

**RADICALISATION TO COMMIT TERRORISM
FROM A POLITICAL SOCIALISATION PERSPECTIVE IN
KENYA AND UGANDA**

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor in
the Department of Political Studies and Governance

Anneli Botha

2012172769

University of the Free State

1 June 2014

Promoter: Professor Hussein Solomon

Co-promoter: Professor Theo Neethling

I declare that the thesis which is hereby submitted for the qualification Philosophiae Doctor at the University of the Free State is my own independent work and has not been handed in before for a qualification at/in another University/faculty.

The ownership of all intellectual property pertaining to and/or flowing from the thesis (including, without limitation, all copyright in the thesis), shall vest in the University of the Free State.

Date of birth: 10 September 1970

Place of birth: Phalaborwa, South Africa

Education: Matriculated at Ellisras Secondary School (1988)

BA (Political Science), University of Pretoria (1991)

BA Hons (International Politics), University of Pretoria (1992)

MA Political Studies, Rand-Afrikaans University (1999)

Professional career: Senior researcher on terrorism at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

Marital status: Single

Signed: 

Date: 1 June 2014

ABSTRACT

Preventing and combating terrorism should start with understanding what drives an individual to resort to terrorism, taking into consideration that not all people experience the same external circumstances – not even people growing up in the same household. In order to understand radicalisation, this study asks the question to what extent political socialisation can explain the participation of individuals in terrorist organisations in Kenya and Uganda. Is there a difference in the applicable factors between the divergent ideological frameworks of the Allied Democratic Forces and the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, and al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council in Kenya? To establish this, 285 interviews were conducted with members of these four organisations and the families of al-Shabaab members who had been killed or incarcerated, or who had disappeared in Kenya. This study found that political socialisation, starting with the family, peers, school, media, earlier political experiences and the terrorist group, played a distinctive role in each of these organisations. In addition to the differences, which create a distinctive profile for each organisation, the study also noted remarkable similarities, starting with personality types, position in the family and education (or the lack thereof). With this in mind, can law enforcement and social organisations be guided to identify and reach individuals at risk? The process of answering this question starts with calling on governments and their security forces to understand the uniqueness of each organisation. In other words, to copy and paste counterterrorism strategies between countries is counterproductive. The only inclusive finding across organisations and between countries has to do with the manner in which countries and their security forces respond to these organisations. Strategies based on ethnic and religious profiling, mass arrests and even torture proved to be extremely counterproductive. On this note, the study found that both Kenya and Uganda have been unable to establish an inclusive national identity. Instead, religious and ethnic identity drives political exclusion and relative deprivation. One of the key findings of this study is that only a very small minority is driven by purely economic circumstances. A

core component among individuals being radicalised relates to the fact that people lose their trust in politicians and the political system, while anger and frustration are directed at security agencies that are presented as agents protecting the current regime at any cost. Consequently, instead of preventing and combating terrorism, these approaches ensure that people experiencing the mentioned strategies – and even their family members – are radicalised. The prevention of unconventional political participation should therefore start with creating a political landscape in which people, especially those being marginalised, can express themselves freely. Additionally, the legitimacy of the political process can only be ensured if the political landscape is free and fair. Therefore, the legitimacy of the government, the measures security agencies implement to respond to these threats, and the potential for unconventional political participation are interlinked. The study also found that education is a key factor in ensuring legitimate participation in the political process and the most effective strategy to prevent relative deprivation.

VOORWOORD

Alvorens daar met die voorkoming en bekamping van terrorisme begin kan word, moet daar allereers 'n begrip wees waarom 'n individu hom of haar tot terreur wend. 'n Belangrike punt wat in ag geneem moet word, is dat mense nie dieselfde op eksterne faktore reageer nie; nie eens mense wat in dieselfde huis grootgeword het nie. In 'n poging om radikaliserings te verstaan, word in hierdie studie gevra in watter mate politieke sosialisering sekere individue aanspoor om by sekere terreurorganisasies in Kenia en Uganda aan te sluit. Aangesien die ideologiese raamwerke van van die Allied Democratic Forces (die ADF) en die Lord's Resistance Army (die LRA) in Uganda, en al-Shabaab en die Mombasa Republican Council (die MRC) in Kenia van uiteenlopende aard is, ontstaan die vraag hoe die aanleidende faktore verskil waarmee voornemende lede van die onderskeie organisasies te kampe het? Ten einde dit te bepaal, is 285 onderhoude met lede van die vier genoemde organisasies, asook familieledes van al-Shabaab ondersteuners wat gedood, in aanhouding, of in Kenia vermis is,

gevoer. Hierdie studie het bevind dat politieke sosialisering, wat begin by die gesin, vriende, die skool, die media en vroeëre ondervindings met die politiek en die terroristegroep, 'n duidelike rol in elk van die organisasies gespeel het. Ten spyte van die verskille – wat 'n duidelike profiel van elke organisasie daarstel – het die studie getoon dat daar merkwaardige ooreenkomste bestaan. Dit begin met persoonlikheidstipes, die rangorde in die gesin en opvoedkundige kwalifikasies (of die gebrek daaraan). Met dit alles in gedagte, is dit moontlik om wetstoepassers en maatskaplike organisasies behulpsaam te wees met die identifisering en bereiking van moontlike risikogevalle? Die proses om dié vraag te beantwoord, begin deur regerings en hul veiligheidsmagte aan te spoor om te verstaan dat elke organisasie uniek is. Om teen-terreurstrategieë wat in een staat gevolg word presies net so op 'n ander van toepassing te maak, is in werklikheid teenproduktief. Die enigste gemene deler wat onder die verskillende organisasies en die onderskeie state aangetref is, is inderdaad die wyse waarop die veiligheidsmagte van elke staat op die organisasies reageer. Aksies wat gegrond is op etniese en religieuse eienskappe, massa-arrestasies en selfs marteling blyk uiters teenproduktief te wees. Hierdie studie het inderwaarheid bevind dat beide Kenia en Uganda onsuksesvol was in hul pogings om 'n inklusiewe nasionale identiteit daar te stel. In teendeel lei 'n religieuse en etniese identiteit uiteindelik daartoe dat politieke uitsluiting en verlies ervaar word. Een van die belangrikste bevindings in hierdie studie is dat slegs 'n klein minderheid aangespoor word deur suiwer ekonomiese omstandighede. 'n Kern komponent van individue wat geradikaliseer is stem saam dat mense hul vertroue in politici en die politieke sisteem verloor het, terwyl woede en frustrasie gemik is teen veiligheidsagentskappe wat bloot gesien word as beskermers – dikwels ten alle koste – van die bestaande regime. Die gevolg is dat in plaas van terrorisme voorkom en bekamp, dié benaderings verseker dat persone (en dikwels hul familieledede ook) wat onder genoemde aksies ly, geradikaliseer word. Die voorkoming van onkonvensionele politieke deelname behoort dus eerstens te begin met die daarstelling van 'n politieke landskap waar almal – en in die besonder diegene wat gemarginaliseer is – hul

stem vrylik kan laat hoor. Tweedens kan die wettigheid van die politieke proses slegs verseker wees indien die politieke landskap vry en regverdig is. Gevolglik is die legitimiteit van die regering, die maatreëls wat veiligheidsmagte tref om bedreigings te bekamp en die gevaar van onkonvensionele politieke deelname nou met mekaar verweef. Hierdie studie het ook bevind dat goeie akademiese onderrig 'n kern faktor is wanneer wettige deelname aan die politieke proses verseker word en uiteindelik die mees effektiewe strategie is om relatiewe uitsluiting te voorkom.

Key words and phrases

Terrorism in Kenya; terrorism in Uganda; radicalisation; political socialisation; identity; conditions conducive to terrorism; al-Shabaab; Allied Democratic Forces; Lord's Resistance Army; Mombasa Republican Council

DEDICATION

Soli Deo Gloria

To my parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to both promoters for allowing me to search for answers to the question I have had since I first got interested in terrorism a lifetime ago: ‘Why?’ Thank you for allowing me to conduct my own study – not forcing your interests onto me – while guiding me through the process. To Professor Hussein Solomon, thank you for all your support, friendship and for the last nudge to complete my studies. To Professor Theo Neethling, thank you for all your assistance and guidance.

To Lomin Saayman who did the language editing, thank you for your hard work ensuring the correct expression of my thoughts and ideas on paper – I know it was not always easy.

To Nathan Twinomugisha, Florence Boyabona, Maria Akio, Kenneth Nsenga, Naomi Sheba and Demilo Onenarach at the Amnesty Commission in Uganda, thank you for your assistance with conducting interviews in Uganda. Also, a special thank you to David Ariko-Emegu and Jason Bamutende from the Counterterrorism Directorate at the Uganda Police for your assistance with some of the practical arrangements.

To Hassan Ole Naado, Khamis Mwanguzo, Shahid Mubari, Said Jumaa Mwawanzinda Mwakileo, Suleiman Kimwaya, Mohamed Ali Chamzuzu, Saada Abdi, Hussein Sakwa, Asili Randani, Naomi Mbeyu and Jamila Kiansori from the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance, thank you for your assistance in conducting interviews in Kenya.

A special thank you to Francis Rwego the head of Interpol’s Regional Bureau in Nairobi, General Kale Kayihura, the Inspector-General of Police in Uganda, John Ndungutse and Boniface Mwaniki, the respective police counterterrorism heads of Kenya and Uganda, for all their support and assistance.

To all who played a role in my own socialisation process, particularly my parents, At and Annatjie Botha, thank you for ‘brainwashing’ me from day one with the idea that I would go to university one day. You gave me the freedom to choose a field and did everything in your power to make it a reality. *Pa*, thank you for teaching me that everything is possible through dedication, perseverance and hard work. *Mutti*, thank you for teaching me to value knowledge, especially books, from a very young age. Thank you for teaching me to question and to enjoy the journey to understand the world around me a bit better. Without your dedication and continued support on every possible level I would never have become who I am. I love you dearly.

To my younger sister, Eldaleen, thank you for your unconditional love. I know that you’re always in my corner. I cannot imagine my life without you.

To Alice, thank you for your amazing friendship.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	1
LIST OF TABLES, MAPS AND FIGURES.....	4
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	5
1. BACKGROUND	5
1.1 <i>United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy</i>	7
1.2 <i>Political socialisation</i>	9
1.3 <i>Identity and perceptions</i>	12
1.4 <i>'Unconventional' political participation as part of political socialisation</i>	13
1.5 <i>Radicalisation</i>	14
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT	16
2.1 <i>Conceptual focus</i>	16
2.2 <i>Geographical focus</i>	17
2.3 <i>Historical and ideological focus</i>	17
3. RESEARCH QUESTION.....	17
4. AIM OF THE STUDY	18
5. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	18
6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	19
7. COLLECTION OF DATA AND CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED	22
8. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH.....	24
9. CONCLUSION.....	26
CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL SOCIALISATION.....	29
1. INTRODUCTION	29
2. INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SOCIALISATION	30
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO POLITICAL SOCIALISATION	32
4. THE INDIVIDUAL AS CENTRAL COMPONENT TO POLITICAL SOCIALISATION.....	35
4.1 <i>Individual characteristics</i>	38
4.2 <i>Personality traits in developing political orientations</i>	45
4.3 <i>Personality tests</i>	49
5. WHEN AND HOW POLITICAL SOCIALISATION OCCURS	51
5.1 <i>Socialisation agents</i>	51
5.1.1 <i>Primary socialisation agents</i>	53
5.1.2 <i>Secondary relationships</i>	86
5.2 <i>Socialisation process</i>	92
5.2.1 <i>When political socialisation occurs</i>	94
5.2.2 <i>How political socialisation occurs</i>	100
6. CONCLUSION.....	102
CHAPTER 3: RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOCIALISATION	105
1. INTRODUCTION	105
2. IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY	106
2.1 <i>Social identity theory</i>	111
2.2 <i>Self-categorisation theory</i>	116
3. ETHNIC IDENTITY	117
4. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY	120
5. NATIONAL IDENTITY	129
6. BELONGING AND IDENTITY	133
7. CONCLUSION.....	138
CHAPTER 4: THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND RADICALISATION	141
1. INTRODUCTION	141
2. POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND RADICALISATION	143
3. ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND RADICALISATION.....	149
4. EXPLAINING RADICALISATION	154
4.1 <i>Theoretical framework associated with radicalisation</i>	158

4.2	<i>Families and radicalisation</i>	164
4.3	<i>Education and radicalisation</i>	166
4.4	<i>Role models and organisational identity</i>	168
4.5	<i>Emotion and perception</i>	171
5.	OPERATIONALISATION.....	178
6.	CONCLUSION.....	179
CHAPTER 5: RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT TO THE ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN UGANDA		181
1.	INTRODUCTION.....	181
2.	POLITICAL HISTORY OF UGANDA AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION.....	182
3.	HISTORY OF THE ADF.....	188
4.	PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS.....	198
4.1	<i>Role of the family in radicalisation</i>	201
4.2	<i>Role of friends in radicalisation and recruitment</i>	205
4.3	<i>Religious divide influencing radicalisation</i>	206
4.4	<i>Ethnic composition of respondents</i>	208
4.5	<i>Political experiences of respondents</i>	210
4.6	<i>Economic circumstances and radicalisation</i>	211
4.6.1	Education of respondents.....	213
4.6.2	Unemployment among respondents.....	214
4.7	<i>Why and how respondents joined the ADF</i>	215
5.	CONCLUSION.....	218
CHAPTER 6: RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT TO THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY IN UGANDA		223
1.	INTRODUCTION.....	223
2.	POLITICAL HISTORY OF UGANDA AND THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY.....	224
3.	HISTORIC ORIGINS OF THE LRA.....	231
4.	PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS.....	244
4.1	<i>Role of the family in radicalisation</i>	247
4.2	<i>Role of friends in radicalisation and recruitment</i>	249
4.3	<i>Religious background of respondents</i>	250
4.4	<i>Ethnic background of respondents</i>	252
4.5	<i>Economic circumstances and radicalisation</i>	254
4.6	<i>Political circumstances and radicalisation</i>	257
4.7	<i>Why and how respondents joined the LRA</i>	260
5.	CONCLUSION.....	263
CHAPTER 7: RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT TO AL-SHABAAB AND THE MOMBASA REPUBLICAN COUNCIL IN KENYA		267
1.	INTRODUCTION.....	267
2.	KENYA’S POLITICAL HISTORY.....	269
2.1	<i>Shifra war</i>	272
2.2	<i>Mombasa Republican Council</i>	274
3.	AL-QA’EDA’S PRESENCE IN KENYA.....	276
4.	PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS.....	291
4.1	<i>Role of the family in radicalisation</i>	297
4.2	<i>Role of friends in radicalisation and recruitment</i>	301
4.3	<i>Religious identity of respondents</i>	303
4.4	<i>Ethnic identity of respondents</i>	311
4.5	<i>Political circumstances and radicalisation</i>	316
4.6	<i>Socioeconomic circumstances and radicalisation</i>	318
4.7	<i>Why and how respondents joined al-Shabaab and the MRC</i>	325
7.	CONCLUSION.....	333
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION		339
1.	INTRODUCTION.....	339
2.	THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES.....	343

3. POLITICAL SOCIALISATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL	343
4. POLITICAL SOCIALISATION AND THE COMMUNITY	358
5. GROUPS AS AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALISATION	362
6. RADICALISATION PROCESS AND EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES.....	367
6.1 <i>Economic circumstances and radicalisation</i>	371
6.2 <i>Political circumstances and radicalisation</i>	376
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	382
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE	385
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RELATIVES.....	401
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	411

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

\$	United States dollar
AQEA	al-Qa'eda in East Africa
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda)
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (Somalia)
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
DEMO	Democratic Movement (Kenya)
DP	Democratic Party (Uganda)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ENFJ	Extrovert Intuition Feeling Judging
ENFP	Extrovert Intuition Feeling Perception
ENTJ	Extrovert Intuition Thinking Judging
ENTP	Extrovert Intuition Thinking Perception
ESFJ	Extrovert Sensing Feeling Judging
ESFP	Extrovert Sensing Feeling Perception
ESTJ	Extrovert Sensing Thinking Judging
ESTP	Extrovert Sensing Thinking Perception
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom (Spain)
FEDEMU	Federal Democratic Movement (Uganda)
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GDP	gross domestic product
HSM/W	Holy Spirit Movement/Warriors (Uganda)
HSMF	Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (Uganda)

ICU	Islamic Courts Union (Somalia)
IDP	internally displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
ILAPK	Islamic Liberation Army of the People of Kenya
IRA	Irish Republican Army
INFJ	Introvert Intuition Feeling Judging
INFP	Introvert Intuition Feeling Perception
INTJ	Introvert Intuition Thinking Judging
INTP	Introvert Intuition Thinking Perception
IPK	Islamic Party of Kenya
ISFJ	Introvert Sensing Feeling Judging
ISFP	Introvert Sensing Feeling Perception
ISTJ	Introvert Sensing Thinking Judging
ISTP	Introvert Sensing Thinking Perception
IT	information technology
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KPA	Kalenjin Political Alliance (Kenya)
LRA/M	Lord's Resistance Army/Movement (Uganda and South Sudan)
MBTI	Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MYC	Muslim Youth Centre (Kenya)
NALU	National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NFD	Northern Frontier District (Kenya)
NIF	National Islamic Front (Sudan)
NPI	narcissistic personality inventory

NRA/M	National Resistance Army/Movement (Uganda)
NUKEM	National Union of Kenya Muslims
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
RPG	rocket-propelled grenade
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims
TJRC	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (Kenya)
UFFM	Uganda Freedom Fighters Movement
UMSC	Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council
UN	United Nations
UNLA/M	Uganda National Liberation Army/Movement
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
UPDA	Uganda People's Democratic Army
UPF	Uganda People's Front
USC	United Somali Congress
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front (Uganda)

LIST OF TABLES, MAPS AND FIGURES

Table 1: Summary of attributes associated with birth order 41

Map 1: Origins of ADF members 195

Map 2: Ethnic composition of Uganda..... 225

Map 3: The geographical origins of members of the LRA 238

Table 2: Religious representation..... 303

Table 3: Ethnic composition..... 313

Map 4: Kenyan ethnic groups 314

Table 4: Regional inequality 320

Table 5: Education figures based on the 2009 census..... 322

Figure 1: Personality of respondents 345

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. BACKGROUND

While the international community is still engaged in a political debate that attempts to formulate a universally accepted definition of terrorism, its impact on countries in Africa is already very real. Scholars and practitioners are responding to this reality by trying to understand the threat terrorism poses to state and human security, and by trying to find ways and means to prevent incidents of terrorism.

In their search for explanations for the process of political radicalisation, scholars, among others, refer to ‘pull-and-push’ factors to explain why and how people become involved in terror organisations. Although these attempts are useful – especially when governments have to formulate domestic and foreign-aid budget priorities – they are made with specific case studies in mind, most notably the United Kingdom (in the wake of the 7 July 2005 bombings), Denmark, Belgium and Norway, to name a few. African governments and practitioners often borrow from these case studies, as well as from statements made by politicians, to formulate their own understanding of why individuals resort to terrorism, predominantly blaming poverty and poor socioeconomic conditions. But to understand why people are susceptible to extremism is far more complex than blaming one factor, such as poverty. Countermeasures and policies have proven to be ineffective and even counterproductive, simply because they are not formulated or implemented based on a clear understanding of what causes drive individuals to be susceptible to extremism.

This study will focus on Kenya and Uganda, where acts of terrorism over the last 20 years have been attributed to al-Qa’eda’s East African cell and al-Shabaab, in Kenya, and to the

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and al-Shabaab in Uganda. Although al-Qa'eda's East African cell was responsible for the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the attacks were predominately planned and executed by foreign nationals and are therefore excluded from this study. Although the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) has to date not been implicated in acts of terrorism, it is often associated with al-Shabaab in the coastal region of Kenya. Demonstrations calling for secession from Nairobi led to the brief banning of the organisation in 2010 till 2012 and the arrest of its members (Kenya Law Report 2012). Because the MRC functions in the same geographical area as al-Shabaab, it has attracted additional attention from the Kenyan security agencies; this co-existence also makes it a natural choice when an organisation is sought against which to test al-Shabaab profiles.

The origins of the LRA and the ADF can be traced directly to domestic circumstances in Uganda and to the country's citizens. The LRA initiated its campaign of terror in the northern parts of Uganda and in southern Sudan, and has killed and maimed civilians since the late 1980s. In contrast to the LRA, whose stated aim is to implement the Ten Commandments of the Bible, the ADF's main justification is based on its interpretation of the Qur'an. Similar to the LRA, the ADF also extended its operations to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). However, this study will only focus on Ugandan nationals recruited to the ADF and LRA.

Although the origins of al-Shabaab are in Somalia, its reach quickly spread to Kenya, especially among Kenya's Muslim community in the country's coastal region and among pockets of Muslims in the capital, Nairobi. Despite being recruited to participate in hostilities in Somalia, the deployment of the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia since October 2011 sparked a wave of attacks inside Kenya. Similarly, the Kampala suicide attacks of 11 July

2010 were attributed to Uganda's military involvement in Somalia. The profiles of the individuals involved in these attacks, in contrast to the 1998 US Embassy attacks, showed the direct involvement of individuals from Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania who had been radicalised in their respective countries.

This study will focus on the socialisation and radicalisation of those who have been prosecuted for, or those who have admitted to being involved in the activities of the LRA, the ADF, al-Shabaab and the MRC. It will attempt to provide empirical research on who, how and why individuals become involved in these terrorist or previously banned organisations.

1.1 United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy

On 20 September 2006 the UN, under then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, adopted the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which introduced the 'softer' side of countering terrorism by bringing to states' attention the circumstances in which individuals resort to acts of terrorism.

Recognising the importance of identifying and addressing conditions conducive to terrorism that might lead to individuals becoming involved in acts of terrorism, Mr Annan, in his report titled, 'Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counterterrorism strategy', on 27 April 2006 provided the background to the strategy. Through this initiative the UN introduced a new phase in its counterterrorism efforts in that all its member states agreed to a common strategic and operational framework to fight terrorism. The strategy presents a basis for a concrete plan of action set out in four broad areas (United Nations 2006, 4–9): to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; to prevent and combat terrorism; to take measures to build state capacity to fight terrorism; and to ensure that human rights are respected while countering terrorism.

Probably the most important area of this strategy is the first, which calls for measures aimed at addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including, but not limited to, prolonged unresolved conflicts; the dehumanisation of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations; the lack of rule of law and violations of human rights; ethnic, national and religious discrimination; political exclusion; socioeconomic marginalisation; and lack of good governance (United Nations 2006, 4–5).

What makes this document unique is that the UN recognised the need to adopt a long-term approach to prevent people from becoming involved in terrorism in the first place. Essentially the root causes, or conducive conditions, refer to external factors that will impact on how people interpret the world around them. Based on the outline above, this study will refer to the following ‘push factors’ that contribute to such enabling circumstances: political circumstances, including poor governance, political exclusion, lack of civil liberties and human rights abuses; economic circumstances; sociological circumstances, with reference to religious and ethnic discrimination; counterterrorism and its impact; and perceived injustice and international circumstances.

Although a basic understanding of these conditions provides an insight into radicalisation, it is important to realise that a combination of factors is often present and that such a combination will differ from person to person. Additionally, although international circumstances should be recognised, without domestic and personal circumstances the individual might support the ideas of extremists without becoming actively involved in the execution of acts of terrorism. Furthermore, not all people confronted with the same set of circumstances will be radicalised, and not all of those radicalised will eventually commit acts of terrorism.

While the root causes of radicalisation are important, the question must be asked if there is one overall factor that can be used to ‘predict’ whether a person is more or less likely to become involved in acts of terrorism? The more analysts hope to simplify radicalisation, the more one realises that human behaviour is extremely complex. The duration and process of radicalisation differ from person to person, although it is commonly accepted that the process occurs gradually and over a period of time; conscious decisions to, for example, join a terrorist organisation are not made suddenly. McCormick (2003, 475) refers to a developmental approach in which an act of terrorism is:

...not the product of a single decision, but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time. The process takes place within a larger political environment involving the state, the terrorist group, and the group’s self-designated political constituency. The interaction of these variables in a group setting is used to explain why individuals turn to violence and can eventually justify terrorist actions.

Whereas generic discussions of the conditions conducive to terrorism are useful in identifying broad trends, individual complexities emerge properly only when particular circumstances at the regional and local levels are interrogated. Despite these circumstances, it is still the individual who takes the decision to join a terrorist organisation, or who is unconsciously drawn to the ideals and activities of such an organisation. In an attempt to understand and explain these individual complexities, this study will refer to political socialisation, identity and perception formation, unconventional political socialisation, radicalisation and later, operationalisation.

1.2 Political socialisation

Developing a theoretical framework to analyse terrorism from the perspective of political socialisation could necessitate borrowing from the theory of socialisation. Not all elements associated with political socialisation are equally important, and a theory of political

socialisation does not provide one set of inclusive elements to be used in a study to analyse the development, reasons and process of becoming involved in acts of terrorism.

This study will ask if it is possible to develop a theoretical basis to understand and analyse the agents involved in the socialisation process and the factors (internal and external) involved in shaping an individual's perception of the world around him/her, leading, ultimately, to the development of a person who becomes involved in acts of terrorism? It is, however, not the intention of this study to introduce a single theory but rather to contribute to the understanding of how analyses of the radicalisation process are conducted. In this regard, political socialisation makes provision for all the complexities of human behaviour, including violence.

Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 17) define socialisation as:

... the process by which children, born with an enormous potential for different types of behavior, come to adopt the specific standards of their own society... [Therefore] political socialization is the developmental process through which the citizen matures politically. The citizen acquires a complex of beliefs, feelings and information which help him comprehend, evaluate and relate to the political world around him. His political views are a part of his more general social views ... related to his religious, economic and cultural views.

Merelman (1986, 279) defines socialisation as:

... the process by which people acquire relatively enduring orientations toward politics in general and toward their own political systems.

Dowse and Hughes (1986, 190) explain the practicalities of this process when they describe socialisation as:

... what the individual learns, when it is learned, how it is learned, and the personal consequences of this process.

But Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 13) also explain that political socialisation occurs at the ‘community level’, also referred to as ‘cultural transmission’. ‘Nations perpetuate their political standards by inducting new generations into established patterns of thought and action.’ For Langton (1969, 4–5), political socialisation refers:

... to the way society transmits its political culture from generation to generation. This process may serve to preserve traditional political norms and institutions; on the other hand, when secondary socialization agencies inculcate political values differently from those of the past or when children are raised with political and social expectations different from those of their forebears, the socialization process can be a vehicle of political and social change. Political socialization [is therefore] the process, mediated through various agencies of society, by which an individual learns political relevant attitudinal dispositions and behaviour patterns. These agencies include such environmental categories as the family, peer group, school, adult organizations, and the mass media.

In other words, political socialisation at an individual level can be described as a lifelong process through which a person develops a unique frame of reference that guides individual choices. An individual’s frame of reference can be defined as the ‘glasses’ through which he/she sees or perceives the world around them. This frame of reference also includes a person’s views on politics and religion, developed through a similar process as his/her views on a specific political party or ideology. Ultimately, the political self is made, not born, to include ‘feelings of nationalism, patriotism, or tribal loyalty; identification with particular partisan factions or groups; attitudes and evaluations of specific political issues and personalities; knowledge regarding political structures and procedures; and a self-image of rights, responsibilities, and position in the political world’ (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 18).

When one speaks to relatives and to people who knew individuals implicated in acts of terrorism, one often listens to a very different description of a person than anticipated. Following the initial shock – ‘I would have never expected that’ of a particular person – most people describe the suspect as ‘a good person’, ‘considerate’, ‘thoughtful’, ‘quiet’, ‘reserved’, ‘a loner’, ‘sensitive’, etc. Another observation is the ‘absence’ (physical or even emotional) of

a father figure (for whatever reason). This is not to say that only people with these characteristics will be radicalised, and compiling a definitive profile is considered impossible. But these characteristics contribute to the vulnerability of a person to the influence of peers and others who can provide a sense of belonging.

Family is a crucial part of a person's socialisation process. A person's relationship with his/her family can be the catalyst for a search for identity and belonging beyond the family, such as a larger, collective identity, and this search could result in that person's radicalisation. Family relationships will, therefore, be a central component of this study.

This supports Martha Crenshaw (1998, 253) when she explains that: 'Processes of socialization affect susceptibility to the attractions of terrorism, ability to overcome moral restraint or fear of the costs, and collective beliefs.'

1.3 Identity and perceptions

Religion and ethnicity are powerful influences on the formation of a person's identity. In addition to the role they play as facilitators of social cohesion, an organisation – such as a religious organisation – itself can become central to a person's identity. What, therefore, happens when a person is converted to a religion other than the one he/she grew up with? Does this identity change have an impact on the political socialisation and radicalisation process?

Perception is another important element to take into consideration. It can be described as:

... an interactive process by which stimuli become interpreted by the individual, the process taking place via the integration of the stimulus events with the prior knowledge and beliefs of the individual. Perception forms part of the cognitive system...of how a person perceives is related to how a person learns, remembers,

solves problems and make decisions. How a person perceives is also related to that person's beliefs, knowledge, affect and goals (Voss and Dorsey 1992, 132).

Based on this definition, perception and interpretation can be regarded as interwoven processes that, essentially, cannot be separated. The conclusion is the fact that individuals form mental images of the world that provide an understanding of the world around them. From these 'images', stereotypes emerge that will impact on how individuals interact or react to the 'other'.

The threat is therefore when perceptions are being formed of the 'other' based on insufficient information, disinformation and a lack of education. Not only will both sides drift apart, but the potential for conflict increases. Crenshaw (in Borum 2004, 13) noted that: 'The actions of terrorists are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories.'

1.4 'Unconventional' political participation as part of political socialisation

As part of the political socialisation process, Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 19) explain:

As with all social learning, political learning is gradual and incremental. There is no magic point in youth when the "political self" is suddenly acquired. Each citizen's political views result from lifelong experiences. Political socialization is the gradual moulding of the political self.

Political participation 'include both conventional (voting, parties and campaigning) and unconventional (movements, radicalism and revolution) modes of influence at individual, group and organisational levels which are aimed at maintaining the status quo, promoting change or counteracting change in the political system' (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1980, 24). In other words, factors similar to those that influence a person's decision to sign up for

voluntary military service could contribute to the process of influencing a person to join a terrorist organisation.

Could the influences of patriotism, ideology and religion be manipulated? And if they can, do the following factors influence political participation, most notably age, the region (urban and rural), religion or ethnicity and economic background?

Political socialisation as a theory has made a number of contributions to explain unconventional political participation (radicalism, violence and revolution). Although these contributions are interesting, discussing all of them will divert attention from explaining the individual factors that make a person susceptible to radicalisation.

Although terrorism is not limited to religious movements or organisations, emphasis will be placed on the use of religion to justify the resort to violence and terrorism. Three of the four organisations referred to in this study base their ideology on religion, both Christianity (the LRA) and Islam (the ADF and al-Shabaab). Ethnicity is an equally important factor in the radicalisation process, leading to the inclusion of the MRC as a multi-religious organisation driven by regional secession (not based on one single religious or ethnic cause) from the rest of the country.

1.5 Radicalisation

Gurr (1990, 87) defines radicalisation as:

... a process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Some become discouraged, while others intensify their efforts, lose patience with conventional means of political action, and look for tactics that will have greater impact. This is the kind of situation in which modelling or “imitative” behavior occurs. Impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation (anger) and rationalistic grounds (dramatic episodes of violence elsewhere) that make it likely that some

activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics. The choice is made, and justified, as a means to the original ends of radical reform, group autonomy, or whatever. And the dynamics of the process are such that the terrorists believe that they enjoy the support of some larger community in revolt.

While a number of factors play a role in the radicalisation process, political socialisation provides important insights into an individual's increasing involvement in radical causes. John Horgan and Max Taylor (2001, 16–18) best describe the nexus between socialisation and radicalisation:

What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialisation towards extreme behaviour.

Therefore, supporting an earlier observation that becoming involved in acts of terrorism does not occur overnight, it is clear that it entails a gradual process that includes a multitude of occurrences, experiences, perceptions and role-players.

Neumann (2008, 4) probably provides the least complex description when he observed that, after 9/11, the term 'radicalisation' entered the discourse to refer loosely to 'what goes on before the bomb goes off'.

Radicalisation, however, involves both external circumstances – referring to domestic and international circumstances, as presented in the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy – and internal, or personal, factors. The latter relate to the interpretation of the external environment and can be influenced by psychological considerations that refer directly to political socialisation. In addition to a number of studies that concentrate on broad contributing factors or external circumstances, this study hopes to go one step further to understand the internal dynamics leading to individuals in Kenya and Uganda committing acts of terrorism. A general theory based on the underlying conditions is incomplete when one considers that the

final decision to commit an act of terror, or to become involved in an organisation and/or operation that will resort to such a tactic, rests with an individual. Therefore, through analysing the radicalisation process of those who have been involved in acts of terrorism, the study hopes to unpack and understand the radicalisation process at an individual level. General factors such as the Internet, prisons, mosques, churches and the role of family and friends will be presented and analysed in context, while keeping in mind that an individual needs to undergo a process of rationalising before killing. How do they reach that stage? What role does personality and socialisation play in establishing an opportunity to be radicalised and in executing an attack?

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

There is no lack of publications on the root causes of terrorism. However, most concentrate on the broad circumstances that motivate people to commit acts of terrorism and are therefore not always applicable. While it will respect the influence of external factors, this study intends to explain radicalisation from the perspective of the individual – in other words, those who were both prosecuted and convicted for terrorism-related offences or who are self-professed members of terrorist organisations.

2.1 Conceptual focus

The study will explain radicalisation within the political socialisation process. This approach will be different than other perspectives that explain participation from a root cause or conditions conducive to terrorism perspective. While the latter is useful, it is too wide, especially considering that it does not recognise the role the individual plays in interpreting these external root causes.

2.2 Geographical focus

Primary research was conducted in Kenya and Uganda, focusing on the individual backgrounds of those arrested for acts of terrorism by the LRA, the ADF and, more recently, al-Shabaab and the MRC to gain a better understanding of the issues from within an East African context.

2.3 Historical and ideological focus

The study covers the period between 1995 and 2013, and will include profiles of members of the LRA, the ADF, al-Shabaab and the MRC.

In summary, the objectives of this part of the problem statement aim to, firstly, identify any differences in ‘profiles’ based on an ideological framework, and, secondly, to compare findings over time and to ideological differences.

3. RESEARCH QUESTION

The primary question this study hopes to answer is: To what extent can political socialisation explain the participation of individuals in terrorist organisations in Kenya and Uganda? This leads to the following additional questions: Is there a difference in applicable factors between the different ideological frameworks? Do these factors change over time? Can one identify criteria that law enforcement and social organisations can use to identify and reach individuals at risk?

4. AIM OF THE STUDY

Despite the increased focus on radicalisation in recent years, it is still a contentious topic, and the same can be said about the debate on the root causes of conditions conducive to terrorism. Despite this, the study aims to show a direct link between a person's early childhood development, when identity and perception formation occur, and a later susceptibility to radicalisation. As socialisation is a lifelong process, the study further hopes to put other socialisation agents in the context of the radicalisation process.

Additionally, while political socialisation might not be a new theoretical framework, an explanation of participation in terrorist organisations in East Africa is new. It will be the first study this student is aware of that uses biographic profiles of individuals associated with terrorism in Kenya and Uganda to attempt to understand susceptibility to extremism and radicalisation. The primary aim of this study is therefore to identify, analyse, interpret, evaluate, compare and explain the socialisation agents that facilitated the radicalisation process of these individuals.

5. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Terrorism is not a new security threat on the African continent, nor will it disappear any time soon. Despite dedicating enormous resources to training and equipping the state apparatus to more effectively counter the threat of terrorism, there is an increasing awareness of the need to prevent individuals from becoming members of terrorist organisations in the first place. In Africa, poverty and a general lack of development have been identified as two factors that contribute to individuals becoming involved in terrorism.

Although socioeconomic conditions play a role, blaming the circumstances associated with terrorism is too simplistic and might even be incorrect. Academic analyses conducted by Alberto Abadie in ‘Poverty, political freedom and the roots of terrorism’ (2004, 1–16), James Piazza in ‘Rooted in poverty? Terrorism, poor economic development and social cleavages’ (in *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2006, 159–77) and Claude Berrebi in ‘Evidence about the link between education, poverty and terrorism among Palestinians’ (2007, 1–30), to name a few, could not prove a direct correlation. Instead, politicians are more convinced of a direct correlation between poverty and terrorism than are academics.

This student has a professional involvement in training counterterrorism law enforcement officers, who often raise the following two questions: Why do people become members of a terrorist organisation or become involved in terrorist attacks? And: Is it possible to profile a terrorist, or at least provide an indication of who might be at risk of being radicalised or recruited? In answering these two fundamental questions, this study hopes to contribute to a better understanding of radicalisation from an African perspective that will contribute to more effective measures and strategies to prevent and combat terrorism – firstly, through the development of training curricula for police officers tasked with countering terrorism and, secondly, to policy makers to enable the development of effective preventative counterterrorism strategies.

