Burden-sharing and Hybrid Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia and Sudan: A Critical Analysis

by

Barbara Mohale

Dissertation submitted in accordance with the requirements for the Degree

MAGISTER ARTIUM
in the

FACULTY OF THE HUMANITIES
(Department of Political Studies and Governance)
at the

UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE
BLOEMFONTEIN 2015

Supervisor: Prof. TG Neethling

Co-supervisor: Mr Eben Coetzee

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

DECLARATION

I, Barbara Mohale, declare that the dissertation, **Burden-sharing and Hybrid Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia and Sudan: A Critical Analysis**, hereby submitted for the Magister Artium degree in Political Science at the University of the Free State, is my own, independent work and has not previously been submitted at another university or faculty. All sources that I have used have been duly specified and acknowledged as complete references. I further cede copyright of the dissertation in favour of the University of the Free State.

Signature: ....

B. Mohale

20 October 2015

ABSTRACT

This study explores whether hybrid peacekeeping operations, or recent forms of UN-AU co-operation, offer new prospects or opportunities to the challenges relating to international peacekeeping in Africa. It further analyses whether the international community is moving towards more effective and legitimate peacekeeping operations when it follows an approach of hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa. Through historical-critical examinations of case studies of peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia, the study interrogates the evolution and practicality of key concepts such as R2P, mandates and legal underpinning, and the UN and AU architectures for peacekeeping operations.

The study found that peacekeeping has shifted to include the three components (civilian, police, and military), making peacekeeping operations multidimensional in scope and approach. The cooperative security partnership between the UN and AU and sub-regional organisations, such as ECOWAS in Liberia and AU in Burundi, have demonstrated the significance of a cooperative venture towards lasting peace. The relationship between these two organisations - the UN and AU - is of paramount importance, and must be based on coherent and strategically structured relations which are systematically integrated.

The implementation of hybrid peacekeeping operations offers new prospects or opportunities if the UN and AU use the advantages these possess to bring about peace, despite the challenges being faced. The study has shown how limited traditional interventions led to the innovative hybridisation but also made the case for the need to refine the response. The ultimate conclusion is that the resource and political constraints faced by the AU would benefit from the solid shared international responsibility provided by the comparative advantage of hybridisation.

The study concluded that the UN and AU relationship and cooperation over the past two decades presents significant steps toward operations that would contribute to lasting peace in Africa. The lessons provided by the Liberia, Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia cases offer an instructive foundation for both the UN and AU to improve on an evolving approach. Lessons can be learned from the conflicts analysed in the

study, and the international community has the advantage of working towards better and more refined hybrid peacekeeping operations than those conducted in Darfur and Somalia.

OPSOMMING

Dié studie doen 'n ondersoek na die vraag of hibriede vredesbewaring of hedendaagse vorme van VN-AU samewerking nuwe vooruitsigte of geleenthede bied aangaande die uitdagings wat met internasionale vredesbewaring in Afrika verband hou. Die studie analiseer ook die vraag of die internasionale gemeenskap tans na meer doeltreffende en legitieme vredesbewaring beweeg deur middel van hibriede vredesbewaring in Afrika. Aan die hand van 'n histories-kritiese ondersoek met betrekking tot gevalle-studies van vredesbewaring in Liberië, Burundi, Darfoer en Somalië, ondersoek die studie die ontwikkeling en praktiese beslag van konsepte soos R2P, mandate en regsgeldigheid, asook die VN en AU institusionele raamwerke vir vredesbewaring.

Die studie het bevind dat vredesbewaring geskuif het om drie komponente in te sluit, naamlik burgerlik, polisie en militêr, waardeur vredesbewaring multidimensioneel in fokus en benadering geword het. Die samewerkende veiligheidsvennootskappe tussen die VN, AU en streeksorganisasies, waaronder ECOWAS in Liberië en die AU in Burundi, demonstreer voorts die betekenisvolheid van samewerkende ondernemings om volhoubare vrede moontlik te maak. Die verhoudinge tussen eersgenoemde organisasies, die VN en die AU, is van die grootste belang en moet berus op samebindende en strategiese verhoudinge wat sistematies tot integrasie gebring is.

Die implementering van hibriede vredesbewaringsoperasies lewer daarom nuwe vooruitsigte en geleenthede waar die VN en die AU die voordele wat sulke operasies bied, kan aanwend met betrekking tot die uitdagings wat die hoof gebied moet word. Die studie toon hoe beperkte tradisionele intervensies gelei het tot innoverende hibridisering en wys ook op die behoefte vir verdere verfyning. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die tekort aan hulpbronne en politieke tekortkominge van die AU kan baat by 'n behoorlike en gedeelde internasionale verantwoordelikheid vir vredesbewaring en dit wat voordelig is aangaande hibridisering.

Die studie se slotsom is dat die VN en die AU se verhouding en samewerking oor die afgelope twee dekades betekenisvolle stappe verteenwoordig sover dit wedersydse

bydraes betref om volhoubare vrede in Afrika moontlik te maak. Die lesse wat geleer is in Liberië, Burundi, Darfoer en Somalië bied ook 'n fondasie aan die VN en die AU om hulle benadering te verbeter. Lesse kan geleer word uit die konflikte wat in die studie geanaliseer is en die internasionale gemeenskap het nou die voordeel om te werk vir beter en meer verfynde hibriede vredesbewaringsoperasies na afloop van dit wat in Darfoer en Somalië afgespeel het.

KEY WORDS

AFRICAN UNION

BURUNDI

DARFUR

ECOWAS

HYBRID PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

LIBERIA

PARTNERSHIP

SOMALIA

SUDAN

UNITED NATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACIRC: African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises

AMIB: AU Mission in Burundi

AMIS: African Union Mission to Sudan

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia

APSA: African Peace and Security Architecture

ASF: African Standby Force

AU: African Union

CADSP: Common African Defence and Security Policy

CAR: Central African Republic

CEN-SAD: Community of Saharan and Sahelian State

CFC: Ceasefire Commission

CNDD-FDD: National Council for the Defence Democracy and Force for the
                  Defence of Democracy

Codesa: Convention for a Democratic South Africa

CONOPS: Concept of Operations

CPA: Comprehensive Peace agreement

CSSDCA: Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-
                  operation in Africa

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DPA: Darfur Peace Agreement

DPKO:	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
EASF:	East African Standby Force
ECCAS:	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG:	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ESF:	Economic Community of West African States Standby Force
EU:	European Union
FARDC:	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FGS:	Federal Government of Somalia
FNL:	Forces Nationales de Liberation
FRODEBU:	Front pour la Democratique au Burundi
ICC:	International Criminal Court
ICISS:	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC:	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC:	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia
INPFL:	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

IRAs: Interim Regional Administrations

JEM: Justice and Equality Movement

LAS: League of Arabs States

MINURCAT: Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
                of the Congo

MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
                Democratic Republic of the Congo

MoU: Memorandum of Understanding

NARC: North African Regional Capability

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCP: National Congress Party

NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development

NPLF: National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NRF: National Redemption Front

OAU: Organisation of African Unity

ONUB: Operation in Burundi

PSC: Peace and Security Council

PSOD: Peace Support Operations Division

R2P: Responsibility to Protect

RECs: Regional Economic Communities

RMs:	Regional Mechanisms
RoE:	Rules of Engagement
RSFs:	Regional Standby Forces
RUF:	Revolutionary United Front
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SANDF:	South African National Defence Force
SADF:	South African Defence Force
SAPSD:	South African Protection Support Detachment
SIPRI:	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNA:	Somali National Army
SNF:	Somalia National Forces
SNM:	Somali National Movement
SOPs:	Standard Operating Procedures
SPDF:	Sudan People's Defence Force
SPF:	Somali Police Force
SPLM/A:	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPM:	Ogadeni Somali Patriotic Movement
SSF:	Southern African Development Community Standby Force
SSR:	Security Sector Reform
TCCs:	Troop Contributing Countries

TFG: Transitional Federal Government

UIC: Union of Islamic Courts

UN: United Nations

UNAMID: United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur

UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

UNITAF: Unified Task Force

UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea;

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIS: United Nations Mission in the Sudan

UNMISS: United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

UNOL: United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia

UNOMIL: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNPOS: United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNSMIS: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria

UNSOA: United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

UNSOM: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

UPRONA: Union pour le Progrès national

US: United States

USC: United Somalia Congress

WFP: World Food Programme

WHO: World Health Organisation

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH THEME

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN), positioned as the world's preeminent international organisation in the field of international peace and security, has borne the unique burden of managing and mitigating the complex strategic, political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of conflicts around the world, but most specifically within the African continent (Crockatt 2005:113).

The African continent was affected by the Cold War and continues to be tormented by the burdens of political instability, religious, social, racial, and ethnic strife. This has undermined Africa's long-term efforts for stability, peace and prosperity. Thus the need to consolidate peace in conflict affected states became an important mission to the international community, specifically in Africa where most of the world's armed conflicts occurred since the early 1990s. In the period of 1990 – 2004, fifty-seven (57) conflicts were fought around the world of which fifty-three were intrastate conflicts in the African continent, thus, 92% of conflicts in Africa (Harbom & Wallensteen 2005: 121). As a result, the international community has increasingly considered UN peacekeeping as an instrument to prevent or resolve wars and armed conflict of an intra-state nature on the African continent (Witharta 2012:5).

Peacekeeping is a tool available to the UN in order to navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. It can be defined as the "deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently also civilians. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace" (United Nations Secretary-General 1992).

Peacekeeping is a concept developed by the UN, as part of its overall strategic process for the management of international conflict. It was created in 1992 for the planning, preparation, management and direction of UN peacekeeping operations. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was created when former

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali took office in January 1992, to oversee the UN peacekeeping at a time when it dealt with several world crises, such as the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, to name but a few (Tharoor & Johnston 2001:3). As a result, he issued 'An Agenda for Peace', as a report which was designed with the explicit aim of conducting peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War world, differently from traditional peacekeeping operations (United Nations Secretary-General 1992). It is important to note that before 1992, peacekeepers were active in Cambodia, Somalia, Angola, Salvador, the Golan Heights, Cyprus, and on the border between India and Pakistan. Traditional peacekeeping operations was heavily military based and did not play a direct role in political efforts to resolve the conflict. Their role was simply to monitor and observe ceasefires. However, at the end of the Cold War, due to intra-state conflicts, the responsibility of peacekeepers had broadened.

The UN was overloaded by a multiplicity of peacekeeping operations of which they had to bare the financial burden amongst other challenges. Thus, it was important for the UN to take significant measures and find the required means to ensure the success of peacekeeping operations. To make the UN more credible and competent as a force for peace, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly known as the Brahimi Report, was issued in 2000. This report "made recommendations on strategic, political and operational improvements to ensure more effective peacekeeping operations" (Murithi 2009:3). It also accentuated concerns, especially regarding adequate management and financial systems, to support the increased number of peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers deployed internationally (United Nations 2000). This report, informally referred to as the Brahimi Report took a critical look at past peacekeeping efforts in order to improve the difficulties the UN had faced during past peacekeeping operations. Past peacekeeping operations were often marked by a lack of clear guidelines for the required interventions and related operations, which arguably was one of the reasons behind some unsuccessful peacekeeping operations such as in Rwanda (where the international community stood by as the slaughter of Tutsis continued), and the case in Bosnia (where the UN declared safe areas for Muslims in March 1992 but basically did nothing to secure them, thus the slaughter of Srebrenica continued).

In March 2007, the UN DPKO implemented a series of reforms recommended by the Brahimi Report with a view to strengthening its peacekeeping undertakings and enhancing the prospects of successful outcomes. These reforms focused on strengthening the capacity of multinational peacekeeping operations in order to manage and sustain field operations, which has led to complex peacekeeping operations in the Darfur region of Sudan and in the Central African Republic (CAR). This was done by focusing on integrating UN efforts with that of other entities and functionaries in the field of peacekeeping operations such as the African Union (AU) (United Nations Peacekeeping 2012a). In addition, it was noted that in order for peacekeeping operations to be effective, peacekeepers should be properly resourced for their tasks and functioning under clear mandates (United Nations 2000). This new approach helped to clarify what UN peacekeeping operations were pursuing to accomplish, what kinds of forces were required, and what conditions might necessitate different kinds of operations.

Given the increasing intensity and prevalence of intrastate conflicts on the African continent, peacekeeping operations have become significant to the international community for securing peace. Moreover, as part of a commitment to help find African solutions to African problems, the UN also had to acknowledge the need for a regional organisation such as the AU to play a fundamental role in peacekeeping operations.

Sound and clear mandates also had to be adopted by regional organisations. In Africa, the AU (and previously its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)) has increasingly assumed responsibilities for promoting peace and stability. This even extended to sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which deployed troops to the civil war in Liberia in 1993, where they worked alongside a UN observer force, and thus became an important peacekeeping actor (Segell 2010:26; Adebajo 2011:12). Progressively, regional and sub-regional organisations played a significant role in peacekeeping operations within Africa, such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi and Sudan's Darfur region (Adebajo 2011:12). In these operations the AU had steadily been gaining prominence as an international peacekeeping body. Of even greater significance is that some of these operations have gradually evolved into hybrid UN-AU operations,

such as the peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Sudan – thereby indicating a move toward closer co-operation between the said organisations (Kobbie 2008:4-6).

In Burundi, for instance, South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia deployed troops to this once war-ravaged state as part of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB). In 2004 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed to take over AMIB which then became known as the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). When ONUB was terminated in 2006, the following were among the operation's major achievements: the disarmament and demobilisation of fighters, the rendering of support to the Burundian electoral process, protecting returning refugees and humanitarian convoys, and facilitating the training of Burundi's police force (Adebajo 2011: 78-79).

Thus the nature of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa has evolved and has broken new ground in terms of the processes of burden-sharing between the UN and African role-players (Adebajo 2011: xvii).

In recent years, peacekeeping operations premised on a greater measure of burden-sharing and co-operation were most apparent in Sudan from 2004-2011, starting with the AU Mission to Sudan (AMIS) operating in the country's western region of Darfur. With the collaboration of the AU and UN on peacekeeping operations in Darfur, this operation was transformed into a hybrid peacekeeping operation, which was officially established as the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) – a peacekeeping operation that was more robust than AMIS (Kajee 2010:170). In another significant development the AU deployed a peacekeeping operation to Somalia in 2007 after Ethiopia failed to stem instability in Somalia before withdrawing its troops from the country in 2008. The AU peacekeeping operation, known as the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), consists largely of Ugandan and Burundian troops and has since its deployment played an important role as a conflict management mechanism in the conflict dynamics of war-ravaged Somalia (Adebajo 2011:176).

It is important to note that all the above-mentioned peacekeeping operations were established on the basis of the need for better co-operation and a greater measure of financial and logistical burden-sharing between the UN and the AU in the pursuit of peace and security in Africa. From a scholarly perspective, it seems that hybrid peacekeeping operations and/or operations that are premised on formal co-operation

between the UN and the AU offer new perspectives and possibilities relating to the challenges of multinational peacekeeping undertakings in Africa (Malan 1999:45-61).

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Although peacekeeping operations are often conducted in Africa, continental and institutions also play a key role in international peacekeeping in the sense that such entities are often willing and able to provide sizeable deputation for UN peacekeeping operations. African countries are more and more likely to be called upon to organize and sustain their own peacekeeping operations under the mandate of the UN. At the same time, the UN retains the most important politico-security role on the African continent, which vary across regions (and within them) and warrant not only differentiated strategies but different capacities. It also faces the prospect of being overstretched in the many operational areas of involvement (United Nations Security Council 2009).

In addition to the challenge of becoming overstretched, the UN also had to attend to the legitimacy of its peacekeeping operations. China and Russia, for instance, rejected the prospect of a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, given that such an operation was considered as a form of intervention – even an exercise of American or Western hegemony in the developing world. Instead, the Chinese and the Russians supported "the hybrid force with an African charter that emerged as the compromise solution", i.e. the creation of UNAMID as a joint UN-AU endeavour.   In the African context, role-players such as Ghana and Tanzania also specifically pushed for the deployment of a hybrid peacekeeping operation in this particular case (Adebajo 2011: 207-208). As a result of the serious challenges to deal with Africa's conflict and security needs, the UN and the AU have developed what is referred to as 'hybrid peacekeeping operations'.

In view of the above, it seems to be of great importance to realise and understand the need for deeper forms of co-operation as an imperative to work towards more effective and legitimate peacekeeping operations. In the eastern and central parts of Africa, demands for effective peacekeeping roles for the UN and the AU have especially been on the increase in recent years, with major operations mandated in Somalia, Chad,

and Sudan. Whether the above-mentioned operations could be considered as possible future models for peacekeeping operations on the African continent remains to be answered. We should nonetheless take into consideration that it is not a one size fits all approach, as each environment is different and should be approached differently. The question currently accentuated is whether this new approach of hybridisation in peacekeeping in Africa has a better chance to bring peace and security in a country such as Somalia and Sudan.

Currently, this question also extends to the challenges in Mali, as the most recent international peacekeeping operations challenge on the African continent. Whatever the answer to this question, more can and should be done by the UN and AU in pursuit of an integrated system of burden-sharing that will play a meaningful role in future peacekeeping endeavours in Africa.

1.3 AIM AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Peacekeeping operations on the African continent is an important undertaking, especially given the fact that such peacekeeping operations are now conducted at a time when African states are taking greater responsibility and ownership towards promoting peace and security within the continent (Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones & Miller 2001:171).

The aim of this study is to explore hybridisation in peacekeeping operations in Africa and other forms of burden-sharing as a fairly new phenomenon and prospect in the arena of international peacekeeping operations, with specific reference to the multinational operations in Somalia and Sudan.

In brief, the hybrid peacekeeping operation in Sudan and UN-AU co-operation in Somalia are both premised on and coincide with the need for better co-operation, more effective burden-sharing and robust partnerships between the UN and the AU (Malan 1999:45-61).

Peacekeeping operations are often carried out in environments where there is a fragile peace and also dependent on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents. The challenges that have faced peacekeeping operations were seen in the

exponential increase in spending in addition to the global commitment relating to the development goals of the African continent. A report of the Secretary-General, A/65/152 of 20 July 2010, emphasised the importance of human sustenance and security policy focusing on people, development and social issues as the core for Africa's peace and sustainable development (Report of the Secretary-General 2010).

Furthermore, it is important to note that although peacekeeping operations are not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter, they are viewed as an important tool or mechanism to maintain international peace and security where armed conflicts of a serious nature are the order of the day.

In view of the above, this study intends to provide insights and perspectives on the need to address the complex challenges relating to hybrid international peacekeeping operations in Africa. The analysis further intends to address the interaction and cooperation between the UN and AU in their peacekeeping efforts in Africa, and to finally reflect and make recommendations on whether hybrid operations or other forms of contemporary UN-AU burden-sharing offer more suitable working arrangements to address the challenges in conflict-ridden African states than conventional UN peacekeeping operations of recent years. The case studies selected – Somalia and Sudan – will also be used to determine to what extent the hybrid operations or other forms of UN-AU co-operation might serve as models or parameters for future peacekeeping undertakings.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question that this study intends to answer is: *Does hybrid peacekeeping* operations *or recent forms of UN-AU co-operation offer new prospects or opportunities to the challenges relating to international peacekeeping in Africa? Furthermore, is the international community moving towards more effective and legitimate peacekeeping operations when it follows an approach of hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa, such as the one in Sudan and previously in Liberia and Burundi, or where an AU force is deployed in accordance with a UN Security Council mandate, such as the case of Somalia?*

The concepts leading to the above questions are addressed in the study in order to conduct a synthesised framework of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The concept of hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa serves as a departure point for the study. The methodological approach of this study is a historical-critical study based on analyses of the literature on peacekeeping operations. A historical critical study entails "interpretation and understanding of various historical events, documents and processes. It is best understood as not a series of facts, but rather as series of competing interpretive narratives" (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2013). Therefore, the objective of applying a historical-critical study necessitates analysing why peacekeeping operations happened the way they did, why and how. This would provide an in-depth analysis of the key factors that shaped the outcomes of past peacekeeping operations on the African continent, offering critical lessons for future peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

The analytical framework of the study is deductively linked using qualitative analysis, which will add more insight on the case of hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa. Qualitative analysis is more pragmatic than prescriptive, because it introduces different possibilities of conducting hybrid peacekeeping operations without advocating for just one particular approach. This reiterates that there is no one size-fits-all model. Therefore, qualitative analysis can be defined as "a process of resolving data into its constituent components, to reveal its characteristic elements and structure. Without analysis, reliance would entirely be on impressions and intuitions about the data as a whole" (Dey 1993:31). Specifically, peacekeeping operations that have been conducted in Somalia and Sudan between 2004 and 2011 will serve as case studies in determining the prospects to the challenges and opportunities of hybrid operations in Africa. The study will present an in-depth understanding of the practice of hybrid peacekeeping operations and a comprehensive appreciation of its evolvement in a world which bears little resemblance to post-Cold War expectations. The data to be gathered is largely qualitative in nature using documents of the study of peacekeeping operations with a focus on the hybridisation in Somalia and Sudan. Given the explicit focus on these two cases, the study will follow an ideographic

research strategy. Secondary data sources will include published documents, reports, newspaper articles and reports regarding the mandate of operations and books. In addition, primary sources will be utilized which include official UN and AU documents, and relevant documents on the concept of hybrid peacekeeping operations with reference to Somalia and Sudan.

The study takes into consideration that the two main case studies under review, namely Somalia and Sudan, are different in terms of background and context – specifically from a peacekeeping perspective. Sudan has a political structure (that is, a government) that could be used to consent to intervention, whereas Somalia has a very tenuous structure. It also takes into consideration that both Somalia and Sudan constitute some of the greatest peacekeeping challenges in the contemporary African peacekeeping arena.

This research will therefore specifically focus on the post-Cold War period from 1992 to 2014, considering that this period in the historical development of international peacekeeping offers important lessons from which practitioners, scholars, analysts and students can learn and enrich themselves in a scholarly context.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature and data sources consulted for the research can be separated into five categories:

1.6.1 Literature on human security and development

This category deals with a broad underpinning of the concept of human security and development in terms of its relevance to the context of Africa. Brown, Cote, Lynn-Jones and Miller (2001), Malan (1999), and Snyder (1999) all argue for the primacy of human security over state security. Attention is also paid to Cilliers (2004), who focuses on a wider conception of human security that includes not only physical hurt, abuse and threat, but also hunger, disease and environmental degradation. Cilliers thus makes a vertical distinction between at least five levels of security: personal/individual, local/community, national, regional and international security, which will constitute part of this study's literature review. Literature from Tschirgi, Lund

and Mancini (2010), Stern and Öjendal (2010) on the security and development nexus which assesses the promise and shortcomings of integrated security-development policies as a strategy for conflict prevention will be consulted. Chandler (2007) also gives an account of the framework of the security-development nexus as a way to achieve coherent and well-managed policies. With regard to international security, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook of 2005 and 2012 will be taken into consideration as a compendium of data and analysis in the concepts of security and conflict, peace operations and conflict management. In addition, the African Standby Force (ASF) will be consulted with reference to the capability of rapid development and its potential contribution to multi-layered security by Cilliers and Malan (2005). Literature from Bellamy and Wheeler (2005), Stahn (2007), Orford (2001) and Rubinstein (2008) focus on the responsibility to protect. Other supporting documents such as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report (2001) and Orford (2001) focus on sovereignty as the responsibility for transparency and accountability. Furthermore, the original concept of peacekeeping, with specific focus on the legitimacy and cultural inversion in peacekeeping, is analysed.

1.6.2 Literature on peacekeeping operations

The second category refers to the literature that addresses peacekeeping operations in Africa. Generally, peacekeeping refers to the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security (Fortna & Howard 2008). The term has emerged from traditional operations during the Cold War as an instrument to monitor a ceasefire between two belligerents. Literature on peacekeeping has included efforts to contain or terminate hostilities, while others focus to prevent the recurrence of conflict once a ceasefire has been agreed upon. However, the definition and practice of peacekeeping has changed with times. Peacekeeping operations have worked to develop more sophisticated approaches to the implementation of mandated tasks, such as post-conflict stabilization, support to political processes and peacebuilding, including the restoration and extension of state authority and the rule of law.

The definition in the 1990 edition of The Blue Helmets the UN's review of operations, notes that peacekeeping personnel deploy "without enforcement powers" and refers

specifically to "international peace and security" (United Nations 1990). Hence, peacekeeping was strongly established as technical tool for maintaining peace in internal and interstate conflicts. As a result, the line separating peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations became blurred. Therefore, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace which was the principal policy document, drew a series of activities for which the UN should be responsible, from peacekeeping to peace enforcement to peacebuilding. This was an optimism and confidence of the UN Secretariat at the time. There was a pervasive sense that finally, after decades of disagreement, the UN would be instrumental in resolving disputes across the world.

The literature on peacekeeping operations are extraordinarily diverse and difficult to categorize. Some of the leading authors in this regard are Tharoor and Johnston (2001), Arbuckle (2007), Durch and Berkman (2006), Chandler (2007), Adebajo (2011), Bellamy and Williams (2009; 2013). Bellamy examines why states contribute peacekeepers, the factors that inhibit contributions and the ways in which the UN might strengthen its capacity to secure more and better peacekeepers. In addition, de Coning (2010) is consulted on international peacekeeping. The UN Secretary-General reports to the UNSC on peacekeeping operations for resolutions are also of great significance as they provide factual accounts of the activities of operations within a given period, including the Secretary-General's observations and recommendations for further action. Reports from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are also of scholarly significance. Focus will also be placed on Shaw (2008) for international law regarding the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, Neethling (2007) argues that the AU and associated sub-regional organisations do not have the capacity to undertake complex peacekeeping operations on their own – a perspective which is of vital interest to this study. Sriram (2008) focuses on the context of conflict prevention including peacekeeping with the emphasis of the relationship between rule of law, security and development, and human rights. Bellamy (2004) states the strengths, weaknesses and experiences of peacekeeping operations that have been written; however, global politics or the roles of peace operations within it have not been reflected on.

1.6.3 Literature on hybrid peacekeeping operations

The third category is closely linked to hybrid peacekeeping operations. There are various sources relating to hybrid peacekeeping operations, including works by Gelot, Gelot and de Coning (2012), in which the importance of clarifying the exact role of non-UN components, especially regional organisations, in hybrid peacekeeping operations is discussed. They look at the potential disadvantages or difficulties of hybrid peacekeeping operations. An article by Aboagye (2004) on how the UN and the AU can create a 'peace to keep' will be consulted including ECOWAS and the AU's peace and security architecture. Literature on regional actors such as the AU, and sub-regional organisations are analysed in terms of the security arrangement in Africa for peacekeeping operations. The Constitutive Act of the AU which established organs such as the Assembly, the Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, and various other agencies that have more specialized functions will be taken into consideration. The Protocol Relating to the Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU (African Union 2003), mandates to undertake security initiatives dedicated to using international cooperation such as the UN and other institutions to achieve and promote peace and security in Africa will be scrutinized.

The Brahimi Report 2000, on modalities for peacekeeping operations, will also be explored. This report explains the importance of cooperation and coordination between the AU and UN, including how funding is disbursed for peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2000). Hybridisation is also analysed in its ability to effectively secure peace in Africa. The study also looks at secondary sources such as Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010) who focus on the evolving hybrid peacekeeping operations where two institutions join their efforts to establish working procedures. Reports of the Secretary-General on the work of the UN regarding hybrid operations are also of significance to the study of hybridisation in peacekeeping as a phenomenon.

Furthermore, the study will include literature from Murithi (2007), Draman and Carment (2001) on an analysis of the evolving relationship between the AU and the UN, by focusing on the establishment of a hybrid UN-AU force to stabilize the situation in the region. Murithi analyses the extent to which such a hybrid partnership exists.

1.6.4 Data sources on peacekeeping operations, with specific reference to Liberia and Burundi

Scholars such as Dennis and Dennis (2008), Ikechi (2003) and Wippman (1993) researched extensively on the history of the Liberian conflict. Akinyemi and Aluko (1984), Okeke (2012) and Akindele (2012) give a detailed account on the role ECOWAS played to respond to the conflict in Liberia in the quest to bring about peace. Furthermore, Adebajo (2013) focuses on the role played by Nigeria through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which took the responsibility to protect civilians. He provides three possible reasons why Nigeria decided to intervene in Liberia. The study will further explore data sources such as Aboagye and Bah (2015) on the transition from the African agency to UN peacekeeping operation.

The study will also focus on data sources on Burundi, as such, it will focus on work done by Boshoff, Vreÿ and Rautenbach (2010) and Zartman (1995) who analyse the contributions by regional actors to the peace process of Burundi. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) (2007) and de Coning and Lotze (2013) give a detailed view on the AU which emerged as peacekeeping partner of the continent and the imperative approach taken by the Nelson Mandela and Julius Nyerere as facilitators in the peace process. Other authors such as Thobane, Neethling and Vreÿ (2007) analyse the practical conditions that AMIB operated under.

1.6.5 Data sources on peacekeeping operations, with specific reference to Sudan

This category consists of sources regarding peacekeeping operations in Sudan in which peacemaking and peacebuilding have been combined to pave the way for peacekeeping. Literature on UN mandates and previous operations conducted in Sudan are considered in order to establish the patterns that could be avoided in order to secure lasting peace. The study also includes UN-AU hybrid operations in Sudan wherein the burden-sharing for peacekeeping operations by Neethling (2009) will be

explored. Furthermore, works by Mamdani (2009), Murithi (2013), Juma (2003), Dowden (2009), Beswick (2010) on peacekeeping, regime security and 'African solutions to African problems' will be explored. Neethling (2004) as well as the Reports from International Peace Academy are of great significance in assessing the operations that have already been conducted. Adebajo (2011) is of great importance, as he addresses the accounts for the resurgence of UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa in the post-Cold War era, including factors that determined the successes or contributions to the failure of peacekeeping operations with reference to Sudan. Literature in Mickler (2013), who argues that UNAMID represents on the one hand, an important attempt by the evolving AU to play a direct and effective role in regional peace operations, and contains elements of a viable model for other potential hybrid operations on the continent, will be considered.

1.6.6 Data sources on peacekeeping operations, with specific reference to Somalia

Works by the following authors are relevant:

Thomashausen (2002) assesses the contemporary developments in the principle of intervention regarding the human disaster in Somalia including international reaction to the situation of Somalia. It assesses the UNSC acts and the different resolutions that were conducted in Somalia because of the deteriorating events and lack of good governance.

Work by Murphy (2007) will be consulted, which focuses on how the robust peace enforcement operation in Somali was conducted. Murphy analyses the lessons that may be learned from these operations in terms of mandates, command and control of UN forces in Somalia. Connaughton (2002) and the Reports from the International Peace Academy are of great significance in assessing the operations that have already been conducted.

UNSC mandates and Resolutions are furthermore significant to assessing peacekeeping operations in Somalia. An article by Ramsbotham and Pippard (2006) and Wheeler (2000) on the peacekeeping situation and other political developments in Somalia is also of great significance to the study. Additional articles by Shinn

(2013), William (2013), and Boutellis and William (2013) provide a critical analysis of AMISOM towards creating peace and security in Somalia.

1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The study is structured in a conventional way, being divided into a theoretical framework, a main body and a concluding section containing an evaluation.

Chapter One is of a methodological nature and provides an introduction, identification and formulation of the research theme and problem statement. This chapter demarcates the study and provides the methodology adopted in the research. The literature review that forms part of this chapter provides an overview of some of the sources consulted to undertake the study.

Chapter Two is of a conceptual nature and provides definitions of the concept of human security and related issues that are of relevance to the evolution of international peacekeeping with special relevance to the African context. It also focuses on the evolving post-Cold War roles and policy frameworks of organisations involved in African peacekeeping, specifically the UN and the AU. The AU policy framework on peace and security is of special interest as this framework provides the basis for new institutional co-operation and partnerships between the UN and the AU.

Chapter Three addresses the contemporary UN and AU institutional peacekeeping context in Africa. The content of this chapter focuses on regional initiatives and non-UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, as well as regional organisations which are and have been active within the African continent. Attention is also paid to the manifestation of UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping operations. The case of Burundi (circa 2000) and Liberia (sub-regional organisation cooperated with the small UN observer force in 1993) will specifically be highlighted as one of the first operations where a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping initiative was conducted on the African continent.

Based on the above*, Chapter Four* and *Five* focus on hybrid peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Sudan. These chapters will specifically explore the research question of this study, i.e. *is the international community moving towards more effective and*

legitimate peacekeeping operations when it follows an approach of hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa, such as the one in Sudan and previously in Burundi, or where an AU force is deployed in accordance with a UN Security Council mandate, such as the case of Somalia? UN resolutions and mandates within these countries, including advantages and disadvantages of the approach of peacekeeping in Somalia and Sudan will be analysed. The cases of Somalia and Sudan will be focused on to deduce lessons from the recent approach of hybridisation and burden-sharing in Africa. In other words, the study is intended to determine whether hybrid peacekeeping operations and burden-sharing offer any insightful, meaningful and practical perspectives into to the ongoing challenges faced by the international community and African role-players in the arena of peacekeeping on the African continent.

Chapter Six provides an evaluation and summary of key findings that address the research questions posed in Chapter one. This includes an assessment of the utility of the concept of hybrid peacekeeping operations and determines whether this approach should be utilised for future peacekeeping operations in Africa.

