolutisation of the nation

Although national pride and identity are legitimate goals, it was the *absolutisation of the national identity* of the Afrikaner that changed an innocent theory into a restrictive and totalitarian ideology. Strauss (1978:264; 1992:104; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1979:82; Schoeman 1998:132 and Strauss 1969:7ff) describes "nation" as a civilised cultural association of people who are in the process of historico-cultural development of a typical (national) individuality of culture. As such, the national character of a people is not a product of nature based on individual traits of tribal and racial communities, but the result of cultural relations and culturally formative activity. The implication is that *nation* not only exhibits a disclosed historico-cultural way of doing, but an essentially *modal* qualification. While the legitimate compass of the nation remains restricted to the historico-cultural aspect of reality, the absolutisation thereof will not only lead to the violation and the domination of all other aspects of reality, but the nation itself, becomes a *Ding an sich* (infra:3.3.1). However, since the nation is only a particular facet of reality, the absolutisation thereof resulted in a hierarchical view of reality. By elevating the nation to a position of a supreme authority, it not only acquired supra-modal status, but became an autonomous regulative norm that "dictated" a particular direction to all spheres of life.

Due to a peculiar conception of the Afrikaner nation as an organic whole, not only the individual, but also all societal relationships became totally subservient to the nation (Schoeman 1998:134; Strauss 1978:264-267; 1992:91 and Van der Walt 1994:379; cf. also Davies 1978:34). Since true individual freedom and meaningfulness became inseparable from the national identity, the purification of the nation was equated with the necessity for each nation to have, amongst other things, its own school, church, education and government. Consequently, the various social communities were to find their deepest meaning in the nation itself. In this regard a curious contradiction can be detected: in Calvinist thinking recognition was indeed given to the principle of sphere sovereignty. According to Coetzee (1968:25), the acceptance of the existence of different spheres in life, as separate spheres, involved the acknowledgement that each "sphere has a status of its own, which is rooted in its divinely instituted nature and which cannot be infringed upon by any other sphere". While these spheres exist next to one another, they simultaneously stand under the sovereignty of God, their Creator. It appears, however, that this principle ultimately became subjected to a (mis)conception that the different structures of the various social communities must reside in the different nations themselves, and not so much in the modal

framework of a *universal* reality (infra:3.2). Claiming (cf. Ashley 1989:12 and Beherec 1998:1) that South Africa should be viewed as a country inhabited by different national groupings who do not share a common language, origin, culture, religion, political traditions and worldview, thus placed the emphasis on the national differences, while at the same time, the possible existence of commonly shared properties was relativised.

In order to sustain a segregationist position aimed at the guaranteeing of "national purity", the illegitimate dominance of the Afrikaner nation coincided with the equation of cultural nationality with state authority. However, since the nation only possesses a solidary unitary character and no permanent authority structure (Strauss 1991:97), such an equation furnished the nation with illegitimate power. The Afrikaner-state consequently became the regulator of, *inter alia*, the national school, the national church and the national state. In this regard Van der Walt (1994:380) alludes to a curious tension that accompanied the idea of the maintenance of diversity in South Africa: while the Afrikaner nation could only exist if it could be distinguished from other nations, it was the other nations that constituted a threat to the Afrikaner nation. Since the existence of the own nation remained negatively bound to the other, the own would thus have to be continually defended. Concluding that the different cultural groups within the boundaries of the Afrikaner state posed to be a threat to this nation, the admittance of the other national groups to a position of equality became an impossibility. The implication is that the policy of separate development based on the recognition of equal nations, ultimately corrupted itself! Although presented as an overt liberal political programme aimed at safeguarding the national identity of separate nations, it can indeed be agreed with Mervis (1972:67ff; cf. also Davies, O'Meara & Dlamini 1988:1-3; Goudzwaard 1984:42ff and Mncwabe 1990:9) that this policy was in actual fact an intensified campaign aimed at the maintenance of white supremacy. In this regard Verwoerd (quoted in Van den Berghe 1978:5) himself underscored the contradiction embodied in the policy of separate development when he stated: "Now a Senator wants to know whether the series of self-governing Native areas would be sovereign? The answer is obvious ... It stands to reason that white South Africa must retain their guardian .... We cannot mean that we intend by that to cut large slices out of South Africa and turn them into independent States".



#### 4.4 Critique of the apartheid ideology

##### 4.4.1 Critical rationalism and the exposure of ideological thought-patterns

The importance of the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude for the critique of ideology resides, amongst those merits already outlined (infra:3.10), in the permanent resistance against ideological indoctrination and manipulation, as well as the willingness to recognise and analyse thought-patterns that contribute to the sustaining and advancing of ideological goals. In an attempt to answer Popper's (infra:3:10) proposed questions for the critical analysis of an ideology, the following answers seem to indicate the presence of an ideology in South Africa:

1. To what extent can we recognise in social conceptions, political doctrines, religious belief-systems etc. assertions to the effect that specific insights and basic principles are infallible and true once and for all?

Due to a particular religious belief-system concerning God's creation of different nations and the specific role the Afrikaner nation had to play in the history of South Africa, it appears as if the insights concerning separate development were regarded as infallible, true once and for all and thus relating to a particular blueprint according to which the South African society ought to be organised.

2. Are there in connection with such assertions elite groups or individuals (charismatic political leaders, religious prophets etc.) that claim to have a monopoly on some basic exclusive knowledge or a privileged right of interpretation of certain basic ideological principles?

The idea of an exclusive blueprint for a separatist South African society seems to coincide with the claim that the Afrikaner nation was not only the sole possessor of exclusive knowledge, but that this nation enjoyed the privileged right of interpreting God's plan for South Africa. In this regard Schoeman (1998:59) indicates that the "political leader of this so-called 'Christian Nation' was endowed with an almost pontifical role: He became the *Pontifex Maximus*, the 'High Priest' of this national religion, while the church...supplied the theological basis and justification for the absolutization of the nation".

3. To what extent can we recognise tendencies toward immunising the central assumptions of the belief-system against criticism, and how are the strategies constructed so that this immunisation can take place?

By linking the policy of separate development to a state of affairs ordained by God, the apartheid ideology not only acquired greater legitimacy, but was adequately immunised against criticism. The implication is that while adherents of the ideology regarded criticism of the ideology as

criticism against a God-given blueprint, the transcendence of ordinary concerns of logic resulted in an exaggerated claim of airtight logic and absolute scientific precision according to which criticism and alternative ideas were rendered as immoral, irreverent and "unscientific" (cf. Lifton 1969:428). According to Schoeman (1998:159) criticism against the apartheid regime was constantly rejected as being of "either liberal or communist origin, and therefore per definition anti-Christian and a menace to the future of the nation".

4. To what extent can we find in a political doctrine, social philosophy or religious belief-system categorisations and value-judgements that are determined by rigid dogmatic dichotomies and bipolar labels for the interpretation of social and political reality?

There is no doubt that the interpretation of the South African social and political reality was determined by the rigid perception that the deepest meaning of human existence is to be sought in the nation (supra:4.4.2.2). It was accepted that because the final destination of a separatist society was in line with the will of God, it also constituted a white/black juxtaposition.

5. Can we find highly emotional enemy-stereotypes and, along with these, tendencies toward utilising scapegoat strategies and conspiracy theories?

Since cultural and racial separation was perceived as a sacred duty of God's election of his children, anything that threatened the separate existence of the Afrikaner nation was to be regarded as the sinful enemy. While British Imperialism was regarded as the initial enemy of the Dutch-Afrikaner people, it was African Nationalism that became the surpassing enemy.

6. To what degree are value premises in ideological thought-patterns openly declared to be such, and to what degree are they disguised as matters of fact?

Value-premises such as the supposed supremacy of the Western culture, the supremacy of whites and the supposedly backward nature of black people in South Africa were all declared as matters of fact. The misfortunes of the majority of the population of the country was accepted as "God-given", while the opposite was considered to be the "natural heritage" of others (cf. Schoeman 1998:159).

From the above it has become clear that the South African society was indeed driven by ideological thought-patterns. The mere exposure of this state of affairs can, however, never suffice, since the presuppositions that underpin these patterns remain hidden. While Popper (infra:3.11.1 and 3.11.2) argued that presuppositions and a starting-point can be criticised, such

criticism is only possible once the presuppositions and starting-point had been brought to the fore. In order to comply with the latter and thus come to a comprehensive understanding of the integral and radical nature of the apartheid ideology, it has to be subjected to transcendental critique.

#### **4.4.2 Transcendental critique of the apartheid ideology**

Ashley (1980:2) describes the emergence of the ideology of apartheid as the fusing together of the Christian and the national into a powerful outlook on the world which has had a dominant political influence on the South African society. However, apartheid is not simply a political policy consisting of a collection of segregational laws. Since this ideology represents a particular belief-system that can be linked to a particular way in which a group of people view reality, the removal of segregational laws will not necessarily lead to the disappearance of apartheid. As Van der Walt (1994:378) stipulates, this ideology formed the foundation of the entire South African societal order and as such, led to a physical condition of unequal distribution of power and prosperity. In order to determine the pre-ideological conditions that led to this physical condition in apartheid South Africa, the ideological outlook that played such a profound role in the history of South Africa, especially up to the first democratic elections in 1994, needs to be subjected to transcendental critique.

##### **4.4.2.1 Disregard of the meaning-coherence of the modal meaning-diversity**

*The first transcendental question - what do we abstract in the intentional theoretical attitude from the integral structure of human experience?*

Confronted with the first transcendental question concerning what can be abstracted from the integral structure of the horizon of human experience (infra:3.2), it becomes apparent that the ideology of apartheid exhibited a distorted insight into the meaning-coherence of the modal meaning-diversity. Since the absolutisation of the nation is an indication of a disregard of the inter-modal coherence within which each modal aspect of reality reveals its own distinct nature, it can also be stated that a distorted view of the coherence of inter-modal time must necessarily lead to the absolutisation of an aspect of reality. The absolutisation of the Afrikaner nation and the equation thereof with the state, is representative of a hierarchical view of the South African

society whereby the national state became the supreme authority, implying that all other kinds of authorities were merely subsidiary. An awareness of the essence of life forms was placed within the context of a diversity of modes of human existence and societal relationships as part of the "life" and "aspirations" of the nation. The various aspects of created reality were consequently regarded as spheres of the (absolutised) nation. Regarded as subsidiary authorities derived from the national state as the fundamental authority, the various societal communities such as the school, the church, the business enterprise and even scientific endeavour, were all placed in service of the survival and the continual purification of the white (Afrikaner) nation (cf. Schoeman 1998:60ff). True to a hierarchical view of reality, all social communities in South Africa were rearranged from a horizontal coexistence alongside each other, to a vertical order. This implies that the structural integrity of the various societal spheres were not only severely violated, but that the eradication of the boundaries between the peculiar and intrinsic natures of the various life spheres resulted in tyranny - a new condition of crisis thus emerged when the various life forms resisted being thrown into alien moulds. This resistance not only represents evidence of the distinct nature and structure of each societal institution, but underscores Dooyeweerd's (1996:64) argument that a totalitarian regime cannot be sustained in the long run.

The Catch 22-paradox (infra:2.4.4.1) that surrounds any hierarchical view of reality, seems applicable to the South African society: while British colonialism caused a situation of crisis when the cultural uniqueness of the Afrikaner nation was threatened by the utilisation of all life spheres to promote Anglicisation, the social disequilibrium was redirected when the ideology of ethno-nationalism utilised the very same life spheres to promote the ideals of the Afrikaner nation. In this regard Derrida (1985:292) draws an ironic comparison: he indicates that the word *apartheid* "occupies the terrain like a concentration camp. System of partition, barbed wire, crowds of mapped out solitudes. Within the limits of this untranslatable idiom, a violent arrest of the mark, the glaring harshness of abstract essence seems to speculate in another regime of abstraction, that of confined separation". The irony of this comparison lies in the fact that the many deaths that occurred in the concentration camps during the Anglo Boer War in 1899-1902, had been regarded as one of the major triggers in the fierce emergence of Afrikaner Nationalism (cf. Goudzwaard 1984:41; also Jordaan 1988:22). As such, the barbed wires remain erect: since one hierarchical view of reality calls another into being, it can be argued that all ideologies sustain a hierarchical view of reality.

From the outset it has become apparent that by subjecting the distorted and biased anatomy of the ideology of apartheid to the first transcendental question, a particular insight into the structure of reality that undergirds the ideology, is exposed. While the truth or falseness of the *subjective* (ideological) *a priori* resides in the insight into the *structural a priori*, it can be stated that the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism represented a distorted and biased view of the meaning-coherence of the modal diversity of reality. However, since disregard of the structurally pluralistic view of the South African society led to the disharmonious disclosure of the various spheres of life, the nature of such retardation can only be explained in terms of an exposure of the nature of the ideological insight into the structure of reality.

#### 4.4.2.2 Ideological starting-point resides in the nation

*The second transcendental question - from what starting-point can the aspects of human experience which were theoretically abstracted, be united in a theoretical synthesis?*

Although the nation remains restricted to the historico-cultural aspect of reality, and thus exhibits a relative character, the misconception regarding a totality perspective on the modal meaning-diversity has ultimately resulted in the elevation of the nation to "the position of a (pretended) supra-modal common denominator of the remaining aspects of human life" (Schoeman 1998:132; cf. also Davies 1978:34 and Van der Walt 1994:379, 386). However, by attributing supra-modal status to the nation, it not only acquired regulative status to demand normative control of every societal sphere, but simultaneously provided the starting-point for all ideological endeavours. From here it becomes apparent that by subjecting the ideological attitude of thought to transcendental critique, not only the absolutisation of the nation is exposed, but also the untenability of a vantage point that remains bound to reality itself. Proceeding from the supposedly supra-modal status of the nation, it can be argued that the nation was no longer regarded as subject to norms pertaining to the historico-cultural aspect of reality. As the regulative norm, the nation not only gave direction, but it promised to safeguard the purity of the nation. The ultimate solution to race problems and the final guarantee for the dignity of all members of humankind resided, according to this ideology, in the nation. Consequently, the absolutised nation embodied the ultimate and sole source of authority and power. The ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism therefore found its support in something that was relative. Due to a distorted insight into the structural *a priori* concerning the structurally pluralistic horizon of

reality, this ideology remained bound to self-induced limits since the point of support is never to be found outside the boundaries of reality.

#### 4.4.2.3 Origin of meaning - God or the nation?

*The third transcendental question - how is critical self-reflection, namely the concentric direction of thought toward the self, possible, and what is its origin?*

Although the starting-point for ideological thought in apartheid South Africa was found in the Afrikaner nation itself, and even though this point appears to be directly linked to a "belief" in an *absoluteness* by which it is constituted, the subjection to transcendental critique exposes a curious inner connection between religion and the ideological endeavours. Given the profound role the Calvinist religion played in the lives of white Afrikaners in South Africa (cf. Christie 1991:176-177; Davies 1978:82 and Hexham 1981:35ff), there is no doubt that the *religious relationship between the Christian Afrikaners and God as Creator* was regarded as the *primary* relationship that transcends all of created reality. Since this relationship was thought to transcend reality, it had to be of supra-modal nature, while all modally qualified human relationships and life forms were *secondary*. On the contrary, it can be argued that the Christian principle dealing with the central commandment of love (Luke 10:25-37), ought to be the one and only regulating principle in the life of a nation that considers itself to be a Christian nation. In other words, because this principle of love and compassion is of supra-modal nature, all human activities of modal nature must be subject to this all-encompassing principle. Since the Afrikaner nation proclaimed to be God's chosen people (cf. Goudzwaard 1984:40-41 and Mbere 1979:4), it is to be expected that this nation would have regarded this regulative principle to be of radical, central and total nature. In this regard Strauss (1998a:12-13) refers to the joint closed connection of the nation of God (the elect) in Christ, constituting a radical claim laid upon the human selfhood, a concentration (central) of all human activities in the religious selfhood, totally encompassing all human activities by directing all human functions in the same transcendental direction. The implication here is that also the nation as a modally qualified cultural association of people, should be regulated and permeated by this all-encompassing principle.

However, by virtue of transcendental critique, it has become clear that the exposure of the absolutisation of the nation to supra-modal status not only relativised the regulative role of the

primary relationship (central commandment of love) as such, but resulted in attributing coequal status to the nation with regard to this primary relationship. From here it can be argued that the perception of the nation as being regulative for the development of society, reveals a serious misinterpretation of the Christian doctrine (cf. Goudzwaard 1984:45). Since transcendental critique identifies the inner connection between religion and ideological endeavours, there is little doubt that the ideology of Afrikaner Nationalism elevated the *nation* as the theoretical axiom that was taken as the centre and the starting-point of ideological thought. The exposure of the *nation* as the theoretical axiom can schematically be presented as follows:

<b>Transcendental questions</b> Refers to the <i>same</i> reality, constituting a "neutral" ground for discourse, irrespective of religious suppositions. <i>Neutral</i>	<b>Theoretical answers</b> Concrete answers as regulated by religious suppositions. <i>Un-neutral</i>	<b>Transcendental ideas</b> Exposes the subjective insight into the structural a priori. <i>Un-neutral</i>	<b>Exposure of a ideological axiom by virtue of transcendental criticism</b>
1. What is abstracted for the theoretical attitude of thought?	The coherence of inter-modal time.	The <i>coherence</i> of meaning.	The absolutisation of the <i>Afrikaner nation</i> and the equation thereof with the state.
2. What enables the totality of the diversity of meaning?	Archimedean point as the fixed point of departure.	The <i>totality</i> of meaning.	The <i>Afrikaner nation</i> .
3. What enables self-reflection?	The origin.	The <i>origin</i> of meaning.	A <i>fusion</i> between the <i>Christian principle</i> dealing with the central commandment of love and the <i>absolutised nation</i> .

**Table 2: Exposure of the *nation* as the theoretical axiom**

Viewed in conjunction with the already exposed transcendental ground-ideas concerning the coherence, the totality and the origin of the Afrikaner nationalist ideology, South African education as a system to secure and maintain Afrikaner nationalist domination of society, can be critically reflected upon.

#### 4.5 The South African school as an ideological state apparatus

##### 4.5.1 A plea for Christian-National Education

Considering the hypernormative status that was attributed to the Afrikaner nation, it becomes comprehensible why societal relationships such as the church, the state, and also the school

became totally subservient to issues such as the retaining of the Afrikaner culture and the continuation of a distinct religious community. In this regard it appears that the perception of the school as the societal relationship that could occupy the most important contributing position towards socialising children into the ideology of the day (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.7B.), applies to South African schools during the reign of the apartheid ideology. Considering education as one of the most important pillars in the South African social order, the Nationalist government not only employed the ideology of Christian Nationalism to set the standard against which policies were judged and in terms of which modifications were to be justified, but it also justified the deliberate and explicit use of schools as a tool for indoctrination and social control (Robertson 1978:103, 106; cf. also Davies 1978:1 and Mncwabe 1990:3). Although the school was used by the NP as an instrument of domination, the link between the ideology of separate development and the South African educational practice was to be found in the document entitled *Manifesto for Christian National Education*, first published in 1948.

Christian-National Education (CNE) was however not a new tool developed by the Dutch-Afrikaner nation to safeguard the survival of religious convictions and a cultural uniqueness. As a 17th century ideology CNE can be traced to an era in the Netherlands where the state, the church and the school were so closely identified that it was difficult to see where the authority of the one ended and the authority of the other began (Muir 1968:31; cf. also Ashley 1989:7 and Coetzee 1968:16). Although the church was in control of all educational activities not only in the Netherlands, but in other European countries and in the Cape, it should be indicated that *national* in the concept of Christian-National did not refer to a particular nation *per se*, but rather to a group of people who had adopted the Calvinist interpretation of Christianity. In South Africa, however, *national* was ethnically nuanced when it was identified with the Dutch-Afrikaner nation who regarded themselves as the carriers of the (Protestant) Light in Africa. Strauss (1969:1ff) alludes that while the Christian-National progress of the Afrikanerdom enjoyed imperturbability up to the first half of the 19th century, it was humanist liberalism and the humanist revolutionary democracy which accompanied the next half of the 19th century that eventually threatened the existence of the Calvinist-Protestant foundation of the Afrikaner nation. Strauss continues by explaining that it was in view of this threat that the Afrikaner nation realised that the most important area that should deliberately be safeguarded in terms of Christian-Nationalism, was the education of the Afrikaner child.



Although the first CNE schools were established in South Africa around the turn of the 20th century, it was after the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), which was followed by a deliberate policy of Anglicisation, that private CNE schools were established (Robertson 1973:53; cf. also Christie 1991:173; Hexham 1981:152 and Strauss 1969:2). While these schools did not survive for a long period, the importance of educating the Afrikaner child in a "Protestant-Christian Spirit" ultimately led to the formulation of the *Manifesto for Christian National Education* (1948). In this publication CNE not only received its formal codification, but it also expressed the views of the orthodox Afrikaners that education for their children had to be based upon the Christian Gospel and the perception that national differences should be reflected in education. With regard to the education of the Afrikaner child, the policy document (cited in Robertson, 1973:55) stated:

The instruction and education of children of European parents must be carried out on the basis of their parent's attitude of life and to the world. For Afrikaans-speaking children this means that they must be reared on the basis of the Christian-National attitude to life and the world as held by our volk. The Christian foundation of this attitude is based on the Holy Scriptures and expressed in the articles of faith of our three Afrikaans Churches. By the National principle we mean the love of everything that is our own, with special reference to our country, our language, our history and our culture. We believe that both principles must be developed in such a way that these two principles are characteristic of the whole school as regards its spirit, aim, curriculum, method, discipline, staff organisation and activities. Corresponding to the basic structure of our Christian-National attitude to life and to the world the National principle must always be under the guidance of the Christian principle.

From the above it becomes clear that religion and nationalism merged into an educational theory that was aimed at the preservation and the development of the Christian and Nationalist spirit of the Afrikaner nation. While the Christian element in CNE schools referred to knowing and honouring God, the National tenet underlined the desire to preserve the unity between the Afrikaner child and his/her cultural environment. Although the policy document enunciated that the National principle must always be under the guidance of the Christian principle, Muir (1968:39) argues that the maintenance of a balance between these two concepts is impossible. While Christianity teaches principles like "Love thy neighbour as Thyself" and "turn the other cheek", nationalism emphasises that one's own group has special significance and must be glorified. In this regard Boesak (1978:11) indicates that this "love" had a stifling and destructive character that denied the true essence of Christian love - since there is no dichotomy between love and righteousness, it does not seek the fulfilment of self-interest, but serves the other selflessly. However, within the context of Christian-Nationalism in South Africa, it appears that the unity of mankind was sought in Christ on the one hand, and on the other hand (and of coequal status), in the nation (cf. infra:4.4.2.3). In this regard Chris Coetzee (1954:280), who is regarded as one of the major architects of CNE in South Africa, stated that to the religious person the

Christian principle would be of more importance than the national, however, "die gelowige aanvaar tog weer dat die eie nasionaliteit gegrond is op Gods verordeninge: so word die ideaal van Christelik-nasionale onderwys een, onlosmaakbare band, nie Christelik en nasionaal nie, maar Christelik-nasionaal". Against the background of the claim that the Christian principle and the National principle were in fact *one* principle, the individual was not only identified with his/her religion and national situation, but it also became the task of the school to strengthen this identity. According to the *Report of the Provincial Education Commission of the Orange Free State* (1951:24), disregard of the national principle, namely to educate the child to love and appreciate the traditions and achievements of the "own" culture, would necessarily lead to the development of a nation that carried a feeling of inferiority. In order to counter any un-national, and thus neutral education, CNE not only prided itself on its devotion to the Afrikaner tradition, but consequently housed no opportunity for education as an "enlightening experience capable of losing traditional bonds and opening the individual to new experiences" (Hexham 1981:150; cf. also Mncwabe 1990:3).

Coetzee (1968:19) emphasised the fact that the policy on CNE "was developed by Dutch Reformed Afrikaners for the education of Dutch Reformed children (not for the education of other groups) and designed to serve as an example for people of other persuasions, who are by this policy invited to develop for their own groups comparable educational policies". However, the policy appears to be clear in its adoption of the claim to manifest knowledge concerning the nature and character of the future of and schooling for Coloured people and blacks (referred to as natives in the document)! On the education for these groups the documents (cited in Robertson 1973:58) read as follows:

The instruction of the Coloured people should be regarded as a sub-division of the vocation and task of the Afrikaner to Christianize the non-European races of our country. We accept the principle of trusteeship of the non-European by the European, particular by the Afrikaners. This trusteeship imposes on the Afrikaner the solemn duty of seeing that the Coloured people are educated in accordance with Christian and National principles. ...We believe that the Coloured man can and will only be truly happy when he has been Christianized for then he will be proof against his own heathen ideology and all sorts of foreign ideologies that give him the illusion of happiness but leave him in the long run dissatisfied and unhappy...We believe he can be made race-conscious if the principle of apartheid is strictly applied in teaching...The welfare and happiness of the Coloured man depends on his realising that he belongs to a separate racial group ...The financing of Coloured education must be placed on such a basis that it is not provided at the cost of European education.

...The task of white South Africans with respect to the native is to Christianize him and to help him culturally, and this vocation and task has found its immediate application in the principles of trusteeship, no placing of the native on the level of the white, and in segregation...The teaching and education of the native must be based on the European's attitude to life, more particularly that of the Boer nation as the senior European trustee...The mother-language is the basis for instruction...Because of the cultural immaturity of the native, it is the task of the State in

co-operation with the Christian Protestant Churches to provide and superintend education for natives...The actual teaching...should be undertaken by the natives themselves under control and guidance of the State, with the proviso that the financing of native education be placed on such a basis that it is not provided at the cost of European education.

Although it was stated in the *Report of the Provincial Education Commission of the Orange Free State* (1951:24) that the National principle is not of Chauvinistic or isolationistic nature, it appears as if this principle indeed was responsible for the isolationist policy that not only prevented different groups in coming together as a common culture, but contributed to continuously dividing groups (Muir 1968:40). The attitude underpinning this document appears to be of paternalistic and authoritarian nature, placing the state and the church, irrespective of the overt acknowledgement of the principle of sphere sovereignty, in authoritarian positions with regard to the carrying out of school-typical education along preconceived conceptions. Though this policy document was never accepted as official government policy on education, it was indeed representative of a view of society and its education that provided the framework for the construction of South African education to serve a racial ideology that degenerated from its initial historical conjunction of cultural survival into an entity characterised by institutionalised racial discrimination.

#### **4.5.2 State control of the South African school**

Placed within the context of sphere sovereignty and thus in recognition of the existence of life spheres next to one another, it was accepted by the followers of the Christian-National philosophy that each life sphere has a status of its own which ought not to be infringed upon by any other sphere. At the same time it was accepted that no life sphere can exist independently. In this regard it was assumed that the home, church, state and school must be closely bound together in education - as such, each life sphere had to accept its own "autonomy", as well as its dependence on other spheres. With regard to the relation between the school and the state it was argued that the state is "autonomous in deciding the right to education of its youthful citizens, being the institution for the maintenance of justice in human society, as well as on the proper standard of pupils' education and on compulsory education within certain limits and finally on the maintenance of public morality and national safety" (Coetzee 1968:25).

The emphasis on and recognition of sphere sovereignty apparently relates to the struggle for the freedom of the school system from state control, especially after the Anglo-Boer War when the

British introduced a state schooling system aimed at the Anglicisation of the Dutch-Afrikaner (Christie 1991:173; Jordaan 1988:22-23 and Muir 1968:34). State control of schooling posed a definite threat: as a secular schooling system that was controlled by the state, the system and content of the school curriculum was not only regarded as foreign to the Afrikaner, but stimulated the ideal of separatism in the midst of the Afrikanerdom. When placed within the context of sphere-sovereignty, the plea for freedom of the school from bureaucratic state control is legitimate. The attempt at Anglicisation of the Dutch-Afrikaner appears to be representative of state control where the school is misused for other than school-typical purposes. Proceeding from the assumption that all life spheres coexist alongside each other, the misuse of the school for extra-educational purposes can be regarded as an unlawful encroachment upon the relative sovereign sphere of the school by the state. Consequently, the struggle of the Dutch-Afrikaner to free schooling from "unlawful" state control was legitimate. When exposing state control of South African schooling during the years of apartheid it is important to determine to what extent such control was legitimate in the sense that it did not involve an overextension of state power upon the relative sovereign sphere of the school.

According to Robertson (1978:103) the form and content of South African education during the apartheid dispensation was directed towards a single goal, namely that of "preparing each child to occupy a niche in a highly segregated and stratified society, with the relative position and appropriate attitudes of the individual being determined by the criterion of skin colour". If the task of education is to prepare the child for a particular position in the South African society, who then must decide on such a position? Viewing South Africa as a country inhabited by different national groups, it was accepted by the Afrikaner-Nationalist government that total territorial separation, including separate education for the four population groups was the only salvation for cultural (racial) purity. Assuming that both a government and a lifeview are unique to a particular nation, Boshoff (1988:40) argued that before the South African government could attempt any constitutional reform, the Afrikaner, thus also the Afrikaner teacher, had to be encouraged to let go of his/her Christian-National confession. Boshoff's argument not only emphasises the assumption that cultural survival necessarily involves the equating of nation with state (cf. Schoeman 1998:134), but also justifies the Afrikaner nation's obtaining of political power. While the position of the individual was determined by the national group to which he/she belonged, it was the task of the nation in power to assist the "less" civilised nations (cf. Cronje 1947:122; cf. also *Verlag van die Provinsiale Onderwyskommissie van die Oranje-Vrystaat*

1951:24). As such, the Afrikaner Nationalist government claimed the "right" to determine the "relative position and appropriate attitudes of the individual" in South Africa. At the same time, however, the division of mankind into nations was coupled with the Will of God and the carrying out of the policy of separate development was regarded as obedience to God's Will. Consequently, the position of an individual in the South African society was in the first instance determined by pigmentation, explained and illuminated by the white guardian who enjoyed the privileged position of contributing towards the well-being of the Non-white peoples of South Africa (cf. Tikly 1993:10;13). In the last instance, however, such a position was determined by God Himself! To educate the child to eventually occupy a particular niche in a segregated South African society was thus not only in line with the will of God, but contributed towards the fulfilling of God's Will. The "right" of the Protestant-Christian Nationalist state to decide on the Christian-National nature of state schools was not regarded as a matter of legitimacy under the guidance of the principle of sphere-sovereignty, but ultimately as obedience to a "higher" calling. Whatever relates to a higher calling is necessarily regarded as an absolute and therefore unquestionable truth: "no one had the right to question what was divinely ordained" (Malherbe 1977:106). Proceeding from such a manifest "truth" not only relativises the possibility to falsify this "truth" itself, but constitutes the presence of an ideology. If it can be determined that state control of South African schools was exercised in service of the ideology of Afrikaner-Nationalism, then it can be argued that the principle of sphere-sovereignty was not necessarily ignored, but rather deployed as co-worker of the apartheid ideology.

Although South African education was divided into four separate systems along racial lines (cf. Ashley 1989:12), a further division is possible, namely between education for whites and education for non-whites (Coloureds, Indians and Blacks). However, if the conditions and quality of education for the various groups were to be placed within a hierarchy, it appears that the two extremes will be white education at the top of the hierarchy, with black education at the bottom. Due to the stark contrast between these two positions, it is important to juxtapose education for whites and blacks.

#### **4.5.2.1 Control of white education**

Before the assumption of power by the Afrikaner Nationalist government in 1948, control of education was exercised by the provincial councils of the provinces of Natal, the Cape, the

Transvaal and the Orange Free State (Behr 1980:21; *Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:6 and Robertson 1978:108). Although the power of the provinces was never withdrawn until the passage of the National Educational Policy Act in 1967, it was the voice given to parents through local school committees, with the exception of Natal, that contributed to the introduction of CNE principles into white schools.

In order to apply CNE principles in white schools, centralisation of the control of education became inevitable. Consequently the Nationalist Party exercised its power to remove Black, Coloured and Indian education from the provinces to central government control and to create a white education policy that was applicable to all provinces (National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC) 1992:6). Simultaneously, however, provinces were granted administrative power over almost all types of white primary and secondary schools. State-control of white education was also embodied in the Christian and national character that assumed law-status in the National Education policy Act, no, 39 of 1967. Schutte (1984:128; cf. also Stimie 1975:9) notes that the state shifted the responsibility to parents and teachers to eventually define what should be understood under the Christian and national character. Although the education of the white child was state-controlled, parents thus played a profound role in school control through parent-teacher associations, school committees, school boards and boards of control.

The amount of say that was given to parents in the control of the school relates to the assumption explained in the *Manifesto for Christian National Education* (Ashley 1989:17) that the upbringing of the child is not only the duty and the right of the parents, but that the parents should play a profound role (in co-operation with the state and the church) to ensure that education is established in accordance with the worldview of the parental home. This perception was asserted by Coetzee (1968:22) who argued that according to the Afrikaners' Calvinistic theoretical thought, the parents remain in every way responsible to decide on the foundation, aim and spirit of their children's education, not only at home but also at school. The right of parents to educate and to foresee that their children are educated according to their specific worldview was regarded as fundamental.

Stimie (1975:38-40) subsequently gives an exposition of the school boards and school committees that were established in the Cape Province, the Orange Free State, Transvaal and

Natal. The Cape Province, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were all divided in school districts, for each of which a school board was elected or partly appointed:

- ♦ by the administrator, municipal councils and divisional councils in the Cape Province;
- ♦ by delegates of the school committees of the schools in the Orange Free State; or
- ♦ by delegates from the governing body, advisory body or school committee of each school in the Transvaal.

The responsibilities of these school boards varied from the submittance of recommendations to the education department on the establishment of schools, the provision of facilities, and advice to the Director of Education on the admission of pupils. School boards, however, had no taxation powers and no say in the appointment of teachers. In the province of Natal there was no system of school boards, and since this province was overwhelmingly English-speaking and intensely opposed to CNE, schools were placed under the direct control of the Department and the Director of Education.

For every state-controlled school in these provinces a school committee was elected by the parents of school-going children. Extensive powers were subsequently given to these committees: in the Cape Province school committees reported, in consultation with the school principal, to the school board, or directly to the education department on matters relating to school grounds and buildings, school property and furniture. They assisted the principal with the internal management of the school (including disciplinary matters); nominated persons to fill teaching posts and acted as a link between the school and the parents, the school board and the department. In the Orange Free State the committees were concerned with the general administration of the school, they recommended candidates for teaching posts to the director (in consultation with the principal and sometimes in collaboration with the inspector of education for the particular area). In the Transvaal school property was supervised by a governing body. The responsibilities of these bodies included recommendations on the provision of facilities and the appointment of teachers, however with the principal acting in an advisory capacity. In Natal an advisory school committee, in co-operation with the principal, made recommendations to the department on issues such as school buildings and the appointment of principals, deputy-principals and vice-principals.

The amount of say allocated to white parents in white schools served to a great extent, especially in white Afrikaner schools, to sustain the Christian and nationalist character that was

underwritten by the South African government in the National Education Policy Act No. 39 of 1967. While it was stated that the education in schools, maintained and managed by the state or by a provincial education department shall have a Christian character, as well as a broad national character (Behr 1980:269), parents were in the position to foresee that this was realised through the role of school committees. Given the role of these committees in the appointment of principals and teachers, parents were able to ensure that their children were educated by teachers who did not only emphasise CNE principles, but whose personal life and worldview complied with the *spirit and direction* of the school. With the publication of the White Paper on the Provision of Education in the Republic of South Africa in 1983 (*Witskrif oor Onderwysvoorsiening in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika* 1983:18-19; cf. also Ashley 1989:18), parents were granted formal statutory recognition on the South African Council for Education at national level and on statutory management bodies at local and regional levels through school committees and regional administrative councils.

As a member of a privileged nation in South Africa, the education of the white child was aimed at preparing him/her to take up a privileged position in the segregated South African society. When taken into consideration the extensive parental involvement in education on community level, there appears to be little doubt that parental control ensured a correlation between the state's envisaged position of the white people and the education they received. Simultaneously, however, parental involvement served the separatist ideology, even as late as in 1990 when the government announced that black students could be admitted to white state schools provided that 90% of the white parents voted in favour (supra:4.5.4.2).

#### **4.5.2.2 Control of black education**

Since they regarded schooling as an essential means in bringing about apartheid, the Nationalist government set up a Commission on Native Education (Eiselen Commission, 1949-1951) with the main term of reference being "the formulation of the principles and aims of education for Natives (later officially referred to as Bantu, the collective name for the African peoples occupying most of the African continent south of the equator, excluding white people who were referred to as Europeans) as an independent race in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitudes, and their needs under ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration" (Christie & Collins 1984:160; Horrel 1972:485



and *Samevatting van die Verslag van die Naturelle-Onderwyskommissie 1949/51* 1951:1; cf. also Behr 1980:165ff). This correlation between education for blacks (Natives) and their cultural heritage coincides with the Government's perception that cultural affiliation serves as a pre-requisite for a particular and separate schooling system. This perception clearly served as the basic premise that ultimately conditioned the commission's recommendation that black education must be placed within the context of the school as an institution aimed at the transmission of a black cultural heritage (cf. Mncwabe 1990:28-29; also Fleisch 1998:61). When taking into consideration the fact that CNE entertains the notion that God not only willed different nationalities, but that these differences should be reflected in education, the CNE origins of this commission's recommendations are clearly detectable when it was stated that the education of the Bantu must not only be Christian in character, but also be an integral part of a Bantu Development policy (cf. Davis 1972:12; also Ashley 1989:13).

While the ecclesiastical support for the policy of separate development allowed for a conception of nations to be *separate but equal*, it was the notion of white supremacy that not only contradicted this notion, but also "safeguarded" the control of education under the guidance of whites, and in particular, Afrikaners. Aimed at the establishing of their own education according to the Afrikaner's cultural uniqueness, the Afrikaner had to separate the education of all other groups either geographically or culturally from the education of the white child. Simultaneously, they also needed to control the education of these groups. Placed within the context of an assumed white supremacy, the manipulation of black education in order to maintain the privileged position of power of the Nationalist government, became evident with the passing of the Bantu Education Act of 1953.

Based on the principles of the Nationalist government's ideology of separate development, the Bantu Education Act introduced a changeover from shared control among the provinces, church authorities and the Union Parliament to direct control by the Department of Native Affairs (Verwoerd 1954:7; cf. also Davis 1972:12; Horrell 1972:486 and Mncwabe 1990:21). Van Zyl (1972:500) argued that since the education of the Bantu child became too great a task for the missionaries, it was now a national task "requiring the resources and direction of the central government and the specialist attention of a state department equipped to provide the educational services increasingly being demanded by the Bantu peoples". In his plea for state control of black education, Dr. Verwoerd (1954:5) stipulated in the Senate that the major defects of the prior

black education system was the lack of co-ordination of the interests of the school with those of the (black) community and the absence of co-ordination between education offered in black schools and the broad national policy. With regard to the first "defect", it was stated that by "blindly producing pupils trained on a European model, the vain hope was created among Natives that they could occupy posts within the European community despite the country's policy of 'apartheid'. This is what is meant by the creation of unhealthy 'white collar ideals' and the causation of widespread frustration among the so-called educated Natives" (Verwoerd 1954:7). By defining African culture as being in an infantile and child-like state, the Nationalist government claimed the "right" to delimit the educational interests of the black people to training of basic skills, inculcation of certain attitudes, mother-tongue education and proficiency in Afrikaans and English. While education in this form prepared the Bantu for life within the Bantu community (a community defined and controlled by whites), it simultaneously had to prepare him/her to perform certain tasks in the 'European' economy (cf. Tikly 1993:13 and Mncwabe 1990:23). In order to bring about Bantu education in accordance with the broad national policy of separate schooling, the transference of control of school education and teacher-training for Africans from the provinces to the central government became an imperative of the Nationalist government.

Whilst black schools were, prior to the passage of the Bantu Education Act, primarily run by religious institutions, Verwoerd (1954:5) justified the transference of the control of mission schools from the missionary bodies to the Native Affairs Department by claiming that in "South Africa the Natives who remain to a great extent a heathen community, are served by a large variety of churches while the Christian section of the Native community has been split up into numerous denominations and sects". In order to force missionaries to hand over control of their schools, subsidies were not only progressively reduced (after 1957 these schools had to run without government subsidies), but all schools were required to be registered with the Department of Native Affairs. While the Department and the Minister of Native Affairs enjoyed the prerogative to withhold registration at own discretion, no registration was granted to schools who were situated in areas zoned for whites under the Group Areas Act (1950) (cf. Horrel 1972:486; also Davis 1972:13 and Robertson 1978:114). Although white teachers were gradually eased out of Bantu education, the Department of Bantu Education, which was created in 1958, maintained firm authority through the appointment of local school committees and boards. While one quarter of the members of these school boards were appointed directly by the

Secretary for Bantu Education, the appointment of the other members also had to be approved by him. In addition, the Central Government had the power to withdraw subsidies on a month's notice without providing any reason for such action (*Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:5). State control also extended to control over teachers as it was required that those who plan to teach in state-aided schools (virtually all schools for blacks) had to attend government-run teacher training institutions. By increasing state control over Bantu education, the government obtained the (self-imposed) mandate to not only manipulate education to comply with the demands of the broad national policy of separate schooling, but to ensure the sustaining of white supremacy.

The Bantu Education Act gave wide powers to the Minister of Bantu Education and his department, including the drawing up of the syllabi, the control of inspections, the administration of examinations and the general supervision of the operation of Bantu schools. Even private, unaided schools had to accept departmental syllabi and the Department's regulations regarding the appointment of teachers, the admission of students and the medium of instruction (*Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:5). In accordance with the recommendations of the Eiselen Commission, the Department of Bantu Education claimed the right to formulate the principles and aims for Natives as an independent race, in which their distinctive characteristics and needs under ever-changing social conditions were taken into consideration (cf. *Samevatting van die Verslag van die Naturelle-Onderwyskommissie 1941/1951* 1951:1). Louw (1998:34; cf. also Hofmeyr & Buckland 1992:25) observes that although Bantu Education was aimed at a special type of education to meet the cultural needs of black people, it was the white government that determined the type of education suitable for blacks. This state of affairs was also emphasised in the ANC's revolutionary action programme, *The Freedom Charter* (1969:89), which stated that:

White professors sit in education committees as arbiters of African languages and books without consulting with the people concerned. The grotesque spectacle is seen of the White Government of South Africa posing as a "protector" of so-called Bantu culture and traditions of which they know nothing. The arrogance of the fascists knows no bounds! They apparently love African culture more than the Africans themselves! The truth is that they wish to preserve those aspects of the African tradition which contain divisive tendencies likely to prevent the consolidation of the African people as a nation.

State control of black schooling appeared to be of an all-encompassing nature: while community participation in the running of black schools remained firmly under state control, the supervision of black teachers was subject to the paternalistic control of a white government. On the basis of

its trusteeship status, the white government exercised control of black education by accepting its "duty" to ensure that the Bantu was guided to serve his/her own community in all respects:

There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his own community, however, all doors are open. For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community, where he cannot be absorbed. Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze. This attitude is not only uneconomic because money is spent for an education which has no specific aim but it is also dishonest to continue it. The effect on the Bantu community we find in the much discussed frustration of educated natives who can find no employment which is acceptable to them. It is abundantly clear that unplanned education creates many problems, disrupting the community life of the Bantu and endangering the community life of the European (Verwoerd 1954:23-24).

Affirmation of the policy of separate development is not only clearly reflected in the above quotation from Dr. Verwoerd's statement concerning Bantu Education, but the assumed status of supremacy from which the white Nationalist government proceeded is also emphasised. While it was argued that there should be co-ordination between the education in black schools and the broad national policy, it becomes evident that the Bantu Education Act not only paved the way for the promotion of the separatist policy of the day, but also for the preparation of blacks to be "taught not merely the value of their own tribal cultures but that such cultures were of lower order and that, in general, the blacks should learn how to prepare themselves for a realistic place in white-dominated society, namely (at that point in time) to be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' " (Christie & Collins 1984:162; cf. also Hall 1979:58ff and Tikly 1993:12). As such, the notion that nations were created "separate but equal" was not only contradicted, but the so-called "christianising and civilising" mission of the white race to prescribe to black people what was best for them was clearly affirmed. In this regard the white Nationalist government not only claimed their supposedly "lawful right" to determine those "forms of labour" for which the Bantu may be educated, but the control of Bantu Education was used as a mechanism for the sustaining of the apartheid creed. Hall (1979:59) argues that due to a failure to distinguish between "white supremacy" and apartheid, African education reflects, maintains and reinforces a system of institutionalised racial domination with the whites at the top of a racial hierarchy and the Africans at the base. This is affirmed by Mncwabe (1990:22) when he states that within "the framework of separate schools for the different racial groups,...with one economy and one geo-political space, blacks are at the bottom of the hierarchy". Black school leavers with relevant skills acquired in black education were not regarded as having the same market value as those earned in the education systems for other population groups - due to inequalities the black population remained dominated at the base of the racial hierarchy.

#### 4.5.2.3 Funding as a means of control

The inequality of African education compared with that for whites was, even before the passage of the Bantu Education Act, anticipated by Verwoerd (quoted in Hall 1979:58): "When I am controller of native (African) Education, I will reform it so that the natives (Africans) will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them". Although this inequality was also illustrated by the per capita expenditure on African education, the exposition of such inequality should be considered against the background of the application of the parsimonious principle, as stated in the *Manifesto for Christian National Education* (cited in Robertson 1973:58; cf. also Mbere 1979:132). According to this principle the financing of native education should be "placed on such a basis that it is not provided at the cost of European education" (Robertson 1973:58).

In 1955 a Bantu Education Account was created from which Bantu Education was to be financed. The provision for Bantu Education was made up by a fixed amount granted from the general Revenue Account, four-fifths of the general tax paid by Africans and receipts from the management of schools (cf. Horrell 1972:489; Louw 1998:39; Mbere 1979:133ff and Robertson 1978:116ff). The expenditure on black education was greatly increased after the introduction of Bantu Education. However, the Nationalist government did not increase the fixed amount allocated for black education, but poll tax was increased. By increasing the poll tax - a tax paid only by blacks and not by any other population groups - the blacks themselves had to pay for the education of their children. It was also announced by the government in 1964 that funds for Bantu community schools had to be raised from bazaars and concerts, while school boards were required to raise part of the money towards capital costs of higher and post-primary schools (*Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:7; cf. also Hall 1979:60; Pomeroy 1973:20 and Schultz 1996:22). In addition Africans were required to pay for the erection of lower primary schools, to meet half the costs of building other schools and to pay for all textbooks, stationary and school and examination fees. This meant that while white education was free, compulsory and characterised by a steady increase of per capita expenditure, the poorest section of the community not only had to pay for its own social services, but had to make the greatest sacrifices for the worst education system in the country.

Since black schools were placed at the base of a racial hierarchy, they were characterised by ill-equipped facilities, over-crowded classrooms and underpaid and poorly-trained teachers. The conditions of the white teachers serving in Bantu schools were "just as favourable as those of their colleagues in European schools, because they are really regarded as being on loan to Bantu Education" (Verwoerd 1954:21). Black teachers, however, were barely paid one-half of the salary of white teachers; a situation which was explained by Verwoerd (1954:19):

The salaries which European teachers enjoy are in no way a fit or permissible criterion for the salaries of Bantu teachers. The European teacher is in service of the European community and his salary is determined in comparison with the income of the average parent whose children he teaches. ... In precisely the same way the Bantu teacher serves the Bantu community and his salary must be fixed accordingly.

While the African community had to pay for its children's education through direct and indirect taxation and school fees, the per capita pupil expenditure for blacks in 1978 was about one-seventh of that spent on a white child (Robertson 1978:117; cf. also Christie & Collins 1984:181 and Louw 1998:39). Considering the fact that the Africans' average income was low, and bearing in mind that the government's grant remained fixed, although its value was steadily eroded by inflation, the high rate of dropouts after four or five years of school came as no surprise.

The placing of the burden of financial responsibility on Africans for the education of their children, should be linked to the government's policy of the Bantu Homelands (Native Reserves) (infra:4.2.2). The Promotion of the Bantu Self-Government Act (1959) provided for the establishment of separate black governments under the guidance of the all-white South African government. The homeland policy, also referred to as the Bantustan policy, was primarily aimed at reducing the numbers of permanently settled blacks in urban areas - all Africans in South Africa, whether domiciled in an African area or not, were regarded as citizens of the African area for their ethnic group (Behr 1980:155; Stimie 1975:4-5). At the same time, however, this policy provided the South Africa government with the leverage to supply and control black migrant labour (Christie & Collins 1984:172-173; cf. also Mberere 1979:187). In line with the separation of whites and blacks, the retribalisation of blacks in the homelands was operated by a combination of tribal and bureaucratic authority structures. With regard to education, Behr (1980:171) indicates that Departments of Education, as well as the Departments of Education and Culture, were set up by the Legislative Assemblies of the Homelands. While these

departments were administratively independent, each with its own Minister of Education, they remained closely linked professionally to the central Department of Bantu Education.

This department was responsible for control in two directions: with regard to education in the homelands, it was responsible for control and guidance in respect of examinations, syllabi, courses and teaching standards in South Africa, however, Bantu Education was also employed as a means to promote the homeland policy. The close connection between Bantu Education and education in the homelands was emphasised when it was stated by the South African government that an "increase in the number of institutions in higher education located in urban areas is not desired. Steps will be taken deliberately to keep institutions for higher education, to an increasing extent, away from urban areas, and to establish them as far as possible in the Native reserves" (Verwoerd 1954:23; cf. also Fleisch 1998:64). Opposed to the passage of the homelands policy, Mbere (1979:146) argues that the shift of financial responsibility for black education from the state to Africans ought to be viewed in conjunction with the perception that Africans residing in the urban areas of South Africa are not considered permanent residents in their homes. Within the context of an envisaged segregated society as the utopia, the apartheid ideologues wanted the Bantu to find "educational, social and political expression in the reserves, but work for the "European" as migrant laborers in factories, farms, mines and homes" (Fleisch 1998:64; cf. also Christie & Collins 1984:172). As migrant labourers, their real homes were the impoverished Bantu homelands to which they eventually had to return. However, as Mbere (1979:146) continues, the consequences of Africans having to raise funds for the education of their children, not only brought them together within the African communities, but also contributed towards the emergence of a black consciousness aimed at the rejection of ideological state institutions, such as the school, which were aimed at the instilling of racial domination.

#### **4.5.2.4 State control and the restriction of educational freedom**

Hall (1979:62) identifies the main objective of state-controlled education in an apartheid South Africa as the maintenance of white supremacy. He continues by stating that the crucial relation was neither "between education and separate development nor integration but between education and racial domination" (Hall 1979:62). It consequently appears that the state's responsibility to protect the legal interests of those who are gathered together to form the social institution of the school was extended to the setting of terms and conditions for the operation of the school that

exceeded its juristic competence. As a juridically qualified social institution the state does indeed possess the ability to carry justice through its juristic competence (Clouser 1991:255; cf. also Dooyeweerd 1979:162 and Louw 1998:96). The relationship between the state and the school however involves the supplying and maintenance of the necessary buildings, resources and equipment to make school-typical education possible. As such, the state does have the right to request an account of the manner in which state-provided funds are spent. This right, however, harbours the possibility that taxing powers may be used to force parents to enrol their children in the state-controlled school network. The restrictions placed on the registration of mission schools as private (cf. Horrell 1972:486), as well as the provisions adopted for black schooling (cf. Christie & Collins 1984:171) were indeed representative of an uneven distribution of wealth that forced parents, especially black parents, to support the type of schooling provided by the state. These state-imposed terms and conditions not only restricted those who wanted to shape a schooling system in harmony with their life values, but subordinated people to a type of schooling determined by the state. Since South African schooling was provided and controlled by a government that exercised oppressive use of state authority to enforce a racial definition of the nation (cf. Fowler, Van Brummelen & Van Dyk 1993:125), parents had no choice but to comply with education for (white) dominance and education for (black) subservience.