6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology used should facilitate a more complete understanding of how individuals in Kenya and Uganda are empirically linked to and associated with acts of terrorism. In doing so, the study will utilise qualitative data-collection tools, while recognising the importance of locating the research within a particular social, cultural and

historical context. The qualitative method not only provides results but also intends to describe and investigate the relationship among variables in the radicalisation process. This methodology will therefore be particularly useful to understand how radicalisation happens within the political socialisation process. Additionally, since more than one variable will be studied associated with political socialisation, qualitative research provides for involving multiple variables in the same study and, therefore, will be the method most useful to this study.

The first part of the study is based on qualitative research, utilising literature available on political socialisation (chapter 2) and on the causes of terrorism and radicalisation (chapters 3 and 4). The term ‘political socialisation’ was introduced in the early 1950s to explain the role of the family and the role of school and group experiences in forming a person’s political orientation. The theory regained influence after the second world war and cites national independence movements, anti-colonialism, the rise of ideologies (such as socialism, communism and democracy) and, later, why people vote, in attempting to identify external factors that could explain political behaviour, perceptions and beliefs. The literature most often referred to includes Easton and Hess (1962), Dawson and Prewitt (1969), Langton (1969), Renshon (1975 and 1977), Horowitz (1972), Tolley (1977), Sigel and Hoskin (1977), Beck (1977), Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1980), Merelman (1986), Dowse and Hughes (1986), Greenstein (2009) and Hess and Torney (2009).

As part of the discussion on political socialisation, ‘unconventional’ political participation within political socialisation will also be referred to as discussed in Pinard (1967), Gamson (1975), Orum (1976), Sigel and Hoskin (1977), Bardis (1980), Post (1987), Johnson and Friedman (1992), Akhtar (1999) and Taylor and Louis (2004).

Causes or conditions conducive to terrorism include reference to ethnic and religious identity, political legitimacy, economic and social circumstances, ultimately leading to radicalisation. The literature referred to will include Lipset (1963), Gurr (1968), Schwartz (1975), Schwartz (1975), Gergen and Ullman (1977), Crenshaw (1981, 1988, 1992, 1998, 2003), Howard (1992), Taylor (1997), Reich (1998), Lia and Skjølberg (2000), Simon and Klandermans (2001), Pape (2003), Moghaddam and Marsella (2004), Borum (2004), Gupta (2005), Malečková (2005), Juergensmeyer (2005), Arena and Arrigo (2006), Horgan (2006), Saunders (2008), Neumann (2008) and Post (2008).

The second part of the thesis will make use of quantitative research methods, through the use of structured and unstructured interviews. A combination of grounded and collective case study qualitative analysis was used to analyse 239 interviews with convicted or acknowledged members of the LRA, the ADF, al-Shabaab and the MRC, supported by 46 interviews with al-Shabaab family members, which brings the total number of respondents interviewed to 285. Respondents from the ADF and the LRA interviewed in Uganda all benefited from the Amnesty Act of 2000, which provided blanket amnesty to rebels who renounced violence. Employees of the Amnesty Commission, using a structured questionnaire, conducted interviews. Similarly, members of the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance conducted interviews with members of al-Shabaab and the MRC, using the same structured questionnaire. Some of the structured interviews were recorded with the approval of interviewees, and are supported by notes made during the interviews. Interviews were conducted with the primary subjects (those convicted or self-professed members of the LRA, the ADF al-Shabaab and the MRC) as well as with their families, where available, and with individuals who could provide insight into the personalities and backgrounds of the primary subjects. The information obtained from these structured interviews was captured in Microsoft Excel to facilitate analysis and evaluation. Breaking the information down while keeping it in a profile format was valuable

to place biographical information and circumstances contributing to the individual's involvement in context while comparing it to that of other respondents within the same organisation. This provided the basis to describe the variables in the socialisation process that enabled later radicalisation within and between organisations.

7. COLLECTION OF DATA AND CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED

While working directly with the heads on counterterrorism units in Kenya and Uganda on other projects, the student requested the assistance of police units in these countries to gain access to relevant background information. A dedicated police officer from each country provided additional assistance. This proved to be problematic for respondents who questioned the intent of those conducting the interviews. For the same reason, the student realised early in the research that being and looking foreign, respondents were either reluctant to answer questions truthfully – fearing that the student was involved in gathering information for a foreign intelligence agency – or provided answers that respondents thought the student wanted to hear. To address these concerns and minor obstacles, the student requested the assistance of the Amnesty Commission in Uganda, the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance and the defence counsel of individuals arrested to conduct interviews. This, however, implied that a more structured questionnaire directed at primary respondents (attached as Appendix A) and family members (Appendix B) had to be used to ensure that the same questions were directed to all respondents to make later analysis possible. Researchers also had to be trained on how to conduct the research that was done with the assistance of coordinators from the above institutions who worked with researchers. The questionnaire also included a brief description of the study and the contact details of the student for the benefit of both researchers and respondents. In addition, researchers were asked to write down other information the respondents were willing to provide. While ADF and LRA respondents were more open to

provide information to enable later identification after benefiting from the amnesty process, al-Shabaab and MRC respondents – even those interviewed after being arrested – were more cautious, especially in the wake of the Westgate attack in Nairobi on 21 September 2013. Consequently, the student instructed researchers to only include the names of respondents on the questionnaire – to enable later identification – after receiving permission from the respondent. Additionally, the names of specific respondents were only included in the thesis after permission was received from the relevant respondent. The inclusion of specific names, however, has been limited to where absolutely necessary. Community leaders and security forces were also informed of the study and its objectives to ensure complete transparency.

As mentioned above, the Amnesty Commission made research into the ADF and the LRA in Uganda possible. Based on its records, 13 032 LRA members benefitted from amnesty as on 29 October 2013, of which 3 680 were female and 9 342 male. Although the LRA can be categorised as the biggest organisation based on its numbers, the sample size was the smallest, considering that the majority of LRA members were forced to join the organisation after being abducted. The focus of the sample group was on individuals who joined willingly or who, after being abducted, accepted the LRA as an organisation that reflected their ideas. As a result, 26 respondents were interviewed between 23 September and 12 October 2013 in the Kiryandongo district in northern Uganda.

With reference to the ADF, the Amnesty Commission indicated that 2 040 ADF members benefitted from amnesty as on 29 October 2013, of which 942 were female and 1 098 male. Relocation officers and members of the Amnesty Commission conducted interviews with 73 respondents between 21 July and 1 August 2013 in Kampala, Jinja, Kyazanga Town, Lwengo district in mid-western Uganda and Bugiri district in eastern Uganda.

In Kenya, 184 interviews were conducted in Nairobi, Kilifi, Mombasa, Kwale and Lamu during the period 8 to 18 September 2013, and again between 28 October and 2 November 2013. Those interviewed included 137 primary respondents or individuals that were radicalised, while 47 interviews were conducted with the relatives of individuals currently imprisoned, who disappeared or who were killed in Somalia. Although the primary focus was on al-Shabaab, members of the Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance who assisted in conducting the interviews also included interviews with members of the MRC. While working through the interviews the student realised that MRC respondents served as a control group to al-Shabaab respondents in having individuals that shared similar characteristics with those had been radicalised to a completely different organisation. In addition to al-Shabaab interviews in Kenya, two members of the cell already convicted for their involvement in the suicide attacks in Kampala on 11 July 2010 (attributed to al-Shabaab) were also interviewed. Reference to these interviews will be made in Chapter 7. Attempts to interview others also implicated in the above attacks and currently on trial proved to be more complicated than expected.

8. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The thesis can be broadly divided into two interconnected parts. The first part (chapters 1 to 4) will focus on the manner in which political socialisation developed as a theory, as well as provide the theoretical basis for how the individual interacts with his/her broader environment, influencing later predispositions and political orientations. Central to this process is the role individual characteristics play in linking the world to that individual's interpretation of the external environment and the outcome of the political socialisation process in the form of identity formation and later radicalisation. The second part (chapters 5 to 7) of this study will explore the role political socialisation played in people joining the

ADF, the LRA, the MRC and al-Shabaab. Explaining the thinking behind this broad outline, the main focus of each chapter can be described as follows:

Chapter One serves as an introduction and sets out the basic parameters of the study, most notably a problem statement; the research questions; the aim, purpose and significance of the study; the research methodology; and a literature review.

Chapter Two focuses on political socialisation in identifying the agents and processes of political socialisation. From this chapter variables to be used in the interview process were identified.

Chapter Three focuses on identity and the role ethnicity and religion play in forming a collective and social identity. Emotions and perceptions play an integral part in this process, in which the individual interprets the world around them.

Chapter Four concentrates on the external or conditions conducive to terrorism. At the end all of the aforementioned accumulate in radicalisation and operationalisation.

Chapter Five sets out the external factors or conducive conditions in Uganda as these contributed to the formation of the ADF. The introduction is followed by an analysis of the political socialisation factors identified through an analysis of biographical information and of interviews with ADF members.

Chapter Six sets out the external factors or conditions in Uganda that facilitated the formation of the LRA. The introduction is followed by an analysis of the political socialisation factors

identified through an analysis of biographical information and of interviews with LRA members.

Chapter Seven discusses the external factors or the conditions conducive to al-Shabaab gaining a foothold in Kenya. In addition to al-Shabaab, this chapter also makes reference to the MRC. The introduction is followed by an analysis of the political socialisation factors identified through an analysis of biographical information and interviews with al-Shabaab and MRC members and members of their families.

Chapter Eight, which also serves as the concluding chapter, will compare the study's findings by identifying similarities and differences in political socialisation among the LRA, the ADF, al-Shabaab and the MRC. This chapter, in effect, attempts to answer the research questions: To what extent can political socialisation explain the participation of individuals in terrorist organisations in Kenya and Uganda? Is there a difference in the applicable factors between the various ideological frameworks? Did these factors change over time?

The answers to these questions will address the last, and probably the most important, question: Is it possible to formulate criteria that law enforcement and social organisations can use to identify and reach individuals at risk?

9. CONCLUSION

Terrorism as a threat to both state and human security is part of history and there is no immediate indication that this threat will diminish or disappear in the foreseeable future. Yet, government responses focus on what happened or the crime being committed and not on the person committing the offence or act of terrorism. Being able to identify those at risk before

they become involved in terrorism will go a long way in preventing acts of terrorism. Although it is not the responsibility of the police to intervene at such a stage (but rather the task of teachers, social workers and civil society), this study will also assist counterterrorism officers to better understand those involved.

Additionally, instead of explaining terrorism only from the perspective of external enabling conditions, this study also includes psychological influences. It is hoped that this study will contribute to making counterterrorism efforts more effective and, ultimately, to preventing individuals being radicalised.

CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL SOCIALISATION

1. INTRODUCTION

A basic understanding of political socialisation, followed by identifying the different agents, or role-players, involved in moulding a person into an individual who becomes a member of a terrorist organisation and commits acts of terrorism, is essential. Starting with its origins, this chapter introduces the broad theoretical principles of political socialisation leading to political participation. At this particular point it is important to note that political socialisation was constructed to ensure the positive, that is, the continuation of the political system. In this study, the focus is on the negative, namely, the identification of agents involved in socialising the individual with the aim of joining a terrorist organisation. Despite the difference in outcome, the agents and the process should be the same. The most notable agents that will be referred to in this study will be the family, peers, friends, school, groups and the media. Using the same basic framework will enable the assessment and comparison of the value of each of these agents in the socialisation, and later radicalisation, process when conducting the practical part of this study.

Lewis Froman (1961) proposed three variables that influence the process of political socialisation (Renshon 1975, 35): the environment (agents of socialisation), personality and politically relevant behaviour. These variables also provide a valuable guideline for the following two chapters.

2. INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SOCIALISATION

The classic principles of political theory presented by Plato in *The Republic* and Aristotle are still of value today. Plato focused on childhood development and education in instilling values. Aristotle highlighted ‘aspects of political education, political character and their relationship to behaviour and institutions’ (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 7). Plato and Aristotle underlined the importance of the socialisation process in transferring essential information from one generation to another to ensure the survival of the *polis*, the city state of ancient Greece.

When placing political socialisation in a contemporary theoretical perspective, it is important to keep in mind that political socialisation originally developed out of other disciplines, most notably anthropology, psychology and sociology.

Anthropology, in its study of different cultures, notes that ‘the many forms of social learning indigenous to a society seemed to ensure that each generation more or less replicated the behaviour of the parent generation. Children, at a very early age, begin to pick up cues from parents and peers about how to behave in various situations’ (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 8). Psychology and psychiatry, particularly in how personality develops and how childhood experiences influence social values when a person becomes an adult, further adds to political socialisation as a theory. The two most important contributions that psychoanalytic theory made towards understanding political socialisation relate to the conceptualisation of personality and attitudes as structured developmental phenomena and the attention it brought to the significance of early childhood experiences in the formation of political attitudes and values (ibid, 9–10). Psychology also injects references to biology, with specific reference to the role genetics, imprinting and physiological psychology play in the political socialisation

process (Peterson 1983, 274). Sociology contributes to how group standards are passed on to individual members of society (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 10).

The study of political socialisation underwent several stages of development. In the 1950s Hyman established political socialisation in an effort to bridge learning theories presented in psychology to explain political behaviour (Renshon 1975, 29). Theories that followed were predominately based on research explaining the role of the family, school and group experiences in forming a person's political orientation to ensure regime stability. Through concentrating on the family, scholars hoped to demonstrate how parents instil political trust and allegiance in younger children and orientations such as partisan identification in older children (McDevitt and Chaffee 1992, 282–83).

Political socialisation during this period focused on the nature and direction of political involvement. The former analysed the way in which young people become interested in party politics, acquire political information and adopt party identification, while the latter focused on the realisation of political ideologies (Easton and Hess 1962, 230).

It should be noted that 'right-left politico-economic scales' in this context referred to the Republican–Democrat political party divide in the US. The objective of political socialisation was seen as an important insurance for political continuity from one generation to another. This status quo came under serious dispute during the turbulent political period of the late 1960s. During the late 1960s until the mid-1970s the theories produced by then were questioned since they had become unable to explain political demonstrations and the overall breakdown of social order (Cook 1989, 27–29).

Regaining interest in the mid-1980s, political socialisation theories accepted their limitations and initiated a new drive to address earlier constraints: the primary focus on childhood and the family and its almost exclusive focus on political socialisation in the developed world, especially the US. Addressing the former, the focus was also extended to adult political socialisation, while acknowledging that the world had changed drastically since the 1960s. In the mid-1990s scholars accepted that children should not be seen as passive receptors of political socialisation, but rather as ‘active participants in their own development’, enhancing the role of peer groups, especially during adolescence (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, 282). Globalisation and the role of mass media through the Internet, social media and powerful international media resulted in the need to accept that open mass societies also influence individual development, beyond traditional family structures (Van Deth, Abendschön and Vollmar 2011, 148).

Before providing the theoretical foundations of political socialisation, it is important to note that, although the basic principles might be the same, one should expect differences between political socialisation in the developed world versus the developing world. For one, the political culture in the former is established and is less static than in the latter. Where needed, theoretical foundations in the developed world will be supported by trends from the developing world, most notably in Kenya and Uganda.

3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO POLITICAL SOCIALISATION

In the aftermath of the second world war the following primary ‘models’, or schools, developed, associated with political socialisation (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1980, 5–6): Firstly, the **symbolic interaction theory** that presented the socialisation process as the manner an individual evolves through social interaction. The interactionists therefore

considered the 'self' as a product of the socialisation process (Mishra 2003, 37). The theoretical contributions of Charles Hurton Cooley, George Herbert Mead and H.S. Sullivan were the most important. Cooley, through the 'looking-glass self', established that the concept of 'self' grows in the mind of a child on the basis of the reflection of his behaviour on other members of the family and vice versa. It is through the process of presentation, identification and subjective interpretation of 'self-behaviour' that the child conceptualises his/her role in a broader perspective (Mishra 2003, 36). Mead regarded socialisation as nothing but a process of learning to communicate symbolically. Children learn to think about themselves and their behaviour by reacting to the responses of the other person (ibid, 36). Sullivan, in turn, focused on how the child begins to take on social roles based on what he/she observes. The child consequently identifies with 'significant others' (ibid, 36–37).

Secondly, the **functionalists**, or the **consensus model**, presented society as consisting of social 'units' (institutions, groups, classes and organisations) held together by shared common values and goals. Mishra (ibid, 37) best described this school: 'The purpose of socialisation, for them, is how effectively the new members can play their role in the society.' Langton (1969, 6–7) referred to David Easton as an example of this school when he observed that 'they see political and social systems as performing requisite functions necessary for their maintenance'. According to Talcott Parsons, political socialisation can be described as 'pattern maintenance that involves the maintenance of conforming to the prescriptions of the cultural system ... [through which] individuals are moulded into wanting to fulfil role expectations of the society and polity' (ibid, 6–7).

Thirdly, the **conflict theory** challenges the consensus model and argues that society is held together by coercion and not consensus. Sigmund Freud is probably the best known for his observation of conflict between the primal desires of the individual and the social rules. A

child, according to him, develops a manner of handling this conflict early in life, which is retained as it shapes and influences the behaviour of the child during adulthood. Accordingly, Freud established that the period of primary socialisation is fundamental to all later behaviour (Mishra 2003, 37).

Fourthly, the **cognitive** or **developmental theorists** focus on the process persons ‘come to know and how they know’ (Peterson and Somit 1982, 321). Included are scholars such as Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, who explained the socialisation process through referring to different stages in the life cycle of human beings (Mishra 2003, 38). This theory will again be referred to when the political socialisation process in children is discussed.

Fifthly, the **class perspective** is represented by Karl Marx, who emphasised that the root of conflict is economic in nature, and the **elite perspective** that concentrates on economic, political and military elites or ‘radical elites’ (presented by C.W. Mills) versus the ‘aristocratic or conservative’ school that tried to refute Marx’s idea that the ruling class is an economic elite (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1980, 5–6).

Lastly, the **pluralist perspective** does not recognise the existence of a power elite but rather identifies social entities and interest groups that compete with one another. To a degree the work of Fred Greenstein can be categorised as part of this school as he ‘attempted to combine several of the basic elements in the various conceptual formulations into a series of questions pertaining to political socialisation: (a) who (b) learns what (c) from whom (d) under what circumstances (e) with what effects. A distinction is often made between macro, or “system level”, approach to socialisation and an individual approach. The former focuses, for example, on the role and function political socialisation plays in the stabilization, change, and

integration of political systems. The latter supposedly emphasizes the process whereby an individual acquires political orientations' (Langton 1969, 7–8).

Out of these schools of thought (elaborated by later scholars) came the theoretical principles used to study the relationship between politics and society, the relationship between state and society and the relationship between political and social institutions. This stimulated interest from state political socialists on 'how and how much social groups (e.g. classes, occupational groups, ethnic groups) influence political behaviour and processes and in turn how these affect society and culture' (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1980, 7). Although this study has no intention to produce a new theoretical framework based on any of these schools, an important element taken from this early development is the realisation that there exists an interrelationship between politics (or those representing the political establishment) and society (or those institutions, organisations and structures representing society). In this study, this element is essential in appreciating that a study of terrorism cannot be done in isolation from politics and society.

4. THE INDIVIDUAL AS CENTRAL COMPONENT TO POLITICAL SOCIALISATION

Socialisation, therefore, enables the transmission of values (in this case political values) from one generation to the next. These factors play an essential role in the development of a child in the way that he or she might potentially vote or choose a particular political party, and will most definitely play an important role in 'unconventional' political behaviour. Although similarities exist (for example, members of the same family becoming involved in terrorism), limiting the theoretical framework to primary socialisation agents, while helpful, will still be insufficient in explaining why some individuals are inclined to radicalism while other

members of the same family are not. This implies that there is much more to existing explanations of why and who becomes involved in terror organisations.

Shedding light on one of these primary questions, social science provides the foundation to understanding who we are, starting with the age-old debate between ‘nature versus nurture’ (that is, genetics versus environment) debate (Schaefer 2013, 79). However, most social scientists have moved beyond this debate, acknowledging instead that biological and environmental factors do not act in isolation. It is rather this interaction that contributes to the complexities in shaping human development (Mondak et al. 2010, 85).

The same needs to occur in the study of terrorism, as people, especially politicians, concentrate almost exclusively on the external environment to explain why individuals resort to terrorism. This study instead proposes that the process (joining a terrorist organisation) be described from a micro- and macro -level: the micro-level (individual members of society and their socialisation process) is of significant importance at this particular point in the study, while the macro-level (an individual’s environment) will be discussed at a later stage.

Understanding the adult starts with understanding the child and how the child becomes the person he/she is growing up to be – essentially discovering who the person is, but also how he/she fits into society. In turn, this will impact on how a child interprets the world around him/her and participate in it. Out of this need developed a complete discipline of which psychoanalytic theory is the most often referenced. The work of Freud is most significant, followed by that of Cooley and Mead.

For Freud the self is a social product, and other people, especially one’s parents, influence those aspects of one’s personality. However, unlike Cooley and Mead, he suggested that the

self has components: 'Id' is in conflict with 'superego' that gives rise to the role of 'ego'. According to Freud, our natural, impulsive instincts are in constant conflict with societal constraints. By interacting with others we learn the expectations of society and then select behaviour most appropriate to our culture (Schaefer 2013, 84).

According to Mead, 'the socialisation process involves discovering what it is that society expects of us in our various roles. The child discovers "himself" as he discovers what society is. He forms a "social self" in response to the expectations directed towards him from parents, peers, teachers and other "significant others". As the child matures he discovers that society in general – "generalized other" – is little more than a package of expectations about how he, the child, should behave. The socialised child is one who has discovered and behaves in a manner consistent with society's expectations' (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 11).

With regards to the political socialisation process, Freud suggests that 'children acquire political attitudes and orientations at a very early stage' (Renshon 1975, 31). According to Stanley Allen Renshon, these are 'acquired in the attempt to satisfy certain basic human needs and this process of basic belief acquisition has crucial implications for the political socialisation process' (ibid, 37).

Breaking this process down, Hess and Torney (2009, 75) explain that the process of political socialisation in children can be subdivided into two categories: the rate and sequence with which attitudes are acquired by children that focus on the developmental changes and patterns of acquisition, and factors that influence the transmission of political orientations, concentrating on the circumstances which impede or facilitate children's acquisition of attitudes.

Both refer to ‘attitudes’ without explaining how they are formed. Gordon Allport (Hyman 1959, 39–40) explains that attitudes emerge through experiences or gradual development; individuation or differentiation of earlier subtle attitudes when confronted with new experiences; trauma or sudden changes; and adoption of attitudes directly from parents, teachers, peers and other individuals.

4.1 Individual characteristics

Attitudes, and for that matter everything that influences the choices and decisions we make, start with who we are as individuals. In this section the characteristics that influence this basic question of what it is that determines who we are – our unique individual characteristics – are briefly presented and will be analysed in the practical part of the study. The individual still is the central component of the political socialisation process. An important factor that the cognitive theory provides in understanding political socialisation is that ‘there must be innate cognitive structures which predispose the young to accept the ideas of authority figures, thus providing a nexus between evolution and cognitive development’ (Peterson 1983, 276). Alternatively, all people confronted with the same external stimuli will respond the same way: ‘Successful socialisation can result in uniformity within a society. If all children receive the same socialisation, it is likely that they will share the same beliefs and expectations’ (Patel 2013, 122). But this is not always the case.

This called for a study of how the individual interprets the world around him/her. Family, friends (peers), school, religion, prison, the Internet, the political system, socioeconomic conditions, etc. all impact (and play a lesser or greater role) on the individual, but the political socialisation process that leads to radicalisation is still an individual process. A central element should be the person’s personality that differentiates people, even twins, from one

another. Political socialisation, therefore, absolutely has to factor in individual characteristics in understanding political behaviour.

‘Personality’ refers to ‘a person’s typical patterns of attitudes, needs, characteristics, and behaviour’ (Schaefer 2013, 79). Salkind (1990, 361) defines personality as:

[...] the pattern of behaviors and thought that characterizes individuals, distinguishes them from others, and remains relatively stable throughout their lives. It is that unique complex of emotional responses that differentiates one person from another and makes up an important part of an individual’s identity.

Personality, through presenting a set of variables, plays an important role in the political socialisation process in serving as the link between the environment and a person’s behaviour (Renshon 1977, 17). Personality therefore explains behaviour and is a crucial component of understanding the socialisation process to the extent that personality traits can in one way or another have an impact on political behaviour (Froman 1961, 346). Personality is the filter through which the world or environment is interpreted, but personality should also be seen as the central factor that will influence or even determine political attitudes and behaviour throughout a person’s life. Personality might therefore be fundamental in explaining why one person might be attracted to an extremist group while another, being confronted with the same external circumstances, will choose a different route.

Being born with the building blocks of a personality – notably personality traits and assessed as temperaments – developmental psychology developed an entire research field explaining how personality is formed and the different characteristics that can be associated with different traits. Vasta, Haith and Miller (1995, 112) identify the following characteristics: ‘dominance, fearfulness, social openness and sensation seeking’. Grusec (2011, 259) defines temperament as:

[...] biologically based, early appearing, and relatively stable differences in response to emotionally salient stimuli and in self-regulation of those responses.

Temperament therefore explains why some babies are irritable and cry frequently, whereas others smile a lot. Some need to be entertained while others can keep themselves occupied for hours. These characteristics are the first signs of personality in babies and may explain why individuals experience the same experiences or circumstances differently. Although this description might at first glance seem worlds apart from political socialisation and joining a terrorist organisation, later predispositions and susceptibility to the influence of a specific ideology, political attitude and even the willingness to resort to violence start here. External stimuli play a very important role, as will be explained throughout this study, but political socialisation and radicalisation cannot occur without individual ‘vulnerabilities’.

Personality traits associated with politics will be presented later in this section. Before that, factors that influence personality development will be discussed, serving as an introduction to when birth order, interaction between siblings and broader personality will be empirically tested, with reference to members of the ADF, the LRA, the MRC and al-Shabaab.

A number of factors have an impact on how a personality is developed. Firstly, genetics contribute to approximately 50% of a person’s personality (Vasta, Haith and Miller 1995, 113). Within a political framework it means that ‘genetic factors lead to the development of personality traits, which in turn “cause” people to develop political attitudes either by motivating them to select environments that promote the development of these attitudes or directly by the genetic variance in personality accounting for all of the genetic variance in political attitudes’ (Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi 2012, 36). Genetics also mean that there is a very strong link between personality traits and group orientations, most notably ethnic or racial and religious identity (Weber, Johnson and Arceneaux 2011, 1314). Ethnicity and religion form a strong component through the political socialisation process, and ultimately influences political participation. Its influence will therefore be referred to throughout.

Secondly, the socialisation process itself can also influence and direct a person to specific beliefs, attitudes and experiences (Patel 2013, 122).

Thirdly, birth order contributes to personality in explaining that people who are genetically similar and grow up in the same household in a very similar environment (siblings) can still be remarkably different. To explain this, psychologists refer to birth order as one factor that influences personality. Although not set in stone, the following attributes are associated with individuals born in this particular order:

Table 1: Summary of attributes associated with birth order

	Oldest	Middle	Youngest	Only
Positive	Mature; high achievers and motivated towards success; conformist to parental values; highest self-esteem; self-disciplined; responsible and conscientious; easiest influenced by authority; competent and confident; conservative towards change	Sociable; relates well with older and younger people; competes in areas not attempted by oldest; successful in team sports	Empathetic, most popular; highest self-esteem; most affiliative; excel in social interplay	High achievers (after oldest); most likeable next to youngest; most cooperative; most trusting
Negative	Highest percentage of Type A behaviour; greatest fearfulness in new situations; dependent on the approval of others; most vulnerable under stress; higher narcissism	Greatest feeling of not belonging	Spoiled; highest psychiatric disorders; anxiety and fear if age difference is more than five years; most disturbed at losing a parent during childhood	Highest percentage of Type A behaviour; selfish; behavioural problems

(Source: Eckstein 2000, 484–86)

Type A personalities refer to people who tend to be impatient, competitive and aggressive (McIntyre and Platania 2009, 18). According to Sulloway, parents invest more time and energy in firstborn children while at the same time being themselves unsure of their new role as parents. Therefore, firstborn children display beliefs, attitudes and personality

characteristics that mirror those of their parents. The siblings who follow ‘need’ to be different to establish their respective ‘place’ (Michalski and Shackelford 2002, 182–83).

In addition to the interest of psychologists and sociologists in birth order, political scientists equally recognise the role birth order plays in the political socialisation process, personality development, social learning and political behaviour. Freud and Alfred Adler (Renshon 1975, 71) explain that the firstborn or older children are more likely to be conservative:

The first born or older child is given a great deal of attention until the second child arrives. At this point he is suddenly deprived, relative to his former position, of both love and attention, which makes the older child resentful and in many ways insecure. He may, for example, develop a profound distrust of people and take elaborate steps to insure against other sudden reversals of fortune. In short, he is likely to become conservative and cautious in his approach to life.

According to Schacter, in a study conducted in 1959, first and only children experience intense love, manifesting in overprotection, but also anxiety from their parents (being inconsistent and inexperienced as new parents) that may lead to increased dependency. Increased dependency, in its turn, can increase the need for affiliation, especially under stressful circumstances. Although parents are more likely to use physical rather than psychological punishment with oldest and only children, parents also become more relaxed, allowing more latitude and becoming more consistent with later children. Other studies also found that the oldest become independent or autonomous earlier, are used as role models for younger siblings, and are expected to become an ‘adult’ at an earlier stage. Within the political landscape, Becker and Carroll (1962) found that the firstborn are more likely to give into group pressure and more likely to change their opinion under stress than children born later. Hoffer (1959) and Toffler (1971) note that ‘first born and only children might be more likely to support leaders whose programs and symbols stressed inclusion and identity reinforcement’ (Renshon 1975, 74–77).

Birth order also influences self-esteem and empathy as Renshon (1975, 78–79) refers to a number of studies in the 1960s that found a correlation between low self-esteem and decreased interest in world affairs, recruitment into political roles, rigid belief systems and hostility towards minority groups. This is relevant as firstborn children might have the lowest self-esteem because their only reference is their parents, who are seen as powerful. Firstborn children also have other siblings close in age and abilities who they can compare themselves with. Another observation is that firstborn and only children do not develop the same ability to empathise with others as later siblings manage to do. Birth order, therefore, influences the type of experiences the child will encounter, but also the way he or she will interpret it, making it an important aspect to be analysed throughout the study.

Age difference between siblings and family size further influences personality. Brothers and sisters make up the first peer group the child interacts with. In addition to the personality traits described above, which are associated with a person's place in the family, the child learns valuable lessons from his/her interactions with siblings and their interaction with parents. Relationships with siblings are in some cases the most intense and most enduring of all other peer groups (Salkind 1990, 502–04). There is also a direct correlation between family size, the intelligence of children and the overall socioeconomic status of the family. As the size of the family increases, parents will spend less time with each child, which will have a direct impact on intellectual development. It is therefore not surprising that intellect decreases with the child's position in the family, which, in turn, influences political behaviour (discussed below). In an earlier study, Douglas, in 1964, suggested that as more children are being born into working and middle-class families, the existing limited financial and social resources are even further stretched, and parental concern decreases (Renshon 1975, 73).

According to tests, average-size families score higher in cooperativeness, inhibition and helpfulness, while large families score the highest in persistence. These characteristics will be internalised by individual family members (Stagner and Katzoff 1936, 341). The size of the family will also influence its authority structure, which will influence later political behaviour. For example, Bossard (1956) concludes that an increase in family size leads to a more centralised family authority structure. Such a structure is categorised by an increase in parental dominance and a decrease in parental contact with each child. Consequently, older children are expected to step in, thereby increasing their responsibility to look after younger siblings (Renshon 1975, 72). Although different parental styles will be discussed under the role of family, Elder (1962) explains that the centralisation of authority may be a source of adolescent rebellion against the political norms and expectations of parents (Renshon 1975, 72). Impacting probably the most is the notion that an increase in family size will also have an impact on whether the mother or father is the authoritative figure in the family. This will be discussed further in the section dealing with the family as a political socialisation agent.

Intellect serves as the fourth contributing factor to personality. For Hess and Torney (2009, 78–79) a direct relationship exists between intellect and the child's ability to learn political behaviour. A high intelligence quotient (IQ) is expected to accelerate political socialisation in children, in that children with a high intelligence tend to regard the system in less absolute terms and consider the possibility that some laws may be unjust. Children with a high intelligence are therefore less bound to the status quo and more willing to accept changes in government. Hess and Torney (Renshon 1977, 20) explain that the ability to be critical about politics may relate, at least in part, to the abilities of a person. For example, research found that children with a higher IQ show greater interest in politics, engage more in political discussions and are more efficient in political participation.

Lastly, gender also influences personality. Politically, one of the most prominent differences between boys and girls is that boys acquire attitudes more rapidly than girls, and that they are more interested in politics. Girls, compared to boys, relate to the political system through emotional concepts such as trust, reliance and the inherent goodness of the system. In contrast, boys tend to be more task-oriented and more willing to accept and see the benefit of conflict. There is, however, no difference between boys and girls in their basic attachment and loyalty to their country (Hess and Torney 2009, 77). Gender differences in aggressiveness also may have something to do with the greater political involvement of young boys. Tolley (1977, 390) further notes that boys are politically better informed and are more interested in public affairs. When watching news programmes, boys are more attuned to politically relevant information. Although the difference between boys and girls and, later, men and women is a very contentious topic, traditionally interest in politics is associated with being a male-dominated concern. It can therefore be expected that boys and men will be politically more active than women. This led to a debate following the emancipation of women that is beyond the focus of this study. The different theories explaining why boys are more aggressive than girls will not be discussed (Greenstein 2009, 59). What is important is to recognise that although theoretical discussions deal with broad trends, there are always exceptions.

4.2 Personality traits in developing political orientations

Personality traits associated with politics are those that connect a person's cognitive and emotional investment in his/her political life to take political action. Some individuals find political and social developments more meaningful than others to a degree that they strongly identify with a particular group (Cutin, Steward and Duncan 2010, 947). Personality traits identified by Dowse and Hughes (1986, 279) that also influence political participation include feelings of efficacy or lack thereof; civic responsibility and group identification awareness;

sense of alienation that often manifests in suspicion, distrust, hostility and cynicism; and authoritarianism.

To explain how political orientations are formed, Fred Greenstein, in 1969, clarified that ‘particular social characteristics interact with specific personality orientations to produce particular types of political behavior’ (Renshon 1975, 36). Gerber et al. (2010, 111) summarised it best when they explained that:

These personality differences affect how individuals *respond* to the stimuli they encounter in their environment. As such, personality traits can likely be viewed as *predating*, rather than being caused by, social and political influences, offering an opportunity to examine how fundamental, enduring personality differences affect an array of social outcomes, including political attitudes and behaviors [emphasis added].

The environment that influences personality development (with reference to ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds) also impacts on how an individual will interpret the world around him/her (Van Deth, Abendschön and Vollmar 2011, 157). This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

For Gerber et al. (2010, 112), political attitudes should be seen as ‘characteristic adaptations’ that are seen as ‘acquired skills, habits, attitudes, and relationships that result from the interaction of individual and environment’. In other words, each person will interpret the political stimuli, shaped by the environment, differently. It is, however, important to note that core personality differences should not be seen as the direct source of political beliefs, but rather that these dispositional traits shape how the individual will respond to the stimuli, keeping in mind that the context will influence how the stimuli are interpreted (Gerber et al. 2010, 115). Verhulst, Hatemi and Martin (2010, 306) put it in context when they describe that behaviour is predetermined by personality. Regarding the relationship between personality and the environment, the latter provides the motivation for behaviour, while personality

predispositions increase or decrease the likelihood of a specific type of reaction or behaviour when a specific situation presents itself. But this is not to say that people with similar personalities, finding themselves in similar circumstances, will respond the same. Instead, the predisposition exists, but activation involves a combination of two sets of interactions: personality and attitude interactions, and personality and environmental interactions (Mondak et al. 2010, 104).

Providing an example for the interaction between the environment and personality in conservatism, Jost (in Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi 2012, 36) explains that exposure to a threat and associated uncertainty in the political situation evoke fear and anxiety. In turn, this heightens the need to survive as a result of increased confidence in the ‘correctness’ of the person’s opinions and strengthening of his/her concept of self. Political conservatism therefore serves as a coping mechanism that allows people to manage threats, leaving these individuals more intolerant of ambiguity, while calling for high levels of order, structure and mental closure. In contrast, variations in the broad political environment create political circumstances that require adaptive attitudinal responses. Despite this, people tend to be set in the way they respond because the individual’s personality determine to what extent he/she will adapt to their political environment.

The link between personality and politics also has a lot to do with needs (influencing a worldview), which Maslow, in 1954, differentiated between (Renshon 1975, 39–40): physical safety against aggression and attacks; and psychological security, or a need to live in an orderly and predictable world. When these two basic needs are satisfied, ‘higher needs’ may emerge: love or affection forms a central human need. It is important to note that individuals growing up, especially in early life, without human warmth and affection will grow up emotionally stunted. Although the political consequences might seem irrelevant, Renshon

(1975, 40) explains that ‘the resurgence of strong ethnic and racial self-group identification can be viewed as arising out of [this] same need’. In this regard, Maslow distinguished between esteem-related needs (ibid, 40), in referring to desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery, competence, self-confidence, and for independence and freedom; and the desire for reputation and/or prestige, status, dominance, recognition, attention, importance and appreciation. Within political science and the study of political socialisation and radicalisation, to become a member of a terrorist organisation may seem worlds apart from the personal desires listed above, until one is reminded that to study and understand the outcome we need to appreciate individual or personal needs and desires. In other words, the political and personal cannot be separated.