1.8 CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War era sought a foundation built on cooperation among states and within them. The African continent has played a significant role in acknowledging the importance of a shift in the concept of security from traditional state security to human security. Conflict prevention mechanisms have been initiated by both international and regional role-players such as the UN and the AU. These mechanisms embrace strategies that aim to improve the formula of dealing and managing the outbreak of war and its escalation, thus peacekeeping operations. The concept of peacekeeping will never really surmount the intricacy of international politics due to different ideologies regarding its operations. It remains one of the focal challenges to both the UN and the AU to maintain peace within the African continent. The notion of peacekeeping is not a new phenomenon and several perspectives have been added to the evolving concept of peacekeeping operations worldwide and specifically in the African context. At the same time, much still needs to be examined and learnt on how

to effectively conduct peacekeeping operations in Africa within the ambit of the UN Charter.

Hybrid peacekeeping operations remain one of the greatest and complex challenges within the African continent. It has faced diverse and significant changes ever since the end of the Cold War in order to be consistent with the new era and its expectations for a better contemporary world. Many issues that face Africa remain to be addressed in relation to finding a 'practical model' of hybrid peacekeeping operations. These evolving role-players at the continental and sub-regional levels are working and cooperating with the UN in countries such as Somalia and Sudan. There are certainly a number of unresolved issues regarding the present and future conduct of hybrid peacekeeping operations in the realm of peace and security. Specifically, it seems that the modalities, legal framework and practical foundations for delegating or for sharing the responsibility for international peacekeeping in Africa need to be clarified in a practical and scholarly context. Put simply, the challenge remains to establish a legitimate and acceptable basis for UN-African involvement in joint ventures so as to ensure an appropriate response to situations where the security of people is endangered. Thus, this study aims to critically analyse hybrid and burden-sharing peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Sudan.

CHAPTER 2: BEYOND THE VACUUM: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF PEACEKEEPING INTERVENTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Concepts and perspectives do not emerge in a vacuum. Concepts such as state sovereignty, human rights, and human security have transpired as pillars of the post-Cold War era. It is from this framework that notions such as the security-peace nexus, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding are explored.

The end of the Cold War raised prospects for international peace; however, these were encumbered by civil conflict during the establishment of the new world order. As civil conflict intensified, the international community had to develop new ways to resolve them and move away from traditional approaches to conflict. Thus peacekeeping had to move beyond ceasefires to a more radical approach. With the support of the Brahimi Report and the Agenda for Peace, the new approach of peacekeeping crystallised. As a result, peacekeeping became multidimensional in nature and structures to include the military, police, and a civilian component which is progressively growing in order to achieve the objectives of mandates. International actors such as the UN and continental actors such as the AU have taken great strides to maintain and develop peace and security. The AU, in particular, has been undergoing an important phase in terms of the definition it is giving to its collective security regime, by taking strides to develop peace and security policies and architecture.

At the most basic level of accessing sufficient the modalities towards peace and security on the African continent, state sovereignty, human rights, human security, and development are at the forefront of dialogue and much debate. Therefore, the AU's long-term evolution as an institutional framework proposes to address the multi-faceted problem of security in unique and innovative ways. Thus the international community's implementation of the responsibility to protect by taking into consideration peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding initiatives. Furthermore, regional actors are of importance in regional security governance on the African continent. The 2008 conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan have drawn attention to the role of peacekeeping operations in Africa. From the beginning of 2009,

the introduction of a similar force in Somalia became a possibility. These operations have sparked great debate within the international community with the intersection of morality and legality.

This chapter encloses an exploration of concepts related to the evolution of international peacekeeping with special relevance to the African context. The analysis will consist of the evolving post-Cold War roles and policy frameworks of organisations involved in African peacekeeping. The UN and AU policy frameworks on peace and security are of special interest, as these frameworks provide the basis for new institutional co-operation and partnerships between the UN and the AU.

2.2 CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The African continent witnessed various conflicts such as that in Sierra Leone, where due to unrelenting human rights violations since 1991, civil war erupted resulting in the death of over 50,000 people, with over one million persons displaced.

The conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) exposed its people to a similar fate, with thousands of people were killed, while other fled to the capital Bangui in droves.

During the Rwanda genocide in 1994, more than 800,000 people died and 250,000 women were raped. This period has become known as the darkest and most brutal killings of all time witnessed by the international community. This left the country's population traumatised and its infrastructure decimated, despite a small UN contingent which was under-resourced and under-staffed with a limited mandate. Additionally, the genocide spilled over into the DRC and resulted in hundreds of thousands of predominantly Hutu refugees pouring into its eastern provinces, among them were genocidaires, remnants of the army and militia that perpetrated the genocide. These conflicts exposed the serious lack of intervention concerns by the international community (Jean 2006).

As a result of these conflicts, and to ensure the international community never again fails to act in the face of such gross forms of human rights violations, the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in his 2000 General Assembly report, challenged the international community to reach consensus on how and when interventions should proceed for the sake of protecting populations. In September 2000, the ICISS was

established by the government of Canada to address the concerns reflected in Kofi Annan's report. In February 2001, the phrase 'responsibility to protect' was recommended as a way to circumvent the use of the 'right to protect' or the 'obligation to protect'. In December 2001, the report '*The Responsibility to Protect'*, was released based on the notion of sovereignty as a responsibility not a right and with the focus on the right of humanitarian intervention (ICISS report 2001:2). The notion also denoted as R2P, centred on prevention and halting mass atrocity crimes which include, genocide, war crimes, crime against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. This concept provided a framework for the application of tools that already exist, such as negotiation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctioning, and the UN Charter with reference to chapter VII. In 2004, R2P received renewed emphasis with the creation of the 'High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change'. This Panel identified threats that face the international community regarding peace and security. As a result, they released a report entitled 'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility', based on their findings and recommendations. In September 2005, R2P was fully supported by the international community. As a collective responsibility, it is grounded in the obligation of state sovereignty, humanitarian and national law, regional actors, and the UNSC as an organ to maintain international peace and security. This was unanimously adopted into the 2005 Outcome Document of the General Assembly.

Intrinsically, this new norm had three comprehensive pillars. The first pillar declared the state as the primary entity responsible to protect its population against mass atrocity. The second pillar asserted the importance of the international community to assist these states. Lastly, if the state fails or is unable to protect, and peaceful measures are futile, the international community has the responsibility to intervene for the protection of civilians. In cases where peaceful means have been exhausted, only then would the UNSC consider the use of military force (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2013). These pillars, while seemingly noble, are yet in doubt because of the occurrence where humanitarian intervention is used for self-interest and member states are reticent to help, have led to security dilemmas. The challenge of R2P is further fuelled by the international community's confusion around what it really means, and when and how it can be implemented to prevent and respond to mass atrocities executed against civilians. The need to clarify the concept over its

reach and limit is essential. Although it is an attempt to negotiate between the respect of state sovereignty and the moral obligation for the protection of civilians, theoretically, the application of R2P needs great improvement due to it being subject to the whims of politics. According to King (2013:1), "R2P often fails to achieve its intended purpose, igniting a storm of controversy whenever it is invoked". It declares the limit of state sovereignty above the importance of human rights and human security, including development. The first official use of the doctrine of R2P was UNSC resolution 1973 implemented in Libya in 2011, but since 2000, eight new operations have been mandated under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to use "all means necessary" to protect civilians (Gray 2001).

R2P can be interpreted and approached differently based on its apropos scope and parameters. On the one hand, it can be perceived as an infringement upon state sovereignty, and an amplification of human rights and the protection of civilians. States often see R2P as a threat to state sovereignty, especially that advocating military intervention and translating this action to interveners pursuing their own interests at the expense of citizens, states, and peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, it is a method to reconcile state sovereignty through rebalancing it with human rights. In the same breath, it is a shift from conflict prevention to human rights protection. Much remains to be done to fortify political provision, and to build institutional capacity, in order to implement R2P. Therefore, clear guidelines defining the circumstances requiring international intervention, and agreed upon by the international community, must be established. Until these steps are addressed, tension will persist between state sovereignty, human rights, human security, and development.

2.2.1 State sovereignty, human rights, human security, and development

Conflict in Kosovo (1999), Somalia (1993), and Srebrenica (1995) demonstrate the international community's failure to go against the concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention to protect human rights.

Fundamental disagreements between the global North and South was encountered throughout the 1990s. Those mainly in the global North, argued for a 'right to humanitarian intervention', and those, mainly in the global South, feared that any recognition of such a 'right' would mean a revival of old imperialist habits that would put newly-won and still-fragile independence at risk. As a result, state sovereignty and human rights continue to broil within the international community (Evans 2011:78).

Sovereignty still remains rooted in the notion of the non-interference of external force in domestic affairs, which entails the absolute authority within a bounded territorial space, having an internal and external dimension. Internally, sovereignty is unchanging, having a settled population that possesses a monopoly on the use of force, making it the supreme authority within its territory. Externally, sovereignty is the gateway into the society of states. Historically, the concept was used as a method of facilitating and maintaining peace which was an acceptable practice in the seventeenth century. In the twenty first century, conventional norms regarding human rights changed. Currently the challenge faced by the international community is states that hide behind the concept of sovereignty as they commit human rights abuses and atrocious crimes against their populations. In this light, sovereignty can no longer be seen as absolute. A state can no longer perpetuate gross and systematic human rights violations and presume impunity. While assuring basic human rights may seem like a policy which all states and societies can adhere to, it remains a highly contentious issue. For example, the Rwandan genocide epitomised the way in which state sovereignty restricted the policies that governments would consider in the wake of human rights violations. Such behaviour is regarded as both politically and morally intolerable. Consequently, states are not impervious to external forces or influence. It is important to rethink the notion of sovereignty in an epoch of interdependence due to global change. This is not to rule out sovereignty entirely, but to recognise that there are different forms, each performing more than one function and each state having limited powers (Hinsley 1989:1).

A theoretical paradox arises comprising of two notions as a result of respecting state sovereignty. Firstly, it may lead to international unity, and secondly, it can deteriorate the climate of human rights and limit the ability to protect human rights outside their borders (Krasner 2001:2). Therefore, sovereignty is not a concept that should solely be viewed negatively in cases where it serves to undermine international peace and

security, it has positive aspects only if exercised correctly. This is brought about by honouring human rights. Simultaneously, it draws on the principle that sovereign states are responsible and accountable to the international community for the protection of their populations, and that the international community can act to protect populations when national authorities fail to do so. Through this, human security is intertwined with human rights, noting that state security does not automatically guarantee individual security and the respect for human rights.

By adopting a human-centric approach and supplementing it with the latter view of limited power, a new conception of state sovereignty emerges. This approach involves state sovereignty and human rights exclusively reinforcing each other. The advent of human rights as a concern to the international community therefore affects state sovereignty, because the agreements upon principles places clear limitations on the authorization of state sovereignty to act within their borders (Baylis 2005:300).

The absence of human security can give rise to intractable crises that challenge both governments and people. This is evident in the conflict in Darfur which led to an influx of refugees into Chad and contributed to the conflict-ridden CAR (United Nations 2013). At the same time, human security underscores the universality and interdependence of a set of freedoms that are fundamental to human life. Where sovereign states are either unwilling or unable to protect the fundamental freedoms of their citizens, sovereignty and human rights come into conflict.

Sovereignty has become more permeable than ever due to globalisation which has had an enormous impact on the protection of human rights and security. As the world becomes a global village due to globalisation, the emphasis of these two concepts are increasingly being highlighted, both in domestic and international policies which guide the behaviour of states and individuals towards human security.

In this light, human security is a concept coalesced with human development which interconnects peace, security, and sustainable development. According to Duffield (2007: 334-335), peace and stability abated due to the increase in civil conflicts, lack of large-scale humanitarian interventions and reconstructive programmes, which challenge old assumptions of security and development. Duffield further elucidates that development is impossible without stability and, at the same time, security is not sustainable without development.

The security-development nexus is whereby security and development become analytically inseparable. According to Stern and Öjendal (2010: 6), "the notion of nexus seems to provide a possible framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address the complex policy problems and challenges". The need to integrate both these concepts in post-conflict situations has become increasingly essential because of the growing civil conflicts and the category of failed and potentially failing states. Often states involved in these conflicts are underdeveloped, lacking an effective government and state institution/structures, and faced with state corruption. This has led to insecurity and increased the risk of violent upheavals including the inability to manage social tension in a non-violent fashion. The framework of the security-development nexus has been perceived as a way to achieve coherent and well-managed policies regarding complex challenges facing states (Chandler 2007:367). This is supported by Stern and Öjendal (2010:18), who state that the logic of the nexus can best be demonstrated as the "merging of human development and human security", although there is a plethora of reasons why this can remain perpetually out of reach. Stern and Öjendal (2010:19) further note that efforts of achieving this nexus would breed impasses/impossible accounts.

Contrary, in order to resolve conflicts and sustain security and development, it is imperative to determine the root causes of conflicts by focusing on the sources of human security. Banditry, looting and inter-communal strife; hate crimes; the collapse of welfare systems; the politicization and neglect of the military; the unprofessionalism of paramilitary and police forces that were once an integral part of the neo-patrimonial system; state repression, oppression and corruption; poverty; hunger; and inequalities serve as some of the root causes of conflict (Conteh-Morgan 2005: 70-71). The causes of conflict are often incited and spread by violations of human rights which spiral out of control. As a result, intervention to create peace and alleviate suffering becomes a prerequisite through intervention.

2.2.2 Intervention and human security

The African continent continues to experience a disproportionate number of emergency situations. Conflicts such as in the DRC, Burundi, Liberia, and the Darfur Region of Sudan continue to rage. More recent conflicts such as in Mali, the CAR, and Uganda continue to fester. These situations have led to the intervention of many humanitarian agencies and organisations across the continent. The prevalence of these deployments matches the pervasive need to address challenges arising from the presence of humanitarian actors and the need for mutual understanding of the drivers and principles underlining the work of major actors. As conflict evolved, intervention, whether military for humanitarian purposes, remain at the heart of discussions as to when, if ever, is it appropriate to implement it for the purpose of security and the protection of civilians.

Addressing the plight of conflict-affected populations and the threat of armed groups, managing open borders and combating infectious diseases are now part of a dialogue for the objective of protecting individuals (Massingham 2009:804). For that reason, intervention remains a possible necessity for the protection of civilians. However, there are challenges which provoke dispute for and against humanitarian intervention in conflict states. For instance, intervention took place in Kosovo and Sierra Leone but not in Burma, and in Libya but not in Syria. These decisions were based on non-consensus surrounding the circumstances of the right to intervene for human security, and on who should intervene and how. There are still no clear guidelines as to how to intervene based on a case-by-case situation. In addition, the problem is exacerbated by the perspective of intervention on whether it is a form of imperialism or opportunism. Based on current conflicts depicted across the globe, it is important to agree on a practical framework for intervention taking ethics into careful consideration. In this light, intervention in pursuit of humanitarian objectives can be considered legitimate under circumstances that fall in the realm of R2P, accompanied by policies of which intervention is assessed and monitored. The complex situation and environment in which intervention takes place requires a pragmatic assessment in order to have coordination and collaboration of all the parties involved in the intervention. Therefore, as stated above, prevention is better than cure, conditions

should not be worse off before intervention takes place. Thus, intervention needs to take priority over sovereignty for the purpose of human security.

Nonetheless, there still remains discord about the extent and manner of intervention, specifically, the efficacy of the utilisation of military force to protect human rights. Yet, states are often reluctant to commit military force to protect human rights, because the use of force to end human rights violations poses a moral dilemma. As much as military actions are prohibited, under certain circumstances, military action can be the best solution to bring atrocity to an end. Therefore, intervention requires reasonable parameters of putting a halt to human atrocities. This includes the authority and legitimacy of the UNSC. However, if the decision to intervene occurs without the authority of this organ, then such a situation should be justified as an extraordinary emergency and accepted as the best possible solution in a bad situation. For instance, the cases of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo in 1999, where intervention was undertaken without the authorisation of the UNSC, was seen as a hard case. While the UNSC should be the main organ to authorise intervention, there is no definitive exclusion of a possibility that R2P "might ultimately be assumed by the General Assembly, regional organisations, or coalitions of states if the UNSC fails to act" (Stahn 2007:104). In fact, in Mali, French soldiers intervened in the conflict after the AU was not prepared to conduct an intervention operation. In other words, there was no authority or mandate from either the UN or the AU; making the intervention essentially an ad hoc endeavour – which could be potentially dangerous if political aims or outside national interest are the main motivators or rationale. "French intervention aimed to support the Malian government by combating all Malian insurgency groups, no matter what their motivations were" (Holmgren 2013). While humanitarian considerations provide the pretext of intervention, the surge of the French military engagement in Mali could be more about protecting France's access to raw material and strategic resources on the continent, than about saving lives or promoting democracy and development (Prince 2013). The engagement of the French in the Mali conflict demonstrated that it was not only an African responsibility, although an ECOWAS-led intervention would have been better placed to respond immediately. However, African partners, the European Union (EU), the US, and the UN were divided on the pace of the intervention. Considering the rapidly deteriorating

security situation in Mali, France took the lead, although insisting that a military intervention be led by ECOWAS (Holmgren 2013).

The dilemma of intervention can become a disguise for interference in the affairs of sovereign states. It could also encourage secessionists to use violence to provoke intervention-triggering human rights abuses. But if intervention, especially humanitarian intervention is an unacceptable assault on state sovereignty, the international community could have never been able to respond to conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In cases where humanitarian intervention is necessary, it is based on moral obligations rather than political objectives (Bellamy and Wheeler 2005:560). However, the UN cannot respond to all conflicts, thus the importance of collaborating with regional organisations and non-state actors which would lead to greater alleviation of human suffering in Africa.

Non-state actors are gaining momentum in post-conflict states to alleviate human suffering. These actors range from UN agencies, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); World Food Programme (WFP); World Health Organisation (WHO), to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who works in armed conflicts, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) who work in areas of natural disasters. These actors are of great importance for the protection of civilians. Human rights specialists, for example, can provide information on human rights conditions in the country and historical information on the record of state institutions. Human rights personnel are also key partners in building effective rule of law structures and procedures. They can also provide valuable inputs on human rights principles and standards for police training curricula.

Humanitarian workers are often in contact with local grass-roots organizations and can provide crucial insights into the population's opinions of the police and the military, and on sensitive issues such as how to deal with past human rights abuses, reconciliation, and victim support. These are invaluable actors, who provide information, concerning remote or outlying areas where they are often based.

2.2.3 Sovereignty as a Responsibility

As stated above, if the state fails to protect, the responsibility then devolves to the international community, with this development providing a layer of protection for civilians (Anghie 2012).

The concept of sovereignty as responsibility is not set as a license to control but as a set of obligations towards citizens. Currently, states that are unable to govern their populations are more of a threat than stronger states that have military and economic power. Despite weaponry and small armed groups that operate within and across states, these have a destructive capacity to mandate international attention. For instance, over 15,000 people, mostly Muslim civilians were surrounded and threatened by armed militia groups in CAR (Reuters 2014); two people were killed and 24 wounded in clashes between militias in Libya's capital, highlighting the rivalries behind heavily armed groups that have plagued the country since Muammar Gaddafi (Shennib 2013); and in Sudan, in the South Kordofans' Rashad district clashes resulted in the displacement of 6,700 civilians (United Nations 2014a). These demonstrate that if states do not manage the situations, they could cause greater harm in the long run. According to Orford (2001:12-13), the state has an onus "to preserve life-sustaining standards for its citizens", which is a necessary condition of sovereignty.

Sovereignty is judged by international law based on its legitimacy, therefore, states need to qualify based on certain standards for it to be recognised as a state. This will then be judged by the international community against the backdrop of international law. Therefore, if states fail to preserve life, they cannot legitimately protest against international humanitarian intervention.

Sovereignty as a responsibility requires transparency and accountability that would generate legitimacy, thus entailing the democratisation of sovereignty. This concept is a milestone from the traditional perspective which is gradually evolving at the international level. Thus, it is important for state leaders to find a balance between the need for good governance and interdependence for the implementation of sovereignty as responsibility (ICISS report 2001:13). Such a responsibility would entail protection and prevention of crimes against the population. In the same breath, the international community should encourage and assist states to implement this responsibility and

support the UN to establish early warning capabilities. In this light, collective security or a shared responsibility with both state and non-state actors is of great importance. The shared responsibility can range from working and supporting peacekeepers which have been used to promote peace across the globe. Peacekeeping has been used to promote peace across the globe. However, due to numerous armed conflicts which hamper institutional, social and economic development since the end of the Cold War, several peacekeeping operations have been conducted in Africa.

The next sub-section will therefore consider the evolution of international peacekeeping as a response to conflicts, specifically addressing the different ways they are mandated, constructed, operationalized, and implemented. It will also highlight the weaknesses and challenges that traditional peacekeeping operations face in their response to the dynamic evolution of security threats in Africa.

2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

UN peacekeeping has come a long way from military observers to multidisciplinary activities to assist states overcome crises. Whether peacekeeping operations are UN led or undertaken by regional entities, with the authorisation of the UNSC, they involve five principle activities that are involved, namely, conflict prevention; peacemaking; peacekeeping; peacebuilding; and peace enforcement. Focus will be given to peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. These principles have been conceptually identified as three distinct activities in a post-conflict context and that, if successful, peacekeeping would lay the foundation for peacebuilding activities (De Carvalho and Ettang 2011:6). However, there are challenging conflicts within the African continent contributing to the need for peacekeeping operations with robust mandates for the protection of civilians.

The focus on Africa originates from its agricultural capability and natural resources that increasingly attract other governments, multinational companies and trans-border political movements. Concurrently, the continent suffers from significant tensions and conflicts that have led to both UN and AU interventions with an objective to promote conflict prevention and resolution.

The process of conflict resolution involves peacemaking which addresses conflicts that are already in progress, involving diplomatic measures. These measures range from negotiation to mediation and arbitration, in order to bring hostile parties of the conflict to a negotiated agreement by using Chapter 6 of the UN Charter as a benchmark. Peacemaking is a key objective in the agenda of African governments and regional organisations and initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). This objective has been utilised in Burundi, DRC, and the Ivory Coast to establish peace and foster an environment for negotiations and strengthen weak peace processes.

Peacebuilding has emerged as one of the most significant developments aimed to support the establishment of lasting peace in post-conflict societies. In the early 1990s, the then Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali defined peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict". Peacebuilding has since expanded to go beyond mere efforts that seek to prevent the relapse of conflict to include various activities such as humanitarian aid; governance assistance; (re)building of infrastructures; and provision of security conducted by peace providers (Tschirgi 2004:2). Furthermore, it includes processes such as conflict prevention, management and transformation in post-conflict settings. Peacebuilding is not a reactive approach which only seeks to prevent resurgence of violence, what Galtung termed 'negative peace'. It aims to address the underlying root causes of conflict, and to create the conditions for human development and for a just and equitable social order, termed 'positive peace' (Galtung 1985:12).

The realisation is that peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional or system-wide undertaking which has led to the development of frameworks such as the Secretary-General's Note on the Integrated Approach and the AU's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework, highlighting a range of peacebuilding dimensions including political; human security; development; human rights; rule of law; social reconciliation: and security. Practically, there are three elements that are crucial to preventing the relapse to conflict and producing more buoyant states and societies, namely, inclusivity, institutional and confidence building; and sustained international support (United Nations 2015).

Sustainable peacebuilding aims to support the creation of institutions and the establishment of reforms that support the implementation of peace agreements. Moreover, peacebuilding should be understood in the context of an increasingly complex and interdependent conflict management system. While the generation of multiple frameworks is reflective of renewed and concerted efforts by national, regional and international actors to address the post-conflict conundrum, the bourgeoning of peacebuilding actors and mechanisms can be perilous especially if there is no coordination and symbiosis. However, the African continent has had progress in promoting peace over this period, occurrences of armed conflicts and mass atrocities have declined, and despite effects of financial crisis, the Africa continent is managing to maintain an economic outlook. Nonetheless, there still remains challenges to this effect.

Post-Cold War conflicts that are more intra-state have shown to be more complex and are not solvable by military approaches alone. Currently, conflicts involve more multi-functional peacekeeping operations which are multidimensional in character such as peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC. Thus, there is a need to support these countries to find political settlements in order to overcome conflict through peacekeeping efforts.

Peacekeeping is seen from a variety of perspectives based on the diversity of its operations. This concept involves facilitating a transition from a state of conflict to a state of peace. The presence of peacekeepers often comprising soldiers, military observers, or individual/civilian police encourage the prevention of arms in conflict, but instead use negotiations for peaceful settlement of disputes (Ahere 2010). Peacekeeping performs different tasks to stop or contain hostilities and assists in developing conditions in which peacemaking can take place. These peacekeepers are deployed to monitor or supervise the implementation of peace agreements between the conflicting parties (United Nations 1990: 276). However, peace is often challenged by conflicts over natural resources such as gold and cobalt in the DRC, diamonds in Sierra Leone, and the unrest and cultural conflict in Sudan.

Peacekeeping operations increased after the Cold War ended, with the UNSC authorising 20 operations between 1989 and 1994, from 11,000 to 75,000 peacekeepers. In the twenty-first century, the UN established complex peacekeeping

operations in Africa, namely, in Burundi - ONUB; in Chad and the CAR - UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT); in Côte d'Ivoire - UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI); in DRC - UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); in Eritrea/Ethiopia - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE); in Liberia - UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); in Sierra Leone - UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL); in Sudan - UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in the south of the country and UNAMID in Darfur); UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); in South Sudan - the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS); and in Syria - UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) (United Nations 2014a). These operations show the need and the myriad cases of peacekeeping around the world.

Challenges to some of the above operations have caused interim UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, for instance the ignominy of Somalia in the 1990s, which was called 'Operation Restore Hope'. This operation saw the withdrawal of United States of America (USA) troops which contributed to the failure of the operation, leaving Somalia without a central government and in a state of lawlessness. Somalia became a threat not only to its population but also to neighbouring states. Furthermore, the largest peacekeeping operation in the DRC posed another challenge to peacekeeping operations. These operations have been conducted with no clear guideline, and the legal framework for these operations still remains unclear. Thus the lack of a foundational legal framework of peacekeeping operations underpin the challenges faced by peacekeepers in the field as they implement peacekeeping mandates.

2.4 MANDATES AND LEGAL UNDERPINNING FOR PEACEKEEPING

The UNSC has authorised robust and complex mandates for UN peacekeepers, but these are more robust, because of the nature of multidimensional peacekeeping with the focus on the protection of civilians. There is still no reference made to peacekeeping in the UN Charter despite of the fact that its implementation is growing around the world, especially within the African continent. The development of peacekeeping has not been clearly and strategically formulated and framed by international law. It is driven by demands of international political situations on the

ground as an ad-hoc response. As a result, the lack of a legal framework has brought significant challenges.

However, the UN derives the use of peacekeeping operations from Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter including the utilisation of the settlement of disputes that threaten international peace and security. Article 33 of the UN Charter, does not give the UN any right to intervene in the peacemaking process, but states that parties are to resolve the dispute peacefully. The UN can make recommendations to the parties involved. If the parties are unable or unwilling to disputes peacefully, the matter is then brought before the General Assembly or the UNSC. Therefore, the General Assembly or UNSC may recommend that a peacekeeping operation be launched based on a political decision rather than a legal one (Sohn 1984:402-403. Under Article 33 or any provision of this Chapter, consent of the parties to the peacekeeping operation is mandatory. Without this consent, a peacekeeping operation cannot be a Chapter VI operation. Therefore, in cases where the UN deals with a government that has collapsed and has no means on getting consent, peacekeeping operations are then conducted under Chapter VII (Sohn 1984:403-404).

Chapter VI provisions peacekeeping operations, but does not give any guidance on the details which are to be agreed between the UN and the states involved. These agreements are legally binding, although the UNSC does not ratify them. Proceeding under Chapter VII, peacekeepers can use force in cases of self-defence in order to protect the mandate. The UNSC is the only organ that can authorise this, although the General Assembly makes recommendations for UNSC actions. However, it should act under Article 39 of the UN Charter where a threat to international peace and security exists. Without this finding, lawfully it cannot act under Chapter VII (Sohn 1984:404). Grounds of Chapter VII are set out in Article 39 (any threat to peace; breach of peace; and act of aggression). This article is particularly important because it sets the benchmark for which the General Assembly and the UNSC should operate in order to utilise the chapter. Under Article 42, UN mandate can be more robust, involving the use of air, sea, and land force actions.

2.5 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

As an important mechanism of the international community, international peacekeeping is essential for conflict resolution. This involves the military, civilian, and police components performing an extensive range of duties that may have a robust mandate. International peacekeeping is envisioned to create a stable and peaceful environment, mandated by the UN and are guided by principles of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations have become complex to accommodate a number of actors and complex activities, most prominent being the UN, AU, and the EU. The increase of actors has given rise to operations being increasingly diverse with different interests, approaches, and mandates, which has led to the development of policy frameworks and architectures.

2.5.1 The UN peace and security policy framework and architecture

In the aftermath of WWII, the UN emerged as a beacon of hope for a war weary world. As the delegates of 50 nations met in San Francisco to sign the UN Charter, no one had predicted the need for UN peacekeeping. But it was not long before the Cold War descended on the world, making it difficult for the UNSC to agree on matters of peace and security. New ways to ease and to address conflict had to evolve.

In response to the growing demand for peacekeepers, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released a 2008 manual which comprised lessons learned and basic principles from recent operations, for the constructive implementation of UN peacekeepers.

The first principle is consent, suggesting that UN peacekeeping operations are often deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict, which requires a commitment and dedication to a political process in order to resolve the conflict. Consent provides the UN with the freedom to carry out its mandate. Without such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming party to the conflict and drawn towards peace enforcement actions, and away from its fundamental role (United Nations 2014a). However, consent does not necessarily guarantee that there will be consent at the local level, particularly if there are internal divisions or weak command and control systems. Thus, universality of consent is less plausible in volatile

situations, charactised by the presence of armed groups who are not under any control of the parties or by the presence of other injections/spoilers.

The second principle is impartiality, which is used synonymously and interlinked with neutrality. UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their engagement with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the implementation of their mandate. On the one hand, impartiality refers to non-discrimination and proportionality, on the other hand, neutrality can be understood as not taking sides with belligerent parties. So a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a UN peacekeeping operation upholds (Johannessen 2007).

Although there is need to establish and maintain good relations between parties, a peacekeeping operation must conscientiously avoid actions that might compromise its image of impartiality. A UN peacekeeping operation should not shy away from an arduous application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation. Failure to do so, may undermine the peacekeeping operation's credibility and legitimacy, and lead to an extraction of consent for its presence by the parties.

The third principle is non-use of force. Except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate, it should be taken into account that UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, with the authorisation of the UNSC, UN peacekeeping operations can use force at a tactical level, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate. In certain volatile situations, the UNSC has given UN peacekeeping operations 'robust' mandates authorising them to use all necessary means to prevent forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under impending threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order (United Nations Peacekeeping 2012a). Although in the field they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The difference between these is that robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at a tactical level with the consent of parties. Peace enforcement does not require the consent of parties involved and often operates at a strategic or international level. A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional, and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum

force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the peacekeeping operation and its mandate. The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances. Judgments concerning its use need to be made at the appropriate level within an operation, based on a combination of factors including operational capability, public perceptions, humanitarian impacts, force protection, safety and security of personnel, and most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the operation (United Nations 2014a).

With these principles as guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations, the UN has carried out numerous peacekeeping operations. The end of the Cold War marked another watershed, ushering in an era of unprecedented expansion in UN peacekeeping. These principles marked a significant step towards the clarification of the nature of UN peacekeeping operations as well as best practices.

The UN took a step forward for maintaining peace and security through the development of *An Agenda for Peace* report written by former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in 1992. This report responded to a request made by the UNSC for an analysis and recommendations to strengthen peacemaking and peacekeeping processes. The report outlines the way the UN needs to respond to conflict in the post-Cold War world. The vital contribution of *An Agenda for Peace* was to the modern understanding of peace and the comprehension of the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding. It was hoped that the post-Cold War era would result in the implementation of the UN Charter's ideals which include the protection of human rights (Boss 2006:69). Nonetheless, peacekeeping has been one of the main challenges the UN has faced since the end of the Cold War due to the rise of civil wars. Furthermore, the landmark Brahimi report of 2000, charted a renewed vision, principles, and guidance that were more robust and cost-efficient for effective UN peacekeeping. The Brahimi report provided recommendations for sweeping changes in the way UN peacekeeping and associated post-conflict peacebuilding are conceived, planned, and executed. In alignment with Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, the Brahimi report aimed to recommence pledges made by UN member states to maintain international peace and security (Gray 2001:270). Furthermore, it scrutinised the pertinence of traditional pre-Cold War peacekeeping when threatened by "new wars". As recommended by the Brahimi report, UN

peacekeeping operations became more impartial and robust. Immediate relief was no longer the first priority of the UN, instead, re-establishment, development, and sustainable peace became one of the main concerns of the organisation, which is striving to facilitate sustainable and lasting peace. While ameliorations have been noted, the UN must refurbish the responsibility of member states for future successes (Ban 2010).