Although Clouser (1991:261) alludes that state-typical authority is limited to the structure by which the existence of the state is constituted, it is clear that state authority in South Africa assumed absolute authority overriding that of the school. Placed within the context of the principle of sphere-sovereignty, a principle that was initially recognised by the propounders of the idea of CNE (cf. Coetzee 1968:25), it becomes clear that the state negated its duty as the administrator of public justice to guarantee the distinctiveness and sphere integrity of all sorts of institutions, including that of the school. By exceeding its limited boundaries, the state encroached upon the relative sovereign sphere of the school by setting the terms and conditions under which all schools in South Africa were suppose to operate. The South African school was therefore not only dependent on the state, but was allowed to exist only in so far as the terms and conditions set by the state were met. Because of the assumption that the white guardian had the best interest of all of society at heart, there was, *in principle, no limit* to the terms and conditions set by the state (cf. Fowler *et al.* 1993:121). The principle of sphere-sovereignty was not necessarily disregarded, but rather re-interpreted to become a co-worker in the promotion of a particular ideological goal. While the apartheid ideologues proceeded from the assumption that



the truth was their sole possession, they claimed the "right" to decide on behalf of those who did not know what was best for them, and what the terms and conditions of their education had to be. Education policies and planning were regarded as specialised functions that should be left to "experts" within the state bureaucracy. The belief in centralised governance, expert control and efficiency had a profound impact on the shaping of South African education: the construction of education policies and the allocation of powers, rights and functions to different layers of systems of educational governance were entrusted to European "experts" with specialised knowledge of white life and education, but also of Bantu life and education (cf. Fleisch 1998:58-59,61). Accountability was consequently bottom-up towards the governmental experts, and not top-down toward "amateurs" in civil society. While the claim to "expert" control was based on the segregationist foundation of the Nationalist government, it simultaneously empowered the state in two ways: first, it contributed to the insulating of the state from the broader society, and secondly, it allowed for the championing of a form of state power where structures of domination could be produced and maintained to serve the hegemonic interests of Afrikaner bureaucrats.

Since state control of the South African school stood in service of a particular ideological goal, the freedom of the school as a social institution was seriously restricted. Because the school can only be free when it is allowed to function in a school-typical way within its own limited boundaries, it is the over-extension of state power that disables the institution to control its own affairs within its sphere of competence (cf. Schoeman 1980:141 and Fowler *et al.* 1993:134). Differential allocation of resources and the nature of the regulations and conditions imposed on the school by the state not only inhibited its ability to shape the process of learning according to school-typical values, but also robbed the school of its legitimate freedom. As such, it can be stated that the deploying of the South African school as an ideological state apparatus placed the school in a crisis of legitimacy - the school was no longer granted the "lawful" right to function in a school-typical way by virtue of exercising school-typical authority, but it was clearly misused for extra-educational purposes. The government consequently "outlawed" teaching by claiming itself the right to make judgements in a sphere of work that lay outside its boundaries of competence.

### 4.5.3 School content as a tool for dominance

The over-extension of the juristic power of the state over the school not only involved the controlling of the school in terms of conditional "freedom" within the boundaries set by the state itself, but also the control of the curriculum. Against the background of the relation between education and racial domination, the control of the curriculum not only served as a basis for hegemonic interests, but proved to be a major instrument of racial domination in South Africa: while the white minority of South Africans were provided with education orientating them towards an apartheid society in which they had to play a superior and privileged role, the black majority received education aimed at the instilling of independence (cf. Schoeman 1998:155; also Hall 1979:64). Both instances were, nevertheless aimed at maintaining racial dominance.

In this regard, however, it should once again be emphasised that the link between racial dominance and curriculum-control should be viewed against the background of two central features of apartheid education: firstly, all education should be based on the Christian Gospel, and secondly, education must reflect national differences (Ashley 1989:7). According to Cilliers (1981:14; cf. also Boshoff 1988:39ff and Schutte 1984:128), because the school should not be alien to the nation it is serving, it should draw its strength and inspiration from the activities and aspirations of the nation in which it functions. While it was accepted that the Afrikaner child must be educated according to the Afrikaner culture and tradition, Verwoerd (1954:15) proclaimed that the subject-matter presented in Bantu schools must be of such a nature that it can easily be understood and mastered by the Bantu child, to the benefit and service of the Bantu community. An education system based on the circumstances of the community and aimed at satisfying the needs of that community, was consequently envisaged by the South African government. Although it could be argued that a community should know what education would best suit its needs, it was on the basis of their trusteeship role that the white Nationalist government was "permitted" to prescribe to blacks what they regarded as the best education to fulfil their aspirations.

#### 4.5.3.1 Language-prescription

Tikly (1993:13; cf. also Ashley 1989:10 and Mncwabe 1990:14) recognises the principle of mother-tongue education as of central importance for the preservation of a culture. Language is

not only a crucial factor in the development of a child's identity, but the acquisition thereof is regarded as essential in the development of a worldview. Nel (1942:36-37) underlined this significance of language when he stated that language is the carrier of a nation's culture. Against the background of the assumption that the acquiring of language is a pre-requisite for understanding the soul life of a nation, and driven by a history of suppression of Afrikaans as medium of instruction under British rule, the importance of mother-tongue education was underlined in the *Manifesto for Christian National Education* (cited in Robertson 1973:54). Mother-tongue education was subsequently re-confirmed as principle (c) in the *National Education Policy Act No. 39 of 1967* (Behr 1980:272).

Thus committed to mother-tongue education by the CNE dogma, the Nationalist government used centralisation of educational control to eliminate dual medium schools that were attended by both white Afrikaans and white English-speaking pupils. This matter had already been pleaded for in the *Manifesto for Christian National Education* when it was stated that the "dual-medium struggle has opened the eyes of our people, and helped them to appreciate still further this ideal ...We will have nothing to do with a mixture of languages, of cultures, of religion, or of race" (cited in Robertson 1973:54). As a result, on 16 May 1969 the government decreed that in all state-controlled and state-aided schools throughout South Africa mother-tongue instruction was to be compulsory to the end of Standard 8 (Grade 10) (cf. Horrell 1972:494; also Malherbe 1977:150). This meant that only after a child had passed Standard 8 parents were granted the right of choice to request that the child should be instructed in the other official language (either Afrikaans or English). According to Robertson (1978:107) the Afrikaans child in the single-medium school was now educated in the language of the home and in "the pure, hothouse atmosphere of the CNE school". Language segregation as such clearly benefited the inculcation of attitudes compatible with the CNE dogma in the Afrikaans classroom - senior pupils from Afrikaans-medium schools could now easily be indoctrinated with the political dogmas of the National Party when they attended state-aided congresses where they were "addressed by highly qualified academics on the justification of apartheid from a theological, historical, as well as an anthropological point of view" (Malherbe 1977:146). At the same time, this also implied that white Afrikaans pupils were now insulated from the English community's scepticism and criticism of the Christian-National ideology. Although a distinction was made between the Afrikaans and the English-speaking nations on cultural grounds, separate education for these groups, and reference to the term "national" always referred to the white "race" in general (cf. Christie

1991:178; also Malherbe 1977:142 and Tikly 1993:16); a reaffirmation of the white/black juxtaposition that underpinned South African education.

Under the care of central government and with a commitment to bureaucratic control, the overall plan for the development of the Bantu as a separate nation included the use of mother-tongue as the medium of instruction. Prior to the passage of the Bantu Education Act, the vernacular was used in the first four years of elementary school, and thereafter the medium of instruction was either English or, although rarely, Afrikaans. After the passage of the act, however, the vernacular was introduced as the medium of instruction in black schools for the first eight years of primary schooling and gradually extended upwards to secondary schools and teacher training institutions (Mbere 1979:147; cf. also Horrell 1972:495). The introduction of the vernacular caused numerous practical problems as the African languages never enjoyed the same official status as Afrikaans and English, and were therefore never granted the opportunity to develop the necessary technical jargon required for effective teaching (cf. Mbere 1979:147; Robertson 1978:144-115; Schoeman 1998:157 and *The Freedom Charter* 1969:89). Subsequently, no textbooks were available in the African languages. In order to achieve the aim of preserving the "traditional culture" of the blacks, the Department of Bantu Education set up a Language Service Centre to develop a specialised vocabulary in seven African languages. The language committees for the various languages were, apart from the compilation of technical terminology, also responsible for matters such as orthography, spelling, rules and suitable books in the respective languages. The terminology developed by these committees was, however, artificially forced to such an extent that it deviated considerably from the language used in homes.

According to Robertson (1978:114) the introduction of the vernacular relates to Afrikaners' projection of their insecurity about their language onto other groups. The introduction of the vernacular was, however met with the strongest opposition from black parents and teachers and the government had little choice but to re-introduce Afrikaans and English as mediums of instruction. While Afrikaans was regarded as the language of the oppressor (cf. Malherbe 1977:151), English enjoyed preference in black education. The insecurity of the Afrikaner nation was further underlined when fear for "linguistic imperialism" of the English language prompted the government to introduce Afrikaans as a third language in black schools (Schoeman 1998:157). While the introduction of the vernacular was met with opposition, the enforcement of Afrikaans resulted in rebellion against the government in 1976.

The main reasons behind the introduction of the vernacular, however, appear to relate to issues such as separatism, inequality and racial domination. While the emphasis on cultural differences contributed to ethnic divisions among the various black tribes, they were simultaneously deprived of a common *lingua franca*, thus pacifying the emergence of a black nationalism. Robertson (1978:115; cf. also Behr 1980:177; Mbere 1979:148ff and *Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:11) continues that by imprisoning blacks within a moribund tribal culture, they were deprived of the English language that was needed to provide them with a window onto the world. This also meant that the black pupil was deprived of the opportunity to cope with modern scientific terminology, a matter that proved to be detrimental to the advancement of black groups in a technological age. The imposing of outdated tribal customs and languages onto unwilling blacks also appeared to be part of a systematic strategy to guarantee that blacks would ultimately accept education for subservience and cultural domination, that they would become familiar with their "place" in a white-dominated society and accept the myth that cultural differences were part of an unchallenged order.

#### 4.5.3.2 Curriculum-prescription

According to Ruperti (1973:105) the school curriculum can be viewed as the assimilation of a nation's view of a total reality. As such, the school curriculum is not only representative of a particular worldview, but it is also one of the most prominent and direct means for the transmission of a nation's knowledge, beliefs and ideals to the younger generation. However, in a separatist society where school curricula for various nations are prescribed by centralised education departments controlled by one nation, the knowledge, beliefs and ideals to be transmitted become a matter of relevance. Since the curriculum relates to the planned experiences of pupils in formal education (cf. Ashley 1989:21), and because this is a crucial factor in the transmission of a nation's beliefs and ideals, it is necessary to ask whether this is an ideological development. If it is possible to indicate that the prescribed curricula in South African schools can be associated with a particular draft in the becoming of the utopia (separatist South African society under the guidance and leadership of whites), then it can indeed be argued that state-prescribed curricula were employed by the South African government as a means to not only justify the *status quo*, but to ensure that the educand's future choices will remain oriented towards a future determined by the apartheid ideology.

### A. Curriculum for white dominance

The *Manifesto for Christian National Education* of 1948 thus clearly stated that the selection of subject-matter, as well as the presentation thereof, must be Christian-Nationalist in spirit and manner (cf. *Manifesto for Christian National Education*, cited in Robertson 1973:55; cf. also Ashley 1989:21 and Christie 1991:176ff). Religious education was therefore regarded as of extreme importance, especially in the light of the Christian belief that God reveals himself through the Scriptures and through nature. As such, the study of the Scriptures as the primary source in acquiring knowledge of God led to the adoption of religious education as a compulsory non-examination subject in white schools. Although it was stated in the *National Education Policy Act No. of 1967* that the religious convictions of the parents and the pupils were to be respected with regard to religious instruction and religious ceremonies, they had no choice when it came to the prerequisite that education "in schools maintained, managed and controlled by a department of State (including a provincial administration) shall have a Christian character" (*National Education Policy Act 1967:272*). Christian principles and values were therefore not confined to religious education, but were to be filtered through to the teaching of so-called secular subjects. It was thus argued that "the greater the variety of knowledge and the deeper the study of nature, of man and his activities, the more the child will come to know about the revelations of God and thus of God Himself" (Cilliers 1981:14). As Christie (1991:177; cf. also Stimie 1975:8) indicates, Christian education was not only about the teaching of religion, but the imprinting of Christian principles throughout school-typical education - the whole school, in its approach to various activities and study areas, was to breathe an atmosphere of Christianity based on the Calvinist interpretation of the Gospel.

In addition it was stated in the *National Education Policy Act (1967:272)* that South African education must have a broad *national character*. The implication was that the curriculum had to be brought in line with this requirement, thus leading to the imprinting of the national character:

- (a) through the conscious expansion of every pupil's knowledge of the fatherland, embracing language and cultural heritage, history and traditions, national symbols, the diversity of the population, social and economic conditions, geographical diversity and national achievements;
- and (b) by developing this knowledge in each pupil into understanding and appreciation by presenting it in a meaningful way where appropriate, in the teaching of the two official languages, national history of the fatherland, civics and geography in school teaching... (Malherbe 1977:147-148).

The Christian-National inclination of South African education was therefore not only supported by the 1967 Act, but it highlighted the government's commitment to "imprint" the ideas and the worldview of a particular power-group onto education, by justifying and legitimising a *status quo* of separatist layers in a racial hierarchy. The criteria for the selection and presentation of subject-matter in South African curricula were therefore laid down by a government that proceeded from the assumption that the inculcation of CNE values, skills and attitudes necessarily represented the instilling of the "correct" values, skills and attitudes that would ultimately contribute to the coming of the (separatist) utopia. As suggested by the Act, and in conformity with the idea of Christian-Nationalism, it was consequently the content of subjects such as History, Geography, Social Studies and Literature that ultimately became powerful shapers of the values and attitudes required for personal disclosure in the freeing from a continuous struggle with the elusive subtleties of truth. The relevance of a curriculum therefore directly related to the assumed and manifest "truth" that a separatist society existed through the Will of God and that this truth should be conveyed through subject-matter in the school.

In this regard Chisholm (1981:139; cf. also Oosthuizen 1988:13) reflects that language usage, omissions, simplifications, deliberate suppressions of evidence, the creation and use of stereotypes were "tools" that could be incorporated to ensure that a textbook would "emerge as a protean propagandistic device". Although all subject-matter had been placed upon Christian and national cornerstones, it was especially History as a subject that provided endless possibilities for selective perceptions and the inculcating of stereotypes aimed at the justification of a separatist society (cf. Ashley 1989:22; Auerbach 1965:7ff; Chernis 1991:12ff and Schoeman 1998:153). While History syllabi aimed at fulfilling the legitimation, identification and orientation needs of the prevailing political, economic and social order, it appears as if stereotypes were of profound importance not only with regard to the selection of textbooks, but also in the writing thereof. Oosthuizen (1988:13; cf. also Du Preez 1983:6-8) views stereotypes as connected to a static view of the world, according to which habits, preferences and abilities are adapted. Language and stereotype are consequently not only nation bound, but given the presence of a static worldview, a particular nation or group can indeed acquire *fixed* descriptions as the basis from which prescriptions can be derived. When placed within the context of an assumed manifest truth, the deviation from or change of such fixed descriptions and prescriptions are simply not required. It is in this regard that stereotypes contributed to the enforcing of a *status quo* characterised by a racial hierarchy according to which one race group was favourably presented,

while other groups were simultaneously devaluated. This happens when the socially most undesirable elements of such groups are generalised as the prototype (Du Preez 1983:7; also Chernis 1991:13).

**(i) Master symbols present in South African school textbooks**

With regard to the imprinting of nationalism in schools: since Afrikaner-Nationalism had been central to South African politics, the self-image of the Afrikaner-nation was portrayed as positively as possible in textbooks. Chernis (1991:14) comments that the image of the Afrikaner-nation was enhanced by the co-existence of hostile images of those standing outside the nation. This not only gave rise to stereotypes, prejudices and derogatory language in selected textbooks as indicated in the previous paragraph, but resulted in the creation of *master symbols* that reflected the Afrikaner's self-esteem, whilst simultaneously instilling prejudices that contributed to the sustaining of structures of domination.

Du Preez (1983:73-87) identifies twelve master symbols that repeatedly appeared in South African school textbooks. The following master symbols consequently relate directly to the fulfilling of an orientation, legitimation and identity-formation function of Afrikaans-speaking whites:

- ♦ *Legitimate authority was not questioned.* Since state authority was deemed as of divine sanction, this meant that loyalty and obedience to, as well as unconditional acceptance of the (white) government, were regarded as essential. Respect for authority, the endowing of the political leaders of the so-called "Christian Nation" with an almost pontifical role, the emphasis on efficiency, philanthropy and the justification of the government, were all factors that contributed towards an uncritical acceptance of the *status quo* (Du Preez 1983:94; cf. also Schoeman 1998:59 and Fleisch 1998:54).
- ♦ *Whites were superior to blacks.* This assertion was based on assumptions that white Christian civilisation was more advanced than blacks, and were the saviours of mankind who had come to save blacks from themselves by ushering them into an era of prosperity and renewal (Chisholm 1981:143; cf. also Auerbach 1965:118-119). Vilakazi (1998:72) underscores this perception when he indicates that "the West simply took it for granted that the mind of humanity was full of nothing but error, rubbish, nonsense and superstition, until Whites emerged with a more superior mind. From the West's point of view there was



absolutely no need to study and understand the thought of Africans". Since feelings of superiority amongst one population group could serve to keep the people as a whole divided, the inculcating of these feelings were to play a significant role in encouraging the acceptance of separation in every sphere of the South African society.

- ♦ *The Afrikaner nation had a special relationship with God.* As a nation created by God, it was believed that the Afrikaner was given the special mission to establish a Christian civilisation amongst the (black) heathens in South Africa. It is significant that God was only presented in relation to the white Afrikaner in textbooks; thus only presenting the white Afrikaner as religious. According to Auerbach (1965:118) textbooks not only emphasised race differences, but little mention was made of increasing acceptance of Christianity by blacks. The omission of the latter not only enforced the exclusivity of the relation between God and the white Afrikaner, but relayed the message that the Christianising task still remained in the future. In this way the supremacy of the white Afrikaner, as well as the important role of God's "chosen people" in South Africa was underscored within the context of a (divinely) justified division of population groups.
- ♦ *The Afrikaner had a God-given task in Africa.* This "missionary master symbol" relates to the assumed exclusive relation between God and his white Afrikaner people. This symbol not only underscored the perception of white supremacy versus black inferiority, but it authorised the paternalistic and God-given task of the Afrikaner to administer the various population groups and to assist them in their development (Du Preez 1983:87). As such, the encompassing role of the Afrikaner with regard to other population groups in South Africa was regarded as sanctified by God himself.
- ♦ *South Africa rightfully belonged to the Afrikaner.* It was assumed that South Africa was given to the Afrikaner by God. As such South Africa was not only the Afrikaners' fatherland, but it was its members' birthright to protect their cultural heritage and to establish Afrikaner rule. Since the Afrikaner thus had a special God-given duty, this nation had the right to exercise God-given authority; authority that had to be unconditionally accepted. The assumption that South Africa rightfully belonged to the Afrikaner can be illustrated by examples of selective historiography according to which the Portuguese *discovered* the Cape of Good Hope and Jan van Riebeeck *founded* a new nation at the Cape in 1652, without any reference to the fact that other human beings inhabited these regions long before the arrival of Europeans. One of the major claims made by the South African government was that 87% of the territory belonged to them because when they

arrived in the country it was found unoccupied and was subsequently developed by them (Mbere 1979:195). No mention is however made of the fact that such development was made possible by the help of abundant cheap African migrant labour.

- ♦ *The Afrikaner was militarily ingenious and strong.* The British ("Kakiegevaar"), the blacks ("Swartgevaar") and the Communists ("Rooigevaar") were regarded as major threats to the Afrikaner nation. One of the central themes in History textbooks deals with a narrow and sectional image of the struggle for supremacy between Boer and Briton (cf. Chernis 1991:20). This Boer-Briton clash not only sustained Afrikaner nationalism, but also contributed to the portraying of Afrikaner leaders as heroes who were prepared to be sacrificed for the fatherland. These enemy-stereotypes were not only loaded with a high degree of negative emotion, but they simultaneously served as an instrument to reduce internal differences within the Afrikaner nation and to stabilise positions of power (cf. Salamun 1999:87). It appears as if this scape-goat strategy in South Africa shifted the responsibility for the decline in Western and Christian values in South Africa to the door of the black peoples and what was vaguely referred to as "communism".
- ♦ *The Afrikaner was threatened.* According to Du Preez (1983:83) the notion of the Afrikaner under threat manifested very prominently as a master symbol in the curriculum. Since the Afrikaners regarded themselves as the carriers of Western civilisation and Christianity in South Africa, any threat to the existence of this nation was linked to an attempt to undermine Western civilisation and Christian morals. This master symbol also relates to the government's claim in the early 1970's that the country was experiencing a "total onslaught" (Christie 1991:180; cf. also Ashley 1989:22-23). As a means of resisting to dangers to Christianity and in order to protect the South African youth from "moral and physical decay", two curriculums, *Youth Preparedness* and *Veld-schools*, were introduced in white schools in 1972. The Youth Preparedness program consisted of two components, viz.: physical preparedness aimed at the acquisition of skills in the event of any crisis, and moral preparedness concerned with the cultivation of sound moral attitudes and rectitude in the youth (Behr 1980:44; also Christie 1991:180). These programs complied with the government's prescribed Christian and national character for South African education, and the values and beliefs conveyed through this program were placed within the context of CNE. Among the items in the syllabus were:

- The Bantu. Dangers of detribalization. Our missionary task.
- Modern tendencies and their causes. Conservative groups and decadent groups.
- Anchors for the ship of life: the Bible, religion, the family, the church, the nation.

- Authority and freedom. All authority comes from the hand of God. The place and function of authority at every stage of man's life.
- The Christian philosophy of life. Communism and religion. Communism in practice. Ideologies that pave the way for communism. How communism can be combated by (a) the application of Christian principles (b) education (Robertson 1978:108-109).

Similar to the Youth Preparedness program, Veld-schools were also based upon Christian and national values outlined by the government as the stable basis for building up a strong and upright youth who will ultimately comply with a "state-prescribed" worldview. Veld-schools were aimed at bringing urban children into an unfamiliar rural environment where they had to do strenuous physical activities and were given lectures on themes such as discipline, respect and understanding, patriotism, race relations, communism and creation (Christie 1991:185-186). These issues clearly reveal the presence of various master symbols: the fundamental threat to Western civilisation and Christian morals; a special and God-given task and unquestionable legitimate authority. Because these programs were only introduced in white schools, the message was conveyed that, as the repositories of civilisation and Christian virtue, and "while we still have to render many services to other population groups in our country" (Kotzee on *Youth Preparedness* as cited by Christie 1991:181), only the white youth had to be saved from "moral and physical decay". This not only underlined the master symbol of white supremacy against black inferiority, but illustrated that the imprinting of these values contributed towards the perpetuation of the apartheid ideology.

## **(ii) Role of master symbols in South African education**

From the exposition in the previous paragraphs, it seems that the presence of certain master symbols in South African school textbooks indicates that facts cannot speak for themselves since they have to be theoretically interpreted (Schoeman 1998:154; cf. also Visagie 1988:6). It appears that ideologues neither "invent" new facts nor disregard old ones, but interpret and define facts within the context of their ideological convictions, in a way that will best serve their ideological objectives. Du Preez (1983:92) defines master symbols as those unavoidable categories within which a person divides his/her world and the things he/she is surrounded by. In this regard Soudien (1995:43) refers to mechanisms that are active as unavoidable signs and metaphors which give form and nuance to our thoughts and practice and assist in the shaping of our consciousness. These master symbols or inscriptions, however, become fundamental points

of view in the collective conscience of a nation and they ultimately provide the *glasses* through which such a nation views, experiences and evaluates reality. On the one hand these master symbols have saturated the lives and subjectivities of the Afrikaans-speaking as well as the English-speaking child, whilst, on the other hand, they constituted the basis for the choice and interpretation of textbook content. The chain of master symbols links through the whole education system: while the writers of textbooks usually enjoy the respect of their professional colleagues, it is most likely that the textbooks in use will be accepted by those teachers who organise their lives according to the same master symbols (cf. Auerbach 1965:1).

As generalisations that enforce sosio-cultural values, master symbols are gradually accepted as irrefutable facts. Since these symbols were to play a profound role in the legitimation of the "correctness" of the *status quo*, they had to be imprinted as irrefutable in the class room: in this way it could be guaranteed that the child would be oriented towards accepting the prevailing political, economic and social order as just and correct. The imprinting of these master symbols benefited from the Christian-National conception of schooling as a process of "moulding". In the *Manifesto for Christian National Education* (as cited in Robertson 1973:56) it was stated:

Every pupil must be moulded into a Christian and National citizen of our country ... Instruction in civics must be such that it will produce Christian and National citizens, so that each one in his turn by the proper exercise of his rights and the execution of his responsibilities and duties shall respect, preserve and perpetuate the Christian and National character of the family, the church, the community and the State.

Defining education as a conscious, systematic, purposeful and planned involvement by the mature adult educator, Cilliers (1981:9) argues that the process of intellectual and spiritual development of the immature child must be accelerated and geared for a particular direction, viz. Christian-Nationalism. He (1981:9) continues by stating that the immature child will reach human maturity when the educand "has been enabled to select (in freedom) and under all circumstances the good, the beautiful and the true according to the generally accepted norms of the Christian-Nationalist and according to his own Christian-Nationalistic norms". While the teacher was considered to be a parent-substitute, he/she had to be a God-fearing Christian and a nationalist. In this regard the role of the teacher was a so-called legitimate, and therefore not to be questioned, authority. As a parent-substitute, the teacher was regarded as the embodiment of the ideal Christian and nationalistic qualities of the adult (Ashley 1989:11). As such, it was the task of the teacher to instil master symbols through personal example of Christian and nationalist norms, values, language and traditions, often by exerting firm (and unconditionally accepted)

authority. Arguing that education is a science to be practised by scientific practitioners detached from concerns of the material world, the policy of Christian-Nationalism installed rigid curricula and practices into the sphere of education. Through educational discourse, consisting of a curious combination of phenomenology and Christian-Nationalism (referred to as Fundamental Pedagogics), there was a prominent attempt in Afrikaans teachers' training institutions to bend teachers to the will of the state. It was extremely difficult for teachers who did not support CNE principles to express their resistance. Through an inspectorate with the only task to monitor teachers' political obsequiousness, it was possible for the state to determine whether teachers and their students were the (prescribed) kinds of persons they had to be (Soudien 1995:44; cf. also Christie 1991:184). It was consequently through a system of "moulding", that static interpretations were employed as infallible insights and basic principles to constitute a particular consciousness within a connective matrix in which the child's (prescribed) identity had to be set.

### **(iii) Presence of authoritarianism, positivism and indoctrination in white education**

Such a "moulding" concept appears not only to be an uncritical champion of the *status quo*, but it is fundamentally determinative. For the child to be "moulded", he/she had to be like clay in the hands of those who had already been "cast" into a particular mould. In this regard it appears that the notions of authoritarianism, a culture of positivism and indoctrination had a profound impact on the nature of South African schooling during the years of apartheid.

The apartheid government's authorisation of the Christian and national way of being, as well as a series of generic polarities (white/black; self/other and good/evil) as the constituents of the truth can be coupled with the assumption that the South African government and its leaders were directly called upon by God himself. As the mediator between the members of God's chosen people and God, the government and its leaders were thus entitled to blind obedience and unconditional following. As Du Preez (1983:74) concurs, to criticise the government was equal to treason against the group. The school, as the embodiment of this authority, was therefore deployed as one of the state's most effective propaganda instruments. In this regard the task of the school was to imprint on young South Africans minds a conviction that was not only authorised by the state, but ultimately by God himself. While textbooks encouraged absolute and unconditional loyalty towards the state, it simultaneously assisted in enforcing the *status quo* by instilling a particular viewpoint that rested in the "soothing" knowledge and false security that

loyalty to the state necessarily meant obedience to God's Will. Placed within the context of this authoritarianism, it becomes clear why the curriculum, its content and its form of mediation were aimed at subservience and the uncritical acceptance of "the sacred spheres of knowledge, that is those domains where other who know better will make the decisions" (Soudien 1995:47). This subjection to the authority of the government is illustrated by the Preamble of the South African Teachers' Council's Code of Conduct (applicable to white teachers) when teachers were required "to pledge themselves to obey the laws of the country". (Morrow 1989:8). As such, the authority of teachers were placed lower in the hierarchy than the authority of those who were in the position to make the laws of the country. Thus, by pledging themselves to be obedient servants of those who make the laws of the country, teachers indeed abandoned a key feature of their professional autonomy. By deferring to the supposed good wisdom of school and schooling, teaching was equated to the dictating of knowledge from prescribed texts, without requiring of pupils to develop an opinion about the knowledge they were dealing with.

The uncritical acceptance of the "expertise" of government to develop educational plans, and the blind belief in "expert control" of national educational governance not only resulted in the resistance of educators to question the curriculum and its content, but also gave way to the stifling of teachers' abilities to encourage critical thinking in the classroom. Soudien (1995:44; cf. also Schoeman 1998:146ff) couples this state of South African education to the culture of positivism. As a supposedly neutral scientific attitude, the *philosophy of positivism* involves the so-called non-hypothetical, objective-scientific description of facts (cf. infra:2.4.4.7C(i); also Giroux 1981:44). Proceeding from the assumption that only "law" statements and scientifically verifiable facts can be understood as authentic science, the ultimate objective of South African schooling became the transmission of a body of positive knowledge by the teacher as the accepted authority. The presentation of facts as law statements did not acquire any scrutiny - as law statements, they had already been critical analysed and proven in the name of science and therefore necessarily had to be regarded as irrefutable. It is in this regard that master symbols were introduced as scientifically irrefutable realities (facts) in the South African classroom. Schoeman (1998:147; cf. also Louw 1998:84) alludes in this regard that as "knowledge of 'facts' *per se* was considered important, curricula were whittled down to bare facts; the infallible method of the assessment of these facts was learning by rote and memorization, while the uncritical 'disgorging' of accumulated 'facts' was an indication of the 'success'; of the teaching enterprise". While the positivist impulse limited the capacity of the youth to critically analyse and

meaningfully interpret acquired facts, teachers were similarly prevented from exercising their critical faculties - the responsibility of the teacher was consequently to provide prescribed knowledge, while the pupil merely had to uncritically accept this body of knowledge.

A curious chain of illusionary expectations was thus created: the child in the classroom passively accepted the authority of the teacher; the teacher placed his/her trust in the "professionals" or "experts" within the government who specialise in education policy and planning; and the authority of the government and its leaders were regarded as in line with the will of God. Since God was believed to sanction different nations, the pursuing of the ideological utopia of a totally segregated South Africa was not only in line with the will of God, but it also envisioned that the Afrikaner nation will be safe and secure in its total isolation. In this instance the issue of race, according to Soudien (1995:51-52), was taken as an unproblematised and self-determined construct that not only served as the basis for physically ordering the human race, but also served as the means by which the race-hierarchy was established and justified. Such a hierarchy was consequently considered as "scientifically" irrefutable and as such as an incontestable authority. Proceeding from the assumption that the nation, as God's chosen people, possesses the manifest and ultimate truth concerning a particular form of being, this idealised utopia was ultimately relayed through the sacred spheres of knowledge. Master symbols were consequently forced into the curriculum as "scientific" truths that could not be contradicted.

There is also no doubt that religious convictions played a profound role in the way in which South African education was ultimately shaped. As Du Preez (1983:99) concurs, religious domination can exhibit various positive expressions such as the willing submission to norms such as obedience, diligence, peace-loving and unselfishness and as a result, religious legitimation. However, when religious norms are being distorted and misused to legitimise a system of institutionalised racism, when it assists in the sustaining of structures of domination by placing power in the hands of the so-called superior and select minority, (cf. Schoeman 1998:150), when it coincides with glorified nationalism and the negative stereotyping of black people, then religion becomes, in the words of Lenin, "opium to the people".

Since the positivist experience left little room for the rudimentary training of critical thinking, it apparently opened the door for doctrinaire thinking. It has become clear that the upshot of daily confirmation of the correctness of the *status quo* in white schools was unconditional loyalty to

the ideological belief-system. Morrow (1989:163; *infra*:2.4.4.5) identifies such loyalty or faithfulness with an ideological belief-system, as typical of a person being trapped in doctrinaire thinking. Proceeding from the assumption that the (Afrikaner) nation is the possessor of a coherent and all-inclusive interpretation of reality, education was taken as complete and fulfilled text. Soothed by the knowledge that the government and its education experts are the revealers of the "ultimate truth", the teacher and the pupil became faithful to curricula and content that carried the stamp of approval by those who supposedly knew the truth. State-prescribed curricula were therefore accepted as inviolable, as sacred and as the purest expression of the doctrine. The radical and unconditional criticism and rejection of this ideology by English scholars and black communities were linked, in the eyes of the Afrikaner nation, to ignorance, and even foolishness.

While whatever was authorised by the state was accepted in the ranks of Afrikaner academics as the truth, criticism of the belief-system itself was classified as untruth, "the propagation of which is punishable and so leading to the exercise of force to bring the other to accept the single truth" (Soudien 1995:43). While external criticism caused a situation of social disequilibrium, it simultaneously challenged the government's spectrum of "solutions" for such a disequilibrium. In order to create an environment that contained no more and no less of what is regarded to be the ultimate truth, the government arrogated itself the right to limit the capacity of the youth. This was done through authorising a particular education system to move beyond prescribed limits in order to ultimately imagine their worlds in sociologies other than that of the dominant racial ideology bequeathed to them by apartheid (*cf.* Soudien 1995:51). Hoernlé (1939:16) already predicted this state of affairs when he claimed as early as 1939 that the "White child grows up to accept, without conscious reflection or analysis, the structure of South African society and the 'place' of non-Europeans in it".

The attempt to produce responses in favour of the apartheid policy of the state was assisted by two factors: while most white South African children arrived at the school with the norms governing race relations already internalised, education practices as dictated by authoritarianism, had a mere reinforcement function to continue "legitimation of the existing system and the blanket nihilation of potential alternative" (Robertson 1973:64). A particular form of teacher and pupil deportment was consequently set in place before "real" education began. However, while this "real" education involved a method of indirect control, it can be argued that indoctrination was part and parcel of South African education. As a form of control the need for indoctrination



can be coupled with the necessity to maintain the stability of the social system by virtue of the free and separate development of racial groups. Puolimatka (1995:122; cf. also Schoeman s.a:151 and infra:2.4.4.7C(ii)) describes indoctrination as a prerequisite of effective prescriptive instruction that should lead to a particular set of (prescribed) acts. In this regard, the culture of positivism contributed greatly through indoctrination of pupils when master symbols, as the outcome of the ideological belief-system, were imparted as "scientifically" verified facts. The careful way in which content was selected, the role translations played in transferring ideologically motivated facts, the subservience of ideologically motivated teachers to authoritarianism, were all co-workers in inducing the perception that a segregated society in which whites play the leading role, provided the only solution to maintain social stability.

### **B. Curriculum for black subservience**

From the foregoing exposition it has become apparent that since the "ruling nation" held state power, the same nation was very much active in employing the school as an ideological state apparatus aimed at realising the ruling ideology (cf. Althusser 1971:146; also Schulz 1996:32ff). While the curriculum for white education dealt with the government's conceptualisation of white superiority in the South African society, the curriculum for the Bantu similarly represented the way in which the government conceptualised Bantu conditions of life. Shortly after the Nationalist Party obtained state power in 1948, an inquiry was established into the education of the Bantu as a separate race. One of the defects of native education was linked to the fact that the "curriculum (to a certain extent) and educational practice, by ignoring the segregation or "apartheid" policy, was unable to prepare for service within the Bantu community" (Verwoerd 1954:7; cf. also *Samevatting van die Verslag van die Naturelle-Onderwyskommissie 1949/1951* 1951:8ff). This quotation indicates that the Bantu community should be regarded as a separate community, that this particular insight of the government must be relayed through the curriculum in Bantu education and that the only future of the Bantu lies within the boundaries of the Bantu community itself. Verwoerd's (1954:24) indication that there was "no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour", however, implied that although the Bantu had a separatist future, he/she was needed as non-competitive cheap labour in the European community.

Fleisch (1998:53) explains the relationship between education and the economy not as education for employment, since little or no education was necessary for the black students' future employment in the major sectors of mining, domestic services and agriculture. The task of Bantu Education, however, was rather to conduct schools in such a way that "the native who attends those schools will know that to a great extent he must be the labourer in the country" (The Eiselen Report as cited in Christie & Collins 1984:176). The government envisaged, through the passage of the Bantu Education Act, a curriculum that would be based upon the circumstances of the community and aimed at satisfying the needs of the community. Given the government's perception of black cultures as primitive and less developed, it was argued that because these communities have "not been developed to such an extent that it can absorb in suitable posts those of its sons and daughters who have won fine examination", the Bantu child was not to be educated for a life outside the Bantu community (Verwoerd 1954:17). Those children who had received Bantu education would therefore have to serve their community, not only in terms of knowledge, skills and attitudes obtained through state-controlled education and apparently beneficial to the Bantu community, as decided upon by "white experts", but above all, as agents of Europeans. The "educated Bantu" had to convey the message that the Bantu is destined to a life of largely unskilled, or at best semi-skilled labour in the employment of Europeans.

Since it was government policy to discourage any semi-permanent black settlement in the so-called white areas, secondary schools catering for matriculation students were not established in urban areas (Robertson 1973:176; cf. also Mbere 1979:165-166; *Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:10 and Verwoerd 1954:23). In 1970 there were only 20 black secondary schools in urban areas in the entire country that catered for matriculation students. Due to the existence of 1 school for every 80 000 black youths, large numbers of black children were refused admission to these overpopulated schools. The rationale behind this policy was the establishment of separate black governments in the geographically fragmented homelands. In line with the government's policy of separate development, it was envisaged that education for the Native should have its roots in the Native areas, the Native environment and the Native community - it is in the Bantustans that "Bantu education must be able to give itself complete expression and there it will be called upon to perform its real service" (Verwoerd 1954:23; cf. also Mncwabe 1993:4). As blacks were excluded from citizenship, they were consequently to be taught that they were foreigners when they are in "white" South Africa. While little formal education was required to serve the less-developed communities, little formal

education was needed to serve the European community "below" the level of certain forms of labour that was necessary for the continued prosperity of white industry. The submission and adjustment of the Bantu to the superior status of the European clearly formed the central feature of Bantu Education - "the natives will be taught from childhood to realize that equality with Europeans is not for them" (Verwoerd cited in Hall 1979:58; cf. also Malherbe 1977:546-547).

The Annual Report (1969) of the Department of Bantu Education (cited in Van Zyl 1972:514-515; cf. also Robertson 1973:178) on general achievement refers to the following successful aspects achieved by those Bantu pupils who had reached matriculation standard and those who had completed their training as teachers in a two-year course taken after Standard VIII (Grade 10):

They have clear, neat, uniform and easily legible handwritings that are the envy of many a person and for which employers have the greatest appreciation...

They are in a position to write their own difficult mother-tongue well, fluently and correctly, and also of course to speak it faultlessly...

They have no reason to be ashamed of their knowledge of both the official languages, whether in written or in spoken form;...

When they work with figures they are neat and accurate, to such an extent that they have already gained recognition for the outstanding quality of work they perform in this sphere...

They have a sound understanding of any instructions in Afrikaans and English which they may be required to study, and can carry out these instructions.

As Robertson (1978:118) points out, these claims as the prime products of thirteen years of schooling seem somewhat suspect. To boast about the pupils' command of Afrikaans and English and their ability to follow instructions in these languages relates to the specific purpose of language instruction, namely to facilitate communication in the language of the employer. The acquiring of this ability, however, was regarded as essential "from the earliest stages, so that even in the lower primary school they should develop an ability to speak and understand them" (Verwoerd 1954:18). Christie & Collins (1984:179) concludes that the elementary level of literacy was not aimed at black pupils mastering these languages, but rather to enable them to perform basic reading and writing, a situation that not only perpetuated the ideology of inferiority, but also assisted blacks in locating their position in the hierarchy of social relations. Those few blacks who managed to succeed in schooling, were eventually trained to take up positions in separate institutions where the ideology of the state would be promoted. In the same Annual Report (Van Zyl 1972:515) it was recorded that there is general praise for those pupils who had left school to be trained

as nurses, to take up apprenticeship in a trade or employment as factory workers in industry... It is even maintained that the Bantu women factory worker with a good school background can be compared with the best of her kind in the world...

Those pupils who leave school before reaching Standard VI become useful workers who can read, write and do figures, while those who complete Standard VI become employees who rise to the position of foremen...

Boys who qualify as artisans (particular in the building industry) give proof in practice that they are capable of producing top-grade workmanship.

At the three vigorous young universities 2 400 students are receiving higher education - a further contribution to the preparation of Bantu youth for playing their part in progressive communities in each homeland.

While few black students passed the matriculation examinations, Bantu Education was aimed at extending the mass base of schooling at the lower levels. One of the objectives suggested by the Eiselen Commission was to provide enough places in the first four classes of primary schools by 1959 to accommodate children ageing from 8 - 11 years. In the lower primary phase (Grades 1-4) the curriculum included the teaching of reading, writing and elementary arithmetic through the medium of the mother-tongue, the beginning of the study of Afrikaans and English, Religious Education, Singing, Arts and Crafts, Gardening and Environmental Studies. Although the Commission's target pupil enrolment was met in 1959, the level of teacher training required to meet the demands of pupil enrolment was only met in 1975 (Mncwabe 1993:4). The consequences of the lack of qualified teachers in black schools were numerous: not only did teacher-pupil ratio increase rapidly, but the introduction of a double-system at more than half the schools eventually resulted in quantity being given priority at the expense of quality. Although automatic promotion in the first four years of schooling increased the possibility that those children who started school would at least complete the basic lower primary phase, the majority, however, dropped out soon thereafter. It is clear from the government's concern for Bantu Education that the lower primary phase of black schooling did not escape the oppressive and exploitative arrangement of apartheid: Verwoerd (1954:17) stated that "there will have to be the strictest supervision to ensure that our Union regulations are fully complied with and that departures from them do not take place as in the past". Bearing in mind that the government's policy for Bantu Education was to ensure that the black person was not absorbed in the European community, then it is evident that lower primary education was merely aimed at equipping blacks with the most basic schooling required to earn their living in the service of Europeans.

In addition, factors such as under-funding, the inability of many black parents to pay school fees and schoolbooks, classroom-shortages, overcrowding and the lack of qualified teachers all contributed to many blacks leaving school after lower-primary schooling. The curriculum for the higher-primary schools was designed to continue the work of lower-primary schools with Social Studies taking the place of Environmental Studies and the following subjects: Nature Study,

Tree Planting, Soil Conservation, Needlework (for girls) and Woodwork and Metal Work (for boys) (*Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:9; cf. also Christie & Collins 1984:177). In the Junior School Course the curriculum consisted of a variety of subjects and a holder of the Junior Certificate was allowed to be trained for two years as a primary school teacher. During 1966 "basic or core syllabuses" were drawn up for the Senior Certificate Course that were more or less the same for all South African schools. However, according to the South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) it was stated in 1965 (*Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:10; cf. also Horrell 1972:491 and Mncwabe 1993:3) that those black pupils who did obtain a university entrance qualification "remained so few that there were not likely to be sufficient recruits of the educational standard required to graduate into the professions, train for senior positions in the growing civil service and fill the other positions becoming available". If the standard of those black students who did eventually pass matric was so low, then the standard of those who had merely only obtained the Junior Certificate and then became teachers must be suspect. Given the fact that Bantu Education was to be in line with the government's strongly segregationist ideology, based on cultural differences and racial inferiority, there is no doubt that young black people were subjected to an education system gravely inferior to that provided for whites.

#### **(i) Choice of subject matter in black education**

It is evident that by imparting essential skills and knowledge and by "training the mind", education in South African schools either conferred superiority or inferiority. Committed to govern the black population, the white government prescribed curricula "based on the circumstances of the community and aims to satisfy the needs of that community" (Verwoerd 1954:17). When taking into consideration that the entire social atmosphere in which whites and blacks existed was constituted by race-relations, and that the status of a person was determined by race and not by the education he/she received, then the relevance of such curricula relates to assuring the educational subordination of blacks. This educational subordination was helped along by the fact that syllabi, that were based closely on the national "basic" syllabi were worked out in considerable detail. The implication was that black teachers, most of whom had no more than the Junior Certificate plus two years professional training as teachers, were assisted by these syllabi to convey a particular message (cf. Van Zyl 1972:504). Through teachers' guides for most

subjects and teaching material on a lesson-by-lesson basis, the government thus enjoyed the opportunity to reinforce the racial superior-inferior social fabric.

According to the *Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations* (1967:10; cf. also Mbere 1979:184-185 and Schoeman 1998:154) the subject History was taught in the light of the Divine Revelation. Proceeding from the assumption that the white Afrikaner nation possessed the manifest truth concerning the will of God, the curriculum for History was introduced in black schools from a white point of view. Since it was assumed that God willed separate nations and a special calling to each nation, it was the history of the white man in South Africa that was highlighted in History textbooks. By emphasising that blacks and whites arrived simultaneously in a virtually unoccupied South Africa, the country's history was not only equated with a history of white South Africans, but it also instilled the assertion that the arrival of whites in the country had historically prevented a descent into chaos. While white Afrikaner leaders were glorified in History textbooks as heroes, irrespective of human fallibility, the underplaying of black leaders led to the absence of role models amongst blacks (cf. Du Preez 1983:93; also Van den Heever 1987:13). Chisholm (1982:143) states that by emphasising white superiority, by underplaying black achievements and by negating the fact that the South African society is based on stereotypical images of blacks and whites, "the impression that is left with the school child is that of the insignificance and barbarity of the African in South African history".

It further seems that the maintenance of white supremacy and the instilling of a sense of inferiority into black people continued through the perpetuation of apartheid myths. In a Standard 8 (Grade 10) Guidance textbook it is pointed that intermarriage between whites and non-whites is, in the name of Christianity, too drastic a change in the culture of these two groups as it can only create confusion and degeneration. It is further stated that when all things are taken into consideration, "the coming about and continued existence of the white Christian civilisation in spite of the mass of non-whites can be seen as nothing less than a disposition of the Almighty" (cited by the *Report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* 1967:10-11). This perception not only correlated with the government's Act on the prohibition of mixed marriages (1949), but it also explained the inclusion of value-judgements in translations from English text ("...by encouraging the white men under his command to marry Hottentot women") into Afrikaans ("...[f]urther, he committed the unforgivable blunder by encouraging the

white men under his command to marry Hottentot women") (cited in Auerbach, 1965:14). There is no doubt that such value-judgements were influenced by the rigid dogmatic white/black dichotomy by which the South African society was interpreted. Simultaneously, value premises were disguised as matters of fact when a particular nation's perception of territorial separation was brought into line with the will of God, and when it became a logical conclusion and justification for the homelands policy. The justification of the latter, as well as the biased and paternalistic coverage of topics such as rural settlement patterns and agricultural development were part of the implantation of apartheid myths through the subject of Geography (cf. Drummond & Paterson 1991:65ff). As part of apartheid myths, Tikly (1993:29-30) refers to racist stereotypes such as the perception that Europeans have "scientific ability" while Africans have "community spirit", innate musical ability and a poor sense of time/punctuality. The instilling of such stereotypes allows Western "civilisation" to be praised in conjunction with scientific achievement. However, by equating scientific achievement with Western culture, the role of blacks in the development of science and technology had been denied.

Mncwabe (1990:20) notes that deep concern was expressed about the practice of rote-learning and the lack of encouragement given to pupils to develop initiative and skills of independent and critical thinking. While the education system was examination oriented, pupils had little opportunity for problem solving since they had to concentrate on abstract theory and verbiage for examination purposes. As was the situation in white education, the black child was also subject to an authoritarian education system that operated within the culture of positivism with the clear aim to indoctrinate in terms of a narrow ideological perception of a separatist society. In this regard Njobe (1990:46) alludes that curriculum programmes in Bantu Education "deliberately include content intended to brainwash the learners' minds into an acceptance of colonisation presented to them in the cloak of Apartheid". Methods of indoctrination were often used as a norm, while the development of free thinking, originality and creative initiative were deliberately suppressed. Thus, while the African culture was held accountable for rote-learning in African schools, Tikly (1993:30) exposes this apportion of the blame as a means to side-step the "issue of how forms of pedagogy have developed in relation to the colonial context and a dire lack of recourses in black schools".

#### 4.5.3.3 South African education in a crisis of relevance

If the relevance of state-prescribed curricula in white and black schools were to be questioned, the answer can indeed be affirmative as well as negative. From the foregoing exposition it has become apparent that state-prescribed curricula were used at school-level to explain and defend the system of apartheid. While the super-structure of the South African society was constituted by a racial-oligarchy in which all substantive power was arrogated to whites, the decision-making processes, the aims, objectives and control of curricula, as well as the teaching methodologies used at school level were designed to not only perpetuate an Afrikaner Nationalist interpretation of society, but to serve the narrow ideological aims of a particular interest group. In this regard it can be stated that the relevance of school curricula in the view of the Nationalist government was manifested in the way it expressed, promoted and maintained "power and privilege for whites and the consequent subordination and dispossession of African interests" (Mbete 1979:295; cf. also Chisholm 1981:136).

If it is however argued that the school curriculum is the assimilation of a nation's view of reality in totality (infra:4.4.2ff), then the relevance of the South African school curricula with regard to the beliefs and ideals of all the different national groups in South Africa becomes suspect. This suspicion is also confirmed if we were to agree with Luthuli's (1981:81) perception that the school curriculum should reflect not only the values, but also the anxieties and the pressures to which the *whole* of society is subjected. Since the curricula coincided with the system of ideas, values and meanings aimed at legitimating racial dominance by one particular nation, then there is no doubt that the transmission of these beliefs and ideals related to ideological development. The irrelevance of state prescribed curricula in especially black schools was emphasised by vehement criticism amongst black communities. Although the initial intention was to "provide the Bantu with an education not concentrated on the interests of the individual, but having as its purpose the progress of the (Bantu) community" (Verwoerd 1954:5), the system eventually entertained curricula aimed at equipping the African child with those skills required to meet the demands imposed by the economic life of a white-dominated South Africa (cf. Fleisch 1998:53 and Louw 1998:36). While curricula proved to be foreign to the interests and the aspirations of the African pupil, they were representative of the tradition of whites making decisions for black people.



If the relevance of state-prescribed curricula proceeded from, and ended with the perpetuation of an ideological belief-system, thus rendering such curricula to be irrelevant for the black community, then the question ought to be raised to what extent such curricula were truly relevant to the white community? Whereas the unquestioning and unconditional adoption of the ideological belief-system promised the white child a kind of certainty, emotional stability and high self-esteem, it simultaneously robbed the same child from engaging in the critical analysis and interpretation of facts outside of the parameters set by the ideologues (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.7C(i) and 2.4.4.7.C(ii)). While supporters of this ideology were pacified by strategies of immunisation aimed at discrediting and silencing unwanted critiques, radical and unconditional rejection constantly came from English scholars and so-called liberal-minded Afrikaners (cf. Hofmeyr & Buckland 1992:29-30 and Schoeman 1998:153). Placed within the midst of a crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of relevance, the majority of South Africans no longer regarded their education system as a credible system that functioned according to values and norms inherent to the institution.

