

INKATHA AND THE NATIONAL PARTY, 1980-1989

BY

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THIS THESIS HAS BEEN SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
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Abstract

This thesis explores Inkatha and National Party politics in the period 1980-1989, focusing particularly on the relationship between them. It considers the nature of both parties' political outlook, their objectives and how they sought to achieve those objectives. It asks what sort of relationship each party sought with the other and what significance they attached to this. It undertakes a detailed comparison between the politics of Inkatha and the National Party, thereby bringing each into clearer perspective.

It is a leitmotiv of accounts of Inkatha that its politics were paradoxical and ambiguous. This thesis offers a clearer understanding of Inkatha's ambiguous politics by providing the first characterization of the coherent philosophical assumptions which underpinned Inkatha's politics and were reflected in aspects of its politics which, *prima facie*, appear irreconcilable or inconsistent. It is argued that Buthelezi, Inkatha's leader, articulated a conservative political outlook which resembled that of philosopher Edmund Burke. It is contended that this form of Burkean conservatism was expressed not only in Inkatha's criticisms of the African National Congress and revolutionary radicalism, but also in its opposition to National Party ideology and policy. By presenting the distinctive and coherent political outlook of Inkatha, this thesis poses a challenge to the reductionism of many prominent accounts which seek to understand the party solely in terms of its interests and the tactics employed in the pursuit of those interests.

A better corroborated account is provided of Inkatha's political priorities and how these reflected the changing circumstances of power contestation. New illustrations are offered of how Inkatha's priorities and its perception of practical realities manifested themselves in its political approach towards both the National Party and the ANC.

Previously unstudied Government documents are used to give novel insights into the politics of PW Botha's National Party. It attempts to show in greater detail the fundamental differences of approach and objectives with Inkatha, and to reveal that these contrasts remained stark despite apparent shifts in the National Party's politics in the second half of the 1980s. These unused documents are utilized in a clearer characterization of the politics of senior National Party cabinet minister Chris Heunis, which highlights many significant differences with the approach of his party leader, and a number of noteworthy similarities with Inkatha politics. This underscores the contingency of politics in the upper echelons of the National Party, and is particularly significant given that Buthelezi expressed hope for the emergence of more reformist tendencies within the National Party. However, it is argued that even Heunis did not attach the same degree of significance to Inkatha, and envisage the same role for it, that Buthelezi sought. Despite significant differences in their political approaches, both Heunis and PW Botha increasingly perceived a solution to the problems amongst young, urban Africans to be crucial to achieving their objectives. In the second half of the 1980s, they both believed that changing economic and demographic realities, in combination with heightened African radicalism, had rendered Inkatha unable to provide the type of leadership for Africans that was crucial for the National Party to resolve its political difficulties. This thesis suggests that Buthelezi's failure to persuade the National Party to adopt his preferred approach to political change was not due solely to his stark political differences with PW Botha.

Key Words: Inkatha, Buthelezi, Homelands, Apartheid, National Party, PW Botha, Chris Heunis, Reform, Negotiation, Armed Struggle, Edmund Burke, Mandela.

Opsomming

Hierdie tesis stel ondersoek in na die politiek van Inkatha en die Nasionale Party in die tydperk 1980-1989, en verneem die verhouding tussen die partye. Dit belig die aard van die onderskeie partye se politieke uitkyke, doelwitte en hul strewes om daardie doelwitte te bereik. Vrae word gestel oor die aard en belangrikheid van hul verhouding met mekaar. 'n Breedvoerige vergelyking word getref tussen die politiek van Inkatha en die Nasionale Party, om sodoende elkeen te verhelder.

Die leitmotiv wat algemeen voorkom in beskrywings van Inkatha is dat sy politiek paradoksaal en dubbelsinnig was. Hierdie tesis bied 'n begrip van Inkatha se dubbelsinnige politiek deur vir die eerste keer 'n kenskets daar te stel van Inkatha se filosofiese opvattinge wat in aspekte van sy politieke weerspieël is en wat met die eerste oogopslag onversoenbaar of teenstrydig sou voorkom. Daar word aangevoer dat Buthelezi, die leier van Inkatha, 'n konserwatiewe politieke uitkyk gehad het wat ooreenkomste toon met die filosoof Edmund Burke. Daar word verder aangevoer dat hierdie vorm van Burkeaanse konserwatisme nie net uiting gevind het in Inkatha se kritiek teen die African National Congress en revolusionêre radikalisme nie, maar ook in teenstand tot die Nasionale Party se ideologie en beleid. Deur Inkatha se eiesoortige politieke uitkyk aan die lig te bring bied hierdie tesis 'n uitdaging aan 'n aantal vernames, dog oorvereenvoudigde, beskrywings van die party wat slegs daarop gemik is om Inkatha te verstaan wat betref sy belange en die taktieke wat ingespan is om daardie belange te verwesenlik.

'n Meer empiriese beskrywing word gegee van Inkatha se politieke prioriteite en hoe dit die veranderende aard van die magstryd weerspieël het. Nuwe voorbeelde word daargestel wat wys hoe Inkatha se prioriteite en sy persepsies van die praktiese realiteite uiting gevind het in sy politieke benadering tot die Nasionale Party en die ANC.

Voorheen onontginde regeringsdokumente word gebruik om nuwe insig te bied in die politiek van PW Botha se Nasionale Party. Daar word gepoog om die fundamentele verskille met Inkatha in meer detail aan te dui, en om te wys hoe hierdie teenstellings onoorbrugbaar gebly het, ten spyte van verskuiwings in die Nasionale Party se politiek tydens die tweede helfte van die 1980's. Hierdie onbenutte dokumente word gebruik om 'n helderder kenskets van die senior Nasionale Party kabinetsminister, Chris Heunis, se politiek te gee, wat 'n aantal belangrike verskille teenoor die benadering van sy partyleier aan die lig bring, sowel as 'n aantal belangwekkende ooreenkomste met Inkatha. Dit onderstreep die gebeurlikheid van politiek in die hoër range van die Nasionale Party, en is veral betekenisvol gegewe Buthelezi se hoop dat daar meer hervormingsgesindheid binne die Nasionale Party na vore sou tree. Daar word egter aangevoer dat nie eens Heunis dieselfde mate van belang aan Inkatha geheg het nie, en dat hy nie dieselfde rol as Buthelezi daarvoor voorsien het nie. Ten spyte van vernames verskille in hul benadering tot die politiek was beide Heunis en Botha toenemend daarvan oortuig dat die probleme onder jong, stedelike swart mense opgelos moes word ten einde hul eie doelwitte te bereik. Tydens die tweede helfte van die 1980's was hulle ook daarvan oortuig dat veranderende ekonomiese en demografiese realiteite, tesame met verhoogde swart radikaliserings, dit onmoontlik vir Inkatha sou maak om die tipe leierskap aan swartes te bied wat so broodnodig was indien die Nasionale Party sy politieke probleme wou oplos. Hierdie tesis voer aan dat Buthelezi se mislukte poging om die Nasionale Party oor te haal om sy verkose benadering tot politieke verandering te aanvaar nie bloot te wyte was aan sy strakke politieke verskille met PW Botha nie.

Table of Contents

Introduction.	10
Part One- Inkatha Politics, 1980-1989.	36
Chapter One- A Conservative Opposition to both Revolutionary Radicalism and Apartheid.	36
Chapter Two- Inkatha's Priorities, Practical Politics, and its Approach Towards the National Party.	61
Chapter Three- Inkatha Walking a Tightrope.	89
Chapter Four- Interpreting Inkatha.	107
Part Two- The National Party and Inkatha, 1980-1989.	114
Chapter Five- The 'Golden Threads' in South Africa's History. The National Party's Quest for 'Self-determination', 1980-1989.	114
Chapter Six- 'We sit over Things over Which we have Jurisdiction'. Channelling Inkatha's role in South African Politics and Salvaging Verwoerdian Apartheid, 1980-1985.	147
Chapter Seven- The 'Anvil on Which Apartheid was Broken'? Abandoning Verwoerdian Apartheid, 1983-1985.	163
Chapter Eight- Negotiating and Reforming Towards Power-Sharing? 1985-1989.	171
Chapter Nine- The Political Approach of PW Botha, 1985-1989.	183
Chapter Ten- The Political Approach of Chris Heunis and the Department for Constitutional Development and Planning, 1985-1989.	198
Conclusion.	215
Bibliography.	236

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Inkatha and the National Party, 1980-1989.

Introduction

The years prior to the African National Congress's unconditional unbanning in 1990 were characterised by mounting challenges to the power and authority of the apartheid Government. Radicals mobilised more effectively and with greater violence in their efforts to force an end to the apartheid system. The Soweto uprisings from June 1976, 'lasted for more than 18 months, and shook South Africa to its core'. It led to large numbers of youths joining the ANC in exile.¹ In 1984, ANC leader Oliver Tambo called for a 'People's War' to make South Africa ungovernable and to set the stage for a revolution in South Africa.² In September of that year, unrest broke out south of Johannesburg,³ and widespread radical violence persisted throughout the decade.⁴

PW Botha, the leader of the National Party, became Prime Minister in 1978, and State President in 1984 following the introduction of a new constitution. He declared in the early-1980s that South Africa was threatened by a 'Total Onslaught' of Soviet communism in 'combination' and 'interaction' with 'the struggle for political power by Black Power organisations'. The latter was being manipulated and exploited by the former.⁵ In Robert Rotberg's description, the onslaught was supposed to be 'pointed dagger-like at the heart of South Africa'.⁶ As early as 1970, when serving as Minister of Defence, Botha spoke of a communist onslaught directed not against apartheid, but 'against stability, security and progress'. This would manifest itself in economic disruption, student protest, disorder and terrorism.⁷ The Prime Minister told business leaders that Western civilization has been 'built on the twin pillars of free enterprise and democratic government', both of which were rejected by communism which therefore presented 'an increasingly sinister threat to our survival'. Botha intended to maintain Western values within an 'essential framework of order'. Freedom and prosperity were not possible without stability, but order itself was not sufficient. A

¹ A. Jeffery, *People's War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2009), xxxii; *Ibid.*, xxxiii.

² Jeffery, *People's War*, 67-68.

³ H. Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2003), 611.

⁴ P. Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa* (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1997), 46.

⁵ PW. Botha, Speech to the House of Assembly, 2 February 1982, in JJJ. Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer: Extracts from the Speeches of PW Botha* (Pretoria: Bureau for Information, 1989), 34.

⁶ RI. Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy: The Tribulations of Southern Africa, 1986-2000* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC and World Peace Foundation, 2002), 309.

⁷ PW. Botha, Speech to the House of Assembly, 23 July 1970, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 33.

Marxist form of order left no space for freedom.⁸ The Prime Minister warned in 1982 that if they did not handle their relations with other groups properly, then 'the powers of radicalism and even revolution' would 'disfigure' the country.⁹ The onslaught was 'total' because it was seen as being much broader than a military challenge to the South African regime. Botha described the onslaught as being an attempt 'to lay hold of man's soul and thinking, of people's convictions'.¹⁰ In the same vein, Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence, argued that the onslaught concerned 'every spectrum of human activity in our country- it is in fact directed at the very moral fibre, the very soul of our community'.¹¹

Botha told parliament that an 'all-embracing onslaught' required an 'all-embracing response'.¹² He stated as early as 1979 that '...we need to adapt our policy...otherwise we die'.¹³ Partly, this consisted of taking more effective measures to maintain security. The State Security Council became the only cabinet committee which Botha presided over personally.¹⁴ Government responded to the huge upsurge in township unrest by imposing of a state of emergency from 1986.¹⁵ However, Botha's 'total strategy' went beyond military action.¹⁶ At the National Party's Federal Congress, Minister for Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis said the Government was committed to simultaneous reforms in the economic, social and political spheres.¹⁷

A major element of the apartheid project since Verwoerd had been ultimately to deny black people citizenship of South Africa by the establishment of ethnic homelands which would eventually accept political independence. Regardless of whether they were resident in the homelands, black South Africans would only have political rights at the national-level fulfilled by membership of their allotted homeland. South Africa's political problems could not be solved in the context of a unitary or federal

⁸ Jagger library, University of Cape Town (Hereafter JL), Colin Eglin Collection BC 1103, WW2 PW Botha 1979-89, 'Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa', Meeting between PW. Botha and Business Leaders, Johannesburg, 22 November 1979.

⁹ PW. Botha Speech to the Republic Festival, Rand Afrikaans University, 27 May 1982, Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 19.

¹⁰ PW. Botha Speech at National Party meeting, Ellisras, 22 November 1978, Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 33.

¹¹ Archive for Contemporary Affairs, University of the Free State (Hereafter ACA), Magnus Malan Collection PV634, 3/2/16-35, Speech by General M. Malan, SAVLU Kongres 10 June 1981.

¹² PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 2 February 1982, Column 112.

¹³ H. Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2012), 141.

¹⁴ R Schrire, *Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1991), 38.

¹⁵ M. Swilling and M. Phillips, 'The Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making Structures and Policy Strategies in the South African State', in *South Africa at the End of the Eighties: Policy Perspectives 1989* (University of the Witwatersrand: Centre for Policy Studies, 1989), 30.

¹⁶ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 44-45; ACA Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/55/42 1988-99, Brian Wrobel, 'First Report to the British Parliamentary Human Rights Groups', March 1988-9, 217.

¹⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 59 1978-87, 'National Party: Federal Congress', Bloemfontein, 30-31 July 1982.

state.¹⁸ This remained the National Party's aim in the early-1980s,¹⁹ and Africans were excluded from changes in 1983 which established chambers for coloureds and Indians in the national parliament on the basis of 'division of power'.²⁰ Yet, in the mid-1980s, the National Party repealed several discriminatory laws, such as influx control laws and the Mixed Marriages and Immorality acts, and announced its support for a common citizenship for all South Africans.²¹ However, the National Party continued to reject majority rule for South Africa, insisting that each racial cultural/racial group must be guaranteed what it called 'self-determination'.²²

Government ministers emphasised 'consultation, deliberation and cooperation' with non-whites.²³ National Party officials alluded to a 'power struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of extremism'.²⁴ However, only Indians and Coloureds were invited to serve on the President's Council to advise on the creation of the tricameral constitution of 1983.²⁵ Approved African leaders were invited to participate in a separate Black Advisory Council,²⁶ and then in the Special Cabinet Committee from 1983.²⁷ Yet, in 1986, there appeared to be a shift in National Party strategy when it was announced that the Government planned to establish a National Statutory Council, chaired by the State President, to provide a forum for negotiation. 'Pending the creation of constitutional structures jointly to be agreed upon for (their) multicultural society' the National Council was to 'consider and advise on matters of common concern, including proposed legislation on such matters'. As part of this process, Government needed to become more conscious of 'Black aspirations and needs'.²⁸ All groups could participate in negotiations, but only provided they

¹⁸ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

¹⁹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (collection not Indexed), Speech for Women's Action Gathering, 1983.

²⁰ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (collection not Indexed), GPD. Terblanche, Chief Information Officer of the Federal Council of the National Party, Questions and Replies on Constitutional Plan N/D; ACA, Kobie Coetsee PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

²¹ R. Harvey, *The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to Mbeki* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), 82; 'Still Suspicion on Botha's offer', *Weekend Argus*, 12 October 1985; EG Malherbe Library, University of KwaZulu-Natal (Hereafter EG), Address by M. Buthelezi, Vaal Industries Association Annual Dinner, 13 November 1986; C. Heunis, 'The Search for Democracy', *Leadership*, 13 January 1986.

²² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 59, Statement by State President PW. Botha DMS After his Discussions with Sir G. Howe, 29 July 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 32 1986, Speech by Minister C. Heunis, March 1986.

²³ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73 3/1/70, Letter from R. Botha to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, 5 June 1980.

²⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, Rand Afrikaans University, 7 November 1988.

²⁵ 'Sharing of Power the Only Road Forward- Buthelezi', *Daily News*, 9 August 1980.

²⁶ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Prayer Meeting for Black Unity, Lamontville, 1 September 1984.

²⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 46, Letter by C. Heunis Regarding the Inclusion of Black People in the Constitution, 1983.

²⁸ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986, Column 15-6; PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986, Column 14-5.

officially renounced violence.²⁹ The offer was extended to, and rejected by, the ANC and Nelson Mandela.³⁰ PW Botha told a visiting US Congressman that a future political dispensation would not be imposed, but had to be ‘the product of negotiation between our communities’.³¹

Against this backdrop was the role played by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. He was a traditional Zulu leader, the head of the Zulu Territorial Authority from 1970 and the Chief Minister of the KwaZulu Homeland from 1972 until the end of apartheid.³² Unlike other homeland leaders, he established a popular political organisation, Inkatha, of which he had been the president since he founded it in 1975. This was a revived and modified version of the Inkatha set-up by the King Solomon in 1928 which had aimed to salvage what had been lost of traditional Zulu values.³³ The new Inkatha aimed to ‘foster the traditions of the people’, to cultivate solidarity between Zulus living in the countryside and in the cities, but to go beyond the old Inkatha by encouraging a ‘spirit of unity’ between Zulus and ‘all their African brothers in Southern Africa’.³⁴ Polls showed that Buthelezi was amongst the best supported black political leaders in South Africa in the late-1970s, and by the mid-1980s his Inkatha movement had become the largest single legal political organisation in South Africa in terms of formal membership.³⁵ In the 1980s, Buthelezi featured conspicuously in public discourse and was involved in two salient attempts to formulate constitutional proposals for political change within South Africa- the Buthelezi Commission 1980-2 and the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba 1986. Moreover, Inkatha was one of the African organisations which the governing National Party sought most keenly to involve in negotiations and consultations about constitutional change.

Buthelezi’s role is noteworthy not just for its prominence, but because of the distinctive and paradoxical position he occupied amongst major black leaders and because it defies straightforward categorisation. As Chief Minister of KwaZulu, he operated from within the structures of apartheid. He also opposed the violent struggle against apartheid and the imposition of international economic sanctions against South Africa. Instead, he advocated reform and negotiation.³⁶ Furthermore, he

²⁹ S. Friedman, *Options for the Future: Government Reform Strategy and Prospects for Structural Change* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1990), 24.

³⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum from Discussion with Senator Kennedy N/D; ‘Mandela’s rejection “sad”’, *Sunday Star*, 3 March 1985.

³¹ ACA Chris Heunis Collection, A1/4/2/ Vol. 31 1982-6, Memorandum From PW. Botha to Visiting Mission of US Congressmen Under Leadership of Chairman William H Gray, 3 January 1986.

³² G. Mare, *Ethnicity and Politics* (London: Zed Books, 1993), 56-8.

³³ S. Bengu, ‘The National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha)’, *Reality*, September 1975, in HW. van der Merwe, NCJ. Charton, DA. Kotze and A. Magnusson (eds), *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents* (Cape Town: David Philip Publisher, 1978), 490.

³⁴ B. Temkin, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Zulu Statesman* (Cape Town: Purnell, 1976), 198.

³⁵ Jeffery, *People’s War*, 15; *Ibid.*, 22.

³⁶ ‘German talks’, *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986; ‘For the record’, *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986.

expressed serious criticisms of the ANC and revolutionary politics.³⁷ The ANC initially supported Inkatha,³⁸ but relations between the organisations soured after a meeting between them in London in late-1979 when Buthelezi refused to endorse the armed struggle or to recognise the ANC as the dominant party in the struggle against apartheid.³⁹ Buthelezi was denounced by many African radicals and the 1980s saw a number of violent clashes between supporters of the ANC/the United Democratic Front and Inkatha.⁴⁰ Yet, Buthelezi was outspokenly opposed to apartheid and the National Party's policies. In the early-1980s, he resisted Government pressures to accept independence for KwaZulu.⁴¹ And later he consistently refused to participate in the National Party's proposed negotiating forums, demanding first a commitment to the abandonment of all racial discrimination, and the unconditional unbanning of the ANC and other proscribed political parties.⁴² Despite defending African traditions, Buthelezi called for South Africa to develop towards a 'Western-type, industrial democracy'.⁴³ As such, a recurring theme in academic accounts of Buthelezi is the ambiguous role he played in South African politics. Inkatha is described by John Brewer as occupying a 'paradoxical position in South African politics' and Buthelezi as having a 'Janus face'.⁴⁴ Shula Marks has pointed to Buthelezi's 'contradictory role as both critic and collaborator'.⁴⁵ Also, Mzala characterised Buthelezi as the Chief with a 'distinct and irreconcilable double agenda'. It was a contradiction, for Mzala, to claim to oppose apartheid whilst participating in its structures.⁴⁶

This thesis provides an account of the politics of Inkatha and the National Party. It focuses on the period 1980-1989, beginning shortly after PW Botha's 'adapt or die' speech and the rift between Inkatha and the ANC in London, and ending prior to the release of Nelson Mandela in early 1990. It examines the nature of Inkatha's politics and what accounted for its ambiguities. It seeks to

³⁷ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/BA/1 1985-86, Testimony by M. Buthelezi, Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1985-86, 20 January 1986; 'NSC will not work without Mandela', *Cape Times*, 8 May 1986; 'State President Buthelezi', *The Sunday Star*, 20 July 1986; Rhodes House, University of Oxford (Hereafter RH), Citation of Memorandum for Discussion (with Prelates) at the Commission of Justice and Peace, Bonn, 21 February 1986, in Policy Speech By M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

³⁸ J. Wentzel, *The Liberal Slideaway* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1995), 220.

³⁹ A. Jeffery, *The Natal Story: 16 Years of Conflict* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997), 26-32; *Ibid.*, 32-36.

⁴⁰ Jeffery, *People's War*, 503.

⁴¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, 'Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)'.

⁴² 'Black Demands in the Struggle for Liberation', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1989.

⁴³ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Role of Business in the Political Reform Process', Financial Mail Annual International Conference on Investment in 1986, Johannesburg, 13 November 1987.

⁴⁴ J. Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to KwaZulu: Inkatha in South African Politics', in S. Johnson (Ed.), *South Africa: No Turning Back*, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1988), 353; *Ibid.*, 354.

⁴⁵ S. Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth Century Natal* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), 123.

⁴⁶ Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with A Double Agenda* (London: Zed Books, 1987), 228; *Ibid.*, 229.

understand Inkatha's political priorities, motivations and values. It explores the nature of the approach Inkatha adopted in pursuit of its objectives and how this developed over the course of time and in response to broader circumstances. It asks what effect Inkatha had on South African politics. It also asks what approach was adopted by Inkatha towards the National Party. In what ways did Inkatha forge, or try to forge, a partnership with the apartheid Government? If so, what was the nature of this partnership? If not, why not? To what extent did the values, objectives and motivations of the two organisations coincide? How far was the relationship between Inkatha and the National Party defined by conflict and how far by consensus? To the extent that it was defined by conflict, how did Inkatha seek to bring about a change in National Party policy?

Furthermore, this thesis examines the National Party's politics as they developed in this period. It explores the nature of the party's political aims and how it sought to achieve these objectives. It considers the role it wanted Inkatha to play in South African politics. How significant was Inkatha's envisaged role and how did it relate to the role which National Party foresaw for other, more radical, organisations such as the ANC? What were the reasons for Inkatha's significance, or lack thereof, in the National Party's plans? How did the National Party's approach change over time and what were the reasons for this? To what extent were the Government's politics influenced by those of Inkatha? This thesis will examine the similarities and differences which existed amongst senior National Party figures and reflect on their significance in connection to the aforementioned questions. It seeks to improve understandings of Inkatha politics, particularly by characterizing its ambiguous relationship with the National Party, and by comparing and contrasting the politics of the two parties.

Conversely, it attempts to provide a better account of the National Party, particularly in connection with African politics, by undertaking such a contrast, and by analyzing its approach towards Inkatha which was the largest and highest profile homeland organization and African political party which explicitly renounced the armed struggle. It should be noted that this thesis does not give a focused account of the National Party under the leadership of FW de Klerk which began in 1989.

Historiography

A number of academic studies have addressed some of these questions and have sought to provide insights into the nature of Inkatha and National Party politics and relationship between the two parties. In interpreting Buthelezi's apparently ambiguous role in South African politics, most accounts tend to stress either Buthelezi's role as an opponent of apartheid whose politics were guided and tempered by pragmatism or his role as a conservative who feigned or exaggerated his radicalism. Welsh and Spence, and Temkin, Jeffery and De Kock all emphasise Buthelezi's pragmatic aim of bringing about radical change from within the system and his defiance of the apartheid

Government.⁴⁷ Jeffery lays the emphasis on the tactical differences between Inkatha and the ANC. Inkatha pragmatically adopted a non-violent approach to ending apartheid and also had a broader conception of liberation which entailed the need also for economic growth.⁴⁸ Similarly, Wessel de Kock contended that Inkatha was 'no less insistent and radical than the ANC in its demands for a democratic South Africa' and was a 'moderate only in terms of his strategy'.⁴⁹ On the other hand, John Brewer argued that Buthelezi, 'by inclination', placed Inkatha at the 'Conservative political centre' of South African politics. The party was moving to a progressively more moderate position.⁵⁰ Similarly, Mare and Hamilton argued that, although Buthelezi opposed some of the 'most obnoxious elements of apartheid', the gulf between Buthelezi and the South African Government lay 'more in the detail than in the principles'. Buthelezi's 'big prize' was to be accepted in the reform process and a 'future place in a South Africa that will not have been too radically altered'.⁵¹ Colleen McCaul contended that Inkatha was a 'major conservative force in black South African politics'.⁵² Mzala goes further, arguing that Buthelezi was not striving in opposition to apartheid.⁵³

There is a tendency amongst accounts which emphasise Inkatha's conservatism to argue that Buthelezi's politics were motivated by his personal desire for power and status. John Brewer argued that black liberation seemed to be 'secondary to Buthelezi's accession'.⁵⁴ The title of Mare and Hamilton's book suggests that Buthelezi was driven by an 'appetite for power'.⁵⁵ For Laurence Piper, Inkatha's politics in the 1980s were characterised by a defence of 'elite political interests' and a struggle for political hegemony with the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. Inkatha utilised Zulu ethnicity and traditional structures of authority in order to retain power and influence.⁵⁶ Also, Mzala argues that the KwaZulu Chief Minister was motivated by political position and 'personal advancement'.⁵⁷ Moreover, it is argued that Buthelezi was motivated by the pursuit of elite economic economic

⁴⁷ D. Welsh and J.E. Spence, *Ending Apartheid* (London: Longman/Pearson, 2011), 98; B. Temkin, *Buthelezi: A Biography* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 200-50; Jeffery, *The Natal Story*, 20-25; W. de Kock, *Usuthu Cry Peace: Inkatha and the Fight for a Just South Africa* (Cape Town: Gallery Press, 1986), 20-25.

⁴⁸ Jeffery, *People's War*, 14.

⁴⁹ De Kock, *Usuthu Cry Peace*, 21; *Ibid.*, 31.

⁵⁰ J. Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to KwaZulu', 359; J. Brewer, *After Soweto: An Unfinished Journey* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 352.

⁵¹ G. Mare and G. Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa* (Johannesburg: Ragan Press, 1987), 221; *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵² C. McCaul, 'The Wild Card: Inkatha and Contemporary Black Politics', in P. Frankel, N. Pines and M. Swilling (eds), *State, Resistance and Change in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1989), 146.

⁵³ Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi*, 228; *Ibid.*, 229.

⁵⁴ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 371.

⁵⁵ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*.

⁵⁶ L. Piper, 'The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South Africa' (PhD Thesis, Wolfson College, Cambridge University, December, 1998), 78; *Ibid.*, 84; *Ibid.*, 91.

⁵⁷ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 229.

interests. Shula Marks, for instance, argued that 'increasingly, Buthelezi appears to represent the small class of African accumulators, the chiefs and wealthier landowners....His concerns mirror those of the aspirant bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie, although their class interests are masked by his claims to speak for "my people" and the need to "temper" the harshness of unfettered capitalism with the humanity of African communalism'.⁵⁸ Mare and Hamilton wrote of the 'class interests dominant in Inkatha'.⁵⁹ Mzala also alleged that Inkatha's policies reflected bourgeois class interests.⁶⁰ There is, however, some dissent. For instance, Adam and Moodley suggest that 'Buthelezi primarily articulated the fears of his less-privileged constituency of migrant workers and rural traditionalists who had the most to lose from higher unemployment and economic decline'.⁶¹

It has been asked whether Buthelezi was primarily motivated by a broad African and South African nationalism or whether he was chiefly concerned with promoting the sectional interests of Zulu society as perceived by its traditional leadership. This is closely related to the question of whether the Inkatha leadership was driven chiefly by the objective of regional political change and sought political structures which, whilst departing from apartheid, offered more power to the traditional Zulu leadership than would a centralised, unitary democracy. Mzala saw Buthelezi's politics as part of a divisive 'Zulu nationalism'. An 'ethnic tendency' and 'true South African' nationalism could not be reconciled.⁶² Laurence Piper argues that as Inkatha's national influence waned relative to the ANC, its politics became increasingly concerned with a sectional Zulu nationalism and ethnicity.⁶³

Mare argues that Buthelezi put forward an historical narrative which was tailored to suggest that Inkatha's policies were a continuity of past African politics and thereby to confer legitimacy on those policies.⁶⁴ He contends that Buthelezi's invented traditions, his denial of class differences and his concept of the traditional family are used as 'ideology' in a 'competition for power' against other groups.⁶⁵

Those who emphasise Inkatha's conservative orientation often contend that the different aspects of Buthelezi's politics were irreconcilable or incoherent. Inkatha's ambiguous politics represented its rhetorical attempts to serve its own political interests and the contradictory political demands placed on the organisation. Brewer described Inkatha as an organisation with a 'janus face' which

⁵⁸ Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence In South Africa*, 118-119.

⁵⁹ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 89.

⁶⁰ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 167.

⁶¹ H. Adam and K. Moodley, *The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1993), 128.

⁶² Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda* (Zed Books, 1987), pp. 230-1.

⁶³ Piper, 'The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South Africa', 78; *Ibid.*, 91.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 43; *Ibid.*, 47; *Ibid.*, 67.

presented two images to the world.⁶⁶ Its role as a 'political party in KwaZulu requires compromise and barter politicking with the state, and an alliance with traditional forces in KwaZulu, such as chiefs.⁶⁷ By contrast, in order to win widespread support among black South Africans, Inkatha needs, in its political movement role, to reject the very government with which it negotiates; to transcend the ethnic base it governs; and decry the traditionalism with which it is in alliance'. Inkatha's 'ambiguity in these matters reflects its inability to resolve the contradictory demands of its dual role and constitutes its Janus Face'.⁶⁸ For Mzala, Buthelezi was the Chief with 'a distinct and irreconcilable double agenda' in which he claimed to be an opponent of apartheid whilst in fact serving that system.⁶⁹

Academics such as Venter and Welsh argued in the first half of the 1980s that Inkatha was seeking to play a 'broker's role' or a mediating role in political change, in which it was attempting to form meaningful relationships with both the ANC and the National Party and to position itself so as to be able to broker a deal between the two and thereby exert an influence over the process of change.⁷⁰ However, by the mid-1980s, historians such as Brewer argued that Buthelezi's estrangement from more radical forces had made it unlikely that he could mediate between the Government and the ANC.⁷¹ For Brewer, this made Buthelezi more likely to collaborate and compromise with the Government to the exclusion of the ANC. Moreover, Shula Marks argued that the increasing radicalisation of black politics, spearheaded by the ANC and its allies, had narrowed Buthelezi's political options to the extent that he was walking a political tightrope.⁷²

Many of these accounts see Buthelezi as inclined towards cooperation, collaboration and compromise with the National Party Government. For Brewer, the Inkatha leader was 'seeking an alliance with the Afrikaner' and was prepared to make significant compromises in order negotiate himself into power.⁷³ Mare and Hamilton argued that Buthelezi was a 'willing ally' of the Government's 'mission to fight off the "total onslaught"'.⁷⁴ Laurence Piper goes as far as to say that Inkatha fell into an '*ad hoc* alliance' with the National Party Government.⁷⁵ Mzala went further,

⁶⁶ Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to Kwazulu', 354.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 364.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 365.

⁶⁹ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 228-9.

⁷⁰ 'Inkatha: paradox of apartheid?', *The Star*, 14 October 1981; Brewer, *After Soweto*, 372.

⁷¹ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 372.

⁷² Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence*, 124.

⁷³ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 372.

⁷⁴ G. Mare and G. Hamilton, 'The Inkatha Freedom Party', in A. Reynolds (ed.), *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaign, Results and Future Prospects* (London: James Curry, 1994), 77.

⁷⁵ Piper, 'The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South Africa', 79.

arguing that Buthelezi's participation in the homeland system had bound him to the rules of apartheid as determined by the National Party Government.⁷⁶

But while existing studies of Inkatha provide interesting insights into the nature of Buthelezi's politics, many of the claims made in the existing accounts are not substantiated by primary source material and are not supported by detailed argumentation. The existing historiography is vague and broad-brushed in its analysis, omitting to bring a careful delineation of categories to bear in its characterisation of Inkatha politics. It fails to define what exactly it means to be either a conservative, a pragmatic opponent of apartheid, or any other type of politician. It does not reflect on similarities and differences between these categories or the variations within them. Many of the accounts lack clarity, precision and detail in their characterisations. In describing Inkatha as a 'conservative' organisation, Brewer and McCaul do not give a detailed description of exactly what this entailed, and the ways in which Buthelezi differed with, or was similar to, the National Party and its leaders.⁷⁷ Similarly, Mare and Hamilton argue that Inkatha differed with the National Party more in the 'detail' than the 'principles', but do not enumerate and reflect upon those principles and details.⁷⁸ Instead, some accounts which stress Buthelezi's conservatism offer fairly narrow definitions of the liberation struggle so that Inkatha can be excluded therefrom. Mzala argued that fundamental change entailed the planned development of the economy, large-scale land redistribution and affirmative action, and the rejection of any form of power-sharing.⁷⁹ 'Transformation', for Mare and Hamilton, necessarily involved not only the implementation of democracy and the rejection of racial discrimination, but the creation of a society 'that is non-exploitative both internally and in relation to its southern African neighbours'.⁸⁰ These are serious shortcomings given the ambiguity and paradox of Inkatha politics.

Another shortcoming is that there is no thorough analysis of how the different facets of Inkatha's politics related to one another and whether they reflected a coherent political vision. A number of accounts are reductionist in their analyses which assume that Inkatha's politics could only have been motivated by elite political and economic interests, at the expense of popular interests, and shaped solely by cynical strategic reasoning in pursuit of those interests. These include the aforementioned studies by Mare and Hamilton, Marks, Brewer and Mzala. These accounts do not give sufficient consideration to other ways of interpreting Buthelezi's politics and make no serious effort to reflect

⁷⁶ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 3-7.

⁷⁷ Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to Kwazulu', 353-374; McCaul, 'The Wild Card: Inkatha and Contemporary Black Politics', 146-173.

⁷⁸ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 6.

⁷⁹ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 223-226.

⁸⁰ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 7.

on how interest and expediency might have interplayed with Buthelezi's ideas and values in forming his politics. At the root of this problem is the lack of any serious attempt to discern political and philosophical ideas which were expressed in his utterances and his policies. As such, the studies overlook a number of vital insights which provide for a clearer and more profound understanding of Inkatha's politics. They fail also to uncover the deep and coherent philosophical core which lay at the heart of Buthelezi's politics, and which reconciled different facets of Inkatha politics which appear, at first glance, to have been inconsistent or contradictory. The pragmatism referred to by Jeffery and De Kock, is not explored in depth. Although it has some value as a description of Buthelezi's approach, it is an inadequate account the philosophical assumptions which underpinned Inkatha politics.

Furthermore, existing accounts of Inkatha often advance conclusions without adequate evidence or illustration. Analyses of Buthelezi's political priorities, his inclination to collaborate with the National Party, his interaction with broader political circumstances and his approach to achieving his objectives are not well-demonstrated. For instance, Brewer does not substantiate his claim that for Inkatha 'Black liberation is secondary to Buthelezi's accession'.⁸¹ Moreover, Marks argued that Buthelezi was walking a tightrope without illustrating his perception of hostile realities and without showing what the Inkatha leader's politics of walking the tightrope consisted in.⁸² A final problem with the existing scholarship on Inkatha is that much of it was produced in the 1980s, before the period in question had come to an end, and without the benefit of distance of time.

Existing historical accounts delineate in broad terms the stated goals of the National Party's reform programme as it evolved over the course of the 1980s. They highlight the principles which Government spelled out as guiding the search for a new constitutional dispensation and characterise the key intentions which lay behind these. According to Allistair Sparks this was to reformulate the old system of racial supremacy and to maintain Afrikaner hegemony.⁸³ Hermann Giliomee, quoting a prominent businessman, characterised Botha's politics throughout the 1980s as an attempt to share power without losing control.⁸⁴ Robert Schrire wrote that Botha believed that the 'unrestrained pursuit of white interests' was not sustainable or just, but throughout this period considered the pillars of white power to be 'inviolable'.⁸⁵ Similarly, for Robert Harvey, Botha was a pragmatist who recognised that the Government needed to adapt to changing circumstances. But his main goal was

⁸¹ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 371.

⁸² Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence*, 124.

⁸³ A. Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Negotiated Revolution* (Sandton: Struik Publishing Group, 1994), 69; *Ibid.*, 68.

⁸⁴ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 147.

⁸⁵ Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 47.

the survival of white South Africa. His total strategy was an effort to implement ‘...more flexible, intelligent policies’ in pursuit of this objective.⁸⁶

Some studies point out that once the National Party had abandoned its project for homeland independence, it did not express a precise vision of what power-sharing would consist of. Dubow notes that the form of the power-sharing which was promised by Government was ‘unspecified’.⁸⁷ Waldmeir argues that ‘no ideology, no visions, guided them’,⁸⁸ and Sparks writes that reforms were piecemeal and ‘no clear vision’ led Botha.⁸⁹ Many accounts stress the significance of the 1985 changes. Waldmeir states that such shifts as a ‘radical departure from the notion that blacks would never have any power at national level’.⁹⁰ Yet, it is also emphasised that there was a continuity of the NP’s effort to retain white power. Saul Dubow argued that groups retained ‘ontological centrality’ throughout the Botha period. Shifts in National Party politics were part of a ‘neo-apartheid’ project which ‘begged the question as to whether the government intended to reform apartheid or merely reformulate it’.⁹¹ Hermann Giliomee argued similarly that racial/ethnic groups were seen by Botha as the fundamental ‘building blocks of the political and social system’ and that there could be no competition between groups.⁹² In the mid-1980s, many contemporary observers saw a convergence in the policy objectives of the National Party and those of Inkatha. As has been shown, Buthelezi sought in the first half of the 1980s to persuade the National Party Government to abandon its aim of independence for the homelands, to abolish key pieces of apartheid legislature and to lead South Africa towards a single state dispensation, with majority rule, tempered by significant power-sharing mechanisms and federal devolution. In a 1985 editorial article named ‘hands across the chasm’, the *Sunday Times* opined that there were ‘major ideological shiftstaking place between the Government and its strongest black establishment opposition – Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi and his Inkatha organisation’.⁹³ Similarly, in 1987, Mare and Hamilton argued that differences between Inkatha and the National Party were now more of detail, than of principle.⁹⁴

In accounting for the Government’s abandonment of the homelands independence project in 1985, some have argued that Inkatha’s opposition to homeland independence and its refusal to participate in Government discussion forums was a key factor in bringing about this change. Gavin Relly of

⁸⁶ R. Harvey, *The Fall of Apartheid*, 77.

⁸⁷ S. Dubow, *Apartheid: 1948-1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 203.

⁸⁸ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*. 42.

⁸⁹ Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 68.

⁹⁰ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 45-6.

⁹¹ Dubow, *Apartheid: 1948-1994*, 203.

⁹² Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 145.

⁹³ ‘Hands across the chasm’, *Sunday Times* 2 June 1985.

⁹⁴ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 7.

Anglo-American told Patti Waldmeir that Buthelezi was 'the anvil on which apartheid was broken'. If Buthelezi had accepted independence, this would have lent credibility to the National Party's project.⁹⁵ Also, FW de Klerk emphasised Buthelezi's refusal to accept independence as a key factor which 'sounded the death knell for grand apartheid'.⁹⁶ Giliomee echoes these interpretations, describing Buthelezi as the 'only internal black leader with any mass following who could act as a counter to the ANC'. His 'tough stand' against independence for KwaZulu 'more than any other opposition destroyed the government's hope to construct "a constellation of black states" out of the homeland system'.⁹⁷

There are academic accounts of the National Party in the first half of the 1980s which characterise the means by which it sought to achieve its ends and how these developed over the course of the period 1980-5. Accounts such as by O'Meara and Waldmeir describe the nature of the National Party's 'Total Strategy' against the 'Total Onslaught', noting its military, economic and political facets.⁹⁸ Waldmeir writes that political reform, particularly the introduction of the tricameral parliament was the 'centre-piece' of this total strategy.⁹⁹ O'Meara stresses that the 'entire reform initiative hinged, firstly, around the expected positive effects of transformed economics policy'.¹⁰⁰ It is a recurring theme that the National Party was seeking to win the allegiance of limited sections of the non-white populations. O'Meara describes the 'series of weird and wonderful schemes' by which the Government sought to win the loyalty of a small black elite.¹⁰¹ Schrire argues that the 1983 tricameral constitution was a means of gaining allies from amongst a non-white elite.¹⁰² Harvey contends that the National Party was seeking to cultivate a black middle-class to act as a counterbalance to African radicals.¹⁰³ Moreover, Giliomee sees Government's urban-focused political reforms as reflecting an attempt to create a 'stable core' of relatively privileged blacks in South Africa's towns.¹⁰⁴

A number of academic accounts have characterised the nature, purpose and significance of the negotiations, dialogue and co-optation as part of the National Party's approach to political change, particularly in the later stages of the decade. One major theme in these accounts is that although

⁹⁵ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, G. Relly interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 7 December 1994.

⁹⁶ FW. De Klerk, *The Last Trek, A New Beginning: The Autobiography* (London: Macmillan, 1998), 99.

⁹⁷ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 604.

⁹⁸ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 44-5; Dan O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the National Party, 1948-1994* (Randburg: Ravan Press, 1996), 259-75.

⁹⁹ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 45.

¹⁰⁰ O' Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 273.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 275.

¹⁰² Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 75.

¹⁰³ Harvey, *The Fall of Apartheid*, 77

¹⁰⁴ H. Giliomee, 'Constitution's two paths towards "State efficiency"', *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 September 1984.

Government declared itself, in the mid-1980s, willing to negotiate with any organisation which renounced violence, its aim was merely to entice moderate or conservative black leaders into state structures and to gain their support and cooperation in the fight against more radical black movements. Steven Friedman argued in the late-1980s that 'the reforms described thus far are not designed to win the support of black leadership in general but of a relatively narrow section of that leadership'. This was done with a view to strengthening 'presumed moderates' at the expense of those the Government did not 'yet regard as acceptable negotiating partners'. The Government was seeking a 'selective settlement' which removed the need to reach an accommodation with more radical leaders.¹⁰⁵ For Friedman, these moderate leaders would be brought into such a settlement as 'junior partners'.¹⁰⁶ In the same edited volume, Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert argued along the same lines that 'the long term goal is undoubtedly to induce a sufficient number of compliant, co-operative, "good", "moderate" blacks into the State structure to assist in the administration of a multi-racial autocracy'.¹⁰⁷ Patti Waldmeir also argued that the ANC was 'excluded' from the Government's plan to 'lure moderate blacks into state structures' so as to 'build a buffer against militant blacks'.¹⁰⁸ For Christi van der Westhuizen also sees Government's proposal of the National Council as part of its 'intensified efforts to create an acceptable class of conservative black leaders' which would act as a 'bulwark against resistance'.¹⁰⁹ William Minter contended in 1987 that the Government was moving towards an 'internal settlement' like that which occurred in Rhodesia. The involvement of leaders with some previous credibility in the Government would 'impress foreign observers' and provide a propaganda tool for the National Party.¹¹⁰ This echoes Roger Southall's forecast in the early 1980s that Buthelezi would find himself in the role of South Africa's Muzorewa.¹¹¹

In making these arguments, a number of academics have stressed the importance of Inkatha for the Government's plans. In an interview with Patti Waldmeir, Steven Friedman commented that in 1986 and 1987, the National Party was seeking to make an internal deal with Buthelezi. Talks behind the

¹⁰⁵ S. Friedman, 'Hot air or fresh breeze? : Current state reform strategies', in M. Swilling (ed.), *Views on the South African State* (Human Sciences Research Council, 1990), 17-8.

¹⁰⁶ Friedman, *Options for the Future: Government reform strategy and prospects for structural change*, 27.

¹⁰⁷ F. Van Zyl Slabbert, 'The struggle for a non-racial democratic South Africa', in M. Swilling (ed.) *Views on the South African State* (Human Sciences Research Council, 1990), 81-2.

¹⁰⁸ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 46.

¹⁰⁹ C. van der Westhuizen, *White Power and the Rise and Fall of the National Party* (Cape Town: Zebra, Cape Town, 2007), 127-8; *Ibid.*, 109.

¹¹⁰ W. Minter, 'Giving up the White Man's Burden? Western Relations with a Free South Africa', *Third World Quarterly*, 9, 2, *After Apartheid* (April, 1987), 461.

¹¹¹ R. Southall, 'Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise', *African Affairs*, 80, 321, (October, 1981), 479-80.

scenes with ANC and UDF was merely an 'insurance thing' in case things didn't work out.¹¹² William Minter predicted that Buthelezi would play a key role in any Government attempt to forge an internal settlement.¹¹³ Mare and Hamilton argued that 'for the state (Inkatha) may be the most hopeful partner in the first tentative steps beyond or away from the Bantustan policy, steps aimed at bringing African people into the structure while maintaining a policy based on "power-sharing" between "groups"'.¹¹⁴ For Colleen McCaul, Inkatha would 'undoubtedly be an important actor on South Africa's political stage...With black politics becoming increasingly radicalised, Inkatha is likely to become the base around the very possibility of a reformist settlement will turn'.¹¹⁵

On the other hand, Richard Humphries and Khehla Shubane emphasise Government's attempts to create credible moderate leaders through local Government structures.¹¹⁶ Other accounts have attached significance to the fact that Government officials were involved in clandestine talks with both the ANC and the UDF in the second half of the 1980s. Patti Waldmeir also suggests that senior members of the National Intelligence Service which were involved in talks with Mandela in these years, were seeking to marginalise radicals by 'wooing moderate allies', but was 'prepared to look for those moderates within the ANC'.¹¹⁷ Allister Sparks agrees along with the view that Botha government intended to 'isolate militant black leaders and groups, and negotiate a new deal with "moderates"'. He argues, though, that they were trying to co-opt Mandela into the moderate camp.¹¹⁸ Michael Clough also argued that the Botha administration would consider trying to split the ANC and to find moderates from that organisation with whom to forge a deal.¹¹⁹

Many academic accounts have also made arguments about how negotiation and political reform was intended to feature in the broader scheme of the Government's political programme. It has been argued that despite the National Party's reforms, its stated commitment to negotiations and its suggestion of statutory negotiating forums, its approach was dominated by an effort to suppress the black uprising militarily. Robert Schrire argues that 'when Botha's reform program began to unravel in late 1984, he had two options: He could attempt to accommodate black aspirations by accelerating reform or he could try to crush the opposition. He chose the latter course'. 'The gap between black aspirations and the limited impact of his policies' had caused 'explosive passions'.

¹¹² JL, Hermann Giliomee files BC 1070, Steven Friedman interviewed by Patti Waldmeir, 17 November 1994.

¹¹³ Minter, 'Giving up the White Man's Burden?', 461-2.

¹¹⁴ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 6.

¹¹⁵ McCaul, *The Wild Card: Inkatha and Contemporary Black Politics*, 169.

¹¹⁶ R. Humphries, K. Shubane, 'A Tale of Two Squirrels', in *South Africa at the End of the Eighties: Policy Perspectives 1989* (Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989), 93-4.

¹¹⁷ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 51.

¹¹⁸ Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 71.

¹¹⁹ M. Clough, 'South Africa: Challenges and Choices', *Foreign Affairs*, 66, 5 (Summer, 1988), 1079.

Botha felt it necessary, therefore, restore political stability through repression.¹²⁰ Swilling and Phillips agree, stating that the politics of reform were 'relegated....to matter of at best secondary importance to be dealt with at some point in the future'. The Government's first objective was to crush the uprising.¹²¹

As part of this approach, it is argued, a greater emphasis was laid on satisfying black aspirations by economic reform than by political reform or negotiating processes. Giliomee claims that 'Botha strongly believed that houses, medical care, proper schools, a firm grip on law and order and the availability of jobs would take much of the sting out of black alienation'.¹²² Swilling and Phillips echo this, arguing that for the 'securocrats' socio-economic development had to come before political reform which could proceed from the bottom-upwards.¹²³ Others, such as Dan O'Meara, have emphasised the importance to Government of developing a black, property owning middle-class. He points out a plan to sell one third of state housing by 1989.¹²⁴

According to this view, negotiation and political progress was increasingly seen as something to which could only be successfully undertaken once revolutionary radicalism had been defeated or significantly weakened. Sparks suggests that 'increasingly, Botha swung around to their view that the uprising had to be crushed to make space for a new deal negotiated with the "moderates", meaning those Africans who were already collaborating in the apartheid structures plus any others who might be co-optable once the uprising was crushed'.¹²⁵ Hermann Giliomee argues that the security establishment increasingly subscribed to the theories of Low-Intensity Conflict which stressed the doctrine 'Crush, conciliate, negotiate'. They adopted a strategy which was based on the assumption that only twenty percent of blacks were committed revolutionaries, thirty percent were 'moderates' and half were 'fence-sitters'. If enough agitators were dealt with, the non-committed group could be turned away from revolutionary radicalism.¹²⁶ It has been argued that, to this end, stability and prosperity would create conditions in which moderate leaders would be strengthened and gain credibility. Richard Humphries and Khehla Shubane argued that "'moderate" leaders were being promoted to step into the space from which "popular" leaders and organisations were being evicted. The October elections were in a sense a way of consolidating these processes with an

¹²⁰ Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 77.

¹²¹ Swilling and Phillips, 'the Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', 48-9.

¹²² Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner leaders*, 265.

¹²³ Swilling and Phillips 'the Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', 49.

¹²⁴ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 347.

¹²⁵ Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 71.

¹²⁶ Giliomee, *The last Afrikaner leaders*, 344-5.

emphasis on the promotion of a moderate leadership, whilst suppressing leaders from the mass democratic movement'.¹²⁷ Swilling and Phillips argued, that the plan was for 'Constitutional development (to) begin at local level and proceed upwards'.¹²⁸ The approach of the Botha Government, Sparks suggests, was to negotiate and reform only after the forces of rebellion had been defeated.¹²⁹ Giliomee argues that this was seen as something to be done in the long-term.¹³⁰ Swilling and Phillips suggest that negotiation was not a priority for the Botha Government by pointing out that 'PW Botha hardly ever mentioned the words "reform" and "negotiation" in his speeches during 1988. ...His talk referred to "deliberations", "dialogue", "talks", "consultation" and "social" (read: socio-economic) reform", but not "negotiation" or "constitutional reform"'.¹³¹ Furthermore, it is suggested that Botha's Government was shaped by his desire to retain control and power over the process of change. Willie Esterhuysen comments that Botha was 'addicted to power'.¹³² Similarly, Robert Rotberg argues that Botha brought a 'heightened sense of command and control' into Government from his years Minister of Defence. Botha placed the State Security Council and the 'military mind' at the helm of South African policy-making.¹³³

The historiography notes that there were differences in outlook between different elements of the National Party leadership in the second half in the 1980s, both in terms of objectives and the means of achieving those objectives. Dan O'Meara writes of 'the growing Afrikaner disillusionment with Botha's policies (which) was also reflected in ferment inside the NP'. He cites the four factions described by former National Party reformist, W Breytenbach. These were the 'PW Nats' who continued to be 'strong on security and Group Areas Act', the 'Fast Nats' who were increasingly disaffected with the PW Nats' lack of reform strategy, the 'New Nats' who were similarly alienated, but remained convinced that the National Party was the 'best vehicle for reform', and the 'Past Nats' who left the party because of their disillusionment with the Botha leadership.¹³⁴ Hermann Giliomee states that whereas Botha, De Klerk and others were opposed to the idea of a fourth chamber in the existing parliament for black people, Chris Heunis was in favour of it. He also suggests that Heunis

¹²⁷ Humphries and Shubane, 'A Tale of Two Squirrels', 93-4.

¹²⁸ Swilling and Phillips, 'The Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', *South Africa at the End of the Eighties: Policy Perspectives 1989* (Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989), 49.

¹²⁹ Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 70.

¹³⁰ Giliomee, *Last of the Afrikaner leaders*, 271.

¹³¹ Swilling and Phillips, 'The Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making Structures and Policy Strategies in the South African State', 61-2.

¹³² W. Esterhuysen, *Endgame: Secret Talks and the end of Apartheid* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2012), 56.

¹³³ Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy*, 309.

¹³⁴ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 372.

was a driving force behind the acceptance of South Africa as one country.¹³⁵ Moreover, Jan Heunis argues that his father was more reform-minded than PW Botha and more willing to make significant changes to the system to ensure a better arrangement for Africans. He contends that his father was the force behind the implementation of the regional services council and the 'watering down' of the Group Areas Act.¹³⁶ FW de Klerk's autobiography also argues that Heunis was less concerned with the concept of 'own affairs' than others in cabinet and that Heunis favoured the possibility of black president whereas he wanted a rotational presidency.¹³⁷ It is argued also that Botha's strategy was in tension with the approach of key Government ministers, most notably Chris Heunis, who saw negotiation and political change as being a vital part of the process of reform in South Africa. The differences and tensions between these two outlooks is emphasised by Swilling and Phillip, Giliomee, Sparks and O'Meara.¹³⁸ Jan Heunis also argues that his father was part of reformist tendency in the Government which to accelerate political change towards a more democratic system and which came to be increasingly marginalised by Botha.¹³⁹

There are a number of shortcomings in existing accounts. Their conclusions are often poorly substantiated and most studies do not use official National Party documents. Current scholarship overlooks a number of important insights into the nature of National Party politics. For instance, existing analyses of the National Party's political objectives, its approach to achieving those objectives, the rationale behind its politics, the differences in thinking between various cabinet ministers, and how these things changed over time, are often without firm grounding and neglect to consider crucial National Party cabinet transcripts, memoranda and concept documents. Most studies fail to draw upon key sources which provide detailed illustrations and more reliable impressions of the considerations and principles which shaped PW Botha's vision of a new political dispensation. They mistakenly assume that PW Botha and his advisers lacked a detailed conception of a constitutional model to be brought about. Moreover, they do not capture a number of crucial insights into the differences and similarities of the political objectives, approaches, and assumptions of various Government ministers. In particular, a much fuller and more intricate account can be given of the politics of Chris Heunis and his department and how this differed radically from that of PW Botha and a number of like-minded cabinet ministers. Significantly, the arguments made

¹³⁵ Giliomee, *The last Afrikaner Leaders*, 183-9.

¹³⁶ J. Heunis, *The Inner Circle: Reflections on the Last Days of White Rule* (Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2007), 123-5.

¹³⁷ De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 101; *Ibid.*, 107.

¹³⁸ Swilling and Phillips, 'The Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making Structures and Policy Strategies in the South African State', 29-74; Giliomee, *Last of the Afrikaner Leaders*, 180-5; Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 70; O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 342.

¹³⁹ Heunis, *The Inner Circle*: 124-25; *Ibid.*, 66.

concerning the National Party's envisaged plan for Inkatha are not grounded on an examination of primary sources.

Much current scholarship is lacking in detail and nuance in some aspects of its analysis and fails to give a focused consideration to certain questions with which this thesis is concerned. The existing scholarship does not undertake a detailed comparison between the political aims and approaches of leading figures in the National Party and those of Inkatha. Nor does it undertake a focused examination of National Party politics in the first half of the 1980s as it related to, and were reflected in, its relationship with Inkatha. Regarding homeland leaders and Buthelezi in particular, the existing historiography limits itself to a few broad observations about the National party's political approach. It is noted that black people were excluded from the tricameral parliament introduced in 1984, and that even official black leaders were left out of the relevant deliberations in the President's Council.¹⁴⁰ It is stated by Giliomee, that towards the mid-1980s, the National Party Government established a Special Cabinet Committee for black constitutional development which paid closer attention to these issues and sought to discuss them with official black leaders.¹⁴¹ Of course, it is noted broadly that the National Party sought to persuade Buthelezi and others to accept independence.¹⁴² Further, there are a few general statements made about the National Party's response to the Buthelezi Commission, such as Giliomee's contention that the Buthelezi Commission proposals were rejected 'in the classic apartheid mode'.¹⁴³ However, no account gives a thorough and focused consideration of what role Botha's Government envisage for Inkatha in the first half of the 1980s. It is not asked how significant Inkatha was to the National Party's plans in this period, nor to what extent the ruling party perceived there to be benefits or disadvantages of potential partnership or collaboration with Inkatha. No account illustrates how the National Party responded to Buthelezi's proposals for reform and cooperation. And there is no detailed characterisation of the nature of the National Party's interactions with Inkatha or how it sought to influence Inkatha's politics. Furthermore, there is not currently a detailed, well-substantiated account of why the Government came to abandon its plan for the homelands to become independent, and the significance of Inkatha's role in that regard.

Contribution and Structure.

¹⁴⁰ Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 59.

¹⁴¹ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 182-3; *Ibid.*, 186-7.

¹⁴² Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 52-3.

¹⁴³ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 172.

This thesis seeks to build upon the current scholarship, and overcome its shortcomings, in order to give a detailed account of Inkatha and National Party politics in this period, and the relationship between them. It does so by giving detailed, focused and more elaborate consideration to the questions delineated above. In providing answers to those questions, it draws upon extensive original primary source research and brings previously unused evidence to bear. The author also seeks to offer new insights by challenging and refining interpretations of the relevant source material. The thesis is split into two parts. Part one focuses on characterizing Inkatha politics, and part two examines the politics of the National Party, giving particular attention to the relationship this bore to the politics of Inkatha. Each part is subdivided into a number of chapters which address distinct, if related, themes. Chapters one, two, three and four are contained in part one, whereas chapters five to ten comprise part two.

Drawing on previously unused primary source material, chapter one examines the ambiguity of Buthelezi's opposition to apartheid and the reform policies of the National Party, as well as his fight against the policies of the ANC and its allies. It not only provides a more extensive exposition of Buthelezi's utterances in connection with these two aspects of his politics. It also seeks to provide a deeper, more illuminating and better substantiated understanding of Buthelezi's politics by reflecting upon the ideas which he expressed and the philosophical content of those ideas. It attempts to demonstrate that Buthelezi's utterances had greater philosophical substance than has previously been credited. It contends, moreover, that a coherent set of philosophical assumptions were expressed in many facets of Buthelezi's politics which, *prima facie*, appear contradictory or inconsistent. It is hoped thereby to provide an improved sense of perspective on Buthelezi's politics which have often been characterised merely as a series of cynical tactics employed in pursuit of elite political and economic interests. In particular, it is argued that Buthelezi's espoused political principles bore a strikingly close resemblance to the political philosophy of Edmund Burke, widely seen as the founder of the modern conservative tradition and the best-known philosophical critic of a certain type of revolutionary radicalism. It tries to show how these assumptions were reflected in a range of Buthelezi's political positions, and to elucidate the way in which Buthelezi applied a Burkean political understanding to the specific circumstances of 1980s South Africa. As such, it reveals the deep cleavages between his politics and what he saw as the revolutionary radicalism of the ANC and affiliated organisations. Yet, it attempts to show that Buthelezi's conservatism was not a defence of the status quo or status quo ante, and not incompatible with a strong opposition to apartheid and a desire for liberalisation and democratisation in South Africa. Indeed, it argues that Buthelezi's type of conservative outlook brought him into strong disagreement with apartheid policy.

Chapter one of this thesis seeks to provide a clearer and more sophisticated understanding of what Buthelezi's conservatism consisted in and how it varied from the National Party outlook. It tries moreover to demonstrate precisely how this conservatism was compatible with and gave rise to a pragmatic opposition to apartheid. It attempts to show why Buthelezi was strongly opposed to certain forms of revolutionary radicalism, but was committed to significant political change. It seeks to demonstrate that despite Inkatha's making less radical demands than the ANC, its objectives were fundamentally different to the National Party's and constituted an insistence on the end of apartheid. It argues that despite Inkatha's defence of ethnic identity and its sympathy for devolution of power to groups and regions, Buthelezi's Burkean outlook led him to reject the rigid, ideological programme of PW Botha which sought the political 'self-determination' of groups regardless of unpropitious social and economic factors. It seeks to provide a better understanding of the liberal aspects of Inkatha politics, and explains the relationship between these and Inkatha's conservatism. It argues that these aspects of liberalism were compatible with, but highly qualified and circumscribed by, the Burkean conservatism which lay at the foundation of Inkatha's politics. It tries to show that Buthelezi's western liberalism and his Zulu traditionalism were somewhat reconciled by Burkean assumptions, but existed in a degree of tension.

Chapter two engages critically with existing scholarship to examine the hierarchy of Inkatha's political priorities and how these shaped, and were shaped by, its perception of practical politics in the 1980s. It examines a number of related questions raised by the existing scholarship, undertaking for the first time a focused primary source analysis to seek a better understanding of these aspects of Buthelezi's politics. It seeks to demonstrate that, at least in the late-1980s, Buthelezi's opposition to revolutionary radicalism was his most urgent political priority. The chapter attempts to show that Inkatha's political priorities changed over time, and in response to broader circumstances. It contends that Buthelezi's prioritisation of his struggle against revolutionary radicalism reflected the context of acute power contestation in which organisations such as the ANC and UDF had gained a steep ascendancy, and apartheid had become moribund. As such, Buthelezi's anti-revolutionary focus did not mirror a desire to defend key apartheid structures, but reflected his perception that white minority regime of which he so disapproved was destined to come to an end in the medium-long term.

Chapter two undertakes the first fine-grained examination of the extent to which Inkatha's distinct objectives of ending apartheid and thwarting revolutionary radicalism came into conflict. It questions the extent to which practical considerations led Buthelezi to cooperate, collaborate or compromise with the National Party Government. It enumerates a number of ways in which Inkatha can be said to have collaborated with the ruling party, not least in matters of security. Yet, it

contends that these forms of collaboration are not evidence of Inkatha's positive support for the Government's reform and negotiating initiatives, and it stresses Inkatha's consistent opposition to, and defiance of, those initiatives. It brings original primary source research to bear to show that this defiance of the National Party was not simply feigned radicalism, but reflected Buthelezi's judgement that more meaningful political change was necessary to thwart the rise of revolutionary radicalism. This chapter attempts the first detailed characterisation of the nature of Inkatha efforts to persuade National Party to forge a partnership with them on these terms. It argues that Inkatha adopted a critical, but non-confrontational approach towards the National Party. It sought to cultivate a sense of common purpose and mutual interest in the struggle against revolutionary radicalism. It exhibited a strong and resilient commitment to this task in the face of National Party intransigence.

Chapter three undertakes an analysis of the nature of Buthelezi's relationship with the ANC and the bearing this had on Inkatha's approach to political change, particularly in the second half of the 1980s. It seeks an improved understanding of the ambiguities of this relationship whereby Inkatha furiously castigated the ANC, but called for its unconditional unbanning and the release of its political prisoners. It examines, furthermore, how the context of power-contestation shaped Inkatha's approach towards the ANC. It asks the question, whose answer is not properly demonstrated in the historiography, whether Inkatha was seeking to play a mediating role between the National Party and the ANC. It argues that Inkatha was seeking to play such a role, despite a set of increasingly unpropitious circumstances. However, it argues that Buthelezi recognized that circumstances made his political position more precarious, and provides the first detailed illustration of how Buthelezi adapted his political approach to overcome or to mitigate the political difficulties he faced. As such, it corroborates and elaborates Shula Marks's contention that from the mid-1980s Buthelezi was walking a political tightrope.

Building on the analysis undertaken earlier in part one, chapter four explores a number of difficulties in interpreting Inkatha. These difficulties regard what shaped and what motivated its politics. These questions are somewhat addressed, but not fully resolved, in previous chapters. Chapter four considers several accounts which have portrayed Inkatha's politics as being motivated merely by elite interests, both political and economic, and shaped by the tactical considerations regarding the pursuit of those interests. It weighs the arguments in favour of these interpretations by reflecting on new evidence as well as that provided in early chapters and by the historiography. Without denying the significance of interest and expediency in explaining Buthelezi's politics, it poses a challenge to reductionism of accounts which do not look beyond these factors. It draws upon the analysis given in chapter one, and provides a telling biographical characterization to argue that Buthelezi's ideas and

values, in interrelationship with interests and strategic reasoning, played a significant part in forming his politics.

Chapter five makes use of previously unstudied Government documents to provide an understanding of the principles which formed the National Party's vision of a new political order in South Africa in the 1980s. It undertakes a more detailed examination of the National Party's espoused principles on this subject, the rationale it offered for these and the extent to which these changed over time course of the decade. It offers a vivid and reliable account of PW Botha's constitutional inclinations as expressed privately, and analyses Botha's only departmental document which sketches a detailed constitutional model for South Africa. Furthermore, it utilises previously unused documents to provide a much better understanding of the differences which existed in this respect amongst different cabinet ministers in mid-late 1980s, particularly between PW Botha and Chris Heunis. Moreover, this chapter will compare with greater intricacy the constitutional preferences of the National Party, its various leaders, and Inkatha. It will delineate the similarities and differences, both real and apparent, as they developed over the decade.

Chapter 6 will bring original primary source analysis to bear when accounting for the nature of the National Party's approach to politics in this period and where Inkatha lay within it. It is argued that in the early-1980s the National Party fundamentally rejected, and that Botha's National Party was rigidly opposed to any role for Inkatha beyond that of a homeland and Zulu-based political party. It will highlight that there was no sense in the early-1980s of a need to forge an alliance or common vision with Buthelezi with regard to South Africa-wide issues. The Government only sought to cooperate on kwaZulu-related issues. In this connection, the Government focused on KwaZulu's movement towards independence, Inkatha's potential role as a representative of Zulus in urban elections and the economic development of the homeland as a means of stemming the flow of Africans into common South Africa. It contends that in seeking independence for KwaZulu, the National Party's tendency was towards forcefulness, insistence and self-assuredness. In the face of criticism and opposition from Inkatha, the National Party displayed great intransigence and little self-doubt. Despite an emphasis on consultation and dialogue, it did not express understanding of Buthelezi's stated concerns, seek to address them or apparently take much cognisance of them. It responded only to dismiss Buthelezi's politics and to reiterate dogma. It was hoped that enough pressure could be brought to bear on Buthelezi that he would accept independence. This chapter also argues how there were subtle, but significant shifts in National Party politics in the early-mid 1980s, when in response to growing radicalism, there was an increased appreciation of the role of moderates black leaders and greater efforts made to engage them in multi-lateral discussions about South Africa-wide questions.

Chapter seven attempts the first detailed account of the National Party's abandonment the homelands independence project and the reasons for it. Unlike previous accounts, it draws upon official Government documents to undertake this analysis. It seeks to assess the significance of Inkatha's opposition to the Verwoerdian apartheid as a factor in this shift and explores other factors which might have had a bearing. It is argued that Inkatha's approval of the homeland independence project was necessary for its viability, and that Buthelezi's resistance to independence was a significant factor in bringing about a change in National Party approach. However, it casts into doubt whether Inkatha's politics can be seen as the chief cause by attempting to highlight the significance of a number of other key developments which led National Party leaders to change course.

Chapters eight, nine and ten draw upon a range of useful and previously unstudied official documents to give a fine-grained and reliable understanding of the National Party's approach to achieving its political objectives in the second half of the 1980s. They seek to understand the significance of the National Party's purported commitment to a negotiated political settlement in South Africa and its apparently greater efforts to engage in formal negotiations with African leaders who rejected the armed struggle. They attempt to grasp the intended nature of these negotiations, and their role relative to other aspects of the National Party policy. These chapters seek to discern the role which the National Party intended for Inkatha in South African politics, in political change, and in a final political settlement. They ask how this role related to the role envisaged for other African organisations, such as the ANC. The final three chapters build upon the existing scholarship to discern the different tendencies which existed within the National Party in this period, and the significance of these differences. They examine the continuities and discontinuities of the National Party's approaches as they developed from the early-1980s to the late-1980s, and show how these compared to the approach which Inkatha wanted the ruling party to adopt.

Chapter eight offers an account of the broad principles which were espoused by National Party officials regarding their approach to politics in the second half of the 1980s. It considers the new commitments to negotiation which were announced, and the reform and negotiation initiatives in which the National Party were involved, in this period. It reflects on the nature and significance of these changes, whilst also describing the continuities of the National Party's approach from the early-1980s. It seeks further to highlight these continuities and developments by considering the Government's response to the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba in comparison to its response to the Buthelezi Commission. Much of the analysis in this chapter is broad-brushed and based chiefly on a study of the public pronouncements of various National Party officials. Its main purpose is to set the scene for the more detailed and deep analyses which are undertaken in chapters nine and ten. These draw more upon official Government documents to provide a nuanced understanding of the National

Party's approach to political change. Chapter nine focuses on the political approach of PW Botha and similar-minded National Party officials. Chapter ten examines the distinct tendency represented by Minister Chris Heunis and his Department for Constitutional Development and Planning. It compares this approach with that of President Botha, and reflects on the nature and significance of these differences in connection with Inkatha politics.

Source Material

As well as being based on an extensive study of secondary literature, this thesis draws upon a large volume of original primary source research. The analysis of Inkatha politics draws chiefly on the public utterances of Buthelezi made to a variety of audiences, ranging from his own party members, to foreign politicians and diplomats, and a range of civil society organisations in South Africa and abroad. Many of these statements are taken from the large volume of speech transcripts, of which the author has undertaken an extensive study. These transcripts were studied at the EG Malherbe Library on the Howard College campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal, the Alan Paton Centre on the Pietermaritzburg campus of the same institution, and Rhodes House at the University of Oxford. This study also makes use of large numbers of South African newspaper and magazine articles which contain interesting quotations from senior Inkatha officials such as Buthelezi and Oscar Dhlomo, as well as providing information about key events in the period. These sources were collected chiefly from the South African Media resource at the Archive for Contemporary Affairs at the University of the Free State. A large collection of the editions of *Clarion Call*, the official magazine of Inkatha, from 1983 until the end of the 1980s were accessed at Rhodes House. This thesis also makes use of recorded private interactions between Inkatha officials and the ANC, and white politicians in the Progressive Federal Party and the National Party. These dialogues are documented in a number of National Party politicians' collections at the Archive of Contemporary Affairs, and in the Colin Eglin Collection at the Jagger Library, University of Cape Town. Furthermore, the analysis of Inkatha politics draws upon an interview which the author held with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Moreover, this thesis draws on telling biographical details, where appropriate to corroborate its interpretation of Buthelezi's political orientation.

One limitation of the available source material is that there is a dearth of evidence which reveals Buthelezi's thoughts on South African colleagues as expressed privately to close colleagues throughout this period. This is a significant difficulty, because it makes the author's interpretation of Inkatha dependent on utterances made to various constituencies, interest groups and political protagonists in a context of acute and shifting power contestation. Therefore, in forming his

arguments, the author was conscious of the need to give careful consideration to the provenance of the documents and to reflect on the reliability and usefulness of the evidence uncovered. Moreover, the author sought to interpret individual sources by cross-examining them with the broader body of evidence, and the patterns which emerged in that wider range of documents.

In characterizing the National Party's politics, this thesis makes use of some of the same types of sources that it employs in its analysis of Inkatha. It makes use of a large number of South African newspaper and magazine articles as sources of information regarding key events, official policies and the publically espoused beliefs of senior National Party figures. These are drawn from the South African Media resource at the Archive for Contemporary Affairs. It utilizes a number of official party publications and speeches given by party officials, which further enrich an understanding of the National Party's publically voiced politics. Many of these were drawn from the Archive for Contemporary Affairs which contains collections of documents from a broad range of National Party politicians, including PW Botha, Chris Heunis, Leon Wessels and Magnus Malan. It is also based on an extensive reading of the *Hansard* transcripts of South African parliamentary debates in the 1980s. Moreover, it seeks further, more reliable, and deeper insights by analyzing a range of interviews undertaken by scholars with senior National Party figures. A key resource in this respect was the collection of Patti Waldmeir's interviews contained in Hermann Giliomee's files at the Jagger Library. It is also based on a study of Giliomee's own interviews contained in the same files, and the interviews conducted by Padraig O'Malley published online. Furthermore, the thesis is informed by an interview the present author conducted with National Party MP and former regional leader, Valentine Volker.

These sources have similar drawbacks to the ones noted above, and the author was just as mindful of these problems and how to mitigate them. However, in its analysis of the National Party, this thesis makes use of previously uncited private National Party documents, which are also contained in various collections at the Archive for Contemporary Affairs. These include memoranda, official correspondence, minutes from important meetings amongst leading Government figures, and detailed concept documents. They provide important and reliable insights into the thinking and policy-making of leading party figures, and also serve to corroborate or refute what is reflected in the Government's public statements.

These private sources, however, have their own limitations. The range of documents available to study likely does not constitute a comprehensive collection of the relevant official documents which were produced during the period. In addition to the many Government meetings which undoubtedly went undocumented, official documents do not record the informal but crucial interactions and

communications which took place. Moreover, the available private sources chiefly offer insights into the political outlooks of PW Botha and Chris Heunis. Despite important glimpses into the other leading figures, no comparatively detailed documentation is offered for the thinking of these other characters. Perhaps most crucially, there are very few sources which reveal the nature of FW de Klerk's private thinking in the short spell at the end of the 1980s when he was the leader of the National party and then State President. These sources are illuminating and often demonstrative, but ultimately an incomplete documentation of National Party thinking in this period.

Part One: Inkatha Politics, 1980-1989.

Chapter One: A Conservative Opposition to both Revolutionary Radicalism and Apartheid.

Opposition to Revolutionary Radicalism.