Furthermore, for a person who is self-actualised or reaches his/her potential – in that when a person is born and grows up in an environment in which all his/her needs and desires are met, or where they can realise their potential – joining a terrorist organisation will not be an expected option. On the negative side, when an environment fails to meet such needs and desires, an individual will be more susceptible. At this particular point it is important to note that the objective of this study (as explained in the introduction) is not to come up with a ‘terrorist personality’, but rather to recognise, as Jerrold Post (1998, 31) explains, that a combination of personal feelings of being inadequate and a tendency to place the blame for everything that is wrong on an external ‘actor’, will be especially attractive to a group of like-minded individuals whose credo is ‘it’s not us, it’s them; they are the cause of our problems’. The objective of this approach is not to accept any form of responsibility, or blame, the individual or ‘collective’ might be confronted with. Elements of narcissism in these examples should therefore be assessed. Feelings of inadequacy and the discussion of personality serve as an introduction to identity and how individuals identify and interpret the outside world, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

In addition to the possible influence of narcissism, since the 1960s a number of scholars, for example, Akhtar (2002), attempted to identify specific personality characteristics with resorting to terrorism. Akhtar (Smelser 2007, 92) identifies the following personality traits associated with individuals inclined to join terrorist organisations: ‘... deeply traumatized individuals. As children they suffer chronic abuse and profound emotional humiliation. They grow up mistrusting others, loathing passivity, and dreading the recurrence of a violation of their psychological boundaries. To eliminate this fear, such individuals feel the need to “kill off” their view of themselves as victims. One way to accomplish this is to turn passivity into activity, masochism into sadism, and victimization into victimizing others.’ In contrast to earlier scholars who attempted to present specific terrorist personality characteristics, this study will focus on broader personality types.

4.3 Personality tests

A large number of tests are available and were previously used to determine the personality of subjects. These include, among others the Five-Factor Model (FFM) that determines, firstly, openness, or to what extent the person is open to new experiences and ideas, but also whether the person is willing to accept new information that may shift existing attitudes and beliefs. In effect, this type of person can be categorised as innovative, not conservative and as someone who values nonconformity. In political terms, individuals measuring high in being ‘open’ are likely to be able to consume ‘conflicting’ information, whereas, those less open tend to be more conservative, less affected by the circumstances of others, and even authoritarian (Cutin, Steward and Duncan 2010, 948). Secondly, conscientiousness shows measurement of personality traits that can be organised or disorganised, careful or unconcerned, focused and disciplined or undisciplined. This personality trait may also influence the degree to which people rely on group identities to structure their personal lives (Weber, Johnson and

Arceneaux 2011, 1320). Thirdly, extroversion assesses if a person is sociable or reserved. It may also influence what position the individual will give to social groups in their lives (ibid). Fourthly, agreeableness shows the traits of agreeableness, from helpful or uncooperative to trusting or suspicious. Individuals who score high in agreeableness will avoid conflict (Gerber et al. 2011, 37). In other words, agreeableness refers to how individuals interact with others. It is associated with conflict orientations (for example, attraction or aversion), altruism and trust. Agreeableness may also affect the degree to which people rely on social groups to navigate their social environment and, therefore, the intensity of in-group identities (Weber, Johnson and Arceneaux 2011, 1320). Lastly, neuroticism assesses if a person easily gets nervous or stays calm. To a large degree political conservatism (manifested in intolerance, uncertainty and fear of threat, loss, etc.) can be associated with neuroticism (Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi 2012, 35–36).

In addition to the Five-Factor Model, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) – based on the work of Carl Jung and developed by Isabel Briggs Myers and Katharine Briggs – measures all of the above with the exception of neuroticism, and presents 16 personality types through assessing the following characteristics (McCrae and Costa 1989, 19, and Cottam et al. 2004, 21): The first category assesses extroversion (E) which refers to expressiveness and gregariousness or introversion (I) and includes people who are introspective, reserved and seeking solitude. The second category refers to sensing (S), which signifies people who are guided by literal and empirical perception or intuition (N), which leans toward abstract, figurative perception. Thirdly, thinking (T) refers to objective, detailed and logical decision-making, while feeling (F) suggests subjective, value- or emotion-based decision-making. Lastly, individuals who rate high on perception (P) are categorised as curious, spontaneous and tolerant of disorder, while, at the opposite end, those leaning towards judging (J) seek resolution and order.

Recognising the different tests available to assess personality, this study will utilise a combination of the Jungian and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test as developed by Richard Stephenson (2012) for the practical side of the study, supplemented by Raskin and Terry's Narcissistic Personality Inventory-40 (NPI-40) to assess the level of narcissism among respondents.

5. WHEN AND HOW POLITICAL SOCIALISATION OCCURS

Substantial work is available on political socialisation. However, to turn theory into practice, or to convert theoretical principles to a framework that can be used, a distinction will be made between socialisation agents; processes through which the individual is being socialised; and the product of political socialisation, most notably political and national identity, leading to conventional and unconventional political participation. Each of these categories will be discussed in greater detail below.

5.1 Socialisation agents

As explained above, political socialisation requires 'agents' or mediators through which an individual, from birth until death, learn. These are divided between primary socialisation agents (including the family, school, peers and groups) and secondary socialisation agents (including the media and political experiences). These pave the way a child, and later an adult, learn and consequently impact on the way he/she perceives the world around him/her and acts on particular external stimuli in his/her political development. These socialisation agents influence a person's beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviour (Higgins et al. 2010, 133).

Socialisation is a continuous process that implies that, in addition to the primary socialisation agents, secondary socialisation agents equally play an important role in the later radicalisation into terrorist groups. Piaget best describes this in his cognitive development theory (to be discussed later), which posited that no behaviour constitutes an actual, absolute beginning. Instead, behaviour develops from previous developments, while being assimilated with new elements. New information is therefore incorporated into existing cognitive structures. Change is, however, possible if the individual adapts to the world at large, or when the person opens him- or herself to new possibilities (Peterson and Somit 1982, 322–23).

This section is especially important in identifying relevant socialisation agents and other applicable factors that need to be evaluated when determining the role players significant in the socialisation and radicalisation process to the ADF and the LRA in Uganda, and al-Shabaab and the MRC in Kenya.

Before venturing into the different role players, Beck (1977, 117–18) explains that three preconditions influence the role of each agent when discussing political socialisation. Firstly, exposure in that the individual needs to be in contact with the agent for it to have any influence. However, exposure alone does not guarantee influence. Secondly, communication through which a politically related message needs to be communicated. Considering that all forms of socialisation – including those without a clear political message – can influence a political orientation, this factor is the most difficult to determine.

Thirdly, receptivity, in which being in contact with a specific agent who transfers a particular message does not imply that the particular individual will be susceptible to that particular source. Being receptive depends on two factors: the nature of the relationship and timing. With reference to the nature of the relationship, an emotional relationship with the source will

carry more weight than when the individual has no relationship with an agent carrying the message. For example, if a person has a weak bond or emotional connection with his/her family, he/she will be more susceptible to the influence of another socialisation agent (Higgins et al. 2010, 133). With reference to timing, two different hypotheses need mentioning at this stage, although it will be referred to again (Beck 1977, 118): early socialisation, which emphasises that early learning is the most important because it is retained over the longest period and structures later learning, and later socialisation, which explains that since political behaviour is only required later in life it may well be what a person learns as an adult that moulds political orientations.

5.1.1 Primary socialisation agents

Primary socialisation agents are categorised as being unstructured and highly personalised. Although these relationships are not established for political purposes, what a person encounters through these agents will influence political learning and impact on political socialisation. Additionally, political socialisation in the family and peer groups will be different and will resonate in different political values.

Primary socialisation agents will help the individual with a conceptualisation of the political world, to the degree that the individual will view the social world, including the world of politics, through the lens of primary relationships. In early life the family, and then peer groups, will provide the individual with important communication links, as well as with his/her conceptualisation of 'self' and his/her position in the social world (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 134).

5.1.1.1 Family as socialisation agent

Socialisation starts with the family, specifically with an individual's parents. It is here where a person learns the core principles of who they are and what is expected of them. Over the years many volumes have been produced on the role of the family in the socialisation process, especially during the early years of political socialisation, when the emphasis is on how parents transfer their political orientations to their offspring.

This came under serious scrutiny as scholars in empirical studies showed that, despite years of influence, children do not necessarily mirror the political opinions of their parents. Instead of eliminating the family from the equation, scholars, such as Westholm in 1999, explain that political values are transferred between generations through a 'two-step approach' in which the child first needs to be 'open' or susceptible to the influence of the parent. This means that the child, especially after the first five years of his/her life, becomes an active participant in this process. At the same time, children also play a role in socialising their parents (for example, in earlier studies conducted by Wilson in 1984 and McDevitt and Chaffee in 1998) (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, 283).

The focus of this study, however, is not only on *why* a person adopts the political orientations of his/her parents, but rather *what* is transferred from parent to child. Of equal interest is the broader socialisation process, most notably transference of political attitudes that possibly influence the individual to be susceptible to the ideology of a terrorist organisation. The following section will also explain that it is not only *what* is taught but rather *how* parents interact with their children that is important in this study.

The family plays an essential role (positive or negative) throughout any person's life. Although the role of the family, particularly parents, is the strongest from infancy until the

child reaches school-going age, the family serves as the first step in the transmission of fundamental values. According to Greenberg (2009, 5–6) in many instances adult opinions can be retraced to political socialisation as a child in that ‘the child is father to the man’. This is particularly relevant to basic political orientations such as identifications, loyalties and values. This does not imply that an adult is a carbon copy of a child, but rather that a child already has the basic framework from where he/she will grow. As with personality development, children also go through the first stage in their political developmental process. Attitudes developed during childhood also serve as an important predicator for future attitudes and behaviour.

Socialisation is a learning process that implies that a newborn child is not socialised. Through socialisation a child learns, but also internalises societal norms relating to what is expected, right, moral and just (Sigel 2009, 19). The family serves as an introduction where the individual learns his/her first set of social roles in the socialisation process, most notably his/her role within the family power structure. It is also here where the child develops his/her initial self-concepts: the kind of person he/she perceives themselves to be, what assets and liabilities he/she sees themselves possessing, and what he/she expects of him-/herself in the present and the future (Langton 1969, 21).

Establishing loyalties towards the state is part of the socialisation process, but the child also learns to sort people into social categories, with reference to linguistic, racial, class, tribal, occupational and geographical characteristics. Through this process the child also learns to which group he or she belongs and identifies with that particular group. Based on this classification children also learn to behave differently toward the ‘other’ group. What is especially important to note in this regard is that because these affiliations are formed so early in the child’s life they are among the strongest and most resilient to change. These feelings

also form the basis on which subsequently orientations are built. Later in life political events and experiences are interpreted within the context of these basic orientations. Consequently, the beliefs and attitudes the individual adopts later in life are determined by early political learning based on attachments to a particular political or social grouping (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 22–24). The social identity and self-categorisation theories will take this discussion further in the next chapter where this study considers how an individual identifies with others.

Renshon (1975, 65) identifies five beliefs a person establishes early in life that are influenced by the family: beliefs about the nature of physical reality (for example, colour, form, space, time); beliefs about the potential for individual action in the world or the level of personal control; beliefs involving the evaluations of the world in which one lives, most notably if the world is friendly or hostile; beliefs about the nature of other people, broadly referring to whether other people are basically good and can be trusted or not; and beliefs about the self as being generally good or bad.

In this context it is also important to keep *what* the family is teaching the child in mind. In a study of socialisation and delinquency, Higgins et al. (2010, 134) notice that some families may transmit delinquent behaviour, such as stealing and drinking, to their children as acceptable behaviour. If applicable to delinquent behaviour, the same should be true for other acceptable as well as unacceptable behaviour. What is termed ‘unacceptable’ is, however, relative.

The role of the family and how it passes it on to its offspring are influenced by five factors. Firstly, children learn by imitating. Because parents influence their children so profoundly in the early years, the political lessons a family teaches are highly resilient. For the same reason,

the lessons a family fails to communicate are difficult to ascertain in later life (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 108–09).

Secondly, the bond (or lack thereof) between parent and child will play an extremely important role in developing a person's self-esteem, identity and emotional health. Different parental styles will directly impact on the type of relationship the child will have with his/her parents (to be discussed below). The family serves as a major source through which a child develops his/her own basic self-identification. Through these first interactions and the manner in which family members interact with the child, he/she establishes a concept of 'self' and his/her relationship with others. The family is also the first provider of the child's physical and psychological needs (ibid, 109).

Thirdly, learning 'accepted' behaviour and relationships with others initially takes place in the family context, starting with associations with the family's ethnic (cultural), religious, linguistic and social class, and exposure to others. These serve as reference points for political attachments and interpretations. By raising their children in a particular social setting, parents help determine how they will view the political world and with which other socialising agents they will come in contact (ibid, 109–10). It is therefore expected that the child will reflect the different values and norms associated with his/her ethnic and socioeconomic background when it comes to particular issues (Van Deth, Abendschön and Vollmar 2011, 158). Ethnicity and religion will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Fourthly, political antagonisms, loyalties and viewpoints of both contemporary and past generations are passed down through the family – this is particularly important with reference to ethnic and religious identity. Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 123) explain that these

‘orientations are passed on from generation to generation through potent family socialisation, and are often able to withstand pressures from the larger society for change and conformity’.

Lastly, identification and national loyalty (belonging) are first learned from imitating the family. Associated with the development of obedience to the state or political authority, the child also becomes aware of ideologies associated with the authorities. Dawson and Prewitt further explain that the first loyalties and identification are the strongest and most difficult to change: ‘These feelings serve as the foundation upon which subsequently acquired orientations are built. Political events and experiences later in life are interpreted within the context of these basic orientations. They serve as “political eyeglasses” through which the individual perceives and makes meaningful the world of politics’ (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 23).

Teaching children broad political orientations, or how to perceive the world around them, is one thing; discussing contemporary politics, especially during adolescence, is a completely different issue. Due to its emotional and inherently controversial character, anger and frustration between parent and child while debating political issues may limit or even negatively influence parental influence on the child (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, 288).

Although the child may not specifically follow in their parents’ footsteps, pre-adult political socialisation still influences political behaviour through transferring social status, political attitudes, organisational involvement and group consciousness that will influence later political participation (Beck and Jennings 1982, 94). Although the example parents set for their children in terms of being politically active and adopting broad political attitudes, the opposite could equally be true in that parents did not participate in politics, but their offspring do. This study hopes to also determine if the parents of individuals who join the ADF, the

LRA, the MRC and al-Shabaab were politically active, and, if so, *how*: through conventional or unconventional political participation?

Building on the two-step process mentioned above, for parents to have any influence over their children the children need to be open to their parents' influence. To facilitate this process a number of factors will enhance or alternatively limit the role the family plays in the political socialisation process.

In addition to the emotional nature of the relationship, the family has almost a monopoly during the early political socialisation period because of the amount of time spent in a family environment. It is during these formative years that the person, including his/her political self is being developed. National, tribal or community identities; perceptions of social groups; and acceptance or rejection of various political structures and processes are also being formed during this period. The norm is also that the most intensely and persistently held political views are established in the person's early years. This serves as the basis on which later political learning can be built. It is therefore not surprising that the family, due to the considerable time spent in its midst, influences the child considerably during his/her formative years, and this has a lasting effect in later political development (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 107–08). Building on this, Renshon (1975, 67) identifies six variables that will influence the role the family plays in the life of a person.

First, parental empathy and emotional involvement relate to what degree parents failed to understand the emotional needs and opinions of the child. The emotional nature of the relationship between parent and child is important to build a sustainable and influential relationship. The extent of this relationship is influenced by the depth and emotional connection between parent and child, in that the more intense and emotionally involved the

relationship, the more influence the former is likely to have on the development of the social and political behaviour of the child (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 108).

The degree of affection can be measured by expressions of love and affection between parent and child. At the positive end, a warm relationship is one of the building blocks of a coherent identity, categorised by increased responsibility. At the time of conflict or stress, children in these types of family cope better with stress and trauma. Alternatively, lower levels of affection are linked to, among others, impulsiveness and risk-taking; tendencies to violate societal norms; aggression; delinquency; and discipline problems (Lavi and Slone 2012, 550–52). Building on this description, Kenniston, in a 1965 study on alienated students, found that those with the highest levels of alienation described their fathers as ‘cold, rigid and withdrawn men’ (Renshon 1975, 72). Earlier, Davies (1965, 16) found that alienation, as a result of strict parental control, causes children to be more conforming or even politically deviant. Schmid (2012, 546) went one step further when she explains that when children attach low importance to parental expectations, it could be viewed as an indicator of a negative to poor parent–child relationship and overall negative feelings about parents. To illustrate this, a study conducted by Russell Middleton and Snell Putney in 1963 among 1 440 college students found that students who reported ‘not being very close’ or even ‘hostile’ to their parents were more likely to deviate from their parents’ political orientations than were students who reported being ‘fairly close’ or ‘very close’ to their parents (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 117–18).

Therefore, when children feel loved by and are comfortable with their parents, they are more likely to listen and agree or accept what their parents say and do. Associated with the latter, children will be more open to the value system parents are trying to pass onto them (Hardy et al. 2010, 114). Families that provide a high degree of emotional closeness and acceptance

provide ‘a secure place to which the child can return in times of need’ (Renshon 1975, 72). Consequently, parents can buffer their adolescent children against the negative effects of unhealthy peer experiences, but only if a warm and affectionate relationship exists between parent and child (Grusec 2011, 245). Specific questions in relation to the degree of punishment and the involvement of parents in the lives of respondents will be used to analyse the relationship between parent and child. Specific questions in relation to the level of punishment and involvement of parents in the lives of respondents will be referred to.

Second, the degree of autonomy allowed relates to what extent the child was allowed to direct his/her own life while growing up. The granting of autonomy encourages identity exploration and commitment. One of the primary responsibilities of the family is to allow and guide children to become their own person, while, at the same time, promote and encourage efforts to establish rewarding relations with other family members. This involves a two-prong approach: firstly, through granting autonomy, the family allows its members to assert individuality with respect to ‘family beliefs, obligations, rules, and emotional processes’. Through this process healthy identity development is made possible while allowing self-discovery within the context of acceptance; secondly, through cohesion or connectedness the family provides ‘mechanisms that sustain togetherness in terms of cooperative behavior, conformity to expectations, and emotional ties’ (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, 291). Lessons learned in the family can also form the basis of whether a child becomes a ‘leader’ or ‘follower’. According to Renshon (1975, 72), for example, the lack of personal control and overreliance on the good intentions of others often produces followers, while leaders manifest a high degree of personal control and seldom need to have faith and trust in other people. This may lead to a single-minded desire to manipulate in order to control the world around them.

Third, the allocation of decision-making authority: who makes family decisions? The father only, the mother only, or is there a sharing of decision-making responsibility? Even early political socialisation research focused on family role structures (for example, maternal versus paternal dominance) and discussed the socialisation environment it provides. Different parental power structures and composition (absence of the father) were expected to provide different environments and role players the child could interact and identify with (Langton 1969, 30). The absence of a parent, but particularly the absence of a father figure, will be assessed later in this discussion as a possible factor contributing to later radicalisation.

As introduced earlier, an increase in family size will also have an impact on whether the mother or father is the authoritative figure in the family. A study conducted by Henry in 1957 found that when the family size increases, the mother starts to take over the disciplinary responsibility in the family. As a result, the father will be the source of discipline for older children and the mother for younger children. Consequently, as rebellion against the father is more likely than against the mother (considered to be the primary caregiver), older children will have no problem to direct their anger and frustration against the source. The problem is, however, that younger children will not direct their anger against the primary source (their mother as the primary caregiver), leading to the possibility that anger will be directed inward or displaced outwards to more accepted objects, leading to a possible increase in outward aggression among younger siblings (than among older siblings) (Renshon 1975, 73).

A study conducted in Israel during a period of instability found that parental roles were well established with the mother as the compassionate figure and the father as the authoritative figure. But when the mother became the authoritative figure in the family, negative consequences were reported, most notably higher levels of behavioural and psychological

difficulties among children, reporting a more severe impact of political violence (Lavi and Slone 2012, 559).

Fourth, the nature of rule enforcement: given that rules are made, how are they enforced? Are they applied consistently or is there a lack of structure? This is further discussed below.

Fifth, trust in parents refers to what degree a child trusts his/her parents with an important personal problem, but, also, to what degree a child values the opinions of his/her parents? Schmid (2012, 535), for example, found that adolescents who considered their parents as very important in their lives and who value their parents' expectations, will be more keen to identify with their parents' values. This could lead to a higher identification with these values, and, as a result, also to a higher-value similarity. Grusec (2011, 249) supports this analysis by stating: '[When] children trust their parents to act fairly and in their best interests, they are more likely to comply with parental directives and thus are likely to become better socialised, although the evidence is in fact mixed with respect to this last observation.' Trust also relates to the extent to which parents understand the needs of their children and the subsequent level of protection parents are willing to offer, implying that children whose parents respond to their concerns by comforting them and wanting to remove the source of their problems will become more attached to their parents. This relationship will in turn influence socialisation outcomes, including the ability to manage negative emotions, most notably the ability to cope with stress, the ability to have empathy with the distress of others, and not to let down others who trust in his/her ability to act in the best interest of others. In the absence of responsive parents, children will learn not to show their emotions, especially when in trouble. In the worst-case scenario, when parents are inconsistently responsive, their children will learn to exaggerate their problems and stress factors in an attempt to get recognition from their parents.

Teaching a child empathy or the ability to ‘read the emotions of others’ and to respond to distress will not only create responsible citizens but is also the first step to prevent children from intentionally harming others (ibid, 250). Although parenting style impacts on the level of trust the child will have in the parent, social class also plays a role. Research conducted by Langton revealed that especially younger individuals from parents from a lower social standing might discredit their parents as valuable sources of information, and subsequently rather rely on their peers (Silbiger 1977, 174).

Sixth, parents’ level of personal control and faith in people refers to the extent to which parents feel that they have control over relevant aspects of their lives, and the degree to which they have faith in the essential goodness of other people. Trust in other people forms the basis of everyday interactions and has a visible manifestation. From these experiences, children may be able to conceptualise parental beliefs from their behaviour, further influencing socialisation (Dalton 1980, 427). These valuable life lessons are transferred through actions and experiences. It is therefore important to note that personality traits of the parent are equally important in the political socialisation process of the child (Renshon 1975, 54).

Based on the above six variables, three parental styles, which speak directly to the development of an individual’s personality, can be identified (Lavi and Slone 2012, 550). First, authoritative parents encourage independence, negotiation, communication and the consideration of other points of view. This parenting style is recognised as the most adaptive, while encouraging the development of the following traits in children: responsiveness, involvement, warmth, autonomy-granting, autonomy-support, and demandingness, strictness and supervision facilitate moral identity development (Hardy et al. 2010, 114). Described as less rigid and restrictive, this parenting style is the most effective in supporting children to become autonomous and socially responsible people. This type of parent is also more likely to

allow children to create their own experiences because they have more confidence in their children's social and cognitive abilities. Consequently, children gain more confidence in their abilities. Additionally, authoritative parents teach rather than punish their children, but if punishment is necessary, it is not harsh or arbitrary. These parents set clear standards and limits while being warm and attentive to their children's needs and concerns (Schmid 2012, 535–36). Being able to facilitate moral identity development, parents are indirectly improving the way their children will relate to others, including out-group members (Hardy et al. 2010, 119).

Second, authoritarian parents emphasise obedience and authority, but rule out verbal negotiation, independence and uniqueness. Referred to by Bell as the 'control system model', this particular system is unlikely to survive adolescent years, as parent-child conflict will increase (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, 288). According to Grusec (2011, 254), this style is 'characterized by a failure to share decision-making power with children, an assumption of parental infallibility, and becoming inaccessible or withdrawing in response to the child's deviation'.

Third, permissive parents do not demand compliance from the child but rather believe the child's behaviour should not be monitored. Parenting or attempts to influence the child manifest through 'psychological control', which include the following types of behaviour: guilt induction, withdrawal of love and parental intrusiveness. Psychologically controlling parents are classified as manipulative and insensitive to the emotional needs of their children. As a result children of such parents display internalising problems that include anxiety, depression and low self-esteem (Grusec 2011, 254).

Role of each parent and incomplete families in political socialisation. Considering the central role families play in the political socialisation process, this study hopes to also determine if the absence of either a mother or father has an impact on those being radicalised in Kenya and Uganda. This interest was particularly sparked following a study of 250 West German terrorists (from the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement) that found that 25% of the terrorists had lost one or both parents by age 14, while 79% did not have a positive family relationship – 33% had a particularly hostile relationship with their fathers (Post 1998, 28). A number of similar studies will be referred to, but this reference serves to explain why family relations will be an important component of this study.

The family is also the child's first reference to understand the political culture and process of his/her country. Who teaches these principles to the child will equally impact on the political development of the person.

According to Hess and Torney (2009, 71), children's interest in politics can even be influenced by whether the mother or father is dominant. Based on their research, when the father is perceived as dominant or when both parents have equal authority, children tend to be more informed and interested in political matters, while when the mother is recognised as the dominant authority, children tend to be less interested in politics and often only acquire political attitudes later in life.

What will the consequences be if the father is absent? Langton finds that children in families without a father tend to be more authoritarian, less interested in politics, and have a lower sense of political efficacy similar to families where the mother is dominant. Additionally, a father's absence has a more prominent effect on boys than girls. Studies of father-absent families indicate that male children tend to be less achievement orientated than individuals in

nuclear families. Other studies report that boys from father-absent households develop decidedly effeminate behaviour patterns. Males from maternal families are also more infantile, dependent and submissive than those from households in which the father is present. These findings have been explained in the following ways (Langton 1969, 31): first, male children from mother-child households lack appropriate male figures with whom to interact and identify, and thereby learn gender-appropriate role behaviour. As a result, their ego development is retarded as they face debilitating conflicts over their cross-sex identification, confounded by the insecurity of being the 'sole male provider' in the household. Second, mothers in mother-child households are more protective than mothers in nuclear households. They tend to keep their children physically and emotionally dependent on them longer than do mothers of father-present males. Lower-class mothers are especially likely to be described as 'over-protective, dominating and demanding'. Given the tendency for the parent of the opposite sex to be relatively more protective toward the child, it is in lower-class families where boys run the greatest risk of this debilitating experience with their mothers. Lastly, given the tendency for the parent to be more affectionate and attentive toward a child of the opposite sex, the presence of the father may counter the mother's overprotection and provide a more balanced environment.

This shows that boys from a fatherless family are affected negatively when comparing them to their sisters or boys from a nuclear family. Langton (1969, 32–34) for example, finds that boys from father-absent families are more likely than girls to react to anxiety as a result of insecure paternal identification with closed belief systems. In this regard a closed belief system serves as a defence against anxiety. Being dogmatic the person will have rigid beliefs and expectations. He will probably also have an authoritarian outlook on life, and be intolerant towards those who hold opposing beliefs.

It is to be expected – based on the research mentioned above – that the absence of a parent, especially a father, would play an important role in the political socialisation and possibly the later radicalisation process. In particular, where the person experiences abandonment or a lack of belonging, these feelings might contribute to making a young person susceptible to another father figure or the need to belong to a group where he or she will experience acceptance and a feeling of belonging. Jaros, Hirsch and Fleron (2009, 100–03), in their study in the Appalachian region of eastern Kentucky in the US, notice that being without a father could interfere with the transfer of political values from family to child. Although children from fatherless homes become more dependent upon their mothers, mothers are not typically strong in giving political guidance. Consequently, other agents assume a more prominent role in the socialisation process, often with different values.

Socialisation in traditional societies. Enquiring if socialisation is universal and how different cultures influence the socialisation process, Grusec (2011, 261) differentiates between ‘individualist’ and ‘collectivist’ cultures: individualist cultures have the following characteristics: ‘independence, autonomy, equality with parents, and self-assertion’ (ibid, 261). Alternatively, collectivist cultures have the following characteristics: ‘valuing lifelong obligation to family, family harmony, restrained emotional expression, and, in some cases, deference for authority’ (ibid, 261).

The influence and duration that the family has in the socialisation process differ from situation to situation. Although the basics might be the same between developed and developing societies, the latter takes place in a different environment where the emphasis is on traditions. Also, the broader community and extended family play a more prominent role in the traditional developing world. Generally speaking, the family will have less overall influence when other primary and secondary socialisation agents take part in socialisation.

When the family is unable to transfer its political orientations, other institutions are likely to be more influential. The family's most serious competitor in developed nations is the school. However, in societies without secondary institutions, the family is likely to have almost a monopoly over political socialisation (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 107).

Consequently, it is to be expected that there is a greater continuity in political views from generation to generation. The most direct competition to parental influence may come from schools (often controlled by the political authorities) and peer organisations (Beck 1977, 127).

Although family ties are as a rule stronger in traditional cultures, in the absence of other agents of socialisation and when faced with rapid changes these societies are faced with considerable challenges, most notably conflict between generations when political orientations are not tied to those of the family (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 111). This has important consequences for the political and social culture of a country. Considering its conservative bias, political socialisation through the family prevents swift and extensive changes to political orientation, limiting the ability of the political culture to adjust to immediate political, social and economic change. As a result, political institutions may be changed, often very rapidly and substantially, but the family persists in passing on the same political attitudes as it has done in the past (*ibid*, 124–25).

Robert LeVine, in 1963, during the independence processes in many African countries, made a contribution titled 'Political socialisation and cultural change' and found that adults in these independent countries are more loyal to local tribes and local governmental units than to newly established nation-states. These families are therefore expected to socialise their children into traditional patterns and pre-existing political structures. Considering that family socialisation patterns are both slow to change and very difficult to manipulate from above,

different forms of political and social instability should be expected (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 125).

The reality, however, is that children often move away from the family in search of more or better economic opportunities, leaving a question mark over the influence of the family over its offspring in the development and continuation of political orientation, especially considering that the family has more influence when its members are close and when it has continuous interaction (ibid, 117–18).

According to Davies (1965, 17) this will lead to a conflict between the traditional and modern: traditionally the family acts as a shield protecting its members against the outside world, but also protecting the family's autonomy and integrity. When its position is threatened the family is likely to withdraw from political life. However, if children, especially the youth, interpret the influence from the outside world as an opportunity and not a threat, conflict between parents and children is likely. As a result, the family will lose its influence in the political socialisation process, which will be taken over by the school, peers and other organisations.

5.1.1.2 School as socialisation agent

Second to the family, the school communicates knowledge about a particular society to the child and is therefore important in the child's development. The period between early childhood and late adolescence (to be discussed later in greater detail) is crucial in any person's development. Not only learning but also *what* a child learns is important. Overall, two factors are essential in understanding the impact of schools on the political socialisation process: first, learning cultural values and traditions that are based on the level of interaction with children from other ethnic, social and cultural backgrounds will impact on how

‘acceptable’ the person might be to these differences later in his/her life; second, education or the lack thereof is certainly not the only factor playing a role in the radicalisation process; it is also the *type* of education the person receives that needs be considered.

In addition to the above two factors, teachers play an equally important role. Keeping in mind that trust is a central component in determining the influence a socialisation agent will have on an individual, teachers who are trusted by the majority of their students will play an active socialisation role (Koff and von der Muhll 1967, 24). What the teacher transmits to the child will therefore be equally important in the political socialisation process.

Diversity in schools. The school is the first major institution where most children experience a larger and more diversified community of peers and authority figures than at home or in the smaller, neighbourhood peer groups. From these new interactions a young child learns how to express and solve collective problems, how to assert and protect rights in competition with others, and about the possibilities of social cooperation or conflict.

The social categories a child develops in the family become the backdrop against which the child will identify with others and develop prejudices. A segregated society, based on racial, religious, ethnic and social class, and a segregated school system could heighten the tendency towards rigid and inaccurate stereotyping. This basic framework provides and serves as a ‘filter’ through which a person interprets the world around him/her. When the child later in life interacts with people outside his/her social classification, these individuals can become confused, especially when own experiences contradict existing perceptions. Increased contact between various groups in society therefore aids cooperation among groups and replaces patterns of discrimination and hostility. Social composition and interaction between different ethnic, religious and cultural groups from a young age will enable better understanding

between people from different backgrounds. This affects his/her way of viewing their social and political world and assists, or prevents, the development of community identification. These experiences can ultimately work directly against the socialisation of the family as contact with other people facilitates understanding and cooperation between groups. It can help create intergroup cooperation and harmony, or isolation and conflict (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 168–69).

Subgroups – based on racial, religious, ethnic and social class – will still develop, seeking to promote group values and to differentiate themselves specifically from the rest of society. In doing so they will establish their own school system, primarily to keep their members from close contact with other groups in society. By limiting the social diversity of their schools and keeping their children out of more socially integrated public schools, particular in-group feelings and loyalties can be promoted (ibid, 169–70).

Although this is a severe example of subgroup identity, peer groups, based on the same class system mentioned above, can also form within a student body. These peer groups provide a student with a feeling of integration and help him/her adjust to school life (Langton 1969, 123). Peer groups will be discussed separately below.

Level of education and political participation. In addition to a person's exposure to other subgroups (level of diversity) while being educated, the level of education a person receives equally impacts on how he/she will perceive the world of politics.

A better-educated individual tends to participate more in politics (conventional) and for the following reasons (Almond and Verba 1963, 380–81). First, individuals who have been better educated feel that they can influence the political process more than a less-educated person,

especially considering that an educated person is also able to articulate opinions better. Second, the person is more aware of the impact of government on the individual. Having more information, this person is expected to have opinions on a wider range of political topics. Furthermore, the person is more likely to engage in political discussions with a wider range of people, while those with less education are more likely to report that there are many people with whom they avoid such discussions. Third, the more educated individual is also more likely to express confidence in the political process and is more likely to be an active member of a legitimate political organisation.

In addition to the above, the level of education also has additional benefits that will impact on political opinions and participation (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 177–78): Better-educated persons have different reading habits, travel experiences, friendships and leisure activities that will have an impact on information, impacting on opinions. The educated are more accustomed to collective decision-making and actively participating in social and political organisations. An educated person also acquires different attitudes, most notably the impression of political competence and the ability to influence political developments through political participation. Lastly, educated individuals, due to their higher social and economic status, usually have a greater stake in society in that political events have a direct effect on their political well-being. These individuals might participate more in politics out of a need to protect their ‘investments’.

This analysis originated during a time when educated people had better access to information, which, in turn, impacted on their level of participation in political processes. Since then, information has become increasingly available to all levels of society, to the extent that even less-educated people from all walks of life are bombarded with information. Despite access to information, a more relevant aspect at the time of this study is the *quality* of information. The

level of education may still impact on the ability of an individual to interpret information. In other words, a person who achieved a higher level of education should be able to process and interpret information more efficiently than a less-educated person. Notwithstanding these elements, another factor needs to be introduced: the type or even the quality of education a person receives.

Quality and type of education. When one considers the profiles of individuals previously radicalised, it is increasingly apparent that being educated does not necessarily mean that an individual's personal horizon has expanded. In many cases, the type of education might even narrow the individual's understanding of the world around him/her.

When the primary educational focus is on science and technology, and on black-and-white facts, it leads to a situation where children and young adults are seldom taught to question. Consequently, when confronted with philosophical questions, they are at a loss, making them extremely susceptible to a world categorised as black-and-white and right-and-wrong from a religious point of view, or us-versus-them. In this regard Gambetta and Hertog (2009, 216–17) notice that individuals studying engineering (including medicine and natural sciences) in both the Middle East, North Africa and Western countries were three to even four times more attracted to violent extremism than other degree holders. The two scholars explain their findings through among others referring to an 'engineering mindset' that is directly linked to personality. Based on this hypothesis, extremist recruiters are drawn to individuals that seek 'cognitive "closure" and clear-cut answers as opposed to more open-ended sciences – a disposition which has been empirically linked to conservative political attitudes'. The opposite was however found among left-wing extremists who were more drawn to law and humanities and right-wing extremists that were far less educated (ibid, 209–10).

Therefore, the defence against radicalisation – especially Islamist extremism – is not education per se (considering that terrorists are often educated), but rather the quality and type of education. While education is essential in ensuring a better future, students also need to learn from other disciplines, such as social sciences, history and philosophy to equip them to be open to other opinions, to argue intellectually and to understand domestic and international realities. As explained above, not starting at university level but at pre-school level, understanding diversity will be effective as part of a medium- to long-term strategy in preventing radicalisation and terrorism. It is therefore important to establish the level at which a person interacted with other people from different backgrounds, as this could explain if the subject developed stereotypes and prejudices early in life.