#### **4.5.4 South African education in a crisis of credibility**

Louw (1998:36) indicates that as early as 1954 an education crisis was called when black students campaigned for the abolishment of Bantu Education. Although the boycotts were fairly effective for some weeks, especially on the Witwatersrand and in the Eastern Cape, the state reacted by threatening to expel students and to close down schools. While students continued to protest against Bantu Education in the 1960's through strikes, marches and demonstrations, the major crisis in South African education occurred in 1976 and 1980. Large sections of the black population revolted against inferior provision, the enforcement of Afrikaans and the general and inferior state of black education. Due to the disruption of various sectors of the education system and under considerable pressure, the government gave a mandate to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) to appoint a Commission of Inquiry. This commission were to conduct a scientific and co-ordinated investigation of the provision of education which would guarantee education of the same quality for all population groups (HSRC 1981:1; cf. also Chisholm 1982:3). The findings and recommendations of the De Lange Report (the investigation was chaired by Professor J.P. de Lange, rector of the Randse Afrikaans University), especially the central recommendation that in order to achieve equality in the provision of education for the

entire population, a single education ministry must be established, incited swift reaction from the government.

The Cabinet responded to the Report in its Interim Memorandum of October 1981 by accepting the Report's eleven principles for the provision of education. Simultaneously, the government confirmed not only its standing in terms of Christian and broad national principles, but also reaffirmed that "in terms of its policy that each population group should have its own schools, it is essential that each population group should also have its own education authority/department" (*Interim Memorandum on the Report of the HSRC Council on the Inquiry into the Provision of Education in South Africa* 1981:3). In 1983 the government issued a white Paper on the provision of education as its official response to the De Lange Report. In this official statement (*Witskrif oor Onderwysvoorsiening in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika* 1983:4) the government reaffirmed that:

it stands by the principles of the Christian character and the broad national character of education as formulated in section 2 (1) (a) and (b) of the National Policy Act, 1967 (Act 39 of 1967), in regard to white Education and as applied in practice or laid down in legislation in regard to the other population groups. Any changes or renewal in the provision of education will have to take these principles into account, with due regard to the right of self-determination which is recognised by Government policy for each population group.

It was thus clear that the government took the opportunity to restate their commitment to CNE principles and to reaffirm the assumption that education can only be understood and pursued within particular social groups. Accepted as an "own affair", each population group remained responsible for the education of its youth. It was consequently regarded as wrong for members of one group to interfere with the education of another group, or for one group to impose its view of education onto the members of another group (Morrow 1989:63; cf. also Ashley 1989:15 and Mncwabe 1993:24). It would therefore, *in principle*, have been wrong for the white government to enforce the Christian and national principles onto the education systems of other groups. However, the acclaimed right to such enforcement was justified in the light of a 'divine calling' (infra:4.2.3) and the assumption that such calling necessarily implied an undeniable connection between education and culture (cf. Morrow 1989:66; Mncwabe 1990:28 and Schoeman 1998:138ff). While the latter served the argument that each population group must be responsible for its own education, issues such as financing, educational programmes, conditions of service and the registration of teachers were allocated to the Department of National Education. As such, general education policy was treated as a "general affair" and handled by the same department for everybody, while three other Executive Departments of

Education and culture handled "own affairs". However, bearing in mind that blacks were not members of the South African parliament, it can be agreed with Mncwabe (1993:46; cf. also NECC 1992:7) that the setting up of an Executive Department of Education and Training to cater for blacks in South Africa, did indeed violate the principle of "own affairs". Education for blacks was consequently treated as a "general" affair since it was determined by the Tricameral parliament in which blacks were not represented.

By basing the South African education model on the principle of "own and general affairs", a plausible rationalisation was provided for the reproduction of relations of domination and exploitation. Since it can be assumed that schooling is one of the principle agencies to prepare people for positions in the occupational, social and political hierarchies of society (infra:4.5.2), it indirectly plays a role in the manipulation of access to the exercise of power (Morrow 1989:65). The white government could, therefore, not afford to level the boundaries between the various education systems - such levelling would not only threaten the "white man's psycho-social distance from the black man", but also white supremacy when the (white) control of labour power has to face up to (black) competition.

While the government indicated that the state's financial capacity to ensure equality of opportunity and standards are limited (*Witskrif oor Onderwysvoorsiening in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika* 1983:31), its preoccupation with separateness brought about serious financial constraints because education in South Africa was further divided along racial lines with the creation of Departments of Education in the ethnically-based self-governing national states. Although the state proposed to ensure equality, it also stated that parity in education was to be considered as dependable on the communities involved. In this regard it becomes clear that, when taking into consideration a history of substantial inequalities in the provision of education, classroom shortages, overcrowding and a lack of qualified teachers, the already disadvantaged communities would indeed have had an impossible task to achieve parity. Since equality was to be sought within a segregated system, and while little was done to address backlogs in educational spending, standards and facilities through the rearrangement of the state's budgetary priorities (cf. Mncwabe 1993:24; also Van Niekerk 1988:87), a growing education crisis became an indication of a situation where the majority of South Africans were no longer satisfied with an education system that had failed their communities and their children.

#### 4.5.4.1 Revolutionary reaction to South African schooling

While a particular sector of the South African society was led through ideological mystification into the passive acceptance of schooling for white dominance, the black population was no longer satisfied with the discriminatory educational policies of the apartheid government (supra:chapter 5). This dissatisfaction reached its peak with the school boycotts during the 1984-86 period. By the end of 1984 about 220 000 pupils were not attending classes and by the end of 1985 an estimated 650 000 students were on boycott throughout the country (Noola & Eckstein 1991:21; cf. also Truscott 1993:11ff). A qualitative shift from a demand for reforms of the education system to a demand for control over education was epitomised by the slogan "Liberation Now, Education Later". However, when student boycotts resulted in undisciplined actions, and since the final end of the year examinations were drawing closer, a group of concerned parents in Soweto decided to become involved. On 13 October 1985 the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC) was elected and in March 1986 the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) was founded. Although the NECC was established to address the crisis in education, it was also regarded as the organisational "vehicle" for the process of formulating the content and practice of an alternative system to Bantu Education (Centre for Adult and Continuing Education (CACE) 1988:6; cf. also Levin 1991:117ff and Louw 1998:43).

During 1985/1986 "People's Education for People's Power" emerged as a substantial challenge to existing state structures and institutions that were deployed as mechanisms to reproduce apartheid. Proposed as a type of education that *inter alia* enables the oppressed to understand the evils of apartheid; prepares them for participation in a non-racial, democratic system; eliminates all forms of capitalist norms of competition and individualism and encourages collective input and critical thinking, the official appearance of People's Education appeared to be fundamentally of a democratic nature. However, being conceived within the midst of a national liberation struggle by the oppressed, People's Education was drawn into this struggle when it became a means of "mobilising and organising teachers, students and parents as a political force in a particular sphere of the struggle for national liberation" (Wolpe & Unterhalter 1991:10; cf. also Sarinjeive 1991:51-52 and Schoeman 1998:98-99). Whereas apartheid education was used as a tool to oppress, People's Education was now being proposed as a mechanism to bring about the achieving of people's power (cf. supra:5.2.3.2). The revolutionary undertones underpinning this alternative means for liberation can be identified in an undated Azanian People's Organisation

(AZAPO) document on *Education in South Africa* (s.a.:21): "...no fundamental change in education is possible without change of the ruling class and the sweeping away of the values and norms they represent. ...This change can only be brought about by the oppressed when it has achieved national liberation". It is therefore clear that the struggle for People's Education not only envisioned the abolition of Bantu education, but its replacement by a radical alternative through the politics of people's power.

While People's Education became politically aligned in favour of the oppressed, and since its non-racial and non-ethnic emphasis made it incompatible with the government's education policy, the NECC was vigorously repressed between 1986 and 1990. In an attempt to stabilise the social disequilibrium and stifle the development of People's Education, students, teachers and NECC leadership were detained. The implementation of People's Education in schools was banned and in February 1988 the NECC was restricted along with 16 other liberation organisations (CACE 1988:6; cf. also Levin 1991:119,124; Wolpe & Unterhalter 1991:12).

#### **4.5.4.2 Reactionary response to South African schooling**

Since the crisis in education was merely one facet of an all-encompassing struggle for liberation, it has become clear that the ideological belief-system that nourished separate development as the sole solution to bring about social equilibrium, ultimately became the cause of disequilibrium. The South African society entered a period of extreme tension between a state of affairs that was brought about by apartheid ideologues and their supposedly manifest blueprint for society, and a "different" world that was being rationally conceived by those who sought liberation. While it became extremely difficult for the apartheid government to create an environment that contained no more and no less of what was regarded as the "ultimate truth", it was no longer possible to simply disregard external criticism as insanity, disobedience and ignorance. However, although the pillars of apartheid were in the process of being dismantled, the reaction from the government to overt pressure and resistance to its apartheid policy, appears to have been driven by not so much the arresting of change itself, but by an attempt to frustrate the process by clinging to the ideological belief-system. The latter was underscored by the government's reaction to the De Lange Commission when it was not prepared to jettison the ideological approach of Christian-National Education (cf. *infra*:4.5.4). A reactionary response appears to have been almost unavoidable when taking into consideration that "people are already ideologised and

cannot just be taught how inadequate their ideologies are, given that their ideologies are their lives, and to an important extent, themselves" (Sharp 1980:114).

The South African education system with its separate departments of education lost credibility, and since the government had the experience to know that education constitutes a definite source of political conflict, it knew intuitively that the creation of a single education system for all population groups would be merely a matter of time. Simultaneously, however, it can be stated that the same government, from decades of experience, was well aware of the fact that the school had the necessary resources to act as a powerful agent in influencing and manipulating the process of making meaning. The government knew that by creating one education system for all population groups and by opening schools to all races, it did not only stand the chance of losing the support of a major sector of its white constituency, but also its control of manipulating the youth into interpreting their social context in terms of pre-set ideologically determined parameters. The reluctance of the government to radically restructure the education system was clearly underscored by the Minister of National Education and the Minister of Education and Training when it was stated in 1991 that such a reconstruction could only take place once a new constitution was drawn up. Since the philosophy of separate education was cemented in the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983, the government had a handy excuse to prolong the dismantling of the assumption that education at all levels was an "own affair". Mncwabe (1993:35) further couples the government's reluctance to the excuse that it is "necessary to wait to see the shape of the future constitution and that the economy cannot afford to restructure the system so as to spend the same amount on each child regardless of race".

Although the unbanning of the ANC and other organisations, including the NECC, in February 1990 introduced the beginning of a process of negotiation between the ANC and the apartheid regime, it was clear that the process of transition would not be simple. Caught up in a power-struggle between the power of conservation and the revolutionary spirit of liberation, it was soon clear that the South African education system was not going to change overnight. Under the pressure for radical change, those in government office still had the power to give conservative direction to the process by limiting the range of bargaining with pressure groups to what was seen as marginal interests. However, policy changes in areas other than education, carried certain consequences for education policy change (Hofmeyr & Buckland 1992:37; cf. also Christie 1991:190-191 and Mncwabe 1993:51-52 on *open schools*). The revoking of the Separate

Amenities Act in 1990 and the allowing of free settlement areas placed pressure on the principle of segregated education to such an extent that the government announced in 1990 that black students could be admitted to white state schools provided that 90% of the white parents voted in favour. Piet Clase, the Minister of Education and Culture (Christie 1991:190-191) introduced three school models from which white parents and school governance bodies could choose:

- Model A: The school could choose to close down as a government school and reopen as a private school.
- Model B: The school could continue to operate as a government school but could determine its own admissions policy.
- Model C: The school could choose to become a state-aided school.

However, as the government made it clear that the schools would still be part of the white education department and that mother-tongue instruction in Afrikaans and English, as well as the CNE principles of the 1967 Act would be maintained, it was clear that the government opted for open schools to fit in with the existing provisions for CNE. Relating to a long tradition of Christian-National thought, the principle of "parental choice" was not only granted official recognition in the White Paper of 1983 (*Witskrif oor Onderwysvoorsiening in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika* 1983:18-19; *infra*:4.5.2.1), but was ultimately used as a rhetorical device to embed the privileges of white communities. White schools consequently still had the choice to stay segregated without losing state funds. By the beginning of 1991 205 schools had admitted blacks students, while the introduction of a user-fee in schools under Model C, operated as an exclusionary mechanism. In this regard it is indicated in the NEPI report on governance and administration (NECC 1992:24; cf. also NECC 1993:15-16) that since the Model C conversions explicitly attempted to place the issue of class at the centre of the stage, while simultaneously deracialising education provision, the major forms of inequality in South Africa was perpetuated within a framework of choice and democracy.

Although the introduction of open government schools indicated a significant change in the education system, it still didn't imply the establishment of a single, non-racial education system. Mncwabe (1993:47) notes in this regard that South African education in 1991 continued to be administered by 19 different major education departments. By the end of 1993 the education system consisted of 14 Departments of State which provided education under autonomous political authorities. In September 1993 Mr Piet Marais (1993:2), Minister of National Education, referred to this racially based system as a temporal state of affairs. He (1993:8-9; cf. also *Nasionale Opvoedingsbeleid* 1993:9) continued by anticipating that if consensus could be reached on creating a state along federal characteristics, the exiting education departments will

have to be rearranged into "nine non-racial geographically based education departments which should fall under the authority of autonomous regional governments". Although the Nationalist government had committed itself since 1990 to improve education, it also warned that the transition to a new education system could easily be undermined by three stark realities, namely the increasing difficulty in financing the ever-growing education system under present economic restraints, unrealistic expectations of many South Africans as to what benefits a new education system should deliver, and violence that resulted in the disruption of many black schools (Marais 1993:11-13). The transition of education and the accompanying realities were, however, placed in the hands of a new government when the ANC assumed political power in 1994. While 1994 marked the end of the apartheid dispensation, it simultaneously introduced a period characterised by the transformation of the entire South African society from a deterministic society to a democratic society.

#### **4.6 Concluding remarks**

The major crisis in South African education during the years of apartheid reminds of two closely related notions:

- ♦ the first notion deals with the perception that when the boundaries between intrinsic natures of various life forms are eradicated, then a condition of crisis emerges. From the foregoing exposition of the South African society and the South African education system under the ban of apartheid, it has become clear that the South African reality was interpreted in terms of a particular (apartheid) ideological belief-system. Placed within the context of the basic features of an ideology, the ideal of national survival became an all-encompassing goal, demanding the application of any means despite their nature. Given the hypernormative status and the regulative power attributed to this ideal, all societal institutions were relegated to total subservience. The ideological elevation of the ideal to a position of dominance introduced the entering of the sensitive area of societal relationships in which injustice is fairly easy to perpetrate (cf. Schoeman 1998:92). In this regard attention should once again be drawn to the fact that the relative sovereign sphere of justice of each social institution demarcates its characteristic purpose and competence (cf. *infra*:2.3.4). However, since South African education was erroneously misused for ideological purposes, the structural integrity of the school as a social institution was not only violated, but it soon started to "resist" being pressed in an "alien mould". Because the school was deployed as



an ideological apparatus by an authoritarian and dictatorial regime, it was not allowed to function properly according to its primary (proper) function. By expropriating the school for non-educational objectives, namely the instilling, sustaining and maintaining of a political ideology, soon became counterproductive when South African education was plunged in a major crisis.

- ♦ the second notion relates to the argument that no totalitarian regime, such as the society under the ban of the ideology of apartheid, can be sustained in the long run. The "resistance" of the school to being cheated and coerced into serving principles and interests foreign to its essential nature, gives evidence of the fact that the interpretation of the way in which the school *ought* to function within the South African society could no longer be regarded as credible. Popper's theory (cf. infra:3.9.3) about human fallibility and the implication thereof that no theory concerning education can be accepted as the final and ultimate say on education seems to be applicable. If the opposite could be argued and if it could be agreed that education theories stem from an authoritative source such as the nation, why then the crisis in South African education? However, by accrediting education theories in South Africa with the ultimate truth, especially with regard to the role of education in promoting the separatist ideal, the growth of knowledge concerning the education reality was not only strained, but all other interpretations were necessarily disregarded. While this state of affairs could be accredited to the totalitarian nature of the apartheid regime, it became clear that because of pressure for the transformation of the South African society, escalating from within South Africa as well as abroad, the totalitarian regime could not be sustained for much longer.

While this chapter was aimed at exposing the ideological nature of the apartheid regime in general, and apartheid education in particular, the focus of the next chapter will be on the struggle and resistance against the oppressive regime and its education system.

## Chapter 5

# The Struggle for Liberation: Education as a tool of Critical Opposition

### 5.1 Introductory remarks

Against the background of the misuse of education to promote and sustain a particular belief-system (cf. *infra*:chapter 4), and bearing in mind the casting of a social institution such as the school into an alien mould, resistance in South Africa was eventually inevitable. However, since the apartheid ideology resulted in the oppression of the non-white peoples of South Africa on a national scale, the liberation from oppression and exploitation equally attained national proportion. As part of the national struggle, the education struggle and the students who participated in this struggle provided much of the energy that fuelled the struggle against apartheid, and thus brought South Africa to its current transitional phase (cf. Truscott 1993:3). Although the present transformation of the South African society can be accredited to a new government that has come into power in 1994, it should be noted that leaders who participated in the struggle against apartheid, are currently the leaders of the new government. There consequently exists a close connection between the struggle against apartheid, thus including apartheid education, and the present-day South African government. It is therefore imperative to critically reflect on the nature of the struggle against apartheid, both national and educational, in order to expose possible ideological underpinnings thereof. Only in this way will it be possible to approximate the extent to which such underpinnings (and new ones), may play a decisive role in the present attempt to establish a democratic and equitable education system.

Proceeding from a critico-rationalist attitude (cf. *infra*:3.8ff), human fallibility is not only accepted, but all forms of human bondage to deterministic powers are rejected. Adhering to this attitude, it is accepted that no certainty concerning reality, thus including educational reality in South Africa, is to be found in relative human explanations. Whilst a critico-rationalist attitude contributes to increased resistance against ideological indoctrination and manipulation, it is by attempting to answer Popper's proposed questions (cf. *infra*:3.10) whilst critically reflecting on

South African education, that anti-democratic thought-patterns in an ideological belief-system might be exposed. In addition, such a critical analysis could also contribute to revealing the particular epistemology that has a profound influence on thought concerning education theory and practice. Simultaneously, however, the application of transcendental critique (cf. *infra*:3.6ff) is required since it enables penetration to the roots of not only theoretical thought itself, but assists in exposing the presuppositions underpinning educational theories aimed at other than education-typical purposes. The intention with this chapter is consequently to critically analyse the struggle for liberation, not only by disclosing the profound role played by an ideological belief-system, and by unmasking ideological practices, but also by penetrating to the roots of such thought in order to expose the starting-points that underpin ideological thought-patterns (cf. *supra*:5.3ff). The mere exposure of deterministic and totalitarian tendencies can never suffice, since they are only symptoms of deep-rooted suppositions by which they are determined. It is thus only when the presuppositions and prejudices underlying struggle-related activities are brought to the fore, that the elimination of anti-democratic thought-patterns can be successfully contemplated.

## **5.2 Nature of the struggle for liberation**

### **5.2.1 Situation of threat and the emergence of the struggle for liberation**

It has been established in chapter 2 (*infra*:2.4.4.1) that conditions of crisis can be regarded as the most fertile breeding-ground for the emergence of an ideology. Due to the repressive and totalitarian nature of the South African society, the status of the non-white South African majority was threatened by a reigning ideological belief-system that favoured the needs and purposes of white South Africans. The implication of a racial hierarchy in South Africa was a situation whereby the needs and objectives of those groups at the base of the hierarchy (non-whites) were only addressed insofar as it was to the advantage of those who were privileged (white) enough to find themselves at the top. Since a distorted but "legalised" distribution of power brought about a warped social system, it can be stated that equity and equality were not ensured for all South Africans. From the previous chapter it has become clear that the white/black juxtaposition not only played a profound role in shaping the nature and extent of the separatist South African society, but it can also be argued that since it culminated in a situation where white supremacy was placed over against alleged black inferiority, it contributed towards the birth of black nationalism. Although nationalism refers to the consciousness of groups who strive to

attain freedom and sovereignty for the nation to which they belong, Grobler (1988:1) alludes that the term "black protest politics", in conjunction with the birth of black political consciousness in South Africa, is a more suitable term to use than the broad concept "black nationalism". Because the search for black identity, self-awareness and self-esteem was accompanied by so many black political movements, it would therefore be more appropriate to place the notion of black consciousness within the context of black political protest.

The relation between a maturing Afrikaner nationalism and the developing of a black political consciousness in South Africa appears to be egregious: Afrikaner nationalism, thus the striving to attain freedom and sovereignty for the Afrikaner nation, was accompanied by the decline of the *law state* into a (white) *power state*. While justice within the territory of the *law state*, prevails irrespective of race, creed and culture, a *power state* depends on power to maintain law and order. In South Africa the power state involved the misapplication of state power in order to defend and sustain its position of white domination, while simultaneously enforcing black inferiority (cf. Schoeman 1998:57). Placed in a position of subservience, black people developed, according to Alan Boesak (1978:9; cf. also Biko 1998:366ff on *Black Consciousness*), an awareness

that their humanity is constituted by their blackness. It means that black people are no longer ashamed that they are black, that they have a black history and a black culture distinct from the history and the culture of white people. It means that blacks are determined to be judged no longer by, and adhere to white values. Viewed thus, Black Consciousness is an integral part of Black Power. But Black Power is also a clear critique of and a force for fundamental change in systems and patterns in society which oppress or which give rise to the oppression of black people.

From the foregoing two important conclusions can be derived: on the one hand it appears that black consciousness can be linked to the establishing of a black power base, while, on the other hand, it is clear that separatist ideologues did not succeed in promoting the idea of "separate but equal" (infra:4.5.2.2). The failure of the latter was emphasised by the plea for the rejection of an adherence to white values, white stereotypes and white morals by the majority of South Africans. The birth of a black awareness not only implied the enforcing of the idea that things should no longer be looked at through whites eyes, but that a black consciousness should contribute towards a solidarity among blacks that could form the power base required for liberation from oppression (Koster 1982:5; cf. also Ashley 1989:50). Although the composition of the black population itself revealed a conglomerate of diverse elements - class differences within the black population, as well as ethnic differences between various black ethnic groups - the majority of politically-conscious blacks found racial separation unacceptable. In this regard Grobler (1988:2;

cf. also *The Freedom Charter* 1969:80) indicates that apartheid was perceived by blacks as "a systematic legal structure based on racial prejudices, designed to perpetuate those prejudices and to transform them into a justification of economic exploitation". Since apartheid was portrayed by the Nationalist government as a policy of "innocent" whites who have just "been placed in a position of leadership (guardianship) over blacks by nature, by virtue of their "superior" culture, or by God" (Boesak 1978:11), the motives of white politicians were always regarded as suspect within black communities. As early as 1944 the notion that the white man in South Africa was helping the African on the road to civilised life by adopting the title and role of "Trustee for the African people", meant (to the African) the "consolidation by the White man of his position at the expense of the African people, so that by the time national awaking opens the eyes of the African people to the bluff they live under, White domination should be secure and unassailable" (*ANC Youth League Manifesto* 1944:2).

The emergence of liberation movements such as *inter alia* the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the nature of their demands for liberation should consequently be placed against the background of an ethical belief that was presented as a moralised conception of humanity - coupled with the belief that God willed separate nations, humanity was regarded in terms of separateness, hence the policy of separate development. Since separateness resulted in an ideological structure that relentlessly victimised oblivious of all human factors, the resistance of oppressive and alienating powers culminated in the legitimate ideal for liberation. However, given the fact that at the root of all ideologies legitimate, honourable and praiseworthy social objectives are to be found (cf. *infra*:2.4.3), it should be determined to what extent the asserted "right of the African people as the indigenous owners of the country, entitled to determine its direction and destiny" (*The Freedom Charter* 1969:80), remained merely an ideal or became an obsession that provided the gateway for the emergence of yet another ideology.

## **5.2.2 Foundations of political critique of the South African society**

### **5.2.2.1 Marxist socialist foundation**

Because Black Consciousness and Black Power in South Africa thus owed its emergence to the repressive and oppressive ideology of separatism, it can be regarded as a critique on the South

African society. In this regard Ashley (1989:43; cf. also Leatt *et al.* 1989:146) identifies Marxist theory as one of the most prominent foundations of political critique of the South African society. Within the circle of critique on the South African society, many believed apartheid to be an outgrowth of capitalism - "[t]he crisis of apartheid ... is due to the system of capitalist exploitation based on colonial racial relations" (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:2). Placed within the context of such a perceived apartheid-capitalist connection, the South African society was thus identified with the establishment of a capitalist system that had a major impact on the lives of all South Africans: while private ownership and private enterprise were stimulated, it simultaneously led to an increase in wage labour. However, since white South Africans enjoyed more rights and privileges than blacks, only the former benefited from private ownership and enterprise. In the ANC's non-racial *Freedom Charter* (1969:80), a document published in 1955 reflecting the demands of the ANC and its allies of the kind of South Africa they wished to live in, this state of affairs was noted as follows:

The South Africa of today is the product of the common labor of all its peoples. The cities, industries, mines and agriculture of the country are the result of the efforts of all its peoples. But the wealth is utilized by and for the interests of the White minority only.

By tightening the job colour bar and directing skilled blacks into their "own" areas, economic power was canalised into white hands. Linked to a policy of industrial decentralisation, centres of industry were set up on the borders of homelands (cf. *infra*:4.2.2) to which black and white employees were to travel from opposite sides, without infringing group area delimitations. At the same time the homelands policy allowed for the use of cheap migrant labour, "whilst relegating the cultural identity and political aspirations of these people to areas outside what was customarily referred to as 'White South Africa'" (Schoeman 1998:56-57; cf. also Truscott 1993:6). While this state of affairs contributed to the development of black protest politics in South Africa, it also assisted in creating a society characterised by the inequalities that accompanied not only the division between rich and poor, but also between white and black. Because race and class were regarded as interacting factors, race was consequently not seen as operating independently of class.

The oppressed majority regarded white South Africans as capitalists that accumulate money and own the means of production. At the same time, however, the non-white peoples of South Africa were considered the workers who were exploited through cheap labour, and who were not allowed to participate in determining the conditions under which they laboured and had no control over the means of production (Ashley 1989:44-45). The relationship between capital and

labour and the contradiction between white capitalists and black proletariats to a great extent determined the perception of South Africa as a society defined in terms of class relations. In this regard Christie and Collins (1984:163) argue in favour of a class analysis of the South African society to expose the fact that "whites are oppressing blacks not merely because they are racists (which they may well be) but because they need them as non-competitive cheap labour". In Marxist fashion it was argued that capitalism underpinned the entire South African society. The relation between Marxist influence in political critique and the perception of the South African society in terms of class domination is further underscored when critically analysing South African schooling in terms of the theory of the reproduction of labour (cf. *infra*:4.5.2.2). It was argued in liberation circles that the South African school is one of the main contributors to the capitalist accumulation process of labour power. Central to the task of South African schools was the reproduction of capitalists in white schools and workers in black schools - schools were thus regarded as the principal focus of the labour reproduction process.

From the foregoing exposition two arguments can be put forward:

- ◆ Given *prima facie* evidence of pervasive state power to limit and deny property ownership to non-white people and to bar them from the best jobs and from owning and starting businesses legally, apartheid was in fact hostile to true capitalism and free enterprise. This argument is further given momentum when it becomes clear that the greatest enemy of the creation of a welfare state for whites was the idea of individual freedom intrinsic to capitalism (cf. Williams 1990:125ff).
- ◆ Opposition to apartheid was routinely yoked with hostility to capitalism and it has become clear that the "minds" of members of black political resistance were profoundly shaped by a Marxist socialist view, opting socialism or even Marxism as the moral and economic alternative to "capitalist" South African society.

Whilst the first argument was not accepted within liberation circles, it was the acceptance of the latter that highlighted the profound presence of Marxist socialism in black resistance. It was thus proclaimed by the ANC that capitalism, which is an extremely repressive and exploiting system, is the reason for the evil and human suffering in South Africa (Raath 1989:1; cf. also Ashley 1989:45 and Williams 1990:125). Although Marxism attained a variety of interpretations within the realm of liberation, it was stereotyped by the South African government as Soviet communism and was labelled, in colloquial language, as the "red danger" (Rooi Gevaar).

Banning and censorship of Marxist literature, the Suppression of the Communism Act of 1950 and the activities of liberation movements with bases in exile (the ANC and PAC), accredited Marxism with an almost mystical attraction (cf. Leatt *et al.* 1989:146). Major liberation movements subsequently accepted the overthrowing of the capitalist South African system, followed by the creation of a socialist state, as the solution for deliverance from institutionalised racism, economic exploitation and political oppression.

### 5.2.2.2 Populist foundation

Placed within the centre of the liberation movements was the will and the well-being of the people who found themselves being dominated and exploited by the oppressive regime. As an abstract and collective social entity the dominated was labelled as *the people*, and by using slogans such as *the majority should rule* and *the people will govern*, the struggle for freedom not only touched the hearts of *the people*, but also presented *the will of the people* as the sole liberation force. *The Freedom Charter* (1969:82) declared that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people". In 1991 (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1) the ANC also stated that "the majority of the people refuse to be governed by a regime not based on their will".

Much controversy and ambiguity surrounds the definition of the concepts *people* and *the will of the people*. According to Visagie and Pretorius (1993:60) the populist concepts of *the people's will* and *the people's interests* can be respectively understood in terms of *ethnocentric populism* and *non-ethnocentric populism*. The former ideal relates to the will and interests of a people assuming a culture-specific identity, thus referring to a people of common culture. In the absence of an ethnically homogeneous community, non-ethnocentric populism, relates to *the people* either aligned to racial criteria, or to political criteria. When considering the apartheid ideology in terms of these forms of populism, it appears that it can be regarded as an example of ethnocentric populism: while this populist idea of *the people* intertwined so closely with that of the state, the latter ultimately became the organisational form within which the Afrikaner nation expressed its cultural identity (cf. *infra*:4.4.2.1). However, since it can be stated that *the people* as the *white race* (thus not the Afrikaner nation *per se*) and the state merged into each other, it appears as if ethnocentric populism was supplemented by the non-ethnocentric populist ideal that aligned to racial criteria. The liberation struggle in South Africa can therefore be regarded as a critique of



and a struggle against ethnocentric populism which embodied the hypernormative status of the Afrikaner nation in particular. Simultaneously, however, it was a critique of and a struggle against non-ethnocentric populism that represented the superiority of the white race in general. As already stated, the non-ethnocentric populist ideal can also be aligned to political criteria (Visagie & Pretorius 1993:61). By defining *the people* implicitly and relationally in terms of governmental rule, the ideal was put forward that the regime that comes to power by popular support, functions as a natural extension of the people. Shale (1999:53), however, warns that populism constitutes an ideological trap whereby the collective *will of the people* is elevated to a position of utmost importance. Placed within the context of *ethnocentric populism* and *non-ethnocentric populism*, either the collective will of a particular race group, such as that of the white Afrikaners, or the will of a collective majority might attain hypernormative status.

When placed within the context of the struggle for freedom, Levin (1991:120; cf. also Louw 1998:55ff) indicates that *the people* were united in struggle through antagonism towards repression by the apartheid state. In this regard two notions of *the people* appeared to be present in the liberation struggle:

- ♦ Within the ANC tradition *the people* referred to all oppressed groups, namely blacks (Africans), Coloureds, Indians, as well as to progressive white Democrats (cf. *Advance to Power - 75 Years of Struggle* 1987:8). Campbell's suggestion (Raath 1989:38) that *the people* includes only the revolutionary elements of society and not society as a whole, appears therefore to be true for the ANC's interpretation of the concept. This perception is underscored by the distinction between two major camps in the South African society, namely the enemy camp and the people's camp. Although the people's camp included all race groups involved in the struggle (later referred to as the Congress of Democrats), the working class had been designated a special role with regard to the liberation process. This role was linked to economic emancipation in the document *Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* (1969:9; cf. also *Advance to National Democracy* 1991:6 and Mashamba 1991:4): It indicated the emergence of a new kind of South Africa, "in which there is a large and well-developed working class whose class consciousness and in which the independent expressions of the working people - their political organs and trade unions - are very much part of the liberation front". It was thus argued that as a class subjected to exploitation and being responsible for the greater part of social wealth, black workers will eventually be among the chief beneficiaries once the envisioned fundamental transformation of the South

African society had taken place.

- ◆ The second notion of *the people* refers to the tradition of Pan Africanism and Black Consciousness and is entirely confined to the oppressed (black) sectors of South Africa (Levin 1991:121). White Democrats were therefore not included within this perception of *the people*. This coincides with the reason why *The Freedom Charter* was violently rejected by a minority group of "Africanists". It was argued by this faction that the ANC had 'abandoned' the true African Nationalism of the 1949 Programme of Action (cf. supra:5.2.2.3), and had become the tools of the 'white communists' of the Congress of Democrats" (*Advance to Power - 75 Years of Struggle* 1987:8; cf. also Koster 1982:7). Opposed to the joining of democratic organisations of national groups other than African, the ANC's provision that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, was rejected and the PAC was formed.

The ANC, however, had to a great extent succeeded in establishing a firm base of solidarity and unity among not only the oppressed, but also among the non-oppressed by including those who were prepared to join the struggle (cf. *Constitution of the African National Congress* 1991:1). As mentioned earlier, it thus appears as if the general perception of *the people* refers to a people's camp involving not only the workers, but also all those involved in the struggle against the apartheid system, regardless of race and class. This conception can also be linked to the non-ethnocentric populist ideal since *The Freedom Charter* (1969:83) envisioned the transformation of the South African parliament into an "Assembly of the People", and the creation of an administration in which all people, irrespective of race, colour and sex could take part. As such the envisaged populist government exhibits a fundamentally democratic image when it is linked to the perception of a New South Africa in which, regardless of race, gender, creed, culture, political and religious convictions,:

- ◆ the people shall govern;
- ◆ all national groups shall have equal rights;
- ◆ the people shall share in the country's wealth;
- ◆ the land shall be shared among those who work in it;
- ◆ all shall be equal before the law;
- ◆ all shall enjoy equal human rights;
- ◆ there shall be work and security;
- ◆ the doors of learning and culture shall be opened;

- ♦ there shall be houses, security and comfort; and
- ♦ there shall be peace and friendship (*The Freedom Charter* 1969:83-91).

By coupling the democratic image of the liberation struggle with a history of national oppression, the promise of the struggle to achieve complete emancipation from oppression, the eradication of all human suffering and the final guarantee for liberty and human dignity, clearly presents the deepest aspirations and emotions of the people (Schoeman 1998:91). However, since *the people* refers to a collective group within the context of the struggle and because this group is representative of the majority of South Africans, the minority was not included. If democracy is defined in terms of "rule by majority consent", the position of the minority who do not consent, might become problematic. It is precisely in the absence of addressing the latter that popular consent constitutes the emergence of the ideology of populism. Since the realisation of a populist government - a government *by the people for the people* - was to be the outcome of a revolutionary struggle, and because hypernormative status had been attributed to *the will of the people*, *revolutionary populism* appeared not only to be a very persuasive ideal, but a prominent basis of political critique of the South African society.

### 5.2.2.3 Revolutionary foundation

In 1949 a militant *Programme of Action* was adopted at the Annual National Conference of the ANC (*Advance to Power - 75 Years of Struggle* 1987:6-7), which laid down the forms and methods of the struggle as:

strikes, boycotts, 'civil disobedience' and non-cooperation. Civil obedience means defiance of laws and Government orders. Non-cooperation means cease to recognise a foreign authority on our soil; to cease to obey it; to ignore its law-courts; to refuse to pay taxes; and to decline to serve it as soldiers and policemen.

While in 1949 the resistance programme was stipulated in 1949 as a policy of non-violence, it was argued in 1960 that the avenue of non-violent protest was exhausted. Half a century of peaceful struggle in the form of mass meetings, deputations, demonstrations, protests, passive resistance and strikes was continuously met with violent repression on the part of the apartheid regime. While white labour was entrenched in a position of privilege through political means, the white government was simultaneously backed by a strong-willed security force. Protest by the oppressed and repression by the oppressor eventually culminated in the banning of the ANC (1960) and the declaration of a state of emergency in South Africa (1960). The ANC was consequently not only forced to go underground, but fierce repression invoked the perception

that the bringing about of fundamental social change "calls for social groups to be organised in pursuit of programmes which they perceive as furthering their interests, and it requires that such groups shall be stronger than those opposing them" (Leatt *et al.* 1989:35). While in 1961 Nelson Mandela declared the next stage of the struggle to be one of non-collaboration, the same year saw the formation of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation) - "our people's army, our striking force for final liberation" (*Advance to Power - 75 Years of Struggle* 1987:1). Moving from a policy of non-violence to non-collaboration, it was now predicted that repression by the white regime was to be met by revolutionary violence of *the people*. In the document on *Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* (1969:2; cf. also *Advance to Power - 75 Years of Struggle* 1987:1) it was argued that policy and organisational structures for resistance ought to grow from the "real situation" if they were not to become meaningless clichés. The document (1969:1) proceeds to describe the "real situation" as:

South Africa was conquered by force and is today ruled by force. At moments when White autocracy feels itself threatened, it does not hesitate to use the gun. When the gun is not in use legal and administrative terror, fear, social and economic pressures, complacency and confusion generated propaganda and "education", are the devices brought into play in an attempt to harness the people's position. Behind these devices hovers force. Whether in reserve or in actual employment, force is ever present and this has been so since the White man came to Africa.

Thus, since South Africa was conquered by force and ruled by force, it was now accepted that it should be liberated by force. Although the violent nature of the revolution was envisioned in 1955, six years before the acceptance of the policy of non-collaboration, it was stated in *The Freedom Charter* (1969:87; cf. also Raath 1989:28-29) that the ideal of a free and democratic South Africa was to be brought about in terms of a violent and armed struggle. *The Freedom Charter* (1969:87) unambiguously stated that it was the major aim of the "armed revolution to defeat and destroy the police force, army and other instruments of coercion". The revolutionary nature of the struggle was further emphasised by Oliver Tambo in 1985 (*Advance to Power - 75 Year of Struggle* 1987:11) when he stated that

[o]ne of our central tasks in the coming period is to transform the potential we have created into the reality of people's war. Guided by that perspective, we must build up the mass combat forces that are training themselves in mass political action for sharper battles and for the forcible overthrow of the racist regime. The mass combat forces that are and have been engaged in the popular offensive, these death-defying patriots, must now become part of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the vital cutting edge of our onslaught. It is in this way that we will ensure that the people's army deepens its roots and grows inextricably among the popular masses. It is in this way that we will ensure that it grows in size, in the spread and quality of its operations and in the weight of every blow it delivers.

It thus seems that the struggle for freedom found its strength in the adoption of a revolutionary character. The revolutionary character of the struggle also seems to relate to an interpretation of the South African situation in terms of Marx's attempt to apply Hegel's dialectic process to

materialism. Since this process involves the perception of nature as an auto-dynamic unity of counterparts that clash in order to bring about progressive change in nature, the dialectic process in South Africa was regarded as follows: from the thesis of white racism and the antithesis of black solidarity a non-racist socialist society will emerge as the synthesis (Leatt *et al.* 1989:107 and Van Wyk 1979:64-65). This synthesis was envisioned by the ANC when *The Freedom Charter* (1969:82-83) called on "the people, Black and White, as equals, countrymen and brothers to pledge to strive together" as revolutionary forces led by the ANC, to bring about democratic changes in South Africa. Aimed at the replacing of an unjust society, the revolutionary alternative and the accompanying violence was justified in terms of the argument that "[i]t is the White people who in the past as now have rejected this [democratic] principle leaving the people no alternative but to convince them by the truth of revolutionary struggle" (*The Freedom Charter* 1969:82-83; cf. also *Suffer the children: child abuse for revolutionary ends in South Africa* 1987:1).

### **5.2.3 Political critique of the South African society: education as an ideological apparatus**

When the fundamental rights of human beings are violated, resistance is almost unavoidable. Certainly, no fault can be found with the right to strike out at what is basically unjust. The pursuit of a justifiable end such as the banishing of an oppressive regime and the creation of a just and democratic social order are legitimate ideals. Within the context of South Africa as a capitalist society, and the suffering of black labourers under unjust laws that coerced racial segregation and racial discrimination, the phenomenon of *racial capitalism* (discrimination based on skin colour combined with the division of labour) became one of the main stimuli for revolutionary activities. However, as Goudzwaard (1984:30) so clearly warns, any justifiable end entertains the possibility of becoming an overarching goal that expands into an ideology that exhibits no flexibility in its mobilisation of means to pursue the original legitimate goal. This perception is emphasised in a report of the International Freedom Foundation (*Suffer the children: child abuse for revolutionary ends in South Africa* 1987:1) which stated that although no fault could be found with the attempts at creating a more equitable dispensation in South Africa, the "motives, methods and aims of those who want to bring about the transformation of South African society in a revolutionary way are highly questionable". It appears that the choice for a revolutionary way can be linked to the perception that the mere reform of the South African system was not sufficient. By simply reforming the system would necessarily have implied the

acceptance of major points around which the system revolved. The aim of all revolutionary activities to overthrow the exploiting South African regime was emphasised by Biko's (1998:360; cf. also Alexander 1990:5) statement that "Blacks were out to completely transform the system and to make of it what they wish".

Historically speaking it can be stated that from the time of the imposition of "alien rule" (cf. infra:4.2.1), unbroken resistance existed in South Africa. Although resistance had taken different forms at different times, it eventually developed into an all-encompassing goal that subsequently acquired hypernormative status. The passion for freedom was no longer enough:

The winning of our freedom by armed struggle - the only method left open to us - demands more than passion. It demands an understanding and an implementation of revolutionary theory and techniques in the actual conditions facing us. It demands a sober assessment of the obstacles in our way and an appreciation that such a struggle is bitter and protracted. It demands, too, the dominance in our thinking of achievement over drama (*Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:4-5).

Not only were the struggle to dominate and absorb the minds of people, but all life spheres were pulled into it. Since people were suffering of national oppression, a national liberation was acquired. The apartheid ideology used all life spheres (political, economic, educational, cultural and social) to promote the policy of separatism - "[I]n every walk of life White autocracy creates privilege by operation of the law", thus "the defence of all-round economic, social and cultural privileges combined with centuries of indoctrination and deeply felt theoretical rationalisation which centre on survival" necessitated that all life spheres in the South African society had to be liberated (*Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:8 and 9).

The all-embracing nature and assertive character of the struggle was expressed in the *ANC Youth League Basic Policy Document 1948* (1948:1; cf. also *Education in South Africa* s.a.:20 and Grobler 1988:90):

The African has a primary, inherent and inalienable right to Africa which is his continent and Motherland, and the Africans as a whole have a divine destiny which is to make Africa free among the peoples and nations of the earth. In order to achieve Africa's freedom the Africans must build a powerful national liberation movement, and in order that the national movement should have inner strength and solidarity, it should adopt the national liberatory creed - African Nationalism and it should be led by Africans themselves.

It was consequently assumed that it was a God-given task of Africans to free Africa in order to establish true democracy. Popper (1996b:243) refers to the dangerous situation in which an (total) ideology appears in the cloak of religious mysticism when ideologues persuade themselves and their followers that their thoughts are endowed because of divinity. Placed within the all-encompassing nature of the struggle, true democracy will necessarily involve, *inter alia*,

political democracy, economic democracy and educational democracy (supra:6.2.1 on *democracy*). Apart from assuming a totalitarian character, the struggle for freedom also took on an almost religious character - proceeding with a "divine destiny" in mind, all hope was placed in the undertaking of a national liberation struggle as the sole form of deliverance from oppression - "[w]e have learnt that in struggle, and only in struggle, is freedom and independence to be found" (*Forward to Freedom - 1975* 1975:1). The eventual salvation would consequently be a New South Africa in which authority would be based on *the will of the people*.

By imposing absolute value on a finite reality such a revolution, no sacrifice was deemed too important (cf. Leatt *et al.* 1989:284). In 1949 the policy of non-violence (*Advance to Power - 75 Years of Struggle* 1987:7) was linked to the consideration of the

avoidance of the massacre of our armed people. As the leader of the African people, the African National Congress had to see to it that, if possible, mass slaughter had to be avoided. It is a notorious fact that the Boers are always ready and happy to shoot down Africans. Where the lives of thousands of people are involved, a leader cannot afford the luxury of experiment, gamble or recklessness.

However, after 1961 the ANC (*Advance to Power - 75 Years of Struggle* 1987:2) declared that they stand

for a new South Africa, a South Africa in which racism shall be a thing of the past, where human dignity and equality shall prevail in the life of the country and its people, where the goals enshrined in the Freedom Charter shall be transformed into a living reality. Before that day dawns, many lives will be lost. Our people will suffer great hardship. But we are prepared to meet this challenge, to make whatever sacrifices are necessary for achieving freedom in South Africa.

The mere fact that in 1961 the ANC was prepared to adopt, not only a "more developed and meaningful armed activity of the guerrilla type" (*Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:5), but "to make whatever sacrifices are necessary", was an indication of a legitimate ideal that had turned into an ultimate goal. Freedom from oppression was regarded as worthy of sacrifices - "[c]ompatriots, freedom beckons us. Its stands before us demanding that we refuse no sacrifice and we spare neither life nor limb in the coming battles to win back our land" (*From Ungovernability to People's Power* 1986:3). Arguing in favour of the withdrawal of investments in South Africa and addressing the possibility of the closing down of companies and consequent unemployment, the ANC stated that where this "occurs in the course of political struggle for our liberation, it does not matter if we become unemployed. In our struggle we have given our lives as all fighting people do. We can easily sacrifice full stomachs. The majority of our people are doing just that every day" (*Forward to Freedom - 1975* 1975:9). The youth was saluted by Bishop Desmond Tutu (1985:20) for not only diagnosing the education crisis as political, but also for being prepared to die for it. Equally true to the form of an ideology, no criticism was

tolerated (cf. supra:5.3.2(3)). It was the young comrades of the ANC who manned the street committees by keeping a watchful eye on moderate blacks who did not participate in the revolutionary struggle. It was reported by the International Freedom Foundation (*The Role of Youth in Revolutionary Warfare* 1987:2) that the "[p]eople who do not observe strikes; consumer boycotts; and compulsory funeral attendance; or who do not participate in street marches and mass rallies are denounced collaborators and have to face trial in what are known as 'people's courts'...for their 'crimes' against the revolution. The verdict could be 50 lashes with metal wire, or at worst, death by the hideous necklace method - where a tire is placed over a victim's head, soaked in gasoline and ignited".

In order to attain a new and democratic South Africa, the white "bloodsuckers who have grown fat on the sweat and toil of our exploited people" (*Forward to Freedom - 1975* 1975:1) had first to be overthrown. However, being prepared to sacrifice whatever is necessary, the attainment of the ultimate purpose justified the use of any conceivable means. Since the vision of a New South Africa indiscriminately justified every means, the means not only obtained power, but were justified with a vast system of redefined norms and values (cf. Goudzwaard 1984:23-24 and also Van der Walt 1994:360ff). Various means were employed, ranging from strikes and demonstrations to militant boycotts; the strengthening of the unity of the workers and the encouragement of affiliation to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and "the creation of mobile defence units and the finding of ways to obtain arms as part of the process of strengthening the People's Army, Umkhonto we Sizwe" (*From Ungovernability to People's Power* 1986:1,3). Aimed at rendering apartheid unworkable and South Africa ungovernable, it was stipulated in the *Constitution of the African National Congress (South Africa)* (1958:3) that "[f]or the purpose of drawing the youths into the struggle and preparing them for leadership, the Congress shall organise the African youths into an organisation for youths to be known as the African National Congress Youth League".

One of the policies adopted by the Youth League was an educational policy that envisioned education aimed at:

- ◆ moulding the characters of the young;
- ◆ giving them a high sense of moral and ethical values; and
- ◆ preparing them for full and responsible citizenship in a democratic society (*ANC Youth League Basic Policy Document* 1948:3).



However, in order to realise such an educational policy, education first of all had to be liberated from being misused by the apartheid regime for ideological purposes. While the South African white minority rulers generally found the apartheid ideology useful in enforcing ruthless measures to delay self-determination amongst the black majority, Bantu Education was particularly employed as a system to prolong the processes of domination and exploitation of black people (cf. *infra*:4.5.2.2; cf. also Radebe 1999:54ff). The imposition of the inferior Bantu Education system and the accompanying repressive measures, such as the enforcing of Afrikaans into the black classroom in 1976, was subsequently met with fierce resistance, ranging from massive agitation among parents, teachers and pupils to violent riots. Education, and in particular black education in South Africa was plunged into a crisis of relevance (cf. *infra*:4.5.3.3) and of credibility (cf. *infra*:4.5.4 and also Alexander 1990:6ff). Since education thus played a significant role in national oppression, national liberation also required the liberation of education from bondage of the apartheid ideology. However, although education needed to be freed from being an ideological state apparatus in the hands of the apartheid ideologues, it soon became a new ideological mechanism, first in the form of *Liberation before Education* (inkululeko ngoku idegtee ngomso) and later as *Education for Liberation*. While South African education needed to be liberated to enable the emergence of "[i]ndigenous national expertise with decolonialised minds" (Njobe 1990:53), education also needed to be used to accomplish such an end.

### 5.2.3.1 Liberation before Education

Viewed as *gutter education*, Bantu Education was in general rejected by black teachers, pupils and the parental community. Proceeding from the approach that *we don't want gutter education and therefore we won't go to school*, education struggles during the 1980's culminated in school boycotts, reinforced by militant barricading of schools. Classrooms were empty while the youth became more involved in illegal Student Representative Councils (SRCs), in student organisations such as the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and local youth organisations. Because stayaways (stay away from work), general strikes and consumer boycotts were often militantly reinforced by youths who mounted barricades along township roads, it became clear that "[m]any of the youth simply saw themselves as being at the vanguard of the struggle against apartheid, and were therefore unwilling to submit to more democratic ways of working" (Truscott 1993:13; cf. also Mashamba 1991:9). Accompanying a strategy of making the apartheid society ungovernable, was the slogan *Liberation Now, Education Later*.

Democratic functioning of organisations at any level became increasingly difficult as youth struggles went far beyond protest against Bantu Education.

Although a primary aim of the ANC's struggle was to introduce the youth of South Africa into their "people's war", and because mass mobilisation of the youth had intensified since 1985, the organisation had limited active control over the violent uprising of black children. There is therefore little doubt that the ANC is to blame for coercing children into the front lines of the ongoing conflict with the South African authorities. Executive members of the ANC and their spokesmen are quoted (*Suffer the children: child abuse for revolutionary ends in South Africa* 1987:11-12) to indicate how the youth was incited to greater heights of outrage and bloody violence, apparently with no regard for their well-being and safety:

Burn the cars and the schools, burn everything down. Everything which belongs to the whites must be burnt down (Winnie Mandela, 1976).

With our boxes of matches and our necklaces we shall liberate the country (Winnie Mandela, 13 April 1986).

The youth, for instance, in our country have been actually carrying out actions of the people's war. They have been clearing our townships of collaborators, of the black bullies and black councillors (Oliver Tambo, 20 May 1987).

This type of incitement consequently led youths to the burning of delivery trucks from white traders entering the townships; "necklacing" police informers and reprising workers who did not stay away from work (*Suffer the children: child abuse for revolutionary ends in South Africa* 1987:6; also Truscott 1993:12-13 and *The Role of Youth in Revolutionary Warfare* 1987:2ff).

