

# MOOKI LEEPA'S REBELLION OF FEBRUARY TO MARCH 1970: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF MOTIVES

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## *Abstract*

*This article deals with a well-known but largely under-researched event that occurred in Lesotho during the first three months of 1970, an incident in which members of opposition parties under the leadership of a former Deputy Commissioner of Police, Clement Mooki Leepa, occupied a cave, Lehaha-la-Likhomo, and organised themselves into a force determined to resist police arrest. Using the oral testimony of one key participant, court cases, official reports and secondary sources, the article firstly attempts to situate the incident, and Leepa's involvement in it, in the context of political divisions that characterised the country's road to independence and, secondly, to reconstruct the events that took place at the cave. The article mainly argues that, accepting without question the assertion that many of the acts of members of opposition parties in 1970 were attempts to topple government, prevents a deeper understanding of the complex and contradictory political and at times personal reasons and motivations of equally complex individuals and groups who participated in these activities. We have used the terms "rebel" or "rebellion" to describe the incident discussed in this paper, but have done so reluctantly because the men and their backers' plans were nipped in the bud, and never came to anything.*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Some of the difficulties of decolonisation in Africa became clear, and were sorted out, during negotiations, or struggles, for independence. Others came to the fore after independence, and combined with those that could not be resolved during pre-independence negotiations, demanded resolution and testing the ability of the newly-established political system to reproduce itself. In Lesotho,<sup>2</sup> to many events of 1970 stand unchallenged in the country's political history as marking the beginning of the kingdom's political problems, some of which persist to this day. In January of that year the first postindependence elections were held and the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) was defeated. Instead of handing over power to the victorious Basutoland

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2 For examples of comparable experiences of transitions from colonial rule to independence see John G Pike, *Malawi A political and economic history* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), ch. 5, and Philip Short, *Banda* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), ch. 10, for Malawi; and Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, *Ghana End of an illusion* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), chs 4 and 5; Kofi Buenor Hadjor, *Nkrumah and Ghana The dilemma of post colonial power* (London, New York: Kegan Paul, 1988) ch. 4; Peter T Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah The anatomy of African dictatorship* (London: C Hurst, New York: Africana, 1970), ch. 4; D Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah The political kingdom in the third world* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), ch. 8, for Ghana.

Congress Party (BCP), the leader of the ruling BNP, Chief Leabua Jonathan, declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution, and the police proceeded to arrest, hound, maim and kill scores of opposition supporters and leaders in what is known in the country as *qomatsi*.<sup>3</sup> Through the fear that was sown in society in these ways, the BNP succeeded in holding on to power for the next 15 years. On the other hand, by displaying intolerance towards all forms of dissent, from those early months of 1970, the party expanded the boundaries of what it considered opposition to its rule, and self-servingly interpreted rather complex, societywide acts of resistance and opposition as attempts to topple the government.<sup>4</sup>

We argue here that the events of 1970 were not the cause of the kingdom's political problems as such, but rather the culmination of extreme partisanship and instability that characterised the country's road to independence, which commenced in the second half of the 1950s. This period saw the rapid disintegration of the main political movement, the Basutoland African Congress (BAC), which began six years after its formation. Despite its early and spectacular successes in challenging colonial rule, uniting the population behind its political programme of resisting incorporation into the Union of South Africa, defending the rights of chiefs in the face of encroachment by the colonial government, and calling for the establishment of a legislative council that would for the first time include elected representatives of the people, the BAC was unable to stem the tide of a rapidly splintering movement. The result was the emergence of a political landscape in which various political formations competed for political supremacy in campaigns that were characterised by bitterness and suspicion among the political actors.

The subject of this paper, Clement Mooki Leepa's rebellion of February to March 1970, provides a useful microcosm through which the political problems of Lesotho in 1970 can be studied and better understood. There are a number of reasons for this assertion. The rebellion is not, as leaders of the ruling BNP sought to argue, a straightforward case of people who wanted to topple the government. Leepa himself, to say nothing of the men under his command, presents a complex combination of personal and political motives, often influenced by time and chance, that need to be unravelled if his rebellion is to be understood. How and why did a man, who was the highest ranking local officer in the Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP), become, in less than a year of his retirement, the most wanted fugitive in the country? In what ways

3 *Qomatsi*, A word that ordinarily means "emergency", became a part of Lesotho's political lexicon in 1970, and came to refer to a combination of the declaration of a State of Emergency and myriad acts – assault, arson, murder and wanton imprisonment of political opponents – of the repressive arms of the state and independently organised armed militia, seemingly unencumbered by law, against the general population.

4 For another complex event in 1970 usually explained purely in terms of participants' plan to topple the government, see Motlatsi Thabane, "Liphokojoe of Kao: a study of a diamond digger rebel group in the Lesotho Highlands", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(1), 2000, pp. 105-121.

does the chequered road he travelled serve to illustrate the vicissitudinous nature of the wider political environment?

In researching this understudied and little understood event, we have relied on court cases, parliamentary debates, a personal testimony of one participant in the rebellion, press reports and secondary sources. It should be pointed out from the outset that today very few of the men who participated can still be found. Some died, while others settled in South Africa after fleeing Lesotho in the wake of the police persecution that followed their participation in the incident. Of those who are still alive in Lesotho, some are reluctant to talk, still fearing that admitting to have participated in the incident might earn them the attention of the police. In the trial that followed police action against the conspirators, one participant turned state witness. He also refused to talk to us saying that his testimony could open old wounds and recharge the anger of people they had abducted, among them a local chief. He was vehemently opposed, he said, to creating an archival record access over which he would have no control, and the consequence of which would be animosity or persecution of his grandchildren by the grandchildren of those who suffered at his and his colleagues' hands. The dominant tendency among those who were prepared to speak was to repeat a story which their lawyer seems to have advised them to stick to during court proceedings. The questions that issue of turning state witness and the repetition of stories presented in court are too many and too complicated to be discussed here, but they raise such problems as the usefulness of the legal record to those attempting to reconstruct the past. At his own request the identity of our informant will not be disclosed.