5.1.1.3 Peers and friends as socialisation agents

Within the context of this study, the term ‘peers’ refers to siblings, kinship and friends. The discussion of personality earlier in this chapter refers to siblings in the discussion of birth order. In addition to this first peer group (siblings), a child also does not have a say in choosing his extended family. In this regard, Schaefer (2013, 284) explains that, within sociology, kinship means:

[...] the state of being related to others. Kin groups include aunts, uncles, cousins, in-laws, and so forth. Kinship ties frequently create obligations and responsibilities.

Especially relevant to this study is the observation made by Beck (1977, 131) that kinship relations have a more predominant position in traditional societies to the extent that peer groups do not typically form and therefore play a limited role in the political socialisation process. Influencing identity formation (to be discussed in the next chapter), having stronger ties with family members should have other implications. It is especially expected that an individual will relate and trust members of his/her kin more than a complete stranger. In the study of terrorism, other members of a cell or larger terrorist organisation often include direct

and extended family members. Family and kinship ties will therefore be another element in assessing the role these socialisation agents play in radicalisation.

The majority of friendships are formed with people with whom the person has something in common: age, interests, attitudes, a value system and outlook or position, and social background (ibid, 132). Taking over from parents, friends teach a child how to socially interact.

With this said, not all individuals are equally susceptible to peer influence. Silbiger (1977, 173–77) identifies a number of factors that influence a person's susceptibility. The first is personality. For example, McIntyre and Platania (2009, 18) identify Type A personalities as being more likely to conform to group pressure. Individuals experiencing social anxiety also cope better through conforming. Young people with secure identities, while driven by idealism, are vulnerable when a particular peer becomes an important role model or inspiration for ideological development and/or participation. As one gains in security and stability of self-identification, one is more likely to seek rewards from oneself rather than from any single 'other' (Silbiger 1977, 173–77). The second factor refers to pre-existing beliefs. Considering that individuals, including children, socialise with others they share a common or familiar background with, it is to be expected that peers will reinforce existing beliefs. A third factor relates to the social or demographic position in which social class may closely relate to family structure and associated values that will itself impact on political socialisation. Fourth, endurance or interaction over an extended period can change an individual's opinions. In the fifth instance, the size, considering that conformity within a group increases when the group consists of five to eight members and declines when membership increases beyond eight. Lastly, the homogeneity within a group can facilitate maintaining similar opinions (ibid, 173–77).

In order to understand the influence of friends, one needs to appreciate that when influence increases and what an individual receives in return. According to Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 129–30), family influence wanes at 13 or 14 years of age, and various peer groups become significant as political socialisation agents. This is the time when basic political orientations and knowledge have been fairly well established. This is also the period when the individual begins to take a more active interest and participation in specifically political affairs – when they begin to anticipate and in some instances assume adult political roles. Political socialisation during adolescence will be discussed later in this chapter.

Assessing the influence of the family and peer groups, Silbiger (1977, 181) finds that young people are more likely to turn to parents when it comes to what is expected of them as adults, but when it comes to more contemporary or generational concerns, young people turn to peers. These findings imply that young people would rather follow peers on political and other contemporary issues.

In the social development process of children in developed countries, peer groups are especially important as parents are not able to prepare their children for traditional societies, especially since transitional societies, other than modern states, are not based on kinship ties. The family is therefore less suitable in preparing the person for his or her role in society (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 128). Mishra (2003, 60) explains that an individual may become involved in political activities because of the influence of friends. In these cases, individuals change their attitudes and ideas and increasingly present the behaviour pattern as desired by their close circle of friends.

In the case of Kenya and Uganda, the following statement may sound accurate: ‘Individuals, but especially young people look progressively more towards peers, rather than to their elders

and social authorities, for cues regarding social and political behaviour.’ Understandably, friends play a very important role in any person’s life, but during early adolescence, when a person becomes politically more conscious, young adults are particularly vulnerable to the opinions of their peers. Peer influence during adolescence will play a prominent role in radicalisation, especially when considering the assessment of Langton (1969, 123) that the individual’s alienation from his/her family increases as the influence of peer groups over political opinions intensifies.

In addition to the extended influence of peers and friends, the individual’s perception of ‘self’ and the world is determined by group relationships (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 134–35). Peers have more influence over the individual when the group members are in agreement. Divided or conflicting political orientations will be less likely to influence an individual’s political orientations. Through focusing on politics peer groups are most likely to serve as agents of political socialisation when politics is important to the group and when the group deliberately attempts to convey political messages. Peer groups therefore provide an individual with an understanding of his/her political self and interpretation and understanding of the political world and how he/she fits into it.

Furthermore, importance and influence relate to the level of influence peers have over the particular person, which is determined in part by the strength of the relationship. The more important the more likely it is that the person will be influenced. Through socialisation individuals are motivated or pressured into conforming to attitudes and behaviour accepted by the group. Individuals adopt the views of their close friends because they like or respect them, or because they want to be like them. An individual may develop an interest in politics and come to follow political events simply because of his/her close friends. Therefore, behaviour and interests are modelled after that of his/her friends.

The strength of peer groups is therefore based on two prime pillars: the emotional link between the individual and the peer group, and the access the individual has to the specific peer group, and vice versa (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 132).

According to Dawson and Prewitt (*ibid*, 138–39), two exceptions to the general pattern exist. In the first instance, the social backgrounds of close associates are consequential for the role of primary relationships in political socialisation after childhood. If adult associates are of a social and economic background similar to that of an individual's family, they are likely to reinforce the political learning that took place in the family during an earlier period. In the second, if they are not like the individual's family, they are most likely to alter his/her previous political learning.

Adults, especially in complex societies, belong to numerous peer groups. An individual develops primary associates in almost any social structure or secondary group to which he/she belongs. Various peer groups may offer similar or conflicting political cues to the same individual. The general tendency is for political and social pressures of one's various primary associates to be harmonious and consistent.

While one would expect that peer groups enforce existing socialisation patterns established by the family, conflict starts when the individual moves from one area to another, thereby opening the person up to other peer groups with different roots and influences. The possibility for conflict depends on the degree to which the two worlds differ from each other.

Recognising the positive and negative influences friends have in a person's development and decision-making process, the role of family and friendship plays in the radicalisation process is unmistakable. In one of the better-known examples, Mark Sageman (2004, 111 and 113)

finds that 150 of his subjects were friends before they joined 'the global jihad'. When he combined friendship and kinship ties, 75% of his subjects were in 'social bonds' with individuals already involved in the global jihad or decided to join a group with friends or relatives.

5.1.1.4 Groups as socialisation agents

To explain the influence of groups, we first need to understand what is meant by the term 'group'. 'In sociological terms, a group is a number of people with similar norms, values, and expectations who interact with one another on a regular basis' (Schaefer 2013, 107). Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (1960, 46) define a group as 'a class of social entities having in common the property of interdependence among their constituent members'.

In addition to peer groups, sociology distinguishes between different types of groups that are useful in recognising the role these different groups play in the political socialisation process (Schaefer 2013, 108–09). Primary groups refer to a small group categorised by intimate, face-to-face interaction. Primary groups play a pivotal role both in the socialisation process and in the development of roles and the person's status. Secondary groups are categorised as a formal and impersonal group in which there is little social intimacy or mutual understanding. These groups emerge in the workplace among people who share special circumstances.

In-groups are any group or category to which people feel they belong. Simply put, it comprises everyone who is regarded as 'we' or 'us'. The in-group may be as narrow as a teenage clique or as broad as an entire ethnic or religious community. In-group members typically feel distinct and superior, seeing themselves as better than people in the out-group. This double standard enhances the sense of superiority. In contrast, the very existence of an in-group implies that there is an out-group that is viewed as 'they' or 'them'. An out-group is

a group or category to which people feel they do not belong. Conflict between in-groups and out-groups can turn violent on a personal as well as a political level (Schaefer 2013, 108–09).

Both primary groups and in-groups can dramatically influence how an individual thinks and behaves. Sociologists call any group that individuals use as a standard for evaluating themselves and their own behaviour a ‘reference group’. Reference groups have two basic purposes: they set and enforce standards of conduct and belief, and they provide a standard against which people can measure themselves and others. Lastly, coalitions serve as a temporary or permanent alliance geared toward a common goal. Coalitions can be broad-based or narrow (ibid, 108–09).

Associated with in-, out- and reference groups are social groupings that refer to socially significant categories such as social class, income level, occupation, race, religious affiliation and national, regional and tribal origin. Individuals belong to these groupings because they have certain physical attributes, or hold specified beliefs, or belong to particular social aspects of society (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 181).

It is, however, in- and out-groups that form the basis of the social-identification theories that will be referred to in the next chapter. In addition to the above categorisation, Cartwright and Zander (1968, 54) identify three circumstances in which groups might form. First, deliberate or task-orientated groups form to accomplish a particular objective. Political groups in most cases fall in this category (Cottam et al. 2004, 64). Second, spontaneous groups consist of people who spontaneously come together. The group’s composition is determined by mutual consent, meaning that each member wants to be in the relationship and each is accepted, or at least not rejected, by others. A basic condition for the forming of a spontaneous group is that the individuals involved need to have sufficient contact with one another. Third, external

designation or a group of homogeneous people forms after being treated as a collective by other people. Although there are several ways in which people can be categorised in society, the most common is based on ethnicity, religion, social status, etc. People behave differently toward people in these categories. This perceptual or cognitive segregation leads to behavioural segregation. Members of a certain defined category (ethnicity, religion, social status) find that certain kinds of behaviour are expected of them, and that certain opportunities are available to them or denied due to their membership of that category. This interdependence among members develops as a result of this designation.

The extent to which an individual identifies with the group measures solidarity within a group. This will have an impact on socialisation, but also on the way its own members and the broader society will perceive the group. Focusing on the inner dynamics, the group is therefore not only important from a socialisation perspective; it also serves as an introduction to the inner workings – at least on a social level – of groups resorting to violence, including terrorism. The impact of groups on identity will again be referred to in the next chapter when social-identity theory and the role religion and ethnicity play in driving an individual to collective action will be presented.

Group identification is defined as:

[...] a set of preconscious and unconscious attitudes which incline each member to apperceive the group as an extension of himself and impel him to remain in direct contact with the other members and to adhere to the group's standards (Janis 1968, 80).

Associated with group identification, group cohesiveness contributes to a group's influence and strength as it heightens the importance of being a member to those who belong to the group (Cartwright 1968, 91).

It is expected that a person will not join or remain a member if there are no benefits. In other words, the group needs to be attractive. Cartwright (ibid, 96) identifies four variables to determine a person's attraction to a group. First, the group's motive provides security, recognition or even a financial benefit. Second, incentives offered by the group in turn contribute to the attractiveness of its members, starting with the type of function the group serves in the mind of an individual. Third, when the group serves as an anchor, it affirms the attitudes that form part of an individual's identity, making the group more attractive (Campbell 1980, 325). Fourth, similarities among members with respect to values, interest, attitudes and beliefs will further enhance the appeal of the group. Additionally, having a distinctive goal or purpose will attract people with similar objectives. The members will also develop interpersonal bonds that will make the group attractive to other members.

Interdependence among members occurs when the members of a group accept a common goal and agree on actions required to reach that goal. Members therefore gain satisfaction from contributing towards its common goal. A common threat to its members, posed by a common enemy or opponent, will equally draw members together. Group activities further contribute in making a group attractive to its members. Membership of a group means that a person gets involved in certain activities. Subsequently, an individual's evaluation of these activities will affect the pull of the group (ibid, 103).

Groups associated with strong leadership – especially democratic leadership – and decision-making abilities should be more attractive than one with an autocratic or laissez-faire leadership. By the same token, people with different values and attitudes may react quite differently to the same type of leadership. Research has found that satisfaction is higher among members of groups with a decentralised network than a centralised one. However, if a

person has a specific role within the group it will enhance attraction to the group. Group size provides that the larger the group becomes, the less effective it will be (ibid, 103).

Cottam et al. (2004, 66) identify the following factors that further enhance group cohesion. First, the time spent, in which the more time people spend together, the more cohesive the group. Second, an external threat, or a perceived external threat, will even further enhance the cohesiveness by increasing the us-versus-them mindset. Lastly, deindividuation is called for, in that the more individualistic members are, the less likely these individuals will be to conform or act as a collective. The effect of deindividuation on conformity manifests when people ascribe their behaviour as being part of the group's behaviour. When acting in a group, people consequently feel less responsible for their actions, as when they would if they committed the group's activities alone. Acting in a group therefore leads to a diffusion of responsibility (ibid, 72).

These factors contribute considerably to individuals joining the ADF, the LRA, the MRC and al-Shabaab, especially considering its legal status. Individuals associated with these groups, and as Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 133) explain, membership of smaller groups (especially cells) has consequences. Most notably, research has shown that members of small groups tend to think and act alike. This would imply that an individual's values are increasingly based on his/her relationships and associations with others within a group.

Janis (1972) refers to this phenomenon as 'groupthink' and describes it as:

[...] an irrational style of thinking that causes group members to make poor decisions
(Cottam et al. 2004, 80).

What is important in this regard is to keep in mind that terrorist groups, including terrorist cells, can easily be trapped in 'groupthink'. Some of the most important causes and

consequences of groupthink is isolation, the presence of a direct leader and stress. Isolation provides that discussions and decisions made in secret or isolation will entail that other members of the group or broader society will not have an opportunity to correct wrong perceptions or the incorrect information a decision is based on (Cottam et al. 2004, 81). Discussions with people with different opinions force people to constantly rethink and refine their position. While sharing one's opinions with people who hold similar viewpoints will reinforce one's position, it will also identify common problems and provoke collective action (Quintelier, Stolle and Harell 2011, 2).

The presence of a strong leader with almost absolute power can contribute to groupthink. Not allowing equal opinions among all members often leads to a situation where the leader is told what members think he wants to hear. Being under stress further contributes to the group becoming smaller and, in effect, contributes to the first two circumstances mentioned above (Cottam et al. 2004, 81).

This level of group cohesiveness will also have consequences for its members. Cartwright (1968, 103–05) identifies three primary consequences. First, the power the group has over its members will determine the influence the group has over its members. Consequently, a more cohesive group will accept the group's goals, decisions and assignment more readily. Second, participation and loyalty increase as cohesiveness increases. This will lead to more frequent communication among members and a greater degree of participation in in-group activities. Third, group cohesion will have direct consequences for the individual, in the form of acceptance, trust and confidence among group members. Assessing cohesion, respondents will be asked to consider the level of belonging they have experienced at the time of joining and again while being members of the ADF, the LRA, the MRC and al-Shabaab.

It is clear that groups can play a significant role in socialisation – in this case the political socialisation of the individual. Although the original predispositions or attractiveness – similar norms, values and expectations as mentioned above – of the individual to the group have to be present, its influence can be significant. Although terrorist organisations or groups will not be discussed at this stage, the principles mentioned above are equally applicable to understand the influence of these types of organisation on the individual. What is important is to keep in mind that terrorist organisations bring with them a higher level of secrecy, isolation and purpose, which is expected to further enhance cohesion and the power of the group over the individual.

5.1.2 Secondary relationships

Secondary relationships are categorised as more formal and impersonal social settings. They include political parties, political experiences, the mass media and other institutions that are not directly involved with the individual (ibid, 100).

Secondary groups can be broadly divided into three groups (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, 186–87): groups with a political agenda, which include political parties and youth groups involved in informing the public, bordering on indoctrination; groups established for non-political purposes but which conduct political education and mobilisation – religious groups with a political message often initiate political indoctrination programmes among their group activities, influencing political opinions; and groups that unintentionally are involved in political socialisation. It is especially the second type of secondary group that might serve as ‘front’ to indoctrinate and radicalise susceptible individuals.

As with other socialisation agents, the importance of the group is determined by the time spent with that particular agent and its importance to the individual. Additionally, if the group is relevant to the individual, its policies will be accepted.

Early political experiences will have a direct impact on the level of trust the person will have in the efficiency or worth of the political process. This starts at the family level: children growing up in families where politics is discussed, or where parents are interested in politics, are more likely to see the value of participating in political process. This ripples through to peer groups in which the level of political discussion will mirror the sense of political efficacy: in groups where politics is seldom, if ever, discussed, members will place a question mark behind the value of political participation, and vice versa (Langton and Karns 1969, 146).

Then there are actual events that will impact on political socialisation in contributing to political perceptions and values. Political learning does not occur in isolation from the world of politics (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 191). Orum (1976, 154) supports this notion and explains that events have a substantial impact on how people, especially the youth, interpret the world around them. Consequently, due to the fact that young people are more affected by world events, one may notice a difference in how young people versus adults not only perceive a political event but also how they respond to it. In this regard, the events leading to, and the aftermath of, 9/11 had a significant impact on the world, including in the Horn of Africa (this includes Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) when referring to al-Shabaab.

The media (newspapers, radio, television and the Internet) not only provides information but can also actively influence a person's political orientations, positively as well as negatively. The role the media plays in political socialisation is not a new topic for discussion. Dawson

and Prewitt in the late 1960s, for example, noted that technological advancements enabled the media to increasingly play an active role in weakening traditional social structures, most notably the family and the local community. Not only influencing the social fabric, mass media since then increasingly shaped political orientations (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 194).

This analysis is becoming increasingly relevant. According to Cohen in 1963, the media not only influences opinions while it reports news but also set the news agenda through influencing people what to think (Cottam et al. 2004, 140). Setting the agenda – that is, deciding on which events to broadcast or publish and in what context – gives the media a lot of power. One can broadly differentiate between local and international media, each with its own role in the political socialisation process: the national media, which is, in most cases, state-controlled, focuses on maintaining the status quo, thereby maintaining the balance of power in line with other socialisation agents (especially the family and school); and the international media, which, since its inception, has had a different agenda that will be discussed in greater detail below.

The media also facilitates political socialisation: the better people are informed, the more they will use media content in interpersonal communication (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, 286). In evaluating mass media as a political socialisation agent (with specific reference to national media), the following observations are worth noting: the media acts as transmitters of political cues initiated by other agencies; the media can reinforce existing political orientations rather than create new ones; and the messages transmitted by the mass media and the manner in which they are received and interpreted will be determined by the social setting and the context of socially conditioned predispositions (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 197).

The last observation is probably still the most relevant. However, Silbiger (1977, 184) adds another variable – the personality of the individual – in differentiating between leaders and followers in how people will interpret information. According to his theory both leaders and followers are expected to get their original information from media sources. The difference comes when information reported is inconsistent with his/her own pre-existing beliefs: while followers will seek out opinions from peers, leaders will either form their own opinions or ask for advice from experts.

It is, however, interesting to note that the role or importance of the media has changed considerably, especially with the introduction of the Internet and transnational satellite television. During the late 1960s, Dawson and Prewitt did not consider the media as an equal role player in the political socialisation process. At that particular point in time, the media served as an instrument through which other socialisation agencies communicated their messages. Media bosses had a limited say in what sort of political information they transmitted to the population, to the extent that a number of studies found that the mass media did not influence its audiences directly. The media was therefore not regarded as the most effective means through which people were introduced to new ideas, especially since there were no guarantees that information would reach those at whom it was directed (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 197).

The above interpretation has changed considerably since then. To explain its influence, a distinction is made between international and national media: international media, in contrast to national media, has as its main focus a change in the recipient's opinions. Globalisation also changed the nature of the media and enhanced its reach. In recent years, media establishments advanced beyond national boundaries to create transnational spaces for political discourse and mobilisation. These developments enabled the creation of new

‘audiences’ that politically define themselves within these new information environments, no longer based on their respective nationalities (Nisbet and Myers 2010, 347).

Traditionally, international media access was seen as a means of facilitating social development (enhancing the quality of life and education), and of encouraging economic modernisation and political democratisation within newly established countries. The hope was that when people in the developing world saw how people in the Western or developed world lived, it would raise ‘expectations and aspirations, widening horizons, ultimately enabling people to want better alternatives for themselves’ (Loveless 2009, 120–21).

In other words, the values of the country that transmitted or broadcast were set as the norm in an attempt to culturally expose those not adhering to these values and norms to encourage them to adopt what is presented. Within this context international media began to play a more active role in the political socialisation process. Also, the medium – television – provided an added advantage, exposing its audience to events, developments and even personalities beyond traditional national borders. People are, in other words, introduced to a much larger world than they traditionally encounter on a daily basis. Consequently, this broader perspective nurtures international values and attitudes, thereby introducing alternative cultural, political and economic options to its audience (ibid, 122).

Nisbet and Myers (2010, 349) add to the above and explain that the television transmitting international news ‘undermined the traditional relationship between physical location and access’. Consequently, the world became smaller but most recipients were not directly affected by the ‘stories’. Although people became more involved through relieving the plight of others after natural disasters (for example, the drought in Ethiopia that increased foreign aid donation), not sharing a common bond (nationality or ethnic and religious background)

did not maximise the media's political socialisation potential – at least until al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya entered the stage.

According to Nisbet and Myers (*ibid*) in an article on transnational television and identity in the Middle East, the power of international media rests with its ability to establish collective political identities that are not necessarily bounded by traditional national borders or political institutions. These new identities are therefore based on shared regional, cultural, linguistic or religious frameworks. That is particularly what al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya managed to do in eroding national political identity and replacing it with a transnational identity based on ethnicity (Arab) and religion (Islam). Cherribi (2006) explains that al-Jazeera managed to build a global Muslim identity, mobilise a collective public opinion, and create an imaginary transnational Muslim community (Nisbet and Myers 2010, 352).

Al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya managed to achieve this by reporting on issues that had a pan-Arab and pan-Muslim connotation, such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq from a Muslim and Arab perspective that were in contrast to the angle of the Western media (CNN and the BBC) and even state media. Equally, not being able to control what was being reported, al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya found themselves in conflict with authorities in Muslim countries, which further enhanced their appeal, especially among the youth that were until then less politically active (in the traditional spectrum of conventional political participation) (*ibid*, 352).

Creating a 'perfect storm', social media continues where al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya left off. The better people are informed the more they will discuss politics and the more they will participate, in turn facilitating revolutions (the Arab Spring) driven by the youth. Facilitated by the Internet, it is particularly the youth that utilises these new venues for political participation. Through blogs, social network sites, user-generated news (YouTube) and

specific websites, individuals and organisations are now able to (from anywhere in the world) engage in activities aimed at influencing governments and their policies. An important spinoff of this development is that the more people feel that they can influence developments, the more it provides them with an additional incentive to participate (Valenzuela, Kim and de Zúñiga 2012, 164).

Therefore, notwithstanding the limited influence of media bosses on what types of stories or articles are being distributed (at least during the 1960s), the focus should rather be on the individual receiving the information. Based on the limited effects model:

[...] the person is committed to a particular line of political behaviour, and this precedes and controls communication inputs from the mass media; consequently, one sees and hears only that portion of available media offerings that is congenial to attitudinal “predispositions” that have already been built up. At one level, this is undeniable; it is clear that early learning structures the child’s acquisition of later information and the evaluative meanings he will attach to it (Chaffee, Jackson-Beeck, Durall and Wilson 1977, 224).

Reaction to the message communicated by the media rests on the following factors (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 199): the social location of the individual receiving it, which will also determine the medium and type of message; and the individual’s preconditions and perceptions, which influence how information will be interpreted.

International media, most notably al-Jazeera and the Internet, did not only facilitate political participation among the youth, which drastically changed the political landscape in North Africa and the Middle East, it also serves as an important radicalisation medium to terrorism.

5.2 Socialisation process

A description of *when* and *how* political awareness occurs is now important. Theories presented by political sociology on when and to what extent a young person becomes

politically socialised came under intense scrutiny during the late 1960s and 1970s. Overall there are two positions on when political socialisation occurs: the first focuses almost exclusively on early childhood, while the second minimises the impact of early socialisation and rather focus on the later internalisation of ‘attitudes, values, norms, stereotypes, community and culture’ (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, 284). Both recognise that political socialisation is a continuous process.

The objective of this study is not to choose between one of the two but rather to acknowledge that political socialisation is an ongoing process and that the individual learns different things at different times from the political socialisation agents discussed above. To explain this process, four stages can be identified: childhood; adolescence; adulthood; and being elderly. The focus will be on the first two, while briefly referring to the third. Before discussing when, how political socialisation occurs need to be referred to.

Recognising that political ideas and principles do not suddenly appear, Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 47–48) explain that early political learning occurs along with other social learning. As the child begins to become aware of the political world, he/she also becomes aware of other societal groupings and definitions of him-/herself in relation to them. During this process, a person comes to realise if he/she is rich or poor, belongs to an elite or oppressed minority group, and if he/she is part of a particular nationality or tribe. These subgroup identities are important because through them the individual interprets and relates to the political world. Through this process group identities become part of the core of the person’s political self. The consequences of these developing associations with a specific religious and ethnic group will be discussed in Chapter 3. The primary objective of this section is to place the political development of a child to adolescent in the context of *when* specific developments occur.

5.2.1 When political socialisation occurs

The cognitive theory of development provides essential insights into the socialisation process among children in relation to the individual's individual characteristics and external environment. According to this theory, what is learned early is reprocessed, reshaped and re-understood over and over again as the individual's cognitive capacity develops through the various stages (Peterson and Somit 1982, 327). The theories of Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg will be referred to briefly: Erikson, through his theory of identity formation, explains that: 'The personality of an individual faces a variety of cultural variations which contribute towards the socialisation of the individual. Hence, socialisation and personality development do not stop in childhood; instead they are life-long processes' (Mishra 2003, 38). In his identity versus role diffusion, Erikson explains that identity, which is formed during adolescence, involves four conflicts (Salkind 1990, 563): task identification versus a sense of futility; anticipation of roles versus role inhibitions; the will to be oneself versus self-doubt; and mutual recognition versus autistic isolation.

Piaget focuses on the cognitive or intellectual aspects of socialisation which occur in stages, referring to four identifiable stages a child has to go through to acquire the ability to think, know and reason (Schaefer 2013, 85). The fifth stage refers to adolescents and will be discussed in the next section. The first stage is the sensorimotor period, which starts at birth and lasts until 18 months to two years of age. During this period the child uses their senses to discover the world around them.

During the preoperational thought period, between 18 months or two to seven years of age, the child begins to use words and symbols to distinguish between ideas and objects (Schaefer 2013, 85). With regards to ethnic cognition, the child's awareness of race is at this stage based on biological features (Sears and Levi 2003, 67).

The concrete operations stage occurs between seven to 12 or 13 years of age. During this period ‘children are no longer bound actually to physically manipulate objects; they can now manipulate them in their mind’ (Peterson 1983, 267). With regards to ethnic understanding, the children develop the ability to understand the more subtle aspects associated with ethnicity, language, customs, etc. During this period children also start to explore their own ethnic and/or religious identity, which also involves joining ethnicity/religious-based peer groups (Sears and Levi 2003, 67–68).

In the formal operational thought stage the person develops the ability to think in ‘hypothetical and deductive terms’ (Peterson 1983, 267). Ethnic and/or religious identity is established at this stage. Positive acceptance of the person’s own ethnic and/or religious identity may lead to greater self-esteem and ego-identity (Sears and Levi 2003, 68–69). Through this process, four outcomes can be identified: physical and mental maturation; experience and knowledge; social interaction and transmission; and equilibration or auto-regulation, ‘by which individuals actively participate in the developmental process through coordination of multiple activities which lead to intellectual behavior’ (Peterson 1983, 268). What is especially important is that, according to Piaget, socialisation is an ongoing process through which people constantly adapt to the world around them through assimilation and accommodation (ibid, 268). Peterson and Somit (1982, 325) explain the difference between these two processes as follows: assimilation occurs when new information and experience fit into an existing framework, and accommodation takes place when the existing framework is altered to facilitate new information.

Kohlberg also refers to the cognitive process, but in addition to ‘the acquisition of cognitive skills, a child develops an abstract sense of right and wrong, that is, moral judgement, in the different stages of his personal development’ (Mishra 2003, 39).

It is really only during adolescence that a person is able to develop the abstract reasoning skills and the capacity for mutual, socio-centric thought that is crucial for understanding politics and applying principles to problematic situations associated with politics (Sigel and Hoskin 1977, 264). Adolescence is a crucial period in the political socialisation process. Although different interpretations exist of the exact age adolescence refers to, this study will consider the period between puberty (ages 12 to 17) and early adulthood (ages 18 to 22) as especially formative. It is also at this stage that a person is at their most impressionable and most open to outside influence, because they are becoming increasingly aware of the social and political world around them at the same time that they are establishing their identity and political 'self' (Sears and Levy 2003, 83). To understand this one needs to consult psychology and sociology to understand what happens to a person during adolescence. First, the individual forms an identity between the ages of 12 and 16 and children develop the ability to think ideologically (Peterson and Somit 1982, 324). Ideological thinking refers to a person's ability to politically identify with subgroups in society, also a crucial step in establishing a person's political 'self' (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 50). Establishing an identity will be taken up again in the next chapter.

Second, a person's self-esteem, referring to the degree a person values him- or herself, is formed. Finding a correlation between self-esteem and political participation comes down to the fact that liking oneself and feeling personally competent will promote social participation in general and political participation in particular (Gergen and Ullman 1977, 425).

Third, individuals form 'worldview beliefs' that manifests during later childhood and early adolescence and that influence how individuals perceive, interpret and respond to their social and interpersonal environments. Two worldview types were identified (Duckitt and Sibley 2010, 1869). Under the dangerous worldview the person perceives the world as 'inherently

dangerous, unpredictable, and threatening as opposed to safe, stable and secure place'. Measuring high in social conformity to the existing social and political order, the individual not only identifies with the existing order, but also considers external threats as threats to collective security. Insecurity, uncertainty and actual or perceived danger will stimulate this worldview (Duckitt and Sibley 2010, 1867–68; 1874). Alternatively, under the competitive jungle worldview, the individual interprets the world as 'a ruthlessly competitive jungle in which might is right, the strong win, and the weak lose, as opposed to a place of cooperative harmony, in which people care for, help and share with each other'. A person who possesses this view of the world is motivated by dominance or superiority over others. Group dominance is a central component of this attitude. Group dominance, competition, inequality and scarcity in resources will advance this worldview. The origins of the above attitude can be traced to individual personalities; long-term exposure (socialisation) to the beliefs of others in the social group the person shares with others; and direct exposure to the particular environment (ibid, 1869).

In examining the role of personality in the political orientations of adolescent and early adulthood, Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi (2012, 35) explain that 'young [people] are more susceptible to political tides because they have relatively weak attitudes that do not crystallize until their mid to late twenties'. Being more 'open' means that younger people are more affected by external events and are therefore more driven to act on those experiences. In other words, because a young person does not have significant life experience, personality is driving involvement, whereas an older person, possibly the leader of the organisation, is rather driven by experience than the person who initially introduced him or her to the cause (Cutin, Steward and Duncan 2010, 963).

Young people are particularly active and susceptible to influences during their mid- to late-teens. It is therefore not surprising that it is during this period that people are the most susceptible to be radicalised and recruited into terrorist organisations. According to Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 174–75), a student's political development tends to radicalise political orientations. Whatever political views a student has, they tend to be intensified and radicalised during student life. Several factors may explain this phenomenon, for example, the student is living out his political views in a highly emotional situation, as part of a collective which gives him support and strengthens his political commitments. At that particular time in the person's life he/she might feel shut out of normal paths of political expression, being sometimes too young to vote or ignored by their elders in traditional societies. At this particular time in a person's life the individual generally has few direct responsibilities in his society and therefore fewer limitations.

As described above (political experiences), young people are more affected by world events than adults. Sears and Levi (2003, 61) describe these as 'storm and stress', which cause individuals to be easily drawn into unconventional political behaviour. Therefore, the broad characteristics of the youth need to be taken into consideration, most notably how they respond when coming in contact with political and social ideas. Because they are not used to the realities of political and economic participation, are more idealistic and reform-minded, they can be impatient with the 'compromising methods' of their elders (Sigel and Hoskin 1977, 265). This would imply that the youth are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation for two primary reasons. First, about the impatience of the youth: a study between different age groups following racial violence during the 1960s in the US found that the youth felt estranged from the 'system' and more willing to change the political system, if necessary through the use of violence. Instead of accommodation or manipulation (the favourite political tactics of the older generation), the youth favour confrontation. In other words,

people initiate change to their political environment to meet their needs rather than remaining socialised to the environment (ibid, 286). This observation is applicable and relevant to all countries and societies marked by conflict.

Second, the political activities of ‘youth movements’ are often characterised by strivings for autonomy and independence from adults and adult values. The needs for autonomy may be particularly salient to the adolescent. However, as research suggests, persistent needs for autonomy may be developed in the pre-adolescent period. The political movement for autonomy-prone individual offers an opportunity to be integrated with an organised group while at the same time facilitating a break with parent-child attachments (Gergen and Ullman 1977, 419–20).

Despite the positive influence, peers and other social groupings – especially during adolescence – can have a negative influence on a person. Why is this the case? During adolescence the person, as part of the formalisation of their identity, goes through a process of value acquisition. Both parents and peers influence this process (Schmid 2012, 535): parents transfer basic cultural norms and values (keeping in mind that success is influenced by parental style and influence over the child), while peers, during adolescence, take over from parents and can reinforce deviant behaviour.

Explaining this form of rebellion, research (referring to a study conducted by Kerr et al. in 2003) shows that if the adolescent–parent relationship is characterised by limited trust, and if adolescents feel rejected or overly controlled, they are likely to generalise these negative feelings about their parents toward other adults (Schmid 2012, 536–37).

As mentioned earlier, authoritarian and permissive parenting styles contribute the most to rejection and rebellion. In the case of the former, McDevitt and Chaffee (2002, 288) warn that parent–child conflict would increase. Being not present, permissive parents cannot step in during this period of a person’s development and expect to be considered.

In contrast to early adulthood, two changes appear between the ages of 25 and 30: involvement with more extreme, or at least unorthodox, movements and/or ideologies abates, but participation in more conventional politics increases (Sigel and Hoskin 1977, 266).

5.2.2 How political socialisation occurs

Political learning occurs through direct and indirect processes. Indirect forms of political socialisation refer to the acquisition of predispositions which are not political in nature but which will influence the development of the political self. For example, the child, as a result of his relationships with parents, teachers and other non-political authorities, develops certain expectations from persons in authority. He acquires a general disposition toward authority – not particular authorities, but authority in general. If parents are tolerant, political leaders are regarded as progressive. If parents are rigid and doctrinaire, the same qualities are expected of political authorities. Indirect political learning involves two steps, acquiring a general predisposition and transferring it to political objects (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 63–64).

Direct political socialisation occurs through imitation, political education and participation. Imitation of a wide array of values, behaviours, skills, expectations and attitudes can be part of a conscious, deliberate effort, or it may involve unconscious copying of values and behavioural patterns from others. Consciously or not, children especially pick up an important part of social, cultural and religious preferences from adults and adopt them as their own. Imitation grows out of a need to be accepted (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 74). At the opposite

end, the child may also deliberately reject the values of parents or other authorities in an act of rebellion. Reverse imitation sometimes takes place among adolescents as they seek to shape an identity that differentiates them from parents and other authorities. Under certain conditions, especially when politics is highly salient to both the rebel and the ones rebelled against, this process can significantly alter the political self (ibid, 75).

Political education carried out by the family, the school, political or governmental agencies and other organisations intend to encourage loyalty, patriotism and support for political institutions. It includes activities such as commemorating national heroes and the singing of the national anthem, which is intended to bind the individual to his/her nation (ibid, 76–77). This is followed by political experiences that come from actual participation in the political process. Political participation relates to confidence that participating actually matters and count for something. For this process to have the desired outcome, a government needs to be responsive to the wishes of its people. Although adults traditionally learn more through political participation, children can also have specific political experiences that can condition their way of viewing the political world. The best example relates to experiences with the police in that a child who grows up in a slum will develop a very different picture of the police and political authority than a child who grows up in a more affluent area. While the child in the slum might see the police officer as a symbol of force, punishment and brutality, the middle-class child might possibly recognise a police officer as a figure who ‘helps elderly ladies across the street and rescues cats from the neighbourhood trees’ (ibid, 79–80).

6. CONCLUSION

Political socialisation is a continuous process that involves a number of agents, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, potentially peaking at different periods in a person's political development.

The theory also recognises that both the individual and the environment a person interacts with need to be considered. This chapter started with the individual and the socialisation agents involved in the development of the political 'self', most importantly the extent to which personality traits influence how the person interprets the world around him- or herself. The chapter continued explaining what, and in what manner, the individual learns from family, siblings, friends, peers, social groups, the media and even political experiences. The role the environment plays in the political socialisation process will be discussed in the next chapter.

In addition to presenting the basic theoretical principles of political socialisation, this chapter also identified the agents and processes associated with the socialisation process – most notably personality traits, family, peers, social groups, the media and political experiences – which will be used when analysing the profiles of, and conducting interviews with, members of the ADF, the LRA, the MRC and al-Shabaab.

Although political socialisation continues beyond childhood, the period up to adulthood is crucial in understanding perceptions, identity and, later, radicalisation. This chapter did not pay attention to political socialisation during adulthood, not because it is not important – a person can be radicalised at any time in life – but rather because the theory of political socialisation explains that a person's identity is established during early adulthood. Even

though changes may occur as a result of dramatic circumstances, the primary political socialisation agents will play a limited role under these circumstances.

Based on this chapter, a range of questions will be included in the questionnaire (attached as Appendix 1). Starting with **personality type**, the Jungian/MBTI test followed by Raskin and Terry's Narcissistic Personality Inventory-40 (NPI-40), will be used to determine respondents' personality types and narcissistic trends.