Black children in South Africa clearly became the unwitting pawns in a ruthless power game far beyond their comprehension. These children were the expendable means to an end that was linked to an utopian perception of a free and democratic society in which the South African child would eventually enjoy education aimed at instilling a high sense of moral and ethical values and thus preparing the child for responsible citizenship. However, a "high sense of moral and ethical values" (*ANC Youth League Basic Policy Document* 1948:3) was first to be sacrificed in favour of a "people's war" (*Advance to Power - 75 Year of Struggle* 1987:11) that was aimed at attacking and destroying symbols, structures and organs of apartheid power, including those who are in charge. Father Smangaliso Mkatshwa (1985:11) stated that since "students made tremendous sacrifices both in terms of the losing of their own lives as well as intensifying the struggle for the total liberation of this country", their work in promoting the broader popular struggle should be recognised. However, although the youth played a leading role in the rising

tide of resistance, the increasing levels of violent activity soon escalated beyond control. Van der Walt's warning (1994:354) that ideologues become enslaved to the idolised and absolutised ultimate end seems applicable in such a situation. The propounders of revolutionary populism could apparently not bear the responsibility any more - the means had indeed taken on a momentum of its own.

Because the black schooling system disintegrated at this time, Alexander (1990:10-11) recognised that the notion of *Liberation before Education* was indeed a false slogan, in the sense that indefinite boycotts of schools clearly didn't serve the task of "100 per cent literacy among the people, in order to ensure the realisation of an effective democracy" (*ANC Youth League Basic Policy Document* 1948:3). It rather led students on to the labour market, unqualified and prematurely. Although this state of affairs could have been avoided by sufficient attention to strategy and by competent leadership, the disintegration of the black schooling system might be attributed to the emergence of a tendency which separated the struggle of the students from that of the workers (their parents and teachers). Regarding education as a matter that concerned students only, the educational struggle thus became an isolated struggle that caused division within the struggle movement itself. However, it can be agreed with Alexander (1990:9ff) that education, by its very nature, concerns students, parents and teachers. Placed within the context of the struggle, these three sectors needed to be brought into line with each other in order to avoid the degeneration of the educational struggle into counter-productive conflicts between the different sectors. In an attempt to bring the mentioned sectors together and to address the severe crisis in education, parents, teachers, students and community leaders tried to salvage the positive elements thereof. It was emphasised that boycotts were not the only weapons of the struggle, and subsequently propagated that the very system of apartheid education had to be transformed into a weapon against apartheid ideologues. The instilling of a political consciousness, a disciplined and organised student body, as well as leadership through educated teachers, could contribute to the carrying out of the struggle for liberation on a day-to-day basis in the classroom. Thus, instead of liberation before education, education was now to be used as a *tool for liberation*.

### **5.2.3.2 Education for Liberation**

In order to counter the misdirection of energy, as was the case during the period 1984-1986

when black education was plunged into a national crisis, it had become imperative to leaders of the struggle that the experiences of the oppressed should be analysed and theorised. Only by engaging in the latter, beacons for the future could be set and goals laid down to assist in redirecting the channelling of energy. As part of the process to organise and focus energy spend on the struggle itself, the concept of *People's Education* was introduced to challenge the fundamental basis of apartheid education by:

- ♦ enabling the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system;
- ♦ eliminating the capitalist norms of competition, individualism and stunted intellectual development;
- ♦ preparing them for participation in a non-racial, democratic system; and
- ♦ encouraging collective input, active participation and stimulating critical thinking and analysis (Ashley 1989:48; cf. also CACE 1988:6ff).

The thrust towards the realisation of a people's education was driven by the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), a committee consisting of concerned parents and community leaders. Arguing that pupils could only be organised and become a force for change if they are at school, the NECC undertook to give content to People's Education and encouraged students to return to schools (cf. Rensburg 1988:44). In this regard Tutu (1985:20) argued that black people could not afford an uneducated generation. Because a post-liberation South Africa was envisioned, it thus became important that educated black people would eventually be the skilled people when liberation came. Since ungovernability was the climax of the national crisis, the struggle proceeded to a situation where people were beginning to take control and define their alternatives. In this regard white education was not regarded as an alternative. Although white education only considered the educational needs of the white South African child, it did reap incentives in the form of well-equipped classrooms, well-trained teachers and sophisticated resources. Although white education was therefore in many ways "superior" to inferior black education, the oppressed peoples of South Africa no longer demanded the same education as whites. Since white education was education for dominance, *the people* rather opted for People's Education that meant "education at the service of the people as a whole, education that liberates, education that puts the people in command of their lives" (Sisulu, cited in Van den Heever 1987:1-2). Although regarded as an ongoing process in the development of a new practice, People's Education was clearly to stand in service of the struggle for liberation - it was regarded as part of a power strategy for the attaining of state power.

Since South African education had been used as a tool of oppression, *People's Education* was to be a type of education that could help the oppressed to achieve *people's power*. It was therefore intrinsically linked with politics and social transformation: one of the basic features of People's Education was the "underlying assumption that education and politics are linked, and consequently that the struggle for an alternative education system cannot be separated from the struggle for a non-racial democratic South Africa" (CACE 1988:7; cf. also Ashley 1989:48, Mashamba 1991:9 and McKay & Romm 1992:20ff). *The people* had, however, come to realise that *people's power* was not political power *per se*, nor was it ungovernability, force or coercion. It was thus accepted that because political power can only be realised in and by liberation from national oppression, *people's power* could be achieved and exercised in the course of the struggle for national liberation itself. It was therefore through *People's Education for People's Power* that the consciousness of *the people* were to be moulded in line not only with the circumstances of their oppression, but also with establishing a non-racial, democratic education system in a future South Africa.

People's Education for People's Power clearly exhibited a message that was rooted in socialist principles. Proceeding from the assumption that white capitalists exploited the black proletariat, People's Education was aimed at eliminating the divisions between theory and practice, between mental labour and manual labour, thus between (white) intellectuals and (black) ordinary people (Ashley 1989:47). Because these divisions were regarded as the outcome of a capitalist society that maintained different social classes with different forms of consciousness, People's Education was designed to ensure that educational institutions would not reinforce the *status quo* by reproducing the characteristics of the capitalist mode of production. While Bantu Education was a mechanism to facilitate separatism and capitalism, People's Education was to be used as a mechanism of liberation.

The link between People's Education and the political critique of the South African society was further underscored by the presence of a Marxist socialist foundation (cf. infra:5.2.2.1) and a revolutionary populist foundation (cf. infra:5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.3) in this proposed educational alternative to Bantu Education. Aimed at serving *the people* as a totality, People's Education was conceived as an element of the national liberation struggle. It was consequently used as a means to prepare *the people* for total liberation - teachers, students and parents, but also workers, were to be mobilised as political forces to fully participate in the liberation of all social, political and

cultural spheres of society. Simultaneously, however, *education for liberation* was also meant to play a role in preparing *the people* to eventually participate in a liberated and democratic South African society (Levin 1991:10-11; cf. also Kruss 1988:4ff). However, in order to advance the interests of the masses, capitalist social relations were first to be dismantled. The mere existence of this close relationship between People's Education and political criticism is evidence of the fact that educational institutions such as the school were employed as mechanisms in service of the political critique of the South African society. In this regard Mokone (1996:17) sketches a scenario that was a microcosm of circumstances in black schools:

My Standard Eight year was cut short in May because the Congress of South African Students' "comrades" told us that our education had to stop until Mandela was released from prison. That was in 1984. Lawless events in that period included the frog-marching of my elderly history teacher who was accused of being an apartheid agent. Her house was burnt to ashes by the slogan-chanting comrades...all in the name of the struggle. The following year we came back to start school again where we had left off. However, the organisation said re-registration must be kept on hold until all comrades who had been arrested the previous year were released...My consolation for going to Moletsane High was that I did not have to repeat Std. 8. I went to Std 9 without the Std 8 results!...Things were great in Soweto until my matric year in 1986. The year battle lines were drawn between Cosas, aligned to the African National Congress, and the Azanian People's Organisation. The two organisations had radically conflicting views on the role pupils had to play in the fight against apartheid. But above all, the organisations were notorious for running battles that saw many pupils die or go into exile. That year Cosas ruled that exams should not be written. I don't remember the reasons. Some of us, however, ignored the decree and on the first day of exams, after finishing our first papers, Cosas comrades attacked us with pangas, sticks and sjamboks. We ran for dear life, and some of us did not return for the afternoon paper.

### 5.3 Critique of the struggle for liberation

#### 5.3.1 An unhistorical venture

Although it can be argued that the South African society with its differentiated institutions cannot be described as an undifferentiated and closed society, it seems that it can neither be viewed as a completely open society. In addition to Popper's statement that the transitional process from a closed to an open society is still in its beginning (cf. *infra*:2.3ff), it can be argued that because the process of cultural disclosure is of an ongoing nature, the conflict between the guardians of tradition and the propounders of new ideas will remain part of the transitional process. While apartheid ideologues clinged to the policy of separatism by organising every facet of the South African society to reflect a racial hierarchy, those at the base of the hierarchy united in "the people's program of liberation" (*The Freedom Charter* 1969:91). This situation is also applicable to education in South Africa: clinging to its particular perception of Bantu Education, the South African government impeded the opportunity to resolve the education crisis when the proposed education alternative from liberation quarters were met with repression and the detaining of

NECC leaders (cf. Levin 1991:124). In this regard a curious chain of incidents appears in the history of South Africa, all of them involving either a particular social change, or a reaction to the social change. In all of these incidents the traditional assumptions and patterns of a particular group or groups were challenged and threatened.

The chain of events involved the introduction of a schooling system under the guidance of the British Imperialist ideology that was not only foreign, but also threatening to the traditional Dutch-Afrikaner's perception of schooling. In a subsequent attempt to safeguard their cultural heritage, the Dutch-Afrikaner nation introduced, along with other social institutions, a schooling system that eventually resulted in the introduction of Bantu Education (cf. *infra*:4.5.2.2). Since the latter was aimed at moulding "the African psyche along European lines, to ensure that the educated African is alienated from its roots", and because South African education primarily served and imitated a dominant western ethos, the cultural heritage of certain groups in South Africa was once again placed under threat (Makgoba 1998:50). Whilst the British Imperialist ideology contributed to the birth of Afrikaner Nationalism and the emergence of movements aimed at the preservation of the Afrikaner's unique cultural heritage, the birth of Black Nationalism and the emerging of liberation movements were also the inevitable outcomes of a "foreign" and an alienating society and schooling system.

Qualified as major historical events that contributed to the history of South Africa, it can be argued, in rejection of the philosophy of Historicism (cf. *infra*:2.3.5), that this chain of events is not the outcome of inviolable and fixed historical laws. The meaning of the history of South Africa rather relates directly to the ability of man to exercise free formative control over the South African reality, and because free, formative power involves the application of transgressable norms, it can be argued that this chain must be the result of human decision-making and responsibility (cf. *infra*:2.3.5). When placed within the Popperian tradition, the possibility exists that this state of affairs might not only be an example of the tendency to arrest the transitional process (cultural disclosure), but that these events were accompanied by a methodological approach of utopian engineering aimed at the realisation of an ultimate end (British rule, separatism, liberation and democracy). Given the *prima facie* evidence of human suffering under apartheid rule and bearing in mind that social communities (institutions) were not regarded as authoritative and efficient in taking care of the majority of South Africans' needs and purposes, an eradication and violation of the structural integrity of life spheres must have

contributed to relativising the competence of these communities. From the exposition of education under apartheid rule (cf. *infra*:4.5ff) it can be put forward that cultural disclosure in South Africa (thus the transitional process from a closed to an open society) was characterised by severance of the *principle of historical continuity* when conservative forces curtailed progress in the South African history - reactionary (Afrikaner and separatist) tradition-bondage contributed to the stagnating of cultural development in its totality. Thus, little doubt exists that events in South Africa under the ban of apartheid were of an unhistorical nature.

However, if the above-mentioned line of thought is made applicable to the struggle for liberation, it appears that this struggle equally contributed to the curtailing of progress in the history of South Africa. This implies that since the revolutionary activities of the oppressed people(s) were aimed at the complete subversion of the South African regime, the rightful place of progress and renewal in history alongside tradition and the power of conservation was ignored. The revolutionary aim of overthrowing tradition in South Africa could however only be understood in view of the fact that the coming about of the apartheid regime was accompanied by the deification of the Eurocentric tradition, whilst the African experience of reality was ignored. Seepe (1998:v) underlines this state of affairs by suggesting that "the continual erection of the pyramid of knowledge and science according to the prescription of the West effectively reduced the African to the position of a mere practitioner rather than the theoriser about knowledge". Whilst progress under the ban of the apartheid ideology was thus linked to Western civilisation, it was tradition according to the Western understanding that was granted the "right" to co-exist alongside the reconstruction of the South African society according to the policy of separate development. Because the parameters for being "civilised" were "set" by the supposedly superior Western civilisation, African traditions and the African experience of reality were placed outside these narrow confines. It consequently appears that the existence of progress alongside tradition within an apartheid South Africa was limited to the Western definition of the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth. In reaction to the fixation on Western values and traditions, and since many black South Africans were subjected to a totally alienating and oppressive education system, the struggle for liberation was aimed at the eradication of Western traditions and the bringing about of fundamental changes in education. With regard to the latter it was stated in an undated AZAPO document (*Education in South Africa* s.a.:20-21) that "no fundamental change in education is possible without change of the ruling class and the sweeping away of the values and norms they represent". This perception was further underscored by the



ANC when it was stated that the contradiction between the oppressed black majority and the white oppressor state cannot be resolved by the apartheid state reforming itself. The liberation movement therefore faced the challenge of harnessing the sense of national grievance "into a mighty force to sweep aside the apartheid state and create a united, non-racial and democratic society" (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:5). It was thus conceived that change could only be brought about when existing values and norms had been eradicated.

The eradication of existing values and norms, notwithstanding their Western origin, appears to be problematic. Whilst tradition relates directly to historical formation, which presupposes the ability of man to exercise free formative power (cf. Dooyeweerd 1979:66f), human culturally formative activity involves man's cultural task of subduing the earth and exercising dominion over it. Tradition consequently reflects the way in which man subdues the earth - the mastering and controlling of reality may therefore be done in a Western-typical manner or in an African-typical manner. When placed within the Popperian "line of thought" it appears as if the mastering and controlling of reality can be linked to the transitional process from a closed to an open society (cf. *infra*:2.3.5). The transitional process, thus the exercising of formative power, involves pressure on the rational person to accept personal responsibility and accountability for his/her participation in the process of historical development. Because it also involves a process of increasing cultural integration and differentiation, it can be argued that the revolutionary intention to overcome the power of tradition will necessarily imply the annihilation of culture itself. Furthermore, good and evil may be mixed in tradition and the eradication thereof would necessarily involve the elimination of both. However, the "sweeping away of values and norms" through a revolution is simply not possible since the transitional process from a closed to an open society has already been set into motion - it is therefore a false notion to argue that the transitional process can be turned around in order to start with a clean canvas. At this stage it can be deduced that the (revolutionary) opposing of the power of conservation through every attempt to break with the past, as well as the irrational clinging to tradition are irrespectively, examples of the reconstruction of a place of refuge, or the safeguarding of an existing place of refuge (cf. *infra*:2.3.6.1). In both cases, however, magical attitudes and all kinds of taboos (as generated in the closed society) are employed to assist the "regulated" individuality in escaping the burden of personal responsibility. Placed within the context of the struggle for liberation, it appears that the collective *will of the people* was to provide the "secure" haven for the regulating of the individual. Simultaneously, however, the irrational clinging to tradition by conservatives

correlates, in the South African context, with the Eurocentric perception of the world as the "secure" haven.

Only three universal characteristics of an historical event have been recorded, namely their being *unique, non-recurrent* and *unrepeatable* (Strauss s.a.:2). In this regard it can be stated that the above-mentioned chain of events should be regarded as *unique, non-recurrent* and *unrepeatable*. Simultaneously, these events should also be scrutinised in terms of historical norms. Although historic events under apartheid rule were factually *unique*, they were, due to their reactionary nature, historically anti-normative. Since it has been established that apartheid rule stood in service of the ideology of ethno-nationalism, and placed within the context of Van der Walt's (1994:340; cf. also Goudzwaard 1984:37) statement that one ideology calls another into being, the emergence of political critique of the South African society constituted an ideology. Since it was not tempered by the historical norm of *continuity*, the struggle, by virtue of its revolutionary populist nature, attempted to sever any connection with the past by starting with a clean slate. It can consequently be argued that the struggle against apartheid was as historically anti-normative as apartheid itself. From the outset it thus seems apparent that South Africa not only became the playground of opposing ideologies, but that the history of South Africa could be characterised by disharmonious cultural development. In addition, such disharmonious development appears to coincide with disregard of the norm of *differentiation* according to which historical development is rooted in the principle of sphere sovereignty (cf. *infra*:2.3.4 & 2.3.6.1). Since this principle refers to a "consciousness" of the essence of each life sphere, both the misuse of education within the context of the apartheid ideology and the ideology of revolutionary populism (cf. *infra*:5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2), appears to be a manifestation of the eradication, levelling and erasing of the boundaries between the peculiar and intrinsic natures of the various life spheres. The norm of cultural *economy* (cf. *infra*:2.3.5) appears to be equally disrespected in both cases, since education was clearly granted greater expansion of its cultural power than that which normally agrees with its unique nature. Demurred by reactionary and revolutionary activities the South African society has thus become a grave example of a society caught up in an unhistorical mastering and controlling of reality, clearly manifested in an unstable system of education

### **5.3.2 Critical-rationalism and the exposure of ideological thought-patterns**

Salamun (1999:83) argues that, in order to neutralise authoritarian and totalitarian practices,

Popper's philosophy of Critical Rationalism appears to be extremely useful for effective critique of anti-democratic thought-patterns. Although the ideological nature of the struggle for liberation in South Africa has already been established, the posing of Popper's questions (cf. *infra*:3.10) in the critical analysis of this ideology is specifically aimed at exposing possible ideological thought-patterns that contributed to ideological indoctrination and manipulation.

1. To what extent can we recognise in social conceptions, political doctrines, religious belief-system etc. assertions to the effect that specific insights and basic principles are infallible and true once and for all?

In order to answer this question an exposition of Freire's explanation (1974:13) of the so-called "culture of silence" ought at first to be put forward. He distinguished between an alienating culture that owes its manifestation to oppression, and the authoritative elite (*machthebbende elite*) that is responsible for the oppression. While the latter prescribes and dictates to the oppressed, it simultaneously contributes to establishing a culture of silence. However, once the oppressed starts to expose such a culture and attempts to break it down, the means and mechanisms used by the oppressors to maintain silence develop into autonomous and sinister powers in their own right (cf. Schoeman 1998:57). This situation was also true for apartheid South Africa. It has already been established that the opposing of the apartheid regime was met with fierce repression (cf. *infra*:5.2.2.3). However, since it has become clear that the oppressed South African masses were no longer prepared to merely accept a condition of imposed silence, the struggle for liberation was in fact a struggle for human emancipation. Victims of imposed silence were therefore to be emancipated by means of empowerment through the acquisition of knowledge in order to contribute to the generating of knowledge concerning their own experience of reality, opposed to the alienated reality that had been imposed upon them by the oppressors (cf. Freire 1974:12; also McKay & Romm 1992:101).

In acceptance of the assumption that the struggle for liberation was in fact a *struggle for human emancipation*, an important link between knowledge and power is emphasised. As already indicated, emancipation implies the conscious participation of *the (oppressed) people* in generating knowledge. In this regard People's Education was aimed at addressing the problem of empowering people to participate in the very definition of what reality, thus including educational reality, is. It subsequently seems that the theory underlying the struggle for emancipation, thus the ending of the culture of silence, related not only directly to the process of knowledge-creation in society, but also entailed an epistemological revolution in society. McKay and Romm (1992:101)

referred to "a new way of thinking where people come to recognise the vanity of attempting to uncover the 'right' picture of reality". The "right" picture of reality, however, might be problematic once it becomes representative of a specific epistemology that is considered manifest knowledge about reality. It is significant to notice that McKay and Romm (1992:21, 57) issue two warnings: It is in the first instance imperative that perceptions on the way in which the South African society should be restructured should not stifle discourse about the situation. If this happens it is to be expected that the political component of the liberation movement becomes an ideology, while the pedagogical component does not succeed in gearing *the people* towards critical participation in constructing knowledge about reality. The second warning bears on the necessity of preventing a liberation movement from being ideologised through the attribution of rigid definitions.

Thus, if it can be determined that the struggle for liberation presumed to tell the "right" story about society, and if such a "right" story is to be coupled with a manifest truth, (a specific and final epistemology), then the possibility exists that human emancipation was impeded rather than encouraged during the struggle for liberation. In the *ANC Youth League Basic Policy Document* (1948:1-3) the general basic policy of the ANC was put forward, involving African Nationalism as the national liberatory creed; the achievement of true democracy as the goal of political action; an economic policy in favour of, *inter alia*, a just and equitable distribution of wealth; an educational policy allowing free compulsory education and access to education, as well as a cultural policy that stands for assimilating the best elements in European and other cultures on the firm basis of what is good and durable in the African's own culture. Although it was argued that the programme of organisation and action may and shall be modified from time to time, it was clearly stated that the general policy will remain *fixed* and *unalterable*. It can simultaneously be argued that it appears that the *fixed* state of the general policy can be linked with the ANC's assumption that their interpretation of African Nationalism "is the sanest and at the time the most practical and realistic view" (*ANC Youth Basic Policy Document* 1948:6). Regarding such a policy as unalterable, no room was left for the improvement of knowledge by error elimination, in order to move towards an ever more sophisticated and objective knowledge about ourselves and the world (Salamun 1999:84). Proceeding from an infallibilistic assumption that the "African has a primary, inherent and inalienable right to Africa which is his continent and Motherland, and the Africans as a whole have a divine destiny which is to make Africa free among the peoples and nations of the earth" (*ANC Youth League Basic Policy Documents* 1948:1), the defining of basic

political concepts such as freedom, democracy and *the will of the people* was claimed the monopoly of the leaders of the struggle. Linked to the fixed and unalterable general policy of the ANC, these concepts equally acquired fixed and unalterable meaning and significance.

When placed within the context of People's Education, the realisation of human emancipation as conscious participation in generating knowledge, required the reconceptualisation of "apartheid" syllabi in order to "decolonize" the African mind. The process of re-constructing schooling was especially important with regard to the power of education to transform consciousness. In the *ANC Youth League Basic Policy Document* (1948:3) the moulding of the characters of the young was opted as an important aim of education. One of the aims of People's Education was the stimulating of creativity and critical thinking to equip students for the future (CACE 1988:8). If the "moulding" of the character is, however, coupled with the negative perception that the concept obtained in apartheid education (cf. infra:4.5.3.A.(ii)), namely the transmission of static interpretations of reality as infallible insights and basic principles to constitute a particular consciousness within a connective matrix in which the child's identity had to be set, then these two educational aims cannot supplement each other, rather they had to be counter-productive. It appears from literature on People's Education that the moulding-concept might have been linked to the transformation of consciousness to understand the evils of the apartheid system, as well as a readiness to participate in a non-racial, democratic system (*People's Education for People's Power* 1985:10; also Ashley 1989:48 and Mashamba 1991:26). Such a transformation, however, implied the introduction of alternative programmes, courses and material to be used in schools.

The envisioned syllabi were indeed a critique of not only Bantu Education, but also of the separatist policy of the apartheid regime. However, an exposition of suggested alternative syllabi features the struggle as a central theme in the counter-educational strategy. According to SACHED (*Focus on Alternative Education* s.a.:24), classroom activities were to centre around the immediate interest of the struggle and historical perspectives on it, as well as on the culture of the people of South Africa born out of the struggle. It was suggested that students were given

material to read about our struggle, and the struggles of people in other countries for liberation (articles from magazines, books, newspapers, poems, songs, stories); discuss and answer questions about the ideas in these articles (comprehension work); ask students to write essays, poems and stories about their experiences of struggle and those of their family and friends. Teach students to think critically and independently about what they read (*Focus on Alternative Education* s.a.:24).

According to Louw (1998:69) it remains doubtful whether education revolving around one prominent theme can encourage true independent thinking. It seemed that the harbouring of a

one-dimensional attitude in People's Education might rather impede the liberation of people - instead of empowering people to take control of their own lives, they are paralysed by rigid curricula and practices that bend the generating of knowledge in line with an all-encompassing solution to oppression, namely the struggle for liberation. This state of affairs can be illustrated by practical suggestions that had been made for the teaching of Economics in the school:

- ◆ discuss the so-called "free-market" of South Africa whereby prices are controlled to protect producers and their profits and not for the benefit of the consumer;
- ◆ show the real political motive behind decentralisation and the extra expenditure by the state which results in high taxes;
- ◆ indicate the recession as excessive expenditure by the state to maintain its racist policy;
- ◆ explain inflation as a system whereby maximum profits and wages are earned for which no product is generated. Money is put in the pockets of whites enabling them to constitute surplus demand whereby prices are pushed up;
- ◆ the effects of colonisation by European powers and by the capitalists on the economic life of the people must be discussed (*Focus on Alternative Education* s.a.:22).

Although educands were thus encouraged to be critical of the economic reality "created" by the apartheid regime, this critical attitude seems to have been one-dimensionally directed. It can be agreed with Louw (1998:70) that although themes such as decentralisation, inflation and recession are suggested for critical discussion, it appears noticeable that these topics were combined with ready-made interpretations and explanations of the specific state of affairs. Thus, instead of questioning knowledge, it appears as if knowledge was transmitted as in supposedly pure form - the illusion was therefore created that the knowledge mediated in the classroom was already representative of criticism of the *status quo* and should therefore be accepted uncritically (cf. Puolimatka 1995:75-76). On the one hand it appears that People's Education displayed a democratic image since it favoured quantitative change, demanding equal access to education for all in South Africa, as well as the elimination of racism from texts, teaching and the organisation of education (cf. Mashamba 1991:26). On the other hand, however, it exhibited a fundamentally determinative character that seems to relate to the "moulding" of the child to suit the ideological goal, namely participation in a national liberation struggle. The danger was consequently that children of the liberation era were becoming mere copies of the role models and thought-patterns that were set for them by the liberation movement - they were becoming part of a ploy in the "moulding of mass political consciousness" (*Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:3).

The reformulating of e.g. History syllabi were proposed to be in line with the "people's perception of what history is" (*Education in South Africa* s.a.:21; Rensburg 1988:44; cf. also Ashley 1989:55-56). Although it was argued that *the people* referred to the oppressed, including those opposed to apartheid, it was stated by SACHED (*Education in South Africa* s.a.:21) that

neutrality in history was impossible. Thus, given the un-neutral character of history and the fact that People's Education had to "cater for the needs and interests of the nationally oppressed blacks and the exploited working class" (Mashamba 1991:26), the interpretation of the "people's perception of what history is" might once again have been one-sided. Louw (1998:72) reflects in this regard that syllabi for People's Education were devised to serve the needs of oppressed students only. The implication is that People's Education was fundamentally politically aligned in favour of *the people* and their ideal of a non-oppressive South African society. This state of affairs was underscored by Rensburg (1988:46), in his capacity as national secretary of the NECC, when he announced that "people's education is not a blueprint for African schools alone", but also for so-called Coloured and Indian schools. By placing the emphasis on the struggle and portraying whites and the capitalist society as evil enemies, it appears as if the proposed preparation of *all* South Africans, thus including whites, for a non-racial country did not contribute in empowering people in terms of their capacity to participate in the process of knowledge-creation. It rather seems that People's Education was based upon a blueprint for education that coincided with a specific epistemology relating to the African's divine task to liberate Africa amongst the peoples and nations of the world. The choices available to the educand about the way in which to interpret the world, apparently did not involve many alternative meanings. All possible alternatives were rather reduced to a one-sided interpretation of the South African society that eventually impeded the liberative character of People's Education. Since the epistemological basis of People's Education involved a blueprint perception of reality, as interpreted by *the people*, the people's participation in the production of knowledge was steered within the parameters set by the struggle for liberation itself. Simultaneously, education was driven by the ultimate objective of developing a political consciousness that was aimed at the destruction and transformation of all racial educational structures created by the apartheid government. In line with the expectation of teachers to contribute to the "moulding" of a political consciousness, a true educationist was defined as "a person concerned with and involved in the issues of the educational struggle" (Rensburg 1988:45). It thus becomes apparent that the purpose of education and the role of the teacher were no longer decided with reference to the true nature and internal structure of education itself, but was determined by the "infallible" will of the people that were to give direction to the liberation struggle.

2. Are there in connection with such assertions elite groups or individuals (charismatic political leaders, religious prophets etc.) that claim to have a monopoly on some basic exclusive knowledge or a privileged right of interpretation of certain basic ideological principles?

High premium was placed upon the knowledge and experience of those "comrades" who were actively involved in the national liberation struggle. At the National Consultation Conference held in 1985 (Sarinjeive 1991:49) the requirement was voiced that the establishment of a democratic peoples' South Africa should involve the participation of "genuine leaders of the people". The genuine leaders were presumably those who were banned, detained or imprisoned. The document *Forward to Freedom* (1975:9) explained that the struggle for liberation was carrying out the mandate of "[c]hief A.J. Luthuli, lying motionless in his noble grave; Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, now bravely enduring minute by minute, the severity of Robben Island; and others". In his keynote address at the National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education in December 1985, Father Smangaliso Mkatshwa (1985:5) addressed his fellow compatriots and comrades with fear and trepidation since it was believed that such an historical conference "should have been addressed by Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo, Kathrada and all other authentic leaders of this country who are either in prison or in exile". During the period of the struggle, these leaders were not only looked upon for guidance, but the specific epistemology they stood for was regarded as representative of the *will of the people*. Documentation on the struggle for liberation continuously underlined the prominent role that the *will of the people* were to play in a future democratic South Africa (cf. *The Freedom Charter* 1969:82 and *Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1). With regard to revolutionary leadership, it was argued that the art thereof "consists in providing leadership to the masses and not just to its most advanced elements: it consists of setting a pace which accords with objective conditions and the real possibilities at hand" (*Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:2). Thus, by bringing the real possibilities in line with the assumptions that "the majority of the people refuse to be governed by a regime not based on their will" (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1), and that "in struggle, and only in struggle, is freedom and independence to be found" (*Forward to Freedom* 1975:1), the ANC's call for an armed struggle was not only accepted by *the people*, but was also regarded as being in accordance with the *will of the people*.

3. To what extent can we recognise tendencies toward immunising the central assumptions of the belief-system against criticism, and how are the strategies constructed so that this immunisation can take place?

According to Popper (Salamun 1999:85) the claims of an absolute and definite truth within



anti-democratic thought-patterns is closely related to the tendency to exclude ideological assumptions from criticism. The implementation of "strategies of immunisation" appears to be imperative with regard to safeguarding the ideological belief-system. Through the isolation of an ideological belief-system from criticism, the unconditional adoption of a system that promises complete eradication of all human suffering and exploitation, and that intends to achieve complete emancipation of the oppressed masses and the final guarantee for liberation from domination, seems to be regarded as the sole form of salvation. Whilst the ideology of revolutionary populism professes to represent the deepest emotions and aspirations of the people - and once the deploying of strategies of immunisation have been held off long enough for people to adopt the belief-system - it becomes extremely difficult for any form of criticism (internal and external) to divorce supporters from their new-found emotional stability and high self-esteem. Because the ideology of revolutionary populism thus provided its followers with the certainty that a national liberation struggle, accompanied by the will of the (oppressed) people, was the sole liberating force, the ideology acquired the status of a perfect belief-system that enabled the people to overcome difficulties during the struggle.

Within the context of the educational struggle, it was stated that the employees who were to run regional offices for the NECC had to be "activists with experience in the educational struggle since 1976" (Rensburg 1988:45). By thus appointing organisational representatives of some Education Crisis Committees rather than having them elected was an effective means in securing the educational struggle from internal criticism. Education members of the African Teachers' Association of South Africa (ATASA) were also considered to be too conservative and reactionary to promote national liberation. Since some of ATASA members were school inspectors and implementers of the Department of Education and Training's (DET) policy, the association and its members were excluded from employment by the NECC. In this regard it was noted that members of ATASA who didn't distance themselves from the implementing of DET policy would "come under great pressure to give up their jobs" (Rensburg 1988:46). It was even reported that the house of a deputy-director of the DET who denounced the working of ATASA, was petrol-bombed. No external criticism was thus allowed, especially not from Africans who were not prepared to partake in the struggle (cf. *infra*:5.2.3). This state of affairs was emphasised when students in Uitenhage gave ATASA members a one week ultimatum to resign and become members of the progressive National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA). Condemning the Inkatha Freedom Party - a party founded in 1975 that was aimed at the preservation of the

Zulu heritage and traditional values, and also encouraged the development of the people of KwaZulu with all the progressive African and Nationalist movements and political parties in its pursuit of African unity (Golan 1994:11) - it was decided that action would be taken against ATASA members in Natal who remained linked to Inkatha. Although the NECC didn't believe that teachers should be forced to align with any specific teachers' organisation, ATASA members were warned that they were "incurring the wrath of the people" and would have to move (Rensburg 1988:46; cf. also Sarinjeive 1991:49-50). While it can be argued that intimidation had been the outcome of anti-democratic and ideological thought-patterns, the presence of the latter appeared to have been representative of a biased interpretation of *democracy by the people*. This was underscored by Mashamba (1991:7) when he stated that many activists were feared rather than respected. Although their ideas were admirable, their practices were not always based on the democratic will of the community. Whilst the official image of revolutionary populism was fundamentally democratic, anti-democratic activities appeared to be indicative of a situation where democracy was not to the benefit of *the people*, but rather dictated by *the people*.

4. To what extent can we find in a political doctrine, social philosophy or religious belief-system categorisations and value-judgements that are determined by rigid dogmatic dichotomies and bipolar labels for the interpretation of social and political reality?

From the outset it has become apparent that the doctrine of revolutionary populism was not only interspersed with rigid dogmatic dichotomies, but the interpretation of the South African society was primarily determined by and reduced to rigid bipolar categorisation-schemes. The dichotomous interpretation of political events, activities and conflict within the South African society coincided with "the irrational division of men into those near to us and those who are far from us" (Popper 1996b:242; cf. also Salamun 1999:86-87). The complexity of the South African reality was reduced to African (black) versus European (white); gutter education versus white education; white superiority versus black inferiority (cf. infra:5.2.1); white capitalists versus black proletariat (cf. infra:5.2.2.1) and the people's camp versus the enemy camp (cf. infra:5.2.2.2). This simplistic division of the South African reality into a *friend* or *foe* relationship coincides with the tendency to advocate a distorted image of the enemy.

5. Can we find highly emotional enemy-stereotypes and, along with these, tendencies toward utilising scapegoat strategies and conspiracy theories?

Since an ideological struggle cannot be continued without an enemy, and because the ideological enemy stands in the way of the all-encompassing purpose, it is extremely important that an image

of the enemy is maintained. Whilst an ideology is fundamentally negative, being *anti-this* and *anti-that*, the image of the enemy is usually loaded with a high degree of negative emotion (cf. Van der Walt 1994:365-367). Because the enemy image needs to serve the realisation of the aim and purpose of the struggle, the created image need not be accurate. Through unending propaganda stereotypes, generalisations and half-truths were instrumentalised in order to inform the majority of South Africans about the white enemy. Described as "bloodsuckers who have grown fat on the sweat and toil" of the exploited non-white majority of South Africa, white people were regarded as "an alien people" who introduced a "system of discrimination and exploitation based on race" into the South African society (*Strategies and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:8; cf. also *Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1). The *Youth League Basic Policy Document* (1948:5) indicated that a few Europeans "love Justice and condemn racial oppression, but their voice is negligible, and in the last analysis counts for nothing. In their struggle for freedom Africans will be wasting their time and deflecting their forces if they look up to Europeans either for inspiration or for help in their political struggle". In conjunction with a scapegoat-strategy, the presence of force and violence was attributed to the coming of whites to South Africa: "[w]hether in reserve or on actual employment, force is ever present and this has been so since the White man came to Africa" (*Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:1). The adoption of a revolutionary and violent struggle was justified by the ANC by stipulating that "[t]he enemy has set the pace if any were called for. He has provided the excuse for this offensive - we did not need an excuse, but his initiative justifies the call we are about to make" (*Forward to Freedom* 1975:4; cf. also *Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1). Although the white regime was responsible for the oppression and exploitation of the non-white peoples of South Africa, it was the extremely negative and aggressive outbursts against this racist regime that contributed to the reducing of internal differences within the liberation struggle itself. By directing the focus on the white regime, portraying it as the manifestation of all that was evil, the "evils" within the liberation movement itself, such as the misuse of the youth for ideological purposes and the incorporation of violent measures, escaped criticism.

6. To what degree are value premises in ideological thought-patterns openly declared to be such, and to what degree are they disguised as matters of fact?

This question relates to the tendency in ideological thought-patterns where a fusion, in contrast to a clear and overt distinction, between standards of value and factual knowledge contributes to manipulating and influencing people's attitudes and political preferences (cf. Salamun

1999:87-88). Since such a fusion serves an ideological purpose and because the ANC considered it crucial to organise and mobilise various sectors of the population (women, youth, religious communities and cultural workers) into active struggle against apartheid, the disguising of evaluations as factual knowledge seemed to be extremely important. It was thus easy to convince people of the viability of the particular set of political aims and principles when evaluations were presented as factual knowledge.

It has already been established that major historical events in the South African history, such as the oppressive apartheid era and the revolutionary struggle for liberation, were not only the result of human decision-making and responsibility, but also the outcome of the application of transgressable norms (cf. *infra*:5.3.1). However, since norms are standards of evaluation, it becomes apparent that the evaluation of these events necessarily involved giving account of the way in which historical norms were applied. The evaluation of the apartheid regime as being reactionary and the struggle for liberation as being revolutionary consequently involves historical value-judgements. The events are therefore valued in terms of the application of not only historical norms, but also norms relating to *inter alia* the social, lingual, economic, aesthetic, juridical, ethical and pistical modes of existence. Because these historical events involve the application of norms, and since these norms can be transgressed, it can be argued that the transitional process in the South African society can be evaluated in terms of being historical (relating to the normative application of historical norms) and unhistorical (relating to the anti-normative application of these norms). However, it has already been established that both the apartheid government and the liberation struggle were unhistorical ventures that not only contributed to arresting of the closed society, but resulted in the disharmonious disclosure of cultural development (cf. *infra*: 5.3.1). It should further be stated that since norms exist only for man, who is responsible for his/her own behaviour and who is accountable for conduct that transgresses norms, accountability is necessarily at stake when a government or a political movement is blamed for its reactionary or revolutionary attitude towards historical development (Dooyeweerd 1979:69). Thus, any evaluation of the apartheid regime by the followers of the revolutionary struggle will consequently not only involve historical value-judgements, but will also refer to those who are to be blamed for the said state of affairs.

From the foregoing it can be deduced that evaluations of the apartheid regime within revolutionary circles involves value-judgements concerning the application or misapplication of

historical norms in the transitional process from a closed to an open society. Evaluations of the apartheid regime, such as the following, are therefore all examples of historical value-judgements:

- ◆ Our own ruling class [apartheid government] has its origins in the Western Power Elite - the colonies of Africa, the plunderers of its resources, the enslavers and merciless exploitators of its people. They are the local caretakers and junior partners of the Western Power Elite and like all caretakers junior partners develop grandiose ideas of its own status and of its powers over a subjugated and oppressed people. Society in all its facets is so regimented to maintain and bolster this insecure ruling class and undermine the progressive forces of the oppressed (*Education in South Africa* s.a.:20).
- ◆ Apartheid is evil, it is decadent. It must go, but it will not simply disappear through its 'irrationality' or immorality (Mkatshwa 1985:5).
- ◆ South Africa represents a "system of white minority and exploitation" (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1) in which white minority rule has throughout been characterised by "legalised racial discrimination which adversely affects the legitimate interests of the majority black population" (Njobe 1990:44).
- ◆ "South Africa has been caught up in a general crisis of the world capitalist system" (Alexander 1990:1).

Although it has been argued by Popper (Salamun 1999:87; cf. also Zecha 1999:247ff) that value-judgements cannot be derived from or reduced to descriptive and cognitive knowledge, it appears, however, that since the above-mentioned value-judgements were based upon empirical experience, thus on factual knowledge, they became closely connected and tied to statements of facts. The evaluation of the South African society as oppressive, racist and exploitative appeared consequently not only as statements of facts, but constituted knowledge of facts and were thus accepted as knowledge of facts in their own right. This state of affairs served the struggle for liberation in two ways:

- ◆ apart from convincing people of the viability of the struggle, the fusion of value-judgements and factual statements contributed to concentrating the blame for oppression (thus the misapplication of historical norms) upon the propounders of the repressive regime. Although the ideologues of the apartheid regime have to be held accountable for their contribution to the (mis)forming of the history of South Africa, the giving account thereof by those opposed to the regime, relates to their position to justify normative political aims and principles through matters of fact. By putting forward an evaluation such as "[w]e have learnt that in struggle, and only in struggle, is freedom and independence to be found" (*Forward to Freedom* 1975:1), as a matter of fact, people could easily be manipulated and influenced to participate in the struggle. Simultaneously, the directing of the blame on the white apartheid regime for human unhappiness in South Africa enforced the stereotyping of the white minority as the scapegoat for every form of evil in the South African society (cf. *infra*:5.3.2(5)).

Perceptions concerning education in South Africa were also interspersed with a fusion of value-judgements and factual knowledge. The crisis in black education was evaluated as:

*A credibility crisis.* Education systems based on ethnic grounds are unacceptable to the majority of South Africans. ... *A crisis of provision.* This is ascribed, among other things, to the qualitative inequalities between the different education departments and also the chronic shortage of suitably qualified teachers. *A crisis of relevance.* The present curricula is Eurocentric and academically oriented. Insufficient attention is paid to practical skills, problem solving and independent thought" (Mncwabe 1990:20; cf. also Mkatshwa 1985:8ff and Truscott 1993:4ff).

Mkatshwa (1985:11) argues that because students are often victims of oppressive imperialist designs, the bait for better education is very attractive. The bait, however, becomes further enforced when evaluations of apartheid education are so closely tied with the empirical state of affairs that people are easily convinced of the solution to the oppressive situation: "[e]ver since 1976 the people have recognised that apartheid education cannot be separated from apartheid in general...the entire oppressed and democratic community is concerned with education, that we all see the necessity of ending gutter education and we all see that this is a political question affecting each and every one of us" (Sisulu 1986:96).

Whilst the smoothing over of the distinction between statements of facts and value-judgements influenced attitudes, it specifically served the revolutionary ideological goal when the negotiation attempts between the apartheid government and the ANC in the 1990's was evaluated (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1) as a process entered into by the white ruling group with

its own agenda: a radically reformed system of apartheid which will retain the essentials of white domination of the economic, political and social institutions of our country. Its attempts to interpret agreements in a manner that would constitute surrender on the part of the ANC; delays in the implementation of agreements reached; and the systematic use of violence and other repressive measures against the people - all these are part of Pretoria's arsenal to weaken the ANC and its allies and derail the struggle for national liberation.

The proposing of these value-judgements concerning the negotiation process as factual knowledge was extremely important since it had to serve the ideological end. It consequently attributed to the execution of the revolutionary policy by means of the "most fundamental transformation and transfer of power from one class to another" (*Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:2), as well as the complete eradication of the apartheid South African society in order to create a new South

African society based on the will of all the people.

- ♦ in the second instance the fusion of value-judgements and factual knowledge by those opposed to the repressive South African government assisted such opponents in giving an account of the way in which historical norms were applied by the apartheid regime. Simultaneously, however, it equally succeeded in assisting such critics in escaping accountability for the application of the very same norms within liberation circles. By fixating on the apartheid regime and the unhistorical nature thereof, the *equally* unhistorical nature of the struggle for liberation (cf. infra:5.3.1) went unaccounted for. In this way the struggle was to a certain extent immunised from internal criticism (cf. infra:5.3.2(4)).

### 5.3.3 Transcendental critique of revolutionary populism

From the foregoing exposition it has become apparent that the struggle for liberation from oppression started with a legitimate goal that soon degenerated into the all-encompassing ideology of revolutionary populism. This ideology was representative of a particular belief-system concerning not only a particular view of the South African society, but also a vision of a future non-racial and democratic South African society. However, given the presence of ideological thought-patterns accompanying the ideological struggle (cf. infra:5.3.2), there seems to be a tension between the supposedly democratic ideological end and the struggle in achieving the end. Although the ideological nature of the struggle and the presence of ideological thought-patterns have been exposed, it is of profound importance to determine the pre-ideological conditions that contributed to the ideological nature of the struggle. In order to penetrate to the roots of those presuppositions underpinning the struggle, it has to be subjected to transcendental critique.

#### 5.3.2.1 Disregard of the meaning-coherence of the modal meaning-diversity

*The first transcendental question - what do we abstract in the intentional theoretical attitude from the integral structure of human existence?*

When putting forward the first transcendental question (cf. infra:3.6.1), it appears that the ideology of revolutionary populism exhibits a distorted insight *into the meaning-coherence of the modal meaning-diversity* of reality. It has already been established that extreme emphasis was

placed upon not only *the people*, but more specifically *the will of the people*. This prominent role of the people and their will was continuously emphasised within the confines of the liberation struggle. While it was stated in *The Freedom Charter* (1969:82) in 1955 that "no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people", it was declared in 1991 (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1) that "the majority of the people refuse to be governed by a regime not based on their will". This was further underlined when it was pronounced by the ANC that the international community was also "seeking an end to the system of apartheid and the creation of a society based on the will of all the people". The prospect of the establishment of a national democracy was therefore identified not only with the *will of the people*, but also with the transference of power into the hands of the people as a whole. Whilst the majority of people in South Africa were for so many years subjected to oppression and exploitation, and for so long excluded from participating in the governing of South Africa, promises of complete emancipation of the oppressed masses, eradication of human suffering and the prospect of participatory democracy were extremely tempting. However, such a fundamental transformation required the changing of political power from being an instrument of oppression into an instrument of liberation (cf. Mashamba 1991:6). Thus, while *the people* in political motion were accepted to be the strength of the national democratic movement, it was the *will of the people* that was considered the sole liberation force from oppression and exploitation.

Schoeman (1998:92) argues that the regarding of the *will of the people* as the ultimate norm for human conduct coincides with the absolutisation of the democratic goal that the liberating *will of the people* shall be the highest and final authority. The absolutisation of the people appears to be not only indicative of its acquiring of hypernormative status, but also of the disregard of the inter-modal coherence within which each modal aspect of reality reveals its own distinct nature. In conjunction with Visagie's (1995:4; cf. also *infra*:2.4.1) definition of a hypernorm as the unjustifiably elevation of certain goals or practices into a position of power from where all other goals and practices are dominated, the absolutisation of an abstract and collective social entity such as *the people* constitutes the domination of all life spheres by the *will of the people*. From the envisioned non-racial, democratic and populist South African government, it has become apparent that the *will of the people* was to be equated with the populist state. In this regard the input of a comprehensive socio-political discourse, characterised by a hypernormative logic that centres on the inhabitants of the state (*the people*), can be assumed in all spheres of a society based upon the *will of the people*. However, when placed within a structurally pluralist view of



society (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.1; also Clouser 1991:249ff), it can be stated that everyone of the plurality of types of communities (social institutions) not only enjoy an internal sovereignty in its own social sphere, but that they are irreducible. Since the state is therefore constituted by its own internal and unique structure, it cannot be equated with an entity such as *the people*, nor can it be subjected to the *will of the people* - a political collective such as the people cannot of itself constitute the state (cf. Visagie 1995:13).

In this regard Schoeman (1998:96-97) poses an open question whether the absolutisation of *the people* really differs in essence from the absolutisation of *the nation* (cf. *infra*:4.3.2). Not unlike the latter, the equation of *the people* with the state resulted in a situation whereby *politics* was "illegitimately aggrandized to the position of all-inclusive *action front* of all other cultural spheres of human life, thereby severely undermining their relative autonomy" (Schoeman 1998:97). As a distinct life sphere (sphere of justice) the state demarcates not only its characteristic juridical purpose, but also its state-typical type of authority and competence. However, since "ordinary people" are dominated by an abstract and collective entity referred to as *the people*, and while the state is equated with the latter, a collective entity of "ordinary people" consequently form the "political body out of which transformed (democratic) governmental structures arise in a kind of organic harmony with this body" (Visagie 1995:13). Simultaneously, however, since the *will of the people* embodies the ultimate and legitimate source of authority and power, the differentiated authority spheres and competencies of the plurality of types of communities are regulated and directed by the will of these "ordinary people". The accountability of the elective representatives towards those who elected them, is thus not only *one* of the criteria, but rather *the* criterion. As Van der Walt (1994:391) alludes, "[p]eople are elected with the explicit presupposition that they are the direct representatives of the will of the people and that their power to make decisions is accordingly limited".

In an attempt to answer the first transcendental question, it becomes apparent that the absolutisation of the *will of the people* was representative of a hierarchical view of society. Whilst the existence of the diversity of modes of human existence and societal relationships are regarded as of co-equal status existing alongside each other, the hierarchical view involves the existence of these spheres as subsidiary to the *will of the people*. A hierarchical view of society gives way to a chain of events: the disregarding of the principle of sphere sovereignty leads to the violation of the structural integrity of the diversity of life spheres; once the boundaries

between the intrinsic natures of these spheres are eradicated, life spheres are misused for purposes contrary to their *prima facie* functions; since life spheres are misused for ulterior motives, they are no longer capable of protecting and promoting those human needs that necessitated their existence. It appears that the outcome of such a hierarchical view delimits the ruling out of the interference of one social community in the affairs of another. Visagie (1995:5; cf. also Walzer 1983:19) describes the "overflowing" of the natural and functional boundaries of one social institution (such as the populist state) by another institution as a form of terror and tyranny.

Placed within the structurally pluralist view of society, the school is regarded as a logically qualified organisation that coexists alongside all other social institutions. Since educational norms are (crucially) determined by the values of the educational institutions in which they operate, educational norms must consequently be an expression of these values. In this regard Clouser (1991:254) argues that "[b]y means of education, our concepts of ourselves and the world around us are expanded and enriched. So the authority in a school is an authority based on competence in knowledge; it belongs to those who are expert in the concepts and theories to be taught". However, since the ideology of revolutionary populism involves the absolutisation of the *will of the people*, it was accepted that "schools don't belong to the government, they belong to the people" (Tutu 1985:21). In this regard it appears as if educational norms were envisaged to be the expression of the *will* of a collective entity, namely *the people*. In this regard Visagie (1995:13) argues that a political collective such as *the people* does not, of itself, constitute the nature of educational institutions, but an educational institution may very well be "terrorised" in the name of this collective. Thus, coinciding with a hierarchical view of society, the principles internal to the school as a social institution were disregarded. In the "name of the people" the relative institutional boundaries were eradicated and the institution was no longer used for school-typical purposes, but rather for liberation purposes (cf. infra:5.2.3.1 & 5.2.3.2).

By subjecting an ideological belief-system to the first transcendental question, the particular insight into the structure of reality that undergirds such a system, can be exposed. From the foregoing exposition it has become apparent that the ideology of revolutionary populism was representative of the elevation of the *will of the people* to hypernormative status. At the same time, all spheres of life were reduced to this collective. When placed within the context of the distinction between structural *a priori* and subjective *a priori* (cf. infra:2.4.4.2), it can be argued

that the "ideological insight" (as pertaining to revolutionary populism) into the structural *a priori* does not recognise the internal character and structure of the distinct spheres of life. Thus, since the truth or falseness of the subjective *a priori* resides in the insight into the structural *a priori*, it can be stated that the ideology of revolutionary populism represents, not unlike the ideology of apartheid, a distorted and biased view of the meaning-coherence of the modal diversity of reality.