## **2. THE TURBULENT ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE**

For much of the colonial period Basotho chiefs enjoyed good working relations with the colonial government. In 1903 these relations were brought to a higher and more formal footing with the establishment of the Basutoland National Council (BNC), whose membership was made up of chiefs, colonial officials and their nominees. Feeling excluded, the commoners formed their own organisations, the Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) and Lekhotla la Bafo (LB), in 1907 and 1919, respectively. These organisations sought reforms that would allow their members to participate in the BNC and other forums where discussions and decisions about Lesotho's administration and future took place.

By the 1960s political movements and parties seeking Lesotho's independence had become active. Of these, the Basutoland African Congress, formed in 1952 and renamed the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in 1959, opposed the colonial government's reforms that the organisation deemed detrimental to the chieftainship, while at the same time seeking independence under a democratic constitution, and

a government by popularly elected representatives. The Marema-Tlou Party (MTP) was formed in 1957 by senior chiefs who broke away from the BCP, convinced that they and the future paramount chief, Prince Bereng Seeiso, were in danger of being politically marginalised in an independent Lesotho. The party sought an immediate enthronement of the prince who was at the time still studying in England while Chieftainess Mantšebo Seeiso acted as Regent. The third party, Basutoland National Party (BNP), was formed in 1959 by junior chiefs who had also broken away from the BCP, fearing political exclusion in an independent Lesotho, whether government was dominated by commoners under BCP, or by senior chiefs under MTP. The Basutoland Freedom Party (BFP), formed in 1962 by individuals who had broken away from the BCP, sought a bigger role for Prince Bereng (installed on the throne in 1960 as Paramount Chief under the title *Motlotlehi*, and now known as Moshoeshe II) in an independent Lesotho. In 1963 the MTP and BFP merged to form one promonarchy Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP).

Concerning constitutional changes that the colonial government introduced from the 1950s – many at the initiative of, or fully supported by, the BCP – in preparation for Lesotho's independence, the paramount chief was unhappy that many of them took power from his office, giving it to elected representatives. As part of the progress towards independence, parliamentary elections were held in 1965. These were unexpectedly and narrowly won by the BNP. To the leaders of this party now fell the task to put final touches to the independence constitution, and thereby determine the roles of the future monarchy, the army and other institutions in post-colonial Lesotho. Suspicious of the BNP government's intentions, the paramount chief opposed clauses of the constitution that emasculated his office, proposing, instead, revisions that would give him power to enact laws. For their part, the BCP, fearing political persecution by a BNP government, found themselves having to make a number of about-turns and modifications to their stances: they made common cause with the paramount chief and supported his bid for certain powers, including control over internal and external affairs; they advocated the formation of a government of national unity; and they tried to lobby the National Assembly to vote for the postponement of Lesotho's independence.<sup>5</sup>

These and other issues became subjects of discussion at the Independence Conference convened by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and held in London from 8 to 17 June 1966. Both the supporters of the government's position and supporters of the Motlotlehi and BCP's positions sent delegations to the talks, each side hoping for the British Government's support for its stance. On the question of giving the paramount chief and future monarch some political power in the constitution, the British Government pointed out that, from the time when the Basutoland Constitutional Commission made its recommendations in 1962, right up to the London Conference of

5 For more detailed discussions of the BCP's about-turns see for example BM Khaketla, *Lesotho 1970 an African coup under the microscope* (London: C Hurst and Co., 1971), pp. 66, 71.

1964, it had always been understood that Motlotlehi would be a constitutional monarch. Accordingly, the National Assembly had rejected any amendments that sought to give Motlotlehi executive powers other than those exercised by his government. As such, the matter was closed. All in all, the British Government rejected the arguments of Motlotlehi, the BCP, and their supporters on the grounds that: "First, they were confused; second, they were not only inconsistent with, but wholly out of tune and spirit with all previous agreements; third, they were fundamentally undemocratic and would lead to a division of responsibility and inevitable conflict in Basutoland."<sup>6</sup> Motlotlehi protested against the agreement by refusing to sign, while representatives of the BCP and MFP withdrew from the conference saying: "The role we have been allocated in this Conference is that of puppets in a carefully rehearsed pantomime. We are therefore forced to protest in the only way immediately open to us by dissociating ourselves completely from this travesty."<sup>7</sup>

On Friday, 2 September 1966, the BCP leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, proposed the following motion in the National Assembly:

"That the honourable House urges Motlotlehi to call upon leaders of political parties and some prominent chiefs and citizens to discuss the future of this country, having in mind the present constitutional impasse and with a view to finding a common new ground and a basis of unity upon which an independent Lesotho will be founded."<sup>8</sup>

Mokhehle argued that Lesotho stood at the threshold of independence more divided than at any time in its history. Essentially, he pointed out, the divisions were among the people's leaders, not among the people themselves who desired unity, not divisions. Experiences of countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Zanzibar and Indonesia showed that, forging ahead to independence, without regard for the situation on the ground, led to instability and bloodshed. The challenge was for people's leaders to do away with considerations of personal gain and eagerness to satisfy foreigners and come together and build unity for the Basotho. It was important for the people's leaders, Mokhehle continued, to be vigilant against the influence of foreigners like the Secretary of State for the Colonies who, at the end of the London Conference, made a mockery of Basotho people by recognising the divisions among Basotho on the one hand, and granting independence on the other. Why not, he wanted to know, ask Motlotlehi to call the country's elders to leave aside considerations of personal gain and foreign influence and come together to examine the reasons for the country's disunity and to chart a path to unity?

Government, for its part, denied that there was no peace and unity in Lesotho. The best way for the opposition to demonstrate its desire for unity, the government

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6 Report of the Basutoland Independence Conference (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, June 1966), p. 8.

7 Memorandum submitted to the Commonwealth Secretariat by the Basutoland Congress Party and the Maramatlou Freedom Party (27 June 1966).