Reference to **family**, which in this case will include sibling and kinship ties will introduce the following questions: Did the person grow up with both parents? If not, which parent was absent? For what reason and at what stage did the particular parent disappear from the person's life, and at what age? Which parent took the lead and under which parental type did the person grow up (to assess the relationship the person had with his parents growing up)? What was the size of the family and the person's position in the family? Were other members of the person's family involved in the organisation (the ADF, the LRA or al-Shabaab)? Did the person join the organisation with other family members, or did a family member introduce the individual to the organisation?

To assess the role of **peers and friends** in the political socialisation process of respondents, the following questions will be asked: Did the person have a large or small group of friends? Did the person join the organisation with friends, or did a friend introduce the individual to the organisation?

It is expected that **education** will also play an important role as an agent in the political socialisation process of respondents. To determine its influence, respondents will be asked if

they attended school? If so, until what age and what was the highest scholastic level achieved?

Political socialisation not only includes the earlier **political experiences** of respondents but also refers to the political experiences of parents or the example set. To assess earlier political experiences, the following questions will be asked: Did the person grow up in a politically active family? Did the person ever vote in elections before joining the group? At what age did the person join the group and for what reason? The last question also serves as a bridge to identity, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Assessing the political socialisation process in hindsight, or working with individuals already radicalised, trying to trace the steps from being involved in terrorist organisations to periods associated with early development, does not come without some challenges, most importantly reaching an understanding of early childhood development. While an interview with a subject (a person involved in the mentioned terrorist organisations) will provide basic background, interviewing parents or close family members, who will be in a better position to provide insight into early development, is extremely valuable. But before any of this can be initiated, a better understanding of political socialisation is critical to this study.

CHAPTER 3: RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

1. INTRODUCTION

Building on the previous chapters which introduced the internal or personal dynamics of the socialisation process, this chapter will unpack the influence a person's ethnic and religious background has in the development of that person's political development. As presented in the previous chapters, early political socialisation establishes associations with, first, the family and, later, ethnic or tribal and religious associations. Being social beings we all have a need to be accepted and belong, and some have a greater need for this than others. Being a root of a person's identity, ethnicity and religion are by default also sources on which people are divided, in referring to in- and out-groups. Identity and religion can therefore bring people together or divide them. If they are divided, can this separation contribute to conflict? But what if more than one ethnic or religious group is found in a country? What is the relationship between ethnic and/or religious identity and national identity? Central to this interpretation process are perceptions and other emotions that will be presented in the next chapter under radicalisation.

Special reference in this chapter will be made to the social identity theory, the self-categorisation theory and the need to belong as being relevant to the practical part of this study. In contrast to ethnic and religious identity is national identity. Although all three can mutually exist in relative harmony, the focus will be on the consequences when people's ethnic or religious identity is stronger than their national identity.

2. IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY

A number of variables can be used to divide people, most notably ethnicity, gender, language, nationality and religion, to name a few. Diversity is seldom the only factor that contributes to a conflict situation. Instead, scholars realised that identity, or the manner in which individuals identify with others, could be a source of conflict. Why is this so? To answer this question it was found that when religion or ethnicity is linked to political or economic marginalisation, these differences are used to identify and justify the use of violence against the 'other'. The following section will clarify what is meant by identity, followed by reference to two of the most prominent theories explaining identity formation and its relation to others, namely, the social identity theory and the self-categorisation theory. The relationship between identity and radicalisation will become clear.

To start with, analysts refer to three forms of identity: personal, social and collective identity. **Personal identity** refers to that which makes an individual different from other people. Before continuing, it is important to emphasise (based on the previous chapter) that there is a difference between 'self' and 'identity'. 'Self' can be seen as the person or borrowing from Freud's 'id'. 'Identity' refers to distinct categories or roles a person 'collects' over time, for example, daughter, wife, mother, to name a few. These 'roles' influence how the self will interpret information and associated behaviour towards a particular situation at that particular moment. It will also influence how the individual relates to others (Abádi-Nagy 2003, 173). On the question of identity in this context, Stryker and Serpe (1994) define identity as 'cognitive self-schemas consisting of the internalized role expectations and positional designations incorporated and organized within our sense of self', or, as explained by Stryker and Burke (2000), 'parts of the self composed of meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically play in highly differentiated contemporary society' (Arena and Arrigo

2005, 488). To understand the role of identity in the manner the individual will interpret and act on the outside world, Arena and Arrigo (2005, 498) present two scenarios. Firstly, the influence of society on the self in that a person's identity comprises not one but multiple identities, which are sorted in a hierarchy, with some more prominent than others when in a particular situation. When confronted by certain circumstances, a more prominent identity will take the lead. In other words, the external environment will determine the subjective choice of the individual in determining which identity takes the lead. Secondly, during interpersonal processes, the more prominent identity will determine behaviour. In other words, 'an active self that seeks to align society's meanings for roles with one's self-relevant meanings for roles. This is known as the "self-verification process" and is facilitated through a variety of strategies such as identity cues and interpersonal prompts' (ibid, 498).

The individual's personality, as discussed in the previous chapter, should also play a role in making a person more susceptible to extremism and terrorism. Although the student supports the opinion that, under the right circumstances or preconditions, any person can resort to violence, Mercia (1966) identifies two personality types that are more susceptible to extremism (Schwartz, Dunkel and Waterman 2009, 544–45). 'Authoritarian foreclosure' refers to individuals who accept what is presented to them without questioning or being open to alternatives. These individuals also tend to interpret the world around them literally. 'Identity diffusion' refers to individuals who do not have clear identity commitments. Being aimless or without purpose, or even detached from society, these individuals might be drawn to groups that can give them an identity. These individuals are particularly vulnerable to manipulation, furthered by the need to belong. What is important to note from both personality types is the inability to question or to conduct own research into the reasons for following or belonging to a particular group.

Social identity forms ‘part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from one’s knowledge of his or her membership in a social group or groups together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership’ (Arena and Arrigo 2006, 27–28). The best way to understand the difference between individual and social identity is to consider that whereas an individual identifies with others (in being similar) to construct a social identity, the same individual will concentrate on what makes him or her unique when referring to personal identity.

Collective identity presents ‘a shared sense of characteristics, values, purposes, statuses, histories and futures’ (ibid). Abádi-Nagy (2003, 176) defines collective identity as ‘the set of culture traits, social traits, values, beliefs, myths, symbols, images that go into the collective’s self-definition’. Explaining the importance of collective identity in the psychological makeup of people, Simon and Klandermans (2001, 321) list five functions: it confirms that the person belongs to a particular place in society; it provides distinctive characteristics to identify others who do not share the person’s place in society; it ensures respect from those sharing that person’s position, leading to self-respect or self-esteem in providing understanding or meaning of the social world the person is part of; and it provides solidarity with others and reminds the individual that he/she is not alone.

Collective identity can easily be politicised in that the individual intervenes on behalf of the group. For this to happen, the majority of the in-group need to share their feelings of injustice or inequality to transfer ‘my grievances’ to ‘our grievances’. The next step is that the ‘other’ or out-group needs to be in a position to be blamed, leading to stereotyping of the ‘other’ (ibid, 324–25). The forming of stereotypes will be referred to in greater detail later in this chapter.

Simon and Klandermans introduce a very important step: that the situation reaches the point where 'my grievances' become 'our grievances'. Staub and Bar-Tal (2003, 718) fill the gap explaining why 'my' is transferred to 'our' in that this particularly occurs when the individual is faced with the following types of conditions: when individuals are increasingly unable to provide for themselves and/or their families; when individuals are confused by social and political pandemonium around them; and when the individual feels threatened by another group. In an attempt to address these circumstances, individuals will turn to an ideological movement to provide them with an identity, or enhance his/her identification with a religious, ethnic or political group. Individuals hold on to their collective identity in an attempt to feel secure and to provide in the person's basic needs. In an attempt to enhance the status of the in-group, these individuals will diminish and ultimately harm the out-group.

With this in mind, an organisation can develop an identity of its own, as explained by Taylor and Whittier (1992), derived from group members' common experiences, interests and solidarity and, according to Melucci (1995), an interactive and shared definition of actions, opportunities and constraints (White and Fraser 2000, 326). Collective identity within an organisation is formed through a shared sense of 'we' – a common opponent and agreement of how the problem should be addressed needs to exist. Culture provides the setting through which collective identity develops in referring to the 'norms, beliefs, symbols, identities and stories that produce solidarity, motivate participants and maintain collective actions', and becomes integrated in the group through rituals and specific practices (Saunders 2008, 232–33). According to Taylor (1997, 183) culture (or cultural identity) develops as members of a group share values, attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns. It is these shared characteristics that builds a collective identity. These rituals and practices can even manifest as a subculture to differentiate between 'us' and 'them'.

According to Arena and Arrigo (2006, 27–28) personal, social and collective identities play a significant role in shaping one's self-concept, self-worth, self-esteem and self-definition. Referring to the work of Baumeister (1991) and Teifel (1978 and 1982), Branscombe and Wann (1994, 642) explain that people draw much of their identity and self-worth from the group they belong to, referred to as 'organization-based self-esteem'. Which of the three – personal, social or collective identity – will be more prominent differs from person to person. As explained above, for some their individual characteristics are more prominent, while for others the need to belong to a 'collective' is central to their existence. In summary, the consequences of whether a person's personal or social identity is more prominent are: if a person's personal identity is prominent, he or she will compare him- or herself with others, wanting to be different. As Taylor (1997, 181) explains, being different relates to personality characteristics but also other abilities, values, attitudes and behaviour. Under these circumstances, a person will want to act and think as an individual. However, if the person's social identity is more prominent, the focus will be on similarities between oneself and the in-group and differences between the in-group and out-group. Under these conditions, the person will act and think as a group member. It is also expected that these individuals will find it difficult to differentiate between themselves and the group (Kawakami and Dion 1995, 555).

Explaining the influence of personal and collective identity in joining a terrorist organisation, Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003) in Gupta (2005, 19) describe this relation best when they explain that, 'as an individual succumbs to the organization, there is no room for individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making'. In other words, the individual almost ceases to exist. What is paramount is the interest and well-being of the group or the collective the individual identifies with.

It is also to be expected that those whose identity is attached to that of a group will be more concerned with the status of their 'group' or the 'collective' and act in the best interest, or even intervene on behalf of, the group. To explain this process, reference will be made to the social identity theory and self-categorisation theory, followed by the relative deprivation theory, when the perception exists that the in-group is being deprived of political, economic, social, etc. status and the impact it has on behaviour. What is important to keep in mind with these theories is the focus on the 'collective' or the group the individual identifies with, and the status, goals or values, threats or opportunities the group is confronted with. The individual, through being part of a group, considers the in-group in a particular way, which implies that the out-group is also categorised in a particular way.

2.1 Social identity theory

Social identity is formed around descriptive and demographic characteristics like ethnicity or race, religion and gender, and can produce a powerful link, binding people to one another. These characteristics provide a powerful source of group identity and have a long history justifying exclusion, prejudice, conflict and collective violence (Weber, Johnson and Arceneaux 2011, 1314).

Explained through the social identity theory presented by Tajfel and Turner in 1978, an individual's self-worth and identity are vested in groups to which the person belongs. Consequently, people are motivated to regard their in-group as positively distinct from the out-group in order to sustain their own positive identity and sense of self-worth (Alexander, Levin and Henry 2005, 33). This can contribute to a situation where members of the person's in-group will always be right, leading to in-group favouritism. In-group favouritism can easily lead to out-group discrimination, contributing to inter-group conflict (Branscombe and Wann

1994, 653). Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (1997, 617) summarise the objective of the theory as:

[...] to explain why, under certain circumstances, people may act in terms of group membership (i.e., their social identity) rather than behave as distinct individuals. [The] theory focuses on the different ways in which group members may respond to unfavourable social status, and it specifies how different beliefs about the properties of the social structure may lead people to engage in either individualist or collective coping strategies.

Tajfel (1978) identifies three components that contribute to the formation of a person's social identity (Bergami and Bagozzi 2000, 556). First, the cognitive component incorporates a cognitive awareness that the individual belongs to a particular social group. As explained in the previous chapter, this process starts at a very young age when an individual learns to differentiate between the different social groups in his or her life through which a person later identifies or associates with that particular group. According to Dutton (1994) in Bergami and Bagozzi (2000, 556), 'identification with' is described as 'the cognitive connection between the definition of an organization and the definition a person applies to him- or herself. This self-awareness or self-knowledge of belonging to an organization, then, is one way that a person achieves a social identity.'

Second is the evaluative component, which refers to the fact that the social setting must provide for inter-group comparisons to allow the person to have a positive or negative connotation to membership of this particular group (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors and Preston 2004, 46).

Third, the emotional component manifests in the level the individual is emotionally involved in the group. What is important at this particular time is to recognise that emotions go hand-in-hand with the in- and out-group categorisation process, and that factors such as similarity, proximity and situational salience will determine whether an out-group is considered a valid

and reliable comparison group (ibid, 46–47). Other emotional attachments will be discussed in greater detail under the heading ‘emotion and perceptions’.

All three components have important consequences for the individual in that the individual will realise that being part of a ‘collective’ brings with it ‘mutual responsibility and an alignment across time, space and distinctiveness’ (David and Bar-Tal 2009, 357).

Consequently, individuals categorise people into ‘us’, ‘we’ or ‘ours’ in referring to the in-group versus ‘they’, ‘them’ or ‘theirs’ that form the out-group. However, as Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman and Tyler (1990, 475–76) explain, the mere fact that these terms are being used to categorise people should indicate that people are being divided into in- and out-groups. Associated with this categorisation, perceptions will follow in which positive connotations will be associated with the in-group, while the out-group will be associated with negative connotations.

To bridge ‘identifying with’ and behaviour, Ellemers, Kortekaas and Ouwerkerk (1999, 372), explain that the extent to which people identify with a particular social group determines their inclination to behave in terms of their group membership. Social identification is therefore used to refer to a feeling of affective commitment to the group (or the emotional component), rather than the possibility of distinguishing between members of different social categories (the cognitive component). This clarifies why people belonging to the same group act differently when confronted with the same circumstances. What is especially important in how the individual is integrated into a collective is that the individual is no longer important and that the ‘depersonalisation’ of the self follows for those whose social identity is prominent. As Hogg, Terry and White (1995) in Brewer and Silver (2000, 154) explain: ‘Through depersonalization, self-categorization effectively brings self-perception and

behaviour into line with the contextually relevant in-group prototype, and thus transforms individuals into group members and individuality into group behaviour' – in other words, the individual acts as part of the collective.

Based on this process in social identity theory, Brewer (1991) presents his theory of optimal distinctiveness in explaining the need for inclusion and assimilation on the side of the in-group and the need to differentiate from the out-group. According to this theory, the need to belong manifests in the forming of social groups, and the larger and more inclusive the group is, the more this need is satisfied. On the other side of the spectrum, being different is driven by personal identity. What is particularly interesting is that Brewer recognises the role personality, socialisation and cultural values play in whether inclusion and assimilation or differentiation is more prominent in the social identification process (Brewer and Silver 2000, 154).

It is important to recognise that the cultural identity of people will influence whether a person will lean towards individualism or collectivism. To put it differently, some cultures and religious orientations place greater emphasis on the importance and well-being of the collective, to such an extent that the interest and well-being of the individual becomes almost irrelevant. It is these values a person learns through socialisation. It is therefore to be expected that people growing up in collectivism will act when the interest and well-being of 'us' are being threatened. These cultures are also recognised by higher levels of emotional dependence, group solidarity and the importance of saving face (Verkuyten and Lay 1998, 1971). Consequently, an insult directed at one will be interpreted as an insult to all. Post (2005) and Schwartz (2005) applied this rule to terrorism and found that terrorists are seldom driven by their own interest. A suicide attacker is possibly the best example to emphasise this particular point (Schwartz, Dunkel and Waterman 2009, 541). The interest of the collective,

based on religion or ethnicity, becomes the most important component to a person's identity. For some, these two are interwoven in one. Associated with religious identity will be the interpretation of particular religious texts and the position violence has. For example, US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the 'global war against terrorism' that some interpreted as a 'war on Islam' followed by Ethiopian and later AMISOM's intervention in Somalia, were interpreted by some Muslims in East Africa as the persecution of Muslims, which called for their assistance. Furthermore, being a Muslim in a country that is considered to be the transgressor (for example, Uganda and Kenya) should raise the question which of the two identities is the strongest: being an Ugandan or Kenyan citizen or a Muslim (while keeping the first factor in mind). When discussing al-Shabaab, the implication of the above will be particularly relevant.

The social identity theory also refers to the difference between majority and minority groups. According to the theory, social acceptance, power and status are central to the problems and conflicts minorities might encounter (Verkuyten and Lay 1998, 1971). Identifying between in- and out-groups is, however, only the beginning of possible conflict, starting with accepting the in-group and rejecting the out-group. Devaluation of the other group is the next step in this process. This comes as a response in a number of circumstances, including the group becoming more powerful than the other and needing to justify exploiting the other; when the group needs to create a separate identity; in cases of scapegoating; or when the two groups are in conflict with each other. Delegitimation as a form of negative categorisation often occurs during inter-ethnic conflict, providing the following primary objectives: explaining the conflict; justifying the in-group's aggression against the out-group; and providing the in-group with a sense of superiority over the other (Haslam 2006, 254). This extreme form of devaluation can manifest in the following ways: dehumanising people as being primitive, savage, etc.; casting out members of the other group as murderers, thieves,

etc.; by trait characterisation through referring to the other group as parasites, pigs, apes, devils, etc.; by using political labels, including descriptions such as colonialists, communists or terrorists; and, lastly, through group comparison, for example, referring to the other as ‘vandals’ or ‘Huns’. Devaluation serves as an important precursor to enabling the use of violence against the out-group (Staub and Bar-Tal 2003, 720–21).

2.2 Self-categorisation theory

The self-categorisation theory as presented by Turner et al. (1987) and J.C. Turner (1991 and 1999) expanded the cognitive basis of social identity and focused on the basic principles of categorisation. As a result the theory is fixed on the depersonalisation process, in which individuals define themselves as examples of their social category rather than as unique individuals. This process is dependent on the relative emphasis placed on the different levels of self-categorisation in a specific situation. Thus, the theory suggests a psychological foundation for making an individual part of a social group in a given context (David and Bar-Tal 2009, 355). In other words, an individual have different identities in relation to other people, and the identity that is most prominent at that particular time will depend on the particular person’s interpretation of the situation.

Therefore, the theory goes further in explaining the role of group identification and, more specifically, whether a person’s personal or social identity is more prominent in guiding that person’s perceptions and subsequent behaviour. As Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (1997, 617) summarise: ‘Self-categorization theory predicts that people are more inclined to behave in terms of their group membership because their common identity as a group is more salient’ in times of being under threat. Consequently, any threat to the in-group will be interpreted as a threat to the individual (Mitchell 1989, 88).

As a result, the theory, through its emphasis on self-categorisation, places emphasis on stereotypes, attributions, social influence, polarisation and group cohesion (Kawakami and Dion 1995, 555). All theories differentiating between different groups include elements of the above in the manner it perceives the in- and out-group. In addition to the emotional impact categorisation has, it also influences the manner in which information is interpreted and the subsequent impact it will have. As Hogg (1996) presents, information is selectively processed and interpreted, or even dismissed, depending on the situation, type of group and information (Brewer and Silver 2000, 166–67).

3. ETHNIC IDENTITY

Ethnicity refers to a complex combination of racial, cultural and historical characteristics by which societies are occasionally divided into separate, and probably hostile, political entities. Ethnicity raises the whole socio-political question of national identity, which is why ethnic politics are at their most dangerous and important in developing countries whose geographical representation is far from ethnically homogeneous (at least until globalisation began to impact on the ethnic character of most countries throughout the world). In developing countries, ethnic divisions may be absolutely central to the problems of organising a working political system.

As explained in the previous chapter, children learn from a very young age to which ‘group’ he or she belongs as part of the political socialisation process. Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 48), for example, explain that children learn very early in life – even before they fully understand which interests or policy differences actually divide them – that there are significant political groupings and that some groups are their friends and others their enemies. It is, however, when political access is driven by ethnicity, or when there is a competition between ethnic

groups, that the potential for conflict increases (Nagel 1994, 159). This will be the case, especially when political access brings with it additional benefits to the winning ethnic or tribal group. Under these circumstances, political access is regarded as a ‘winner takes all’ contest.

It is, however, not the collectivism associated with ethnic identity that causes violence or terrorism, but rather the rights (physical and psychological) and associated threats the ethnic group – or, on a smaller level, the family, tribe or clan – perceives. The potential for conflict is further promoted when physical differences are noticeable between the in- and out-group. In this regard, Banks (2008, 132) explains that when children from ethnic minority groups are marginalised at school and treated as the ‘other’, they will ‘emphasize their ethnic identities and develop weak attachments to the nation-state’. Simultaneously they will also develop a closer bond with each other as a means to protect themselves against ‘the other’. The role of the school in political socialisation was introduced in the previous chapter and will be referred to in Chapter 4 as an agent of radicalisation.

Ethnicity is considered to be a contested term in that it possibly refers to multiple distinctions based on a particular ethnic group, shared cultural components, etc. Instead, Smith (1986) in Anthias (2002, 497) refers to ethnic identity based on a shared culture. Irrespective of this, ethnic categories based on identity markers – culture, origin, language, colour, physiognomy, etc. – differentiate between people and serve as a basis for belonging, as well as for social and political mobilisation (ibid, 498).

As explained before, individuals enhance their own self-image and self-esteem through affiliation with persons of similar ethnic backgrounds. Especially when one is a member of a unique group in a particular situation, it will give that aspect of a person’s identity more

prominence. Also, when a particular situation endangers that aspect of a group's identity, it will become more important to defend that aspect of their identity. It is under these circumstances that members of the group will rush to defend that part of the ethnic identity that is under siege or being threatened (Arena and Arrigo 2006, 33). At the centre is a cultural identity that provides members with a mutual history, shared value system and a plan for how to pursue the group's goals as defined by its collective identity (Taylor and Louis 2004, 174).

This explains why individuals will provide assistance to people or the group they identify with in a conflict situation. In exploring the causes of ethnic bloodshed, the following catalysts for ethnic-group formation and inter-group conflict have been identified as important (Arena and Arrigo 2006, 34–35). First, proximity, or being physically closer, to other ethnic groups, in that the less space there is, the higher the possibility of friction. Second, nationalism, which is described as the desire to promote one nation's superiority over others, provides the desire of one ethnic group's domination over another. In a country with multiple ethnic groups, this can possibly lead to disengagement, tension and even a violent confrontation between ethnic groups in the country and even with other groups outside the country. Third is similarity, or the human tendency to affiliate with those who have similar physical characteristics, values and attitudes. When threatened, individuals find comfort in the presence of those who are like them. Fourth, ethnic hatred between minority groups serves as another catalyst for ethnic-based conflict. It has been noted that groups that experience prejudice and discrimination themselves tend to direct similar behaviour towards other minorities. Fifth is ambivalence, in that uncertainty of one's identity and group affiliation can result in violence. Through destroying or damaging the other-group, the in-group creates a more certain or more positive image. Sixth, ethnic group differences, with reference to culture, language and physical characteristics, serve as cues and constant reminders of being different and as another stimulus for conflict. Last, strangeness or fear of the unknown

facilitates the in-group's lack of exposure and contact with the out-group, which, in turn, creates fear and suspicion of the 'other'.

Diversity, especially if accompanied by geographic and economic differentiation, can lead to distrust, violence and acts of terrorism. As with other forms of identity, ethnicity provides a sense of belonging, which psychologists regard as essential to the psychological development of a person. However, ethnocentric nationalism leads to a number of violent conflicts in the search for self-determination. These conflicts are difficult to contain and solve. The threat that ethnicity can be used as a driving force behind frustration and aggression, is higher in resource-scarce environments (Lange and Dawson 2010, 234). The LRA and MRC serve as examples of where ethnic identity in Kenya and Uganda contributed to marginalisation, distrust and violence.

4. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

Religion can be described as one of the most important forces to collective action as a result of its ability to provide meaning and bind people together. It is especially its ability to bind people together that has been a source of prejudice and intolerance against those not classified as part of 'us'. Consequently, wars were fought and some of the most horrific atrocities were committed in the name of religion. The unfortunate reality is that none of these religions encouraged hatred. Rather, its leaders interpreted texts – driven by their own personal and political reasons – and convinced their followers that they were messengers from 'god' and everything done was justified by that particular 'religion'.

For a majority of the world's citizens, religion provides meaning to life and the individual's place in relation to his or her creator and that individual's relationship with other human

beings and the broader environment. These beliefs, values and traditions are transmitted through rites, rituals, song and prayer to provide people with a shared sense of ‘locatedness’, a place in the world and history. Involvement in a religious group also satiates people’s need for stability, safety, affection, belonging and self-esteem. But religion also contributes to the construction of individual and group identity: Through providing an answer to life’s more crucial questions – Where do we come from and what is the purpose of life? – most religions also speak of a community of believers and its struggle against evil in which members of the religion will be victorious. Those fallen during this struggle are presented as heroes (martyrs), whose lives and struggles are commemorated. Being a member of a particular religion will identify others as not being part of this group. Consequently, inter-group comparison and competition based on religious differences is a given. What is interesting to note is that these differences become even more pertinent when scarce resources and territorial boundaries come into dispute (Arena and Arrigo 2006, 32).

It is unfortunately the absolute nature of religion that contributes to the ‘us versus them’ view. Not all believers (us) will violently convert, subjugate or even eliminate non-believers (them), leading to the following broad categories: moderates, fundamentalists, extremists, fanatics, etc.

Sosis and Alcorta (2008, 112) define fundamentalism as:

[...] a religious ideology that embraces scriptural literalism and traditional religious values. Current fundamentalist trends, however, have placed *higher* demands on their practitioners than the traditional practices that they claim to emulate.

Religious fundamentalists are not confined to any particular faith or country, or to the poor and uneducated. Hector Avalos in Juergensmeyer (2005, 2) presents a very important take on religion within the framework of conflict when he observed that religious conflicts are seldom about religion per se. Instead, it is more about national territory, political leadership and

socioeconomic control, framed within a religious context. Additionally, Jeffrey K. Hadden (1992, 1637–42) identifies four types of fundamentalism: theological fundamentalism or a theological movement concerned with defending the traditional religious doctrine against modern thinking; political fundamentalism is a combination of theological fundamentalism and the personal commitments of religious adherents to combat worldly corruptions; cultural fundamentalism refers to the abovementioned two types of fundamentalism combined in culturally unenlightened individuals fixated on preserving tradition at the expense of progress; and global fundamentalism or fundamentalists that extend beyond a specific geographic location and are linked to other religiously motivated groups around the world.

The biggest challenge, considering Avalos's statement and the four types of fundamentalism set out above, is to separate true religious principles from the manner in which religious sentiment and principles are manipulated to justify killing in the name of religion, especially considering that as soon as a conflict becomes desperate or when frustration sets in, the conflict becomes 'religionised'. It is at this particular point in time when a secular struggle becomes a sacred conflict (Juergensmeyer 2005, 6).

In the mind of the person committing attacks, religion-motivated terrorism is predominately committed out of the belief that the person is sanctioned to restore 'good' based on his/her own interpretations to separate 'good' from 'evil'. The manifestation of this phenomenon and its symbolism vary from religion to religion and culture to culture. Despite these variations, previous acts of terrorism suggested that religion-motivated groups are more lethal than secular groups, especially since religion is used to legitimise or justify the use of violence. Bruce Hoffman (1998, 94–95) identifies the following 'core characteristics of religious terrorism' to justify the use of violence. The following factors also play a role in dehumanising the 'other'. First, in the mind of a religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental

act or divine duty in direct response to a theological demand and necessity (ibid, 94–95). That, to some extent, explains the resort to indiscriminate killing in contrast to other forms of terrorism. Second, religion-sanctioned violence legitimises the use of force in that victims targeted by religious terrorists are often portrayed as not human (through name-calling such as ‘infidels’, etc.). Third, the absence of a ‘constituency’ leads to a sanctioning of almost limitless violence against a virtually open-ended category of targets – that is, anyone who is not a member of the terrorists’ religion or religious sect. Lastly, whereas secular terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system or as a means to create a new system, religious terrorists see themselves as ‘outsiders’ seeking fundamental changes in the existing order. This sense of alienation or not being part of the existing system further enables the religious terrorist to resort to more destructive attacks than secular terrorists (ibid, 94–95).

For Juergensmeyer (2005, 7–8) religion not only personalises the conflict – it also offers the following additional advantages: personal rewards in the form of redemption and other heavenly rewards. Furthermore, religion serves as vehicle for social mobilisation that extend well beyond the number of people reached if supporters were mobilised around (the real) political or social issues. Organised religions further provide an organised network through religious institutions, most notably churches, mosques, temples, etc. Religion also provides a moral justification for the resort to violence in that it ‘absolutises the conflict’ and ‘demonises opponents’ in a cosmic war between ‘good’ and ‘evil’; it not only provides answers to the most complex questions but also sets that particular person (follower) in context to this conflict as ‘religious soldiers’ in which ‘total victory’ is promised through ‘divine intervention’. Jones (2006, 171) on this particular point went further and explains that apocalyptic religious movements not only split the world into irreconcilable opposites of good and evil but also look forward to an end of history, when ‘evil’ will be finally, and violently

eradicated, and replaced with what is regarded as holy. In other words, purifying the world cannot occur as a peaceful process because the apocalyptic mind-set – in all religions that speak of the end of the world – refers to images of violence, warfare and bloodshed in which what is classified as ‘unholy’ is destroyed in the most gruesome fashion imaginable.

Religion-motivated terrorist groups therefore believe that they know what is ‘good’ (or what is sanctioned by God or by their beliefs) and that this knowledge obligates them to destroy the evil and the unjust, according to their own perceptions of good and evil. In other words, the use of violence is religiously sanctioned and justified. Religion-based terrorism is particularly more violent than non-religious or secular terrorism. In addition to the possibility of violence, society is not only divided between different religions but a separation is also made between followers of the same religion. Often as a result of isolation classifications are made between ‘us’ and ‘them’, two camps that are not only difficult to identify but are also open-ended, in which even believers of the same religion can be categorised as ‘non-’ or ‘unbelievers’. The impact of globalisation, especially the influence of mass media and the Internet, implies that its spread and impact could extend beyond national and cultural borders, which returns the discussion to the concept of identity.

It is particularly religion-based terrorist groups that have a unique classification of society. According to Pape (2003) in Cinoğlu (2010, 207), secular terrorist groups divide society into three distinct groups: ‘us’, ‘them’ and ‘others’. ‘Us’ represents the in-group members; ‘them’ refers to the opposing side or out-group that the conflict is with; ‘others’ consists of people who do not want to be a part of the conflict, or who choose not to support either side of the conflict. This categorisation has an important impact in target selection when acts of terrorism are being planned in that the majority of secular terrorist groups do not consider ‘others’ as threats and do not target them unless it is strategically imperative to their cause. Religion-

motivated terrorist groups, especially Islamist groups, in contrast, divide society into two groups: ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (note it is not ‘us’ *and* ‘them’). As with secular groups, this categorisation has an important impact on target selection, in that, in the minds of religious extremist groups, their interpretation of religion (Islam for Islamic terrorist groups), allows, and even justifies, acts of violence on ‘them’ (wherever you find ‘them’).

In addition to the above analysis, Ziemke (2009, 99), in her analysis of the role of social conditions on extremism and radicalisation, recommends that analysts make a distinction between the Arab core; the non-Arab and greater Middle East; traditionally Muslim societies in the non-Arab world; emerging Muslim nations; traditionally Muslim minorities with deep historical roots; and the Western Muslim diaspora, especially considering that every Muslim – or any religious – community has a unique historical, cultural and social character that will contribute to its susceptibility or vulnerability to extremism. With the above classification in mind, Kenya, especially, can be considered a country with a Muslim minority with deep historical roots (especially in its coastal region in the east of the country). Regarding this category, Ziemke (2009, 106–07) explains that in most cases these Muslim minorities are confronted with real economic and political marginalisation, worsened by limited education opportunities. Many people in these communities have lost their traditional livelihoods and find themselves isolated from their traditional economic and trade systems. When analysed, most militant groups among these Muslim communities fight for their local interests – political and cultural autonomy and economic justice – and not for some abstract notion of a global Islamist caliphate. Ultimately, what these communities need and want is respect and security that often manifest in calls for separation or self-determination. The degree to which respondents associated with the ADF in Uganda and al-Shabaab in Kenya’s call for respect will be referred to later in this study. A central concept towards a solution is based on tolerance in which both government and the minority community have to find a common

ground of tolerance, even if autonomy is a viable option. These circumstances need to be analysed in the practical part of the study.

To return to the fundamental question: is it religion or religious principles being presented while the real reasons are hidden? Pape, in the Chicago Project of Suicide Terrorism, finds that the common element among those radicalised was ‘the sense that their territory or culture has been invaded by an alien power that cannot easily be overthrown’ (Juergensmeyer 2005, 4). This reintroduces the theory that religion is not at the core but, rather, that religion provides the ideology. Although a number of scholars have written on ideology, a group of writers, including Alvin Gouldner (1976), Wilhelm Reich (1970), Karl Mannheim (1928) and David Flakser (1971), referred to worldview as an ideology. Ideology in this context refers to a combination of psycho-cultural, historical, and psychoanalytical perspectives people have in the form of rationalisation (projection), images and perceptions of the world around them. These ideas are, however, subjective, based on what people believe (myths, rationalisations, images, distortions, lies, stereotypes), which often turn out to be self-fulfilling prophecies. Ideology, therefore, reflects people’s historical political situation and background (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1980, 42).

For ideology to be relevant in a worldview, strategies and tactics need to be part of its thinking. Strategy refers to short- and long-term goals and objectives, while tactics refer to the means, methods and techniques available to the organisation to achieve these goals and objectives. The tactics the organisation will decide on depend on the strategy. Tactics include all forms of individual and mass persuasion and manipulation techniques and methods (ibid, 43). In other words, resorting to acts of terrorism is only a tactic within a broader strategy to achieve an objective, leaving this part of the study to introduce the reasons and objectives of resorting to acts of terrorism in the countries mentioned.

Although the major politico-ideological systems, including fascism, communism, socialism and liberalism, have been replaced by other ideologies, the role and impact of ideology in justifying the resort to violence (including terrorism) is far from over. This emphasises the important role domestic circumstances play in the radicalisation process while recognising that religion is not the only motivation or justification to resort to acts of violence, including terrorism. Regarding the relationship between religion and domestic circumstances, Juergensmeyer (2005, 6–7) explains that despite different political, economic and social circumstances, all groups have a common element: the belief that secularism was unable and insufficient to provide answers or solutions to the political, social and economic challenges faced by these people. As a result, religion became an ideology of protest in which grievances – the sense of alienation, marginalisation and social frustration – are articulated in religious terms and seen through religious images, and the protest against them is organised by religious leaders through the medium of religious institutions. Consequently, religion is not the initial problem but the medium through which these issues are expressed, which in itself becomes problematic.

At face value, religion is an extremely powerful tool driving people to acts of violence, but it is essential to differentiate between religion and ideology, especially when groups involved in what is categorised as religious terrorism are being analysed.

In addition to the above discussion, Bartlett and Miller (2012, 9) identify another very important element in our understanding of religion as a cause or factor in eventual radicalisation and motivation for acts of terrorism: the ability to really understand religious principles, or ‘critical thinking and learning’, as Bartlett and Miller referred to it. Based on their analysis of the profiles of 61 terrorists in Canada, Europe and the US, they found that the

majority 'did not educate themselves, did not engage in deep analysis, and therefore had grossly misinterpreted the Qur'an'.

Adding to the analysis of Bartlett and Miller, a similar element can be added in whether those who converted later in life sometimes feel as if they need to prove their commitment to their new religion and therefore become easy prey to extremists. Borrowing from the above analysis, it can be expected that these individuals are not well versed in their new religion when compared to individuals who grew up in the religion. Also, being new to the religion implies that the person who convinced the person to convert has tremendous power over the new convert. It is therefore equally important to understand that person's (religious leader or existing follower) background and motivation.

Freedom of religion, and with that the right to educate children in a particular religion, is accepted as a basic human right. Without criticising either the right or the responsibility of adults to want to teach their children fundamental religious principles, the question of exclusion or limited interaction with 'others' referred to in the previous chapter comes to mind.

To analyse the impact of religious schooling in the radicalisation of individuals in Kenya and Uganda, an analysis of backgrounds included questions of whether the individual attended religion-based or mixed (secular) schools.

5. NATIONAL IDENTITY

Both Kenya and Uganda gained independence from Britain in the early 1960s, Uganda in 1962 and Kenya in 1964, whereafter both countries experienced political turmoil. Considering the discussion in the previous chapter that the basic foundation of a child's political framework is based on the most basic loyalties towards ethnic or tribal affiliation, race or religious orientation, one cannot but wonder to what extent both countries underwent a successful nation-building process, especially since this will directly impact on not only loyalty to the state but, more importantly, to what extent those radicalised considered themselves truly Kenyan and Ugandan nationals. Answering this question starts with understanding political culture and national identity as one of the main products of political socialisation. These questions will, however, not be answered in this chapter. Instead, this chapter will introduce the core concepts that will be analysed in subsequent chapters based on field research conducted in Kenya and Uganda.