### 5.3.2.2 Ideological starting-point resides in the people

*The second transcendental question - from what starting-point can the aspects of human experience which were theoretically abstracted be united in a theoretical synthesis?*

Visagie and Pretorius (1993:59) defines populism as a name for a certain "conceptual model in which the will and the well-being of a social entity mostly referred to as 'the people', ascend to a position of paramount importance". Placed within the context of the liberation struggle, the concept of *the people* was aligned to political criteria. Since the idea of *the people* was defined implicitly and relationally in terms of governmental rule, political identity was regarded as constitutive of the hypernormative logic that regulated the ideological belief-system. As an abstract and collective social entity, *the people* possess a solitary unitary character since unity is to be found in the form of the political body out of which the newly transformed and democratic government structures are envisioned to arise (cf. Visagie 1995:13). However, *the people* as a social entity does not possess a permanent authority structure. Although the equation of *the people* with the state attributes "unlawful" state-typical power to *the people* as a political entity, the relative character of *the people* is clear: while the state remains restricted to the juridical aspect of reality by which it is qualified, the equation of the state and *the people* consequently also underscores the relative character of the latter. However, due to the misconception regarding a totality perceptive on the modal meaning-diversity (cf. infra:5.3.2.1), the conceptual model of *the people* was, as already established, exalted to "the position of a (pretended) supra-modal common denominator of the remaining aspects of human life" (Schoeman 1998:132). By attributing supra-modal status to *the people*, the *will and well-being of the people* acquired regulative status with regard to the normative control of every societal sphere, including that of education. The *will of the people* was therefore identified with justice and morality (Visagie & Pretorius 1993:59).

Given the regulative status whereby *the people* exercise a normative appeal on any form of human conduct, it becomes clear that the *will of the people* provided the starting-point for all endeavours to be undertaken in the name of the (will of the) *people*. However, given the relative character of the conceptual model, namely *the people*, the vantage point remained bound to the boundaries of reality itself. Since *the will of the people* was regarded the point of departure, and because this conceptual model was attributed supra-modal status, it was not regarded as subject to norms pertaining to the various aspects of reality. As the regulative norm, it was the *will of the people* that was now giving direction to all life spheres. Every societal sphere was therefore envisaged to find its deepest meaning in the *will of the people* - hence the ANC's aim of destroying the apartheid state and replacing it "with the united, non-racial, nonsexist and democratic South Africa in which the people as a whole shall govern" (*Constitution of the African National Congress* 1991:1); and the "creation of a society based on the will of all the people" (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:1). The ultimate solution to oppression and exploitation and the final guarantee for human liberty therefore resided, according to the ideology of revolutionary populism, in the *will of the people*.

Thus, by subjecting the ideological attitude of thought pertaining to revolutionary populism to transcendental critique, it has been possible to expose the absolutisation of the 'collective entity called *the people and their will*, as well as the vantage point from which all ideological ventures were to be undertaken. Since *the people* exhibits a relative nature and because the absolutised *will of the people* embodied the ultimate source of liberation and of authority, it can be stated that the ideology of revolutionary populism has found its support in something that was relative. It is in this regard that it appears that populism provides a starting-point that remains bound to reality itself. Similar to the apartheid ideology, a distorted insight into the structural *a priori* concerning the structurally pluralistic horizon of reality, the ideology of revolutionary populism remained bound to self-induced limits, since the point of support could not be found outside the boundaries of reality.

It has been argued in chapter 3 (cf. *infra*:3.6.2) that the finding of a vantage point is not a purely rational matter, but is posited by an act of critical self-reflection in which the self transcends rational thought. By arguing that human experience cannot be divorced from the selfhood of man, two important notions can be deducted: all human actions, including theoretical thought, must be concentrated in the selfhood of man; and it is through knowledge of the self that man

comes to knowledge of the origin of all meaning. At this stage, through the method of transcendental critique, not only has the hidden absolutisation of the ideology of revolutionary populism, namely *the people*, been revealed, but also the *will of the people* as the vantage point that provides support for theoretical thought. However, in order to penetrate to the deeper and fundamental root (origin) of this absolutisation, the ideology ought to be subjected to the third transcendental question.

### 5.3.2.3 Origin of meaning?

*The third transcendental question - how is critical self-reflection, namely the concentric direction of thought toward the self, possible, and what is its origin?*

It appears that by subjecting an ideology to transcendental critique, an inner connection between religion and ideological endeavour is revealed. In this regard attention should once again be drawn to the fact that religion is to be distinguished from faith (cf. infra: 3.6.3): while the latter refers to only one aspect of human existence (the pistical mode of human existence), religion is of radical and integral nature since it binds all human outlets to an origin. Religion is consequently not understood as modally restricted, but in the *supra-modal* sense that refers to those "prevailing supra-modal principles to which is appealed when other (modal) norms are identified and verified...attempts at the authentication and validation of norms appeal to an idea of an origin, i.e., the origin of truth and of acceptable norms" (Schoeman 1998:46). It can subsequently be argued that the last appeal regarding truth as such, is to the origin of truth itself.

It has already been established that within liberation circles, the *will and the well-being of the people* was accepted as the starting-point for all endeavours to be undertaken (cf. infra:5.3.2.2). This point however, must be linked to a "belief" in an *absoluteness* to which the *will of the people* can ultimately appeal in order to get other (modal) norms authenticated. Thus, while the *will of the people* has acquired the status of a starting-point, it simultaneously has to relate to a particular origin that regulates, in the last instance, not only the thoughts and the actions of *the people*, but also their interpretation of reality. Documentation on the struggle exposes the high premium that was placed on human freedom - "the offensive for freedom must forge ahead in every other field and area of action. This call goes out to all opponents of racist oppression and exploitation; to all people who want to see, not just change, but racial change that brings freedom

to our oppressed people" (*Forward to Freedom-1975* 1975:8; cf. also *Constitution of the African National Congress* 1991:1 on *Aims and Objectives*; *Forward to National Democracy* 1991:5ff and supra:6.2.2 on *Human Rights*). Accompanying the emphasis on human dignity and human freedom, was the "belief" in human (African) ability to establish a non-racial and democratic South Africa. In 1969 it was envisaged that the "confidence in final victory rests not on the wish or the dream [of freedom] but on our understanding of our own conditions and the historical processes" (*Strategies and Tactics of the ANC* 1969:6). This understanding and knowledge, however, were to be linked with the central objective, namely the transference "of power to the people as a whole, and the use of the power to construct a socio-economic system that will meet the aspirations of all the people of our country" (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:5). Thus, placed within the context of revolutionary populism, and given the *will of the people* as the starting-point, it appears that the origin in this case might be not only *human autonomy and freedom*, but also *autonomous human reason*. Given the religious nature of the origin, it appears that two notions (cf. Dooyeweerd 1979:148ff; also Kalsbeek 1975:63 and Schoeman 1998:45-46) are consequently placed in the centre of religious attention, namely:

- ♦ the dignity and freedom of the human personality; and
- ♦ human reason, relating to the assumption that only man knows best how to master and control reality.

*Free human personality* is thus not only regarded as the ultimate origin, but *human reason* is subsequently viewed as a law unto itself. By accrediting these two notion religious status, and bearing in mind that religion is of *radical* and *integral* nature because it binds all of human existence to an origin, it appears that *human dignity* and *human knowledge* have indeed been exaggerated to the position of a supra-modal common denominator of all modes of human existence. As such, autonomous *human freedom* and *reason* becomes the ultimate regulative principle that exercises, in the last instance, a normative appeal on and normative control of all forms of human conduct, including education. The *will and the well-being of the people* is therefore ultimately regulated by *autonomous man*.

The attributing of supra-modal status to *human reason*, however, appears to be problematic in the sense that reason refers to only one of a number of modalities that encompass man's entire existence as a human being (cf. infra:3.2). As such, reason finds its deepest qualification (meaning) in the logical aspect of reality. Because of its essential modal qualification human

reason can never be regarded as an autonomous magnitude as if it is a law unto itself (cf. Schoeman 1998:132). Due to its modal qualification, human reason has a relative character since its legitimate compass remains limited and bound to the logical aspect by which its distinctive structure or character is qualified. As such, human reason cannot be regarded as a regulative principle, since it is totally dependence for guidance on regulative principles.

It should, however, be noted that the *autonomous freedom of human personality* and *human reason* as the ultimate origin regarding truth as such, has neither a natural predilection, nor a peculiar preference for any particular ideology. Schoeman (1998:46) underlines this statement by referring to the fact that "the objectives of ideological antagonists like capitalists and communists are more often than not interpreted in terms of central principles that derive from the very same basic driving force, namely that of, on the one hand, the ideal of unrestricted scientific control, and on the other the ideal of the free human personality". The implication is that the origin to which the ideologues of revolutionary populism finally appealed for ultimate validation, transcended the ideology as such. Schoeman (1998:47) contributes the origin of an indubitably supra-ideological nature to the realm of basic cultural powers that have been operative in all human societies since the beginning of time.

In summary it can be stated that by virtue of subjecting the struggle for national liberation (including the liberation of education) to transcendental critique it was possible to expose autonomous human freedom and reason as the (supposedly) ultimate origin that constitutes truth itself. Directly linked to this origin, is the vantage point from which an authentic and valid theoretical perspective of reality can be acquired. In the case of revolutionary populism *the people*, especially the *will of the people*, was revealed as the vantage point that provided support for theoretical thought within the parameters of this particular ideological belief-system (cf. infra:5.3.2.2). At the same time, however, this perspective includes an idea regarding the meaning-coherence of the modal meaning-diversity. In this regard and by subjecting the ideology to the first transcendental question it was possible to not only expose the absolutisation of an abstract and collective social entity such as *the people*, but also to reveal the distorted and hierarchical (in contrast to a structurally pluralist) view of reality that was the unavoidable outcome of the absolutisation (cf. infra:5.3.2.1). The outcome of the application of transcendental critique can be illustrated as follows:

<b>Transcendental questions</b> Refers to the <i>same</i> reality, constituting a "neutral" ground for discourse, irrespective of religious suppositions. <i>Neutral</i>	<b>Theoretical answers</b> Concrete answers as regulated by religious suppositions. <i>Un-neutral</i>	<b>Transcendental ideas</b> Exposes the subjective insight into the structural a priori. <i>Un-neutral</i>	<b>Exposure of a ideological axiom by virtue of transcendental criticism</b>
1. What is abstracted for the theoretical attitude of thought?	The coherence of inter-modal time.	The <i>coherence</i> of meaning.	Absolutisation of an abstract and social entity called <i>the people</i> .
2. What enables the totality of the diversity of meaning?	Archimedean point as the fixed point of departure.	The <i>totality</i> of meaning.	The <i>will</i> and <i>well-beign</i> of the people.
3. What enables self-reflection?	The origin.	The <i>origin</i> of meaning.	<i>Human freedom, dignity and reason.</i>

**Table 3: The outcome of transcendental criticism on revolutionary populism**

#### 5.4 Concluding remarks

From the foregoing exposition it has become clear that the struggle for national freedom in South Africa soon turned into an all-encompassing and stubborn ideology that caused people to view reality in a particular way. Similar to the apartheid ideology where education was misused as an ideological apparatus for the promotion of ideological purposes, at the expense of school-typical objectives and aims (cf. infra:4.5ff), it seems that education under the ban of the ideology of revolutionary populism was also utilised as an ideological mechanism. Although the ideological goals differed in the above-mentioned instances, it can be argued that the misuse of school-typical education (in both cases) can be accredited to the disregarding of the *principle of sphere sovereignty* (cf. infra:2.3.6.1 and 5.3.1). Whilst recognition of this principle relates directly to the differentiated distribution of power and authority according to the distinct essences of all social institutions, the disregard of this principle can be linked to a distorted insight into the co-equal existence of social institutions existing alongside each other - it rather relates to a hierarchical view whereby, in the case of the two mentioned ideologies, either the (Afrikaner) nation or the people are identified with the state and elevated to a position of supreme authority. The unavoidable consequence of such an absolutisation was (in both cases) the replacing of a structurally pluralist view of reality by a hierarchical view - either the national state or the people's state was to be regarded as the ultimate form of authority from which all other forms of authority, thus including school-typical authority, was to be derived. The implication of such a hierarchical view was the misuse of school-typical education for the promotion of ideological



objectives and goals.

The exposition of the struggle for liberation was first done by subjecting the ideological belief-systems to Popper's six critical questions, which assisted in determining the presence of ideological thought-patterns (cf. *infra*: 4.4.1 & 5.3.2). However, the mere exposure of such ideological thought-patterns can never suffice, since the presuppositions at the root of such thought-patterns remain hidden. Thus, in order to expose those presuppositions that ultimately determine the ideological thought-patterns itself, the ideologies were subjected to transcendental critique (cf. *infra*: 4.4.2 & 5.3.3). When placing the critical analysis of these belief-systems within the context of the transitional process from a closed to an open society, it can be argued that it has become clear that an ideological belief-system represents not only a place of refuge for its followers, but always promises redemption from some situation of threat. However, by adhering to such an ideological belief-system, personal responsibility is reduced in the sense that the ideologues prescribe to the followers. Thus, in order to reap from the promised salvation from national oppression, adherents only needed to participate in the national struggle - they were not required to criticise the belief-system itself (cf. *infra*: 5.3.2(3)), nor the means utilised. They, however had to be prepared to sacrifice whatever was required for the sake of the ideological goal. It is thus evident that such an ideological belief-system can be identified with remnants of the closed society, in the sense that it contributes to the strain of the transitional process. Simultaneously, however, these remnants can be linked to disharmonious cultural differentiation whereby the structural integrity of social institutions are violated when the principle of sphere sovereignty is ignored. The latter was clearly illustrated in the misuse of education under the ban of the apartheid ideology, as well as the misuse of school-typical education for liberation purposes.

Although the South African society is still in the transitional process from a closed society to an open society, it evolved during the transformation process from a deterministic society, (the apartheid dispensation), to a democratic society, (as envisioned by the national struggle). Because the national struggle against oppression has eventually led to the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, and since the leaders of the struggle are currently in a position of national leadership, the focus in the next chapter will be to determine to what extent the view of reality in terms of the liberation struggle has laid the foundation for a new non-racial and democratic South Africa. Against the background of the legacy of misuse of the school for

ideological purposes, an attempt will be made to determine to what extent the school in the new democratic South Africa enjoys its right of functioning within its relative sphere of sovereignty without unlawful encroachment upon its terrain for other than school-typical reasons.

## Chapter 6

# Education in a Democratic South Africa

### 6.1 Introductory remarks

From the previous chapters it appeared that whilst apartheid education played at indoctrination in order to promote a belief-system that favoured separatism, education for liberation established a prominent link between education and political critique by drawing the youth into the struggle for national liberation. After the first democratic elections in 1994 white control was abolished, and the ANC was in a position to transcend the monolithic conception of black/white antagonism that was maintained by a previous regime, in order to realise its central objectives, namely "the transfer of power to the people as a whole, and the use of that power to construct a socio-economic system that will meet the aspirations of all the people of our country" (*Advance to National Democracy* 1991:5). Transformation of the South African society inevitably led to the redirection of the system of education and training against the background of the newly accepted Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

The purpose of this chapter is a critical analysis of the present transition of education from a predominantly deterministic system, as it was known during the apartheid era, to an envisioned democratic system. Against the background provided in chapters 3 and 4 an attempt will be made to expose possible ideological thought-patterns in the process of transformation, through critical rationalism and transcendental criticism.

### 6.2 From determinism to democracy

In March 1994, a month before the first democratic elections in South Africa, Nelson Mandela (1994a:1) acclaimed that because the very essence of life in South Africa was corroded by apartheid, "our people deserve nothing less than the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness". The emerging political leaders were thus challenged to build a nation in which all people, irrespective of race, colour, creed, religion or sex could assert their human worth. In order to build such a nation, two critical issues were identified:

- ♦ an understanding that issues of human rights extend beyond the political since it embraces the economic, social and environmental; and
- ♦ the perception that "just and last solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy" (Mandela 1994a:1).

These two issues were to play a leading role in the future since human rights were accepted as the guiding light in South Africa, while true democracy was regarded as the only guarantee for such rights (Mandela 1994a:2). The ANC consequently envisioned a new South Africa in which the rights of South Africa's people were to be secured in a government *of the people, by the people and for the people*.

The elections of April 1994 not only implied the end of a pernicious ideology and its accompanying practices of racism and racial oppression, but it also conferred glory and hope upon new-born liberty. However, although the majority of South Africans have finally achieved political emancipation, it was to be expected that the democratic elections on their own did not mark liberation and the fulfilment of the objectives of, what was referred to as, the "democratic revolution". However, since the pursuit of human rights and the establishment of a democratic South Africa were envisioned to play a profound role in the transitional process, these two notions were also to leave an imprint on the transformation of education. It seems therefore essential to give a brief exposition of the way in which these two notions are presently conceptualised in South African.

### **6.2.1 Democracy as a guarantee for human rights**

During the turbulent years of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa the democratic ideal was almost sanctified as the solution to the oppressive and exploiting apartheid regime. In search for a system of government that would secure both the personal interests and the general welfare of the community, the apprehension that "democracy presupposes the idea of populist sovereignty, that is the notion that power of government stems from the people and must be exercised by the people for the people" (Nguru 1995:59; cf. also Du Toit 1993:3 and Gitari 1996:85), was indeed perceived as the only alternative to the repressive regime. Whilst the democratic ideal was contained during the struggle in slogans such as "The People Shall Govern" and "Power to the People", the first democratic elections introduced the beginning of an era that was regarded as a promising end to the struggle for liberation - the majority of South Africans were now in

anticipation of the coming about of a democratic South African utopia.

However, in order to understand the relevance, meaning and implications of the democratic ideal for South Africa, it needs to be interpreted within the country's social and political context. Although originating from the Greek *demos* = people and *kratos* = rule or power, that is "govern by the people", the term democracy has acquired different conceptions. At the core of these conceptions, however, two notions are to be found, namely that the ruling power of a state is legally vested in the people (not in any particular population group or class) and that all people should politically be accepted to be equal (cf. Cloete 1993:4,8). At this point it should be indicated that there are two kinds of democracy that are deeply rooted in the South African tradition, namely *liberal democracy* and *social democracy* (Steyn 1997a:6-8; cf. also Cloete 1993:7-8). Three major characteristics of *liberal democracy* are identified: personal freedom that includes a wide range of human rights, the notion of decentralisation, thus favouring the devolution of power through a bottom-up approach and the emphasis on individual competition in all walks of life. In contrast, *social democracy* places the emphasis on equality, communality, a communal value system, centralisation and the strengthening of state control. It appears therefore that in order to shed light on the democratic ideal envisioned for a new South Africa, the *relation between the individual and the community* within the South African context should be investigated.

Any conception of a democratic ideal for the new South Africa should take into account that the struggle for democracy involved resistance against all forms of racism, tribalism and the bantustan system, as well as a pursuit of the redistribution of wealth and land and a struggle for a representative political system (cf. infra:chapter 5). For many decades South Africa has thus been known for its individualistic, undemocratic and authoritarian practices - whilst the individual well-being of white South Africans was promoted at the expense of the well-being of the majority, power was controlled by a few (white) people who did not represent the interests of the majority. Contrary to the minority rule of the apartheid regime, the perception of a democratic South Africa, however, coincided with the objectives of collective action, accountability, mandates, mass participation and People's Power (Mashamba 1991:16-17). The implication here is that representatives chosen by the community should act on the basis of mandates.

It appears therefore that the democratic ideal for a new South Africa should be coupled with an

emphasis on the role of the community and community members. While the violation of fundamental rights in South Africa led to the recognition of, and emphasis on human rights (cf. supra:4.2.1) in the new dispensation, it is suggested that *freedom of the individual and for the individual*, as proposed by a *liberal democracy*, should rather be identified with the notion of a *populist democracy* based on the assumption that all people are equal (on the basis of a common man) and must be treated as such. (Cloete 1993:9; cf. also McQuoid-Mason, O'Brien & Greene 1993:14). The sympathy of proponents of a *populist democracy* towards the workers fits the profile of the national liberation struggle that was primarily aimed at exchanging power from the hands of the rich white minority into the hands of the oppressed exploited majority of workers. This reminds not only of the white/black (rich/poor) juxtaposition that was one of the main forces for liberation, but also coincides with the identification of the *poor common people* (the workers) with the abstract social entity called *the people* (cf. infra:5.2.2.2), as referred to in the democratic ideal of *government by the people for the people* (cf. Nguru 1995:59). Cloete (1993:8-9) however argues that a *liberal democracy* will only succeed in countries where the people have developed to such an extent that most of them are able to serve as informed and rational voters. He continues by stating that such a state of development is only possible after a long period of progress involving social and economic advancement of the whole population. The majority of the South African society, however, has no experience in serving as informed and rational voters, nor has the new leaders any experience - this state of affairs was underscored by former president Mandela (1995:1): "[a]ll of us, precisely because we had never sat in any democratic parliament before, had to begin the continuing process of learning how to carry out our functions as people's deputies. We had to educate ourselves in an atmosphere characterised by a critical public focus which did not necessarily allow for the reality of that inexperience".

Reference to the "carrying out of functions as people's deputies" (Mandela 1995:1) relates to two principles present in the populist perception of democracy, namely the mandate principle, and indirectly to the majority principle. Whilst populist democracy implies "government for and by the majority", leaders may, according to the mandate principle, not undertake political actions in arbitrary and unco-ordinated ways (cf. Du Toit 1993:6), which means that action taken by leaders on their own account will lack democratic legitimacy. In his report to the 50th National Conference of the ANC in 1997, Mandela not only emphasised the above-mentioned principles, but also underlined the prominent role of the populist ideal: he noted that "the majority of our people have chosen the national liberation movement, led by the ANC, as the political force that should lead our country as it goes through its post-apartheid process of reconstruction and

development" (1997:1), but also emphasised that the concept expressed in *The Freedom Charter*, namely "the people should govern" (more recently referred to as a *people-driven process of change*) should be translated into practice (1997:5). The idea that popular consent is to play a significant role in creating a people-centred South African society becomes apparent in Mandela's (1997:5) reference to the contradiction between representative democracy and participatory democracy:

Where the people have freely elected representatives to govern and have the right and possibility to change such representatives, what need is there for these representatives to seek a popular mandate for every decision they have to make! But if they do not seek such mandates, how do we avoid the development of an elite, alienated from the people, that, during its five years in office, will implement policies which, in reality, do not represent the will of the people!"

This commitment of the GNU to a *populist government* in which *the people as a whole* (the majority) were to *participate* indirectly by virtue of the *mandate principle*, was also underlined by Thabo Mbeki (1999:2) during his inauguration as president of South Africa on June 16 1999, when he proclaimed that the outcome of the second democratic elections (4 June 1999) was an indication of the fact the people has "mandated us [the ANC] to pursue" the freeing of the people "both from oppression and from the dehumanising legacy of deprivation we inherited from our past". Mbeki (1999:3) continued that "[w]hat we have to see in the rising light is a government that is fully conscious of the fact that it has entered into a contract with the people, to work in partnership with them to build a winning nation".

From the foregoing it appears that the democracy ideal in South Africa involves a populist interpretation with mass participation through mandates. Margetson (1978:36) argues that one of the crucial features of participation is that it seems essential to the concept of humanity. In contrast to a form of life created by a white minority, the notion of participation in South Africa appears to be central to a shared form of life in which all humans are being regarded as equal. Thus, while mandates bind leaders to their followers to execute the popular will, in so doing, the people will "participate" through popular consent. It seems that the elements of the contemporary interpretation of the democratic ideal in South Africa opens the door to various anti-democratic outcomes, all impeding the democratic ideal itself. Du Toit (1993:6) alludes that while the majority principle might result in the tyranny of the democratic majority, the mandate principle is open to manipulation by leaders and central executives, which means that local or grassroots initiatives may not have been properly mandated by the people. In the same manner Margetson (1973:35) indicates that people can be manipulated by disguising manipulation

"behind a favourable facade expressing humanitarian 'participation'". Morrow's (1989:113) concern, namely "[h]ow can one participate in an activity unless one has already learnt how to participate in it?", relates to a similar issue not only raised, but also answered by President Mandela (1997:6) himself:

Put crudely, precisely at the point when the process of social development confers "sovereign" powers of decision-making to the citizen, and because of this, the politician and the public servant will or may be driven to argue that "the man in the street" is incapable of governing himself without the intervention of the professionals.

Obviously, the matter we are raising is relevant not only to ourselves, but is a vexed question which impacts on the functioning of all democracies throughout the world.

Returning to our own reality we must make the point that our experience of the last three years points to the importance of non-governmental organisations (NGO's), community-based organisations (CBO's) and grassroots-based political formations in ensuring popular participation in governance.

The effective and admirable way in which many of these structures have functioned has served to emphasise the point that, in many instances, the public service, however efficient it may be, may not be the best instrument to mobilise for popular involvement and participation. However, we must also draw the attention to the fact that many of our non-governmental organisations are not in fact NGO's both because they have no popular base and the actuality that they rely on the domestic and foreign governments, rather than the people, for their material sustenance.

As we continue the struggle to ensure a people-driven process of social transformation, we will have to consider the reliability of such NGO's as a vehicle to achieve this objective. The success achieved by many CBO's based on the contribution of "sweat equity" by very poor communities, points to the need for us seriously to consider the matter of the nature of the so-called organs of civil society.

The commitment of the ANC government to encourage public participation became evident in 1995 when the Constitutional Assembly (CA) launched a programme to ensure that the process of producing the new constitution was people-driven. The CA's public participation programme included public meetings, open sectoral hearings and constitutional education programmes to inform people about the process and to solicit their views. In the *Journal of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa* (Shireen Badat 1995:14-15) it was reported that national sectoral hearings were held with business, the legal profession, children's rights groups, traditional leaders, women, religious and labour organisations. A number of these hearings were organised in conjunction with NGO's. The Constitutional Assembly thus entered into partnership with various NGO's, not only to organise public hearings, but in order that civil society should be heard. The main purpose of the constitutional education programme was to empower rural, disadvantaged and marginalised groups. Shalala (Shireen Badat 1995:15), the assistant director of the CA in 1995, was quoted saying that "[it] has been very exciting and moving to see people in rural areas, who have ordinarily and historically been left out of political processes, participating and making inputs". It was therefore believed that democracy "is not only about people voting for government once every four of five years, but that people should participate on a daily basis in decision-making processes in all aspects of their lives, including education" (Sithole 1994:6).



Proceeding from the premises that *the people* have chosen the ANC movement as the government of South Africa and that the revolution had not ended with the 1994-elections, the GNU thus set out to "remove the obstacles obstructing the successful and efficient implementation of our programmes and engaged in the process of empowering the masses of our people to participate in the process of governance" (Mandela 1997:25). In an attempt to construct a people-centred society, the fundamental social transformation of the GNU involved *inter alia* a programme of affirmative action in order to address racial disparities; the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with the purpose of bringing about unity and reconciliation through the investigation and disclosure of human rights violations committed during the apartheid past; a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP); and the establishing of institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector, the Gender and Youth Commissions, the Inspector General of Intelligence and other structures to be created by the Open Democracy or Freedom of Information Act (Mandela 1995:4; 1997:3; 1997 and also Van der Walt & Van der Walt 1996:3). Because the emphasis was being placed on participation of the masses, the people were to enjoy fundamental human rights that would *inter alia*, guarantee man's equality before the law; his/her equal protection of the law, man's entitlement to respect for his/her life and the integrity, liberty and security of his/her person and the right to express and disseminate his/her opinion within the law (*African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights* 1986:1-2).

### 6.2.2 Human Rights as a condition for full development

After the 1994-elections the ANC was in a position to underscore its assumption that Human Rights ought to be regarded "as a condition for the full personal, political and economic development of the people of our continent many of whom, even as we speak, endure the ravages of poverty, war and disease" (Mandela 1994b:1). The ratification of the 1986 *African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights* (1986:1) involved *inter alia*, the affirmation of the pledge to not only eradicate all forms of colonialism, thus including apartheid, but also to promote and protect human and people's rights and freedom in Africa, thus including South Africa. Simultaneously, however, whilst the codification of Human Rights involved the respect for and the intrinsic worth of all human beings, it had to be applied in an African setting in an appropriate way. In this regard it was argued by Mandela (1994b:2) that the subscribing to and strengthening of a Human Rights framework would have to be done by Africans, rather than

through the expedient foreign policy priorities and selective morality of some industrialised nations. It was thus the intention of the new government to expedite their accession to the African Human Rights framework that found expression in the African Charter for Human and People's Rights, together with the African Commission on Human and People's Rights based in Banjul.

The new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (8 May 1996) became the embodiment of the vision of a society founded on the values of human dignity, the achievement of human rights and freedom. These values are spelt out in the justifiable Bill of Rights (cf. *The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* 1996: 6-25) and by "[r]eflecting the deepest aspirations of our people, it creates an obligation on the state to 'respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights'" (Mandela 1998:2). Basic rights include the right to life, equality, dignity, privacy, freedom of expression, religion and association, it also includes the right to education. Steyn (1997b:29) included *inter alia*, the right to own property, the right to participate in the making of decisions, the right to work and the right to take control of one's own life. These rights are essential in any democratic society and are not only interrelated, but also mutually supportive of each other. However, given the difficulty of introducing a human rights culture unknown in the history of South Africa, the GNU had to formulate strategies for the effective implementation of human rights norms, set clear targets and benchmarks for human rights promotion in South Africa, and define structures of accountability for government and for civil society. Even before the adoption of the final Constitution, Mandela (1994b:3) stated that although Human Rights belong to the people, and although the people are its best guardians, it is the task of government to ensure that the necessary institutions and mechanisms exist by means of which Human Rights could be enforced and protected. Whilst these rights form part of the Constitution and are therefore indisputable, the Bill of Rights also includes clauses that provide the means to protect and enforce these basic rights. Bray (1996:151), however, indicates that there is always a constant tension between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. This state of affairs was also underscored by Mandela (1994b:2) when he referred to the possibility of heated contests between the state and the citizens because of the nature, boundaries and justifiable limitations on fundamental Human Rights. He indicated that these contests would arise when rights were in conflict with each other, or with the implementation of a mandate given to Government by the People. While Mandela (1994b:2) argued that such a tension "should be interpreted as the flourishing of democracy and a critical contribution to the evolution of our

'Constitutional State"', Bray (1996:151) indicates that the balance between the competing claims of the power of the state and the freedom of the individual, is facilitated by a supreme Constitution and a Bill of Rights. Whilst the state has power in terms of the Constitution, such powers are limited not only by the Constitution itself, but in particular by the recognition of the rights of the individual. Conversely, however, individual rights are not only guaranteed by the Constitution, but also limited under specific circumstances, e.g. the right to privacy may be limited when a person is imprisoned for an offence. Proceeding from the assumption that human rights are integral to good government, the National Action Plan for Human Rights were thus adopted to involve government in an interactive relationship with structures of civil society.

It seems therefore that the process of establishing a rights-based South African society involves a confrontation with terms such as democracy, basic democratic principles and the protection of human rights. However, in order to grasp the meaning of these concepts people should be empowered, thus be educated. In this regard, Bray (1996:150) refers to the enormous task that lies ahead of education managers and educators/teachers to ensure that education structures, models, curricula and methods of certification reflect the democratic norms and values underlying the Constitution. This includes accepting the responsibility of cultivating democratic values, tolerance and the changing of attitudes. As Bray (1996:150) indicates, "in and through education, we all have to become protectors of human rights and freedoms". Although basic rights, as stipulated by the Constitution, include the right to education, the school as a social institution should first be transformed in such a way that the inculcation and practice of democratic values and the protection of human rights are indeed possible.

### **6.3 Transforming South African education**

While the 1994 "democratic breakthrough" captured the advance marked by the electoral victory, it simultaneously signalled the outstanding challenges to realise the overall transition from apartheid to a democracy. One of the major challenges was the transformation of the divisive, discriminatory, ineffective and inefficient state education system that was inherited from the apartheid era. Since South African educational institutions were for many decades part of the arena of political mobilisation and confrontation, the "democratic breakthrough" in South Africa introduced a situation whereby "[f]or the first time in South Africa's history, a government has the mandate to plan the development of the education and training system for the benefit of the

country as a whole and all its people" (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:17). This paramount task involved not only the creation of a transformative, democratic mission and ethos in the new departments of education, but also the creation of a just and equitable system providing open access to good quality education and training. It was envisioned that with the establishing of appropriate education and training, people could be empowered to participate effectively in all processes of the democratic society, including the building of a nation free from racial, gender and all other forms of discrimination. In this regard Njobe (1990:34) argues that since a *pedagogy of oppression* had been a distinctive feature in South Africa and the majority of South African still had to overcome epistemological oppression, the necessity for a *pedagogy of liberation* could not be debated. However, in order for education to play a liberatory role in the South African society, the system would have to be just and equitable. It should also contribute to improving the quality of delivery by developing a culture of efficiency and productivity and recognising difference and diversity. Makgoba (1995:2) summarises the transformation process as:

a deep process underlined by solid principles that will lead to the total and genuine liberation of white and black people in this part of the continent... [it] is the opportune time for all our institutions to take stock and ask hard, soul-searching and fundamental questions about who they are, which knowledge is crucial and important, what are the consequences of knowledge and research for future generations in the shaping of thought, values and society, what are the unique features of these institutions in Africa today?

### **6.3.1 Basic structure for a free and democratic South African education system**

Because the 1996 Constitution is to be understood as the supreme law of the country and since any law or act inconsistent with it will be of no force and effect, it is apparent that the transformation of South African education should first of all be understood in the light thereof. In this regard Nkondo (1998:33) indicates that the Constitution proceeds from the assumption that "every human being has the capacity and the will to determine, as individuals, their own destiny and even to endeavour to realise their independently determined destiny. The pursuit of the latter implies a further assumption, namely, that interdependence is the essence of political and social being. Law, even in the form of the Constitution, steps in as a specific human creation designed to define and regulate human interdependence in political and social life. Human beings do not exist for the sake of the Constitution but the Constitution is made for and in the name of human beings". The Constitution subsequently reveals not only a specific understanding and interpretation of human existence and life, but also the assumption that the survival of democracy is linked indissoluble to the rule of law. Proceeding from the assumption that the human being

has the capacity and the will to determine its own destiny, the right to education has been included in the Bill of Rights.

In Chapter 2 of the Constitution (1996:14) the right to education is expressed as follows:

- (1) Every person has the right -
  - (a) to basic education, including adult basic education; and
  - (b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively available and accessible.
- (2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonable practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account -
  - (a) equity;
  - (b) practicability; and
  - (c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.
- (3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent educational institutions that -
  - (a) do not discriminate on the basis of race;
  - (b) are registered with the state; and
  - (c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public institutional institutions.

While the Constitution has laid down the foundation of a democratic constitutional system based on freedom and equality, it also provided the basic structure for a free and democratic education system. As such it does not only embody the powers and the responsibility of the state with regard to the provision of compulsory basic education, but it guarantees and protects the right to education for all individuals, without distinction. Since they form the basic structure of a free and democratic education system, a detailed discussion of the rights is inevitable.

### **6.3.1.1 The right to basic education**

Basic education is considered a legal entitlement to which every person, (children as well as adults) have a claim. While, for children this right would be satisfied by the availability of schooling facilities by means of basic education programmes of acceptable quality, youth and adults would enrol in education and training programmes appropriate to their age and personal circumstances. Basic education seems to be linked to functional literacy, that is to be able to read, write, count, as well as to possess elementary knowledge of economics, culture and politics. Functional literacy can be obtained through education programmes for the General Education Certificate (GEC) (up to a grade 9-level) offered in schools to children, or through other forms of delivery to young people and adults (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:40; cf. also Bray 1996:152-153; Hartshorne 1999:113 and *South African Schools Act* 1996:3(1):6). The

inclusion of adult basic education, as well as the provision for further education complies with the Ministry of Education's definition of basic education in terms of "learning needs appropriate to the age and experience of the learner, whether child, youth or adult, men or women, workers, work seekers or self-employed" (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:40).

Against the background of the historic inadequacy of (black) school education, the guaranteeing of adult basic education as a right to all persons should be regarded as a form of redress. The further education level is allocated the developmental task to address the inadequacy of programmes at the senior secondary level and above, both in school and out of school, in the workplace, in other institutions, or by private study. It is stated that this level should be planned as a comprehensive, interlocking sector that provides a purposeful educative experience to learners at the post-compulsory phase. A modular curriculum of great variety comprising core general education and optional vocational or academic subjects should be provided and made accessible irrespective of age, place and time of delivery (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:32; cf. also *Education White Paper 4* 1998:6ff).

In terms of the right to basic education it is the duty of the state to provide basic education to all persons. In this regard Bray (1996:153) refers to important factors that should be taken into account:

- ♦ The standard of basic education which the state can "afford" depends on aspects such as *inter alia* the availability of educators, the standard of qualifications and expertise, the availability of physical facilities such as buildings and technology.
- ♦ The right to basic education does not necessarily imply *free* education. The cost of the provision of schooling for all children to the GEC level must be borne from public funds while basic education programmes for all young people and adults, however, would not be borne by public funds alone, but be shared among a variety of funding partners (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:40). In supplement to provincial budgets for schools, the need to mobilise additional resources for operating costs was recognised. Legally obligatory fees payable by all parents who can afford them was recommended.

### 6.3.1.2 Right to instruction in the language of choice

Given the heterogeneous and multilingual South African population, the incorporation of special

language provision for education in the Bill of Rights was of extreme importance for the establishing of a just and equitable education system. This section is subsequently aimed at protecting not only the choice of mother-tongue instruction, but also instruction in any other preferred language. This right is, however subject to reasonable practicability for the educational institution involved (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:42-43). The *South African Schools Act* (1996:8) provides, subject to the Constitution, that the medium of instruction may be determined by the governing body of a public school. It also states that no form of racial discrimination may be practised in the implementation of this policy. Bray (1996:154) however, raises a few relevant question with regard to language rights:

- ◆ how many students should there be in a school to make instruction (in a specific language) provided by the state, or the province, practicable?
- ◆ what is the role of parents of such a school in the district or region?
- ◆ what standard of instruction would be adequate for these students?
- ◆ can other pupils claim that they are discriminated against because the linguistic disadvantaged children are receiving more attention?

In the *Education White Paper 2* (1996:4) the Ministry made its position clear by stating that since it does not support language imperialism, the use of only one of the official languages as medium of instruction in public schools will never be promoted. No language community should therefore fear that the education system will be used to suppress its mother-tongue. However, it is clear that the Ministry is "vehemently opposed to the misuse of cultural and linguistic distinctiveness as a pretext or camouflage for the perpetuation of racial privilege in public school education" (*Education White Paper 2* 1996:4).

### 6.3.1.3 The right to freedom of religion

In the 1993 Constitution (cited in the *White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:40) the right to instruction in the language of choice was linked to the right to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture and religion. The new Constitution, however, includes in the Bill of Rights (1996:section 30 & section 31:15) only a general provision on freedom of religion, while specific principles relating to education are omitted:

Everybody has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights (section 30:15) and  
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with

other members of that community -

- (a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and the use of their language; and
- (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society (section 31:15).

Specific provisions concerning freedom of religion and education are made in the *White Paper on Education and Training* (1995:21), a document that preceded the adoption of the Constitution of 1996:

[p]arents have an inalienable right to choose the form of education which is best for their children...The parents' right to choose includes choice of the language, cultural or religious basis of the child's education, with due regard for the rights of others and the rights of choice of the growing child.

In the *South African Schools Act* (1996, section 7:8), issued after the adoption of the Constitution, it is also stated that:

[s]ubject to the *Constitution* and any applicable provincial law, religious observances may be conducted at a *public school* under the rules issued by the *governing body* if such observances are conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at them by *learners and members of staff* is free and voluntary.

Bray (1996:155) indicates that the term "equitable basis" implies the provision of equal opportunities for the observance of the different religious beliefs, possibly in proportion to the number of adherents. The attitude towards religious freedom and the state's active involvement in creating favourable circumstances for the practising of religious freedom is underscored by the fact that attendance at religious observance must be free and voluntary. Although it appears from the *White Paper on Education and Training*, as well as the *South African Schools Act* that religious activities may be part of the curriculum in state and state-aided schools, religious freedom in educational institutions is not guaranteed by the Constitution *per se*. Nzimande (Davis 1995a:1) states that while clauses guaranteeing the right to basic education and equal access to places of learning are important, the ANC is against clauses that could be interpreted as entrenching the *status quo* in schools. Considering the fact that a common culture and religion were used in apartheid South Africa as prerequisites for a particular type of schooling, omission of the clause providing the right to establish schools on the basis of a common religion from the Constitution, should be regarded in the light that it might impede the establishment of a non-racial and democratic education system.



### 6.3.1.4 Right to establish and maintain independent educational institutions

Schools that were formerly known as private schools in South Africa are henceforth to be known as independent schools. These schools are privately owned and are established and maintained at own cost. In addition, this right also includes the right of a learner to be educated at home, thus the right to "home-schooling". Independent schools and those offering home-schooling are further required by law to be registered by the head of the education department. For the purpose of registration, independent schools have to comply with the following conditions (*South African Schools Act 1996:28*; also *Education White Paper 2 1996:10*):

- (a) the standards to be maintained by such schools will not be inferior to the standards in comparable *public schools*;
- (b) the admission policy of the *school* does not discriminate on the grounds of race; and
- (c) the *school* complies with the grounds for registration as determined by the *Member of the Executive Council*, by notice in the Provincial Gazette.

The registration of a learner intending to receive education at home will be undertaken by the Head of the Department (*South African Schools Act 1996:30*) if he/she is satisfied that:

- (a) the registration is in the interest of the learner;
- (b) the education likely to be received by the learner at home -
  - (i) will meet the minimum requirements of the curriculum at public schools; and
  - (ii) will be of a standard not inferior to the standard of education provided at public schools;
 and
- (c) the parent will comply with any other reasonable conditions set by the Head of Department.

### 6.3.2 Principles for the reconstruction and development of education and training

Four pivotal principles are to drive the national policy for the reconstruction and development of education and training reflected in the 1995 *White Paper on Education and Training* (1995:21-22). These are *open access* to education, the principle of *equity*, improvement of *quality* and the creation of a *culture of accountability*. The application of these principles are, however, a complex matter since they have to assist the transformation process in two ways:

- ◆ The legacy of inequality and injustice in the South African schooling system has to be addressed and eradicated.
- ◆ An equitable, efficient, qualitatively sound and financially sustainable schooling system must be ensured for all South African learners (*Education White Paper 2 1996:6-7*).

In order to formulate education policy goals on the basis of defensible principles, these principles should not only be clearly defined, but their interrelatedness should also be indicated. It is only in

an attempt to attach meaning to these principles and by outlining values inherent in them, that they can guide, not only the process of redressing past inequalities, but also "the practical decisions which will be required in the course of drawing up legislation, in the process of negotiation with school governing bodies and teachers' organisations, and in the development of administrative arrangements to implement the new system" (*Education White Paper 2* 1996:7).

### 6.3.2.1 Open access to education

Essop (1995:1) recognises access to lifelong learning and training as a key principle and over-arching goal, central to the reconstruction and development of the South African education system. As such, provision of open access to education and training opportunities has been prioritised in the *White Paper on Education and Training* (1995:21) as one of the specific policy initiatives central to a new schooling system. The urgency of this matter should be linked to past discrimination in education and unequal access to "knowledge" due to the inferior system of black education. In this regard Fataar (1998:69) argues that the reconstruction of education after apartheid can only find proper expression if the state is committed to the provision of schooling to all South African children. Open access to education and training opportunities is, however, not only limited to children of school-going age, but also applies to pre-school children, youths and adults.

Identified as a basic human right and protected by the Bill of Rights, the right to basic education (cf. *infra*:6.3.1.1) can only be guaranteed when there exists unimpeded and open access to education and training opportunities for all. This means that equal access to basic education is guaranteed by implication in the Constitution. In terms of the provision of basic education, educational policy in South Africa seems to reach beyond the provision of schooling since the idea of lifelong learning is linked to an increasing range of learning possibilities that provide the means for learners to move from one learning context to another - open access to education and training opportunities must therefore offer greater flexibility to learners which means that the choice of what, where, when, how and at what pace to learn, should be that of the learner. By ensuring maximum flexibility for mobility between different levels of the formal and non-formal education and training system, individuals will be enabled to progress to higher levels of learning from any starting-point in the system. This will be made possible through a common system of qualifications and certification, namely the National Qualification Framework (NQF). The NQF

is based on a system of credits for learning outcomes achieved and assists in opening doors of opportunity for people "whose academic or career paths have been needlessly blocked because their prior knowledge (acquired informally or by work experience) has not been assessed and certified, or because their qualifications have not been recognised for admission to further learning, or employment purposes" (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:15; cf. also McGrath 1998:169ff and Morris 1996:5ff). The implication is that although greater articulation amongst post-secondary institutions and qualifications is important, access should rest not on the status of particular certificates, but rather on genuine assessments of competence, suitability and merit (NECC 1993:91).

Various important factors should be considered in connection with providing access to schooling:

- ♦ Open access is not unlimited access. Access can be limited in terms of factors that include "the physical capacity of the institution in terms of the applicable norms, the appropriateness of the educational programme for the applicant's needs, the applicant's gender in the case of single-sex schools, and the right to retain the specific character of an institution based on common language, culture or religion" (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:21 & 41).
- ♦ Plans for greater access should be conceptualised in the light of the constraining economic context that has a negative impact on the amount of funding available for educational reconstruction (Fataar 1998:69).
- ♦ Care should be taken that open access does not result in a mere qualitative expansion of schooling. If the expansion of access is not linked with addressing inadequate quality in existing schools, it can easily contribute to existing forms of inequality.

### 6.3.2.2 Principle of equity

The principle of equity is directly linked to the deploying of the state's resources in order to provide the same quality of learning opportunities for all South Africans. This is not only an inescapable duty of the government, but also calls for the utilisation of purposeful strategies for ensuring that the education system protects the rights of teachers and students to equitable treatment (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:21). Equitable treatment, however, requires, by implication, open access to learning opportunities to all South Africans. Schoeman (s.a.:75), however, argues that the principle of equity should carefully be distinguished from that

of equality in education. Whereas *equality* relates to the notion of the "same treatment for all", *equity* should be regarded as basic to every concept of justice, thus implying "fairness" that may entail different or unequal treatment. It can consequently be argued that an equitable education system should involve open or equal access, but should simultaneously be flexible in order to accommodate diversity and differences without discriminating. However, the mere opening of learning opportunities to all does not necessarily imply equity. Nor does the repeal of discriminatory legislation create the substantive conditions of real equality amongst all South Africans. Because of its systemic roots inherited from the apartheid era, the *redress* of inequalities is a prerequisite for a South African education system in accordance with the principle of equity.

There appears to be, with regard to the issue of *redress*, a close relation between equity, equality and affirmative action (AA). This connection is explained in the *Green Paper on a Conceptual Framework for Affirmative Action and the Management of Diversity in the Public Service* (1997:11; see also *White Paper on Education and Training 1995:74* and *White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service 1998:3ff*):

In the workplace, AA, has become the drive to materialise the value of equality. It seeks to achieve this through the removal of any conditions that violate the right to equality. As such, equality, is the point around which AA turns, where it has great resonance for all AA matters. Through AA's pursuit of equality, it becomes a tool of social justice in civil society and the workplace. In essence it is a tool to bridge the gap between the injustices of the past and a democratic future.

An equitable education system can therefore only be established when the quest for AA is located in the acknowledgement and eradication of the actual conditions that generate inequality e.g. in the teaching profession. Within the context of education and training, AA should thus be seen as a means to enable those historically disadvantaged educationists and educators to compete with their advantaged counterparts. As such, AA programmes should involve the adoption of different selection standards of ability or potential for distinct groups of candidates for enrolment at teacher training institutions, as well as for employment in the teaching profession. AA measures subsequently entail specific plans and efforts involving preferential treatment in appointments and promotions, as well as accelerated development and advancement. In this regard AA in education and training can to a certain extent, correct racial and other imbalances or inequities in social spending and the distribution of social capital (cf. NECC 1993:90).

### 6.3.2.3 Principle of equality

One of the most persistent themes in the history of South African education is the notion of *equal educational opportunities*. For many decades apartheid education was driven by the assumption that although people are equal, they should be divided into different nations (and attend different schools) - hence the slogan *separate but equal*. *Prima facie* evidence, however, portrays a picture of grave inequalities during this period (cf. infra:4.5.3.2). In this regard Mncwabe (1990:32; cf. also Schoeman s.a. 78) refers to a survey of the social foundations of South African education during the years of apartheid, which exposed the potency and determining role of social class membership in setting inequalities. Exaggerated emphasis on cultural diversity, while disregarding commonalities and simultaneously enforcing supposed incompatibilities between Western and African cultures, resulted in a discriminatory education system. However, rather than equating equality with white middle class conditions, the achievement of a new society and political dispensation, based on non-racialism and democracy in a united South Africa was a priority of the national struggle (cf. Mashamba 1991:23-24). Open access to education and training opportunities subsequently implied equal access to educational institutions not based on the former white perception of education, but to newly transformed non-discriminatory institutions.

The *Green Paper on a Conceptual Framework for Affirmative Action and the Management of Diversity in the Public Service* (1997:11-12) distinguishes between *formal equality* and *substantive equality*. Involving the repeal of laws that result in discrimination and segregation, *formal equality* prescribes *equal treatment of all people* regardless of circumstances (including race, gender and disability), on the understanding that all bear the same rights. The implication of formal equality for education and training relates to all South Africans having the right to basic education. This means that doors to education and training opportunities are *equally* open to all. Formal equality, however, recognises only the existence of the equal rights of all, while entrenched structural inequalities that continue to block access, participation and enjoyment of people's rights, are ignored. This limitation of formal equality has, however, to be supplemented by the application of *substantive equality*. While formal equality recognises the right to basic education and equal access, substantive equality also necessitates the acknowledgement and the eradication of existing inequalities in education as a result of discriminatory laws. The implication is that equality in education and training involves both formal equality and substantive equality:

while substantive equality presupposes formal equality, the latter needs to be supplemented by substantive equality. Equality in the South African system of education and training therefore not only requires transformation in terms of legislation and policy, but also entails the levelling of an unequal playing-field.

Since the termination of the power of the apartheid regime did not imply that equality in education would be immediately attainable, attention should be drawn to three important issues relating to the need to achieve equality in the South African education and training system:

- ♦ Historic and systematic inequalities and injustices within the realm of South African education must not only be exposed, but special emphasis should be placed on the redress of these inequalities. This implies the utilisation of purposeful strategies for ensuring an equitable education and training system where inequalities no longer prevail (cf. *infra* 7.3.2.2 on *affirmative action*).
- ♦ Since the process of exposing and redressing a legacy of inequality is no short term project, open access and equality of education requires "compensating additional provision of equipment or resources for children from disadvantaged backgrounds: that schools must spend more on the poor than on the rich" (NECC 1993:41). In the quest for equality in education, the link between equality and equity should once again be highlighted: although the same treatment for all (equality) is required, fairness (equity) may entail different treatment. Because existing disparities and backlogs still impact heavily on South African education, the fundamental difference between "having a right" and "enjoying a right" (Jeevanantham in Schoeman s.a.:80) should be acknowledged. The ideal of equality of opportunity can only be realised when existing inequalities are eradicated and the victims of such inequalities are empowered to use the education and training opportunities that have been opened up to them. This relates directly to the first issue, since potential learners can only be empowered to use learning opportunities once the playing-field has been levelled by means of explicit and well-structured AA measures.
- ♦ The third issue relates to a balance that should be established between equality and economic growth (cf. *supra*:6.3.2.4 on *globalisation*). According to Vilakazi (1998:80) one of the greatest problems in South African education is the current lack of synchronisation between the existing education system and development policy and the development needs of the country. He argues that "development is the development of the human personality; therefore, in capital accumulation, the development of human

capital is actually the most crucial input". Because the South African economy was in the past controlled by the white minority, the black majority was only integrated into the industrial economy insofar as they were needed as unskilled workers. The implication was that due to the grave inequalities generated by the apartheid education system, a very low ceiling was set for the development and growth potential of the economy, thus of human capital. Education policy, as well as the education system was subsequently not oriented to developing the African population as human capital.