8 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth Meeting, First Session, 29 August 9 September 1966, p. 240.

pointed out, was for them to join other Basotho in the independence festivities of 4 October. Beyond that, the motion by the leader of the opposition was an attempt to reintroduce, by the back door of Parliament, business that had already been disposed of. Further, the motion was nothing but a clever attempt by the Opposition to scupper independence. Finally, the ruling party wondered whether, had the BCP won the general election of 1965, it would have regretted the absence of unity in Lesotho. By persuading individual senior chiefs and individual members of opposition parties to support him in Parliament, and including them in Lesotho's delegation to London, Chief Jonathan finally got his way and was thus able to outmanoeuvre his much more experienced and educated opponents – the King and Mokhehle, who had formed an alliance against him – and secure the constitution he wanted.<sup>9</sup> The Paramount Chief was the biggest loser, because throughout, his had been the most radical demand: the power to enact laws in an independent Lesotho.<sup>10</sup>

But problems remained for Chief Jonathan's government. The BNP had won the 1965 elections by the slenderest of margins, and its government enjoyed a majority of one in Parliament. Presiding over a weak government, viewed contemptuously by Mokhehle and his colleagues as an uneducated person, and having difficult relations with the King, who saw him as one of the people who had advised against his early enthronement in 1960, it is not surprising that Chief Jonathan's government continued to be threatened by preindependence political tensions and the instability they bred in years that followed independence. In fact, the first incident took place only two months after independence. Frustrated by his failure to improve his lot during constitutional processes leading to independence, the King and his supporters in December 1966 defied the Prime Minister and tried to hold a public meeting at which the King would appeal directly to the people over the head of his government. He was supported by Mokhehle, equally frustrated by constitutional provisions – some of which, as we saw, he had earlier favoured.

The Prime Minister described the move as unconstitutional, and brutally foiled it. On 6 January 1967, the King was made to sign a statement – cosigned by the College of Chiefs and witnessed by the Prime Minister and cabinet – in which he undertook to cooperate with the government, to respect the constitution and to refrain from organising public meetings without the knowledge and consent of the government. If at any time the King was found to be in contravention of this undertaking, he

9 The extent to which individuals, involved in negotiations for Lesotho after independence, contributed to the character of the country's independence constitution should not be exaggerated: the British were determined to give Lesotho a constitution similar to theirs, and it was a constitution that Chief Jonathan also wanted after he had won the general elections of 1965.

10 To this end, the Paramount Chief and his supporters staged walk outs during constitutional talks in London, threatening the British that when he and his party returned to Lesotho they were going to organise mass rallies where the Paramount Chief would appeal directly to the Basotho to reject the constitution. Khaketla, pp. 105, 107.

would be deemed to have abdicated, the statement said.<sup>11</sup> This was not to be the end. The preindependence tensions persisted and contributed to political instability in the independence era, as the King and his allies continued to search for ways to improve his constitutional position, by a combination of conspiring and taking advantage of opportunities that presented themselves. One such opportunity was the Lehaheng-la-Likhomo incident of February to March 1970, in which Clement Mooki Leepa and our informant were major actors.

### 3. CLEMENT MOOKI LEEPA, INFORMANT AND THE ROYAL FAMILY

#### 3.1 Clement Mooki Leepa

Clement Mooki Leepa was born on 23 February or March 1923. He served in World War II. Upon his return he joined the Basutoland Mounted Police (BMP) on 21 October 1947. By 1961 he had risen to the officer ranks as Inspector. In January 1963 he was awarded the Colonial Police Medal for Meritorious Service. Among several training courses he attended overseas were those at Hendon in the United Kingdom and in Australia. He became Deputy Commissioner in January 1966, so that independence found him already in that position. On at least two occasions Leepa acted as Commissioner of Police: in December 1966 and from May to July 1967.<sup>12</sup> One former colonial official described Leepa as a man “who held himself so stiff and tense that he gave the impression of being permanently on the brink of uncontrollable fury”, and as “too independent for the government’s liking”.<sup>13</sup> Our informants described him as stern and with an approach of not tolerating any nonsense.

Leepa left the Lesotho Mounted Police (LMP) in 1969 at the age of 46, when he was pensioned after his position, Deputy Commissioner of Police, had been abolished. This the government accomplished by way of the Police Amendment Act of 1969. According to government, the position was abolished because the incumbent had no specific duties to perform and therefore the position was redundant. The move was also deemed necessary if conflict between the heads of department in the LMP, assistant commissioners and the Deputy Commissioner was to be avoided.

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11 See *Koena News* 1(43), 24 May 1967. For the text of the declaration see JH Proctor, “Building a constitutional monarch in Lesotho”, *Civilisations* xix(1), 1969. See also, R Weisfelder, “Power struggle in Lesotho,” *Africa Report* 12(1), 1967.

12 Biographical information on Leepa was gleaned from BMP *Staff lists* for the years 1955, 1957, 1962 and 1963, LMP *Staff lists* for the years 1966, 1967 and 1972, and the *Colonial Annual Report*, 1963.

13 Peter Sanders, *The last of the queen's men A Lesotho experience* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2000), pp. 31 and 156.

Further, the abolition of the post would lead to budgetary savings which could be used elsewhere, the government pointed out.<sup>14</sup>

### 3.2 The informant

The person whose testimony helped in the reconstruction of the incident that forms the subject of this paper was 78 years old when we interviewed him in December 2003. He had served as a soldier during World War II, and was based in Egypt, where he guarded over German prisoners of war at a British incarceration camp. He said he had become a *Haresem*, which, we are told, was the Sesotho rendition of “RSM”, or Regiment Sergeant Major – the highest rank an African commoner could attain in the Allied Army. After the war, he went to the Cape Province in the Republic of South Africa, where he worked as a policeman. Upon his return from the Cape sometime in the early 1960s, he was charged and convicted and sentenced to six months in jail for taking part in intervillage fights over pasture in his home area. Having served part of his sentence in a Maseru jail, he was taken to the Paramount Chief’s homestead at Matsieng, where he was to serve the remainder of his sentence. Upon his release, he was immediately employed at the same homestead as a driver. Complaining of poor pay and bad working conditions, he absconded and later found employment at the Department of Roads as a truck driver. A principal chief who noticed in him loyalty to the King, and enormous energy, recruited him to the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). He left his employment at the Roads Department and worked for the party during campaigns for the 1965 parliamentary elections. By the late 1960s his political allegiances had changed, and he helped the BCP during campaigns for the 1970 general elections. Events described in this paper in which he had participated, and for which he served a jail sentence, found him in his home village fearful of his arrest and political persecution after witnessing and hearing rumours of arrests and persecution of leaders and members of opposition parties.