Building a national identity is easier in homogeneous countries or where ethnic, religious, geographic and socioeconomic divisions are minimal. Although these differences should not be considered outright as presenting a threat to national identity, differences present challenges (Easton and Hess 1962, 232). As David and Bar-Tal (2009, 361) explained, sharing a collective national identity is powerful to ensure that individuals (citizens) internalise their shared beliefs to produce a collective belief system. Although the lack of a collective national identity and its impact is of interest to this study, and not how a collective identity could be established, the following generic features were identified: a sense of a common fate; the perception of the uniqueness of the collective and its distinction from other collectives; coordinated activity of the collective's members; commonality of beliefs, attitudes, norms and values; concern for the welfare of the collective and mobilisation and

sacrifice for its sake; and continuity and consecutiveness in the dimension of time (ibid, 362–65).

Challenging national identity, some of the most common collective identities found in a country are based on religion and/or ethnicity (as already presented). It should, however, be noted that the modern state seldom comprises of nationals from only one ethnic or religious group. It is therefore to be expected that these countries will be confronted with some sort of social divide and possible degrees of conflict. One only has to follow the arguments contesting integration of immigrant communities in Canada, Europe and the US to appreciate that this is the next hot topic in political science. Returning to this study, Kenya and Uganda might not be confronted with the same discussions, but the two countries are far from homogeneous. This leads to a very important test in assessing the level of national identity: do nationals identify with the interests of the entire country or with a specific tribal or ethnic or religious affiliation?

If nationals associate with their country, the assessment presented by Hess and Torney (2009, 66) will be accurate, in that a child's initial involvement with the political system begins at a very young age. Also important to note is that this attachment is positive and forms the central component of a bond that is possibly the most basic and essential aspect of socialisation into involvement with the political life of a country. This initial bond serves as an emotional connection that grows from complex psychological and social needs. Considering that this association starts from a very young age, this emotional attachment will be largely resistant to change or arguments to convince the person of the contrary. Equally, if the person did not grow up with this strong attachment to his or her country, the opposite should be expected: a stronger association with his or her ethnic or religious affiliation than to a country.

This will have a direct impact on the political culture of the country. 'Political culture' serves as 'a product of the history of the political system and the individual members of the system, and, thus, is rooted in public events and private experience' (Dowse and Hughes 1986, 227).

Political culture is a complex set of variables that has its core in the social reality of a country and its citizens. It consists of political traditions; folk heroes; the nature of public institutions; the political involvement of a country's citizens; and the political ideology, including the goals the country sets for itself. It also includes other less tangible factors, such as political stereotypes and the moods and tone of political exchanges. Political culture can therefore be described as 'the orientations members of a political community have towards politics. This patterned collectivity of orientations influences the structure, operation, and stability of political life' (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 26).

Political socialisation plays a very important role in developing and maintaining a country's political culture, simply because through socialisation a nation's political culture is shaped and transmitted to the next generation (ibid, 27).

In explaining what happens when the political culture changes, Dawson and Prewitt (ibid, 27) explain that: 'Nation-building tasks include developing an "attitude dimension" or "subjective realm" compatible with new structural and institutional arrangements. The question of whether the basic influence of political socialisation at any particular time is that of maintaining and transmitting an existing political culture, replacing or transforming an older one, or creating a new one in a new society.' This process depends on several factors, most notably the history of the country; the pressures of the social and international environment; the appropriateness of traditional outlooks toward political life; and the goals, aims and purposes of leaders and citizens.

With regards to the challenges that countries attaining independence face, Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 29) explain: 'Peoples without a common political culture or common political history have been put together in new national entities. One of the most crucial socialisation tasks for the leadership and machinery has been directing political loyalties toward that new national unit.' But independence is not the only factor that calls for a change in political culture – immigration, changes in a person's social status, international political developments and globalisation, especially the increasing interconnectedness of people around the world, all impact on political culture. Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 34) add: 'A war, a depression, urban riots, an invasion, a coup, a shift in international alliances, and so forth, all rearrange the political order and consequently transform the political culture. Political socialization agents mediate between the changes in the political-social order and alterations in the political culture.'

Successful nation building can therefore be assessed based on the level of political integration or 'the process of amalgamating distinct cultural groups into a single unit with a central authority, involves the creation of a national political consciousness' (Dowse and Hughes 1986, 367).

Regarding the threat of diversity, Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 185) explain: 'Societies that have a number of distinctive and enduring political sub-cultures are said to have fragmented political cultures. Stability is difficult to maintain in the midst of a severely fragmented political culture. Stable democracies seem most likely to develop in non-fragmented cultures in which there is broad consensus on political fundamentals.' Individuals also realise that working independently will not be as effective as working in a group (Banks 2008, 131).

Immediately after independence, Uganda and Kenya had to create a new political culture. ‘Traditional values – loyalty to the tribe, deference to the traditional leaders, old ways of farming – stand in some tension to modern values. Socialization agencies are marshalled, frequently under the control of a dominant political party, to the task of instilling suitable citizenship values, national patriotism, obedience to constitutional authorities, and commitment to modern economic techniques’ (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 35).

It is therefore not surprising that: ‘Many of the adults in these new polities maintained the basic political attachment to tribal and other parochial political units which they acquired during childhood before the new nation-states came into being. The persistence of these orientations has made it difficult to establish new allegiances and primary identifications with the new nations. The new nations consequently cannot count on the primary loyalties of large segments of their citizenry or wide-spread acceptance and understanding of their political forms ... most individuals develop a core of political loyalties and attachments which are generally resistant to change in later life. They are altered only as result of severe pressure’ (ibid, 62).

This was in the late 1960s. The question now is: did political socialisation change over 50 years? Did Kenya and Uganda succeed in establishing a political culture in which loyalty to the nation is central, or is society fragmented? These questions will be answered in the following few chapters that deal with the practical part of the study.

6. BELONGING AND IDENTITY

Belonging is a central component of any discussion referring to social or collective identity. To reiterate, belonging to a collective provides a feeling of solidarity the individual shares

with others. The degree to which the individual identifies with the group or association will differ, depending on the level of solidarity and integration. In cases of higher levels of integration and solidarity the person will start to refer to 'us' or 'we' versus 'them' or those who are different. When 'against' or 'versus' is referred to, the 'other' is represented as a real or, at least, perceived threat (Kolocharova 2011, 41–44). The stronger the perceived threat is, the stronger the individual will identify with the in-group. In this context group identification is the consequence of psychological needs. The previous chapter introduced the concepts in- and out-group, but what is important is the possibility of conflict. Within the in-group cohesion and trust exists, but the question is: what is the level of distrust between the in- and out-group? A number of factors, according to Weber, Johnson and Arceneaux (2011, 1317), influence the level of distrust and the possibility of conflict: The perceived threat presented by the out-group; the status of the in-group within the social hierarchy; the distinctiveness of the in-group; and the survival of in-group members.

The degree to which individuals find similar attributes, or common ground between themselves and the organisation will directly influence the extent to which the individual identifies with the group (Bergami and Bagozzi 2000, 557). These degrees, referred to as 'scales', explain the level to which the individual identifies with the organisation. This will ultimately impact on the value the person places on that particular group that manifests through emotional attachment, or the emotional response a person might experience when the group he or she belongs to is attacked or praised. As Bergami and Bagozzi (2000, 559) explain: 'When someone criticizes the [group] it feels like a personal insult', or 'When someone praises the [group], it feels like a personal compliment', and 'If a story in the media criticized [the group], I would feel embarrassed.' Affective commitment will result in identification with, involvement in and emotional attachment to that particular organisation (ibid, 560).

Identification with people with the same religious or ethnic background not only serves as a bridge across linguistic and national borders – it requires a person to differentiate (with the ‘other’) and associate with those he or she ‘belongs’ to. As a result of ‘intergroup comparison and derogation [...] prejudice, discrimination and ethnic conflict [might possibly emerge]’ (Arena and Arrigo 2006, 29).

The individual’s self-esteem therefore becomes associated with the collective self-esteem. But not all people belonging to a particular group will place the same value on its social identity. Long and Spears, in Bergami and Bagozzi (2000, 563), explain that ‘people high in collective self-esteem are more likely to enhance their in-group, while people low in collective self-esteem are more likely to derogate their out-groups’.

A number of factors will influence the extent to which an individual will defend his or her social identity. First, how important is the group to the individual? When a person’s identity is tied to the membership of a particular group, that particular individual will ‘invest’ more to ensure that the particular group maintains a positive image (Alexander, Levin and Henry 2005, 34). It is, however, important to note that it is not membership of a group that leads to favouritism or discrimination, but rather the extent to which the group is important to the individual and whether other coping mechanisms are available to the individual. Branscombe and Wann (1994, 653) explain that the relationship between the individual’s identity and self-esteem and group association are important factors that need to be taken into consideration. It is expected that defensive practices will be activated when a particular out-group threatens the individual’s social identity in relation to his or her association with that particular in-group. Those most responsive to failure (that is, persons with diminished self-esteem) should then engage in out-group derogation for self-protective purposes.

Second, the interpretation or ‘definition of the situation’, also referred to as the ‘process through which people assign meanings to and exchange meanings for the symbols in their environment’, will equally determine if a person will act in the interest of his/her in-group. To explain, Arena and Arrigo (2005, 491) refer to Lauer and Handel (1983), who noted that it is important to understand the meaning that the situation has for the in-group to understand why they behave as they do.

Third, the level of indoctrination the person has been exposed to. The person needs to internalise the relevant social and cultural values of that group through socialisation, leading to ‘collective conditioning’ as a form of indoctrination. When the person reaches this level of his/her social identity, the individual will start to think in the collective and completely identify with the group (Abádi-Nagy 2003, 177).

The extent of a real or perceived threat will directly influence whether and to what extent the person will step in to defend his/her social identity. It is especially when a person can no longer take that part of his/her social identity for granted that it will become particularly important (Aronoff 1998, 72). This ‘threat’ can even be attempts by government to assimilate different ethnic groups into a new consolidated national identity. One consequence is to raise ethnic barriers in an attempt to ensure the self-preservation of the group, followed by violence in protecting the group. Horowitz (1985) in Conversi (1999, 570) summarises this process as follows:

The cultural revivals that emerged in response reflected an awareness of the danger of a fading group identity. They tended to emphasise the history of separateness and even hostility between the groups. Memories of insult were recalled. Languages were “purified” of words that derived from the language of the neighbouring group. Religious practices were cleansed in the name of returning to some former state of orthodoxy that may or may not have existed. Group identity was thus infused with a new or revived cultural content that served to demarcate the lines between groups more clearly, therefore reducing the ease with which individuals could cross group

boundaries. Movements that went furthest in asserting the distinctiveness of groups believed to be in danger of assimilation ultimately become strongly separatist.

In the fourth and last instance, the status and size of the group as well as the basis on which the group was formed will also contribute to in-group favouritism (Bergami and Bagozzi 2000, 556). Ellemers, Kortekaas and Ouwerkerk (1999, 374) explain that being in a minority will result in stronger in-group identification. The reason for this has to do with the possibility that membership of a small or distinctive group implies that there is a relatively large overlap between the collective self and the individual self. It will therefore be important to assess to what extent ADF, LRA, MRC and al-Shabaab respondents regard themselves to be in the minority or majority, followed by a sense of being discriminated against.

In the need to belong, or determined by the level of indoctrination, individuals can find themselves in a situation where they knowingly or unknowingly conform. Being part of an organisation where the person has a purpose or where he or she is 'needed' broadens a sense of belonging. In these cases the identity of the organisation becomes the identity of the individual. Explaining the individual's participation in terrorist organisations, scholars, including Böllinger (1981), Knutson (1981), Post (1984), Crenshaw (1986) and Shaw (1986), to name a few, refer to an individual's search for identity as an aspect that makes them vulnerable to recruitment into a terrorist organisation. In other words, having a negative personal identity, terrorists turn to a collective identity to experience meaning and purpose in their lives (Arena and Arrigo 2005, 485–86). According to these scholars, a person who does not know who he/she is, is especially susceptible to manipulation. In these cases the identity of the organisation becomes the identity of the individual (Post 1987, 24). Johnson and Friedman (1992, 29) support this observation and found that membership of a terrorist organisation provides a sense of identity or belonging, especially to those individuals whose identities are flawed. Collective identity of a terrorist organisation also refers to the group's

beliefs, values and goals. The group's collective identity further provides a template individual members of the group can use to develop their own respective personal identities (Taylor and Louis 2004, 172–73).

In addition to a sense of belonging, individuals joining terrorist organisations also refer to finding 'meaning' or being 'complete' while having faith in something better or greater than themselves (Arena and Arrigo 2006, 21). One can almost refer to a collective identity where individual identities are being replaced by a sense of being part of something bigger. Following discussions in the previous chapter, it is again young people who are particularly vulnerable in finding themselves at a time in their lives when they are looking to the future with hopes and dreams. Yet, in reality both the circumstances and opportunities to achieve these 'dreams' are absent. As a result, these individuals will look for meaning, which is often provided by their collective identity. However, those at the fringes of society will not only feel disadvantaged but will be marginalised and vulnerable to a new philosophy willing to correct these wrongs (Taylor and Louis 2004, 178).

More vulnerable are those individuals who lack a clearly defined cultural or religious collective self-concept. Being psychologically desperate, terrorist organisations can fill this void through offering a simplistic worldview, a clearly defined enemy and an unmistakable set of norms and expected behaviour through which the individual and the group can significantly improve their circumstances (Arena and Arrigo 2006, 39).

7. CONCLUSION

Identity forms a crucial part of how a person associates with others, of which religious or ethnic/tribal associations are considered the most prominent. To complete this formula, this

chapter also referred to national identity. It is this priority, and who obtains it, that will play a role in whether a person associates with a particular group, but also to what level the well-being or status of his/her in-group will be important to that particular individual. As discussed in this chapter, to join a collective means that the agenda of that particular collective is important to the individual, especially considering that joining a terrorist organisation is associated with danger and hardship. Understandably, not all involved in the group or movement identify with that particular religious or ethnic/tribal group at the same level. However, considering the focus on political socialisation, the focus of this study, in the practical parts that will follow, will predominantly be on these associations. When these individuals' national identities had not been sufficiently established, turning against their fellow countrymen became easier, especially considering that the in-group the person associates and identifies with are stronger than the nation or country he/she belongs to.

To assess and analyse the value respondents place on religious and ethnic identity, a series of questions will be included in the interview questionnaire (Appendix 1), starting with questions to determine if the respondent had contact with other ethnic and religious groups while growing up. This will be followed by a series of questions to determine the respondent's position on diversity and equality between ethnic and religious groups, leading to the request to rate how important the respondent's religious and ethnic affiliation is to him/her. Asking if the person would marry a person from another ethnic or religious group further qualified this position, before determining and analysing the respondent's threat perception in relation to belonging to the particular ethnic and religious group. It is equally important to determine who the respondent categorises as the enemy. These answers will also be read with the reasons the respondent joined the particular group and how the respondent defined 'us' and 'them'. Answers to these questions will finally also shed light on the respondent's position on national identity.

CHAPTER 4: THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND RADICALISATION

1. INTRODUCTION

Understanding the role political socialisation plays in the radicalisation process requires an appreciation of internal (personal) as well as external (environmental) influences. The previous chapters dealt with the former – internal socialisation agents – and the influence of ethnic and religious background on an individual's development. This chapter will concentrate on external conditions that contribute to radicalisation and terrorism, with particular reference to political, economic and social circumstances. A broader understanding of the environment in which people interact with one another will explain if and to what extent the social setting – most notably whether in-groups do not have equal access to political or economic resources – fuel marginalisation, resentment and even hatred. In other words, the external environment plays a crucial role in a person's development and in the type of decisions he/she will make. The extent of these influences will, however, be determined by personality characteristics and whether the person's personal or collective identity is more dominant (as discussed in the previous chapters).

Radicalisation cannot take place without the presence of the right circumstances. As mentioned above, this study is a supporter of the root-causes model that sees a direct link between macro- (external) and micro-factors (internal) that facilitate radicalisation. In addition to these to primary elements, a trigger or catalyst needs to be present to set the radicalisation and, later, operationalisation processes in motion. In this regard Lia and Skjølberg (2000, 15) made a distinction between precipitants and preconditions leading to terrorism. Precipitants are specific and immediate events leading to a terrorist attack, while

preconditions are classified as the circumstances setting the stage in the long-term. These are subdivided into permissive factors, which include those circumstances and opportunities that make terrorism an attractive tactic to achieve a group's objectives, and direct situational factors, which refer to those circumstances that might inspire or motivate terrorists. Emotions and perceptions serve as the link between the in- and out-group and the environment in which both are found. It is through these lenses that the person assesses and interprets information in determining the position of his/her group in relation to others.

While the basic socialisation agents provide the initial framework that is to be radicalised later, root causes or 'conducive conditions' refer to external or macro-factors (those factors external to the person that will impact on how he or she interprets the world around them): political circumstances, including poor governance, political exclusion and lack of civil liberties; and human rights abuse, including counterterrorism and its impact, followed by economic circumstances and sociological circumstances with reference to religious and ethnic discrimination and perceived injustice and international circumstances. Although political and economic circumstances will be presented separately, the two are interconnected. For that matter, although these circumstances are individually presented, a combination of these circumstances might be present or experienced by the person being radicalised in providing the conditions in which radicalisation can take place.

When assessing vulnerability and the conditions conducive to terrorism, a distinction should be made between domestic and transnational terrorism. The following discussion will refer only to domestic terrorism as a prelude to the LRA, the ADF and, to a lesser extent, al-Shabaab in Kenya and the conditions within this context. Although the MRC cannot be classified as a 'terrorist' organisation, other than being periodically banned by the Kenyan government, domestic circumstances play an equally important role.

2. POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND RADICALISATION

Referring to political circumstances as a condition conducive to terrorism, Kofi Annan (United Nations General Assembly 2006, 4), under ‘poor governance, lack of civil rights and human rights abuse’, note that:

Terrorism often thrives in environments in which human rights are violated and where political and civil rights are curtailed. Indeed, terrorists may exploit human rights violations to gain support for their cause. Persecution and violent government crackdowns often radicalize opposition movements. The absence of non-violent channels to express discontent and pursue alternate policies may lead some groups to resort to violent means and terrorism.

In assessing the existence and success of non-violent channels to express frustration, reference will be made to participation in the political process and press freedom. It is through these avenues that frustrated people can express themselves. However, in the absence of political opportunities those marginalised and frustrated will resort to violence to communicate their frustration and influence changes (Malečková 2005, 41).

Referring to political circumstances, the immediate factor to consider is the type of government and its influence in contributing to terrorism. In this regard, Abadie (2004, 51) notes that countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes. By the same token, countries in transition from authoritarianism to democracy are also more vulnerable to terrorism. To put this in context, Abadie (2004, 54) argues that countries on the lower levels of the political rights spectrum are associated with higher levels of terrorism. However, extreme authoritarian countries experience a lower-than-expected risk of terrorism. A possible explanation is that repressive practices associated with autocratic regimes to eliminate political dissent will also be directed at terrorists, who will be aware of the risk, while countries in transition are weak and simply unable to address any risk.

For the purposes of this discussion the interaction between government and its citizens influences tremendously the decision to resort to violence. To this extent, political exclusion and marginalisation have been cited as an important underlying cause of frustration that can manifest in acts of terrorism. The relationship between political conditions and a country's vulnerability to terrorism therefore needs attention.

The risk of political violence and terrorism is greater in countries where the political system is perceived to be illegitimate, corrupt and removed from the ordinary citizen, especially the inability to transfer political power through an equally accepted political process. Freedom within the political process will also be a reflection of the level of activities political opponents are 'allowed' to conduct without the involvement of the governing political party or the security forces.

Regarding the legitimacy of government, Forsythe (1993) refers to the following primary sources: '[L]egal traditions, established morals and norms, history, ideology, personal characteristics, and in functional factors like efficient rule and satisfaction of needs' (Lia and Skjølberg 2000, 20). Lipset (1963, 64) associates legitimacy with an effective government that is able to provide what its population needs, or at least maintains the popular belief that it is the most appropriate vehicle to provide in this basic need relevant to all people in that particular country.

Illegitimacy is defined as:

[...] the extent people regard their regimes as improper and deserving of opposition. But illegitimacy sentiments are a particular type of discontent that arises from relative deprivation with respect to power values, i.e. a discrepancy between people's expectations about the kinds of participation and security values their regimes should provide and those they actually provide (Gurr 1970, 186).

Diversity, and to which extent the country manages to build a national identity despite its diversity, can influence the legitimacy of a particular government. Engene in Lia and Skjølberg (2000, 21) identify three main challenges to a country's legitimacy: unsolved ethnic demands; problems of continuity in the development of democracy; and problems of integrating politically marginalised groups.

Countering the above circumstances, the democracy-fosters-peace theory as presented by Levy (1988), Gurr (1990), Rummel (1995), Gissinger and Gleditsch (1999), to name a few, is based on the principle that political violence is less likely in democratic countries for the following primary reasons (Lia and Skjølberg 2000, 18–19): in the first instance, political freedom, associated with increased political participation, will increase the legitimacy of that particular government in the minds of its citizens; and, secondly, democracy itself provides additional means and platforms to allow people to express frustration through pressure groups and other forms of legal dissent.

Alienation occurs and represents the opposite of legitimacy. The term 'alienation' most commonly refers to the feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, self-estrangement, inefficacy, cynicism and a lack of social rootedness or feeling of being estranged from the mainstream. The social or economic structure of a society may generate alienation at virtually any point in the individual's life. It is, however, important to note that certain individuals may be more sensitive to a sense of being alienated. The impact of alienation on political participation may lead, at one end of the spectrum, to the alienated person being less inclined to political activism. The argument supporting this position explains that, as a result of little sense of participation or control, the alienated person should be politically apathetic (Gergen and Ullman 1977, 420–21). On the other end of the spectrum, alienation may lead to political activism. For example, according to Cinoğlu (2010, 205), in

the mind of terrorists, their deeds and ideology are not the sources of alienation, but rather the cure for alienation. To put it differently, alienation is seen as the result of the exploitative characteristics of society, which create alienation. It is especially here where religion-based extremist ideology reaches its true strength in providing a substantial set of arguments and answers to the ills of society, in presenting its interpretation of a particular religion as the answer to everything that is wrong. As a result, the alienated person may become more inclined to join these movements and actively participate in their activities in an attempt to rectify what is wrong and to renew a sense of control over the situation.

Political cynicism is defined as ‘the perception that political authorities and/or the regime generally and regularly violate perspective standards for their behaviour. In other words, the political system or aspects of it are perceived to behave illegitimately’ (Schwartz 1975, 189).

Referring to collective identity earlier in the chapter, Lia and Skjølberg (2000, 19) also explain that ethnic terrorism is more likely in less proportional democracies than in open proportional systems. The reason for this is that the threshold for using violence depends on whether people from different parts of society have alternative channels to express concern and frustration and, through this, influence government. Despite the additional channels associated with democracy, the reality is that it is unfortunately these open channels and the platforms for mobilisation, as well as associated freedoms, which terrorists can use to their advantage. Additionally, countries in transition are especially vulnerable to experience internal conflict and domestic terrorism (ibid, 19). Considered weaker – especially moving from an autocratic government to democracy – the hypothesis of Ziemke (2009, 98) needs to be taken into consideration when she noted that ‘terrorists do not emerge when nothing changes; they emerge when things change too slowly to meet rising expectations, or faster than people are able to adapt’. In other words, domestic groups on either side of the divide

will either mobilise under the principle that changes should not occur (conservative or right-wing ideology), or that changes take place too slowly, leading to liberal or left-wing ideologies.

Alienation from the state is one of the central driving factors of radicalisation. Measuring alienation, participants will be asked if they previously participated in elections before joining the organisation.

Associated with political circumstances is the manner in which government forces respond to insecurity. According to Crenshaw (1981, 396): 'Government reactions that are inconsistent, wavering between tolerance and repression, seem most likely to encourage terrorism.' Or, to put it differently, a strategy based on violent repression can further fuel or encourage the group or movement.

Supporting Crenshaw's analysis, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson (2007, 364–65) are of the opinion that repression is part of a terrorist's strategy to enable further radicalisation and mobilisation of those not yet committed. Drawing on examples from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, Palestinian groups, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi groups following US intervention in 2003, they identified the primary reason for this phenomenon: the affected public learns about the true nature of the government, that, when confronted with terror, it responds in a way that imposes suffering not only on the terrorists but on the entire population. A number of factors play a role in whether state response will contribute to radicalisation, starting with the type of government. Campana and Lapointe (2011, 90) explain that state repression of an individual's decision to join or participate in a terrorist group could be as high as 60%. Those involved will also calculate the cost. Identifying and going after those responsible for acts of terrorism can take long and

require resources. Being confronted with acts of terrorism, governments influenced by public opinion can easily overreact in an attempt to portray itself as being in control. In addition to the role of government, the affected public has an equally important role in whether the broader public will be radicalised. First is the identity of the affected community, as it is to be expected that the community will identify with the party of the conflict that is the closest to their identity. Second is government's use of violence, in that if government adopts a hard-line approach it will lead to an increase in support for the extremists. Last is the expected outcome of the conflict, in that the affected community will assess which side of the conflict will be the victor. Ultimately the affected community will side with the side that might win the conflict.

No state can effectively prevent and combat terrorism without the assistance of the public. It is, however, only a relatively small number of government officials who appreciate that their actions will have a positive or negative impact on citizens. This is evident in both domestic and transnational or international terrorism in the fact that winning public support rests with lip service that is often in direct conflict with the actions of officials. A possible explanation for this situation is that there is no clear line between friend and foe when a state has to prevent and combat terrorism. The unfortunate reality is that terrorists are well aware of this dilemma and will maximise its advantage, especially when the community represents the same ethnic, tribal or religious background that is at the same time different to that of government representatives. Under these circumstances it will be extremely difficult to counter claims on the part of the affected community that counterterrorism measures were not directed against them because community members shared a common background with the terrorists. Therefore, 'us' versus 'them' claims and arguments will be extensively used, through which emotions can easily counter official policies.

3. ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND RADICALISATION

One of the most controversial aspects of conditions conducive to terrorism is any discussion of the potential role economic conditions, especially poverty play in radicalisation.

Politicians tend to be convinced that there is a positive link between poverty, radicalisation and terrorism. Some of the most prominent statements have been made by US, UN, Israeli and British politicians. For example, then-US secretary of state Colin Powell declared in 2002: ‘I fully believe that the root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where there is ignorance, where people see no hope in their lives’ (Berrebi 2007, 2). In contrast, a number of academic studies found a negative correlation between economic circumstances and activism, specifically referring to Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin (2003), James A. Piazza (2004) and Claude Berrebi (2007). Before 2001, Russell and Miller (1983) and Hudson and Majeska (1999) even found that terrorists came from a professional background: ‘Terrorists in general have more than average education, and very few Western terrorists are uneducated or illiterate. ... Older members and leaders frequently were professionals such as doctors, bankers, lawyers, engineers, journalists, university professors, and mid-level government executives’ (Berrebi 2007, 4).

Although poverty is not a cause of terrorism, the relation between socioeconomic development and other forms of marginalisation – most notably political, ethnic and religious circumstances and differences – requires closer scrutiny. Despite the immediate connotation people often make between poverty and terrorism, the discussion of economic conditions extends well beyond only poverty. In other words, other indicators (that will be presented in this chapter) ‘facilitate’ or provide favourable circumstances for recruitment. Therefore,

economic difficulties that include, for example, unequal access to resources, expertise and popular legitimacy, contribute to a state's vulnerability to terrorism.

In assessing the impact on economic conditions, the following chapter will, among others, focus on population growth, the growing divide between rich and poor, and literacy.

Based on the above, two primary opinions emerge (Lia and Skjølberg 2000, 17–18). Firstly, there exists a positive correlation between economic inequality and terrorism when referring to the theories of Tocqueville (1961) and Engene (1994), found in the internal inequality theory. Secondly, economic development will prevent terrorism in the legitimacy hypothesis. Lipset (1963), for example, presents that economic development that includes increased wealth, urbanisation, education and literacy and communications is supposed to enhance legitimacy and tolerance. Associated with the spread of democracy, the theory is that development and democracy are the best insurance towards stability.

Linking economic and political circumstances, Abadie (2004, 51) explains that the risk of terrorism is not higher for poorer countries, once other country-specific characteristics, most notably the level of political freedom, are taken into consideration.

In the absence of a clear link between economic circumstances and terrorism, reference will be made between economical circumstances and violence. Ted Gurr (1970, 24) presents an important term – 'relative deprivation' – when explaining why people turn to violence.

According to him:

Actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping. An individual's point of reference

may be his own past condition, an abstract ideal, or the standards articulated by a leader as well as 'reference group' (Gurr 1970, 24–25).

According to Kawakami and Dion (1995, 553), relative deprivation theory consists of two key components: Firstly, the perception of inequality, or a perceived discrepancy between one's own position (individual or group) and that of others; and secondly, effects related to perceived inequality or, to put it differently, the intensity or degree of inequality.

Although presented separately, relative deprivation also plays a role in the social identity theory where inter-group comparison will have an impact on collective self-esteem and social identification when the individual puts more emphasis on his or her identification with the group. Consequently, this will have an impact on the perceptions attributed to in- and out-groups (Brewer and Silver 2000, 165).

Therefore, it is a case of which rewards people expect versus which they receive. If what is expected exceeds that which a person has or experiences, the next question in that formula will be: what will the costs be to balance the scales? In answering this question, Gurr (1970, 24) is of the opinion that '[i]f people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have, or even grateful simply to be able to hold on to it'.

Regarding the above, Walter Laqueur (1977, 12), asks whether those committing acts of terrorism were, in fact, suffering from relative deprivation? A number of years later, Gurr (2006, 87) explained that groups resorting to terrorism seldom refer to poverty as a cause for their action. Instead, they act on behalf of a marginalised – often based on ethnic, religious or class differences – group. When economic progress and political representation visibly divide people based on ethnic or tribal and religious differences, the possibility for violence and

terrorism increases. These categorisations refer to the domestic political reality and should be seen as contributing to domestic terrorism. As it is based on these differences, self-determination groups are formed.

Ultimately it comes down to the question: What is worth fighting for? As individuals, different things drive us: wealth, status, power, security, etc. When people cannot achieve these goals, possible consequences include dissatisfaction, anger and possibly aggression, especially if the person considers him or herself entitled to what he or she hopes to achieve or accomplish. But what if a group of people are driven by a common objective? The possibility that anger can turn to violence is a reality. Dowse and Hughes (1986, 372) explain that: 'If the group feels that collective violence is a legitimate response to its anger, and that violence is the only means to alleviate the discontent, then the likelihood of violence is greater.'

The ability of government to provide in the basic needs of its citizens and its ability to control its territory further enable an assessment regarding the effectiveness of government. In other words, the ability of the state to provide in the basic needs of its people serves as the central component in assessing whether a particular state is 'weak', 'failing' or 'collapsed'. It is commonly accepted that particularly failed and collapsed states are more vulnerable to experience or facilitate acts of terrorism in other countries. The ability to provide, however, extends well beyond political circumstances to also include economic and sociological challenges. The inability of the state to function has serious consequences on three basic, interlinked levels (Zartman 1995, 5): The state as sovereign authority in providing a source of identity; the state as an institution making collective decisions; and the state as security provider through its monopoly to use force.

In the analysis of conditions conducive to terrorism, the ability of the state to provide and address basic challenges has a direct link to political violence. It is particularly when the state no longer has a monopoly on the use of force that insurgent, criminal and terrorist organisations emerge as a growing threat to both government and the broad populace.

Berrebi (2007, 9) produces one of the most interesting arguments about why poor people will be less attracted to terrorism: because poorer individuals are more concerned with daily survival – most notably providing for their families – and end up devoting less attention to militant struggles. This is in line with Dipak Gupta (2001, 85) who presents a correlation between economic decline and revolution, but instead of the poor, middle-class youths serve as the driving force. Similar to Berrebi, Gupta explains that:

Revolutionary recruiters have noted that although the poorest of the poor have “nothing but their chains to loose”, they steadfastly remain outside the movement. This is because the urban lumpenproletariat remains too busy eking out a living. Any time away from their daily struggle to survive makes them the most unwilling participants.

Regarding the trigger for revolutions, Gupta explains that people are willing to accept political oppression at times of economic growth, in what he referred to as ‘high opportunity cost of time’. To further explain his theory, he presents the following formula: $\text{maximise net utility} = \text{utility of the self (greed)} + \text{utility of the group (ideology)} - \text{cost of participation (fear)}$ (ibid, 85).

Expectations are a central component of the above arguments. Of these the youth are especially vulnerable if expectations cannot be met. Being naturally impatient, their frustration can easily lead to action. According to Kofi Annan: ‘Globally, young people are three times as likely to be unemployed as adults. In some countries, youth unemployment rates remain entrenched and of worrying proportions’ (UN General Assembly 2006, 7).

Furthermore, young people are not only more susceptible to indoctrination, they are also more inclined to get physically involved. In contrast, an older person is often more inclined to think of the consequences of his or her actions. This is as relevant in young men and women signing up for military service or recruited into a paramilitary or terrorist organisation/cell resorting to violence to achieve an objective. Irrespective of this, young people are particularly vulnerable for the following basic reasons: in addition to those looking for adventure, most young people also search for a place in society. Often as a result of a lack in life experience, young people do not always have the discretionary power or ability to judge people and their influence on his/her life. Young people also see the immediate, believing that they can change the world around them. An unfulfilling family life introduces another element that will not only impact on young people (although they are particularly vulnerable) but also older individuals, contributing to the need to belong. In addition to an organisation and the social impact it might have, terrorist organisations/cells involve a strong leader that might compensate for a father figure. It is equally interesting to note the influence friend and family ties have in cell structures and terrorist organisations.

It is unmistakable that the youth is particularly vulnerable to external influences. It is for this reason that the practical part of the study included questions assessing the age at which individuals were drawn to the organisation they eventually joined. At the same time it is important to note, that due to this reason, the ADF, the LRA and al-Shabaab implemented specific strategies targeting the youth.

4. EXPLAINING RADICALISATION

Everything that was presented in the study thus far cumulates into understanding radicalisation. Starting with the individual and how socialisation occurs and explaining how

individuals identify with others (most notably based on ethnicity and religion), followed by a broad description of external circumstances, none of this can be removed from the person taking the final decision to join and actively participate in the execution of acts of terrorism.

Radicalisation is another product of political socialisation that manifests as the start of unconventional political participation. Kenneth Kenison (1990, 110), in his study of the New Left in 1968, explained that:

In no instance was radicalization sudden or dramatic; in every case, the process was gradual, unself-conscious, “natural,” and at the time largely unexamined. None of these young men and women deliberately set out to become radicals; rather they realize, as a result of their activities, that they were radicals. Precisely how long this process had been under way depends on how one defines it. In one sense, it had begun in early childhood, where the underpinnings of a later radical commitment were developed. In another sense, radicalization began with the growing sense of self-dissatisfaction and stagnation that afflicted most of these young men and women as they entered adulthood. Defined in another way, real radicalization began only when these young men and women awoke to realize that, generally without specifically intending it, they consider themselves radicals or a part of the Movement.

The description of the radicalisation process in the late 1960s is as relevant today as it was then. As a result the student particularly subscribe to the description Anne Aly and Jason-Leigh Striegher (2012, 850) give: that radicalisation is the process through which individuals and groups are *socialised* to adhere to a particular worldview that is radical or extreme.

Trying to define when radicalisation occurs, Kenison (1990, 111) presents that: ‘It is not possible to define a sharp beginning or end to this stage; but one can delimit a period of life when the individual did not think of himself as a radical, followed after an interval of months or years by another period when being a radical was crucial and even central part of his concept of himself. I will call this intervening interval the stage of radicalization. This stage is important, partly because it is so frequently discussed by radicals themselves, by their sympathizers and by their detractors.’

Driven by the psychological dimensions of the individual, influenced by the primary socialisation agents, these causes will drive an individual – conformed to the right triggers – to act. Recognising that political socialisation is a constant process, reaching the point where the person resorts to violence, implies that socialisation occurred. Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 24) explain that: ‘The range of beliefs, information, and attitudes one adopts in later life is limited by early political learning. The development of strong attachments to a particular political or social grouping will tend to prescribe one set of political choices and experiences, and to delimit others. Selective perceptivity by the individual helps assure that the basic labels and identifications acquired early are not drastically challenged in later life.’

In asking why and how politically inactive individuals become involved in a radical movement, Kenison (1990, 112) refers to the roles of intellect or a process that involved intellectual reasoning and emotion played in radicalisation: ‘The most common controversy in such discussions was the relative weight of emotion and intellect in radicalization. Some argued that their own involvement in the New Left had been largely the result of feeling, emotion, and passion – indignation, idealism, frustration and anger. Such individuals saw radicalization as a ‘gut reaction’ that preceded the development of more articulated intellectual positions. Others considered that their entry into the New Left had been a matter of conscious reflection and thought, preliminary as a result of an intellectual awareness...’