Although the UN has successes and failures, its failures were more the focus by the international community. As a result, in the late 1990s, the Secretary-General released two very sobering reports assessing how the UN dealt with the case of Rwanda and Srebrenica. These reports reopened old wounds including the operational difficulties faced by the freshly launched peace operations and an overstretched UN DPKO. They suggested a potentially destructive crisis for UN peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, decided that piecemeal solutions to peacekeeping problems would no longer suffice. In March 2000, he commissioned a high-level group of experts to assess the weaknesses of the UN's best known tool for stabilizing recent conflict zones, and to offer practical recommendations to remedy those weaknesses (Durch, Holt, Earle, & Shanahan 2003).

Current peacekeeping operations are a choice between "a more robust approach and going home", and states, if they fear for their troops, will hesitate to intervene as demonstrated in the DRC (Johnstone, Tortolani & Gowan 2005:40). The Brahimi report recommended the use of peacekeeping forces to be robust enough to represent a threat to belligerents and deter them from retroceding previously signed peace agreements (Khan 2002: 492-496). The objective was not to turn peacekeeping forces into "war fighting machines", but to be "prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence" (Annan 2000).   This proposition was first tested in 2000 by the UNSC resolution 1313, which expanded the mandate of UNAMSIL (Johnstone 2006).

In May 2000, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) withdrew its support of the Lomé Peace Agreement and recommended pugnacity endangering both peacekeepers and civilians in Burundi. The peacekeepers were unable to protect themselves or the civilians from the militia attacks despite the robust mandate previously authorised in February, UNSC resolution 1289. As a result, the UNSC authorised a new mandate

to "deter and where necessary, decisively counter, the threat of RUF attack by responding vigorously to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force" (United Nations 2000). This decision was provocative as it essentially blurred the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The Brahimi report cautioned the concepts of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force remained essential in peacekeeping operations. In Darfur, the partial failure of UNAMID was attributed to the inexistent consent of one of the factions which forced troops to keep peace where there was no peace to keep. The 2005 World Summit reiterated the entreaty of the Brahimi report and called for the implementation of a ten-year plan to build the capacity of the AU for its role in peacekeeping operations (United Nations 2005). The intention of the report was not to declare the UN the imperialistic arbiter of good and evil but rather to differentiate between neutrality, the equal treatment of both parties, and impartiality, reactivity unburdened by prejudice. To favour neutrality over impartiality has in the past caused operations to fail. In 2004, the MONUC operation in the DRC failed to protect the town of Bukavu when the militias attacked it, killing more than one hundred people (Johnstone 2006).

Peacekeepers were criticised for having mistaken impartiality for neutrality. Rather than withdrawing from the DRC, the UNSC revised the mandate to establish a more robust force and "ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence" (United Nations Security Council 2008. Yamashita (2008:623) argues that impartiality is loyalty to the mandate of the operation and that in the face of genocide, there can be no neutrality. Post-Brahimi report operations require peacekeepers to identify potential spoilers of the mandate and take action against them, using force if necessary. This can be a danger to the mandate, as governments, if they support militias, will feel threatened by peacekeepers and withdraw their consent (Johnstone 2010:39). The UN has to both maintain a friendly relationship with governments by making concessions to its mandates and remain impartial enough that it does not appear as a supporter of a non-democratic government that violates human rights. In the DRC MONUC was a victim of a decrease in its credibility when it cooperated with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), also known as the DRC armed forces, a necessary step for the conduct of the operation but an apparent dismissal of the human rights violations they had committed. Abandonment of neutrality was prominent

in subsequent UN operations. This was a ground-breaking measure as it set a precedent to the doctrine of R2P embraced in 2005 during the General Assembly World Summit.

Building on the report, the UN published the Capstone Doctrine in 2008, a document that detailed the duties and responsibilities of peacekeeping operations. It aimed to prevent shortcomings similar to UNAMID. The parties of the conflict had to consent to both the presence of peacekeepers on their territory and the implementation of a political process (Johnstone 2010:25). In addition, consent had to be maintained by peacekeepers, through deterrence if necessary. This type of consent was not an ideal situation as it hindered the rapid development of the local political process that would lead to sustainable peace. In certain cases, the UN was accused of overlooking two of its guiding principles, namely, consent and impartiality which led to doubt the credibility, efficiency, and legitimacy of the UN (Taylor and Curtis 2005:407-409). Due to the growing number of conflicts, the UN DPKO was formed as a UN department that deals with peace operations as a whole.

As a result, the official UN DPKO was formally created in 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali took office as Secretary-General of the UN. It is an institution that is primarily aimed at providing effective solutions to the evolving contexts of war-affected countries. The UN DPKO supports various UN peacekeeping operations by developing policy frameworks that respond to the changing needs of both conflict situations and the societies which are affected by the conflict. It should be noted that with its countless efforts, UN DPKO has witnessed a number of incessant challenges which impacts the effective implementation of its policy frameworks concerning UN peacekeeping operations. Alongside its role, UN DPKO works to assimilate efforts of the UN, government, and non-government entities within peacekeeping operations. This includes coordination of the three multidimensional components in operations (United Nations 2014a).

Each peacekeeping operation is not the same and it is therefore accompanied by a particular set of mandated tasks. In order to implement the mandate which leads peacekeepers to be exposed in the field, UN DPKO works to minimize the risks which peacekeepers face in the field. Taken into consideration, UN peacekeeping operations consist of several aspects of the military, police, and civilian components.

Peacekeepers may be deployed to prevent the outbreak of conflict, assist in the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, and even lead states through a transition to stable governments. As a result, it is important that UN DPKO work with civil society in the promotion of peace, democracy, and development.   Thus, strengthening the relationship between the civilian and military component, is of great importance.

The collection of organisations, mechanisms, and relationships to manage and prevent conflict is what is known as peace and security architectures. The UN has pursued a path to implement organisational reforms in order to adapt to the changing environment of conflicts. It adopted an integrated peacekeeping operation concept within the UN system to engage in its capabilities in a coherent manner though mutual strategic objectives for operational approaches among UN agencies. The aim of this reform was to amplify UN contributions to states emerging from conflict. Most of these states were in Africa, as a result, the UN's relation to this continent needed to be strengthened.

2.5.2 Role of the UN in African peacekeeping challenges

UN peacekeepers have been in the front lines working towards bringing peace to the most vulnerable people and conflict-ridden countries such as Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria, Kosovo, and Darfur. Never before has UN peacekeeping been as large as it is today, and never before has the UN been tasked to make such broad contributions to peace, security, and development in societies that have suffered from conflict.

It is evident that making peace is more of a challenge than war. Since the UN's establishment, it has been at the centre of peacekeeping operations and conflict resolutions with a vital responsibility to maintain international peace and security. The legitimacy of the UN as a whole, as well as that of its peacekeepers, rests largely on its performance to protect civilians. It is important that peacekeeping be based on a well-defined mandate and supported by appropriate resources and operational structures.

However, lack of staff capacity, funds, and equipment have been one of the causes of many of the failures of the operations. For instance, the calamity UNAMSIL attributed

the allocation of only five staff in the UN DPKO to manage 12,000 troops in the field. In 2001, the UN DPKO was composed of only 400 staff for 58,000 troops deployed around the world (Gray 2001:273). UN peacekeeping operations have also been unsuccessful due to the lack of Troop Contributing Countries' (TCCs) involvement and the gap between the physical means provided and the aims of the operations which worsened due to the war on terror that began in 2001. Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2010:279) argue that states were also more wary of deploying their own personnel in perilous areas because of the number of casualties the war on terror caused. Nonetheless, the number of uniformed personnel have steadily increased to reach almost 105,394 in 2015, five times more than in 2000, and the operations in DRC – to mention only one example – constitutes 19,452 deployed on a territory as large as Western Europe (United Nations Peacekeeping 2012b). Regardless of this sharp increase, troops are still plagued by overstretched peacekeeping operations (Gowan 2009:1).

Division of labour through the participation of regional and international organisations can be seen as a possible solution to the lack of personnel that restrains complex operations.

Furthermore, the UN is faced with pressing challenges, particularly in implementing the protection of civilians' agenda in UN peacekeeping operations. The crux of the challenge is mainly rooted in the coherent inability to interpret the meaning of protection of civilians. This is because there are still divergences as to its meaning and application. At an operational level, there is still no agreement as to the meaning, its applicability, and how it ought to relate to local contexts and sensitivities. This makes it difficult to train personnel, and thus becomes difficult for them to grasp their roles and responsibilities in carrying out their operational tasks (de Carvalho and Lie 2009:2).

2.5.3 The AU peace and security policy and architecture

The African continent is confronted with a variety of conflicts during a period when it cannot always afford to depend on the international community to provide their needs. Therefore, the role of regional and sub-regional organisations to provide peace is important. For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and

OAU active mediation efforts in Angola which culminated in the Lusaka Peace Agreement of 1994, as well as the 1999 Lusaka Cease-fire Accord on the crisis in DRC (although that Accord is now faltering). Furthermore, ECOWAS successfully brokered peace agreements in Liberia, and the successful restoration of President Kabbah to power, and the continuing efforts to promote peace in Sierra Leone through the basic aspects of the Lome Peace Agreement in 1999. Collective security played an important role and consisted of a common commitment to the proposition that a threat to peace in Africa or elsewhere should be considered a threat to peace everywhere. Yet, there is a recognition that the UN cannot do everything and cannot work in a vacuum, hence the importance of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which encourages co-operation between UN and regional arrangements (working closely with regional leaders such as Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa) and the need to improve their relative capabilities in undertaking certain peace initiatives. The latter has the advantage of proximity and familiarity with such conflicts in their respective regions while the UN has the advantages of universality, relative impartiality, and greater financial resources. These regional actors work under the umbrella organisation of the AU.

As a successor of the OAU, the AU aimed to strengthen African unity and states within the international orbit. In addition, it aimed to fortify regional security frameworks within its Constitutive Act with new legal underpinnings. The AU has played a vital role by adopting a series of policies and protocols. In the 2000 Lome Summit, the AU adopted the AU Constitutive Act as an approach to prevailing challenges of peace and security on the continent. Guided by the AU Constitutive Act, the AU established seventeen institutions to address continental security and development. These bodies committed to peace and security, were engaged under a framework known as the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), intended to enable the continent to find regional solutions to severe human security challenges such as civil conflicts and violence against civilians (Mickler 2013:491).

Within this framework was one of the AU's most ambitious initiatives, a fifteen-member AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) which would approve armed intervention in cases of gross human rights violations and unconstitutional changes in government. The AU PSC is bestowed with the responsibility to be the principal decision-making entity of the AU for peacekeeping operations (Kobbie 2009:10). Moreover, the APSA

consisted of a peacebuilding framework that includes a 'Panel of the Wise' to promote mediation efforts; a rapid-reaction ASF affixed in five regional brigades; a Military Staff Committee; a Peace Fund; and a continental Early Warning System. In the same year, 'the Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation' in Africa (CSSDCA) was adopted as a policy framework to complement activities to be undertaken by the AU. Four years later, in 2004, the 'Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP)' was established as a guideline for the AU. The AU departed from the OAU and presented itself as a far more willing and even assertive interventionist and activist organisation for peacekeeping than its predecessor. Therefore, the adoption of CADSP was to strengthen its commitment to develop consensus regarding peace and security in Africa. Furthermore, this policy sought to address challenges faced by African states holistically and collectively, thus cooperation and coordination was and still remains important. In addition, the policy would assist to guide the direction of the AU PSC. In 2007, the AU adopted the 'Declaration on the Framework for a Response to Unconstitutional Changes in Government', and it also adopted the 'African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance' (Chitima 2012:187).

The African continent has a strong desire to build capacity to deal with its own challenges through the establishment of an ASF. There has long been talk of implementing an ASF, which is still underway and expected to be operational in 2015, after being postponed in 2010. The AU appears to have a new desire to develop such capabilities and this is what is being seen in CAR. There is a desire to bring about law and order in the State before the possibility of handing over to the UN for long-term stabilisation projects such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) initiatives, security sector reform (SSR), and institution building. This process highlights burden-sharing between the AU and UN as a way of collaboration and coordination for the purpose of peacekeeping.

The AU has initiated peacekeeping operations as a tool for conflict resolution and has even appeared to be a "pro-interventionist organisation" (Mickler 2013:492). Its growing role indicates a paradigm shift from traditional peacekeeping to a more contemporary peacekeeping approach. This is also a way to bring about African solutions to African problems. Despite its role on the continent, the AU faces a variety of constraints from political and institutional limitations to conceptual challenges that

weaken it from being effective. It remains the most prominent organisation that has a moral responsibility to contribute to peacekeeping in Africa. Thus, the African strategic environment serves as "impetus for an assessment of the role and readiness of the AU in peacekeeping operations". This was tested in the deployment of the AU in Burundi and Sudan, through political, institutional, and conceptual dynamics. This resulted in the need for a change in the APSA in order to better respond to conflict. It is imperative to analyse and comprehend the root causes of conflict in Africa before resolving them. "There is considerable uncertainty about whether the AU is ready to effectively respond to the current evolving security reality, indeed whether the AU is able to fulfil its proper role in managing contemporary complex peacekeeping operations in Africa" (Kobbie 2009:2).

Realising that Africa needs to develop a military mechanism to deal with common security threats, which undermine the maintenance and promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent, the AU adopted the 'Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council' in July 2002, to establish a military staff committee to advise and assist the AU PSC on all questions relating to military and security requirements. The Protocol provides for an ASF to enable the AU PSC to deploy peacekeeping operations and intervene pursuant to the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act (de Coning & Kasumba 2010:10). The proposed ASF serves as the AU's implementation arm for peacekeeping capacity and a mechanism to rapidly and efficiently respond to conflict on the African continent, which was approved in 2004. In January 2004, African ministers of defence and security, met at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopted the 'Draft Framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy'. The ministers reviewed progress made in developing an African standby peacekeeping force, an early warning system to detect and prevent potential conflicts, and to ensure rapid humanitarian relief during disasters. In July 2004, the AU Assembly, meeting at the Headquarters, formally adopted the defence and security policy as Africa's blueprint in search of peace, security, and stability on the continent.

The ASF is an envisaged standby arrangement that is supported by the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). This comprises Regional Standby Forces (RSFs), namely, the North African Regional Capability (NARC); East African Standby Force (EASF); the Economic Community of West

African States Standby Force (ESF); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force; and the SADC Standby Force (SSF). The challenge for the effective operationalizational readiness of the ASF is cooperation and coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs. The desire to move towards the establishment of the ASF can be seen as an important stepping-stone towards African unity and increased African agency in the field of continental peacekeeping. The ASF was conceived to conduct, observe, and monitor peacekeeping operations and support operations. Its tasks include operations across the entire spectrum, ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Although considerable progress has been achieved since the conception of the ASF, its overall operationalization has been slower than anticipated, and has been predominantly focused on the military aspect of peace operations (Davies 2014:26) As a result, little consideration of other aspects of peace operations, or the lack thereof, has back-tracked the ASF's achievement of full operational capacity, and has prolonged the process of readying the force for rapid deployment. What has become a pressing challenge for the effectiveness of the ASF is the need to develop the civilian and police dimension framework, in order for the integration of multidimensional peace operations into the AU peace operations concept. This challenge has a spill-over effect on issues relating to training, rostering, and recruitment which hamper the various efforts pertaining to the rapid deployment of the ASF. Its purpose is to ensure that trained formations and troops, including police and civilian personnel, are rapidly available for deployment to AU-mandated peacekeeping operations. Currently, the ASF has the potential of facing significant challenges especially given the duration it is taking to become fully operational. It will need to combat challenges that would impede its operation such as coordination, institutional capacity building, political will, funding, logistics, training, and the role of external partners. Although faced with challenges, it is important to note that there has been great progress in the development of the ASF, which is presumed to become active by the year 2016. These achievements include an annual continental training programme, harmonised policy documents, improved training standards for personnel who are to be deployed in operations (which include the military, police, and civilian components of the ASF). In order to assess and validate the ASF in a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, a series of decision-making exercises have been conducted in collaboration with the EU, where most of the funding comes from. These exercises are known as AMANI AFRICA which followed a phased approach to

ensure a systematic process, which is designed as a training and capacity-building cycle for the broader APSA (Kasumba & Debrah 2010:13-14).

However, the APSA structure is too ambitious and complex for a continent comprised of limited capacity and rich in political differences. APSA has been unable to address the current challenges of peacekeeping in Africa such as in the Sahel and CAR. For instance, under the framework of the APSA, the AU was incapable of fielding a credible intervention and was overtaken by the decisive response of the French in Mali. The French intervened at the last minute because African regional organisations were paralysed by leadership rivalries and a lack of capacity. Chuter (2014) denotes that the speed and sophistication of the French operation, with good intelligence and the use of airpower, made a difference. This testifies to the weakness of the APSA and specifically the AU and African regional organisations. According to Chuter (2014), "before the APSA can function as originally envisaged, it requires extra time, effort, money and coordination". As a temporary mechanism, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), capable of acting rapidly and independent of external support was proposed. The ACIRC is aimed to be based on a coalition of willing and able African states and financed by the AU Member States on a voluntary basis. The rapid deployment to stop atrocities is an essential tool for the AU which is often perceived as being slow to act. The ACIRC will directly work through the AU, whereas the ASF is aimed to work through the RECs. In addition, the ACIRC will be deployed at the behest of a lead country with the approval of the AU. Practically, the ACIRC will be more responsive and less of a burden on the AU itself. However, this does not mean that the ACIRC will function without its drawbacks such as predictability and preparedness.

Despite its shortcomings the AU has played significant roles in Africa in order to maintain peace and security. It has conducted peace operations in the Comoro Islands, a hybrid operation with the UN in Darfur, and another large operation in Somalia. The AU has since 2003 deployed peace support operations with increasingly complex mandates into volatile conflict environments, including through the deployment of the AMIB from 2003 – 2004, which reflected a traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping operation where it saw the AU and the UN collaborate (Neethling 2009:45). The AU also deployed troops due to a humanitarian crisis in Darfur and eastern Chad for the AMIS I and II from 2004 to 2008. This peacekeeping

operation presented many challenges such as a restrictive mandate and inadequate troops to cover the region. The region faced massive human rights violations and indiscriminate violence, which resulted in the establishment of UNAMID through the UNSC Resolution 1769 in July 2007 (Sansculotte-Greenidge 2012:120). From 2007 to 2011, Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) operations in Somalia were predominantly military-led. As of 2011, PSOD has prioritised ensuring an adequately staffed and resourced civilian component to oversee operation management, adding substantive civilian and operation support functions in AMISOM.

Thus, cooperation and coordination between all parties involved is of paramount importance, which also includes a partnership with the UN. In this light, this partnership will depend on coherent and strategically structured relations which are systematically integrated. Irrespective of some progress made in UN-EU and UN-AU relations, maintaining and enhancing inter-organisational arrangements for peacekeeping operations remains a challenge. Initiatives made by the AU and its continuous commitment to peace and security on the African continent is to be recognised through a deeper and an equal relationship between the AU PSC and the UNSC (Koops 2012:2). Nonetheless, this relationship remains unbalanced due to the AU's dependence on the UN for resources and funding to undertake large peacekeeping operations.

2.5.4 The need for greater African agency in regional security governance

The challenge of security is more prominent on the African continent than anywhere in the world. The multiplicity of armed conflicts and security threats has intensified, therefore requiring support aspects on complex operations such as in Darfur and CAR. These operations called for collaboration with the RECs such as ECOWAS, SADC, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to meet challenges faced in complex peacekeeping operations (Neethling 2009:42). These regional actors are better suited to deal with conflict in their neighbourhoods based on their knowledge of African states. These qualities also restrain them, based on the lack of capacity and resources, which pose challenges to respond to conflicts.

Collective security by regional and sub-regional organisations have gained prominence in the promotion of peace and security. They have played a significant

role in conflict prevention and management in the region. Their level of engagement is evident in its involvement in the aftermath of Kenya's disputed elections in 2007, where diplomacy and mediation led to a swift resolution of the crisis and prevented further escalation of violence (Crossley 2011). Furthermore, ECOWAS intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, as a peace effort through robust peace enforcement operations, which set precedent for "devolving peacekeeping responsibilities to African regional role-players" (Neethling 2009: 44).

ECOWAS' involvement in Liberia emphasised the stabilisation role that regional organisations can play by taking decisive roles and having the political will to take action. Although, ECOWAS faced challenges, it might have benefited from the UN's political and material support from the onset rather than at a later stage. The intervention in Liberia serves as a lesson of collaboration between both organisations which was also exemplified by the response to the conflict in Sierra Leone (Bamfo 2013:12-23). The role of ECOWAS is analysed comprehensively in Chapter 3. The UNSC is committed to cooperate with regional organisations in order to address the challenges of international peace and security. Thus, it is evident that regional organisations can play a larger role in international peace and security (Boulden 2003:11-12).

2.6 CONCLUSION

Aristotle once said that man is nothing but a political animal, thus conflict can be seen as being part of and an unavoidable part of human interaction. As a result of differences and perspectives, conflict arises, which needs to be managed. If the international community merely observes while people get killed because of the provision of sovereignty, we therefore disregard the importance of humanity. In this light, sovereignty cannot be utilised as a right if mass atrocities are conducted. Sovereignty should then be a responsibility for which states can be accountable to the international community for its actions. If the state does not or is unable to bear this responsibility, it then becomes the international community's responsibility to act for the preservation of life. Thus the importance of R2P comes to the fore, taking human rights, human security, peace, and development into great consideration. Despite some progress in the spread of human rights, respect for states' sovereignty continues

to take precedence. The mass dissemination of human rights continues to be slowed by the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty. States' internalization and reification of sovereignty has only exacerbated the situation. However, the first step has already been taken by redefining sovereignty. Due to conflicts, it is important that the ICISS report guide be practical to what should be done on a case-by-case basis which is fully thought through.

The international community learned from its mistake of the Rwanda genocide to never again stand back and do nothing as people are massacred and their rights violated. As conflict arises, so too does the importance of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations have been guided by the recommendations made in the Brahimi report which also include the importance of peacekeepers to abide by principles in the field. The Brahimi report is not an achievement in itself since very few of the recommendations made were implemented or implemented properly. The report greatly contributed to the progress of peacekeeping by highlighting its operational and doctrinal flaws. The UN and its partners realised the urgency of the situation and produced a number of reports designed to reform peacekeeping, including the 2008 Capstone doctrine that set out the principles and guidelines for peacekeeping operations. Post-2000 peacekeeping is characterised by the increasing involvement of transnational and regional organisations that contribute to the credibility and achievability of the mandates. Moreover, more robust operations have stirred peacekeepers away from neutrality and forced them to engage in impartiality so as not to be complicit in crimes against humanity. Finally, the Brahimi report was the first step towards the "humanitarianisation" of peacekeeping that charged itself with peacebuilding and development goals.

Peacekeeping has shifted to include the three components, making operations multidimensional in scope and approach. Security has gradually expanded from state security to human security, and now includes the limits of borders. Therefore, in order to maintain international peace and security with the focus on the African continent, it has become apparent that the UN cannot work in a vacuum, but needs the assistance of regional actors. Without this approach, the UN can become overstretched with maintaining peace. Actors such as the AU and sub-regional actors have developed over the years and have played an active role in bringing about peace on the continent. Therefore, the relationship between the two organisations, the AU and the UN, is of

paramount importance if the international community is to take lasting peace seriously, which will depend on coherent and strategically structured relations which are systematically integrated. However, there still remains challenges to be faced regarding the roles of these two entities in peacekeeping operations, which require coordination, collaboration, and cooperation. Without these, the roles are blurred, with a possibility of duplication of work especially with the rise of civil conflicts.

Since 2003, the AU has deployed peace operations which have provided extensive experience in the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations across a range of deployment scenarios. It has worked to develop the ASF under the APSA, which would provide a standby peace support operations capability. The AU under the ambit of the APSA intended to enable the continent to find regional solutions to severe human security challenges such as civil conflicts and violence against civilians. The Architecture structure is too ambitious and complex for a continent comprised of limited capacity and rich in political differences.

Peace operations in Africa have increasingly been tasked with the protection of civilians, and the ability of these operations to implement their mandates in this respect has become increasingly linked with their legitimacy and credibility. Substantial challenges have, however, been faced in this regard, in particular by the AU-mandated operations in Sudan and Somalia. Increasing the effective conduct of peace operations and the implementation of protection in the field, therefore, requires an enhanced focus on the security and rights of individuals affected by conflict.

CHAPTER 3: HYBRID PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: TOWARD JOINT VENTURES IN LIBERIA AND BURUNDI

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Conflict and security threats have changed the nature of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era, particularly in Africa. The continent continues to experience raging conflicts and crises, such as armed insurrections and domestic warfare. These are anticipated to increase if they are not dealt with in a cooperative and coordinated manner. For instance, Libya has faced the challenge of all-out-civil war and catastrophic state collapse; the popular uprisings in North Africa experienced violent protests due to frustrations of decades-long living under authoritarian and corrupt regimes; and the crisis in the DRC witnessed conflicts over basic resources fuelled by different political agendas from various national and international states. Still more conflicts waged in Burundi, Somalia, and Liberia. In response a shift from traditional formations to more robust and multidimensional operations were conducted by the UN, AU, and sub-regional organisations of the RECs to bring about peace and security on the continent.

In the last few years with the shift of the OAU to the AU, African member states and organisations seemed more committed and willing to take responsibility to enhance the peace and security of the continent by deploying troops, police, and civilians for peace operations. Since its inception, the AU, as the successor of the OAU, has undertaken peace operations in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia to regulate conflicts. Furthermore, sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS have also played a vital role through the establishment of ECOMOG to create peace in Liberia. The international community saw the rise of countries such as Nigeria and South Africa take a leading role towards peace on the continent. This demonstrates Africa's shifting principle from non-interference to accentuating non-indifference in its pursuit of the primacy of humanity coupled with robust and peace enforcement mandates.

These regions are accepting co-responsibility, accountability, and sharing the burden with the UN to organise themselves and bring about lasting peace to Africa. By sharing the burden, the AU has established operations that were later merged with or taken

over by the UN. This hybrid arrangement was first conducted in Liberia and Burundi, which will be discussed in this chapter.

This chapter will assess key dynamics of regionally-driven peacekeeping operations in Africa. It will specifically interrogate regional initiatives and non-UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, as well as regional organisations which are and have been active within the African continent. Attention is also paid to the manifestation of UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping operations. The case of Liberia (sub-regional organisation cooperated with the small UN observer force in 1993), is a significant case study because it was the first time that an African sub-regional organisation intervened in a member state. Moreover, focus will also be on Burundi (circa 2000) which will specifically be highlighted as one of the first operations where a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping operation was conducted on the African continent. This chapter will serve as a background foundation before the cases of Sudan (Darfur) and Somalia are explored in Chapter 4.

3.2 CONTEMPORARY AU INSTITUTIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTEXT IN AFRICA

Peacekeeping operations in Africa have increased in terms of complexity, goals, and approaches. This has led to challenges and opportunities by a number of factors which have reached a pivotal moment. Conflicts that confront the African continent have also necessitated urgent changes to be made. It is thus, becoming clear that the continent needs to find ways to resolve these challenges.

To show devotion to promoting unity and solidarity among African states, and to proclaim its commitment and competence to the international community, the OAU was established in 1963. To a large extent, the organisation was characterised by the challenges of decolonisation. It focused on eradicating all forms of colonialism under Article II of the OAU Charter, and to strengthen solidarity, by coordinating international and regional cooperation for development under the framework of the UN. Murithi (2005:3) notes that there were challenges of flawed colonial boundaries and fear of intervention. It is in this context, then that non-interference became one of the principles of the organisation.

With the end of the Cold War and the fluctuating nature of conflict, it was imperative that the OAU reconsider and reassess its role in Africa's development by changing its priorities. These would include, but were not limited to, multi-party democracy, human rights, and development. The most inimitable challenges were the prevailing conflicts which impeded the continent's development. In response, the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution was adopted in 1993. Through the new mechanism, intervention, which was previously considered as internal conflict, became possible. But then again, the organisation's prominence on non-intervention became the factor for the mechanism's lack of effectiveness (Hestermeyer 2014). Unfortunately, the mechanism was ineffective in providing resolutions to the challenges on the continent. Tragically, the African continent witnessed the genocide in Rwanda, the collapse of state institutions in Somalia, and violence in other parts of Africa while the mechanism was operational. These exposed the limitations of the OAU to address the challenges on the continent. In reality and for much of its existence, the doctrine of non-intervention positioned the organisation as a silent observer of the atrocities committed by some of its own member states. It was perceived as an organisation that comprised of African Heads of States, of whom some were not legitimately elected. This deleterious discernment of the organisation was further viewed by Murithi (2005:27), who stated that the OAU was "an organisation that existed without having a genuine impact on the daily lives of Africans". Subsequently, the OAU revealed difficulties to progress the agenda of unity due to non-consensus on strategies which were unclear, and also exhibited intricacies due to different economic and political ideologies. This questioned the OAU's credibility and the role they were to play to promote peace and security on the continent. What further threatened Africa's solidarity and weakened the OAU, was the lack of a common vision by African leaders; financial contributions by member states needed to effectively run the organisation; and futile decision making. Consequently, notwithstanding the conflicts, Khamis (2008:7) stated that, the OAU was unable to intercede in the African state's internal affairs because of the respect for the principle of non-interference.

On a positive note, the work done by the OAU enabled it to confer a palpable reality on a united Africa. It gave its members an opportunity to implement coordinated positions on common issues, and to defend the continent's interests. In 1999, the

OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government passed the Sirte Declaration that was called to amend the focus of the Organisation in order to make it more effective and efficient to strengthen its capacity to meet the challenges it faced. African leaders then decided to establish a new continental organisation that would address the new realities and eliminate conflicts with the crucial objective of the Charter of the continental organisation combined with the provision of the Treaty forming the African Economic Community (Hestermeyer 2014). As a result, the AU succeeded the OAU and was inaugurated in July 2002 at the Durban summit in South Africa.

The AU was in the forefront to accelerate and deepen the process of economic and political development on the continent. While the OAU represented the politics of an earlier era, in the quest to promote liberation, peace, and security on the African continent, the AU appeared to be key to rebuilding post-Cold War Africa. The main difference between these organisations was that the OAU was seen as a union of leaders of Africa and the AU, as described by Nzomo (2003), was to be a "union of Africa's peoples", shifting from non-interference to non-indifference. The organisation dedicated remarkable efforts to create a peace and security architecture to combat the multitude of challenges. It also sought to combat armed conflicts especially at a time when it faced an outbreak of extreme violence in the DRC, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Somalia (Makinda & Okumu 2008:1). The focus on peace, stability, security and human rights encompassed the amendment of the AU Constitutive Act to include the right to intervene in a member state on humanitarian and human rights grounds. This thus implemented the principles of R2P and non-indifference, underpinned in article 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act and authorised by the AU PSC (Murithi 2008:3-4).

As security continued to be a dire challenge, the AU engaged in peacekeeping efforts in African conflicts. The central preoccupation of these efforts is exacerbated by the joint responsibility of the UN and AU organisations to respond to peace and security threats on the continent. Accordingly, hybridisation in peacekeeping in Africa has assumed great significance. The quest for peace and security heightened the debate on the continent's enthusiasm for the complementary role that sub-regional organisations can play in peacekeeping operations. Therefore, in this context, hybrid peacekeeping was born out of both the same objective towards peace and the comparative advantages of the UN, AU, and sub-regional organisations. The hybrid

peacekeeping arrangement emphasises that no single organisation can manage the intricacies of peace and security challenges.

This approach to the specific issues arising from peace operations does not take place in a vacuum but rather occurs within the context in which the two organisations' efforts are stressed to address Africa's challenges. According to de Coning (2004:23), this practice seems to play into the strength of the AU conflict resolution attempts and compensates for the weaknesses of the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations. While the AU was an important actor to address the challenges, it lacked the necessary equipment and financial capabilities to advance the continent and resolve its issues.

Despite its shortcomings, the need for the AU to take an imperative position on non-indifference was important especially having to work towards conflict management and resolutions on the continent. The implementation of the principle of R2P was then executed when they took the lead in their first peace operation in in the Great Lakes region, where Burundi was entangled by chaos and mass human rights violations. Its transition was characterised by ethnic violence between the majority Hutus and minority Tutsis which was aggravated by the tensions between smaller rebel groups and transitional governments. To respond to the challenges faced, greater changes had to be made, and capacity of regional organisation in peacekeeping operations had to seriously be cogitated. Before the cases of Liberia and Burundi are explored in more detail, it is important to review the developments of African regional organisations in undertaking peacekeeping operations on the continent.

3.3 AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Resolving African conflicts has been challenging and has necessitated crucial changes at the international, regional, and sub-regional levels. This required a strong collective approach to the various challenges faced on the continent. As a result, the UN turned to regional and sub-regional initiatives to take the lead in resolving conflicts by contributing peacekeeping forces under the mandate of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Gray 2005:218). The UN's role in collective security reflected an institutional strengthening of the organisation to take action not only for peaceful settlements of disputes, but also to enforce coercive measures.

The UN and AU have leaned towards hybrid operations with regional powers and the RECs, to play a significant role in conflict resolution in Africa. It is therefore important to note that hybridisation is not only limited between UN-AU, but involves UN-RECs and AU-RECs. Francis (2006:96) remarked that the cooperative advantage of this hybridisation arrangement was the regional and sub-regional organisations' willingness to play a fundamental role in maintaining internal peace and security on the continent, because these conflicts affect them directly or indirectly due to the spill-over effect they have. Such emerging strategies are a reflection of the shifting complex nature of responses to conflicts in Africa. This cooperative security strategy provides legitimacy and possible exit strategies, and it also ensures that each actor has a role to play by utilising their comparative advantages.