Buthelezi expressed a number of criticisms of the ANC and revolutionary radical African political movements in the 1980s. Some of Buthelezi's utterances from the period suggest, at first glance, that such criticism was not based on a fundamental or principled conflict between himself and the ANC, but arose from a disagreement over means rather ends, or that the difference in outlook between the two organisations was less significant than between Inkatha and the National Party. For instance, Buthelezi often stated that his opposition to radical violence and sanctions was because these were not the most effective ways of promoting radical change. He advocated the development of black economic bargaining power as a better expedient for bringing apartheid to an end whilst hinting that violent struggle might become justified eventually as a last resort.¹⁴⁴ Inkatha rejected the designation of a 'moderate' African party and emphasised its 'radical' objectives, as well as calling for a Black Unity which reconciled different parties on the basis of a 'multi-strategy approach'.¹⁴⁵ A close inspection of Buthelezi's politics, however, demonstrates that his criticisms expressed a fundamental and deeply-felt opposition to the politics of revolutionary radicalism which he associated with the ANC and its allies. He criticised these organisations stridently, frequently and to a wide range of audiences.

¹⁴⁴ Jeffery, *Natal Story*, 20-5; G. Mare, 'Versions of Resistance History in South African: The ANC Strand in Inkatha in the 1970s and 1980s', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 27, No. 83 (March, 2000), 68; ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/BA/1 1985-86, M. Buthelezi testifies to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1985-86, 20 January 1986; RH, Buthelezi Cites his Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London, 20 January 1986, in Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

¹⁴⁵ 'Are these the words of a moderate leader?', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 4, 1985; RH, Citation of Memorandum from M. Buthelezi for Prime Minister of Israel, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986; 'Plea for Black Unity', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1987.

These aspects of Buthelezi's politics are partly described by the existing historiography. Anthea Jeffery notes Buthelezi's opposition to apartheid, but points out that the Inkatha leader adopted a strategy that was 'diametrically opposed' to that of the ANC/SACP alliance.¹⁴⁶ Buthelezi's opposition to violence and to sanctions was 'both principled and pragmatic'.¹⁴⁷ As well as warning that they would be ineffective, Buthelezi opposed violence and sanctions because they would have an adverse economic effect and he was interested not only in overcoming oppression, but also 'poverty, hunger and disease'.¹⁴⁸ Jeffery also comments that Inkatha criticised the ANC alliance for using violence as a means to replace apartheid with an authoritarian socialist regime.¹⁴⁹ Mare and Hamilton argue that Inkatha had become part of the effort to preserve capitalism in South Africa and in that sense its 'resistance has been loyal to...reformism and compromise, to capitalism, to anti-communism...'.¹⁵⁰ However, there are many important insights about Buthelezi's opposition to ANC politics which are still to be provided. Particularly, existing accounts do not examine the deep political and philosophical assumptions which are expressed in Buthelezi's utterances. Nor do they examine the relationship which Buthelezi's opposition to revolutionary radicalism bore to his antagonism towards apartheid and the National Party. It is significant in this respect that the historiography fails to discern and to illustrate the fact that Buthelezi's utterances regarding political change bear a strikingly close resemblance to the philosophy espoused by the British philosopher, Edmund Burke. This is noteworthy because Burke is widely considered the philosophical founder of modern conservatism and also because his strident critique of the French Revolution is the *locus classicus* of anti-revolutionary philosophy. Indeed, Burke's ideas became deeply influential amongst anti-communists in the twentieth century.¹⁵¹

Burke was a traditionalist and anti-rationalist conservative who rejected the French Revolution which he regarded as a utopian endeavour to wipe clean the slate of French society and to rewrite it in accordance to purely abstract ideals. For Burke, human societies were not completely malleable entities to be refashioned according to abstract principles, but were social orders comprised by a distinctive arrangement of traditions, institutions and laws, and the products of unique histories. Burke argued that attempts to bring about revolutionary change will often produce harmful unintended consequences, bring political upheaval and tyranny, and destroy much of value which

¹⁴⁶Jeffery, *Natal Story*, 21.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 25-6.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 194-195.

¹⁵⁰ Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 221.

¹⁵¹ SK. White, *Edmund Burke: Modernity, Politics and Aesthetics* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), xix.

had been inherited from previous generations.¹⁵² Burke believed that societal improvement is something which can only be undertaken cautiously and with close attention to experience, inherited wisdom and circumstances. He argued that many of the objectives of society cannot be achieved in a single generation, but only over the course of many generations. The valuable inheritance received from previous generations is easier to destroy than to regain and ought to be conserved, enhanced and passed on to future generations. Hence, his famous dictum that society is a partnership between 'those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born'.¹⁵³

Not only did Buthelezi explicitly cite the 'wisdom' of Edmund Burke, and allude to the French Revolution in his critique of South African revolutionaries,¹⁵⁴ but the Inkatha leader's attacks on the ANC and revolutionary radicalism expressed a broad range of deeply conservative assumptions as propounded by Burke. A recurring theme in Buthelezi's political pronouncements was his repeated criticism of the utopianism and idealism of South African revolutionaries. For instance, Buthelezi frequently denounced those radicals who thought 'that South African society is like a black-board which can be wiped clean and a new order of social, economic and political existence can be written on it'.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, Buthelezi told visitors in Ulundi that the ANC wanted 'to flatten South Africa as it has emerged in the twentieth century, and they want to write on a slate wiped clean by violence a new one-Party socialist State'.¹⁵⁶ Such criticisms are remarkably similar to Burke's criticism of revolutionaries who considered their country 'as nothing but *carte blanche*, upon which he may scribble whatever he pleases'.¹⁵⁷

Buthelezi explicitly denounced revolutionary radicalism for not being grounded in the relevant realities. He lamented the Kairos Document produced by the South African Council of Churches which supported the politics of the ANC and which he thought sanctioned revolutionary violence.

¹⁵² PJ. Stanlis, *Edmund Burke: The Enlightenment and Revolution* (New Jersey: Transaction publishers, 1993), 209; JL. Pappin iii, *The Metaphysics of Edmund Burke* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), 130; J. Norman, *Edmund Burke: The Visionary Who Invented Modern Politics* (London: William Collins, 2014), 200-205; *Ibid.*, 137.

¹⁵³ Norman, *Edmund Burke*, 201; *Ibid.*, 200-205.

¹⁵⁴ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi at a Dinner in Honour of HE the President of the Transkei Paramount Chief Tutor N. Ndamase and his Sister Paramount Chieftainess N. Sandile of the Ciskei on the Occasion of Their visit to Express Sympathies to HM King Z. Goodwill Ka Bhekuzulu and the Zulu Royal House After the Deaths of a Number of Members of the Zulu Royal House, Ulundi, 17 September 1987; EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Importance of Conserving Lives and Energy and of Preserving Our Manpower in Preparing Ourselves for the Final Battle in the Struggle for Liberation', Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, Ulundi, 22 August 1987.

¹⁵⁵ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Primary School Hall, Welgemoed, Cape Town, 24 November 1987.

¹⁵⁶ EG, Some Remarks by M. Buthelezi Prior to a Dinner with Mr WAM. Clewlow, Chief Executive of Barlow Rand Limited, and Dr K. von Schirnding, Director of the South Africa Foundation and MR. Noyce, Ulundi, 1 October 1987.

¹⁵⁷ Stanlis, *Edmund Burke*, 209.

This document was 'Utopian and dangerously removed from the realities which surround us'. 'It negates political reality', he went on, and contained 'dangerous idealism'. In fact, the Kairos Document misconceived the 'nature of man and the nature of society'.¹⁵⁸ Buthelezi criticised revolutionaries for their ideological approach to politics, seeking to apply rigid, abstract principles without understanding that the consequences of their policies would be determined in large part by context and circumstance. He told representatives from the US National Democratic Committee that African experience had shown that ideologies had had little success in bringing about a reduction in inequality and an improvement of living standards. 'Realities prescribe how this best can be done, not ideologies', he claimed.¹⁵⁹ Buthelezi told an Inkatha conference in 1980 that 'theoretical approaches, whether they be Marxist or other ideological approaches, constitute a grave threat to our struggle for liberation, if they regard the struggle as anything other than a pragmatic attempt to establish the black man in his rightful place in partnership with the whites of this country'.¹⁶⁰ Buthelezi told Swiss academics, that ideologues wrongly envisaged 'some future idealistic South African State', because they falsely assumed that 'present and future...can be shaped by political philosophies put into practice'. For Buthelezi, circumstances 'tear dreams apart because they are the realities which past history has produced and future history will express'. Reflecting on the record of utopian politics in Africa, Buthelezi contended that it had often destroyed what little the people had.¹⁶¹ These comments bear a close similarity to Burke's contention that 'circumstances... give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind'.¹⁶² Burke condemned revolutionary intellectuals as 'metaphysicians' who were 'the most foolish of men, and who, dealing in universals and essences, see no difference between more and less'.¹⁶³ Buthelezi frequently expressed concerns about the ANC's hostility to free-market economics. In late-1987, he argued that the ANC Mission in Exile held 'that apartheid and capitalism are

¹⁵⁸ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu, March 1986, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

¹⁵⁹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Location of United States Vested Interests in Changing South Africa', National Democratic Committee, USA, on the Occasion of their visit to Ulundi arranged by the Southern African Forum, 15 March 1984.

¹⁶⁰ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Sixth Ordinary General Conference of Inkatha, Ulundi, 20 June 1980.

¹⁶¹ EG, 'South Africa Today: South Africa Tomorrow', Address by M. Buthelezi to the Study Groups on Southern Africa- Annual Seminar, Switzerland, 5 September 1987.

¹⁶² CC. O'Brien, 'Ireland, Circumstances, Anti-communism', in DE. Ritchie (ed.), *Edmund Burke: Appraisals and Applications* (New Jersey: Transaction, 1990), 173.

¹⁶³ E. Burke, *The Works of Edmund Burke in Nine Volumes, Volume iii* (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1839), 502.

irrevocably intertwined and that the one must be destroyed with the other'.¹⁶⁴ The Inkatha leader argued that the free-enterprise system needed to be retained for South Africa's 'war against poverty, ignorance and disease' and that change must be brought about 'in such a way that the free enterprise system remains intact'.¹⁶⁵ Like Burke, Buthelezi expressed a particular hostility to the notion of equality as a rigid, ideological commitment.¹⁶⁶ Buthelezi argued against socialism in distinctly Burkean terms in a speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, stating that those in favour of reconstructing society in 'idealistic, socialist terms' failed to see that 'Society is not a thing written on a blackboard which can be wiped clean and re-written to the dictates of any formula you choose'.¹⁶⁷ He issued a warning to an Inkatha youth rally that 'if we took all the money out of white pockets and out of white bank balances, and distributed that money equally among the millions of Black South Africans, that money would be eaten in a matter of weeks or months.....there is no Utopian solution to poverty'.¹⁶⁸ For Buthelezi, a radical redistribution from white to black would only succeed 'in ensuring national suicide'.¹⁶⁹ He argued that 'equality has only meaning when equality is rewarding. What use is equality to people who are starving?' Instead, South Africa needed a 'vibrant and growing economy'.¹⁷⁰ In 1981, Buthelezi stated that 'we know that in average terms, South Africa is not a highly developed country and simply insisting on equality will not solve the problems. We insist on development and equality- the two concepts cannot be separated'.¹⁷¹ This echoes Burke's comment that radical egalitarianism would result in 'desperate disappointment', 'equal wretchedness' and 'equal beggary'.¹⁷²

Buthelezi also espoused a Burkean understanding of social improvement. That is to say, Buthelezi regarded many aspects of social improvement as things which could only be achieved over the course of generations. He asked Inkatha youths to seek gradual, cumulative economic gains and to be 'the link between past poverty and future prosperity' in a 'great human chain which spans

¹⁶⁴ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Role of Business in the Political Reform Process', Financial Mail Annual International Conference on Investment in 1988, Johannesburg, 13 November 1987.

¹⁶⁵ 'No! No! No! Fifty Thousand Times', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988; Alan Paton Centre, University of KwaZulu-Natal (Hereafter AP), Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, 'What Boundaries for Business?', Keynote Address by M. Buthelezi, University of Witwatersrand, Department of Business Economics and the Association of Managerial Economists, Conference, 10 July 1986.

¹⁶⁶ Pappin iii, *The Metaphysics of Edmund Burke*, 130.

¹⁶⁷ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

¹⁶⁸ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, Inkatha Youth Rally, 16 June 1986.

¹⁶⁹ 'The US Will Become An Exporter of Violence', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

¹⁷⁰ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The South Africa I Would Like to see', Father Lopez High School, Florida, USA. 30 November 1986.

¹⁷¹ 'Inkatha's strategy for peaceful change- Excerpts of Buthelezi Speech to visiting delegation of US Congressmen', *The Sowetan*, 11 August 1981.

¹⁷² Pappin iii, *The Metaphysics of Edmund Burke*, 130.

time'.¹⁷³ Also, Buthelezi emphasised the importance of retaining those things of value which they had inherited from previous generations, which were easier to squander than to regain. Speaking to the Inkatha Youth League, he reminded them that 'life is always continuity' and that there is never ever an escape from the past. 'The very present we are living in is determined by the past, and when the present becomes the past sometime in the future, you will see that your future is determined by your present today'. He warned that 'no matter how well a chain is forged, it is only as strong as the weakest link in it. When it is put under tension, the strong links fall into the dust because of the weak links. The youth of today dare not to be the weak link in the human chain from the past to the future, from the present to the future'.¹⁷⁴ The Inkatha leader declared in Soweto in 1980 that 'our fathers before them suffered and struggled on their suffering to make a better world for us. Ours is the task of making a better world for our children'.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, he told a commemoration service for Albert Luthuli that it was they 'the living who are storehouse for the dead...The present is ours for the fleeting time of the present, and it will soon merge with those who have gone before us'.¹⁷⁶

Buthelezi further emphasised the partnership between the living, the dead and the unborn, by arguing that an understanding of present realities, which were so important in shaping policies which would contribute to a better future, could only be achieved by a grasp of history. The Inkatha leader told Transkei and Ciskei officials that the common history of different African ethnic groups in South Africa bound them together into a broader community. Indicatively, he said 'I am always conscious, as Edmund Burke stressed, that in order to understand the present, we must look at our past. I am only paraphrasing Burke's words of wisdom here'.¹⁷⁷ Buthelezi told reporters that each country is the product of history and that 'the history of the development of South Africa as we know it today, is a driving force in the totality of South African politics'.¹⁷⁸ Buthelezi also spoke of

¹⁷³ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Tackling the Problems of Peaceful Change Within the Challenges of Violence, White Intransigence and Escalating Poverty and Sanctions', Ulundi, 30 August 1986.

¹⁷⁴ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Tackling the problems of peaceful change within the challenges of violence, white intransigence and escalating poverty and sanctions', Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, Ulundi, 30 August 1986.

¹⁷⁵ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, 'Strategies for Liberation 20 Years After Sharpeville- and Five Days Before the Independence of Zimbabwe', Inkatha Soweto Prayer Meeting, Jabulani Ampitheatre, 13 April 1980

¹⁷⁶ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Prayer Meeting in Commemoration of Chief A. Luthuli, 29 August 1982.

¹⁷⁷ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi at a Dinner in Honour of HE the President of the Transkei Paramount Chief Tutor N. Ndamase and his Sister Paramount Chieftainess N. Sandile of the Ciskei on the Occasion of Their visit to Express Sympathies to HM King Z. Goodwill Ka Bhekuzulu and the Zulu Royal House After the Deaths of a Number of Members of the Zulu Royal House, Ulundi, 17 September 1987.

¹⁷⁸ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Primary School Hall, Welgemoed Cape Town, 24 November 1987.

learning the 'lessons of Africa' which taught of the dangers of poverty and radical violence.¹⁷⁹

Gerhard Mare and Paul Forsyth emphasise that the Inkatha leader often referred to the past when legitimising his politics.¹⁸⁰ Yet, they do not recognise that Buthelezi argued not only for a partnership between the living and the dead, but between the living, the dead and the yet unborn.

The Inkatha leader argued that the politics of negotiation 'must salvage the best that there is and jettison the worst that there is in order to get continuity in progress towards a really democratic South Africa'.¹⁸¹ In *Clarion Call*, Inkatha's official magazine, he suggested that sanctions could be effective in bringing about apartheid's demise, but 'for sanctions to work they would have to be so comprehensive and so rigorously applied that they would end up destroying the foundations of future economic growth'.¹⁸² For Buthelezi, political victory against apartheid would be 'hollow' if at the expense 'social, economic and political reconstruction'.¹⁸³ Senior Inkatha official, Oscar Dhlomo argued that to advocate sanctions and disinvestment at the cost of rising unemployment was 'sheer cruelty'.¹⁸⁴ As such, in opposing sanctions and radical violence, the Inkatha leadership greatly emphasised factors other than expediency in the struggle against apartheid. Indeed, they were keen to stress that there was much to be conserved in South Africa. Buthelezi said that 'By international standards we are a little back-yard somewhere in the world, but by African standards by which we should be judged in the first instance, our achievements on the ground do have a vastness about them...South Africa is not a Banana republic'. In fact, things worked better in South Africa than across the 'length and breadth of Africa'.¹⁸⁵ He declared that 'nowhere in Africa is there more to build on than there is in this country'. South Africa had the foundations of a good education system, a developed economic infrastructure, and a sound judiciary. This inheritance needed to be safeguarded against 'violent politics'.¹⁸⁶ To the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Buthelezi spoke in

¹⁷⁹ EG, Some Remarks by M. Buthelezi prior to a dinner with Mr WAM. Clewlow, Chief Executive of Barlow Rand Limited, and Dr K. von Schirnding, Director of the South Africa Foundation and MR. Noyce, Ulundi, 1 October 1987; EG, A Few remarks on the Occasion of a Visit to Ulundi by Dr FJ. Strauss, Prime Minister of Bavaria, FDR and Party, Accompanied by Mr N. van Heerden Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria by M. Buthelezi, The South African Black Alliance, Ulundi, 25 January 1987.

¹⁸⁰ Mare, *Ethnicity and Politics*, 64-65; Forsyth, 'The Past in the Service of the Present Use of History by Chief ANMG Buthelezi 1951-1991', 74-75.

¹⁸¹ EG, Vote of Thanks by M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis, First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 14 March 1989.

¹⁸² M. Buthelezi, 'Sanctions....', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

¹⁸³ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Visit to Ulundi by Dr FJ. Strauss, Prime Minister of Bavaria, FDR and Party, Accompanied by Mr N. van Heerden Department of Foreign Affairs, Ulundi, 25 January 1987.

¹⁸⁴ 'KwaZulu leader slates call for disinvestment', *The Star*, 4 July 1988.

¹⁸⁵ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Young President's Organisation, Durban, 28 July 1987.

¹⁸⁶ EG, Some Remarks by M. Buthelezi prior to a dinner with Mr WAM. Clewlow, Chief Executive of Barlow Rand Limited, and Dr K. von Schirnding, Director of the South Africa Foundation and MR. Noyce, Ulundi, 1 October 1987.

condemnation of young 'comrades' who were fostering violent confrontation and who were boycotting schools. These so-called comrades were 'shitting in the doorstep through which they will have to step into the future' and were 'destroying the future which they themselves will have to live in'. They were part of a 'hideous political disease' which would cripple the whole country for future generations.¹⁸⁷ In 1979, Buthelezi warned a conference that the chances were '50-50' that all that had been built by 'White initiative and White capital as much as with Black brawn' could be lost.¹⁸⁸ It was a recurring theme in Buthelezi's political commentary that how apartheid was brought to an end would determine 'events for generations to come' and 'the quality of life for future generations'.¹⁸⁹ In a telling phrase, he warned in 1981 that 'children yet unborn' could have their future security endangered by the nature of political change.¹⁹⁰

As Jeffery suggests, Inkatha accused the ANC of being authoritarian. In 1988, Buthelezi met with Progressive Federal Party politicians and said that the ANC was aiming to bring about a one-party state with a socialist-economy.¹⁹¹ Speaking in Ulundi in 1983, Buthelezi declared that South Africans would not swap 'white apartheid masters for black Marxist masters'.¹⁹² In a 1985 letter, Buthelezi denied that all ANC leaders were communists, but expressed concerns that the ANC Mission in Exile had 19 out of 30 communist executive council members.¹⁹³ This comment was made in the same year that the ANC's Kabwe conference appointed national executive committee members of whom only five were not members of the South African Communist Party, and in the year that Chris Hani, a senior figure in both parties, remarked that 'we in the Communist Party have participated in and built the ANC. We have made the ANC what it is today and the ANC is organisation'.¹⁹⁴ The year prior, he stated that he was 'frightened of people with closed minds within our own black family particularly if they have political ambitions' and would be as fearful a black hangman as of a white

¹⁸⁷ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Importance of Conserving Lives and Energy and of Preserving Our Manpower in Preparing Ourselves for the Final Battle in the Struggle for Liberation', Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, Ulundi, 22 August 1987.

¹⁸⁸ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed) Conference: Economic Development of the Self-Governing Black States, Cape Town, 22-3 March 1979.

¹⁸⁹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, '1989- A Year of Action for Peace; A Year of Organisation for Peace; A Year of Preparation for the Future', Inkatha Annual General Conference, Ulundi 8 July 1989; EG, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi to the National Council of Inkatha, 1 July 1988.

¹⁹⁰ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi to the Natal Region of the Urban Foundation at the Opening of Zubumandi Pre-school and Resource Centre, Umlazi, 7 March 1981.

¹⁹¹ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.1, M. Buthelezi, A Few remarks on the Occasion of a Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP, leader of the Progressive Federal Party and Professor NIC. Olivier MP, 3 Feb 1988.

¹⁹² 'Buthelezi lashes out at the "Marxist" ANC', *Sunday Times*, 26 June 1983.

¹⁹³ 'Nelson Mandela a Nationalist', *The Natal Mercury*, 17 March 1985.

¹⁹⁴ Jeffery, *People's War*, 509.

hangman.¹⁹⁵ In a private meeting with National Party officials, KwaZulu representatives argued that communists were probably the strongest of the factions of the ANC, but were hiding under the dress of African nationalism.¹⁹⁶ The Inkatha leader also claimed that the ANC Mission in Exile was 'totally opposed' to black democracy if that democracy was exercised in defiance of the ANC.¹⁹⁷ The ANC was interested in 'supremacy' was the tail that tries to wag the dog'.¹⁹⁸ In a policy speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1987, Buthelezi spoke of the 'brutal dictatorial methods' used against Inkatha by the ANC's allies.¹⁹⁹

Condemning the French Revolution, Burke argued that revolutionary radicalism would lead to upheaval, anarchy, violence and tyranny.²⁰⁰ Similarly, Buthelezi warned that violent struggle had a radicalising and destabilising effect which would 'boomerang' on black communities. Revealingly, Buthelezi told the Inkatha Youth Brigade that radical violence would 'consume its own children...as happened to the children of the French Revolution'.²⁰¹ Also, he argued that radical violence had an 'awesome inbuilt propensity of all revolutionary violence to spread beyond all control'. 'Gangs of so-called comrades will ever-increasingly become ugly fragments of force which will develop a way of life which is neither the ANC Mission in Exile nor the UDF could direct or control'.²⁰² Moreover, Buthelezi characterised the behaviour of revolutionaries as destructive and disorderly and warned that 'If these behavioural patterns are going to become accepted norms of our society, I can see a lot of destruction of black property by other blacks'.²⁰³

Chief Buthelezi argued that 'poverty is the enemy of democracy'. Where governments lacked 'the means to uplift the people' they would become threatened by discontent and seek to protect their

¹⁹⁵ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Apartheid Society- Do we have a Part to Play?', University of Zululand Graduation, KwaDlangezwa, 10 June 1982; EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Prayer Meeting for Black Unity, Lamontville, 1 September 1984.

¹⁹⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/11/1, Summary of the Discussion Between the Special Cabinet Committee and KwaZulu, May 1986, 17 June 1986 and 15 July 1986.

¹⁹⁷ RH, Citation of Memorandum for Meeting with Chancellor Dr H. Kohl, Bonn, 18 February 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

¹⁹⁸ 'Buthelezi slates UDF as ANC stepping stone', *Eastern Province Herald*, 28 May 1984.

¹⁹⁹ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

²⁰⁰ Norman, *Edmund Burke*, 137.

²⁰¹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Importance of Conserving Lives and Energy and of Preserving Our Manpower in Preparing Ourselves for the Final Battle in the Struggle for Liberation', Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, Ulundi, 22 August 1987.

²⁰² EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Cape Town Press Club, Cape Suns Hotel, 23 October 1986.

²⁰³ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Importance of Stamina and Stability in the Exercise of Revolutionary Patience in the Long Struggle for Liberation', Women's Brigade, 7th Annual General Conference, Saturday, 3 October 1983.

power by descending the 'downward road into dictatorship'.²⁰⁴ In *Clarion Call*, Buthelezi stated that the 'total economic isolation of South Africa' and the resulting mass poverty would contribute towards creating the 'circumstances in which violence overtakes democracy' and would tip the balance in favour of a revolution.²⁰⁵ Buthelezi claimed that the indirect result of increased poverty would be the establishment of a 'one-party state over a devastated land and people'.²⁰⁶ This threat was particularly grave because of the Utopian expectations of economic improvement which many black people had.²⁰⁷ Moreover, a 1988 edition of *Clarion Call* opined that 'the international experience has been that poverty radicalises, criminalises, is a health hazard and undermines youth education. These effects are already very apparent in South Africa's black townships'.²⁰⁸ Indeed, the Inkatha leader seems to have been warning against a vicious cycle of violence, poverty, and political instability and disorder. To illustrate, he asked the Inkatha Annual Conference to 'look nationally, continentally, internationally at the extent to which the growth of violence is accompanied by the growth of poverty and the extent to which the growth of poverty becomes the enemy of democracy'.²⁰⁹ For Buthelezi, it was 'not simply a question of bringing about a democracy', but of 'bringing about a democracy that can last'.²¹⁰ Buthelezi told an American audience in 1986 that it was 'absolutely vital that South Africa be turned into a bastion of liberty and stability'.²¹¹ Furthermore, Buthelezi expressed a particular worry that poverty would create increasing pressures for the radical economic policies which he opposed. He commented to Inkatha youths that 'If the Black struggle against apartheid does no more than vanquish apartheid without alleviating the massive poverty of Blacks, we really will have struggled in vain because a new struggle will emerge between the haves and the have-nots'.²¹² Buthelezi warned in 1979 that 'as long as the majority of the people of this country have no stake in your free enterprise capitalist system, its future is in

²⁰⁴ EG, Some Remarks by M. Buthelezi prior to a dinner with Mr WAM. Clewlow, Chief Executive of Barlow Rand Limited, and Dr K. von Schirnding, Director of the South Africa Foundation and MR. Noyce, Ulundi, 1 October 1987.

²⁰⁵ 'Disinvestment- The ferment grows', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1987.

²⁰⁶ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, A few remarks by M. Buthelezi on the occasion of a meeting with Mr ML. Cheshes, American Consul General, 1 April 1986.

²⁰⁷ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 20 November 1986.

²⁰⁸ M. Buthelezi, 'Sanctions....', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

²⁰⁹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, '1989- A Year of Action for Peace; A Year of Organisation for Peace; A Year of Preparation for the Future', Annual General Conference, Ulundi, 8 July 1989.

²¹⁰ M. Buthelezi, 'Sanctions....', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

²¹¹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 20 November 1986.

²¹² AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Education for Liberation', Inkatha Youth Rally, 16 June 1986.

balance'.²¹³ Indeed, the Inkatha leader alleged further that the creation of poverty was a deliberate strategy adopted by revolutionaries to promote their agenda. He told a conference of the Inkatha Women's Brigade that 'The ANC Mission in Exile has always led the call for sanctions because it is a measure which enhances the prospects of a final violent showdown between Black and White in this country.....They actually want Black South Africa to suffer more so that the Black population gets more desperate'.²¹⁴

Buthelezi seems to have been particularly concerned by the prospect of a radicalised youth. As mentioned above, he specifically criticised young 'comrades' for their revolutionary approach to political change. He often addressed his concerns about revolutionary radicalism with particular vehemence to Inkatha's Youth Brigade. When expressing his broad concerns about radicalism and radicalisation, Buthelezi frequently warned that 'half the black population is 15 years old and under'.²¹⁵ On another occasion, the Inkatha leader said the radicalisation and brutalisation of youths was one of his 'gravest concerns about the future'. It was imperative to 'shape a new generation capable of looking after peace' and the fact that so many had been born into conflict dragged this into doubt.²¹⁶ *Clarion Call* opined in 1986 that it was improbable, given the increased conflict in black politics, that 'out of school youth in the urban areas are going to be satisfied with menial tasks in rural development'. He had great concerns about the role of 'power hungry and politicised youth' after the end of apartheid.²¹⁷ The demographic trend in South Africa made it more important for Buthelezi to maximise economic growth. Even if this happened, he cautioned, it would still be difficult alleviate deprivation given the rapid population growth.²¹⁸ Also, he told an American audience, that the growth of the economy was essential because, *inter alia*, this was the only means

²¹³ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, Statement by M. Buthelezi, Conference: Economic Development of the Self-Governing Black States, Cape Town, 22-3 March 1979.

²¹⁴ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Challenges of Black Womanhood in the Midst of Escalating Violence, White Intransigence and the Problems of Facing Escalating Poverty Worsened by the Imposition of Sanctions Within a Stunted Economy', Annual General Conference of the Women's Brigade, Ulundi, 11 October 1986.

²¹⁵ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, "Tackling the Problems of Peaceful Change within the Challenges of Violence, White Intransigence and Escalating Poverty and Sanctions", Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, 30 August 1986.

²¹⁶ RH, Speech by M. Buthelezi, 'Inkatha's Call for Peace in South Africa', Topical Briefing from Information Centre on South Africa, November 1989.

²¹⁷ 'A critical problem: Youth who need jobs', *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986.

²¹⁸ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi to the Study Groups on Southern Africa, 'South Africa Today: South Africa Tomorrow', Annual Seminar, Switzerland, 5 September 1987.

of reducing population growth.²¹⁹ Conversely, he said, the destruction of South Africa's productive capacity would serve to accelerate population growth.²²⁰

Chief Buthelezi claimed it was necessary to maintain certain Zulu traditions. He expressed concern about the breakdown of traditional 'norms and values' and of the 'fabric of community life'.²²¹ Buthelezi was a staunch defender of the authority of adults over children. He was keen to defend the wisdom and authority of tradition and experience, making strong condemnations of young people who rejected the authority of adults in favour of a radical intellectualism. Addressing the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Buthelezi complained that 'ever since 1976, some celebrity leaders started saying that the Youth by themselves were going to liberate this country....The energy of youth is vital for the struggle but it would not be of much value without the wisdom and experience of adults'.²²² Buthelezi also criticised some mothers for failing to assert authority over their children, particularly if those children were educated. A university education was not a reason for the 'roles of parent-child to be reversed'. Buthelezi warned that if children were allowed to dictate to parents, then this would lead to instability.²²³ Without normal family life, Buthelezi commented, there could not be the level of discipline which was needed as the foundation of a peaceful struggle against apartheid. A change in conduct amongst young people was 'the main source of our problems'.²²⁴ In 1982, the Inkatha leader said that he was deeply distressed by declining respect by the young of their elders. Such respect was one of the 'golden threads in our culture'.²²⁵ Buthelezi criticised radical student politics and said in 1980 that '...those who destroy school buildings defile their parents and their elders, with their dirty hands'. He condemned 'teenage thuggery' and called for a 'combined effort of pupil, parent, teacher and authority' to overcome these problems.²²⁶ Buthelezi lamented the erosion of respect for elders amongst the urban youth in particular and proclaimed that it was 'an honour for me that I was once ridiculed by the late Biko as someone who is supported only by the oldies. To me

²¹⁹ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection, PC 129/1/2, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The South Africa I Would Like to see', Father Lopez High School, Florida, USA, 30 November 1986.

²²⁰ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 20 November 1986.

²²¹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'faction Fighting Halts Development', Symposium on Faction Fighting at the Umlazi Division of the University of Zululand, 3 April 1987.

²²² EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Importance of Conserving Lives and Ebergy and of Preserving Our Manpower in Preparing Ourselves for the Final Battle in the Struggle for Liberation', Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, Ulundi, 22 August 1987.

²²³ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Importance of Stamina and Stability in the Exercise of Revolutionary Patience in the Long Struggle for Liberation', Women's Brigade, 7th Annual General Conference, Saturday, 3 October 1983.

²²⁴ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Conference of the Catholic Women's Guild, Eschowe, 15 June 1982

²²⁵ EG, Speech for M. Buthelezi, Youth Brigade Dinner for the Aged, Umlazi, 22 May 1982.

²²⁶ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Sixth Ordinary General Conference of Inkatha, Ulundi, 20 June 1980.

this is a blessing I value'.²²⁷ He explained radical student politics, *inter alia*, in terms of a lack of authority of teachers over children. In 1980, he lamented influence of the Paulo Freire's radical *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* on students at the University of Zululand. The influence of such theories helped to explain why students at the university were 'so politically rabid'.²²⁸ He also lamented that 'it is almost tragic that the brighter an intellectual is, the more devastating the mistakes of his thinking can become'.²²⁹ In this stance, Buthelezi's politics again echo Burke's conservatism which, in Nisbet's description, holds that wisdom and authority often reside in tradition and which defends 'the unconscious, the pre-rational and the traditional' against the view that wisdom is to be gained purely from individual rationality.²³⁰

Buthelezi argued strongly in favour of conserving ethnic identities, traditions and authority. He claimed that the ANC and the Black Consciousness movement were doing 'their damndest to annihilate Zulu identity' and saw this as the expression of an idealistic political understanding.²³¹ In response to the ANC's comment that they could have a closer relationship with Buthelezi so long as Inkatha was de-Zuluised, Buthelezi asked 'how can a Royal Prince, a descendent of King Shaka be deZuluised?.....Are we to be neither fish nor fowl just for the sake of getting recognition by those who claim to be "holier than thou"?'²³² He argued that '...mature politics works with realities and shapes the future out of these realities... Politicswhich leaps theoretically into Utopias and denies the nature of South African society is destructive politics....You cannot talk Zuluness out of the hearts and souls of six million people'.²³³ Inkatha's full name was the 'National Cultural Liberation Movement' and its leader saw KwaZulu not as an apartheid construction as an historic 'kingdom' and spoke frequently of a distinctive Zulu identity and history.²³⁴ He even spoke favourably in the mid-1980s of the 'emergence of Zulu political life'.²³⁵ Moreover, an approved biographer of Buthelezi's, states that one of the main reasons for Inkatha's establishment in 1975 was the desire to 'establish a base for solidarity between those Zulu living in the country and those in the cities'.²³⁶ Furthermore, the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba and Buthelezi Commission recommended for that region some counter-

²²⁷ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, Youth Brigade Dinner for the Aged, Umlazi, 22 May 1982

²²⁸ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi to Inkatha Meeting, Ulundi, 13 September 1980.

²²⁹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Official Opening of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Buildings, 2 April 1984.

²³⁰ R. Nisbet, *Conservatism* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986), 29-30.

²³¹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Official Opening of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Buildings, 2 April 1984.

²³² 'To be DeZuluised for Political Recognition', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, December 1983.

²³³ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Official Opening of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Buildings, 2 April 1984.

²³⁴ Mzala, *Chief with A Double Agenda*, 118; EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Official Opening of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Buildings, 2 April 1984.

²³⁵ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Official Opening of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Buildings, 2 April 1984.

²³⁶ B. Temkin, *Gatsha Buthelezi: Zulu Statesman* (Cape Town: Purnell, 1976), 198.

balances to pure majoritarian democracy and implied a preference for a federal devolution of power.²³⁷

On this basis, it has been asked whether Buthelezi was primarily motivated by a broad African and South African nationalism or whether he was chiefly concerned with promoting the sectional interests of Zulu society as perceived by its traditional leadership. This is closely related to the question of whether the Inkatha leadership was driven chiefly by the objective of regional political change and sought political structures which, whilst departing from apartheid, offered more power to the traditional Zulu leadership than would a centralised, unitary democracy. Mzala saw Buthelezi's politics as part of a divisive 'Zulu nationalism'. An 'ethnic tendency' and 'true South African' nationalism could not be reconciled.²³⁸ Laurence Piper argues that as Inkatha's national influence waned relative to the ANC, its politics became increasingly concerned with a sectional Zulu nationalism and ethnicity.²³⁹ For Gerhard Mare, Inkatha's politics in the 1980s can be summarised as 'regional consolidation' characterised by a number of efforts to integrate KwaZulu with the white Natal Provincial Administration and by a 'blatant and dangerous ethnic mobilisation'.²⁴⁰ Moreover, John Brewer comments that it is possible to interpret initiatives like the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba as either the beginnings of non-racial democracy or as an attempt at regional separatism.²⁴¹

However, not only did Buthelezi insist throughout the 1980s that South Africa was one country, but he sought to refute the premise that ethnic identity is regressive and foments conflict between groups. He stressed that his struggle was part of a broader national struggle for liberation and that 'Zulu political life' did not mean 'blowing out the flame' of a single South Africanism.²⁴² The cultural identity associated with ethnicity was important for cultivating solidarity and harmony within cultural groups.²⁴³ Buthelezi was quoted in *Clarion Call*, arguing that culture 'distinguishes man from beast...and...cements human beings into cohesive achievement orientated communities'.²⁴⁴ Deep-rooted culture provided the self-awareness that allowed groups to better resist oppression and cope with adversity.²⁴⁵ Moreover, culture was 'not an insular thing which divides one group from

²³⁷ ACA Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 32 1985-6, Memorandum by AH. Van Wyk, 'Comparison of Constitutional Principles in the First Report to the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council Versus the Indaba Proposals', 13 February 1987; Professor L. Schlemmer, 'Constitutional Perspectives', *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986.

²³⁸ Mzala, *Chief with A Double Agenda*, 230-1.

²³⁹ Piper, 'The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South Africa', 78; *Ibid*, 91.

²⁴⁰ Mare, *Ethnicity and Politics*, 60.

²⁴¹ Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to Kwazulu', 363.

²⁴² EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Official Opening of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly Buildings, 2 April 1984.

²⁴³ 'Culture should join people- not divide them', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 4, 1985.

²⁴⁴ 'The open wound of Black disunity', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1985.

²⁴⁵ 'Culture should join people- not divide them', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 4, 1985.

another', but a rich cultural identity was something which cultivated a respect for the identity of others and could be the basis for a 'fabric of unity' in South Africa.²⁴⁶ South Africa's different cultural identities made for a 'rich South Africanism'.²⁴⁷ He claimed that ethnic identities were at the foundation of such broader identities, telling a gathering on King Shaka day that 'I for one cannot be a black person without being a Zulu black person. I cannot be a South African without being a Zulu South African'.²⁴⁸ For Buthelezi, different African cultures of South Africa were united by Ubuntu-Botho which formed the basis for a 'brotherhood' between the different groups.²⁴⁹ Here there are striking parallels with Burke who defended French provincialism against centralising radical nationalism. For Burke, 'the love of the whole is not diminished by subordinate partialities' and the love of particular communities was '...the first link in a series by which we proceed towards a love of our country and to mankind'.²⁵⁰

Nevertheless, the distinctive 'Zulu political life' and identity of which Buthelezi approved at least had the possibility of coming into tension with broader South African nationalisms even if it was not as divorced from, or in conflict with, them as has been alleged. Seeing that he was deeply immersed in Zulu traditions and his power, prestige, and status were bound up in traditional Zulu society, it is hard to imagine that Buthelezi did not have a preponderant interest in Zulu and regional politics. This is especially likely given the strength at the national level of revolutionary radical parties whose politics were anathema to him.

In the 1980s, Buthelezi's advocacy of federal devolution and checks on conventional majority rule were often presented as a compromise and an expediency- a way of making political progress which could gain the cooperation of the whites.²⁵¹ Buthelezi said that he was committed to the 'cherished ideal' of one-man-one vote in unitary state.²⁵² The Buthelezi Commission and the Indaba proposals were portrayed as compromises designed 'to avoid bloodshed'.²⁵³ He claimed that a conventional one-man-one-vote democracy was his 'cherished ideal'.²⁵⁴ This portrayal of Inkatha's preferences, however, seems not to be accurate. These statements are contradicted by a number of utterances

²⁴⁶ 'The open wound of Black disunity', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1985; 'Culture should join people- not divide them', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 4, 1985.

²⁴⁷ 'Culture should join people- not divide them', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 4, 1985

²⁴⁸ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, King Shaka Day, 28 September 1986.

²⁴⁹ EG, Vote of Thanks by M. Buthelezi to DR. CM Phatudi, Chief Minister of Lebowa, Second Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 12 June 1984.

²⁵⁰ Stanlis, *Burke*, 184.

²⁵¹ RH, Citation of Memorandum by M. Buthelezi for Margaret Thatcher During Visit to London, August 1985, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

²⁵² RH, Policy Speech By M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

²⁵³ EG, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, National Council of Inkatha, 1 July 1988.

²⁵⁴ RH, Citation of Memorandum by M. Buthelezi for Margaret Thatcher During Visit to London, August 1985, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

made by Inkatha official, Oscar Dhlomo, who remarked in 1986 that Inkatha had ‘unflinching commitments to power-sharing at the local and regional level’, and in 1988 lamented that the ANC favoured centralisation which would lead to ‘social conflict’ and a less ‘participatory democracy’.²⁵⁵ Furthermore, Buthelezi’s authorised biographer, Themba Nzimande, states falsely that Buthelezi has ‘from the onset pronounced his preference for a federal formula, because the power of the state is distributed equitably under a federal form of government’. Federalism ensures that ‘tyranny does not arise. Since South Africa consists of a diverse society, it is wise to devolve power to all the components of the state’.²⁵⁶ Indeed, Buthelezi confirmed his preference for federal devolution in an interview with the present author.²⁵⁷ There is no statement explicitly linking Buthelezi with a preference for consociational government, but given the espoused preference for dispersal of power and participatory structures in the aforementioned sources it is likely that the Inkatha leadership favoured both power-sharing mechanisms and federal devolution, not just as expediciencies, but as a political preference. However, even if Buthelezi’s concern for regional developments was paramount, it would have been understood by him that politics in KwaZulu and Natal would be determined in the 1980s to a significant extent by broader South African political developments. Inkatha’s conservatism, it can be seen, was not merely or primarily an attempt to preserve a free-market economic system. It was concerned more broadly with an effort to conserve or to restore a particular social order in South Africa and specifically amongst Zulu-speaking Africans. This social order was constituted by traditions, values and hierarchies, rather than merely by material realities. This poses a challenge to Mare and Hamilton’s account which stresses above all Buthelezi’s desire to conserve a capitalist economic order.²⁵⁸

Opposition to Apartheid.

Mzala argues that Buthelezi was not seeking to challenge apartheid in any fundamental way and was seeking to retain the Bantustan structures. For Mzala, the Inkatha leader was not charting a course independent of both the ANC and the National Party.²⁵⁹ Also, Mare argues that in speaking of the importance of the past, Buthelezi was ‘providing a romanticised model for a static present’.²⁶⁰ An analysis of Buthelezi’s utterances in the early-mid 1970s produces a complex picture of his

²⁵⁵ O. Dhlomo, ‘KwaZulu/Natal: Inkatha’s views on co-operation and development in the region’, *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986; O. Dhlomo, ‘Piecing together a new South Africa’, *Weekly Mail*, 7 October 1988- 13 October 1988.

²⁵⁶ T. Nzimande, *The Legacy of Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi in the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa* (USA: Xlibris, 2011), 157.

²⁵⁷ M. Buthelezi interviewed by Adam Houldsworth, South African Parliament, Cape Town, 28 October 2014.

²⁵⁸ Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 221; *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁵⁹ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 7-9.

²⁶⁰ Mare, *Ethnicity and Politics*, 17.

relationship to the apartheid project. Although he consistently declined to accept independence for his territory, and criticised National Party policies, Buthelezi was not absolute in his rejection of separate development. He told a Swedish audience that he had 'great reservations about the apartheid philosophy'.²⁶¹ Buthelezi told the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce that the homeland system seemed incapable of providing 'separate but equal' facilities. He implied that he had sympathised at one point with at least some aspects of the National Party's project, commenting that 'it might also be pointed out that all of us including myself, may be indulging in self-hypnosis by even trying to believe we can successfully create several ethnically oriented economies in South Africa instead of one'.²⁶² He did however criticise the apartheid Government for seeking to cut Africans off from the wealth of the South African national economy,²⁶³ for allocating 13% of land to 80% of the population,²⁶⁴ for imposing degrading influx controls,²⁶⁵ and for over-emphasising the significance of ethnicity.²⁶⁶

Inkatha's demand for system with some group protections and with federal dispersal of power in the 1980s was less radical than the demands of many popular Africans organisations, such as the ANC. Yet, from the mid-1970s, Buthelezi definitely rejected and stridently criticised homeland independence and Botha's reform objectives. Inkatha leaders told Government parliamentarians in an informal discussion in 1979 that a solution had to be based on one citizenship and one state with representation for all in a single legislature.²⁶⁷ Buthelezi told a prayer meeting that the 'the notion of

²⁶¹ Excerpts from Address by M. Buthelezi, 'My Role within Separate Development Politics', Scandinavian Institute for African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden, December 1972, in HW. van der Merwe, NCJ. Charton, DA. Kotze and A. Magnusson (eds) *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents* (Cape Town: David Philip Publisher, 1978), 456.

²⁶² Excerpts from Address by M. Buthelezi, Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, 16 June 1972, published in S. Biko (ed.), *Black Viewpoint, Durban: Sprocas Black Community Programmes 1972*, in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds) *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 133-4; *Ibid*, 135.

²⁶³ Excerpts from Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Issues in KwaZulu', General Conference of the National Cultural liberation Movement (Inkatha) at Bhenkuzulu College, Nongoma, 18 July 1975, in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds) *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 481-82.

²⁶⁴ A Report by M. Buthelezi to the Reef Africans on the Conference of Black Leaders with the Hon. BJ. Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa, on 22 January 1975, 'Report Back', in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds) *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 570.

²⁶⁵ Excerpts from M. Buthelezi Address, Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, 16 June 1972, published in S. Biko, ed, *Black Viewpoint, Durban: Sprocas Black Community Programmes 1972*, in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds) *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 136.

²⁶⁶ A Report by Mangosuthu Buthelezi to the Reef Africans on the Conference of Black Leaders with the Hon. BJ Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa, on 22 January 1975, 'Report Back', in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds) *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 567.

²⁶⁷ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/12/1 1979-80, Brief sent to L. Wessels by Dr R. Tusenius (AKSA) on the subject of Inkatha, 'Background document for the third informal discussion-group meeting between

ethnicity as a criteria for nationality is rejected by us'.²⁶⁸ He described the prospective independence being offered to KwaZulu by the National Party as 'pseudo-independence'.²⁶⁹ A confederal South Africa would leave whites in control of 87 percent of the country, and blacks could not allow themselves to be excluded from decision-making in what the National Party wrongly called 'white South Africa'.²⁷⁰ As such, Buthelezi opposed the Government's tricameral constitution which included Indians and Coloureds in central decision-making organs, but not Africans. The logical extension of this reform was a confederal system of Government, and because it was not leading to 'genuine power-sharing', Inkatha opposed the new constitution.²⁷¹ Buthelezi stated that one South Africa with one citizenship was 'totally non-negotiable'.²⁷²

The Inkatha leader spoke of apartheid as an 'evil ideology'.²⁷³ In a paper presented to Government in 1980, Oscar Dhomo declared that 'we stand opposed to and we will remain opposed to apartheid in its present or in any other form'.²⁷⁴ Buthelezi wrote in a 1983 pamphlet that 'the only direction in which political progress can be made in this country is by moving away from racialism in politics and moving towards an open and democratic society'.²⁷⁵ And he often called for South Africa to be reformed into a 'Western-type, industrial democracy'.²⁷⁶ Although a defender of ethnic identity and traditional authority, Inkatha consistently rejected the National Party's fundamental notion that ethnic and racial identities should be enforced by law. Inkatha leaders told Government parliamentarians in private discussions in 1979 that they could not accept any form of statutory discrimination.²⁷⁷ Inkatha's Statement of Belief said that 'we believe that the identity of an individual within a particular cultural milieu is essential to his identity as a South African, but we believe also that culture belongs to all men and that no social, economic or political impediments which hinder the free movements of individuals from one cultural milieu to another are in any respect justified'.²⁷⁸

Inkatha leaders and Government Parliamentarians, to be held at the Burgerspark Hotel, Pretoria, on 17-18 January 1980', 31 December 1979.

²⁶⁸ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, The South African Black Alliance Prayer Meeting, 25 July 1982.

²⁶⁹ 'New Move Will Lead to Strife, Says Chief Buthelezi', *The Daily News*, 21 August 1982.

²⁷⁰ 'South Africa Today- A Black Perspective', *Clarion Call*, Vol.1, March 1984.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² 'Government urged to reconsider: Statement of Intent Vital, Says Chief Buthelezi', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1985.

²⁷³ 'Excision part of evil ideology, says Buthelezi', *Rand Daily Mail*, 22 May 1981.

²⁷⁴ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73, 1/A1/1 1979-1982, Paper by O. Dhomo, Pretoria, 17 January 1980.

²⁷⁵ ACA Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, 'Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)', N/D.

²⁷⁶ EG, Address By M. Buthelezi 'The Role of Business in the Political Reform Process', Financial Mail Annual International Conference on Investment in 1988, Johannesburg, 13 November 1987.

²⁷⁷ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/I2/1 1979-80, Brief sent to L. Wessels by Dr R. Tusenius (AKSA) on the subject of Inkatha, 'Background document for the third informal discussion-group meeting between Inkatha leaders and Government Parliamentarians, to be held at the Burgerspark Hotel, Pretoria, on 17-18 January 1980', 31 December 1979.

²⁷⁸ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M.1.3.1., Inkatha Statement of Belief, N/D.

Furthermore, Buthelezi pointed out that the new constitution imposed a rigid distinction between 'own' and 'joint' affairs and did not in practice empower even the Indian or the Coloured communities to overrule white decision-making.²⁷⁹

Once the National Party had accepted the premise of a single South African nationality and citizenship in 1985, Inkatha continued to express significant disagreements with the Government's objective of non-majoritarian power-sharing and 'self-determination' guaranteed for each group. As will be shown in chapter five, the Government sought a system in which racial/ ethnic groups would form the building blocks of political representation and in which the Population Registration Act and Group Areas Act would remain intact. Inkatha opposed this and rejected the idea that different groups should remain entirely in control of their 'own affairs' whilst there would be consensus decision-making in matters of 'joint affairs'. Contrary to Mare and Hamilton's claim in 1987 that for Buthelezi's opposition to the National Party Government lay 'more in the detail than in the principles' and that he would accept power-sharing between a 'plurality of minorities',²⁸⁰ the Inkatha leader firmly insisted that it was 'fundamental' that there was a black majority and that South Africa's development must be aimed at a system of majority rule.²⁸¹ He stated that Africans were entitled to a 'share of what is available in the National kitty',²⁸² and that there had to be one, undivided, sovereign parliament.²⁸³

Buthelezi also expressed a consistent opposition to all forms of racial discrimination. Inkatha's Statement of Intent stated that it sought a constitutional framework in which there was no discrimination on the basis of 'colour, sex or creed'.²⁸⁴ The Population Registration and Group Areas acts needed to be abolished.²⁸⁵ Inkatha officials told Government parliamentarians that enforced ethnicity was wrong and 'doomed to utter failure'.²⁸⁶ He criticised Influx controls until their abolition

²⁷⁹ ACA Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, 'Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)', N/D.

²⁸⁰ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 6.

²⁸¹ 'Buthelezi Rejects Council Proposal', *Citizen*, 22 June 1988; 'SA Govt has Ended Reform-Buthelezi', *Cape Times*, 22 February 1988.

²⁸² EG, Vote of Thanks by M. Buthelezi to Commissioner PN Hansmeyer, Opening of Sixth Session of Third KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 2 March 1983.

²⁸³ 'White SA now ready for power-sharing says Buthelezi', *The Citizen*, 7 July 1986; 'Natal Indaba will discuss federal plan for area', *The Citizen*, 10 March 1986.

²⁸⁴ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M.1.3.1., Inkatha Statement of Belief, N/D.

²⁸⁵ EG, Some Remarks by M. Buthelezi prior to a dinner with Mr WAM. Clewlow, Chief Executive of Barlow Rand Limited, and Dr K. von Schirnding, Director of the South Africa Foundation and MR. Noyce, Ulundi, 1 October 1987; AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129/1/1, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'My View of Apartheid and the Effects of Disinvestment', Youth Presidents' Organisation, Upper Canada Chapter, Toronto, 11 November 1985; 'Buthelezi denies support for Statutory Council', *The Sowetan*, 20 February 1986.

²⁸⁶ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/12/1 1979-80, Brief sent to L. Wessels by Dr R. Tusenius (AKSA) on the subject of Inkatha, 'Background document for the third informal discussion-group meeting between

in 1986.²⁸⁷ He described as ‘totally wrong’ the Government legislation in 1980 which created harsher penalties for those contravening influx controls. ‘This nullifies the title Black Community Development Bill, 1981, which should rather read Black Community Discrimination Bill, 1981’.²⁸⁸ Buthelezi also furiously criticised Government’s attempts to excise Ingwavuma, a part of KwaZulu, and to give it to Swaziland.²⁸⁹ This episode showed ‘how bestial Mr Botha’ was prepared to become.²⁹⁰ As such, the allowances Inkatha was prepared to make for what Mare and Hamilton called a ‘plurality of minorities’ were fundamentally different to those demanded by the National Party. There were differences of principle and not merely of detail between the two parties.

Much of Inkatha’s politics in this respect seems liberal or liberal-democratic. Did liberalism shape Buthelezi’s politics and reconcile his opposition Buthelezi’s rejection to revolutionary radicalism with his opposition to apartheid? His authorised biographer, Themba Nzimande, argues that Buthelezi ‘subscribes tenaciously to the basic tenets of liberalism and has always actively promoted the idea of a multiparty democracy and a market-orientated economy’.²⁹¹ Buthelezi had a close association with a number of prominent reformist liberals, such as his former headmaster Edgar Brookes,²⁹² and prominent former member of the South African Liberal Party, Alan Paton, with whom he shared his opposition to economic sanctions, violent struggle and his advocacy for federal devolution.²⁹³ And in the Indaba, Inkatha worked alongside a range of prominent liberals, such as John Kane-Berman, and Lawrence Schlemmer.²⁹⁴ In criticising white minority rule, Buthelezi quoted Lord Acton’s famous liberal maxim that ‘power tends to corrupt and absolute power absolutely’.²⁹⁵

The elements of liberalism in Buthelezi’s politics were not in contradiction to his Burkean conservatism. The conservatism of Burke is not necessarily supportive of the status quo and does not preclude a desire for political change where oppression and injustice can be removed without destroying what is good in society’s inheritance in an attempt to reconstruct the social order along

Inkatha leaders and Government Parliamentarians, to be held at the Burgerspark Hotel, Pretoria, on 17-18 January 1980’, 31 December 1979.

²⁸⁷ ‘Scrap pass laws, Chief urges Botha’, *Natal Mercury*, 22 May 1985

²⁸⁸ ‘KwaZulu Leader Tilts at New Deal’, *Rand Daily Mail*, 25 November 1980.

²⁸⁹ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC 144/10/6/2, Speech by M. Buthelezi, Visit of Member of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to Maputa to Report on Pretoria’s Intention to Excise Ingwavuma District and Hand it Over With its People to Swaziland, Tembe Tribal Headquarters, Ingwavuma District, 27 May 1982.

²⁹⁰ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC144/10/6/2, Presidential Address by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, ‘Black Political and Economic Destitution and the Liberation Struggle’, Eighth Annual General Conference, 3 July 1982

²⁹¹ Themba, *The Legacy of Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi*, 69.

²⁹² Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 19-25;

²⁹³ ‘Natal-KwaZulu idea the “best Nats have had”’, *The Natal Mercury*, 22 May 1985; ‘Natal/KwaZulu- White Views’, *The Natal Witness*, 23 October 1984.

²⁹⁴ Temkin, *Buthelezi: A Biography*, 241-2.

²⁹⁵ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, ‘Black Frustrations of Being Voteless’, Association of Pretoria Attorneys, 13 May 1983.

utopian lines. Burke attacked the Irish penal laws and was an early advocate for the abolition of slavery.²⁹⁶ Despite condemning the French revolution, he retrospectively endorsed the Glorious Revolution of 1689 which established the supremacy of parliament in England and expressed sympathy with the American Revolution. Russell Kirk argues that Burke did not oppose these developments because they were not ‘the sort of political and social overturn that the word “revolution” has come to signify nowadays’. The American Revolution was not trying to overthrow the ‘institutions, customs and beliefs’ of the American colonies.²⁹⁷ Also, as Michael Oakeshott argued, conservatism is not a ‘creed or a doctrine, but a disposition’.²⁹⁸ Burkean conservatism is a number of key assumptions about politics and human society which influence and guide a political programme, but which do not themselves constitute a comprehensive political agenda.

Inkatha did not advocate liberalism in a rigid, ideological form. Buthelezi’s advocacy of liberalism was shaped and qualified by the conservatism which lay at the foundation of his outlook. Inkatha officials stated that western cultural patterns ought not to be imposed on a society without taking into account local circumstances and without being adapted to the particular character of social order which existed in South Africa. In 1975, an Inkatha official wrote an article which said ‘Inkatha accepts the fact that we as Africans have many things to copy from the western economic, political and educational patterns of development’.²⁹⁹ However, he argued, ‘certain western patterns have...to be put to the test to see if they work in an African situation’. ‘National unity and models for development should be based on values extrapolated from the people’s culture and adapted to present-day needs and situations’.³⁰⁰ Also, Buthelezi declared in 1971 that he was educated in the Western tradition and saw the advantages of democracy, but his Zululand Authority could not yet be democratic in the Western ideal, with multi-party opposition. It needed to be remembered that Westminster model was a product of Britain’s unique history and ‘was not artificially and deliberately created’. As circumstances changed he would seek to move towards greater freedom.³⁰¹ Buthelezi placed a great deal of emphasis on the significance of ‘Ubuntu’ or ‘African communalism’ in his thinking. Inkatha’s constitution stipulated that the ‘patterns of thought’

²⁹⁶ Norman, *Edmund Burke*, 97-99; *Ibid.*, 202-207; *Ibid.*, 87-90.

²⁹⁷ R. Kirk, ‘A Revolution Not Mad, but Prevented’, in Ritchie (ed.), *Edmund Burke: Appraisals and Applications*, 89-91.

²⁹⁸ Extract from: M. Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (London: Methuen and Co Ltd, 1962), in P. Loptson (ed.), *Reading in Human Nature*, (Toronto: Broadview, 1998), 202.

²⁹⁹ Bengu, ‘The National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha)’, in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds), *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 491.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁰¹ Excerpts from a Letter by M. Buthelezi, ‘In Defence of the “No Opposition” Policy’, *Natal Mercury*, 31 August 1971, in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds), *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 468.

associated with Ubuntu were to be retained and blended with Western 'patterns of development'.³⁰²

Buthelezi stated explicitly that his support for a free-enterprise and democracy in the 1980s were pragmatic, rather than ideological.³⁰³ Inkatha's Statement of Belief declared no rigid commitment to a particular economic model, but a belief that that the resources and the wealth of the country should be utilised for the 'greatest good of the greatest number'.³⁰⁴ This was an implicit reference to the utilitarian thinking of Jeremy Bentham and JS Mill, which stresses ends rather than means in moral and political thinking. Buthelezi also described how a broadly free-enterprise system should be 'diluted with African communalism' so that all could benefit from it.³⁰⁵ Constitutions, Buthelezi told Lawyers in Pretoria, were based on a practical attempt to find ways of 'regulating conflict, and relating people to each other and to the state'.³⁰⁶ Stability in democracy, Buthelezi stated at the launching of the Buthelezi Commission, was not so much achieved by the franchise itself, but 'through the balance of lobbies, interests, concerns which both inform government and curb potential excesses'.³⁰⁷ The reasons stated for such support were distinctly Burkean.³⁰⁸ Western institutions had 'evolved over great lengths of time' and were the 'product of centuries of striving'.³⁰⁹ Buthelezi warned the South African Government in 1987 that the country had 'no option' but to 'emulate what Western democracies have *distilled out of their own past experiences* as the essentials of democracy' (author's italics). Western institutions had brought about a 'substantial increase in standards of living...for a number of generations'.³¹⁰ Exact constitutional models did not need to be copied, but South Africa needed to learn from 'the wisdom of mankind', and to adapt

³⁰² EG, Speech for M. Buthelezi, Youth Brigade Dinner for the Aged, Umlazi, 22 May 1982

³⁰³ EG, Some Remarks by M. Buthelezi prior to a dinner with Mr WAM. Clewlow, Chief Executive of Barlow Rand Limited, and Dr K. von Schirnding, Director of the South Africa Foundation and MR. Noyce, Ulundi, 1 October 1987.

³⁰⁴ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M.1.3.1., Inkatha Statement of Belief.

³⁰⁵ 'Zimbabwe, SA and the future', *Financial Mail*, 21 Mar 1980

³⁰⁶ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black frustrations of being Voteless', Association of Pretoria Attorneys, 13 May 1983.

³⁰⁷ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC 144/10/6/2, Speech by M. Buthelezi, At the Function to Launch The Buthelezi Commission into the Future of Natal and KwaZulu, 29 October 1980.

³⁰⁸ EG, Some Remarks by M. Buthelezi prior to a dinner with Mr WAM. Clewlow, Chief Executive of Barlow Rand Limited, and Dr K. von Schirnding, Director of the South Africa Foundation and MR. Noyce, Ulundi, 1 October 1987.

³⁰⁹ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi 'The South Africa I would Like to See', The Senior Forum of Hilton College, 13 September 1985.

³¹⁰ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Role of Business in the Political Reform Process', Carlton Hotel Johannesburg, Financial Mail Annual International Conference on Investment in 1986, 13 November 1987.

democratic principles from around the world to South Africa's particular circumstances and heritage.³¹¹

There are a number of other sharp distinctions between Buthelezi's outlook and a fundamentally liberal outlook. Jesse Norman contends that liberalism 'emphasises the primacy of the individual: Burke emphasises the importance of the social order'.³¹² 'Liberalism believes above all in the power of reason; Burke believes in tradition, habit and "prejudice". Liberalism stresses universal principles; Burke stresses fact and circumstance. Liberalism is unimpressed by the past; Burke quarries it'.³¹³ In these respects, Buthelezi is most justifiably characterised as a Burkean conservative rather than a liberal. Moreover, the particular traditional Zulu social order which Buthelezi sought to conserve, brought his conservatism into greater tension with his liberalism than would be the case for most Western Burkean conservatives. In the early-1970s, Buthelezi spoke of the tradition of 'Zulu democracy' being 'based on a consensus of opinion'.³¹⁴ And in 1975, Buthelezi stated that 'Western civilisation is impressive in its emphasis on the rights of the individual. On the other hand our culture stresses the rights of the individual as a member of a group'.³¹⁵ In the same year, an Inkatha official wrote that in terms of its politics in KwaZulu, Inkatha did not regard itself as a political party, because it did not accept partisanship.³¹⁶ Despite Buthelezi's criticism of revolutionary authoritarianism, Inkatha's governance of KwaZulu in the 1980s can be seen as authoritarian in important respects. As early as 1980, Buthelezi argued that the situation required Inkatha to 'pursue its growth and its consolidation by every means possible'. This meant the training of Inkatha youngsters in the 'employment of anger in an orderly fashion' and creating incentives for people in KwaZulu to join Inkatha.³¹⁷

Buthelezi's defence of traditional tribal authorities might also be said to be illiberal. He argued that these structures were essential for the foreseeable future in helping communities to ameliorate their impoverished conditions. Tribal authorities were the only structures which contained the wisdom which made them 'social, economic and political blocks for everybody, who would possibly

³¹¹ Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black Frustrations of Being Voteless', Association of Pretoria Attorneys, Friday 13 May 1983.

³¹² Norman, *Burke*, 282.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ Excerpts from Letter by M. Buthelezi, 'In Defence of the "No Opposition" Policy', *the Natal Mercury*, 31 August 1971, in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds), *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 468.

³¹⁵ Excerpts from Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Issues in KwaZulu', General Conference of the National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha) at Bhenkuzulu College, Nongoma, 18 July 1975, in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds), *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 478.

³¹⁶ Bengu, 'The National Cultural Liberation Movement (Inkatha)', in Van der Merwe, Charton, Kotze and Magnusson (eds), *African Perspectives on South Africa: Speeches, Articles and Documents*, 492.

³¹⁷ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Sixth Ordinary General Conference of Inkatha, Ulundi, 20 June 1980

attempt to rule', and conflict and instability would ensue without them.³¹⁸ For Buthelezi, the erosion of 'the structures of local authority' and 'Zulu mechanisms for political and social control' reduced the ability of Zulu communities to create wealth for themselves and contributed to increased instability and turmoil.³¹⁹ Buthelezi may have had an abstract admiration for 'Western values' and for liberal democracy. He undoubtedly supported the liberalisation and democratisation of South African politics as a means of increasing the power of the African populations, stopping certain humiliating and degrading interferences in black lives, and as the only feasible means of balancing different interests in the country. However, his support for liberal values was highly circumscribed and qualified, at least as far as his regional constituency and traditional Zulu society were concerned. These two positions could be reconciled philosophically by a Burkean anti-rationalism, but were nevertheless in tension.

Many of Buthelezi's attacks of National Party policy were Burkean, rather than liberal-democratic. One of his main criticisms of Government policies was that they were rigidly ideological and therefore insensitive to relevant realities and circumstances. The National Party's attempts to make apartheid work were causing suffering to black people for 'the sake of an unrealistic dream'.³²⁰ The National Party was often criticised for this in the same breath as revolutionaries. In 1984, *Clarion Call* opined that 'in the final analysis, the future is not going to be shaped by National Party ideology. There are, among Black leaders and Black opinion-formers those who believe that the future can be shaped through Africanist ideology, Black consciousness ideology, or Socialist or Marxist ideology. I believe that together they err with the National Party in thinking that specific Party political ideologies can author the future and determine Black and White political relationships in the long run'.³²¹ Although Buthelezi may have thought cultural self-determination and the dispersal of power amongst groups to be a good thing *ceteris paribus*, he opposed the National Party's project to impose an abstract concept of self-determination onto circumstances which were not conducive to such forms of political organisation. He rejected the implementation of rigid forms of separation when other considerations pushed strongly in the opposite direction. The National Party, like the revolutionaries, were abstract metaphysicians, ideologues, concerned in Burke's phrase with 'universals and essences' and neglecting to consider the differences between 'more and less'.

³¹⁸ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'faction Fighting Halts Development', Symposium on Faction Fighting at the Umlazi Division of the University of Zululand, 3 April 1987.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ 'Against the Tide', *Natal Mercury*, 19 May 1981.

³²¹ 'No Solution can be imposed unilaterally', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1984.

He lamented the Government's lack of realism in supposing that homelands such as KwaZulu could be viable independent states. The fact that Africans were expected to find their future in unconsolidated and impoverished homelands, which would be economically *in hoc* to white South Africa made 'nonsense of the view that we have the scope to indulge in self-determination'. Afrikaners wrongly believed that self-determination was 'related to the divine will' and that this ideal should be imposed on human societies at all costs.³²² South Africa was, in fact, one society with a single economy and it was not possible in such circumstances to 'have one economy and separate political solutions for people who despite their diverse ethnic backgrounds are one people in one land'.³²³ Buthelezi argued that 'economic and political realities support Black political aspirations, whereas they militate against the kind of apartheid policies which have made South Africa a pariah in the world at large'. Economic integration demanded political integration.³²⁴ In Buthelezi's view, the National Party's understanding of political realities was distorted through its ideological lens which exaggerated the significance, and caricatured the nature, of ethnic and racial identity in politics. He criticised the governing party for thinking that ethnic origins played a 'dominantly determining role in the creation of and in the direction of African political aspirations'. For the Inkatha leader, 'ethnic based politics super-imposed on reality will unmeasurably compound our problems in facing up to the need for radical change and bedevil political relationships between Black and White'.³²⁵ It was also incorrect for the Government to believe that ethnic identity necessarily entailed conflict between different ethnic groups living in the same society.³²⁶

Anthea Jeffery characterises Buthelezi as a pragmatic opponent of apartheid, referring not only to his tactical expediency, but to his preference not to damage the economy in the struggle for economic change.³²⁷ And when asked to summarise his political approach in an interview with the present author, the Inkatha leader described himself as a pragmatist.³²⁸ Moreover, an approved biography of Buthelezi lays emphasis on his pragmatism.³²⁹ This description of Buthelezi does not fully capture the nature of his political philosophy. Yet, in terms of its anti-utopianism, its

³²² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, 'Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)', N/D.

³²³ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black Frustrations of Being Voteless', Association of Pretoria Attorneys, Friday 13 May 1983.

³²⁴ "'Black Disillusionment': an assessment by Dr MG Buthelezi, President of Inkatha and Chief Minister of KwaZulu to the International Collectors' Association', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1984.

³²⁵ 'No Solution can be imposed unilaterally', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, No. 9, April 1984.

³²⁶ EG, Vote of Thanks by M. Buthelez to DR CM. Phatudi, Chief Minister of Lebowa, Second Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 12 June 1984.

³²⁷ Jeffery, *Natal Story*, 22.

³²⁸ M. Buthelezi Interviewed by Adam Houldsworth, South African Parliament, Cape Town, 28 October 2014.

³²⁹ Themba, *Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi*, 25-29; *Ibid*, 66.

assumption that radical change will cause unintended consequences and conviction that the objectives of society can only be achieved over the course of many generations, Burkean conservatism can be seen as pragmatic. Paradoxically, the categories 'pragmatic opponent of apartheid' and 'conservative' are not mutually exclusive. Buthelezi's politics can be seen to be lying in the overlap of the two categories.

Chapter Two: Inkatha's Priorities, Practical Politics, and its Approach Towards the National Party.

In 1980-1989, Chief Buthelezi opposed apartheid and Government reform policy on the one hand, whilst vehemently rejecting revolutionary radicalism on the other. These two positions are not philosophically contradictory. However, these aims were distinct, if not incompatible. As such, John Brewer correctly points out that such aims were 'potentially contradictory'.³³⁰ That is to say, practical politics could bring Inkatha's objectives into conflict with one another. For Brewer, Buthelezi's desire to bring apartheid to an end was in practical conflict with his aim of maintaining the stability and prosperity of South Africa.³³¹ Given that the revolutionary radical organisations which Buthelezi so opposed had such a prominent role in the struggle against apartheid, and given that, in certain respects, the apartheid Government was the strongest bulwark against such radicalism, there was great potential for different elements of Buthelezi's politics to come into practical conflict. As noted in the introduction, the accounts given by Brewer, Mzala, and Mare and Hamilton, suggest that Buthelezi's opposition to revolutionary radicalism was his foremost priority. Laurence Piper goes as far as to say that Inkatha fell into an '*ad hoc* alliance' with the National Party Government.³³² However, these characterisations of the Inkatha leader's priorities are either asserted or inadequately demonstrated. Indeed, this point is inherently difficult to establish, not just because of the ambiguous nature of Buthelezi's politics, but because of the scarcity of sources which reveal Buthelezi's thoughts as expressed privately.

Nevertheless, there is evidence which demonstrates that Buthelezi's opposition to revolutionary radicalism was his foremost priority in the second half of the 1980s and constituted the key focus of the Inkatha President's political efforts. Not only did Buthelezi make a large number of statements condemning revolutionary radicalism comprehensively and in strong terms. Almost all of Buthelezi's speeches, memoranda and articles featured criticism of revolutionary radicalism, and in a significant majority it constituted the overwhelmingly dominant theme. Indeed, a member of the British

³³⁰ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 378.

³³¹ *Ibid.*

³³² Piper, 'The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South Africa', 79.

Foreign Affairs Committee informed Oscar Dhlomo that ‘the greater part by far’ a memorandum sent by Chief Buthelezi ‘consists of attacks on the ANC’ which amounted to ‘massive denigration and denunciation’.³³³ Furthermore, Buthelezi often stated that his opposition to revolutionary radicalism was his key political priority. Buthelezi told the KLA that whether South Africa brought apartheid to an end by revolution or by a negotiated transition was ‘the basic question, the deep down fundamental question, the question taking priority over all other questions...’³³⁴ Writing in *Clarion Call*, he argued that ‘it is not a question of whether apartheid can be eradicated. It is a question of how finally it is going to be eradicated and what kind of society we are going to have after apartheid’.³³⁵ Similarly, Buthelezi said that white intransigence and racism had yet to be eradicated, but ‘...by far the more pertinent truth is that apartheid can now no longer possibly survive for any length of time.’ Too many people in the sanctions debate failed to see that ‘the way in which apartheid is eradicated holds vital implications for the future’.³³⁶ It was in the second half of the 1980s that Buthelezi’s condemnations of his black opponents became more vehement and condemnatory. For instance, he told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that he was ‘staggered by the extent to which the ANC emulates South Africa’s apartheid masters’,³³⁷ and argued that ‘in our circumstances revolutionaries are doing no more than escaping the responsibility of being human’. He also told the Assembly that he wondered ‘whether it is the ANC which is beyond reform and not the National Party’.³³⁸ Buthelezi even wrote to PFP politician Colin Eglin that ‘divisions between the UDF and Inkatha may well be divisions which can only be settled by a political fight to the death. They rest on the divisions between Inkatha and the ANC which could also well be divisions which can only be settled by a political fight to the death’.³³⁹

The evidence relating to the early years of the 1980s is less clear. Buthelezi made substantive criticisms of both the National Party and revolutionary radicalism, but his opposition to the ANC was less strident than in the later parts of the decade and there was not the same degree of focus on revolutionary radicalism as would subsequently become the case. Indeed, many of Buthelezi’s criticisms of the Government carried a venom that seemed to be less present in his later utterances.

³³³ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/B2/3, Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 July 1986.