It is, however, important to note that not all individuals socialised and confronted by the same circumstances will commit acts of terrorism. Equally, not all who become radicalised will commit acts of terrorism. To make this distinction, Bartlett and Miller (2012, 2) made a distinction between violent and non-violent radicalisation. Under violent radicalisation individuals who were radicalised actively participated in terrorist-related activities, whereas individuals undergoing non-violent radicalisation adopt radical views without going over to

action. One can even refer to in-principle support. In other words, radicalisation overall refers to the process through which a person violently rejects the ‘normal’ or status quo.

The Sibley and Bhatt’s four-phase radicalisation process serves as an example of one of these phase-models. This model referred to the Madrid terrorist attack (2004), the Amsterdam Hofstad Group (or Hofstad Network), the London public transport bombings (2005), Australia’s Operation Pendennis (2005), and Canada’s Toronto 18 Case (2006), in which four phases were identified (Aly and Striegher 2012, 851). During the pre-radicalisation phase or the period before the person had any contact with the ideology or the group he was radicalised in, followed by the self-identification phase that is described as the phase in which the person is being exposed to internal and external ‘triggers,’ which may include trauma, social alienation, economic marginalisation or discrimination. This phase is also marked by drastic lifestyle changes during which they reinterpret their faith and find new meaning in their lives. During this phase these individuals almost exclusively associate with likeminded people and adopt new religious ideologies as their own. The observations of al-Shabaab family members interviewed will be particularly telling to the accuracy of these observations within this study. The indoctrination phase is associated with an increased intensity of their belief system to the point that they wholeheartedly accept the particular ideology and worldview. Furthermore, conditions and circumstances exist whereby the resort to violence (jihad) is justified to further the cause. Lastly, during the jihadisation phase members of a ‘select’ group usually appoint themselves as ‘warriors in a holy war’ and thus see it as a religious duty to begin planning, preparing and undertaking a terrorist attack.

There are many, wide-ranging models available to explain this process. What is noticeable is that the majority of these models were developed to explain the radicalisation process within Western countries that involved decentralised cells. Although useful to identify the broad

trends, whether these models can be applied to groups such as the ADF, the LRA and al-Shabaab in Kenya and Uganda remains to be seen. Therefore, instead of applying a phase model as summarised above, this study will rather refer to the ‘root cause model’ that refers to macro-level circumstances – most notably political (national and international), socioeconomic circumstances, etc. – that will be interpreted by the individual (micro-level). The individual, however, also came a long way – personal characteristics, socialisation, social identity, etc. – that will determine why some people are more susceptible to be violently radicalised than others.

4.1 Theoretical framework associated with radicalisation

Considering that the aim of this study is to understand radicalisation to terrorism from a political socialisation perspective, the theoretical foundation to unconventional political participation needs some attention. According to Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 14), scholars will be in a better position to understand ‘political violence, governmental deception, aggressive national behaviour, social stagnation, or racial injustice’ if they study it as consequences of political socialisation. When it comes to unconventional political participation (radicalism, violence and revolution), political socialisation as a theory made a number of contributions. Theories trying to explain terrorism or the resort to violence can broadly be categorised into the following main groups: access to resources, frustration and organisational dynamics within groups. Although differentiated, special attention will be placed on the relative deprivation theory.

The psychological approach concentrates on psychological interpretations on actual or perceived social, political and economic changes or developments. This approach includes ‘status inconsistency and status politics, cumulative and relative deprivation, rising

expectations and the isolation of mass society' (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1980, 28). The collective behaviour paradigm (presented by William Gamson in 1975) maintains that 'organised groups develop goals and strategies and mobilise resources while social movements express reactions of disorganised groups of people suffering from strains and/or frustrations' (ibid, 28), while the structural or normative perspective refers to 'uninstitutionalised behaviour' or 'actions taking place outside the normal channels of society'. According to Neil Smelser (1963) in *A Theory of Collective Behaviour*, 'movements are abnormal occurrences based on irrational behaviour' (ibid, 28).

According to the organisational perspective, referred to as the 'group conflict perspective', movements are classified as 'common' and concentrate on both social and political movements. Social movements motivated to resist change in social institutions or in the social order, in an 'attempt to change existing institutions by means other than the institutionalised or conventional methods to include violent and non-violent strategies (demonstrations, riots, protests and acts of terrorism)' (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1980, 29). Political movements share similar characteristics with social movements, but they are motivated by ideological and political goals and objectives. It is within this framework that Anthony Orum in *Introduction to Political Sociology: The Social Anatomy of the Body Politic* (1978), and Kenneth Wilson and Tony Orum in 'Mobilising people for collective political action' (1976) present a structural and social psychological approach to the study of social movements, including left, centre, right and extreme right or reactionary or repressive movements. In summary, scholars who specifically contributed to unconventional political participation within the terrorism debate, among others, include: Alejandro Portes (1970) and Maurice Pinard (1967), who focused on the role of anger and frustration as socio-psychological factors in political socialisation, with particular reference to leftist movements; Irving Horowitz (1972), who focused on political terrorism within the context of political radicalism and attempted to

develop a profile of a terrorist; Kenneth Wilson and Anthony Orum (1973), who analysed why individuals become involved in politics and how political organisations succeed in mobilising people; and J.W. Crayton (1983, 33–41), who presented a possible link between narcissism and terrorism.

Narcissism can broadly be described as self-obsession, to the extent that others are excluded from an ‘egoistic and ruthless pursuit of one’s gratification, dominance and ambition’ (Veldhuis and Staun 2009, 55). ‘The essence of pathological narcissism is an overvaluing of self and a devaluing of others... In developmental context the way in which this evolves is that as a child the nascent terrorist is deeply traumatised, suffering chronic physical abuse and emotional humiliation. This creates a profound sense of fear and personal vulnerability that becomes central to their self-concept. To eliminate this fear and create a more tolerable self-image, such individuals feel the need to “kill off” their view of themselves as victims. They buttress their own self-esteem by devaluing others. The result of this devaluation of others (termed “malignant narcissism”) muffles their internal voice of reason and morality. Furthermore, whatever sense of “esteem” has developed in that process is extraordinarily fragile. This makes the individual particularly vulnerable to any slights, insults or ideas that threaten to shatter the façade of self-worth. Such insults are known as “narcissistic injuries” and are the triggers of narcissistic rage’ (Akhtar 1999, 350–55). According to Crayton (1983, 33–41), the two key narcissistic elements are a grandiose sense of self and an idealised parental image in that ‘if I cannot be perfect, at least I am in a relationship with something perfect’. Linking narcissism to terrorism, people with narcissistic personality traits need an external enemy to blame for their own weaknesses while they are drawn to charismatic leaders and terrorist organisations that nurture the us-versus-them divide’ (Veldhuis and Staun 2009, 55). To test this theory, the study will include the Narcissistic Personality Inventory-40 (NPI-40) as developed by Robert Raskin and Howard Terry (1988).

Jerrold Post (1984, 243) presents two different forms of dysfunction to explain the resort to terrorism. At one end, the anarchic ideologue includes individuals who come from severely dysfunctional families, leading them to have hostile feelings towards their parents. Adopting an extremist ideology is essentially a disarticulation of their rebellion against their parents, represented by the state. In contrast, the nationalist-secessionist includes individuals who, instead of being hostile to their parents, are loyal. Ultimately becoming involved in extremism, they retaliate or avenge mistreatment their parents had to endure at the hands of the state. Elements of this form of loyalty are expected within the MRC and to a lesser extent within the LRA due to the longer historic origins of these two organisations.

Martha Crenshaw (2003, 101), in addition to the external circumstances, identifies a number of personal motivations that to a degree also summarise what the first three chapters presented thus far. Considering that the decision to resort to violence is premeditated, followers are aware of the risks that reflect their commitment to the cause. As a result of stress and isolation, members of the group develop an intimate relationship based on trust and shared commitment. This intimate relationship creates a comradeship in which shared views are hardened and members reinforce existing beliefs. In this regard terrorist groups and cults are very similar.

On the other side of deprivation is the ability to mobilise resources into collective action to address the causes of frustration. Although presented as a counter to the former, it is important to note that resource-mobilisation theorists reject emphasis on feelings and grievances, the use of psychologising categories, and the focus on breakdown characteristic of the collective-behaviour approach. Instead, resource-mobilisation theorists focus on organisation, interests, resources, opportunities and strategies to explain mobilisation based on the cost-benefit calculation. Therefore, collective action follows a rational process in which those involved realise that they will be able to achieve their objectives. These theories

oppose those that are based on the idea that organisations, influenced by a specific ideology, form to address a set of grievances (Cohen 1985, 674–75).

Explaining the resort to violence, the following theories provide useful insights. One of the most important that will be referred to in this study is the relative-deprivation theory, which analyses the relationship between frustration and political violence (Lia and Skjølberg 2000, 11).

The frustration-aggression hypothesis, as presented by William McDougall and John Dollard, is based on the principle that individuals and groups have goals. The frustrated individual or group will attack the real or perceived source of the frustration. If the attack fails to remove the frustration, further aggression is likely to follow (Dowse and Hughes 1986, 371). ‘Dollard’s main thesis is that frustration, that is, some interrupted purposeful activity, is conducive to aggression, of which violence is a major type... [H]e has stated that all violence results exclusively from frustration, which is indefensible, since various other forces, including physiological ones, such as sleep disturbance, may also cause violence’ (Bardis 1980, 229–30). It is important to note that, according to Dollard, not all frustration is followed by aggression, possibly linking this theory to the fact that not all people who experience the same frustration become violent.

Leonard Berkowitz defines frustration as ‘an interference with goal-orientated activities’ and presents a ‘frustration-anger-hostility chain when appropriate release is associated with the source of anger’. Using Freud’s ideas on psychodynamics of pleasure-seeking or pain-avoiding behaviour, he depicts frustration as ‘the inevitable antecedent of aggression, regarding aggression as the dominant unlearned response to frustration’ (Rohier 1975, 150). Following Dollard’s theory, Berkowitz adds that there are various intervening variables

between frustration and violence (in explaining why not all people confronted by the same frustration will turn violent), including: fear may replace anger; the person might interpret the situation differently; and the possibility of being caught and punished.

Ted Robert Gurr's hypothesis is based on both psychological and societal variables under the proposal that 'the greater the frustration, the greater the quality of aggression against the source of the frustration' and, in relation to political violence, 'the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence ... and its duration' (Gurr 1970, 9). Radicalisation in the mind of Gurr takes place when a group is mobilised to achieve a political or social objective, but realises that it is unable to achieve its objectives. While some may be discouraged, others will initiate tactics with greater impact in that 'impatience and frustration provide an expressive motivation (anger) and rationalistic grounds (dramatic episodes of violence elsewhere) that make it likely that some activists will decide to experiment with terror tactics' (Gurr 1998, 87).

Marxian theories suggest that 'in societies with sharp social class distinctions, it is the difference between reality and expectation that leads to frustration and violence' (Bardis 1980, 230).

In the Spiegel-Kluckhohn model, John Spiegel and Florence Kluckhohn present three elements: first, at the individual level, violence occurs when frustration reaches the grievance tolerance stage, and non-violent means are not available; second, in the social sphere, tolerance levels are determined by other available methods and the potential influence of violence on society; third, in the cultural sector, there are two ways in which violence may be affected: acceptance of prevailing goals that cannot be obtained, since no effective means are

available (leftist violence), and appearance of new goals opposed to old ideals that cannot be defended (right-wing violence).

Frustration and other related phenomena must be operationalised if measurement and prediction are to be facilitated (Bardis 1980, 233). Frustration is a central theme as a precursor for aggression and violence. But, as presented above, not all frustration leads to aggression and violence.

Charles Tilly, Louis Tilly and Richard Tilly (1975), for example, through their breakdown theories, explained that the potential for violence is greater during urbanisation (and industrialisation and modernisation) as large-scale structural rearrangements in society and the breakdown of the traditional social controls create strain and uncertainty for the individual (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 1980, 28). According to Cohen (1985, 678), in his interpretation of Tilly, collective action is not directly linked to hardship, crisis and conflict. Instead, economic transformation and urbanisation change the character of collective action. According to him, these processes (along with the development of the mass media) facilitate the emergence of new types of mobilisations and organisations while undermining others.

Instead of deciding on one of these theories, this study will assess the level of frustration when interviewing members of the ADF, the LRA, the MRC and al-Shabaab in Kenya and Uganda, while recognising the complexities of how and why individuals turn to terrorism.

4.2 Families and radicalisation

Considering the relationship of these radicals to their families, Keniston (2009, 116–17) observes that two levels of belief must be distinguished. On the one hand, families have what

we call *core values* – basic assumptions concerning desirable human relationships, feelings and motives. Such values – like honesty, deference, success, kindness, achievement, getting one’s own way, or humility – are more often implicit and expressed in behaviour than formally articulated. On the other hand, families have publicly articulated *formal values*, which include more intellectual policy statements concerning attitudes to the wider society, formal religious conviction, and so on. Among formal values, articulated political beliefs must be included. Becoming a radical, as seen in this group, involves no fundamental change in core values. To be sure, the formal political beliefs of parents and children invariably differ, even in the children of radical families.

In addition to the above explanation, Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 120) introduce another factor in the family–child relationship: that children might intentionally rebel against their family in authoritarian families, but also in developing countries in the midst of rapid social and political change. In these countries young adults often want to break away from traditional structures, causing tension between generations. Rebellion is made more attractive by what people might gain when turning against its traditions. While parents may play a lesser role, schools, peers and other groups will play a more prominent role in the political socialisation process.

Fireman and Gamson (1979) in Polletta and Jasper (2001, 289) were among the first to point out that individuals who share prior bonds through, for example, friendship, kinship, organisational membership, informal support networks or shared relations have a bigger stake in the group’s fate, even if their contribution is not noticeable. In another study, Dawson and Prewitt refer to a study conducted by Eleanor Maccoby, Richard Matthews and Anton Morton in 1954, which found that rebellion most commonly occurred in families where parents had either optimal control or did not make any real attempts to control their children. At the same

time rebellion occurred least where young people indicated that their parents had ‘about an average amount to say’ over their activities (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 119). Langton (1969, 28) in turn notices that: ‘Higher parental politicization increases political deviancy in the most autocratic families by presumably making party identification a visible symbol of protest, but it has the opposite effect among more permissive parents. Heightened parental politicization acts as a catalyst in transmitting and maintaining partisan homogeneity in the less autocratic families, while it illuminates party identification as an object of protest in the most authoritarian family. To determine the rigid parental control is likely to drive adolescents away from the party loyalties of their parents toward those of their peers.’

4.3 Education and radicalisation

While education can play a positive role to prevent conflict in increasing a person’s tolerance towards other groups, thereby also raising a person’s stake in society (as introduced in the previous chapter), education can equally contribute to radicalisation.

Explaining the role of education in this regard, Lange and Dawson (2010, 219–23) present three theories. In critical socialisation, education contributes to violence by strengthening ethnic or religious identities and therefore promoting intergroup misunderstandings. At the root of this theory (also introduced in the previous chapter) is, firstly, segregation at school, especially when the instruction is in the mother tongue. Recognised as a basic right to be educated in a person’s native language, segregation at school occurs naturally. Secondly, the curriculum taught, especially when political and religious bodies run and determine the curriculum presented, often favouring the in-group (specific religious or ethnic group) while ridiculing and discriminating against the out-group. In addition to the curriculum, a teacher also decides what is discussed and the emphasis that is placed on certain topics. Berrebi (2007, 7–8) confirms this observation and explains that educational content that advocates

particular political or religious messages may increase an individual's propensity to join terrorist organisations and participate in terrorist activity.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis, as presented above, provides that educated individuals are more likely to refer to violence to correct real or perceived injustices (frustration), especially because education enhances self-confidence and assertiveness. A real threat exists when less educated individuals are employed over those more educated, based on religious or ethnic affiliations. When this happens to an individual, violence will be contained to those close to that particular individual. But when a collective (referring to collective identity) is affected, scapegoating will be a possible consequence (Lange and Dawson 2010, 221). Scapegoating occurs when the out-group(s) is blamed for everything that is 'wrong' in the person or the group's life. This psychological response eventually becomes the group's belief in turning groups against each other (Staub and Bar-Tal 2003, 718–19). Associated with this frustration, individuals may be drawn to a terrorist group in response to limited opportunities, especially when people are well qualified but are unable to secure employment and when their heritage (religious, ethnic or tribal background) or social standing prevents them from attaining a particular position (Berrebi 2007, 8).

In addition to being educated, as noted in the previous chapter, we should rather focus on the type of education and the areas individuals studied. In a study conducted by Bartlett and Miller (2012, 7) involving those convicted for acts of terrorism in Canada, Europe and the US, it was found that only one of the 30 studied social science, while the majority (17) studied sciences, including engineering, information technology and business. This study also included a control group of 28 'radicals' or individuals who adhere to the same ideology of 'terrorists', but who are not actively involved in acts of terrorism. What was particularly interesting is that in contrast to the 'terrorists' who predominantly studied science, the

majority of the ‘radicals’ studied arts or humanities (seven) or business (six). A possible reason for this rests with the fact that a higher education, especially in social sciences, enables the development of better reasoning skills while being more sensitive to perceived injustices (Berrebi 2007, 7).

4.4 Role models and organisational identity

Becoming a radical might involve a role model the new member can look up to in ‘teaching’ him or her how to act. Keniston (2009, 139) explains that ‘...in this process, the availability of individuals who could serve as models of radical commitment, tactics, and ideology was crucial. To be of genuine assistance in the process of activation, such individuals had to be physically available to the incipient radical: for no matter how important his identification with distant or historic figures, the latter rarely can substitute for real people whom he actually knows. In the early stages of radicalisation, such real people serve to concretize the meaning of radicalism, to relieve the sense of aloneness, to focus vague discontent into a new interpretation of society, to provide specific ideas, tactics, and models of effective action, and to enable the fledgling to begin to identify himself as part of the organization. When such [role] models are not available in the immediate environment of the individual, the potential radical, no matter how personally responsible he may feel, is likely to become a lonely and frustrated eccentric operating in quixotic solitude.’

This analysis was first presented in 1968, at a time before the Internet and the rise of mass media. Founded on the same basic principles as presented above, it is expected that role models will play as important role as during the 1960s, with one important difference: the young radical being radicalised does not need to be in the physical presence of his or her mentor. What young radicals look for in their role models, as identified by Keniston (2009,

140), has not changed, namely, commitment to the cause human warmth (at least for ‘their’ people), and intellectual relevance.

According to Keniston (2009, 140), the relevance of a particular role model differs from person to person ‘according to what he personally seems to have been looking for [in his or her own life]’. Further explaining the relevance of the role model in the radicalisation process, Keniston (2009, 142) made another observation that is still relevant today: ‘...[they] came at the right time’. Putting it differently, the role model crossed paths with the person being radicalised at the right moment, when the latter was most susceptible and especially drawn to the role model’s commitment. ‘For those whom these incipient young radicals took as models had a special charisma of commitment that spoke directly to their own search for a way out of personal stagnation and vaguely articulated guilt over the seeming meaninglessness of their futures. The models possessed the qualities these young men and women felt to be most lacking in themselves: passionate moral conviction and dedication to principle, personal kindness, openness and warmth, and intellectual strength combined with relevance. By identifying with such committed radicals, the novice does not identify with those who are like him, but with those whom he seeks to be like’ (ibid, 143–44).

This study has discussed the importance of groups throughout the last two chapters. The student has also referred to collective identity earlier in this chapter, and although the student has no intention to repeat what has been discussed already, it is important to briefly refer to the impact an organisation has on the individual. What is central to this brief discussion is that we need to remember that when individuals join an organisation they incorporate organisational characteristics into their self-concept. The extent of this attachment will ultimately influence and determine the extent to which the specific person will commit to the organisation. Referred to as ‘organisational identification’, it in effect relates to a form of

psychological attachment in which members of an organisation adopt the defining characteristics of an organisation as their own defining characteristics (Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail 1994, 242). Consequently, as explained in the social identity theory, the identity of the group becomes prominent, casting a shadow over personal identity. Group identification in itself is important in forming an identity, but what is particularly important in this study is how social and group identity motivates an individual within a group to loyalty and action. To put it differently, how loyalty to a group drives a person to act for the group, often at the expense of the individual. As presented in Chapter 2, 'groupthink' is one of the problematic manifestations of social identification. Taken from the previous chapter, socialisation and a shared group identity increase the perception that individuals within a group share the same fate and are interdependent on each other. Consequently, group members trust fellow group members and their intentions more. According to Kramer, Brewer and Hanna (1996), it is this trust that drives members of a group to collective action (Brewer and Silver 2000, 161). This is, however, not the only driver; the perception of being deprived, as presented earlier, is another aspect that drives individuals that associate with a group to collective action.

Exploring why an individual is attracted to the organisational identity, Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail (1994, 244–48) explain that people are attracted to an organisational identity if it matches his or her self-concept, as it is easier to attach to something that is familiar. When the person's self-concept and organisational identity are similar, he/she finds an opportunity to express themselves more efficiently. Similar to the need of individuals to be distinct from others in their personal identity, members of an organisation enjoy and are attracted to the idea of being different within their organisational identity. Consequently, when an organisation provides a distinctive culture, structure and other characteristics, individuals associated with the organisation will experience stronger organisational identification. Individuals are more attracted to organisations that they perceive in a positive light. As a

result these individuals will also have positive self-esteem. The duration and intensity of involvement with the organisation will have an impact on the extent to which the individual identifies with the organisation. To put it differently, the longer a person is a member of an organisation and the more actively involved he or she is in the activities of the organisation, the more prominent the organisational identity will be to his or her personal identity.

Before reaching this particular point, the extent to which an individual identifies with the group will influence the intensity he or she is willing to act with in the interest of the group. Consequently, radical organisations require a higher degree of conformity, ‘revised’ self-identity and ‘defined’ collective identity, as explained by Snow and McAdam (2000) in Saunders (2008, 230).

4.5 Emotion and perception

Terrorism, similar to other forms of political violence, cannot be studied or understood without recognising the role emotion plays in every part of the study. Socialisation, categorising people in in- and out-groups, interpreting injustices leading to frustration, radicalisation and even the justification of acts of terrorism are all driven in one way or another by emotions, most notably our interpretation of conditions or circumstances to what we perceive as facts. Similarly, the response to terrorism is also influenced by emotions from those on the receiving side of the attacks. It is therefore essential to briefly refer to the role emotions and perceptions play in the political socialisation process before being analysed with reference to ADF, LRA, MRC and al-Shabaab respondents.

The emotional approach in understanding violence and terrorism refers to irrational and perceptual beliefs that are needed to cause and sustain violence that is strongly associated

with in- and out-group categorisation as part of the social-identity theory and self-categorisation theory (Franks 2005, 18–19). The simple notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are associated with biased perceptions and judgements, and even prejudiced behaviours, as Tajfel in Forgas and Fiedler (1996, 28–29) identified in his minimal-group paradigm. In effect, the fact that categorisation occurs will lead to the exaggeration of inter-group differences and the diminishing of intra-group differences. The mere act of labelling individuals as in-group and out-group members is sometimes sufficient to create discriminatory opinions as people come to rely on the category label as the basis for understanding and interacting with the other.

Some of the most common emotions and attitudes associated with terrorism include **anger**, probably one of the most common and powerful emotions associated with political violence and terrorism. This emotion normally occurs in response to a particular circumstance or event in an attempt to regain control, to remove the reason for anger and directed at those considered to be the source of anger (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors and Preston 2004, 50). According to Huddy, Feldman and Cassese (2007, 205–06), anger is intensified when the responsible party is perceived to be unjust and illegitimate. Anger seldom enables the person to reasonably evaluate the information surrounding the cause of the anger. Consequently, individuals affected are often unable to recognise additional threats that might contribute to unnecessary risk taking. In this regard, Bodenhausen (1994) explains that people concerned tend to get more involved in stereotyping, opening them up to individuals that might convince them to respond (Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2007, 208).

Although **contempt** will not be initially visible, this sense of being better than others can lead to dehumanisation in particular. Through dehumanisation it becomes easier to justify the killing of others (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors and Preston 2004, 50).

Empathy with others, or rather the lack thereof, can, along with contempt, further contribute to dehumanisation. Although not referred to as an emotion, but rather part of a person's cognitive processing, the lack of empathy does not refer to those the person know, but rather those the particular person grew up with not being in his or her in-group (ibid, 224–25).

Shame and guilt. Guilt over past injustices binds terrorists together. Crenshaw (2003, 103) even refers to a form of 'survivor-guilt' that enforces solidarity within the group. To a degree it also explains why members of a group are willing to go through tremendous hardship. According to Jones (2006, 169), a link exists between shame, humiliation and violence. Furthermore, religion has the potential to create and even reinforce feelings of shame and humiliation that can contribute to terrorism.

All of the above contribute towards **hatred** and vengeance or revenge. According to Cota-McKinley (2001), vengeance can be defined as 'the infliction of harm in return for perceived injury or insult or as simply getting back to another person' (Silke 2005, 245). There are a number of reasons why an individual or a group would want to take revenge on another, from restoring self-worth or correcting a real or even perceived injustice to preventing future injustices. What is especially important to note is that those involved in carrying out the act of revenge is willing to sacrifice a lot in the process. Even if the wrong was not directed at the person or group personally, people are willing to go through extreme lengths and hardship to avenge a wrong (ibid, 245–46).

Martha Crenshaw considers **vengeance** the most central emotion common to both individuals and groups in driving them to acts of terrorism. She explains that '...one of the strongest motivations behind terrorism is vengeance, particularly the desire to avenge not oneself but others. Vengeance...is an obsessive drive that is a powerful motive for violence toward

others, especially people thought to be responsible for injustices' (1992, 71–80). As suggested, vengeance might be in reaction to a specific event (for example, the death or humiliation of a close friend or family member at the hands of security forces) or in reaction to a series of developments, finally 'pushing' the person to react. Anger as a result of unjust persecution leads to revenge. Groups will avenge from injustices committed to the in-group to the treatment of its members (or in-group) by members of the security forces. To the most extreme, the fact that members will avenge the death of other members will even make membership to the group more attractive. It is this avenging of the member's death that will give meaning to the person's sacrifice and life (Crenshaw 2003, 102).

Although the student has already referred to **dehumanisation**, it is necessary to briefly refer to what the concept implies. According to Kelman (Haslam 2006, 254), dehumanisation involves denying the person, on the receiving end, both his and her personal and collective identity. On the level of personal identity the perception is that the person is not recognised as an individual who is independent and distinguishable from others. On the collective or communal level, the existence of being interconnected, in which people care for each other, is not being recognised. Being de-individuated, it becomes increasingly difficult to have compassion for members of the out-group.

An important element that will be noted throughout this chapter concentrates on psychological interpretations of actual or perceived social, political and economic changes or developments. Introducing the role of **perception** in aggression and violence (including terrorism), individuals form perceptions as part of an internal process, although it might also represent a collective. Referred to as 'cognitive theory', Dodge and Schwartz (1997, 171 and 180), for example, explain that there are internal and external factors that can impact on an individual's perceptions of provocation or intent leading to aggression, starting with an

inability to find non-aggressive solutions or a lack in confidence that they might be successful and followed by a tendency to interpret the world from a hostile or aggressive frame of reference.

On the interrelationship between perceptions and terrorism, Crenshaw (1988, 12) explains that ‘the actions of terrorists are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories.’ Based on this description, it is equally important, as Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors and Preston (2004, 46) explain, that people ‘tend to see what they expect to see. They fit incoming information into the ideas or beliefs that they already hold to be true, and they typically do not recognize that they do this.’ This discussion will form the basis of how ‘terrorists’ perceive the world around them.

Perceptions can be described as:

An interactive process by which stimuli become interpreted by the individual, the process taking place via the integration of the stimulus events with the prior knowledge and beliefs of the individual. Perception forms part of the cognitive system that cannot be separated from the following basic elements, of how a person perceives is related to how a person learns, remembers, solves problems and make decisions. How a person perceives is also related to that person’s beliefs, knowledge, affect and goals (Voss and Dorsey 1992, 8).

Therefore, based on this definition, perception and interpretation are interwoven processes and essentially cannot be separated. The basic conclusion is the fact that individuals form mental images of the world that provide an understanding of the world around them. From these ‘images’ stereotypes are formed that will impact on how individuals and even countries will interact or react to the ‘other’. The forming of perceptions forms part of a process that includes the formation of a selective perception, the selective recalling of incidents and the establishment of a group identity. Central to this process is the recognition and interpretation

of incoming information evaluated in a subjective manner. All information that does not form part of existing beliefs and images is ignored, reinterpreted or rejected. In other words, people tend to see what they want to see, enabled through consistency in information processing, that can be achieved in the following ways (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors and Preston 2004, 40–41): selective exposure, in which the person selectively seeks information not yet acquired but that would reinforce existing beliefs; selective attention through concentrating on consistent information; and the selective interpretation in which vague or confusing information will be interpreted in such a way that it is consistent with what is already known. It is important to note that the term ‘selective’ is central to the perception-forming process.

Associated with perceptions, we also form stereotypes or beliefs about the characteristics of a particular group of people. These stereotypes can include personality traits and physical characteristics shared by the group (ibid, 43). All members belonging to that group (or country) are expected to exhibit stereotypical characteristics in which individual differences are being played down. Each group will form its own group identity, which will imply growing superiority and hostility towards the other group. In accordance to these group differences, individual members of that stereotype will be disregarded. Ultimately, it becomes almost impossible to empathise with the other group’s beliefs, fears, suspicions and grievances (Mitchell 1989, 82). When one group is more powerful than another, the stronger group is in a position to impose its stereotype on the less powerful to the extent that it might even be forced to internalise its imposed stereotype (Taylor 1997, 182).

Based on these concepts, individuals and groups start to expect behaviour as behaviour is shaped by the interpretation of earlier events or emotions derived from prior experiences. However, within this process earlier experiences are selectively recalled (Voss and Dorsey 1992, 131–45). Past experiences can therefore be particularly powerful in contributing to

violence. Firstly, when the group was on the receiving end of conflict before, unhealed wounds and the negative perception of the other group will make the in-group more susceptible to any possible sign of threat or danger. This perception may cause the group to react, even if it was not necessary, or alternatively overreact to become the transgressor. Secondly, traumatic past experiences become the glasses through which contemporary events are being interpreted. Constant perceived insecurity provides the building blocks for a siege mentality or the perception that the group is under constant threat (Staub and Bar-Tal 2003, 722).

When perceptions are being formed of the 'other' based on insufficient information, disinformation and a lack in education that both sides would not only drift apart, the potential for conflict increases. In this regard, Forgas and Fiedler (1996, 28) explain that when group membership is not personally relevant people might rely more on categorical information about groups, leading to greater inter-group discrimination. However, when group membership is personally relevant, negative attitudes is expected to lead to greater inter-group bias. This occurs as people will deliberately initiate a strategy to repair dispositions through increasing the positive distinctiveness of the in-group.

In all conflicts all parties concerned form selective perceptions and expectations derived from experiences, which could be described as 'attitude'. Selective perceptions will contribute to an ongoing conflict situation: 'All negative, violent, aggressive words and deeds of the other side against one's own group are viewed as characteristic of the nature of the evil other. All potential conciliatory initiatives are viewed as ploys to get the other side to put its guard long enough for the evil other to move in for the kill. This kind of selective perception is self-sealing. The other can do no right, by definition and by nature. In addition, and connected to this idea, one's own side can do no wrong. Any negative words or deeds by one's own group

towards the others are the result of pressures, circumstances, aberrations and legitimate revenge brought on by the evil others themselves' (Rothman 1992, 15). These selective and subjective perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories. For example, seeing two people holding hands might be interpreted or equated as having intercourse, thereby leading to an exaggerated reaction to what another person would consider 'innocent' (Borum 2004, 13–14).

5. OPERATIONALISATION

As mentioned before, not all people that were radicalised will eventually be recruited or execute acts of terrorism. Chapters 2 and 3 identified three factors that contribute to a person's decision to finally go over to action: socialisation leading to a person's belief system, socio-political values and attitudes, followed by psychological attributes and increases in a person's frustration. On the positive side, a sense of belonging or worthiness can further push a person to the group. Most scholars refer to a 'final trigger'.

Martha Crenshaw (1981) in Veldhuis and Staun (2009, 26) refers to a catalyst that finally accelerates the radicalisation process. These catalysts are seen as relevant to that particular situation and can occur on micro- and macro-levels, or possibly cut across both. Irrespectively it is traditionally a drastic or volatile event.

Devaluation and dehumanisation serve as conditions leading to the justification of violence. Presented earlier in this chapter, these two processes provide for the justification of violence for both the in- and out-group. Becoming increasingly dangerous, members of the out-group, or 'enemy', are increasingly perceived as not being human and not deserving to live. In the extreme, killing members of the out-group even becomes a moral right, if not a responsibility.

6. CONCLUSION

It is clear from research thus far that there does not exist independent causal factors determining or explaining why people resort to terrorism. Despite this statement, the theory is that it should be possible to identify the factors that contributed to a specific individual being radicalised and drawn to a specific group. It is at the same time important to recognise that individuals will be drawn to or participate in these movements for different reasons.

When individuals' national identities have not been sufficiently established, turning against their fellow countrymen becomes easier, especially considering that the in-group the person associates and identifies with is stronger than the nation or country he/she belongs to.

Gurr's hypothesis on relative deprivation provides insight into especially economic, but also social and political circumstances that motivate a person to act for a collective. It is therefore important to understand the conditions conducive to radicalisation or root causes of terrorism within the framework of how the individual – as part of his in-group – interprets it. To assess the role external circumstances played in the radicalisation process, respondents will be asked why they joined the particular organisation and whether a specific incident influenced him/her to finally join the organisation. Answers to this question will also shed light on the role a trigger or catalyst played in the operationalisation process. Considering the emphasis placed on political circumstances in the radicalisation process, a series of questions will also be asked to determine and analyse the respondent's position on elections (conventional political participation) and his/her perception of politicians and the political process.

To determine the role family members, friends and role models played in the radicalisation process, respondents will be asked if they informed anyone of their decision to join the

organisation and to identify the category. Respondents will also be asked to identify who (without referring to specific details) introduced him/her to the organisation. Lastly, respondents will be asked if he/she joined the group with friends and/or family and if they, in turn, recruited friends and family members to the organisation.

The emotional aspect involved in joining an organisation will be determined and analysed by asking respondents to best identify the emotion that captures their decision to join, but also to provide the timeframe between first interaction and actively joining the organisation. It is expected that the shorter this period, the more emotional the decision. This period will also be read with the reasons for joining. Furthermore, respondents will be asked to rate their level of frustration at the time he/she joined the organisation, as well as to rate the level of belonging they experienced when they initially joined the organisation, and again while being members of the organisation.

With the theoretical bases established in chapters 2 to 4, the following three chapters will analyse the backgrounds of individuals who became members of the ADF, the LRA and al-Shabaab in Uganda, and al-Shabaab and the MRC in Kenya, taking specific note of personal backgrounds, identity – national or social identity based on religion or tribal and ethnic associations – and perceptions. All of these will be assessed in terms of the economic, political and social circumstances individuals found themselves in.

CHAPTER 5: RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT TO THE ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN UGANDA

1. INTRODUCTION

Since it gained independence from Britain in 1962, Uganda has experienced its fair share of political turmoil fuelled by religious and ethnic divides. The preceding chapters have established that it is not extraordinary for an individual's political framework to be based on loyalty towards ethnic or tribal affiliation, race or religious orientation. Recognising that religious and ethnic identities present the biggest challenge to building an inclusive national identity in heterogeneous societies, the first part of this chapter will focus briefly on Uganda's political development since independence and the role religious diversity has played in building national identity. This chapter – one of two on Uganda – will analyse the role of religion in the formation of the ADF, a Muslim organisation that attempted to capitalise on the religious identity of its members to further its religious agenda. Chapter 6 will, in turn, focus on ethnicity when discussing the LRA.

The ADF is probably one of the least-known groups on the continent. For example, according to an analysis by Lucy Hovil and Eric Werker (2005, 14) only two substantial reports had been written on the ADF by 2005. Despite these challenges, this chapter will provide broad background before going into the research findings that focus on the personal backgrounds of 73 ADF members who benefited from the amnesty process. The purpose of individual interviews, as referred to in Chapter 1, is to place the political-social process, which ended in joining the ADF, in context. These research findings will be interpreted in greater detail in Chapter 7, when the ADF, the LRA and al-Shabaab are placed in the perspective of the theoretical framework presented in chapters 1 to 4.

2. POLITICAL HISTORY OF UGANDA AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION

Religious divisions in Uganda have a long history. In the late 19th century, a series of civil wars were fought in Buganda that pitted Christians against Muslims and Protestants against Catholics. With the support of the Imperial British East African Company, the Protestants were victorious. To be Christian had political rewards. For example, the 1900 Uganda Agreement made specific reference to religion in the allocation of offices. The king of Buganda, his chief minister and the minister of finance were to be Protestant; the Minister of Justice, Catholic; while no office was allocated to Muslims. The leadership of the 20 administrative counties was also divided along religious lines: Protestants received 10 counties, Catholics eight, and Muslims two. In addition, Protestants were assured of higher government positions even in Catholic counties (Baldwin 1990, 315–16).