### 3.3 Leepa, the informant and the royal family

Leepa and the informant lived in adjacent villages, and had known each other from their days as boys herding animals in the area. Although the two men were not in the same company in the Allied Army, participation in the World War strengthened the boyhood friendship between the informant and Leepa even further, who is said to have been very partial towards Second World War veterans. One indication of this was that, after the war, Leepa found employment for the informant and other veterans in the BMP, but the informant declined because he did not like their uniform. Instead, he went to the Cape Province, and became a policeman there, and learned how to

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14 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) of the National Assembly 1(2 24), 24 February 27 March 1969, pp. 91 95.

drive. As mentioned above, upon his return from the Cape, some time in the early 1960s, he was sentenced to six months in the Maseru jail. It was while in jail that the informant and Leepa renewed their acquaintance. According to the informant, Leepa arrived at the jail and asked to see him. He offered words of encouragement and hope. That was the first of many visits that culminated in Leepa using his influence to have the informant transferred to Matsieng, where he was to finish his sentence at the Paramount Chief's homestead.

At Matsieng, the informant was not treated like a prisoner at all: he was not made to wear the prisoners' uniform, he drove a car with which he ran a variety of errands, and he frequently travelled distances of 40 kilometres and more to places like Maseru on his own, without any escort from the Department of Prisons. At the end of his sentence, and probably as a result of Leepa's influence, he was offered a job at the royal homestead. Leepa and the informant continued their relationship throughout a period that saw the informant leave his employment at Matsieng, seeking and finding employment at the Department of Roads, and leaving that too in favour of returning to his home village and going full time into politics, initially as an MFP activist, and later as a campaign worker for the BCP in the run-up to the 1970 elections.

#### 4. THE LEHAHENG-LA-LIKHOMO<sup>15</sup> INCIDENT

On 30 January 1970 the Government of Lesotho, fearing defeat at the polls held on 27 January, suspended the constitution and declared that the country was under *qomatsi*. Our story begins shortly after the declaration had been made when, according to the informant,

“(i)t happened that... immediately after the Prime Minister announced the state of emergency, and we had seen that we of the BCP were already being gathered and taken to *Maximum* [Security Prison], it happened that we made a plan amongst ourselves and then we met a person who was called Leepa.... there [at his village] and I said ‘Well, as for me I cannot go there; I cannot agree to go and be locked there without knowing why I am being locked-up there...’ And then it happened that... Leepa agreed with me, and he said: ‘Well, we cannot come to be arrested here gentlemen... and go and be collected [in prison] without knowing why we’re going to be collected there; having done what?’ We agreed that we would refuse [to be arrested], we’re not going to agree. Our issue was just this: immediately they said Bereng (King Moshoeshoe II)... was being guarded (i.e. not allowed free movement and communication with friends and allies) we said: ‘Aikhona, now that the King has been done like this, aikhona’.”<sup>16</sup>

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15 Literally “cave of cattle”, from the fact that communities from nearby villages used it to kraal their cattle.

16 CML01.B000 023. In this interview reference and hereafter, the first three letters of the alphabet followed by the number refer to the title of the project (Clement Mooki Leepa Rebellion) and Cassette number. The letter “A” or “B” refers to the side of the cassette, and the numbers refer to transcriber counter readings. Italicised words in testimony texts are original.

With a collection of men from nearby villages, and united by the general objective of resisting arrest as best they could, they moved up a nearby mountain and settled at LehahenglaLikhomo, which offered them excellent protection against a likely attempt by government forces to arrest them. To further fortify their sanctuary, the men dug trenches in the area around the cave. In the days that followed more men arrived at the cave, including the local chief, Taelo Tsiu, until they numbered more than 50 men, all living in the cave. Cooking utensils were brought up the mountain from the villages below and some of the men were sent regularly to trading stores nearby and as far afield as HaMofoka, where they were given whatever groceries they needed. Receipts were issued and duly settled by some “important people from Matsieng”. In the weeks that followed, communities in nearby villages gave them the name *Banna ba Thaba*, “men of the mountain”, and the police gave them a more politically charged name, the “Lesotho Liberation Movement”.<sup>17</sup>

The men were to be trained and organised into some kind of fighting force. However, it became clear that the vast majority of them had absolutely no knowledge of guns and their use. That is when a handful of men who had previous experience as soldiers, including Leepa and the informant, undertook the task of training the rest. But it was not an easy task.

*“Eik! We were not even after [the men being] welltrained; we were just saying that they should understand; they should not shoot themselves; they should not make mistakes. We were not driving towards a [satisfactory] training... The majority of them were people who you could see completely they were handling guns for the first time... and a person when... you say ‘Handle a gun!’ When whenwhen when when he cocks it and it refuses to be cocked, he is going to peep in there in the barrel! He is going to peep! Now, you see they were things that we wanted that we should – at least we should – at least we should stop only big things which could cause injury... to them.”*<sup>18</sup>

The plateau on top of the mountain provided an excellent training ground for drills and other exercises designed to mould a disparate group of men into a fighting force. Guns and ammunition for this purpose and for the coming battle were acquired in a number of ways. Leepa had brought guns with him to the cave, and some policemen who had remained loyal to him brought more guns. Quite a few chiefs from the Matsieng Ward who were sympathetic contributed guns. To get more guns, men were sent from the cave in pairs to go and surprise policemen on patrol. Unlucky policemen found on patrol were held up by one of the men, who would say to his partner: “Take those guns! Take these guns! Take those guns!” Once the guns had been taken, the men would tell the dispossessed policemen: “*Mesim’a men’ting!* Go from here and leave!”

Sympathetic policemen from Maseru told the men at LehahenglaLikhomo that BNP supporters in nearby villages had turned police informers, telling them everything

17 Commissioner of Police, *Annual Report for 1970* (Maseru, 1971), p. 13.

18 CML01.B347-373.

they needed to know about the goings on at the cave. They decided the men would abduct suspected informers from the villages and drive them up the mountain to the cave, where they would be held captive until government forces arrived.

Periodic meetings were held at a nearby village between Leepa, the informant and some "important people from Matsieng". On one such occasion, the informant was unable to attend the meeting, because he was on sentry duty, and had decided earlier that it was too important a duty to be left to the inexperienced men who had not been to World War II, but he sent one of the men, Tlou Phafane, to attend on his behalf. Leepa and the "important people from Matsieng" expelled Phafane from the meeting. Phafane later reported the incident to the informant. As a result, the informant left the cave and returned to his homestead in protest against the treatment of one of his men. According to the informant, it was as if the entire effort was now in the hands of the chiefs, and ordinary people, the vast majority of those at the cave, had no say. Amid frantic efforts to get him to go back, it was agreed that the informant would act as the Commander in Chief who could issue orders, even to Leepa himself, in all matters related to their stay at the cave.