³³⁴ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

³³⁵ M. Buthelezi, ‘Sanctions...’, *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

³³⁶ AP, PC 129 Cliff Gosney Collection, ‘The Plight of Responsible Black Leaders in south Africa’, Address by M. Buthelezi, University of Boston, 17 November 1986.

³³⁷ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

³³⁸ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987; AP, PC 129 Cliff Gosney Collection, Address by M. Buthelezi, ‘The South Africa I Would Like to see’, Father Lopez High School, USA, 30 November 1986.

³³⁹ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.1, Address by M. Buthelezi, Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP, leader of the Progressive Federal Party and Professor NIC. Olivier MP, 3 Feb 1988.

For instance, he called a National Party cabinet minister a 'skunk'.³⁴⁰ Moreover, the Inkatha leader's criticisms of the ANC in the early-1980s were more reluctant and qualified than would later be the case. When criticising the armed struggle against apartheid, Buthelezi would often add that that ANC's decision to opt for violence was 'not a decision which any patriot can fault given the circumstances of White recalcitrance which resulted in the banning of these then legitimate mouth-pieces of Black South Africa'.³⁴¹ Acts of violence 'must ultimately be laid at the feet of apartheid'.³⁴² Although the Inkatha leader expressed concerns about socialism and Marxism in the early-1980s, he also criticised the National Party's rhetoric on communism. He told a West German audience that it was a 'fallacy' to assume that the black-white conflict in South Africa was caused largely by communism. Buthelezi said that he did not share Botha's concern that wherever the white man vacates power, communism would fill the vacuum.³⁴³ Furthermore, Inkatha in the early-1980s was more inclined than later in the period to emphasise its common cause with the ANC. Buthelezi stressed in 1980 that he had 'no quarrel' with the ANC, but only with the Pretoria regime.³⁴⁴ In 1983, he appealed to Oliver Tambo and others for a 'political marriage of convenience even if we differ on strategy'.³⁴⁵

This is better understood when Buthelezi's activities are considered in the context of shifting power contestation. As noted in the introduction, the mid-1980s saw an intensification of the violent struggle against apartheid in the townships. Also, the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South African Trade Unions were established in 1983 and 1985 respectively.³⁴⁶ Both were supportive of the ANC and were mobilised to great effect. This 'people's war' also involved hostility towards those African individuals and organisations which were critical of it. As Jeffery demonstrates in her forensic examination of political violence in the 1980s, 'as the people's war intensified from September 1984, intimidation and political killings accelerated'.³⁴⁷ This period saw an intensification

³⁴⁰ "'Skunk" remark gets PW rebuke', *The Daily News*, 24 June 1982.

³⁴¹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Importance of Stamina and Stability in the Exercise of Revolutionary Patience in the Long Struggle for Liberation', Women's Brigade, 7th Annual General Conference, Saturday, 3 October 1983.

³⁴² EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The crucial role of women in our efforts to retain our humanity as we face the demanding challenges of the struggle for liberation' Annual General Conference of the Women's Brigade, 20 October 1984.

³⁴³ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC 144/10/6/2, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Opportunities for the Young Generation to Contribute Towards Evolutionary Developments in the Third World: Initiatives Illustrated on the Model of Natal/South Africa- Through Inkatha', Hanns Martin Schleyer Foundation, West Germany, 25 September 1981.

³⁴⁴ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, Inkatha Meeting, Ulundi, 13 September 1980.

³⁴⁵ 'To be dezuluised for political recognition', *Clarion call*, Vol 1, 1983.

³⁴⁶ Mare, *Ethnicity and Politics*, 60.

³⁴⁷ Jeffery, *People's War*, xxxiv.

of violent clashes between Inkatha members and members of ANC-aligned movements.³⁴⁸ The ANC's Chris Hani told the *The Times* of London that the organisation's policy was to 'isolate and destroy' Chief Buthelezi.³⁴⁹ Buthelezi, in turn, spoke of taking an 'eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth', and he told the Inkatha Women's Brigade that he would die before being forced out of the liberation struggle by other organisations.³⁵⁰ He warned the ANC that his people came from 'warrior stock'.³⁵¹ Surveys throughout the decade showed increasing radicalisation amongst Africans and a corresponding decline in the popularity of Inkatha.³⁵² Moreover, the ANC gained a significant degree of recognition and prestige in the international community, amounting to what Pauline Baker called 'the status of a government in waiting'.³⁵³ This included shifts in policy in relatively conservative countries such as the United States, which passed the Anti-Apartheid Act and imposed greater sanctions on South Africa in 1986,³⁵⁴ and in the United Kingdom, whose Government met with Oliver Tambo, having dropped its previous demand that the ANC first renounce violence.³⁵⁵ Buthelezi lamented the prestige of freedom fighters in Western society, calling this 'white liberal romanticism at its very worst'.³⁵⁶ He expressed concern to his central committee members that ANC-affiliated movements were gaining influence amongst his KwaZulu constituents and exhorted them to mobilise more effectively at grass-roots level. Furthermore, Buthelezi frequently identified a political 'battle' for the minds of black South Africans.³⁵⁷ As an organisation dependent upon popular support, Buthelezi argued, Inkatha needed to mobilise more effectively at grass roots level and to 'spread our message for peace amongst the people'.³⁵⁸ Indeed, he told the Inkatha youth brigade

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 503.

³⁴⁹ 'ANC to Step up Violence- Inkatha Members a Target Says ANC Military Chief', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

³⁵⁰ RH, Citation of Memorandum by M. Buthelezi for Chester Crocker, July 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987; EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Preparing for the Challenges of a new liberated South Africa During the Present Political Impasse when There is Failure to Get the Politics of Negotiation on Track and the Challenges the Black Women of South Africa Face in Refusing to Abandon Hope', Inkatha Women's Brigade, Ulundi, 8 October 1988.

³⁵¹ 'ANC at war with Inkatha', *City Press*, 28 January 1984.

³⁵² Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to Kwazulu', 353-374; Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 181-216; Jeffery, *People's War*, 49-202; R. Southall, 'Consociationalism in South Africa: The Buthelezi Commission and Beyond', *The Journalism of Modern African Studies*, 21, 1 (March, 1983), 91; TG. Karis, 'South African Liberation: The Communist Factor', *Foreign Affairs*, 65, 2 (Winter, 1986), 286.

³⁵³ Baker, 'Facing up to Apartheid', *Foreign Policy*, 64 (Autumn, 1986), 47; Giliomee, *Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 221-226; *Ibid.*, 272-276; 'Violence Must Cease Before Talks Begin- Buthelezi', *Citizen*, 25 March 1987; A. Klotz, 'Norms and Sanctions: Lessons From the Socialisation of South Africa', *Review of International Studies*, 22, 2 (April, 1996), 180-1; 'Have They got it Right?', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

³⁵⁴ Klotz, 'Norms and Sanctions: Lessons from the Socialization of South Africa', 180.

³⁵⁵ Baker, 'Facing up to Apartheid', *Foreign Policy*, 64 (Autumn, 1986), 47-8.

³⁵⁶ RH, Citation of Memorandum for Meeting with Chancellor Dr H. Kohl, Bonn, 18 February 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

³⁵⁷ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 17 March 1987; 'No! No! Fifty Thousand Times', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

³⁵⁸ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, Details of Inkatha Central Committee Resolutions and Presidential Greetings to central Committee, 3-4 June 1989; EG, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, '1989- A Year of

that the lies spread about their organisation at home and abroad constituted ‘the biggest of our man-made problems as a Movement’.³⁵⁹ The Inkatha accused the ANC and UDF of politicising the trade union movement.³⁶⁰ And in 1986, Inkatha supporters founded the United Workers Union of South Africa.³⁶¹ The context of the late-1980s caused Buthelezi to perceive the ANC as a very serious threat to his political objectives and interests. He recognised that international and domestic developments had elevated the ANC to the status of ‘government in waiting’ whilst rendering apartheid moribund. It might be expected that this context of power contestation would increase, for Buthelezi, the importance of opposing the ANC and its politics, and would shift his priorities away from opposing apartheid and towards opposing revolutionary radicalism.

Even prior to the launching of the UDF in 1983 and the mass uprisings of 1984, Inkatha came into conflict with, and seems to have felt threatened by, radical black organisations. Cordial relations with the ANC soured following a meeting in London in late-1979.³⁶² And from 1980, Buthelezi was denounced by radicals as an ‘enemy of the people’, a ‘junior partner in Gestapo repression’, and a ‘snake that needs to be hit over the head’.³⁶³ Buthelezi stated in 1980 that he would not ‘under any circumstances buckle under any pressure merely because those who attempt to terrorise me politically-speaking are black like me’.³⁶⁴ Prior even to its rift with the ANC in late-1979, Buthelezi had come into conflict with the Black Consciousness Movement and with radical student groups. In discussions with the ANC in London in 1979, Buthelezi complained bitterly that he had been abused by the Black Consciousness Movement. He censured the ANC for failing to issue a condemnation when Black Consciousness activists tried to kill him at Robert Sobukwe’s funeral.³⁶⁵ In 1980, Buthelezi spoke of the pressures being placed on Inkatha by the ANC, ‘its black consciousness cohorts and the western liberal lunatic fringe’.³⁶⁶ Indicatively, when speaking in 1984, Buthelezi warned that the UDF was ‘attempting to mobilise Black opinion in to its 1976 mood’.³⁶⁷ As noted in

Action for Peace; A Year of Organisation for Peace; A Year of Preparation for the Future’, Inkatha Annual General Conference, 8 July 1989.

³⁵⁹ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, ‘Tackling the Problems of Peaceful Change Within the Challenges of Violence, White Intransigence and Escalating Poverty and Sanctions’, Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, 20 August 1986.

³⁶⁰ ‘COSATU- what worried the workers’, *Clarion Call*, Vol 2, 1986.

³⁶¹ K. Moodley and H. Adam, ‘South Africa: Revolution, Repression, Reform’, *International Journal*, 41, 4, Africa: Crisis and Beyond (Autumn, 1986), 842.

³⁶² Jeffery, *The Natal Story*, 26-32.

³⁶³ Jeffery, *People’s War*, 503.

³⁶⁴ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, King Shaka Celebrations, 28 September 1980.

³⁶⁵ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/A1/5 1979, ANC-Inkatha meeting in London, Consultative Meeting Document- 29 October 1979 to 30 October 1979.

³⁶⁶ EG, Opening remarks by M. Buthelezi, Central Committee Meeting, Ondini, 18 July 1980.

³⁶⁷ ‘New constitution will stir more Black Anger says Chief’, *Clarion Call*, October/November 1984.

the previous chapter, Inkatha was willing to resort to authoritarian means to bolster its position in this context of power contestation.

However, the threat of revolutionary radicalism to Inkatha and its objectives was significantly less in the first years of the 1980s than it became from late-1983 when it gained greater power and influence internationally and domestically. This might partly explain why opposition to revolutionary radicalism became a greater and more urgent priority as the decade progressed. Indeed, the nature of the National Party's policies in the first half of the decade may illustrate further why Inkatha's opposition to Government policy was a relatively high priority in the early stages of the 1980s. Although there were disagreements between the two parties throughout the decade, the gap was at its greatest in the first half when the National Party had not accepted the premise of a single South African nationality and was seeking to impose a new constitution which enshrined the exclusion of blacks from central decision-making structures. Buthelezi argued that the implementation of the tricameral parliament left him in 'a kind of cleft stick, and Mr PW Botha with his Constitutional plans which exclude Africans has made my position even more tenuous than it was before'.³⁶⁸ It was in the aftermath of the November 1983 white referendum which gave a resounding endorsement to the National Party's constitutional plans that Buthelezi spoke of a potential 'political marriage of convenience' with the ANC and others.³⁶⁹ In this context, it is understandable that despite his genuine concerns about Marxism Buthelezi would not want to go along entirely with the Government's anti-communist narrative which was being used as a pretext for excluding Africans from South African citizenship. The early-1980s also saw Government attempts to forcibly excise Ingwavuma from KwaZulu and to transfer it to independent Swaziland, which provoked a furious reaction in Buthelezi.³⁷⁰

Despite noting Inkatha's initial reluctance to collaborate with Government, Brewer, and Mare and Hamilton, have all stressed Inkatha's moderation and its ultimate willingness to compromise in order to secure its place in the Government's reform initiatives. Mzala went further, arguing that Inkatha had assumed by the mid-1980s a very close association with apartheid structures.³⁷¹ It is the case, as Brewer suggests, that Buthelezi's desire to bring apartheid to an end came to some extent into practical conflict with his predominant priority of halting the progress of revolutionary radicalism. In certain ways, Inkatha resolved this dilemma by choosing to aid Government's fight against

³⁶⁸ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black Frustrations of Being Voteless', Association of Pretoria Attorneys, 13 May 1983.

³⁶⁹ 'To be Dezulised for Political Recognition', *Clarion call*, Vol 1, 1983.

³⁷⁰ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, On the South Africa- Swaziland Land Deal Involving the Excision of Kangwane and Ingwavuma, Wits Alumni Luncheon Club, 27 July 1982.

³⁷¹ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 4.

revolutionary radicalism at the expense of his struggle against apartheid. This can be seen in Buthelezi's cooperation with state security services in KwaZulu. The 'Inkathagate' scandal revealed that Inkatha had, in a context of intense power contestation and mutual hostility between the ANC and itself, accepted secret funding for anti-sanctions rallies and its affiliated trade unions, and had collaborated with Government on matters of security, including accepting training for 150 Inkatha guerrillas in 1986.³⁷² As Mzala pointed out, Buthelezi spoke favourably of General Johan Coetzee of the South African police and KwaZulu took over the running of the police stations in many of Durban's black townships.³⁷³ Indeed, Tienie Groenewald, the Chief Director of Communication Operations in the staff of the Chief of the South African Defence Force said in an interview that regular security briefings were given to the leaders of the national states. He recalled answering the questions of KwaZulu cabinet members for more than four hours after finishing his presentation.³⁷⁴ Moreover, once commented that sanctions could bring about the end of apartheid, but only at the expense of prosperity and stability.³⁷⁵ Inkatha also found a degree of common ground with the National Party's plan in the early-1980s that the homeland leaders should have greater involvement in the politics of urban areas populated mainly by Zulu-speaking Africans. Government documents reveal that Buthelezi was in favour of establishing ministries for urban affairs.³⁷⁶ Furthermore, Inkatha encouraged the National Party's policy of adding land to the homelands.³⁷⁷

However, Inkatha had its own reasons for these forms of cooperation with the apartheid Government. They were not an indication, as Mzala implied, that Buthelezi had decided to give positive support to the National Party's agenda, or to subordinate Inkatha to the Government's politics.³⁷⁸ It should be emphasised that Inkatha's politics, throughout the 1980s, were in important respects characterised by defiance of, and opposition to, Government policies. Buthelezi steadfastly refused to accept independence for KwaZulu and to endorse Government attempts to establish a confederation or constellation of southern African states. He argued in 1983, that the National Party policy would 'crumble' if it was shown that black people would not accept independence. This was because the 'ideological edifice' of the National Party rested 'on the assumption that so-called

³⁷² Klotz, 'Norms and Sanctions: Lessons from the Socialization of South Africa', 186-90; Nzimande, *Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi*, 80; Jeffery, *People's War*, 287.

³⁷³ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 4.

³⁷⁴ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, T. Groenewald interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 December 1994.

³⁷⁵ M. Buthelezi, 'Sanctions...', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1988.

³⁷⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

³⁷⁷ ACA, Kobie Coetsee PV357, 1/A1/5 1979 October, ANC-Inkatha meeting in London, Consultative Meeting Document- 29 October 1979 to 30 October 1979.

³⁷⁸ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 4.

homelands will in due course opt for “independence””.³⁷⁹ Buthelezi campaigned stridently against the implementation of the tricameral parliamentary system.³⁸⁰ After initially contemplating participation, Buthelezi refused to involve Inkatha in urban African council elections, while they were ‘being used as a substitute for democratic involvement at Government level’. He complained that local government representation was not used a substitute for white ‘involvement in the central Government’. He would not be drawn into to the new urban government system which were being used as ‘props’ for the tricameral constitution.³⁸¹ Although Buthelezi advocated negotiated change in South Africa, and participated in informal, non-statutory discussions with Government, he rejected the ruling party’s appeals for him to become involved in formal negotiating forums. He refused to participate in the proposed Black Advisory Council in the early-1980s, the Special Cabinet Committee for black constitutional development from late-1983, the Non-Statutory Negotiating Forum in 1985 and the National Statutory Council from 1986.

The Inkatha leader refused to enter the Black Advisory Council, because it was a separate forum from the President’s Council which was deliberating over the new constitution. In meetings with Government, Bishop Zulu called for a continuation of informal discussions, because things ought not be rushed if there was not agreement and if the political climate was not conducive.³⁸² Throughout the early-1980s, Buthelezi called for South Africa’s problems to be solved, ultimately, by a national convention. In the meantime, all of the country’s leaders needed to declare themselves committed to a just society in the ‘foreseeable future’.³⁸³ In the first half of the decade, the Inkatha leader seemed less concerned with setting specific conditions for entry into negotiating forums, but sought the Government’s abandonment of grand apartheid, and demanded a ‘moratorium’ on constitutional developments until a greater degree of consensus had been achieved across all racial groups.³⁸⁴ Buthelezi did not rule out involvement in the National Statutory Council, but laid out a number of strict conditions for his participation.³⁸⁵ He insisted that the Government release Nelson

³⁷⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, ‘Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)’, N/D.

³⁸⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, ‘Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)’, N/D.

³⁸¹ ‘Buthelezi Rejects Community Polls’, *The Natal Mercury*, 27 September 1983.

³⁸² ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), ‘Buthelezi’, Hand-written notes on the subject of the Black Council, 26 May 1980.

³⁸³ ‘Buthelezi Calls for National Convention’, *The Citizen*, 8 July 1981.

³⁸⁴ ‘Violence “will now follow new constitution”’, *Rand Daily Mail*, 18 October 1983; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, Memorandum from M. Buthelezi for Discussion Between Black Leaders At Unity Talks to be Held in October 1983.

³⁸⁵ Adam and Moodley, *The Negotiated Revolution*, 128; Giliomee, *Last Afrikaner leaders*, 181-186; Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 223-233.

Mandela, unban the ANC, and state its intent to abolish the entire present constitution including the Population Registration and Group Areas Acts.³⁸⁶

To a significant extent, Buthelezi's aim of bringing apartheid to an end did not come into conflict his predominant aim of opposing revolutionary radicalism. Indeed, Buthelezi reasoned that only by achieving more meaningful political reform could the success of revolutionary radicalism be averted. It has been argued that Inkatha was reluctant to cooperate with Government or approve of its reform policies because this would erode Buthelezi's legitimacy amongst his increasingly radicalised black constituency. For Shula Marks, Buthelezi's support for Government was constrained by the fact that his legitimacy amongst his constituency was conditional on 'not being seen to be too closely allied to the white power bloc'.³⁸⁷ Also, for Mare, Hamilton and Brewer, one of the key motivations for any opposition by Buthelezi towards apartheid was a need to appear radical in the eyes of its supporters.³⁸⁸ This conclusion, however, is inferred solely from historical context- it is assumed simply on the basis that Buthelezi headed an organisation with a large black constituency at a time of increasing radicalism. Yet, Buthelezi also made a number of statements which seem to further corroborate this view. He spoke of Inkatha's need to retain the support of its constituency and of black people in general and to shape its politics accordingly. For instance, in addresses to Inkatha officials in 1989, Buthelezi emphasised the importance of keeping Inkatha 'rooted in the people'. It was the ordinary people who would author the future of South Africa, and only those organisations rooted in the people would maintain their political relevance and had 'any hope of lasting for any length of time during and after transition'.³⁸⁹ Similarly, giving evidence to the British Government's Foreign Affairs Committee in 1986, Buthelezi said that 'I have from time to time to adopt positions because I am a constituency leader with a mass following and I am dictated to by ordinary people in every day walks of life.....I as the President of Inkatha dare not move out of step with my constituency'.³⁹⁰ National Party notes of a meeting with Inkatha officials in 1980 show that Buthelezi told Government officials that he 'have great difficulty' gaining support from his constituents for the proposed Black Advisory Council, because blacks had been excluded from the Presidential Council deliberations regarding the new constitution. The council could bring 'about a very explosive situation and resentment'. He could not 'sell it to Blacks'. His Inkatha colleague, Bishop Zulu, warned

³⁸⁶ 'Black Demands in the Struggle for Liberation', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1989.

³⁸⁷ Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence*, 124.

³⁸⁸ Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 135-150; Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to Kwazulu', 364.

³⁸⁹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, '1989-A Year of Action for Peace; A Year of Organisation for Peace; A Year of Preparation for the Future', Presidential, Inkatha Annual General Conference, 8 July 1989; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, Details of Inkatha Central Committee Resolutions and Presidential Greetings to the Central Committee, 3-4 June 1989.

³⁹⁰ RH, Policy Speech by Chief M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

that many Africans condemned Inkatha for working with the Government and accused Buthelezi of being the new Muzorewa. It was important that Chief Buthelezi did not take any 'step where he would not be able to carry his people'.³⁹¹ In another Inkatha-National Party 'think-tank' in 1979, Oscar Dhlomo said that policies needed to be such that Buthelezi would not 'lose face'.³⁹² Inkatha officials considered its opposition to Grand Apartheid to be crucial to its retention of support amongst Africans. In 1986, Dhlomo commented that 'the reason why Inkatha has been able to maintain its coherence and legitimacy amid the storms of alienation and turmoil in Black communities is because of its commitment to and unceasing work towards the establishment of the right of all Africans to be full citizens of the Republic of South Africa'.³⁹³

Crucially, the existing historiography does not demonstrate Buthelezi's perception that only by persuading the Government to change its policies could the progress of revolutionary radicalism be halted and the type of politics of which he approved be bolstered. In warning of the risk of his own legitimacy being eroded, Buthelezi frequently expressed concern about his 'utility' in serving the cause of non-revolutionary politics.³⁹⁴ He argued that Government policies were contributing to a 'loss of faith' amongst black people which was fuelling 'the fires of revolution'.³⁹⁵ In 1983, Buthelezi told the Inkatha Women's Brigade, correctly as it transpired out, that the tricameral parliamentary system would 'trigger off instability'.³⁹⁶ The same year, Buthelezi warned that the new constitution was radicalising Inkatha members as well as UDF supporters, and was responsible for black anger 'sweeping the country'.³⁹⁷ Moreover, the Inkatha leader expressed great concern that the Government's attempts to excise Ingwavuma would undermine his type of non-revolutionary politics. He complained to Minister Piet Koornhof that he was expected to tell his followers that he could do nothing to prevent them becoming citizens of a foreign country. He was 'expected to

³⁹¹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), 'Buthelezi', Hand-written notes on the subject of the Black Council, 26 May 1980.

³⁹² ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/12/3 1979, 'Inkatha Think-Tank', Hand-written notes of Leon Wessels, 24 July 1979.

³⁹³ O. Dhlomo, 'KwaZulu/Natal: Inkatha's views on co-operation and development in the region', *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986.

³⁹⁴ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Speech by M. Buthelezi, Read on his behalf by ES. C. Sithebe, 'A Black Man's Perspective of the Unrest Situation', University of Potchefstroom Department of Criminology and the Bureau for Continuing Education, Symposium: The Unrest in the RSA, 15 August 1986; AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Keynote Address by M. Buthelezi, University of Witwatersrand, Department of Business Economics and the Association of Managerial Economists, Conference: 'What Boundaries for Business?', 10 July 1986.

³⁹⁵ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, Read on his Behalf by Oscar Dhlomo, South African federation of Civil Engineers, 14 November 1986.

³⁹⁶ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Importance of Stamina and Stability in the Exercise of Revolutionary Patience in the Long Struggle for Liberation', Women's Brigade, 7th Annual General Conference, Saturday, 3 October 1983.

³⁹⁷ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 25th Anniversary, USSALEP, Durban, 4 November 1983.

survive the shock of world opinion which will ridicule me for being powerless to halt this kind of Afrikaner political chauvinism'. He was 'expected to stand muted when...asked whether Inkatha is made of words and can show no teeth in actions'.³⁹⁸ Throughout the 1980s, Buthelezi expressed great concern that quicker and more meaningful reform towards power-sharing was needed to forestall the rise of revolutionary radicalism. Buthelezi told an audience in Portugal in 1988 that the type of gradual change which the Government was pursuing could not work in South Africa because the constitution was utterly rejected by the majority of the people. He warned that 'unless we make a qualitative step forward and establish a permanent constitution which will discipline the political process, the turbulence of radical change will create the kind of instability which will militate against sound constitutional development.'³⁹⁹ The Inkatha leader argued that 'black political recalcitrance continued to raise black tempers'. The reluctance of whites to bring about fundamental changes was leading to more and more Africans considering the option of violence for bringing about change.⁴⁰⁰ *Clarion Call* republished in 1985 the findings of the Buthelezi Commission that an increasing proportion of black people, including in KwaZulu, saw violence as a legitimate tactic in the struggle and that many predicted a surge in violence if meaningful changes were not implemented soon.⁴⁰¹ Buthelezi also expressed a concern that the international community would increasingly disregard the prospect of non-revolutionary change in South Africa. In 1988, for example, he warned that the failure of negotiation politics to produce 'tangible results' would lead to the 'final slamming of the international door in our face'.⁴⁰² The Inkatha leader was quoted in *Clarion Call* in 1987 saying that in order to break the upwards spiral of violence 'a quantum political leap into democracy' was needed. 'We dare not fail at the national political level and fuel the hideous flames of violence'.⁴⁰³ As such, Buthelezi declared that 'Botha needs to become an equal partner with Blacks in breaking the logjam' or 'the politics of negotiation will continuously be downgraded'.⁴⁰⁴ The Chief Minister lamented in 1980 that the whites' 'suicide will be our suicide'.⁴⁰⁵ Buthelezi told Botha to 'reform or we will all die'.⁴⁰⁶

³⁹⁸ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly's Formal Response to the South African Government's Suggestion that Ingwavuma be Excised and Incorporated into Swaziland, On the occasion of the visit of the Hon the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr PGJ. Koornhof, 14 June 1982.

³⁹⁹ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.5/M1.3.4, Speech by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Luncheon, Portugal, 3 May 1988.

⁴⁰⁰ "'Black Disillusionment'": an assessment by Dr MG Buthelezi, President of Inkatha and Chief Minister of KwaZulu to the International Collectors' Association', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1984.

⁴⁰¹ 'Black South Africans- what they feel', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1985.

⁴⁰² 'Inkatha wants Results from Indaba', *The Star*, 19 May 1988.

⁴⁰³ 'We Dare not Fail...', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1987.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁵ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, 'Strategies for Liberation 20 Years After Sharpeville- and Five Days Before the Independence of Zimbabwe', Inkatha Soweto Prayer Meeting, Jabulani Ampitheatre, 13 April 1980.

⁴⁰⁶ 'Buthelezi "inspired by Western world decency"', *The Citizen*, 15 October 1985.

Moreover, Buthelezi had reason to oppose the homelands system in terms of its implications for the economic development of his constituents. As shown, the Inkatha leader placed a great deal of emphasis on the economic development of South Africa and of the KwaZulu. Indeed, he argued that maximal economic development and the alleviation of hardship was a prerequisite for political and social stability, particularly given the rapid increase in the black population. Buthelezi repeatedly argued that apartheid structures failed to give the black population a sufficient influence over the allocation of national resources.⁴⁰⁷ There needed to be the maximum state redistribution that was compatible with strong economic development.⁴⁰⁸ Buthelezi rejected the distinction between 'white South Africa' constituting 87% of the country and the black ethnic homelands comprising 13% of South Africa.⁴⁰⁹ The Bantustan system, underpinned by this distinction, would never give the black population and its leaders enough influence over national economic policy to satisfy its economic needs. This meant increased social upheaval and increased political radicalism.

Furthermore, Buthelezi seems to have been concerned about the damage which apartheid and neo-apartheid policies had done to Africans' idea of traditional and ethnic identities. The National Party had posed as 'custodians of our cultural identities, which they have attempted to use for hanging up their abominable ideology of apartheid'.⁴¹⁰ Buthelezi spoke of the stupidity of concluding that because the Government had done an evil thing Africans ought not to celebrate the past 'heroes of Africa', Shaka and Moshoeshe. He went on, 'the evil of government abuse of black ethnicity has done a lot of harm to African history and has also done damage to the African psyche'.⁴¹¹

Mzala argued that Inkatha was not working in opposition to apartheid, because he was dependent upon Government support for power, status and influence. As long as Buthelezi was 'funded, directly or indirectly, by Pretoria, his ultimate mode of political conduct must be determined by the rules of the system in which he participates, whether or not he personally prefers apartheid'. Buthelezi was serving 'the system that produced him'.⁴¹² The above analysis shows that this is a fundamental misreading of what Buthelezi perceived to be in his political objectives and interests in the 1980s. Mare and Hamilton's contention that Buthelezi was a 'willing ally' of the Government's 'mission to fight off the "total onslaught"' is in one respect true and in another important respect

⁴⁰⁷ 'Power-sharing key to negotiations, says Buthelezi', *The Citizen*, 18 July 1985.

⁴⁰⁸ 'PW and Dr T should attend convention—Buthelezi', *The Citizen*, 23/9/1985

⁴⁰⁹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Resolution signed by Buthelezi, other homeland leaders, appended to a memorandum from M. Buthelezi for Discussion Between Black Leaders at Unity Talks to be Held in October 1983; 'No Solution can be imposed unilaterally', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1984.

⁴¹⁰ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, King Shaka Celebrations, 28 September 1980.

⁴¹¹ EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi, King Shaka Memorial Celebrations, 24 September 1981.

⁴¹² Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 7-9.

false.⁴¹³ Buthelezi pursued as a foremost priority the thwarting of revolutionary radicalism, a priority shared with the South African Government. To this end, he sought keenly and proactively to establish a partnership with the National party. Yet, contrary to the predictions of Brewer, and Mare and Hamilton, Buthelezi was not willing to become a supporter of Government's constitutional reform and negotiation initiatives. He sought instead to persuade the National Party to change its approach to political change and to become Inkatha's ally on Inkatha's terms. Buthelezi's politics, in this respect, were a form of conservative radicalism in which a certain type of change is desired not only for its own sake, but in order to forestall a more revolutionary form of change. Moreover, this partnership was pursued on the assumption that apartheid was inevitably coming to an end in the medium-long term.

But if Buthelezi was unwilling to become a political collaborator with the Government on the National Party's preferred terms, Inkatha politics throughout the decade were characterised by a very determined and concerted attempt to persuade the National Party to adopt policies which would make it possible for Inkatha to work with the Government. Success in this endeavour was necessary to thwart the revolutionary radicals, and in that sense Buthelezi was dependent upon National Party politics. This was particularly so because no white party to the left of the Government stood a chance of coming to power. The Progressive Federal Party was 'virtually obliterated' in the 1987 election.⁴¹⁴ In this context, Buthelezi's criticisms of National Party policy were not essentially confrontational, but were part of a strategy of encouragement. This is indicated in his speech to the KLA when he declared that 'Botha needs to become an equal partner with Blacks in breaking the logjam' or 'the politics of negotiation will continuously be downgraded'.⁴¹⁵ Also, Buthelezi complained to his Legislative Assembly that whites failed to see that they could not secure their interests alone; 'They need Black partners to do so'.⁴¹⁶

As such, Buthelezi sought to foster a sense of common interest and mutual dependence between the Inkatha, the Government and white South Africans in general. Partly, this consisted in arguing that the approach advocated by Inkatha, to accelerate reform and to commit to the eventual establishment of a broadly majoritarian dispensation tempered by significant minority protections, was the only means of forestalling a revolutionary outcome. Dhlomo told the Government in 1980 that apartheid would be dismantled in an orderly, 'democratic' way, or by revolutionary violence. There was no 'third option'.⁴¹⁷ Buthelezi told a managerial conference at the University of

⁴¹³ Mare and Hamilton, 'The Inkatha Freedom Party', 77.

⁴¹⁴ Dan O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 373.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁶ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁴¹⁷ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73, 1/A1/1 1979-1982, Paper by O. Dhlomo, Pretoria, 17 January 1980.

Witwatersrand that radical change had been made inevitable 'by realities quite beyond political and governmental control'. He declared that it was a myth that PW Botha could manage political change in South Africa, arguing that the most the Government could hope for was to exert an influence on the radical change which was unavoidable. Buthelezi claimed that, depending on whether the Government took the right course of action, there would either be revolutionary radical change or non-revolutionary radical change. If Government failed to play a role as 'co-author' of change, then political change would not only threaten the National Party, but also 'Parliament itself, stability and even the rule law'.⁴¹⁸ Indeed, the type of measures which Inkatha advocated were the only means of reconciling black and white interests and establishing a system with any notable power-sharing features. Buthelezi was quoted in *Clarion Call* in 1989, for example, saying that 'If white South Africans want to succeed in establishing something other than a one-man-one-vote system of government in a unitary state, there will have to be a lot more give and take than the National Party now gives evidence of being prepared for. My guess is that we will end up with one or another form of a federal system of government and my guess is that we will move towards a system in a kind of way which was indicated in the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba's constitutional proposals'.⁴¹⁹ Buthelezi spoke to Botha at a conference in 1980 of the basic 'common purpose' between them despite their disagreements on a number of issues. If this common purpose was overlooked 'then South Africa will not only be much poorer for it, South Africa will burn to ashes and we with it'.⁴²⁰

The Inkatha leader reassured the National Party that the type of reform programme which the party advocated would gain the support of many black people. The Chief Minister said that President Botha in late-1985 that he had stopped 'just one step short of genuine reform', and promised to support the Government advanced further.⁴²¹ He assured an audience at the University of Witwatersrand that most Africans sought change, but wanted to preserve the best that existed in South Africa. Buthelezi declared that if PW Botha got meaningful political transformation underway, 'The vast majority of Blacks will be natural allies to the South African Government'.⁴²² Inkatha officials told Government parliamentarians in 1979 that most Africans would be prepared to accommodate white fears regarding numerical inferiority as long as negotiations towards power-

⁴¹⁸ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Keynote Address by M. Buthelezi, University of Witwatersrand, Department of Business Economics and the Association of Managerial Economists, Conference: 'What Boundaries for Business?', 10 July 1986.

⁴¹⁹ 'Plan Too Vague for Black South Africa', *Clarion Call*, --Aug 1989.

⁴²⁰ ACA, PW Botha PV203, A1/15/1/9, M. Buthelezi Speaking to PW. Botha at a Conference, 15 February 1980.

⁴²¹ 'A short pause for the voice of reason', *The Star*, 8 August 1985.

⁴²² AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Keynote Address by M. Buthelezi, University of Witwatersrand, Department of Business Economics and the Association of Managerial Economists, Conference: 'What Boundaries for Business?', 10 July 1986.

sharing began soon.⁴²³ Similarly, he remarked in 1986 that 'a great many of those who are now attempting to bring about change through violence, or are dabbling in its employment, would cross sides and join those who support us if there was even a little more evidence that South Africa could be normalised through non-violent tactics and strategies. The vast, vast majority of Black people do not yearn for a Communist or Socialist state. They yearn for a normalised South Africa in which they can be truly free. They yearn for a normalised industrial society in which there is equality of opportunity'.⁴²⁴ Furthermore, he told the South African Institute of Management that if Government got a 'really meaningful reform programme off the ground, then you would have anti-revolutionary Blacks dominating Black South Africa'.⁴²⁵ The Inkatha leader also offered the encouragement that the Government could gain credibility in the international community by committing to the abolition of key apartheid laws, such as the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts.⁴²⁶

Buthelezi not only attempted to persuade the National Party that more meaningful changes had to be undertaken, but also that these had to be undertaken in collaboration with Inkatha. He was keen to make the argument that the Government could not create black leaders by legislation. South Africa politics revolved around political forces already in existence.⁴²⁷ It was asserted frequently that a partnership between Inkatha and the National Party represented the only feasible option for the National Party. Dhlomo delivered a paper in Pretoria in 1980 in which he said that Buthelezi was the only black leader who has sufficient integrity, intellect, political common sense and political sensitivity' to become a 'working partner' with the Government in bringing about reform.⁴²⁸

Buthelezi said in 1983 that the only option for whites and 'fellow-travelling coloureds' was forge a partnership with Inkatha. There was 'no single black organisation which offers the same kind of friendship'.⁴²⁹ He told the Administrator of Natal that 'I say to Mr PW Botha ultimately his legitimacy as State President continues to depend upon our legitimacy as Black opponents of apartheid'.⁴³⁰

Buthelezi also declared that 'South Africa does not have the time in which to ask another Black leader to start at the beginning of the long road that I have had to walk to build up this vast

⁴²³ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/12/1 1979-80, Brief sent to L. Wessels by Dr R. Tusenius (AKSA) on the subject of Inkatha, 'Background document for the third informal discussion-group meeting between Inkatha leaders and Government Parliamentarians, to be held at the Burgerspark Hotel, Pretoria, on 17-18 January 1980', 31 December 1979.

⁴²⁴ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

⁴²⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 11 1988, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Absurdity of the South African Log-Jam', South African Institute of Management, 12 October 1988.

⁴²⁶ 'I am a Freedom Fighter', *Sunday Star*, 14 September 1986.

⁴²⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, 'Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)', N/D.

⁴²⁸ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73, 1/A1/1 1979-1982, Paper by O. Dhlomo, Pretoria, 17 January 1980.

⁴²⁹ 'Chief Buthelezi warns Indians', *The Sowetan*, 10 January 1983.

⁴³⁰ EG, Address By M. Buthelezi, Vote of Thanks to the Hon RC. Cadman, Administrator of Natal, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 14 March 1989.

constituency. Whites must deal now with Blacks and it is simply a fact of life that that translated into reality means that Whites must now deal with Inkatha'.⁴³¹ The Inkatha leader told the American Ambassador that the National Party would be able to achieve little without his cooperation, and that 'an essential part of White/Black rapprochement is a Buthelezi/Botha rapprochement'.⁴³² Buthelezi declared that it was either his 'kind of leadership and that of the African National Congress mission in exile'.⁴³³ Moreover, Chief Buthelezi often pleaded with ruling party officials in language which implied a partnership. For instance, he told Dr Koornhof in 1986 that '*We cannot be successful in our negotiations if we do not carry our constituencies with us*' and said that he wanted the State President to '*get us out of the present impasse*' (author's italics).⁴³⁴ Furthermore, Buthelezi appealed by to the ethnic sensibilities of the National Party by talking of the special role which could be played by both the Boers and the Zulus. He commented that 'they do form the two largest groups on either side of the colour line....if a miracle happened and there was rapprochement then I think it would be progress enough to general rapprochement in the country as whole between black and white'.⁴³⁵ He spoke to Piet Koornhof of the 'pivotal role Zulu/Afrikaner relations' had for all South Africans.⁴³⁶

Buthelezi was keen to communicate to the National Party Government that if his conditions were met, he would become a willing and dependable ally. The Inkatha President asked Minister Chris Heunis 'to think of the constancy of my own commitment...to political ideals which you in fact cannot fault'. 'We are not', he assured Heunis, 'fair-weather friends....We will not abandon those who do the right thing with us. White South Africa need not fear sharing with us in a future democracy'.⁴³⁷ Indeed, Buthelezi seems to have wanted to impress upon the National Party that his abstention from formal negotiations was not a sign of a reluctance to enter into a cooperative relationship with the Government, but was rather an expression of the constraints within which he operated. As such, the Inkatha leader was keen for his rebuff of Government invitations not to have an adverse impact on goodwill between the two organisations. In 1986, Buthelezi wrote to Dr

⁴³¹ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Speech by M. Buthelezi, Read on his behalf by ES. C. Sithebe, Symposium: The Unrest in the RSA, 'A Black Man's Perspective of the Unrest Situation', University of Potchefstroom Department of Criminology and the Bureau for Continuing Education, 15 August 1986.

⁴³² EG, A Short Welcome Address by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Visit to Ulundi by HE Mr H. Nichol, American Ambassador to South Africa, Ulundi, 18 May 1982.

⁴³³ 'Me or the ANC', *Press*, 29 September 1985.

⁴³⁴ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Confidential Memorandum used in a private discussion between the honourable PGJ. Koornhof, Chairman of the President's Council and M. Buthelezi, Umdoni Park, 31 March 1986.

⁴³⁵ 'I am a Freedom Fighter', *Sunday Star*, 14 September 1986.

⁴³⁶ EG, M. Buthelezi, The KwaZulu Legislative Assembly's Formal response to the South African Government's Suggestion that Ingwavuma be Excised and Incorporated into Swaziland, On the occasion of the visit of the Hon the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr PGJ. Koornhof, 14 June 1982.

⁴³⁷ EG, By M. Buthelezi, Vote of Thanks to C. Heunis MP, First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 14 March 1989.

Koornhof because he knew the extent to which he was 'troubled by the fact that I have not participated in all these Government structures while I am at the same time committed to the politics of negotiation and reconciliation.' Buthelezi assured Koornhof that he was acting as constructively as possible within a very difficult set of circumstances. He complained that there was 'a multi-million rand campaign of denigration and vilification' against him by the ANC and UDF. Being seen to cooperate with the Government's present policies would 'play into the hands of my detractors' and destroy his domestic and international credibility. Only by retaining the support of his constituency could a negotiation process be successful. Moreover, it was 'in the interests of South Africa that I should have the kind of international credibility that makes it easy for Heads of State in the West, such as President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher, Chancellor Kohl and other statesmen in the West, to invite me to confer with them on the problems of South Africa.' Buthelezi thanked Koornhof for acting as a 'mediator' between himself and Government leaders.⁴³⁸

Furthermore, prior to the unveiling of the National Council in early-1986, Buthelezi wrote regretfully to Chris Heunis to turn down the chance to meet with President Botha. He said that he was 'reluctantly' declining the invitation because if he was seen to be making 'false starts' in discussions with Government it would undermine any ability he had to contribute, as a black South African leader, to a better South Africa. He said that Botha had pointed 'his feet in the direction of real statesmanship', but now needed to take bold steps. Buthelezi was waiting with 'anxiety' to see if this would happen. In concluding the letter, Buthelezi appealed for Heunis to 'understand that I write to you to express genuine concerns and attitudes as a South African who loves his country very dearly'.⁴³⁹

Inkatha reassured the National Party that the South African Government and white people in general had a vital role to play in the reform process along with black people. The Inkatha president often stressed the 'interdependence' of black and white South Africans and spoke of the 'urgent necessity of recognising the South African Government to be an essential partner in change if ever we are to succeed in salvaging the best that there is and eliminating the worst that there is.'⁴⁴⁰

Buthelezi told Piet Koornhof in 1982 that black could not 'achieve a future worth having without the active cooperation of whites'. It was his 'desperate concern' for progress to be made 'in cooperation

⁴³⁸ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Confidential Memorandum used in a private discussion between the honourable PGJ. Koornhof, Chairman of the President's Council and M. Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, Umdoni Park, 31 March 1986.

⁴³⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/29 1986, Letter From M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis, 14 January 1986.

⁴⁴⁰ 'I am a Freedom Fighter', *Sunday Star*, 14 September 1986; AP, Cliff Gosney Collections PC 129/1/2, Keynote Address by M. Buthelezi, University of Witwatersrand, Department of Business Economics and the Association of Managerial Economists, Conference: 'What Boundaries for Business?', 10 July 1986.

with the Government'.⁴⁴¹ He told Chris Heunis that although the Government was wrong in its policies, it was 'childish' to dismiss the regime as illegitimate. Instead, the National Party needed to be 'salvaged from the consequences of its own actions'.⁴⁴² Moreover, despite making some firm demands of the National Party, Inkatha was keen to stress its willingness to give serious considerations to their concerns and to negotiate in a spirit of give-and-take. In discussions with Government parliamentarians, Inkatha officials said that there should be negotiations in which each party sought to better understand the other's 'ambitions and fears'. They were not there to 'trap one another', but to compare ideas in a 'spirit of mutual trust and in a mutual endeavour to find a...peaceful future for our beloved mutual fatherland'. They should be able 'to achieve a fundamental consensus'.⁴⁴³ Furthermore, Buthelezi emphasised to Minister Heunis the significance of the role that he envisaged for the Government, declaring that the ruling party needed to pursue policies which would put it 'in a position where you can campaign in black society against the far right and the far left (and) from whatever faction opposition comes'.⁴⁴⁴

As noted, Buthelezi refused to participate in the Government's proposed negotiating forums or to give his support to the ruling party's reform policies unless a number of strict preconditions were fulfilled. Nevertheless, within those parameters, Inkatha often sought to promote and engage in dialogue with National Party and others about change in South Africa. This consisted of a number of informal negotiations, or 'talks about talks', between KwaZulu and South African Government officials. These included the establishment of an informal Pretoria- KwaZulu 'think-tank' in the late-1970s, several meetings to discuss the recommendations of the Inkatha-initiated KwaZulu-Natal Indaba and in 1989 even a Joint Committee to discuss the 'obstacles to negotiations'.⁴⁴⁵

Inkatha's attempts to forge a partnership with the National Party Government were proactive and pragmatic. Most notable in this respect were its initiation of, and participation in, two regional negotiating initiatives- the Buthelezi Commission 1980-2 and the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba 1986-7. These were attempts to persuade the National Party to assimilate to Inkatha's proposals for change

⁴⁴¹ 'Blacks vital as whites- Buthelezi', *The Argus*, 11 February 1982.

⁴⁴² EG, M. Buthelezi, Vote of Thanks to C. Heunis MP, First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 14 March 1989.

⁴⁴³ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/I2/1 1979-80, 'Background document for the third informal discussion-group meeting between Inkatha leaders and Government Parliamentarians, to be held at the Burgerspark Hotel, Pretoria, on 17-18 January 1980', Brief sent to L. Wessels by Dr R. Tusenius (AKSA) on the subject of Inkatha 31 December 1979.

⁴⁴⁴ 'Buthelezi to Heunis: Seek white mandate for a new SA', *Cape Times*, 15 March 1989.

⁴⁴⁵ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/A1/5 1979, Consultative Meeting Document, 29 October 1979 to 30 October 1979; ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/K2/1 1984-1990, Perspective on Political Negotiations, 23 October 1987; 'Government to talk to Indaba after all', *Business Day*, 28 October 1987; 'Buthelezi, Heunis set up committee', *Business Day* 10 January 1989.

and more broadly to bolster the politics of negotiation in South Africa. They were established to facilitate negotiations between major political, commercial and civic organisations in KwaZulu and Natal with the aim of producing a set of proposals for regional majoritarian political power-sharing on which a broad consensus might be established.⁴⁴⁶

Inkatha saw the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba as means of breaking the impasse in South African politics. It was part of the broader effort to state clearly the type of power-sharing which would be acceptable to Inkatha and to demonstrate its eagerness to form a constructive partnership with the Government. Similarly, the Indaba was intended by Inkatha to highlight the extent to which different political parties and interest groups could be united around Inkatha's concept of power-sharing and to persuade the Government that white minority interests would be best protected by the type of reform which Inkatha advocated. In the early-1980s, Buthelezi argued that Inkatha strategy could simply be to oppose current Government policies, but had to consist of constructive and positive attempts to create a more favourable political climate. He said the Commission was a 'clear statement' that he was prepared to negotiate. It was a 'black initiative' which reduced the 'dependency on whites for the proposals about constitutional reform'. Its intention was to help break the 'political logjam'.⁴⁴⁷ Black ought not simply to resist the present order, but to 'rise above it' and change the perceptions of whites about their security in a post-apartheid South Africa.⁴⁴⁸ They had to help avoid increased conflict in South Africa by suggesting 'alternative models for the peaceful coexistence of our people'.⁴⁴⁹ Whites needed to be 'given a formula' which enabled them to abandon exclusive control of parliament.⁴⁵⁰

Indeed, Buthelezi asked Chris Heunis to accept the Indaba proposals on the basis that they were the only plans capable of uniting a broad range of interest groups, including his own supporters. 'Where else' he asked 'is there something so saleable to so many?'⁴⁵¹ He appealed to Heunis to support the

⁴⁴⁶ 'The Buthelezi Commission and the Future', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1985; 'The process of establishing a government in KwaZulu Natal', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1985; 'Government urged to reconsider: Statement of Intent vital, says Chief Buthelezi', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1985; 'Inkatha's strategy for Peaceful Change- Excerpts of Buthelezi Speech to Visiting Delegation of US Congressmen', *Sowetan*, 11 August 1981; , Professor L. Schlemmer, 'Constitutional Perspectives', *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 10 1987, Press Statement by Minister C. Heunis, 27 November 1987; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Letter from M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis , 17 August 1987; JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.1 PFP-Inkatha Relationship 1978-1994, A Few remarks by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP, leader of the Progressive Federal Party and Professor NIC. Olivier MP, 3 Feb 1988.

⁴⁴⁷ 'Buthelezi inquiry report will ready in October', *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 August 1981

⁴⁴⁸ 'Black rights, White Safety: That's the Buthelezi Blueprint', *Sunday Times*, 4 October 1981.

⁴⁴⁹ AP, Colin Webb Collection, PC 144/10/6/2, Speech by M. Buthelezi, At the Function to Launch The Buthelezi Commission into the Future of Natal and KwaZulu, 29 October 1980.

⁴⁵⁰ 'Follow the devolution road, urges Buthelezi', *The Star*, 10 May 1984.

⁴⁵¹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Letter from M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis , 17 August 1987.

Indaba proposals, because they were the product of a process of negotiation and a Government endorsement was needed of the way in which negotiation was being undertaken in the region.⁴⁵² Buthelezi spoke of the Buthelezi Commission proposals as not reaching out for a 'utopian solution' or seeking to impose 'an impossible and alienating ideology on Whites'. They were 'a prudent and thoughtful invitation to whites to struggle with us for a better country'.⁴⁵³

Perhaps most significantly, Inkatha intended the Buthelezi Commission and the Indaba to stimulate meaningful moves towards majoritarian power-sharing at a regional level which was seen to be a more likely prospect in the immediate term than significant progress on the national level. This was desirable in itself and would, in turn, increase the chances of a political breakthrough on the national level. The Inkatha leader spoke in 1980 of the 'enormous constraints' on change created by 'centuries of apartheid'. Therefore, it was a good idea to 'overcome these constraints in different places at different times, by seeking to find regional options'. This was to 'fragment' the impediments, rather than the country. A political logjam could be best tackled by moving one log at a time.⁴⁵⁴ In 1985, Buthelezi said that before negotiations became possible on a national level, progress could be made by accepting the regional proposals of the Buthelezi Commission.⁴⁵⁵ Regional reforms were seen by Buthelezi as having the potential to be a 'precursor to change in other parts of the country'.⁴⁵⁶ Buthelezi described the Indaba as 'part and parcel of a negotiating process from the bottom upwards' and said that it was a 'vital venture into political pragmatism'.⁴⁵⁷ Also, Oscar Dhlomo commented in 1989 that 'the Indaba started as a regional initiative designed to help unblock the South African political log-jam' and spoke of the Indaba's 'ever-increasing catalytic role at both regional and national levels'.⁴⁵⁸ The Inkatha leader considered it more likely, initially, that the National Party could be persuaded to establish such majoritarian structures at regional level which would allow the ruling party, for the time being, to retain power at the national level. Indeed, in 1987 Buthelezi reassured Chris Heunis that 'The KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals fully recognises the sovereignty of the South African parliament and the proposals themselves are formulated as a local option within that sovereignty. The State President loses none of his final authority under

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*

⁴⁵³ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC 144/10/6/2, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black Political and Economic Destitution and the Liberation Struggle', Eighth Annual General Conference, 3 July 1982.

⁴⁵⁴ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC 144/10/6/2, Speech by M. Buthelezi, At the Function to Launch The Buthelezi Commission into the Future of Natal and KwaZulu, 29 October 1980.

⁴⁵⁵ 'Buthelezi and Mandela....the two most powerful men', *The Graphic*, 19 April 1985.

⁴⁵⁶ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 25th Anniversary United States- South Africa Leadership Exchange Programme, Durban, 4 November 1983.

⁴⁵⁷ EG, Some Remarks by M. Buthelezi Prior to a Dinner with Mr WAM. Clewlow, Chief Executive of Barlow Rand Limited, and Dr K. von Schirnding, Director of the South Africa Foundation and MR. Noyce, Ulundi, 1 October 1987.

⁴⁵⁸ 'The Indaba and the Directors' Report, *The Daily News*, 5 October 1989.

them. They require his approval. The White electorate of South Africa would trust his acceptance of them'. He even pointed out to Heunis that the Indaba proposals fitted in with the Government's espoused commitment to localism and to devolved powers.⁴⁵⁹ Moreover, Buthelezi believed that such an initiative was more viable and more saleable in the KwaZulu-Natal region than in any other part of South Africa. Buthelezi told American Congressmen that the changes proposed by the Buthelezi Commission would become attractive to the National Party because they would not directly affect the more verkrampste white population of the Transvaal.⁴⁶⁰ He described the Buthelezi Commission as a means of breaking the 'logjam' in South African politics.⁴⁶¹

Buthelezi intended that regional power-sharing would satisfy, in part, the political aspirations of black people in the region and would allow a regional Inkatha government to better ameliorate the material deprivation of its constituents. This, in turn, would thwart the growth of revolutionary radicalism by restoring and enhancing Inkatha's legitimacy within its traditional support base and by demonstrating the efficacy of the party's non-violent efforts of bringing about political change.⁴⁶² It can also be said that Inkatha was seeking to use its regional proposals to bolster its own position in politics. Speaking about the Buthelezi Commission, the Inkatha leader said that their policy was to 'become institutionalised ourselves so that we gain experience of power and that we become linked into the major structures in our society'.⁴⁶³ And in 1984, he spoke of Inkatha seeking to become 'part of the fabric of change'.⁴⁶⁴

Throughout the 1980s, Inkatha exhibited a deep and resilient commitment to seeking a partnership with the National Party. There is no sign that Inkatha ever seriously reconsidered its strong commitment to negotiated political change and a non-violent struggle against apartheid. This was despite very great frustration in seeking to persuade the National Party to undertake the policy changes which Inkatha desired and thought necessary to attenuate the threat of revolutionary radicalism. Inkatha was unable to persuade the Botha Government not to implement the tricameral political system which it so opposed. Although the National Party abandoned Grand Apartheid in

⁴⁵⁹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Letter from M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis, 17 August 1987.

⁴⁶⁰ 'Inkatha's Strategy for Peaceful Change, Excerpts of Buthelezi Speech to Visiting Delegation of US Congressmen', *Sowetan*, 11 August 1981.

⁴⁶¹ 'Buthelezi Inquiry Report will Ready in October', *Rand Daily Mail*, 20 August 1981.

⁴⁶² AP, Colin Webb PC 144/10/6/2, Speech by M. Buthelezi, At the Function to Launch The Buthelezi Commission into the Future of Natal and KwaZulu, 29 October 1980; AP, Colin Webb PC 144/10/6/2, Speech by M. Buthelezi, At the Function to Launch The Buthelezi Commission into the Future of Natal and KwaZulu, 29 October 1980.

⁴⁶³ 'Inkatha's strategy for peaceful change, Excerpts of Buthelezi Speech to visiting delegation of US Congressmen', *Sowetan*, 11 August 1981.

⁴⁶⁴ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Crucial Role of Women in Our Efforts to Retain Our Humanity as we Face the Demanding Challenges of the Struggle for Liberation', Annual General Conference of the Women's Brigade, 20 October 1984.

1985, PW Botha insisted that there could be no majoritarian form of power-sharing in South Africa and that a future dispensation would be founded on a distinction between 'own' and 'joint' affairs and that there could be no elections with a common voters' roll. The Government did not issue a Statement of Intent as Buthelezi persistently requested. And although it established a Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal at Inkatha's request, the National Party never implemented, or suggested that it would accept, the proposals of the Buthelezi Commission or the Indaba.

Indeed, it is clear that Buthelezi was frustrated at many stages of the 1980s with the National Party's failure to respond to his appeals. He recognised that any success in persuading the Government to change its course in the desired direction would come as the result of a long and arduous process. Buthelezi was prepared to endure such a difficult and protracted ordeal. He argued in 1982 that in rejecting the Buthelezi Commission proposals, whites had 'passed yet another crossroad without turning in the direction of political sanity and common decency'.⁴⁶⁵ He told lawyers in Pretoria that the Government's proposed tricameral constitution had done a great deal of damage to his attempts to forge a consensus amongst different groups in South Africa and that only the future would tell whether the constitution would destroy the country's chances of avoiding a catastrophe. Such an eventuality would occur 'unless a miracle happens and we have a real change of heart on the part of whites'.⁴⁶⁶ Despite frustration with the rejection of the Buthelezi Commission, the Inkatha leader remarked to the party's annual conference in 1982 that the initiative 'was not mounted with any real hope that Whites would see political sense. I work on the assumption that white privilege blinds most whites from seeing any political sense'. It was merely part of the search for the next move towards liberation.⁴⁶⁷ In 1982, Buthelezi said that the Government's insistence on separate development had made it 'clearer than ever how difficult the road ahead will be for South Africa'.⁴⁶⁸ He echoed these thoughts to a German audience, saying that 'the road ahead is so long and so hard'.⁴⁶⁹ Buthelezi expressed doubt in 1984 that Government was prepared seriously consider any black initiative as part of the resolution to South Africa's problems.⁴⁷⁰ Relations between himself and

⁴⁶⁵ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC 144/10/6/2, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black Political and Economic Destitution and the Liberation Struggle', Eighth Annual General Conference, 3 July 1982.

⁴⁶⁶ EG, Black frustrations of being Voteless'', Address by M. Buthelezi, Association of Pretoria Attorneys, Friday 13 May 1983

⁴⁶⁷ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC 144/10/6/2, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black Political and Economic Destitution and the Liberation Struggle', Eighth Annual General Conference, 3 July 1982.

⁴⁶⁸ 'Buthelezi, Minister praat "direk"', *Die Burger*, 12 February 1982.

⁴⁶⁹ 'German Government Told There's No Change in SA', *Clarion Call*, October/November 1984.

⁴⁷⁰ 'No Solution can be imposed unilaterally', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, No. 9, April 1984.

Botha had 'completely broken down since 1980'. Botha treated black leaders like 'small boys' and had treated his suggestion that there be a joint declaration of intent with 'contempt'.⁴⁷¹

This continued into second half of the 1980s. Buthelezi criticised Botha for seeking negotiations in which he was 'able to hire and fire Black leaders with whom he negotiates'.⁴⁷² .⁴⁷³ Moreover, handwritten notes by Leon Wessels regarding a private meeting between Inkatha, the Government and others, show that Oscar Dhlomo criticised the ruling party for pursuing the 'politics of prescription' and for mistaking 'consultation for negotiation'.⁴⁷⁴ The Inkatha president said that State President wanted him to be 'obligingly docile and obedient' whilst he 'made political blunder after political blunder'.⁴⁷⁵ In a meeting with professor Olivier and Colin Eglin of the Progressive Federal Party, Buthelezi complained that the Government rejection of the Indaba had 'set the political clocks back quite considerably' and that 'I see only a very hard rough road ahead and I am beginning to believe that we have not yet entered the darkest hour before a new dawn'.⁴⁷⁶ Moreover, in Memoranda aimed American and German audiences, the Inkatha leader declared he was pessimistic about the immediate future. He told US official Chester Crocker that 'It is becoming increasingly difficult to predict when the right circumstances will eventually emerge. My fear is that these circumstances may now well be receding further into the future, rather than drawing closer'.⁴⁷⁷

In fact, throughout the 1980s, Buthelezi often suggested that the problems he faced were intractable, at least as long as PW Botha sat at the head of the National Party. Whilst campaigning against the tricameral constitution, he conceded that the 'adoption of the constitution of parliament is a foregone conclusion'.⁴⁷⁸ Buthelezi lamented in November 1983 the 75% 'yes' vote for the new constitution by white voters in Natal. This dashed hopes of a partnership between KwaZulu and Natal and presented 'insurmountable constitutional hurdles' for the Buthelezi Commission. Whites

⁴⁷¹ EG, M. Buthelezi, Vote of Thanks at the Opening of Sixth Session of Third KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 2 March 1983.

⁴⁷² RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁴ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/K2/1 1984-1990, Perspective on Political Negotiations, 23 October 1987.

⁴⁷⁵ 'Editorial', *Clarion Call*, --Jan 1989.

⁴⁷⁶ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.1 PFP-Inkatha Relationship 1978-1994, A Few Remarks by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP, leader of the Progressive Federal Party and Professor NIC. Olivier MP, 3 Feb 1988.

⁴⁷⁷ RH, Citation of Memorandum from M. Buthelezi to Chester Crocker, July 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987; German talks', *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986.

⁴⁷⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2, 'Vol. 55---Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)', N/D.

had endorsed Botha's classical apartheid plans.⁴⁷⁹ Despite initial optimism concerning PW Botha's leadership, Buthelezi stated as early as 1982 that there was no hope for the necessary changes to be brought about by the National Party leader. He wrote to Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert that 'the PW Botha leadership has proved to be ineffective. Black South Africa must now look elsewhere for hope'.⁴⁸⁰ In a 1984 speech, Buthelezi echoed these thoughts, saying that the 'the dye is cast for the present Prime Minister's term in office. I realise that it is impossible for him to recover from his underachievement and to put the country's politics on the path of real reform'. It would be 'left to his successor to charter another course'.⁴⁸¹ These expressions of pessimism continued into the second half of the 1980s. Buthelezi expressed his hope in early 1989 that 'when the time came for Mr PW Botha to retire, Afrikanerdom would produce leaders who would carry Afrikanerdom across new horizons of dynamic politics'.⁴⁸² Indeed, he expressed the same sentiments to the Inkatha Youth Brigade in 1986.⁴⁸³

Buthelezi recognised that if success was possible, it would be as the result of a gradual process of persuasion. It was recognised that the requisite degree of consensus between Inkatha and the National Party was not going to be achieved immediately. In 1980, Oscar Dhlomo told the Government that 'our commitment at this stage is keep talking and avoid shooting'.⁴⁸⁴ The Buthelezi Commission was not expected to produce results straight away, but was supposed to furnish an alternative model to apartheid when the Government eventually decided to abandon apartheid.⁴⁸⁵ In recognising the inevitability of the implementation of the tricameral constitution, Buthelezi wrote that he only hoped that 'white South Africa will come to its political sense in time'.⁴⁸⁶ Moreover, Oscar Dhlomo commented to the British Government's Foreign Affairs Committee in 1986 that his leader was 'aware it will not be easy for people who have been in power since 1948 to abandon it all that easily. It will take time'.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁷⁹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 25th Anniversary United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Programme, Durban, 4 November 1983.

⁴⁸⁰ 'Consequences of a Confederation will be Terrible- Buthelezi', *Deurbraak*, 30 April 1982.

⁴⁸¹ "'Black Disillusionment': an assessment by Dr MG Buthelezi, President of Inkatha and Chief Minister of KwaZulu to the International Collectors' Association', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1984.

⁴⁸² 'Time for a New Mandate', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1989.

⁴⁸³ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Tackling the Problems of Peaceful Change within the Challenges of Violence, White Intransigence and Escalating Poverty and Sanctions', Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, 30 August 1986.

⁴⁸⁴ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73, 1/A1/1 1979-1982, Paper by O. Dhlomo, Pretoria, 17 January 1980.

⁴⁸⁵ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black frustrations of being Voteless', Association of Pretoria Attorneys, Friday 13 May 1983; Inkatha's strategy for peaceful change, 'Excerpts of Buthelezi Speech to Visiting delegation of US Congressmen', *Sowetan*, 11 August 1981.

⁴⁸⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, 'Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)', N/D.

⁴⁸⁷ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/B2/3, Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 July 1986.

This process would have to be gradual in the sense of being incremental as well as being protracted. Oscar Dhlomo told the Government in 1980 that Inkatha were not adopting an 'all or nothing approach' and would support all meaningful reform taken.⁴⁸⁸ Buthelezi told Botha in the same year that he was only asking for a 'national dialogue' at that stage, because he recognised that the Prime Minister had difficulty accepting a national convention.⁴⁸⁹ He also described the Buthelezi Commission as being part of a search for the 'next firm stepping stone in our march towards liberation'.⁴⁹⁰ The notion of incremental change is particularly apparent in Inkatha's approach in the second half of the 1980s. It was envisaged that there would be a series of incremental steps forward, each leading to the next. In a 1986 speech in France, Buthelezi spoke of the need for driving the 'South African Government step by step towards the negotiating table'.⁴⁹¹ Also, speaking to the Inkatha Youth Brigade in 1988, he declared that 'we in Inkatha are intensely aware of the fact that there can be no leap into Utopia for black South Africa...We are also aware that the struggle will not be won in a single phase of activity. The struggle will be an ongoing process in which first things will have to come first and first conquests will have to come before second conquests.' This incremental struggle was to be based on the assumption that it was 'quite imperative that the hearts of those who wield power get softer in good enough time for peaceful change to which we are committed to have a chance'.⁴⁹² Indeed, it was Inkatha's expressed assumption that the 'fear and mistrust' which existed in South Africa was one of the impediments to reform, but that it was only by making progress that such fear and mistrust could be dissipated. He told an audience in Portugal, for instance, that I am not one of those who believe that you first have to deal with fear before you can take the right step. You can only I think deal with fear by taking the right step. When you do take the right step, fear starts diminishing and ceases to be prohibitively antagonistic to what should be done'.⁴⁹³

In this respect, the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba was a key element of Inkatha's endeavour to build goodwill and to incrementally persuade the government to undertake its desired reforms. As described above, the Indaba was partly a means of bringing about meaningful reform on a regional level given that such reforms were not yet saleable to the government on a national level and that Inkatha was not yet prepared to negotiate with the ruling party on the national level. Regional

⁴⁸⁸ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73, 1/A1/1 1979-1982, Paper by O. Dhlomo, Pretoria, 17 January 1980.

⁴⁸⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, A1/15/1/9, Buthelezi to Botha at a Conference, 15 February 1980.

⁴⁹⁰ AP, Colin Webb Collection PC 144/10/6/2, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Black Political and Economic Destitution and the Liberation Struggle', Eighth Annual General Conference, 3 July 1982.

⁴⁹¹ 'What will Replace Apartheid?', *Clarion Call*, Vol 1, 1986.

⁴⁹² EG, Address by M. Buthelezi to Honour N. Mandela, Inkatha Youth Brigade, Prayer Meeting...and Youth Rally, Umlazi, 11 June 1988.

⁴⁹³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 11 1988, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Absurdity of the South African Log-Jam', South African Institute of Management, 12 October 1988.

reform was desirable for its own sake, but was also seen as a catalyst of change in other regions and on the national level. Buthelezi was quoted in 1987 in *Clarion Call* saying that although ultimately negotiations would have to occur from the 'top down', in the meantime negotiations would be mounted from the 'bottom up'.⁴⁹⁴ Also, he told the Foreign Affairs Committee in the UK that regional experimentation in KwaZulu and Natal could play a part in reducing the alienation which existed between those in power and those who lacked power. A successful experiment in the region could 'then become a pilot for the rest of South Africa'.⁴⁹⁵ Buthelezi told Chris Heunis in late-1987 that the Indaba proposals provide the 'impetus' for greater momentum and realism in the negotiations process. There was a 'need for ongoing negotiations in our dynamic South African situation. Each step must lead to another step. I urge you, Mr. Minister, and the South Africa Government to put the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba proposals on an agenda for negotiation with all parties concerned'.⁴⁹⁶

In fact, the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba proposals were part of a broader effort to bring about incremental change in South Africa. Also noteworthy in this respect was Inkatha's advocacy of a Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal. Of all Inkatha's recommendations to Government, this received perhaps the positive response, being approved by the National Party in 1986 and publicly initiated by both Buthelezi and PW Botha in late-1987.⁴⁹⁷ This entailed the establishment of a joint authority for 'administrative and executive co-operation' between KwaZulu and Natal.⁴⁹⁸ In itself the JEA fell far short of the reform which Buthelezi regarded as essential. Yet, Buthelezi welcomed the implementation of the Joint Executive Authority with great enthusiasm, chiefly because it was a step away from the previous policy which aimed at the fragmentation of South Africa and a step in the direction of the implementation of the Indaba proposals. To illustrate, Buthelezi told the Inkatha Youth Brigade that it was 'encouraging that a bill being passed for a Joint Executive Authority between KwaZulu and Natal. This is a very small step. It is, however, a very important small step. It is historic because for the first time people of all races are going to administer the affairs of KwaZulu-

⁴⁹⁴ 'What does he want to talk about?', *Clarion Call*, Vol 2, 1987.

⁴⁹⁵ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/Ba/1 1985-86, M. Buthelezi, Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1985-86, 20 January 1986.

⁴⁹⁶ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Letter from M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis, 17 August 1987.

⁴⁹⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, Speech by Minister C. Heunis, House of Representatives, 14 May 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Document Issued by the Ministry of Constitutional Development and Planning, 'Natal/KwaZulu Indaba', Pretoria, 28 October 1987.

⁴⁹⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, Speech by Minister C. Heunis, House of Representatives, 14 May 1986.

Natal jointly. This is a big step away from Fragmentation and apartheid'.⁴⁹⁹ For him, the Joint Executive Authority would help create a climate in the region which would be more conducive to further changes. In 1987, the KwaZulu Chief Minister stated that 'I am convinced that the speedy establishment of the Joint Executive Authority will further assist in creating the necessary climate for co-operation and bringing about greater realism among all parties that have to deal with the future of interdependent KwaZulu and Natal'.⁵⁰⁰ In fact, Oscar Dhlomo stated publicly that the Joint Executive Authority was merely an intermediary step towards the complete implementation of the Indaba proposals.⁵⁰¹ Buthelezi asked 'what earthly use' the Joint Executive Authority would be if it did not lead to further reforms.⁵⁰² Indeed, Buthelezi told the Inkatha Women's Brigade that the Joint Executive Authority 'was but another milestone on the road to democracy'.⁵⁰³ A further stepping stone towards the acceptance of the Indaba proposals was to establish a Joint Legislative Authority for the region. This was said by Buthelezi to the Women's Brigade to be the next stage of their progress towards democracy. And he assured them that the Government was preparing to negotiate with Inkatha about just such a development.⁵⁰⁴ Buthelezi also portrayed the implementation of the Joint Executive Authority as the culmination of a longer-term process of incremental persuasion which had its roots in the Buthelezi Commission. He told the Women's brigade that it had been Inkatha's perseverance in negotiating the Buthelezi Commission proposals and in negotiating with the Provincial Government which had cultivated the necessary consensus to establish the Executive Authority.⁵⁰⁵ As such, the KwaZulu- Natal proposals which were a stepping stone towards further reforms were themselves to be achieved by way an incremental process of reform and consensus building. As Buthelezi told the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1986, 'We should move towards the recommendations of the Commission, but we must do it in phases'⁵⁰⁶.

In light of this strategy, it is easier to understand why, despite being deeply dissatisfied with the overall rate of political change in South Africa, Buthelezi welcomed and praised every incremental step towards the abolition of apartheid. He spoke of Botha's 1986 comment that apartheid was

⁴⁹⁹ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129/1/2, Address by M. Buthelezi, Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, 'Tackling the problems of peaceful change within the challenges of violence, white intransigence and escalating poverty and sanctions', Ulundi, 30 August 1986.

⁵⁰⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Document Issued by the Ministry of Constitutional Development and Planning, 'Natal/KwaZulu Indaba', Pretoria, 28 October 1987.

⁵⁰¹ 'Indaba May Break Logjam', *Sunday Times*, 01 November 1987.

⁵⁰² 'KwaZulu may withdraw from Indaba, JEA', *The Star*, 07 December 1987.

⁵⁰³ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Conserving the strength and the lives of those involved in the black struggle for liberation', Annual General Conference of the Women's Brigade, 10 October 1987.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁶ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/Ba/1. 1985-86, M. Buthelezi, Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1985-86, 20 January 1986.

outdated as an 'historic' pronouncement, even though he was aware that the State President planned to replace classical apartheid with something quite different to what he demanded. Also, he welcomed the abolition of the Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act and the Pass Laws as progress, despite the fact that he believed this didn't address the fundamental issue of establishing democracy and ending apartheid.⁵⁰⁷ Moreover, despite refusing to participate in the Government's proposed National Council, Buthelezi applauded the proposed aim of the Council to: 'provide for participation in the planning and preparation of a constitutional dispensation which provides for the participation of all South African citizens in the process of government...' For the Inkatha leader, those were 'the words that South Africa and the whole world have been waiting for. There will be a very massive Black South African input if the National Council actually ends up addressing this'.⁵⁰⁸ Moreover, he celebrated the National Council's aim to further build sound relations, to provide a voice for black people during the interim period before the new dispensation and to plan for further changes.⁵⁰⁹ Furthermore, in response to Chris Heunis's pronouncement in 1989 that the Government had no objection in principle to a Joint Legislative Authority for KwaZulu and Natal, Buthelezi expressed satisfaction with this announcement and urged that 'whatever those in power do something right they must be encouraged'.⁵¹⁰ This praise for incremental progress in National Party policy might also be seen as motivated by the desire to shore up the Government's international and domestic legitimacy and therefore the correctness of Inkatha's reformist strategy. White South Africa was not 'beyond redemption', Buthelezi insisted to KwaZulu's legislative body.⁵¹¹ He also told a group of foreign politicians in 1986 that the Commonwealth's demand for the National Party to release Mandela within a six month period was 'unrealistic'.⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁷ 'I am a Freedom Fighter', *Sunday Star*, 14 September 1986; ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Address by M. Buthelezi to JU. Greeff, Speaker of the House of Assembly, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 19 March 1986.

⁵⁰⁸ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129/1/1, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Violent Threat to Democracy in South Africa', The Christian Democratic Party, 17th National Congress, Italy, 28 May 1986.

⁵⁰⁹ RH, Citation of Memorandum by M. Buthelezi for Chester Crocker, July 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁵¹⁰ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129/1/2, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Tackling the problems of peaceful change within the challenges of violence, white intransigence and escalating poverty and sanctions', Annual General Conference of the Youth Brigade, Ulundi 30 August 1986.

⁵¹¹ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

⁵¹² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Address by M. Buthelezi to JU. Greeff, Speaker of the House of Assembly, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 19 March 1986.

Chapter Three: Inkatha Walking a Tightrope.