Since 1993, the UN has cultivated co-operation with regional organisations, leading to the establishment of joint representation for managing conflict in Africa. Because the UN is so over-stretched owing to its diverse responsibilities in maintaining peace and security around the world, these organisations have taken the responsibility to contribute and play a far greater role in peacekeeping operations. They provide the advantage of strengthening the understanding of the intricacies of domestic conflicts and the interests of various factions within a particular domain. They also have the lead to the rapid deployment of personnel to conflict affected areas. The collective approach also provisioned in the UN Charter, permits states to form regional organisations which provide for the pacific settlement of disputes which has led to collective security arrangements between the UN and regional organisations on the African continent (Draman & Carment 2001).

This trend towards hybrid peacekeeping operations could be argued to go against the notion of 'African solutions to African problems', but without external support to sustain operations, regional organisations initiatives would become impractical. In this light, the formation of a partnership may offer a significant insight to confront the challenges on the African continent. It is worth noting that partnerships are easier said than done, bringing both challenges and opportunities. On one hand, they have the potential to offer a platform to advance pragmatic solutions that build on the capacities of each stakeholder and actor. On the other hand, these partnerships usually bring different conceptions and approaches to the conflict based on their understanding of the conflict. In this context, they collaborate because they share a common objective to

create and maintain peace and security which would lead to cooperation and coordination in a hybrid peacekeeping operation.

A range of initiatives have been implemented by regional organisations in the form of support to the UN, and in return, the UN's support for the regional organisations has led to co-deployment or budgetary support. Despite political difficulties that face the regional organisations, such as lack of resources and funding, their involvement continues to grow, promoting subsidiary. Similarly, member states have also contributed solutions to some of the challenges faced, for instance, the role played by Tanzania and South Africa in Burundi, and the contributions made by Nigeria to ECOWAS and ECOMOG in Liberia.   These cases exemplify hybrid peace arrangements to collectively respond to peace and security threats on the continent (Draman & Carment 2001). Moreover, they demonstrate that their actions did not have the same political decision making constraints such as those of the UN.

As part of the RECs that took initiatives to find conflict resolutions, ECOWAS authorised an operation by creating its military arm, the ECOWAS-ECOMOG in Liberia.   Similar cases were demonstrated by SADC when it contributed in peacekeeping operations by deploying troops to the DRC and Lesotho in 1998. Furthermore, the Community of Saharan and Sahelian State (CEN-SAD) deployed a small force in CAR. Since the 1990s, ECOWAS has been involved in peacekeeping operations in Liberia (1990-1996), Sierra Leone (1997-1999), and Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2004) (Hannibal 2013:45).

The focus of the section below will be on peacekeeping intervention by ECOWAS-ECOMOG to restore peace in Liberia.

3.4 TOWARDS A COOPERATIVE VENTURE: THE ROLE OF SUB-REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Hybridisation arrangements contributing to peace operations have taxed the ingenuity of scholars and policy makers engaged in the front line of conflict and tasked to provide solutions to end instability. To operationalize this task, the need to understand past success or failure cases and contributory factors has always pinned over many non-operational and theoretical adumbrations. To this end, cases of peacekeeping

operations such as ECOWAS-ECOMOG and the peace processes in Burundi have often been the subject of many policy reflections. Focusing on cooperative ventures in Liberia and Burundi, this section seeks to unearth its modalities against the argument, that whereas certain features may have led to the success or failure of these cases, the contextual environment in which they operated must be given due consideration, especially by policy makers contemplating an operation configured and structured like these cases, would breed success or failure.

As already explained, the UN shifted its focus on the role that regional organisations can play to maintain peace and security. This reflected the UN's and regional organisation's commitment to solve post-Cold War conflicts. This hybridisation confronted the regional organisation's lack of resources to carry out operations, thereby depending on the UN, while the UN found the legitimacy of peacekeeping operations strengthened by the operability of regional organisations. The concept of hybrid peacekeeping operations requires more than just merging efforts of peacekeeping operations together.

Peacekeeping operations require clear mandates, international legitimacy, and sufficient capability. Furthermore, they need appropriate organisational structures including cooperation with the actors involved. It is worthy to note that in the post-Cold War era, neither the UN nor regional organisations alone have the full capacity to ensure successful peacekeeping operations. Without the support of the UN or a form of collaboration with them, the implementation of peacekeeping operations by regional organisations seems impossible. Yet, this can also be seen as a weakness because there are legal and practical difficulties for regional organisations to cooperate with the UN. However, the latter cannot completely substitute for the former. Taking into consideration that despite the UN's resource capabilities that go beyond regional organisations, these regions have a better knowledge of the causes of conflict which is inevitable for the UN.

3.4.1 From African agency to United Nations mission: From ECOMOG to UNOMIL - Case Study of Liberia

In order to emphasise the proposition of the actors and stakeholders in Liberia, it is important to contextualise the intervention by depicting the system into which ECOWAS would intervene. Understanding the complexities of the Liberian conflict is a significant prerequisite in order to comprehend how fallacious and successful ECOWAS was in their actions towards the Liberian conflict.

3.4.1.1 Historical Overview of the Liberian conflict

The most vital period for Liberia, prior to the beginning of the armed conflict, was during the tenure of President William Tubman and President William Tolbert, who were descendants of freed slaves. According to Dennis and Dennis (2008:42-43), Tubman was regarded as one of Africa's first leaders, who was then succeeded by Tolbert who continued advance reforms and accelerated them. In 1980, a bloody coup by Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe was organised to overthrow the new president. By the mid-1980s, Doe's government set in motion a regime of human rights violations and consolidated power which aggravated ethnic tension. During this period, Liberia received more aid than ever before. Doe's close relation with the US raised questions by regional actors such as Libya, who supported the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF), led by Charles Taylor to commence war against Samuel Doe's regime (Ikechi 2003:42). This resulted in Liberia's first civil war which began from 1989 and raged until 1996. By the 1990s, the insurgency spread throughout the country, killing thousands of civilians and forced over half its population of 2.6 million people to be displaced, with some 600,000-700,000 seeking refuge in neighbouring countries such as Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone. Conflict continued as one section of the NPLF broke off to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Johnson, who battled for control over the capital, against Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor then took over power and proclaimed presidency after the INPFL, capturing and executing Samuel Doe in the process. His death did not end the civil war because Charles Taylor refused to recognise anyone but himself as President. Throughout the 1990s, the INPFL and NPFL continued their siege of Monrovia, with civilians caught in the crossfire, despite international calls for a cease-fire (Wippman

1993: 163). Given the accelerated conflict combined with the lack of a UN requirement for a ceasefire in order to deploy, the contextualised ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia needs to be analysed in-depth.

3.4.1.2 ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Liberia

ECOWAS was established through the efforts of Nigeria with active support by Togo. This establishment found expression in the rationale of the UN under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. ECOWAS emerged as a regional economic community in West Africa to achieve economic integration and collective self-reliance. As described by Akinyemi and Aluko (1984:4), ECOWAS "is the structural embodiment of the peoples' belief in a collective attack against the enduring problems of underdevelopment in tropical Africa". It appeared that the sub-regional organisation never anticipated dealing with security challenges. Therefore, the Treaty of ECOWAS focused on the challenges of 'Settlement of Disputes'. It therefore realised that due to the nature of the new challenges, its aim of economic integration would be futile if it did not confront the security issues collectively. As a result, ECOWAS signed the 'Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence' in Freetown. This Protocol was not well developed and it exposed the organisation's weakness to deal with security challenges in the face of internal conflict (Akindele 2012:5). The efforts outlined in the Protocol were rendered inadequate against the Liberian crisis because the crisis did not fall within the scope of the Protocol.

As Golwa pointed out (2009:280), "as a matter of conjecture, one could say that the community at the time of formation, did not foresee the nature of the threat and conflict which engulfed the sub-region. Therefore, precedence was given to issues of economic integration to the detriment of peace building or conflict management". In the midst of security challenges, ECOWAS had to take responsibility, even more compelling, because of the disinclination of the OAU to intervene based on their principle of non-interference, and the reluctance of the international community to get involved based on the principle of sovereignty.

ECOWAS's involvement was arbitrated in four summits, the 13th session on the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS in May 1990; the Standing Mediation Committee Meeting in July 1990; The National Conference in August 1990; and the First Session of the Standing Mediation Committee in August 1990 (Okeke 2012:40). These summits were important, as they resulted in the establishment of ECOMOG, because of the need to intervene militarily. But its mandate was to monitor a cease-fire in order to create a stable environment for an interim government and democratic elections. However, before the deployment of ECOMOG, there was no cease-fire agreement in place and no peace to keep in Liberia, yet they were assigned peacekeeping duties (Draman & Carment 2001:9). It was therefore surprising that the NPFL was inimical towards ECOMOG. While those loyal to Samuel Doe and the INPFL accepted the intervention by ECOMOG, the NPFL resisted any foreign troop deployed in Liberia and showed its discontent by attacking ECOMOG (Nass 2000:67-68).

ECOMOG managed to settle in, however, its operation became compounded as the country faced collapse and chaos was the order of the day. Various rebel factions emerged to take advantage of the progress made by the NPFL, and against this tide, ECOMOG launched a 'strategy of limited offensive', which would overpower the NPFL and bring order to Liberia (Draman & Carment 2001:5).

It is imperative to note that although ECOMOG was referred to as a peacekeeping operation, there was no consent based on the NPFL's resistance towards it. Furthermore, a clear and enforceable mandate seemed impossible because there was a lack of peacemaking effort. In retrospect, it is unclear whether the operation was a peacekeeping intervention or a traditional multilateral intervention. Since its deployment, ECOMOG alternated between peacekeeping and enforcement action in the attempt to establish order. Francis (2000:179) stated that the "consequence of the indiscretion is that the peacekeeping operation, which never engaged in peacemaking became embroiled in peace-enforcement challenges". This was demonstrated when ECOMOG not only had to face the NPFL but also the INPFL, which caused the shift from a peacekeeping to peace-enforcement operation. Adisa and Aminu (1996:86) further argued that peacekeeping and peace-enforcement measures are essential incompatible tenets. Therefore, this operation was "disastrous for Liberia and the sub-regional organisation", because it protracted the crisis and thousands were killed.

Fortuitously, there was a turn of events, when Charles Taylor agreed to participate in the peace process in Abuja, Nigeria. The Abuja Accord paved the way for inclusivity in the peace process. The approach initiated by ECOWAS signalled the peacebuilding process and the crisis came to a halt with the inauguration of Charles Taylor as president. Despite the challenges faced by ECOWAS-ECOMOG, it paved a way for the investiture of an interim government, changing the mandate from peacekeeping and peace-enforcement to peacemaking (Wippman 1993:169). However, lasting and sustainable peace was a challenge which needed further intervention.

3.4.1.3 The ECOWAS non-consensus to intervene in Liberia

Military coups, social unrest, political instability, and economic crises have plagued many West African countries since the wave of independence swept through the region. The ECOWAS military intervention in Liberia, was undertaken without a clearly defined legal precedent, and therefore was positioned under the concept of giants of clay as a form of a regional 'coalition of the willing'.

Nigeria's involvement in Liberia and its contribution to ECOMOG prevented the peacekeeping operation's failure. As Adebajo (2013:254) noted, "Nigeria was the only contingent whose withdrawal would have meant the end of the mission". This analysis is contextualised against the backdrop that most of West Africa's countries are underdeveloped and cannot contribute the same capacities as Nigeria; Dowyaro (2000) added that Nigeria was the only member of ECOWAS with capacity to support its own troops effectively. Nigeria has been a major troop contributing country especially for the UN, and in regional peacekeeping operations in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East (Adebajo 2013:245). It particularly contributed in the composition and finance of ECOMOG, amounting to the majority of troops.

The burden of such a large responsibility to ensure ECOMOG's survival also left room for Nigeria to exploit the situation for its own national interests. First, Nigeria's decision to intervene is rooted in its national foreign policy ethos of 'Pax Nigeriana', which provides a cohesive platform for its national security priorities, attitude, and responses to foreign policy issues within the continent (Ajayi, 1998:179). Adebajo, further noted that "this peacekeeping activism has been part of a 'Pax Nigeriana': Nigeria's historical quest to pursue a hegemonic role and to secure a permanent seat on the reformed

UNSC". Second, Nigeria's role in the Liberian intervention set the benchmark of exerting its dominance in the region; the intervention was consistent with its own image of Nigeria as an aspiring political, economic, and military hegemony to the rest of West Africa. Third, Nigeria's intervention positioned the country with an opportunity to exploit Liberia's natural resources (Adebajo 2013:245).

The modalities of Nigeria's involvement in the ECOMOG intervention have also come under criticism. This originated from significant difference between the ECOWAS members as to whether to intervene through force or to use soft diplomacy throughout the operation of ECOMOG. These differences were most prominent between the Francophone and Anglophone blocs within ECOWAS, with the Francophone countries preferring the use of negotiations and mediation rather than a military approach (Dowyaro 2000). Despite opposition to the military intervention and following a meeting in 1996 Banjul, Gambia, ECOWAS was designated to intervene with the support of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia (Dowyaro 2000).

The decision to intervene was unwelcome by Charles Taylor, who saw the initiative as a blatant attempt to remove him from power. He subsequently denounced the intervention by ECOMOG. Moreover, some members of ECOWAS from the Francophone countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, opposed the peacekeeping operation in Liberia. Their position was based on their understanding that ECOMOG had insufficient competence to implement and intervene in the internal conflicts of another Member State. As a result, some ECOWAS countries viewed Nigeria's intentions and intervention with suspicion. Analyses of ECOWAS' intervention have generated strong debate, following the establishment of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force.

What seemed indubitable, however, was that ECOWAS and ECOMOG were confronted with enormous challenges to achieve their mandate to restore peace in Liberia. Particularly, where necessary engagements contributed to international efforts to end conflicts, the sub-regional organisation took an approach of non-indifference. Yabi (2010:6) noted that when Nigeria decided to intervene through ECOMOG in Liberia a few months after Charles Taylor's rebel movement attacked Samuel Doe's regime, neither the victims of the attack nor the Nigerian government could be defined as models of democracy or observers of human rights. Nigeria's

troops began to engage in questionable activities for a peacekeeping contingent as rather than stand as a neutral force, they took sides between the factions.

Following the intervention, Nigeria gained increasing recognition throughout the international system in the areas of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement. On the one hand, Howe (1997:419-420) criticized ECOWAS' intervention and Nigeria's leadership role to bring about lasting peace to Liberia because of the regime and security interests of Ibrahim Babangida, who had a great personal interest in the development of Liberia. While Nigeria denied these allegations, it persisted with its intervention in the Country, and later, also in Sierra Leone (Olonisakin 2008:14). On the other hand, Dowyaro (2000) contended that Nigerian-led ECOMOG, proved to the international community what is possible if African states mobilize their resources to address peace and security threats on the continent.

In spite of reservations about Nigeria's prominence in ECOMOG, its overwhelming contributions should be seen as positives. In the overall analysis, the majority of West African states acknowledge Nigeria's initiative in peacekeeping, yet similarly resent its unilateral military intercession and strategy. Concerns about Nigeria's prevalence and 'Pax Nigeriana' by smaller states have been persevering. Essentially, a few states saw ECOMOG as a Nigerian instrument towards its own security strategy. In the post-Cold War period, the security vacuum within West Africa initially gave Nigeria expanded opportunities to assume a leading role in the support of peace and security in the region. It is reasonable that without the responsibility of the sub-regional hegemon, the support for ECOWAS and its viability in the peacekeeping operation in Liberia would have been extensively constrained, taking into consideration that ECOWAS has no standing armed force or military.

Although ECOMOG was able to implement its unclear mandate and bring about a positive difference, it did so with some challenges and causalities. Despite its success which was attributed by and based on the political initiatives of ECOWAS, it was an economic community and did not have a clear peacekeeping mandate. It is vital to credit the Community on its response to the crisis in Liberia. Its effort led inextricably to the conduct of its mandate despite the costs and challenges it was confronted with.

3.4.1.4 UN-ECOMOG intervention in Liberia

The challenges ECOWAS-ECOMOG created were that it contributed to casualties, from 4000 to more than 150 000, and an estimated over one million persons displaced. ECOMOG as a peacekeeping operation lacked consent of a major faction and it was also not equipped to impose a unilateral solution as a peace-enforcement operation. Moreover, it lacked neutrality and impartiality due to shifting alliances with various rebel groups, which undermined its credibility (Draman & Carment 2001:6).

It was only after the signing of a formal peace agreement of Cotonous in 1993, three years after the formation of ECOMOG, that the UN deployed a peacekeeping operation, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (United Nations 2014b). The deployment of UNOMIL marked the first time that a UN peacekeeping operation was undertaken in cooperation with an operation that had already been established by another organisation. The UN's role through this peacekeeping operation was part of the Cotonous peace agreement to support ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis. In practical terms, the UN's contribution could be described as minimalist at best and ambivalent at worst. It substantively started with the deployment of 368 men which highlighted its strict adherence and importance to establish a peacekeeping operation after peace agreements had been established (Aboagye & Bah 2004). While ECOMOG was actively involved in supporting the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, it provided security for the UN, and support for the disarmament process, UNOMIL monitored the progress on the ground and ECOMOG operations. This showed the cooperative nature of two organisations in support of a peace process.

In 1997 Charles Taylor became the elected president, and in November 1997 the UN established the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) to replace UNOMIL, whose mandate expired on 30 September 1997. UNOL had the sole mandate of assisting the government with consolidating peace. Despite efforts made by UNOL, Liberia was plagued by civil conflict once again after some factions felt cheated and oppressed by Charles Taylor. This revealed that the conflict was not eventually resolved in 1997, and although it paved the way for a peace process, it did not end the Liberian crisis, nor did it address the underlying factors that would contribute to the relapse of conflict. Nonetheless, the parties reached a ceasefire in 2003 with the signing of the 'Comprehensive Peace Agreement' in order to establish

a transitional process. To support this process, the UNSC authorised the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) under Resolution 1509 to replace ECOWAS forces (Aboagye & Bah 2004). As a result, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia was re-hatted into UNMIL. According to Ajayi (2008:3), prior to the deployment of UN peacekeepers, the UNSC held several informal consultations in order to assist ECOMOG, of which some were on the request of ECOWAS, but there was no immediate action.

The intervention of ECOWAS through ECOMOG demonstrates the need for a clear mandate for successful operations. It exemplifies the requirement of a clear mandate suitable for the capabilities of the implementing organisation. Although a mandate existed to ensure a ceasefire and to assist the establishment of an interim government by the Liberian people, it was too broad, encompassing both peacekeeping and peace enforcement objectives. This was exacerbated by the failure to take the complex nature of the Liberian conflict into great consideration. This case study is an indication that additional international support to achieve mandates is needed, and the need for a hybrid peacekeeping operation needs to be clear and comprehensible. It also demonstrates the significant role sub-regional organisations can play towards peace and security.

It is also worthy of note that the rapid response by ECOWAS signifies the capability of a sub-regional organisation to save thousands of lives especially in a country that had spent years on the brink of collapse. "Responding to conflict early warning in a timely manner might result in increased instances of preventive deployment (to avert a major crisis) rather than full-fledged peacekeeping operations or enforcement action, which are more cost intensive" (Olonisakin 2008:41).

ECOMOG was able to conduct a robust operation which imposed a stable environment. It was faced with a task of establishing political order, and the UN came afterwards to consolidate the relative peace that had already been established by ECOMOG. Moreover, their impact also determined a number of post-conflict issues such as reforming of the national army and police. The peacekeeping operation in Liberia indicated the region's willingness to combat instability, and the impetuses to respond to conflict is unique due to the cases' contextual environment. Thus a collective response in the case of Liberia points to an austere truth, that this approach

had the potential elements to make a difference. It therefore highlights the importance of moving beyond a traditional outlook on conflict which has led policy-makers to rely on ambiguous mechanical allegory of conflict. As a result, a new approach requires an amalgamation of institutional frameworks in order to provide solutions to end instability.

3.4.2 From African agency to United Nations mission: From AMIB to UNIB - Case Study of Burundi

Burundi is a significant case study in terms of peace-building and conflict resolution in Africa. Its ethnic conflict history and prolonged conflict process is an experience from which Africa, the international community, and policy-makers can learn from.

3.4.2.1 Burundi's civil war and peace process

Periodic violent conflicts and military coups have been a facet of Burundian history since its independence in 1962. Like many states in Africa, the conflict in Burundi was rooted in political competition for power based on ethnic lines between the Tutsi and the Hutu. The first civil genocide which erupted in Burundi resulted in the death of over 150,000 people, predominantly from the Hutu community who fled to Rwanda and Tanzania (Boshoff, Vreÿ & Rautenbach 2010: 1-4). Again, in 1988, thousands of Hutus were massacred by the Tutsi tribes which was described as a retaliation following a number of Hutu insurgencies. The Country's first elected president, Francois Melchoir Ndadaye, (a Hutu from the 'Front pour la Democratie au Burundi' (FRODEBU) political party) was ostensibly assassinated by a cadre from the 'Union pour le Progrès national' (UPRONA) in 1993. The UPRONA was the nationalist political party in Burundi supported by the Tutsi ethnic group. This resulted in unprecedented violence which broke out causing the death of over 300,000 lives and the displacement of many more civilians (Curtis 2003).

Following the failure of the elections, power-sharing became an alternative response to the Burundi conflict. According to Khadiagala (2003:217), "neighbouring countries such as Rwanda, Tanzania, and the DRC bore the brunt of the mostly Hutu refugees fleeing from the conflict". An agreement between the FRODEBU and UPRONA was

then signed in 1994 under the auspice of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ould-Abdallah. The 1994 Convention of Government temporarily restored calm; it lacked the capacity to address significant issues of national structures and strategies. Furthermore, there was no peacekeeping force to monitor the agreement. Despite the accord, sporadic violence continued and in 1996, another coup was conducted which reinstalled Pierre Buyoya as President. Yet, in the face of the conflict in Burundi, the international community's response was fragmented (Curtis 2003).

To address the conflict in Burundi and restore peace, negotiation efforts began with former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and was taken further by former South African President Nelson Mandela, which resulted in several peace agreements between the belligerents. The early intervention in Burundi was of great regional significance because of the immense flow of refugees, conflicts, and regional instability it fostered, and, in part, because of the innovative approaches to mediation and post-crisis recovery.

3.4.2.2 Early intervention in Burundi: Peace Negotiations

The most significant aspect of the conflict resolution intervention in Burundi was its peace negotiations which was firstly conducted by Julius Nyerere, as a respected figure in the national and international arena. His approach focused more on being a facilitator rather than a mediator. Given the nature of the conflict, according to Butiku (2004), this was the best approach. He facilitated various phases of the Arusha peace process from 1996-1999. During this period, those present in the negotiations were the UPRONA party and the FRODEBU, which meant many parties involved in the conflict such as the armed groups and civil society did not take part in the process, but not for Julius Nyerere's lack of trying. Negotiations broke down and a military coup was conducted by Pierre Buyoya.

Some proposed regional military intervention would worsen the country and negotiations would not be feasible because the warring factions would lose trust in the process. Therefore, in response to the coup, nine regional governments imposed economic sanctions which lasted from 1996 to 1999. These sanctions had the result, inter alia, of suspending international cooperation, which compounded the

humanitarian emergency in the country. Participants in the peace process were not prepared or capable of addressing root causes, and so the conflict and violence continued (International Crisis Group 1998:3). According to Khadiagala (2003:227), economic sanctions "offered the best mechanism of diplomacy that could be used in a way that moved the parties toward the desired outcome".

The negotiations resumed in 1998. Julius Nyerere implemented a negotiation structure which would eventually lead to agreement on the concept of power-sharing. The notion of institutionalised power-sharing, based on ethnic quotas, was put forward by the actors in the peace process as an essential principle guiding the pursuit for a solution to the Burundi conflict. Ayebare (2014:3) holds that this structure failed to realize the political and military environments of the groups' involved in the conflict, and therefore the armed groups did not participate. It is worthy to note that power-sharing in itself cannot always create sustainable peace and may in the future prove to be a weak approach. Power-sharing, however, proved to be appropriate for Burundi, because the country was ethnically divided, rooted in clan conflict. It could be argued that, inter alia, the conditions in Burundi were not acquiescent for such an approach to resolve the conflict. Lijphart (1991:493) contended that besides partition or secession, power-sharing is the only feasible solution to conflicts articulated in ethnic terms. To further support this view, Zartman (1995:271) stated that power-sharing arrangements contributed to peace by harnessing all factions to contribute in government.

Nelson Mandela, took over from Julius Nyerere as a facilitator. He approached to the mediation process from his South African experiences. He further viewed institutional peace and security as a means of addressing the root causes of the Burundian conflict. This dialogue led to the creation of a transitional government under which the Hutu and Tutsi leaders could share power.

As an urgent need to solve the conflict, Boshoff, Vreÿ and Rautenbach (2010: 14) pointed out that South Africa's contribution was a humanitarian effort which strengthened Nelson Mandela's role as a mediator, and demonstrated support for peace and security across the African continent. It further substantiated the necessity for an African Renaissance, and for Africans to find their own solutions to their problems. Nelson Mandela's approach was built upon a multi-stakeholder and multiparty forum for negotiations, as advanced in South Africa's Convention for a

Democratic South Africa (Codesa – which was a bargaining forum where all parties and groupings were present). It could be debated that this paved the way for the majority of rebel groups to be present in the negotiations, although it took a long time for people to actually participate. Furthermore, he applied an inclusive approach which involved non-state actors, mediators, and power-sharing between belligerent parties. Mandela also encouraged the international community to pay close attention to the Arusha peace talks, which resulted in US President, Bill Clinton and Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo addressing the Burundian conflict with the rest of the world's leaders. This accommodating approach to the conflict emphasised the significant need for the Burundians to take responsibility for their actions. Paving the way for a salubrious debate on relations to the impact of the conflict, it led to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliations Agreement in 2000 (ACCORD 2007:18).

However, the Arusha Accord, did not stop the civil war especially with the same armed groups absent from the negotiations, and determined to prove that no peace was possible without their consent. Thus, the violence continued. By no means was the accord a finished product, because there were other warring parties to the conflict that did not sign the agreement. With the UN's unwillingness to mandate a peacekeeping force to assist the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, claiming there was no peace to keep and a comprehensive ceasefire in place, the AU then opted to collaborate with South Africa to deploy troops in Burundi. South Africa was fast becoming a regional actor in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in Africa. It deployed for the first time under its 'White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions'. The deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) marked South Africa's engagement in peace operations which was also a significant part for Mandeala's contribution to the Arusha Agreement. According to ACCORD (2007:26-27), the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) was deployed "in great haste and according to operational staff of the SANDF, amidst a general sense of confusion, which was inextricably linked to the duration for deployment as well as the preparation time and type of deployment" in 2001, mainly in Bujumbura, the capital city of Burundi. This was achieved through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the government of Burundi and South Africa with the aim of supporting the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. The reason for the MoU, came at a time when a ceasefire could not be

secured by the AU and all remaining potential troop contributing countries had signalled their intent not to deploy (ACCORD 2007:27). Following the Arusha Agreement, Mandela sought to secure a ceasefire, while establishing grounds for a transnational government. It was during this period that South Africa assumed a more central role in the post-Arusha peace process. Mandela was able to encourage President Thabo Mbeki to deploy South African troops on the grounds that the UN "proved reluctant to do so until a comprehensive ceasefire agreement was signed" (de Coning and Lotze 2013:383). In addition, no other African country was willing or had the capacity to undertake such a role on the ground. According to Thobane, Neethling and Vreÿ (2007:81), the SAPSD's mandate provided security to leaders returning from exile, who were mainly Hutu. The type of protection was also perceived as a bodyguard role, which falls outside peacekeeping functions, but was deemed essential especially for the installation of the transitional government. The importance of this was imperative in an "already suspicious political environment" ACCORD (2007:26). However, due to a limited mandate, the SAPSP were unable to play a broader role and provide protection to civilians. This was the last significant role played by the OAU before it was replaced by the AU in 2002.

Subsequently, two ceasefire agreements were signed in 2002 to consolidate the peace process with parties such as the National Council for the Defence Democracy and Force for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the Palipehutu-Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, who did not participate in this process and further waged war. Non-participants were not ready to focus on how the negotiations would benefit them. Because they were accused of human rights violations, they did not participate in the peace processes earlier on. There was much hope for the success of the Arusha Agreement; however, peace accords between the government and the armed parties failed to establish a comprehensive ceasefire agreement to stop the fighting. As a result, ceasefires were broken on a daily basis, and violence persisted. Ayebare (2014) asserted that the Arusha Agreement "directly addressed the issue of ethnicity in Burundi and devised a power-sharing arrangement that guaranteed security to the minority Tutsi and democracy to the majority Hutus". This represented different visions of peace struggles of which neo-liberal peacemaking was a contested terrain with long-term culmination of hostilities which were not essential for the agenda (Daley 2007: 333-352). In 2004, South Africa continued to

strengthen the Arusha Agreement to include the remainder of the rebel movements that had not yet signed the agreements implemented by President Jacob Zuma. Until 2008, the then Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, was involved in efforts to integrate the remaining rebel movements.

Based on what has been discussed, lessons can be learned from the Burundi peace negotiations. These lessons range from the commitment showed by regional leaders, inter alia, to African's collective leadership that had the capacity to promote a mode of politics that rejected coups; reconstruction programmes; and long-term peace processes, which led to the importance of peace-building initiatives.

3.4.2.3 The Transition from AU to UN Mission in Burundi

It is important to note that the AU emerged as a peacekeeping partner on the continent. With South African support to assist in the planning of the intervention in Burundi, the AU PSC authorised the deployment of its first peace operation, AMIB. The peacekeeping operation also incorporated the SANDF/SAPSD personnel who formed the bulk of headquarter staff in 2003 (ACCORD 2007:29). According to Agoagye (2004:11), it had a strength of 3,335 personnel "with military contingents from South Africa (1 600), Ethiopia (858), Mozambique (228), as well as the AU observer element (43) drawn from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia". Thobane, Neethling and Vreÿ (2007:81) noted that the deployment of troops showcased the AU's venture from the OAU and its restrictive principles, and demonstrated 'African solutions to African problems'. This peacekeeping operation was the first o exclusively initiated, planned and executed by AU member states. It was effectively mandated to build peace in a fluid and dynamic situation in which the country could relapse into violent conflict if the accords were not implemented and monitored (Murithi 2005:91–95).

This was based on the backdrop that there was no peace in Burundi, positive or negative, from the signing of the Arusha Agreement in 2000 until the entry of the CNDD-FDD into the government in late 2003. Following the deployment of South African troops in 2001, they were reinforced by contingents from Ethiopia and Mozambique to monitor the implementation of the accord and provide security for a year and route for the deployment of UN peacekeepers. The AMIB force comprised of more than 3 000 troops contributed by these 3 countries (de Carvalho, Jaye,

Kasumba & Okumu 2010: 68).   The operation was not limited to creating better conditions for the UN deployment, but also played a vital role by assisting the mediation team to get all parties to sign the Arusha Agreement. During this period, the CNDD-FDD had the strongest combat capacity of all the armed groups, and after it stopped fighting, the violence and instability ended in most of the country, while continuing where there was a significant presence of the Palipehutu-FNL. However, due to the financial and logistical constraints by Ethiopia and Mozambique, the US, France, and the United Kingdom were then involved in bilateral undertakings to assist with the deployment, which was done seven months after the approval of the mandate, thus omitting the 60 days of deployment date (Thobane, Neethling & Vreÿ 2007:81). In light of this, member states had to deploy troops at their own cost, thus becoming dependent on external funding and donors. This highlighted the AU's lack of an appropriate mechanism at the time to solicit support from donor countries, which had a great impact on AMIB. Part of this impact was the financial difficulty to maintain the peacekeeping operation due to its high monetary costs to the TCCs. The impact exposed the AU's lack of experience and skills in peace support operations which were subsequently compensated by the UN.

The Arusha Accords and the transitional Constitution that followed contained explicit commitments to human rights, freedom, improved governance, and improved economic management. It was the attainment of these, or the lack thereof, that were the key determinants in sustaining and building the quality of Burundi's peace since 2003.

Despite these shortcomings, AMIB's presence and preventative activities helped the intervention deter the outbreak of further violence and provided a secure environment conducive for sustaining the peace process. It also managed conflicts in other areas of the Country, notwithstanding the persisting violence in Bujumbura. AMIB was able to safeguard refugees and shepherd internally displaced people back into the country through the secure environment they had created for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, it is important to credit the peacekeeping operation for the work done especially in the context stated by Neethling (2008:4): "AMIB has been described as being somewhere between a traditional peacekeeping and complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation as it operated in a complex peacekeeping operation environment with a peacekeeping mandate".

Following the inclusion of some armed movements in the peace process, South Africa continued to advocate and negotiate for the deployment of a UN force in Burundi. According to de Coning and Lotze (2013:383), "the cost of the SAPSD peacekeeping operation to South Africa was an estimated $21 million, and by 2003, AMIB's operation cost soared to an estimated $110 million". Within this complex environment, it managed to de-escalate a volatile situation, stabilise Burundi, allowing it to be taken over by the UN peacekeepers in 2004, despite the host of challenges which remained in the Country. AMIB's term came to an end, the UN took over leadership of AMIB, establishing the UN Peace Operation in Burundi (UNUB) in June 2004. AMIB was described as one of the AU's biggest success stories (Boshoff, Vreÿ & Rautenbach 2010: 69). It is important to reiterate that the fact that the UN was reluctant to deploy troops, illustrated the precarious security environment in Burundi. The peace process and ceasefire agreements were fragile, and not all parties to the conflict had signed the accord nor consented to the presence of a peacekeeping force. Nonetheless, the AU intervened and AMIB managed the violent aspects of the conflict.