In an attempt to find allies with whom they could resist the impending onslaught by government forces, Leepa and the informant on two occasions travelled on horseback to the village of Likotsi in search of BCP leaders who had not yet been arrested. They were especially looking for Koenyama Chakela, the General Secretary of the BCP, who was said to be hiding in the Likotsi area.<sup>19</sup> According to the informant, the idea was to meet Chakela and others and put to them the suggestion that they should join forces and fight alongside each other now that Chief Leabua Jonathan had declared a state of emergency. Both sides agreed to work together, and the BCP leaders even agreed to come to Lehahengla Likhomo. They however never came. Leepa and the informant undertook the second trip to meet them, only to be told that they had left and that they were probably somewhere in the area of Ha Mokhalinvane.

The same sympathetic policemen who had provided guns and intelligence, also told the men at the cave that a raid by government forces was imminent. There were at least three police attacks on Leepa and his men at Lehaheng-la-Likhomo. The first attack took place on the afternoon of Tuesday, 10 February 1970. On this occasion, the police killed four men but failed to break up the group after four hours of battle. It would seem that, following this encounter, many of the men went back to their villages, returning to the cave only at night to continue their activities. A few, like Leepa, known leaders whose homes were likely to be watched, however remained at the cave. On the following day, Wednesday, 11 February 1970, a police contingent of more than 80 men invaded the cave again, and a fierce battle ensued. This time the police managed to reach the cave where the men lived. As many of the men had gone back to their homes, only a few of them remained at the cave with Leepa. They were

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19 See Koenyama Chakela v. Rex (Appeal), 17 April 1972. *Lesotho Law Reports* 1971, 1973.

however not in the cave at the time of police operation. Consequently, no deaths were reported as a result of the sticks of dynamite that the police threw into the cave. Leepa himself escaped with six men.<sup>20</sup> He returned to the cave, necessitating another police operation. This began at dawn on 17 February 1970.<sup>21</sup>

Under the command of white officers Fred D Roach, the officer commanding the Police Mobile Unit, and JS McFall, a combined force of soldiers and police numbering about 84,<sup>22</sup> invaded Lehahala-Likhomo. The informant recounted the events of that day:

“It happened that just at *seven* [o’clock in the morning], just at *seven* [police vehicles] arrived and the lights filled and lit up the place: some approached us from the top [of the cave], some approached from this side and others approached from this side.... at *seven!* There were all of a sudden *lines* [rows of men] *lines*; one *line* was running up there below the cliffs, one was running here, these lines were coming up from there; some of [the lines] were running across there. Where are they going? They are coming [to the cave]! And ...now that they had arrived, then [*ntoa*] *ea ququta!* (Fierce fighting began). It was at seven when [the fight] just started.... it – it even came to be *three o’clock afternoon*.... By [mid-afternoon] there were now just mists around [the mountain and the cave], of guns.... These smokes of guns... were now just mists and you could no longer see.”<sup>23</sup>

The men put up a determined resistance but, as the informant said, it was a losing battle.

“It happened that Roach hailed with a loudspeaker, and he said: ‘Let us stop we will try another way...’ And that one McFall said, ‘*no, no, no, no, no, fire till the bullets finish!*’ ...In there in Lehaha-laLikhomo bullets were... full on the ground here, it was just full of these shells... And then – I lost courage. When I looked in this gun of mine I found that I had *only nine bullets*; that person is saying that the fighting should go on until they finish [their bullets], [until] bullets get finished... but...[my side] are being protected by me alone... We are just lying down in a hole there... in the hole there, we are just lying down. They would shoot; they would even [think] that ‘it must be that we have killed that thing that was there’. It would happen that immediately they try to climb up, I am already there [shooting]! You will hear them when they try to go back and disappear below! Our guns were poor quality, which had been just *collected*... [Bullets] got finished on me, completely... they got finished on me completely, that *nine* [bullets] of mine got finished... and I remained like (with nothing)... (I thought to myself) ‘What now!’ But now I think they saw that, *aikhona*, this time that he has now spent without shooting, it must be he has run out, that person...”<sup>24</sup>

In the absence of further resistance, the government forces now moved freely up the mountain until they arrived at the cave. By late afternoon the resistance at LehahenglaLikhomo was over.

Once again, Leepa escaped with a few men, this time to nearby Thaba Telle, about five kilometres away. Three men, including Chief Taelo Tsiu, were dead, and

20 “Four die in Lesotho clash”, *The Friend* (Bloemfontein), 11 February 1970. It is not clear where Leepa escaped to.

21 “Lesotho’s most wanted man escapes again”, *The Star* (Johannesburg), 18 February 1970.

22 Khaketla, pp. 267-268.

23 CML01.B058-081.

24 CML01.B058 107. See also “Lesotho’s most wanted man escapes again”, *The Star* (Johannesburg), 18 February 1970, for a description of the police assault on the cave.

34 men, including the informant, were arrested and taken to Maseru, where they were ultimately charged. More arrests were made, including that of Chief Moramang Seeiso, younger brother to King Moshoeshoe II, who was not at the cave during the raid, but was suspected of involvement. The government offered a R100 reward to anyone who could provide information that could lead to Leepa's arrest.

Leepa met his end at the hands of government forces on 3 March 1970, after a fierce battle.<sup>25</sup> According to Khaketla, "his body was riddled with bullets, and it appeared that even after he had been shot dead he was attacked with bayonets and almost disembowelled".<sup>26</sup> He was 47 years old.<sup>27</sup>

According to government, the rebellion at LehahenglaLikhomo was an example of how ordinary people are "falling prey to deceitful and unscrupulous self-serving politicians who are driven by their lust for power to engage in illegal and violent measures to satisfy their political ambitions". Further, government claimed that the machinations at Lehaheng-la-Likhomo had been financed by "a very highly placed person". Government also announced the arrest of the younger brother of King Moshoeshoe II, Chief Mathealira Seeiso, under the country's emergency regulations. And, in a break with tradition, government announced that the annual Moshoeshoe's Day celebrations, held on 12 March, were cancelled, mainly as a result of the political tension in the country.<sup>28</sup>

The trial of the 34 men was held in the High Court of Lesotho on 24-26 November 1970. The prosecution argued that the men were guilty of attempting to overthrow the government of Lesotho, that they assembled unlawfully with the aim of drilling and training an armed force, and that the men were drilled and trained in the use of firearms. Further, the prosecution argued that the men were guilty of assaulting and seeking to abduct, on 9 February 1970, Julius Ketso Letele, Rantšala Semapo and Moloi Ntabo.