The above analysis leaves open certain important questions regarding Inkatha's approach to, and vision of, political change in South Africa. It has not yet been examined how Inkatha's desired partnership with the National Party was intended to fit within a broader process of change. It needs to be asked what role Inkatha envisaged for other organisations, particularly those radical black organisations whose politics Buthelezi so opposed, but whose stature had become so great. How did Inkatha see its relationship with the ANC in a potential reform process in which both were involved? Given the acute power contestation in which both organisations seemed to be involved, how was Inkatha's political approach informed by its perceptions of the challenges of operating in what Buthelezi described as the 'centre-field' South African politics?

Academics such as Venter and Welsh argued in the first half of the 1980s that Inkatha was seeking to play a 'broker's role' or a mediating role in political change, in which it was attempting to form meaningful relationships with both the ANC and the National Party and to position itself so as to be able to broker a deal between the two and thereby exert an influence over the process of change.⁵¹³ However, by the mid-1980s, historians such as Brewer argued that Buthelezi's estrangement from more radical forces had made it unlikely that he could mediate between the Government and the ANC.⁵¹⁴ For Brewer, this made Buthelezi more likely to collaborate and compromise with the Government to the exclusion of the ANC. Moreover, Shula Marks argued that the increasing radicalisation of black politics, spearheaded by the ANC and its allies, had narrowed Buthelezi's political options to the extent that he was walking a political tightrope.⁵¹⁵

However, these conclusions are expressed in very broad terms and are asserted rather than demonstrated. Marks, for instance, does not show how Inkatha perceived its circumstances, and does not illustrate in detail how Buthelezi's attempts to walk a political tightrope manifested itself in his political approach. Indeed, these accounts were all written before the end of the 1980s. This chapter will draw upon original primary source research to give a more detailed and reliable account of Inkatha's approach to the involvement of the ANC in political change, and how it sought to achieve its political objectives. In doing so, it will build upon previous chapters to demonstrate more clearly than before the extent to which Buthelezi perceived his political ambitions to be challenged by the prevailing conditions of power contestation, and how this perception shaped, and was reflected in, Inkatha's politics.

⁵¹³ 'Inkatha: paradox of apartheid?', *The Star*, 14 October 1981; Brewer, *After Soweto*, 372.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁵ Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence*, 124.

A major ambiguity in Buthelezi's politics was that despite his strident opposition to the ANC and his claim that they were the enemies of black democracy, he nevertheless demanded the release of black political prisoners and the unbanning of the ANC before he would participate in negotiations with the National Party. In the light of what has been highlighted above, it must be considered that one of the key reasons for this paradoxical stance was that Buthelezi perceived his legitimacy and the legitimacy of any non-revolutionary, peaceful, negotiated settlement were dependent on these conditions being fulfilled. Indeed, this might explain Buthelezi's calls for Black Unity and a multi-strategy approach. Adam and Moodley argue that the status of the ANC and Nelson Mandela was such that 'President Botha remains as much a prisoner of Nelson Mandela as vice versa'. For them, Buthelezi's insistence that Nelson Mandela be released was due to the risk that otherwise he would be dismissed as a 'collaborator'.⁵¹⁶

In fact, Buthelezi often expressed the view that no negotiation process would be viable or sustainable if black political organisations such as the ANC remained unable to participate and leaders such as Nelson Mandela remained in prison. Furthermore, the continued restriction of black democracy would contribute to the further radicalisation of South African politics. The Inkatha leader argued to an American official that the ANC benefited from the sympathy generated by its banning and the imprisonment of Nelson Mandela.⁵¹⁷ Similarly, Buthelezi argued at the University of Potchefstroom that as long as black democracy was shackled, leaders such as himself would 'suffer terrible disadvantages'. Buthelezi asked the audience to consider how the National Party would cope with the challenge from right-wing politics if Andries Treurnicht and Eugene Terreblanche were put in prison. How then, he asked, 'do you expect Black leaders to cope if Dr Nelson Mandela.....and others are in jail?'⁵¹⁸ The necessity of ANC participation in a negotiated solution was emphasised by Buthelezi on a number of occasions. Buthelezi explained that this was because 'even if we negotiate the best possible solution as Blacks and Whites sat around a table, the best that is possible will be useless unless Black leaders are free to sell the best to the most'.⁵¹⁹ Similarly, the Inkatha leader said that black leaders must be freed because 'The strength of the masses must be mobilised in support of whatever the Government is trying to do'.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁶ Moodley and Adam, 'South Africa: Revolution, Repression, Reform', 847.

⁵¹⁷ 'ANC basks in "the illusion of its popularity"', *The Citizen*, 3 February 1986.

⁵¹⁸ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Speech by M. Buthelezi, Read on his behalf by ES. C. Sithebe, 'A Black Man's Perspective of the Unrest Situation', University of Potchefstroom Department of Criminology and the Bureau for Continuing Education, Symposium: The Unrest in the RSA, 15 August 1986.

⁵¹⁹ 'Mandela is more dangerous in jail', *The Citizen*, 20 June 1987.

⁵²⁰ 'Buthelezi's Mandela plea', *The Daily News*, 9 October 1986.

Despite this perception that the release of jailed leaders and the unbanning of the ANC was a necessary part of a sustainable negotiated settlement, Buthelezi's demand for these things was more qualified than appears at first glance. In speaking about the ANC, Buthelezi distinguished between elements within the organisation. It is noted by historical accounts that although Buthelezi vehemently criticised the ANC Mission in Exile, he was more positively disposed towards Nelson Mandela and that this more positive disposition was reflected in Buthelezi's approach to political change. Mare and Hamilton argue that 'Buthelezi's continued allegiance to the political symbolism of Nelson Mandela' had 'left the door open for an alliance with elements of the ANC'.⁵²¹ Moreover, Jeffery acknowledges that Buthelezi expressed hope of a constructive relationship with the 'real ANC' which he thought was represented by Mandela. She also notes that he said that the release of Mandela would help improve relations between the ANC, UDF and Inkatha.⁵²² Indeed, Buthelezi very often drew a sharp distinction between Mandela and the ANC Mission in Exile. In his testimony to the British Foreign Affairs Committee, the Inkatha President declared that he had '...the deepest respect for Mr Nelson Mandela and I regard him as a brother in the struggle for liberation.' Buthelezi stated that 'his politics have always been realistic and he has never despised ordinary people'. Unlike the Mission in Exile, Mandela had never considered him 'political dirt'.⁵²³ Furthermore, the Inkatha leader often welcomed the fact that Mandela had endorsed Inkatha as a liberation force when many in the ANC had sought to marginalise them. Buthelezi pointed out that Mandela had told both the PFP politician Helen Suzman and Nigerian statesman General Obasanjo that Inkatha had a part to play.⁵²⁴

A crucial detail which is overlooked in the current historiography is that this distinction was also reflected in the political demands Buthelezi made. Buthelezi demanded both the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC before he would participate in formal negotiations, but on a number of occasions he advocated the prioritisation of the release of Nelson Mandela. In a memorandum to United States official Chester Crocker, for example, Buthelezi stated that 'I believe that it is in South Africa's interest that the unbanning of the ANC be separated from the question of the release of Dr Mandela. 'He must be released first'. Buthelezi added when it comes to the unbanning of the ANC as a precondition for my entry into the politics of negotiation, I say very

⁵²¹ Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 149.

⁵²² Jeffery, *Natal Story*, 180; 151.

⁵²³ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, Testimony of M. Buthelezi, Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1985-86, 20 January 1986.

⁵²⁴ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, '1989-A Year of Action for Peace; A Year of Organisation for Peace; A Year of Preparation for the Future', Annual General Conference, Ulundi 8 July 1989.

clearly that I reserve my position.⁵²⁵ Similarly, in a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, he criticised the US demand both for the immediate unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela before it would lift sanctions on South Africa. He argued that ‘...the release of Nelson Mandela should be elevated beyond this kind of package-deal demand...’. After Mandela’s release, the unbanning of the ANC ‘will be attended to’.⁵²⁶ Furthermore, speaking to an audience in Portugal, Buthelezi said that the best way to proceed was to ‘let the ANC’s leadership have someone inside South Africa who is free to participate in negotiations. Let us phase in these negotiations by releasing Dr Mandela and watching what he does’.⁵²⁷ Despite later calls for the unconditional release of Mandela, Buthelezi welcomed the Government’s conditional offer in early-1985 to release Mandela if he renounced armed struggle.⁵²⁸ Buthelezi said Mandela’s decision not to accept release on such terms was ‘sad’, because his ‘undoubted talents and experience’ ought to be made available.⁵²⁹

When they were confronted on this issue, Inkatha officials portrayed this call for the release of Mandela to be prioritised over the unbanning of the ANC as simple pragmatism, designed to accelerate political change in South Africa. When giving evidence to the British Foreign Affairs Committee in 1986, Oscar Dhlomo was challenged by one of the committee members who pointed out that ‘There is a very considerable passage in Chief Buthelezi’s paper which argues for the release of Mr Mandela but not for the simultaneous unbanning of the ANC. Is it not the case that Mr Mandela has himself flatly rejected the idea that he should be released unless the ANC was simultaneously unbanned?’ Dhlomo responded that this was a pragmatic suggestion by Buthelezi guided by the fact that the simultaneous unbanning and release seemed unlikely. He explained that for Buthelezi ‘if the South African Government would release Mr Mandela, for instance, and then negotiate with him directly the unbanning of the ANC, that to him would still be more acceptable than keeping Mr Mandela in jail forever... He is worried about the stalemate that now exists, all at the expense of Mr Mandela who is denied the opportunity of exercising his leadership capabilities’. He went on ‘his primary position is the same is the same as anybody else’s, but as a man of negotiation he is trying to say now “would it be easier, to facilitate the process, if you separated the two issues?”’.⁵³⁰ This may well have been part of Buthelezi’s thinking on the issue. It would not

⁵²⁵ RH, Citation of Memorandum for Chester Crocker, July 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁵²⁶ ‘Give Mandela priority: Buthelezi’, *The Daily News*, 20 November 1986.

⁵²⁷ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103,M1.3.5/M1.3.4, Speech by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Luncheon, Portugal, 3 May 1988.

⁵²⁸ ‘Buthelezi Hails Mandela Peace Pipe’, *Sunday Star*, 3 February 1985.

⁵²⁹ ‘Mandela’s rejection “sad”’, *Sunday Star*, 3 March 1985.

⁵³⁰ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/B2/3, Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 July 1986.

have been implausible to think that the prospect of releasing Mandela without immediately unbanning the ANC would have been more appealing to National Party leadership than a simultaneous change. A document from PW Botha's files which records a meeting in 1986 between the Government's Special Cabinet Committee and the KwaZulu administration on the subject of political change shows that Inkatha and the National Party agreed in private that the release of Nelson Mandela ought to be separated from the issue of the unbanning of the ANC.⁵³¹ However, there are reasons to doubt that this was the main impulse behind this aspect of Inkatha's politics. In fact, Dr Dhlomo's interlocutor at the Foreign Affairs Committee found deeply implausible the interpretation which he had placed upon Buthelezi's recommendations. The committee member told Dhlomo that 'this paper will be published as a part of the evidence we have received, and what you have just said I think will have to be compared very carefully with a passage in the middle of Chief Buthelezi's telex and on the copy we have made it is on pages 8 to 10, which specifically says "Release Mandela but don't unban at the same time"- but let us move on'.⁵³² More likely, Buthelezi's desire for the release of Nelson Mandela to precede the unbanning of the ANC was chiefly a reflection of his concerns about the politics of the ANC and his judgment that the influence of Nelson Mandela would be favourable to the interests of the KwaZulu-based party. As shown by sources presented above, Inkatha perceived Nelson Mandela to be a comparatively moderate ANC leader who was relatively well-disposed towards Inkatha and its leader. Moreover, there is evidence that Inkatha sought to diminish the influence of the revolutionaries within the ANC by separating them from the more moderate leaders whom they wanted to bring to the fore. To illustrate, in the aforementioned meeting with the Special Cabinet Committee, KwaZulu representatives argued for the separation of Mandela's release from the unbanning of the ANC. Contrary to demands made in public, KwaZulu proposed that, provisionally, the ANC should not be unbanned, but that Nelson Mandela should be released and certain ANC representatives should be brought under government protection for negotiating purposes. In the same meeting, the KwaZulu officials stated that there were three elements within the ANC: the nationalists; the communists; and Umkhonto We Sizwe. They expressed concerns that the latter two elements were 'hiding under the dress' of, and exerting a considerable influence upon, the nationalists and commented that they hoped that on its eventual unbanning the ANC democrats could be separated from its revolutionaries.⁵³³

⁵³¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/11/1 1984-87, Summary of the Discussions Between the Special Cabinet Committee and KwaZulu, May, June and July 1986.

⁵³² ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/B2/3, Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 July 1986.

⁵³³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/11/1 1984-87, Summary of the Discussion Between the Special Cabinet Committee and KwaZulu, May, June and July 1986.

From the mid-1980s, Buthelezi thought that Mandela was the only leader capable of bridging deep divisions in black society and that his influence might help to augment the politics of moderation at the expense of revolutionary radicalism. Buthelezi had, on several occasions, described the struggle against revolutionary politics, as a struggle in defence of 'decency'.⁵³⁴ It is telling, therefore, that Buthelezi told Chester Crocker that the release of Mandela would give 'impetus' to the 'forces of decency'.⁵³⁵ Given the serious conflict and polarisation which existed in black politics, and the fact that Inkatha would need to forge a constructive relationship with the ANC should negotiations begin, Buthelezi saw Mandela's role as of the utmost importance. To illustrate, Oscar Dhlomo stated in 1989 that Mandela was 'today the only black South African leader inside or outside South Africa who is still able to reach across the ideological divide in black politics'. Mandela had 'outgrown parochial party politics' and Dhlomo expected that on his release 'Mr Mandela will take the first opportunity to meet leaders of all significant black organisations with a view to working out with them a common negotiating strategy'. Inkatha wanted him to 'spearhead negotiation politics and reconciliation'.⁵³⁶ Also, the Inkatha leader was reported to have said in an interview in January 1990 that 'he pinned his hopes on Mr Mandela bridging the chasm between Inkatha and the African National Congress'. He even went as far as to state that the prospects for negotiation hinged on Mandela's approach when he was released.⁵³⁷ Similarly, a 1988 edition of *Clarion Call* gave backing to Mandela as the 'real president of the ANC' and predicted that if Mandela was released 'massive historical forces would be released to work for the reconciliation of black and white...but also between black and black'.⁵³⁸

Furthermore, Buthelezi often celebrated the fact that Mandela had written to him in kind terms, expressing his desire for reconciliation and for Inkatha to be involved in the process of change. As such, he considered Mandela's support for him as a useful propaganda device in his efforts to bolster his legitimacy amongst his black constituents. He seems to have been most keen draw attention to Mandela's communications and to express admiration for him when speaking to Inkatha rallies and to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, pointing out variously that they had known each other for many years, that Mandela had called for reconciliation with Inkatha and that he had endorsed them as a force of the liberation movement.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁴ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Vaal Industries Association Annual Dinner, 13 November 1986.

⁵³⁵ RH, Citation of Memorandum for Chester Crocker, July 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁵³⁶ O. Dhlomo, 'Mandela release: Chances better', *Weekend Argus*, 20 May 1989.

⁵³⁷ 'Future of negotiations hinges on Mandela- Buthelezi', *The Star*, 31 January 1990

⁵³⁸ (Title Unclear, 40-1), *Clarion Call*, 31 March 1988.

⁵³⁹ 'Assembly applauds Mandela Peace Plea', *The Daily News*, 7 April 1989; EG, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, '1989-A Year of Action for Peace; A Year of Organisation for Peace; A Year of Preparation for the

Despite Buthelezi's hopes for the role that Mandela might play if released, he clearly also had grave concerns throughout this period about how any potential negotiation process would transpire and what role the ANC would play in such a process. Often whilst advocating the unbanning of the ANC, and calling for negotiations to commence, Buthelezi simultaneously warned that the ANC Mission in Exile would not commit to a process of peaceful negotiations. To an audience of businessmen, for instance, it was reported that Buthelezi said that 'he saw no evidence anywhere in the world which justified the thought that a militant revolutionary movement in exile would lay down its arms to join peace initiatives....Everything it did was to establish itself as the government in a one-party state'.⁵⁴⁰ Moreover, the Inkatha leader urged Chester Crocker and other western statesman to recognise that 'the ANC Mission in Exile inevitably seeks a totally dominating role for itself'. It would not 'change overnight' simply because the government initiated a negotiating forum which could succeed.⁵⁴¹ Furthermore, Buthelezi warned businessmen not to base their view of the possibility of talks with the ANC Mission in Exile on their impressions of Oliver Tambo. He lamented portrayals of the 'sweet reasonableness' of Tambo which did not reflect the official policy of the ANC Mission in Exile.⁵⁴²

In 1989, the prospect of a negotiated settlement to South Africa's problems became more realistic and more immediate when new National Party President, FW de Klerk, began to discuss more seriously the release of Nelson Mandela. Oscar Dhlomo commented that, following talks in the Joint Committee, Inkatha could 'say with a fair amount of certainty that the chances for Mr Mandela's release (were) now better than they have ever been during the entire period of his incarceration'. They were confident that the incarcerated leader would be released unconditionally.⁵⁴³ Indeed, ANC leaders' words and deeds signalled that they would commit to negotiating a solution to South Africa's problems. This was Mandela when he met with representatives of the Commonwealth's Eminent Person Group, and by ANC leaders in meetings with white liberals, academics and businessmen in 1987.⁵⁴⁴ Chief Buthelezi made some qualified expressions of optimism in this regard. In *Clarion Call* in 1989, Buthelezi expressed a qualified satisfaction that 'revolutionaries in exile are making the first real moves in many years towards making it possible for them to participate in the politics of negotiation'.⁵⁴⁵ He also remarked to the Inkatha Annual General Conference that 'it is not only Inkatha that sees the ideals of peace now. Even the ANC is now reported to be circulating a

Future', Annual General Conference, Ulundi 8 July 1989; EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Prayer Rally for Peace, Taylor's Halt, Pietermaritzburg, 23 July 1989.

⁵⁴⁰ 'Buthelezi Plea to Businessmen For Inkatha Backing', *The Citizen*, 21 January 1987.

⁵⁴¹ RH, Citation in Memorandum for Chester Crocker, July 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁵⁴² 'Don't judge ANC by Tambo, Chief Warns', *The Natal Mercury*, 27 May 1986.

⁵⁴³ O. Dhlomo, 'Mandela release: Chances Better', *Weekend Argus*, 20 May 1989.

⁵⁴⁴ Esterhuyse, *Endgame*, 33-4.

⁵⁴⁵ 'Democracy- or Else!', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1989.

document for discussion in South Africa about bringing about change through the politics of negotiation. There is a softening of ANC lines in a number of directions and however flawed and faulty the ANC's document on constitutional guidelines is, there is a certain step towards the acceptance of a multi-party approach to South Africa's problems'.⁵⁴⁶

Yet, even as a process of negotiations became more likely, Buthelezi remained deeply suspicious of the ANC's intentions and very concerned about the role they would play in a negotiated settlement. The Inkatha leader pointed out, for instance, that the ANC's talk of peaceful negotiations was happening whilst it was also making calls to intensify the armed struggle.⁵⁴⁷ He also told the Annual General Conference that it was not clear that ANC Mission in Exile would commit to non-violent struggle as a primary means of political struggle.⁵⁴⁸ As well, Buthelezi frequently expressed the concern that if the ANC committed to negotiations, it would do so with the intention not to make any concessions whatsoever and to dominate the process. Buthelezi commented in *Clarion Call* that it was vital for the ANC now to abandon a 'winner-takes-all-approach in an all or nothing politics'.⁵⁴⁹ He said that it was not enough for FW De Klerk to make moves towards negotiations. It was also necessary for this to happen against a background of growing black support for the politics of negotiation in non-violent attacks and strategies against apartheid'.⁵⁵⁰ On another occasion, Buthelezi expressed scepticism about the ANC's new 'façade' and whether there had been any really profound change in ANC attitudes towards political change. He argued that the ANC's previous activities had 'a kind of momentum all of their own. Some politics cannot be switched on and off at the drop of a negotiating hat. There is nothing that has yet persuaded me that the ANC is even thinking of taking up its place at a negotiating table as an equal amongst equals'.⁵⁵¹ He argued that the ANC, the UDF and COSATU would not abandon the politics of confrontation because they 'only have the momentum of whatever politics of confrontation they have generated behind them. When dramatic politics stops, their steam is shut off'. Furthermore, the Inkatha leader expressed doubts as to whether the ANC and its allies would be prepared to engage constructively in negotiations with an organisation such as Inkatha or with the white minority which 'with Zimbabwean hindsight, will make sure that minority group protection really is that and will remain that for as long as minority groups feel they need protection'.⁵⁵² Inkatha stated that there ought to be a negotiating alliance

⁵⁴⁶ EG, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, '1989-A Year of Action for Peace; A Year of Organisation for Peace; A Year of Preparation for the Future', Annual General Conference, Ulundi, 8 July 1989.

⁵⁴⁷ 'Revolutionaries Feel Threatened, Buthelezi Warns', *Natal Mercury*, 6 April 1989.

⁵⁴⁸ EG, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, '1989- A Year of Action for Peace; A Year of Organisation for Peace; A Year of Preparation for the Future', Annual General Conference, Ulundi, 8 July 1989.

⁵⁴⁹ 'Democracy- or Else!', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1989.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵¹ 'Action Needed Now', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1989.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*

between black anti-apartheid organisations, but also worried that the ANC might seek to dominate such an alignment. Dhlomo, for instance, commented that 'If there is to be any coalition, the ANC must not dominate. There must be collective leadership, equal responsibility and autonomy of the groups in a coalition'.⁵⁵³ Worse than this, Buthelezi accused the ANC of seeking to marginalise Inkatha from the negotiating process entirely and looking to hold discussions solely with the National Party.⁵⁵⁴ Dhlomo noted in 1989 that the ANC was seeking to vilify Inkatha and that 'there seems to be an attempt to exclude Inkatha politically'.⁵⁵⁵ Similar complaints included the allegation that the ANC was also seeking to 'drive a wedge' between Chief Buthelezi and King Goodwill who was invited by the ANC for a meeting in Lusaka.⁵⁵⁶ The Inkatha president also often voiced concerns that the ANC's participation in negotiations would be highly conditional and that it would seek to wreck the process if things were not going in their favour. Buthelezi asked, again in *Clarion Call*, whether Inkatha would 'be pressurised into participating in negotiations in which there is the revolutionary veto right or the "abandon-the-negotiations- to destroy-them" element'.⁵⁵⁷ He went on 'at this stage of development, one can hope for the ANC's inclusion but I am quite sure that politically they intend coming either with a recognised veto right or with a "departure to wreck if necessary" intention'.⁵⁵⁸

In addition, the Inkatha president compared the ANC's commitment to negotiations unfavourably with the commitment of the National Party under FW de Klerk. He commented that it was 'a myth that the ANC, UDF and COSATU want to negotiate in the sense that Mr FW de Klerk wants to negotiate. I and Inkatha are already far enough away from Mr FW de Klerk and the National Party in the regard to create awesome difficulties. Those who are political light years further away are talked about as though they are around me and Mr de Klerk'.⁵⁵⁹ Accordingly, throughout the period 1986-9 Buthelezi warned against the view that the ANC needed to be included in every move towards a solution. This placed the ANC in a position where it could dictate the entire negotiation process.⁵⁶⁰ On a number of occasions, he stressed that he had only demanded that the ANC be able to participate in elections. If the ANC chose not to participate, negotiations might commence without

⁵⁵³ 'Buthelezi offers ANC Coalition', *Natal Mercury*, 8 Feb 1990.

⁵⁵⁴ 'Future of negotiations hinges on Mandela- Buthelezi', *The Star*, 31 Jan 1990.

⁵⁵⁵ 'Who holds the real power?', *Sunday Tribune*, 3 December 1989.

⁵⁵⁶ 'ANC invite king, but not Boya', *Weekly Mail*, 7-13 April 1989.

⁵⁵⁷ 'Action Needed Now', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1989

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁰ 'Buthelezi Plea to Businessmen For Inkatha Backing', *Citizen*, 21 January 1987.

them.⁵⁶¹ In a 1986 address to an Italian audience, Buthelezi warned that, if released, the ANC had no intention on of participating in the National Council. But if this were the case, Buthelezi contended, the National Council 'could still herald the breakthrough that the whole world has been waiting for'.⁵⁶² He was also keen to stress to Chester Crocker in the same year that if Mandela chose not to participate in the proposed National Council 'I, however, would not be dictated to by that decision and I would make my own assessment about the prospects of it working'.⁵⁶³

In the second half of the 1980s in particular, Inkatha was gravely concerned that many influential people within and outside South Africa seemed to consider the ANC to be the by far the most important negotiating partner for the South African Government and that this would allow the ANC to marginalise Inkatha from the process. The Inkatha leader expressed serious concerns about international perceptions of the ANC as the key liberation movement in South Africa. For instance, he criticised the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on a number of occasions for seeing the ANC as the 'prime negotiating partner, or perhaps the only Black negotiating partner'.⁵⁶⁴ Buthelezi insisted that Inkatha ought not to be seen as a token party at a prospective negotiating table and that 'the world must know that I cannot accept a position on some negotiating guest list which is drawn up for those who must come to be witness and to participate in the real negotiations'.⁵⁶⁵ To Chester Crocker, Buthelezi criticised western support for the ANC Mission in Exile as a 'nightmare of moral indignation gone absurd' and said that when he heard the ANC being spoken of as 'being the only force worth dealing with, then I get very perturbed'.⁵⁶⁶ As well as this, Buthelezi was concerned about the advantage that the ANC had from its unrivalled funding from international sources. He doubted that the process could be fair given that 'If you did some back-of-an-envelope sums and looked at millions that Scandinavian countries give the ANC, at the millions that come to it and its South African working allies from the EEC; if you look at what churches and interdenominational donor agencies make available make available to the ANC and its partners, you would end up with

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*; AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Violent Threat to Democracy in South Africa', The Christian Democratic Party 17th National Congress, Italy, 28 May 1986; 'Ready to Roll', *Leadership SA*, October 1989.

⁵⁶² AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'The Violent Threat to Democracy in South Africa', The Christian Democratic Party 17th National Congress, Italy, 28 May 1986.

⁵⁶³ RH, Citation of Memorandum for Chester Crocker, July 1986, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁵⁶⁴ AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Western Diplomacy in the South African Arena Where Violence Contends with the Politics of Negotiation', The Heritage Foundation, Washington 14 November 1986.

⁵⁶⁵ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁵⁶⁶ RH, Citation of Memorandum for Chester Crocker, July 1986, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

telephone number figures'.⁵⁶⁷ Indeed, Buthelezi remarked that he had previously advocated the presence of international ombudsmen at prospective negotiations, but that the nature of international support for the ANC made him doubt whether they were 'able to deal with South African complexities in the sophisticated way'.⁵⁶⁸

Buthelezi had considered the Progressive Federal Party to be an important ally for Inkatha in the centre-ground between the National Party and the ANC. He had been calling for a closer alignment between the two parties since the early-1980s. In 1987 Buthelezi told the leader of the PFP, Colin Eglin, that 'now is the time to cement worthwhile relationships while we run parallel courses to bring about the things we both believe in'.⁵⁶⁹ Moreover, the Progressive Federal Party had been one of Inkatha's main negotiating partners in the Buthelezi Commission and then in the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba. Buthelezi emphasised the importance of the relationship that had been built up between the two parties when he stated in a meeting with the PFP leader that 'the Indaba politics which led to the proposals must be preserved at all costs. This kind of politics of reconciliation which keeps doors open is vulnerable and the PFP/Inkatha relationship is important in the defence of that which is vulnerable'.⁵⁷⁰ However, in the second half of the 1980s many within the Progressive Federal Party seemed to be placing an increasingly greater emphasis on the role of the ANC rather than that of Inkatha. Many PFP members also seemed to be seeking a closer relationship with the ANC which was reflected, *inter alia*, in the fact that many prominent PFP representatives travelled to Lusaka in 1985 and then to Dakar in 1987 to engage in discussions with the ANC.⁵⁷¹ As such, in the second half of the 1980s Buthelezi expressed serious worries about the lack of a firm centre-ground partnership between the two parties and about the PFP's perceived sympathies with the ANC and its allies. In 1987 Buthelezi lamented a 'body of PFP opinion which still applauded....Dr van Zyl Slabbert's talks with the ANC leader Mr Oliver Tambo but which downgraded the importance of Inkatha in the current situation'.⁵⁷² Also, Oscar Dhlomo wrote regretfully to Colin Eglin that 'there are times when some PFP members would behave as if their partnership with Inkatha has become an liability rather than an asset. I believe that if this is the case it is only fair that the PFP informs Inkatha so that the

⁵⁶⁷ 'Action Needed Now', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1989.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁹ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.1 PFP- Inkatha Relationship 1978-1994, A Few Remarks by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP Leader of the Progressive Federal Party, Ulundi, 22 January 1987.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷¹ 'ANC's Influence on Unrest Exaggerated, says Buthelezi', *The Citizen*, 2 October 1985; JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.5 Buthelezi Correspondence 1986-7, Letter from M. Buthelezi to R. Swart, 18 August 1987.

⁵⁷² 'Buthelezi Warns on ANC-PFP Talks', *The Citizen*, 23 January 1987.

political relationship can be amicably ended'.⁵⁷³ Chief Buthelezi wrote to the leader of the PFP, Colin Eglin, in 1987 'specifically to draw your attention to the fact that Mr Horace van Rensburg accuses the PFP of being equivalent to the ANC while at the same time housing members who denigrated and criticised me'. Buthelezi was concerned that no official announcement had been made to repudiate Mr van Rensburg's comments. He lamented that despite the fact that 'in aim and objective the PFP stands closer to Inkatha than to any other political organisation in the country', there was an anti-Inkatha clique within the PFP which was 'hostile to me and continue to embarrass me politically from time to time'. Buthelezi told Eglin that he did not want this anti-Inkatha clique 'diminishing my political stature' and that the PFP ought to make 'unequivocal statements of support' in certain circumstances.⁵⁷⁴ Moreover in a memorandum for a meeting with Professor Olivier and Colin Eglin, Buthelezi complained of the 'elements in the PFP which give moral respectability and political credibility to the UDF, COSATU and the ANC....at the expense of the credibility of Inkatha'. He recognised that the PFP was a fragile party which could split if a formal partnership with Inkatha was acknowledged, but it appalled him to survey the South African situation and to 'note the extent to which those who belong together are divided from each other by Party political boundaries'.⁵⁷⁵ The Inkatha leader also lamented PFP members' sympathies with the ANC and UDF regarding the violent conflict that was then raging between those organisations and Inkatha. He found it 'difficult to accept that those who "scream blue murder" when UDF or AZAPO member is killed by an Inkatha member are so quiet when an Inkatha member is killed by UDF and AZAPO members'.⁵⁷⁶ In broad terms, Buthelezi complained that many PFP member were 'hankering after White moral respectability which they see as coming from championing radical Black politics'.⁵⁷⁷

In the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, he declared that he did not want the National Party and other prominent South Africans to 'spurn whatever we are doing to bring about change through non-violent means' by 'taking the gap'. Instead, there had to be a 'diplomatic "quid pro quo"' between

⁵⁷³ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.5 Buthelezi Correspondence 1986-7, Letter from O. Dhlomo to P. Gastrow, 10 July 1987.

⁵⁷⁴ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.5 Buthelezi Correspondence 1986-7. Letter from M. Buthelezi to C. Eglin, 20 February 1987.

⁵⁷⁵ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.1 PFP Inkatha Relationship 1978-1994, A Few Remarks by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP, leader of the Progressive Federal Party and Professor NIC. Olivier MP, 3 Feb 1988.

⁵⁷⁶ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.1 PFP Inkatha Relationship 1978-1994 A Few Remarks by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP Leader of the Progressive Federal Party, Ulundi, 22 January 1987.

⁵⁷⁷ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.1 PFP Inkatha Relationship 1978-1994, A Few Remarks by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP Leader of the Progressive Federal Party, Ulundi, 22 January 1987.

Inkatha and the National Party.⁵⁷⁸ Also, this concern was reflected in the comments of Oscar Dhloomo in a meeting with Government officials regarding political change. He criticised the ANC for seeing itself as the leader of the liberation forces and warned the government that listening only to the ANC would not solve South Africa's problems.⁵⁷⁹

Although Inkatha was one of the foremost advocates of a negotiated settlement, the sources presented above, in conjunction with those presented earlier in this thesis, suggest that its leadership was profoundly concerned that conditions were not sufficiently propitious to enable it to play a key role in prospective negotiations and therefore to exert a significant influence on the outcome of those negotiations. Inkatha's political strategy was aimed not only at bringing about a negotiated settlement in South Africa, but at ensuring that Inkatha was 'a strong contender at the negotiating table'.⁵⁸⁰ Inkatha sought to achieve this not only by positioning itself in the centre-ground of South African politics between the National Party and the ANC. It intended to achieve this by creating a situation in which Inkatha was at what Buthelezi frequently called 'the very centre of gravity in South African politics'.⁵⁸¹ This was to be achieved by reform and negotiation being undertaken in such a fashion that the increasing polarisation, radicalisation and confrontation, which characterised South African politics for much of the 1980s, could be dissipated and replaced by an increasing degree of agreement, cooperation and reconciliation. The reform policies which Inkatha advocated, if implemented, would gain increasing legitimacy and support, domestically and internationally. This aspect of Inkatha's strategy is reflected in the statements of its leaders. For instance, Buthelezi told an international audience that there was a 'desperate necessity of reconciling Black and White in the process of bringing about radical change'.⁵⁸² Moreover, when advocating the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba proposals, the Inkatha leader spoke of the importance of cultivating consensus in all sections of the South African population.⁵⁸³ He also argued that the proposals could be a 'militant factor' against the politics of confrontation.⁵⁸⁴ Furthermore, Oscar Dhloomo told Government officials in a private meeting that the National Party's policy needed to

⁵⁷⁸ 'Violence Must Cease Before Talks Begin- Buthelezi', *The Citizen*, 25 March 1987; RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁵⁷⁹ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/K2/1 1984-1990, Perspectives on Political Negotiations, 23 October 1987.

⁵⁸⁰ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Women's Brigade Annual General Conference, 14 October 1989.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸² AP, Cliff Gosney Collection PC 129, Keynote Address by M. Buthelezi, Department of Business Economics and the Association of Managerial Economists, Conference: "What Boundaries for Business?", University of Witwatersrand, 10 July 1986.

⁵⁸³ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Letter from M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis, 17 August 1987.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

'build trust' and create the right climate for change.⁵⁸⁵ As this happened, the parties at the centre of the South African politics, Inkatha foremost, would gain legitimacy and influence at the expense of both revolutionary radicals and those who sought to defend white minority rule. The centrifugal dynamics of South African politics would be replaced by centripetal forces which would allow Inkatha to gather its bargaining power and move 'step by step' towards the 'national centre of political gravity'.⁵⁸⁶

This process would place Inkatha both in a strong bargaining position and a strong mediating position. Indeed, Chief Buthelezi expressed his hope several times that Inkatha would serve to mediate between the white and black populations. He expressed delight to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that a survey of 422 Afrikaner opinion-makers had found that 319 regarded him as mediator.⁵⁸⁷ Buthelezi also told the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1986 that he envisaged Inkatha playing a role in the reconciliation between those currently in power and those who were alienated from them.⁵⁸⁸ He told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1985 that any utility he had in the South African situation would depend on 'mass support in an ever-broadening range of constituencies which break all the barriers apartheid has for so long attempted to set up in a divide and rule approach'.⁵⁸⁹ It was intended that Inkatha's combination of bargaining power and an advantageous mediating position would allow it to hold the balance of power and thereby exert a very strong influence on the outcome of negotiations. As Buthelezi told the National Council of Inkatha in 1988, 'in a very real sense, real power belongs to those who hold the balance of power'. Inkatha was 'moving into an era in which it could be a final determiner of what happens by the way it shifts its stance in the balance of power'.⁵⁹⁰

It seems, however, from the analysis undertaken above that neither Inkatha's bargaining or mediating position were strong enough for it to be confident of holding the 'balance of power', and the Inkatha leadership were well aware of it. This is reflected in Inkatha's concerns about the great domestic and international legitimacy of the ANC and its own comparative lack thereof. It is also expressed in Inkatha's concerns regarding the relationship of conflict and fierce hostility existing between itself and the ANC, which would have made it less likely that it could mediate between the

⁵⁸⁵ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/K2/1 1984-1990, Perspectives on Political Negotiation, 23 October 1987.

⁵⁸⁶ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.5/M1.3.4, Address by M. Buthelezi to the Inkatha Central Committee Meeting, 17 January 1987.

⁵⁸⁷ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

⁵⁸⁸ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/Ba/1 1985-86, M. Buthelezi Testimony, Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1985-86, 20 January 1986.

⁵⁸⁹ M. Buthelezi, 'Statement to KwaZulu Legislative Assembly', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1985.

⁵⁹⁰ EG, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, National Council of Inkatha, 1 July 1988.

Government and the black population. Indeed, the National Convention alliance for negotiated change proposed by Inkatha and the PFP in 1985 was rejected out of hand by the ANC, which commented that 'Buthelezi and Slabbert continue to advance the empty perspective of dialogue'.⁵⁹¹ In this connection, Slabbert reports that Bishop Tutu told him that he would not talk to Buthelezi who was 'beyond the pale'.⁵⁹² Moreover, Buthelezi's suggestion in 1983 of a 'marriage' of political convenience between Inkatha and the ANC, was said by the latter to only be possible once Inkatha had completely 'dezuluised' itself. This was utterly rejected by Buthelezi.⁵⁹³ Furthermore, Inkatha's leadership was concerned about the fragmentation of the centre-ground of South African politics. This can be seen Buthelezi's concern about Inkatha's faltering relationship with the PFP whose representatives were increasingly placing greater emphasis on the role of the ANC and UDF. It can be seen, furthermore, in Inkatha's laments regarding the weakening of the South African Black Alliance. Buthelezi complained to Colin Eglin and Professor Olivier that 'over the last three to four years Inkatha has also been caught up in the deepening polarisation in this country. We are a million political miles away from the Labour Party and from the Progressive Federal reform party. Their leaders were colleagues of mine in the South African Black Alliance and we have now nothing to say to each other across the chasms which their entry into the present parliamentary system created. It is tragic that this is so but I cannot reverse history and wish away the realities which are now historic fact'.⁵⁹⁴ But perhaps most telling is Buthelezi's concern that the National Party was increasingly seeing the ANC as the only important protagonist in black politics and by-passing Inkatha as a mediator. Inkatha's place in the 'very centre of gravity in South African politics' cannot have been secure so long as there was the risk of the Government 'taking the gap'.

Against this background, Inkatha continued to seek a mediating and bargaining role, but also sought desperately to bolster its weakened position. A significant element of this, as shown above, was to place a great of emphasis on the role of Mandela who, Buthelezi hoped, would exert a moderating influence on South African politics and help to reconcile Inkatha with elements of the ANC, thereby placing Inkatha in a better position to mediate between the Government and more radical black parties. Also, Inkatha advocated the type of negotiations process which would best remedy its difficulties. Buthelezi sought to improve Inkatha's prospects by arguing for a long and multi-faceted process of negotiations which would allow for the moderation of black politics and the reconciliation

⁵⁹¹ 'Rejection will not deter Slabbert', *The Star*, 27 August 1985.

⁵⁹² JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, F. Van Zyl Slabbert Interviewed with P. Waldmeir, 11 November 1994.

⁵⁹³ 'To be Dezuluised for Political Recognition', *Clarion call*, Vol 1, 1983.

⁵⁹⁴ JL, Colin Eglin BC1103, M1.3.1 PFP-Inkatha Relationship 1978-1994, A Few Remarks by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Meeting with Mr C. Eglin, MP, leader of the Progressive Federal Party and Professor NIC. Olivier MP, 3 Feb 1988.

of disparate black groups. Although Buthelezi had called until 1985 for a national convention to negotiate South Africa's future,⁵⁹⁵ from 1985 onwards he frequently dismissed the idea of a 'Lancaster House-type conference' aiming at a quick, 'big-bang' solution to South Africa's problems.⁵⁹⁶ 'Negotiations in our circumstances are going to take the form of a political process which will fashion and reconcile as it proceeds...'.⁵⁹⁷ The Inkatha leader argued to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that the negotiations process ought to be gradual and open-ended so that 'step by step we move away from violent solutions to democratic solutions'.⁵⁹⁸ For Buthelezi, there would be no reconciliation between the different black groups if the groundwork had not been by a process of negotiations gradual enough to normalise South African politics.⁵⁹⁹ The ANC ought not to be brought to the conference table 'while they have not yet had the opportunity of putting their case to the South African people' and of seeking a mandate from the people.⁶⁰⁰ Similarly, he told Chester Crocker that the process of radical change needed an 'interim period' in which ordinary black people could 'decide for themselves which leaders and organisations should be supported'. This was because 'Black attitudes towards the ANC Mission in Exile are filled with myths and a wide range of misconceptions' which could only be cleared up by a gradual negotiating process.⁶⁰¹ Also, part of this negotiating process ought to be based on a 'bottom-up' approach to political change. Buthelezi hinted at the importance of the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba when he told the KLA that 'we must work towards negotiations which must work upwards from local, regional and provincial levels to national levels'.⁶⁰² Indeed, throughout the late 1980s and early-1990, Inkatha officials argued that the Indaba's national role had increased in significance and emphasised that the implementation and negotiation of its proposals could play an important role in the overall negotiations process.⁶⁰³ Regional proposals may also have been aimed at entrenching Inkatha influence in the political

⁵⁹⁵ ACA, Piet Koornhof PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Memorandum from M. Buthelezi for Discussion Between Black Leaders At Unity Talks to be Held in October 1983.

⁵⁹⁶ RH, Citation of memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London, 20 January 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986; RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987; RH, Topical Briefing from Information Centre on South Africa, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Inkatha's Call for Peace in South Africa', November 1989.

⁵⁹⁷ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁹ RH, Citation of Memorandum from M. Buthelezi to the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London, 20 January 1986, in Policy Speech By M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰¹ Citation of Memorandum for Chester Crocker, July 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁶⁰² RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁶⁰³ 'The Indaba and the Directors' Report', *The Daily News*, 5 October 1989; ACA, Kobie Coetsee PV357, 1/K1/4, Discussion with KwaZulu-Natal Indaba, 20 February 1990.

process and rendering his preferred dispensation a *fait accompli*. Finally, Inkatha sought to ensure the most favourable outcome from negotiations by seeking the inclusion of local and international business interests in the negotiations.⁶⁰⁴ Inkatha's efforts to bolster its position ahead of negotiations are perhaps also reflected in its willingness to participate in 'talk-about-talks' with the Government throughout 1989. There was also an increased emphasis on the importance of agile and responsive leadership to navigate and overcome the difficulties presented by challenging and ever-changing circumstances. Buthelezi stated in 1988 that it would be the 'calibre of Inkatha's leadership which will matter most' when trying to 'survive in a kaleidoscope situation'.⁶⁰⁵ Perhaps more ominously, Buthelezi also increasingly stressed that significance of Inkatha being a 'disciplined, employable force'. He wrote to Colin Eglin that Inkatha's real national power was still great precisely because it was employable. He stressed that the Youth league was 'more vibrantly powerful now than it has ever been'.⁶⁰⁶

Nevertheless, the Inkatha president perceived very significant risks to be involved in the inclusion of the ANC in the negotiations process. Buthelezi advocated a central role for Mandela, but had doubts as to what this would achieve. He commented in the first month of 1990 that although Mandela was his 'best hope', but 'if he is a captive of Lusaka, he could prove to be of limited utility'.⁶⁰⁷ He told Chester Crocker that despite his hopes for Mandela's role, the ANC leader would face 'immense problems he will face were he to come out of jail and attempt to take firm control in the country. There is a vast range of interests which would really test the calibre of his leadership and the role he could play'. Whether or not the Mission in Exile could be turned into a democratic force remained to be seen.⁶⁰⁸ 'Negotiations in our circumstances....', Buthelezi told Chris Heunis, '...mean playing risk games'.⁶⁰⁹ In 1989, Buthelezi told the Inkatha Central Committee, Buthelezi remarked both the USA and USSR had now started pushing for a negotiated settlement to South Africa's problems. 'The problem...', Buthelezi declared, '.....is that so many of the expectations placed on us are naively conceived. They do not understand just how much some leaders and some organisations are using

⁶⁰⁴ 'Time to Negotiate has Arrived', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1989.

⁶⁰⁵ EG, Presidential Address by M. Buthelezi, National Council of Inkatha, 1 July 1988.

⁶⁰⁶ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.5/M1.3.4, Memorandum by M. Buthelezi for Discussion with Mr Colin Eglin, Durban, 23 September 1986.

⁶⁰⁷ 'Future of negotiations hinges on Mandela- Buthelezi', *The Star*, 31 Jan 1990.

⁶⁰⁸ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁶⁰⁹ EG, Vote of Thanks by M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis MP, First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 14 March 1989.

this evolving climate demanding peace to lay traps beyond which they and they alone will emerge leaders in a new South Africa which will be entirely differing to the one the world is hoping for'.⁶¹⁰

Historians such as Brewer argued that Buthelezi's estrangement from more radical forces had made it unlikely that he could mediate between the Government and the ANC.⁶¹¹ For Brewer, this made Buthelezi more likely to collaborate and compromise with the Government to the exclusion of the ANC. However, Buthelezi recognised that to have legitimacy a negotiated political settlement would require the involvement of the ANC in the negotiation process. Yet, it has been shown, Buthelezi was in fact deeply concerned about his ability to mediate between the Government and the ANC and was fearful that he would be marginalised from the negotiations process for which he had been one of the strongest advocates. The Inkatha leader hoped that Nelson Mandela would help to bridge the gap between himself and the ANC. He also advocated a gradual and multi-faceted negotiation process as a means of promoting greater unity between disparate Black groups. Despite this, he clearly perceived the inclusion of the ANC in negotiations as a very risky eventuality, if less risky than the alternatives.

The analysis contained in this article demonstrates more clearly how the changing nature of power contestation in South Africa shaped the nature of Chief Buthelezi's political approach in the period 1986-89. The ascendancy of the politics of revolutionary radicalism and its increased popularity among South African blacks presented a serious threat to Buthelezi's political agenda, made more tenuous his position as an operator in the ambiguous middle ground of South African politics, and constrained him in his political approach. Buthelezi described these constraints in his address to the British Foreign Affairs Committee where he commented that he could not '...afford the luxury of being personal in my politics or being idiosyncratic. My political life is filled with the hard, grinding work of serving a number of very large and demanding constituencies...it is filled with very stringent demands which I have to meet as I work on the interface between Black and White politics...'.⁶¹² Indeed, Buthelezi seems to have been navigating a political path which he perceived to be fraught with danger. He told Chris Heunis that 'Every sane and sensible political leader wants to minimise risk but we can only minimise the risk inherent in real negotiations to a certain point. Beyond this point, the risks we avoid incur far greater risks in the development of the country's revolutionary

⁶¹⁰ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, Details of Inkatha Central Committee Resolutions and Presidential Greetings to Central Committee 3-4 June 1989.

⁶¹¹ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 372.

⁶¹² RH, Citation of his memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London, 20 January 1986, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, March 1986, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

climate'.⁶¹³ Furthermore, he commented to the Inkatha Central Committee that 'history is totally unforgiving. If you are wrong it casts you aside: if you are right it lifts you up: it smashes every fence you may wish to sit on'.⁶¹⁴ As such, this article demonstrates that Buthelezi's political options had narrowed considerably by the mid-1980s and it elucidates and substantiates Shula Marks's argument that Buthelezi was forced to walk a political tightrope.⁶¹⁵

Chapter Four: Interpreting Inkatha

The preceding analysis has a bearing upon, but does not resolve a number of key interpretive problems. These relate primarily to the question of what shaped and motivated Inkatha politics. Many accounts which emphasise Buthelezi's conservatism have characterised his politics solely in terms of interests and expediency, rather than ideas and values. That is to say, they have claimed that Buthelezi was motivated by the pursuit elite interests and his politics were shaped by the employment of whichever tactics best served those interests.

Accounts by Mare, Forsyth, and Piper, argue that Buthelezi's focus on history and tradition was merely a means for securing his influence and mobilising support. Mare argues that Buthelezi tailored a narrative of politicised ethnicity and tradition in order to 'legitimate existing structures of authority'. He sees Buthelezi's utterances on history, tradition and culture as part of an 'invented tradition' of the type described by Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm as serving to 'inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past'.⁶¹⁶ In this respect, the Inkatha leader drew upon a set of symbols from Zulu history and another from the history of the ANC, particularly prior to its banning. These two symbols are 'entangled' in Buthelezi's utterances, because he emphasises the historical presence of Zulus in the ANC prior to its banning. Otherwise, he argues that Buthelezi's narratives are somewhat tailored to suggest that Inkatha's policies are a continuity of past African politics and thereby to confer legitimacy on those policies.⁶¹⁷ Mare seeks to show politicised manipulation of this narrative by pointing to another study by Mdluli which found that the Inkatha version of resistance history had large gaps between 1960 and 1975 and also in the 1980s.⁶¹⁸ He contends that Buthelezi's invented

⁶¹³ EG, Vote of Thanks by M. Buthelezi to C. Heunis MP, First Session of the Fifth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, 14 March 1989.

⁶¹⁴ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, Details of Inkatha Central Committee Resolutions and Presidential greetings to Central Committee from 3-4 June 1989.

⁶¹⁵ Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence*, 124.

⁶¹⁶ Mare, *Ethnicity and Politics*, 17-20; *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*

traditions, his denial of class differences and his concept of the traditional family are used as 'ideology' in a 'competition for power' against other groups.⁶¹⁹ Paul Forsyth also argues that Buthelezi manipulated the past in order to give justification to Inkatha's policies. He undertakes a long-term analysis, showing that Inkatha's version of history changed over the course of time to reflect the organisation's political concerns at different moments.⁶²⁰ Furthermore, Mare argues that the traditional structures of chieftainship were favoured because they were essential for Inkatha power.⁶²¹

A range of scholars have insisted that Buthelezi's dominant motivation was to serve elite political and socio-economic interests associated with Inkatha. Brewer, Mare and Hamilton, Mzala and Piper all emphasise personal ambition for political power and status as a key motivation for Buthelezi.⁶²² It has also been argued that the Inkatha leader was motivated by elite political interests. Such accounts imply that gaining and retaining political power, influence and status motivated Buthelezi's opposition to revolutionary radicalism rather than a moral conviction about what was good for South Africa. For Laurence Piper, Inkatha's politics in the 1980s were characterised by a defence of 'elite political interests' and a struggle for political hegemony with the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. Inkatha utilised Zulu ethnicity and traditional structures of authority in order to retain power and influence.⁶²³ Also, Mzala argues that the KwaZulu Chief Minister was motivated by political position and 'personal advancement'.⁶²⁴ He gives a history of Buthelezi's career since the 1950s, arguing that the Inkatha president had a long record of manoeuvring for political position which included reaching out to government to secure and safeguard his position as chief.⁶²⁵ Similarly, John Brewer has also argued that Inkatha would 'negotiate itself into power at the sacrifice of moderating its demands'.⁶²⁶ And Mare and Hamilton wrote a book about Inkatha entitled *An Appetite for Power*.

Many of these historians, in addition to Shula Marks, have argued that Buthelezi was driven to serve the class interests of the African bourgeoisie with which it was associated.⁶²⁷ Mare and Hamilton

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 43; *Ibid.*, 47; *Ibid.*, 67.

⁶²⁰ Forsyth, 'The Past in the Service of the Present Use of History by Chief ANMG Buthelezi 1951-1991', 89; *Ibid.*, 92.

⁶²¹ Mare, *Ethnicity and Politics*, 69; *Ibid.*, 54.

⁶²² Mzala, *Chief With a Double Agenda*, 229; *Ibid.*, 5-6; *Ibid.*, 58-9; *Ibid.*, 67-73; *Ibid.*, 229; Piper, 'The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South Africa', 78; *Ibid.*, 84; *Ibid.*, 91; Brewer, *After Soweto*, 371; Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 98.

⁶²³ Piper, 'The Politics of Zuluness in the Transition to a Democratic South Africa', 78; *Ibid.*, 84; *Ibid.*, 91.

⁶²⁴ Mzala, *Chief with A Double Agenda*, 229.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, 5-6; *Ibid.*, 58-9; *Ibid.*, 67-73; *Ibid.*, 229.

⁶²⁶ Brewer, *After Soweto: An Unfinished Journey*, 371.

⁶²⁷ Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence*, 118-119; Mzala, *Chief with A Double Agenda*, 167; *Ibid.*, 179; Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 98.

write of the 'class interests dominant in Inkatha'.⁶²⁸ Indeed, Mare suggests that Inkatha's emphasis on ethnic identity may have been a device for downplaying class divisions.⁶²⁹ Mzala also alleged that Inkatha's policies reflected bourgeois class interests. He too emphasises Inkatha's involvement in Khulani Holdings and other private companies. He points out that the KwaZulu government failed to intervene on behalf of National Union of Textile Workers in a dispute with the KwaZulu Bata Shoe Company which had strong links to Khulani Holdings. He also draws attention to the fact that the Inkatha-established trade union the United Workers Union of South Africa had a president, a general secretary and a treasurer who also held senior position in large private companies.⁶³⁰ Moreover, Shula Marks argued that 'increasingly, Buthelezi appears to represent the small class of African accumulators, the chiefs and wealthier landowners....His concerns mirror those of the aspirant bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie, although their class interests are masked by his claims to speak for "my people" and the need to "temper" the harshness of unfettered capitalism with the humanity of African communalism'.⁶³¹ And in the early-1980s Roger Southall argued that 'Buthelezi's actions reflect his efforts to serve the interests of the African petit bourgeoisie whilst retaining mass support among South African blacks'.⁶³² There is, however, some dissent. For instance, Adam and Moodley suggest that 'Buthelezi primarily articulated the fears of his less-privileged constituency of migrant workers and rural traditionalists who had the most to lose from higher unemployment and economic decline'.⁶³³

This thesis does not seek to deny significant roles to expediency and interest in shaping the Inkatha leader's politics. Indeed, chapters two and three demonstrate in greater detail Buthelezi's deep concerns regarding the context of acute power contestation, particularly in the second half of the 1980s, and shows how he shaped Inkatha's politics in his attempt to position Inkatha at the 'centre of gravity' of South African politics. It is clear from the context of power contestation and Buthelezi's expressed concerns about the 'battle' between Inkatha and ANC-aligned movements that the Inkatha leader motivated by a strong sense of political competition and rivalry with revolutionaries. Buthelezi perceived a serious threat to Inkatha's role as an independent and influential political force and accordingly was desperate to withstand the dangers of the situation. In fact, he gave clear and open expression to this. He told the Inkatha Women's Brigade that '...it is a conflict in a Black political arena in which the tough are going to survive, and South Africa needs the tough. Whatever

⁶²⁸ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 98.

⁶²⁹ Mare, *Ethnicity and Politics*, 41.

⁶³⁰ Mzala, *Gatsha Buthelez*, 167; *Ibid.*, 179.

⁶³¹ Shula, *The Ambiguities of Dependence In South Africa*, 118-119.

⁶³² Southall, 'Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of Compromise', 478.

⁶³³ Adam and Moodley, *The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, 128.

is said about black on black confrontation in this vein, however, is simply a statement that inevitably in the end, the powerful will survive'.⁶³⁴ In private correspondence with Colin Eglin of the PFP, Buthelezi expressed the similar sentiment that 'It is a tough world out there in which politics must survive. I intend surviving'.⁶³⁵ To the KLA, Buthelezi said 'with measured tones and with carefully chosen words that I am no loser. I do not intend being annihilated in the cross-fire situation in which I find myself'.⁶³⁶ In 1980, Dhlomo emphasised Inkatha's focus on expediency, telling a Government audience that 'People seek individual, group, and community vested interests. Real politics is dominated by a kind of realism of how these interests can be maximised at any point in time given the circumstances of that time'.⁶³⁷ Buthelezi even told the British Foreign Affairs Committee that his 'political life is filled with the hard, grinding work of serving a number of very large and demanding constituencies'.⁶³⁸ The analysis in chapters two and three further suggest that many of Buthelezi's utterances were shaped partly by the strategic imperatives of retaining the support of the African population and forging a political partnership with the National Party. It also shows that there was a slight shift in the emphasis of Inkatha politics over the course the 1980s, reflecting changing circumstances and tactical priorities. Moreover, an examination of Buthelezi's utterances reveals differences in emphasis depending on his audience. For instance, he made more strident condemnations of ANC communism when addressing foreign, particularly Western, audiences. He stressed the concepts of discipline and authority more when talking to his KwaZulu constituents. Expediency in power contestation was, therefore, a significant factor which shaped Inkatha politics in the 1980s. Buthelezi may have made some speeches which exaggerated, understated, or did not reflect his true beliefs, in order for Inkatha to exert an appeal to different audiences. But to what extent were these political manoeuvres aimed at power as an end in itself and the service of elite interests? Inkatha undoubtedly had a close association with private enterprise. In 1981 Buthelezi characterised Inkatha's ownership of shares in companies as part of the party's plan 'become linked to the major structures in our society'.⁶³⁹ Indeed, in 1984, Dhlomo acknowledged the business-owning class as an important element of Inkatha's constituency: 'Inkatha's membership represents a

⁶³⁴ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, 'Conserving the strength and the lives of those involved in the black struggle for liberation', Annual General Conference of the Women's Brigade, 10 October 1987.

⁶³⁵ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, M1.3.5 1986-7, Letter from Buthelezi to Eglin, 14 July 1987.

⁶³⁶ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fifth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1987.

⁶³⁷ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73, 1/A1/1 1979-1982, Paper by O. Dhlomo, Pretoria, 17 January.

⁶³⁸ RH, Citation of Memorandum from M. Buthelezi to the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London, 20 January 1986, in Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

⁶³⁹ 'Inkatha (Yakwazulu) and its Leadership', Special Issue, African People Democratic Union of Southern Africa, Affiliated to the Unity Movement of South Africa, December 1988, 6.

true cross-section of South African black society. It is dominated by peasants and workers, as is black South Africa, but it is also representative of South Africa's black so-called middle class and its business and professional classes'.⁶⁴⁰ On another occasion he described how Inkatha represented a broad range of opinions, from those of the peasantry to those of the 'professional and moneyed'.⁶⁴¹ As such, elite economic class interests may have influenced Buthelezi's political thinking. Yet, given the broader context of power contestation, political transition and potential social upheaval, it seems unlikely that the service of certain bourgeois economic interests were preponderant amongst Buthelezi's motivations. Buthelezi was a traditional political leader and it cannot simply be assumed that he had only economic interests. Even if it were granted that the Inkatha leader was not motivated by a sense of duty towards his constituents, the fact that the political, social and constitutional order were in the balance would surely have exercised a greater influence over Buthelezi's politics than the desire to maximise the profits of companies with which his party was associated. Also, in circumstances of upheaval, increasing radicalism, disorder and population growth, it was unlikely that Buthelezi would have advocated any economic policy which he thought would serve only a small elite at the expense of the many. Mass poverty was thought by Buthelezi and many others to be a key exacerbating factor in social and political instability, and therefore the stifling of revolutionary radicalism depended partly on the amelioration of the hardship of the people. In fact, the Inkatha leader expressed concerns about Government's strategy to thwart revolution by co-opting middle class blacks, Indians and coloureds. Unless standards of living improved for those at the bottom, the economic situation would be a continued source of social conflict.⁶⁴² Therefore, it is implausible for Jane Hunter to argue that Buthelezi's strategy was to create from 'an oppressed population a middle class wealthy enough to identify with the ruling power as its protector and large enough to stave off rebellion from below- but no larger'.⁶⁴³

There are strong indications that Buthelezi sought personal power for its own sake. Buthelezi also called for an understanding that the struggle in South Africa was 'fundamentally characterised by the black power struggle'. It was not simply an idealistic, Utopian struggle. It was a 'political struggle where there are a number a number of black aspirants to positions of personal and political power'.⁶⁴⁴ In correspondence with Colin Eglin, Buthelezi asked whether they sought increased

⁶⁴⁰ O. Dhlomo, 'This is Inkatha', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1984.

⁶⁴¹ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73, 1/A1/1 1979-1982, Paper by O. Dhlomo, Pretoria, 17 January 1980.

⁶⁴² EG, Address by M. Buthelezi to the National Democratic Committee, 'The Location of United States Vested Interests in Changing South Africa', USA, on the Occasion of their visit to Ulundi arranged by the Southern African Forum, 15 March 1984.

⁶⁴³ J. Hunter, 'Israel and the Bantustans', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Spring, 1986), 71-2.

⁶⁴⁴ 'OAU Should Consider Inkatha's Role', *Clarion call*, Vol 1, 1983.

influence in the current system or were pursuing 'a course aimed at positions of power in a new dispensation for South Africa. The latter is for me true'.⁶⁴⁵ Moreover, Buthelezi was in the habit of holding power and indicatively retains the leadership of his party until the present day. There was also a coincidence between Buthelezi's personal political interests, the retention of the social order which Buthelezi sought to defend, and the political structures he sought to promote. The defence of traditional and adult authority, of ethnic identity, and of the dispersal of power, all seem to have coincided with his personal political interests.

However, one of the main purposes of the first half of this thesis has been to establish an analysis of Buthelezi's ideas as fundamental to an understanding of his politics. It challenges the reductive analyses of Buthelezi's politics as shaped merely by the cynical pursuit of elite interests. Serious reflection on Buthelezi's ideas has been neglected in the subject's historiography. By bringing a range of previously unused primary sources to bear, chapter one of this thesis has revealed a greater depth and substance to Buthelezi's political discourse than has previously been assumed or demonstrated. It does not discern a systematic ideology, or a set of rigid principles, consistently expressed in Buthelezi's politics. Indeed, the Inkatha leader explicitly rejected this type of political outlook. However, it has illuminated a coherent philosophical core to Buthelezi's politics. The extent of variation amongst Buthelezi's utterances when addressing different groups should not be overstated. As with any politician, there is a degree of contradiction and inconsistency to be found in Buthelezi's utterances. Yet, Buthelezi's criticisms of both revolutionary radicalism and apartheid were expressed repeatedly to a range of different audiences and over the course of a long period of time. The assumptions of Burkean conservatism were consistently expressed in different aspects of Buthelezi's politics which, on first glance, appear inconsistent, contradictory or difficult to reconcile. It also refutes Brewer's view that Buthelezi's politics were janus-faced or double-faced in the sense of presenting disjointed and opposing political narratives tailored solely to maximise Inkatha's appeal to particular audiences in specific circumstances.⁶⁴⁶

Moreover, to see Buthelezi's politics merely as an attempt to serve his own narrow interests is to place a reductive and implausible interpretation on his politics. Not only did Buthelezi exhibit a deep and profound political philosophy, but there are biographical reasons to imagine that the Burkean conservatism, which brought him in to opposition to both revolutionary radicalism and the National Party, would have strongly appealed to him and rationalised many of his intuitions and inherent sympathies. It is easy to imagine the strong attraction of this traditionalist political philosophy to

⁶⁴⁵ JL, Colin Eglin BC1103, M.1.3.1, Aide Memoir used by M. Buthelezi on the Occasion of a Visit to Ulundi by the Leader of the Opposition Dr Van Zyl Slabbert MP and RAF. Swart MP, 13 March 1980.

⁶⁴⁶ Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to Kwazulu', 354.

Buthelezi who was steeped on Zulu traditionalism. Buthelezi had been educated at Adams College where both traditional African identity and the Western canon were esteemed.⁶⁴⁷ He was not only deeply rooted in Zulu history and traditions, but was also socialised into broader black, South African, Southern African and indeed Western identities by his experiences at Adams College where he was exposed to the influence of Edgar Brookes and was educated alongside students from across Southern Africa and at Fort Hare where he was a member of the ANC Youth League.⁶⁴⁸ Indeed, Edgar Brookes recounts his encouragement of national and tribal celebrations, such as Shaka Day and Moshoeshoe day.⁶⁴⁹

One possible point of contact with Edmund Burke's thoughts may have been Buthelezi's headmaster at Adams College, Edgar Brookes. Brookes was immersed in the Western philosophical tradition and was clearly familiar with Burke, citing the philosopher three times in a 1933 lecture series regarding 'The Colour Problems of South Africa'.⁶⁵⁰ Ben Temkin comments that Brookes's influence on Buthelezi was 'seminal', particularly in the field of politics, and that Brookes was a 'father figure' from whom Buthelezi sought advice until his death.⁶⁵¹ Brookes was mainly known as a liberal opponent of apartheid, but his writings contain many conservative themes. In his autobiography, he says 'at times I come to the conclusion that I am a natural conservative who has become a liberal in South African circumstances almost in spite of myself'.⁶⁵² In a 1961 address entitled 'Things New and Old', Brookes argued that 'we should prefer to welcome the new things without destroying the beauty of the old' and that 'there lies therefore a heavy responsibility on those of us...who love both freedom and South Africa, to try to secure the first without the ravaging and destruction of the second'.⁶⁵³ He warned that revolutionary change had the potential to be 'terrible' and spoke of the 'mists of revolution and anarchy' in the Congo.⁶⁵⁴ Brookes warned against South Africa acquiring a dictator 'even if he, like Hitler, derives his original power from universal suffrage'.⁶⁵⁵ In these words, there are strong similarities with both Buthelezi and Burke. Buthelezi's partly conservative rationale for radical change is also mirrored in the writings of Brookes whose 1961 address 'Things New and Old' Brookes argued that a refusal to give rights to blacks and to cooperate with moderate black leaders would make the inevitable political change more

⁶⁴⁷ EH. Brookes, *A South African Pilgrimage* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1977), 64.

⁶⁴⁸ Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 19-25; *Ibid.*, 30-39.

⁶⁴⁹ Brookes, *A South African Pilgrimage*, 64.

⁶⁵⁰ EH. Brookes, *The Colour Problems of South Africa* (Cape Town: Lovedale Press, 1934), 2; *Ibid.*, 51; *Ibid.*, 61.

⁶⁵¹ Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 23; *Ibid.*, 25.

⁶⁵² Brookes, *A South African Pilgrimage*, 56.

⁶⁵³ EH. Brookes, *Things Old and New* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1961), 3.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 5; *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

revolutionary.⁶⁵⁶ 'If we would preserve the old we must welcome the new', argued Brookes.⁶⁵⁷ He warned that, otherwise, 'violence will be met with violence, bitterness with bitterness.... Much that we all value, will go down in blood and flame'.⁶⁵⁸

As a black man and a black leader, it is highly likely that Buthelezi sincerely and strongly opposed apartheid, with its unequal distribution of resources and power between groups and its interference with black lives. This is underscored both by the Inkatha leader's formative experiences at Adams College where he fell under the influence of the conservative liberal opponent of apartheid, Edgar Brookes and Fort Hare University where he was educated alongside future African nationalist leaders from across southern Africa.⁶⁵⁹ Therefore, this thesis contends that Inkatha's political approach reflected a complex interplay between Buthelezi's ideas and values, on the one hand, and considerations of expediency and interests on the other.

Part Two: The National Party and Inkatha, 1980-1989.

Chapter Five: The 'Golden Threads' in South Africa's History. The National Party's Quest for 'Self-Determination', 1980-1989.

This chapter makes use of previously unstudied Government documents to provide an improved and more firmly grounded understanding of the principles which formed the National Party's vision of a new political order in South Africa in the 1980s. It undertakes a more detailed examination of the National Party's espoused objectives, the rationale it offered for these and the extent to which these changed over time course of the decade. It offers a vivid account of PW Botha's constitutional inclinations as expressed privately, and analyses Botha's only departmental document which sketches a detailed constitutional model for South Africa. Furthermore, it utilises previously unused documents to provide a much better understanding of the differences which existed in this respect amongst different cabinet ministers in mid-late 1980s, particularly between PW Botha and Chris Heunis. Moreover, this chapter will compare with greater intricacy the constitutional preferences of the National Party, its various leaders, and Inkatha. It will contribute to a clearer and more precise understanding of their different political outlooks by delineating their similarities and differences, both real and apparent, as they developed over the decade.

In calling for adaptations to policy in 1979, Botha was not calling for majority rule or the abolition of key apartheid laws. In the first half of the 1980s, it even rejected power-sharing between different

⁶⁵⁶ Brookes, *Things Old and New*, 5-6; *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶⁵⁹ Temkin, *Buthelezi*, 19-25; *Ibid.*, 30-9.

racial or ethnic groups. His Government reaffirmed the apartheid premise that the country was constituted by a number of minority groups, each entitled to 'self-determination' and not to be 'dominated' by the others. There was to be cooperation between groups on matters of 'common affairs', whilst each group was to have responsibility for its 'own affairs'. Having just called for a peace based upon justice, Heunis told the Federal Congress that 'we are a land of minorities' and 'the quests for self-determination and freedom are the golden threads in the history of Southern Africa'. He went on, 'we are determined to fight for the rights of minorities and if necessary to fight for it'.⁶⁶⁰ Indeed, the National Party manifesto for the election of 1981 contained a 'twelve point plan' for dealing with the country's problems. The first point of the plan was the 'recognition of multi-nationalism' in South Africa, whilst the second point was to accept 'vertical differentiation with self-determination on as many levels as possible'. In committing to these two points, the manifesto highlighted the continuity with the prescriptions of Hendrik Verwoerd.⁶⁶¹ A National Party Information Service publication stated that the party did not believe in power-sharing which was a Progressive Federal Party concept. Power-sharing required all to take part in a common parliament, whereas the governing party favoured separate parliaments for each group.⁶⁶² The Botha Government remained committed throughout the first half of the 1980s to the Verwoerdian apartheid plan for African people in South Africa to have their political rights at national level fulfilled by citizenship of independent homelands which were assigned to particular ethnic groups. South Africa's political problems could not be solved in the context of a unitary or federal state.⁶⁶³ By the end of 1980, four homelands Governments- Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana- had accepted political independence.⁶⁶⁴ Minister of Cooperation and Development, Piet Koornhof told a gathering in 1983 that for blacks 'we still work at the solution as initiated by Dr Verwoerd and others, namely, independent homelands'.⁶⁶⁵ In fact, this was the third point of the twelve point plan. The party's plan stated that political ties between Africans within and outside the homelands were to be pursued.⁶⁶⁶ Koornhof commented in 1981 that the intention was for the homelands to become independent and for blacks to be given citizenship of these states in such numbers that the

⁶⁶⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 59 1978-87, 'National Party: Federal Congress', Bloemfontein, 30-31 July 1982.

⁶⁶¹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984 Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

⁶⁶² ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984 Document- National Party Information service, Questions and Replies on Constitutional Plan.

⁶⁶³ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984 Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

⁶⁶⁴ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 606.

⁶⁶⁵ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Speech for Women's Action Gathering, 1983.

⁶⁶⁶ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

remaining black citizens of South Africa would be fewer than the number of whites, coloureds and Indians.⁶⁶⁷ Botha argued that a 'Xhosa born in Johannesburg is still a Xhosa. And a Zulu born elsewhere remains bound to his nation. We shall give the black man in the cities the right to vote for the parliament of his own people'.⁶⁶⁸ Challenged on this premise in parliament in 1982, Prime Minister Botha asked whether Turks working in West Germany ought to be given the vote there. When it was answered in the affirmative that Turks born in Germany should be given such a right, Botha declared that if a cat has 'kittens in an oven, that does not make them loaves'. In response to the suggestion that homeland leaders might not be the real leaders of South African blacks, Botha asked 'what kind of nonsense' the honourable members were talking.⁶⁶⁹

David Welsh commented in 1984 that 'the supposition appears to be that such juggling with numbers of citizens can somehow legitimate white rule and give credibility to the Government's contention that South Africa is a land of minorities, none of which can claim overall numerical preponderance'. Furthermore, the Government was using homelands independence as a rationale for the exclusion of Africans from South African decision-making bodies.⁶⁷⁰ The homelands project was used as a justification for excluding Africans from South African decision-making processes and from major constitutional reforms which were undertaken in 1984. A new dispensation was implemented following a white only referendum the previous year. The head of Government was now to be a president who would preside over a three-chambered parliament with separate houses for whites, Indians and Coloureds. These were elected on separate voters' rolls and made decisions on 'common affairs' on the basis a fixed 4: 2: 1 voting ratio, giving the white majority the ability to outvote the other two chambers. Each chamber had its own cabinet and budget for dealing with its community's 'own affairs'.⁶⁷¹ The Government established a President's Council constituted by representatives of the white, coloured and Indian groups to consult on the creation of a new parliamentary system accommodating the latter two groups.⁶⁷² The Government's twelve point plan stated that Indians and coloureds would be accommodated with South Africa on the basis of self-determination and the 'division of power'.⁶⁷³ Africans were excluded from deliberations in the President's Council and offered participation in a separate Black Advisory Council. Justifying the

⁶⁶⁷ D. Welsh, 'Constitutional Changes in South Africa', *African Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 331 (April, 1984), 149.

⁶⁶⁸ PW. Botha Speech, NP Meeting, Brakpan, 31 March 1981, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 27.

⁶⁶⁹ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 5 March 1982, Column 280; *Ibid.*, Column 283.

⁶⁷⁰ Welsh, 'Constitutional Changes in South Africa', 149.

⁶⁷¹ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 603-5.

⁶⁷² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol 59, Speech from National Party Federal Congress, Bloemfontein, 30-31 July 1982.