On the one hand, Curtis and Nibigirwe (2010:110) noted that the transition from AMIB to UNOB was relatively successful because the necessary environment to deploy was created. On the other hand,), asserted that "AMIB cannot be said to have fully facilitated the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, nor was it able to fully ensure that the defence and security situation in Burundi was stable and well managed by newly created national defence and security structures". But based on relative terms, part of its success was because AMIB troops remained to serve under the mandate of UNOB. It also showed commitment and readiness of the AU to act. The combined resources and capabilities from both institutions proved to make a difference in the Country. In conformity, the transition or handover from the AU to the UN was successful, especially at a time where there was no peace to keep, which demonstrates the feasibility to approach peacekeeping through regional initiatives. When there was no peace to keep, in the case of Liberia and Burundi, the AU had created a relatively stable environment and grounds for UN operations to take over the peacekeeping operations. In 2007, after steady progress in Burundi's peace process, the UN withdrew its peacekeepers and transferred responsibility back to the AU, to maintain a small task force in support of continued peace-building efforts, while the UN opened a peace-building office in the Country to assist the AU (Murithi 2008).

According to Hendricks and Lucey (2013:2), "Burundi has successfully transitioned into a post-conflict country, although it remains very fragile. It is one of the few countries that the UN Peace-building Commission has been supporting since 2006".

Although the UN took over the operation from the AU, it is important to note that the AU made considerable efforts to coordinate its activities with UN agencies in Burundi, by establishing UN-AU engagement to organize resources. This engagement involved receiving logistic, technical, and administrative assistance from UN systems. According to Thobane, Neethling and Vreÿ (2007:83), "AMIB was able to stabilise 95% of Burundi, facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, coordinate mission activities with UN presence, and provide protection to returning leaders". Overall, AMIB performed relatively well operationally, considering the various constraints it faced, both on the ground in Burundi and especially as the first AU peacekeeping operation.

The case of Burundi demonstrates the value made by regional bodies, albeit limited, contributions of peacekeeping interventions. Furthermore, despite the challenges faced, collaboration between the UN and regional organisations and actors was relatively successful, which enabled each actor to play a significant role in Burundi. It provided the platform for reflections on current and future peacekeeping hybridisation operations in Africa.

What was revealed, was that regional organisations were not only important to create a suitable environment for UN deployment, but also for rapid deployment of forces within its boundaries that require peacekeeping (Languille & Keef 2004:32). This partnership will need to continue their combined efforts to ensure that lasting peace in Burundi prevails. The work in Burundi still continues as concerted efforts to ensure that peace carry on. The joint venture sets the foundation and precedent for the most complex UN-AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur, which began in June 2004, and the most recent one, AMISOM, a force deployed in March 2007. These operations are to be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

3.5 CONCLUSION

The AU has come a long way since it succeeded the OAU, especially with the changing and complex political and security environment it was born into. It has made great strides in responding to conflicts and maintaining peace and security on the African continent despite its challenges. As part of the changing nature of conflicts, the organisation shifted from non-interference to non-indifference, which underscores the role Africans are playing to take responsibility for peace and security. It further denotes accountability for the atrocities that transpire. To this end, the AU has deployed more peace operations with increasingly complex mandates into volatile conflict environments.

Extrapolating from several years of UN peacekeeping experience, the 'High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change' held that peacekeepers ought not to be deployed in post-conflict environments without peace to keep. If the operation is expected to both create and keep peace, the operation ought to be underpinned by a robust mandate and the political, financial and material support to help the peacekeeping operation in achieving its mandate. Therefore, non- indifference to the violence on the continent has become a principle of regional and sub-regional organisations.

The case of Liberia, in retrospect, was defined by prevalent conflicts and belligerent factions, including the signed agreements, although the vital role played by ECOMOG throughout this process was controversial. ECOMOG's involvement in Liberia was plagued with challenges that had persisted beyond the Liberian intervention. This started from the non-consensus of intervention by the members the Community. Its role as a leading state in the intervention was without doubt a major contributor to the implementation of ECOMOG's mandate. On the one hand, the Liberia case resulted in a situation where ECOMOG usurped the authority of the UN, which impeded on their mandate and affected its credibility. The challenge encountered by ECOMOG and UNOMIL raised questions about joint ventures of both organisations. On the other hand, this example of hybridisation is important because a regional institution was capable of taking responsibility for peace in the region to a point where the peacekeeping operation could be taken over by the UN. The role of the UN in the Liberian crisis was also lacking because they failed to coordinate their intervention

with the work done by ECOMOG. The UN deferred to the existing ECOMOG hierarchy instead of being neutral. Given the strengths and weaknesses of both actors, as part of a holistic approach to address conflict on the continent and build capacity, ECOWAS, as a sub-regional organisation, played a vital role in peacekeeping operations.

It would be a limited view to see the ECOMOG's intervention as a complete failure. ECOWAS undertook an operation when there was no precedent for sub-regional intervention. It further spear-headed an operation for both peacekeeping and peace enforcement using its own resources during the preliminary stages of the intervention in Liberia. Furthermore, contributions towards the operation in Liberia was greatly supported by Nigeria's involvement which prevented the peacekeeping operation's failure. It is unclear whether or not an intervention by the UN could have been more successful by working with regional organisations from the onset. If the example of ECOMOG is any indication, the path to regional peacekeeping is not easy. Taking into consideration that such hybridisations can be advantageous but can also create more problems, ECOWAS deserve to be credited for taking the lead in Liberia, especially when others were not willing to.

As such, the AU steadily gained prominence as a competent peacekeeping organisation through its work in Burundi. It is important to view the conflict and intervention in Burundi in a wider context of the Great Lakes region. The region witnessed intertwined conflicts such as in Rwanda, thus demonstrating the reason why regional actors are devoted to find peaceful settlements to conflicts. Albeit, several positive developments have been conducted since the installation of power-sharing in Burundi.

An interesting aspect of Burundi's peace process was the facilitators' interpretation of the concept of inclusivity. The strategy of inclusivity by both mediators embarked on including the small and large political parties in the peace process, without overlooking the other based on its size. During this approach parties were encouraged to talk freely with each other. This created an environment where mistrust, anxieties, and concerns could be addressed. The stature of both mediators were used to draw attention by the international community in order to take a tough stance to encourage parties to adhere to the agreed goals to reach an accord. Furthermore, Julius Nyerere

and Nelson Mandela used their own experiences of their respective countries to realise that, the conflict included political and ethnic dimensions, which made the discussion more frank, and provided the platform to go beyond the deadlocks that impeded the negotiations.

The Arusha Accords were negotiated by the prevailing political forces except by the main warring armed groups, while the post-Arusha peace process explicitly focused on engaging the CNDD-FDD and FNL and bringing them into the Arusha Agreement. As part of this process, the South African facilitation team lavished much attention on militarily small break-away factions from both armed groups, only to shift their focus from these factions once they had signed up to a ceasefire. Infuriating as all this was to the CNDD-FDD and FNL, it served both to preserve the momentum of the process, and to underscore the message that participation was in the best interest of all actors. In addition, South Africa, as seen with Nigeria was similarly influential in reflecting its political will, institutional strength, and resource availability in places in Burundi. The reason for South Africa's response to Burundi was largely a humanitarian one, although it also coincided with South Africa's post-1994 role as a regional peace broker. South Africa attempted to find a political resolution to the conflict which was a moral viewpoint and based on material interest. Yet, during its involvement in Burundi, it was also an inexperienced democratic country focusing on its own development. They ensured that the content of the agreement was produced by Burundians themselves, whether this approach was more desirable to achieve lasting peace is still to be seen. Despite the challenges experienced, the peace process in Burundi has the characteristic of a potential success. AMIB's ability to stabilise the country to the extent where the UN was able to take over, demonstrated the importance of its contribution. In addition, the troops contributed by the African member states remained behind, re-hatting from 'green' to 'blue' helmets, therefore highlighting that AU/regional intervention can be turned into sustainable and beneficial forces.

Various lessons can be learnt from the Liberian and Burundian cases, which underscore the need for the UN to get involved in efforts to maintain peace and security at the earliest stage of a conflict, and including collaboration with regional and sub-regional organisations from the onset of peace operations. The transition (or hand-over) of operations have been effective and it is worthy to note that each partnership in an operation is uniquely defined by the specific and contextual nature

of conflict, yet they could be classified as successive or integrated. Sequential operations such as each of those analysed above, saw regional actors taking responsibility and leading in operations, particularly in circumstances where the UN lacked the political will or did not have the capacity for a complex operation. As such, the AU proved itself a significant partner for the UN in managing conflict situations on the continent. Thus hybrid peacekeeping operations between the UN, regional, and sub-regional organisations could be the key to addressing many of the problems, under the provision of the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Given the overlapping objective and mandate between the AU and UN, the collaboration between these two organisations may offer insights into a new approach to peacekeeping on the African continent, which are comprised, driven, and financed through burden-sharing. Accordingly, hybridisation has assumed great importance. Working together to address peace and security challenges given the growing regional operations seem most propitious despite both entities' resource limitations – the AU lacks resources and the UN is limited by its responsibilities throughout the world. Yet, they both bring important skills and capacities to this joint venture.

Since ECOWAS-ECOMOG and AMIB, the AU has continued to develop its operational and institutional capabilities. To date, the UN and the AU have cooperated on initiatives, such as AMISOM and established a joint UNAMID, one of the greatest notable efforts in security cooperation efforts which are to be discussed in Chapter 4. Obviously, there are challenges that are bound to manifest when controversial issues and crises occur. This goes to say that different models of support to hybrid peacekeeping reveal that there is no one entity that can be able to implement peace operations alone, including stabilisation efforts for sustainable peace. These matters will be under review in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4: HYBRID PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: THE CASES OF SUDAN (DARFUR) AND SOMALIA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The emergence of peacekeeping partnerships constitutes an important trend in conflict management on the African continent over the past two decades. This trend is founded upon the realisation that no single multi-lateral institution is capable of implementing peace operations on its own. The increasing size of and responsibilities included in contemporary peace support operations, especially considering the need for peace operations to act as stabilising forces in a conflict environment, place greater demands on the implementing institutions (as analysed in the previous Chapter). Furthermore, the enshrinement of the normative concepts of the protection of civilians and R2P within the mandates of African peace operations, which in many ways constitute the most basic essence of peace operations, necessitates constant collaboration between various institutions to successfully achieve these responsibilities.

In order to collectively respond to these challenges, institutions such as the AU and UN have collaborated to create hybrid peacekeeping forces. As alluded to in the previous Chapter, hybrid peacekeeping operations are collaborative efforts between different multilateral organisations to implement peace support operations in Africa. In hybrid peacekeeping operations, the various institutions collaborate and complement one another to enhance their comparative advantages, share the political and economic costs of responding in order to work towards an environment of sustainable peace. Comprehensively addressing the root causes of given conflicts, specifically as urgent but long-term processes, require commitments from various actors to work together in partnership – this is best seen in the peace operations in the Darfur region of Sudan and in Somalia, which serve as the case studies for this Chapter.

An examination of the peace operation in the Darfur region of Sudan remains an important case study because of the complex root causes of the conflict, which in part derive from the cross-cutting and interrelated issues of competition over scarce resources, to ethnic, cultural, and racial codification of power and influence in nomadic

and largely tribal areas. Darfur is also important because of the different models of support used in the processes for managing and resolving the conflict. Darfur has endured several episodes of violent conflict, the most conspicuous of which emerged following the 2003 uprising of various ethnically-aligned communities against the Sudanese government. The gross human rights violations and urgent humanitarian situation in Darfur necessitated a comprehensive international intervention rooted in the normative framework of R2P over collective indifference.

The second case study examined in this Chapter concerns the hybrid peacekeeping operation in Somalia, which serves to similarly highlight lessons learned and best practices emerging from hybrid peacekeeping operations. The current Somalia peace operation, AMISOM, is an AU-driven peacekeeping mechanism operating under the mandate of and with technical and financial support from the UN. This distinction in the type of hybrid collaboration will lead to a different but nonetheless vital line of analysis. The points to consider for this case study will include issues emerging from the transitions from an AU to a UN mandated peacekeeping operation and best practices that surround the creation and implementation of hybrid peacekeeping operations. Not all context is the same, thus the respective political situations of both case studies will be taken into consideration as important variables. Issues about coordination, co-existence, and collaboration by all actors who are attempting to bring about peace in the country is of great importance to the following analysis.

In view of the above, this Chapter seeks to analyse whether hybrid peacekeeping, especially recent incarnations of UN-AU co-operation in peace operations offer better prospects or new opportunities to comprehensively respond to the challenges inherent in peacekeeping throughout the continent. Furthermore, the Chapter will consider whether the international community is moving towards more effective and legitimate peacekeeping operations through the hybrid peacekeeping operation approach (as evidenced by Sudan and previously in Burundi) or where an AU force is deployed under a UN Security Council mandate (such as the case of Somalia). In sum, the study is intended to determine whether hybrid peacekeeping operations and burden-sharing strategies for peace operations offer any insightful, meaningful, and practical perspectives into to the ongoing challenges faced by the international community and African role-players in the arena of peacekeeping on the African continent.

4.2 CONFLICT DYNAMICS OF DARFUR

There have been several conflicts throughout the history of the Republic of Sudan, especially since its independence in 1956. These conflicts underscore that Sudan has constantly been forced to navigate violent internal conflicts, especially during the periods of 1956-1972 and 1983-2005. In order to analyse the dynamics and developments that led to the hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur, it is important to provide a background to the conflict.

Sudan was characterised by various socio-cultural and historically distinct communities, to some extent differentiated along the lines of Arab and non-Arab mainly in the North and South of the country. Srinivasan (2006:4) makes the distinction between the two, Arab tribes are semi-nomadic 'Abbala' (camel herders) in the North of the country and the Western Darfur regions. The 'non-Arabs' are identified as the sedentarized 'Baggara' and as 'African' in the South. According to Deng (2002:70), the North identifies with Islam and Arabization, while the South stood against a hegemonic and dominant Islamic identity. Since independence, the Sudanese government based in Khartoum (in this case also referred to as the Khartoum government), and the main rebel movements, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudan People's Defence Force (SPDF), engaged in a civil war over power and resources. Prior to this conflict, Juma (2003:187) stated that, for 11 years, the SPLM/A and SPDF fought intense battles over the control of territory in the South and in 2002, the leaders of the two groups signed a declaration merging their movements. This was two-fold, in a sense that on one hand, it meant relative peace between the two groups, and on the other hand, they now had a common enemy which later proved to be disastrous for the government.

Since 1989, the Khartoum government, led by current President Omar al-Bashir, amassed and distributed weapons throughout the country from the exchange of the profits earned from the country's oil wealth. This trade and proliferation of arms throughout the country strengthened the collaboration between the Khartoum government and various communities inside the country as well as with neighbouring countries, thereby heightening political and security-driven tensions. Throughout the 1990s, neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Kenya, the DRC, CAR, Chad, and Ethiopia accommodated massive outflows of refugees from Sudan who sought

political asylum and refuge from the enduring conflicts. However, these countries were also facing challenges of their own: for instance, Juma (2003:190) pointed out that "in Ethiopia, the government of Mengistu El Mariam was overthrown; in Somalia, Siad Barre's government collapsed; in northern Uganda the internal insurgency escalated; and in Kenya political violence swept through the country". These political dynamics created tensions with Sudan, but nonetheless further strengthened the need for African states to assume the primary responsibilities to prevent further conflicts. Security further deteriorated throughout Sudan as rebel groups intensified their conflict with the Sudanese government for political power and control of the country. Many of the rebel groups' grievances derive from the politicization of identity in Sudan, namely between Arab-Muslim communities (those affiliated with the Islamist-driven and ruling National Congress Party (NCP)) and those communities who were identified as African (mainly from the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit tribes) and were consequently marginalised by the government. Other rebel movements such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Khali Ibrahim, and the National Redemption Front (NRF) were allies against the Arab military who dominated the socio-political and security environment throughout Darfur. Although the Northern region of Sudan benefited from the spoils of the country's vast oil wealth, the Southern region (now the independent country of South Sudan) was continuously marginalised and became economically destitute. These socio-economic imbalances throughout large parts of Sudan were further exacerbated by waves of famine, drought and desertification (Zamechic 2008).

In 2002, two agreements were signed between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A in Burgenstock, Switzerland and in Machakos, Kenya. The first was the Nuba Mountain Ceasefire Agreement which laid the foundation for the second agreement, the Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA) of 2005, which was a landmark agreement on transforming the government and governance which formed the basis of the CPA which will later be discussed. However, none of these agreements were respected. In February 2003, the SPLA and JEM collectively launched a full scale war against the Khartoum government as a common enemy, condemning it of wilful neglect. In addition, the rebellion was incited by continuing economic marginalisation and insecurity. De Waal (2007:1044) noted that the rebels appeared to take the

Khartoum government by surprise and enjoyed short-lived and relative successes, through the destruction of half a dozen military aircraft.

The Khartoum government responded violently by enlisting the services of some of the nomadic tribes in Darfur loyal to its agenda, as well as by deploying its own troops to arm and enhance the capacities of the Janjaweed militias. The Janjaweed militias originated from the civil war in Chad in the 1980s, which comprised of the Sudanese Government's NCP. "The government promised these tribes land in exchange for their military allegiance, subsequently turning the conflict into genocide by "Arabizing" the issues" (Freccia 2015). During the responses to these attacks, the Janjaweed militias subsequently engaged in killings, abductions, forced expulsions, torture, systematic sexual violence, and intentional destruction of resources such as livestock. Furthermore, they waged a systematic operation of ethnic cleansing against civilians who formed part of the ethnic groups of the rebellion. Dagne (2010) stated that the war resulted in an estimated 2.7 million people displaced, more than 240,000 people forced mainly into Chad and other neighbouring countries, and an estimated 450,000 were killed. The attack on the El-Fasher Airport in 2003, which is the headquarters of the peacekeeping operation, is considered to be the starting point of the current civil war in Darfur.

It is no surprise that the dynamics of the conflict in Darfur inspired a large amount of literature, although intrinsically there is still no widespread consensus on the identified triggers and indicators of the Darfur conflict. One could deduce the triggers being the SLMA and JEM or even the Khartoum government. While the indicators among others are marginalisation and oil. William and Black (2010:7) identified that first, the conflict originated from the oppressive nature between the dominant core of the elites based in Khartoum and the marginalised zones of Sudan, especially in Darfur. Second, the conflict in Darfur is considered to be an inevitable consequence of Sudan's existence as a turbulent state based on its history. Third, the dynamics of the conflict are ascribed to the systematic tensions between the Arab and African populations of Sudan because it was believed that their identities were used to define who had access to resources, power, and development. In the context of peace and security, the Khartoum government had the responsibility to protect all of the people living in its country, but consciously and deliberately flouted this responsibility by conducting an ethnic cleansing campaign.

The Darfur conflict appeared to be a real test of the international community's resolve to move R2P to full recognition in international law. A report of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that the Khartoum government "is failing to protect the human rights of the population, in particular the right of life".   The Khartoum government had demonstrated the lack of obligation to protect and to prevent the atrocities in the Country under the commitment of international law (UN OHCHR 2007). There were attempts for peace with the signing of the CPA between the Khartoum government and the SPLM, which granted Southern Sudan the right to conduct a referendum to determine whether the region would become independent of Sudan. The agreement provided power-sharing arrangements between the North and South in the Sudanese government between 2006 and 2011. However, the CPA did not explicitly address the specific issues driving the conflict in Darfur: the underlying factors of the conflict are complex and intricate but are also multi-levelled, involving international, regional, and national elements. This intricacy is especially relevant because of the dichotomy and identity of Darfur's conflict, which had been characterised by its political and historical affairs and not only limited to North-South relations.

As the situation worsened, the international response to the conflict was dominated by non-consensus. The UN remained polarised and paralysed to take action and also lacked resources and effective structures to respond to security threats. Their response was often not rapid enough but rather moderate and divided. For many years, the lack of sufficient political will and tangible commitment by the international community to intervene ensured the continuation of widespread attacks against civilians. According to Abiodun (2011: 188-190), their failure to act emerged from a collection of diplomatic, bureaucratic, and political difficulties that ultimately restrained what could be done. Udombana (2007:97) argued that "by the time the genocide claims its last victim, the UNSC, which has the primary mandate for maintaining international peace and security will be suffering from resolution fatigue". In addition, the lack of interest to intervene was masked under the motto of 'an African solution to an African problem'. Given the UN's responsibility, it failed to produce a swift response to the ongoing violence in Darfur. Yet again, this demonstrated the UN's lack of flexibility and delayed approval of the mandates. As a result, the UNSC delegated the responsibility to the AU.

4.3 AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN DARFUR

The establishment of the AU in 2002 was greeted with buoyancy, and its desire to support and contribute meaningfully to continental peacekeeping initiatives was perceived as an improvement from the OAU. The need for the AU to take this responsibility for responding to the crisis in Darfur was two-fold. First, it was from the reluctance and difficulties inherent in intervention by the Members of the UN Security Council, especially due to lingering tensions due the US withdrawal from Somalia and the tragedy in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Secondly, the conflict was not only a threat to Sudan but also had the potential to spread to other countries in the Horn of Africa region. Therefore, it was both prudent and necessary to contain the conflict within the border of one country, taking into consideration the logistical and financial prudence. It was not surprising when Idris Derby, the President of Chad, took the lead by initiating peace talks in 2003. This initiative led to the first Sudan ceasefire between the Khartoum government and the rebel movements which allowed free and unimpeded humanitarian access within Darfur. The AU deployed a small peacekeeping operation to Darfur (AMIS I), with the authorisation of the UNSC to monitor or oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. Their mandate also included patrolling the region and protecting civilians and humanitarian operations from imminent danger. AMIS also provided armed escorts to humanitarian agencies on request. The ceasefire did not resolve the political causes that were rooted in the Darfur conflict. Nonetheless, AMIS I became the only external peacekeeping force providing security to Darfur (Brosche & Rothbart 2013:118).

The small peacekeeping operation later evolved into a stronger AMIS II in 2004 given the constant violence. The peacekeeping operation was primarily authorised by the UNSC and led by the AU, as it set up to 'monitor' the ceasefire through the deployment of an AU 'Observer' Mission, to become the operational arm of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and to protect civilians. However, the AMIS mandate was unclear when it came to protecting civilians; the loose language underpinning the mandate concealed a lack of political will by the international community to conduct a robust operation, as expectations far exceeded its mandate and capability to act as a traditional peacekeeping force. This translated into a tragic reality that AMIS was limited from doing more in Darfur, and if the situation worsened, it could only use force

in self-defence rather than to protect civilians. The use of force was unclear in its Rules of Engagement (RoE) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which should have been provided to its commanders and troops. The RoE was not well communicated within the chain of command and to all the AMIS troops.

Although the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed by one faction of the SLA under the guidance of the former Secretary-General of the OAU, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, the agreement was by no means a comprehensive one. This was because breakaway factions of the SPLM and the JEM refused to sign the accord, citing demands for greater wealth and power-sharing in the agreement (Pronk 2006). The DPA was perceived by some analysts as being strong in areas of power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security arrangements, but it was fragile and insubstantial. This was supported in an open letter from the AU mediators to the members of the movements who were still reluctant to sign the DPA, acknowledging that the agreement was not perfect and did not meet all the aspirations of the movements (Explaining the Darfur Peace Agreement 2006). Unlike the Arusha Peace Accord signed in Burundi, the DPA was for the people of Darfur, but not by the Darfur (therefore the agreement did not speak to the heart of the challenges facing the communities in Darfur). This was a significant deficiency of the DPA, as the people were not included in the process and therefore the process lacked the necessary ownership by those who would benefit the most from its ratification and implementation. Additionally, the DPA possessed unintentional but nonetheless detrimental consequences that ultimately led to the split of the SPLA and JEM.

In order to respond to the political and security dynamics in Darfur, changes had to be made to AMIS. As a response to continuing attacks on civilians, the 3,320 personnel strength of AMIS I increased to 7,731, making it AMIS II (Jooma 2006:6). Despite the presence of AU peacekeepers in Darfur following the establishment of AMIS II, the situation continued to deteriorate as parties to the conflict failed to terminate the violence as they continued to break numerous agreements. The efforts of AMIS II had unfortunately been insufficient to deter attacks from civilians due to internal and external constraints. By 2007, it became evident that AMIS II was neither large nor strong enough to stop the violence in Darfur. Furthermore, the failed Tripoli peace talks in 2007 indicated that there was no peace to keep in the absence of a durable ceasefire. A meeting was later held to finalise the peace talks which was followed by

the meeting held in Arusha, Tanzania. This meeting resulted in the pledge for power-sharing of resources and talks towards a political solution to the conflict in Darfur. Yet again, the bigger rebel factions were not present in the Arusha meeting. The UN and the AU attempted to ensure the negotiations were both inclusive and comprehensive, but the persisting conflict continued to hamper any progress. Heavens (2007) argued that "the parties to the conflict in Darfur were [are] not yet prepared to enter into genuine political negotiations". It is worthy of note that any political solution is often complex especially given the different perspectives and ideologies of what is considered fair in the political arena.

The exertions of AMIS II fell short of changing the situation in the region, and the peacekeeping operation had an insufficient mandate and inadequate international support. The peacekeeping operation bespoke the AU's lack of experience in peace operations, particularly in the doctrine of civilian protection. AMIS I and II failed to address the root causes and emerging dynamics of the conflict, which contributed to the sustained violence while its efforts to disarm and demobilise the Janjaweed (which was part of its mandate) were futile. Since it was poorly equipped, underfunded, understaffed, and given the vast territory that needed security, AMIS II was unable to protect civilians. These factors were some of the challenges confronted by the AU and its peacekeeping effort in Darfur. Funding for such peacekeeping operations also remained a constant challenge. Gottschalk and Schmidt (2004:142) remarked that "a handful of Africa's wealthiest states are left to bear the burden of paying for the AU's peacekeeping budgets".

The peacekeeping operation also experienced logistical shortcomings and limitations. AMIS lacked military equipment and support mechanisms to prevent any insurgents in the region. Its deficiencies were also caused by constrained operational concepts, lack of resources, and strategic gaps. The lack of civil-military coordination further posed a challenge to the peacekeeping operation. These challenges were demonstrated when former AMIS sector commanders were assigned only four soft-skin vehicles, 5000 US dollars and two Thuraya phones at the beginning of the peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, the first 250 police that arrived in Darfur only had four cars to share between them, a limitation that seriously constrained the operation. Even Darfur's logistics systems were severely strained and the resources provided to AMIS I were particularly insufficient to fulfil its tasks. These limitations,

which also comprised a poor logistical capacity and a lack of or non-existing pre-deployment logistical plan, delayed the deployment of AMIS II (Guicherd 2007:16).

According to Appiah-Mensah (2006:1), AMIS did not have the ability or resources to implement its mandate and it also lacked the logistical infrastructure to manage bulk and urgently needed purchases worth millions of dollars. Airport infrastructure, aircraft handling capacity, including deteriorating runway and road conditions for the transportation of heavy equipment, were some of the logistical challenges facing the peacekeeping operation (United Nations Secretary-General, 2008). It became clear that logistical planning fell secondary to political and operational decision-making processes. The AU also required greater staff capacity to conduct effective coordinated logistical planning on the scale essential for such peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, AMIS lacked a full self-sustaining fuel capacity based on the difficulties to develop fuel contracts with Khartoum government because of their bureaucracy in approving processes, which delayed and placed the peacekeeping operation in a vulnerable position. Given the limitations by AMIS II to implement its mandate, its peacekeepers came under severe attacks. They were outnumbered and clearly outgunned in what seemed to be an impossible peacekeeping operation. Gompert, Richardson, Kruger and Bernath (2005:5); and William (2006:9) pointed out that, for instance, the Janjaweed force was 10,000-20,000 strong and AMIS II should have been at least as numbered or equal to 12,000-22,000. As the situation worsened, the call to deploy a robust peacekeeping operation under the mandate of the UNSC became a necessity.

Despite the challenges and shortcomings of AMIS I and II, the AU provided the rapid response to deploy, especially in the face of emerging conflict and given the international community's resistance to intervene. On the one hand, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2006:45), while AMIS II was commended for improving the situation in Darfur and "reducing large-scale organised violence", it also provided safety to a handful of civilians. On the other hand, Reeves (2005) argued that approximately 75% of all villages were destroyed and AMIS was deployed too late to make a significant difference. Stopping the ongoing violence was just the tip of the iceberg; it required reassessing the goals and interests of the parties involved. Furthermore, it was important to have appropriate mechanisms in place to prevent relapsing into conflict.

The reluctance of the international community to deploy a large contingency under UN command led to an increased reliance on developing countries to contribute troops. Most TCCs had been from developing countries, who were often less resourced. The hesitation of the international community to intervene in conflict-afflicted states until it is deemed absolutely necessary (often after the significant loss of lives), is a calamitous failure on its part.

It is important that the UNSC and the international community take into greater consideration that prevention is a tool that is necessary and it is more effective than a cure to the conflicts. One of the paramount limitations of the peacekeeping process remains the reliance of the political will from UNSC member states which have the authority of adopting peacekeeping resolutions under the UN Charter. Furthermore, veto powers are often used by the Permanent Members of the UNSC, revealing how national interests often come into play in the UNSC and can consequently bring any draft resolution to a standstill. Even when a draft resolution is ratified, the process of assembling a peacekeeping force can take months, especially given the dependence of the UN on TCCs. Therefore, the UN peacekeeping mechanisms can be characterised as being cumbersome and slow to respond to the dynamics on the ground.

There was a clear ambition for an early African response to the crisis in Darfur, but the AU found itself in a situation where it was institutionally ill-equipped and under-resourced to resolve the conflict situation successfully, or even play a meaningful role in conflict facilitation. The AU's proactive role enjoyed Western support, but as a fledgling continental organisation it was not able to mobilise the necessary troops, funds or material to conduct a large-scale civilian-protection operation. The material constraints were especially evident, but the political constraints imposed upon the peacekeeping operation also constrained it in Darfur.

4.4 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN DARFUR

Despite their reluctance, the role played by the international community towards the provision of peace in Darfur remained essential. A peace agreement mediated by a number of countries was brokered at the end of 2003 between the Khartoum government and the SPLA. This was the first of several agreements which were

respected by the warring factions, despite an AU presence. Among the central reasons for the ongoing conflict were Sudan's large oil deposits, as foreign actors vied for lucrative concessions, while the wealth accrued by the Sudanese government did not result in development throughout the country.

The Darfur conflict was perceived as a threat to international peace and security due to the number of deaths, rapes, and destruction to property in the region, in many ways reflecting similar trends to the Rwanda genocide. In this light, the UNSC passed Resolution 1556, mandating the deployment of an AU protection force to monitor the April 2004 ceasefire. Mounting evidence of massive human rights abuses in Darfur tested the international community's will and capacity to halt ethnic cleansing and protect civilians (Power 2004). By the end of 2004, the UNSC, at a special session on Sudan held in Nairobi, Kenya, called into question the commitment of Member States to follow through on their earlier resolutions. The international community's responses to the crisis in Darfur came in the form of humanitarian assistance through the UN and its specialized programmes and agencies such as the WFP, UN High Commissioner on Refugees and WHO, (Clough 2005).

Piiparinen (2007:73) acknowledged that without the consent and cooperation of the Khartoum government, it was impossible for the AU and UN troops to disarm the Janjaweed. The need for a robust peacekeeping force through the use of current and additional UN resources was passed through the UNSC Resolution 1706, which authorised a strength of more than 20,000 military and civilian peacekeepers. The resolution made provision for the military to use force to protect civilians under immediate danger. However, the impact of these efforts were weakened by the UNSC's internal impotence to implement its commitment. While the UNSC continued to threaten to intervene by imposing sanctions against the petroleum sector and government officials, it did not follow through despite the ongoing violence. President al-Bashir condemned the presence of the UN force in Darfur and without his consent the UN struggled to negotiate a peace plan that would gradually place UN peacekeepers in the country. This presented a limiting factor because the Khartoum government believed that the situation in Darfur was an internal matter, thus, the respect of state sovereignty which is central to international diplomacy.

A call for a humanitarian-driven military intervention in Darfur seemed be an ideal action especially given the intervention which was conducted by the NATO in Kosovo, during the time when the government was the cause of the loss of lives and refused to halt human rights violations. Although their actions were relatively successful, the case of Darfur had become much more complex. Even if this was muted as a possibility, no government was willing to attempt such an excursion particularly in the face of unprecedented threat to the Country. Moreover, China's position of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country played a significant role in constraining and hobbling the UNSC's effectiveness (International Crisis Group 2006:17). China is Sudan's biggest trading partner, and as Goodman (2004) states, "it purchases 64 percent of Sudan's oil exports, and its companies have invested billions of dollars in Sudan's oil industry". By no means, was China solely responsible for the UNSC's lack of action, however, it played a significant part. Putting pressure on the Khartoum government would have blurred the lines between China's model of assistance (fewer government-related strings) and the 'carrot and stick' approach by many donors. It is an open secret that the greater majority of the peacekeeping operation in Darfur had been funded mostly by foreign donors, amongst them, the US, EU, Nordic countries, Canada, and a host of other bilateral donors. This could also have led to a carrot and stick approach if it was deemed necessary by those funding the peacekeeping operations.