Exclusive focus on equality, however, leads to a situation where the formulation of education policies are abstracted from the particular conditions in which they have to be applied. Simultaneously, the elaboration of such policies takes place in isolation from not only the concrete educational reality in which they have to operate, but also the development programmes that may be appropriate to transform educational conditions. Thus, if the formulation of education policies does not take into account the needs of economic growth, particularly with respect to the nature of skills available in the labour market, education and training may eventually contribute to the aggravation of existing tension and anomalies between education and training and the labour market. Badat (1998:26) continues by stating that it cannot be accepted that equality of education, on its own, is the key to the achievement of equality in society. Neither can it be assumed that the equalising of access to education and training opportunities will necessarily have a transformative effect on the economy or will produce systematic levelling effects on class, race, gender and other forms of inequalities.

While equality in education and training should be balanced with economic development, exclusive focus on the latter might not only have a limiting effect on the shaping of education policies, but could effectively delay the equalisation process itself. The contention that economic growth necessarily entails equality is not self-evident - the general rise in living standards as the result of "economic growth" might be accompanied by an intensification of inequalities among the people. An exclusive focus on education for economic development also leads to a violation of the integrity of education institutions, since it reduces the primary functions of such institutions (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.7A). In this regard Schoeman (s.a.:81; cf. also Visagie 1995:10) warns against the instrumentalising of education for non-educational purposes, which places demands on educational institutions that exceed their specific spheres of competence. Thus, if economic demands are to become the sole aim of education, it would amount to abolishing the legitimate

claim of educational institutions to their relative and specific autonomy.

With regard to determining the location of education in the broader society, especially relating to economic needs, it becomes apparent that both the claims of equality (redress of inequalities) and economic growth should be recognised. Thus, while the elimination of the objective of equality in favour of economic growth, or *vice versa*, cannot be sustained, a viable policy for an education and training system has to ultimately counterbalance equality policies with economic policies, although never at the expense of the *central mission* of educational institutions.

#### 6.3.2.4 Principle of quality

The notion of education standards has always been a rather contentious issue in South African education discourses. For many decades so-called Western cultural values were not only regarded as the unchallenged source of everything that was culturally desirable, but these values were also accepted as the origin of exclusive and ultra-refined standards in terms of which curricula, syllabi, training courses and educational programmes had to be assessed. Linked to this perception, was the argument that there can be no debate about the standards of South African education, since they are internationally accepted (Visagie 1995:8-9).

Thus, while the clinging to so-called international standards provided academic prestige to South African education at all levels, it was at the same time utilised as a mechanism for sustaining structures of domination. The reconstruction and development of South African education subsequently calls for the naturalisation of Western values and standards. Makgoba (1998:49) is of the opinion that such a naturalisation is to be done through Africanisation, which not only involves a mind-set shift from the European to an African paradigm, but especially the defining, interpreting and transmitting of African thought, philosophy, identity and culture in education and training. However, while the *White Paper on Education and Training* (1995:21) places emphasis on the improvement of the quality of education, the call for Africanisation is linked, within opposition circles, to the lowering of standards and the decline of quality.

Makgoba (1998:54) explains a standard as a benchmark against which something is assessed or measured. As such a standard is a dynamic entity that exhibits the components of *precision*, *quantifiability* and *comparability*. Because educational standards in South Africa were used to



entrench the separation between pupils and students in terms of race, it becomes clear that the formulation of such standards were dictated by the socio-political order of the day. However, although educational standards are the outcome of a complex formulation of historic, socio-political and cultural factors, they rarely acquire precision since they lose their meaning if the socio-political relationship has changed. Thus, while the South African socio-political order has changed, standards accepted during the apartheid dispensation bear very little resemblance (relevance) to the current South African reality and its unique problems. Thus, to regard a particular (Western) interpretation of a standard as a manifest truth and a universal norm, relativises its dynamic and flexible nature. Since a rigid interpretation of standards does not take the majority culture into account, as was the case in South African education, then such standards may become irrelevant for the particular environment in which such a culture functions. Thus, in order to improve quality in education and training services, academic standards must not be the mere copying of so-called universally accepted standards that have little reflection on the South African reality (cf. Makgoba 1998:57-58). The issue of academic standards in South Africa should be liberated from the apartheid mentality of race, exclusion and discrimination - it should rather be formulated by South Africans themselves, taking into account the African culture, the African identity, but especially the unique (South) African reality.

However, the issue of setting standards and improving quality should never be divorced from the implications of globalisation for South Africa. The process of globalisation should be regarded in economic terms (economic development and economic growth) since it involves a process aimed at transforming the world into a single world market (Nzimande 1998:Foreword). Although the relation between equality in education and training opportunities and economic growth and development within the South African context has already been elucidated (cf. *infra*:6.3.2.3), an attempt should be made to place South African education and training within the global context. Exclusive focus on addressing local needs such as *inter alia* human resource development, equity policies, redress of the apartheid legacy and improvement of quality in education and training does not counteract the unavoidable impact of globalisation on the South African society. The opposite can equally be true: by exclusively concentrating on the process of globalisation, the emphasis on global policy trends may supersede transformative concerns within the South African education and training system. In this regard Pam Christie (1998:114) argues in favour of capturing the interplay between global and local factors. She also indicates a similarity between local and international debates: to be able to develop economically South Africa requires better

educated workers who are acquainted with mathematics and science as required by technological developments. The setting of standards and improving of the quality of South African education and training services should consequently not only involve the redress of educational and economic imbalances, but also the integration of global policy trends.

### **6.3.3 Development initiatives and education transformation**

The success of the proposed integrated education system in South Africa was envisioned to rely on the introduction of an outcome-based approach, as well as the implementation of the new Curriculum 2005.

Contrary to the traditional content-based approach, the main focus in South African education and training would no longer only be on what is being learnt (the content), but also on the process of learning and the results (outcomes) at the end of each learning process. As such, an outcome is regarded as the end product of a clearly defined process carried out by the learners. As indicated by Elen, Louw, Rossell, Schippers, Van Wyk & Van Wyk (1999:13) the realisation of an outcome is demonstrated at the culminating point of the learner's learning experience. The implication is that the demonstration of an outcome must be of a high quality in order to indicate whether significant learning has taken place. The South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) played a significant role in the implementation of the new curriculum policies. Part of its task involved the identification and formulation of eight critical outcomes that are regarded as essential and applicable to all learning in South Africa (cf. *Wits EPU: Quarterly Review of Education and Training in South Africa* 1996:2). These critical outcomes were defined not only in terms of generic skills and knowledge, but also relates to the ability to understand a task theoretically, to apply skills and knowledge, as well as to transfer the latter to another context. It is being envisioned that the achievement of the critical outcomes will ensure that learners gain the knowledge, skills and values that will allow them to contribute to their own success, as well as the success of their community and the nation as a whole.

It is apparent that OBE challenges the polarisation between different orders of learning and knowledge, between theory and practice, between the ability to think abstractly and concrete applications (Greenstein 1998:157). While outcomes are regarded as an integral component of learning by complementing curricular content and learning methods in the new education and

training system, OBE, rests on the premises that:

- ♦ all students can learn and succeed;
- ♦ success breeds success; and
- ♦ schools control the conditions of success (Elen *et al.* 1999:11; Naicker 1999:47).

Although content is not prioritised in the OBE system, it cannot simply be regarded as incidental. In this regard Jeevanatham (1999:52) indicates that because content is the vehicle for the attainment of pre-determined outcomes, subjects ought to interact with the content since they have to be constructed in the process of achieving desired outcomes. However, given the plea for the Africanisation (contextualisation) of South African education (cf. Makgoba 1998:49ff; also Mncwabe 1994:15 and Sebidi 1995:17), as well as the need to address international trends, a particular South African version of OBE was required (Elen *et al.* 1999:11-12; also *Curriculum 2005, Implementation OBE - 4, Philosophy* 1997:17-18,22). The Department of Education subsequently adopted the radical *transformative OBE approach* since it seemed the most suitable approach to abolish existing remnants of the apartheid era through radical and rapid change. It was believed that since existing syllabi still reflected a legacy of institutionalised racism and inequality, the adoption of a transformative OBE would comply with the need for national transformation in South Africa. This meant that the South African education and training system would have to be radically transformed in order to produce learners who could contribute to the vision of a transformed South African society. The implication is that because syllabi originating from the apartheid dispensation were regarded as a constraint on change, critical outcomes (knowledge, skills and attitudes required to function as critical citizens) were to be accepted as the sole determinants of a new curriculum. Schools were thus to be granted the freedom to choose any subject content, the only prerequisite being that learners should be empowered with the knowledge, attitudes/values and skills that would contribute to the reconstruction of South Africa as a democratic and equal society.

### 6.3.3.1 Curriculum 2005

Although OBE can be realised in a variety of different curricula, Curriculum 2005 was proposed in March 1997 as the instrument to implement the South African version of OBE in formal schooling. This was introduced in grades 1 and 7 in 1998, with envisaged final implementation in 2003.

According to the Minister of Education, professor S.M.E. Bengu, the aims of Curriculum 2005 are the equipping of "all learners with the knowledge, competencies and orientations needed for success after they leave school or have completed their training. Its guiding vision is that of a thinking, competent future citizen" (*Curriculum 2005. Lifelong learning for the 21st century* 1997:Foreword). This implies that the revolutionary move from objectives to outcomes is committed to the establishment of a culture of lifelong learning for all South Africans. In this regard the close connection between OBE and Curriculum 2005 becomes apparent: through the integration of education and training and its relevance for local and global needs, Curriculum 2005 would assist in cultivating a culture of lifelong learning in formal schooling. In addition the OBE approach in education and training services also aims to provide for the provision of lifelong learning opportunities to adults and out-of-school youths. The latter underscores the ANC's insistence that the emphasis on "further education and training must be shifted to equip people with skills to do a job and the ability to adapt to lifelong learning" (*ANC Parliamentary Bulletin* 11 September 1998). Since the new curriculum is no longer subjected to time constraints, the doors of education and training are open to all, irrespective of age, race, creed, gender and colour. Individuals (adults and out-of-school youths) that were deprived from access to education or quality education as a result of inequalities due to the apartheid system, will now be able to enter into an integrated system that is flexible in allowing the cut across traditional divisions of skills and knowledge. Because the integration of education and learning involves the linking of one level of learning to another, individuals are not only permitted to move through the levels by accumulating appropriate combinations of credits, but successful learners are enabled to progress to higher levels without restriction of any starting-point in the education and training system (cf. *White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:26; also *Outcomes based education* 1997:14-15). Education (including training) is consequently no longer regarded as a product, but rather as a lifelong process in which every learner has to accept responsibility for his/her own beliefs, actions and thoughts. Although the rationale behind the integration of education and training can be justified as the eradication of the gap between theory and practice, Bak (1999:2) issues the warning that the distinction between education and training should not be completely erased. While education is more a case of cultivating the humanity of the people, training has an explicit goal since it entails training for a specific occupation. Care should therefore be taken that OBE does not obfuscate this distinction and would become a mere instrument to meet economic demands (cf. also *infra*:6.3.2.4). On the contrary, the transformation of South African education and training, thus also the integration of global influences into a texture of local concerns, should

always be counterbalanced by considerations regarding the central mission of educational institutions.

In rejection of the rigid division between academic and applied subjects, education is made more reality-based through learning programmes which include learning and teaching activities that cut across traditional divisions of skills and knowledge. A shift from the traditional curriculum and its separate subjects to a flexible structure of appropriate learning programs and learning areas has been devised. Although based on national guidelines, learning programmes not only replace what has traditionally been known as syllabi, but teachers are enabled to develop their own learning programmes "as long as they take into account the various kinds of outcomes and complement the needs of the learners" (*Curriculum 2005. Lifelong Learning for the 21st century* 1997:13).

This means that learners' individual needs are accommodated through various teaching and learning strategies and assessment tools. Instructional design is subsequently an ongoing process of reflection and analysis that remain focused on meeting the learner's needs. This shift to learner-centred schooling includes the enabling of learners to design their own learning options and assessments. Assistance to the learner is therefore no longer defined in terms of traditional views, of school, learning or teaching, but is provided to meet the needs of the learner in totality (*Outcomes based education* 1997:18). Learning programmes should therefore provide for progression, continuity, transition, relevance, differentiation and coherence. In this regard, however, Bak (1999:2-3) draws the attention to the important distinction between "school" or "formal" knowledge and "everyday" or "indigenous" knowledge. While it was pointed out that schooling aims to learn *different* frameworks of thinking in order to make sense of the world, learners would still have to know certain "facts" (cf. also Jeevanatham 1999:52). While nothing can be delivered without content, the selection of content cannot be done uncritically and simplistically in terms of "relevance". Bak (1999:3) argues for a balance in teaching styles, which means that oral work should not dominate over written and reading work, and neither should group work dominate over individual work, while activity learning should be balanced with expository learning.

#### **6.3.4 Policy and its implementation: effects on South African education**

The commitment of the South African government to a process of fundamental restructuring

included the promised intention of bringing about greater development, equity, participation and redress in South African education and training. Within the realm of school-typical education, especially black education, the year 1994 was met with the expectation of equal education for all. Contrary to a disastrous 1993, which was characterised by many strikes and little schooling, organisations undertook the responsibility in encouraging not only students to go back to school, but parents were also urged to take an interest in the education of their children (Khalo 1994:22). COSAS circulated an open document that entailed a detailed code of conduct for students, teachers and the community, also giving an indication of existing problems in South African institutions, mainly concentrated in (black) township schools. Issues covered in this document included punctuality, learning and teaching, respect and conduct and the security of schools, as well as school property. A definite appeal was made for the reinstating of discipline, the empowerment of teachers and heads of departments and the expulsion of students that were guilty of serious crimes such as rape, the stabbing of teachers and students, and arson. Mahlomula Kekana, regional chairperson of COSAS, was quoted (Rantsekeng 1994b:25) stating that the "culture of respect for adults has been thrown away. All this is done under the pretext of being engaged in the struggle for a better education".

The above-mentioned were encouraged by the fact that a newly elected government not only symbolised the end of apartheid, but introduced a new era through the establishment of a unitary education system that were to prepare people for total human liberation. Mncwabe (1994:15) describes this envisaged unitary education system as representative of all the people of South Africa, the result of consultation with all of the major parties concerned with education and who were given an opportunity to participate in decisions relating to policy on a national level.

Under the pressure of expected radical transformation, the first five years of the new democratic South African government saw, *inter alia*, the reconstruction of 19 education departments into a single education department, as well as and the production of a series of White Papers on Education by the Ministry of Education. In 1996 the White Papers were followed by the South African Schools Act and the National Education Policy Act. Nzimande (1996:15) couples the adoption of the South African Schools Act (1996) with the repealing of "several racist education Acts based on the Verwoerdian blueprint of preparing whites for domination and relegating blacks to subservience". While this Act introduced compulsory education for all, as well as the establishment of equal and non-discriminatory principles of access to pupils, it also introduced the

elimination of the affluent Model C-schools (cf. *infra*:4.5.4.2). The publication of the SAQA Act (1996) should however, be considered the focal point of reforms to the education system since it provides a framework for the transformation of education. Curriculum review culminated in the proposal of Curriculum 2005 (1997), while 1998 witnessed the implementation of the first phase thereof.

From the foregoing exposition it is clear that various policy instruments confirm the government's commitment to remove existing inequalities. Within the period of transition, educational policies were thus rapidly changed, reformulated and adapted to the new South African context and dynamics - the envisaged liberation of apartheid education was subsequently set into motion. However, although substantial ground on policy transformation had been covered, the determining factor lies in the implementation process. Not only is the intricate relationship between policy formulation and implementation fundamental to the transitional process, but the balance of this relationship with *the people's* expectations of transformation is also significant.

It should further be indicated that the ANC's pre-election policy documents were drawn up after extensive participation and consultation with supporters, and thus represented visionary, symbolic policies committing the ANC to development, equity and redress (De Clercq 1998:150). However, after the euphoria of the success of the elections, the inauguration of President Mandela and the appointment of the first Cabinet of the GNU, the ANC, was and still is confronted with the sobering realities of addressing the expectations of those who have placed it in power. There is little doubt that the political urgency of transformation placed the new government under enormous pressure to eradicate existing inequalities in order to establish a non-racial and democratic South African society. However, while policies on educational transformation provided the necessary framework for, and indications of extensive proposals for the eradication of inequalities, these policies still had to be translated into practice. Thus, having designed the basic structure for a free and democratic South African education system (cf. *infra*:6.3.1), and guided by the principles for the reconstruction and development of such a system (cf. *infra*:6.3.2), the South African government faced the complicated task of establishing a sustainable relation between policy and practice. As Davis (1995b:2) indicated, the Minister of Education was caught within the cross-currents of the transition; between massive expectations and the need to fiscal discipline; between the urgent need to deliver and the excruciatingly slow pace of implementation. The years following the 1994 elections would consequently be crucial in

determining whether education transformation was being managed successfully. Thus, in order to determine the nature of educational transformation, the transformative impact of education policies and legislation on *inter alia* the school, the relation between policy and practice within the transitional context should subsequently be considered.

#### **6.3.4.1. Policy and the curriculum**

Education transformation should be viewed in relation to the fact that the struggle was shaped by a social structure characterised by severe geographic, economic and social inequalities of race and class (Badat 1998:14-15). Thus, while these inequalities urged the struggle for the liberation of education, it also provided the basis of understanding that all inequalities had to be eradicated before a democratic and non-racial education system could be established. It can therefore be argued that a close connection exists between the expectations of those who put the ANC in power and the proposed policies for educational transition.

An area that was perpetrated by injustices is that of school curricula and syllabi. For many decades state-prescribed curricula for schools contributed to sustaining relations of domination. While facts and states of affairs were distorted in order to serve the apartheid ideology, they were also foreign to the interests, and aspirations of the majority of students. The implication was that because curricula promoted the needs of a white minority and simultaneously insulated white South African pupils from criticism against the prevailing ideology, they became the target of vehement criticism among black communities (cf. *infra*:4.5.3.2). The division in South African education between "white superior education" and "black inferior education" was also reflected in the curricula. Existing curricula were consequently no longer acceptable, and given the commitment of the Ministry of Education to build a system of education and training with which all South Africans could identify, an overhaul of curricula was imperative.

Extensive interdepartmental discussions (Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labour) in 1995 and 1996 led to the setting of the basic framework for future curriculum development. The emergence of the SAQA Act not only embodied new curriculum thinking, but signified profound change in a short period of time. The change was, however, not concrete in terms of implementation on a school level as most of the material dealt with structures and principles rather than with the actual content of learning and the production of new national textbooks.



Major changes at this stage rather related to the setting of a framework for curriculum change. While this might be regarded as a remarkable achievement given the short time since the ANC's coming into power on April 1995, the question should be asked whether the adoption of new education policy documents made provision for authentic participation? It seems that most stakeholders in education and training were accommodated on the board of SAQA, with members drawn from unions, teachers' organisations, business, national and provincial departments, and formal and informal education and training providers. Representatives of women, youth and students were however conspicuously absent from the list of initial appointments (*Wits EPU: Quarterly Review of Education and Training in South Africa* 1996:2).

The series of curriculum policy documents that were initially published as "discussion documents" by the national Department of Education included little reference to outcome-based education (Jansen 1999a:7). Teachers subsequently complained that they were not consulted in the course of developing the OBE approach. Although they were involved through special committees at national as well as provincial levels in working out the practical implications of OBE, they were not involved in its initial conceptualisation (Jansen 1999a:8). The decision to adopt OBE, however, relates directly to a close working relationship between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labour.

The introduction of Curriculum 2005 as the vehicle to implement OBE is also regarded by Jansen (1999a:9) as problematic. He refers to a weak linking of OBE and Curriculum 2005 in official documents and discourses. While Curriculum 2005 was officially launched in March 1997, it was at the same time announced that OBE would be introduced in grades 1 and 7 classrooms in January 1998. This overhasty introduction of OBE subsequently led to anxiety amongst teachers (Menell 1997:5): they were subjected to a series of popular documents explaining OBE and a one-week information session for grade 1 teachers, shortly before the implementation of OBE in a selection of pilot schools in each of the nine provinces. However, when considering that effective implementation of curriculum transformation presupposes a clear understanding and preparation of teachers, and since OBE involves a radical paradigm shift from content-based learning to outcome-based learning, can teachers be expected to successfully implement OBE after only 1 week's training? The orientation of thousands of teachers annually is without doubt an enormous undertaking that will have to be done by subject/curriculum advisors under enormous pressure. The question remains however, whether the hasty implementation of OBE

and Curriculum 2005 had not been enforced for the sake of radical transformation at the cost of quality education?

Schreuder (1999:126) also warns that although post-1994 education policy documents represent proposals for the eradication of inequalities, neither teachers nor communities were adequately informed of the key elements of the new curriculum. Schreuder continues to warn that the urging for a "paradigm shift" cannot be achieved by introducing and enforcing new policies. Prior to the implementation of Curriculum 2005 numerous concerns were named: funding shortages, training backlogs and staff vacancies were not only piling up, but teachers also complained that classes were too large. It was also anticipated that the latter could pose a serious threat to the implementation of OBE, since it would add pressure on the teacher (Naicker 1999:63). One of the major concerns was the timeous training of teachers. Mahomed, head of Gauteng's Department of Curriculum and Teacher Development, pleaded for more time to train teachers to understand the new curriculum (Eveleth 1997b:1). It was feared that less-trained teachers and their pupils were going to be left behind if the process of implementation goes to fast. Subsequently, in May 1997 calls were made by some education departments on the national government to scale down on plans to implement the new curriculum in both grades 1 and 7. The national Department of Education thus realised that the provinces were lacking the capacity to meet proposed timeframes and in June 1997, Bengu was forced to limit the curriculum's launch to grade 1 only, postponing the phase-in for additional grades until 1999.

In the Free State Province, Curriculum 2005 was implemented without learning materials and textbooks from the national Department of Education. In 1997 the "Suid-Afrikaanse Onderwysunie" (SAOU), a union to which mainly former Model C-schools were affiliated, initiated work sessions for teachers in the Free State Province and developed Afrikaans learning material. While these materials were being used by traditional affluent schools, black schools were still battling with pamphlets they had received from the Free State Department of Education. It was also reported that the training of teachers at the district offices was not sufficient since teachers were still not familiar with the way in which to implement the new curriculum (Krüger & Horn 1998:1). Although the national Department of Education attempted to kick-start the phase-in by providing emergency training and materials, half of the primary schools in some provinces had ignored the launch of Curriculum 2005. The envisioned three-month period for the start-up, and which initially cost R25-million was now to run for the

entire school year of 1998, costing up to R80-million. As Duffy (1998c:1) indicates, the department's decision to seek maximum involvement from the provinces backfired. Because it was physically impossible to train so many people so quickly, the department had started to draft NGO's to provide teacher training and support.

It seems from the mismatch between the new democratic framework and the South African realities on ground-level that the translation of policy into practice is not an unproblematic and smooth process that simply requires control by a small group of experts who claim to have the knowledge. Garson (1999a:2) refers to another alarming gap that is emerging between the country's policy framework and the reality - because provinces have neither the money nor the capacity to properly train teachers, it can be expected that teachers will simply carry on teaching the old subjects in the old way.

The plea for high-quality pre-service and in-service training for teachers is however not limited to those teachers who still have to be eased into OBE. The President's Educational Initiative Research Project reports on the implementation of OBE:

teachers who lack proper knowledge of their subjects are so confused about what Curriculum 2005 requires of them that they have abandoned the traditional 'three R's' approach and not replaced it with anything resembling outcomes-based education. Many are not even teaching basic reading or numeracy in the foundation phase. They are locking away perfect good textbooks because they do not have outcomes-based education scrawled all over them. Yet because teachers' knowledge of content is so poor, they are unable to replace the old with much else. They simply cannot do what Curriculum 2005 requires of them, like design their own learning programmes and develop their own assessment strategies. Their inadequate content knowledge and failure to come to grips with Curriculum 2005 are having a negative impact on their pupils, who are suffering in both the lower and higher grades (Garson 1999b:1).

It thus appears that Curriculum 2005 had not only become a problem child, but that 1997 was a disastrous year for education. In 1997 the *Weekly Mail & Guardian* (23 December 1997:2) indicated that the introduction of Curriculum 2005 was not only hampered by the fact that the provinces did not have cash, but that many black schools in the townships and the rural areas were overcrowded and barely functioning. One year later the same newspaper (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 24 December 1998:2) reported that while a cash shortage stymied the introduction of Curriculum 2005, the formerly disadvantaged schools still remained significantly disadvantaged. It seems that although Bengu committed himself to thorough participation and a strategy of moving at a slow pace, the opposite appears to be true. As stated previously the timeframes for the implementation of Curriculum 2005 appear to be not only over-hasty, but also to the detriment of South African education. Although the doors to education and training have been

opened to all South Africans, it seems that the principles of equity and quality have become victims of a political urgency to radical reform. Disadvantaged black schools continue to be disadvantaged and the contrast between advantaged and disadvantaged schools remains: while many children spend significant periods of time surfing the Internet for research purposes, most others are still grappling to get their hands on basics such as textbooks and stationary.

Problems surrounding the implementation of Curriculum 2005, however not only relate to unrealistic timeframes, but educators are also not given the opportunity to experiment with a clear set of guidelines within the context of curriculum development. Instead educators are constrained by highly technical interpretations of key concepts of Curriculum 2005, that are advanced as prerequisites for the only *bona fide* direction that should be followed to ensure the successful implementation of the proposed curriculum (Schreuder 1999:126; also De Klerk 2000:4 and Jansen 1999b:147ff). Asked whether schooling in South Africa was making progress, Thulare (1997:4) significantly answered: "Yes, but it is not inside the classroom: it is outside".

Although the answer to the above-mentioned question has not changed, new hopes were raised when Kader Asmal was appointed as the new Minister of Education in 1999. Having to deal with the heritage of Curriculum 2005, and although Asmal did commit himself to outcome-based education, he acknowledged that the hasty implementation of Curriculum 2005 had been a mistake. However, although it was decided after deliberation that schools must proceed with the implementation of grades 3 and 7, Asmal adopted an aggressive approach to the solution of education problems by appointing a committee to review Curriculum 2005. The task of this committee was, among other things, to devise steps to implement OBE in grades 4 and 8, to develop strategies to strengthen the implementation of the curriculum and to increase the level of understanding of OBE. Addressing the committee, Asmal (cited in Mboyane 2000b:14; cf. also Asmal 2000b:2) admitted that the implementation of OBE had not been thoroughly contemplated: "[i]mmediately after elections, the first thing to happen was an attempt to eradicate from our syllabi all notions of racism and sexism. On reflection, some of this may have been too rushed, we may have been too hasty".

#### **6.3.4.2 Funding of education**

Although it was emphasised in the ANC's Policy Framework for Education and Training in 1994 (Pampallis 1998:1) that "[t]he absolute priority will...be the introduction of ten years of free and

compulsory general education", no reference was made in the South African Constitution of 1996 that basic education would be free (cf. *infra*:6.3.1). The period prior to the adoption of the Constitution, was thus marked with confusion reigning over school fees and contributions. The national Ministry of Education's introduction of "free education" for grade ones only, as well as the introduction of school fees and school fund contributions at government schools (cf. *infra*:6.3.1.1 on *funding system for public schooling*), was met with resentment. Confused by pre-election promises and what was understood by the right to *basic* education, a student alluded that "[w]e as students were excited by news that free and compulsory education from Grade 1 up to Std 10 would be implemented but that seems to be a far-fetched notion...I thought that this free and compulsory education would be extended to tertiary institutions" (Radebe 1995:16). COSAS and the NECC condemned the payment of school fees and contributions to school funds as "exploitation" of parents by principals.

It appears that the problem surrounding school funds and school fees relate to confusion regarding the responsibility of both the government and the community to the school. Community involvement in schooling relates to the liberation of education from apartheid and the establishment of a process (People's Education) that could lay the foundation for a future education system in which the whole community would be involved (cf. Kruss 1988:17). This perception was underscored in the *White Paper on Education and Training* (1995:21) when it was stated that the "rehabilitation" of "schools and colleges must go hand in hand with the restoration of the ownership of these institutions to their communities through the establishment and empowerment of legitimate, representative governance bodies". Against this background the Department of Education argued that it was not only the government's responsibility to maintain schools, but also that of the community. The payment of school fees were therefore to be regarded as the contribution of the parental community to assist in the daily maintenance of schools. However, Mahlomola Kekana, acting chief administrator of COSAS was quoted saying (Rantsekeng 1995:2) that "free and compulsory education was not a question of election promises but something that people had laid down their lives for". COSAS's view was not shared by the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) who made a clear distinction between school fees that are mandatory for acceptance into a school and school funds democratically decided upon by the parents for the maintenance of the school (cf. *Education White Paper 2* 1996:22). While COSAS and the NECC were convinced that the Minister of Education's budget should provide for the daily maintenance of schools, SADTU argued that

since the government could not cater for everything, schools had a responsibility to find ways of raising funds, and one way was to ask parents for contributions (Rantsekeng 1995:2).

The Ministry subsequently has to find a balance between the expectations of the majority of South Africans who have not only been deprived of quality education for many decades and can hardly afford to pay for education, and the reality of spiralling funding shortfalls threatening the transformation of South African schools. This means that because of the shortage of government funds for education even the poorest communities are expected to contribute to the essential needs of the school (costs of water, electricity and telephones). The implication is that since such a big percentage of the parental corps cannot afford to contribute financially, the principle of compulsory education, as well as children's right to a basic education might be threatened.

Although in the first (1994-1995) budget education was given the largest share of the government's expenditure, it soon became clear that this budget had to be cut by R221 million. While the national Department of Education is responsible for determining broad policy, provincial departments remain responsible for the implementation of these policies. The setting up of provincial departments, in order to replace the old ethnically based departments of the apartheid era, already claimed a huge chunk of the budget, before implementation had even started. Another problem was the weighing of the annual budget in relation to existing inequalities among the various provinces. While budget cuts for developed (Western Cape and Gauteng) provinces and the semi-developed Free State Province caused these provinces difficulty in meeting their commitments for teachers' salaries, other provinces that have a limited administrative capacity struggled to use all the funds allocated to them (Hartshorne 1999:107-109; cf. also Jita 1998:1). Education planners thus remain stuck between government policies and goals on the one hand, and insufficient state funding on the other hand (Pampallis 1998:2; cf. also Radebe 1999:238 on *free and compulsory education*).

#### **6.3.4.3 Redeployment, voluntary severance packages and retrenchments**

Pampallis (1998:3) indicates that although salaries in the education sector are not excessive, the proportion of the budget spend on personnel costs is not only unacceptably high, but is escalating. In KwaZulu-Natal alone, personnel costs in 1997 overran the budget by 103%. This state of affairs also applies to the other provinces, that spent on average between 72% and 90% of their budgets on staff (Eveleth 1997d:1). The implications are enormous: provinces have to

cope with insufficient funds for non-personnel costs such as the implementation of Curriculum 2005, Adult Basic Education and Training, Early Childhood Development, special needs, textbooks, equipment, school repairs and maintenance.

This means that in order to make funds available for the transformation of education, personnel costs have to be decreased. Pampallis (1998:3-4) refers to several ways in which this could be done:

- ♦ Increasing the total budget. However, this is highly improbable because of the government's commitment to reduce deficit, as well as the current slow rate of economic growth.
- ♦ Decreasing expenditure on salaries and benefits, particularly with regard to teachers. This option is also contentious, because militant teacher unions are strongly opposed to such a measure. With regard to compulsory retrenchments, the unions has drawn a defined line - SADTU would oppose any talk of retrenchments (Eveleth 1997d:2).
- ♦ The paying of a smaller number of salaries, a situation that could be achieved through mechanisms such as the above-mentioned retrenchments, non-renewal of temporary teacher's contracts, or a moratorium on refilling vacancies. It is, however, also expected that the unions will oppose these mechanisms.

Whatever measures are undertaken to address this problem, the government's redeployment action of teachers was also met with conflict and concern. Teachers in understaffed schools were redeployed to schools in poorer areas and voluntary severance packages were offered to those who wanted to leave the system. The latter was presented as an alternative for teachers who were unwilling to transfer and could be declared "excess" teachers in their schools (*Wits EPU: Quarterly Review of Education and Training in South Africa* 1996:1; Thiel 1997:1). Although this plan to right-size the education system was initially agreed upon by government and the major teachers' organisations, it led to enormous conflict, confusion, controversy and tension within education circles. One of the main concerns was the fact that the severance packages favoured mainly those teachers who had been in the system for many years. Other difficulties with the offering of severance packages included the following:

- ♦ Because packages were calculated on the basis of the length of service, salary increases and pension contributions, the amount that had to be paid out was astronomical. Although these packages were dependent on money raised from sources other than the education budget, in January 1997 Bengu admitted that the offer of voluntary severance

packages to teachers had caused enormous financial strain upon the already cash-strapped public school system (Thiel 1997:1). Teachers' preference of severance packages to redeployment was understandable because most of them have families and are not able to re-locate.

- ♦ The education system was losing expertise, especially in the form of Mathematics and Science teachers who were needed most in the system, but stood a better chance of finding employment outside the public service. This implied that the most-needed teachers were paid astronomical amounts of money to stop teaching.
- ♦ The national Department of Education failed to provide guidance in the unfolding of the plan for right-sizing. In 1997 almost 12 000 teachers were granted severance packages, while another 6000 applied. It was also expected that thousands more would apply (cf. Jita 1998:2). However, new educators were recruited to fill most of the posts that became vacant due to this option. It might also be argued that these packages were not granted only to excess educators who declined redeployment. The filling of posts that were meant for redeployment by temporary teachers, as well as the redistribution and equity processes were further complicated. This situation was worsened when KwaZulu-Natal was forced to re-employ 230 senior teachers who had been given hefty retrenchment packages under the redeployment programme. This was due to the provincial department's oversight in approving the retention of personnel where no immediate replacements were available (Eveleth 1997a:1).

It seems thus that the emphasis on achieving equity did not carefully consider an issue such as quality in education. Naidoo (*Wits EPU: Quarterly Review of Education and Training in South Africa* 1996:2) argues that "the lack of reference to training and support in the redeployment plan implies that structural transformation is taking precedence over the principle that the school has a responsibility to provide for the affective as well as the cognitive needs of the children". The whole process of redeployment and severance packages was subsequently derailed due to a court ruling declaring the redeployment policy "illegal" in terms of hiring rights that were to continue until new recruitment powers for school governing bodies came into play. This ruling was the outcome of a Cape Town school's legal action challenging Bengu's policy of insisting that schools employ teachers from a central list of staff available for redeployment (Eveleth 1997c:1).

Although the redeployment policy was scrapped, thousands of teachers were in limbo with their



names on redeployment lists. This led to a so-called "double-parked" situation where redeployed teachers were still employed in their schools, in addition to the temporary teachers who were filling their posts in other schools, both groups of whom had to be paid a salary. Western Cape's Minister of Education (MEC), Helen Zille consequently called for the suspension of the teacher redeployment policy because it "undermines excellence in favour of mediocrity" (Ngcai 2000b:4). She argued that since the redeployment list consisted only of permanent teachers, it discriminated against non-permanent teachers who might be competent, committed and well-qualified. While the redeployment policy thus grossly discriminated against teachers not on the list, newly qualified graduates did not stand a chance of employment and many potentially good teachers were lost to the system. This meant that listed teachers only had preference because of being previously employed, implying that competence and commitment did not play a role.

Since attempts to cut personnel costs through voluntary retrenchments and redeployment thus failed, the next option were either a forced-retrenchment policy or exceeding the budget. The decision not to renew the contracts of temporary teachers was opposed by teachers' unions, such as the SAOU, who argued that the provincial education department in the Free State Province declined to submit a budget for the next year, enabling schools to set their own budgets. Due to this, schools were under the impression that the department was still accepting the responsibility of paying the salaries of temporary teachers. When the Free State department of education subsequently announced the dismissal of temporary personnel, not only the teachers, but also thousands of learners became the victims of inefficient planning and budgeting. The right of all to basic education was suddenly questioned - since temporary teachers were often responsible for teaching so-called "scarce" subjects such as Mathematics, Science and Accountancy, learners were left without teachers (Krüger & Kok 1998:2).

Although the legacy of the apartheid past contributed to current problems in the South African education system, several years of democratic governance have gone by since 1994, and conditions in South African schools seem as bad as ever. At grassroots level people no longer wish to hear about policy achievements since there are little evidence of these policies making a difference in townships schools. While teachers, on the one hand, have to cope with a low morale, learners, on the other hand, are still struggling for the realisation of their right to basic education.

#### 6.3.4.4 Shortage of textbooks and proper facilities

Although a shortage of textbooks is a legacy of apartheid education and presents a major concern, it seems that little has been achieved during the past years to rectify the situation. On the contrary, educational publishers are currently retrenching staff since orders for textbooks have trickled to a halt. This is due to the fact that between 1996 and 1999 the country's 32 000 public schools have had their textbook budgets decreased by more than 70%. Although Curriculum 2005 moves away from prescribed textbooks, books are required more than before, since this curriculum is resourced-based. Although (in August 1998) Mandela promised that the 12 million South African pupils would get their books within seven days of the start of the new school year, the national Department of Education had to acknowledge in January 1999 that it did not have the financial resources to supply most of the schools with textbooks. It was subsequently promised that grades one, two and twelve would receive their books by March of the same year, while the majority of pupils would not get new textbooks for 1999. Because of the government's promise of free education, parents were also not willing to buy textbooks (cf. Ngobeni 1999a:1-2; also Radebe 1999:199).

However, in the midst of the textbook crisis, and contrary to Asmal's major literacy campaign, thousands of unused textbooks are to be pulped as a result of a decrease in state textbook purchases. These books have been gathering dust on warehouse shelves since 1996 when the national Department of Education announced plans to introduce Curriculum 2005, complete with textbooks. Although most schools are still waiting for the promised textbooks, the government cut back on orders for grades not affected by the new curriculum. Heineman publishers donated about 100 tons of books to NGO's and libraries, while the rest had to be pulped because the Department of Education did not have the capacity to distribute such great numbers of books at short notice (Eveleth 1999:1). In January 2000 the *City Press* (6 January 2000:12) reported that the gap between policies and reality are evident in our school classrooms. Although the budget for textbooks and stationary was increased from R192 million in 1998/1999 to R627 million in 1999/2000, some provincial education departments were still in the process of tendering, while it was reported that schools have not received the necessary textbooks (cf. Mboyane 2000a:2). The ANC, however, indicated (ANC press *Statement on Education* 12 January 2000; cf. also ANC press statement on *The Textbook Shortage* 6 January 2000) that although they were optimistic that in the majority of schools learner support materials had either been delivered or would be

delivered in the following weeks, they remained disturbed by the fact that the provinces were still not succeeding in ensuring that textbooks are available at schools before the first day of the school year.

Apart from a shortage of learning material, realities such as overcrowded classrooms and the lack of proper facilities continue to contribute to impeding the establishment of a democratic education system along the principles set for such a reconstruction (cf. *infra*: 6.3.2.1; 6.3.2.2; 6.3.2.3 & 6.3.2.4). In 1997 it was reported that the Eastern Cape had a total shortage of 15 538 classrooms, 80% (4 505) of the schools were without electricity, 823 were "falling to pieces", 2 578 are in need of repair and 19% lacked telephones (cf. Bishop 1997:1). In the Free State Province 1 638 schools had no electricity and 25% no telephones, while 60% of schools in the Northern Province did not have proper facilities or electricity, and 20% were without water and telephones (cf. Ngobeni 1999b:1).

#### **6.3.4.5 Management and policy**

It has already been established that redress and the quest for equity in South African education are of prime importance in order to realise the ideal of a democratic education system that is free from domination and coercion (cf. *infra*:6.3.2.2). Although affirmative action in the area of education is aimed at eventually restoring equity in South African education, poorly-conceived affirmative action policies can indeed do more harm than good to the people they intend to benefit. It has also been stated that strong preferential policies can easily result in the recruiting and promoting of individuals who might lack the required skills and knowledge. Since such a situation leads to poor job performance, the self-confidence and morale of the individual might not only be undermined, but the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the education system could be seriously impaired (cf. Schoeman s.a.:77). In spite of favouritism and inequalities to which millions were subjected in the past, affirmative action appointments ought to be considered in terms of competence. However, irregularities in education departments and the amount of misconduct on the part of education officials, at the expense of the democratisation of education, places a question-mark over the implementation of the policy of affirmative action.

In 1997 independent investigators in the North West province were probing into alleged irregularities relating to education department contracts worth more than R130-million. These

irregularities included a massive textbook order where half of the books never reached the schools, as well as the presence of nepotism in the department (cf. Duffy 1997:1). In February 1998 the management of public schooling in the Free State Province was badly hampered when five top education officials were suspended for gross negligence relating to the ordering of textbooks and stationary. Duffy (1998b:1) reported that while this province had seen a stream of old-guard senior officials quitting during the past year, a quarter of the department's administrative posts across the province subsequently became vacant. Although Nkonka, from the Free State Province's department of education, argued that management understaffing was the main problem facing the department after underfunding, it seems contentious to blame underfunding when mismanagement cost the province R50-million. "Smaller" incidents of abuse by officials in the provincial department of education were also reported, ranging from cheque fraud, the misuse of government vehicles for private purposes, but also poor work performance and officials not turning up for work (Horn 1998:1).

In 1998 the MEC for Education in the Northern Province suspended the Director General who was accused by the department as being "incompetent, inefficient and severely lacking in management skills" (Ratshitanga 1998:1). The lack of sufficient control in order to safeguard the interest of the government and the public became clear when millions of rands' worth of stolen textbooks belonging to the department were discovered in a warehouse. In addition, more than half of the 1 211 people who were found to be recipients of ghost salaries were Department of Education employees. Staff members also criticised the former MEC of education who practically appointed every one of the ex-bantustan bureaucrats to senior positions, without considering the fact that "[t]hose people have no history in education transformation and the capacity to drive the transformation. All they know is how to receive orders" (Ratshitanga 1998:1). However, Motsoaledi, the former MEC attempted to refute these accusations by claiming that all appointments had been done by the Provincial Cabinet. However, in February 1998 the Head of Education in the Northern Cape Province, Ms Dlamini, was fired after flouting procedures when recruiting a textbook publisher. Duffy (1998d:1) also indicates that one of the major problems facing this education department was the overspending of the 1997/1998 budget of R705-million, by R120-million.

#### 6.3.4.6 Absence of a culture of learning and teaching

The complete lack of a culture of learning and teaching during the apartheid era culminated in a situation at a vast number of black schools where teachers were never in the classroom, children spent their schooldays playing outside and violence was ever present. This situation can be attributed to the misuse of former black (apartheid) education for non-educational purposes. However, in following the example set by the apartheid government, liberal forces equally misused school-typical education when it was mobilised as a political force to participate in the struggle for liberation. Because education was also misused for non-educational purposes during this period, the emphasis of the school was no longer on its primary task, namely the disclosure of the logical faculty of the learner. Instead, the instilling of a culture of learning was sacrificed for ideological purposes (cf. *infra*:5.2.3.1 & 5.2.3.2; cf. also Hofmeyr 2000:4). However, three years after the 1994 elections, while chaos still prevailed in South African schools, Nwadi (1997:14) proclaimed that "[w]e are all to blame for this chaos. First it was bantu education, then slogans like 'Freedom now and education later' and now a government which is failing to promote equitable resource distribution". It seem thus that one of the major obstacles in the way of the new government's plan to radically transform South African education, is the continued absence of a culture of learning and teaching.

The abolishing of corporal punishment (*South African Schools Act section 10* 1996:10) has repeatedly been blamed for the lack of discipline. Although teachers were not trained in alternative methods of discipline, it seems that this abolishment cannot account for the fact that there is no prohibition on relationships, if not sexual activity, between teachers and their pupils. While teachers complain about learners spending time in school toilets smoking, coming late and not returning to the classroom after break, the question arises whether the restoration of corporal punishment would assist in bringing teachers back to their classrooms? Asmal (2000a:3) indicates that the lack of discipline and professionalism among some teachers has rightly created a perception that they do not care about the future of South African children. When schools opened in January 2000 for the new schooling year, various schools in the Northern Cape Province were unexpectedly visited by their MEC, Tina Joemat-Peterson. The delegation was shocked by the state of chaos: expensive science apparatus were strewn across the floors, and volumes of encyclopaedia were ruined in the library (Montgomery 2000:1; also Ngcai 2000a:4 on *lack of discipline*). In Soweto the Minister of Education, Kader Asmal, also turned up at a school, finding the school in "total shambles. Learners were still registering - despite the fact that

registration was supposed to have been completed in September last year. Seven staff members were absent in what is a microcosm of large-scale absenteeism in many of our schools. Textbooks and stationary were lying in boxes in a dirty room, not ready to be handed out to learners. There was no proper attendance register; we were given a piece of paper which was used as a register" (Asmal 2000a:2).

The Minister of Education is adamant that teaching should be taken back to the time when "teachers were pre-eminent residents of every village, where schools were considered as hallowed as the churches, back to the time when education was revered and the educated respected, when teachers were honoured with girls crossing their legs in class and boys swallowing their cigarettes at the sight of a teacher" (Asmal 2000a:3). In order to achieve school improvement and teacher professionalism, it has thus become necessary to develop a school evaluation instrument, as well as guidelines on attendance records to be kept in schools. Regular evaluation, monitoring and reporting are thus required. In the Free State Province it was anticipated that teachers would be forced, before the end of 1999, to sign a code of conduct which meant that a teacher found to be guilty of misconduct, would be removed from the profession. Although teachers are granted the right to strike, the ethical correctness of staying away from a classroom for two weeks is now being questioned. In this regard Asmal (2000a:4) has announced the appointment of a new provincially-based "supervisory" service that should be fully operational by the end of 2000. The focus of this unit will be on the evaluation of the school and the provision of advice on continuous quality improvement.

Other factors contributing to the lack of a culture of learning and teaching are violence and racism. With-regard to the former, 75 schools were closed in Kwa Mashu in 1996, leaving 40000 pupils without schooling for two weeks, after teachers had gone on a "chalk-down" strike following the shooting of their colleagues. Teachers were demanding the deployment of security guards on a 24-hour basis (Ngema 1996:22; cf. also Nzimande & Thusi 1996:54ff on *violence and disturbances at school*). Although it has been estimated that 40 youths have died since 1992 in violence on the East Rand between PASO and COSAS students, both organisations denounced violence and denied their involvement by claiming that criminal acts by unknown perpetrators had led to violence (*Wits EPU: Quarterly Review of Education and Training in South Africa* 1996:1). Since schools in townships are often the breeding-ground for power struggles between student organisations, pupils in schools on the Cape Flats e.g. have to find shelter when playgrounds are used as battle-fields for gang-related shootings. Although various schools have

subsequently started to utilise various security measures, the Western Cape Department of Education plans on spending R15-million on safeguarding schools on the Cape Flats (Joubert 2000:1).

Violence at schools are often also related to racism. Although the South African Schools Act (1996) prohibits racism, racial problems at schools should be considered against the background of the South African history of institutionalised racial-discrimination. Fact is that the mere coming into power of a new government, together with the elimination of racial-based legislation and the formulation of new policies does not eradicate the social consciousness and identity of parents, structured by apartheid education, that are passed on to their children. According to Salim Valley, member of the University of the Witwatersrand Education Policy Unit (Ratshitanga 1997:1), it is not enough to say that we must accept each other's culture, because this might even mean accepting what a racist defines as his or her culture. While Valley argues in favour of an explicitly anti-racist curriculum, Goduka (1996:30) opts for the affirming of diversity. He states that affirming diversity does not mean "tolerance, acceptance, patronization, benevolence, or compassion, for these come from a place of implied superiority or favors granted to individuals who are not part of the norm, but who deserve special treatment". To affirm diversity thus not only means to acknowledge, validate, respect and be sensitive to the diverse nature of humankind, but it confirms the fact that diversity is broader and more inclusive than an anti-racist approach. However, because racial stereotypes have been instilled over many decades, it cannot be expected that racial tension at schools will disappear immediately. This issue should continuously be addressed since its continuation not only undermines the culture of learning and teaching, but is also "detrimental to both learners, teachers, education officials and the school governing body regardless of skin colour" (ANC press statement on *Reported Tensions at Vryburg High School* 10 September 1998 and ANC press statement on *Racial Tensions at Vryburg High School* 25 February 1998).

#### **6.3.4.7 Matriculation results and the question of standards**

If South African education is to be measured in terms of its grade 12 (matriculation) results, then it becomes apparent that the current system needs urgent revision. The matriculation pass rate has varied from 47,4% in 1997, 49,3% in 1998 and 48,9% in 1999. While the 1996 matriculation examination degenerated in a debacle when gross irregularities occurred (ANC press statement on *Exam Irregularity Hearing* 8 January 1997), the 1998 matriculation results were adjusted in

order to compensate for language disadvantages. The ANC claimed that such adjustments were aimed at realising the full potential of candidates, rather than imposing a blanket and artificial pass rate. In this regard the ANC subsequently dismissed with "contempt any suggestion that adjustment amount to lowering standards" (ANC press statement on *The 1998 Matric Results* 7 January 1999). The results and the management of examinations were also regarded by the government as an indication that the education system was getting out of "the vicious cycle created by the Apartheid education system". However, the euphoria of the slight improvement was soon to be dimmed when Bengu (*Statement by Prof SME Bengu, Minister of Education, on the alleged irregularities during 1998 Senior Certificate Examinations in Mpumalanga Province* 25 February 1999) issued a statement acknowledging that there was indeed *prima facie* evidence that irregularities had occurred in the computation of the marks of individual candidates of the Mpumalanga Department of Education in 1998. The implication was that almost 7000 students who had failed their 1998 matriculation exams passed after the results had been tampered with. Although the province's Education MEC, Faith Sitole, was fired from the department for her suspected involvement in the 1998 matriculation scandal, she was offered a R2,6 million settlement in March 2000 (Layton 31 March 2000:1). While the generally poor results emphasised the desperate need to inculcate and prioritise the culture of learning and teaching in South African schools, the ANC called on learners, teachers and communities to use the same persistence, energy and determination that they showed in the fight against apartheid to turn the public schooling system around so that it may be responsive to the reconstructing needs of the country.

In 1999 less than half (48,9%) of the 511 474 matriculants successfully completed their school careers. While 330 schools obtained a 100% pass rate, 81 schools had a 0% pass rate. More than half of the schools (2 612) obtained a pass rate less than 40%, while 1 056 obtained less than 20% (*Die Volksblad* 31 Desember 1999:1; also Coetzee 2000:2). Although this situation was marked as a tragedy by Dr. Ihron Rensburg, the Deputy-director-general of education, Kader Asmal remains positive that the results could be improved by 5% at the end of 2000.

In its official *Statement on Education* (12 January 2000) the ANC indicated that the high rate of matric failure was unacceptable, not only in the light of the challenges facing the South African nation, but also since it is both financially and socially expensive for the country and thus puts enormous pressure on the limited resources available. Radebe (1999:239-240) indicates that



because schools are expected to re-accommodate learners, it has a major impact on school administration. The re-accommodation results in high teacher-learner ratio, classroom-learner ratio, platooning systems and double sessions. Because schools are unable to accommodate all failures, there is often conflict between learners and teachers, leading to education resistance by learners. Radebe continues by stating that clear guidelines on the way in which schools should address this problem is not provided. In this regard "schools use their own discretion which is tantamount to a laissez-faire approach instilled by the DOE [Department of Education] and is incompatible with one education system characterised by communality and equality".