⁶⁷³ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

exclusion of Africans from this process, Botha argued that blacks already had constitutional structures in the form of homelands which could declare independence.⁶⁷⁴

Given its commitment to 'multi-nationalism' and 'self-determination', the Botha Government maintained the National Party's commitment to racial legislation, such as the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the provision of separate schools for different races.⁶⁷⁵ The Government's election manifesto of 1981 promised the elimination of 'hurtful discrimination'.⁶⁷⁶ Yet, Botha made a distinction between 'hurtful discrimination', which was unjust, and 'differentiation', which was necessary.⁶⁷⁷ Separate residential areas and schools fell into the latter category, being considered rights and 'fundamental for happy social conditions'.⁶⁷⁸

Botha did not renounce Afrikaner nationalism. In parliament, the Prime Minister declared that he was a Nationalist and informed opposition members that they could stick that in their 'pipe and smoke it'. He would not turn his back on his 'own people' for 'any price'. 'The greatest happiness' he said was to 'remain true to what is one's own'.⁶⁷⁹ He vowed not to follow the policy of the Smith regime in Zimbabwe which 'was a Prog regime'.⁶⁸⁰ Indicatively, he told a party youth conference that he did 'not believe in revolution', but the 'prevention of revolution'.⁶⁸¹ As such, Michael Spicer commented in 1980, '...the underlying intention is to rationalise, not to abolish, the policy of separate development. Unlike a growing number of Afrikaner intellectuals, Mr Botha and his advisers do not consider this policy to be fundamentally unsound but believe it to be in essence the only one that will enable the Afrikaner to continue to control his destiny and safeguard his identity'.⁶⁸² As Robert Schrire describes, the early years of Botha's Government were an attempt to 'make apartheid work' and to make the homelands system a 'viable strategy'.⁶⁸³

However, the National Party implemented a number of changes supposedly reducing 'hurtful discrimination' against Africans. The 1981 Labour Relations Amendment Act relaxed the restrictions

⁶⁷⁴ 'Gatsha cool on new bid to Avoid a deadlock', *Evening Post*, 11 Aug 1980.

⁶⁷⁵ Giliomee, *The last Afrikaner Leaders*, 254; PW. Botha, NP Congress, Durban, 15 August 1979, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 59.

⁶⁷⁶ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

⁶⁷⁷ PW. Botha Speech, House of Assembly, 29 April 1980, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 58-9.

⁶⁷⁸ PW. Botha Speech, NP Congress, Durban, 15 August 1979, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 59

⁶⁷⁹ PW. Botha, *Hansard*: Tuesday, 2 February 1982, Column 125.

⁶⁸⁰ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 2 February 1982, Column 110.

⁶⁸¹ PW. Botha Speech, NP Youth Conference, Port Elizabeth, 29 September 1978, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 16.

⁶⁸² M. Spicer, 'Change in South Africa? Mr PW Botha's Strategy and Policies, *The World Today*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January, 1980), 34.

⁶⁸³ Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 47.

on black trade union membership.⁶⁸⁴ Ninety nine year leasehold was allowed for blacks in 'white' South Africa.⁶⁸⁵ Forced removals were put on hold,⁶⁸⁶ and urban blacks with 'section 10' rights were to be allowed to move freely within South Africa.⁶⁸⁷ However, these changes seemed to be aimed at addressing the grievances of Africans who lived in 'white' urban areas. Paul B Rich comments that it was the Botha Government's policy to 'give greater security to "permanent" African residents in urban areas'.⁶⁸⁸ Giliomee points out that the Government's reforms excluded two million or more than half of black workers outside the homelands.⁶⁸⁹ He contended that the relaxation of restrictions on a class of urban blacks was coupled with a redoubled attempt to keep 'the number of browns and blacks in the cities down to a minimum'.⁶⁹⁰ Not only were the pass laws to remain, legislation was put forward in 1980 to tighten influx controls.⁶⁹¹ Indeed, the National Party administration rejected the recommendation of the Riekert Commission that the punishment for illegal employment should be moved from employee to employer. Both needed to be punished. The purpose of the proposed changes to influx controls was to ensure more the effective exclusion of homeland Africans whilst reducing the irritation and 'friction' caused by its implementation.⁶⁹²

Two of the most significant shifts in the Government's approach were its recognition of the difficulties posed by economic interdependence of the four racial groups in South Africa and its open acceptance of the permanence of large black communities in 'white' South Africa. Koornhof stated in 1983 that demographics were a significant factor and that Verwoerd had seriously underestimated the number of Africans who would be living in 'white' or urban areas. It could not be disregarded that the 'entire economy, and I want to say also the wealth of the whites, is dependent on the labour of blacks'.⁶⁹³ Similarly, the National Party Information Service announced that the Government accepted that there were a 'great number of blacks permanently in the RSA'.⁶⁹⁴ PW Botha commented in 1982 on the presence of blacks outside their homelands that 'we need these people in our industries. They have become part of our economy and there is no doubt we can

⁶⁸⁴ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 161.

⁶⁸⁵ Dubow, *Apartheid: 1948-1994*, 197.

⁶⁸⁶ 'Race laws will go, Pledges Koornhof', *The Star*, 17 July 1980.

⁶⁸⁷ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Speech by Dr Koornhof, Seminar of the school of industrial leadership about the implications of the Riekert Report, 5 October 1979.

⁶⁸⁸ PB. Rich, 'The Changing South African Scene', *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations*, 19, 2 (1993), 312.

⁶⁸⁹ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 159.

⁶⁹⁰ H. Giliomee, 'Constitution's two paths towards "State efficiency"', *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 September 1984.

⁶⁹¹ Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 71.

⁶⁹² ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Speech by Dr Koornhof, Seminar of the school of industrial leadership about the implications of the Riekert Report, 5 October 1979.

⁶⁹³ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Speech for Women's Action Gathering, 1983.

⁶⁹⁴ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Dr J. Grobler, 'The Course of Constitutional Processes over Generations', Chief Information Officer, NP Information Services, 27 May 1983.

ignore them'.⁶⁹⁵ Moreover, the party's twelve point plan included the recognition of the economic interdependence of the different groups.⁶⁹⁶

In recognition of the permanence of large black communities outside the homelands, the Government committed to establish local government structures to give Africans outside their 'national states' a greater say over the administration of the towns and cities where they lived. The Black Local Government Act provided for black city councils 'with full municipal status'.⁶⁹⁷ For Heunis, self-government promoted 'stability in urban communities, and it is an instrument for the realisation of Black self-determination in respect of their own affairs up to a certain level'.⁶⁹⁸ Piet Koornhof commented that 'the introduction of autonomous government at the third level over their own people in their own areas of jurisdiction is without any doubt a very important step forward in the history of our country'.⁶⁹⁹ In the midst of increasing black, urban radicalisation, a 1983 Government document stated that the effective and visible implementation of urban government reforms could contribute towards the restoration of legitimacy of the National Party Government and non-radical African leaders.⁷⁰⁰

However, 'in accordance with the NP philosophy' it was still necessary for urban Africans to 'retain links with their mother states'.⁷⁰¹ It was said that the objective for urban blacks was to establish 'maximum ties and bonds with these States, while at the same time satisfying his requirements with regard to his residential area outside these states'.⁷⁰² How to establish such links was a matter of 'urgent attention'.⁷⁰³ It was acknowledged that Africans had aspirations for political accommodation at a higher level than the municipal, but initially a large part of the perceived solution to this was for these 'further political aspirations' to be satisfied by coupling with 'their black states'.⁷⁰⁴ Another part of the proposed solution was to develop a form of local authority that somehow had more authority than ordinary third tier Government, whilst encouraging 'liaison' between those bodies

⁶⁹⁵ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Thursday, 15 April 1982, Column 4617-8.

⁶⁹⁶ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

⁶⁹⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol 59, Speech from National Party Federal Congress, Bloemfontein, 30-31 July 1982.

⁶⁹⁸ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 1 February 1983, Column 163.

⁶⁹⁹ P. Koornhof, *Hansard*, Friday, 11 June 1982, Column 9383.

⁷⁰⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

⁷⁰¹ WA. Odendaal, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 21 April 1982, Column 5027.

⁷⁰² P. Koornhof, *Hansard*, Friday, 18 February 1983, Column 1333.

⁷⁰³ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Friday, 9 September 1983, Column 13610.

⁷⁰⁴ PW. Botha Speech, House of Assembly, 20 April 1979, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 27.

and white local authorities.⁷⁰⁵ This foreshadowed Government's implementation of Regional Services Councils for cooperation between different groups' third tier authorities.⁷⁰⁶

Botha recognised that it was unlikely that the homelands would achieve economic self-sufficiency.⁷⁰⁷ Yet, the Prime Minister did not see this as an insurmountable obstacle to the homelands project. The concept of sovereignty was a 'relative concept' and even the USA could not 'do what it likes, in an absolute sense'. The world was 'becoming smaller' and 'matters of common interest' were increasing. For this reason, an ideal solution could not be found, but nations in their self-determination also needed to take into account 'their interdependence'.⁷⁰⁸ The solution was for there to be ongoing economic development 'co-operation' between nations. This would benefit all without harming anybody.⁷⁰⁹ Botha proposed that this and other forms of cooperation between South Africa be facilitated by the creation of a constellation of southern African states which would promote 'welfare, security and stability'.⁷¹⁰ This was to be a form of confederation which, 'unlike a federation, is not a state and therefore as a necessary consequence it cannot have citizens or nationals'. It was a 'formal association of independent states' founded upon a treaty agreement.⁷¹¹ Indeed, the metaphor of a constellation was contrasted by Botha with 'a solar system' in which 'planets revolve around a central point'. In a constellation of states, sovereign state constituents would cooperate and develop their relationships in the pursuit of mutual interests.⁷¹² In committing to a constellation of states, the National Party's twelve point plan cited the example of the European Community or NATO as the type of relationship envisaged.⁷¹³ In a meeting of the Government's Special Cabinet Committee in 1984, homeland leaders were told that the constituents of a constellation of states would be guaranteed the right to secede. Its structures would be mainly 'advisory and coordinating', perhaps executive, 'but seldom legislative'. Further examples of such a

⁷⁰⁵ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Thursday, 8 September 1983, Columns 13524-5.

⁷⁰⁶ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/88, NP Information Document, 'RSCs are essential for peace and stability', N/D.

⁷⁰⁷ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Extracts from the Address Delivered by the Prime Minister, PW. Botha, Opening of the 1980 Congress of the National Party of Transvaal, Pretoria, 1 September 1980.

⁷⁰⁸ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Thursday, 15 April 1982, Column 4515.

⁷⁰⁹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Extracts from the Address Delivered by the Prime Minister, PW. Botha, Opening of the 1980 Congress of the National Party of Transvaal, Pretoria, 1 September 1980.

⁷¹⁰ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 5 March 1982, Column 2278.

⁷¹¹ P. Laurence, 'Urban blacks...NP policy leaves few alternatives', *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 February 1983.

⁷¹² JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC 1103, WW2 PW Botha 1979-89, 'Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa', Meeting between PW Botha and Business Leaders, Johannesburg, 22 November 1979.

⁷¹³ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

confederation were the North German Confederation of 1866-71 and the Commonwealth.⁷¹⁴ In a Department of Foreign Affairs document sent to PW Botha, it was argued that the constellation of states should be the product of a bottom up 'organic growth process' motivated by the desire of states to develop on matters of common concern and sustained by growing trust, rather than a top-down imposition on those states.⁷¹⁵ Botha declared that he recognised that the economic welfare of the people would be better served by 'acting together' rather than alone. A constellation of states would allow a nation to determine its own future as 'master of its own house' whilst cooperating voluntarily in the pursuit of 'common aspiration'.⁷¹⁶

National Party officials offered a number of reasons for the continuation of 'separate development', the exclusion of blacks from national political structures in the Republic of South Africa and the compulsory racial categorisation of all South Africans. Political self-determination for different groups was often spoken of as an intrinsic or absolute right,⁷¹⁷ or something which arose from 'the very nature of things'.⁷¹⁸ Yet, ministers also spoke of the 'realities' which precluded the possibility of a successful majoritarian or power-sharing settlement in South Africa in either a unitary or federal state. National Party officials argued that racial and cultural heterogeneity creates problems within society and is difficult to accommodate in one state- 'Little evidence exists, if any, of a successful multiracial state, anywhere in the world'. And the South African population was 'probably the most complex and heterogeneous in the world, with thirteen distinct nations'. The development of separate nation states was necessary to prevent a 'multiracial society with virtually insoluble conflicts'.⁷¹⁹ National Party parliamentarian Val Volker said that the concept of a unitary state was 'impractical' and that the history of Africa and the world showed the dangers of states containing 'a variety of communities and has different outlooks, values and norms', citing Nigeria and Cyprus as examples. 'There would be a similar total collapse of stability in South Africa'.⁷²⁰ The diversity in

⁷¹⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/11/1 1984-87, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee with Leaders of the National States, Cape Town, 14 June 1984.

⁷¹⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/12/1 1981, Commentary by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information on the Cabinet Committee Memorandum, 'The Confederation Idea as Part of a Comprehensive Political Strategy', N/D.

⁷¹⁶ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Extracts from the Address Delivered by the Prime Minister, PW. Botha, Opening of the 1980 Congress of the National Party of Transvaal, Pretoria, 1 September 1980.

⁷¹⁷ 'Gatsha cool on new bid to avoid a Deadlock', *Evening Post*, 11 August 1980; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Document from National Party Information service, Questions and Replies on Constitutional Plan, N/D.

⁷¹⁸ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

⁷¹⁹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Southern Africa: Now and in the Future', N/D.

⁷²⁰ V. Volker, *Hansard*, Monday, 1 March 1982, Column 1833.

South Africa was argued to be particularly dangerous, because not only were there thirteen separate nations, but these were at 'different stages of development'.⁷²¹ PW Botha reflected on the difference between the South African situation and that in Switzerland where several groups shared power within a consociational state. Unlike in South Africa, groups in Switzerland enjoyed the same standard of living, the same level of civilisation and had all reached a 'high level of existence'. In South Africa, things were more difficult, because some were 'still far behind others'.⁷²²

There was also a strong sense that Africans could not be accommodated in a unitary state and could not share power with whites, because of the nature of Africa and African politics. It was pointed out that only 11 states in Africa were democracies as compared to 24 dictatorships and 18 one party states.⁷²³ An official document for PW Botha on the subject of black politics in 1983 expressed 'political-ethnological' concerns in addition to concerns about the influence of radical ideologies on the black population. It contended that traditionally, black people had considered individual rights to be secondary. 'The entrenchment of human rights in the constitution' was a 'rarity' in African societies. There was a tendency in African political cultures for 'centralized authority' based on the supremacy of a 'single authority figure in one-party state'. The dispersal and voluntary devolution of power was 'foreign' to Africa, as was an independent judiciary.⁷²⁴ Similarly, Foreign Minister Pik Botha spoke to homeland leaders of his concern at the 'tendency for one party states across Africa' and that a majority rule system result in totalitarian government by the strongest group.⁷²⁵ In parliament, Heunis explained the exclusion of Africans from the new constitution by saying that 'African Blacks have their own values, and I am not saying that they are inferior ones. I may point out the tendency towards centralisation of power, whereas we in this country are trying to achieve the opposite, namely decentralisation of power'. Furthermore, there was a tendency towards 'ethnic domination'.⁷²⁶ Heunis also argued that a fourth chamber for blacks would contradict the premise of multi-nationalism. Africans were divided into many nations and multi-cameral system with 13 chambers was impractical.⁷²⁷

⁷²¹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Southern Africa: Now and in the Future', N/D.

⁷²² PW. Botha Speech, NP meeting, Fauresmith, 25 April 1980, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 40.

⁷²³ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Southern Africa: Now and in the Future', N/D.

⁷²⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

⁷²⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/4 1985-88, Minutes of Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 24 May 1985.

⁷²⁶ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 2 February 1983, Column 212.

⁷²⁷ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 2 February 1983, Column 213.

Despite the Government's insistence on a division of power between groups, Indians and coloureds were included in the national parliament of South Africa. Explaining the distinction between the treatment of these groups and blacks, National Party officials emphasised the significance of practical circumstances. In his arguments, Heunis implied that the culture of Indians and coloureds not as incompatible with the type of division of power which the National Party was seeking, and that it was easier in practical terms to accommodate two new groups into parliament than ten. Writing in 1985, National Party politician Stoffel van der Merwe contended that 'the Coloureds and the Whites have a substantial number of cultural similarities in common. It is thus possible for them to achieve consensus on government actions in a specific manner at a specific level.' Indians differed culturally in some respects, but were a 'highly sophisticated community'. Blacks, on the other hand, were more culturally remote from the other groups, and because of their numbers had the ability to 'subjugate the other minority groups by joining forces against them'. For all the differences between whites and Indians, the latter lacked the numbers to assume power and to dominate others.⁷²⁸ The perceived relative cultural similarity of many coloureds is also evident in the speeches of PW Botha. He told parliament in 1981 that many coloureds lived as 'westerners' and that he had the 'greatest respect' for these 'civilised' coloureds.⁷²⁹ On another occasion, Botha stated that hundreds of thousands of coloureds were 'superior to the weakest whites'. They needed to be given a say on their own affairs and to be encouraged to take jobs which could no longer be filled by 'weak whites'. In other words, there must be 'provision for the decent coloured'.⁷³⁰

There seemed to be a radical break with these constitutional aims in 1985, when Verwoerdian apartheid was declared by the National Party to have failed. A state with a single citizenship was now the declared objective and the National Party committed to political participation by all black South Africans in 'all decisions-making processes affecting their lives' and political representation "up to the highest level".⁷³¹ In the mid-1980s, the Government announced other political commitments relating to multiracial Government. Regional Service Councils were planned to facilitate 'joint-responsibility' between local racial governments.⁷³² In the mid-1980s, it was also agreed to create a Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal on the basis of a proposal by the

⁷²⁸ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

⁷²⁹ PW. Botha Speech, House of Assembly, 25 August 1981, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 24.

⁷³⁰ PW, p. 89, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 25.

⁷³¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12 /77/1 1979-1986, Extracts from Speeches by the State President on Reform During 1985; Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 70; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985; M. Buthelezi, 'I call on Mr Heunis to reconsider his words.', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1985; Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 45-6.

⁷³² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 29 1985-88, Document Concerning RSCs, N/D.

KwaZulu Government and Natal provincial authority. This was supposed to be another form of cooperation and co-administration between groups.⁷³³ Furthermore, it was said by the Government that black leaders could be included on the electoral role which elected the State president or be appointed to positions in cabinet.⁷³⁴

Why these shifts in policy occurred will be examined in chapter seven. The present concern is with the nature and significance of these changes. Many aspects of the National Party's newly proposed constitutional dispensation were indeed a departure from previously stated goals. Not only did the National Party commit to a single state in which all citizens would be represented in national level political institutions, but it stated that there would be 'democratic systems of government', 'universal franchise', and an end to white domination.⁷³⁵ In mid-1980s, freehold property rights were extended to blacks, the prohibition of racially mixed marriages was abolished, as were the much despised pass laws.⁷³⁶ The Government did not endorse any particular model of constitution, but stated that ultimately there would be joint legislative and executive bodies at the national level in which South Africans of all races would be represented.⁷³⁷ Indeed, the final dispensation would provide for 'equal power-sharing' between all groups in South Africa.⁷³⁸ In certain respects, these shifts in National Party policy brought its vision for South Africa closer to that of Buthelezi. As shown in previous chapters, one of Buthelezi's main political priorities in the first half of the 1980s was to oppose Botha's plans for a constellation of independent states in South Africa and instead to see a united South Africa with 'democratic involvement in central government'.⁷³⁹ The Government also seemed to move closer to Buthelezi's position by committing itself to the 'democratic ideal' and to 'power-sharing'.⁷⁴⁰ Buthelezi had not called for a dispensation based on 'one-man-one-vote' in unitary state. He remarked that it was not 'God-ordained' that South Africa should have a

⁷³³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, Speech by Heunis in House of Representatives, 14 May 1986.

⁷³⁴ B. Pottinger, *The Imperial Presidency: PW Botha, The First Ten Years* (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1988), 129.

⁷³⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol 74. 1986-8, Document- 'Government by Consent', N/D; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Announcement by the State President on Constitutional Development, N/D; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Memorandum, Administrator Cadman Writes About the Indaba Proposals, 2 November 1987.

⁷³⁶ 'Apartheid undented as Parliament rises', *Weekend Post*, 30 march 1985; EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Vaal Industries Association Annual Dinner, 13 November 1986.

⁷³⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting 8 March 1986.

⁷³⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Urgent Indaba Document for the Minister, Political Planning, Pretoria, N/D.

⁷³⁹ 'Inkatha scorns "prop for farce"', *The Cape Times*, 29 September 1983.

⁷⁴⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Speech Script for Minister Heunis, 'Nie uitgereik nie', May 1985; FW. De Klerk, Hansard, Thursday, 5 February 1987, Column 318.

Westminster system.⁷⁴¹ Alternatives should be considered, and Buthelezi stressed that a new dispensation should enjoy support ‘across race groups’.⁷⁴² The Inkatha leader argued, like the National Party, that federal decentralisation should be part of the solution and cited the Swiss canton system as an example of power-sharing to be considered.⁷⁴³ Buthelezi approved of ‘checks and balances’ in order to provide ‘reasonable safeguards to white interests’ in a system of power-sharing.⁷⁴⁴ Indeed, in arguing for minority protections, Heunis cited Buthelezi’s remark that ‘however much I recognise the need to make society work for the good of the individual and not the other way round, I believe that constitutionally entrenched individual rights under a Bill of Rights needs to co-exist with mechanisms to protect minority rights’.⁷⁴⁵ The National Party reaffirmed its belief, like Inkatha’s, that the interests of KwaZulu and Natal interlocked.⁷⁴⁶ As noted previously, the Government established a Joint Executive Authority in the region in 1987 in response to a request by Inkatha.⁷⁴⁷ Indeed, Government ministers expressed support, in principle, for a Joint Legislative Authority in the region.⁷⁴⁸ Also, the Government’s President’s Council claimed its constitutional proposals were based on the idea of ‘consociationalism’ or ‘joint and consensual rule’ developed by Arend Lijphart.⁷⁴⁹ Lijphart was a participant in, and supporter of, the Buthelezi Commission.⁷⁵⁰

However, unlike Inkatha, the National Party did not accept majority rule in any form. The envisaged constitutional system would remain group-based.⁷⁵¹ As Hermann Giliomee argues, ‘at the core of Botha’s political ideology was the assumption that racial and ethnic groups formed the building blocks of the political and social system, and that there could be no interracial democratic

⁷⁴¹ EG, Address by M. Buthelezi, Women’s Brigade Annual General Conference, 14 October 1989.

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 29 1985-8, ‘Second and Third Tier Reform in South Africa (Notes to the Press)’, 24 May 1985; ‘White SA now ready for power-sharing says Buthelezi’, *The Citizen*, 7 July 1986; ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/54 1989, Transcript of interview with Botha, ‘Botha: World Should let Pretoria Change at its own Pace’, *The Washington Times*, 14 March 1988.

⁷⁴⁴ ‘Power-sharing key to negotiations, says Buthelezi’, *The Citizen*, 18 July 1985.

⁷⁴⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 35 1987, Natal/KwaZulu, Issued by the Ministry of Constitutional Development and Planning, 28 October 1987.

⁷⁴⁶ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Column 142.

⁷⁴⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off the Record Briefing for 38 Foreign Editors-World Media Group, Cape Town, 1987.

⁷⁴⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 35 1987, Natal/KwaZulu, Issued by the Ministry of Constitutional Development and Planning, 28 October 1987; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Memorandum, Administrator Cadman writes about the Indaba proposals, 2 November 1987; C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, 141.

⁷⁴⁹ ‘“An abuse” to omit blacks’, *Sunday Times*, 18 May 1982; ‘Sharing power- the Nat Way’, *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 August 1980.

⁷⁵⁰ ‘US Expert for Buthelezi Commission’, *The Natal Witness*, 17 October 1980; ‘“An abuse” to omit blacks’, *Sunday Times*, 18 May 1982.

⁷⁵¹ ‘PW unveils plan for a new federal system’, *Sunday Times* 1 December 1985.

competition'.⁷⁵² For Heunis, a democratic solution to South Africa's problems could not be based on the 'individualistic approach' found in most Western societies.⁷⁵³ Indeed, individuals would participate in political structures primarily as members of groups.⁷⁵⁴ They would be represented firstly in regional ethnic/racial political structures, which in turn would be represented in a national political body. Government preferred for existing political structures, such as the homelands and representative bodies for whites, coloureds and Indians to be retained. Local and regional structures would be developed for Black people outside the homelands.⁷⁵⁵ As such, there would be no common voters' roll, as Inkatha demanded, for representation at the national level or any level. For the National Party, a new South African constitution would need to be premised on the right of 'self-determination' for each group, which ought to be 'extended maximally'.⁷⁵⁶ For President Botha, South Africa was a 'nation of minorities'. Liberty was not just important at the level of the individual and the state, but also at the level of the community.⁷⁵⁷ A system would need to be created which prevented the 'domination' of any group by any other.⁷⁵⁸ The National Party was said to be against not just white domination, but any form of political domination, including 'Black domination'.⁷⁵⁹ Indeed, for Stoffel van der Merwe, it was 'no less abhorrent' for there to be domination by the majority, than domination by the minority.⁷⁶⁰ To ensure that there could be no such 'domination', the National Party not only insisted that political participation be through the group, but that all 'joint decision-making' between groups would be made on a consensus basis on which no group could be subject to a policy which had not been accepted by its own elected leaders.⁷⁶¹ Within groups, numbers were to 'make a difference', but between groups decision-making could not be based on numbers.⁷⁶² Indeed, it was declared in 1989, that Government's policy was 'specifically aimed at

⁷⁵² Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 145.

⁷⁵³ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 19 June 1986, Column 8782; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

⁷⁵⁴ 'PW unveils plan for a new federal system', *Sunday Times* 1 December 1985.

⁷⁵⁵ FW. De Klerk, *Hansard*, Thursday 5 February 1987, Column 318.

⁷⁵⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Announcement by the State President on Constitutional Development, N/D; FW. De Klerk, *Hansard*, Thursday 5 February 1987, Columns 317-18; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 57 1986-7, NP 1987 Election Manifesto, Programme of Action.

⁷⁵⁷ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986, Columns 14-5.

⁷⁵⁸ M. Buthelezi, 'I call on Mr Heunis to reconsider his words..', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1985; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 57 1986-7, NP 1987 Election Manifesto, Programme of Action.

⁷⁵⁹ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 8 May 1989, Column 7999.

⁷⁶⁰ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

⁷⁶¹ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 45-6; FW. de Klerk, *Hansard*, Thursday, 5 February 1987, 318.

⁷⁶² C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 8 May 1989, Column 7997; C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 19 June 1986, Column 8782.

avoiding, at getting away from, majority rule in this country'.⁷⁶³ Moreover, only matters of 'common interest' were to be the subject of such 'joint decision-making', whereas groups were to have exclusive control over their 'own affairs', whose parameters were not stated.⁷⁶⁴ Accordingly, power was to be devolved to regional ethnic structures as a means of avoiding 'group domination'.⁷⁶⁵ There was a new willingness to review and reform racial legislation, such as the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act. The creation of an 'open group' was discussed during the later years of Botha's presidency. Moreover, the President's Council recommended in 1987 the adaptation of the Group Areas Act so that a number of 'grey' or open areas could be created. Yet, the group-based nature of the envisaged state required these statutes to remain on the books.⁷⁶⁶

As such, there was also a clear continuity of the group concept and the idea that groups had a right to self-determination and the right to control their 'own affairs'. In the context of mounting township violence, National Party officials emphasised that their constitutional policies were aimed at 'security', 'stability', 'peace' and 'harmony'.⁷⁶⁷ Yet, it was stressed, these things were to be achieved whilst ensuring 'self-determination for each group'.⁷⁶⁸ FW de Klerk said in 1987 that the Government had abandoned theories which 'could no longer succeed in practice', but had not sacrificed its principles. It had merely adapted them to 'the demands of circumstances and to the realities within which one has to work'.⁷⁶⁹

As shown in part one, Buthelezi was opposed to any system which preserved key apartheid legislation and which was not based on majority-rule in a broad sense. Buthelezi expressed concern that the National Party had not really accepted power-sharing as he understood it, but 'power division'. When Inkatha insisted on power-sharing, it was really interested in acquiring a role for Africans in the determination of what happened with central budgetary resources, with the national wealth to which they contributed.⁷⁷⁰ For Buthelezi, Government's announcement that all citizens

⁷⁶³ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 8 May 1989, Column 7999.

⁷⁶⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 57 (343) 1986-7, NP 1987 Election Manifesto, Programme of Action.

⁷⁶⁵ PW. De Klerk, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986, Column 14-15.

⁷⁶⁶ Friedman, 'Options for the Future: Government reform strategy and prospects for structural change', 11; 'Buthelezi is firm', *Financial Mail*, 10 March 1989; 'Group Areas Must Go', *Cape Times*, 18 September 1987; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/55/42 1988-99, First Report to the British Parliamentary Human Rights Groups by B. Wrobel, March 1988-9.

⁷⁶⁷ 'Blacks Won't Get The Vote', *Pretoria News*, 02 February 1985; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Announcement by the State President on Constitutional Development, N/D; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 57 1986-7, NP 1987 Election Manifesto, Programme of Action; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Speech Script for Minister Heunis, 'Nie uitgereik nie', May 1985.

⁷⁶⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Announcement by the State President on Constitutional Development, N/D.

⁷⁶⁹ FW. De Klerk, *Hansard*, Thursday 5 February 1987, 315-6.

⁷⁷⁰ 'Power-sharing key to negotiations, says Buthelezi', *The Citizen*, 18 July 1985.

would enjoy 'political participation for everybody in all decision-making processes affecting their lives' was a 'classical apartheid statement', as was the distinction between 'own affairs' and 'general affairs'. These words represented a 'clear rejection of power-sharing' and contradicted the Government's claim to be committed to reform of 'real deep meaning for Blacks'.⁷⁷¹ Decision-making in South Africa could not be 'compartmentalised'.⁷⁷²

The National Party was also keenly aware of the difference between the type of power-sharing Inkatha advocated and the sort they advocated. This can be seen most clearly in Government officials' rejection of the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba proposals. In rejecting the Indaba's proposals for a new regional dispensation, Government officials expressed definite and fundamental rejections of the principles which underpinned the proposals. Heunis announced to parliament that the proposals were 'out of line' with Government principles for constitutional change, because they were concerned with the provision of 'limited protections for minorities', rather than ensuring 'equal group participation'. They failed to provide for 'effective power-sharing' or 'sufficient protection against domination' which were 'fundamental elements of any model that attempts or professes to take the group basis of society into account'.⁷⁷³ The Administrator of Natal, Mr Cadman, stated in a Government memorandum that although the Indaba placed much emphasis on power-sharing it was 'very difficult to ascertain precisely which proposals would in fact bring about power sharing in reality'. Guaranteed representation in a legislature and executive did not constitute power-sharing. The 'great problem' of South African politics was not how to 'engineer a Black majority constitutional structure' in which minority groups had some representation. Power-sharing was 'real only if' groups retained a 'sphere of political power and influence' and if in matters of national government 'their objection to any proposal can be sustained until such time as consensus is reached'.⁷⁷⁴ The National Party's concept of power-sharing precluded any negotiation with Inkatha about a majoritarian model with increased protections for minorities. The Indaba proposals were said to be 'nothing more or less than majority government'.⁷⁷⁵ Mechanisms for minority protection could not 'balance out' the fundamental shortcomings of the proposals.⁷⁷⁶ Indeed, the formation of the Joint Executive Authority with KwaZulu did not signal a movement towards the model recommended by the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba. It was stressed by Chris Heunis that the Authority

⁷⁷¹ M. Buthelezi, 'I call on Mr Heunis to reconsider his words...', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1985.

⁷⁷² EG, Speech by M. Buthelezi to G. Viljoen After Performing the Official Opening of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 26 March 1985.

⁷⁷³ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 15 February 1989, Column 46.

⁷⁷⁴ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Memorandum, Administrator Cadman writes about the Indaba proposals, 2 November 1987.

⁷⁷⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off The Record Foreign Media Briefing by C. Heunis, HF. Verwoerd Building, Cape Town, 12 February 1988.

⁷⁷⁶ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Column 141.

would not affect in any way the 'right of political self-determination of any group' and that there were 'no fundamental political rights' associated with it. It was merely an 'instrument for the use of existing second tier administrations'. In fact, Heunis specifically said that their acceptance Joint Executive Authority did not imply an acceptance of the Indaba proposals.⁷⁷⁷ He told parliament that the Authority was a means of cooperation between groups without 'entering the thorny area of political rights'.⁷⁷⁸ Indeed, Val Volker argued that the Joint Executive Authority 'reconfirm(ed) the separate right of existence of the KwaZulu legislative body and the authority for the rest of Natal'.⁷⁷⁹

Therefore, Inkatha and the National Party's constitutional recommendations were not, in the late-1980s, at different points on the same spectrum of power-sharing, but were based on fundamentally different conceptions of power-sharing, and both parties were aware of this. The builds on chapter one to demonstrate that the differences between Inkatha and National Party proposals were not, as Mare and Hamilton proposed, 'more in the detail than the principles'.⁷⁸⁰ Indeed, a National Party position paper in 1986 drew a sharp distinction between these two concepts. It argued that 'power-sharing' was a term an 'original meaning and several derived meanings- some of which are far removed from the original basic, meaning and are indeed even the opposite thereof'. It was this ambiguity which accounted for the National Party's previous rejection and subsequent embrace of the term. The original and proper meaning of 'power-sharing' was a system of universal franchise in which there was 'an equitable sharing of power by all citizens', whereas 'power-sharing' had come to be falsely associated with a 'surrender of power' to majority rule. It was this latter sense of the term that they rejected and the former sense which they embraced. The National Party had had to embrace the term 'power-sharing' because of its positive connotations in Western societies.⁷⁸¹ This exploitation of ambiguous meaning buttresses the argument of Deborah Posel that the Botha regime was involved in constructing 'a new language of legitimation'. It further corroborates Dubow's description of National Party discourse as consisting in a 'bewildering vocabulary, in which trusty old formulations were mangled together with neologisms' as part of a reformulation of apartheid rather than its abandonment.⁷⁸²

Despite abandoning Verwoerd's homeland project and committing itself to 'power-sharing', there was also a striking continuity from the first half of the 1980s in terms of the National Party's

⁷⁷⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, Speech by C. Heunis in House of Representatives, from 14 May 1986.

⁷⁷⁸ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Friday, 20 June 1986, Columns 9159-60.

⁷⁷⁹ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Friday, 20 June 1986: Column 9166.

⁷⁸⁰ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 6.

⁷⁸¹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, NP Position Paper, S. Van der Merwe, 'Power-Sharing', Federal Information Service of the National Party, July 1986.

⁷⁸² Dubow, *Apartheid: 1948-1994*, 203.

espoused arguments as to why they rejected any form of majority government and sought to retain fundamentally group-based constitution. National Party representatives also argued in this period that a group-based, non-majoritarian dispensation was essential because of South African circumstances and how these affected the functioning of a political system in South Africa. Such a system was required for the 'continuance of civilised standards'.⁷⁸³ That is to say, the National Party contended that a group-based form of 'power-sharing' was the only form of government which could preserve a free-enterprise economy, peace, prosperity, stability and an effective form of democracy in South Africa.⁷⁸⁴ It was claimed that freedom and democracy were rare and under threat.⁷⁸⁵ Democracy was a recent historical phenomenon whose survival and proper functioning depended on certain prerequisites.⁷⁸⁶ It was argued that South Africa was a society of a unique nature which could not have conventional Western democratic models imposed upon it.⁷⁸⁷ The task was to find a unique constitution which could 'serve a society like ours', and to find a 'kind of democracy' which could be maintained the 'circumstances prevailing in South Africa'.⁷⁸⁸ Heunis contended that the 'realities of South Africa' meant that traditional Western forms of democracy could not form the foundation of a 'viable and lasting democracy' in the country.⁷⁸⁹ 'As a matter of philosophy' he did not think that a majoritarian democracy could endure in South African circumstances.⁷⁹⁰

A reality which was supposed still to constitute a threat to democracy and 'civilised standards' in South Africa was the 'total onslaught' of communists and revolutionaries who were attempting to overthrow the South African Government. Heunis said that the ANC did not seek democracy, but was trying to destroy other African leaders such as Buthelezi and seeking to 'establish a Marxist

⁷⁸³ JWH. Meiring, *Hansard*, Friday, 6 February 1987, Column 396.

⁷⁸⁴ B. du Plessis, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 16 April 1986, Column 3581; ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, Document, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol 74. 1986-8, Document- 'Government by Consent', N/D; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off The Record Foreign Media Briefing by C. Heunis, HF. Verwoerd Building, Cape Town, 12 February 1988.

⁷⁸⁵ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986, Column 5.

⁷⁸⁶ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Column 130; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol. 31 1982-6, C. Heunis, 'In Search of Democracy', *Leadership*, January 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off the Record Foreign Media Briefing by C. Heunis, HF. Verwoerd Building, Cape Town, 12 February 1988.

⁷⁸⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/54 1989, 'Botha: World Should let Pretoria Change at its own Pace', (transcript of interview with Botha) *The Washington Times* 14 March, 1988; PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Monday, 17 April 1989, Column 5474.

⁷⁸⁸ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 18 August 1986, 10162; C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Column 130.

⁷⁸⁹ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 8 May 1989, Column 8000.

⁷⁹⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off The Record Foreign Media Briefing by C. Heunis, HF. Verwoerd Building, Cape Town, 12 February 1988.

state'.⁷⁹¹ FW de Klerk argued that the ANC were seeking to 'grasp' power and if successful would destroy freedom of speech,...private ownership and democracy'.⁷⁹² National Party officials warned also of 'marxist influences' and 'communist expansionism' as threats to South Africa.⁷⁹³ Yet, the National Party also placed great emphasis on other, more deeply entrenched, characteristics of South African society as rendering the country unsuited for any form of majority rule.

One such characteristic of South African society was the existence of ethnic groups which could not be 'ignored or simply changed'.⁷⁹⁴ South Africa was a country with different tribal, ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups.⁷⁹⁵ This included, it was stressed, different black groups whose divisions were 'often more emotional and deep than between White and Black'.⁷⁹⁶ For National Party ministers, this reality was not conducive to a properly functioning majoritarian democracy.⁷⁹⁷ A properly functioning majoritarian democracy had to be based on a 'firm foundation of community consensus' and required agreement on 'basic common values'. In a society without such a common culture, conflicts would be more difficult to resolve.⁷⁹⁸ Voting was not a 'magic word' and would not ensure a 'stable, orderly and satisfied society'.⁷⁹⁹ It was argued that in heterogeneous societies, in practice, people compete for power as part of groups.⁸⁰⁰ The existence of a diversity of groups within a society 'stimulates group action'.⁸⁰¹ As such, South Africa had an inherently great potential for conflict.⁸⁰² In the stated opinion of Chris Heunis, 90% of the world's conflict was caused by race or ethnicity.⁸⁰³ The situation was made more difficult, according the National Party, by the fact that the African population was so much larger than the white population. Despite stressing the difference between different black ethnic groups, the ruling party emphasised that majority rule would

⁷⁹¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off the Record Briefing for 38 Foreign Editors, World Media Group Held in Cape Town, 1987.

⁷⁹² FW. de Klerk, *Hansard*, Thursday, 5 February 1987, Column 322.

⁷⁹³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 32 1985-6, C. Heunis, 'South Africa: An Assessment: Chapter 14: Challenge of Change', November 1986; JWH. Meiring, *Hansard*, Friday, 6 February 1987, Column 410.

⁷⁹⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by Minister C. Heunis, March 1986.

⁷⁹⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol 74. 1986-8, Document- 'Government by Consent'.

⁷⁹⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/11/1/2 Vol. 39. 1989, Address by C. Heunis, 'Constitutional Development: A Perspective', Meeting of the SACS History Society, 13 April 1989; ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of the Washington Times, 25 February 1986.

⁷⁹⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol 74. 1986-8, Document, 'Government by Consent', N/D.

⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁰ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Columns 138-9.

⁸⁰¹ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 5 October, Columns 6671-2.

⁸⁰² *Ibid.*; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum from Discussion with Senator Kennedy, N/D.

⁸⁰³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/4 1985-88, Minutes of Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 24 May 1985.

produce a black majority government of some description. The 'numerical relationship among respective communities' created a risk that whites would be 'swamped' by the majority in political decision-making.⁸⁰⁴ A National Party document commented that accommodating black people in central decision-making was different practically to accommodating Indians or coloureds. This was partly because blacks had the 'potential to subjugate other minority groups by joining forces against them'.⁸⁰⁵ Another National Party position paper stated that in multi-cultural societies majoritarian democracy would constitute a 'dictatorship of the majority'. Without cultural homogeneity, there would be a serious threat to the 'basic interests' of the minority group.⁸⁰⁶ A National Party parliamentarian warned that the overwhelming Zulu majority in KwaZulu and Natal was a key factor in rejecting the Indaba proposals. He cited Arend Lijphart's arguments that ethnicity was likely to persist in an open and democratic South Africa and that power-sharing was problematic in any society in which one group constituted the large majority.⁸⁰⁷ Another parliamentarian warned that a black majority would exclude all minorities from 'political decision-making forever'.⁸⁰⁸ For these reasons, PW Botha said it still needed to be demonstrated that democracy was 'capable of application in our multicultural society'.⁸⁰⁹ Heunis contended that if a democracy that worked rather than a 'democracy in name' was to be established in a multicultural South Africa, a system was required which 'neutralised demographic realities' and prevented group domination.⁸¹⁰ For him, group rights needed not necessarily be considered ends in themselves, but 'means for protecting the individuals belonging to them in a future South Africa'.⁸¹¹ Indeed, the National Party attacked those who sought majority rule as idealists and 'dreamers'. Val Volker said that PFP demands were 'ideologically based' because they ignored 'practical circumstances'.⁸¹² The advocates of the Indaba proposals were described as a 'coalition of dreamers'.⁸¹³ Furthermore, for PG Marais, the

⁸⁰⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 32 1985-6, C. Heunis, 'South Africa: An Assessment: Chapter 14: Challenge of Change', November 1986.

⁸⁰⁵ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

⁸⁰⁶ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, NP Position Paper, S. Van der Merwe,, 'Power-Sharing', Federal Information Service of the National Party, July 1986.

⁸⁰⁷ PJ. Steenkamp, 'The National Party and the Kwa-Natal Indaba', in H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer (eds), *Negotiating South Africa's Future*, (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers, 1989), 47-8.

⁸⁰⁸ PG. Marais, *Hansard*, Friday, 7 April 1989, Column 4925.

⁸⁰⁹ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986: Columns 15-16.

⁸¹⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 32 1985-6, C. Heunis, 'South Africa: An Assessment: Chapter 14: Challenge of Change', November 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol 74 1986-8, Document, 'Government by Consent', N/D.

⁸¹¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, House of Delegates, 1 June 1988.

⁸¹² V. Volker, *Hansard*, Thursday, 29 May 1986, Column 6855.

⁸¹³ GS. Bartlett, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Column 158.

Democratic Party's desire for majority rule was 'just as unattainable as classical apartheid ideology' and would require 'social engineering' akin to that of the Soviet Union.⁸¹⁴

Another reality which rendered South Africa unfitted for any form of majority Government was its economic, developmental and class disparities, which largely coincided with ethnic and racial divisions. PW Botha commented that South Africa had both a first world and a third world economy and that this made it harder to reconcile different sections of society in a common democratic system.⁸¹⁵ For Heunis, South Africa was not only divided between black and white, and black and black, but between the 'privileged and the underprivileged, the poor and the rich, the haves and the have-nots'. This increased further the 'conflict potential' of South African society.⁸¹⁶ Also, the existence of 'first world ideas' in a third world economy would cause a rise in expectations beyond what could be satisfied.⁸¹⁷ Heunis told US Senator Kennedy that in affluent societies 'people are often more prepared to share than to divide', but this was not the case in the 'third world'. In fact, political systems in such societies had often 'crashed and failed' partly 'because the economies could not be sustained'.⁸¹⁸ These ideas are also reflected in the writings of Sampie Terreblanche, the Stellenbosch academic who became increasingly critical of the National Party in second half of the 1980s, but who was a close friend of Heunis's. Indeed, several copies of an academic paper by Terreblanche entitled 'Economic Implications of a Federal Model for South Africa' can be found amongst Heunis's private documents. In this, Terreblanche argued that a First World economy was vital for a 'people's democracy'. He pointed out that most nineteenth century democracies had been 'bourgeois democracies' with a limited franchise, and claimed that they had only become 'people's democracies' when they had 'sufficiently developed economically'. South Africa was a developing country and did not have 'the tax capacity to support a fully developed people's democracy'.⁸¹⁹ Similar ideas can be seen in Heunis's comments to Parliament that most countries with 'model democracies' were 'highly developed'. The 'so-called "democracies"' in developing countries lacked the 'large revenue resources which are a prerequisite for a successful democracy modelled on western lines'.⁸²⁰ President Botha argued that there was a great danger involved in synchronising

⁸¹⁴ PG. Marais, *Hansard*, Friday, 7 April 1989, Column 4924-5.

⁸¹⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of the Washington Times, 25 February, 1986.

⁸¹⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum from Discussion with Senator Kennedy N/D.

⁸¹⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection, A1/4/2 Vol 74. 1986-8, Document, 'Government by Consent', N/D.

⁸¹⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum from Discussion with Senator Kennedy N/D.

⁸¹⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, SJ. Terreblanche, 'Economic Implications of a Federal Model for South Africa', Paper Delivered at a Symposium: 'Federalism: An Option for South Africa', Institute for Political and Africa Studies, Jan Smuts Holiday Inn, 20 November 1985.

⁸²⁰ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Column 140.

South Africa's first and third world economies of 'destroying the principle of private initiative'.⁸²¹ Heunis warned reporters that many South Africans did not 'really understand the free enterprise system'. It was not only the political system which was under attack, but also the economic system. It would be very difficult to persuade people that the free enterprise system served the common interest rather than just white interests.⁸²² Similarly, Val Volker cautioned that it was a 'universal phenomenon that severe poverty radicalises', particularly when first world and third world communities existed alongside each other.⁸²³ There is a 1987 document from PW Botha's official files entitled 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA'. In this document it is argued that interests of all South Africans were best served by the protection and development of the country's economy. Given that only the white people had 'expertise comparable to the expertise of the Western world', the other groups were to a great extent dependent on the white community. A majority government would result in the developing communities which only possessed 'third world expertise' would acquire 'total political power'. The country's economy and therefore the national interests would suffer serious injury.⁸²⁴ Therefore, a majority government was 'totally unrealistic and unfeasible'.⁸²⁵ Chris Heunis echoed these thoughts in 1989, saying that 'basically, ours is a developmental problem and not a racial or a colour problem'. Only twenty percent of the population was developed.⁸²⁶ Heunis argued that across the third world countries had not gained 'peace, security, prosperity and freedom' as the result of ascertaining political rights.⁸²⁷

A further reality which the National Party claimed ruled out the possibility of successful or viable majority government in South Africa was the culture of Africa and Africans. Firstly, it was claimed that the cultural differences between black Africans and other groups was 'very substantial' and greater than those between whites, coloureds and Indians.⁸²⁸ This made it more difficult to include Africans in central, democratic institutions of government. One of Heunis's official documents comments the 'impediment' of 'social dualism' in South Africa whereby 'modern and traditional cultures' existed in one geographical unit. This was another factor which prevented the 'national

⁸²¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of the Washington Times, 25 February, 1986.

⁸²² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off the Record Briefing for 38 Foreign Editors, World Media Group, Cape Town, 1987.

⁸²³ V. Volker, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 4 April 1989, Column 4198.

⁸²⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, Document, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987.

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/11/1/2 Vol. 39. 1989, Address by C. Heunis, 'Constitutional Development: A Perspective', Meeting of the SACS History Society, 13 April 1989.

⁸²⁷ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 9 June 1987, Column 1125.

⁸²⁸ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

consensus' which was necessary for conventional democracy.⁸²⁹ Moreover, President Botha told the *Washington Times* that 'our black tribes' could not be compared to 'your thoroughly Americanised Blacks who have been part of your culture for generations. Your Blacks' culture and language is American, not African'.⁸³⁰ Also, remarks made by National Party officials suggested that the culture of black Africans was not one in which democracy could easily take root. 'Africa has no love for democracy', declared Defence Minister Magnus Malan in a 1987 National Party meeting. 'Of the 50 independent states, more than 40 are one-party states and military dictatorships'.⁸³¹ Likewise, an official document from President Botha's files says that the economy would be destroyed and minorities would be oppressed if majority rule were granted, 'as is the case elsewhere in Africa'.⁸³² Botha warned of the 'grim alternatives' illustrated by the 'marxist states' and 'miserable failures' 'seen all over Africa'.⁸³³ Indeed, Heunis declared that 'democracy does not have a successful history in Africa'. Almost all African states had one-party governments. This 'tendency' was also present 'in Black political cultures within South Africa'. In fact, it was 'still open to question' whether a 'durable democratic system' could be 'established in Black political cultures'.⁸³⁴ Furthermore, the National Party continued to warn of Africans' inclination towards tribalism and tribal conflict. As noted, the different culture and identity of tribes was emphasised, and PW Botha warned that one-man-one-vote would lead to an 'inter-tribal blood bath'. He claimed that the Government had had to stop intertribal fighting between Zulus and Pondos.⁸³⁵ Another National Party parliamentarian cautioned that 'too often liberation served only to gain complete control for Africans and then the strongest black ethnic group takes over'.⁸³⁶

Furthermore, National Party officials argued that mechanisms for minority protection within a majoritarian democracy could not be sufficient to guarantee minority rights and the continuance of civilised standards. For Stoffel Van der Merwe, this was partly because 'constitutional guarantees' were 'not worth the paper on which they were written'. Many leaders of the majority had torn up

⁸²⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol 74. 1986-8 Document, 'Government by Consent', N/D.

⁸³⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/54 1989, Transcript of interview with PW. Botha, 'Botha: World Should let Pretoria Change at its own Pace', *The Washington Times* 14 March, 1988.

⁸³¹ ACA, Magnus Malan Collection PV634, 2/2/100-114 1987, M. Malan Points for Speech to NP Meeting, 28 March 1987.

⁸³² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987 Document, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987.

⁸³³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of the *Washington Times*, 25 February 1986.

⁸³⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 32 1985-6, C. Heunis, 'South Africa: An Assessment: Chapter 14: Challenge of Change', November 1986.

⁸³⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of *The Washington Times*, 25 February 1986.

⁸³⁶ Steenkamp, 'The National Party and the Kwa-Natal Indaba', in Giliomee and Schlemmer (eds), *Negotiating South Africa's Future*, 50.

the constitution and treated minorities as they chose.⁸³⁷ For Heunis, there needed to be 'greater power that guarantees the maintenance of a constitution'. The only such power self-determination of groups.⁸³⁸

In its emphasis on the importance of realities, context and history, the National Party's thinking resembled to some extent the thinking of Inkatha. Indeed, like the National Party, Inkatha expressed fear of the threat of revolution and the dangers of Marxism and dictatorship. It stressed that democracy could only survive in certain conditions and that poverty, inequality and instability undermined it. Inkatha also perceived some problems with conventional democratic government in South African circumstances and therefore sought a degree of power-sharing and devolution within a broadly majoritarian system. On the other hand, there were clear differences in the two parties' perceptions of the relevant realities, and their way of thinking about South African politics. Unlike the National Party, Inkatha thought that the degree of economic and social interdependence between different ethnic groups in South Africa and the history of the country made a form of majority rule desirable and inevitable. This was also necessary to prevent the radical outcomes of which Buthelezi disapproved.

Despite the claims of Volker not to be ideological, it seems that the governing party's vision of reality was refracted through its ideological lens which magnified the significance of matters of identity and political self-determination while minimising other relevant considerations. Commenting on the subject of South Africa's transition to confederation or federation in 1986, PW Botha asked 'If federation or confederation were a simple matter, why is the EEC not much more than a customs union with, after 40 years of effort, a European Parliament whose role is still very limited. If it's as easy as our detractors claim, why hasn't tiny Luxemburg with 350,000 people, integrated with France, or West Germany, or Belgium?'⁸³⁹ Such analogies with European integration were made throughout the 1980s by a range of National Party politicians as a means of demonstrating the realities which, as they perceived it, shaped South African politics. In the mid-1980s, when it was proposed that urban African communities should become micro-states, an official document cited the examples of San Marino and Monaco as the sort of states which were intended.⁸⁴⁰ Earlier, party documents suggested that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or the European Community were

⁸³⁷ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

⁸³⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Statement by C. Heunis, Pretoria, 7 November 1988.

⁸³⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of *The Washington Times*, 25 February 1986.

⁸⁴⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

models for the proposed Constellation of States in southern Africa.⁸⁴¹ This would strike many, including Buthelezi, as reflecting a very distorted perception of the social and economic realities of South Africa and their significance. Indeed, when the National Party was committed to homeland independence in 1982, Botha sought to overcome objections about the viability of those states by saying that no country was sovereign 'in an absolute sense', even the United States could not act as it pleased and all nations were interdependent to a degree.⁸⁴² This reveals the sort of deeply ideological commitment to self-determination which is incompatible with the Burkean outlook which Buthelezi had. Because all sovereignty is relative, for Botha there was no significant difference between the independence of the United States and the independence of KwaZulu. Because all countries were interdependent to some extent, the extreme and unequal interdependence between South Africa and its homelands did not present any insurmountable obstacle. If European nation-states, which had similar levels of wealth and citizens who for the most part occupied distinct territories, had political self-determination, then Botha could not see any reason why South Africa's ethnic, racial and cultural groups, which were profoundly interconnected and unequally interdependent in social, economic and geographic terms, should not also have political self-determination. This represents the fixation with 'universals and essences' and the oversight of the difference between 'more and less' of which Burke so strongly disapproved. Indeed, much party rhetoric implied that there was a fundamental right to group self-determination and to an 'own community life'.⁸⁴³ For PW Botha, people who wished to 'live among their own people and have their own community life' and any group which wanted to 'uphold its own values and way of life' had a right to do so.⁸⁴⁴ The Government's approach had 'always been that each group has the vested right to cherish and to protect its own way of life' and to preserve 'its own unique identity'.⁸⁴⁵ For another National Party minister, a new dispensation needed to guarantee each group a 'reasonable degree of *lebensraum*'.⁸⁴⁶ Stoffel Botha argued that a group could not accept a loss of its 'own power bases' because this would lead to a loss of 'control over its own destiny'.⁸⁴⁷ This marks out the National party world-view as drastically different to Inkatha's. Although Buthelezi was a defender of the idea of distinctive cultural identities within South Africa and power-sharing and regional

⁸⁴¹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

⁸⁴² PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Thursday, 15 April 1982, Column 4515.

⁸⁴³ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Monday, 5 October 1987, Column 6668.

⁸⁴⁴ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Monday, 5 October 1987, Column 6675.

⁸⁴⁵ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Monday, 5 October 1987, Column 6669.

⁸⁴⁶ FW. de Klerk, *Hansard*, Friday, 12 May 1989, 8620-1.

⁸⁴⁷ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/1 1987, Speech by S. Botha during no-confidence debate, February 1987.

devolution as means of balancing different interests, he never espoused any idea of an intrinsic or metaphysical right to self-determination for cultures or peoples.

Another significant difference between Inkatha and the National Party's interpretation of the South African realities, is that the former seems primarily to have seen the threat to democracy and ordered liberty as arising largely from revolutionary radicalism, whereas the latter expressed a great deal of concern regarding what they perceived as the lack of cultural sophistication and social development of Africans as a key reason why no form of majority government could function properly in South Africa. Buthelezi sought the conservation of certain traditional African structures and 'patterns of thought'. Inkatha's utterances as described in chapter one of this thesis reveal that it perceived differences and tensions between Western values and traditional African thinking. But notwithstanding the need to adapt Western models to local circumstances, Buthelezi did not perceive African culture as precluding successful development towards a broadly liberal and democratic South Africa, at least as far as inter-cultural relations were concerned. The National Party saw in African society a deeply-ingrained character which ruled out a successful transition to democracy. It was not simply concerned by the prospect of a premeditated communist revolution, but by the allegedly inherent propensity of African societies towards a concentration of powers and 'ethnic domination' by the strongest group.⁸⁴⁸ Indeed, this reveals a worry that Inkatha and its Zulu constituency was itself a threat to the liberty and prosperity of South Africa. A 1984 Government document described Buthelezi as ruling KwaZulu like a 'typical one-party African state'.⁸⁴⁹ Volker remarked in 1981 that regardless of Buthelezi's politics, the Inkatha leader had a constituency which was not yet ripe for normal democratic participation.⁸⁵⁰ Moreover, the National Party differed with Buthelezi in its emphasis on the inability of different African ethnic groups being able to coexist in a common political system.

In the second half of the 1980s, the National Party did not state publicly what the specific nature of the constitutional dispensation and the process envisaged. Dubow notes that the form of the power-sharing which was promised by Government was 'unspecified'.⁸⁵¹ The private interactions of cabinet ministers reveal that there was no agreed upon model which they sought to establish. Indeed, there was disagreement as to whether they ought even to be discussing the exact nature of the final dispensation which they were trying to bring about. Chris Heunis was even rebuked for producing a document which made a proposal for a 'final' goal. This rebuke was made by President

⁸⁴⁸ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 2 February 1983, Column 212.

⁸⁴⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-85, 'Nasionale State Agtergrondinligting', January 1984.

⁸⁵⁰ 'Volker: It's impossible to share power in SA', *The Argus*, 9 October 1981.

⁸⁵¹ Dubow, *Apartheid: 1948-1994*, 203.

Botha's private secretary and then biographer, Dr Prinsloo. He claimed to be representing the President when he argued that the party should be guided by key principles, but that they did not have the foresight to decide on final outcomes. They ought simply to be constructing building blocks for the next stage of political development depending on 'the success achieved over the short term, and given the political environment, the security configuration, the support of the electorate'.⁸⁵² This seems to confirm the view of Waldmeir that 'no ideology, no visions, guided them',⁸⁵³ and of Sparks that reforms were piecemeal and 'no clear vision' guided Botha.⁸⁵⁴ Yet, there is evidence that serious consideration was given by Government ministers and the State President to the nature of the dispensation which they were seeking to create. There are indications which reveal in greater detail the nature of PW Botha's preferences and rationale for constitutional development, including an in-depth examination by his office of a particular political model. Moreover, Government documents give new insights into the nature of other ministers' constitutional thinking. In particular, they highlight and illustrate the significant differences in outlook between Chris Heunis and PW Botha.

In constitutional discussions in Tuynhuys in mid-1987, Botha dismissed Heunis's suggestions that a Joint Council of State be created which, though not the final dispensation, would possess significant decision-making powers. Heunis had proposed four alternatives, each varying in functions and structure, with the State President possessing either the decisive vote or a veto. President Botha objected to the composition of such a Council of State, which was proposed to represent thirty urban African communities, eighteen for the self-governing areas, three representatives each from the white, Indian and coloured houses of parliament. With such a composition, Botha stated, there was a danger that the voices of the whites would not be heard in consultation. If such a body was given legislative authority, it would descend into majority rule.⁸⁵⁵ Despite his general aversion to spelling out what the final dispensation would consist of, PW Botha's official documents do contain a detailed 'concept for a new constitutional or political order for the RSA' from late-1987 which appears to have been prepared by his own office. This document claims to be inspired by the Swiss Cantonal system and probably corresponds to the concept Botha referred to in a 1995 interview with Patti Waldmeir in which he stated that the 'end result of my vision' was based on the Swiss model and that in the later stages of his time in office he sent people to Switzerland to study the

⁸⁵² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-87, Report of Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee, 4 November 1987.

⁸⁵³ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 42.

⁸⁵⁴ Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 68.

⁸⁵⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

system there.⁸⁵⁶ It states that even though a new system of government ought to pursue and achieve consensus between the groups to a great extent, it was 'impossible to establish a government in the RSA that rests absolutely on consensus between these communities'. This was because of the extent of the differences between the groups in terms of 'expertise, developmental level, culture and language'. The non-white groups were to 'the greatest extent dependent on the expertise of the white community' which would need to be transferred to the non-whites over the course of time.⁸⁵⁷ This corroborates Giliomee's argument that the National Party leadership believed that progress and good government in South Africa depended on the continuation of 'firm control by an Afrikaner leadership'.⁸⁵⁸ According to the concept document, the constitutional arrangement needed to draw a distinction between the right to participate in negotiations regarding common affairs, which was a basic democratic right, and the right to vote on common affairs, which depended on whether such an entitlement 'best served the national interest'. As such, South Africa should be divided into ten cantons. The six self-governing homelands and four central cantons (white, black, Indians and coloureds). All ten cantons were to be represented in a central legislative authority which would have 200 seats. These seats were to be apportioned on the basis of each canton's average tax contribution over the past five years, with each canton being entitled to a minimum of ten representatives. However, not all representatives would be able to vote. Voting rights would be determined solely by a canton's total tax contribution and the average contribution of its adult citizens.⁸⁵⁹ Such a system would, for the foreseeable future, have conferred very little influence over common affairs on the non-white communities and would have given the representatives of the white canton a decisive influence in national policy-making. Blacks' representatives would have been limited mainly to participating in discussions which preceded votes in which they had little influence. And such a dispensation would have made it likely that the overwhelming majority of black representatives in such discussions came from the self-governing homelands, rather than the more radical urban areas. PW Botha even rebuked minister Pik Botha in February 1986 for declaring that he would serve under a black president of South Africa. FW de Klerk was also hostile to Pik's announcement, preferring a 'rotational presidency'.⁸⁶⁰

⁸⁵⁶ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, PW. Botha Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 March 1995.

⁸⁵⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, Document, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987.

⁸⁵⁸ H. Giliomee, 'Afrikaner Politics 1977-87: Afrikaner Nationalist Rule to Central State Hegemony', in Brewer (ed.), *Five Minutes to Midnight: Can South Africa Survive?*, 117.

⁸⁵⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987 Document, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987.

⁸⁶⁰ De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 107.

Botha's remarks in correspondence with other National Party leading figures suggest that he was not concerned to develop a constitution which reallocated a degree of effective decision-making influence over national affairs to non-white citizens. Indeed, the aforementioned policy concept departs from the National Party's publicly stated view that common affairs decision-making would be based on consensus between groups and that all groups would enjoy an equal status in a national-decision-making forum. The concept seems specifically contrived to give black populations participation in common decision-making without influence in common decision-making. Indeed, the 'expertise' of whites was seen as a justification for the retention of control by whites over 'common affairs' and certainly over 'white' South Africa. It was explicitly designed to keep power over 'common affairs' in the hands of those groups which already possessed the greatest proportion of wealth. To the extent power was to be redistributed to Africans, it was to be divided, rather than shared. In discussions with cabinet in Tuynhuys, Botha's emphasis was on the blacks' rights to vote for their own local governments and on the importance of effective urban administration. In support of this position, he cited Ronald Reagan on the importance of tribal governments in providing for the needs of Native Americans.⁸⁶¹ A leaked tape recording of a conversation between Botha and Van Zyl Slabbert revealed that the State President had told Buthelezi that the Zulus did not need more political rights in the first instance, because they already enjoyed political rights. Rather, they needed the socio-economic development of KwaZulu.⁸⁶²

Botha's emphasis on the importance of protecting the white minority's self-determination was particularly emphatic. At Tuynhuys, he told his colleagues that the rights of minority groups were 'the core of our entire existence'. He was concerned that if whites abnegated their self-determination in any significant way, there would be catastrophic consequences. Botha stated to cabinet that he did care what 'Anton Rupert says or what old Sampie Terreblanche says' - if they deviated from the National Party Federal Council's resolutions, 'we've had it'. If the whites were to let the security services or the treasury out of their control, 'we've had it'.⁸⁶³ It seems, in fact, that Botha attached less significance to his Government's concession of a joint citizenship for all South Africans than would appear at first glance. He commented to Waldmeir that despite this shift he was seeking to establish a confederal system, because he was concerned that any form of federation

⁸⁶¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

⁸⁶² RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

⁸⁶³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

which could be formed from the top-down would 'lead to majority government'.⁸⁶⁴ Indeed, Botha continued to insist that Africans be accommodated in a different way to Indians and coloureds.⁸⁶⁵ There seems therefore to be a strong continuity in Botha's thinking from the early-1980s when he sought to put 'a roof over apartheid'.⁸⁶⁶ He continued to preclude a 'fourth chamber' for Africans in the national parliament.⁸⁶⁷ Indeed, Botha seemed uncomfortable with the changes announced in 1985, telling Chris Heunis that 'I thought on August 2 that we had clarity, but I do not think that we have it anymore. Because you want me to say we stand for a unitary South Africa, you allow me to say it, you write it in my speeches, and I accept it, but what do we mean by that?'⁸⁶⁸ The constitutional concept detailed in Botha's official documents does not consider any other forms of power-sharing or power-division, but contrasts itself only with majority rule.⁸⁶⁹ In one sense, these sources confirm the view that Botha was trying to 'share power without losing control', but they give a clearer demonstration that despite the Government's rhetorical shift towards 'power-sharing', Botha was determined to keep as much decision-making influence over South African affairs as possible in white hands, and seemed to think that any sharing of power was tantamount to a loss of control. He was adamant on retaining absolute control over 'white South Africa'. Giliomee argued that Botha was seeking to give blacks a say, 'but certainly not the decisive say'.⁸⁷⁰ These sources reveal that Botha had an extremely broad definition of what would constitute a 'decisive say' for blacks. They illustrate that any compromise of whites' control over their own affairs or even common affairs was dismissed by Botha as tantamount to majority rule or as a slippery slope towards majority rule.

Chris Heunis was one of the National Party's key cabinet ministers in the 1980s. He chaired the Special Cabinet Committee for black affairs from late-1983,⁸⁷¹ and was perhaps the most prominent spokesperson on the subject of reform. He also headed the Department for Constitutional Development and Planning played a significant role in the design and undertaking of the reform process. Like other Government ministers, Heunis did not express a detailed conception in public of the form a final dispensation was intended to take. Yet, an examination of his official documents alongside his public utterances give an insight into the type of constitutional dispensation which he

⁸⁶⁴ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, PW. Botha Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 March 1995.

⁸⁶⁵ Giliomee, *Last of the Afrikaner Leaders*, 185.

⁸⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁸⁶⁷ Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 82-3.

⁸⁶⁸ Giliomee, *Last of the Afrikaner Leaders*, 188.

⁸⁶⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, Document, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987.

⁸⁷⁰ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 147.

⁸⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 177.

envisaged in this period. Heunis made proposals within the framework of group self-determination, group-based participation, consensus decision-making and a distinction between 'own' and joint affairs'. Yet, he and his department seemed, in contrast to Botha, to have believed that a new political system would need to confer a considerably greater degree of influence on African communities at the level of national decision-making. He remarked to the Corporate Forum Meeting in 1987 that it needed to be accepted that 'effective bargaining power will be transferred to blacks'. From an African perspective, bargaining power would 'only be effective if it also enables them to influence to a satisfactory extent fiscal decisions'.⁸⁷² This judgement was rooted in the assumption, not apparently shared with the State President, that Africans' exclusion from the decision-making process at central government level, rather than merely socio-economic grievances, was a key cause of black protest and unrest. This is expressed in a Department of Constitutional Development and Planning memorandum from March 1986, which stressed that black grievance and frustration were closely bound up with a desire for a 'redistribution of power' and 'full accommodation' in a 'political order in which equal civil rights are guaranteed to all South Africans regardless of race, colour or ethnicity'. There was evidence that Africans would continue to legitimise their violent challenge against the Government as long as they were marginalised from the 'mainstream of effective decision-making' and connected their struggle to the pursuit of fundamental human rights. It was noted that black leaders and 'sophisticated blacks in general' saw political power as a means to an end and as the only way to address socio-economic deprivation and other issues.⁸⁷³ There was an apparent eagerness in Heunis's politics to bring about a constitutional dispensation which could satisfy, at least somewhat, these aspirations. Indeed, it was Heunis's department which wrote PW Botha's January 1985 speech in which he first announced a commitment to providing representation 'at the highest level' for Africans outside the homelands.⁸⁷⁴

The National Party's official documents support FW de Klerk's contention that Heunis 'tended to attach less importance to the concept of own affairs than some of the committee and I did',⁸⁷⁵ or at least that he preferred a narrow conception of own affairs and a broad definition of common affairs. It is stated in a report of a meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee in late-1987 that Heunis had proposed a definition of own affairs which primarily concerned the 'cultural and educational domain, including welfare and certain aspects of health possibly'. Heunis drew a distinction between

⁸⁷² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis, 'The Present State and the Future of Reform', The Corporate Forum Meeting, Mount Nelson Hotel 13 June 1987.

⁸⁷³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting 8 March 1986.

⁸⁷⁴ Giliomee, *Last of the Afrikaner Leaders*, 185.

⁸⁷⁵ De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 101.

his view and the idea that there should be a maximal and broad definition of own affairs. Without a broad definition of common affairs, Heunis argued, there could not be a phasing out of 'existing, fundamental inequality' in terms of the distribution of the financial resources of the country. He gave an example of fundamental problems which might arise in that a hospital located in a white area might fall under white own affairs, but might in practice need to be used mainly by non-white people. As such, the definition of own affairs would come into conflict with what they wanted to achieve. The problem they faced in practice was that politics had to do with the distribution of benefits, and many saw the group definition as synonymous with 'white wealth and non-white poverty'. Many black leaders would refuse to participate in negotiations as long as the group concept was seen to be an impediment to reducing inequality. The group definition, instead, needed to be made into a 'vehicle for rights and not for prejudice'.⁸⁷⁶ Moreover, Giliomee argues that Heunis pushed for an extension of 'general affairs' in the tricameral parliament as early as 1984.⁸⁷⁷ This not only contrasted with Botha's approach, but also with a range of cabinet ministers', including Gerrit Viljoen, who has often been seen as relatively *verligte* or enlightened. Viljoen challenged Heunis's suggestion that a concept of own affairs could be chiefly concerned with issues of cultural identity. He warned that 'when own affairs are defined strictly as only those that are necessary for identity, they would basically be reduced to education and culture'. This was a 'problem' for Viljoen who believed that groups had not only an identity but also a 'quality of life'. A 'maximal definition' of own interests was preferable, because a minimal definition would lack 'sufficient content to provide a solid foundation for own affairs'. Kobie Coetsee shared these concerns, arguing that a narrow definition of group rights could 'weaken considerably' the 'protection and balancing of groups' rights'. Own affairs ought to be defined 'as widely as possible' in order to achieve the Government's main objectives.⁸⁷⁸ On these important matters, the majority of Heunis's cabinet colleagues seemed to side err with the party leader rather than the minister of Constitutional Development and Planning. This corroborates the testimony of Andreas van Wyk who said that Heunis was the most *verligte* member of the cabinet more certain in his commitment to political change.⁸⁷⁹

In terms of the central legislative institution in which decision-making on common affairs, Heunis maintained that such a body should be composed of representatives of the own affairs legislative

⁸⁷⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-87, Report of Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee, 4 November 1987.

⁸⁷⁷ Giliomee, *Last of the Afrikaner Leaders*, 184.

⁸⁷⁸ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-87, Report of Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee, 4 November 1987.

⁸⁷⁹ Giliomee, *Last of the Afrikaner Leaders*, 183.

bodies and decision-making should occur on the basis of one group ought to have a 'continuous veto over the other'.⁸⁸⁰ But a narrower conception of own affairs would have made the veto power of the non-white groups more meaningful and reduced the power of whites to dictate which 'joint' decisions were to be made. Moreover, Heunis speculated that a national joint legislative body might contain 200 or 300 hundred non-white representatives compared to a much smaller number of white representatives. He said that this should be considered despite the shock it would cause to the white population. He also hinted that his previous suggestions were more shocking to white voters.⁸⁸¹ The type of assembly envisaged by Heunis would, despite veto rights, have been a system in which whites could not determine the nature of the dialogue and the agenda for discussions. In Heunis's approach can be detected not only the influence of his departmental advisers, but of Sampie Terreblanche, the Stellenbosch academic who left the National Party in 1987 calling for more meaningful reform.⁸⁸² Terreblanche is described by Chris Heunis's son, Jan, as 'an erstwhile friend and confidant of my father' and many copies of his 1985 speech 'Federalism: An Option for South Africa' are amongst Heunis's official documents.⁸⁸³ In this speech, Terreblanche argued that for a system to be acceptable it had to ensure the transfer of 'a certain amount of effective bargaining power' to blacks. This meant sufficient influence over the way 'public funds are collected and allocated' and a 'scaling down of the effective bargaining power in the hands of whites'. The 'real challenge' was to do this without giving black people a degree of influence which would 'empower them to overthrow the economic apple cart. This is easier said than done'.⁸⁸⁴

It is argued by Jan Heunis, that his father's publicly stated positions often contrasted with privately held beliefs. He refers to a memorandum from 1985 in which Heunis discussed the possibility, amongst other options, of some form of majoritarian government for South Africa.⁸⁸⁵ In the sources stated above, Heunis's proposals were within the framework of a group-based system and a distinction between own and common affairs. Yet, this might partly have been a reflection of his working within the parameters which Botha set out. Certainly, in May 1989, when Botha had ceased to be party leader, Heunis announced a 'vision for the future' based on a 'non-numerical democracy'

⁸⁸⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-87, Report of Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee, 4 November 1987.

⁸⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸² O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 373.

⁸⁸³ Heunis, *The Inner Circle*, 105.

⁸⁸⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, SJ. Terreblanche, 'Economic Implications of a Federal Model for South Africa', paper delivered at a Symposium: 'Federalism: An Option for South Africa', Institute for Political and Africa Studies, Jan Smuts Holiday Inn, 20 November 1985.