As an attempt to halt the violence and bring parties to the negotiation table, an international mediation peace process took place in 2005. This process was not enough, as violence continued and reconciliation talks were abandoned due to significant differences between the warring factions. The objectives and goals of the factions, particularly the Khartoum government which kept breaking what was already a fragile peace deal established throughout numerous mediation processes, remained difficult to assess. Vehnamaki (2006:53) confirmed that the involvement of the Khartoum government in the violence was too unclear to confirm its intention. In 2005, the UNSC authorised Resolution 1590, creating the UNMIS under chapter VII to support the comprehensive DPA. In addition, UNMIS had to evaluate how best to assist and support AMIS. As a result, the UNSC Resolution 1706 called for the deployment of UNMIS in Darfur; however, there was no consent from the Khartoum government for the UN peacekeepers to intervene.

What is important to note is that a peacekeeping operation can usually complement a political process, but it cannot be a substitute for that process. Therefore, the way forward for the ongoing conflict in Darfur depended on a feasible political discourse and architecture among all the relevant parties.

4.5 TRANSITION FROM AMIS TO UNAMID: A HYBRID PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Although the Khartoum government initially opposed a UN peacekeeping operation, after the conclusion of a peace accord between the largest rebel forces in Abuja, Nigeria 2006, it indicated however that it was willing to discuss the involvement of the UN. In view of this, the Khartoum government also made it very difficult for funds to be transferred via Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to AU troops on the ground. Practically, this created a convoluted route before funds could reach AMIS personnel, with the delayed remittance of funds caused some apprehension among the troops, and therefore resulted in low morale at ground level. Obviously, the lack of support by the Khartoum government undermined the operations of AMIS and this did not help the AU to work towards a meaningful outcome in Darfur (Mansaray 2009:40).

As a result, in 2007 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1769 and deployed a peacekeeping force that ultimately combined with AMIS to create UNAMID. The presence of a hybrid operation was only accepted on the bases that the force comprises primarily of African troops and if a peace accord was reached. The cooperation between the UN and AU was determined on the political dynamics of Darfur, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

UNAMID personnel comprised a complement of "15,553, representing 79% of the authorized strength of 19,555. That number included 14,948 troops, 346 staff officers, 64 liaison officers, and 195 military observers" (United Nations Security Council 2007a). The hybrid peacekeeping operation had greater resources and was well equipped to address the challenges to protect civilians and oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. It was also mandated to assist an inclusive AU/UN-mediated political process, and to monitor the UN arms embargo which has been in place since 2005. It was the most expensive and largest peacekeeping operation ever authorised by the UNSC at the time (United Nations Security Council

2007b).   The joint operation also demonstrated the international community's responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflict.   Although it might have been too late to implement the doctrine of R2P as envisioned to prevent atrocities, the hybrid peacekeeping operation had the potential of providing practical guidance to the application of R2P.

The joint peacekeeping operation replaced a previously African-led operation. UNAMID currently works under a unified command structure, a single force commander, a single senior representative, and an integrated chain of command agreed between both UN and AU. Given the strength, logistic, and financial resources, including its robust mandate to protect civilians, it is no surprise that UNAMID was more proactive than AMIS. UNAMID conducted daily patrols and community policing within the limits afforded by its logistical capability which represented an avowal of the peacekeeping operations' efforts to enhance its robust mandate.   Furthermore, UNAMID also aimed to bring groups that were non-signatories to the DPA of 2006 into the peace process through diplomatic and political efforts. It strove to give effect to the actualisation of its mandate and operational tasks to secure the security situation which remained in a state of instability. Despite the robust mandate and consent to accept a hybrid peacekeeping operation, however, the Khartoum government remained despondent to the involvement of the UN. They consequently attempted to impede the work of the peacekeeping operation by refusing to supply the force with any equipment, therefore leaving the force to build its own camp in dangerous and remote locations. Logistically, there was only one railway line in Darfur and during the rainy season, the roads were impassable, making working conditions even more difficult (Mahmood, 2012).

Notwithstanding, UNAMID did not meet the expectations envisioned. It failed to utilize and capitalise its force strength, logistical capabilities, and resources to protect civilians.   The presence of the hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur had not completely fostered peace but had improved the lives of ordinary citizens on the ground. However, the new precedent operation faced similar challenges as AMIS II, such as sourcing troops to be deployed, given the AU's commitment and struggle to deploy for AMISOM. Despite the presence of the force, Murithi (2009:13) pointed out that the violence persisted and "included high levels of banditry, occasional military engagements, ethnic clashes, and deadly attacks on UNAMID forces".

Internationally, although a peace agreement between the Khartoum government and the rebel movements was signed, this had not stopped the fighting and concerns over the atrocities committed culminated in a request for an investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to hold those responsible for genocide, war crimes, and violation of human rights accountable for the atrocities committed. The UNSC had taken strides towards pressuring the Khartoum government and parties to the conflict to end the violence in Darfur. Most significantly, it had instructed Khartoum to disarm the Janjaweed militia. Since February 2003, the term genocide was often associated with crisis and the word gained prominence around the international community. The seriousness of events in Darfur was clear when Luis Moreno Ocampo, former prosecutor of the ICC, sought a warrant of arrest for President Omar al-Bashir on charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. This charge also became an obstacle within the politics surrounding UNAMID. Tensions between the hybrid partners was created by the UNSC's role in the indictment of President al-Bashir, which could undermine efforts for lasting peace and reconciliation; African leaders have perceived the involvement of the ICC as a threat to derail the peace process. The case is similar to the reaction from the arrest warrant for President Charles Taylor in 2003. Hence the interplay between justice and peace created tension not only in Africa, but also internationally. In this light, even though AMIS was cultivated into a UN peacekeeping operation, it found itself embroiled and entangled in many of the same political and military challenges as the AU peacekeeping operation.

Notwithstanding UNAMID's broad mandate to protect civilians, it was not designed to create a sustainable solution to the crisis. In order for Darfur to have a chance of lasting peace, a political solution needed to be found because it would address the fundamental root causes of the conflict. Grignon and Kroslak (2008:186) therefore argued that peacekeeping operations were conducted on trajectory bases in order to protect civilians without a political process in place. In this regard, it was pointless to deploy a peacekeeping force if there was no peace to keep. Given the different dynamics, scope, and landscape of conflict, each case was different and would need to be addressed according to their specific context.

Lessons can be learned from AMIS and UNAMID, especially those which demonstrate that troops alone are not enough to ensure the ability to implement mandates to protect civilians, but would need to be accompanied by a clear robust mandate and the provision of mechanisms and modalities. Given the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, UNAMID's effectiveness varied. On the one hand, by late 2008, it was too slow and inadequate to provide tangible improvements on the ground. On the other hand, as a hybrid operation, it provided real improvements for the ordinary citizens on the ground, it hinged on confidence-building of the local population in Darfur by improving the security situation.

According to Mickler (2013:503), despite the various challenges encountered, UNAMID made and continues to make contributions to the security situation in Darfur. Nonetheless the overall human rights situation remains a constant concern. Therefore, the need to strengthen rapid response capabilities, conduct patrols, and deploy well trained and equipped units is of great importance.

The international community seems to be moving towards a more effective and legitimate approach of hybrid peacekeeping in Africa as demonstrated in Burundi and Darfur. Therefore, it is important to give a brief background on the case of Somalia in order to determine whether the approach of hybrid peacekeeping and burden-sharing can offer any insightful, meaningful, and practical perspective into the challenges faced.

4.6 CONFLICT DYNAMICS OF SOMALIA

Somalia has been torn by widespread conflict for decades. Since independence, it has struggled with civil conflict, poor governance, economic exclusion and a lack of social cohesion. The country's instability stemmed from conflict between the state structures executed during colonialism, the exclusive and repressive politics that defined the Siad Barre era, and the intricate clan politics that continue to play a significant role in Somali's pastoral lives (Little 2003:15). Mulugetta (2009:9) added that the conflict in Somalia emanated from the colonial era underpinned by Somalia's divided territory. These territories involved British Somaliland and the Northern territory of Kenya (which was colonised by Britain); the Italians colonised Somaliland; and France occupied Djibouti. The rest of the Ogaden territory was in between

Ethiopia and Somalia. The post-independence regimes, particularly the General Siad Barre (who took over Somalia through a bloodless military coup in 1969) dictatorship, pursued a policy to restore the colonially lost territories in the neighbouring nations. This led to the Ogaden War with Ethiopia, first in 1969, and then later into another full scale war in 1977-8. The war erupted during the Cold War as Somalia aimed to exploit a shift in the regional balance of power to restore the territory to greater Somalia. At the time of the Cold War political alliances shifted, resulting in the Soviet Union changing its aid support to Somalia for subsidising Ethiopia (which had been previously supported by the US); this reversal compelled the US to support Somalia for strategic reasons. One of the reasons was because Somalia has a long coastline on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden making it one of the most strategic countries during the Cold War era to facilitate the water-base traversing the Middle East region. According to Lewis (2002:209), their engagement with Somalia was of strategic importance because it provided a geographic advantage during the Cold War. Somalia lost the Ogaden War and retreated back across the border, later for a ceasefire agreement to be brokered between the two countries. However, the war weakened the autocratic government of Siad Barre. Supported by the super powers (Soviet Union and US) during the Cold War era, Siad Barre kept clan rivalries under control through manipulative, dictatorial, oppressive, and corrupt rule over the country (Murphy 2007:48). Although his regime was more akin to a dictatorship, some positive developments were achieved. He administered the building of hospitals, schools, universities, and handled humanitarian emergencies efficiently in the 1970s.

Somalia also became economically dependent on aid from Arab countries. Although Somalis are not ethnically Arabs, they identify more with Arabs than Africans. They joined the League of Arabs States (LAS) in 1974, making them the first non-Arab state to be admitted as a member. Throughout the 1980s, Somalia became increasingly dependent on its counterparts, which was important to Siad Barre in his aim to side with the US-led coalition of Arab states that opposed Iraq following the intervention of Kuwait in 1990. As Somalia's strategic importance to the West weakened, foreign aid was consequently withdrawn. In addition, the end of the Cold War led to a decline in economic and political support. As a result, power began to splinter as local political factions pushed against the central government. According to Rubinstein (2008:4), the Somali government became non-functional and unable to provide the day-to-day

security for its citizens by the late 1980s. This left the country without the resources to maintain the patronage political systems, and as a result, Siad Barre lost control of the country and the army.

The Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Ogadeni Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) joined forces to create what was known as the United Somalia Congress (USC) which led to a rebellion against Siad Barre's government (Omaar & Mohamoud 2015:86). This insurgency intensified into a full-scale civil war in 1988 and greatly affected the Somaliland region. The government's response was swift and unforgiving. They used increasingly repressive tactics to suppress activists from all clans, killing 50,000 people, while 650,000 fled to Ethiopia and Djibouti (The Centre for Justice and Accountability 2014). By 1991, Siad Barre was ousted by the USC. Any hope of a national reconciliation was dissolved by the division of the USC into two groups, one led by warlord Ali Mahdi and the other by warlord Mohammed Aideed. This sparked the clan warfare that Siad Barre's patronage system had explicitly tried to manage. Other warlords emerged, resulting in further intra-clan conflict, increased division of the country, and the collapse of the central government.

Several factors and dynamics have a role towards perpetuating the conflict in Somalia. The role played by the clan system, which has dominated Somalia and formed part of the division of clans, had politically, socially, and economically fuelled the endemic conflict. Armed clashes were fought in the name of clans, as a result of political leaders' manipulation of clan allegiances for their own interests. The struggle for control, power, and resources changed their boundaries in many parts of the Country towards consolidating their respective positions on occupied territories. Thus, the impact of the changed clan structures resulted in several forms of conflict (Wheeler 2000:174).

Since the downfall of Siad Barre's regime, the very groups that ousted him began to fight amongst themselves for power and the remaining resources. The country and its people entered into decades of protracted civil conflict (Elmi & Barise 2006:33-35). For many analysts, Somalia became a failed state, but it is important to note that the collapse of the Country was not due to the end of Siad Barre, but was a process which triggered it. His regime comprised improvident policies, power, greed, and corruption, which had destructive long-term consequences in the aftermath of his regime.

Rubinstein (2008:5) defined the state of Somalia as a "nation where public authority was no more effective in providing for the security and welfare of the country". Somalia became an impoverished country with limited resources (national economy depended on the export of livestock and bananas), especially with the collapse of the communist system. Furthermore, the international community's attention was more on the Gulf War than the internal strife of Somalia, largely because the country was not of strategic importance at the time. Wheeler (2000:174) stated that Somalia disintegrated into violence and destruction never experienced before. From 1991 to 1992, the country was torn by clan-based conflict and in the capital city alone, 25,000 people were killed and 1.5 million fled the country, along with 2 million internally displaced persons. Drought struck the country, accelerating the destruction of social and economic infrastructure, clan-cleansing, and disruption of a steady food supply caused a man-made famine that ultimately claimed approximately 300,000 lives (Prendergast 2007).

4.7 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN SOMALIA

It was only in 1992, following the eruption of conflict in Mogadishu, that international attention shifted to Somalia. The UNSC authorised the deployment of troops and UN personnel under UNSC Resolution 751, in an effort to restore order and safeguard relief supplies, to oversee the general and complete an arms embargo, and to provide security for humanitarian aid. Resolution 733 declared the conflict in the country a threat to international peace and security, and under the provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter the intervention was unanimously adopted (Wheeler 2000:175). After difficult negotiations, the warring faction leaders signed a ceasefire agreement, which included provisions to allow for a 50 unarmed UN monitoring operation into Somalia. Their mandate was to oversee arrangements for providing humanitarian assistance, continue consultations with parties in Mogadishu, and to work toward a reconciliation government. As a result, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established with the consent of parties to the agreement.

Despite the UN's efforts, the implementation of the mandate failed because of the attacks on humanitarian workers and the complexities of clan-based violence that led to the Country's continued fragmentation. Clark (1993:218) stated that the deteriorating security situation prevented the delivery of food to the starving people;

relief flights were looted upon landing, and many clans would burn the food to prevent it from falling into the hands of their rivals. As a result, UN humanitarian agencies withdrew from Somalia out of fear for the safety of their personnel. According to Wheeler (2000:175-178), thousands of Somalis did not die because there was a lack of aid, but because aid could not be rapidly dispersed due to continuing lawlessness. In light of this, the UN appealed to its members to provide military forces to assist the humanitarian operation and to use all means necessary to stop the atrocities. The US responded to the request to lead an international UN force in order to secure the necessary environment for relief efforts. However, troops were to be provided on the basis that an exit-strategy would be in place for the UN to take over the peacekeeping force.

The UNSC approved a larger US-led military operation of 30,000 through its Unified Task Force (UNITAF) known as 'Operation Restore Hope' under the administration of US President, George H.W. Bush, which replaced UNOSOM I. Wheeler (2000:184) noted that "Resolution 794 was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter [and authorised] the Secretary-General and Member States…to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment as soon as possible for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". The UNSC further adopted Resolution 814, to expand and strengthen the UN's role in Somalia. This became the biggest and most expensive operation in the history of the UN at the time, amounting to 1.5 billion dollars (Brandbury 1994:25).

The situation in Somalia necessitated a humanitarian response rather than a military intervention. Therefore, it left room to question whether a military intervention could serve as a humanitarian agency and under what legal basis it would be deployed.

According to Clark (1993), the international response to Somalia prior to 1992 was inadequate and was a half-hearted multilateral measure that contributed to the circumstance of anarchy and exposed the failure of a collective response to meet the realities of the post-Cold War era. From opposing the deployment of troops to leading in the largest peacekeeping operation, it revealed the amount of pressure the George HW Bush administration was under to take action. Furthermore, the media played a significant role to push the decision to intervene in the Country. Wheeler (2000:181) stated that further reasons for the intervention in Somali included Bush's desire to

deflect attention from his inaction over Bosnia and to emphasise his vision of a new world order.

During the intervention, hundreds of Somalis died and two US helicopters were shot down in a conflict between US Army Rangers and Somalis loyal to various warlords in the streets of Mogadishu. The US operation came to an abrupt end in March 1994 and UN peacekeepers withdrew, having failed to implement their mandate (Heyns & Stefiszn, 2006:315). The conflict in Somalia persisted, and in March the UN decided to transform the UNITAF operation into what came to be known as UNOSOM II. The mandate of UNOSOM II was to strengthen continued relief efforts and, more significantly, to restore peace and stability, including rebuilding the Somali state and economy. Yet, several episodes of fighting with those who were deployed to assist continued to deter the delivery of humanitarian aid. According to Contreras (2012), "there were incidents where Somali civilians were not only starving, but also being used as human shields by the warlords who were storing illegal weapons and breaking the cease-fire agreements".

4.8 AFRICA'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN SOMALIA

Despite the absence of a central government for many years, some areas in Somalia experienced relative peace, reconciliation, and security such as Somaliland and Puntland. But this is not to say that a central government was not necessary or the collapsed State has not come without consequences to the Somali people. It only asserted that the conflicts in Somalia could not be exclusively caused by the absence of a functioning central government, which may not always be the solution to conflicts. It can also be argued that the attempts to establish a central government in Somalia indirectly intensified the conflicts in Somalia. Internationally, Somalia is depicted and exaggerated as a State that has only resonated in a bloody and violent conflict. In reality, fewer people died from armed conflict in some parts of Somalia than in neighbouring countries that had central governments. In these areas, security was better than it was under a government. According to UNDP (2008:16), the same number of annual deaths in Somalia during this period were due to childbirth as were attributable to war, which is roughly 4% of the total number. Furthermore, these deaths

were mostly combatants, not civilians. But although these were in the northern part of Somalia, the southern part of Somalia was plagued by clan-conflict.

In an effort to create long-term stabilisation and development in Somalia, to promote dialogue and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, the AU PSC established AMISOM in 2007. The peacekeeping operation was mostly funded by the EU and comprised primarily of troops from Burundi and Uganda. It became an important role player in the developments leading to the transitional government of Somalia. The peacekeeping operation has carried the heaviest burden of provisioning international solidarity to Somalia since its deployment (Marangio 2012). Some of their actions led to significant improvements in the security situation. AMISOM has a multidimensional focus inclusive of political, humanitarian, and civil affairs, as well as military and policing components. These components engaged with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to ensure decisive contributions towards stabilising the country. In 2012, the transition from the TFG to the FGS was internationally hailed as a sign of hope for a Country that has been without a central government for more than 10 years. Recognition by multilateral financial institutions gave further indication that international opinions favoured meaningful engagements with the administration in Mogadishu (Murithi 2008:69-70).

Despite significant progress on the political and security fronts, many challenges faced the FGS and AMISOM in the implementation of the peace operation's mandate. The exertions to maintain and consolidate the security gains made by the Somalia National Forces (SNF) with the support of AMISOM, remained a requirement. Building more professional, well equipped and motivated security forces, extending the FGS authority, and enabling public service delivery to the population are also critical.

The inception of AMISOM traces back to IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), which was an operation designed by IGAD in 2005. The lack of funding and challenges with the neutrality of the TCCs given that most of the potential TCCs were Somalia's immediate neighbours, led to the inability of IGAD to deploy troops on the ground. IGASOM was also perceived as a US -backed Western means to curb the growth of the Islamic movement. These obstructions led to the establishment of AMISOM (Shinn 2013).

AMISOM is a unique peacekeeping operation comprised of a wide range of troops from African countries and underpinned by a wide mandate. AMISOM's mandate is to protect the transitional government (and now FGS) personnel and institutions, conduct military enforcement operations against Al-Shabaab, and facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations. Furthermore, the need for AMISOM was also to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and create conditions for the reconstruction and sustainable development of Somalia. Its initial deployment strength consisted of 1,600 Ugandan soldiers who were later joined by Burundian troops in 2007. Thereafter, the peacekeeping operation grew and evolved, revealing the changing and complex context on the ground. By 2013, AMISOM comprised a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel, which was adopted by UNSC resolution 2124 (2013) (United Nations 2013). Although the peacekeeping operation is led by the AU, it was created with the expectation to create a suitable environment for the UN to eventually take over the operation. However, years later, these conditions have not eventuated and the UNSC has continued to rely on the AU-led peace support operation as a pivotal pillar in the political and security stabilisation effort in Somalia. Only in 2015, the UN is considering the possibility of deploying a UN peacekeeping force in Somalia. Based on the conditions in the Country, is not expected to be conducive to deployment until the end of 2016 at the earliest (What's in Blue 2015).

AMISOM is unique because it is characterised by an arranged model in the international security architecture where the international community and regional organisations are working in close partnership to advance political and security interests, which can be translated as a form of hybridisation (Boutellis & Williams 2013). Not only is AMISOM supported by the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), it is also supported by IGAD, UN political operations and the UN Country Team which coordinates the UN humanitarian and development agencies. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1722 in 2007 for AMISOM to take all necessary means to *inter alia* protect the institutions of the TFG and support dialogue and reconciliation. In early 2010, analysts, such as Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye (2010) from the Institute for Security Studies, reported that it was "unreasonable to think, given the weakness of its mandate and lack of means and resources, that it [AMISOM] could deliver anything resembling the conditions for peace".

In 2012, the UNSC further adopted Resolution 2036 in order to reduce threats posed by insurgents and other armed opposition groups, and to create conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia (de Coning & Freear 2015). This resolution enforced AMISOM's multidimensional strategy, which is based on two approaches: a security-orientated approach, which was dependent on the improvement of the security system and the continuing defeat of insurgents; and a politically-orientated approach, which was based on the promotion of good governance. Furthermore, AMISOM is envisioned to play a supportive role as it leaves the ownership of the process to the Government of Somalia. The weakening of Al-Shabaab and their removal from the control of strategic areas, and the protection of key government figures (the former Transitional Government Institutions and the current Parliament and Presidency), are the most notable achievements of AMISOM.

Al-Shabaab, an Arabic word for 'the youth', emerged after the invasion by Ethiopia that ousted the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in December 2006 who fought against what they perceived to be an internationally-imposed TFG. Further, Al-Shabaab is also opposed to AMISOM and any UN presence, and determined on imposing its extreme version of Islam on the country. The group's nuance and complexity emerged from radical remnants of the UIC. In June 2015, the AU troops at a peacekeepers' base south of Mogadishu were attacked by Al-Shabaab, as one of the latest series of such attacks. Prior to this, Al-Shabaab aimed to collapse Somalia's government and impose its own strict version of Islamic law, and attacked an AU convoy with Ethiopian soldiers along the same route (Omar & Sheikh 2015). Al-Shabaab has been able to slow down the progress of the FGS and AMISOM through the utilisation of asymmetrical warfare (i.e. violent attacks and indiscriminate bombings of civilians) and attacks on Somali and foreign targets. Much of the central and south of Somalia remains heavily under the control of the group.

Re-establishing the rule of law and attaining sustainable and lasting peace in Somalia has not been easy. AMISOM has been confronted with contextual and structural challenges that were closely related. Contextually, this referred to the challenges that emerged from the recent political and security situation in Somalia. Structurally, this referred to the difficulties that AMISOM have faced since the beginning of the operation, which originated from the institutional deficiencies of the AU and are no doubt also shared by other AU peacekeeping operations (Segul 2013).

It is evident that what AMISOM has accomplished so far can be viewed, for many, as 'relative successes'. With AMISOM's support, the SNF have effectively evicted Al-Shabaab from most major urban centres in southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, Baidoa, and the port cities of Marka and Kismayo. AMISOM developed the techniques and tactics that have enabled it to achieve sustained military successes against Al-Shabaab, but more still needs to be done to defeat the terrorist group. As a result, Mogadishu is witnessing an improvement in the security realm. Asymmetric and systematic attacks in some areas remain a reason for concern. Thus, it can be deduced that AMISOM's military successes, in those areas, remain incomplete.

Although AMISOM has evolved, it has struggled with insufficient equipment. It took years to build basic facilities such as medical support and military amenities. Through UN support, AMISOM has obtained access to a small yet still insufficient number of outsourced helicopters for medical evacuation and transport functions. These are important features as troops are spread over a wide area. In addition, AMISOM has been limited by resources, particularly force size, despite repeated requests for increases in force strength from the AU. By 2013, AMISOM emerged to become the foundation of stability in Somalia, with the support of a series of partnerships and alliances with the Somali government forces, the Somali National Army (SNA).

AMISOM has demonstrated its success in recent years and has grown its force in size, but at the same time it has necessarily relied on non-state armed groups and forces across Somalia, to different degrees and at different times, as AMISOM continues to provide vital human intelligence and enhance population engagement; however, this strategy is challenged by the independence, reliability, and quality of these non-state groups, which oftentimes remained less than the ideal. Furthermore, the effectiveness of AMISOM's ongoing security and stability-oriented operations and efforts to consolidate its gains remain amongst its own significant challenges. AMISOM still lacks an adequate number of civilians within its ranks to conduct a variety of non-military stabilization tasks; furthermore, the FGS does not want AMISOM to become too involved with issues of local governance and policing but rather focus its primary efforts on dismantling Al-Shabaab (Williams 2013:6).

AMISOM's recent efforts to both directly and indirectly support the consolidation of Somalia's governance and administrative structures have supported greater efforts to curb the scourge of war in Somalia. After 21 years without a central government and disparity, Somalia is now witnessing a post-transitional situation that will rely much on the strategic approach of the AU PSC through the support of AMISOM. This process was landmarked by the launch of an Interim Constitution in 2012, the inauguration of the Federal Parliament and the inauguration of Mr Hassan Sheikh Muhamud as President of the Federal Republic of Somalia later that year. These political developments were considered milestones in the stabilisation of the country and stimulated hope that such events could be the inception of a broader political process embracing all Somalis (Segul 2013).

The deeply rooted institutional legacy of corruption needs to be addressed. In addition, the weak and almost non-existent political apparatus, as well as its effectiveness in those areas controlled by the government need to be controlled if Somalia is to have any change for stability. Furthermore, the complexity of clan-based politics that are preponderant in informal, local, and self-governed structures of power will have to be under a watchful eye (Segul 2013). Therefore, AMISOM's success will partially depend on whether governmental structures are able to deliver much needed pubic goods and services, and provide stability and peace throughout liberated areas.

The immediate and perhaps most challenging goal for AMISOM is to comprehend how to stabilise the ostensive 'liberated areas' which can be effectively achieved and maintained according to AMISOM's scope and capacities. Since 2012, AMISOM's expansion in areas of operation has been vast. For instance, areas such as Barawe and Adale have been liberated and according to AMISOM's Force Commander, Lieutenant General Silas Ntigurirwa, by 2014 the SNA and AMISOM forces "control more than 80 percent of the territory of Somalia" (AMISOM Review 2015:4). AMISOM will need to promote its peace-building support strategy in parallel with Somalia's strategy, allowing the government to have the necessary space to manoeuvre in order to be the leading institution in the process.

Lasting peace in Somalia requires that AMISOM understand the local initiatives in dealing with security in order to support the building of a legitimate and effective security strategy. The AMISOM police have the mandate to engage in the capacity building of the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible body that can provide security for the population. So far, AMISOM has assisted the SPF in vetting 600 former Somali police officers with the purpose of increasing the number of operational police officers in the country. More formed Police Unit members and equipment are required to effectively guarantee the rule of law in Somalia.

Initially, the AMISOM operational mandate did not include specific human rights components, in line with international standards for peacekeeping. A shift of focus by the AU and UN resulted in greater attention to civilian protection concerns, leading to a significant drop in civilian causalities.

Progress has also been made in the state formation and federalism process. Two Interim Regional Administrations (IRAs) have been formed in Jubbaland and in South West of Somalia. A state formation process is also underway in the central region, while initial discussions have started regarding the development of the remaining federal state covering the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions. As these states are being established, demands for support in the form of capacity building are increasing.

Ensuring inclusivity in the political process remains critical as demonstrated in Burundi. Regional and local community reconciliation efforts will also need to be strengthened. Despite these improvements, notable challenges remain and should be addressed by AMISOM if it is to be viewed as a legitimate and credible peacekeeping operation by the Somali population. The ongoing challenges in Somalia necessitate an increase of AMISOM's strength and expansion of its logistical package. Therefore, the SNA will need to be supported by UNSOA through the provision of food and water, fuel, transport, tents and in-theatre medical evacuation. This support needs to be provided only for joint SNA operations with AMISOM which are part of AMISOM's overall strategic concept. In light of the progress attained in 2014 and cognizant of the changing situation in Somalia, a joint review of AMISOM is imperative, especially the implementation of the AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) in order to enhance the planning and effectiveness of the joint SNA, AMISOM operation and cooperation with other partners. Politically, the strategy of achieving any form of stability before a

wider inter-Somali dialogue is a mistake, therefore, keeping Somalia divided will continue to exacerbate the conflict.

As a way forward, it is important for the UN and AU to learn from the peacekeeping operations that have been conducted in order to develop ways to improve their peacekeeping initiatives for sustainable and lasting peace. In this light, it is important to consider if lessons could be learned from the case of Darfur which could be applicable in Somalia.

4.9 LESSONS LEARNED FROM DARFUR AND SOMALIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Peacekeeping mandates have shifted to become robust in response to constantly changing security environments. There seems to be a perception of Africa as a continent that knows no peace, and where conflict is the order of the day. These are narrow perceptions, which have not recognised the positive developments that African member states have made.

The cases of Darfur and Somalia are of great significance. They are analysed from both the international and African perspectives, and efforts are directed toward bringing about peace, security, and development. Whether these efforts will result in lasting peace, remains to be seen. As alluded to, both peacekeeping operations have a potential for success, if accompanied by a political solution.

The AU's response to the conflict in Somalia, mainly in the Mogadishu area, adds a bleak perspective on the lessons learned from AMIS. Similar to AMIS, TCCs pledged troops for AMISOM but failed to deploy to its full capacity. While the AU expressed the overarching impetus to developing African solutions to African problems, its initial intention with AMISOM was to prepare the ground for a future UN peacekeeping operation (Ramsbothan 2007:270).

Darfur and Somalia are both intertwined by complex humanitarian and political crises which face a strong opposition to intervention. In both cases, the UN spoke of a robust military intervention, however, this did not come to pass rapidly enough. Furthermore, the first few years of AMISOM's mandate were not consistent with the tasks necessary

on the ground, thus, without the UN presence, AMISOM remained too small to accomplish its tasks.

It is evident that both the case of Darfur and Somalia demonstrate how valuable the political commitment of the AU is to successfully manage and prevent conflicts. However, the increasing propensity for AU-led interventions has been driven more so by political considerations than by the practical considerations of the AU's capacity. This does not indicate that the AU should only intervene when it has capacity. In both cases, the AU responded to its implicit and explicit commitments to protect civilians; however, there was a severe disconnect between their willingness and abilities to intervene.

The same strategy in place to combine efforts for Darfur can be applied in Somalia. The political context of the Country and buy-in of the population would be imperative towards consolidating the Country. It is important to have joint planning and training in order for the AU and UN to succeed in their peacekeeping operation to stabilize Somalia (Gelot, Gelot & de Coning 2012:89).

Furthermore, what can be learned from the case of Darfur and other cases such as Burundi is an attempt of inclusivity in the political processes, which can make a vital difference in the current context of any country. Furthermore, the realities of Somalia, which are threatening and have the potential to escalate, remain a constant challenge.

Hybrid peacekeeping operations and partnerships, especially between the AU and UN, appear to constitute evolving trends in efforts to find constructive peace support solutions to African conflicts. The complexities in Somalia for instance, especially for AMISOM, reflect a new networked pattern in the international security architecture, where the UN and regional organisations are increasingly working in close partnership to enhance political and security interests. The number of actors and the variety of different development, diplomatic, and security interventions thus make for a complex and often unwieldy network of international peace and security actors. The partnership can be cumulative - combined efforts to shape the future of peacekeeping. According to de Cedric and Freear (2015), this can be seen as a networked-pattern of multi-stakeholder cooperation.

The evolution of peacekeeping on the continent, although adherent to international norms and best practices, has led to a more unpredictable environment on the ground. There is no blueprint for peacekeeping operations, and the UN remains derelict, by not performing its functions effectively which have resulted in complex logistical aspects. The hybrid partnership over the years have become more co-dependent: the UN has a partner it engages with for consent to intervene in states, while the AU has a counterpart for financial, technical, logistical and human resource assistance to fulfil their mandates. It is therefore important to practically analyse whether these partnerships offer any new insights to the challenges faced on the continent. This arrangement could be argued to be asymmetrical and unparalleled, based on the mutual consent of both organisations. Practically, both these organisations cannot be seen as co-equal, because the UN is much more experienced, with more resources than the AU. Despite this fact, the AU is in a more advantageous position in terms of being in close proximity to the crisis of the continent and it is able to respond more rapidly than the UN. Moreover, the AU does not have all the standards, rules, and bureaucracies in place that the UN has (de Coning & Freear 2015).