The ANC, however, remains optimistic that 2000 will see a great improvement in the quality of matriculation results, and:

- ◆ Urges all people to support the Minister of Education's Tirisano campaign and indeed work together to get our education right;
- ◆ Reiterates the call of our President for people at all levels of our education system to be held accountable for their actions, even to a point of expulsion for not delivering results without sound reason;
- ◆ Implores government to expedite the process of getting performance contracts in place for officials at all levels of the system, and implementing teacher appraisal and school evaluation processes; and
- ◆ Pleads learners to learn and for parents to ensure that this happens (ANC *Statement on Education* 2000:2; cf. also *Die Volksblad* 17 Januarie 2000:4).

Asmal also made it clear that teachers and officials not performing will be fired. He (2000b:2) announced a crack unit that will focus on dysfunctional high schools and will demand more accountability from these schools, following a more direct intervention in schooling by both the Minister of Education and the MEC's for Education. The question should, however be raised whether the matriculation examinations assessment strategy is not undermining the goals of OBE? The latter was questioned when Dr. Blade Nzimande, chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Education, stated that the current matriculation examination system has to be scrapped. However, the argument that this system is a legacy of the apartheid system is not entirely true, because it was inherited from the English education system, and thus originated from a period prior to apartheid itself.

The fact that failure and success are still rated in terms of matriculation results has given way to the emergence of various tendencies within the realm of South African schooling. Because confidence in South Africa's matric qualification is declining, several government schools are currently offering students the chance to sit for A-level examinations handled by the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate. Compared to the 699 South African school children

who sat for A-levels in 1997, an estimate of 1200 sat in 1999 (Soggot 1999:1). Another tendency that has emerged is that of pupil migration. In this regard Hofmeyr (2000:4) indicates that new education policies since 1994 fuelled confusion and uncertainty among education stakeholders and the general public. While the prospect of very large classes and the capping of school fees sent signals that threaten school quality, the latter was compounded by the mishandling of voluntary severance packages, unsuccessful teacher deployment and examination leaks. The beginnings of black economic empowerment not only resulted in the movement of pupils and teachers between former white and former black schools, but also between the public and independent sector. The implication of this state of affairs is depleted numbers in some black township schools that impacts on quality and equity. While pupil composition and numbers have dramatically changed, teacher supply has either remained the same or was even reduced. Apart from the migration from township schools to suburban schools, Hofmeyr (2000:5) also refers to the fact that during the mid-1990's there was enormous admission pressure on independent schools whose waiting lists lengthened and whose fees rose sharply. Simultaneously, however, parents who could not afford to send their children to independent schools, turned to home schooling. Garson (1999:1) reported that as many as 8 000 people around South Africa were teaching their children at home. Reasons given for the mushrooming of home schooling ranges from religious preference, dissatisfaction with large classes and children's special learning needs. Even though the possibility might exist that (white) parents turn to home schooling for racist reasons, the government has decided to give parents the freedom to choose alternative ways to school their children (cf. *South African Schools Act* 1996 Chapter 5:28ff).

#### **6.4 Critique of the transformation of South African education**

From the above exposition of not only the nature of apartheid education, but also its grave consequences and inability to satisfy basic school-typically related human needs for all South Africans it has become clear that transformation of the system is not debatable. Of importance, however, is a critical reflection on the nature and progress of the transformation process. This means that the process should first of all be subjected to critical rationalism to determine the presence of ideological thought-patterns. However, in order to penetrate to the very root of such patterns, thus in an attempt to expose presuppositions that may lead to such thought-patterns, the process should also be subjected to transcendental critique.

#### 6.4.1 An historical or unhistorical venture?

It has already been established that South Africa is in the midst of the transitional process from a closed to an open society (cf. infra:2.4). While this process involves the differentiation of culture into various life spheres, it also deals with the quest for rational decisions and the acceptance of ownership of the consequences of such decisions. Because the transition from a closed society to an open society is of an historic nature (cf. infra:2.3.5), and since the whole process depends on historical norms for guidance, the process can assume either an historical or unhistorical nature.

When placed within the context of a transitional process from a closed to an open society, cultural differentiation, therefore also the transformation of an education system, can take place either in a harmonious way or in a disharmonious way (infra:2.4). Harmonious cultural differentiation subsequently refers not only to the recognition of the principle of sphere sovereignty, but indicates that the differentiation process complies with historical norms to which it remains subjected. Disharmonious disclosure, however, appears to be the outcome of not only the disregard of sphere sovereignty, but also the transgression of historical norms. Although the notion of historical and unhistorical cultural differentiation refers to the Dooyeweerdian tradition, it has already been established that it can also be connected with the Popperian tradition (cf. infra:2.4) and the arresting of the closed society. Mobilisation of the school as an ideological apparatus in the South African history contributed to the "relaxing" of rational decision-making, as well as of responsibility and accountability, since either the nation-state or a collective social entity, *the people*, assumed supreme authority. *Prima facie* evidence of education in South Africa utilised as an ideological apparatus, as well as the impact it had on school-typical education itself, indicates that the arresting of the closed society claims retribution in the form of retarded and unhealthy unfolding.

In order for the transformation process of South African education to be undertaken in an historical (in distinction from unhistorical) manner, a "consciousness of essence" is required. This means that the transformation process from a deterministic system that has been utilised for other than school-typical purposes, to a democratic system, used for educational purposes alone, should recognise the essence of the school as a unique social institution. Simultaneously, the transformation process involves not only human control of (historical) norms, but also the acceptance of responsibility, as well as accountability for rational decisions. To illustrate our

argument, the following statement by the South African Ministry of Education (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:21) needs to be scrutinised:

The *rehabilitation* of the schools and colleges must go hand in hand with the restoration of the ownership of these institutions to their communities through the establishment and empowerment of legitimate, representative governance bodies.

Placed within the context of a structurally pluralistic view of (the South African) reality, however, it can be argued that the school does not belong to the community. As a distinct sphere it possesses not only its own sphere of formative power, but also its own sphere of sovereignty, authority and competence, all characterised as *school-typical* (cf. infra:2.4.4.8A). It could therefore be argued that the special character of the school exhibits an independent sphere and its own internal logic. As such, it appears that the relative autonomy of the school should not simply reflect the patterns (will) of communities. Because the present South African government emphasises participation, as well as human rights (cf. infra:6.2.1 & 6.2.2), it is to be expected that these notions would also play a directive role in the transformation of South African education. However, if the community's perception and determination of the primary task of the school (essence of the school) is confused with its relative sphere of competence (as determined by its ontic structure), then the possibility exists that the structural integrity of the school might be violated. It seems therefore that the current perception of the school as "owned" by the community can be attributed to a disregard of the essence of the school, as a result of the transgression of the historical norm of cultural economy (cf. infra:2.3.5), thus indicating the unhistorical nature of the transformation process.

#### 6.4.2 Critical rationalism and the exposure of ideological thought-patterns

1. To what extent can we recognise in social conceptions, political doctrines, religious belief-systems etc. assertions to the effect that specific insights and basic principles are infallible and true once and for all?

From the exposition of newly formulated education policies and the implementation of a new curriculum, it has become evident that OBE was launched as the alternative to apartheid education. In this regard Morrow (1999:23), identifies a dichotomy at the centre of the rhetorical framework concerning OBE: apartheid education bad - OBE good. This dichotomy is a result of the following arguments:

- ◆ *Prima facie* evidence of the nature of apartheid education makes the identification thereof with a bad form of education conclusive.
- ◆ Since OBE represents a paradigm-shift and as such is accepted as the path for the radical transformation of South African education, it must represent the counterpart

of all the bad elements of apartheid education.

Thus, while these bad elements have been identified as *inter alia* non-transparent governance structures, teacher-centred methods of teaching, authoritarianism, rote-learning, content-based, a division between teaching and training, and formal examinations, OBE should imply the opposite. Morrow (1999:23) thus argues that "[w]e are in dangerous territory here - it is territory characterised by political correctness, and suspicion about critical or independent thinking" (cf. supra:6.4.2(3)). The possibility therefore exists that OBE might be regarded as infallible and the ultimate solution to apartheid education. The proposal of OBE as the infallible answer to apartheid education is justified in terms of two claims:

- ♦ OBE is built on the principles of *equity, redress, non-discrimination, democracy access and justice*; and
- ♦ high quality education will be available to everyone in South Africa for the first time, irrespective of age, gender, race, colour, religion, ability or language (Baxen & Soudien 1999:134).

It subsequently seems that since OBE has nationally been "chosen" as the answer to apartheid education, all stakeholders in education are expected to be committed to implement this initiative as the *democratic will of the people*.

The *democratic will of the people*, however, presupposes consultation with relevant stakeholders. This presents a difficulty since it has been established that the process followed in adopting new education policies, especially with regard to OBE, did not make provision for authentic participation (cf. infra:6.3.4.1). Baxen and Soudien (1999:134) also question the undeveloped state of the debate, and the tension regarding the philosophical and pedagogical principles underpinning the OBE initiative in the many official documents produced nationally and provincially by the respective education departments. There thus appears to be a disjunctive relationship between the developmental process of this initiative, the players in it, and what is produced. Because the introduction of OBE allowed minimal input from participants to the development process, and since educators are not given opportunities to experiment within the context of a new approach to curriculum development processes (cf. infra:6.3.3.1), stakeholders are not only questioning the foreign provenance of OBE, but also its political underpinnings (Baxen & Soudien 1999:137). In this regard Schreuder (1999:126) warns that "[t]here are increasing signs that at institutional and curriculum levels, the structuralist and determinist

colours still shines brightly". OBE has indeed successfully been put into practice in developed countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Britain, New Zealand and Singapore. Bengu (*Curriculum 2005* 1997:11; also Bengu 1998:2) justified the acceptance of OBE by arguing that "many countries have changed to OBE and are now gaining from their experience. We are building on a system that has already been researched". It is however, dangerous to consider such research as conclusive and a "guarantee" that OBE will necessarily be successful in South Africa. While the reason behind the success of OBE in the above-mentioned countries relates to the fact that they invested massive resources in education, the implementation of OBE in South Africa met with grave financial constraints. Problems surrounding the implementation of OBE in South Africa has proved that there exists no infallible blueprint for the implementation of OBE that can simply be transformed from one country where OBE is successful, unto South African education (cf. *infra*:6.3.4.1).

2. Are there in connection with such assertions elite groups or individuals (charismatic political leaders, religious prophets etc.) that claim to have a monopoly on some basic exclusive knowledge or a privileged right of interpretation of certain basic ideological principles?

In pursuit of a new democratic order, education policies and legislation aimed at the radical transformation of South African education, had to be formulated. Despite evidence of serious problems with regard to *inter alia* the implementation of OBE, the Ministry of Education prided itself at what had been achieved in the short time that had elapsed since the elections: Bengu (1998:2) pronounced that "[w]e in the Alliance are proud that education transformation is on track, thanks to the educators, legislators, students, the policy community, academics, public servants and members of the democratic movement who have done their utmost to transform the system...We must boldly say that the ANC is the only party capable of seeing what we have started through to the finish". However, the implementation of all the education initiatives were soon to be confronted with and frustrated by disturbing footage of real life. As was established earlier, these initiatives are currently going through a phase characterised by attempts to find the intricate balance between policy formulation, their implementation and the expectations of *the people* (cf. *infra*:6.3.3.1 & 6.3.3.2). This proved to be no simple achievement: Confronted by the task of implementing education policies, it soon became clear that the complexity of the system into which policy changes were to be introduced had been underestimated (Jansen 1999c:92). In this regard various examples can be mentioned: the redeployment scheme (cf. *infra*:6.3.4.3) proceeded from the assumption that teachers could simply be moved from one part of the system to another; the complexity of education was also underestimated when it was assumed that

announced policy would necessarily imply that teachers would simply change their practices to mirror policy stipulations. However, although the introduction of redeployment and severance packages cost the taxpayer millions of rands, and the implementation of Curriculum 2005 was met with various problems, the Ministry of Education remained loyal to its perception of what should be the path of transformation. Although Bengu (Thiel 1997:1) admitted that voluntary severance packages to teachers had caused enormous financial strain to the already cash-strapped public school system, he nevertheless defended the policy when stating that the "outcry" against it was based on "unscientific information". With regard to the implementation of Curriculum 2005, he (Bengu 1998:2) indicated that "[w]e said we would democratise the classroom, transform the apartheid curriculum, and make sure that children were active participants in their own learning. We are doing so". Although admitting that problems were encountered with the implementation of Curriculum 2005, he was convinced that they were not related to the curriculum itself, but to resources and teacher retraining.

Criticism of the implementation of policy changes and cries for the resignation of Minister Bengu from opposition parties were disregarded by the minister as an "emotional outcry" and rejected by an ANC statement (ANC press *Statement on calls for resignation of S Bengu* 9 June 1998):

The ANC stands by and expresses its confidence in Minister Sibusiso Bengu's efforts in the transformation of our education system....Since the inauguration of the democratic government, these parties have consistently opposed measures aimed at bringing about fundamental transformation of education. Calls for the resignation of Minister Bengu are therefore a self-fulfilling prophecy.

However, when criticising the lack of authentic participation in the adoption of new policies (cf. infra:6.4.2(1)), Schreuder (1999:126) warns that:

[w]e are left - again - with a small group of experts who claim to have *the* knowledge and know the *only* route to transformation. This authoritarian view of a "paradigm shift" - by creating a new-structuralism and new orthodoxies - is untenable, and such approaches to transformation may have even more calamitous consequences than those of apartheid education. If we are not much more circumspect in the management of change and transformation, and take the key role of practitioners much more seriously, change without a difference seems imminent.

3. To what extent can we recognise tendencies toward immunising the central assumptions of the belief-system against criticism, and how are the strategies constructed so that this immunisation can take place?

By placing the emphasis on transparency as one of the key elements of a democracy, it is accepted that the enterprise of education should be open to egalitarian public scrutiny and assessment. The announcement of OBE did indeed evoke an intensive public debate on the nature and purposes of the school curriculum. Jansen (1999a:10-12), however, gives a significant outline of the unique features that developed in connection with this debate:

- ♦ although critics of OBE came from across the racial and ideological spectrum, the

Minister of Education tried to pass off the criticism as coming from conservative groups of parents and rival organisations;

- ♦ criticisms were sometimes met with hostile and often personalised rebuttals from the Ministry of Education and its allies, such as SADTU. In public conference forums, as well as in newspaper editorials and radio discussions, critics were damned as being either against transformation and in favour of privileges embedded in the *status quo*, or as being disloyal "comrades", armchair academics and "education Trotskyites". By coupling OBE with "infallible" knowledge, there was, according to Morrow (1999:23), almost an attitude of "[w]hat possible motive could anyone have for raising doubts about OBE except that they have benefited from Apartheid Education and, thus, have a strong interest in perpetuating it". The implication was that if a person was opposed to Apartheid Education, he/she must necessarily be in favour of OBE - "[w]e might be a bit unsure about what OBE is, but we must find ways to 'make it work' because it is the path we have chosen to 'transform' education in South Africa, it is our New Scripture" (Morrow 1999:23).

An in-depth research process that was undertaken by 36 research agencies in more than 3000 schools around South Africa, led to alarming findings, including a stark warning that quality of teaching should be improved on a massive scale and budgets ought to be redirected in order to assist teacher training and classroom resources. However, the research was criticised by education officials for allegedly looking only at badly functioning schools and not capturing the many good and innovative educational practices that do exist. According to the researchers these arguments and counter-arguments are taking place in a vacuum because there exists no database reflecting the numbers of good, poor and non-functioning schools (Garson 1999a:2).

Although the Ministry of Education appears to be sensitive towards criticism, and seems to regard the new policy initiatives as infallible, especially when Bengu was Minister, the appointment of Kader Asmal in June 1999 as new minister of education could signify the introduction of a more critical approach. Although Asmal had committed himself to Curriculum 2005, he appointed a committee to review the curriculum and recognised the need to assess inadequacies, errors and problems (Asmal 2000a:2ff and Mboyane 2000b:14). However, although this form of self-criticism seems positive, Ramphela (6 December 1999) warns against the emergence of a conspicuous silence since the advent of democracy on the part of academics. While a lot of academics spoke out fearlessly about the evils of apartheid, their current silence is



disturbing:

White academics do not speak out on issues of national concern any more because they are afraid that they will be labelled racist. Black academics do not criticise government because of misplaced loyalty born out of a comradeship with its roots in the struggle against apartheid. They can't be seen to criticise their own. These misguided loyalties and a culture of silence are putting South Africa's democracy at risk.

4. To what extent can we find in a political doctrine, social philosophy or religious belief-system categorisations and value-judgements that are determined by rigid dogmatic dichotomies and bipolar labels for the interpretation of social and political reality?

It has been argued (*The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation* 1998:3) that the ANC cannot

lay hands on the apartheid state machinery and hope to use it to realise its aims. The apartheid state has to be destroyed in a process of fundamental transformation. The new state should be, by definition, the antithesis of the apartheid state. It is legitimate and serves the interests of the overwhelming majority.

The implication is that the old South African education system should be eradicated in a process of fundamental transformation. Thus, the new education system should be the antithesis of apartheid education (cf. *infra*:6.4.2 (1)). In line with this dichotomy, White Papers, legislative and policy documents on education are not only interspersed with references to apartheid education, but the latter is continuously contrasted with new proposals as the ultimate answer to the wrongs of apartheid education. This dichotomy subsequently highlights that only "good" resides in new legislation and policies on education, and in the people who are in 'solidarity' with such legislation and policies. Evil, therefore, lies in a previous education dispensation, but also in those who criticise transformation initiatives (cf. *infra*:6.4.2(4); also *supra*:6.4.2(5) on *enemy image*). The perception that evil lies outside the ANC was also underscored by Mbeki (1999:1) when he referred to those who were involved in the struggle as "being prepared to pay the supreme price to uphold good over evil". Thus, by continuously emphasising the various crises, conflicts and tension that were brought about by apartheid education, it appears that the ANC seizes the opportunity to:

- ◆ justify the need for transformation;
- ◆ legitimise education initiatives as the answer to apartheid evils; and
- ◆ use the legacy of apartheid as an (granted or ungranted) excuse for new emerging crises.

In a press statement (*ANC on education problems in former HOD schools* 29 January 1998 ) the ANC reacted to former HOD schools' suspension of schooling because of *inter alia*, the termination of cleaning services. In this regard the ANC stated that "there is no money hoarded by government at any level. The country is having a national debt of R254 billion caused by

apartheid. South Africa services this apartheid debt at a tune of R40 billion per year". However, it becomes extremely difficult to explain provincial departments of education overspending their budgets, as well as textbooks scams and mismanagement of funds (cf. infra:6.3.4.2; 6.3.4.4. & 6.3.4.5) in terms of an inherited national debt.

5. Can we find highly emotional enemy-stereotypes and, along with these, tendencies toward utilising scapegoat strategies and conspiracy theories?

In his report to the 50th National Conference of the ANC (16 December 1997) Mandela (1997:2-3) was very clear on establishing an image of the enemy, namely anti-democratic forces of counter-revolution, also referred to as the counter-offensive "which would seek to maintain the privileges of the white minority". He identifies a counter-revolutionary network that apparently did not accept the reality of majority rule and has intensified a campaign of destabilisation with some of the following features (Mandela 1997:4):

- ◆ the weakening of the ANC and its allies;
- ◆ the use of crime to render the country ungovernable;
- ◆ the subversion of the economy; and
- ◆ the erosion of the confidence of both our people and the rest of the world in our capacity both to govern and to achieve our goals of reconstruction and development.

It is also argued within ANC circles that the former ruling establishment has refused to co-operate with the TRC in order to protect the criminal apartheid system. With regard to the ANC's AA-programme to address racial disparities "we have inherited from the apartheid system...the spokespersons of the advantaged have not hesitated to cry foul, citing all manner of evil - such as racism, violation of the constitution, nepotism, dictatorship, inducing a brain drain and frightening the foreign investor" (Mandela 1997:3).

With regard to the position of the Democratic Party (DP) and the former National Party (NP), it was argued (Mandela 1997:15) that the DP

has sought to present itself as the most effective parliamentary opposition to the ANC. Knowing that it has no possibility to attract the masses of the disadvantaged of our country, the Democratic Party, which has no policy differences with the NP, has sought to position itself as an implacable enemy of the ANC, and on the basis, to try to convince the supporters of the National Party to switch their alliances to itself. It therefore has no choice but itself to adopt reactionary positions aimed at protecting the privileges of the constituency it is struggling to secure for itself. Accordingly, the NP and the DP are engaged in a desperate struggle to out-compete each other in a race which they believe will be won by whoever convinces the white minority that they are the most reliable and best defenders of white privilege.

It subsequently appears that the opposition parties, such as the former NP, the DP and also the Freedom Front (who is, according to the ANC, "imprisoned in its narrow nationalist pursuit of

so-called 'Afrikaner self determinism' "(Mandela 1997:15)), are linked with the preservation of white privilege, and must therefore be the enemy of the government's attempts to establish a non-racial social society. The United Democratic Movement (UDM) was also identified as "[t]he latest political grouping to join the miserable platoon of opponents of our movement". The leaders, Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer are regarded as "former bed-fellows and functionaries of the apartheid system and its security forces". As already indicated, the media was also placed within the "enemy camp" (Mandela 1997:12):

we have to confront the fact that during the last three years, the matter has become perfectly clear that the bulk of the mass media in our country has set itself up as a force opposed to the ANC...the media uses the democratic order, brought about by the enormous sacrifices of our own people, as an instrument to protect the legacy of racism, graphically described by its own patterns of ownership, editorial control, value system and advertiser influence.

It subsequently seems that any criticism offered by these parties (and any other groups) is coupled with the preservation of white privilege and interpreted as forces against the democratic process. This is evident from the ANC's statement with regard to the call for Bengu's resignation (cf. infra:6.4.2(2)), that the NP and DP have consistently opposed measures aimed at bringing about fundamental transformation of education. The perception that opposition parties were opposed to the democratic process also relates to the prediction that the majority of these parties would seek to combine their efforts in the 1999-elections in order to weaken the ANC. For the ANC (Mandela 1997:46) this means

that the objective that will be pursued by the forces opposed to the radical non-racial and non-sexist renewal of our society will be to deny us the popular mandate to carry out such a programme. We must also bear this in mind that these opposition forces, to whom a genuinely non-racial society poses a threat will not hesitate to use anything within their means to achieve their objectives. These, the architects and contingent beneficiaries of the system of apartheid, shamelessly present themselves as the real representatives of democracy.

These parties are, however, not exclusively white - members of the UDM are predominantly black, while the (N)NP has strong support amongst the so-called Coloured communities, especially in the Western Cape. This state of affairs was also explained by the ANC (Mandela 1997:8):

the National Party in particular, has continued to exploit this apartheid legacy [the ANC represents the interest of the African majority] to present itself as the political representative of the national minorities. In this regard and characteristically, it raises the spectre of a "swart gevaar" to frighten these sections of our population to its ranks unashamedly using the apartheid years of racist policies as justification for the argument that the national minorities should entrust their future to the party of apartheid.

A high degree of emotion seems to be at stake: On the one hand it was argued that "[t]he apartheid state subverted all sensible social rules and mores - it was the Headquarters of the South African crime against humanity" (*The State, Property Relations and Social*

*Transformation* 1998:3). On the other hand, however, the struggle for the defeat of the apartheid regime, as well as the eventual victory of the liberation movement was loaded with a high degree of emotion. Thus, the association of any form of opposition with the remnants of apartheid, will necessarily be regarded with a high degree of negative emotion. It thus appears that the ANC is colouring certain enemy-images with such negative emotions - by portraying these enemies as being opposed to the democratic process, any form of criticism will subsequently be considered as unjustified since it comes from an "anti-democratic force" (cf. *infra*:6.4.2(3)). Thus, by linking negative emotions to any of the opposition parties' pronouncements, the latter became the scapegoats for all that is wrong, and in this way internal conflict within the ANC is reduced. It has previously been indicated that the implementation of education policies has met with certain realities in South Africa that profoundly frustrate the reconstruction and development of education and training (cf. *infra*:6.3.4). However, because of the scapegoat strategy, criticism of existing evidence of nepotism, corruption and incompetence within provincially managed education, is disregarded because it is expected that the enemy would oppose affirmative action. Simultaneously, it is emphasised that the enemy is responsible for racial disparities, which implies that problems surrounding AA can be blamed on the enemy. The (N)NP, however, made various suggestions with regard to the improvement of South African education, such as *inter alia* the deployment of mobile Curriculum 2005-training centres in the rural areas; taxation benefits for those instances that are willing to provide textbooks and other learning materials; bonuses for teachers who succeed in increasing the matriculation pass rate in their subjects with at least 20%; and subsidy benefits for instances that assist disadvantaged schools (*Die Volksblad* 24 Januarie 2000:7). The question now arises whether such suggestions are in line with the ANC's enemy-image of the opposition parties? Should such suggestions be disregarded simply because it comes from a "counter-revolutionary network", or because they do not benefit the transformation of South African education, or is it because of a distorted enemy-image?

6. To what degree are value premises in the ideological thought-patterns openly declared to be such, and to what degree are they disguised as matters of fact?

The coming into power of the ANC can be accredited to human decision-making and responsibility:

the majority of people have chosen the national liberation movement, led by the ANC, as the political force that should lead our country as it goes through its post-apartheid process of reconstruction and development (Mandela 1997:1).

In his inauguration address, President Thabo Mbeki (1999:1) stated that:

this day is as much a Day for the Inauguration of the new government as it is a Day of Salute for a generation that pulled our country out of the abyss and placed it on the pedestal of hope, on which it rests today.

While these historical events involve rational human decision-making, they are also the outcome of the application of transgressable norms (cf. *infra*:5.3.1). Furthermore, because the process of reconstruction and development can be undertaken in an historical or unhistorical way, it can be argued that this process itself remains dependent upon historical norms for guidance. Those responsible for reconstruction and development are subsequently accountable for the way in which such norms were applied or misapplied. Thus, the evaluation of the transitional process will require an explanation of those who are responsible and accountable for conduct that obey or transgress norms within the context of reconstruction and development.

With regard to the evaluation of the current transformation process, it has been established that it appears that criticism is easily passed off as coming from opposition groups that resist the democratic process (cf. *infra*:6.4.2(4) & 6.4.2(5)). It has also been established that these opposition groups are subject to a scapegoat strategy whereby they are often blamed for certain unhistorical states of affairs during the transformation process (cf. *infra*:6.4.2(5)). It thus seems that the fusion between standards of value and factual knowledge can play a profound role in the establishing of power relations.

The South African history has indeed proved that the above-mentioned fusion can play a decisive role in manipulating and influencing people's attitudes and political preferences. During the apartheid era, as well as the struggle for liberation such fusion has served ideological thought-patterns (cf. *infra*:5.3.2(6) and 5.3.2(6); also Salamun 1999:87-88). The possibility subsequently also exists that a new government might equally disguise evaluations as factual knowledge in order to not only sustain its position of power, but also to continuously convince people of the viability of their aim to create a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. In this regard the evaluation of whoever is regarded as the enemy of this aim, could contribute to emphasising the dichotomy between *the other* that is considered to be bad and evil, and *the self* who is the antithesis of the former. Such an evaluation will necessarily involve value-judgements as it concerns an account of the "enemy's" misapplication of norms. Although such value-judgements are based upon empirical evidence, and although Popper (Salamun 1999:87) has indicated that value-judgements cannot be reduced to statements of facts, it is exactly the fusion of these that contributes to the enforcing of an enemy-image. As such, the

moment value-judgements are accepted as factual statements, people are not only manipulated with regard to a particular enemy-image, but it becomes almost permissible to hold the enemy accountable for all that goes wrong during the transformation process.

Although it could be agreed that South Africa is still suffering from inequalities from racial capitalism, the proposing of the following value-judgements as statements of fact appears to relate to political manipulation:

whites were undeservedly enriched and blacks were undeservedly impoverished...Whites do not accept that the economic gains they made during Apartheid were undeserved, made as they were on the undeserved economic subjugation, oppression and exploitation of the African majority. But the richest whites should know that a sizeable part of their wealth is undeserved, because it was ill-gotten through:

- white power structures
- white privileges
- white favouritism
- white patronage
- white corruption (*ANC Parliamentary Bulletin* 14 April 1998).

It could indeed be argued that the above-mentioned value-judgement is based upon empirical knowledge. However, by presenting such a value-judgement as a factual statement, the perception is clearly delayed that all white people are rich, they are rich *only* because of white corruption, and whites are the only cause of black impoverishment. Against such a background, it is easy to convince impoverished people to support a government that promises to address social and economic inequalities and empower black people, and that "significant changes have already been made by the ANC. For example, black empowerment has helped the proportion of urban Africans in the top 20 per cent income group to increase from two percent in 1990 to six per cent in 1995" (*ANC Parliamentary Bulletin* 14 April 1998). Although there is little doubt that the crisis of black poverty is the unacceptable legacy of apartheid, it is by the lack of a clear distinction between value-judgements and factual statements that particular perceptions are instilled that enforce the stereotyping of the white minority as the scapegoat for every form of poverty in the South African society.

The ANC has also expressed opinions regarding opposition parties that appear to be indicative of a fusion between value-judgements and factual statements. The claim that the NP and the DP "have constantly opposed measures aimed at bringing about fundamental transformation of education" (ANC press *Statement on calls for resignation of S Bengu* 9 June 1998; also infra:6.4.2(2)) is clearly a value-judgement that is being presented as a factual statement. The presentation of value-judgements as factual statements also contributes towards immunising

particular aims and goals against criticism (cf. *infra*:6.4.2(2)), such as:

- ◆ convincing people that all forms of criticism offered by these parties should be interpreted in terms of opposition against the transformation of education;
- ◆ manipulating people to believe that because these parties are supposedly opposed to transformation, the obligation to defend, advance and deepen democracy should be led by the ANC, as the political force that is committed to the process of reconstruction and development (cf. Mandela 1997:1);
- ◆ depriving people of the normative freedom of choice to make a critical distinction between what should be regarded as criticism against the way in which the transformation process is undertaken and criticism of the process itself; and
- ◆ shifting blame for problems that might appear within the process itself, to those who consistently oppose the measures of fundamental transformation. By thus fixating on the opposition parties and their apparent *unhistorical* behaviour with regard to the transformation process, the possible *unhistorical nature of the process* itself, can go by unaccounted for.

#### 6.4.3 Transcendental critique of the transformation of South African education

From the foregoing exposition it is evident that certain ideological thought-patterns appear to be part of the current transformation of the South African society, as well as of the transformation of education. In this regard it could be argued that there exists a tension between the aim of transforming South African education into a democratic and non-racial system and the attempts (implementation) made in order to realise this goal. Although it was possible, by virtue of critical rationalism to expose the presence of ideological thought-patterns, it remains profoundly important to penetrate to the roots of presuppositions that may be responsible for evoking such patterns. Such a penetration thus calls for the application of transcendental critique. In this regard it should be indicated that a close connection exists between the aims and goals that the struggle for liberation envisioned for the transformation of South Africa and the transformation process itself. This implies that the application of transcendental critique to the current process of transformation might have similar results than the application of the same to the liberation struggle.

#### 6.4.3.1 Disregard of the meaning-coherence of the modal meaning-diversity

*The first transcendental question - what do we abstract in the intentional theoretical attitude from the integral structure of human existence?*

When putting forward the first transcendental question (cf. infra:3.2.5.2), it appears that the emphasis in the transformation process is placed not only upon *the people*, but more specifically on *the will of the people*. This perception is underscored by Nelson Mandela (1995:1) in his address at the opening of the second session of the democratic parliament, when he stated that

because we had never sat in any democratic parliament before, [we] had to begin the continuing process of learning how to carry out our functions as people's deputies...we must continue to look for ways and means ensuring that the people as a whole are better informed of what we are doing and given ever improved capacity to intervene in our proceedings in an informed and purposive manner.

The prominent role of *the people* appears to be a continuation of a perception accepted in *The Freedom Charter* (cf. 1969:83ff) and promoted throughout the struggle for liberation. After the first democratic elections in 1994, Mandela continuously emphasised the need to establish a *people-centred society*. Thabo Mbeki (1999:2), subsequently also indicated that during the 1999-elections *the people* mandated the ANC to pursue liberation "until our people are freed both from oppression and from the dehumanising legacy of deprivation we inherited from our past". It thus appears that the majority of people in South Africa, who were for so many years excluded from participation in governance, have now given the ANC a mandate to act on behalf of, and according to their will. This means that the establishment of a *people-centred society* will have to comply with the *will of the people* - "[w]hat we have to see in the rising light is a government that is fully conscious of the fact that it has entered into a contract with the people, to work in partnership with them to build a winning nation" (Mbeki 1999:3). While *the people*, as a collective social entity in political motion, was considered the sole liberating force from oppression, this same entity is currently regarded as the *strength behind the establishment of a people-centred society*.

While the ANC pursues the establishment of a democratic South Africa, and since this envisions the creation of a *people-centred society*, it subsequently appears that a democratic society equals a *people-centered society*. Because the creation of the latter needs to comply with the *will of the people*, it could therefore be argued that the *will of the people* it to be regarded the highest and final authority (cf. infra:6.3.2.1). It therefore seems that the absolutisation of an abstract and



collective social entity such as *the people* constitutes the domination of all life spheres by the *will of the people*. Because the new South African government subsequently acts on the mandate of *the people*, the *will of the people* is to be equated with a populist state. Thus, in order to create a *people-centred society*, the *populist state* becomes the supreme authority from which all other forms of authority is derived.

However, the above-exposed perception appears to be problematic once it is viewed against the background of a structurally pluralist view of society (cf. *infra*:2.4.4.2). It has been established that because the state, as a uniquely constituted social institution, exhibits its own internal and unique structure, it cannot be equated with an entity such as *the people* (*infra*:5.3.2.1). This implies that since the state demarcates its own characteristic juridical purpose, it cannot be subjected to the *will of the people*. However, because the ANC had been elected with the explicit presupposition that they are the direct representatives of the *will of the people*, it could be argued that the differentiated authority spheres of the plurality of social institutions in South Africa are to be regulated and directed by the *will of the people*. The accountability of the elective representatives towards the majority of the people who have chosen the ANC to lead the process of reconstruction and development, subsequently becomes *the criterion*. This implies that the current transformation process in South Africa is directed by the absolutised *will of the people*. Thus, contrary to a structurally pluralistic view of the South African society, it becomes clear that the current view of the South African society, is of a hierarchical nature.

The implication of a hierarchical view of society for school-typical education is that the school, although constituted by its own structure and characterised by a school-typical sphere of authority and competence, is equally being subjected to the *will of the people* (cf. *infra*:5.3.2.1). Although it could be argued (from a structurally pluralist perception of society) that *the people* cannot determine the nature of the school, the national Ministry of Education attributes ownership of educational institutions to the communities (cf. *infra*:6.3.4.2). The profound role that the community is envisioned to play in South African education is further emphasised with relation to curriculum design - "[t]he curriculum is to be planned by parents, teachers, education authorities and learners - in fact, as many people as possible are encouraged to participate. This means that it will vary from place to place, and will respond to very specific community needs and wants" (*Curriculum 2005. Lifelong learning for the 21st century* 1997:11). The *will of the people* appears to be equally ingrained in the *South African Schools Act* (1996:14ff) by virtue of

the composition of the governing bodies. In order to restore the relationship between schools and communities, which was severely disrupted during apartheid, the *South African Schools Act* (1996:14ff) includes an extensive section on the governance and professional management of public schools. The governing body comprises the principal, co-opted members of the community, members of parents of the school, educators, and members of staff who are not educators. The governing body thus rests on the *participatory democratic model* since power is equally distributed among this wide spectrum of participants. The implication of this model is that learners have equal say to educators, parents and co-opted members from the community. Power is therefore not distributed among the various offices (*inter alia* the office of the educators; the office of the parents and the office of the learners) with their particular and distinct spheres of competence, but remains concentrated in the *consent of the popular majority* (cf. Fowler *et al.* 1993:111ff): While it could be argued that the competence required by the office of the parents cannot be the same as the competence sphere of educators, it appears that since all (educators, parents and learners) have the same office in principle, the participatory democratic model of school governance leads to the obliteration of all distinctions of office. Although the idea of open access to the governing structures of the public school is (in principle) positive, however, different spheres of competence should be the determining factor in considering the degree of participation that would be appropriate at various levels of governance. Ignorance of the distinctions of office and the different spheres of competence, harbours the danger that the legitimate interests of the various offices become subjected to the dictates of a (supposedly) popular will (Visagie 1995:14). Shale (1999:53; cf. also Nzimande 1996:15) identifies another problem when he indicates that the number of educator representatives is less than the number of parents and learners who have not been trained in educational matters. The implication is that the educator component might be outvoted in important educational decisions. He continues by arguing that certain functions allocated to the governing body, such as the determining of the extra-mural curriculum, the choice of subject options in accordance with the provincial curriculum policy and the purchase of educational materials and equipment for the school (cf. *South African Schools Act* 1996:16) should be left to the office of those professionally trained in educational matters.

Although it must be conceded that the school as a social institution has a certain responsibility to the community it serves, the implication of the foregoing is unambiguous: communities, as the "owners" of the school, will play a directional role in the transformation of South African

education. In this regard it seems that the assumption that the school belongs to the community not only involves the danger of a disregard of the principle of sphere sovereignty, but harbours the possibility of violating the relative sovereign competence sphere of the school. Such disregard of the distinctions of office within the realm of governance and professional management restrict the institutional rights and inherent freedom of the school.

It appears therefore that, characterised by the hypernormative status afforded to the will of the people, the transformation process ignores the internal nature and structure of inter alia the school, thus remaining bound to a hierarchical view of society. Such a view subsequently constitutes a distorted and biased view of the meaning-coherence of the modal diversity of reality.

#### **6.4.3.2 Ideological starting-point resides in the people**

*The second transcendental question - from what starting-point can the aspects of human experience which were theoretically abstracted be united in a theoretical synthesis?*

In order to come to a particular insight into the meaning-coherence of the modal diversity of reality, man requires a fixed point, not only of support, but also as a point of departure (cf. infra: 3.6.2). Since the transformation process embodies an insight into reality that relates to the acceptance of *the people* as the ultimate source of authority, it can be concluded that *popular consent* provides the starting-point for all transformational endeavours. While, during the struggle for liberation, *the will of the people* was considered as the ultimate solution to oppression and exploitation (cf. infra:5.3.2.2), *consent of the popular majority* is currently accepted as the ultimate way in which a democratic and non-racial *people-centered society* can be established (cf. infra:6.4.3.1). This subsequently implies that while power rests with the ANC who is able to gain the consent of the popular majority, it is the consent of the latter that is regarded as the point of departure. It is thus by virtue of taking popular consent as the starting-point for transformation that the ANC can claim that no serious mistakes have "been made by the democratic movement itself, which would create the conditions for the rejection of the new order by the masses of our people" (Mandela 1997:2). The implication of majority consent as a starting-point, is that minorities not only lack power, but whatever rights they are eventually given, are by grace and favour of the all powerful majority (cf. Fowler *et al.* 1993:112).

Schoeman (1998:102) however indicates that history has proven that in every post-revolutionary

period (such as *inter alia* in socialist states), power remained accumulated and concentrated in the hands of a small *élite* who acted on behalf of the oppressed and led them in their insurrection against the suppressors. The irony is that instead of total personal liberty, the masses are effectively plunged into the same position of total inferiority and subservience that they had occupied prior to the "new order". In this regard Plamenatz (1975:129) equates the governing class with a "set of *élites*" who are responsible for taking important decisions for the masses to accept. This ideology of *élite*, rather than of *class* or *race*, might be used to hold the masses together, to justify the elimination of its rivals and to generally impose its will on the people (Plamenatz 1979:140-141). With regard to the transformation of education it has already been established that processes followed in the adoption of new policies did not make provision for authentic participation (cf. *infra*:6.3.3(1)). As neither teachers nor communities were informed of the key elements of curriculum matters, concerns were opted that South Africans are once again being manipulated by a small group of experts who claim to embody a manifest truth. It was also claimed that although South Africa had the capacity to develop an indigenous, tested version of OBE before implementation, the Department of Education preferred to proceed along its own way (Naicker 1999:63). Although the national Department of Education has to act on the mandate of the masses, the way they were proceeding however, soon led to a chasm, not only between theory and practice, but also between policy decisions and "the mood on the ground" (where the masses are confronted with realities such as financial constraints, chaotic management, poorly trained teachers and the implementation of a new curriculum completely foreign to the latter's understanding and practices). It thus regard it appears that the national Department is more concerned with political benefits and educational achievements than with the reconstruction and development of South African education to the benefit of the masses.

It has been stated that the ANC's acceptance of a mandate of the masses will be a mechanism to ensure that policies will not be implemented that do not represent the *will of the people*, and will resist the development of an *élite* (Mandela 1997:5). This perception once again underscores *popular consent* as the starting-point of decisions to be made. However, *prima facie* evidence in educational transformation indicates the presence of decisions made that are alien to the people. The possibility therefore exists that although popular consent is regarded as the starting-point for reconstruction and development, such consent might, ironically be manipulated by an *élite* who imposes their will on the people (cf. *supra*:7.5). Ramphele (6 December 1999) indicates that there is evidence that suggests that South Africans are sliding towards apathy. She also warns

against the failure of people to see that while the colour of those in power had changed, those who took over the reins are still human like their predecessors. A growing apathy and a lack of a culture of robust open and public debate, based on sound intellectual foundations, might lead to a new ruling élite left to their whims who concentrate absolute powers in such a way that people are manipulated in believing it to be in accordance with their will.

However, since *the people*, as well as an entity called the *élite* are relative, it can be argued that this starting-point remains bound to reality itself. As such, the establishment of a *people-centred* South African society finds its highest meaning in popular consent, or perhaps in the manipulation of such a consent. As such, it appears that the latter is accepted as the regulative force in the transformation process. However, contrary to this perception, it could be argued that since both *the people* and *the élite* are subjected to norms for guidance, they cannot be elevated to the status of a regulative force. While both *the people* and *the élite* contain a mixture of good and evil and therefore remain dependant on norms for guidance, the overemphasis on these entities become problematic - not only are both good and evil elements regarded as absolute, but they are accepted as the ultimate starting-point for transformation. This problem relates directly to a distorted insight into the structural *a priori* concerning the structurally pluralistic horizon of reality. As such, the transformation process appears to remain bound to self-induced limits since the accepted fixed point of support is not found outside the boundaries of reality. Where transcendental critique has thus far enabled the exposure of the absolutisation of *popular consent* and the possible role of an emerging *élite*, it is only by virtue of the third transcendental question that the fundamental roots of this absolutisation can be exposed.

#### 6.4.3.3 Origin of meaning?

*The third transcendental question - how is critical self-reflection, namely the concentric direction of thought toward the self, possible, and what is its origin?*

While it has been established that the transformation process proceeds from popular consent as its starting-point, this process appeals to an *absoluteness* for an ultimate authentication of other (modal) norms. Thus, *the people's* (or *the élite's*) interpretation of reality has to relate to a particular idea concerning the origin of reality. Since the struggle for liberation has placed a high premium on human freedom and human rights, the same emphasis is clearly present in the

transformation process. However, although it was stated that the people are the best guardians of human rights, it remains the task of the government to ensure the existence of the necessary institutions and mechanisms by which such rights could be enforced. The establishment of such institutions and mechanisms appears to relate to the assumption that since man is the guardian of his/her own freedom, it is man who knows best how to establish a rights-based society (infra:5.3.2.3). Two important notions thus appear to be the final basis for the normative control of the transformation process, namely the dignity and freedom of the human personality, as well as the "belief" in human reason. It therefore appears that *autonomous human freedom* and *autonomous human reason* are regarded as the ultimate origins of the truth. The transformation process, embodying the establishment of a *rights-based* and *people-centred* South African society, thus finds its basic driving force in the postulate of the humanist ideal of human autonomy and faith in reason.

This perception of the origin of reality exhibits the same difficulties as elaborated upon in chapter 5 (cf. infra:5.3.2.3). Human freedom is regulated (also limited) by a variety of norms, such as *inter alia* norms related to man's intellectual pursuits, formative (technical) activities, language, social relations, economic enterprises, art, jurisprudence, morality and faith. This means that human freedom cannot assume autonomous status. Human reason in particular, can also not claim to be autonomous, since it is qualified by only one aspect of human existence, namely the logical mode. As such, human reason cannot be regarded as a regulative principle since it remains restricted to the logical mode of human existence. In this regard it can further be argued that man cannot claim to possess pure reason, because faith in the autonomy of reason already signifies an irrational commitment that relativises any claim to an act as being exclusively rational.

In summary it can be argued that by subjecting the transformation process to transcendental critique, it was possible to expose the ideal of autonomous human freedom and knowledge as the ultimate origin of truth itself. This assumed origin is subsequently accepted as the guiding principle to which the transformation process ultimately appeals for the authentication of the process itself. Directly linked to this origin is the starting-point of this process, namely popular consent and the possible emergence of an *élite*. This starting-point subsequently provides the vantage point from which a particular insight into reality is made possible. In this case a distorted insight into the meaning-coherence of the modal meaning-diversity led to the absolutisation of a collective social entity called *the people*. It therefore appears that the transformation process could be linked to a hierarchical view of society (cf. table 3).

## 6.5 Concluding remarks

From the foregoing subjection of the reconstruction and development of South African education to critical rationalism, it has become clear that the process appears to be interspersed with ideological thought-patterns. The presence of such thought-patterns consequently holds certain concerns for the transformation of South African education. Conclusive evidence has also been given in favour of the argument that the South African school should be radically transformed from an institution that has been misused for ideological purposes (cf. *infra*: chapter 5) to an institution that is allowed to freely function within its own unique sphere of competence. However, in order to allow such an institution to function in accordance with the distinct structure by which it is constituted, the recognition of the existence of such a distinct structure itself is required. Thus, it is only by acknowledging the essence of the school and thus of school-typical education, that the institution can be allowed to freely function according to its primary task. However, by virtue of transcendental critique the profound role that *popular consent* plays in the process of transformation has also been exposed. From this followed that the elevation of the *will of the people* to assume hypernormative status contributes to accrediting popular consent with the status of a supreme authority. Since all other kinds of authority in society is thus viewed as being subsidiary to and derived from the fundamental authority (*popular consent*), the implication is that school-typical authority is also regarded as subject to the *will of the people*.

Although transformation of South African education has first to deal with a legacy of institutionalised discrimination that has left severe scars on education, this process is currently also being hampered by realities such as financial constraints, the absence of a culture of learning and teaching, managerial problems and incompetence of officials involved in the process (cf. *infra*:6.3.4ff). One of the greatest difficulties facing the transformation process, however, is the possibility that school-typical education might be misused in the name of democracy for the sake of popular consent. It seems that existing practices involving an everwidening chasm between policy formulation and implementation, might eventually prove to be detrimental to the establishment of a democratic education system. Because the transformation process should be viewed against the transition from a closed to an open society, and since South African history delivers *prima facie* evidence of the way in which school-typical education has been misused, extreme care should be taken that the reconstruction of the education system coincides with a

recognition of the principle of sphere sovereignty.



# Chapter 7

## Conclusion and Recommendations

### 7.1 Orientation

This chapter includes a brief overview of the study, as well as conclusions drawn from the literature study on ideology, the transition from a closed to an open society, as well as the nature of South African education during the apartheid era, the struggle for liberation and the current process of education transformation. Against the background of the way in which school-typical education in South Africa has functioned from 1948 until 1994, certain recommendations will be offered with regard to the present transformation process. Suggestions concerning further research within the realm of South African education will conclude this chapter.

### 7.2 Overview of the study

The research problem of this study was to critically analyse the ideological foundations that played and might still be playing a profound role in determining the nature of South African education. This analysis was, however, placed within the context of the transitional process from a closed to an open society (cf. *infra*:2.3ff). Since this process involves the differentiation of culture into a variety of life spheres, including that of education, this study directly involved a critical exposition of the way in which the school, as a relative autonomous social institution, functioned in different periods during the history of South African education.

In the attempt to expose the presence of ideological thought-patterns, and in order to expose the nature of presuppositions underpinning such thought-patterns, an argument was put forward in favour of the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude, prior to the application of the method of transcendental critique (cf. *infra*:3.6). Karl Popper proposed six questions that appeared to be significant in an attempt to expose the presence of ideological thought-patterns in a society (*infra*:3.10). In this regard Popper argued that it is only after such thought-patterns had been revealed and recognised, that man's resistance against ideological indoctrination and manipulation can be strengthened. However, because the mere exposure of such thought-patterns does not

reveal the presuppositions by which they are determined, the application of transcendental critique seemed to be imperative. Since the method of transcendental critique enables man to penetrate to the roots of ideological thought-patterns, it was possible to critically analyse the ideological *foundations* of South African education. Although Popper (cf. Salamun 1999:88) argued that ideological thought-patterns ought first to be recognised in order to resist ideological indoctrination, it appears that when the presuppositions underpinning such thought-patterns are not brought to the fore, the roots thereof remain hidden.

Chapter three involved a critical exposition of the nature of South African education under the ban of the apartheid ideology (1948 - 1994). In order to fully comprehend the nature of the latter, an extensive explanation was given of the particular belief-system (cf. *infra*:4.2ff) that played a profound role in shaping the South African society, and also school-typical education (*infra*:4.5ff). By virtue of Popper's critical questions (*infra*:5.4.1), as well as the application of transcendental critique (*infra*:4.4.2ff), it was possible to not only expose the link between the belief-system and the ideology of separatism, but also to recognise the profound impact that such an ideological belief-system had on South African education.

A critical review of the struggle against the oppressive apartheid regime also involved an exposition of the role that education played in this struggle for liberation. By subjecting education during the period of struggle, commencing from about 1948 until 1994, to Popper's six questions, it was possible to recognise the presence of ideological thought-patterns not only in the way it was argued that the struggle should be undertaken, but in particular with regard to thoughts concerning the role of school-typical education on the way to liberation (*infra*:5.3.2). By virtue of the application of transcendental critique it was also possible to penetrate to the humanist root of such thought itself (*infra*:5.3.3ff). While the nature of the struggle for liberation, as well as its impact on school-typical education was exposed, chapter five also served to indicate the foundations that were to underpin the transformation of South African education after the 1994 elections when the African Nationalist Party came into power.

Since 1994 was earmarked as the year in which the apartheid regime had come to an end, it signified the beginnings of an era in which freedom and democracy would be introduced in the South African society. Plunged into a process of radical transformation, the South African society was placed on the road towards the establishment of a *people-centred society* where

human rights would be recognised and guaranteed. Although current transformation of South African education is a process still in its beginning, it was critically analysed by means of critical rationalism (infra:6.4.2) and transcendental critique (infra:6.4.3ff) in chapter 6. The presence of possible ideological thought-patterns, as well as a particular insight into the meaning-coherence of the meaning-diversity of reality was subsequently revealed. In this way it was possible to expose certain presuppositions that might play a role in both current and future transformation of South African education.

### **7.3 Findings of the study**

#### **7.3.1 Ideology and the differentiated society**

In chapter two it has been established that in the closed society guidance was taken by the totalitarian bond of kinship, tribe of folk. While the latter functioned as the single leading structure, the role of the individual was regulated by taboos determined by this undifferentiated structure (infra:2.2.3). Apart from a life of obedience regarding social laws that were considered to be inviolable and unalterable, it has become apparent that members of the closed society were not expected to make rational decisions or to indulge in the invention of critical discussions. The closed society was therefore a place of security where there was no need for man to accept personal responsibility based on the principle of reasonable accountability. However, it has also been established that due to various factors such as population growth (infra:2.3.1) and cultural contact with other civilisations (infra:2.3.2), the boundaries of the closed society were not only gradually eradicated, but society itself was placed in the midst of a transitional process - the closed society was beginning to "open-up" into a variety of life spheres such as *inter alia*, science, the fine arts, commerce and industry and education (infra:2.3.3).