On the day of the trial, the charge that the men sought to overthrow the government was dropped, and so was the charge that they assaulted and sought to abduct Moloi Ntabo. The case against accused no. 18, Moramang Seeiso, no. 20, Peiso Chato, and no. 28, Mosehlana Chitjanyana, was dismissed, and they were discharged at the outset. Kharametsa Ntho Taba, who was at Lehaheng-laLikhomo, but absent on the day of the raid, turned state witness. Earlier he had followed Leepa to Thaba

25 "Leepa is killed in attack on police", *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg) 4 March 1970; "Lesotho police kill Clement Leepa"; *The Friend* (Bloemfontein), 4 March 1970.

26 Khaketla, pp. 270-271.

27 "Three villagers killed in clash with police at Taole's", *Koena News* 4(29), 11 February 1970, p. 1; "Taole incident: 32 now under arrest", *Koena News* 4(30), 12 February 1970, p. 2; "Ba bararo ba fatše" (Three are down). *Moeletsi oa Basotho*, 28 February, 1970; "Clement Mooki Leepa shot dead", *Koena News* 4(43), 3 March 1970, p. 1; "Arrested members of Leepa gang named", *Koena News* 4(44), 4 March 1970, p. 3; "Leepa o thuntsoe" (Leepa has been shot), *Moeletsi oa Basotho*, 21 March 1970.

28 See *Koena News* 4(29), 11 February 1970; 4(43), 3 March 1970.

Telle, where he was arrested on 3 March 1970.<sup>29</sup> The informant claimed that before the trial, the prosecution attempted to persuade the accused that they were under the command of Bothata Taole and Lineo Khau, accused nos. 1 and 2, respectively. In this, the prosecution was trying to place the two men at the helm of *banna ba thaba*, now that Clement Leepa and Chief Taelo Tsiu were killed. The men refused, saying that they knew their commanders to be Leepa and Tsiu, and no one else.

Judgement was delivered by Mr Justice HR Jacobs on 27 November 1970. All the accused, except accused no. 30, were found guilty of either drilling and training others, or receiving drills and training. They were all sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment. Accused nos 6, 21, 22, 30 and 31 were found guilty of assaulting Julius Ketso Letele. They were all sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Accused nos 25, 27, 33, and 34 were found guilty of assaulting Rantšala Semapo. They were all sentenced to two years' imprisonment.<sup>30</sup>

All who had been convicted appealed against their sentences, which they saw as excessive on the following grounds: Firstly, their motive had been selfprotection in a political environment that promoted uncertainty and insecurity. Secondly, government might have acted illegally by declaring a state of emergency and seizing power in January 1970. As such their actions may have been justified. Thirdly, the fact that the assaults on which the appellants were convicted were not so brutal as to warrant the twoyear sentences. Fourthly, because the assaults were part of a main offence, their sentences should be made to run concurrently. The Appeal Court upheld the sentences on the grounds that, “[g]eneral deterrence and the maintenance of law and order in a young state like Lesotho were of the greatest importance in considering the proper sentence in a case such as the present”.<sup>31</sup>

## 5. TOWARDS EXPLAINING THE LEHAHENG-LA-LIKHOMO INCIDENT: PERSONAL MOTIVES, AND INTRIGUES OF THE “HIGHLY PLACED”

Government interpreted a whole range of incidents during those first few months of 1970 as attempts to topple it. Leepa's rebellion was not any different. This was mainly an interpretation of a regime which had narrowly won elections in 1965, and had operated in Parliament as a minority for much of the period between 1965 and 1970. Unable to satisfactorily resolve the difficulties it experienced in Parliament, the government sought to enhance its ability to govern by politicising the civil service,

29 CRI/T/36/1970, Rex v. Bothata Taole and 33 others.

30 See judgement delivered by Justice HR Jacobs on 27 November 1970 in the criminal trial of Rex v. Bothata Taole and 33 Others. CRI/T/36/1970. See also “*Ba ahlotsoe kaofela*”. (They have all been sentenced.), *Moeletsi oa Basotho*, 19 December 1970.

31 Bothata Taole and Others v. Rex, LLR, 1971, 1973, pp. 43-46.

leading to the alienation of sections of high ranking civil servants. The BNP had assumed power suspicious that, in the dying days of colonial rule, the government deliberately filled senior positions in the civil service and public institutions with non-BNP or anti-BNP personnel, either because they considered BNP unlikely to win the 1965 elections, or in order to frustrate a BNP government.<sup>32</sup> The result was that, in the early unsettled years after independence, the relationship between Chief Jonathan's government and high ranking Basotho in the civil service had been uneasy and fraught with mistrust. Fearing lack of cooperation and outright opposition from these civil servants, government tended to rely on expatriates from the Republic of South Africa and elsewhere, even where qualified local personnel were available. Where considered possible, the government tried various legal ruses to sack those in the civil service who were suspected of belonging to, or of being sympathetic to, opposition parties<sup>33</sup> Thus the suspension in 1966, and abolition in 1968, of district councils was also prompted by Chief Jonathan's concerns that these bodies' elected component had been overwhelmingly made up of members of the opposition BCP.<sup>34</sup>

Similarly, to opposition groups the government's abolition of Leepa's position and his release on retirement in 1969 was part of Chief Jonathan's government programme to marginalise high-ranking Basotho civil servants suspected of being members of opposition groups, in favour of white expatriates. Leepa acted as Commissioner of Police on at least two occasions, including the time of the Thaba Bosiu incident in December 1966. He might have shared the view that he was a victim of government's preference for white expatriates, one of whom, Mr JH Hindmarsh, had shortly before been recruited to do a job that he had done at least twice. It is against this background that his participation in the Lehaheng-la-Likhomo incident may be partly understood.