The approach of a hybrid partnership as demonstrated in Darfur can be applied in Somalia, only if there is coordination and collaboration of efforts, from both organisations, including sub-regional efforts, to ensure they do not move towards a paternalistic approach. The regions should play a fundamental role, but who is to take the lead, remains a debate. The rhetoric notion of 'African solutions to African problems' is challenged by ongoing external funding, which not only limits the space to which the AU can make decisions, but it has the risk of creating a dependency syndrome. Therefore, because of the prevailing constraints, hybridisation through burden-sharing arrangements between the UN and the AU seems to be the most effective and appropriate approach for the predictable future. Practically, hybridisation reflects the significance and legitimacy of African leadership in regional security, especially in the case of Darfur. Furthermore, the resource and political capacity constraints faced by the AU will benefit from a shared responsibility in peace operations based on comparative advantages (Mickler 2013:507). Although the AU has attempted to be more self-sufficient to end its perpetual and disruptive dependence on external funding, it has struggled to take financial responsibility in resolving the continent's conflicts.

4.10 CONCLUSION

Efforts towards peace, security and development are essential to any peacekeeping operation, and the UN and AU have confronted their own challenges toward maintaining peace and security. Focusing on the AU, its limitations have been especially demonstrated in its conduct of peacekeeping operations. AU-led peacekeeping operations have been characterised by the absence of clear articulated frameworks for peacekeeping. These challenges are further coupled with the lack of capacity and effectiveness on the ground, as demonstrated through AMIS in Darfur and AMISOM in Somalia.

The root causes of the violence in Darfur originate from its inter-tribal conflict over land and other cross-cutting factors. In this light, experiences in the Darfur crisis provide an imperative case study of the international community's commitment to peacekeeping operations, particularly in the face of emerging humanitarian crises.

The challenges and atrocities in Darfur are evidence that there is no clear way to translate the theories of preventive action into effective and realistic practices. Therefore, it is important for the international community to move beyond empty rhetoric of 'never again' by adopting a robust mandate and setting a strong precedence from the onset. Policymakers need to address the assumptions and interests that impede the UNSC member states to rapidly respond to the crises in Africa.

Furthermore, the lack of capacity within the UN and AU will need to be dealt with in order to move towards resilience. The establishment of the AU was greeted with prominence and the mere reality that it is willing to undertake peacekeeping initiatives was a marked improvement from the indifference of the OAU. The organisation's failure to address the conflicts in Darfur only validated the lack of resources and capacity which impeded the protection of civilians. Despite the challenges faced by the organisations, it has seen relative successes towards its attempt to resolving and managing conflicts within the continent. The peacekeeping operations conducted in Darfur and Somalia have sparked great controversy towards political outcomes that are needed for sustainable and lasting peace.

Although the case of Darfur presented the AU with an opportunity to find African solutions to African problems, this slogan or notion provides an opportune façade of the international community to commit their own troops to Darfur. Nonetheless, the AU, despite their inexperience in peacekeeping operations, was able to deploy troops to the Country. The UN could have been a strong and legitimate actor in the case of Darfur, showing that the international community would not tolerate genocide and ethnic cleansing. Internal constraints and a lack of political will have prevented it from doing so, thus there remained a role to be played by African organisations.

The ineffective mandate of AMIS is one of the fundamental criticisms against the peacekeeping operation. Such mandates have plagued peacekeeping operations since their inception, including the surge of demands for peacekeeping operations. However, a few have failed, such as the peace operations in Rwanda. Although attempts were made to enhance the international community's response to the conflicts, consensus was achieved to use the Brahimi Report as a baseline for peacekeeping operations. AMIS has inspired reflection on how experience can guide future peace operations.

Similarly to the AMIB, the AU lacked funds and personnel for AMIS, which was also hindered by a lack of logistics, a lack of capacity to address the complexities of Darfur, especially guided by an unclear mandate, and operational gaps. As a result, the first of its kind, where UN peacekeepers have explicitly worked with another regional organisation, most specifically the AU, in a single integrated operation funded by the UN mechanism and structure. Despite the fact that the violence in Darfur and other parts of the Sudan continue to hinder proper operations of UNAMID, there are evidences that its legitimacy is in place. However, with reflection of the on-going violence, its legitimacy encounters criticisms due to the on-going violence in Darfur. In addition, the image of the UN has been severely tarnished, not only by claims of severe abuse by peacekeepers, but also by its inability to respond quickly and effectively to these events.

Conflicts over economic resources have been a point of contention, prior and post-independence, and this has only deteriorated the cultural divide in Somalia. In the post-independence period, struggle over state power involved securing the major economic resources. This coupled with economic mismanagement, corruption, and

failure to meet the citizen's expectations has increased poverty and discontent which intensified the crisis. The situation in Somalia needs immediate intervention by the international community. As a result, both regional and international organisations had a role to play in resolving the Somali conflict.

The AU was the appropriate mediator in the case of Darfur because it possessed the regional knowledge and has the right intention to find a resolution to the conflict. The role it played was partially motivated by the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' – however, this is not to say that Africa is able to do this in a vacuum. Cases such as genocide, mass murder and ethnic cleansing, are not only African problems, but international problems. Although the UNSC is limited by the respect of state sovereignty, it can still take robust initiatives by supporting other regional actors to address the conflict in Darfur. At the time of structural UNSC limits, the AU in spite of its own challenges was the only regional actor left to address the situation in Darfur, and should be credited for that.

The experience of the hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur demonstrates that a transition from an AU to a UN peacekeeping operation does not necessarily present a solution to Africa's peacekeeping challenges. While a hybrid approach to peacekeeping offers useful possibilities into the AU's initiative to undertake peacekeeping operations, albeit jointly with the UN, the partnership falls short of expectation in its implementation. Hybrid operations enhances the collaboration of one body complementing the other according to their comparative advantage towards achieving sustainable peace. The AU will need to be cautious not to lose this advantage by building bureaucracies which will slow down any future deployment for a peacekeeping operation in Africa.

As a new and growing approach to peacekeeping operations, it is important to determine what the UN-AU hybridisation represents realistically. Hybrid operations will continue to be a major feature on the peacekeeping landscape. The AU's experience in Darfur and Somalia proves that much is still to be improved in order to deliver peace and security in Africa. It is without doubt that the AU's peace and security architecture is and will continue to be a fundamental component of Africa's solidarity towards its peacekeeping initiatives.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to analyse and assess whether hybrid peace operations may offer new prospects or opportunities to respond to the prevailing challenges of international peacekeeping in Africa. This objective was formulated against the growing complexity of peacekeeping operations, which have become multidimensional and robust in nature. The study traced the evolution of the roles and policy frameworks of the organisations involved in African peacekeeping operations, specifically the UN and the AU. In addition, the study focused on the regional initiatives and non-UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, as well as regional organisations which are and have been active within the African continent.

The study specifically explored hybrid peace operations in Darfur and Somalia as case studies. The entire investigation was contextualised through a literature review and an analysis of Africa's engagement in peacekeeping operations.

To facilitate this study, the following questions were formulated:

Do hybrid peacekeeping or recent forms of UN-AU co-operation offer new prospects or opportunities for the challenges relating to international peacekeeping in Africa?

Furthermore, is the international community moving towards more effective and legitimate peacekeeping operations when it follows an approach of hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa, such as the one in Sudan and previously in Liberia and Burundi, or where an AU force is deployed in accordance with a UN Security Council mandate, such as the case of Somalia?

The challenge of the UN becoming overstretched to maintain international peace and security, and having to attend to the legitimacy of its peacekeeping operations, formed the conceptual distinction of the research problem. Furthermore, the challenge to address Africa's conflict and security needs formed the basis of the research problem. This included the possibility to pursue an integrated system of burden-sharing that will play a meaningful role for future peacekeeping endeavours in Africa.

The African continent formed the geographic demarcation, whereas the post-Cold War period from 1992 to 2014 formed the temporal demarcation. The temporal demarcation took into account traditional peacekeeping operations in which lessons might be learnt. The research methodology used is a historical-critical study based on analyses of literature in the scholarly field of international peacekeeping operations. The analytical framework of the study is deductively linked using qualitative analysis. The study presented an in-depth understanding of the practice of hybrid peacekeeping and a comprehensive appreciation of its evolution in a world which bears little resemblance to post-Cold War expectations.

The data gathered was largely qualitative in nature using, documents of peacekeeping which focused on the hybrid operations in Somalia and Sudan. Secondary data sources included published documents, reports, newspaper articles and reports regarding the mandate of operations, and books. In addition, primary sources included official UN and AU documents, and relevant documents on the concept of hybrid peacekeeping with reference to Somalia and Darfur were utilized. The study also focused on peacekeeping operations in the two countries, Somalia and Sudan, which are different in terms of background and context – specifically from a peacekeeping perspective. Sudan has a political structure (that is, a government) that could be used to consent to intervention, whereas Somalia has a very tenuous structure.

The study interrogated the international community's belief that a country can only be at peace if it has a central government. The research revealed that in the absence of a central government in Somalia, Mogadishu experienced turbulence, while other parts of the country such as Somaliland and Puntland remained peaceful. The limitation of the study relates to the ongoing peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Somalia. It thus would be premature to make a conclusive judgement on its future prospects because the peacekeeping operations in both cases have not been brought to finality.

The significance of this study is that the conclusions reached could assist policy-makers, practitioners and academics, as well as other researchers and analysts to explore hybridisation in peacekeeping operations in Africa and other forms of burden-sharing, as a fairly practical prospect in the arena of international peacekeeping with specific reference to the multinational operations in Somalia and Darfur. In addition,

it could assist decision-makers at different levels to develop a better understanding of the complexities and considerations of the deploying authorities at higher international political levels, and thus enrich all relevant actors who need to exercise responsibilities with regard to the complex challenges relating to hybrid international peacekeeping operations in Africa. Furthermore, it is hoped that the outcome and findings of this study would facilitate and stimulate further scholarly analysis and reflection on future hybrid peacekeeping operations or other forms of contemporary UN-AU burden-sharing as a suitable working arrangement to better address the challenges in conflict-ridden African states. It is even trusted that the research conducted could serve as some kind of a framework to assess the extent to which hybridisation may serve as a model or parameter for future peacekeeping operations.

The study commenced by looking at the theoretical framework of peacekeeping intervention in sub-Saran Africa based on new institutional co-operation and partnerships between the UN and the AU. It revealed that the respect of state sovereignty as provisioned in the UN Charter is important; however, it cannot be utilised as a right if mass atrocities are committed. Sovereignty should be a responsibility of which states can be accountable to the international community for its actions. If the state did not or was unable to take upon this responsibility, it then becomes the international community's responsibility to act for the preservation of life. Despite some progress in the spread of human rights, respect for state sovereignty continues to take precedence.

The study also emphasised that the ICISS report should be practical and should be implemented on a case-by-case basis. The rise of conflicts has necessitated the need for peacekeeping operations, which have often been guided by the Brahimi Report, especially in post-2000. The landmark Brahimi report charted a renewed vision, principles, and guidance that were more robust and cost-efficient for effective UN peacekeeping. It also provided recommendations for sweeping changes in the way UN peacekeeping and associated post-conflict peace-building are conceived, planned, and executed. In alignment with Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 An Agenda for Peace, the Brahimi report aimed to recommence pledges made by UN member states to maintain international peace and security. The vital contribution of An Agenda for Peace was to the modern understanding of peace and the comprehension of the concept of post-conflict peace-building. The study also revealed that Post-Brahimi

report operations require peacekeepers to identify potential spoilers of the mandate and take action against them, using force if necessary.

During this epoch, peacekeeping has been characterised by the increasing involvement of transnational and regional organisations that contribute to the credibility and achievability of the mandates. In order to maintain international peace and security with the focus on the African continent, it has become apparent that the UN cannot work in a vacuum but needs the assistance of regional actors. Without this approach, the UN can become overstretched in terms of maintaining peace. Actors such the AU and sub-regional actors have developed over the years and have had a vital interest and a critical role to play in bringing about peace and security on the continent. Therefore, the relationship between the two organisations, the UN/AU, is of paramount importance if the international community is to take lasting peace seriously, which will depend on coherent and strategically structured relations which are systematically integrated.

The study also revealed that the AU has come a long way since it succeeded the OAU, especially with the changing and complex political and security environment into which it was born. As part of the changing nature of conflicts, the organisation shifted from non-interference to non-indifference, underscoring the role Africans are playing to take responsibility for peace and security. To this end, the AU has deployed more peace operations with increasingly complex mandates into volatile conflict environments. The peace operations were beset by many logistical and financial challenges, including political and material support and unclear mandates. The case of Liberia and Burundi, as part of the first hybrid peace operations to be conducted, have accentuated the need for the UN to get involved in efforts to maintain peace and security at the earliest stage of a conflict and including collaboration with regional and sub-regional organisations from the onset of peace operations. Hybridisation in African peacekeeping has involved both regional and global peacekeeping tools and resources toward peace. The concept of hybrid peacekeeping operations requires more than just merging efforts of peacekeeping operations together.

The study analysed hybrid peacekeeping, especially recent incarnations of UN/AU co-operation in peace operations. It acknowledged that the AU's limitations have been especially demonstrated in its conduct of peacekeeping operations. AU-led

peacekeeping operations have been characterised by the absence of clearly articulated frameworks for peacekeeping. The study revealed that similar challenges were faced in both the Darfur and Somalia peacekeeping operations. These challenges include the lack of capacity and effectiveness, unclear mandates, and limited resources. The challenges and atrocities in Darfur provide evidence that there is no clear way to translate the theories of preventive action into effective and realistic practices. Therefore, it is important for the international community to move beyond empty rhetoric of 'never again' by adopting robust mandates, and setting a strong precedent from the onset. Thus a conclusion can be made in the context of providing answers to the research question.

5.2 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Do hybrid peacekeeping or recent forms of UN-AU co-operation offer new prospects or opportunities for the challenges relating to international peacekeeping co-operation in Africa?

The international community seems to have learned from the darkest history of the Rwanda genocide to never again fail to act in the face of gross forms of human rights violations. This resulted in a shift from the right to intervene to R2P, because if states fail or are unable to protect human rights, the international community has the responsibility to intervene for the protection of civilians. Notwithstanding this notion, there is still great debate on what it means practically, when, and how it can be implemented. The concept of R2P can be useful to respond to the atrocities being committed; however, it unfortunately fails to achieve its intended purpose, and has created confusion on its modalities towards implementation. The study revealed that this concept is of a political nature and requires more clarification to improve its implementation. Due to its nature, R2P can be biased toward the countries in need or the most vulnerable states. It is also an infringement upon state sovereignty and an amplification of human rights. Yet it is a tool to ensure the balance of both concepts. Clear guidelines will need to be defined in order to expand on the circumstances requiring international intervention. Despite state sovereignty remaining rooted in the notion of non-interference of external forces in domestic affairs, it can no longer be seen as absolute. This study revealed that R2P is faced with the challenge of state

sovereignty. Nonetheless, implementation of this concept has the potential to serve as being responsible and accountable to the international community for the protection of the population. The international community will need to be flexible in order to protect civilians based on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, human rights and security should be the primary focus as denoted by Kransner (2001), Baylis (2005), and Duffield (2007). Duffield (2007) further emphasise the need for a security-development nexus as a way to achieve coherent and well-managed policies regarding complex challenges facing states.

The study revealed that there is a lack of or unclear guidelines on how to intervene, support peacekeeping operations that are conducted on the African continent such as the DRC and Mali, the use of force, and the protection of civilians. Although the UN has developed guidelines for peacekeeping operations, including implementing recommendations from the Brahimi report, these need to be practical to fit the current situation faced by states. These will need to reflect and enhance the roles transnational and regional organisations can play to maintain peace and security. The study acknowledged that the relationship between the UN, regional, and sub-regional organisations is of paramount importance, and its advantage will depend on coherence and strategically structured relations which are systematically integrated. Moreover, by working together they will reach far greater legitimacy despite both entities' shortcomings.

Collective security can play an important role in terms of the proposition that a threat to peace in Africa or elsewhere should be considered a threat to peace everywhere. Yet, it was evident that the UN cannot maintain international peace and security in a vacuum, thus the growing role of the AU and sub-regional organisations. Guided by the AU Constitutive Act, the AU established several institutions, bodies, and protocols to address continental security and development under the framework of the APSA. The African continent continues to have a strong desire to build capability to address and rapidly respond to crises through the establishment of an ASF. There has long been talk of implementing an ASF, which is still underway and expected to be operational in the near future, after being postponed in 2010. However, the APSA structure is too ambitious and complex for a continent comprised of limited capacity and diverse in political differences. The APSA has been unable to address the current challenges of peacekeeping in Africa such as in the Sahel and CAR. The AU was

incapable of fielding a credible intervention and was overtaken by the decisive response of the French in Mali. This testifies to the weakness of the APSA and specifically the AU and African regional organisations. Therefore, before the APSA can function as originally envisaged, it requires extra time, effort, funding, and coordination. In 2015, due to the slow developments of the RECs, delays, and setbacks, an alternative solution to rapidly respond was proposed. This proposal is the ACIRC which is designed to be a mechanism available until the full operational capacity of the ASF is ready. Discussions are however still underway. There has also been a trend towards increasing continental and regional ownership for peace and security activities. The AU has been working to strengthen its capacity to plan, manage, and implement peace operations on the continent through the development and implementation of policies that have assisted to advance the development of the ASF and improve the capacity and capability of the current peacekeeping operations in the implementation of their mandates.

The study revealed that the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity between the UN, the AU, and the RECs when it came to decision-making on interventions and the division of labour, has been given greater attention. A range of initiatives have been implemented by regional organisations in the form of support to the UN and in return the UN's support to the regional organisations have led to co-deployment or budgetary support. The lack of a practical definition that would govern the relationship is unclear and it is a significant omission. Despite political difficulties that face the regional organisations, such as lack of resources and funding, their involvement continues to grow and promote subsidiarity. There is a need to enhance partnership and cooperation between the UN, AU, and RECs, and clarify the primary responsibility of the UNSC and the AU PSC. Furthermore, a more effective strategic partnership is needed to manage conflicts on the African continent.

Hybrid peacekeeping operations do not occur in a political vacuum but rather as a collective effort by the organisations to address the wide range of peace and security challenges confronting international peacekeeping in Africa. Hybridization is characterised by various institutions collaborating and complementing one another to enhance their comparative advantages, and sharing the political and economic costs of responding in order to work towards an environment of sustainable peace. Thus, comprehensively addressing the root causes of a given conflict requires commitment

from various actors to work together in a partnership. Moreover, coordinated and coherent strategies would be more optimal if accompanied by clear objectives in order to enhance peacekeeping initiatives. Hybrid operations enhance the collaboration of one body complementing the other according to their respective comparative advantage which will guide decisions to enhance peace operations. This approach to peacekeeping introduces useful possibilities into the AU's initiative to undertake peacekeeping operations, albeit jointly with the UN, although the partnership falls short of expectation in its implementation.

The African continent is a fundamental part of the interconnected world and the AU is seeming to be a partner of the UN in peacekeeping operations, which is grounded in mutual responsibility. But this relationship should be seen as a partnership in building the capacity for transformation. The mutual security arrangement is a foundation of the partnership which focuses on areas that are critical to the future of peacekeeping operations on the African continent. The AU will need to be cautious not to lose this advantage by building bureaucracies which would slow down any future deployment for a peacekeeping operation in Africa. It also needs to remain vigilant to ensure that it does not descend into a form of paternalism and dependence on external actors. Moreover, regional organisations have and continue to play a primary and more fundamental role in peacekeeping operations. These have proven themselves in responding to conflict on the continent as demonstrated in Liberia and Burundi, especially in the wake of the international community's lack of a political will to intervene and rapidly respond to the atrocities being committed. There still remains challenges regarding the clarity of roles, responsibilities, and command and control structures of these entities in peacekeeping operations which require coordination, collaboration, and cooperation. Without these, the roles are blurred, coupled with the possibility of duplication of work especially with the rise of civil conflicts.

The implementation of hybrid peacekeeping operations offers new prospects or opportunities despite the AU's lack of financial capacity to fund its own peace operations and will rely on funding from external partners and donors. Although there is an understanding that the UN will not intervene in a country unless there is a ceasefire in place, it then leaves regional and sub-regional organisation in a position where they have to take responsibility despite their limitations. The challenges facing African states are real and they are many; however, the needs to circumvent them will

not be met with ease or in a short period of time. Furthermore, the failure to rapidly respond is a direct result of fragmented politics and failed policies. Therefore, instead of the AU waiting for the international community to respond, the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' comes to play. Africans are in the forefront to resolve conflicts, keep the peace, and support those in need, whether through AU or sub-regionally-led operations. The initiatives are nonetheless supported by the international community such as the case in Somalia. Thus, hybrid peacekeeping between the UN/AU does offer new opportunities to the challenges relating to international peacekeeping cooperation in Africa if they are to use the advantages they have to bring about peace.

Is the international community moving towards more effective and legitimate peacekeeping operations when it follows an approach of hybrid peacekeeping operations in Africa, such as the one in Sudan and previously in Liberia and Burundi, or where an AU force is deployed in accordance with a UN Security Council mandate, such as the case of Somalia?

When disagreements, disputes, and conflict arise, they frequently require the implementation of preventative measures, and often boots on the ground to defuse the conflict, thus the importance of peacekeeping. The growing demands and complex nature of peacekeeping operations in Africa have led to the approach of hybridisation.

The study revealed that conflicts in Liberia, Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia are not simply African problems but are global security challenges which require a global and collective response. Hence, multilateral partnerships through decision-making assistance and support, and the will to contribute towards efforts of peace, security and development on the African continent are of great significance. Therefore, to ensure this objective, states will need to shoulder the burden, both by contributing troops and sharing the financial costs of the operations provided, that peacekeepers deliver on their mandate – it may also bring a greater degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.

The study focused on the case of Liberia to analyse regional initiatives and non-UN peacekeeping operations in Africa as a matter of providing a historical analysis and perspective on the topic under review. As one of the first hybrid peace operations conducted (sub-regional organisation cooperated with a small UN observer force), the

study interrogated the role sub-regional organisations can play to bring about peace in Africa, such as ECOWAS who acted under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The study revealed that, although the Community was initially established to address issues of economic integration and development, however in the midst of security challenges faced, they took responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the region. As a result, ECOMOG was established as a military arm of ECOWAS. Before the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia, there was no cease-fire agreement in place and no peace to keep, yet they were assigned peacekeeping duties, making it unclear whether the operation was a peacekeeping intervention or a traditional multilateral intervention.

Thus the study further revealed the importance for a clear mandate from the outsets in order to ensure lasting peace for the states faced with conflict. Despite the costs and challenges faced, ECOWAS-ECOMOG relatively succeeded to implement its mandate, but failed to create lasting peace. As reiterated, the intervention of ECOWAS-ECOMOG exemplifies the requirement for a clear mandate suitable to meet the needs on the ground. Responding to conflict in a timely manner might result in increased instances of preventive deployment (to avert a major crisis) rather than full-fledged peacekeeping operations, which are more cost intensive. ECOMOG was able to conduct a robust operation which imposed a stable environment. Moreover, their impact also determined a number of post-conflict issues such as reforming of the national army and police. The peacekeeping operation in Liberia indicated the region's willingness to combat instability and the impetuses to respond to conflict are unique due to the case's contextual environment. The study revealed that the rapid response by ECOWAS signifies the capability of a sub-regional organisation to save thousands of lives, particularly in a country that has spent years on the brink of collapse. ECOMOG was faced with a task of establishing political order and the UN came afterwards to consolidate the relative peace that had already been established by ECOMOG.

A collective response in the case of Liberia pointed to an austere truth that the approach of hybridisation has the potential element to make a difference. It therefore emphasised the significance of moving beyond a traditional outlook on conflict, which has led policy-makers to rely on an ambiguous mechanical allegory of conflict. As a

result, a new approach requires an amalgamation of institutional frameworks in order to provide solutions to end instability.

The study further focused on Burundi (circa 2000), again, as a matter of providing a historical analysis and perspective on the topic under review, and to explore the commitment of regional African efforts and actors in the peaceful settlements of conflicts. Although several positive developments resulted since the installation of power-sharing in Burundi, what was of great importance was the negotiation facilitators' interpretation of the concept of inclusivity in the peace process. The strategy of inclusivity embarked on by both facilitators, Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, included small and large parties in the peace process, without overlooking the other based on its size. Both used their own experiences from their respective countries to make discussions frank and provide the platform to go beyond the deadlocks that impeded the negotiations. The negotiations did not guarantee lasting peace, thus the deployment of troops in Burundi. AMIB had to stabilise the country to the extent where the UN was able to take over. Subsequently the peacekeeping operation was able to create an environment for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. The troops contributed by the African member states, remained behind, re-hatting from 'green' to 'blue' helmets. This demonstrated that AU/regional intervention could be turned into sustainable and beneficial forces. The transition (or hand-over) of operations were effective and it is worthy to note that each partnership in an operation is uniquely defined by the specific and contextual nature of conflict, yet they could be classified as successive or integrated.

In the cases of Darfur and Somalia, the study revealed that both states demonstrated how valuable the political commitment of the AU was to successfully manage and prevent conflicts. However, the increasing propensity for AU-led interventions was driven more so by political considerations, than by the practical considerations of the AU's capacity. This did not indicate that the AU should only intervene when it has capacity. In both cases, the AU responded to its implicit and explicit commitments to protect civilians; however, there was a severe disconnect between their willingness and abilities to intervene. The AU's response to the conflict in Somalia, mainly in the Mogadishu area, adds a bleak perspective on the lessons learned from AMIS. Similar to AMIS, TCCs pledged troops for AMISOM but failed to deploy to its full capacity. While the AU expressed the overarching impetus to developing African solution to

African problems, its initial intention with AMISOM was to prepare the ground for future UN operations. Darfur and Somalia were both intertwined by complex humanitarian and political crises which faced a strong opposition to intervention. The same strategy in place to combine efforts for Darfur could be applied in Somalia. The political context of the Country and buy-in of the population would be imperative towards consolidating the Country. The study revealed the importance of having joint planning and training in order for the AU and UN to succeed in their operation to stabilize Somalia.

The cases of Liberia, Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia all validated the role regional and sub-regional organisations can play despite their limitations, challenges, and shortcomings. The study revealed some similarities in the Darfur and Somalia peacekeeping operations. For instance, AMIS lacked military equipment and support mechanisms to prevent any insurgents in the region. Its deficiencies were also caused by constrained operational concepts, lack of resources, and strategic gaps. The lack of civil-military coordination further posed a challenge to the peacekeeping operation. Moreover, years later, conditions in Somalia have not eventuated for a UN presence and the UNSC continues to rely on the AU-led peace support operation as a pivotal pillar in the political and security stabilisation effort in Somalia. AMISOM was limited by resources, particularly force size, despite repeated requests for increases in force strength from the AU, and they struggled with insufficient equipment. These shortcomings and limitations impeded the successful implementation of their mandates. Although the peacekeeping operations provided real improvements in the security situation for the ordinary citizens on the ground, the AU and regional actors will need to learn from the past peacekeeping operations and address their weaknesses.

This serves as an important case study because it can provide the foundation for practitioners and decision-making personnel to focus on past mistakes of peacekeeping operations in order not to repeat these in future. Additionally, they will need to attend to the strengths that were able to assist in implementing the mandate in order not to re-invent the wheel.

The study revealed, that in order to efficiently and effectively achieve the objectives of the mandate, the UN, AU, and RECs will need to collaborate toward ensuring peace and security on the continent. Thus hybridisation will bring a greater degree of

legitimacy especially for the local population that need to be included in order to work towards peace. Given the peacekeeping constraints place on the UN to maintain international peace and security, the implementation of hybrid peace operations has become the most effective and legitimate option for responding to emerging complex crises.

5.3 CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, and following the main findings of this study, it argues that the UN and AU relationship and cooperation over the past two decades, presents significant steps toward operations that would contribute to lasting peace in Africa. The findings allude to the need for the refinement of a common understanding framework for cooperation and burden-sharing. This is more so considering that hybridisation takes place in different policy and operational contexts.

As an improvised response driven by necessity, more studies need to be undertaken to fully explain the positive impact of this cooperation model. The study has shown how limited traditional interventions led to innovative hybridisation but also made the case of the need to refine the response. Specifically, there is a need to: harmonise political decision making, pool resources, and enhance collective action on the ground. The ultimate conclusion is that the resource and political constraints faced by the AU would benefit from the solid shared international responsibility provided by the comparative advantage of hybridisation.

Considering the persistence of factors constraining effective peacekeeping deployment, it is clear that hybrid peacekeeping operations are likely to remain an important feature of international response to conflict. The lessons provided by the Darfur and Somalia cases offer an instructive foundation for both the UN and AU to improve on an evolving approach. The AU and its chronically constrained sub-regional organisations and member states will be better capacitated by the resource mobilisation and burden sharing defined by hybridisation. In the African context, hybrid peacekeeping operations also specifically reflect the significance, legitimacy, and agency of African leadership in regional security, as especially witnessed in the case of Darfur.

In the case of Somalia, the study found a unique set up of UN support to the AU operation on the ground without a handover arrangement. The component led by the AU continued to find political and civilian support from the UN operations on the ground. This cooperation leveraged the international community's engagement with the evolving administrations in Somalia ensuring they were positively influenced to live up to their obligations. The unique Somali context of the AU fighting Al-Shabaab also meant that the institutions building work could be shielded from criticisms of AU limitations and mistakes.

Hybridisation took a context-specific turn in Somalia where the effort of the AU receives logistical support from a specially created UN operation. All these entities operate with clearly defined division of labour, roles and responsibilities. More importantly the UN and AU are cooperating at providing strategic guidance to the field operations. At the operational levels, there is important interlinking engagement ensuring harmonisation of political and strategic guidance. Thus, given the prevailing fragile political and security condition, a hand-over from an AU to UN-led operation of responsibilities could undermine the impartiality of the UN forces and would likely offer insurgents a new rallying course for continuing or escalating the armed conflict. Furthermore, a change of leadership would divert attention of the nascent Somali authorities from the political process.

Lessons can indeed be learned from the conflicts analysed in this study, and the international community now has the advantage of working towards better and more refined hybrid peacekeeping operations than the operations conducted in Darfur and Somalia, which were undertaken when hybridisation as an approach in international peacekeeping had barely outgrown its infancy.

REFERENCES

Abiodun, O. 2011. Darfur: A Complicated Peace Process?. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences*, 3 (1), pp. 183- 207.

Aboagye, F. 2004. The ECOWAS Security regime and its utility for Africa. In: Fields, S. ed. **Peace in Africa, towards a collaborative security regime**. IDG, Geneva, pp. 30-185.

Aboagye, F. and Bah, M. 2004. Liberia at a Crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the protection of civilians. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/papers/95/Paper95.pdf> [Accessed 30 January 2015].

Aboagye, F. and Bah, M. 2015. Synergies of Regional and UN Interventions: The Contribution of the UN Mission in Liberia to Civilian Protection. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/TORTUOUSCHAP5.PDF> [Accessed 30 January 2015].

ACCORD. 2007. **South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Peace Missions. Occasional Paper Series**. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, South Africa, pp. 18-29.

Adebajo, A. 2011. **UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts**. Rienner, Washington, DC, pp. 176-208.

Adebajo, A. 2013. Nigeria. In: Bellamy, A.J. and Williams, P. eds. **Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Troop Contribution**. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 245-268.

Adisa, J. and Aminu, L. 1996. Theories and Doctrines of Peace-Keeping. In: Vogt, M. and Aminu, L. eds. **Peace-keeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies**. Fourth Dimension, Enugu, pp. 85-99.

African Union. 2003. The Protocol Relating to the Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU. Available from: < http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf> [Accessed 22 July 2014].

Agoagye, F. 2004. The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.PDF> [Accessed 6 February 2015].

Ahere, J.R. 2010. A Critical Analysis of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Africa. University of Nairobi, Nairobi. Available from: <http://www.academia.edu/1194136/Critical_Analysis_of_United_Nations_Peacekeeping_Missions_in_Africa> [Accessed on 6 January 2014].

Ajayi, K. 1998. Nigeria's Peace Keeping role in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In: Kolawole, D. ed. **Issues in Nigerian government and Politics**. Steebal Publishers, Akure, p. 179.

Ajayi, T. 2008. The UN, the AU, and ECOWAS-A Triangle for Peace and Security in West Africa? FES Briefing Paper 11. Available from: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/usa/05878.pdf> [Accessed 9 February 2015].

Akindele, R. 2012. The ECOWAS 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence Revisited. *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, 38 (2), pp. 1-15.

Akinyemi, A. and Aluko, I. 1984. Introduction. In: Akinyemi, S. and Aluko, I. eds. **Reading and Documents on ECOWAS**. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Nigeria, pp. 1-17.

AMISOM Review. 2015. New Year, New Focus, Issue 13 Feb - April 2015. Available from: <http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/FIN_Preview_Feb-15-Eng-AMISOM-Mag_Singles.pdf> [Accessed 9 July 2015].

Anghie, A. 2012. Africa, Sovereignty and International Law. Think Africa Press. Available from: <http://thinkafricapress.com/international-law-africa/sovereignty> [Accessed on 30 April 2014].

Annan, K. 2000. Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Office of the United Nations Secretary General. Available from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/741/43/PDF/N0074143.pdf?OpenElement> [Accessed 04 October 2011].

Appaih-Mensah, S. 2006. The African Mission in Sudan: Darfur Dilemmas. *African Security Review*, 15 (1), p. 1.

Arbuckle, J. 2007. Civilian-military conflict in humanitarian operations. NATO Review. Available from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issues3/english/analysis1.html> [Accessed 18 June2012].

Ayebare A. 2014. Peacemaking in Burundi – A Case Study of Regional Diplomacy Backed by International Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. Available from: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/favoritadonia.pdf> [Accessed 1 October 2014].