⁸⁸⁵ Heunis, *The Inner Circle*, 124; *Ibid.*, 127-8

with a multi-racial cabinet. Numbers would still not be 'the decisive factor', but there would be a single voters' roll.⁸⁸⁶

The analysis undertaken above shows with greater evidence and intricacy the nature of the debates which occurred in the National Party about constitutional objectives in the period 1985-1989. It also shows that in the outcomes which Heunis contemplated, a significant contrast can be seen with the policies of PW Botha and other like-minded cabinet ministers. It buttresses and elucidates the accounts of Giliomee, Jan Heunis, Swilling and Phillips who write of significant political differences between Heunis and the State President in the second half of the 1980s, but who do not undertake a detailed comparison. It elaborates on the description cited by O'Meara of a ferment on the left of the National Party in the second half of the 1980s. This analysis provides a more detailed characterisation of Heunis as a 'New Nat', described in O'Meara's book as those who were dissatisfied with the lack of meaningful reform undertaken by the dominant 'PW Nats', but sought nevertheless to work for change from within the party. It also shows the similarity in thought between the Heunis and Sampie Terreblanche, a prominent 'Past Nat' who left the party because of his frustrations with the 'PW Nats'.⁸⁸⁷ Waldmeir argued that Botha could not 'overcome the central dilemma of his presidency; He had to yield some power to blacks in order to maintain white control'.⁸⁸⁸ It is not clear that Botha even grasped the nature of his dilemma so described. As Jannie Roux stated, 'I think he thought that you could improve apartheid so that it would be morally more acceptable, it will be possible to accommodate the black people to the extent that they would be happy and satisfied and that they could have a vote whatever that may have meant in his ideas'.⁸⁸⁹ Heunis and his planners, however, both understood the dilemma and were prepared undertake a redistribution of power. They recognised that, as Rotberg states, 'Africans would be satisfied with nothing less than the political kingdom. That was the predominant message of the 1980s'.⁸⁹⁰ This is not to say that Heunis saw a conventional democracy as desirable. As shown, there were fundamental differences between his proposals and those of Inkatha, let alone the ANC. Heunis continued to frame his politics for most of this period in the prevailing National Party idiom, espousing a commitment in public and with colleagues to self-determination and the distinction between 'own' and 'common' affairs. These were the concepts which Buthelezi described as being in the language of classical apartheid. Yet, within the scope offered by these concepts Heunis advocated a reform which would transfer a significant degree of power from whites to non-whites.

⁸⁸⁶ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 397; Friedman, *Options for the Future*, 13.

⁸⁸⁷ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 372-3.

⁸⁸⁸ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 46.

⁸⁸⁹ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, J. le Roux Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 30 November 1994.

⁸⁹⁰ Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy*, 350.

This placed his vision was very much closer to Buthelezi's than to Botha's and many other ministers'. Whereas Botha's rigid ideology seemed to prevent him from seeing the imperative of redistributing power to a significant degree, Heunis, like Buthelezi, perceived that South African realities did require the redistribution of power over so-called common affairs to Africans.

Chapter Six: 'We sit ver things over which we have jurisdiction'. Channelling Inkatha's role in South African Politics and Salvaging Verwoerdian Apartheid, 1980-1985.

As shown in part one, Inkatha shared with the National Party a deep concern about the rise of revolutionary radicalism in South Africa. It rejected socialism, argued against sanctions and disinvestment whilst denouncing violent protest against apartheid. Buthelezi denounced Black Consciousness ideology and increasingly came into political conflict with the ANC and the United Democratic Front. It reached out to the Government in private and public discourse, and through constructive negotiating initiatives such as the Buthelezi Commission, for a cooperative partnership based on a shared opposition to revolutionary politics.

Despite its differences with the National Party in terms of desired constitutional outcome for South Africa, Inkatha clearly offered a less radical form of change than the increasingly popular radical African politics of the ANC and Black Consciousness activists and, from 1983, the UDF. Moreover, Buthelezi enjoyed a degree of domestic and international credibility far higher than any other black figure to the right of the ANC and its allies. In the first half of the 1980s, journalists and commentators speculated about the prospect of a Botha and Buthelezi partnership in reform. In 1983, following the split in the National Party and the founding of the Conservative Party, Hermann Giliomee argued that Botha would not undertake liberal reform but seek an 'imaginative deal' with Buthelezi to prevent a situation where the Zulu leader will have to conduct a policy of open confrontation with Pretoria or lose all credibility'.⁸⁹¹ A year prior, he suggested that there might be a tendency in white politics towards a settlement which would 'accommodate white and black aspirations'. There were 'signs that the National party leadership senses that the day cannot be postponed much longer when an alternative political dispensation will have to be negotiated with authentic black leaders. And chief Buthelezi undeniably is just that'.⁸⁹² Moreover, opposition politicians, such as Colin Eglin of the PFP called upon Government 'at all costs' to 'give emphasis and positive support to Black leaders such as Chief Gatsha Buthelezi' who was 'trying desperately to find

⁸⁹¹ H. Giliomee, 'After the split: Botha's options', *Eastern Province Herald*, 2 March 1983.

⁸⁹² H. Giliomee, 'New trend in white politics, pattern of politics', *Eastern Province Herald*, 16 March 1982.

a peaceful solution' for South Africa. If moderate blacks were not offered encouragement by Government then an eventual negotiated settlement would become extremely difficult.⁸⁹³

No scholarly account gives a thorough and focused consideration of what role Botha's Government envisage for Inkatha in the first half of the 1980s. It is not asked how significant Inkatha was to the National Party's plans in this period, nor to what extent the ruling party perceived there to be benefits or disadvantages of potential partnership or collaboration with Inkatha. No account illustrates how the National Party responded to Buthelezi's proposals for reform and cooperation. And there is no detailed characterisation of the nature of the National Party's interactions with Inkatha or how it sought to influence Inkatha's politics. This chapter will bring original primary source analysis to bear in order to give more focused and detailed answers to these questions. It will explain the nature of the National Party's approach to politics in this period and where Inkatha lay within it.

In seeking to salvage the Verwoerdian homelands project in the early-1980s, Botha sought to implement an 'all-embracing response' to an 'all-embracing onslaught'.⁸⁹⁴ At the National Party's Federal Congress, Chris Heunis said the Government was committed to simultaneous reforms in the economic, social and political spheres.⁸⁹⁵ Botha said that the war was only '20 to 30 percent military'.⁸⁹⁶ In setting out his total strategy, the Prime Minister acknowledged a number of grievances which non-white populations had and recognized errors in the way the National Party had implemented its programme. Botha said that the country's problems could only be overcome by 'doing to others as I would have them do unto me'.⁸⁹⁷ He urged that 'we must see to it that others cannot point a finger at us and say that we have suppressed their rights. We became strong because others tried to oppress us'.⁸⁹⁸ The Afrikaner needed to be prepared to 'follow the road of justice' in its treatment of non-whites if it wanted to thwart the powers of radicalism.⁸⁹⁹ He spoke also of the need to abolish 'hurtful, unnecessary discrimination' which damaged people's 'self-respect' and

⁸⁹³ C. Eglin, *Hansard*, Friday, 5 March 1982, Column 2271.

⁸⁹⁴ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 2 February 1982, Column 112.

⁸⁹⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 59 1978-87, 'National Party: Federal Congress', Bloemfontein, 30-31 July 1982.

⁸⁹⁶ PW. Botha Speech, NP meeting, Bethlehem, 29 September 1979, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 35.

⁸⁹⁷ PW. Botha Speech, NP Information Conference, Cape Town, 8 March 1980, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 17.

⁸⁹⁸ PW. Botha Speech, NP meeting, George, 8 November 1980, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 18.

⁸⁹⁹ PW. Botha, Republic Festival, Rand Afrikaans University, 27 March 1982, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 19.

created 'circumstances of conflict and confrontation'.⁹⁰⁰ Botha further expressed concern about the way economic inequalities fomented radicalism and opposition towards the state. It could be 'conducive to good neighbourliness' for there to be groups living in extreme poverty whilst others lived in relative luxury. Peace depended on a solution to that problem.⁹⁰¹ Botha warned of a potential struggle between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'.⁹⁰² Part of the solution to these problems was military. Magnus Malan spoke of the importance of avoiding a sense of doubt as to whether the government had the ability to 'control the situation'.⁹⁰³ Yet, the Botha Government saw a need to 'demonstrate in a practical way the superior advantages' of the system they sought to defend.⁹⁰⁴ He spoke of the siren song of revolution for black South Africans. It was incumbent upon Government to 'develop a better message than Communism....a better message for Black South Africa'.⁹⁰⁵ This was the only way to lay a 'foundation of confidence and stability' and to create 'sound inter-group relations' in South Africa.⁹⁰⁶ As such, Hermann Giliomee wrote of the Botha Government that 'gone was John Vorster's paddling about in a pool of complacent white supremacy. The cry went up that South Africa had to change radically before a civil war erupted'.⁹⁰⁷

Political reform for non-whites in 'white South Africa' seems to have played an important part in the Government's strategy. As shown in chapter five, a tricameral parliament was established to give representation for Indians and Coloureds in separate chambers of the national parliament, whilst certain forms of discrimination against a class of urban Africans was abolished. As Giliomee points out, the loosening of restrictions on movement applied only to a limited number of urban blacks.⁹⁰⁸ He argued that the Government sought to 'create a stable core of urban insiders'.⁹⁰⁹ Similarly, the new constitution seems also to have aimed at winning the loyalty of a non-white elite. A minister

⁹⁰⁰ PW. Botha Speech, Administrators' Conference, Durban, 29 September 1982, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 59.

⁹⁰¹ PW. Botha, Conference on Housing, Cape Town, 17 October 1979, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 70.

⁹⁰² PW. Botha, Natal Chamber of Industries, Durban, 11 September 1980, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 70.

⁹⁰³ ACA, Magnus Malan Collection PV634, 3/2/16-35, Speech by M. Malan, 10th Charter Anniversary of the Lions Club of Edenvale, 4 April 1981.

⁹⁰⁴ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC 1103, WW2 PW Botha 1979-89, Document, 'Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa', Meeting between PW. Botha and Business Leaders, Johannesburg, 22 November 1979.

⁹⁰⁵ PW. Botha Speech, Mareola Residence, University of Pretoria, 5 August 1983, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 19.

⁹⁰⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol 59, Speech from National Party Federal Congress, Bloemfontein 30-31 July 1982; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Address by the State President on the occasion of the opening of the fourth session of the seventh parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 27 January 1984.

⁹⁰⁷ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 141-2.

⁹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 159.

⁹⁰⁹ H. Giliomee, 'Constitution's two paths towards "State efficiency"', *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 September 1984.

argued that a 'yes' vote in the constitutional referendum was an 'important step towards building a bulwark against everything which threatens those things that are mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution Bill'.⁹¹⁰ Moreover, Chief Information Officer of the National Party, Jan Grobler wrote to Andries Treurnicht that "Doctor, I would also like to know your position on the idea that we should associate the Coloureds as a bloc of 2.5 million people with the whites at any price, so that we can broaden our own powerbase and not deliver them to the "black power" situation'.⁹¹¹

Bringing about economic changes was also at the heart of the Botha administration's plan for South Africa. It was believed that poverty and deprivation were fomenting the rise of revolutionary radicalism amongst black people. The 1980 Cillie Commission reported that the Soweto uprisings had been caused partly by low wages, inadequate education provision and poor service delivery.⁹¹² Ministers argued that Marxist terrorist groups flourished 'on dissatisfaction and disorder'.⁹¹³ As such, it was vital to ameliorate the conditions of those whose circumstances were not presently 'compatible with human dignity' and to close the gap between the "'haves" and the "have nots"'.⁹¹⁴ But this was to be done 'not by making the rich poorer, but by making the poor richer'.⁹¹⁵ The Prime Minister declared that they believed in the 'distribution of wealth, not in its apportionment'. The communities had to achieve wealth through their own endeavours.⁹¹⁶ The promotion of economic growth was therefore emphasised, particularly growth of underdeveloped, African areas. Decentralised economic growth was not only to alleviate poverty but stem the tide of urbanisation. PW Botha was warned by a document of the Special Cabinet Committee that black urbanisation was due to 'increase sharply' in coming years. His copy of this document has 'decentralisatie' written in the margin by the relevant passage.⁹¹⁷ As such, economic growth in the homelands was an important part of Botha's plan, as Giliomee puts it, to keep 'the number of browns and blacks in the cities down to a minimum'.⁹¹⁸

⁹¹⁰ L. le Grange, *Hansard*, Thursday, 8 September 1983, Column 13568.

⁹¹¹ Welsh, 'Constitutional Changes in South Africa', 148-9.

⁹¹² H. Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1993), 196.

⁹¹³ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), 'Southern Africa: Now and in the Future', N/D.

⁹¹⁴ PW. Botha Speech, Conference on Housing, Cape Town, 17 October 1979, Schultz (compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 70; PW. Botha Speech, Natal Chamber of Industries, Durban, 11 September 1980, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 70.

⁹¹⁵ PW. Botha Speech, Natal Chamber of Industries, Durban, 11 September 1980, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 70.

⁹¹⁶ PW Botha, *Hansard*, Thursday, 15 April 1982, Column 4517.

⁹¹⁷ PW Botha 3--- PV203 PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

⁹¹⁸ H. Giliomee, 'Constitution's two paths towards 'State efficiency'', *Rand Daily Mail*, 1 September 1984.

It was also seen as a necessary measure to increase the economic viability of black 'own affairs' structures. The same Special Cabinet Committee document stated that one of the factors preventing local authorities from gaining the support of black people was 'uncertainty about the sources of funding'.⁹¹⁹ Piet Koornhof argued for the importance of regional development, saying he could not emphasise too strongly that the only sure way of making a success of black Local authorities was to help them to become economically viable and financially independent'.⁹²⁰ He also said that development of local authorities economically would put 'flesh to the bones' of those political structures.⁹²¹ It was also recognised that homelands were economically dependent upon 'white' South Africa. The Prime Minister acknowledged in a speech in 1980 that the homelands were economically dependent upon the rest of South Africa. He conceded that in most national states 'less than 20 percent of their people's income is generated in their own geographical areas'.⁹²² Given that such states were not only intended to accept political independence, but were supposed to be linked with urban black communities and to provide a national state for those communities, this dependence had significant implications for Government policy. The third point of the governing party's twelve point plan expressed its commitment to diminishing this dependence of homelands on the rest of South Africa by a combination of economic development and territorial consolidation.⁹²³ Botha told business leaders that the development of the national states was a top priority and 'more important than ever before' to lay the foundations for independence and cooperation between the independent states.⁹²⁴ Koornhof said that the financing of economic development and decentralisation were other means of creating 'economically viable' and eventually independent states.⁹²⁵ Indeed, Botha lamented to parliament the mistake of not pursuing the development of the homelands from 1948 onwards.⁹²⁶ As such, municipal development boards

⁹¹⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

⁹²⁰ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Address by Dr PGJ. Koornhof, Meeting of Black and White leaders in the Johannesburg and West Rand Area, Johannesburg, 14 January 1983.

⁹²¹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Policy Speech by PGJ. Koornhof, Minister of Cooperation and Development, 2-3 May 1984.

⁹²² ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Extracts from the Address Delivered by the Prime Minister, The Honourable PW. Botha, The Opening of the 1980 Congress of the National Party of Transvaal, Pretoria, 1 September 1980.

⁹²³ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/84 1981-1984, Manifesto of the National Party for Election of April 1981.

⁹²⁴ JL, Colin Eglin Collection BC1103, WW2 PW Botha 1979-89, 'Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa', Meeting between PW Botha and Business Leaders, Johannesburg, 22 November 1979.

⁹²⁵ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Speech by Dr PGJ. Koornhof at the Natal Agricultural Union Special Congress on Consolidation, Durban, 13 May 1981.

⁹²⁶ PW. Botha Speech, House of Assembly, 1 February 1983, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 26.

were established in 1983 'to render development aid and advice to local authorities', the country divided into eight development regions, and a multilateral development bank was created.⁹²⁷

The territorial consolidation of the homelands was also a facet of the strategy. Koornhof said that the consolidation of homelands was one of a number of expedients for 'the enhancement of the basic existability of the states'.⁹²⁸ Yet, there was a limited extent to which the National Party was prepared to transfer land to the homelands in order to reduce their dependence on 'white' South Africa. Commenting on the inability of the bantustans to satisfy the economic needs of their residents, Botha remarked that 'of course, we cannot give away the whole of South Africa merely to create economically viable Black states'.⁹²⁹ In 1985, a Government commission produced a report on the consolidation of the national states. It considered and rejected the possibility of very significant homeland consolidation. Amongst the reasons for this were that the black states did not accept group rights and the whites, coloureds and Indians who would be included the homelands would not have their self-determination respected. Although the homelands would acquire new sources of revenue, it was a concern that South Africa would have to forfeit such income. There was a sense in this report that the black states were unfitted to making good use of extra territory. It was argued, for example, that food production levels would fall significantly in territories transferred to the homelands.⁹³⁰ A similar thought is implied in the comment of Koornhof that the homelands had not developed as Verwoerd had expected, because 'the blacks need the leadership, initiative and entrepreneurship of whites'.⁹³¹ Botha insisted that the Government was not solely to blame for the underdevelopment of the homelands since 1948. Those states had a quarter of the agricultural potential, but only produced 6 percent of the output.⁹³² If black people could only be persuaded to abandon communal land tenure and embrace the principles of free enterprise, they could produce for more wealth.⁹³³ Therefore, Government sought rather to turn black people into better 'creators

⁹²⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Notes to the Press on Second and Third Tier Reform in South Africa, 24 May 1985; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Extracts from the Address Delivered by the Prime Minister, The Honourable PW. Botha, The Opening of the 1980 Congress of the National Party of Transvaal, Pretoria, 1 September 1980.

⁹²⁸ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Speech by Dr PGJ. Koornhof at the Natal Agricultural Union Special Congress on Consolidation, Durban, 13 May 1981.

⁹²⁹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), 'Extracts from the Address Delivered by the Prime Minister, The Honourable PW. Botha, The Opening of the 1980 Congress of the National Party of Transvaal, Pretoria, 1 September 1980.

⁹³⁰ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B4/5/2 1982-85, Commission for Cooperation and Development-Report on a Possible New Approach with regard to the consolidation of the National States, May 1985.

⁹³¹ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Speech for Women's Action Gathering, 1983.

⁹³² PW. Botha Speech, House of Assembly, 1 February 1983, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 26.

⁹³³ PW. Botha Speech, NP Meeting, George, 8 November 1980, in Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 26.

of wealth'.⁹³⁴ This required the promotion of entrepreneurship, and thereby of 'self-sufficiency and self-reliance'.⁹³⁵ This was to be done through a 'small business development corporation' and also by reviewing restrictions which made it harder for 'less sophisticated entrepreneurs' from operating successfully.⁹³⁶ In the meantime, Government had to 'help them to develop their ability to occupy' their positions in local government over which 'macro-financial control' would be retained.⁹³⁷

Botha, however, did not believe that the economic dependence of black political structures upon the rest of South Africa could be entirely dissipated. 'We have learned from hard experience', he stated, 'that the scope for the decentralisation of economic activity in South Africa is limited'. Economic growth was 'inextricably linked to a high degree of concentration at given geographical points'. It was impossible for the homelands to become entirely self-sufficient.⁹³⁸ This was not an insurmountable obstacle for the Government's constitutional vision, so long as there was sufficient cooperation between the political structures of each group to reflect that interdependence.⁹³⁹

It was partly for this reason that cooperation and joint decision-making between black and white local governments was envisaged. Piet Koornhof called for such cooperation in 1983, saying 'this raises the possibility of sharing of essential services on a regional basis which is part of the new dispensation now being worked out'.⁹⁴⁰ The Regional Service Councils later announced were also intended to promote such cooperation whilst guaranteeing 'maximum self-determination' for groups. They would facilitate the more efficient provision of services and ensure an 'equitable application' of financial resources.⁹⁴¹

⁹³⁴ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Policy Speech by PGJ. Koornhof, Minister of Cooperation and Development, 2-3 May 1984.

⁹³⁵ G. De V. Morrison, *Hansard*, Friday, 18 February 1983, Columns 1331-2; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Address by the State President, The Occasion of the Opening of the Fourth Session of the Seventh Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 27 January 1984; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Policy Speech by PGJ. Koornhof, 2-3 May 1984.

⁹³⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol 59, Speech from National Party Federal Congress, Bloemfontein 30-31 July 1982; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Policy Speech by PGJ. Koornhof, Minister of Cooperation and Development, 2-3 May 1984.

⁹³⁷ PW. Botha, Thursday, 8 September 1983, Columns 13524-5; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), C. Heunis Interviewed by the Sunday Express, 23 January 1983.

⁹³⁸ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Extracts from the Address Delivered by PW. Botha, The Opening of the 1980 Congress of the National Party of Transvaal, Pretoria, 1 September 1980.

⁹³⁹ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Thursday, 15 April 1982, Column, 4515; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Extracts from the Address Delivered by PW. Botha, The Opening of the 1980 Congress of the National Party of Transvaal, Pretoria, 1 September 1980.

⁹⁴⁰ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Address by PGJ. Koornhof, Meeting of Black and White leaders in the Johannesburg and West Rand Area, Johannesburg, 14 January 1983.

⁹⁴¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Notes to the Press on Second and Third Tier Reform in South Africa, 24 May 1985.

It was perceived that greater ongoing cooperation between South Africa in the black homelands would be required to make those states viable and to entice them to accept independence. The proposed constellation of states was thought to have benefits in the pursuit of the Government's objectives. A 1983 document for a meeting of the Cabinet Committee for Constitutional Issues suggested that a confederal order could make it easier for the Government to forge constitutional links between the homelands and their 'citizens' outside their territories. Improved and more structured cooperation between the states and the Government of South Africa would visibly improve the 'bargaining power' which homeland leaders could exert on behalf of their constituents.⁹⁴² A constellation of states would also help to entice the self-governing homelands to accept independence. The aforementioned Department of Foreign Affairs document stated that the acceptance of independence was presently 'unattractive', and noted the financial difficulties which the independent states were facing. A constellation would help resolve the problems in the currently independent states and once established would make it 'more attractive and easier' for other states to accept independence as a constituent of such an organisation. Furthermore, the status and functions of such a body ought to be such that states would not be able to be excluded or to secede without 'serious drawbacks'.⁹⁴³ Only independent states would be allowed to join the constellation. The self-governing states would have a say, but 'not a full say'.⁹⁴⁴ Moreover, a constellation of states was seen as a remedy for the lack of recognition the recently independent states enjoyed in the international community. For instance, a confederation was said to be a solution to the problem that the passports of citizens of the independent states were being rejected abroad.⁹⁴⁵

The role of Buthelezi as a homeland leader had a greater potential significance for the National Party given its attempts to contrive a dispensation in which homelands would be linked politically with urban communities. Of the political parties associated with homeland regimes, Inkatha was the largest, most credible and had the greatest urban constituency. A November 1978 memorandum on Inkatha, noted with interest that Inkatha was widely considered by its membership to be a 'volk's organisation' and was 'inextricably linked' to the KwaZulu administration. 'By membership of the organisation, urban Zulus are subtly linked to their homeland and therefore South Africa's homeland

⁹⁴² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee for Constitutional Issues, 4 January 1983.

⁹⁴³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/12/1 1981, Commentary by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information on a Cabinet Committee Memorandum, 'The Confederation Idea as Part of a Comprehensive Political Strategy', N/D.

⁹⁴⁴ 'Tangled skein from PW', *The Star*, 1 May 1980.

⁹⁴⁵ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Thursday, 15 April 1982, Column 4627.

policy'.⁹⁴⁶ In discussing potential connections between homeland and non-homeland blacks, a 1985 commission report stated that an advantage of one potential system was that 'It could further mean that Chief Minister Buthelezi, for example, could act easily as a leader over his entire Zulu power base within one system, but maintaining maximal autonomy for the region of KwaZulu'.⁹⁴⁷ Moreover, in a document for a 1983 meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for black political development, serious concern was expressed about the declining political climate amongst urban blacks and about Inkatha's refusal to participate in upcoming urban council elections. This document is lodged in PW Botha's files and the words 'Inkatha deelname!' ('Inkatha participation!') have been written at the side of the text.⁹⁴⁸ Yet, there is no suggestion that Inkatha was intended to play a leadership role for urban blacks other than Zulus.

The National Party wanted Inkatha, as a governing homeland party, not only to declare independence, but to diminish KwaZulu's economic dependence on 'white' South Africa by accepting Government guidance and aid to bring about economic development. In doing so, KwaZulu would also increase its ability to accommodate a larger proportion of its citizens, and thereby to reduce the number of Africans migrating to common South Africa. It also wanted KwaZulu to join to a constellation of states which would further contribute to these ends, legitimate the homelands project, help to resolve the problem of how to accommodate non-homeland blacks at national level and provide a forum for cooperation between races at the highest level. It was seen that Inkatha could play an important role legitimating local government structures for urban blacks by acting as representatives for non-homeland Zulus.

Inkatha approved of some aspects of this prescribed role. Despite eventually refusing to participate in urban council elections, Buthelezi had initially announced his intention to take part.⁹⁴⁹ Indeed, Government documents reveal that KwaZulu was amongst the few homelands in favour of the idea of extending its jurisdiction into some urban areas populated by Zulus, and the establishment of a Ministry for City Affairs.⁹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Inkatha was not content with its prescribed role and from its foundation in the mid-1970s attempted to attain a role as a national, multi-ethnic party. Inkatha called for partnership between all groups to undertake peaceful and orderly reform towards power-sharing in a single state. The National Party did not seek in the late-1970s and early-1980s to make

⁹⁴⁶ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B3/5 1978, Secret Memorandum concerning Buthelezi, 2 November 1978.

⁹⁴⁷ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B4/5/2 1982-85, Report on a Possible New Approach with regard to the consolidation of the National States, Commission for Cooperation and Development, May 1985.

⁹⁴⁸ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-83, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

⁹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

use of Buthelezi's ambitions to fulfill such a role in non-revolutionary change. Indeed, the party reacted with hostility to any attempt by him to transcend role as a homeland leader and to forge alliances with like-minded groups across ethnic boundaries. This is particularly apparent in a secret Government memorandum on Buthelezi from the early months of Botha's leadership in November 1978. It expressed concern that Buthelezi was seeking to go beyond his remit as KwaZulu homeland leader by involving himself in broader South African politics and trying to provide leadership for blacks beyond his ethnic group. It stated hostility towards Buthelezi's establishment of the South African Black Alliance with Indian, coloured and other homeland groups. It recommended that Buthelezi should 'at all costs' be prevented from gaining any status as the result of Government actions 'other than status which is due to him through being a leading homeland figure'. Efforts were to be made to reorient Buthelezi's politics more closely in line with the homelands policy. This was even to involve eliciting personal and political criticism against him from more radical organisations in order to 'arouse Zulu nationalism' and 'make Buthelezi aware that he cannot speak on behalf of all blacks'. Moreover, it was suggested that other figures in Inkatha such as Dhlomo and Alphaeus Zulu should have their 'esteem' built up by asking them to speak at events and to appear on television. Their increased prominence would 'keep Buthelezi on his toes within Inkatha', thereby turning his attentions inwards. Rather than being pleased with the existence of a strong, multi-ethnic moderate political opposition, the document celebrated that the SABA could not gain the support of either the Government or black radicals and therefore its momentum would inevitably diminish. It advised further that efforts be made to drain Buthelezi's power-base outside KwaZulu, especially within the SABA. Non-Inkatha members of the alliance were to be manipulated to leave. The memorandum remarks particularly on the negative influence black politics was having on the Indian community which was 'easily used and led along'. The effect of black politics over Indians was to be counteracted and a momentum built towards their acceptance of the Government's constitutional proposals. Indeed, a clandestine operation was proposed to establish a new Indian party which could pull their politics in that direction. Furthermore, the memorandum recommended steps to stimulate opposition amongst coloureds to an alliance with Zulus. Other black ethnic groups were seen as easy to make break away from Buthelezi.⁹⁵¹ It is not certain whether all of these thoughts continued to characterise Government's approach towards Buthelezi, but this document lends support to David Welsh's suggestion that the Government's intention to accommodate Indians and coloureds in a tricameral parliament with whites was not only a reflection of its desire to limit the influence of black revolutionaries on those groups, but also to limit the influence of Buthelezi and

⁹⁵¹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B3/5 1978, Secret Memorandum concerning Buthelezi, 2 November 1978.

the SABA on them.⁹⁵² Inkatha's desire to forge multi-racial political partnerships was in conflict with the National Party's attempts to bring Indian and Coloured leaders into an alliance with them at the exclusion of the African population.

The National Party's response to the Buthelezi Commission also reflected a deep rejection of Buthelezi's attempts to seek a significant political role for himself beyond his Zulu constituency and in the affairs of 'white' South Africa. The Government turned down an invitation to participate in the discussions and Giliomee correctly described Botha's response to the commission as being 'in the classic apartheid mode'.⁹⁵³ Not only were its proposals dismissed out of hand, but the right of the commission to exist and of Buthelezi to concern himself with matters outside his current jurisdiction were questioned. Indeed, Botha initially threatened to prevent the Buthelezi Commission from going ahead. Asked about it in parliament, he said that if the commission dealt with things which fell under the control of the central Government, then 'I say no'. Buthelezi was free only to have a commission relating to 'his own country'. Asked another question, Botha softened his stance slightly, saying that the commission could go ahead if his Government had 'full knowledge and control' and that it was fully understood that the Government had the final say in these matters. He could not allow the status of the parliament to be undermined.⁹⁵⁴ Accused of arrogance in its dealings with the commission proposals by the PFP's Ray Swart, the Government's Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs said their attitude reflected the fact that 'Chief Buthelezi has accepted the post of chief minister of KwaZulu...He therefore accepted the post of chief minister of a specific area and he is responsible for that area'. Buthelezi had not accepted a post as minister of South Africa or Natal.⁹⁵⁵ The head of the National Party in Natal, Owen Horwood, echoed these thoughts, stating that 'we sit over things over which we have jurisdiction and not over things over which we do not have jurisdiction'. He expected others to do likewise.⁹⁵⁶

It is clear though that in the first years of Botha's leadership, the Government considered Inkatha to have a potentially significant contribution to make to the success of its political agenda, if Inkatha cooperated with its programme for homeland leaders. The secret memorandum of November 1978 acknowledged that Buthelezi was a major homeland leader and Inkatha a major political movement with its membership drawn mainly from the Zulu ethnic group. It commented that as long as Inkatha remained associated with the homeland system and KwaZulu did not seek to 'forge alliances

⁹⁵² Welsh, 'Constitutional Changes in South Africa', 147-8.

⁹⁵³ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 172.

⁹⁵⁴ 'Threat to Curtail KwaZulu, Natal Talks', *The Star*, 1 May 1980; 'Tangled skein from PW', *The Star*, 1 May 1980.

⁹⁵⁵ PJ. Badenhorst, *Hansard*, Thursday, 1 April 1982, Column 4069.

⁹⁵⁶ 'Rejecting report helped NP', *The Star*, 14 April 1982

across ethnic boundaries', it was an 'asset' and not a 'threat' to Government. Therefore, the objective did not have to be to destroy Inkatha and Buthelezi, but to 'limit, localise and carefully channel their activities'. It was important to keep Buthelezi within the homeland system.⁹⁵⁷ Piet Koornhof even admitted in private that the idea of a constellation of states was a non-starter if KwaZulu would continue to refuse independence.⁹⁵⁸

Despite its espoused commitment to 'cooperation' and 'consultation' with 'responsible' non-white leaders,⁹⁵⁹ Buthelezi was not welcome to explore political questions which had any bearing on matters beyond the remit assigned to him, unless the National Party specifically sought his advice. This was evident in the National Party's response to the Buthelezi Commission. And it reacted dismissively to opposition claims that the Buthelezi Commission ought to be taken more seriously. For instance, the Minister of Health described PFP members as 'agents for Buthelezi', and warned that 'we are watching those hon. members'.⁹⁶⁰ Moreover, the National Party's reluctance to reconsider any of its policy principles was illustrated by Owen Horwood's comment that the Buthelezi Commission proposals were dismissed simply 'because they are contrary to Government policy'.⁹⁶¹ Also, Buthelezi, along with all other black leaders, was excluded from consultations in the President's Council, presumably also for the reason that reforms to the South African parliament did not concern him. A separate Black Advisory Council was set up for consultations with black leaders.⁹⁶² Indeed, a senior National Party figure in Natal stated that bilateral dialogue was more responsible than multilateral discussions. African people were to be involved in discussions in the 'Southern African context' - in other words, only regarding the establishment of a constellation of states.⁹⁶³ Buthelezi's objections to the consultation arrangements, and his pleas for a moratorium on constitutional change, fell on deaf ears.⁹⁶⁴

Inkatha's approach towards the National Party consisted mainly of attempts to persuade by appeals to common cause, and by expressing an understanding of the white population's concerns and by

⁹⁵⁷ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B3/5 1978, Secret Memorandum Concerning Buthelezi, 2 November 1978.

⁹⁵⁸ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 165.

⁹⁵⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 59 1978-87, National Party: Federal Congress, Bloemfontein, 30-31 July 1982; ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Address by PGJ. Koornhof, Meeting of Black and White Leaders in the Johannesburg and West Rand Area, Johannesburg, 14 January 1983; V. Volker, Hansard, Friday, 5 March 1982, Column 2255.

⁹⁶⁰ CV. Van der Merwe, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 2 February 1983, Column 240.

⁹⁶¹ 'Attitude of compromise called for', *Natal Mercury*, 19 March 1982.

⁹⁶² 'Gatsha Cool on new bid to Avoid a Deadlock', *Evening Post*, 11 August 1980.

⁹⁶³ V. Volker, Hansard, Friday, 5 March 1982, Column 2253.

⁹⁶⁴ 'Sharing of Power the Only Road Forward- Buthelezi', *Daily News*, 9 August 1980; ACA, PW Botha PV203, A1/15/1/9, Buthelezi to Botha at a Conference, 15 February 1980.

framing his appeals in a language which might appeal to a white South African audience. In contrast, Botha's ruling party made no similar effort to persuade Buthelezi and other non-violent black leaders of the merits of its political programme. Instead, it reiterated its political doctrines in an esoteric National Party idiom. Party leaders did not express understanding of Buthelezi's concerns or an appreciation of his good intentions. No serious effort was made to address the objections which Inkatha had expressed to homeland independence and the constellation of states. In fact, Buthelezi's political suggestions were dismissed out of hand, and his protestations were viewed with bitterness, resentment and frustration. Botha argued that black states fulfilled the political rights of black people. Regarding Buthelezi's and others' rejection of the constellation of states, he commented that whites increasingly wanted 'the acknowledgement of each other's rights' to be 'less one-sided'.⁹⁶⁵ Despite Buthelezi's calls for group rights, appreciation of minority concerns and a form of power-sharing, a National Party parliamentarian claimed that Buthelezi wanted a 'sole say for the black man'.⁹⁶⁶ Moreover, Piet Clase MP, described Inkatha as an anti-white organisation.⁹⁶⁷ When Buthelezi declined an invitation to meet with Botha in 1984, the State President did not express an understanding of Buthelezi's predicament or his reasons for not participating. Instead, he accused Buthelezi not wanting to break bread with him. 'That is not the only food available' he said. 'I also have my traditions and one is that I am not prepared to lie down so that a man can tramp on me'. When Buthelezi met with Botha in 1980, the latter allegedly waved his finger in the Inkatha leader's face. Botha also reacted furiously to Buthelezi's opposition to the new constitution in 1983, saying that he had created Buthelezi's position in politics.⁹⁶⁸ Furthermore, Buthelezi's warnings in the early-1980s about the potential growth of violence and radicalism if Government's plans were implemented, were dismissed, interpreted as veiled threats and seen themselves as a cause of violence. Volker asked Buthelezi to be more careful in warning of violence, because it gave the wrong impression to many Africans and was 'creating problems'.⁹⁶⁹

Despite claiming a commitment to building mutual trust and cooperation, many National Party representatives adopted a confrontational stance towards Inkatha in the early-1980s. A number of parliamentarians who would break away to form the Conservative Party in 1982 were particularly abrasive. Tom Langley accused Inkatha of Zulu imperialism, seeking to resurrect an empire 'with bones and skeletons again scattered over the empty plains'. He told the Inkatha central committee that he was 'perturbed' by Inkatha's proposals and doubted now whether the situation in South

⁹⁶⁵ 'Gatsha Cool on new bid to Avoid a Deadlock', *Evening Post*, 11 August 1980.

⁹⁶⁶ A. Fourie, *Hansard*, Monday, 21 February 1983, Column 1406.

⁹⁶⁷ 'Koornhof Hits Back at Nats on Gatsha', *Sunday Express*, 11 May 1980.

⁹⁶⁸ Botha's gesture a damaging finger of fate, *Daily Mail*, 19/6/84.

⁹⁶⁹ V. Volker, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 2 February 1983, Column 264.

Africa could be resolved other than by violence. If that were so, 'the sooner the better'.⁹⁷⁰ Willie Kotze asked, also in 1980, whether he was scared that accepting independence would 'expose his inability'. He lamented the poor economic performance of KwaZulu and advised Buthelezi to 'convince Zulu men that it was not their primary role in life to conceive children, drink beer and move around the hut with the sun whilst the women work in the fields'. Instead, Buthelezi stood with 'cupped hands' asking for more redistribution.⁹⁷¹

These comments were not representative of the entire National Party leadership. Notably, in 1980 Koornhof rejected the comments of the aforementioned parliamentarians. He congratulated Inkatha's performance in KwaZulu and said it acted with exceptional responsibility in Natal and in other parts of the country. We must not ignore this, and I want to express appreciation to Chief Minister Buthelezi and the leadership of KwaZulu. We must not ignore this'. Inkatha had acted to stop riots in Natal in 1976.⁹⁷² Yet, broadly the National Party's approach to its relations with Inkatha was not delicate or conciliatory in the early-1980s. This is illustrated further by the Government's attempts in the early-1980s to excise the Ingwavuma area of KwaZulu in order to transfer its control to independent Swaziland. This was in the face of fierce opposition from Inkatha, which said it was 'astounded' that the National Party would 'fritter away' the little goodwill that existed between them.⁹⁷³

National Party leaders were also dismissive of Buthelezi's sincerity and doubted whether his views were formed independently as the result of rational deliberation. The Deputy Minister for Community Development suggested that Buthelezi's rejection of independence was influenced by the PFP's raising of his expectations by serving on the Buthelezi Commission.⁹⁷⁴ Val Volker echoed these thoughts, saying that the PFP had encouraged Buthelezi to regard himself as a potential leader of South Africa. Buthelezi was 'trying to get what he can'.⁹⁷⁵ His politics were also influenced by newspapers, the international community and economic interest groups.⁹⁷⁶ On another occasion, Volker dismissed Buthelezi's involvement in the Buthelezi Commission as 'life-insurance against assassination', motivated by expediency and a desire not to be a 'target for assassins and terrorists'.⁹⁷⁷

⁹⁷⁰ ACA, Willie Kotze Collection PV73, 1/A1/1 1979-1982, Speech by T. Langley to Inkatha Central Committee in Response to Inkatha Document, Organised by Professor Tusenius, 13 January 1980.

⁹⁷¹ 'Buthelezi "turning Inkatha into a Mafia"', *Natal Mercury* 19 April 1980.

⁹⁷² 'Koornhof Hits Back at Nats on Gatsha', *Sunday Express*, 11 May 1980.

⁹⁷³ 'I Never Agreed, Says Buthelezi', *Rand Daily Mail*, 30 April 1982.

⁹⁷⁴ 'Buthelezi Will Have no say in Natal', *The Star*, 15 April 1981.

⁹⁷⁵ V. Volker, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 2 February 1983, Columns 263-4.

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷⁷ 'Volker: It's Impossible to Share Power in SA', *The Argus*, 9 October 1981.

Government's mistrust of Buthelezi's intentions might partly explain their determination for him not to transcend his assigned political role as a homeland leader. As seen in the previous chapter, Buthelezi was perceived by the National Party as a typical, African despot representing the alleged traditional African values which they feared. They were concerned not only about the prospect of Marxist radicals gaining power in South Africa, but also about African traditionalists as they saw Buthelezi. While the Inkatha leader ought to exercise power over his 'own people', the National Party absolutely rejected him having any influence over the future white South Africa. Relatedly, comments by Chris Heunis in the early-1980s suggested that any search for moderate African allies was perceived to be futile. He told parliament that Ian Smith had sought a moderate black Government, but got an 'immoderate black Government' which was on its way to dictatorship.⁹⁷⁸

In the early-1980s, part of the National Party's strategy was to make independence for KwaZulu and other self-governing states more attractive through territorial consolidation, economic decentralisation and the creation of a constellation of states. Yet, its approach at this stage was also characterised by forcefulness and intransigence. Rather than seeking to build consensus through discussions, the Government remained insistent on homeland independence and hoped that the KwaZulu Government and others could be pressured into accepting independence. This forceful approach is reflected in the comment written on one of Kobie Coetsee's documents regarding Inkatha's refusal to enter a constellation of states: 'Ons moet hulle daarin forseer' ('We must force them in to this').⁹⁷⁹ It is also reflected in a party document concerning the 1983 constitution. Regarding the question of what would happen if coloureds and Indians refused to participate, it was stated that 'they will be in exactly the same position as the homelands which are rejecting independence. They then remain where they are. We lay the table and those refusing to sit down shall do without. Because the old dispensation is something of the past, we will simply continue with the new dispensation'.⁹⁸⁰ Volker said in parliament in 1983 that if states did not want independence, then there would simply be a 'continuation of the present dispensation'.⁹⁸¹ In a document concerning the national states, KwaZulu's firm opposition to homeland independence was noted as was Government's intention to change Inkatha's stance. It suggested Inkatha's position might change as other states became independent and KwaZulu became increasingly isolated amongst the homeland Governments. It also raised the possibility that the addition of land to KwaZulu might be

⁹⁷⁸ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Friday, 9 September 1983, Column 13617.

⁹⁷⁹ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 165.

⁹⁸⁰ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Questions and replies on constitutional plan- (compiled and edited by GPD. Terblanche, Chief Information Officer of the Federal Council of the National party).

⁹⁸¹ V. Volker, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 2 February 1983, Columns 263-4.

undertaken on the condition of 'constitutional progress'. In a subtle way, this would allow Government to 'turn the screw' on Inkatha.⁹⁸² As late as June 1985, Inkatha reported that Botha had threatened to withhold financial assistance from KwaZulu if it did not move towards independence.⁹⁸³

Despite its rejection of his attempts to play a broader role than was intended for a homeland leader, the Government did recognise and seek to maintain Buthelezi's moderate stance, relative to revolutionary African organisations, particularly from 1983-onwards. The 1978 memorandum stated that it was important for Buthelezi's distance from black consciousness groups to be maintained. And in seeking to stimulate criticism by more radical groups of Buthelezi, it recommended an attitude of caution and that actions not be taken which could force Buthelezi to adopt a more radical stance. As such, he ought not to be undermined in the eyes of his young followers.⁹⁸⁴ A 1983 secret document from the PW Botha files, lamented the increasing radicalism the urban black population. Leaders who could previously be seen as radical, such as Buthelezi, Motlana and Tutu, had come to represent 'relatively moderate' leadership.⁹⁸⁵

As the radicalisation of urban African increased from 1983, the Government increasingly recognised the importance of consulting with moderate leaders and gaining their approval for its policies. As such, its approach towards Inkatha altered somewhat. PW's Botha secret document concerning urban Africans warned that the leaders of the national states were losing support in the cities and that the time frame in which Government could negotiate a broadly-acceptable constitutional dispensation with credible moderate leaders had been reduced. It recommended that a 'second president's council' be established to negotiate on with 'relatively moderate' or even radical leaders about a new system of Government. It needed to be shown that the Government was not intent on deciding the black man's future for him. It was of 'vital importance' that the constitutional future of black people on the national level was at least 'symbolically visible'. Also, if the currently planned reforms to urban government were 'dramatically and visibly' implemented, it could contribute to the increased credibility of Government and of moderate leaders.⁹⁸⁶ Indeed, a Special Cabinet Committee for black political development was established in late-1983, just five days after the constitutional referendum and homeland leaders, as well as official urban leaders were invited to

⁹⁸² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-85, 'Nasionale State Agtergrondinligting', January 1984.

⁹⁸³ 'Buthelezi "disturbed" by PW's Reaction', *Citizen*, 25 June 1985.

⁹⁸⁴ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B3/5 1978, Secret Memorandum Concerning Buthelezi, 2 November 1978.

⁹⁸⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

⁹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

participate in consultations with Government on constitutional issues.⁹⁸⁷ However, the National Party was not prepared to make any significant concessions in these negotiations, but was simply seeking to gain the cooperation of approved African leaders in a bid to gain legitimacy for its new constitution and its policy of moving towards homeland independence. Koornhof stated that the SCC could consider adaptations to policy, but not changes to the principles of policy.⁹⁸⁸ Botha specified that a fourth chamber for Africans was off the table.⁹⁸⁹

As the homeland leader with the largest political organisation, and the most credibility internationally and domestically, Buthelezi was a key target for participation in the SCC and his absence was surely a source of frustration to the Government. This was reflected in one SCC meeting with homeland leaders in which Mr Mabuza expressed his concern that any agreement produced by the SCC might not be workable, because only five homeland leaders were participating. He went on, 'the Chief Minister of KwaZulu is not here, and it is a fact that he has the widest and broadest base politically if we speak of members. We would ask him, you represent a population of six million people: how would you protect us now from domination? But if he is not here those questions cannot be put and it makes our exercise a little bit senseless'. Chris Heunis replied that, confidentially speaking, he thought 'that we would all prefer Chief Minister Buthelezi to be part of this meeting'. He reassured them that they were having bilateral discussions with him and asked other ministers if they could help persuade Buthelezi to participate.⁹⁹⁰

Chapter Seven: The 'Anvil on Which Apartheid was Broken'? Abandoning Verwoerdian Apartheid, 1983-1985.

In accounting for the Government's abandonment of the homeland independence project in 1985, some have argued that Inkatha's opposition to homeland independence and its refusal to participate in Government discussion forums was a key factor in bringing about this change. Gavin Relly of Anglo-American told Patti Waldmeir that Buthelezi was 'the anvil on which apartheid was broken'. If Buthelezi had accepted independence, this would have lent credibility to the National Party's project.⁹⁹¹ Also, FW de Klerk emphasised Buthelezi's refusal to accept independence as a key factor which 'sounded the death knell for grand apartheid'.⁹⁹² Giliomee echoes these interpretations,

⁹⁸⁷ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 177.

⁹⁸⁸ P. Laurence, 'Urban blacks...NP Policy Leaves few Alternatives', *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 February 1983.

⁹⁸⁹ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 177.

⁹⁹⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/4 1985-88, Minutes of Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 24 May 1985.

⁹⁹¹ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, G. Relly Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 7 December 1994.

⁹⁹² De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 99.

describing Buthelezi as the 'only internal black leader with any mass following who could act as a counter to the ANC'. His 'tough stand' against independence for KwaZulu 'more than any other opposition destroyed the government's hope to construct "a constellation of black states" out of the homeland system'.⁹⁹³

Buthelezi was widely recognised as the only homeland leader with significant domestic and international credibility and Inkatha was the sole homeland organisation with a large membership, both inside and outside the territorial borders of the Bantustan. Their opposition undoubtedly posed insurmountable problems for the grand apartheid project. A constellation of southern African states would have lacked even a modicum of legitimacy without KwaZulu's inclusion. In apartheid thinking, KwaZulu represented the largest ethnic group in South Africa, and therefore its refusal to join a constellation of independent states would have discredited such a body even on the National Party's own terms. Koornhof argued in 1981 that if most other homelands accepted independence, there would be more non-black citizens of South Africa than black citizens even if KwaZulu remained dependent. This would be enough to secure the Government's key objectives.⁹⁹⁴ Yet, in private, Koornhof admitted that the Government's idea of a confederation was without hope if KwaZulu continued to oppose it.⁹⁹⁵ Inkatha was furthermore the only homeland organisation with notable membership in urban areas and therefore an organisation whose participation in urban council elections was considered important.⁹⁹⁶ Seeing that urban Africans' national political aspirations were supposed to be fulfilled by independent national states, each participating in a constellation of states, Inkatha's opposition to independence posed difficulties for the National Party's policy for blacks outside the homelands. If KwaZulu refused independence, then, on the Government's own terms, it could not satisfy the need for national-level political rights for Zulus across the country. Full membership of the constellation of states being reserved for independent states, KwaZulu's non-independence would also prevent the representation of non-homeland Zulus in this overarching structure for cooperation between nations.

Buthelezi's refusal to participate in the Government's Special Cabinet Committee for black constitutional development also frustrated the National Party's efforts to gain credibility for, and agreement on, its broad constitutional project. As noted, Heunis told homeland leaders that he was disappointed by Buthelezi's absence from the Special Cabinet Committee discussions and asked

⁹⁹³ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 604.

⁹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 606.

⁹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁹⁹⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

homeland leaders to persuade him to change his mind.⁹⁹⁷ A Special Cabinet Committee document from late-1984 also noted that 'the absence of Chief Minister Buthelezi of KwaZulu was an influencing factor in the negotiation'.⁹⁹⁸ Buthelezi's role in the Government's abandonment of grand apartheid is underscored in a 1985 document of the commission for homeland consolidation which speculates on alternatives to Government policy, such as dual citizenship and even a common citizenship. In discussing these alternatives, it emphasises that black leaders 'especially Chief Minister Buthelezi' had rejected any loss of South African citizenship.⁹⁹⁹ A 1983 Special Cabinet Committee document also noted problems in getting African leaders to abandon South African citizenship and contemplated a special confederal citizenship or 'neighbouring country nationality'. It advised 'timely consideration of alternatives' to present policy if the leaders of the self-governing states could not be persuaded to accept independence.¹⁰⁰⁰

KwaZulu's acceptance of independence was a necessary condition for the success of the National Party's grand apartheid plan. It can easily be imagined that a *volte face* by Inkatha deciding to support the National Party policy would have given the Government a greater sense of confidence and conviction which might have given grand apartheid an extra lease of life, at least in short-term. However, acceptance by Inkatha of independence was not a sufficient condition for the success of the homelands project. A broader range of factors can be argued to have fatally undermined grand apartheid, and these factors contributed greatly to increased doubts about and then the abandonment of the homeland project in the mid-1980s.

The failure of the Government's homeland strategy to provide a solution to its problems in black urban areas was crucial in forcing a change in policy. In his *And what about the black people?* pamphlet, Stoffel van der Merwe emphasised this factor as a cause for reviewing Government policy. He stated that it had 'become apparent that it would not be possible to accommodate all the black people in independent states'. A linkage policy could not 'provide a complete answer'.¹⁰⁰¹ Opening parliament in January 1985, PW Botha commented that 'after thorough investigation it is also accepted that not all these people can express themselves politically via the government

⁹⁹⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/4 1985-88, Minutes of Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 24 May 1985.

⁹⁹⁸ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/3/6 1985, Meeting of the RSA-Component of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, Pretoria, 7 November 1984.

⁹⁹⁹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B4/5/2 1982-85, Commission for Cooperation and Development Report, N/D.

¹⁰⁰⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

¹⁰⁰¹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, Stoffel van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

structures of the national states'. Africans outside the national states would therefore be treated as distinct entities, entitled to decide on their own affairs up to the highest level.¹⁰⁰² FW de Klerk also acknowledged the significance of this factor, stating that the homelands project was thought not to be able to 'solve problems for those blacks who lived outside the homelands'.¹⁰⁰³

The urban African population was growing rapidly in size, youth and radicalism. A National Party document noted that for 6 out of 10 homelands including KwaZulu, the majority for the population lived outside the homeland territory.¹⁰⁰⁴ This urban population overwhelmingly and increasingly rejected the homeland system and the proposed political linkages with ethnic homelands and the idea of separate citizenships. This posed an insurmountable difficulty for the Botha administration which acknowledged from early on the permanence of large numbers of Africans outside the homelands and introduced political reforms for these communities which were in tension with its homeland policy. By recognising the need for permanent political structures to represent these communities at municipal level in South Africa, the Government was undermining its pretext for denying them citizenship and representation at the national level. Giliomee comments that 'credible political institutions for blacks living in the common area had always been the weakest link in the apartheid system'.¹⁰⁰⁵ Once the premise that these Africans were temporary sojourners had been abandoned, one of the major pillars of Verwoerdian apartheid ideology had been demolished. Party leaders had no clear vision of how such permanent communities could be linked with homeland structures for the purposes of national political representation. A 1982 document in preparation by Heunis for a journalistic interview left the following question unanswered: 'Along what lines do you envisage accommodating urban Blacks politically?' This was the only case in which a proposed question was left unanswered.¹⁰⁰⁶ Also, in 1982, a National Party parliamentarian stated that the National Party had never claimed to have 'concluded its thinking on the question of the liaison between the Black people in White areas with the Black States and vice versa'. For that reason, a Government commission was exploring the question.¹⁰⁰⁷ Another parliamentarian described this issue as a 'dilemma' and the 'central issue' to be resolved.¹⁰⁰⁸ Indeed, a 1985 report of the Commission for Cooperation and Development dismissed the idea of foreign states having

¹⁰⁰² PW. Speech, Opening of Parliament, 25 January 1985, Scholtz (Compiled by), *Fighter and Reformer*, 28.

¹⁰⁰³ De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 102.

¹⁰⁰⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Document, 'Meeting of the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee for Constitutional Issues', 4 January 1983.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 611.

¹⁰⁰⁶ ACA, Piet Koornhof Collection PV476, (Collection not Indexed), Proposed Questions for Interview with Minister of Constitutional development and Planning, Chris Heunis, Union Buildings, Pretoria, 15 November 1982.

¹⁰⁰⁷ HJD. Van der Walt, *Hansard*, Friday, 5 March 1982, Columns 2240-41.

¹⁰⁰⁸ AE. Nothnagel, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 21 April 1982, Column 4967.

jurisdiction over permanent residents in another state as 'legally inconsistent' and unheard-of in the world. Only the Government in the state where a person lived could have jurisdiction over them.¹⁰⁰⁹

Leading figures in the National Party were gravely concerned from 1983 onwards about the increased radicalism in urban African communities and the problems it could pose for their political plan. A secret 1983 document on African constitutional development contained in PW Botha's files, states bluntly that 'the urban black man is the primary key to the white dispensation'. It notes with concern the drastic growth of radicalism and revolutionary politics amongst this constituency. A Government document advised that the number and proportion of African in urban areas was likely to continue to increase rapidly, and that the younger members of this group were likely to continue to make radical demands.¹⁰¹⁰ This served to 'reduce the time frame' in which a 'relatively well-accepted' constitution for these people could be negotiated. It was therefore imperative to find 'the constitutional framework with the widest possible acceptance for the urban black man'.¹⁰¹¹ In searching for a solution to this urgent problem, National Party leaders were mindful of the lack of legitimacy of the homelands project had amongst Africans in the cities. A letter by Chris Heunis to a member of the public in 1983 expressed the view that 'the independence of the homelands cannot solve questions relating to the more than ten million black people who live outside the national states'. Moreover, it could not 'be ignore that a great many black people are opposed to the idea of national states' as well as many Indians and coloureds.¹⁰¹² The call for 'timely consideration of alternatives' by a Government commission in 1985 stated that this should happen if Africans continued not to be committed to homelands as well as if homelands persisted in refusing independence.¹⁰¹³ PW Botha's 1983 document concerning African constitutional development noted that 'most urban blacks reject direct participation and involvement of the relevant states in black urban structures and politics'.¹⁰¹⁴ Moreover, leading Government figures perceived official national leaders to be lacking in sufficient support amongst urban Africans to make viable the Government's linking-up policy. A Special Cabinet Committee document from November 1984 stated that it would be difficult to overcome the view that the homeland leaders were simply the

¹⁰⁰⁹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B4/5/2 1982-85, Commission for Cooperation and Development-Report on a Possible New Approach with regard to the consolidation of the National States, May 1985.

¹⁰¹⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-83, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

¹⁰¹¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

¹⁰¹² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 46, Letter by C. Heunis Regarding the Inclusion of Black People in the Constitution, 1983.

¹⁰¹³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

¹⁰¹⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

'mouthpieces' of Pretoria.¹⁰¹⁵ Minister Chris Heunis acknowledged privately that the current urban council ministers and the homeland leaders' nominated urban leaders were lacking in legitimacy.¹⁰¹⁶ Buthelezi was seen by an official document to have some Zulu supporters in urban areas, but it was noted that support for 'relatively moderate' leadership was diminishing, traditional ties were being rejected and support for homeland leaders were decreasing by the day.¹⁰¹⁷ The Special Cabinet Committee sought specifically to involve those African leaders working within the system. Yet, there was increasing discussion in private about the potential need to involve the radical leadership in future negotiations.¹⁰¹⁸

From 1983, Government officials questioned aspects of the homelands project to which the Botha regime was officially committed. Party documents reveal an increasingly perceived need for urban political structures distinct from, and not subordinate to, homeland structures. Stoffel Botha commented in 1984 that many urban communities could not be joined with national states. The established strategy would still apply to those 'whose ties with their regions of origin are such that they still identify with their national states', but the policy for Africans whose ties to those states had 'grown looser' was being 'investigated by a top-level cabinet committee'.¹⁰¹⁹ The 1983 document about urban Africans considered the possibility of city/micro states which would be able to join a constellation of states in their own right, thereby casting doubt over the ability of national states to provide for the political aspirations of Africans outside their territories. It noted that the idea of a city-state went back to ancient Greece and cited San Marino and Monaco as contemporary examples. These micro-states could potentially boost the status of moderate urban leaders by giving them more direct contact with the South African Government.¹⁰²⁰ An early-1983 working group document on constitutional issues considered the option of 'associate membership' by which urban communities would have direct representation in a future confederation, despite not being an independent state. If the 'further development of homeland coupling (did) not produce the desired results' there would need to be serious consideration of providing a 'vertical structure' for urban

¹⁰¹⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203PS 4/3/6 1985, Meeting of the RSA-Component of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, Pretoria, 7 November 1984.

¹⁰¹⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-85, Minutes, Special Cabinet Committee for the Political Development of Blacks, 1 March 1985.

¹⁰¹⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Ibid.*; ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-85, Minutes, Special Cabinet Committee for the Political Development of Blacks, 1 March 1985.

¹⁰¹⁹ 'Natal/KwaZulu- White Views', *The Natal Witness*, 23 October 1984.

¹⁰²⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

communities to have a say at the national level. This should be considered even though Buthelezi would complain that he was being cut off from his urban constituency.¹⁰²¹

The nature of urban African politics thwarted the Government's plan to link Africans in 'white' South Africa with their ethnic homelands and thereby made the objective of separate citizenships untenable. The prospect of negotiating for the independence of hundreds of urban micro-states, in addition to six ethnic homelands was utterly infeasible. And a Government document recognised that such micro-states would not satisfy the aspirations of 'politicised black youthful elite groups' and would be dismissed as another endeavour to continue apartheid by different means. It commented that such states would be highly unlikely to gain international acceptance. Moreover, such states would be a source of ongoing controversy for the Government as they expanded and sought to renegotiate the size of their territories.¹⁰²² The concepts of associated citizenship or confederal nationality were discussed as alternatives to common or separate citizenships, but were apparently also seen as impractical. A document discussing this contingency can be found in PW Botha's files. Someone has written 'sal nie werk nie' ('will not work') in pen by the side of the page.¹⁰²³

It was increasingly recognised amongst some Government officials that non-homeland communities would not accept any situation in which they lacked a significant role in decision-making in 'common affairs' and could not be confident about sources of funding. Micro-states were criticised also for not being financially viable.¹⁰²⁴ The 1983 document about the urban black man brought into question Government thinking on the constellation of states as a voluntary association for cooperation, stating that 'a wide umbrella structure in which the black people feel they have a significant say in matters of "common" interest, is inevitable'.¹⁰²⁵ Indeed, further doubts about the existing Government policies' ability to satisfy African aspirations were expressed in a November 1983 document of the Special Cabinet Committee. It highlighted black concerns about sources of funding for local government structures, and it noted that the credibility of community councils was low and unlikely to be increased by the implementation of planned reforms to local administration.¹⁰²⁶

¹⁰²¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Document, Meeting of the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee for Constitutional Issues, 4 January 1983.

¹⁰²² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

¹⁰²³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

¹⁰²⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

¹⁰²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/1 1979-1983, Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 1 November 1983.

There was a growing perception amongst Government officials that the Verwoerdian homelands project could not resolve the problems relating to black populations outside the homelands. Homeland independence would not solve the National Party's acute problems with the increasingly large and radical black populations in 'white' South Africa. Therefore, homeland independence became less important in securing the party's objectives of self-determination, stability and prosperity. Indeed, the Commission for Cooperation and Development's report in 1985 warned that in some circumstances homeland independence might even increase the demands of those Africans remaining in the rest of South Africa.¹⁰²⁷ Independence would remove many of the more moderate, traditional and rural Africans from the South African political sphere, leaving the white population with a black citizenry which was in greater proportion young, urban and radical. It can even be argued that the realisation of Verwoerdian apartheid had become counterproductive to the National Party's ends. The aforementioned commission spoke of the advantages of retaining the influence of Chief Buthelezi and other 'authorised national government leaders' over their power-bases outside their homeland borders.¹⁰²⁸ As shown in chapter five, PW Botha seems to have attached only symbolic significance to the concession of South African citizenship to all races, and was not in any sense renouncing his pursuit of political 'self-determination'.

Moreover, the international community had not given recognition to those states which had already become independent. As the Commission for Cooperation and Development noted, those states had in fact 'never renounced the idea of a partnership in a larger South African unity'.¹⁰²⁹ Given these considerations, the commission went on to warn against the 'policy goal (independence) being elevated to a principle'. The Government did not consider the independence of the homelands to be the final answer. The principle to which Government was committed was self-determination which was not synonymous with, and was not necessarily best served by, homeland independence.¹⁰³⁰ So, even though Inkatha's opposition to homeland independence was an effective block on the Verwoerdian apartheid project, there was a broader range of circumstances which combined to make homeland independence much less viable and less useful for the National Party.

It is not clear exactly how the abandonment of the Verwoerdian homelands project came about. It is attested by Heunis that a decision was made amongst cabinet ministers at the Old Observatory on 2 August 1985 that Africans would be included in cabinet and therefore by implication Africans would enjoy a common citizenship. De Klerk claims that it was decided there that the six homelands would

¹⁰²⁷ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/B4/5/2 1982-85, Commission for Cooperation and Development-Report on a Possible New Approach with regard to the Consolidation of the National States, May 1985.

¹⁰²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁰ *Ibid.*

not 'necessarily' be expected to gain independence. However, Daan Prinsloo, PW Botha's private secretary, argued that the State President agreed at the Old Observatory only that black people would be included in a confederal cabinet.¹⁰³¹ Regardless, it seems likely that Heunis was a key protagonist in getting Botha to agree to speak of a common citizenship. As shown in chapter five, Botha said to Heunis that 'you want me to say we stand for a unitary South Africa, you allow me to say it, you write it in my speeches, and I accept it, but what do we mean by that?'¹⁰³² Botha was probably more reluctant than Heunis to conclude that Verwoerdian apartheid had been rendered unworkable by circumstances. And it would have been more difficult for Heunis and others to persuade Botha to accept the principle of common citizenship if KwaZulu had been prepared to accept independence or to participate in discussions in the Special Cabinet Committee. However, the State President was clearly aware of the immense difficulties posed by the need to reconcile a permanent, growing and increasingly radical urban African population to objectives of Verwoerdian apartheid. His Government had clearly been placed under great stress by heightened radicalism which had created a sense of urgency to gain the support of Buthelezi and others. The Old Observatory meeting had been called in response to the National Party's failing to attract key African leaders to participate in the Special Cabinet Committee.¹⁰³³ Therefore, Gavin Relly and Giliomee's claims about the central importance of Inkatha in forcing Government to abandon Verwoerdian apartheid express a significant portion of the truth, but overstate the case somewhat. Buthelezi's opposition to the National Party needs to be seen in a broader context of power contestation and political, economic, and socio-geographic realities which served to render the vision of Verwoerdian separate development unworkable and therefore uncondusive to PW Botha's foremost desire to maintain 'self-determination' for white South Africans.

Chapter Eight: Negotiating and Reforming Towards Power-Sharing? 1985-1989.

At roughly the same point that the National Party abandoned the Verwoerdian homelands independence project, it also announced some seemingly significant changes in its approach to achieving its political objectives. In 1986, it was announced that the Government planned to establish a National Statutory Council to provide a forum for negotiation. Unlike previously proposed forums, this council was to be chaired by the State President. 'Pending the creation of constitutional structures jointly to be agreed upon for (their) multicultural society' the National Council was to 'consider and advise on matters of common concern, including proposed legislation on such

¹⁰³¹ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 189-90.

¹⁰³² *Ibid.*, 188.

¹⁰³³ *Ibid.*, 187.

matters'. As part of this process, Government needed to become more conscious of Black 'aspirations and needs'.¹⁰³⁴ For the first time, it was said that all groups could participate in negotiations, provided they officially renounced violence.¹⁰³⁵ This offer was extended to the ANC and Nelson Mandela.¹⁰³⁶ This followed an announcement in 1985 that the Government wanted to establish a 'non-statutory negotiating forum' to improve 'existing mechanisms for negotiation' and extend the process significantly.¹⁰³⁷ In 1985, Botha announced that he take charge personally of African constitutional development.¹⁰³⁸ In an apparently significant shift of approach, PW Botha told a visiting US Congressman that a future political dispensation would not be imposed, but had to be 'the product of negotiation between our communities'.¹⁰³⁹ As such, the Government was proposing higher profile and more formal, and potentially more inclusive, negotiations about constitutional change than it had suggested before. Moreover, it was doing so having conceded the need for a solution which was in some sense supported by African leaders.

However, it was not stated clearly what the National Party meant by a negotiated settlement. It was not said who would have to be involved, what degree of consensus would be sufficient for a viable settlement, and which African leaders would need to support the new political system. The National Party stated that 'people of violence' were not welcome in negotiations.¹⁰⁴⁰ Its officials alluded to a 'power struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of extremism'.¹⁰⁴¹ And PW Botha condemned the ANC in forceful terms throughout the period. Yet, Botha commented that 'the longer clumsy politicians and other rash victims woo the ANC, the longer it will take to get the ANC as an accountable and responsible party so far as to join other South African interested parties around the negotiating table'.¹⁰⁴² A key Government pamphlet said that a solution should be 'worked out in close co-operation with the leaders of as many Black interest groups as possible'.¹⁰⁴³

¹⁰³⁴ PW Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986, Columns 15-6; *Ibid.*, Columns 14-5.

¹⁰³⁵ Friedman, *Options for the Future*, 24.

¹⁰³⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum from Discussion with Senator Kennedy, N/D.

¹⁰³⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Announcement by the State President on Constitutional Development, N/D.

¹⁰³⁸ Pottinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, 128.

¹⁰³⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol. 31 1982-6, Memorandum From PW. Botha to Visiting Mission of US Congressmen Under the Leadership of Chairman WH. Gray, 3 January 1986.

¹⁰⁴⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 34, Speech by C. Heunis, UCASA Meeting, Bloemfontein, 27 June 1987.

¹⁰⁴¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, Rand Afrikaans University, 7 November 1988.

¹⁰⁴² H. Suzman Quoting PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 14 August 1987, Column 3812.

¹⁰⁴³ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, /N1/86 1981-90, S. Van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

It would later be revealed that Government officials held clandestine discussions with Nelson Mandela from 1985 onwards,¹⁰⁴⁴ and others had secret meetings with the UDF in the same year.¹⁰⁴⁵

In seeking a peaceful, stable and lasting settlement of this particular type, the National Party was confronted by a number of significant impediments. As noted in part one, South Africa in the mid-1980s experienced a sharp upsurge in the armed struggle against apartheid and in African protest against Government policies. Such activities did not abate after the National Party unveiled the changes in its policy described above and indeed such attempts to make South Africa ungovernable endured throughout the decade. Surveys indicated the high levels of support amongst Africans for the ANC and its allies,¹⁰⁴⁶ and international pressure was increasingly brought to bear on the apartheid Government.¹⁰⁴⁷ The ANC was unwilling to abandon violence in order to participate in the National Council, and indeed demanded an unconditional transfer of power for much of this period. But also, many organisations which were in favour of negotiations, like Inkatha, opposed its proposed form of power-sharing and refused to participate in the National Council unless all organisations were free to choose to participate in the negotiations, and Government committed to abandoning all key apartheid laws.¹⁰⁴⁸ The only black representatives who agreed to participate in the proposed forum were certain urban councillors and some of the homeland leaders with a less significant support base than Buthelezi. It is clear that the National Party recognised the difficulties which confronted it. It was concerned not only that the realities of the South African situation made a majoritarian dispensation impossible, but that they made any stable, prosperous and enduring settlement difficult to achieve. PW Botha commented that finding a solution to the country's problems was difficult because there was a 'vast difference in outlook between different sections of Africa on what should actually be done to prevent domination of one minority group by another'.¹⁰⁴⁹ He also told visiting US congressmen in 1986 that 'the situation in South Africa at the moment is sensitive and could hardly be less conducive to the process of negotiation'. It was regrettable that 'some black leaders across the political spectrum are reluctant to come forward and participate publicly in the negotiations'.¹⁰⁵⁰ For Heunis too, there were a number of significant 'impediments to

¹⁰⁴⁴ Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 30-50.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 72.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to Kwazulu', 353-374; Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 181-216; Jeffery, *People's War*, 49-202; Southall, 'Consociationalism in South Africa', 91; Karis, 'South African Liberation: The Communist Factor', 286.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Klotz, 'Norms and Sanctions: Lessons from the Socialization of South Africa', 180.

¹⁰⁴⁸ 'Black Demands in the Struggle for Liberation', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1989.

¹⁰⁴⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of the *Washington Times*, 25 February, 1986.

¹⁰⁵⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol. 31 1982-6, Memorandum From PW. Botha to Visiting Mission of US Congressmen under Leadership of Chairman WH. Gray, 3 January 1986.

reform'.¹⁰⁵¹ He argued that the prospects of any form of lasting democracy were 'as delicate, as fragile, as glass'.¹⁰⁵² An official document from PW Botha's collection, remarks that the Government and the white community had the 'huge task of persuading the developing communities' to accept a political dispensation which best served the national interest.¹⁰⁵³

The governing party did not spell out in public how exactly it thought that these difficulties could be overcome and a viable negotiated settlement could be achieved. But its leading figures made a number of statements about the broad changes which were needed. The ruling party did spell out in detail declared its desire to bolster the side of moderation in a 'power struggles between the forces of moderation and the forces of extremism'.¹⁰⁵⁴ Partly, this involved thwarting the 'total onslaught' of revolutionaries and those who seeking to destabilise South Africa and undermine Government's reform programme by violence. Also, Botha said that there was a need to 'further stimulate the process of negotiation'.¹⁰⁵⁵ Heunis said in 1989 that his Government had been stimulating and supporting negotiation 'by means of actions to create the right climate'.¹⁰⁵⁶ For Heunis, it was necessary to generate a 'spirit of acceptance of communities and groups as they are',¹⁰⁵⁷ and for demands to be scaled down.¹⁰⁵⁸

Many National Party utterances and actions from this period suggest, *prima facie*, that a greater commitment to reform, cooperation, negotiation and dialogue was part of its strategy to bring about these desired changes in the South African situation. Although the National Party did not see a negotiated settlement as an immediate prospect in this period, it was agreed that there should be negotiation, discussion and political cooperation as part of the process of change, rather than merely as its culmination. Heunis told parliament that Government regarded 'negotiation as a process'.¹⁰⁵⁹ For him, the constitutional development process was itself 'perhaps more important than its result'.¹⁰⁶⁰ President Botha said that there were vastly different outlooks amongst South Africa's

¹⁰⁵¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis, 'The Present State and the Future of Reform', The Corporate Forum Meeting, Mount Nelson Hotel, 13 June 1987.

¹⁰⁵² C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 9 June 1987, Column 1128.

¹⁰⁵³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, Document, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987.

¹⁰⁵⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, Rand Afrikaans University, 7 November 1988.

¹⁰⁵⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol. 31 1982-6, Memorandum From PW. Botha to Visiting Mission of US Congressmen under Leadership of Chairman WH. Gray, 3 January 1986.

¹⁰⁵⁶ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 22 May 1989, Column 9848.

¹⁰⁵⁷ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 18 August 1986, Column 10175.

¹⁰⁵⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Statement by C. Heunis, Pretoria, 7 November 1988.

¹⁰⁵⁹ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Friday, 5 May 1989, Column 7702.

¹⁰⁶⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis About Fighting Against the Revolutionary Climate, Meeting of Director Generals, Cape Town, 24 April 1986.

population groups, and commented that political change would take a generation. Botha argued that this required the country to 'travel the road of negotiation'.¹⁰⁶¹ Finding common values and building consensus required consultation and negotiation.¹⁰⁶² The National Party not only proposed the establishment of a National Council, but made renewed efforts to engage in informal talks with various black leaders, including Buthelezi whom Botha met personally for the first time in years in 1985.¹⁰⁶³ A range of discussions were held with Inkatha officials throughout the late-1980s culminating in a joint committee of the National Party and KwaZulu Governments to explore obstacles to negotiation in January 1989.¹⁰⁶⁴ Moreover, it was later to be revealed that Government officials held clandestine discussions with Nelson Mandela from 1985 onwards,¹⁰⁶⁵ and others had secret meetings with the UDF in the same year.¹⁰⁶⁶

The Government also pursued different forms of negotiation, dialogue and political cooperation. This can be seen in the establishment of political bodies for 'joint decision-making' at local and regional levels. This was part of Government's attempt to 'promote dialogue on different levels and modes' and to 'institutionalize it where it is already possible'.¹⁰⁶⁷ It was said by Chris Heunis that 'dialogue at the local level' was one of the 'basic goals' of Regional Services Councils.¹⁰⁶⁸ PG Marais argued that third tier reform could 'create a spirit in South Africa which can give rise to peaceful coexistence for many years in the future'.¹⁰⁶⁹ Moreover, Val Volker argued that RSCs were part of a process to build up trust gradually.¹⁰⁷⁰ Similarly, a Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal was set up in 1987, at the request of KwaZulu and the Administrator of Natal, to allow for a form of 'joint decision-making' on executive matters on a regional level.¹⁰⁷¹ This too, was seen to promote a 'better understanding of one another's mutual problems'.¹⁰⁷² For Heunis, Government's endorsement of the JEA arose from its striving to promote cooperation between different

¹⁰⁶¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. d Borchgrave) of *The Washington Times*, 25 February, 1986.