Form this study it has become clear that the transitional process relates directly to man's ability to indulge in what can be referred to as cultural formative activities (infra:2.3.5). Since culture relates to the way in which man masters and controls reality, it was possible to establish that once the eradication of the "organic borders" of the closed society have been set into motion, the beginning of the differentiation of culture into different life spheres was introduced. Thus, since the differentiation of culture implies different ways in which reality can be mastered and controlled, it was concluded that the emergence of various life spheres must be directly linked to the arising of different human needs that have to be promoted and protected. The implication is

that the differentiation of culture into a life sphere such as commerce and industry relates to economic concerns, the disclosing of a life sphere involving fine arts can subsequently be linked to man's aesthetical needs, while the establishment of the school owes its origin to the inability of the parental home to fulfil increasing educational needs. One of the important conclusions drawn from this is the recognition that life spheres coexist alongside each other (infra:2.3.4). This conclusion was based on the event that differentiated life forms are identifiable and simultaneously distinguishable from each other. As such, it appears that each sphere must be constituted by a universal structure that makes the existence of the very sphere itself possible. The coexistence of distinguishable life spheres alongside each other subsequently implies that no life sphere can be regarded as the source of supreme authority, which means that all other forms of authority cannot be viewed as subsidiary.

While it has become clear that the transitional process involves an ongoing process of societal change (differentiation), it is also evident that the role of the individual is fundamentally affected by this process. An important outcome of the transitional process appears to be the fact that cultural disclosure involves man's participation by virtue of bringing individual cultural dispositions and talents to fruition. Furthermore, it has become apparent that a differentiated society implies differentiated responsibilities. As such, man can no longer find sanctuary in the form of the single, undifferentiated leading structure of the closed society in which responsibility and accountability were concentrated. The rational person in the open society therefore has to accept personal responsibility and accountability for his/her participation in the process of historical development (infra:2.3.5). However, since the burden of personal responsibility places such strain on modern man, there appears to be a tendency to attempt to reconstruct a place of refuge that regulates the responsibility of making rational decisions.

Modern man's tendency to arrest the transitional process thus appears to have a detrimental effect on cultural differentiation. The conclusion was drawn that whilst the variety of life spheres imply differentiated responsibility, man attempts, in order to minimise the strain of personal decision-making and the acceptance of personal responsibility, to take refuge in a totalitarian society where authority resides only in one supreme life sphere. However, the acceptance of one supreme authority structure appears to be a violation of the *principle of sphere sovereignty* that guarantees the differentiation of each life sphere according to its distinct nature. In this regard it was also established that although the transitional process from the closed society to the open

society has been set into motion, the nature of this process can be characterised by a disharmonious disclosure of culture when the distribution of power and authority does not reside in each life sphere in accordance with its distinct structure, but becomes concentrated in a supposed fundamental source of authority (infra:2.3.6ff). As such, it has become clear that modern society with its differentiated life spheres can no longer be described as a closed society. However, the presence of totalitarian ideas and the acceptance of one supreme source of authority, such as the state, can be attributed to the human tendency to recreate a sanctuary whereby an assumed supreme authority takes the leading role, and simultaneously minimises the strain of personal and rational participation in the transitional process.

Another important conclusion was that the elevation of one life sphere to the status of a supreme authority coincides with the eradication of sphere boundaries. This implies that the supreme authority subsequently dictates to the supposedly subsidiary authorities. This state of affairs can be linked to the emergence of a hypernorm, which constitutes the emergence of an ideology (infra:2.4). Since the elevation of a particular life sphere takes the form of a supreme authority and thus dictates the criteria for the interpretation of life in modern society, it necessarily leads to the extreme expansion of the elevated power sphere at the expense of other life spheres. As an action-oriented set of beliefs that tends to function in a totalitarian way, an ideology relates directly to a hierarchical view of society. Contrary to the latter, it has become apparent that, in principle, a structurally pluralistic view of society cancels any tendency to view the various kinds of authorities in society as subsidiary from a supreme all-encompassing authority. Apart from a hierarchical view of society, other trademarks of an ideology have been put forward: the emergence of an ideology can be linked to a situation of threat (infra:2.4.4.1); it assumes an all-encompassing character (infra:2.4.4.2); ideologues claim a monopoly on truth (infra:2.4.4.3); all forms of criticism (external as well as self-criticism) are disregarded (infra:2.4.4.4); the individual assumes a similar rigid and controlled role as was the case in the closed society (infra:2.4.4.5); various means (*inter alia* the perversion of norms, ideological symbolism, hypernormative rationality and power) are mobilised in order to secure the status of the supreme authority (infra:2.4.4.6).

It has also become apparent that the school as a social institution, can easily be mobilised as an important ideological carrier (infra:2.4.4.7). In accordance with the assumption that each life sphere is constituted by its own distinct structure, it was argued that the school exhibits certain

qualities which render it unique. Due to this unique structure that makes the existence of the school possible, it was concluded that the task, the authority and the competence sphere of the school are determined by this structure itself, and not by any external authority (infra:2.4.4.7A). However, since the emergence of an ideology involves totalitarianism whereby society is viewed in terms of a hierarchy, school-typical authority will be regarded as derived from the supreme authority. As such, it appears that the dominating structure will not only overextend its own boundaries by surpassing its own sphere limitations, but will also encroach upon the relative sovereign sphere of the school when the school is being placed in a position of subordination (infra:2.4.4.7B & 2.4.4.7C). School-typical functions will then become secondary to the needs of the dictating authority structure. The implication is that notions such as positivism (infra:2.4.4.7C.(i)) and indoctrination (infra:2.4.4.7C.(ii)) can play a profound role in mobilising the school as an ideological apparatus. While positivism coincides with the transmitting of a supposedly positive mixture of values and facts (as interpreted by persons of clear ideological convictions), the educand is "educated" in accordance with ultimately acclaimed ideological values. As such, it is through the school as an ideological apparatus, that it can be ensured that the future choices of the learner will be to the satisfaction of the ideology. Due to a hierarchical view of society and the concept of monopolistic control, the school also serves the purpose of insulating the learner from foreign ideas and external criticism. By means of indoctrination, the learner becomes a mere receptacle of (ideologically) pre-determined facts. While it seems that this state of affairs leads to rational stagnation, the primary task of the school becomes redirected towards satisfying the ideological goal. It thus appears that responsibility regarding school-typical education becomes regulated by a supreme authority.

### **7.3.2 Transcendental critique and the critico-rationalist attitude**

Having established the link between the emergence of an ideology and the hierarchilising tendency to place the school in a position of subordination, it became apparent that this state of affairs indicates not only a disharmonious disclosure of education as a life sphere, but it also has a detrimental effect on the proper functioning of the school in accordance with its distinct sphere of competence. In this regard it seems that in order to adopt a critical stance against ideological indoctrination and manipulation by means of ideologically-coloured educational theories, the presence of ideological thought-patterns ought to be exposed. However, it was also concluded that the mere exposure of such patterns cannot suffice, since the presuppositions by which they

are underpinned and determined need to be exposed as well. If the latter remains hidden, a situation might arise where mistakes made on the level of the formation of such theories will continually be justified in terms of these prejudices.

The conclusion was thus drawn that the application of the method of transcendental critique appears to be well-suited for attempting to investigate the nature of presuppositions that may lead to ideological thought-patterns. Because this method rests on the assumption that the orderliness of reality enables us to examine the foundational structures of institutions (spheres of competence) within creation, it is possible to critically scrutinise the nature and extent of the ontological structure of the school as a particular educational sphere of competence. Since transcendental critique penetrates to the universal conditions that determine and limit theoretical thought, as well as the existence of (educational) institutions, it was concluded that conflicting accounts of reality presuppose *one reality* that offers itself in exactly the same way within the horizon of human experience (infra:3.2). Thus, any view of reality, whether it be structurally pluralistic, or hierarchical, can only offer itself within the horizon of human experience. It appears that in contrast to an insight into reality whereby all modes of human existence are regarded equal, an ideology can be coupled with the elevation of a particular mode of existence to hypernormative status (infra:3.4). It seems that the method of transcendental critique is well-suited in order to expose such an absolutisation. By subjecting particular theories concerning educational reality to the three transcendental questions, the following can be exposed:

- ◆ a particular insight into the modal diversity of meaning, thus the revelation of what aspect of reality is absolutised (infra:3.6.1);
- ◆ the vantage point from which a theoretical perspective of reality can be required (infra:3.6.2); and
- ◆ an origin to which man directs his/her last and ultimate appeal regarding truth itself (infra:3.6.3).

It was concluded that through the subjection of an ideological belief-system to transcendental critique, the theoretical attitude of ideological thought could be linked to the tendency to reside its absolute starting-point in an aspect of reality. Thus, when presuppositions underpinning thought-patterns relate to the absolutisation of a particular aspect of reality, it could be

anticipated that they will necessarily result in ideological thought-patterns that give way to ideological indoctrination and manipulation.

In order to expose the presence of ideological thought-patterns, the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude seemed to be appropriate. Pertaining to an *attitude of reasonableness*, the critico-rationalist advances from the assumption that in the search for truth, man has to accept the fact that human knowledge remains fallible (infra:3.9.3). As such, knowledge concerning educational reality is of a relative nature and therefore, the claim of a manifest truth remains a fallacy. It thus appeared appropriate to adopt an attitude of permanent willingness to enter into critical discourse of the own educational theory, as well as those put forward by other educationists. This attitude also served to expose and eliminate *inter alia* personal bias and hidden agendas on the way to the establishment of an open education system. Since the critical rationalist rejects all forms of determinism (infra:3.9.5), and while the latter appears to be prevalent in ideologically coloured theories, it was concluded that the critico-rationalist attitude should be adopted *prior* to the subjection of theories to criticism. Once this attitude had been adopted, so-called unquestionable judgements concerning educational reality could be relativised.

One of the important characteristics of critical rationalism, that particularly applied to this study, was the fact that the influence of tradition in rational thought is not denied (infra:3.9.6). Thus, by accepting that total reality cannot be rationally comprehended, it is assumed that science can be liberated from dogmatism, ideologies and other forms of determinism. In order to achieve the latter, it was deduced that the subjection of a society, thus also a particular perception of educational reality, to Popper's six questions (infra:3.10) could be significant in providing guidance in the exposure of ideological thought-patterns. The implication, especially for this study, was that the tools of critical rationalism would expose the presence of ideological thought-patterns that might, on the one hand, contribute to establishing structures of domination, and, on the other hand, disclose the relation between educational theory and ideology.

However, the study also led to the exposure of certain shortcomings in the application of critical rationalism that could be overcome when the method of transcendental critique is also applied. Although critical rationalism relates to the detecting and elimination of errors in *inter alia* educational theories, the role of presuppositions are only accepted, but not exposed (infra:3.11.1). It therefore seems that the application of transcendental critique serves to



overcome this shortcoming, since it is specifically aimed at exposing hidden presuppositions that determine and lead to errors in theories. The critical rationalist's assumption that the choice of a starting-point is not decisively important, is addressed by the fact that the second transcendental question assists in exposing the starting-point that serves as the fixed point of support for all theories (infra:3.11.2). Disregard of the assumed essence by which things are constituted, is also relativised by the method of transcendental critique (infra:3.11.3). Since the latter rests on the assumption that the orderliness of reality enables us to examine the foundational structures of institutions, it allows man to penetrate to the universal conditions that constitute the existence of such institutions. The method of transcendental critique was thus especially significant in order to study the proper function (essence) of an institution, particularly to provide the necessary direction for the reconstruction of an institution that had been misused for non-typical purposes.

### 7.3.3 Apartheid education in South Africa

By subjecting the apartheid society, and particularly education, to Popper's six critical questions (infra:4.4.1) it was concluded that the South African society, in the period from 1948 until 1994, was profoundly interspersed with ideological thought-patterns. It was possible to link such thought-patterns to the following:

- ◆ a particular religious belief-system according to which it was accepted that it was the will of God that society should reflect national differences (infra:4.4.1(1));
- ◆ a claim that the (white) Afrikaner nation enjoys the privileged right of interpreting God's plan for South Africa (infra:4.4.1(2));
- ◆ the assumption that any form of criticism against the foregoing perception would necessarily imply criticism against a God-given blueprint for South Africa (infra:4.4.1(3));
- ◆ a rigid juxtaposition between white people and black people (infra:4.4.1(4));
- ◆ the evoking of emotional enemy-stereotyping whereby good resides in the Afrikaner nation and evil resides in African Nationalism (infra:4.4.1(5)); and
- ◆ presenting value-judgements regarding the nature of black people as factual statements (infra:4.4.1(6)).

However, having exposed ideological thought-patterns, it was by means of the application of transcendental critique that it was possible to penetrate to the roots that determined and directed such thought-patterns. It was subsequently deduced that ideological thought-patterns that

contributed to the shaping of the apartheid society were determined by attributing hypernormative status to the nation (infra:4.4.2.1). By absolutising the nation, the latter was not only regarded as a norm in itself, but was also considered *the criterion* for interpreting all other spheres of the South African society. Because of the assumed *supra-modal status* of the nation, it was also accepted as the starting-point from which a theoretical perspective of reality was acquired (infra:4.4.2.2). This meant that the South African society in its totality was regarded as subservient to the nation. Proceeding from the nation as a point of departure, it was simultaneously concluded that God was not the only origin of truth - rather, and thus co-equal to God, the nation was also perceived as the origin of truth itself (infra:4.4.2.3).

Since the safeguarding of the Afrikaner nation in particular, and the white race in general was accepted as the regulative norm of society, it appeared that education was not primarily aimed at the disclosure of the logical faculty of the learners. This primary function of school-typical education was rather misapplied to serve the apartheid ideology. By exposing apartheid as an ideological belief-system, and revealing the concomitant hierarchical view of society, it was possible to infer that South African education was mobilised as an ideological state apparatus (infra:4.5ff). Through state control superior education for whites was promoted (infra:4.5.2.1), while black education was kept at an inferior level (infra:5.5.2.2). Ideological manipulation of South African education was consequently done through aspects such as funding (infra:4.5.2.3), curriculum and language-prescription (infra:4.5.3ff; also 4.5.3.2B), as well as the content of textbooks (infra:4.5.3.2A(i); 4.5.3.2A(ii)).

Viewed within the context of the transitional process from a closed society to an open society, apartheid education was found to be indicative of a disregard of the *principle of sphere sovereignty*. Whereas the school is supposed to exist alongside other institutions as a relatively autonomous and distinguishable social institution, the South African school was thus not allowed the right to control its own affairs within the sphere of its own competence. This also meant that the equation of the nation with the state not only attributed unlawful authority to the nation as a particular collective entity, but that the nation-state enjoyed the status of a supreme authority. School-typical authority was thus regarded as derived from state authority. Due to this totalitarian tendency, the South African school was indeed deprived of its lawful right of deciding on its own affairs. It became clear that the emergence of totalitarian ideas and the accompanying hierarchical view of the South African society were representative of a disharmonious transition

on the way to an open society. While the open society implies the coexistence of life spheres in complete harmony alongside each other, the entrenchment of the school's specific area of competence can be linked to man's tendency to arrest the transitional process by clinging to totalitarian ideas. The emergence of an ideology is therefore not indicative of a closed society, but rather appears to be part of the transitional process where cultural differentiation remains subject to fallible human participation. It was indicated that in South Africa such disharmonious disclosure resulted in the eradication of the boundaries between life spheres; the violation of their structural integrity and ultimately led to the emergence of a situation where life spheres were no longer granted the right to promote and protect the needs that led to their existence. This meant that in the service of the apartheid ideology, the typical task of the school to disclose the logical function of the learner, was violated. It was evident that (mis)use of the school for other than school-typical purposes would result in increased dissatisfaction with, and rejection of the education system.

#### **7.3.4 The struggle for liberation: education as a tool of critical opposition**

In order to critically analyse the nature of the struggle to free South African education from the ideology of ethno-nationalism, it was necessary to expose the foundations of the political critique of the South African society. It was concluded that the struggle for liberation in South Africa was not only founded in a Marxist socialist tradition (infra: 5.2.2.1), but was also based upon revolutionary populism (infra: 5.2.2.2 & 5.2.2.3). While the former relates to the view of South Africa as a capitalist society in which whites are rich and blacks are poor, the latter refers to the assumption that revolutionary forces, led by the ANC, will eventually bring about the establishment of a democratic South African society that would be ruled by majority consent.

Against this background, and considering the all-encompassing nature of the struggle, the emergence of yet another ideology was evident: The imposing of absolute value upon a finite reality such as a revolution, the acceptance that no sacrifice was deemed too important, as well as a situation where no criticism against the revolution was tolerated, became clear indications that the struggle for liberation had obtained ideological proportions. The implications for school-typical education was unavoidable. Since education played a significant role in oppression under apartheid, it would now have to play an equally important role in the process of national liberation. In order to determine the extent to which school-typical education was once again

mobilised as an ideological mechanism, and to expose ideological thought-patterns, the struggle for liberation was subjected to Popper's six critical questions. This led to the following conclusions:

- ♦ The struggle for liberation proceeded from a general policy that was not only regarded as fixed and unalterable, but was based on a specific and final epistemology concerning the South African reality (infra:6.3.2(1)). This manifest truth about South Africa was linked to the assumption that it is the inalienable right and the divine destiny of the African to free Africa. The implication for school-typical education was that the apparent "infallible" interpretation of the (South) African reality by the propounders of the struggle, were to be transmitted through People's Education. While the latter was proposed as an alternative to Bantu Education, it was linked to a transformation of consciousness to understand the evils of the apartheid system, as well as a readiness to participate in a non-racial, democratic system. Suggested alternative syllabi thereby featured the struggle as a central theme in the counter-educational strategy. It was concluded that school-typical education during the struggle was "constructed" upon a (blueprint) for education based on a blueprint perception of the South African reality as interpreted by *the people*. Since school-typical education was thus aimed at "moulding" the child to participate in a national liberation struggle, it was inferred that the school was once again mobilised as an ideological apparatus.
- ♦ As a result of the high premium and exclusivity placed on the knowledge and experience of the leaders of the struggle, their decisions were regarded as representative of the *will of the people*. It was therefore accepted that because the political leaders had a monopolistic claim on some basic exclusive knowledge concerning the South African reality, they were indeed given a mandate by the people to act on their behalf (infra:5.3.2(2)).
- ♦ It appeared that while the ideology of revolutionary populism represented the deepest aspirations of the people, it also succeeded in deploying strategies of immunisation to hold off external criticism long enough for people to adopt this particular belief-system (infra:5.3.2(3)).
- ♦ It was also concluded that the doctrine of revolutionary populism was interspersed with rigid dichotomies: the *people's camp* was associated with the African, gutter education, black inferiority and the black proletariat. Against the *people's camp* was the *enemy camp* comprising of the European, white education, white supremacy and the white capitalist (infra:5.3.2(4)). The South African society, thus also South African education, was therefore viewed in terms of this *friend/foe relationship*.

- ♦ It was established that the ideology of revolutionary populism presented an enemy-image loaded with a high degree of negative emotion. By arguing that evil resides in the enemy camp, the opposite was subsequently accepted - good resides in *the people*. The decision to adopt a revolutionary and violent struggle was not only blamed upon the enemy that had set the pace, but aggressive outbursts directed against the racist regime, also contributed to reducing internal differences within the liberation struggle itself (infra:5.3.2(5)). This meant that 'evils' such as the misuse of learners for ideological purposes subsequently escaped criticism.
- ♦ *Prima facie* evidence was found regarding the fusion of value-judgements and factual statements (infra:5.3.2(6)). By presenting value-judgements about the nature of South African society, as well as education, as statements of facts, the blame for all that was wrong was concentrated upon the propounders of the oppressive regime. Simultaneously, however, the fixation upon the wrongs of the apartheid regime, contributed to the redirecting of accountability for the nature of the struggle, away from the struggle itself.

Having exposed the above-mentioned ideological thought-patterns, the pre-ideological conditions that determined these patterns, were revealed by means of the application of transcendental critique (infra:5.3.3). In this way it was possible to establish that the perception of a collective entity called *the people*, and *the will of the people*, as the sole liberatory force constituted an absolutisation of *the people* and their *will*. Since the people and their will became the regulative and leading force, all spheres of the South African society were subsidiary to *the will of the people* (infra:5.3.2.1). This hierarchical view of society subsequently "justified" the misuse of school-typical education for revolutionary purposes - since it was the *will of the people* to replace the oppressive regime by a new regime, it was also *the will of the people* that school-typical education should stand in service of this (ideological) goal.

The belief that the school belongs to *the people*, also represented a situation where *the people and their will* was not only accepted as a vantage point from which to gain a totality perspective of the South African society, but it subsequently provided the fixed point of support for theoretical thought itself (cf. infra:5.3.2.2). Although it was concluded that *the will of the people* was considered the starting-point for theoretical thought, it appeared that the *free and autonomous human personality* and *autonomous human reason* was regarded as the (supposed) ultimate origin of truth. This meant that *the will and the well-being of the people* was ultimately

regulated by *autonomous man* who placed his/her trust in *autonomous human reason*. It was therefore evident that ideological thought-patterns prevailing in the ideology of revolutionary populism owed their existence not only to the absolutisation of *the people* and their *will* (as the regulating norm according to which society and education was interpreted), but also, in the last instance, to a "belief" in the autonomy of the human personality and human reason. The implication was that school-typical education was also regulated by *the will of the people* - the relative sovereignty of the school was violated, and due to this unlawful eradication of the competence sphere of the school, the latter was once again, as was the case during the apartheid era, mobilised for ideological purposes.

When viewed within the context of the transitional process from a closed to an open society, it appeared that the school as a social institution, had become the victim of an *unhistorical* exercise of formative power (infra:5.3.1). Various evidence was put forward in favour of the latter statement: disrespect of the *norm of cultural economy* resulted in the over-exceeding of the power of *the people* unto the terrain of the school; and disregard of the *norm of differentiation* led to a situation where (black) schools were not granted the lawful right to function in accordance with their primary function, but was misused for revolutionary purposes. It also appeared that the *historical norm of continuity* was violated since the school became an instrument to overthrow existing educational structures in order to start with a clean slate - a situation that appeared to be problematic since change and transformation can only be built upon the vital forces present in tradition itself. Thus, little doubt exists that while school-typical education was misused as a tool of oppression during the apartheid era, it was equally misused by the propounders of the ideology of revolutionary populism as a tool of liberation.

### 7.3.5 Education in a democratic South Africa

After the first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC was elected into power by the majority of people in South Africa. Although the majority of South Africans finally achieved political liberation, the process of building the envisioned *people-centred* South African society was still to be accomplished. The promotion of *democracy* (infra:6.2.1) and *human rights* (infra:6.2.2) were consequently to play a leading role in the transformation of the South African society. The South African perception of democracy appears to relate to majority participation and consent (populist principle), by means of a mandate (mandate principle) of *the people* to the government.

The new government thus not only committed itself to formulate strategies for the effective implementation of human rights norms, but the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the new Constitution (1996) was evidence of the government's commitment to transformation.

Along with the transformation of society, transformation of the South African education system into a just and equitable system that would provide open access to good quality and training for all, was a prerequisite of the new government. It was thus deduced that the basic structure for a free and democratic South African education system would have to rest on the pillars provided and guaranteed by the new Constitution, namely:

- ◆ the right to basic education (infra:6.3.1.1);
- ◆ the right to instruction in the language of choice (infra:6.3.1.2); and
- ◆ the right to establish and maintain independent educational institutions (infra:6.3.1.3).

Having secured basic rights by the Constitution, the principles for the reconstruction and development of education and training in South Africa were laid down as:

- ◆ open access to education (infra:6.3.2.1);
- ◆ equity (infra:6.3.2.2);
- ◆ equality (infra:6.3.2.3); and
- ◆ quality (infra:6.3.2.4).

It appeared that promises made during the pre-election period placed the newly elected government under enormous strain to comply with the *will of the people*. This also placed the national Ministry of Education under pressure to introduce new development initiatives in order to radically transform the South African education system. Placed within the centre of newly proposed policies and educational strategies, was the radical shift from the traditionally content-based approach to an outcome-based (OBE) approach (infra:6.3.3) in the proposed Curriculum 2005. Although the new Ministry of Education had achieved a lot in the relative short time since its inception, the implementation of OBE and Curriculum 2005 was, however, met with grave realities such as:

- ◆ financial constraints (infra:6.3.4.2);
- ◆ issues relating to redeployment and severance packages (infra:6.3.4.3);
- ◆ the shortage of textbooks and proper facilities (infra:6.3.4.4);
- ◆ managerial problems, including incompetence and corruption (infra:6.3.4.5);
- ◆ the absence of a culture of learning and teaching (infra:6.3.4.6); and

- ◆ poor matriculation results and concerns surrounding standards (infra:6.3.4.7).

Although it could be inferred at this stage that there appears to be a chasm between newly adopted educational policies and the implementation thereof, it was, however, by virtue of subjecting the process of transformation to critical rationalism, that the presence of possible ideological thought-patterns could be exposed:

- ◆ A particular dichotomy could be identified in the centre of the rhetorical framework concerning OBE: apartheid education is bad and therefore, OBE, as the alternative, must necessarily be good. Against the background of this dichotomy, it was assumed that OBE could be the sole and ultimate solution to apartheid education (infra:6.4.2(1)). Thus, proceeding from the perception that OBE was the infallible answer to apartheid education, the decision to implement Curriculum 2005 was made on a national level, seemingly without providing for authentic participation of stakeholders involved in education. Accepting OBE as *the* way in which South African education should be transformed, and by claiming to have a mandate of the people to act on their behalf, participation by stakeholders was apparently not required - since OBE is the ultimate answer, it will necessarily comply with the *will of the people*.
- ◆ However, since OBE was adopted without full participation of *the people*, it appears that a small group of experts claimed to possess *the* knowledge and to know the *only* route to transformation (infra:6.4.2(2)). It thus also seems that the newly proposed "paradigm shift" might be accompanied by an authoritarian view of society.
- ◆ It also appears that the national Ministry of Education might be immunising its policies against criticism (infra:6.4.2(3)). Although critics of OBE come from across the racial and ideological spectrum, criticism is primarily rejected since it is believed to come from conservative groups of parents and rival parties. Critics within the circle of the ANC are also marked as being disloyal or in favour of the previous education system.
- ◆ In conjunction with the already established dichotomy, a perception has been put forward that only "good" resides in new legislation and policies. The implication here is that since evil lies with the old education dispensation, those who criticise transformation initiatives, must necessarily be hostile to transformation itself (infra:6.3.2(4)).
- ◆ The above-mentioned conclusion relates directly to the emergence of an enemy-image that is characterised as anti-democratic and counter-offensive (infra:6.3.2(5)). It thus appears that opposition parties are associated with the preservation of white privilege and are



therefore interpreted as forces against the democratic process. The predicament of such an enemy-image is that authentic criticism of the transformation process may be rejected. This means that even criticism of the *manner* in which the democratisation process is conducted, is disregarded as opposing democratisation. Through scapegoat strategies, the "enemy" is blamed for all the wrongs in society. This includes the redirection and explanation of mistakes made by the new government in terms of the legacy of apartheid.

- ♦ The fusion of value-judgements and factual statements also seem to contribute to immunising the transformation process against criticism. By presenting value-judgements regarding the assumed enemy as factual statements, and by obfuscating evaluations of the transformation process by means of factual statements, the people are easily soothed to believe that transformation of education is moving in the right (only) direction and that problems encountered will not hamper the process itself (infra:6.3.2(6)).

Against the background of the foregoing ideological thought-patterns, and through transcendental critique of the process of education transformation, the following was concluded:

- ♦ The emphasis placed on *majority consent* in the current process of transformation is similar to that during the struggle for liberation. This has been extensively underlined by references to the ideal of establishing a *people-centred* South African society (infra:6.4.3.1). It is thus evident that the transformation of South African education has to comply with *the will of the people*. In this regard it has become apparent that, in order to create a people-centred society, the populist state has been accredited with the status of a supreme authority. Contrary to a structurally pluralistic view of society, this hierarchical populist perception implies that school-typical authority is derived from the supreme populist state authority. Conclusions derived from this relate to the possibility that the nature of school-typical education is once again subjected to the will of the people, thus threatening the relative sovereign sphere of school-typical competence.
- ♦ In compliance with the absolutisation of majority consent, the starting-point for the interpretation of South African education resides in *the will of the people* (infra:6.4.3.2). However, from the study a new possibility arose, namely the emergence of an *élite* who may not only be acting on behalf of *the people*, but simultaneously dictate *the will of the people*. This means that although majority consent is taken as the vantage point for a total perspective on South African education, *majority consent* may well be manipulated by an *élite*, imposing their will on the people, but also acting in the name of *the people*.

- ♦ In the last instance, it was concluded that, similar to the struggle, the *will of the people*, as well as the possible emergence of an *élite*, finally appeal to the humanist ideal of *human autonomy* and *faith in reason* (infra:6.4.3.3). Against the background of the above-mentioned findings, it appears that the will of the people is driven by a basic and fundamental motive relating to humanism.

Within the context of the transitional process from a closed to an open society, various elements of the transformation process indicate a disharmonious disclosure of education. As previously established, the harmonious coexistence of the school as a social institution alongside other institutions is guaranteed by the principle of sphere sovereignty. However, the presence of ideological thought-patterns is an indication that the school could once again, as was the case during apartheid (infra:chapter 4) and the struggle for liberation (infra:chapter 5), be misused for other than school-typical purposes.

#### **7.4 Recommendations**

Aimed at the current transformational process of South African education, the following recommendations are based upon conclusions drawn from the way in which the school (mis)functioned during the apartheid era, as well as the struggle for liberation.

##### **7.4.1 The necessity of the discerning of structure and direction for the successful transformation of South African education**

In this study it was concluded that the reason for the violation of the integrity of educational institutions directly relates to a disregard of the *principle of sphere sovereignty*, and indirectly to man's tendency to escape the need to accept responsibility and accountability for his/her participation in the process of historical development. The prominent role attributed to *the people*, especially with regard to the perception that the school belongs to the community it serves (infra:6.4.1), already issues a warning of the possible disregard of the relative sovereign sphere of educational institutions during the process of transformation. It is therefore recommended that the point of departure for the transformation of education should be the discernment of the *structure* and *direction* of the school (cf. infra: 2.4.4.7A&B).

In this regard Makgoba (1998:43; cf. also Wolters 1990:80ff) makes the important distinction between the *originality* and the *uniqueness* of an educational institution. He argues that an institution should, in accordance with the primary reason for its origin, be relevant and appropriate to the society. The structural principle by which the educational institution, such as the school, is constituted, should therefore be clearly distinguished from the adaptation and integration thereof into the unique society it serves - such adaptation should, however, always take place in accordance with the distinctive structure by which the institution is constituted. It is especially with regard to the need for transformation of education that the discernment between the origin or *originality* (structure) and *uniqueness* (direction) of the school as an educational institution appears to be significant. Since an educational institution such as the school is constituted by a universal structural principle that enables its contradistinction from other social institutions, its *transformation* cannot be accomplished outside the parameters set by its structural principle. Because this principle determines the nature of the institution, and this nature relates to teaching and the propagation of knowledge, the transformation of South African education should consider the *proper function* of the institution. Transformation should consequently not involve an attempt to change the universal structure (*originality*) of the school, since it would then no longer be distinguishable as a school! It should rather be aimed at transforming *the way in which the primary function has been utilised*, thus *the way* (direction) in which the school-typical structure has been implemented in the South African society.

Thus, in order to transform an institution such as the school, it is recommended that educational institutions are continuously subjected to a critical examination in order to determine whether its *proper function* is misused, or directed at other than educational purposes. This implies a constant search for contradictions in educational theories and practice. It should be accepted that the social engineer, who is responsible for the transformation of educational institutions, is subject to the limitation of human reason by human fallibility (Popper 1996b:374-375). The implication of human fallibility is that no hypothesis about educational institutions can be regarded as the ultimate and final blueprint for the transformation of such institutions.

Since educational institutions under the ban of apartheid could not enjoy "autonomy and academic freedom as it is universally defined and known" (Makgoba 1995:1), they ought to be subjected to a "back-to-basics" transformation. It is therefore recommended that the transformation of an institution should involve reform in accordance with the universal structural

principle by which it is constituted. Thus, only when an educational institution accords with its structural principle, as universally defined, then and only then, can such an institution enjoy the "relative" autonomy and academic freedom that coincides with its unique existence. It is therefore recommended that the transformation of education would involve the permanent and positive willingness of social engineers who act in genuine reconciliation and restitution, to continuously renew educational institutions in accordance with their proper functions, by continuously combating the misappropriation of such functions. Transformation of education institutions in South Africa should therefore always be preceded by an institutional check in order to determine to what extent the institution operates in line with its proper function. Only once this check has been undertaken, can the institution itself be transformed in such a way that it enjoys the freedom to engage in teaching and the propagation of knowledge, within its relative sovereign sphere of competence. Only when educational institutions are granted the right to control their own affairs within the sphere of their own competence, can they be made relevant and appropriate to function within the South African society.

### **7.3.2 Education in South Africa should comply with the norm of social relevance**

The argument that social institutions exist in accordance with universally defined structural principles, also indicates that these institutions have been created to protect and promote specific human needs. The implication here is that the transformation of an institution would have to comply with the norm of social relevance. The need to *contextualise* South African education is thus imperative: educational institutions should be made relevant to the society in which they function. Only when education in South Africa is placed within the unique context of the South African reality, can the propagation of knowledge truly contribute towards equipping learners with the knowledge, skills and attitudes required to master and control the South African cultural environment, and to address their particular needs and aspirations.

Though the Eurocentric interpretation and implementation of the primary task of the South African school has been the subject of vehement criticism, the mere shift to an Afrocentric direction is no guarantee that South African education would be transformed into "a just, equitable and high quality system for all the citizens, with a common culture of disciplined commitment to learning and teaching" (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:19). With regard to the call for Africanisation, which relates to an *interpretation* of the universal structure

of school-typical education within the context of the South African reality, two warnings should be issued:

- ♦ the contextualisation (Africanisation) of South African education should take place in accordance with the universal structure by which educational institutions are constituted; and
- ♦ care should be taken that the African vision and interpretation of the South African reality is not elevated to the status of a supreme authority. The consequences of such a hypernorm will not only result in the emergence of Afrocentrism (an ideology whereby Africanness and Afrocentric traditions are regarded as *the* criteria for the interpretation of the (South) African reality), but will evidently lead to the school once again being placed in a position of subservience.

It is therefore recommended that the discernment between the primary reason for the origin of educational institutions (originality) and the unique individual side (uniqueness) of such institutions (placed within the unique South African context), is taken as the point of departure for the transformation of South African education. By proceeding from this point, the primary task of an educational institution will first of all be regarded as *directional*, not only in the transformation process, but also in the process of Africanisation. While there should be an equal focus on both the universal structure (originality) and the relevance (contextualisation) of educational institutions, both transformation and Africanisation should be accompanied by three important notions:

- ♦ the acceptance of human fallibility in determining the exact nature of the universal structure of an institution;
- ♦ the absence of an infallible blueprint according to the way in which transformation and Africanisation should be undertaken; and
- ♦ the willingness to continuously undertake institutional checks in order to determine to what extent institutions are relevant for the unique society in which they function, but also in line with their primary tasks.

#### **7.4.3 Democracy under the guidance of the principle of sphere-sovereignty**

Against the background of a history where the structural sphere of the school was continuously transgressed in order to mobilise school-typical education for ideological purposes, it is recommended that the democratic ideal be placed under the guidance of the principle of

sphere-sovereignty. Since the *principle of sphere-sovereignty* relates to the recognition of a plurality of institutions, all coexisting alongside each other, democracy, as a typical political form of organisation, should not be regarded as an end in itself, but rather as a means to an end. It is therefore suggested that democracy be utilised as a "tool" that contributes to the operation of the state *within* (and not beyond) its distinct sphere of authority and competence. The implication is that a democracy, regulated by the principle of sphere-sovereignty, would allow concepts of freedom and equality, as well as other democratic values (*inter alia* citizen involvement in political decision-making and an electoral system of representation) to function *within* the structural boundaries of the state. Democracy should therefore not be regarded as a principle, nor should it simply be defined as *rule by the people*. It should rather be re-defined as *juridically qualified rule by legally competent people* who are gathered to form the social institution of the state. As such, and by virtue of the principle of sphere-sovereignty the state is held in check not to seek to establish total control over society by accruing to itself the plural responsibilities of members of the society (cf. Storkey 1990:10ff).

Adherence to the principle of sphere-sovereignty, especially with regard to the primary task of the state and the democratic ideal, is of special significance to school-typical education. While guided by the principle of sphere-sovereignty, the state will function within its own boundaries, but should simultaneously ensure that the structural boundaries of the school are not relinquished to comply with *the will of the people*. If the state happens to encroach upon the sovereign sphere of the school and therefore misuses school-typical education for other purposes, then it can be argued that the structural integrity of the school is being violated in the name of democracy. Thus, in order to claim a true democratic South African society, it is imperative that the state remains limited by, and operates within its juridically-bound sphere of competence. Although state authority is thus limited by its distinct structure, it is only through the recognition of the principle of sphere-sovereignty that the state will undertake its task, as the administrator of public justice, to ensure (and not encroach upon) the distinctiveness and sphere integrity of all other social institutions, including that of the school. This means that the state will observe the structural boundaries of the school, watch over it and if necessary enforce sphere boundaries through legislation.

#### 7.4.4 Transformation and the principle of social piecemeal engineering

Although radical transformation of South African education had been set into motion with the introduction of the transformative OBE approach (infra:6.3.3), it has, however, been established that the implementation of Curriculum 2005 is currently being hampered, not only by stark South African realities (cf. infra:6.3.5), but also as a result of its overhasty implementation.

It is therefore suggested that education transformation should be guided by the *principle of social piecemeal engineering* (cf. infra:3.9.8). Contrary to transformation undertaken in terms of utopian projects that are aimed at the total and all-inclusive reconstruction of a society, social piecemeal engineering involves the step by step reconstruction of an institution. From the problems encountered by the implementation of OBE in South African education two lessons should be learnt:

- ♦ there exists no infallible blueprint for the transformation of any education system, nor for the implementation of OBE; and
- ♦ radical, total and all-inclusive transformation may ultimately cause more damage than good.

However, contrary to an attempt at transforming education in "one fell swoop", piecemeal engineering allows for the possibility to learn from mistakes made on a small scale. Due to the fallibility of the social engineer, and in the absence of infallible blueprints, mistakes are bound to be made. However, by undertaking transformation in terms of one step at a time, mistakes made on a small scale will not hamper the functioning of school-typical education in an all-encompassing manner. Rather, there will be the possibility to rectify such mistakes, while school-typical education is still allowed to function within its relative sovereign sphere of competence.

#### 7.4.5 Affirmative action and the issue of competence

Against the background of the legacy of inequalities and imbalances in South African education, it can be accepted that affirmative action should be regarded as a means to reconstruct the education system. However, evidence of irregularities in education departments and misconduct by education officials (infra:6.3.4.5) places a questionmark over the way in which the policy of affirmative action is being implemented. It is thus recommended that affirmative action

programmes should be undertaken in accordance with the *primary reason* for its existence, namely to address and rectify the legacy of imbalances and inequalities within the area of education. There exists little doubt that poorly-conceived affirmative action policies can do more harm than good, especially when they are being utilised for other purposes. If affirmative action programmes should be coupled with strong preferential policies, a situation is bound to arise where individuals are being recruited and promoted into jobs for which they lack the requisite skills and knowledge. Although such practices result in poor job performance, undermining individual morale, it also has a detrimental effect on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the South African education system. It is therefore suggested that while affirmative action programmes could involve the appointment of disadvantaged persons with a lower qualification than the privileged competitor, care should be taken that such an appointment is justifiable in terms of considerations such as academic competence and potential.

### 7.5 Further research areas

Further research within the following problem areas might be beneficial to the process of transforming South African education:

- ◆ The possibility of an emerging *élite* (also in spheres of education) that manipulates *the will of the people* in order to achieve certain pre-determined goals.
- ◆ With regard to school governance, the differentiation of office into different kinds of services, relating to different kinds of authority (*inter alia* the office of teachers, the office of parents and the office of learners).
- ◆ A specific method to undertake institutional checks in order to determine whether an educational institution is functioning according to its primary function, should be contemplated.
- ◆ The relationship between the discernment of the structure and direction of the school, institutional checks and a quality assurance system.
- ◆ Africanisation and the practical implementation thereof.

### 7.6 Concluding remarks

In conclusion it can be stated that it appears that although educational institutions are currently subjected to a transformation process, school-typical education in South Africa is still being



placed in a subordinate position whereby it is not granted the lawful right to decide on its own internal affairs. In addition it seems that the disregard of the principle of sphere-sovereignty has led to a situation where educational institutions are subjected to the unlawful interference by an external authority such as the *will of the people*. Although the national Department of Education does not link this state of affairs to a disregard of the principle of sphere-sovereignty and the elevation of a power sphere to a supreme authority, they indeed recognise the presence of institutional abuse: "in recent times, with a democratic government elected by all the people, abuses have been taking place in educational institutions" (*White Paper on Education and Training* 1995:19). However, since the historical development of South African education should not be regarded as subject to unalterable historical laws, and while the principle of sphere-sovereignty guarantees the existence of an essentially permanent structural uniqueness of an educational institution, past misuses of school-typical education need not be repeated. True education transformation therefore *necessitates* that all stakeholders involved in school-typical education in South Africa, should accept personal responsibility (and accountability) to engage in critical discourse in order to continuously determine whether the purpose of education is decided with reference to its true nature and internal structure.

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## Summary

In order to critically analyse the ideological foundations of South African education, a link was established between the *nature* of the transition from a closed to an open society and the emergence of an ideology. It was concluded that only when the differentiation of culture into different life spheres (*inter alia*, science, the arts, the school and the state) takes place in accordance with the distinct structure by which each sphere is constituted, such life spheres will *coexist alongside* each other. However, when one life sphere is accredited the status of the supreme source of authority, then other life spheres are regarded as subservient to the elevated sphere. In this regard it appears that the elevation of a life sphere to a supra-modal status constitutes the emergence of an ideology. While the latter represents a hierarchical view of society, a structurally pluralist view of society where all life spheres coexist alongside each other, appears to be anti-ideological. The impact of an ideology on school-typical education apparently results in the school not being granted the lawful right to function in accordance with its own sphere of competence and school-typical authority. Rather it is placed in a subservient position to the supposedly supreme authority, being misused for other than school-typical (ideological) purposes. Against this background an attempt was made to engage in a critical exposition of the way in which the school, as a relative autonomous social institution, functioned in different periods in the history of South African education.

In the attempt to not only expose ideological thought-patterns, but also to penetrate to the presuppositions that underpin such thought-patterns, an argument was put forward in favour of the adoption of the critico-rationalist attitude, as well as the application of transcendental critique. Six critical questions proposed by the critical rationalist, Karl Popper, appeared to be helpful in exposing the ideological thought-patterns in a society. Although it was found that the exposure of such thought-patterns assists man in becoming more resistant against ideological indoctrination and manipulation, it was by virtue of transcendental critique that it was possible to penetrate to the roots of such thought-patterns. Thus, by adopting the critico-rationalist attitude and by virtue of applying transcendental critique, it was possible to critically analyse the ideological *foundations* of South African education.

A critical exposition of the nature of South African education under the ban of the apartheid regime (1948 - 1994) revealed that school-typical education was primarily (mis)used to promote the ideology of apartheid. Simultaneously it was possible to determine that ideological thought-patterns during this dispensation were regulated not only by the absolutisation of a particular nation to the status of a supreme authority, but also by a fusion between the Christian principle (central commandment of love) and the absolutised nation. As such, it was concluded that when the school was mobilised as an ideological state apparatus, its structural uniqueness, as well as its terrain of competence was disregarded and violated.

A critical review of the struggle against the oppressive apartheid regime also involved the exposition of the way in which school-typical education was mobilised as an ideological apparatus. It was concluded that this period was interspersed with ideological thought-patterns regulated by an elevated *will of the people*. Simultaneously, however, it was also possible to determine that the last appeal for the justification of norms and ideals were not to be found in the *will of the people*, but within the supposedly free autonomous human personality and human reason. The ideology of revolutionary populism therefore had a profound impact on school-typical education: since *the will of the people* was regarded as the supreme authority, and while it was the will of the people to liberate themselves from the oppressive apartheid regime, school-typical education was utilised as a tool of liberation. School-typical education was

therefore, once again, reduced to an ideological apparatus and the school was not granted the right to function in accordance with school-typical aims.

After the 1994-elections South African education was plunged into a process of radical transformation. While education in South Africa had for many years been misused for ideological purposes, transformation is aimed at establishing a non-racist and equitable system. When viewed against the background of conclusions drawn from the previous chapters, it is evident that transformation can only succeed once it allows school-typical education to function according to its own sphere of competence and authority. However, a critical analysis of educational transformation revealed the presence of ideological thought-patterns. Similar to the ideology of revolutionary populism, it appeared that ideological thought-patterns were being directed by an overemphasis on the *will of the people*. It can thus be anticipated that if the *will of the people* continues to be regarded as the supreme authority, school-typical education will once again be driven and directed, not by its own distinct structure, but by the will of a social collective entity called *the people*.

#### LIST OF KEYWORDS

closed (undifferentiated) society

open (differentiated) society

democratic society

ideology

principle of sphere-sovereignty

transcendental criticism

critical rationalism

structurally pluralistic view of society

hierarchical view of society

school-typical education

institutional abuse



## Opsomming

Ten einde te kom tot 'n kritiese analise van die ideologiese onderbou van Suid-Afrikaanse onderwys, was dit nodig om die relasie tussen die aard van die oorgangsproses vanaf 'n geslote tot 'n oop samelewing, en die ontstaan van 'n ideologie vas te stel. In dié verband is daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat indien die differensiasie van kultuur in 'n verskeidenheid lewensfere (*inter alia*, wetenskap, die kunste, die skool en die staat) in samehang met die besondere struktuur wat die bestaan van elke lewensfeer moontlik maak, geskied, lewensfere in neweskikking tot mekaar sal bestaan. Sou 'n bepaalde lewensfeer egter met die status van 'n superieure outoriteit geakkerediteer word, dan word alle ander lewensfere aan die superieure sfeer ondergeskik gestel. In dié opsig wil dit voorkom asof die akkreditering van 'n lewensfeer met supra-modale status verband hou met die ontstaan van 'n ideologie. Terwyl laasgenoemde 'n hierargiese visie op die samelewing impliseer, blyk dit asof 'n struktureel-pluralistiese samelewingsvisie nie alleen die neweskikkende bestaan van lewensfere impliseer nie, maar dat sodanige visie ook anti-ideologies van aard is. Die impak van 'n ideologie op skool-tipiese onderwys lei skynbaar tot 'n situasie waar die skool nie die reg geniet om in samehang met sy eie bevoegdheidsfeer, en aan die hand van skool-tipiese gesag, te funksioneer nie. Dit blyk eerder dat wanneer die skool in 'n ondergeskikte posisie tot 'n genaamde superieure outoriteit geplaas word, dit tergelykertyd ook vir ander as skool-tipiese doeleindes misbruik word. Teen hierdie agtergrond is 'n poging aangewend om te kom tot 'n kritiese uiteensetting van die wyse waarop die skool, as 'n relatief-outonome sosiale instelling, tydens verskillende periodes in die Suid-Afrikaanse onderwysgeskiedenis gefunksioneer het.

In 'n poging om ideologiese denkpatrone bloot te lê, en om ook tot die vooronderstellings wat sodanige patrone onderlê deur te dring, word daar ten gunste van die toepassing van kritiese rasionalisme, asook transendentale kritiek geargumenteer. Ses kritiese vrae, soos voorgestel deur Karl Popper, blyk behulpsaam te wees in die blootlegging van ideologiese denkpatrone. Alhoewel dit aangevoer kan word dat die blootlegging van sodanige denkpatrone die mens noop om meer weerstand teen ideologiese manipulasie en indoktrinasie te bied, is dit egter by wyse van transendentale kritiek moontlik om tot die wortels daarvan deur te dring. Dus, by wyse van die aanneming van die krities-rasionalistiese houding, en deur die toepassing van transendentale kritiek, blyk dit moontlik om tot 'n kritiese analise van die ideologiese *onderbou* in Suid-Afrikaanse onderwys te kom.

'n Kritiese uiteensetting van die aard van Suid-Afrikaanse onderwys tydens die apartheidsregime (1948-1994) toon dat skool-tipiese onderwys primêr misbruik is om die apartheidsideologie te bevorder. Terselfdertyd was dit moontlik om vas te stel dat ideologiese denkpatrone gedurende hierdie periode nie alleen deur die verabsoluttering van 'n spesifieke nasie tot superieure status, maar ook deur 'n fusie tussen die Christelike beginsel (die sentrale liefdesgebed) en die verabsoluteerde nasie, gereguleer is. In dié verband is tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die skool nie alleen as 'n ideologiese staatsapparaat gemobiliseer is nie, maar dat die strukturele integriteit, sowel as die bevoegdheidsfeer van die skool misken en geskend is.

'n Kritiese oorsig van die stryd teen die onderdrukkende apartheidsregime gee 'n aanduiding van die wyse waarop skool-typiese onderwys as ideologiese apparaat gemobiliseer is. In dié verband is daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat hierdie periode deurspek was met ideologiese denkpatrone wat deur die verabsoluteerde *wil van die mense* gereguleer is. Tergelykertyd is vasgestel dat die laaste appèl vir die regverdiging van norme en ideale nie as sodanig in die *wil van die mense* te vinde was nie, maar eerder in die sogenaamde vrye, outonome menslike

persoonlikheid en rede. Om hierdie rede het die ideologie van revolusionêre populisme 'n diepgaande impak op skool-tipiese onderwys gehad: aangesien die *wil van die mense* as die hoogste gesag voorgehou is, en terwyl dit die wil van die mense was om hulself van die onderdrukkende apartheidsregime te bevry, is skool-tipiese onderwys as 'n bevrydingsmiddel gemobiliseer. Skool-tipiese onderwys is gevolglik tot 'n ideologiese apparaat gereduseer, wat impliseer dat die skool weer eens nie die reg gegun is om in samehang met skool-tipiese doelstellings te funksioneer nie.

Na die 1994-verkiesing is Suid-Afrikaanse onderwys midde-in 'n radikale transformasie proses geplaas. Aangesien onderwys vir baie jare vir ideologiese doeleindes misbruik was, is huidige transformasie daarop afgestem om 'n nie-rassistiese en billike stelsel daar te stel. Teen die agtergrond van die uiteensetting van voorgaande gedagtes, blyk dit dat transformasie slegs suksesvol kan wees indien skool-tipiese onderwys die reg geniet om binne die grense van 'n eie bevoegdheidsterrein te funksioneer. 'n Kritiese uiteensetting van onderwystransformasie toon egter die teenwoordigheid van ideologiese denkpatrone. Soortgelyk aan die ideologie van revolusionêre populisme, wil dit voorkom asof ideologiese denkpatrone deur 'n oorbeklemtoning van die sogenaamde *wil van die mense* gereguleer word. Dit kan derhalwe geantisipeer word dat indien daar voortgegaan word om die *wil van die mense* as 'n superieure outoriteit voor te hou, skool-tipiese onderwys weer eens deur 'n eksterne outoriteit, en nie deur 'n eie unieke struktuur nie, gereguleer sal word.