Another part of the explanation for Leepa's involvement in the Lehaheng-la-Likhomo incident must lie in the relationship that existed between him and the King.<sup>35</sup> His ability to arrange for the informant to serve out the rest of his jail sentence

32 Interview with AC Manyeli, first Minister of Education under BNP government, *Motjoli's Review* 2(3), third quarter, 2006.

33 This led to litigation in which expelled civil servants challenged their dismissals in court. See for example Benjamin Masiloane Masilo v. The Prime Minister and the Public Service Commission, *Lesotho Law Reports, 1967, 1970* (Government Printer, Maseru, 1976), pp. 303, 317. In 1971 the Commissioner of Police reported that "a considerable number of officers were dismissed...from the force" in 1970 for "sympathising with and assisting the opposition". *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police, 1970* (Maseru, 1971), p. 1.

34 John E Bardill and James H Cobbe, *Lesotho Dilemmas of dependence in Southern Africa* (London: Boulder, 1985), p. 128; Sanders, p. 111; Khaketla, pp. 32, 33, 120; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fourth Meeting, First Session of the National Assembly, 18 April 11 May, 1966, pp. 114, 134, 136.

35 According to a member of the BCP's Executive Committee at the time, even though there were BCP members at the cave with Leepa, that rebellion had nothing to do with the BCP. If anything, Leepa was fighting to save the King. See [NM6B000 034] 10 September 2000.

at the royal homestead in Matsieng in relative freedom, and to get him a job there at the end of his sentence, suggests that he was close to, and had some influence on, the royal household. According to our informant, it was the strength of this relationship which had cost Leepa his job:

“...he did not agree with [government ministers] when it got to matters where it was about Bereng... [Leepa] said it used to happen that when [government ministers] talked and talked then he would say, ‘This child of Seeiso, truly, me I will not desert or handle him in the manner that you are talking about...’ He said that is the thing why things were forced and he was given *pension* and that Europeans be put [in his place]... [Leepa] loved him (the King) love! He loved – he did not want to know anything about Bereng! He used to get worked up immediately [government] planned to be unfair to him; he would get worked up!”<sup>36</sup>

The rest of the men also showed their loyalty to the King in court when prosecutors sought to expose the involvement of the royal family. They were steadfast in resisting prodding from the prosecution that they should admit that accused no. 18, Chief Moramang Seeiso, was present at numerous meetings where the effort at LehahenglaLikhomo was planned, and that he was the person who paid all the bills relating to the men’s purchases of foodstuffs during their stay at the cave. According to the informant, all these were true, but Chief Moramang Seeiso had to be protected.<sup>37</sup> Ultimately, in our view, the King had to be protected.

The involvement of the King, his relatives and other supporters in the Lehaheng-la-Likhomo incident, and the existence of relations between him and some of the men at the cave, cannot be doubted. How much concrete evidence of his involvement government possessed, we do not know, but among the many accusations that government levelled against him after the declaration of the state of emergency in 1970, was that he had supplied Leepa and the men at Lehaheng-la-Likhomo with arms and ammunition. What we know from our informant is that some of the obsolete guns and ammunition that found their way to the cave were collected and supplied by chiefs of various ranks.<sup>38</sup> In our view, if this was not done on the King’s orders, those who did it might have known that he would approve of their actions.

If the involvement of the King and his relatives is not difficult to establish, the explanation for his involvement is just as straightforward. As we saw, the King never accepted the position designated to him in the 1966 constitution, and the political circumstances that prevailed after the 1970 elections – the illegality of Chief Jonathan’s regime, the presence of men filled with fear of arrest and political persecution, the availability of a loyal friend and former Deputy Commissioner of Police still bitter from his expulsion from the police force – provided him with an opportunity to correct this. Whether the King was making plans to redress his constitutional position from the early days of independence in 1966, as the prison

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36 CML02.B036 053.

37 CML03.A141-160.

38 CML01.A030-051.

experiences of our informant may suggest, or whether his plan began after the 1970 elections, is difficult to say. However, if the plan dated from the early days of independence, it was hurriedly and prematurely implemented, as evidenced by the impromptu instruction of the men in the use of firearms when they were already at the cave. Even though many of the men, including our informant, were members of the BCP, we can also exclude the official BCP from the plan because attempts to involve it were made at the implementation stage, when men were already at the cave. Moreover, to the extent that Leepa was suspected of gathering arms in the period leading to the 1970 elections, the BCP, who accused Leepa of being a BNP supporter, suspected that he was doing so “in case of a BCP victory”.<sup>39</sup>

It may well be that the plan of the King and his supporters was to change his constitutional status, but it is doubtful that the men's intention was to overthrow the government, as Chief Jonathan's government alleged of all incidents that took place at this time. Their reasons for going to the cave do not indicate intentions to unseat the government. Our informant said he went to the cave because *qomatsi* had been declared and they heard that members of the opposition parties had already been arrested, and that the treatment the King was receiving at the hands of the government was unacceptable.<sup>40</sup> For supporters of the opposition, to go to the cave was selfdefence and a protest. One informant said he went to the cave because his uncle had said: “Let's go man!”<sup>41</sup> Others said they were instructed by the chief to go to the cave, where they would be briefed.<sup>42</sup>

It is instructive, however, that the one incident of a fall-out between our informant, on the one hand, and Leepa and the important people from Matsieng, on the other, involved commoner sensitivities of a BCP member towards domination by chiefs. As the informant put it:

“[The chiefs seemed to think that] it should be only them [in meetings where decisions were made], and then there should not be [an ordinary] person who represents the people! And yet when [Leepa and I] leave the meeting we are going to the [ordinary] people who have gathered [in the cave]... And then come back from the meeting just the two of us, totally forbidden from report[ing] anything [that went on in the meeting] to [ordinary people] at the cave... I just left and came home here... It happened that when they asked me I said: ‘The things that you do I do not associate myself with things of that kind; the people say – it (the people) is put aside in this way, and it should not know anything? When we have one person from the people, and me I have chosen myself that, *ache*, I feel that I have a fear [and] I want that it should actually be me out on *sentry* there... [so that] there should be no [undesirable] people who can reach [the place of meeting]... Now you take the people [who have gone to represent me] out [of the meeting]? No!’ Well, truly when people [at the

39 According to Bernard Leeman, *Lesotho and the struggle for Azania, 1966-1984* III (London, 1985), p. 28.

40 CML01.B000-023.

41 CML04.A000-010.

42 See the evidence of state witness, Kharametsa Ntho Taba, in CRI/T/36/1970, Rex v. Bothata Taole and 33 others, p. 11.

cave] discussed – they discussed and discussed and discussed and we agreed amicably that a committee should go and be elected which is going to run things [at the cave]...”<sup>43</sup>

The function of the committee was to represent *Banna ba Thaba* in meetings and to report decisions that were made. Thus they became part of decision-making processes, thereby reducing their marginalisation from the implementation of decisions.