¹⁰⁶² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol 74. 1986-8, Document, 'Government by Consent', N/D.

¹⁰⁶³ 'Enter Buthelezi', *Cape Times*, 21 May 1985; RH, Policy Speech By M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

¹⁰⁶⁴ 'Heunis, Buthelezi to Create Committee to Discuss Obstacles', *Natal Witness*, 10 January 1989.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 30-50.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 72.

¹⁰⁶⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis About Fighting Against the Revolutionary Climate, Meeting of Director Generals, Cape Town, 24 April 1986.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁹ PG. Marais, *Hansard*, Monday, 17 February 1986, Column 817.

¹⁰⁷⁰ V. Volker, *Hansard*, Thursday, 29 May 1986, Columns 6853-4.

¹⁰⁷¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Document, Off the Record Briefing for 38 Foreign Editors- World Media group Held in Cape Town, 1987.

¹⁰⁷² V. Volker, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 5 April 1989, Column 4666.

communities and entities within South Africa.¹⁰⁷³ As such, these forms of cooperation were intended to advance the process of reform at the national level. In a speech, Chris Heunis said that RSCs would 'speed up reform at higher levels and in other spheres of life'.¹⁰⁷⁴

The National Party also sought to co-opt certain black leaders into Government structures prior to a new dispensation being established. Not only was the National Council supposed to advise Government on policy-making whilst a new constitution was being negotiated, but it was suggested that African leaders might be included in the electoral college which elected the State President as well as appointed to cabinet.¹⁰⁷⁵ A document in Heunis's collection describes co-optation as a means of reaching consensus.¹⁰⁷⁶ In 1989, H. Kriel said that it was a means to 'gain the direct advice of Black people'.¹⁰⁷⁷

Another shift in Government policy was the apparently greater effort made to appeal to 'moderate' African leaders for greater cooperation and partnership based on a common interest in change and in averting revolution. This can be said to have begun in late-1983, but was in stark contrast to earlier points in the 1980s when the National Party only wanted Buthelezi to attend to his designated role as a homeland and ethnic leader, and only sought to consult with him on how South Africa was to move towards a confederation of independent states. Much National Party rhetoric in the second half of the 1980s suggested that the cooperation of organisations such as Inkatha was crucial in creating a new dispensation for a South Africa with an undivided citizenship. By refusing to join the National Council, some leaders were 'not strengthening their bargaining position but the forces of revolution and violence'.¹⁰⁷⁸ Appeals were made for solidarity and negotiation between those leaders who had 'made the fundamental choice' to reject revolution. They needed to realise that 'we are under attack'.¹⁰⁷⁹ It was said that all 'well-meaning and peace-loving black leaders' would accept the State President's invitation to negotiate and cooperate in 'the implementation of (a) new beginning'.¹⁰⁸⁰ Moreover, Heunis spoke of the need for 'all reasonable South Africans' to put preconditions for negotiation to one side and to 'pursue the promotion of those values that are

¹⁰⁷³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 55, Speech by Heunis in House of Representatives, 14 May 1986.

¹⁰⁷⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 29 1985-8, Document concerning Regional Service Councils, N/D.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Pottinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, 129.

¹⁰⁷⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol 74. 1986-8, Document, 'Government by Consent', N/D.

¹⁰⁷⁷ H. Kriel, *Hansard*, Monday, 22 May 1989, Column 9859.

¹⁰⁷⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, House of Delegates, 1 June 1988.

¹⁰⁷⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Document, 'Negotiations on the National Council', N/D.

¹⁰⁸⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol. 31 1982-6, Conference, 7 February 1986.

common to us all, instead of concentrating on the divisive factors'.¹⁰⁸¹ In other words, National Party officials increasingly emphasised the common cause of the Government and organisations like Inkatha and stressed that their participation in negotiating processes was vital.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt the significance of the role intended by the National Party for its negotiating partners in shaping the process and the outcome of change. It was stated publicly that the whites, the Government and the National Party ought to remain in control of the process of change. Heunis argued that whites had to play a prominent role because had been exposed to civilised values for longer.¹⁰⁸² Democratic reform could only succeed if certain actors accepted the Government's 'supervisory role'.¹⁰⁸³ Their 'intellectual abilities', 'leadership' and their 'desire for freedom' had to be at the service of all groups.¹⁰⁸⁴ For him, the Afrikaner held 'the key, not in the first place for himself, but for everyone in this country'. Another minister argued that the reform needed to 'take the lead' in undertaking reform.¹⁰⁸⁵ The National Party regarded the restoration of stability as an important condition for creating a climate for negotiations.¹⁰⁸⁶ But it also saw it as vital that a greater degree of consensus be achieved between itself and the African population and its leaders. To achieve this consensus, the emphasis was not on compromise, but on persuading the black population to change their demands.¹⁰⁸⁷

Inkatha refused to participate in the Government's proposed National Council throughout this period. Instead, it initiated and participated in the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba- a regional negotiating forum similar to the Buthelezi Commission in which it had been involved earlier in the decade. Much about the attitude of the National Party Government towards negotiation and potential negotiating partners in the late-1980s is revealed in its response to the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba. Moreover, many of the developments and continuities of National Party politics over the course of the 1980s are illustrated by a comparison between its reaction to these two initiatives. The existing historiography does not undertake such a comparison, nor examine in detail the National Party leadership's

¹⁰⁸¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, Corporate Forum Meeting, Johannesburg, November 1988.

¹⁰⁸² C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 18 August 1986, Column 10175.

¹⁰⁸³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2, 'Vol. 55---Booklet: Yes/NO: The Book to Read Before You Vote (An Independent Survey of the 1983 Referendum Issues)', N/D.

¹⁰⁸⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 34, Speech by C. Heunis to Young Afrikaners, 5 August 1987.

¹⁰⁸⁵ FW. De Klerk, *Hansard*, Friday, 12 May 1989, Column 8622.

¹⁰⁸⁶ ACA, Magnus Malan Collection PV634, 2/2/100-114 1987, Opening Speech of Symposium by M. Malan About Government and Administration in the RSA, Hotel Malibu, Durban, 21 April 1987.

¹⁰⁸⁷ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/55/42 1988-99, First Report to the British Parliamentary Human Rights Groups by B. Wrobel, March 1988-9; PG. Marais, *Hansard*, Monday, 17 February 1986, Column 817; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Statement by C. Heunis, Pretoria, 7 November 1988.

response to the Indaba and its proposals. It fails to convey the insights contained in several relevant Government documents pertaining to this subject.

Unlike its response to the Buthelezi Commission, the governing party did not rebuke Inkatha for participating in such an exercise or for concerning itself with affairs beyond its homeland boundaries. Despite declining to participate in the forum, Government sent official observers which it had not done in the case of the Buthelezi Commission.¹⁰⁸⁸ Although it rejected the Indaba's proposals, the Government's administrator of Natal praised it in private as a 'worthwhile exercise' which involved a 'valuable exchange of ideas' and reassessment of 'preconceived notions'.¹⁰⁸⁹ Another secret document from the Department of Constitutional Planning and Development stated that the process had helped forge 'valuable bonds of friendship' between different participants. It described as a 'high-point' that all parties had come under the impression that a solution to the country's problems could be found through discussions. It argued that Government should welcome all types of negotiations, because *inter alia* this would lead to the development of 'mutual understanding and trust'.¹⁰⁹⁰ Here can be seen how the Indaba was thought to serve objectives which the National Party had declared to be at the heart of its reform efforts. Having earlier dismissed the Buthelezi Commission, Government ministers encouraged discussion in the mid-1980s with Inkatha about the commission's proposals. In 1984 and 1985, ministers told Buthelezi that they would negotiate some of the suggestions with him.¹⁰⁹¹ The Government's tone was no longer one of dismissiveness of Buthelezi's initiatives. The Government did not accept the Indaba proposals, but Heunis declared his eagerness to work alongside Buthelezi and others in working out a solution for South Africa and the region. The Indaba was a 'major exercise' in the development of consensus.¹⁰⁹² The Government declared that it would hold negotiations with KwaZulu specifically on the Indaba proposals.¹⁰⁹³ Such talks went ahead despite the opposition of the Natal branch of the National Party.¹⁰⁹⁴ Oscar Dhlomo struck a hopeful note in late-1987 that Inkatha was keen to negotiate elements of the recommendation so that agreement could be reached.¹⁰⁹⁵

¹⁰⁸⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 10 1987, Press Statement about the Indaba, N/D.

¹⁰⁸⁹ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Memorandum, Administrator Cadman Writes About the Indaba Proposals, 2 November 1987.

¹⁰⁹⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Urgent Indaba Document for the Minister, from Political Planning, Pretoria, N/D.

¹⁰⁹¹ 'The Buthelezi Commission and the Future', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 2, 1985.

¹⁰⁹² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 10 1987, Press Statement about the Indaba, N/D.

¹⁰⁹³ 'Government to talk to Indaba after all', *Business Day*, 28 October 1987.

¹⁰⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, 'Natal/KwaZulu Indaba', Issued by the Ministry of Constitutional Development and Planning, Pretoria, 28 October 1987.

However, there is no sign that National Party officials sought compromise on crucial differences which existed between the Indaba proposals and their own preferences. The Department for Constitutional Development and Planning stressed that in further discussions with Dhlomo, the KwaZulu official must be allowed to express his opinions, but then should be shown the 'errors' in the Indaba proposals.¹⁰⁹⁶ Notwithstanding the Government's stated support for negotiation at all levels, its leaders did not entirely approve of political deliberations which fell outside the Government's own structures. They perceived in the Indaba and the attention it was receiving a threat to its own negotiating plans. In a speech, Heunis lamented that 'a tendency has developed to portray the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba as the ultimate and only ideal of how negotiations should be conducted, and this is then used by some people to try to show Government's inability to get so-called real negotiations off the ground'. Although Government welcomed the idea of the Indaba and the efforts of its participants, it was 'a gross over-simplification to compare that process with the one the Government is currently involved in with regard to the National Council'. As a regional initiative, the Indaba dealt with 'less fundamental and less complicated' issues than the National Council. The Government forum had to deal with an infinitely greater range of interests and problems which made it harder to bring together the relevant parties¹⁰⁹⁷ Heunis, then, was sensitive to comparisons being drawn between the Indaba and the National Council and the suggestion that former highlighted the failure of the latter to gain traction. Heunis also told administrator Cadman that Indaba recommendations had limited value, because they failed to consider the question of representation in central decision-making. Therefore, they did little to address the 'developing constitutional totality'.¹⁰⁹⁸ The Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and Technology told parliament that the political reform would be brought about by the National Council which would be the 'big indaba'. He expressed his personal view that this 'indaba nkulu' had actually been 'frustrated by the KwaZulu Indaba'.¹⁰⁹⁹

Heunis's department regarded further discussions on the Indaba proposals to be important, not because it regarded the regional initiative as the ideal model for future negotiations, or that agreement on the recommendations was imminent. It was chiefly seeking to avoid negative consequences for the Government's image which would arise if it was not perceived to have responded positively to the initiative. Because of the 'high profile' and significant support enjoyed by

¹⁰⁹⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Urgent Indaba Document for the Minister, from Political Planning, Pretoria, N/D.

¹⁰⁹⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 35 1987, Address by C. Heunis, Sandton, 18 November 1987.

¹⁰⁹⁸ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4, Letter to Mr Cadman from C. Heunis, N/D.

¹⁰⁹⁹ TG. Alant, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Columns 155-6.

the Indaba, it was 'strategically and practically imperative' that there be a visible continuation of the Natal negotiations process in which the government is actively involved. If those negotiations were seen to be at a dead-end, a 'hardening of positions' and polarisation might result. Government's 'willingness to negotiate on broader levels (would be) seriously questioned.' In discussions with KwaZulu, it was crucial that the impression not be created that they were merely 'buying time and...not serious looking for solutions'.¹¹⁰⁰ Another departmental document stated that 'unnecessary polarisation' on these proposals was to be avoided, because such an eventuality would sour the climate for negotiation and play into the hands of revolutionaries.¹¹⁰¹ In its recommendations for 'further handling', therefore, Heunis's department seems mainly to have been concerned with avoiding negative perceptions of Government's handling of the Indaba, rather than with the possibility of any agreement being reached with Inkatha on its regional proposals.¹¹⁰² Con Botha later commented that the Indaba proposals themselves received 'scant attention' from National Party.¹¹⁰³

Indeed, it is not clear that the Government's endeavours in the sphere of negotiation, dialogue or consultation were predominant in its efforts to create a climate more conducive to its aims and ultimately to achieve a viable political settlement. The use of coercion and force was also an increasingly prominent aspect of the National Party's politics in this period. One important aspect of the Government's strategy for reform was to use the security forces to attempt to impose order and stability on areas where black militancy was common. In response to the armed struggle and other forms of radical violence, the Government declared a State of Emergency in 1985 and again from 1986.¹¹⁰⁴ Seventeen more organisations were banned in 1988.¹¹⁰⁵ This can be seen, as Chris Heunis said, as an attempt to thwart the revolutionaries' ambition to make the country ungovernable and to ensure, as Magnus Malan stated, that everything the Government did was from a 'position of power and strength'.¹¹⁰⁶ Malan also said that it was the 'essential philosophy' of the Government

¹¹⁰⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Urgent Indaba Document for the Minister, Political Planning, Pretoria, N/D.

¹¹⁰¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, 'Natal/KwaZulu Indaba', Issued by the Ministry of Constitutional Development and Planning, Pretoria, 28 October 1987.

¹¹⁰² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Urgent Indaba Document for the Minister, Political Planning, Pretoria, N/D.

¹¹⁰³ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, P. Waldmeir Interviewed by C. Botha, 25 January 1995.

¹¹⁰⁴ W. Gutteridge, 'The South African Crisis: Time for International Action', *Conflict Studies*, 179, (1985) in W. Gutteridge (ed.), *South Africa from Apartheid to National Unity, 1981-1994* (Aldershot: Brookfield, 1995) 125; JD. Brewer, 'Five Minutes to Midnight', in JD. Brewer (ed.) *Five Minutes to Midnight: Can South Africa Survive?*, (London: MacMillan, 1989), 338.

¹¹⁰⁵ Humphries and Shubane, 'A Tale of Two Squirrels', 94.

¹¹⁰⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis, 'The Present State and the Future of Reform', The Corporate Forum Meeting, Mount Nelson Hotel, 13 June 1987; ACA, Magnus Malan

that 'stability and progress are indivisible'.¹¹⁰⁷ The desire to improve the security situation was made more urgent by the view, which was recalled by Mike Louw of the National Intelligence Service, that ungovernability was not 'something that you can turn on and off like a tap'. It was feared that disorder would create a lasting mentality amongst blacks, characterised by a breakdown of authority and respect for the law.¹¹⁰⁸ It was also argued by National Party politicians that 'unrest and violence' could 'hamper reform'.¹¹⁰⁹ Indeed, providing security and stability was seen to be an important part of creating a climate for negotiations and political progress. Heunis told parliament that negotiations could only take place in an 'atmosphere of normality'.¹¹¹⁰ Moderate black leaders would not participate in an 'atmosphere of violence and intimidation' such as that which prevailed prior to the State of Emergency.¹¹¹¹ To do so, PW Botha argued, would 'place their lives, their families and their possessions at risk'.¹¹¹² It was noted, in particular, that Buthelezi was a target for terrorist violence.¹¹¹³ For the President, intimidation needed to be 'eradicated' for 'responsible, peace-loving people' to come forward for discussions.¹¹¹⁴ The restoration of order was hoped to encourage non-violent black leaders to come forward for negotiations.¹¹¹⁵

As had been the case in the first half of the 1980s, the National Party pursued a reform strategy which consisted of social and economic reforms, as well as political and constitutional changes.¹¹¹⁶ Indeed, Heunis argued that economic, political and social forces were so 'interwoven' that it was often difficult 'to determine which factor is predominant under certain circumstances'.¹¹¹⁷ This gradual and comprehensive Government programme was to form an 'all-embracing counter-

Collection PV634, 2/2/100-114 1987, Excerpt from Speech by General M. Malan, National Party Meeting , 22 April 1987.

¹¹⁰⁷ ACA, Magnus Malan Collection PV634,2/2/100-114 1987, Opening Speech by M. Malan, Symposium about Government and Administration in the Republic of South Africa, Hotel Malibu, Durban, 21 April 1987.

¹¹⁰⁸ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, M. Louw Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 29 May 1995.

¹¹⁰⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Speech Script of Speaker of House of Assembly, opening of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

¹¹¹⁰ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 9 June 1987, Column, 1126.

¹¹¹¹ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/B2/2, D. Worrall Testimony to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 1985-6, 30 June 1986.

¹¹¹² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol. 31 1982-6, Memorandum from PW. Botha to Visiting Mission of US Congressmen under Leadership of Chairman WH. Gray, 3 January 1986.

¹¹¹³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off the Record Briefing by C. Heunis for 38 Foreign Editors- World Media group Held in Cape Town, 1987.

¹¹¹⁴ PW Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 14 August 1987, Columns 3829-30.

¹¹¹⁵ ACA, Leon Wessels Collection PV883, 1/B2/2, Denis Worrall testimony to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 1985-6, 30 June 1986.

¹¹¹⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12 /77/1 1979-1986, Extracts from Speeches by the State President on Reform During 1985, Port Elizabeth 30 September 1985; PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 5 February 1988, Column 5.

¹¹¹⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, House of Delegates, 1 June 1988.

strategy' against the forces of revolution.¹¹¹⁸ Paradoxically, it also aimed the 'transformation of the whole society as its goal' so that South African realities would allow for a lasting and stable settlement on the National Party's favoured terms.¹¹¹⁹ PW Botha hoped that 'changed realities' in the country would eventually provide the basis for a 'successful accommodation'.¹¹²⁰ For Heunis, the 'fundamental task' was to reconcile 'the systems of developed communities with those of traditional and developing communities'.¹¹²¹ The two societies had to be reconciled in terms of 'value systems, in terms of levels of development, in terms of attitudes towards government processes and, very important, in terms of exposure to those processes'.¹¹²² Black people had not had the historical exposure to democratic processes of government, so in order to preserve civilised standards and values, Government needed to 'bring more and more people into the categories that have those standards and values'.¹¹²³ It was only right that where there were a number of cultures at different stages of development and where 'the traditional sector totally dominates the modern sector in numbers', there should be an 'ongoing and incremental political development process'.¹¹²⁴

It was said by National Party politicians that social and economic reforms were an 'essential ingredient' of 'balanced political reform'.¹¹²⁵ There was a commitment to promoting economic growth, poverty alleviation and improved service delivery. Partly, this was motivated by the belief that hardship and poor service delivery was to a significant extent the cause of black dissatisfaction and therefore radicalisation. It was said that an improvement of living conditions was important, because economic deprivation could create a 'breeding ground for communism'.¹¹²⁶ For Heunis, developing a population's political aspirations without developing their economic self-sufficiency would lead to instability and dissatisfaction.¹¹²⁷ Magnus Malan had stated that when certain key services were provided to blacks, their political demands would be lowered.¹¹²⁸ Heunis argued that

¹¹¹⁸ ACA, Magnus Malan Collection PV634, 2/2/100-114 1987, Speech by M. Malan, Potchefstroom, 1 July 1987.

¹¹¹⁹ RS. Schoeman, *Hansard*, Monday, 8 May 1989, Column 8041.

¹¹²⁰ 'PW About to Talk on Talking', *Sunday Star*, 31 May 1987.

¹¹²¹ Chris Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday 18 August 1986, Column 10152.

¹¹²² ACA, Chris Heunis PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 34, Speech Notes for Minister C. Heunis in the House of Assembly, 9 September 1987.

¹¹²³ ACA Chris Heunis PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum from C. Heunis's Discussion with Senator Kennedy, N/D.

¹¹²⁴ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 22 May 1989, Column 9848.

¹¹²⁵ V. Volker, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 5 April 1989, Column 4618..

¹¹²⁶ JHW. Mentz, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Column 205; C.Heunis, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 9 June 1987, 1126.

¹¹²⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 38 1989, Address by Acting State President C. Heunis, The Official Opening of the First Session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 14 March 1989; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, House of Delegates, 1 June 1988.

¹¹²⁸ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 44-5.

‘purposeful upliftment’ could help shift black demands into ‘non-revolutionary channels’.¹¹²⁹ Similarly, it was argued that economic development had to be encouraged in black and coloured communities so that those people would develop an appreciation of ‘free enterprise and economic freedom’.¹¹³⁰ It was important to increase the number of black people who had a job and a house and therefore ‘something he can protect’.¹¹³¹ This involved boosting economic growth in South Africa generally, but also bringing about more growth in the black communities and in underdeveloped regions.¹¹³² It was hoped that this growth would be stimulated by the earlier division of South Africa into eight development regions and by the work of municipal development boards which would ‘render development aid and advice to local authorities’.¹¹³³ A new strategy was to open Central Business Districts and to all groups, to provide for full property rights for blacks and to remove other restrictions from black enterprise.¹¹³⁴ This was aimed at developing a larger African middle-class with greater entrepreneurship and economic expertise.¹¹³⁵ Not only would such a group have a ‘something to protect’, but would contribute to economic growth and make an important contribution to tax revenues.¹¹³⁶ These developments were particularly important because population growth was outstretching economic growth and meant that ‘the third world component of the total population mix is daily becoming bigger’, which was imposing larger costs on a relatively smaller base of taxpayers.¹¹³⁷ Moreover, Government made a number of political reforms which were intended to facilitate improved service delivery to South Africa’s underdeveloped communities. The Regional Services Councils provided for cooperation and ‘joint decision-making’ between the local authorities of different racial groups.¹¹³⁸ These were seen as ‘essential to reduce the cost of providing services to their respective communities within their financial means and to

¹¹²⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis About Fighting Against the Revolutionary Climate, Meeting of Director Generals, Cape Town, 24 April 1986.

¹¹³⁰ JHW. Mentz, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Column 205.

¹¹³¹ JWH. Meiring, *Hansard*, Friday, 6 February 1987, Column 412-3.

¹¹³² PW Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 5 February 1988, Column 4; RS. Schoeman, *Hansard*, Monday, 8 May 1989, Column 8043; ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/88, NP Information Document, ‘RSCs are Essential for Peace and Stability’, N/D.

¹¹³³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Notes to the Press on Second and Third Tier Reform in South Africa, 24 May 1985.

¹¹³⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, ‘Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA’, 1987; PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986, Column 11-2; AT. Van der Walt, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 25 June 1986, Column 9856.

¹¹³⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, ‘Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA’, 1987; DM. Streicher, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 2 February 1987, Column 87.

¹¹³⁶ ACA, PW Botha PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, Document, ‘Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA’, 1987; DM. Streicher, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 5 April 1989, Column 4687.

¹¹³⁷ PG Marais, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 16 May 1989, Column 9297; V. Volker, *Hansard*, Tuesday, 4 April 1989 : 4198; V. Volker, *Hansard*, Wednesday, 5 April 1989, Column 4618.

¹¹³⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, Notes to the Press on Second and Third Tier Reform in South Africa, 24 May 1985.

improve their living standards'.¹¹³⁹ As implied earlier, these economic changes were also seen as important because of the heightened conflict potential which was seen to arise from the developmental inequality of different population groups. Because groups were less likely to share when the economy was less well-developed, a lack of economic growth could be 'a limiting factor' in political reform. Indeed, systems of Government in the third world had 'crashed and failed' for such economic reasons'.¹¹⁴⁰ As such, it was of 'paramount importance' to understand the link between economic and political reform.¹¹⁴¹ For PW Botha, the gap between first and third world economies in South Africa had to be bridged.¹¹⁴²

In announcing its commitment to a negotiated political settlement, there was no sense amongst National Party leaders that consensus could be achieved quickly or that a settlement could be implemented promptly. They often said that the final dispensation they sought would have to be the culmination of a gradual, extensive and multi-faceted reform process to be led by themselves. PW Botha stressed that there could be 'no shortcuts or quick fixes', and that the reform process would require 'a lot of self-discipline and self-control and patience'.¹¹⁴³ A leitmotiv in National Party discourse was that only a settlement which was the product of evolutionary change could provide a lasting solution. A Government minister railed against an editorial in *The Times* of London which had called for 'instant democracy'. This was a 'naïve and absurd' demand typical of those which the outside world placed on South Africa. Democracy, by its 'very nature' had a 'slow, laborious and evolutionary growth'. There could be 'instant autocracy', but not 'instant democracy', apart from in the sense that a democracy could be 'instantaneous in its duration'.¹¹⁴⁴ Heunis announced in 1985 that 'only progressive democratisation' could lead to 'honest and lasting peace'.¹¹⁴⁵ Reform was a choice for 'responsible government', rather than for 'unfettered freedom which destroys freedom'.¹¹⁴⁶ In pleading this case, senior Government figures pointed to the fact that many western systems of government had developed over long periods of time. For instance, PW Botha emphasised that the cantonal system in Switzerland had taken over one hundred years to develop into its present form, despite the Swiss being 'highly civilised'. For Botha, change could not be

¹¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum from Chris Heunis's Discussion with Senator Kennedy, N/D.

¹¹⁴¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum from Discussion with Senator Kennedy, N/D.

¹¹⁴² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of *The Washington Times*, 25 February, 1986.

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁴ G. Viljoen, *Hansard*, Thursday 5 February 1987, 363.

¹¹⁴⁵ M. Buthelezi, 'I call on Mr Heunis to reconsider his words..', *Clarion Call*, Vol. 3, 1985.

¹¹⁴⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 32 1986, Speech by Minister C. Heunis to the Federal Congress of the National Party, 13 August 1986.

completed in five or ten years, but South Africa could make considerable progress in one generation.¹¹⁴⁷ It was also argued by a number of National Party politicians that if the process were not gradual, it could cause instability. It was stated frequently that reform had the inherent danger of producing volatility. Heunis told a group of reporters in an off the record meeting that reform and instability went 'hand in hand', particularly if undertaken too rapidly.¹¹⁴⁸ It was important to avoid instability because it was the 'expressed goal' of the revolutionaries to 'make the country ungovernable'.¹¹⁴⁹ In setting the pace of reform, a 'very sensitive balance' needed to be struck.¹¹⁵⁰ He cited a number of thinkers on this subject. Heunis paraphrased Lenin that 'a government is most vulnerable during the time when it is making significant changes, even if those changes will be beneficial in the long run'.¹¹⁵¹ He also cited Machiavelli as saying that 'there is nothing more difficult to execute, or of which is more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order, because the reformer meets with resistance from all those who benefit from the old order and gets only half-hearted support from those who benefit from the new order'.¹¹⁵² One of the perceived dangers of hasty reform was the danger of rising expectations on the part of the 'underprivileged'. Such expectations could exceed the 'means to satisfy them' which was a dangerous prospect.¹¹⁵³ It was possible to provoke a conservative backlash against the Government's reforms which would have 'unpredictable consequences'.¹¹⁵⁴ PW Botha also argued that rapid political change creates 'an undisciplined situation'.¹¹⁵⁵ For the National party, the alternative to a gradual, evolutionary political development was 'chaos and anarchy' and 'revolutionary chaos'.¹¹⁵⁶

It is not immediately clear, then, what the significance was of the Government's declared commitment to negotiated political reform and settlement. Nor was it apparent from the public utterances of National Party politicians how these aspects of the NP's political approach related to

¹¹⁴⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of *The Washington Times*, 25 February, 1986.

¹¹⁴⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off the Record Briefing by C. Heunis for 38 Foreign Editors, World Media Group, Cape Town, 1987.

¹¹⁴⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis, 'The Present State and the Future of Reform', The Corporate Forum Meeting, Mount Nelson Hotel, 13 June 1987.

¹¹⁵⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off the Record Briefing by C. Heunis for 38 Foreign Editors, World Media Group, Cape Town, 1987.

¹¹⁵¹ 'Have we crossed the Rubicon at last?', *Pretoria News* 24 April 1986.

¹¹⁵² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Introductory Speech by C. Heunis Regarding the Free Settlement Areas Bill, 1988.

¹¹⁵³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Memorandum by from Discussion Between C. Heunis with Senator Kennedy, N/D.

¹¹⁵⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis, 'The Present State and the Future of Reform', The Corporate Forum Meeting, Mount Nelson Hotel, 13 June 1987.

¹¹⁵⁵ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, PW. Botha interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 March 1995.

¹¹⁵⁶ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 8 May 1989, Column 8003; PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 31 January 1986, Columns 15-16.

the other facets. What were the Government's strategic priorities? The Government also omitted to make clear what exactly it meant by negotiated change and what purpose was intended to be served by negotiation and discussion forums. How precisely was negotiated change to be brought about? Furthermore, the National Party's pronouncements left uncertainty as to what role it envisaged in negotiations for particular black organisations, such as Inkatha or the ANC, and how these related to each other. It has already been shown in chapter five that despite broad agreements in public, there were different views amongst Government ministers regarding the type of constitution which was to be established. It must therefore be asked to what extent there were disagreements amongst the different figures in the NP Government about approaches to achieving a political settlement.

Chapter Nine: The Political Approach of PW Botha, 1985-1989.

Despite committing to a new constitutional dispensation and to a National Statutory Council to facilitate negotiated change, PW Botha seems not to have regarded negotiation and political reform as the utmost or most immediate priorities in his plan to achieve his political objectives in the second half of the 1980s. For Botha and some other Government figures, there were higher priorities. Not only did Botha reject a number of Heunis's suggestions for negotiating forums which would be more attractive to black leaders, but in doing so he told cabinet ministers repeatedly that 'socio-economic programs need to be prioritised'.¹¹⁵⁷ There was an emphasis in this meeting, as well as in a key concept document, on the importance of decentralising the economy and creating growth in underdeveloped regions of South Africa.¹¹⁵⁸ Botha told cabinet that this was necessary to avoid 'South Africa (being) flooded by people looking for work'. Getting the cooperation of the private sector was important in this respect.¹¹⁵⁹ This view was common to a number of other National Party figures. Magnus Malan said that socio-economic improvements would lower Africans' political demands.¹¹⁶⁰ In stark contrast with the interpretation of the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Malan stated that 'the important question is how many black people are

¹¹⁵⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, Schlebusch, Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, General M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹¹⁵⁸ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987. Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C. Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987; ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987.

¹¹⁵⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C. Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹¹⁶⁰ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 44-5.

merely interested in satisfying their material demands- housing, education, job opportunities, clothing, bread and butter etc. There is presently only a limited section which is really interested in political participation. I think for the masses in South Africa democracy is not a relevant factor'.¹¹⁶¹ Botha also regarded the national level constitutional accommodation of Africans as a less important and less immediate imperative of Government policy than political reform on the regional and municipal level. Having discussed the prospect of a National Council or a Joint Council of State, Botha told cabinet ministers that the priority in constitutional terms was to create urban governments which could provide better services for their people and to allow African people to vote in urban elections.¹¹⁶² This thought was also expressed by Val Volker who said in 1986 that the franchise was 'not the main issue at the moment'. Reforms which allowed Black local authorities to render important services more satisfactorily were a higher priority.¹¹⁶³ As illustrated in chapter five, Botha had little sense that the process of change needed to involve a significant degree of power being shifted to the non-white population in national or 'common' affairs. As a former Defence Minister, Botha attached a greater degree of significance to security operations than did the Department for Constitutional Development and Planning. Security was an 'absolute condition for reform'. The two had to be coordinated 'most closely'.¹¹⁶⁴ Magnus Malan expressed similar sentiments, complaining that 'the word dialogue' was seen as a 'magic formula'. Dialogue did not suggest that they should disarm. Everything the Government did should be done from a 'position of power and strength'.¹¹⁶⁵ FW de Klerk wrote of the 'prominent role' played by the State Security Council during Botha's administration, and of the State President's 'special relationship' with the security forces.¹¹⁶⁶ Unlike the Special Cabinet Committee, Botha personally served as the chairman of the State Security Council.¹¹⁶⁷ Although the State President favoured the participation of African leaders in Government-approved negotiating forums, he was against a 'top-down' approach in which South Africa's future would be shaped by national political negotiations and reform. He told Patti Waldmeir in 1995 that he had feared that a political dispensation 'which you start at the top would lead to

¹¹⁶¹ Swilling and Phillips, 'the Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', 61.

¹¹⁶² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹¹⁶³ V. Volker, *Hansard*, Thursday, 29 May 1986, Column 6853.

¹¹⁶⁴ PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Monday, 17 April 1989, Column 5470.

¹¹⁶⁵ ACA, Magnus Malan PV634, 2/2/100-114 1987, Excerpt from Speech by General M. Malan, National Party Meeting, 22 April 1987.

¹¹⁶⁶ De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 68-9; *Ibid.*, 119.

¹¹⁶⁷ Swilling and Phillips, 'The Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', 50.

majority government and consequential strife'.¹¹⁶⁸ This analysis provides the only direct demonstration of Botha expressing the view that, as Swilling and Phillips contend, that the politics of reform were of 'secondary importance'.¹¹⁶⁹ It shows that economic reform and security were prioritised. Botha and some like-minded colleagues sought to withstand, weaken and suppress violent protest, whilst using socio-economic and local 'own affairs' political reform to attenuate the grievances which fomented support for revolutionary radicalism.

Despite Botha's espoused commitment to the politics of 'negotiation', he did not embrace the politics of compromise, or adopt a willingness to loosen the National Party's control of the process of change in South Africa by forming meaningful political partnerships with non-white organisations like Inkatha. When the President spoke of negotiation it seems he meant little more than consultation. Botha told cabinet ministers in 1987 that a National Council should be established as a 'consultative body'. Swilling and Phillips observe that in the late-1980s, Botha spoke less and less about 'reform' or 'negotiation', stressing more the importance of 'deliberations' and 'dialogue'.¹¹⁷⁰ Indeed, official documents illuminate more clearly than before Botha's opposition to forms of negotiation which might threaten the party's grasp on the process of political change. He expressed opposition to Heunis's view that a negotiating body might contain a significantly larger number of non-whites than whites and could have some governmental powers whilst the process of change was still underway. Botha said that a forum was permissible if it were merely consultative. He said Government should 'let them choose some black people and then we go on'.¹¹⁷¹ As already shown, constitutional thinkers at the Office of the State President did not think that South Africa could be governed entirely by consensus even when a new constitution had been implemented. They believed that non-whites were entirely dependent upon the expertise of whites and so it is difficult to believe that Botha would have approved of any negotiating forum which compromised white control over the negotiating process and left them reliant on their ability to persuade non-whites of the rightness of the Government's policies. In fact, Botha seemed bitter about having to establish a National Council in the first place. He told his colleagues that he could not understand why the President's Council could not have been reformed, but kept the same name. If it was a council which advised the President, why couldn't it still be called the President's Council? Botha could 'not see the

¹¹⁶⁸ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070 PW. Botha Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 March 1995.

¹¹⁶⁹ Swilling and Phillips, 'The Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', 48-9.

¹¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 61-2.

¹¹⁷¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C. Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

logic in it'.¹¹⁷² Moreover, the State President dismissed the idea that the National Party needed to sit down with black leaders, come to a mutual agreement and then create a new dispensation accordingly- 'It's not like anything I've ever seen'. Instead, the party needed to govern itself into a new constitution. They had to 'move in a direction and take the people with (them) in that direction, but retain power'.¹¹⁷³ Botha's approach was made clear in his conduct towards those non-white politicians who had entered official Government structures in 1984. In a meeting in 1987, he rebuked coloured cabinet member Allan Hendrickse for publicly expressing a disagreement with the National Party and reminded him abruptly that South Africa did not have a 'coalition government'. Botha expressed exasperation that he had 'stated this very clearly on many occasions'. For Botha, Hendrickse lacked an understanding of his plight and not the other way around. If people such as Hendrickse continued to make 'extravagant challenges...against white South Africa' a reaction would take place which would place the National Party leader in an 'impossible situation'.¹¹⁷⁴ The fact that Hendrickse was not obediently following the Government line seemed to deeply annoy Botha. In discussions with colleagues later in 1987, he said that Hendrickse made him feel sick.¹¹⁷⁵ This corroborates the view of Mitchell and Russell that Botha practised 'survival politics' based on a 'determination to maintain white control of the state apparatus at all costs'.¹¹⁷⁶

At least from 1987, Botha and like-minded ministers were deeply pessimistic about the prospect of gaining legitimacy, cultivating consensus, or winning the cooperation of even relatively moderate African leaders through dialogue and consultation alone. In fact, they quickly came to assume that the cooperation they desired could only be brought about by a demonstration of the National Party's strength, determination and fixity of purpose. This is illustrated further by Botha's comment to cabinet ministers in 1987 that 'at some point it will come for us to say to Black people look, so far and no further. That's where we need to go'. Similar ideas were expressed by a range of other ministers and officials. JCG Botha told ministers that Africans wanted more than they were 'willing to offer' and Government could not give them 'carte blanche'. Viljoen complained that even moderate black leaders were not interested in negotiations, because they saw Government as an 'easy pushover'. The management of security and 'the way government acts to show it has the will and

¹¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 13/37/1 1987-1988, Transcript of Cabinet Meeting, 21 January 1987.

¹¹⁷⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹¹⁷⁶ M. Mitchell and D. Russell, 'Political Impasse in South Africa: State Capacities and Crisis Management', J. Brewer (ed.) *Five Minutes to Midnight: Can South Africa Survive?* (London: MacMillan, 1989), 322.

the ability to uphold authority' was therefore 'fundamental to the whole setup'.¹¹⁷⁷ Magnus Malan's comment about the importance of acting from a position of strength also seems to echo these thoughts. It was argued that it would take a long time to change the approach even of 'moderate' leaders. Schlebusch opined that South Africa 'need(ed) a dictator for twenty years', whereas JCG Botha told ministers that they should not be 'over-optimistic' about achieving results quickly. African leaders and people were said to be in a particular 'state of mind', and it ought to be realised that the 'cooperation of the black man is slow'. PW Botha's approach was one of pronounced intransigence, and he implied while rebuking Hendrickse that his stance would become increasingly trenchant as more people tried to undermine his political approach. 'Make no mistake', he warned, 'If I'm forced I will side with my people....Then we'll fight it out in this country'.¹¹⁷⁸ As Willie Esterhuyse argues, Botha 'hated what he regarded as signs of weakness'.¹¹⁷⁹ In his August 1985 Rubicon Speech, Botha declared that his Government had broken with the past, before making a defiant statement that he had already shown great patience and leniency. He warned his opponents not to push him too far.¹¹⁸⁰ The State President showed similar defiance in connection with the Eminent Persons Group sent by the Commonwealth to explore the possibilities for negotiation in South Africa. During the group's visit, Botha held meetings with British Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, and US ambassador, Herman Nickel. Jan Heunis, who was present, recounts the tone of intransigence that the president conveyed during these encounters.¹¹⁸¹ The Eminent Persons Group mission was scuppered by the Government's bombing of foreign capitals on 6 June 1986.¹¹⁸²

This shows that Botha and like-minded colleagues did not believe that African leaders had any legitimate objections regarding Government's negotiations and reform. It demonstrates that the State President was not prepared to make any significant compromises and corroborates existing arguments that Botha sought to co-opt 'compliant', 'pliable', 'acquiescent and conservative' black leaders.¹¹⁸³ It lends support to Swilling and Phillips's contention that serious reform and negotiation were to be undertaken only once the revolutionaries had already been weakened to the point of

¹¹⁷⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹¹⁷⁸ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 13/37/1 1987-1988, Transcript on Cabinet Meeting, 21 January 1987.

¹¹⁷⁹ Esterhuyse, *Endgame*, 51.

¹¹⁸⁰ Schrire, *Adapt or Die*, 82-83.

¹¹⁸¹ Heunis, *The Inner Circle*, 58.

¹¹⁸² Giliomee, *Last of the Afrikaner Leaders*, 259.

¹¹⁸³ Rich, 'The Changing South African Scene', 308-9; Van der Westhuizen, *White Power and the Rise and Fall of the National Party*, 126; *Ibid.* 116.

defeat.¹¹⁸⁴ However, it gives reason to doubt Friedman's claim that Government was seeking an internal settlement or 'deal' with Inkatha.¹¹⁸⁵ Botha and like-minded colleagues did not think that their problems could be resolved simply reaching an accommodation with conservative leaders, at least not in the short-term. The forces of revolution needed to be thwarted before a settlement could be achieved.

PW Botha's commitment to establish a National Statutory Council and his declaration of commitment to walking the 'path of negotiations' were not reflections of a fundamental shift in the State President's political approach from late-1985 onwards towards compromise and meaningful partnership with African leaders of any type. However, that is not to say that negotiations had no significance for Botha as part of a broader approach, or that the developments of late-1985 were completely trivial in connection with his political tactics. It is clear that Botha amongst other National Party figures perceived a reason to include African leaders in formal constitutional deliberations at least for symbolic purposes. Even if he was not prepared to act in such a way that would loosen the National Party's control or show it to be weak, PW Botha was aware of the necessity of being seen to be willing to cooperate and collaborate with black leaders. This awareness was evidently greater than at earlier stages in decade. This was a reflection of the context of mounting challenge posed to the South African state by the African radicalism and foreign pressure described in part one. A policy of negotiated settlement was also the logical extension of conceding that South Africa was a single state with a single citizenship. Botha said his Government was struggling against the influence of revolutionaries and very concerned about 'international action against South Africa'.¹¹⁸⁶ In this context, the National Council was said to give 'formal and visible shape to the negotiation process'.¹¹⁸⁷ JCG Botha told cabinet ministers that Government should create an 'image of compassion and cooperation here and abroad'.¹¹⁸⁸ PW Botha told his colleagues that the voting rights of urban communities were a priority. There was a demand for Government to speak to leaders and so 'we have got to get leaders', Botha said.¹¹⁸⁹ A secret 1983 document from Botha's collection argued that it was of 'urgent importance for the long-term constitutional development of

¹¹⁸⁴ Swilling and Phillips, 'The Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making Structures and Policy Strategies in the South African State', in *South Africa at the End of the Eighties: Policy Perspectives 1989* (University of the Witwatersrand: Centre for Policy Studies, 1989), 48-9.

¹¹⁸⁵ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, S. Friedman Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 17 November 1994.

¹¹⁸⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2/ Vol. 31 1982-6, Memorandum From PW. Botha to Visiting Mission of US Congressmen Under the Leadership of Chairman WH. Gray, 3 January 1986.

¹¹⁸⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12 /77/1 1979-1986, 'Constitutional Reform', N/D.

¹¹⁸⁸ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

the black man to be visible and to be attended to at least symbolically on the macro-level'.¹¹⁹⁰ Indeed, the State President was frustrated at points with the lack of progress made in getting negotiations underway. A leaked recording of a discussion between Botha and Van Zyl Slabbert in 1986 revealed that the President had lamented Buthelezi's unwillingness to talk with him, particularly alongside other black leaders. He complained that there was 'too little positive co-operation' from African leaders.¹¹⁹¹ In 1988, Botha expressed frustration that Buthelezi was 'blocking negotiations on constitutional reform' and that the homeland leader was being 'misused and misled'.¹¹⁹²

Also PW Botha reasoned that the political cooperation of non-revolutionary leaders, such as Buthelezi, would help the Government to resist the challenge of revolutionary violence, and to assuage the foreign pressure to deal with more radical organisations, like the ANC. Botha's qualified support for a National Council was an expression of his desire to persuade the international community that he was 'busy with (his) own positive programme of development'.¹¹⁹³ In a conversation with a United States Congress fact-finding team, Botha assured them that he was talking to black leaders and mentioned Buthelezi's name twice in this respect.¹¹⁹⁴ Similarly, Magnus Malan sought to legitimate National Party policy by telling a Swiss audience that Buthelezi's participation in the Joint Executive Authority of Natal and KwaZulu was proof 'that President Botha's policy of broadening democracy' was 'gaining momentum'.¹¹⁹⁵ The President requested that Thatcher suspend her demand for Mandela to be released in order to allow Buthelezi to take the credit for it.¹¹⁹⁶ Moreover, it was clearly important to Botha that there were black leaders it could point to who rejected the armed struggle. Botha told Buthelezi that 'The South African Government's hand is strengthened by leaders who openly reject violence as a means of achieving political goals'.¹¹⁹⁷

Botha's approach towards negotiations with the ANC was paradoxical. He portrayed it as a communist organisation waging a 'total onslaught' against South Africa, whilst directing his officials to hold clandestine meetings with Nelson Mandela. In Giliomee's description, Botha's administration

¹¹⁹⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

¹¹⁹¹ RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

¹¹⁹² Editorial, *Clarion Call*, Vol. 1, 1989.

¹¹⁹³ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, PW. Botha Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 March 1995.

¹¹⁹⁴ 'No talks with Govt- Chief', *The Argus*, 10 January 1986.

¹¹⁹⁵ ACA, Magnus Malan Collection PV634, 2/2/100-114 1987, Speech by M. Malan to the Swiss South Africa Association, 6 December 1987.

¹¹⁹⁶ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, B. Du Plessis Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 3 November 1994.

¹¹⁹⁷ 'Natal's JEA can succeed- Botha', *The Star*, 4 November 1987.

sought to 'stigmatise many of its opponents as beyond the pale' and to demonise all 'opposition left of the Inkatha/ Progressive Federal/ Labour/National People's Party axis as tools, witting or unwitting, of the communists'.¹¹⁹⁸ Despite this, Government officials met and held talks with Nelson Mandela from 1985 onwards. Minister of Justice, Kobie Coetsee, visited Mandela in 1985 and many times thereafter.¹¹⁹⁹ Niel Barnard, head of the National Intelligence Service also met with Mandela.¹²⁰⁰ Willie Esterhuysen, a Stellenbosch academic who had meetings with the NIS during this period, accounts for this by arguing that PW Botha 'realised by 1985 that the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners was inevitable. International and domestic pressure, and Margaret Thatcher's stance in particular, were the push factors in this regard'.¹²⁰¹ Official documents show that Botha was being advised from 1983 that radical politics was gaining great popularity amongst urban black men. The popularity of the ANC was 'increasing rapidly' whilst the relevance of the homeland leaders was 'declining on a daily basis', particularly amongst the young. Botha was informed that 'the urban black man' was 'the primary key to the white dispensation'.¹²⁰² Mandela's release was being called for by a wide range of international leaders, which as Esterhuysen suggests, included prominent conservative governments. Botha expressed concern to senior colleagues that he had been 'extremely pressed by almost all western leaders in the last year or two' to release Mandela from prison. 'If not Reagan, then it is Maggie Thatcher, and if it is not she, then it is Kohl and if it is not he, then it's someone else, but each is laying an egg that Mandela must be released from prison'. He also lamented that 'black people (were) starting to demand Mandela's freedom before negotiations'. The Mandela issue was 'now going to be driven to a point'.¹²⁰³ This suggests that, despite his outward defiance, Botha did have some sense of the importance of international legitimacy. In corroboration of Esterhuysen's account, Niel Barnard later claimed that it was considered inevitable from the mid-1980s by those involved in talks with Mandela that the ANC leader would have to be released eventually. Barnard spoke of their worries that Mandela might die in prison and thereby create a 'whole lot of problems'.¹²⁰⁴ Barend Du Plessis described how in 1987 he was asked to tell Thatcher that he would eventually release Mandela, but to ask her to stop requesting it for the time being. Du Plessis gained the impression that 'Mandela's release was

¹¹⁹⁸ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 369.

¹¹⁹⁹ Esterhuysen, *Endgame*, 64.

¹²⁰⁰ Heunis, *The Inner Circle*, 55-62.

¹²⁰¹ Esterhuysen, *Endgame*, 75.

¹²⁰² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/2 1983-1985, Top Secret Document, 'The Urban Black man: A Few Perspectives About his Constitutional Development', 1983.

¹²⁰³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹²⁰⁴ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070 N. Barnard Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 25 November 1994.

already on the cards for PW Botha'.¹²⁰⁵ Furthermore, Botha implied that the ANC would eventually have to be included in the negotiated settlement, when he declared that 'the longer clumsy and other rash victims woo the ANC, the longer it will take to get the ANC as an accountable and responsible party so far as to join other South African interested parties around the negotiating table'.¹²⁰⁶

However, the talks between Government officials and Mandela did not reflect a movement on PW Botha's part towards withdrawing his condition that violence would have to be renounced by the ANC before it could enter negotiations. Nor is there any evidence that he believed that there was any immediate prospect of Mandela or the ANC being reconciled to his political vision. Botha continued to demand throughout his presidency that Mandela renounce violence before he could be released. He told colleagues at Tuynhuys that the demands of foreign governments were unreasonable because 'no orderly government' could simply release Mandela.¹²⁰⁷ The State President also rejected Mandela's requests to speak with him personally, visiting the incarcerated leader only in 1989.¹²⁰⁸ As Esterhuysen points out, for Botha in the mid-late 1980s, the release of prisoners would have to be done on 'his own terms' and 'ANC-orchestrated violence ruled out the possibility of official talks'.¹²⁰⁹ The purpose of discussions with Mandela was not to negotiate an agreement for a future South African dispensation. Kobie Coetsee told Patti Waldmeir that Botha had simply wanted to 'solve the problem' of Mandela's imprisonment and that he never expressed 'any clear thinking' on Mandela's future constitutional role.¹²¹⁰ Botha told the same journalist that he met with Mandela in 1989 only to persuade him to abandon violence. He had been trying to convince Western leaders to drop their demands for an unconditional release.¹²¹¹ Jan Heunis argues that Barnard was not given a political mandate to negotiate with Mandela and that his father was not permitted to meet with Mandela.¹²¹² Indeed, Botha told his colleagues that he was concerned that 'we ourselves are starting to overstep with this Mandela issue'. He asked his cabinet colleagues to please leave the Mandela issue to him and not to express any opinion on the matter.¹²¹³ It seems

¹²⁰⁵ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, B. Du Plessis Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 3 November 1994.

¹²⁰⁶ H. Suzman quoting PW. Botha, *Hansard*, Friday, 14 August 1987, Column 3812.

¹²⁰⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹²⁰⁸ Heunis, *The Inner Circle*, 55.

¹²⁰⁹ Esterhuysen, *Endgame 75; Ibid.*, 67.

¹²¹⁰ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, K. Coetsee Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 2 March 1995.

¹²¹¹ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, PW. Botha Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 March 1995.

¹²¹² Heunis, *The Inner Circle*, 61-2.

¹²¹³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

that Barnard was seeking also to precipitate a split between nationalists and communists in the ANC. Esterhuysen recalls that his questions to him were 'zeroing in' on a potential division in the ANC. Barnard asked Esterhuysen whether there were nationalists who would 'renounce violence and communism'.¹²¹⁴ Mac Maharaj of the ANC also thought that Barnard was interested in dividing the ANC in order to conquer it.¹²¹⁵ As such, these talks seemed to be aimed at weakening revolutionary forces and reducing pressure on government, rather than on forming an agreement as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

It is not clear what role Botha desired the ANC, or some elements of it, to play in an eventual negotiated settlement. He was clearly aware of the organisation's stature both domestically and internationally. It is not evident how far he believed he could diminish their role through his political strategy or if he had even formed a clear view on the point. However, given the ANC's relatively radical demands and PW Botha's inclination to maintain maximum control over the process of change and to act from a position of strength, the State President keenly sought a prominent role for relatively 'moderate' African leaders, especially those working within the system, during his attempts to consolidate power and in an eventual settlement. The State President's constitutional planners envisaged a disproportionately significant role for homeland leaders relative to urban leaders in a future dispensation.¹²¹⁶ And Botha lamented to Patti Waldmeir in 1995 that homeland leaders, such as Buthelezi, were no longer playing a prominent role in South African politics.¹²¹⁷

However, despite his desire to retain the influence of homeland leaders in the process of change and in a new dispensation, Botha recognised that his Government's paramount problem was the urban African radicalism with which it was confronted. In discussions with senior National Party figures in 1987, Botha acknowledged that it was important to find urban leaders with whom he could talk, declaring that 'we have to get leaders. We have to get leaders. They say we should talk with leaders'. He also declared the development of local urban political structures to be a priority.¹²¹⁸ Even though he sought a credible urban leadership with whom to negotiate, Botha was resistant to the idea that more radical movements should be sought to fill this void. However, he also made no suggestion at

¹²¹⁴ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, W. Esterhuysen Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 25 November 1994.

¹²¹⁵ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, M. Maharaj Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 24 October 1994.

¹²¹⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-1987, 'Concept for a New Constitutional or Political Order for the RSA', 1987.

¹²¹⁷ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, PW. Botha Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 March 1995.

¹²¹⁸ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C. Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

this stage that Buthelezi or other homeland leaders could play such a role for urban communities.¹²¹⁹ Botha was determined in late-1987 to cultivate a new credible and moderate urban leadership by means of bottom-up local elections. 'How do you make a leader?' he asked. 'Not necessarily by a general election, but by a form of an election'.¹²²⁰ This shows another way in which Botha sought to use less-radical leaders to help him resist pressure to negotiate with the ANC leader on an unconditional basis. Yet, it suggests the limited usefulness Botha perceived Inkatha and other homeland organisations to have in this respect.

Botha saw a more important role for Buthelezi and the homeland leaders in the socio-economic reform and security programmes to which he gave great emphasis. They were seen by Botha as integral to the economic decentralisation process which he considered so vital. Having told his colleagues that economic development was his number one priority, he argued stridently against the development of urban areas at the expense of the underdeveloped African areas. This would result in 'more black people running to the cities. Then our task in the cities becomes more impossible'. Instead, there had to be a 'large-scale effort from us, along with those governments, to do something positive together with the private sector'.¹²²¹ Indeed, in a leaked conversation with Van Zyl Slabbert, Botha recalled telling Buthelezi of the importance of prioritising the economic development of Tugela and Richards Bay. He had told Buthelezi that 'what the Zulu people need in first place are not just political rights' because they already had political rights and Buthelezi could speak to him whenever he wanted.¹²²² Perhaps it was such regional development which Botha was referring to when he said that 'we do, of course, have different problems in our urban areas and there again we cannot solve them unless we have the co-operation of our self-governing states and independent neighbours. That is a sine qua non'.¹²²³ Here the two men's approaches partly coincided. Although Buthelezi rejected the substitution of economic development for political

¹²¹⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹²²⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹²²¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹²²² RH, Policy Speech by M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

¹²²³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of the Washington Times, 25 February, 1986.

change, he was keen to cooperate as much as possible with Government in the economic development of his homeland.

Their strategies also converged to some extent on the maintenance of security, the threat of trade unionism and opposition to disinvestment and sanctions. As noted in part one, it was revealed in the 1991 Inkathagate scandal that payments had been made to Inkatha in support of its anti-sanctions activity.¹²²⁴ Moreover, in the context of Inkatha's escalating conflict with UDF and the ANC in KwaZulu, the security services provided secret training for Zulu police and paramilitary. Some of this training was for offensive activities.¹²²⁵ Chris Heunis thanked Buthelezi for his efforts in the 'international field' and for his 'exhaustive campaign against sanctions on behalf of our country'.¹²²⁶ According to Tienie Groenewald of the South African Defence Force, Inkatha sought and received advice on the security situation from the early-1980s. They received an in depth briefing every six months.¹²²⁷

This confirms Waldmeir's view that Botha sought to use 'moderate' Africans, including Buthelezi, as a 'buffer' against more radical forces.¹²²⁸ It shows that Inkatha was not sought only to be a bulwark by participating in negotiations, but through anti-sanctions campaigning, security collaboration and its role in economic development and decentralisation. These examples and the fact that Buthelezi was widely acknowledged to be the most credible homeland leader domestically and internationally suggest that he was particularly important to Botha in this respect. Nevertheless, Buthelezi's defiance of the Government's political programme prevented Botha from embracing and celebrating Buthelezi's politics, demonstrating further the State President's desire to work alongside pliable African leaders. The State President was strongly inclined to bolster the role of leaders who were more compliant than Buthelezi. In February 1986, Arnaud De Borchgrave editor of the Washington Times asked Botha whether Buthelezi was then the 'main hope' for serious evolution and the avoidance of revolution. The State President replied that no, he wasn't the only one, and was 'not even the main one'. Other key leaders included the 'leaders of Transkei, Ciskei or Venda'. Buthelezi was only 'one of several'.¹²²⁹

¹²²⁴ As Told to L. Piper by B. Morrow, *'To Serve and Protect': The Inkathagate Scandal* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010), xv.

¹²²⁵ *Ibid.*, xvi.

¹²²⁶ 'Heunis thanks Chief Minister', *The Citizen*, 15 March 1989.

¹²²⁷ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, T. Groenewald Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 1 December 1994.

¹²²⁸ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 46.

¹²²⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 4/1/20 1986, Interview with PW. Botha and Editor in Chief (A. de Borchgrave) of the Washington Times, 25 February 1986.

This approach was in stark contrast to that which Buthelezi implored Government to adopt. Buthelezi did not seek a constitutional and political role merely as a buffer against revolution and a buttress of National Party policy. For Buthelezi, the thwarting of revolutionary radicalism not only required a commitment to non-majoritarian power-sharing, but an accelerated and more meaningful constitutional reform process. Also, it required the forging of meaningful political relationships with African political organisations, particularly Inkatha, and the co-construction of the reform process. He believed that Nelson Mandela also needed to be released, and more radical forces included in the process of change. Botha's attempt to cultivate a new credible urban leadership to rival more radical forces was in contrast to Buthelezi's insistence that the National Party could not expect another African party to be built-up from scratch.¹²³⁰ More importantly, Botha did not envisage any role for Buthelezi beyond that of a homeland leader, even if the KwaZulu Chief Minister stood out as the only homeland leader with any domestic and international credibility. There was no suggestion that Buthelezi could provide urban leadership, even for Zulu-speakers.¹²³¹ This reflected a profound change in the role that the National Party thought homeland leaders could and should play in urban areas. This is significant, because Botha recognised, however reluctantly, that solving the problems of urban radicalism was crucial to achieving his objectives. Buthelezi sought to be recognised as a national figure and 'an indispensable force in the politics of change', and greatly resented Botha's perception of him as 'as a little regional political Black boy, who should be pottering around with regional issues'.¹²³²

Chapter Ten: The Political Approach of Chris Heunis and the Department for Constitutional Development and Planning, 1985-1989.

An examination of official documents reveals a political tendency within the upper echelons of the National Party which is different from that described in chapter nine. Chapter five has already demonstrated the significant differences between Chris Heunis's political objectives and those of PW Botha and many like-minded cabinet ministers. The present chapter shows with greater clarity and detail that there were also differences regarding the National Party's approach to achieving its objectives between these two tendencies. It corroborates and elaborates the truncated accounts of these differences which have been provided by other scholars. And it offers a the most vivid account

¹²³⁰ AP, PC 129 Cliff Gosney Collection, Speech by M. Buthelezi, Read on his behalf by ES. C. Sithebe, 'A Black Man's Perspective of the Unrest Situation', Symposium: The Unrest in the RSA, University of Potchefstroom Department of Criminology and the Bureau for Continuing Education, 15 August 1986.

¹²³¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 12/100/1 1987, Constitutional Discussions at Tuynhuys, Present are: PW. Botha, A. Schlebusch, C.Heunis, RF. Botha, G. Viljoen, M. Malan, HJ. Coetsee, BJ. du Plessis, JCG. Botha, AJ. Vlok, CJ. van der Merwe, Cape Town, 20 July 1987.

¹²³² RH, Policy Speech M. Buthelezi, Fourth Session of the Fourth KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, March 1986.

and prominent example of what is referred to as a 'New Nat' in O'Meara's *Forty Lost Years*- a National Party figure who was in disagreement with the dominant 'PW Nat' tendency, but nevertheless remained within the party and the Government.¹²³³ This chapter shows with greater intricacy and clearer illustration what Heunis's reformism consisted in, what its rationale was, and how it differed from PW Botha's approach as previously described. It offers the first analysis of how these two tendencies each compared to Inkatha's preferred political approach, and asks how Heunis's view of Inkatha's role in politics compared to Botha's view.

As suggested in chapter five, Heunis and his department saw the political aspects of the Government's total strategy as being of paramount importance. A Constitutional Development and Planning memorandum described the opposition to apartheid as essentially political in its nature. Black people were seeking a redistribution of power and their full accommodation in political decision-making. Unemployment and other material grievances were not really 'the great historical forces which provide the dynamic behind the formation of Black aspirations'. In stark contrast to Botha and Malan, it downplayed the importance of socio-economic reform undertaken without political change, stating that 'even if, for example, Black poverty is drastically reduced, it will not in the medium to long term, significantly slow the momentum' of black protest. In further contrast to the State President, South Africa's political problems were to be addressed by reform on the 'common macro level' as opposed to through 'own affairs' mechanisms.¹²³⁴ Heunis disagreed with Botha and others by doubting the role security efforts could play in resolving South Africa's problems, arguing that security was necessary for reform, but that 'the aim of security can be not more than to create and maintain conditions in which social, economic and political processes can function normally'. Reform was needed to 'ensure greater stability and security in the long term', and security measures could not be seen as a 'substitute for reform'.¹²³⁵ Similar thoughts were expressed by Heunis's cabinet colleague, Leon Wessels, who said that any strategy depending on security legislation alone was 'building on sand'. Government needed to 'proceed dynamically and imaginatively on the road of constitutional reform'. He looked forward to the day that security legislation would fall out of use, because constitutional reform would be sufficiently advanced.¹²³⁶ As such, significant political change was seen as essential by Heunis and his department for reducing black unrest. He and his department also placed great emphasis on the importance of dialogue with

¹²³³ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 372.

¹²³⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986.

¹²³⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, House of Delegates, 1 June 1988.

¹²³⁶ L. Wessels, *Hansard*, Monday, 2 June 1986, Column 7067.

African leaders and of getting formal negotiations underway. Heunis declared in 1987 that negotiation was the 'cornerstone' of Government's search for solutions.¹²³⁷ For Heunis, security was 'complementary' to the reform process, but to rely on it without negotiation would be 'fatal'.¹²³⁸ Indeed, a 1986 memorandum of the Heunis's department acknowledged that it was a problem that Government was seen by Africans to act unilaterally and to be unwilling to negotiate or communicate. It stressed that black protest would not decrease if the authorities sought 'to neutralize only the physical manifestation of Black protest' and failed to negotiate with leaders Africans perceived to be legitimate.¹²³⁹ Heunis argued that consensus could only be achieved through dialogue and saw 'the continuation and broadening of the process of negotiations as of prime importance'.¹²⁴⁰ It was important to bring about socio-economic change in order to establish the Government's credibility at local level. At national level, the significance of economic reform was to provide a 'proof of results' for the process of negotiation and dialogue.¹²⁴¹

But in seeking to attract African leaders to the negotiating table, Heunis and his department perceived a number of obstacles, many of which arose from the PW Botha Government's own approach. A departmental memorandum of 1986 argued that the creation of a climate for negotiations had been impaired by an 'over-emphasis on the protection of white rights' and by the perception that the Government was seen as uncomprehending of black aspirations.¹²⁴² Senior figure in the department, Fanie Cloete, argued in the late-1980s that one reason negotiations had not got underway was that the black community was cynical about Government's 'commitment to implement its own policy rhetoric'. Government was seen by such people as a 'dogmatic intransigent group of people intent on retaining white control over political power at all costs'.¹²⁴³ In another 1986 memorandum on the subject of the National Council, Heunis's department stated the importance of overcoming the fear that the council would 'only be used to justify government action'.¹²⁴⁴ In these statements can be seen a number of serious implied criticisms of dominant 'PW

¹²³⁷ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Thursday, 3 February 1987, Columns 134-5.

¹²³⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 32 1986, Speech by C. Heunis to the Federal Congress of the National Party, 13 August 1986.

¹²³⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986.

¹²⁴⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 35 1987, Speech by C. Heunis about fighting against the revolutionary climate, Cape Town, meeting of Director Generals, 24 April 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 35 1987, Address by C. Heunis, Sandton, 18 November 1987.

¹²⁴¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986

¹²⁴² *Ibid.*

¹²⁴³ F. Cloete, 'Prospects for a democratic process of political change in South Africa', in M. Swilling (ed.), *Views on the South African State* (Human Sciences Research Council, 1990), 30-1.

¹²⁴⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

Nat' tendency in the National Party. Indeed, Heunis believed that it was incumbent upon the Government to persuade people to enter negotiations. He stated to an audience of young Afrikaners in 1987, that Africans as well as whites needed to 'be convinced of the merits of participating in real negotiation'. He expressed sympathy for the dilemma of leaders such as Buthelezi.¹²⁴⁵ The common thread in these utterances is that Government's foremost challenge was to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of black people which required the creation of trust in its good intentions. It was not, as the 'PW Nats' thought, to force African leaders to adopt more compliant or less radical approaches by obstinately refusing to make concessions or to yield control of the political process. Another official from Heunis's department, Kobus Jordaan, told Patti Waldmeir in a 1994 interview that in the second half of the 1980s he and Cloete thought that a successful transition required a marriage of 'power and legitimacy'.¹²⁴⁶ A letter from Heunis to President Botha in late-1987 commented that a 'trust gap which leads to crisis of legitimacy' had 'occurred between the Government and the black population' and provided the ideal conditions for revolutionary activity. Therefore, it was vital to undertake an 'intensive campaign' to establish their credibility. A 'breakthrough in the creation of trust' was needed to stop the 'psychological onslaught' against the state.¹²⁴⁷ A departmental memorandum listed as one of the main goals of negotiation the bridging of the 'gap of trust between Government and blacks'.¹²⁴⁸ Moreover, Heunis emphasised in private and public utterances the great importance of Government establishing its 'bona fides'.¹²⁴⁹

Heunis's desire that reform should be aimed at a significant degree of redistribution of power to non-whites can be seen as part of his strategy for establishing the legitimacy of Government's reform policy. Indeed, his department was intent on using this to overcome resistance to Government's reform initiatives. A departmental memorandum stated that the National Council needed to be perceived as the 'first body for the dismantling of apartheid'.¹²⁵⁰ The view of the Department for Constitutional Development and Planning in 1986 was that the Government should

¹²⁴⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 34, Speech by C. Heunis to Young Afrikaners, 5 August 1987.

¹²⁴⁶ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, K. Jordaan Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 15 November 1994.

¹²⁴⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-87, Secret Document, 'Projek Dagbreek', Letter sent From C. Heunis to PW. Botha, 7 November 1987, attached document dated 5 september 1987 (revised 13 october 1987).

¹²⁴⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986

¹²⁴⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 56, Document, 'Negotiations on the National Council', N/D; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 32 1985-6, 'South Africa: An Assessment': Chapter 14: *Challenge of Change*, by C. Heunis, November 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986.

¹²⁵⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

make clear that it was committed to 'a joint legislature and a collective executive authority'. Negotiations were to be seen as deciding on the details of such common structures.¹²⁵¹ He was also keen to tailor the ruling party's negotiation, dialogue and communication strategies to serve this purpose. Heunis advocated in 1986 that the National Council be established as quickly as possible in order to 'maintain credibility on the matter'.¹²⁵² It ought not to be seen as a 'talking shop' and the Government should lay emphasis on the fact that it would have an open agenda, that 'matters of national importance' could be raised, and that decisions would be made on the basis of consensus.¹²⁵³ It was to be a statutory body chaired by the President and was to meet regularly in order to build up 'status and continuity'.¹²⁵⁴ In order to make the National Council more acceptable to intended participants, Heunis stressed the importance of 'exploratory talks' and held over 300 discussions and received more than 122 written requests in 1986-87.¹²⁵⁵ He also established a joint committee with KwaZulu in 1989 to consider the obstacles to Inkatha's participation in the council.¹²⁵⁶ As noted above, Heunis even suggested to Botha that a National Council be bypassed in favour of a Joint Council of State, which was initially intended to come at a more advanced stage of negotiation.

For Heunis, Government's difficulties were partly due to 'unsuccessful communication'.¹²⁵⁷ Accordingly, his department gave close attention to how dialogue and communication with African communities and leaders were to be undertaken. The department recommended that there should be a focus in discussions on 'mutual interests', rather than becoming bogged down in disputes over particular political models. The party would have the greatest success if it were "'hard" on merit but "soft" on people'.¹²⁵⁸ A 1985 document of the Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development which Heunis chaired also stressed the importance of 'concentrating on common

¹²⁵¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986.

¹²⁵² ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-5, Letter from C. Heunis to President PW. Botha, 20 February 1986.

¹²⁵³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

¹²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*; ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-5, Letter from C. Heunis to President Botha, 20 February 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 35 1987, Address by C. Heunis, Sandton 18 November 1987.

¹²⁵⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 32 1986, Speech by C. Heunis to the Federal Congress of the National Party, 13 August 1986; ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 vol. 13 1989, Joint Statement by M. Buthelezi and C. Heunis, 9 January 1989.

¹²⁵⁷ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-87, Secret Document, 'Projek Dagbreek', Letter sent From C. Heunis to PW. Botha, 7 November 1987, attached document dated 5 September 1987 (revised 13 October 1987).

¹²⁵⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986.

objectives rather than differences'.¹²⁵⁹ In 1988, he told a corporate forum meeting that focusing on divisive factors ought to be avoided.¹²⁶⁰ This approach was also reflected in the Government's approach to the Joint Committee between itself and KwaZulu for the discussion of obstacles to negotiation. Stoffel Botha, leading the Government delegation, said that they would 'have to try to find enough common ground on these issues to make both parties willing to enter full negotiations'.¹²⁶¹ As acting President in March 1989, Heunis told the KwaZulu Legislative Authority that 'the obstacles tend to disappear if you look past them at the common ground and the common objective'.¹²⁶²

One noteworthy source which illuminates Heunis's strategic judgements and his approach to political change is a 1987 letter to President Botha in which he suggests a scheme called 'Project Daybreak' as a means of establishing the credibility of the Government and creating a climate in which a National Council could be created. This involved formulating a 'statement of common goals' which could be signed by Government and a range of black leaders who were not participating in the armed struggle, but who were refusing to be part of the National Council. Heunis suggested that a statement could be called 'A New South Africa: Points of Departure' or 'A New Deal for South Africa' or number of similar names. In one scenario, Government was to be the 'primary initiator', but African leaders were to be involved in shaping the statement from an early stage. African figures were to be consulted and recruited in private before the launch of such a statement. Subsequently, a broader range of non-violent leaders would sign the document as the effects of the project 'rippled out'. In an alternative scenario, the statement would be based on the comments made by Buthelezi and President Botha at the recent launch of the KwaZulu-Natal Joint Executive Authority. Such a statement would win wider assent as the document caused a 'snowball effect'. It was advised that such a statement should contain broad 'mother of love' statements on which there could be wide agreement and of 'such a nature that anyone who (did) not want to sign (would) be placed on the defensive'. Project Daybreak would create a 'platform from which a National Council' could be created by highlighting agreement amongst moderates and giving the impression of a 'dramatic break with the past' or 'quantum leap into the future' which was expected domestically and internationally. It would serve as evidence of the National Party's genuine desire to undertake reform. Heunis did not argue that this initiative could cause a breakthrough on its own, but as 'one

¹²⁵⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/4 1985-88, Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, March 1985.

¹²⁶⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, Corporate Forum Meeting, Johannesburg, November 1988.

¹²⁶¹ 'Crucial talks on Natal region's future course', *Daily News*, 27 Feb 1989.

¹²⁶² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 38 1989, Address by Acting State President C. Heunis, Official Opening of the First Session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 14 March 1989.

significant facet' of a broader strategy. It would need to be supported by a 'wide media campaign'. More significantly, he argued that the implications of the reforms already undertaken by the Government had not yet fully been communicated to, and understood by, the African and coloured populations. A joint statement of common goals would help put recent Government initiatives into the 'right perspective' thereby 'dramatically' increasing the credit which government could 'obtain for its reform and development actions'. It would help realise the significant degree of 'latent consensus' which had been made possible by Government policies. As such, Project Daybreak would 'place the initiative in the hands of the government at a very crucial time'. A favourable climate would be established in such a way that it would 'become more difficult for the opposition parties to reverse it'.¹²⁶³ Project Daybreak illustrates the importance Heunis attached to agreeing a common vision of the future with black leaders, to appearing to have broken decisively with past policies and thereby to putting National Party politics into a more favourable perspective. He seemed to believe that by using the right words and expressing its intentions in the correct way, the Government could make African leaders more accepting of its policies. In a Special Cabinet Committee meeting, he said 'I think one of the greatest obstructions in finding solutions is terminology. When we talk about a federation all people don't understand the same thing under this term because there are in fact varieties of federations. Where people talk about confederations they don't understand or they don't have the same interpretation of the concept of a confederation'.¹²⁶⁴ A working document of the same body on the subject of discussions with homeland leaders, stated that 'The major differences recorded so far, pertain mainly to the different interpretations of text book terminology and well-known constitutional models...'¹²⁶⁵ Indeed, Giliomee argues that 'Heunis prided himself on his ability to "shift boundaries" by using ambiguous wording for ambivalent proposals'. He reportedly declared 'Got that one past them' when PW Botha announced a change in policy whose meaning had not been discerned by the Conservative Party.¹²⁶⁶

Project Daybreak is also revealing of Heunis's idea of how different aspects of Government policy could combine to advance its agenda. Heunis did not have a strict, sequential plan for change, but rather sought to create the conditions for progress through a wide range of political, social and

¹²⁶³ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-87, Secret Document, 'Projek Dagbreek', Letter sent From C. Heunis to PW. Botha, 7 November 1987, attached document dated 5 September 1987 (revised 13 October 1987).

¹²⁶⁴ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/4 1985-88, Minutes of Special Cabinet Committee for Black Political Development, 24 May 1985.

¹²⁶⁵ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/4 1985-88, Working Document for Discussion During a Meeting of the Special Cabinet Committee with the Leaders of the Self-Governing States on the 24-25 May 1985 in Pretoria, (Document dated 2 April 1985.)