Bamfo, N. 2013. The Political and Security Challenge facing 'ECOWAS' in the Twenty-First Century: Testing the Limits of an Organisation's Reputation. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3 (1), pp. 12-23.

Ban, K.M. 2010. "Thanks to Brahimi Report Reforms, UN Peacekeeping Today Continues to Serve as 'Operation of Hope' for People Caught in Conflict, Says Secretary General". Available from: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsm12966.doc.htm> [Accessed 06 September 2011].

Baylis, J. 2005. International and Global security in the post-cold war era. In: Baylis, J. and Smith, S. eds. **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 299-324.

Bellamy, A.J. 2004. What Future for Peace Operations? Brahimi and Beyond. *International Peacekeeping*, 11 (1), pp. 183-212.

Bellamy, A.J. and Wheeler, N.J. 2005. Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics. In: Baylis, J. and Smith, S. eds. **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 556-578.

Bellamy, A.J. and Williams, P. 2009. The West and Contemporary Peace Operations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46 (1), pp. 39-57.

Bellamy, A.J. and Williams, P. 2013. The Politics and Challenges of Providing Peacekeepers. In: Bellamy, A.J. and Williams, P. eds. **Providing Peacekeepers:**

The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Troop Contribution. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1-24.

Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P. and Griffin, S. 2010. **Understanding Peacekeeping**. 2nd ed. Polity Press, USA, p. 279.

Berman, E. 2002. African Regional Organisations' Peace Operations: Developments and Challenges. *African Security Review*, 11 (2), pp. 33-44.

Beswick, D. 2010. Peacekeeping regime security and 'African solutions to African problems': exploring motivations for Rwanda's involvement in Darfur. *Third World Quartery*, 5 (1), pp. 739-754.

Boshoff, H., Vreÿ, W. and Rautenbach, G. 2010. **The Burundi Peace Process: From civil war to conditional peace**. Institute of Security Studies, South Africa, pp. 1-69.

Boss, B.C. 2006. Law and Peace: A Legal Framework for United Nations Peacekeeping. Available from: <http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/1204/2/02whole.pdf> [Accessed 29 October 2013].

Boulden, J. 2003. United Nations Security Council Policy on Africa. In: Boulden, J. ed. **Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations**. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 11-33.

Boutellis, A. and Williams, P.D. 2013. Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Towards More Effective Partnerships. *IPI Policy Paper*. International Peace Institute, New York. Available from: <http://www.ipinst.org/2013/04/peace-operations-the-african-union-and-the-united-nations-toward-more-effective-partnerships> [Accessed 18 August 2014].

Brandbury, M. 1994. **The Somalia Conflict: Prospects for peace**. Oxfam, Oxford, p. 25.

Brosche, J. and Rothbart, D. 2013. **Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding: The continuing crisis in Darfur**. Routledge, New York, p. 118.

Brown, M.E., Cote, O.R., Lynn-Jones S.M., & Miller, S. eds. 2001. **Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict**. MIT Press, Cambridge, p.171.

Brown, N. 1999. ECOWAS and the Liberia Experience: Peacekeeping and Self Preservation. Available from: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/brown.pdf> [Accessed 5 September 2014].

Butiku, J. 2004. The Facilitation of the Burundi Peace Negotiations. In: Mpangala, G. and Mwansasu, B. eds. Beyond Conflict in Burundi. Dar es Salaam, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation. Available from: <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/5710/2984.pdf?Sequence=1> [Accessed 3 February 2015].

Chandler, D. 2007. The Responsibility to protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace. Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1353331042000228454> [Accessed 2 March2012].

Chandler, D. 2007. The security-development nexus and the rise of anti-foreign policy. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 10 (1), pp. 362–386.

Chitima, L. 2012. Balancing the responsibility to protect with non-interference: A dilemma for the PSC. In: Murithi, T. and Lulie, H. **The African Union Peace and Security Council: A five-year appraisal**. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, pp. 181-195.

Chuter, D. 2014. Missing in Inaction: Where is the African Peace and Security Architecture? Available from: <http://www.e-http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/19/missing-in-inaction-where-is-the-african-peace-and-security-architecture/> [Accessed 18 August 2015].

Cilliers, J. 2004. Human Security in Africa: A conceptual framework for review. Available from: <http://www.ssrnetwork.net/document_library/detail/2428/human-security-in-africa-a-conceptual-framework-for-review> [Accessed 25 August 2010].

Cilliers, J. and Malan, M. 2005. Progress with the African Standby Force. *Paper presented at the Institute of Security Studies*. Institute of Security Studies, South Africa.

Cilliers, J., Boshoff, H. and Aboagye, F. 2010. Somalia: the Intervention Dilemma. Institute for Security Studies. ISS Policy brief no. 20. Available from:

<http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/No20Aug2010Somalia.pdf> [Accessed 22 February 2013].

Clark, J. 1993. Somalia: Debacle in Somalia-Failure of Collective Response. In: Damrosch, L.F. ed. **Enforcing Restrain: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflict**. Council on Foreign Relations, New York, pp. 205-240.

Clough, M. 2005. Darfur: Who's Responsibility to Protect. Human Rights Watch. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/darfur/darfur.pdf> [Accessed 10 August 2014].

Connaughton, R. 2002. **Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: The reality**. Ashgate, London.

Conteh-Morgan, E. 2005. Peace-building and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 10 (1), pp. 69-86.

Contreras, A. 2012. Behind the Scenes: Somalia and Rwanda. Available from: <http://www.tutufoundationsusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Tutu-past-Rodriquez-Media-Behind-the-Scenes-Somalia-and-Rwansa-Oct-2012.pdf> [Accessed 20 March 2015].

Crockatt, R. 2005. The End of the Cold War. In: Baylis, J. and Smith, S. eds. **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 111-130.

Crossley, N. 2011. Legitimacy through Regional Governance: The African Union. Available from: <http://africanprogress.net/africa-at-lse-legitimacy-through-regional-governance-the-african-union/> [Accessed 24 March 2014].

Curtis, D. 2003. The Peace Process in Burundi: Successful African Intervention? Available from: <http://www.igd.org.za/jdownloads/Global%20Insight/gi_24.pdf> [Accessed 3 February 2015].

Curtis, D. and Nibigirwe, G. 2010. Complementary Approaches to Peacekeeping? The African Union and United Nations in Burundi. In: Besada, H. ed. **Crafting and African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century**. Ashgate, England, pp. 109-128.

Dagne, T. 2010. Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and Status of the North-South Peace Agreement; Congressional Research Service. Available from: <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33574.pdf> [Accessed 23 March 2015].

Daley, P. 2007. The Burundi Peace Negotiations: An African Experience of Peace-making. *Review of African Political Economy*, 34 (112), pp. 333-352.

Davies, O. 2014. Fact File 1: SADC Standby Force: Preparation of Peacekeeping Personnel. In: ACCORD, *Conflict Trends*. Issue 2. ACCORD, South Africa, pp. 26-29.

de Carvalho, B., Jaye, T., Kasumba, Y. and Okumu, W. eds. 2010. **Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Roles of the African Union and Regional Mechanisms**. Training for Peace in Africa. ACCORD, South Africa, p. 68.

de Carvalho, G. and Ettang, D. 2011. Conceptualising the Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Nexus. In: ACCORD, *Conflict Trends*. Issue 3. ACCORD, South Africa, pp. 3-12.

de Carvalho, G. and Lie, J. 2009. Challenges to implementing the protection of civilians agenda. *NUPI Policy Brief*. NUPI, Norway, p.2.

de Coning, C. 2004. Refining the African Standby Force Concept. *Conflict Trends*, no. 2. ACCORD, South Africa, pp. 20-26.

de Coning, C. 2010. The Evolution of Peace Operations in Africa: Trajectories and Trends. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 14 (1), pp. 6-26.

de Coning, C. and Freear, M. 2015. Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali. Available from: <www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.bj/> [Accessed 24 June 2015].

 de Cde Coning, C. and Kasumba, Y. 2010. **The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force**. African Union Commission, Ethiopia, p. 10.

de Coning, C. and Lotze, W. 2013. South Africa. In: Bellamy, A.J. and Williams, P. **Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping**. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 376-395.

De Waal, A. 2007. Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect. *International Affairs*, 83 (6), pp. 1039-1054.

Deng, F.M. 2002. Sudan: An African Dilemma. In: Laremont, R.R. ed. **The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa**. Heinemann, Portsmouth, pp. 61-89.

Dennis, B. and Dennis, A. 2008. **Slaves to Racism: An Unbroken Chain from America to Liberia**. Algora, United States of America, pp. 42-43.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2013. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/> [Accessed 9 August 2012].

Dey, I. 1993. **Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-friendly Guide for Social Scientists**. Routledge, London, pp.31-32.

Dowden, R. 2009. **Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles**. Public Affairs, New York.

Dowyaro, E.T. 2000. ECOMOG operations in West Africa: Principles and praxis. In: Malan, M. ed. Boundaries of Peace Support Operations: The African Dimension, Monograph 44. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/publications/monographs/monograph-44-boundaries-of-peace-operations-the-african-dimension-edited-by-mark-malan> [Accessed on 6 March 2015].

Draman, R. and Carment, D. 2001. Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-Region: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia. Occasional Paper, no 26. Available from: <http://http-server.carleton.ca/~dcarment/papers/ECOMOG.pdf.> [Accessed 30 January 2015].

Duffield, M. 2007. Then New Development-Security Terrain. In: Roberts, J.T. and Hite, A.B. eds. **The Globalization and Development Reader: Perspectives on Development and Global Change**. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 334-348.

Durch, W.J. and Berkman, T.C. 2006. **Who should keep the peace? Providing Security for Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations**. Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC.

Durch, W.J., Holt, V.K., Earle, C.R. and Shanahan, M.K. 2003. The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations. Washington, the Henry L, Stimson Center. Available from: <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf> [Accessed 13 September 2015].

Elmi, A. and Barise, A. 2006. The Somalia Conflict, Root Causes Obstacles and Peace-building Strategies. *Institute for Security Studies*, 15 (1), pp. 32-44.

Evans, G. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention. *ASIL Annual Meeting Proceedings*, 2 (105), pp. 78-89.

Explaining the Darfur Peace Agreement. 2006. Available from: <http://justiceafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Explaining-the-Darfur-Peace-Agreement.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2015].

Fortna, V.P. and Howard, L.M. 2008. **Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature**. University of Columbia, New York, p. 285.

Francis, D. 2000. ECOMOG: A New Security Agenda in World Politics. In: Bakut, T. and Dutt, S. eds. **Africa at the Millennium: An Agenda for Mature Development**. Palgrave, New York, pp. 177-202.

Francis, D. 2006. **Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems**. Ashgate, England, p. 96.

Freccia, T. 2015. Conflict in Sudan. Enough. Available from: < http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/sudans/conflicts-sudan> [Accessed 01 April 2015].

Galtung, J. 1985. Twenty-five years of peace research: Ten challenges and some responses. *Journal of Peace Research*, 22 (2), pp. 11-15.

Gelot, L., Gelot, L. and de Coning, C. 2012. Challenges, Key Issues and Future Directions. In: Gelot, L., Gelot, L. and de Coning, C. eds. **Supporting African Peace Operations**. The Nordic Africa Institute, Norway, pp. 83-110.

Gierke, O. 1950. **Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800**. Cambridge University Press, London.

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 2013. Available from: <http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p> [Accessed 26 August 2013].

Golwa, J. 2009. ECOWAS and Conflict Resolution in West Africa. In: Ogwu, J. and Alli, W. eds. **ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration**. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, pp. 279-287.

Gompert, D., Richardson, C., Kruger, R. and Bernath, C. 2005. **Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing**., National Defence University, Washington, DC, p. 5.

Goodman, P.S. 2004. China Invests Heavily In Sudan's Oil Industry. Available from: <http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Sudan-23-Dec-04-China_Invests_Heavily_In_Sudan_s_Oil_Industry.pdf> [Accessed 14 April 2015].

Gottschalk, K. and Schmidt, S. 2004. The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States? *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 4 (1), pp. 138-158.

Gowan, R. 2009. The Future of Peacekeeping Operations: Fighting Political Fatigue and Overstretch. *Briefing Paper 3*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, New York, p. 1.

Gray, C. 2001. Peacekeeping After the Brahimi Report: Is There a Crisis of Credibility for the UN? *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*. 6 (2), pp. 267 – 288.

Gray, C. 2005. Peacekeeping and enforcement action in Africa: the role of Europe and the obligation of multilateralism. In: Armstrong, D., Armstrong, J., Farrell, T. and Maiguashca, B. eds. **Force and Legitimacy in World Politics**. Cambridge, New York, pp. 207-224.

Grignon, F. and Kroslak, D. 2008. The Problem with Peacekeeping. Current History. *Journal of Contemporary World Affairs*, 107 (708), p. 186.

Guicherd, C. 2007. **The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force**. International Academy, New York, p. 16.

Hannibal, T. 2013. **Genocide, Ethnonationalism, and United Nations: Exploring the Causes of Mass Killings since 1945**. 1st ed. Routledge, New York, p. 45.

Harbom, L. and Wallensteen, P. 2005. Appendix 2A. Patterns of major armed conflicts 1990-2004. In: SIPRI. **Yearbook. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security**. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 121-133.

Heavens, A. 2007. Darfur rebel leader demands delay in peace talks. Available from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSHO04575920070920?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews> [Accessed 20 May 2015].

Hendricks, C. and Lucey, A. 2013. Burundi: Missed opportunities for South Africa post-conflict development and peacebuilding. *Policy Brief*. Institute of Security Studies, South Africa, pp. 2-3.

Henri, B., Very, W. and Rautenbach. 2010. The Burundi Peace Process, From Civil War to Conditional Peace. *ISS Monograph Series*. 171, pp. 14.

Hestermeyer, H. 2014. African Union replaces Organization of African Unity. German Law Journal. Available from: <file:///C:/Users/Stephanie/Documents/case%20studies/The%20German%20Law%20Journal.htm> [Accessed 1 October 2014].

Heyns, C. and Stefiszn, K. 2006. **Human Rights, peace and justice in Africa: A reader**. Pretoria University Law Press, South Africa, p. 315.

Hinsley, F.H. 1989. **Sovereignty**. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 1.

Holmgren, A. 2013. France's intervention in Mali: A decision that couldn't be avoided. Available from: <http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1261:frances-intervention-in-mali-a-decision-that-couldnt-be-avoided&catid=60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers&Itemid=265> [Accessed 13 September 2015].

Howe, H. 1997. Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peace Keeping. *International Security*, 21 (3), pp. 419-420.

ICISS report. 2001. **ICISS report. The Responsibility to Protect**. International Development Research Centre, Canada, p. 13.

Ikechi, M. 2003. **Collective Insecurity: The Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism, and Global Order**. UBC Press, Vancouver, p. 42.

International Crisis Group. 1998. Burundi's Peace Process: The Road from Arusha. Burundi Report, no 2. Available from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/A400219_20071998.pdf> [Accessed 24 February 2015].

International Crisis Group. 2006. Getting the UN into Darfur. Africa Briefing 43, October 12. Available from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4442&1=1> [Accessed 31 March 2015].

Jean, M. 2006. The Rwanda Genocide: The true Motivation for Mass Killings. Available from: <http://history.emory.edu/home/assets/documents/endeavors/volume1/Moises.pdf> [Accessed 28 May 2014].

Johannessen, A.M. 2007. Neutrality and Impartiality of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Available from: <http://amjohannes.wikidot.com/neutrality-and-impartiality-of-the-united-nations-peacekeepi> [Accessed 17 February 2014].

Johnstone, I. 2006. Dilemmas of Robust Peacekeeping Operations. Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. Available from: <http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/4-JOHNSTONE_2006_Dilemmas_of_robust_peace_operations.pdf> [Accessed 05 September 2011].

Johnstone, I. 2010. Managing Consent – the New Variable?. In: De Coning, C., Stensland, A.O., and Ardy, T. eds. **Beyond the New Horizon**. Norwegian Institute of International Peace, Oslo, pp. 24-39.

Johnstone, I., Tortolani, B., and Gowan R. 2005. **The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Unfinished Business**. Center on International Cooperation, New York, p. 40.

Jooma, B.M. 2006. Darfur and the Battle for Khartoum. Institute for Security Studies, Situation Report. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/acpst/publications/situation-reports/situation-report-darfur-and-the-battle-for-khartoum-mariam-jooma> [Accessed 26 April 2015].

Juma, M.K. 2003. The Sudan. In: Boulden, J. ed. **Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations**. Palgrave Macmillan, USA, pp. 185-214.

Kajee, A. 2010. The Darfur Conflict and the Responsibility to Protect: Towards a Sustainable Peace. In: Besada, H. ed. **Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century**. Ashgate, London, pp. 159-178.

Kasumba, Y. and Debrah, C. 2010. An Overview of the African Standby Force (ASF). In: De Coning, C. and Kasumba, Y. eds. **The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force**. African Union Commission, Ethiopia, pp. 10-19.

Khadiagala, G.M. 2003. Burundi. In: Boulden, J. ed. **Dealing with Conflict in Africa**. Palgrave, New York, pp. 215-252.

Khamis, K. 2008. **Promoting the African Union**. Lilian Barber Press, Washington DC, p. 7.

Khan, S. 2002. The United Nations Post-Brahimi: An interview with the UN Under Secretary General for Peace Operations Jean Marie Guéhenno. *Journal of International Affairs*, 55 (2), pp. 489 – 500.

Kihunah, M. 2005. Monitoring the Monitors: UN-ECOMOG Peacekeeping in Liberia Civil War. Yale Journal of International Relations. 1(1), pp. 120-132. Available from: <http://www.yale.edu/yjia/Archieves/Vol_1_Issu_1.htm> [Accessed 1 October 2014].

King, J. 2013. The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian intervention or state sovereignty?. *Policy Brief*, 2 (1), pp. 1-7.

Knes, M. 2014. Organisation of African Unity, Reference for Business, Encyclopaedia for Business. Available from: <

http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Oli-Per/Organization-of-African-Unity-OAU.html> [Accessed 2 October 2014].

Kobbie, C. 2008. **The Role of the African Union in African Peacekeeping Operations. Strategic Research Project**. Army War College, United States of America, pp. 4-6.

Kobbie, J.P.M. 2009. **The role of the African Union in African Peacekeeping operations**. Army War College, United States of America, pp. 2 & 10.

Koops, J.A. 2012. Peace Operations Partnership: Assessing Cooperation Mechanism between Secretariats. *Policy Briefing*. Center for International Peace Operations, Germany, p. 2.

Krasner, S.D. 2001. Problematic Sovereignty. In: Krasner, S.D. ed. **Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Responsibilities**. Columbia University Press, New York, p. 2.

Languille, H. and Keef, T. 2004. The future of peacekeeping. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 11 (1), pp. 31-46.

Lewis, I.M. 2002. **A Modern History of the Somali: Revised, updated and expanded**. Ohio University Press, Ohio, p. 209.

Lijphart, A. 1991. The Power-Sharing Approach. In: Montville, J. ed. **Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies**. Lexington Books, New York, pp. 491-509.

Little, P. 2003. **Somalia: Economy without state**. Indiana University, Bloomington, p. 15.

Maertens, E. 2012. UN System-Wide Coherence and the Regions: The Quest for Reforms. In: Lombaerde, P., Baert, F. and Felicio, T. eds. **The United Nations and the Regionals: Third World Report on Regional Integration**. Springer, London, pp. 215-222.

Mahmood, S. 2012. The Challenges of UN Peacekeeping in Darfur. Available from: <http://toglobalist.org/2012/12/the-challenges-of-un-peacekeeping-in-darfur/> [Accessed 20 June 2015].

Mahoney, J. and Rueschemeyer, D. 2013. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, London. Available from: <http://bilder.buecher.de/zusatz/24/24724/24724327_lese_1.pdf> [Accessed 23 February 2016].

Makinda, S. and Okumu, F.W. 2008. **The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance**. Routledge, New York, p. 1.

Malan, M. 1999. Leaner and meaner? The future of peacekeeping in Africa. *African Security Review*, 8 (4), pp. 45-61.

Mamdani, M. 2009. The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency. In: Hassans, S.M. and Ray, C.E. eds. **Darfur and Crisis of Government in Sudan. A Critical Reader**. Cornell University Press, Netherlands, pp. 125-198.

Mansaray, A.V. 2009. AMIS in Darfur: Africa's litmus test in peacekeeping and political mediation. Available from: <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/18NO1MANSARAY.PDF> [Accessed 14 June 2015].

Marangio, R. 2012. The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions. Available from: <http://www.cosv.org/download/centrodocumentazione/CrisiSomalia.pdf> [Accessed 04 April 2015].

Massingham, E. 2009. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the Responsibility to Protection doctrine advance the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends?. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 19 (876), pp. 803-831.

Mickler, D. 2013. UNAMID: a hybrid solution to human security problems in Darfur? *Conflict, security and development*, 13 (5) pp. 487-511.

Mottiar, S. and van Jaarsveld. 2009. **Mediating Peace in Africa: Securing Conflict Prevention**. ACCORD, South Africa.

Mulugetta, K. 2009. The Role of Regional and International Organisation in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD. Available from: <www.fes-ethipia.org> [Accessed 20 May 2014].

Murithi, T. 2005. **The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development**. Ashgate, England, p. 27-95.

Murithi, T. 2007. Between Paternalism and Hybrid Partnership: The Emerging UN and Africa Relationship in Peace Operations. <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04676.pdf> [Accessed 23 November 2013].

Murithi, T. 2008. The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan, and the African Union Mission in Somalia. African Security Review 17 (1). South Africa, Institute for Security Studies. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/17NO1MURITHI.PDF> [Accessed 4 September 2014].

Murithi, T. 2009. The African Union's Foray into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Hybrid Mission in Darfur. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, Issue 14, July 2009. Available from: <www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk> [Accessed 4 September 2014].

Murithi, T. 2013. The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Mission in Somalia. African Security Review. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/17NO1MURITHI.PDF> [Accessed 23 November 2013].

Murphy, R. 2007. **UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice**. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 48.

Nass, I. 2000. **A Study in Internal Conflict: The Liberian Crisis and the West African Peace Initiative**. Fourth Dimension, Enugu, pp. 67-68.

Neethling, T. 2004. Pursuing a Policy Framework for Peace and Security in Africa: Development, Progress and Challenges. Strategic Review for Southern Africa. XXVI (2). Available from: <http://www.iss.co.za> [Accessed 14 April 2012].

Neethling, T. 2007. Pursuing an Effective African peacekeeping capability: what could be learned from Burundi and Darfur [Sudan]. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 29 (2), pp. 50-73.

143

Neethling, T. 2008. UN peacekeeping operations in Africa: Reflections on developments, trends and the way forward. Available from: <forsvaret.dk/FAK/institutter/institut%20for20Strategi/Documents/sa_abstracts_cvs/neethling_full.pdf> [Accessed 10 September 2015].

Neethling, T. 2009. UN-AU Burden-Sharing and Hybridisation in Contemporary Peacekeeping context with specific reference to UNAMID. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, XXXI (1), pp. 41-64.

Nzomo, M. 2003. From OAU to AU and NEPAD: Regional integration processes in Africa and African women. Southern African Regional Poverty Network. Available from: <http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000608/page1.php> [Accessed 29 September 2014].

Okeke, G. 2012. **ECOMOG and Conflict Resolution in West Africa: A Study of the Linkage between Economic Integration and Regional Security**. Lambert Academy, Saarbrucken, p. 40.

Olonisakin, F. 2008. **Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations in West Africa**. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana, pp. 14-41.

Omaar, R. and Mohamoud, S. 2015. Somaliland: Where there has been conflict but no intervention. *Prism*, 5 (2), pp. 84-93.

Omar, F. and Sheikh, A. 2015. Somali militants attack African Union base. Available from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/26/us-somalia-militants-idUSKBN0P60BX20150626> [Accessed 1 July 2015].

Orford, A. 2001. **International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect**. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 12-13.

Piiparinen, T. 2007. Reconsidering the Silence over the Ultimate Crime: a Functional Shift in Crisis Management from the Rwandan Genocide to Darfur. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 9 (1), pp. 71-91.

Power, S. 2004. Dying in Darfur: Can ethnic Cleansing in Sudan be Stopped? The New Yorker 30. Available from: <http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040830_fact1> [Accessed 4 August 2014].

Prendergast, J. 2007. **Crisis Response: Humanitarian Bond-Aids in Sudan and Somalia**. Pluto Press, London.

Prince, R. 2013. In Mali, conflict continues a year after the French-led invasion: A French re-militarization of Africa, under the well-worn pretext of humanitarian intervention, is in the making. Available from: <http://fpif.org/mali-conflict-continues-year-french-led-invasion/> [Accessed 13 September 2015].

Pronk, J. 2006. UN's Pronk outlines Darfur rebel groups. Sudan Watch. Available from: <http://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2006/10/uns-pronk-outlines-darfur-rebel-groups.html.> [Accessed 14 October 2014].

Ramsbotham, A. and Pippard, T. 2006. Digest: Peacekeeping Mission. *International Peacekeeping*, 13 (3), pp. 422-431.

Ramsbothan, A. 2007. Peacekeeping Mission Updates: April-September 2007. *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (2), pp. 268-282.

Reeves, E. 2005. Ghosts of Rwanda: The Failure of the African Union in Darfur; An international abandonment of the Responsibility to Protect. Available from: <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article12560> [Accessed 15 June 2015].

Report of the Secretary-General. 2010. United Nations General Assembly Security Council. Available at: <http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/2010_causes_conflict.pdf> [Accessed 25 February 2011].

Reuters. 2014. Armed groups surround thousands in Central African Republic. Available from: <http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33774:armed-groups-surround-thousands-in-central-african-republic&catid=3:Civil%20Security&Itemid=113> [Accessed 02 April 2014].

Rubinstein, R.A. 2008. **Peacekeeping Under Fire: Culture and Intervention**. Paradigm, USA, pp. 4-5.

Sansculotte-Greenidge, K. 2012. The PSC and Darfur: A Sudanese solution for an African problem. In: Murithi, T. and Lulie, H. **The African Union Peace and Security Council: A five-year appraisal**. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, pp. 119-130.

Segell, G.2010. A decade of the African Union and European Union trans-regional security relations. *South African Journal of Military Studies*, 38 (1), pp. 25-41.

Segul, N. 2013. Peace and Security Council Report. Institute for Security Studies, Issue 42. Available from: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PSC42Jan13E.pdf> [Accessed 20 April 2015].

Shaw, M.N. 2008. International Law. 6th ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Shennib, G. 2013. Armed groups clash in Tripoli. Available from: <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/armed-groups-clash-in-tripoli-1.1538396#.U2NnPe0aJMs> [Accessed 02 April 2014].

Shinn, D.H. 2013. **Somalia: Origin, Development and Future of AMISOM**. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

Snyder, A. ed. 1999. **Contemporary Security Strategy**. 1st ed. Macmillan Press, London.

Sohn, L. 1984. The Security Council's Role in the Settlement of International Disputes. *The American Journal of International Law*, 78 (2), pp. 402-404.

Srinivasan, S. 2006. **Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Darfur**. Minority Rights Group International, London, p. 4.

Sriram, C.L. 2008. Prevention and the Rule of Law: Rhetoric and Reality. In: Hurwitz, A. and Huang, R. eds. **Civil War and the Rule of Law: Security, Development and Human Rights**. Lynne Rienne, London, pp. 71-90.

Stahn, C. 2007. Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norms?. *The American Journal of International Law*, 101 (1), pp. 104.

Stern, M. and Öjendal, J. 2010. Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?. *Security Dialogue*, 41 (1), pp. 6-29.

Taylor, P. and Curtis, D. 2005. The United Nations. In: Baylis, J. and Smith, S. eds. **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 405-424.

Tharoor, S. and Johnston, I. 2001. The Humanitarian Security Dilemma in International Peacekeeping. In: Gordon, D.S. and Toase, F.H. eds. **Aspects of Peacekeeping**. Frank Cass, London, pp. 3-18.

The Centre for Justice and Accountability. 2014. Somalia: Atrocities Under the Siad Barre Regime. Available from: <http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=287> [Accessed 22 July 2014].

Thobane, B., Neethling, T. and Vreÿ, F. 2007. Migration from the OAU to the AU: Exploring the quest for a more effective African peacekeeping capability. South African Journal of Military Studies. Available from: <http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/40/68> [Accessed 2 February 2015].

Thomashausen, S. 2002. **Humanitarian Intervention in an evolving world order: the case of Iraq, Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor**. 1st ed. African Century, Pretoria.

Tschirgi, N. 2004. **Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges**. International Peace Academy, New York, p. 2.

Tschirgi, N., Lund, M.S. and Mancini, F. 2010. The Security-Development Nexus. In: Tschirgi, N., Lund, M.S. and Mancini, F. eds. **Security and development: searching for critical connections**. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, pp. 1-17.

Udombana, N. 2007. Still Playing Dive with Lives: Darfur and Security Council Resolution 1706. *Third World Quarterly*, 28 (1), pp. 97-116.

UNDP. 2008. Human Development Report 2001-Somalia. Available from: <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/somalia_2001_en.pdf> [Accessed 13 July 2012].

UN OHCHR. 2007. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Sudan. Seventh periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Sudan: Involvement of Sudanese security personnel in attacks on the Bulbul area of South Darfur from January to March 2007. Available from: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/united_nations/1067?theme=alt1> [Accessed on 29 March 2015].

United Nations Peacekeeping. 2012a. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/> [Accessed 13 July 2012].

United Nations Peacekeeping. 2012b. Peacekeeping Fact Sheet. Available from: < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml> [Accessed 30 April 2015].

United Nations Secretary-General. 1992. An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. . United Nations General Assembly Security Council. Available from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PBC%20A47277%20S24111.pdf> [Accessed 25 October 2012].

United Nations Secretary-General. 2008. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the African-Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Available from: < http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/781> [Accessed on 20 June 2015].

United Nations Security Council. 2007a. Security Council Authorizes Deployment Of United Nations-African Union 'Hybrid' Peace Operation In Bid To Resolve Darfur Conflict. Available from: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9089.doc.htm> [Accessed 30 April 2015].

United Nations Security Council. 2007b. Resolution 1769. S/RES/1769, 31 July. Available from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolution07.htm> [Accessed 29 May 2015].

United Nations Security Council. 2008. Resolution 1856. Available from: < http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1856(2008)> [Accessed 25 July 2014].

United Nations Security Council. 2009. Department of Public Information. News and Media Division. Available from: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/doc/2009/sc9583.doc.htm.> [Accessed 18 August 2012].

United Nations Security Council. 2012. Department of Public Information. News and Media Division. 23 January 2009. Available from: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/doc/2009/sc9583.doc.htm.> [Accessed 18 August 2012].

United Nations. 1945. Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Available from: <https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml> [Accessed 29 January 2014].

United Nations. 1990. **The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping**. UN Department of Public Information, New York, p. 270.

United Nations. 2000. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Available from: <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/> [Accessed 04 October 2011].

United Nations. 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. Available from: < http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/worldsummit_2005.shtml> [Accessed 16 November 2013].

United Nations. 2013. Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia, Requests Increase in Troop Strength. Available from: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11172.doc.htm> [Accessed 23 June 2015].

United Nations. 2014a. Thousands flee fighting in Sudan. News 24. Available from: < http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/UN-Thousands-flee-fighting-in-Sudan-20140424-3> [Accessed 02 April 2014].

United Nations. 2014b. United Nations Mission in Liberia. Available from: < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml> [Accessed 21 May 2014].

United Nations. 2015. Security Council: Maintenance of international peace and security. Available from: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/spv_7361.pdf> [Accessed 13 September 2015].

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2006. Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but their accuracy and credibility could be enhanced. Available from: <http://www.gao.gov/asserts/260/253101.pdf> [Accessed 20 April 2015].

Vehnamaki, M. 2006. Darfur Scorched: Looming genocide in Western Sudan. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8 (1), pp. 51-83.

What's in Blue. 2015. Somalia: Briefing and Consultations on Joint AU-UN Report. Available from: <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2015/07/somalia-briefing-and-consultations-on-joint-au-un-report.php#> [Accessed 23 July 2015].

Wheeler, N.J. 2000. **Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society**. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 174-184.

William, P. 2006. Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan. *International Peacekeeping*, 13 (2), pp. 168-183.

William, P.D. and Black, D.R. 2010. Introduction: International society and the crisis in Darfur. In: Black, D.R. and William, P.D. eds. **The International politics of mass atrocities: The case of Darfur**. Routledge, New York, pp. 1-24.

Williams, P.D. 2013. AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Policy and Practice*. Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper, pp. 1-7.

Wippman, D. 1993. Enforcing Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War. In: Damrosch, L. ed. **Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts**. Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, pp. 163-169.

Witharta, S. 2012. The legitimacy of peace operations. In: SIPRI yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Available from: <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/files/SIPRIYB12Summary.pdf> [Accessed 26 September 2012].

Yamashita, H. 2008. Impartial Use of Force in United Nations Peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (5), pp. 615-630.

Yabi, G.O. 2010. **The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau**. Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, p. 6.

Zamechic, M. 2008. Darfur: A refugee Case Study, Slide Show. Available from: <http://www.slideshare.net/michaelZed/darfur-case-study-presentation> [Accessed 18 August 2014].

Zartman, I. 1995. Putting Things Back Together. In: Zartman, I. ed. **Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority**. Lynne Riener, Boulder, pp. 267-295.