## 6. CONCLUSION

The road to Lesotho’s independence was characterised by the splintering of the main political organisation, the BAC, as various groupings vied for political power once it became clear that the British were intent on handing over power to local groups. Yet the British were not just handing over power, they were leaving behind the Westminster parliamentary system in particular. Under this system, the King was to be a constitutional monarch, a position which he rejected. The BCP and other political parties, led by the educated and traditional elite, on the other hand, never showed a clear commitment to the Westminster model, or any other model, for that matter. Competing and outmanoeuvring each other for power, were the most obvious objectives they had. Westminster was acceptable only to those who controlled the levers of state power, and unacceptable to those who did not. Being on the side of the King – the side most inimical to Westminster – at any given moment was the political strategy of those parties that felt removed from political power. As was being demonstrated, role reversals that had characterised independence negotiations continued right up to independence.

When in 1965 the BNP won elections, and became the first government of independent Lesotho a year later, in 1966, opposition parties and the King were willing to ask the British to postpone independence on the grounds that the BNP had too narrow a majority in Parliament, and that a second look at the position of the King ought to be taken. Thus, under pressure, the BNP government embarked on a programme that was also inimical to the independence of the country. It expanded the country’s reliance on expatriate personnel in the civil service, often to the detriment of those Basotho who were already highranked at independence. It abolished local government structures, because it perceived them as being dominated by the opposition BCP. It strengthened the repressive arm of the state quite out of proportion with the general level development of the country, in order to deal with what it saw as a hostile opposition. The country was thus characterised by bitter political divisions as it moved towards the first postindependence elections of 1970.

In our view, Clement Mooki Leepa’s attempted rebellion, whose preparations began shortly after the government had seized power unconstitutionally by suspending the constitution and declaring a state of emergency, thus creating an

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43 CML01.B299-320; CML03.A169-190.

atmosphere of widespread uncertainty and tension throughout the country, provides an interesting mixture of personal and political factors characteristic of the wider political environment. At one level, Leepa most certainly had the personal grievance or bitterness of a man who must have felt that he had lost his job unfairly, and thus being a man of force and action by training, if not by disposition, felt that he had to do something. At another level, the evidence we have presented suggests that there was a plan, whose level of development is difficult to establish, between him, members of the royal family, and other supporters of the King to advance their political agenda by force. The actual execution of the plan suggests that, whether it was still in its infancy or had been some years in the making, in their attempt to take advantage of the government's declaration of the state of emergency and the possibilities of a popular uprising that existed, Leepa, the King and company were forced to act prematurely, with disastrous results.

Granted that in those early months of 1970 many actions of opposition and resistance to the government's actions on the part of ordinary citizens – Leepa's rebellion itself, the diamonddigger rebel group *Liphokojoe* or even villagers coming together in self-defence – were conveniently labelled as attempts to topple the government. The testimony of some participants, coupled with the evidence presented in court, suggest that for most of the men at LehahenglaLikhomo self-preservation and the desire to resist arrest were the primary objectives. Providing a blanket label of toppling the government to diverse events that occurred in Lesotho at the time, served only to give impetus to the ruthless crushing of these acts of resistance and opposition by a government which could not be expected to stand around waiting to be toppled. This is not to say, however, that there were not others, including Leepa and some of his allies, who knew what the plan was about, and for whom the events of 1970 provided a useful excuse.

Number/Name	Sentence	Status (2004)	Number/Name	Sentence	Status (2004)
1. Bothata Taole	2½ yrs	Alive	18. Moramang Seeiso	Discharged	Alive
2. Lineo Khau	2½ yrs	Fled	19 Pelepele Mahloane	2½ yrs	Dead
3. Clement Nkoe	2½ yrs	Alive	20. Peiso Chato	Discharged	Dead
4. 'Musapelo Letele	2½ yrs	Unknown	21. Pheello Lekhoba	2½ + 2yrs	Alive
5. Lerata Nchaba	2½ yrs	Alive	22. Zulu Makhetha	2½ + 2yrs	Dead
6. Samuel Mahloane	2½ yrs + 2 yrs	Alive	23. Smuts Nthunya	2½ yrs	Fled
7. Thabo Mokhutsoane	2½ yrs	Alive	24. Tlou Phafane	2½ yrs	Dead

Number/Name	Sentence	Status (2004)	Number/Name	Sentence	Status (2004)
8. Mokoteli Letele	2½ yrs	Unknown	25. Leribe Ntšoha	2½ + 2yrs	Dead
9. Makhaola Mokone	2½ yrs	Alive	26. Mosoeu Sekonyela	2½ yrs	Unknown
10. Kaizer Rapulumo	2½ yrs	Dead	27. Lebamang Shea	2½ + 2yrs	Dead
11. Moramane Moeketsi	2½ yrs	Dead	28. Mosehlana Chitjanyana	Discharged	Dead
12. Tšoene Toma	2½ yrs	Alive	29. Tšelisio Mopotapoti	2½ yrs	Alive
13. Hanyane Khesuoe	2½ yrs	Fled	30. Malefetsane Khamane	2yrs	Dead
14. Piet Mothabeng	2½ yrs	Dead	31. Ntsikoe Moshe	2½ + 2yrs	Dead
15. Khoalenyane Molefi	2½ yrs	Dead	32. Makalo Beleme	2½ yrs	Dead
16. Mothabeng Nkoe	2½ yrs	Dead	33. Lebea Moromoli	2½ + 2yrs	Alive
17. Letsoha Makhetha	2½ yrs	Dead	34. Paki Leuta	2½ + 2yrs	Alive

Table 1: Rex v. Bothata Taole and 33 Others. The accused, their sentences, and their status in 2004.

*Source* CRI/T/36/1970, Rex v. Bothata Taole and 33 Others.