¹²⁶⁶ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 182.

economic reforms. It was hoped that Government's negotiation, communication and constitutional initiatives would combine with the effects of this broader range of endeavours to catalyse a shift in the momentum of South African politics. This was to be a move away from a revolutionary climate in which the National Party was strongly rejected by non-whites and where legitimate black representatives refused to participate in negotiations. And it was to be a shift of momentum towards increased support for Government policies and greater cooperation with its initiatives. Heunis told Afrikaans students in 1988, that there needed to be a 'sustained process' involving 'give and take' so as to 'achieve a greater measure of agreement'.¹²⁶⁷ The 'momentum' of the process needed to be 'be conserved'.¹²⁶⁸ Perhaps Heunis believed, like his friend and 'Past Nat' Sampie Terreblanche, that it would 'hopefully be possible to organise it in a gradual and orderly manner. But we must be prepared for the fact that this may not always prove possible'.¹²⁶⁹

A comparison of these two approaches reveals many profound differences. For Heunis, negotiation and significant political reform had a much more prominent role to play than for Botha in overcoming revolutionary radicalism and achieving Government's objectives. Rather than seeing reform and negotiation as something which would come later, as the result of conditions created by security and economic reforms, the Heunis reformists envisaged political endeavours as providing a breakthrough needed to make progress in the process of securing the National Party's objectives. Indeed, reform and negotiation were seen as the keys to unlocking the potential benefits created by reforms in the socio-economic sphere. Heunis envisaged a process of change which was both top-down and bottom up, unlike Botha's commitment to bottom-up change. He also saw the need to develop the momentum of political change, in contrast to others' commitment to the consolidation of power. The Department for Constitutional Development and Planning believed that consensus could be, and needed to be, built by persuasion and negotiation, rather than the acquiescence and compliance of black people being gained through force and determination. Rather than keeping complete control of the process of change, Heunis favoured a more risky strategy which required gaining the assent of black leaders at each stage of constitutional reform. Instead of resenting those who would not support the Government, he acknowledged that it was up to them to demonstrate to Africans that they had good intentions, and that it was not solely concerned with safeguarding white interests. Although Heunis did not advocate a detailed joint statement of intent, he did propose a

¹²⁶⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Speech by C. Heunis, Rand Afrikaans University, 7 November 1988.

¹²⁶⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting 8 March 1986.

¹²⁶⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 Vol. 54, SJ. Terreblanche, 'Economic Implications of a Federal Model for South Africa', paper delivered at a Symposium: 'Federalism: An Option for South Africa', Institute for Political and Africa Studies, Jan Smuts Holiday Inn, 20 November 1985.

common statement of ideals by which non-revolutionary black leaders could join Government in a shared vision of political change. Botha, on the other hand, characterised Buthelezi's request for a joint statement of intent as arising from a 'wish to destroy orderly government'.¹²⁷⁰ In many respects, therefore, Heunis's approach was more similar to Buthelezi's than it was to PW Botha's. Similarities with Buthelezi are underscored by the following quotation from the Inkatha leader: 'Reforms are not palliatives which buy political time for apartheid. Each reform adds to the momentum of change and creates demands for more change, and if the Government does not realise this, we are in for a torrid time'.¹²⁷¹

Existing accounts note that Buthelezi was seen by Heunis as the only homeland leader with credibility, but also stress that he recognised the importance of the ANC in black politics. The current historiography does not undertake a specific analysis of the role which Heunis and the reformists envisaged for Inkatha in the process of change, and how this related to the roles foreseen for other African organisations. It is clear that, as far as Heunis was concerned, the Inkatha leader was a key target for involvement in the Government's negotiation process. It was thought necessary for 'each existing and future political entity should serve on the Council',¹²⁷² and Buthelezi was the only homeland leader who had built up a genuine popular following and a substantial political party. The Inkatha president was also by far the most prominent African leader who explicitly and strongly denounced the armed struggle. According to Jan Heunis, his father regarded Buthelezi as the only homeland leader with any credibility.¹²⁷³ Heunis established a Joint Committee with KwaZulu to discuss obstacles to negotiation which suggests that Buthelezi was considered a very important potential participant in the National Council. He also told journalists in an off-the-record briefing that 'Chief Buthelezi is a very important leader in the process of negotiation'.¹²⁷⁴ And official documents further suggest that Buthelezi's participation was a high priority. A 1986 departmental memorandum on the National Council contains a detailed consideration of Buthelezi's objections to the forum and how they might be overcome. It cited a range of Buthelezi's reservations about the council and it was in relation to these misgivings that it was recommended that the State President should act as chairman, that it should have a broad and open agenda, that it should be seen as the first statutory body for the abolition of apartheid and that it should be a tool for real change. The memorandum did not give such emphasis to any other leader, making only one other reference to

¹²⁷⁰ Giliomee, *The last Afrikaner Leaders*, 200.

¹²⁷¹ L. Marshall, 'Buthelezi-Botha talking again', *Weekend Argus*, 18 May 1985

¹²⁷² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

¹²⁷³ Heunis, *The Inner Circle*, 76.

¹²⁷⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/12/1 Vol. 9 1987-8, Off the Record Briefing by C. Heunis for 38 Foreign Editors- World Media group, Cape Town, 1987.

Sam Buti.¹²⁷⁵ Similarly, in correspondence with Botha in early-1986, Heunis said it was 'important, if not essential that the conditions set by individuals and institutions, such as Chief Minister Buthelezi...be put in the spotlight'.¹²⁷⁶ Heunis probably had Buthelezi's participation in mind when he announced in 1988 that provision had been made for a representative of the homelands to serve as a co-chairman of the National Council.¹²⁷⁷ Indeed, the aforementioned memorandum stated that a 'special effort' was to be made to persuade Buthelezi to participate.¹²⁷⁸ A different memorandum named Inkatha as one of the organisations which 'must be involved' in the negotiating process and which could have 'a potential impact on the future direction of black politics'.¹²⁷⁹ And in Heunis's proposed Project Daybreak, the 'main leaders of self-governing regions' were seen as 'absolutely key figures' whose participation was 'essential'. Buthelezi and Botha's comments at the launch of the Joint Executive Authority were seen as one potential source of the statement of common goals which would be at the basis of Project Daybreak. In this scenario, the importance of linking the statement with Buthelezi's remarks was stressed.¹²⁸⁰

However, it is equally apparent that Heunis and his department did not consider Inkatha's participation to be adequate for a legitimate negotiation process, nor its approval to be sufficient for a viable political settlement. The minister stated that they could not negotiate with any 'single individual or organisation'. A 'wide variety of leaders' featured prominently. Each had their own constituencies and was important to the process.¹²⁸¹ Many 'groups and leaders' had to 'be accommodated in the process'.¹²⁸² A memorandum in 1986 emphasised the 'fragmentation of the black elite'. African politics was seen as 'extremely liquid' and 'subject to sharp regional differences'.¹²⁸³ Buthelezi's participation would not 'do the trick', and they needed to specifically

¹²⁷⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

¹²⁷⁶ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-5, Letter from C. Heunis to President PW. Botha, 20 February 1986.

¹²⁷⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 36 1988, Address by C. Heunis, Conference for Representatives of the Self-Governing Territories Held, Pretoria, 8 November 1988.

¹²⁷⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

¹²⁷⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986

¹²⁸⁰ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/9/1 1985-87, Secret Document, 'Projek Dagbreek', Letter sent From C. Heunis to PW. Botha, 7 November 1987, attached document dated 5 September 1987 (revised 13 October 1987).

¹²⁸¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 34, Speech by Chris Heunis to Young Afrikaners, 5 August 1987.

¹²⁸² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 38 1989, Address by Acting State President C. Heunis, Official Opening of the First Session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 14 March 1989.

¹²⁸³ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting 8 March 1986.

avoid the notion that the inclusion of homeland leaders should be preferred over the involvement of urban leaders. In fact, it ought to be assumed that 'the test for the Council' was to get 'some prominent urban leaders involved'.¹²⁸⁴ These sources suggest that Hermann Giliomee was correct in his judgement that in the second half of the 1980s 'Buthelezi was no longer considered a national leader, but rather as one commanding strong support among traditional Zulu in KwaZulu Natal'.¹²⁸⁵ As far as Heunis was concerned, prominent urban leaders needed to participate in the process of change. Buthelezi was not perceived as having strong political support amongst Africans in urban areas or beyond his own region. He was perceived by the Department for Constitutional Development, like by Botha, merely as a homeland leader, although one with a greater profile and influence than the others, and was discussed purely in such terms in departmental documents.¹²⁸⁶ This contrasts with earlier National Party strategies to 'link up' the urban black communities with their homelands. There was no suggestion that as the reform process gained momentum Buthelezi could give leadership to urban communities, even if those communities were largely Zulu-speaking. Indeed, some National Party officials began to doubt Buthelezi's popularity even in the KwaZulu-Natal area. The Government's Administrator of Natal wrote in a memorandum in 1987 that it could not be taken for granted that Inkatha would form the majority in a KwaZulu-Natal election. The 'irreversible trend' of urbanisation had possibly drained the support of the 'established KwaZulu structure'. The KwaZulu Government spoke for the 'major component of blacks', but there was a large number of blacks in Natal for whom Buthelezi may not have spoken.¹²⁸⁷

In seeking prominent urban leaders, Heunis was aware of the necessity of the cooperation of 'more radical factions'.¹²⁸⁸ Heunis told the Special Cabinet Committee in 1985 that the current elected urban black representatives were 'quite obviously' not 'going to be accepted as leaders with credibility'. They were 'an element' which was needed in participation, but there were also leaders outside the system who sought peaceful solutions'.¹²⁸⁹ Heunis's department expressed the view in 1986 that in urban areas there were few available leaders who had 'sufficient credibility, popular support, charisma and legitimacy' to act as power brokers. The existing leaders did not qualify as

¹²⁸⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

¹²⁸⁵ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 623-4.

¹²⁸⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

¹²⁸⁷ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/K1/4 1990, Memorandum, Administrator Cadman writes about the Indaba proposals, 2 November 1987.

¹²⁸⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol 34, Speech by C. Heunis to Young Afrikaners, 5 August 1987.

¹²⁸⁹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-85, Minutes, Special Cabinet Committee for the Political Development of Blacks, 1 March 1985.

leaders in the 'recognized socio-political sense of the word'.¹²⁹⁰ They were considered 'stooges' and although they were a necessary element in negotiations, there were 'other people who are outside the system but who also seek peaceful solutions' who needed also to be included.¹²⁹¹ As noted above, this did not stop Heunis from seeking to increase the legitimacy of elected urban leaders through socio-economic reforms and the promise of their inclusion in the National Council. But Heunis seems to have been far less committed than Botha to the cultivation of sufficiently credible urban black leadership largely through local government structures. There would 'undoubtedly' be a need to involve a wider group of urban black leaders than the 'those involved in local governance'.¹²⁹² Similarly, in *And what about the black people?* Stoffel van der Merwe stated that 'regrettably' leaders operating within the system did 'not represent the entire Black population'. A 'large group of people' had 'not participated in the processes by which these leaders have been appointed'. Many who were 'unquestionably leaders' had not put themselves forward. A 'wider group' of people needed to be enticed into negotiating forums.¹²⁹³ It was argued that without the inclusion of 'more critical' external leaders, the National Council could not enjoy sufficient credibility.¹²⁹⁴ Heunis noted that many in South Africa thought that 'negotiations with particular persons are not valid simply because these persons do not belong to certain types of organisations or do not propagate a particular policy'.¹²⁹⁵ Indeed, the Department for Constitutional Development and Planning stated not only that it would be necessary to involve Inkatha, the self-governing states and UCASA in the negotiation process at national level. It also specified that the United Democratic Front, AZAPO and the ANC would have to be involved along with trade unions and churches.¹²⁹⁶ Examples of those urban leaders who ought to be involved in the National Council included some, like Ntatho Motlana and Bishop Desmond Tutu, with whom Buthelezi had fierce disagreements. The participation of 'some UDF-affiliated organisations or persons' could 'make the critical difference'.¹²⁹⁷ To Heunis's departmental officials, it seemed 'inevitable that with leaders/

¹²⁹⁰ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986.

¹²⁹¹ ACA, PW Botha Collection PV203, PS 5/7/3 1984-85, Minutes, Special Cabinet Committee for the Political Development of Blacks, 1 March 1985.

¹²⁹² ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

¹²⁹³ ACA, Kobie Coetsee Collection PV357, 1/N1/86 1981-90, S. van der Merwe, 'And what about the Black People?', Federal Information Service of the National Party, April 1985.

¹²⁹⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

¹²⁹⁵ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 35, Address by C. Heunis, Sandton, 18 November 1987.

¹²⁹⁶ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985, Memorandum, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986

¹²⁹⁷ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the National Council, Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986.

organizations, for example, the UDF and other civil organizations will have to negotiate without them being required to issue a formal statement denouncing violence/protest'.¹²⁹⁸ This foreshadowed the decision, once Botha had been removed from the party leadership in 1989 to abandon the demand for an explicit renunciation of violence and to accept an undertaking to work for peaceful change.¹²⁹⁹ Indeed, it was later revealed that Heunis had held clandestine meetings with UDF affiliates from 1984/1985 onwards.¹³⁰⁰

The Department for Constitutional Development and Planning also perceived it as important to involve the ANC in the Government's reform programme. Opening the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in March 1989, Heunis remarked that of the African organisations 'some are more important than other, some are larger in numbers much larger than others, some more powerful than others. The African National Congress is perceived as such an organisation'.¹³⁰¹ In an interview in 1990, he said that there had been pressure to talk to the ANC, because black leaders had not been defined 'except for those who sat in prison'.¹³⁰² Jan Heunis made the similar claim that his father become frustrated in the late-1980s, because he was not negotiating with the 'real leaders'.¹³⁰³ Indeed, it was thought by Heunis's department that South Africa's problems could not be solved whilst Government refused to 'negotiate with the Mandelas of the Black freedom struggle'.¹³⁰⁴ They took an interest in the nature of the ANC, identifying several groups from 'liberal democrats to hard communists'.¹³⁰⁵ He pressured Botha to find a way of releasing Mandela in the mid-1980s.¹³⁰⁶ Heunis told Stoffel Van Der Merwe in early-1988 that 'without Mandela's release and the unbanning of the ANC, we will not make progress in this country'.¹³⁰⁷ In attaching this degree of importance to the ANC, Heunis was partly reacting to the demands of organisations like Inkatha that the organisation be unbanned before negotiations could take place. Heunis told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that it had 'become clear that ANC's absence from the list of participants in the political negotiation process, is seen by other essential participants as an obstacle to progress'.¹³⁰⁸ It was stated in a constitutional

¹²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹⁹ Cloete, 'Prospects for a democratic process of political change in South Africa', 34-5.

¹³⁰⁰ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, K. Jordaan Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 15/11/94; JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, S. van der Merwe Interviewed by P. Waldmeir (undated).

¹³⁰¹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 38 1989, Address by Acting State President C. Heunis, Official Opening of the First Session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 14 March 1989.

¹³⁰² JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, C. Heunis Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 18 December 1990.

¹³⁰³ Heunis, *The Inner Circle*, 76.

¹³⁰⁴ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985-6, Memorandum on the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting 8 March 1986.

¹³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰⁶ De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 109.

¹³⁰⁷ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, K. Jordaan Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 15 November 1994.

¹³⁰⁸ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/1/11/1/2 Vol. 38 1989, Address by Acting State President C. Heunis, Official Opening of the First Session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Ulundi, 14 March 1989.

memorandum that a 'successful negotiated settlement with the lawful Black political organisations' was 'very unlikely unless the exiled ANC' also became involved.¹³⁰⁹ Yet, Heunis's department also recognised the degree of prestige and support that the ANC enjoyed from the black population. Departmental documents said that there was 'across the whole Black political spectrum, great support for the principles of the ANC'. The Government was confronted by the objection of blacks that it was not attempting to negotiate with the real leaders. Mandela was 'frequently mentioned as an example'.¹³¹⁰ Heunis also remarked that seemed as though many believed that negotiations only to be between the National Party and the ANC.¹³¹¹

Heunis and his department did not deem Inkatha's support to be sufficient either in the negotiation process or for the final settlement in South Africa. Inkatha was not seen by Heunis as having sufficient legitimacy as an urban or a national leader for a settlement to be based on his assent. He saw more radical groups such as the ANC and UDF, groups with which Inkatha had fierce disagreements, as having more credibility in this respect. In the long-term, these organisations, and particularly the ANC, were seen as more important for achieving the degree of legitimacy the negotiation process needed to produce a viable settlement. Indeed, Buthelezi's participation was not seen as sufficient even for the success of the National Council. In contrast to the State President, Heunis and his reformists certainly do not fit in with the broader characterisation of the National Party Government seeking only to consult and cooperate with 'compliant' and 'conservative' leaders.¹³¹² Still less do they fit with Friedman's description of the Government attempting to achieve a settlement by doing a 'deal' with internal leaders such as Buthelezi.¹³¹³ Moreover, the preceding analysis shows it to be a great overstatement that Heunis saw Inkatha, like McCaul suggested the Government did, as 'the base around the very possibility of a reformist settlement will turn'.¹³¹⁴

However, Heunis clearly saw him as having a degree of influence in South African politics. As a relatively moderate figure amongst those black leaders with a degree of credibility, the Inkatha leader was undoubtedly hoped to play a moderating role in a future negotiating forum. In the absence of radical leaders willing to participate in formal discussions, it seems that Buthelezi was

¹³⁰⁹ ACA, Chris Heunis Collection PV895, A1/4/2 vol. 54. 1985, Memorandum on the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, Meeting, 8 March 1986.

¹³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹¹ C. Heunis, *Hansard*, Monday, 8 May 1989, Column 8003.

¹³¹² Rich, 'The Changing South African Scene', 308-9; S. Friedman, 'Hot air or fresh breeze?: Current state reform strategies', M. Swilling (ed.), *Views on the South African State* (Human Sciences Research Council, 1990), 8.

¹³¹³ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, S. Friedman Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 17 November 1994.

¹³¹⁴ McCaul, 'The Wild Card: Inkatha and Contemporary Black Politics', 169.

perceived as having a potentially very significant role to play as a catalyst for the negotiations process which was itself important for advancing the broader process of change. The documents suggest that close consideration was given to how to attract Buthelezi into the National Council. His relative moderation seems to have made him the most plausible immediate target for Heunis's powers of persuasion. The relevant documents suggest that the participation of UDF affiliates was not seen as such an immediate or likely prospect. Heunis suggested with regard to a proposed statement of common goals that the participation of Buthelezi and others could have a 'ripple effect' or a 'snowball effect' leading to a gain in Government credibility and a shift in political momentum. Perhaps then, Heunis saw Buthelezi's potential participation in the National Council as something which could have a similar 'ripple effect' bolstering the domestic and international credibility of the council and making the participation of more radical leaders a more immediate and likely prospect. As such, Inkatha's role was not seen by the reformists as ultimately crucial in securing a viable negotiated settlement, but its participation and support was seen as important in bringing a breakthrough in a broader process which then would gather momentum towards such a settlement which would have to involve a broader range of black leadership. Heunis's view of Inkatha's support as a catalyst for the reform process can therefore be seen as the opposite of Waldmeir's description of the Government approach towards Buthelezi as a 'buffer' against the ANC.¹³¹⁵ Heunis regarded the eventual participation of the ANC as vital and sought to include relatively radical African organisations in negotiations without requiring renunciations of the armed struggle. In this, he stood apart from the President and in agreement with Inkatha.

Despite remaining a prominent National Party cabinet minister until 1989, Heunis was increasingly marginalised by PW Botha in the late-1980s. 'Macro-policy coordination' was transferred from Heunis's department to the security-orientated National Joint Management Centre in June 1987,¹³¹⁶ and the security clearance of the department's top two officials was revoked in late-1988.¹³¹⁷ Nevertheless, his politics have significance when considering Inkatha's political fortunes. This is partly because Buthelezi had placed many of his hopes for forging a partnership with Government on the emergence of reformist tendencies from within the National Party. It is easy to account for the failure of PW Botha to seek the type of partnership with Inkatha that Buthelezi sought. Despite changes in policy and idiom in the second half of the decade, fundamental differences in objectives and approach remained between the leaders of Inkatha and the National Party. Notwithstanding

¹³¹⁵ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 46.

¹³¹⁶ Swilling and Phillips, 'the Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', 60.

¹³¹⁷ C. Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State* (London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 260.

some disparities, Chris Heunis's political aims and the nature of the political change which he preferred, had a great deal more in common with Buthelezi. Yet, the 'New Nat' reformists did not agree to Buthelezi's view of the role Inkatha ought to play in political change. There is no evidence that Heunis saw Buthelezi as being an 'indispensable force' in national politics or at the 'centre of political gravity' as the Inkatha leader wanted to be perceived. Contrary to Buthelezi's preferences, Heunis attached significance to the Inkatha's role as a catalyst of the process of change, but not seemingly to his role in ultimately forging a negotiated settlement. He regarded credible urban black leadership as crucial to achieving such a solution and had rejected the view one of the few assumptions the National Party held in common with Inkatha in the early-1980s: that Buthelezi could and should exercise leadership over Zulu-speakers outside KwaZulu. Instead, more radical organisations, with whom Inkatha was in furious dispute, were seen by Heunis as by the most the important potential partners in reaching a negotiated settlement. There was no sense that Buthelezi could play a crucial and independent role in the middle-ground of South African politics, mediating between, or bargaining with, Government and more radical groups in future negotiations. There was no indication that Government ought to form a type of 'equal partnership' that Buthelezi sought in which Inkatha was to make a contribution through its own initiatives. As such, it was not merely political differences which prevented Inkatha from forging a partnership with the National Party, but the changing context of power contestation which rendered the ANC uniquely powerful amongst African organisation and Inkatha considerably less influential than it had previously been perceived. As shown in part one, Buthelezi had grave concerns about being unable to fulfil its favoured position as an influential middle-ground protagonist when and if negotiations came about. In realisation of Buthelezi's fears, Heunis and like-minded reformists sought to 'take the gap' between the National Party and the ANC.

However, the fact that Buthelezi was not perceived by the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning to be at the centre of gravity in South African politics does not mean that the Inkatha leader did not exert an influence on Heunis's politics. It seems that Buthelezi's pleadings with Government had little effect on PW Botha whose political vision was fundamentally different to Inkatha's and whose politics were defined by intransigence. However, there is reason to think that Buthelezi's politics had a role in persuading a number of reformists that the ANC needed to be unconditionally unbanned and Nelson Mandela released before any political progress could be made. At most, Buthelezi's contribution to this was as one of a broader range of factors in which the increase of the ANC's power, domestically and internationally, was prominent. Nevertheless, it may still have been significant because Inkatha's participation and support was seen by Heunis as a catalyst for the process he wished to oversee, and a necessary condition for any progress to be

made without the ANC's participation. Inkatha's stubborn refusal to participate deprived reformists of their alternative to the unconditional release of Mandela, and may have removed any doubt that there was any other way of breaking the impasse. Indeed, Gerrit Viljoen attests that although Buthelezi's conditions were not initially taken seriously, over the course of time Inkatha's politics altered attitudes in cabinet. He described how discussions between Inkatha leaders and cabinet members from 1983-onwards led Chris Heunis especially to think that perhaps Buthelezi's organisation was making an important point regarding the ANC and Nelson Mandela. Viljoen says that Buthelezi argued persuasively in those years that no lasting solution was possible without all the influential leaders taking part. This was 'increasingly being accepted within the inner circles of the NP in the middle 80s'.¹³¹⁸

Buthelezi's insistence on the release of Mandela may even have had an effect on FW De Klerk's decision to release the ANC leader in early-1990. In his autobiography De Klerk pointed out that most black leaders, 'led by Buthelezi', had refused to enter the National Council prior to Mandela's release.¹³¹⁹ Roelf Meyer, a National Party politician in the late-1980s also testifies that when De Klerk's Government was anxious to make progress towards its objectives in late-1989, Inkatha's conditions which had been discussed in detail in the Joint Obstacles Committee of that year became prominent in the mind of the leadership. Meyer recounts, it was prior to a meeting with Buthelezi in December 1989 that De Klerk commented that they were 'the liquidators of this firm'.¹³²⁰ Indeed, Inkatha officials believed that they had been successful in conveying to National Party officials in the Joint Obstacles Committee that its demands would not be compromised. Oscar Dhlomo commented on discussions in May 1989 that 'for one thing, we believe the Government now takes us seriously when we insist that neither Dr Buthelezi, nor any other black leader worthy of the name, will ever negotiate while Mr Mandela and his colleagues are in jail'.¹³²¹

Patti Waldmeir also implied that Buthelezi's role in determining the eventual release of Mandela was significant when she argued that 'Botha's greatest contribution, though, may not have been to prove what was possible for de Klerk, but to demonstrate what was impossible. For years he tried to co-opt moderate blacks, and rule South Africa without the ANC. He succeeded only in showing that there was no alternative to a deal with Mandela. By the beginning of 1989, Botha had demonstrated conclusively that the slow boat to reform would never make it to port'.¹³²²

¹³¹⁸ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, G. Viljoen Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 20 October 1994.

¹³¹⁹ De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 109.

¹³²⁰ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, R. Meyer Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 16 November 1994.

¹³²¹ Dhlomo, 'Mandela release: Chances better', *Weekend Argus*, 20 May 1989.

¹³²² Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 113.

Conclusion

The first part of this thesis considered the nature of Inkatha politics in the period 1980-1989. Chapter one, looked closely at Inkatha's opposition to both the revolutionary radicalism of the ANC and its allies, and to apartheid policy and PW Botha's reformism. In order to understand more fully the ambiguous nature of Inkatha's politics it brought clearer and more precise argumentation to bear than previous accounts. It undertook a more focused analysis of Buthelezi's utterances to various audiences and over the course of the period. It provided the first account of the political and philosophical assumptions which underpinned the Inkatha leader's politics and demonstrated how these assumptions were reflected in a broad range of his political utterances. It thereby showed for the first time how different aspects of Inkatha politics, which appear at first glance to be contradictory, in fact conformed to a coherent political philosophy. In doing so, it refuted the characterisation of Buthelezi's politics by Mzala as based on a 'distinct and irreconcilable double agenda'.¹³²³ Similarly, it rebutted Brewer's portrayal of Inkatha as having a 'Janus Face'.¹³²⁴ Anthea Jeffery's *People's War* enumerates many of Buthelezi's positions and comments, but does not demonstrate, or give detailed consideration to, how the different facets of Inkatha politics may have related to each other in a coherent politics.¹³²⁵ It describes Buthelezi's politics as being pragmatic, but this is a shallow, unelaborated and incomplete account of the philosophical assumptions which underlay Inkatha politics.

Chapter one demonstrated that Buthelezi's politics in this period were characterised by a form of conservatism, bearing extremely close resemblance to the political philosophy of Edmund Burke, the well-known critic of the French Revolution. It showed not only that Buthelezi's fundamental political assumptions, and his expression of those assumptions, mirrored those of Burke, but that he explicitly cited the philosopher and the French Revolution in his political utterances. It enumerated the numerous Burkean criticisms and concerns which Buthelezi expressed regarding revolutionary radicalism in South Africa.¹³²⁶ It noted that Inkatha's demands were less radical than those of the ANC and many other anti-apartheid organisations.¹³²⁷ Buthelezi favoured checks on majority Government, advocating a form of power-sharing at the central level and the devolution of power to multi-racial federal entities. Nevertheless, this chapter demonstrated that there were fundamental differences between Inkatha and the National Party in terms of political objectives and political

¹³²³ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 228-9.

¹³²⁴ *Ibid.*, 365.

¹³²⁵ Jeffery, *People's War*.

¹³²⁶ See thesis, 29-41.

¹³²⁷ See thesis, 40-44.

thinking.¹³²⁸ Inkatha demanded majoritarian power-sharing, an end to racial discrimination, and he opposed devolution to ethnic or racial entities. Also, it shows how his Burkean anti-utopianism and opposition to rigid ideology, brought Buthelezi into conflict with the apartheid project.¹³²⁹ Not only did Buthelezi criticise what he considered the National Party's over-emphasis on the political significance of ethnicity, but he condemned the ruling party's disregard for the economic and social realities which came into conflict with apartheid policy. As such, it refuted Mare and Hamilton's argument that the differences between Inkatha and the National Party lay 'more in the detail than in the principles'.¹³³⁰ By giving a precise characterisation of Inkatha's conservatism, it made clearer than before the similarities and differences between its politics and the National Party's. It thereby improved upon the McCaul and Brewer's vague portrayals of Buthelezi as a conservative,¹³³¹ and Mare and Hamilton's inexact comparison of the two parties' politics.¹³³² Moreover, this chapter demonstrated that the categories 'conservative' and 'pragmatic opponent of apartheid' are not mutually exclusive, and elucidated the political outlook which was conservative, but which led Buthelezi to oppose apartheid and National Party reform policy, as well as the ANC and revolutionary radicalism.

Moreover, chapter one noted that aspects of Inkatha's espoused politics were liberal or liberal-democratic, and it further elucidated the nature of Inkatha politics by showing how these elements were related to, and reconciled with, Buthelezi's traditionalism and Burkean conservatism.¹³³³ This is not undertaken by any other scholarly account. It demonstrated that liberalism was consistent with, but shaped and qualified by the conservatism which lay at the foundation of Buthelezi's politics. It showed, nevertheless, that the Inkatha leader recognised a significant tension between western liberalism and his interpretation of the traditional Zulu social order aspects of which he sought to conserve.

Chapter two considered the nature of Inkatha's political priorities in this period, the extent to which its objectives came into practical conflict, and how Inkatha's priorities manifested themselves in its approach towards its relations with the National Party. None of the existing studies substantiate their claims about Inkatha's priorities. This thesis demonstrated with primary source material that in the second half of the 1980s Inkatha prioritised its opposition to revolutionary radicalism over his

¹³²⁸ See thesis, 44-46.

¹³²⁹ See thesis, 50-52.

¹³³⁰ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 6.

¹³³¹ Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to KwaZulu', 359; McCaul, 'The Wild Card: Inkatha and Contemporary Black Politics', 146.

¹³³² Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 6.

¹³³³ See thesis, 46-50.

opposition to National Party politics.¹³³⁴ It better illustrated how the scheme of Buthelezi's priorities reflected the broader circumstances of power contestation, his perception of this context, and how this developed over time.¹³³⁵ It showed that Buthelezi's opposition to revolutionary radicalism became his foremost priority in the late-1980s, because of shifts in National Party policy, increases in the scale and intensity of revolutionary radicalism, the heightened prestige of the ANC domestically and abroad, and the perception that apartheid's demise was inevitable in the long-term whereas its replacement was still to be determined. This chapter asked to what extent Buthelezi's priorities caused him to collaborate or compromise with the National Party Government.¹³³⁶ It pointed out that Inkatha collaborated with the governing party in the fields of security and economics. However, it showed that, contrary to Brewer's claims that Buthelezi was prepared make political compromises to forge an 'alliance with the Afrikaner',¹³³⁷ Buthelezi did not endorse or participate in the National Party's political reform or negotiation initiatives, placing stringent conditions on his support for, and participation in, the Government's reform process.

In a broader sense, however, chapter two corroborated Mare and Hamilton's argument that Buthelezi was a 'willing ally' of the National Party's attempts to resist revolutionary radicalism,¹³³⁸ and Brewer's contention that he was 'seeking an alliance with the Afrikaner'.¹³³⁹ It showed that Buthelezi was desperately seeking to persuade the National Party to make significant policy changes so that he could forge a supportive political relationship with the Government. He sought to establish an alliance with the National Party, but on Inkatha's own terms. Indeed, this thesis showed that Inkatha had a deep, resilient and proactive commitment to persuading the National Party to undertake such shifts in policy.¹³⁴⁰

Chapter two agreed with Brewer's contention that Inkatha's objectives were 'potentially contradictory'.¹³⁴¹ That is to say, they had the potential to be brought into practical conflict with one another. However, it gave the first clear demonstration that Inkatha's two foremost objectives did not come into a great degree of practical conflict. It showed that Buthelezi regarded an accelerated, more inclusive and more meaningful reform process as a necessary condition, not only for retaining

¹³³⁴ See thesis, 52-55.

¹³³⁵ See thesis, 55-58.

¹³³⁶ See thesis, 58-61.

¹³³⁷ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 372.

¹³³⁸ G. Mare and G. Hamilton, 'The Inkatha Freedom Party', in A. Reynolds (ed.), *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaign, Results and Future Prospects* (London: James Curry, 1994), 77.

¹³³⁹ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 372.

¹³⁴⁰ See thesis, 64-69.

¹³⁴¹ *Ibid.* 378.

his only political support, but for thwarting the progress of revolutionary radicalism.¹³⁴² In doing so, it revealed why Brewer and Mare and Hamilton were wrong to assume that Inkatha would move towards greater and less-conditional political collaboration with the National Party Government. It also rebutted Mzala's claim Buthelezi's personal interests prevented him from genuinely opposing the apartheid Government.¹³⁴³

Chapter three provided an account of Inkatha's approach to achieving its objectives given the difficulties posed by its political struggles with the ANC, particularly in the later stages of the period. It offered an improved understanding of a striking ambiguity in Inkatha's politics- that it called for the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC, despite its bitter disagreements with that organisation and the intense power contestation between the two. It showed that, *inter alia*, the growing the status and power of the ANC caused Buthelezi to believe that no viable and lasting settlement could be achieved in South Africa without its inclusion.¹³⁴⁴ It thereby refuted John Brewer's argument that its rift with more radical African forces would lead Inkatha to abandon any attempt to mediate between the National Party and the ANC, moving towards greater collaboration with the Government.¹³⁴⁵ It demonstrated that Buthelezi continued to seek a substantial bargaining and mediating role at the centre of South African politics.¹³⁴⁶ He hoped that more meaningful reform and the commencement of negotiations would diminish the radicalising centrifugal forces in South African politics and that centripetal forces would moderate politics and bolster the centre-ground.

However, it also provided new evidence that Buthelezi perceived Inkatha's position to be extremely precarious in the second half of the 1980s. It elucidated his grave concerns about the role the ANC would play in prospective negotiations, showing that Buthelezi feared that it would be inclined to disrupt the negotiating process by withdrawing its support, and had the power thereby to manipulate the process to its advantage.¹³⁴⁷ It demonstrated Buthelezi's anxiety that the ANC had become seen by many internationally and domestically as the only necessary negotiating partner for the National Party, and showed that the Inkatha leader was deeply concerned that he would not be able to play a key bargaining and mediating role from the centre-ground of South African politics. As such, it corroborated Shula Marks's undemonstrated contention that Buthelezi was walking a political tightrope in the second half of the 1980s.¹³⁴⁸

¹³⁴² See thesis, 60-64.

¹³⁴³ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 3-7.

¹³⁴⁴ See thesis, 81-83.

¹³⁴⁵ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 372.

¹³⁴⁶ See thesis, 92-94, 97.

¹³⁴⁷ See thesis, 86-92.

¹³⁴⁸ Marks, *Ambiguities of Dependence*, 124.

Furthermore, chapter three elaborated on Marks's account to show how Buthelezi attempted to walk the tightrope, and how he sought to overcome and to mitigate the difficulties which confronted Inkatha.¹³⁴⁹ It demonstrated that Buthelezi's desire for the inclusion of the ANC in the political process was far more conditional than other accounts have shown. Chapter three revealed for the first time the Inkatha leader called for the prioritisation of Mandela's release over the unbanning of the ANC. Buthelezi was keen in particular to forge a better relationship with elements of the ANC which he perceived to be more moderate and reconciliatory, such as Nelson Mandela. It was hoped that Mandela would exert a moderating influence on the ANC and national politics, thereby creating conditions more conducive to Inkatha's attempts to mediate between the ANC and the National Party. Buthelezi sought to improve Inkatha's prospects by advocating a long and multi-faceted negotiating process which would allow for the gradual moderation of African politics and the reconciliation of disparate black groups. He also called for negotiations with a bottom-up element, which would strengthen those who sought regional devolution. Chapter three also shows that Buthelezi, ominously, started to lay greater emphasis on Inkatha as a disciplined, employable and powerful organisation.

Chapter four focused primarily on the question of what motivated and shaped Inkatha's politics. Drawing upon the arguments made in chapters two and three, and the evidence presented by Forsyth,¹³⁵⁰ it argued that Inkatha politics were to an extent shaped by considerations of expediency in its efforts to retain or gain influence in South African politics. It considered the arguments put forward by Marks, Mzala, and Mare and Hamilton, that Inkatha politics was aimed at serving the elite economic interests of the African bourgeoisie.¹³⁵¹ It provided new illustrations of the links between Inkatha and the African bourgeoisie, but dismissed the contention that a desire to serve these elite interests was a key formative influence on Inkatha politics. This is because with so many political, constitutional and social matters in the balance in this period, it is implausible that to suppose that this was a preeminent motivating factor.¹³⁵² Also, chapter four presented new evidence in corroboration of Brewer, Mzala, and Mare and Hamilton's arguments that Buthelezi was motivated by personal power and status as ends in themselves.¹³⁵³ However, chapter four argued against the reductionism of many of the aforementioned accounts which portrays Inkatha's politics

¹³⁴⁹ See thesis, 82-6, 192-7.

¹³⁵⁰ Forsyth, 'The Past in the Service of the Present Use of History by Chief ANMG Buthelezi 1951-1991', 89; *Ibid.*, 92.

¹³⁵¹ Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence In South Africa*, 118-119; Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 89; Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 167.

¹³⁵² See thesis, 100, 102-3.

¹³⁵³ Brewer, *After Soweto*, 371; Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*; Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 229.

as being solely determined by tactical expediency in the pursuit of elite interests.¹³⁵⁴ Given Buthelezi's articulation of a deep and coherent political outlook which was expressed to a range of audiences and throughout the course of the period, chapter four argued against the interpretation of Buthelezi's ambiguous politics as a shallow and disjointed set of rhetorical exercises designed to promote a narrow political agenda. It also brought to bear a number of telling biographical details which suggest that the political philosophy which Buthelezi espoused was sincerely held and that it is implausible to see the Inkatha leader as having been entirely motivated by the pursuit of power and status for their own sakes. It contended therefore that Inkatha politics were shaped in this period by a complex interplay between interests and expediency on the one hand, and ideas and values on the other.

Chapter five drew upon a range of previously unused primary sources, including very insightful secret National Party documents, to provide a clearer, more fine-grained and better substantiated account of the National Party's political objectives and the rationale for those objectives as they developed throughout the 1980s. It also compared between the National Party's reform objectives and Inkatha's, building upon the analysis undertaken in part one to elucidate further the differences and similarities and between the two parties' politics. Moreover, chapter five gave a more detailed and penetrating account of the differences in political outlook which emerged in the mid-1980s between PW Botha and like-minded cabinet ministers on the one hand, and a more reformist tendency which was most clearly embodied by Minister for Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis and his department. It illustrates the great significance of these differences in connection to Inkatha politics.

Chapter five built upon the analysis undertaken in part one to show more starkly that there were fundamental differences between Inkatha and the National Party's constitutional thinking throughout the 1980s. In opposition to Inkatha, the National Party rejected a common citizenship for all South Africans in the first half of the 1980s, and insisted on the independence of KwaZulu and other homelands.¹³⁵⁵ Whereas Inkatha insisted on power-sharing, the National Party unequivocally precluded it, even in relation to Indians and Coloureds. It refused to abolish the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, or the pass laws. There were some apparently significant shifts in the National Party's political preferences in the second half of 1980s.¹³⁵⁶ It accepted common citizenship, and promised 'equal power-sharing', 'universal franchise' and representation to the highest level. In these respects, it seemed to move much closer to the vision of Inkatha. However,

¹³⁵⁴ See thesis, 100, 103-5.

¹³⁵⁵ See thesis, 106-115.

¹³⁵⁶ See thesis, 115-121.

the close examination undertaken in chapter five showed with greater precision than before that these shifts concealed a significant degree of continuity in National Party reform objectives. It revealed that the 'power-sharing' which the party came to profess did not have the same meaning that Inkatha and others gave to it. In fact, it shows that National Party leaders espoused a commitment to 'power-sharing' in order to change the connotation, rather than the denotation of their politics. The National Party remained committed to fundamentally group-based political structures in which absolute power would be devolved to racial and ethnic communities over what was deemed to be their 'own affairs' and there would be joint decision-making over 'common affairs'. This precluded any system in which the white population could have any policy imposed upon them by other groups without agreeing to it. This chapter, therefore, demonstrated the significant differences between the majoritarian power-sharing system which Inkatha advocated and the non-majoritarian power-sharing which the National Party supported. These were not on different points on the same spectrum of power-sharing, but were rooted in fundamentally different conceptions of power-sharing.

This chapter demonstrated that there were also pronounced differences between the National Party's and Inkatha's reasoning about a desirable constitution.¹³⁵⁷ The National Party spoke of realities which precluded a united South Africa or later majoritarian power-sharing. It argued that these were precluded by the existence of different cultural and identity groups, of developmental disparities, of Marxist radicalism, and by African cultures' incompatibility with modern, liberal democracy. In stressing the importance of realities and circumstances in guiding politics, the National Party's espoused rationale resembled Inkatha's. Buthelezi shared with the governing party concerns about building a viable constitution and the survival of free-enterprise economy, and about the threat posed by revolutionary radicalism and economic grievances. Both parties had a clear sense that democracy was fragile and difficult to get to take root. Moreover, Buthelezi perceived tensions between western liberalism and traditional Zulu politics, and he thought it desirable to retain certain traditional structures. However, the two parties clearly had different interpretations of the relevant realities. Despite tensions, Buthelezi argued that western liberalism could be 'blended' with African structures, and he did not think that African culture precluded a successful transition to a liberal democracy in South Africa. Unlike the National Party, Buthelezi thought that overcoming revolutionary radicalism required majoritarian power-sharing rather than precluded it. Although he may have seen difficulties in South Africa's cultural and developmental disparities, Buthelezi did not think that they ruled-out a functioning power-sharing arrangement. Furthermore, the National

¹³⁵⁷ See thesis, 121-130.

Party's perceptions of reality were shaped by the apartheid ideology which Inkatha rejected. The governing party recognized South Africa's unequal economic and social interdependence and the permanence of urban African communities in 'white' South Africa. But unlike Inkatha, it did not think that these realities necessitated political integration to the point of majority rule. The National Party's espoused political thinking was clearly shaped by an ideological fixation with political self-determination for cultural/racial/ethnic groups which skewed its perception of other relevant realities. This was the ideological outlook which Buthelezi's Burkean conservatism led him to reject. Indeed, Inkatha did not claim, like the National Party, that groups had an absolute or intrinsic right to self-determination. As such, this chapter further refuted Mare and Hamilton's contention that by 1987, the differences between Inkatha lay 'more in the detail than in the principles'.¹³⁵⁸

Hermann Giliomee emphasized Botha's limited willingness to redistribute power and influence to non-whites, arguing that he was prepared to give African a say, 'but not the decisive say'.¹³⁵⁹ He also quoted approvingly a prominent businessman who said Botha was seeking to share power without losing control.¹³⁶⁰ Evidence provided in chapter five gives the first clear demonstration that Botha's reluctance to redistribute power from whites to non-whites and shows that his constitutional outlook was even more conservative than it appeared to be in public.¹³⁶¹ This chapter revealed Botha's great determination to maintain absolute control over 'white' South Africa, and his belief that even small amount of reform towards power-sharing would jeopardize that control. It shows that he perceived there to be a very steep and a very slippery slope towards majority rule in South Africa, and that he saw a loss of National Party control in catastrophic terms. It demonstrates more clearly that to extent Botha was prepared to confer any greater power on African communities, this was to be almost exclusively in the realm of 'own affairs'. It casts doubt on the arguments of Waldmeir that Botha had little idea of the type of constitution which he wanted to create by explaining the contents of a detailed constitutional concept document which appears to have been drawn up by Botha's presidential office.¹³⁶² Despite the National Party's public commitment to consensus decision-making and a mutual veto on matters of 'common affairs', universal franchise and equal group participation in the new dispensation, this document states that South Africa could not be governed entirely by consensus, even if a degree of consensus was desirable. It proposes a constitutional system which would have kept decisive power over 'common affairs' in the hands of

¹³⁵⁸ Mare and Hamilton, *An Appetite for Power*, 6.

¹³⁵⁹ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 147.

¹³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 147.

¹³⁶¹ See thesis, 130-34.

¹³⁶² Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country*, 68.

the white population, and would have conferred a hugely disproportionately few non-white members in a new national parliament, most of whom would be able to participate in discussions, but not to cast votes. The proposed system was specifically designed to give power to those groups possessed a greatly disproportionate amount of South Africa's wealth. This document made a distinction between the right to participate in parliament and the right to vote. The former was a fundamental right, whilst the latter was contingent upon whether a particular dispensation was conducive to the public good. It states that the country's 'expertise' was concentrated in the white population and therefore the system needed to reflect that fact. Another private document cited in this chapter showed that PW Botha was unwilling even to have consultation forums in which non-white representatives outnumbered white representatives and would therefore have a louder voice in discussions. This chapter therefore not only corroborated the claim that PW Botha was unwilling to give Africans a decisive say, but highlights the extremely broad conception of what Botha and his advisers regarded as a decisive say.

Chapter five also demonstrated very significant differences between cabinet ministers after 1985.¹³⁶³ Although in private and public the National Party cabinet ministers all spoke in same idiom, paid homage to key concepts such as 'self-determination' and 'own affairs', different tendencies in emerged in cabinet which propounded different understandings of these concepts, and which had substantially different forms of political change in mind. This chapter gave a deeper, more reliable and more comprehensive account of the political preferences of PW Botha and Chris Heunis, and to delineate with greater precision the differences between them. This chapter goes beyond previous accounts of the politics of Heunis and his department for constitutional development and planning in presenting clear evidence of their political understanding and how this was reflected in their constitutional preferences. It gives the fullest and clearest characterization yet of what is described in O'Meara's *Forty Lost Years* as a 'New Nat' - a National Party figure who disagreed with the dominant 'PW Nat' tendency, but continued to work for change from within the party.¹³⁶⁴ This is all the more interesting because Heunis was a very prominent figure in the Government, even if he lacked ultimate control. It demonstrates that unlike Botha, Heunis believed that a new system needed to confer a significant degree of power upon non-whites over 'common' as well as 'own' affairs. He thought 'common affairs' ought to be defined broadly and proposed a minimalist conception of 'own affairs'. Unlike PW Botha, Heunis thought that to address the inequality of resources and power was essential to finding a peaceful and enduring settlement in South Africa. This chapter shows that although there were certain fundamental differences between Heunis's

¹³⁶³ See thesis, 134-38.

¹³⁶⁴ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 372.

prescriptions and Inkatha's in the second-half of the 1980s, in certain important respects, Heunis's constitutional thinking can be seen as much closer to Buthelezi's than it was to PW Botha's. This is significant not just because it reveals the diversity of thinking within the National Party upper echelons, but because Buthelezi had stated in the second half of the 1980s that he was placing his hopes on reformist tendencies emerging from within the National Party.

Chapter six provided an improved account of the National Party's approach to achieving its objectives in the first half of the 1980s. Having noted that Inkatha's demands were not as radical as the ANC's, and that Buthelezi was seeking to collaborate politically with the National Party in shared opposition to revolutionary politics, chapter six undertook the first focused analysis of the National Party's interactions with Inkatha and the political role it envisioned for the homeland organization in the early stages of the decade. In doing so, it illustrated the National Party's fundamental rejection in this period of Inkatha's suggestions for political change. It showed that in early-1980s, as in the late-1970s, Botha's National Party was rigidly opposed to any role for Inkatha beyond that of a homeland and Zulu-based political party.¹³⁶⁵ It highlighted further that there was no sense in the early-1980s of a need to forge an alliance or common vision with Buthelezi with regard to South Africa-wide issues. The Government only sought to cooperate on KwaZulu-related issues. In this connection, the Government focused on KwaZulu's movement towards independence, Inkatha's potential role as a representative of Zulus in urban elections and the economic development of the homeland as a means of stemming the flow of Africans into common South Africa. It demonstrates that in seeking independence for KwaZulu, the National Party's tendency was towards forcefulness, insistence and self-assuredness.¹³⁶⁶ In the face of criticism and opposition from Inkatha, the National Party displayed great intransigence and little self-doubt. Despite its emphasis on communication and consultation, it did not express understanding of Buthelezi's stated concerns or apparently take much cognisance of them. It responded only to dismiss Buthelezi's politics and to reiterate dogma. It was hoped that enough pressure could be brought to bear on Buthelezi that he would accept independence. This chapter also showed that there were the beginnings of a shift in the National Party approach in the early-mid 1980s.¹³⁶⁷ In response to growing radicalism, there was an increased appreciation of the importance of gaining the support and cooperation of less-radical black leaders, particularly Inkatha, and greater efforts made to engage them in multi-lateral discussions about South Africa-wide questions. However, this was solely a means of gaining legitimacy for its policy of moving homelands towards independence, and overcoming difficulties in achieving this objective.

¹³⁶⁵ See thesis, 146-50.

¹³⁶⁶ See thesis, 150-53.

¹³⁶⁷ See thesis, 153-55.

Chapter seven considered the degree to which Inkatha politics caused the National Party to abandon the Verwoerdian homeland independence project in 1985. As such, it examined Gavin Relly's argument that Buthelezi was 'the anvil on which apartheid was broken',¹³⁶⁸ FW de Klerk's claim that Buthelezi's refusal to accept independence was a key factor which 'sounded the death knell for grand apartheid',¹³⁶⁹ and Giliomee's contention that the Inkatha leader's 'tough stand' against independence for KwaZulu 'more than any other opposition destroyed the government's hope to construct "a constellation of black states" out of the homeland system'.¹³⁷⁰ It undertook the first detailed analysis of the extent to which Inkatha can be said to be responsible for the National Party's abandonment of its efforts to have the homelands declare independence and its acceptance of South Africa as having a common citizenship. It demonstrated that Inkatha's cooperation with the homeland independence project was necessary for its success and illustrates how Buthelezi's opposition was a significant factor in causing National Party policy-makers to doubt their approach. It argued that Inkatha's assent was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the success of the homelands project which the National Party was pursuing in the first half of the 1980s.¹³⁷¹ It contended that although Inkatha's support would have emboldened the National Party and given its homeland project a new lease of life in the short term, there were a number of other factors which fatally undermined the viability of the project and played a more significant role in its abandonment in 1985. It illustrated in detail how the political accommodation of growing numbers of increasingly radicalised Africans in 'white South Africa' posed a number of insurmountable problems for National Party policy.¹³⁷² It showed that policy-makers increasingly saw the difficulties of restricting national political representation for urban Africans to their allotted ethnic homelands. Furthermore, it described in greater detail than before the ideas which the National Party discussed for reconciling the homelands project to the fact of large, permanent and distinctive urban African communities. It demonstrated the flaws in these suggestions. It showed, moreover, that the homeland independence project's inability to solve the National Party's most serious problems amongst urban African communities, meant that it had become less useful in serving the Government's foremost priority of ensuring 'self-determination for whites. It argued that homeland independence may even have become counterproductive to this aim, because it would have rendered the remaining South African black citizenry in greater proportion young, urban and radical.¹³⁷³

¹³⁶⁸ JL, Hermann Giliomee Papers BC 1070, G. Relly Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 7 December 1994.

¹³⁶⁹ De Klerk, *The Last Trek*, 99.

¹³⁷⁰ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 604.

¹³⁷¹ See thesis, 156-57.

¹³⁷² See thesis, 157-61.

¹³⁷³ See thesis, 161-62.

Chapters eight, nine and ten provided a more illuminating, detailed and better substantiated account of the National Party's approach to achieving its objectives in the period 1985-1989. Chapter eight laid the foundation for such an account by delineating the different aspects of the National Party's approach as reflected in key policies and in the pronouncements of party officials. It analysed the significance of reform, dialogue and negotiation as part of the National Party's approach in the second half of the 1980s.¹³⁷⁴ It described apparent shifts in NP policy towards a more negotiation-orientated approach, such as its professed commitment to negotiated settlement, its announcement of a National Council with the State President as chairman as a means to facilitate this process, the establishment of a Joint Executive Authority at KwaZulu's request, and the institution of a Joint Obstacles Committee to identify and overcome with Inkatha stumbling blocks to its entry into formal negotiations. It also noted the National Party's offer to negotiate with Mandela and the ANC on the condition that it renounced violence, its clandestine discussions with the imprisoned ANC leader and the reforms noted in chapter five. However, it also highlighted a number of reasons to doubt the significance of these policy changes. For instance, the National Party continued to stress that this was part of a broader process of change, it introduced more stringent security measures and continued to emphasize the importance of the National Party's leadership in the process of change. Chapter eight establishes that it was unclear from policies and public pronouncements exactly what the significance of negotiation, reform and dialogue were in the National Party's approach and how it related to other facets of its espoused approach. As such, sets the scene for more detailed and penetrating analysis of chapter nine and ten. Also, chapter eight gives a more nuanced understanding of the National Party's approach to change, and its interactions with Inkatha, by providing the first account of its reaction to the Buthelezi's KwaZulu-Natal Indaba which draws upon private Government documents.¹³⁷⁵ It demonstrates a greater willingness in this period to engage with the negotiation processes which Inkatha initiated. The Indaba was not openly dismissed like the Buthelezi Commission. Documents presented in this chapter reveal a greater keenness to engage in dialogue with Inkatha about the Indaba proposals. However, it demonstrates that there was no willingness to make compromises in order to forge an agreement with Inkatha, and that the indaba proposals themselves were not given serious consideration. Rather, National Party officials were anxious not to be seen to be dismissing the Indaba process and proposals out of hand. Government needed visibly to be engaged in the process, or it risked an 'unnecessary polarisation' and a souring of relations. It shows that National Party officials did not see the Indaba

¹³⁷⁴ See thesis, 163-68.

¹³⁷⁵ See thesis, 169-72.

proposals as the basis for a negotiated consensus, but as a potential threat to good relations, if not handled correctly.

Whereas chapter five demonstrated in detail that there were differences amongst cabinet regarding political objectives, chapters nine and ten illustrated that despite broad agreement in public, there were stark differences in thinking as to how the National Party should approach achieving its objectives. Like chapter five, chapters nine and ten delineated the differences between the dominant tendency of PW Botha and like-minded cabinet ministers and Chris Heunis and his Department for Constitutional Development and Change. Also in common with chapter five, they capture new insights from previously unstudied confidential National Party documents regarding the political thinking of these two party figures. These chapters illuminate the nature of the National Party's political approach by studying the private and detailed comments of party leaders, as opposed to the largely public and broad utterances cited in chapter eight.

Chapter nine provided a more illuminating and better substantiated account of Botha's political approach, the reasoning behind his approach, and the ways in which different aspects of this approach related to each other. It gave new insights into the support Botha received from some senior National Party figures in private discussions. It also offered a better understanding of how Botha's approach compared to Inkatha's and what role Botha envisaged for Inkatha in relation to other African organisations. It demonstrated that Botha attached some importance to gaining African leaders' support for, and participation in, the formal negotiation process.¹³⁷⁶ This was because of the crisis of legitimacy and the greatly increased domestic and international pressure the Government was facing. It showed that Botha was frustrated with Buthelezi's refusal to join negotiations. Buthelezi's participation was sought after because he was the most credible, non-revolutionary leader working inside the system. This chapter demonstrated that despite clandestine negotiations with Nelson Mandela, Botha was not considering releasing him unconditionally, and was simply responding to foreign pressure by seeking a way to release Mandela on terms favourable to the State President.¹³⁷⁷ Indeed, it shows that Botha sought to use Buthelezi's politics as a political bulwark against foreign pressures to unban the ANC and negotiate with it. This confirms Waldmeir's view that Botha sought to use moderate Africans, including Buthelezi, as a 'buffer' against more radical forces.¹³⁷⁸

¹³⁷⁶ See thesis, 182-83.

¹³⁷⁷ See thesis, 183-86.

¹³⁷⁸ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 46.

However, the thesis advanced reasons to doubt Friedman's claim that Government was seeking an internal settlement or 'deal' with Inkatha.¹³⁷⁹ It also refuted McCaul's contention that Inkatha was 'likely to become the base around which the very possibility of a reformist settlement will turn'.¹³⁸⁰ Botha and like-minded colleagues did not think that their problems could be resolved simply reaching an accommodation with the existing moderate leaders. Botha was undoubtedly seeking to weaken and to moderate the ANC to the greatest extent possible. And this chapter advanced evidence that Botha wanted to see Buthelezi and other homeland leaders retain a prominent role in South African politics. Yet, it demonstrated that Botha recognised that solving the serious and distinctive problems of revolutionary radicalism in the African urban areas was crucial to achieving the National Party's objectives.¹³⁸¹ He did not believe that Inkatha could provide credible leadership for Africans in the urban areas. To the extent that Botha sought non-revolutionary leadership to displace loyalty to the ANC in urban areas, it looked to cultivate new urban leaders through the newly created local Government structures rather than to harness support for established homeland leaders, such as Buthelezi. It also showed that Botha recognised the ANC's great political stature, domestically and abroad, and amongst the urban Africans from whom a great deal of the National Party's troubles stemmed. It suggested that Botha did not believe that a viable settlement could be reached until the ANC had been weakened or moderated such that the Government could come to an accommodation which included it.

Chapter nine provided the first corroboration from National Party documents of Swilling and Phillips's view that in seeking to achieve a settlement, PW Botha came to see negotiation, reform and dialogue as secondary aspects of his approach.¹³⁸² It demonstrated more clearly than before that economic reforms and security were prioritized, and that the only political reform which Botha was keen to undertake related to local government structures and 'own affairs'.¹³⁸³ Indeed, it gave unprecedented illustration that despite espoused commitment to negotiated settlement, Botha was utterly unwilling to compromise his political aims or to weaken his grip over the process of change.¹³⁸⁴ Moreover, it provided striking new illustrations of the intransigent nature of his approach, and his sense that only white South Africans were qualified to steer South Africa's political course. It demonstrated that although he wanted black leaders to participate, and to be seen to participate, in the constitutional deliberations, he was not willing for them to participate such that

¹³⁷⁹ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, S. Friedman Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 17 November 1994.

¹³⁸⁰ McCaul, 'The Wild Card: Inkatha and Contemporary Black Politics', 169.

¹³⁸¹ See thesis 195-96.

¹³⁸² Swilling and Phillips, 'the Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', 48-9.

¹³⁸³ See thesis, 177-79.

¹³⁸⁴ See thesis, 179-82.

they would exert a significant influence on the direction of travel. It provided direct evidence of PW Botha dismissing the idea that the Government should sit around a table with African politicians, come to an agreement with them and then establish a new dispensation on this basis. Botha stated that the Government needed to gain the support or the acquiescence of the people, but to retain power as it moved towards a new system. In this sense, chapter nine bolstered the arguments of Rotberg that in overseeing change in South Africa Botha had a 'heightened sense of command and control' and Esterhuysen that the National Party leader was 'addicted to power'.¹³⁸⁵ As with Botha's political objectives, his approach to achieving his aims was even more conservative than was apparent from the party's public statements.

It provided illustrations that Botha and like-minded ministers did not believe it realistic that they could cultivate a sufficient level of agreement even with relatively moderate black leaders. This did not cause them to adjust their objectives, to reflect upon the potential weaknesses of their agenda, or to acknowledge that any African leaders had made just criticism of National Party politics. Botha and a number of other cabinet ministers consciously adopted a stubborn and forceful approach to achieving the acquiescence of the African population. To project an image of strength, power and determination was central to Botha's political approach. Also Botha sought to attenuate black grievances by means of economic improvements and political reform in the realm of 'own affairs' and local Government. It therefore supported Swilling and Phillips's contention that serious reform and negotiation were to be undertaken only once the revolutionaries had already been weakened to the point of defeat.¹³⁸⁶ It also demonstrated that he was not prepared to make any significant compromises and corroborated existing arguments that Botha sought to co-opt 'compliant', 'pliable', 'acquiescent and conservative' black leaders.¹³⁸⁷

Given the importance Botha attached to economics and security in attaining his desired outcomes, Inkatha was seen to have an important role to play in these fields.¹³⁸⁸ Chapter nine showed that Buthelezi was thought to have an important contribution to make in ensuring the security of his homeland, overseeing the economic growth of KwaZulu so as to stem further migration to 'white' South Africa and in advocating against sanctions and disinvestment in the international community. It also demonstrated that Botha's political approach and envisaged role for Inkatha contrasted

¹³⁸⁵ Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy*, 309; Esterhuysen, *Endgame*, 56.

¹³⁸⁶ *South Africa at the End of the Eighties: Policy Perspectives 1989* (Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989). Chapter 2: 'the Powers of the Thunderbird: Decision-making structures and policy strategies in the South African state', Mark Swilling, Mark Phillips, pp. 48-9.

¹³⁸⁷ Rich, 'The Changing South African Scene', 308-9; Van der Westhuizen, *White Power and the Rise and Fall of the National Party*, 126; *Ibid.*, 116.

¹³⁸⁸ See thesis, 187-88.

sharply with that which Buthelezi advocated.¹³⁸⁹ The State President did not regard Buthelezi as being a prospective meaningful partner in negotiated change, and did not see Inkatha as having the potential to be at the centre of political gravity in South Africa with decisive bargaining and mediating influence. He saw Inkatha merely as a homeland organisation, even if was the most credible and popular of them, with a constituency largely confined to its own ethnic base, and increasingly limited to older, traditional, rural and KwaZulu-based Zulus.

Chapter ten corroborated and elaborated the truncated accounts which have been provided by other scholars of the differences between the PW Botha's dominant political tendency and the reformist inclination of Minister for Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis and his department. And it offered the most vivid account and prominent example of what is referred to as a 'New Nat' in O'Meara's *Forty Lost Years*- a National Party figure who was in disagreement with the dominant 'PW Nat' tendency, but nevertheless remained within the party and the Government.¹³⁹⁰ It demonstrated more clearly that for Heunis, political aspects of the total strategy were paramount. He focused on reform and negotiations as means of achieving the Government's desired outcomes, and saw economic reform and security measures as important, but insufficient, expedients for reducing opposition to the National Party's politics. As demonstrated in chapter five, the Minister of Constitutional Development believed in the importance of political reform in the area of 'common affairs' as well as 'own affairs'. Chapter ten highlighted that Heunis, in contrast to PW Botha, believed there were flaws in the current National Party approach. His department perceived some of the criticisms of the National Party to be reasonable, such as the allegation that it was acting unilaterally, and that it was overemphasizing the importance of safeguarding white rights. They wrote of the need to address the perception that Government did not understand black aspirations. This chapter demonstrated that Heunis's department attached great significance to the need to gain legitimacy in the eyes of non-whites and to persuade them of the National Party's good intentions.¹³⁹¹ Private National Party documents put forward show that Heunis argued that there was a latent consensus in South Africa which could be realized through meaningful negotiation, reform and dialogue and a resultant change in perceptions.¹³⁹²

Heunis did not have a strictly sequential plan for political change, but sought a change of political momentum away from revolutionary radicals and in favour of the National Party and those who

¹³⁸⁹ See thesis, 187-89.

¹³⁹⁰ O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years*, 372.

¹³⁹¹ See thesis, 191-96.

¹³⁹² See thesis, 189-196.

favoured negotiated change.¹³⁹³ He wrote that breakthroughs in negotiation, dialogue or common understanding with African leaders would have a 'ripple effect', bringing about a change in the political climate and making an ever broader range of non-white leaders amenable to negotiation and persuasion. It was also argued in Heunis's department that progress in these areas could place Government's economic and social reforms in a new perspective thereby increasing African appreciation for the changes which the Government had already undertaken. Chapter ten revealed a previously uncited document in which Heunis urged PW Botha to implement 'project daybreak' by drawing up a statement of common values signed with a number of moderate African leaders could change the momentum of politics and create a climate more conducive to the establishment of the National Council. He also insisted that there should be a continuous acceleration of political momentum and a broadening of the process of negotiations in what he called a snowball effect. As such, chapter ten showed that for Minister Heunis, in contrast to Botha, negotiations were an important part of the process of political change rather than being significant largely as its culmination. In all these respects, Heunis's approach to politics can be seen as more similar to Buthelezi's than to Botha's.

Chapter ten showed that Heunis envisaged a noteworthy role for Buthelezi in the process of reform and negotiated change.¹³⁹⁴ Heunis stressed the importance of negotiating with African leaders with legitimacy and credibility. He recognized Buthelezi as the only homeland leaders and African politician who opposed the armed struggle who had a significant degree of credibility internationally or domestically. Documents cited in this chapter show that Buthelezi was perceived to be an essential participant in the National Council and that persuading him to enter the body was a high priority for Heunis. They show further that the minister reflected on the nature of Buthelezi's objections to the council and how these could be overcome. However, chapter ten presented evidence which demonstrates that the Department for Constitutional Development and Planning did not perceive Buthelezi's and other official African leaders' support to be sufficient for the achievement of a negotiated settlement in South Africa. Instead, a broad range of leaders needed to be brought into the process.¹³⁹⁵ Private documents reveal the importance attached to gaining the participation of credible urban African leaders. This was seen as crucial to the success of the National Council, let alone the broader process of negotiation. Departmental papers suggest that Buthelezi was not perceived as a credible urban leader, but merely as the most significant homeland leader. As such, this chapter provided the first documentary corroboration of Giliomee's assertion that in the

¹³⁹³ See thesis, 194-6.

¹³⁹⁴ See thesis, 197-8.

¹³⁹⁵ See thesis, 198-202.

second half of the decade 'Buthelezi was no longer considered a national leader, but rather as one commanding strong support among traditional Zulu in KwaZulu Natal'.¹³⁹⁶ In seeking legitimate urban negotiating partners, Heunis perceived it to be necessary to gain the cooperation of radical and revolutionary organisation. Elements of the UDF were cited as having the potential to make the 'critical difference', and departmental officials stated that there was a probable need to involve them without a formal renunciation of violence. Chapter ten demonstrated, furthermore, that the ANC was perceived by Heunis to be of great significance in resolving South Africa's problems. It showed, in contrast to the State President, that Heunis and his reformists certainly do not fit in with the broader characterisation of the National Party Government seeking only to consult and cooperate with 'compliant' and 'conservative' leaders.¹³⁹⁷ Still less do they fit with Friedman's description of the Government attempting to achieve a settlement by doing a 'deal' with internal leaders such as Buthelezi.¹³⁹⁸ Moreover, it showed it to be doubtful that Heunis saw Inkatha, as McCaul suggested the Government did, as 'the base around the very possibility of a reformist settlement will turn'.¹³⁹⁹ However, official documents were used to highlight the important role Heunis sought for Buthelezi as a catalyst in the process of change.¹⁴⁰⁰ It demonstrated that Heunis saw Buthelezi's participation in, and support for, the Government's reform process as the most immediately realistic means of breaking the impasse in South African politics and shifting its momentum in favour of greater consensus, cooperation, wider African participation and ultimately a political settlement. In this sense, it has been shown that Heunis's approach towards moderate African leaders was not to use them, as Waldmeir suggests, buffers against more radical forces.¹⁴⁰¹ On the contrary, it was to use them as a means of drawing more radical leaders into negotiations.

In sum, this thesis has contributed a clearer and more precise understanding of Inkatha politics in the 1980s than is provided by the existing historiography. This is particularly significant given that a leitmotiv of the current scholarship is that Inkatha politics were ambiguous and paradoxical.¹⁴⁰² The thesis also for the first time discerns the philosophical assumptions which underpinned Buthelezi's politics, and which provided a coherent basis for the different elements of his politics which at first appear inconsistent. This is significant not only for a clearer understanding of Inkatha's ambiguities,

¹³⁹⁶ Giliomee, *The Afrikaners*, 623-4.

¹³⁹⁷ Rich, 'The Changing South African Scene', 308-9; Friedman, 'Hot air or fresh breeze?', 8.

¹³⁹⁸ JL, Hermann Giliomee Collection BC 1070, S. Friedman Interviewed by P. Waldmeir, 17 November 1994.

¹³⁹⁹ Colleen, 'The Wild Card: Inkatha and Contemporary Black Politics', 169.

¹⁴⁰⁰ See thesis, 202-3.

¹⁴⁰¹ Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle*, 211-2.

¹⁴⁰² Brewer, 'From Ancient Rome to KwaZulu: Inkatha in South African Politics', 353; *Ibid.*, 354; Marks, *The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa*.

but also because it rebuts a number of prominent accounts which maintain that different facets of Buthelezi's politics were contradictory, disjointed or irreconcilable.

This thesis not only offers a full and fine-grained understanding of Inkatha politics, but offers a new historical perspective on them. By characterising the particular form of Burkean outlook which Buthelezi articulated, it shows that Inkatha warrants historical consideration of the political ideas which it propounded and its distinctive and interesting 'voice' in South African political discourse during a time of great political upheaval and change. This was a voice which was paradoxical in that it was fundamentally conservative whilst being opposed to apartheid, and in favour of significant political change. Inkatha expressed a worldview which was coherent but which argued for both change and conservation, western values and African values, and for both an embrace of the modern and a reverence for tradition. This is significant, because to the extent that scholars have taken an interest in Buthelezi's ideas, that interest has come from those academics who regard Inkatha as a pragmatic opponent of apartheid. Those accounts which portray Inkatha as a conservative tend to be concerned merely with Buthelezi's interests and how he sought to advance those interests. Indeed, by presenting Inkatha's coherent political vision, and providing telling biographical insights, it challenges the reductionism of the aforementioned accounts which assume that Buthelezi could only have been motivated by narrow and elite political and economic interests.

The account of Inkatha offered by this thesis is valuable because it highlights the different shades which existed in South Africa in the 1980s, presenting a challenge to popular understandings of the period as characterized solely by a Manichean struggle between the forces of the ANC-aligned liberation struggle on the one hand, and the apartheid Government on the other. In this respect, it also challenges the premise of academic accounts, such as those by Mzala, and Mare and Hamilton, which imply that the paramount question about Inkatha is whether or not it was part of a narrowly defined liberation struggle.¹⁴⁰³

Regarding its characterization of the National Party, this thesis contributes a deeper and clearer understanding than before of the party and its leaders' politics and political thinking. By drawing upon an unprecedented research of the National Party's private documents, it confirms, elaborates and elaborates many of the arguments which have been made by other scholars drawing principally on less reliable and useful forms of historical evidence.

Much of the thesis's most significant contribution arises not from two distinct analyses of different political parties, but from the insights which accrue from a study of the relationship between them.

¹⁴⁰³ Mzala, *Chief with a Double Agenda*, 223-226; Mare and Hamilton, *Appetite for Power*, 7.

By undertaking the first detailed comparison between the two parties' politics, this thesis brings in clearer focus the nature of each party's politics. By characterising the National Party's perception of, and approach towards, Inkatha, it offers not only a more sophisticated grasp of National Party politics, but also of the nature and strength of Inkatha's position in South African politics. The *vice versa* is also true. For instance, by illuminating the National Party's approach towards Inkatha in the second half of the 1980s, it helps to clarify one of the most salient paradoxes about the governing party in this period- that it advocated reform negotiated with African leaders who rejected the armed struggle and anathematized revolutionaries, but simultaneously undertook covert talks with Nelson Mandela. It also gives insights into how successful Inkatha was in persuading National Party leaders to favour the political approach which he advocated, and why. Furthermore, it suggests why Inkatha refused to participate in the Special Cabinet Committee and the National Council, despite being in favour of a negotiated settlement. It gives indications of why each party was unable to forge their preferred type of political cooperation with the other.

The account given of the differences between the politics of PW Botha and Chris Heunis to some extent illuminates the contingency of National Party politics in this period and its relationship with Inkatha. It shows clearly why Buthelezi was completely unable to convince PW Botha to adopt the political changes the Inkatha leader advocated. It highlights the profound differences in political thinking and objectives which defined their relationship, as well as underscoring Botha's intransigence, rigidity and unwillingness to consider points of view which differed with Afrikaner nationalism. In Chris Heunis the thesis discerns a senior National Party figure who differed from Buthelezi in some important respect, but in other crucial ways was much closer to the Inkatha leader than to his own party boss. This is significant, because Buthelezi expressed despair with PW Botha's leadership and hope in the emergence of reformist tendencies from within the National Party.

However, it is noteworthy that, despite similarities in political preferences and approach, Chris Heunis did not envisage for Inkatha the political role which it sought for itself in the second half of the 1980s. Although differing with PW Botha on the role Inkatha ought to play, both attached less significance to the organization in the process of change than did Buthelezi. In this sense, the thesis also delineates the limitations of the significance of individual National Party protagonists. It shows that both PW Botha and Chris Heunis perceived demographic, geographic and political developments to have significant implications for South African politics. Both men interpreted these realities differently, but the scope for interpretation was limited: both were forced to draw the conclusion that Inkatha's political significance had been downgraded by these developments, and that the importance of the ANC and other radical organisations had been greatly increased.

In its analysis of the first half of the 1980s, this thesis shows that from 1983 onwards Government officials clearly perceived the difficulties it had been posed by rapid African urbanization, radicalization and the increase in the proportion of the black population constituted by young people. Indeed, the thesis highlights this as a key factor in the National Party's abandonment of the Verwoerdian homelands project. This had been one of Buthelezi's key political objectives, but the factors which brought about the demise of the homelands project were also to render him incapable of occupying the centre of South African political gravity as had hoped from the mid-1980s. Indeed, the thesis shows in part one how Buthelezi perceived clearly the dangers to his political position from these developments. It also demonstrates how Buthelezi's perception of changing political circumstances altered his political priorities over the course of the decade.

In that sense, this thesis can be said to be a refinement and elaboration of Giliomee's contention in *The Last Afrikaner leaders* that individual National Party leaders played a 'crucial role' and that developments were of a 'contingent nature', but also that human agency was shaped and constrained by broader factors, including economic and demographic shifts.¹⁴⁰⁴

This thesis raises further questions about the exact relationship between individual agency and broader contextual factors. It shows that the significance unpropitious economic and demographic factors only became impossible to ignore when they were highlighted by heightened radicalism and violence from 1983/1984. It also demonstrates that in the period prior to this, the National Party showed almost no inclination to pursue closer relations and establish a better understanding with relatively conservative African leaders such as Buthelezi. It simply sought to impose a confederal system of Government on Southern Africa and to introduce the tricameral constitution whose implementation was the unintended catalyst of the increased radicalism from 1983. As such, questions remain as to whether a different type of relationship between the two parties would have been possible if the National Party had adopted its 1985 shifts in policy at an earlier point in the decade.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Giliomee, *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*, 12; *Ibid.*, 15.

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