In 1967, a new constitution declared Uganda a republic and centralised power in an executive president. This resulted in a crisis of legitimacy and heightened conflict in the ethnically fragile state (Omach 1986, 4–5). Government became increasingly authoritarian and, in the late 1960s, politically motivated riots and mutinies led to the deaths of about 2 500 people (Deininger 2003, 586). In 1971, the army overthrew the government of Milton Obote. Between 1971 and 1979, under Idi Amin, ethnic and religious relations deteriorated. It is estimated that, under Obote and Amin, between 800 000 and one million people (more than 5% of the total population) were killed in state terror, civil strife and ethnically motivated assaults (Deininger 2003, 586–87).

With Amin's rise to power in 1971, Muslims in the country recognised an opportunity to address their plight – militarily and politically. When Amin, a Muslim, assumed power in 1971, there were two Muslims in the cabinet. By 1977, 14 of the 21 cabinet members were

Muslim. In the military, the percentage of Sudanic-speaking (referring to languages spoken in the Sahel) officers increased from 37% before 1971 to 54% by 1977. The percentage of Bantu, Lwo and Nilo-Hamitic speakers all fell (Baldwin 1990, 333). Amin probably did the most harm by manipulating the religious divide in the country. Initially, he used the fact that religion cut across ethnic, linguistic and regional lines to his advantage in mobilising political support. At the end of 1972, Amin expelled 55 Catholic missionaries followed by 58 European Christian missionaries in 1973. This non-violent stance gradually became more violent when Father Clement Kiggundu, the editor of the Catholic newspaper, *Munno*, was found murdered in his car in January 1973. Another highly visible assassination of a church leader occurred in February 1977 when the archbishop of the Anglican Church for Uganda, Janani Luwum, was killed. Amin further promoted Islam by using it as a criterion for recruitment and promotion in the army and civil service. He initiated an Islamisation campaign to ensure continuing aid from Libya and Saudi Arabia (ibid, 334).

After achieving the shared goal of overthrowing Amin, leadership in the country was again divided along political, ethnic, religious, military and ideological lines. Intrigues and political manoeuvring between the different groups to secure political control meant that all hope of national reconciliation that followed the end of Amin's rule evaporated (Omach 1986, 5). In February 1981, Yoweri Museveni launched his guerrilla war against the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) government, which lasted until January 1986. By the time Museveni's National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) government took control of the country, the army had disintegrated into armed gangs that were engaged in looting and harassing civilians. Furthermore, the conflict had also polarised Uganda along the regional north-south divide and along ethnic lines: between the NRA's predominantly southern guerrilla army and the then northern-dominated government, Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). The NRM came to power on the platform of establishing democracy, restoring security and

consolidating national unity. Within a few months it had succeeded in extending control over the entire country and establishing a measure of stability that was unfortunately short-lived as soldiers associated with the UNLA refused to go to 'politicisation camps' and reorganised themselves under the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA). In August 1986, the UPDA launched attacks against NRA positions in Gulu and Kitgum (Omach 1986, 6–7). This will be discussed in the next chapter as an introduction to the LRA. In the wake of Amin's political demise and exile in 1979, Uganda's Muslims (in south-western Uganda, most notably around Mbarara) were politically marginalised in the 1980s and 1990s (Boås 2002, 13), a development that will be discussed in greater detail below.

Two social divides in Ugandan politics stand out: that between the Buganda and the non-Buganda, and that between the predominantly Muslim and poorer north and the predominantly Christian and more commercialised south. However, as explained in Chapter 3, these divisions were mitigated by further ethnic and religious distinctions; indeed, it was among the most highly fractionalised societies in the world. The popular perception would be that it was a factor that increased the risk of civil war (Collier 1999, 4).

Historically, Uganda's political leaders came to power and stayed in power through the use of force and by limiting the political landscape. Although the roots of the ADF can be traced back to before Museveni and the NRM took power in 1986, the political culture under Museveni directly influenced the formation of groups such as the ADF.

Since independence, political control of the country has been reserved for individuals with a military background (in addition to ethnic origins). As Kagoro (2013, 31) observed, 'the field of power is dominated by a politico-military elite, who participated in the aforementioned guerrilla war'. Coming from a military background, governing a country is seen from the

perspective of commanding troops. This closed the political landscape in Uganda, especially since military discipline does not allow the questioning of orders. Democracy and broadening the political landscape can lead to the following two challenges: first, political opponents can come to be regarded as enemies of the state, especially when the political survival of the head of state is closely associated with the political survival of the country, and second, gaining political power is interpreted as impossible to achieve through the ballot box and the use of force is necessary to do so. This role of the military in African, especially Ugandan, politics in this regard has led to a number of situations that directly threatened the political stability of countries on the continent. Political and socioeconomic issues were resolved militarily rather than peacefully, even before Museveni came to power. For example, in the 1960s, when Obote abrogated the 1962 quasi-federal constitution, the military intervened both directly and indirectly in national politics. It is, however, important to note that it was this absence of sound civil–military relations that led to the NRA/M’s liberation war. Despite this the military, especially the top officer corps, considers itself as having the last word on the country’s political leadership (Olum 2012, 10).

The NRM implemented new political institutions to legitimise its rule, while maintaining its hold on power. Elections were halted between 1986 and 1996. At times when political parties were allowed to form and permitted to participate in elections, these political parties were not allowed to really structure themselves and to campaign. For example, elections were held under the ‘no-party rule’, which meant that political parties were not allowed to sponsor candidates for elections. Instead, candidates had to run under the principle of ‘individual merits’, but not with political party labels or associations (Kim 2012, 3). On 11 March 1986, in line with its views that political parties were ‘sectarian’ and ‘divisive’, the new NRM government suspended the activities of political parties (holding meetings and rallies). Only activities ‘intended to enhance national unity along the lines set by Government’ were

allowed. Government also expanded its political education programme (under the National School of Political Education) in which political parties were portrayed as divisive and sectarian, and blamed for past political evils (Omach 1986, 10–11).

The drafting and promulgation of the new constitution in 1995 was itself controversial, starting with the fact that the police disallowed attempts to organise debates outside the sanctioned framework. This led to the perception that ‘the whole exercise was a gimmick’, as the government had drafted the new constitution and was only opening the process to secure legitimacy for it. The draft constitution submitted at the time to the government confirmed the above view (ibid, 14).

According to McDonough (2008, 367) authoritarian tendencies emerged in the aftermath of the 1996 presidential election, as the government began to consolidate its hold on power and place limits on the political participation of certain factions. Evidence of this was, however, already apparent following reports of intimidation, harassment and violence against opposition multiparty coalition political groups who participated in the 1996 elections. During campaigns, NRM supporters branded supporters of the leader of the Democratic Party (DP) and candidate of the opposition coalition, Paul Ssemogerere, as traitors and subjected them to systematic harassment and intimidation. This was particularly the case in south-western Uganda where NRM supporters considered it a crime for anybody to oppose Museveni or advocate for a return to a multiparty political system (Omach 1986, 14–15).

The thinking was that if the functioning of political parties were restricted, sectarian violence would be prevented. The reality was that although repression proved to be globally fairly effective in (North Africa and the Middle East before the Arab Spring or the former Soviet Union during the cold war) reducing the risk of civil war, its long-term consequences would

be counterproductive (Collier 1999, 8). Elections and the overall political process are supposed to enable legal and non-violent addressing of political marginalisation and frustrations. By closing this avenue, violence that is itself illegal became the only vehicle to express political opinions. As a result, the NRA/M government has found it convenient to use conflicts to suppress political opposition and to militarise society. Sending a strong signal regarding the role of the military in crucial positions, a military general was appointed to head the Uganda Police Force in 2001. Since then, political cadres and military men have been recruited into the police force, allegedly to 'improve it' (Omach 1986, 16). Despite this criticism, Lieutenant-General Kale Kayihura has made positive changes to the Uganda Police Force as Inspector-General.

The first multiparty elections under Museveni took place in 2006 and, as Kim (2012) explained, political parties represent the ethnic divides in the country. People vote based on ethnic lines for a number of reasons, which will not be discussed, but what is important to this analysis is that voters vote for their ethnic party as it is a manifestation of their ethnic identity. Their support for a party has nothing to do with the policies of that particular party but with ethnic identity and alliances (Kim 2012, 4).

As established in the previous chapter, a sense of political identity is not a given but depends on history and government behaviour. The experience of conflict may have tended to polarise Uganda's initially highly fractionalised society into north versus south and Buganda versus non-Buganda. Hence, to restore security the government could attempt to rebuild diversity, encouraging the historic identities not only to re-emerge but to generate a multiplicity of political parties and allegiances (Collier 1999, 9).

Instead of focusing on political parties and elections, the NRM, in its democratisation process, created resistance councils/committees or local councils. These local governance structures were supposed to provide citizens with the necessary opportunities to participate in the governance of the country. The local councils empowered villagers politically, something they had never enjoyed. These councils became the foundation for the formulation of the decentralisation policy in 1992 and transferred powers, functions and responsibilities from central government to lower local governments (Olum 2012, 4–5).

In summary, the political history of Uganda reflects a one-party political system that is definitely not synonymous with national unity, stability and security (Baldwin 1990, 346).

3. HISTORY OF THE ADF

The ADF was created in September 1995, when Yusuf Kabanda, one of the leaders of the Islamic opposition to the Ugandan army (a comrade of Jamil Mukulu), formed an alliance with Commander Ali Ngaimoko of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), in Beni, in the Congolese province of North Kivu. The ADF-NALU was created with the assistance and support of the Sudanese and Congolese secret services as part of the regional political degradation (International Crisis Group 2012, 2–3).

The ADF, claiming to be fighting against what they called the one-party state of the NRA/M, started the rebellion in 1996 after the June 1996 presidential elections, which they claimed were marred by gross malpractices. The ADF also presented itself as a Muslim organisation protecting the interests of marginalised Muslims in Uganda following governmental interference. The mainstream ADF comprised Tabliq of the Salafi sect and remnants of other fighting groups such as the Rwenzururu Freedom Movement, NALU, Idi Amin loyalists led

by Moses Ali (based in Juba), West Nile Bank Front, Uganda National Rescue Front and Liberation Tigers of Uganda (Buseruka rebels) (Muhereza 2011, 28). Of these older resistance movements, the Rwenzururu resistance movement and NALU influenced the ADF most while being injected with the Tabliq movement.

The origins of the ADF–NALU can be traced back to the first Rwenzururu independence movement, in response to the political, economic and social marginalisation of people in western Uganda (Bakonjo and Bamba) experienced under Obote and Amin (Bøås 2002, 12). Tensions within the local kingdom and the rejection of authority from the central government contributed to calls for independence. During the colonial period, Kasese (predominantly occupied by the Bakonjo ethnic group) and Bundibugyo (mainly populated by the Baamba ethnic group) districts were linked to the Kabarole (populated by the Batoro) district. The Bakonjo and Baamba were thus arbitrarily made subjects of the Tooro Kingdom, which was led by a Mutoro king (Romkema 2007, 71). The Tooro monarchy supported the colonial occupation, in contrast to the other communities in this region, and it was used by the British to reinforce their territorial control over western Uganda. In 1919, the first armed rebellion of the Bakonjo against the Tooro Kingdom started. In the early 1950s, the Bakonjo and Baamba again asked for their own district, which was again refused by the British. This refusal provoked the start of a low-intensity guerrilla struggle against the colonial administration, which came to be known as the Rwenzururu resistance movement (De Veenhoop 2007, 79). After independence, this Ruwenzururu group evolved from an anti-colonial force to a peasant guerrilla movement, which continued fighting for political autonomy. In 1962, the Bakonjo and Baamba declared Rwenzururu an independent state under the leadership of Isaiah Mukiranya. The government of Uganda responded to the demand for sub-regional autonomy by arresting the Bakonjo leader, which in turn triggered the start of a low-scale peasant guerrilla campaign (Romkema 2007, 71).

Between 1962 and 1982, the Rwenzururu movement conducted a low-intensity guerrilla war on the Uganda–DRC border in an attempt to gain the Ugandan government’s recognition of the Kingdom of Rwenzururu. The movement predominately included peasants but was headed by middle-class intellectuals, most notably teachers (Boås 2002, 12). The struggle officially ended on 15 August 1982, when Charles Wesley Irema-Ngoma, the Bakonzo’s Omusinga, joined Obote’s government, which granted autonomy to the Kingdom of Rwenzururu rather than independence (International Crisis Group 2012, 2–3).

After Obote’s government fell in 1986 and Museveni came to power, the deposed regime’s head of intelligence services, Amon Bazira (a former minister in the UPC government), created the NALU, a group that brought together supporters of both Obote and Amin. Looking for support and thanks to his contacts in the Rwenzururu, Bazira appealed to Irema-Ngoma but failed to attract the support of all the movement’s ex-combatants. He was joined by Richard Tinyamusitu, the Rwenzururu’s military commander, but only in an individual capacity. However, Irema-Ngoma’s support for the NALU did not last very long and in 1988 he declared his support for Museveni (ibid, 3). Despite this initial setback, in 1990 the NALU began its first large-scale military operation, carrying out 43 grenade attacks in Kampala and Jinga. On 5 July 1991, the Ugandan army killed a Rwenzururu leader during a clash with NALU fighters, eliminating the head of the NALU’s Rwenzururu branch. Despite this success, the NALU continued operations, and in 1992 the group attacked the capital of Kasese district. However, the Ugandan army, which retook control of Kasese within a few days, quickly contained the offensive. The August 1993 assassination of the NALU’s founder, Amon Bazira, in Nakuru, Kenya, marked the end of the movement’s activities.

The Tabliq movement had its origins in the Tabliq Jamaat that was founded in India in the 1920s and based in Pakistan from the 1960s. Traditionally the Tabliq movement focused on

education, proselytising and the improvement of personal morality, not politics (De Waal 2004, 198). In Uganda, the Tabliq movement gradually became involved in politics as will be discussed below.

During the 1970s and 1980s, hundreds of Ugandan Muslim students studied at the Islamic University of Medina. Returning home, some preached a stricter form of Islam influenced by Wahhabist ideas encountered in Saudi Arabia that until then had been virtually unknown in Uganda. The growth of this reformist trend was influential in strengthening an international network that for the first time linked Ugandan Muslims to the major centres of Islam in the Middle East. Pan-Islamic activism in Uganda, associated with the Wahhabist and/or Salafi movements, coincided with growing Islamic awareness in East Africa. This activism was eventually to turn in a political direction, a development not new to Uganda, where religion and politics have often interacted, notably with state attempts to control the institutions of civil society. According to Chande (2000), in the mid-1980s the emerging divisions between the young Salafis and the traditional *ulama* (Muslim legal scholars) of popular Islam had begun to harden (Haynes 2005, 1334).

After the fall of Amin in 1979, the Obote and Museveni governments cracked down on Ugandan Muslims. In the 1980s, the religious Tabliq Muslim movement used this oppression and financial support from the Sudanese government after Hassan al Turabi visited Uganda in 1986 to its advantage. Through establishing charity organisations, Turabi also further established a link with Tabliq students in Pakistan. Consequently, the Tabliq movement increasingly became a major player in local Muslim community politics and gradually increased its support base through the recruitment of Ugandan youth (De Waal 2004, 199). The main objective of the Tabliq movement was to implement reform in the Ugandan Muslim community in a perceived leadership crisis. With a ruling of the Supreme Court in 1989 in

favour of the state-supported Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC), Tabliq Muslims interpreted this development as interference in Muslim affairs (Boås 2002, 14). This coincided with the power struggle between the pro-Iranian and pro-Pakistani (Tabliq) factions in the appointment of the Mufti of Kampala. The Mufti is a powerful position; he also decides on scholarships and charity. Consequently the winning faction would have access to these resources that will ultimately impact on the reach and effectiveness of the losing faction. In March 1991, the court ruled in favour of the pro-Iranian candidate – as president Museveni visited Iran – that sparked the pro-Pakistani Tabliq faction to react (De Waal 2004, 199). The establishment of an Islamic state was regarded as the only strategy to counter government interference.

However, the struggle for the domination of the religious sphere that ensued was to turn violent. On 22 March 1991, an estimated 450 Tabliq students clashed with members of the UMSC in Kampala, leaving five dead, including four police officers. Consequently, Tabliq leaders, including Jamil Mukulu, who was head of the youth movement, were imprisoned between 1991 and 1993. After their release, the group's members referred to themselves as the Uganda Salafist Foundation (according to Ismaila Ssempagala, one of the respondents interviewed that was also one of its founding members). The Uganda Freedom Fighters Movement or UFFM, established in 1994 under Sheikh Sulaiman Kakeeto based in Hoima, would also be integrated into the ADF. Under Jamil Mukulu the ADF regrouped with members of the Uganda Salafist Foundation and the UFFM in February 1995 at Busekura (early members were also referred to as Busekura rebels) and Bunyoro (Boås 2002, 14). Kampala reacted by destroying the movement's training camp in 1995 (De Veenhoop 2007, 81) and found evidence that teachers had been trained in Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan (De Waal 2004, 199). Consequently members were arrested and imprisoned.

Following the destruction of their base, the members of the UFFM took refuge in the Congolese town of Bunia, near the Ugandan border, where they continued to receive support from Sudan. The leaders of the Tabliq movement in Uganda, including Sheikh Sulaiman Kakee and Jamil Mukulu, fled to Kenya and Tanzania (De Veenhoop 2007, 81). As a result of Sudan's support for the LRA and the Tabliq movement, Uganda severed diplomatic ties with Sudan in April 1995 (De Waal 2004, 199).

Until December 2005, the ADF–NALU alliance consisted of a political (the Allied Democratic Movement) and a military (the Allied Democratic Forces) branch. The military branch reported to the political branch, which was made up of joint ADF–NALU leadership. Jamil Makulu was the overall political leader of the ADF (also known as Kyagulanyi or Talengelanimiro). The overall military leader, or 'chief director', of the ADF was Abdallah Yusuf Kabanda, who was based in the Beni-Butembo region of the DRC. Kyeyune, the deputy-chief of the ADF, assisted Kabanda. Other military commanders included Isiko Barahu (chief of military general headquarters, also known as Commander Bosco), Kayiira Mohammed (chief of administration and director of military intelligence), Mohammed Batambuze (Army commander), Mohammed Isabirye (overall field commander, also known as Commander Tiger) and Hassan Musa (chief of military operations and logistics) (De Veenhoop 2007, 84).


The ADF's general staff headquarters was located in Bundiguya where three staff chiefs were in command: chief of administration (who was also the director of military intelligence), chief of military operations and logistics, and chief of military general headquarters (chief of staff). Besides the general military headquarters, the movement comprised three different brigades each numbering four to six companies (each company usually consisting of between 80–250 people and with a number of detachments). These brigades reported to the overall commander

and were located, until December 2005, in the Mwalika, Bundiguya and Chuchubo camps (De Veenhoop 2007, 84).

Fighters were recruited from Kampala, Jinja, Iganga, Mbale, Bushenyi, Mbarara, Masindi and Hoima mainly, and were operational in Kasese, Bundibugyo, Kibaale, Hoima, Bushenyi districts and, to a lesser extent, Mbarara District. They also set up bases in the neighbouring DRC, from where they trained their forces and launched attacks (Muhereza 2011, 28). In 1996, ADF–NALU forces numbered an estimated 4 000–5 000 combatants. Its operations were concentrated in Kasese and Bundibugyo districts, along the border with the DRC (International Crisis Group 2012, 5). Additionally Bushenyi, Kabarole and Kamwenge in south-west Uganda were identified as other ADF strongholds. Although the focus of this study is recruitment in Uganda, the ADF operates from the DRC, most notably from its bases in North Kivu and Orientale (Think Security Africa 2012, 2).

In addition to these areas, the ADF recruited supporters across Uganda (Hovil and Werker 2005, 16). Based on information provided by the Amnesty Commission, the 2 040 former members, as on 29 October 2013, came from the areas shown in Map 1. The original Uganda map was sourced from United Nations Maps before information received from the Amnesty Commission was included.

Map 1: Origins of ADF members



The vast majority of ADF members came from Kasese (1 252), followed by Kampala (90), Masaka (73), Bundibugyo (66), Kabarole (59) and Ntungamo. Kasese, as the district that contributed the most to the ADF, deserves a brief overview. The district is divided into two counties, Bukonzo and Busongora, and is made up of 28 lower local governments, but traditionally it was also the epicentre of the Rwenzururu rebellion as the district is concentrated in a narrow corridor of land running between the Rwenzori Mountains and the Western Rift Valley. Based on figures from 2002, 48% of the rural population of the district

lives below the poverty line. However, this indicates a decrease from 51% compared to 10 years earlier, at the time the ADF was established (Renno, Twinamasiko, and Mugisa 2012, 22).

The ADF launched its first attack at Mpondwe border post in Kasese district in November 1996 before retreating back into the Congo. Over the next five years, the ADF launched attacks in many parts of western Ugandan, mainly Kasese, Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kamwenge and Bushenyi before being defeated in 2002 (Muhereza 2011, 28). In June 1997, the ADF–NALU conducted its first major operation seeking to take control of the town of Bundibuyo, but Ugandan forces successfully repelled the attack. In addition to attacks against the Ugandan security apparatus, the ADF–NALU also targeted civilians, starting with schools. For example, in February 1998, 30 students were abducted from the Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese. In June 1998, at least 50 students were burned to death and more than 60 others abducted when ADF–NALU attacked the Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole district. Later in June, 100 schoolchildren were abducted from a school in the Hoima district (De Veenhoop 2007, 81).

The ADF–NALU successfully executed attacks in Kampala on 14 February 1999 when they detonated explosive devices in two restaurants. Between April and June 1999, the group launched seven attacks in Kampala using hand grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Between 1998 and 2000, the attacks carried out by the group killed approximately 1 000 people, displaced 150 000, including 85% of the population in Bundibugyo district (International Crisis Group 2012, 3 and 5).

In September and October 2006, Ugandan security forces indicated that the ADF had made attempts to increase its activities in western Uganda. For example, during mid-October 2006,

22 rebels were killed in various operations in Bundibugyo and Kyenjojo districts (De Veenhoop 2007, 87).

According to Hovil and Werker (2005, 15) the ADF did not have a clear Islamist agenda as the majority of ex-combatants denied that there was a specific Islamic agenda to the struggle.

One of the ex-combatants in this study said that:

The agenda of the ADF was purely political. The religious aspect came later as a way to get support and recruits ... The ADF adapted the grievances of Islam in order to appeal to these people. Many of the young recruits also happened to be Muslim so the number of Muslims in [the] ADF grew. Islam was a ticket, so the leaders disguised their political motives in religion.

This was not completely supported by Hussein Maiga, the personal assistant to the ADF chief of staff, in an interview on 27 July 2013 in Kampala, who explained that the ADF was created out of the Uganda Salafist Foundation that had a clear religious agenda against government's interference in Muslim affairs. After being imprisoned, as explained above, the Uganda Salafist Movement merged with the NALU, which initially did not have a religious agenda. However, gradually NALU members converted to Islam. According to the ADF, based on its 1997 manifesto, the aim of the group is to overthrow the Museveni government. Based on links to Islamist ideology, most notably Tabliq leadership, its overall objective is to establish an Islamic state in Uganda. Other sources claim the existence of a link between the ADF–NALU and Osama bin Laden, especially during the period when Bin Laden lived in Sudan. Allegations were also previously made that the ADF–NALU received financial support from al-Qa'eda as well as from the Salafi Tabliq sect. According to Ugandan security officials, Jamil Mukulu also preached that 'Muslims should kill non-Muslims, and kill also Muslims who are not fighting for jihad' (De Veenhoop 2007, 83).

In addition to pointing out its links with Khartoum, the Ugandan government highlighted the ADF's links with new Islamist threats in the region, including al-Qa'eda and, since 2010, al-Shabaab. According to Kampala, Jamil Mukulu was al-Qa'eda's second in command in East Africa. The arrest of Jamil Mukulu's son in Nairobi in 2011 allegedly revealed links with radical Kenyan Islamist circles, notably the Kenyan Muslim Youth Council. However, the existence of direct cooperation between al-Shabaab and the ADF remains only a hypothesis (International Crisis Group 2012, 9–10).

Based on the first part of this chapter, which provided a broad historical overview of the development of the ADF in Uganda, the second part will place the above in context from the perspective of former ADF members interviewed. Based on the first four chapters a number of questions were developed to assess the political socialisation process that ultimately led to joining the ADF, but also other organisations that are part of this study. This quantitative part, presented in each of the following three chapters, will focus, among others, on the personality of respondents, family, peers, education, ethnic and religious identity and political perceptions. Following a broad analysis of each organisation, the most important findings and comparisons between organisations will be presented in the concluding chapter.

4. PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS

Respondents included 57 male and 15 female ADF members who benefited from the amnesty process between the ages of 25 and 61. Using the Jungian/MBTI personality test, the majority of respondents (24) were classified as belonging to the Introvert, Sensing, Thinking and Judging (ISTJ) category, followed by Introvert, Intuition, Thinking and Judging (INTJ) (12) and Extrovert, Sensing, Thinking and Judging (ESTJ) (9). The ISTJ personality type is described as 'highly dependable, thorough, and committed to their word. Such people tend to

have great focus and prefer a procedural approach when it comes to completing tasks and are big fans of organisation and structure in all walks of life. They prefer to support and promote the traditions and establishments of a steady society' (Stephenson 2012, 28). Each of the four subcategories that the Jungian/MBTI test focuses on revealed the following results: introvert (64%) and extrovert (36%); sensing (60%) and intuition (40%); thinking (72%) and feeling (28%); and judging (97%) and perception (3%). What is particularly interesting is that the majority of respondents scored high on judging and thinking. Introversions refers to people who are introspective, reserved, and seeking solitude; sensing refers to people who favour literal and empirical perception; thinking includes people who prefer objective, detailed and logical decision-making; and judging people seek resolution and order.

While conducting interviews, a few interesting trends were identified in the manner respondents answered some of the questions. In making decisions 82% of respondents indicated that they make decisions on purpose, while 18% make impulsive decisions. When asked what influences the respondent when making decisions, 54% indicated thoughts and 46% referred to feelings. This also corresponded when given a choice between past experiences (74%) and instinctive feelings (26%) as factors influencing decision-making. Respondents were analytical (79%) and logical (84%), driven by fundamentals (60%) and disciplined (78%), but not easy-going (22%) or emotional (21%), while 58% consider themselves as loyal and 42% as set in their ideas. When asked whether other people are judged based on rules or context, the majority (61%) referred to context and 39% based on rules. Therefore, joining the ADF was for the majority a conscious, well-thought-through decision influenced by past experiences and not impulsive emotions. This was confirmed when respondents were asked how long the period was between introduction to and joining the organisation: 32% of respondents indicated that the period was between one and 30 days. The largest number of respondents (46%) indicated that this period was between two and 12

months, while 22% indicated that this process took longer than a year. Those who waited longer to join even recorded periods of up to six years.

To test the link between narcissism and terrorism (as people with narcissistic personality traits who need an external enemy to blame for their own weaknesses while they are drawn to charismatic leaders and terrorist organisations that nurture the us-versus-them divide, as presented in Chapter 3), the interview included Raskin and Terry's NPI-40 of which the average score is 15. A majority of 62% of respondents scored between 1 and 15 on the test, which can be categorised as 'normal', while 38% scored between 16 and 33 to resemble narcissistic personality traits. In addition to the overall score, specific questions in the test illuminate how individuals perceive the world around them as 60% of respondents indicated that if they ruled the world it would have been a better place. A further 86% of respondents indicated that they like to set the standard for what is acceptable.

Analysing interpersonal skills, 70% recognise an ability to influence others, but not to manipulate (61%) other people. This personality trait is particularly valuable when the person needs to recruit potential members. Any group, however, includes a number of roles and responsibilities, most notably leaders and followers. Analysing the leadership qualities of respondents, 68% regarded themselves as good leaders, but only 38% preferred to be the leader. The majority (59%) were willing to take responsibility for their decisions over 41% who liked to take responsibility for their decisions. Only 47% of respondents recognised an ability to read other people.

In the company respondents preferred to keep, most (71%) considered visionary people as 'pleasant'. The majority of respondents (57%) considered it a fault to be indifferent or apathetic. When asked to decide which was worse, 65% of respondents indicated that it was

worse to be unfair than harsh (35%). In other words, those joining the ADF were individuals who could not remain on the sidelines, but rather took action instead of being treated unfairly.

Respondents can also be categorised as determined as 78% of those interviewed indicated that they would be a success and always know what they are doing (92%), while a further 62% regarded themselves as assertive or being confident and decisive. With this in mind the question, however, is: what will the person do when he or she is not successful? Despite this assessment, only 49% of respondents indicated that they would never be satisfied until they got what they deserved, or insisted on respect (31%). Assessing what is more important, truth or justice, 67% chose truth and 33% justice.

This analysis shows that the majority of people who joined the ADF knew what they were doing in making a conscious decision with a very specific view of themselves and the world around them.

4.1 Role of the family in radicalisation

Family is an essential component of a person's personal development. The following section will assess parental absence, structure and the respondents' positions in the family, as introduced in Chapter 2.

Within the sample group, 44% of respondents grew up without a father and 31% without a mother, while 13 respondents recorded that both parents were absent. Absent parents included a parent who had passed away, left or worked far from home. Although traumatic, one needs to point out that the majority of respondents interviewed had a father (56%) and mother (69%) present in their lives. The absence of a father figure is traditionally regarded as a factor

that has a negative impact on, especially, boys growing up and is a possible reason why some might be vulnerable to radicalisation. Although the figure is high (44%), an absent father figure cannot be conclusively referred to as having a definite impact in the case of the ADF. Instead, an absent parent can create a void that later manifests in a need to belong that those tasked with recruiting future members can use to their advantage.

Assessing the relationship the person had with his/her parents growing up, respondents were asked which parent had taken the lead in making the rules in the family, who punished the respondent, and what type of punishment the person received. Respondents were also asked to indicate how severe this punishment was and how involved his or her parent was while they were growing up in an attempt to assess parental type. In families where both parents were present, the father made the rules in 80% of cases. Overall, the father made the rules in 60%, followed by mothers (16%), grandparents (7%), older siblings (7%), stepparents (6%) and uncles or aunts (4%). When asked who punished respondents, roles changed somewhat with fathers taking the lead (45%), followed by mothers (22%), both parents (17%), older siblings (9%) and grandparents (7%). Regarding the type of punishment, 81% of respondents indicated that they were physically punished, 8% were emotionally punished and 11% were not punished at all (permissive parents). When asked how severe this punishment was and how involved the person responsible for punishing the child was in his/her life, the majority (80%) of respondents indicated that severity was between 1 and 5, and 20% referred to harsher physical punishment. Of those receiving harsher punishment 67% of respondents indicated a lower involvement of their authoritative figure. In other words, in the majority of cases harsher punishment corresponded with lower involvement from a parent, grandparents or older siblings (depending on who made the rules and punished the subject). These authoritarian parents did not have a positive relationship with their children and could not be

expected to prevent later influence from friends and the broader organisation, as explained in Chapter 2.

Regarding the respondents' position in the family, 73% of those interviewed were middle children, followed by oldest (17%) and youngest (10%). With respect to the size of the family, the majority of respondents came from very big families and only 11% of respondents had between one and four siblings. The majority of respondents came from families of between five and nine children (40%), followed by 10 to 14 children (29%), 15 to 19 children (9%) and 20-plus children (11%). An important factor which the theories presented in Chapter 2 do not provide for is traditional polygamous families where the number of children referred to above include children from the same father and its impact on the political socialisation process. According to Renno, Twinamasiko and Mugisa (2012, 33), Uganda has a high fertility rate of 6.7 (one of the highest in the world), which increases in rural areas. For example, the fertility rate in Kasese is 7.4. At the root of these high rates are strongly ingrained cultural values that advocate large families, and gender inequalities and cultural practices, including polygamy, limit women's ability to make fertility decisions, inhibiting fertility decline. It is particularly on this note that a report on Kasese noted that 'despite high dependency rate and overpopulation being main causes of poverty in the district, the link between population growth and development is not clearly understood by community members. Fertility rates remain high, and population issues are not prioritised as means of combatting poverty' (Renno, Twinamasiko, and Mugisa 2012, 24).

A possible consequence of relatively big families, where a father figure is not constantly present, is that 59% of respondents indicated that his/her parents did not discuss politics with them as children when growing up. It was not surprising that only one person of 73 ADF

respondents interviewed indicated that his parents were aware of his decision to join the ADF as the entire family were involved in the ADF.

After joining the organisation, 22% of those who did not keep their decision to themselves informed the family, 17% informed another sibling, but 61% informed a friend. To put this analysis in context, only 26% of respondents informed any other person. In other words, 74% kept quiet about their decision.

Despite relatively limited involvement from parents in joining the ADF, other family members, especially other siblings, played a more active role before and after joining the organisation. In the first instance, 19% of respondents indicated that a relative introduced them to the ADF (overall this was the third-biggest group, followed by a friend and/or religious figure that introduced respondents to the ADF). Secondly, 17% of respondents indicated that they had joined the ADF for their family. The most dramatic reasons were given by two respondents who indicated that the arrest of their brothers and the anger associated with it had finally led to their decision to join the ADF. Despite the influence of the family, only 11% of respondents indicated that they had recruited other family members.

Female respondents (six out of the 15) indicated that they had followed their husband's decision to join the ADF, while a relative or friend introduced the others. The majority of respondents who followed their husbands joined the ADF out of their own conviction; only two respondents felt forced to join and stay. Female members were as committed to the ADF's cause as their male counterparts. For both, religion was the main reason for joining, followed by economic and personal reasons.

4.2 Role of friends in radicalisation and recruitment

The role of friends in joining the organisation was unmistakable as friends were identified as the most active role players in introducing respondents to the organisation (35%, followed by religious figures and relatives), while 23% of respondents indicated that they had recruited other friends. Fifty-eight per cent of respondents indicated that they joined the ADF with friends. The fact that the majority of respondents joined with friends introduces peer pressure, but it also has an impact on how interpersonal relationships should be interpreted. Considering that 90% of respondents preferred quality to quantity in friends, implying that a greater emphasis is placed on having a smaller circle of friends and confirmed by the fact that 81% considered themselves attached to others who like to do things for other people (78%), but rarely depended on others (66%). Being willing to do ‘things’ for others should be seen in the context of the topic at hand, especially when the sense of belonging is included. In this regard, 55% of respondents rated their sense of belonging while belonging to the ADF between 8 and 10 (the highest), 18% rated it between 6 and 7 and 27% between 1 and 5. As could be expected, people who felt forced to join the organisation rated a lower sense of belonging than those who joined out of free will. This was particularly the case for most of the women, who joined with their husbands. A slight increase was noted between respondents’ sense of belonging joining the ADF and while being a member of the organisation.

This specifically speaks to peer pressure and the subsequent group dynamics within the organisation in providing a sense of belonging in drawing specifically friends to join and stay in the organisation. Being part of something bigger than the individual possibly provided some part of the explanation why 73% of respondents rated their sense of belonging between 5 and 10. This sense of belonging was also emphasised when respondents were asked to

define 'us'. For 59% of respondents 'us' referred to members of the organisation, followed by 36% who referred to fellow Muslims (to be discussed below). Only 3% referred to other Ugandan nationals and 2% to family members. Naturally, if there is 'us' there must be 'them': 79% of respondents referred to the Ugandan government, 11% to other religions, followed by 5% each of other ethnic groups and countries (to be discussed below).

4.3 Religious divide influencing radicalisation

Religious rivalries between Catholics (who make up approximately half the population), Anglicans (a quarter to a third) and Muslims (less than 10%) played an important role in Uganda's political development before and after independence as those in power used both their Christian and Muslim identity to ensure their grasp on power (Haynes 2005, 1333–34). As could be expected, religious identity played a central role in the formation and justification of the ADF's existence, radicalisation and recruitment.

Jamil Mukulu, the ADF's leader, was a Christian who converted to Islam (International Crisis Group 2012, 1). With reference to the ADF members interviewed, 15 respondents (20%) indicated that they converted to Islam before joining. Of the 15 who converted, only three respondents indicated that they converted shortly before joining the ADF. The majority converted years earlier. Although it is difficult to assess the association between conversion and joining for the remaining 12 members, other factors proved to be more significant in proving the link between religious identities and joining the ADF.

All respondents placed the importance of their religion in the first three top positions: most important (56%), very important (30%) and important (14%). Taking into account that 96% of respondents had friends from other religions, 51% indicated that they grew up in an area

where their religion was in the minority, but only 26% remembered being discriminated against. However, when asked if the respondent could freely live out his or her religious beliefs, 48% of respondents answered in the negative. Assessing respondents' position on religious diversity, only 26% indicated that religious diversity was not a 'good thing' for the following primary reasons: it leads to violence, it contributes to a lack of understanding and no trust between people coming from different religious backgrounds. In an attempt to determine the extent of being inclusive and accepting other religions, respondents were asked if they would marry a person from another religion: the majority answered in the negative (53%), 14% indicated that they would but that the spouse would have to convert, and 33% responded in the affirmative.

Considering that the ADF's ideology has a strong religious connotation, a number of questions were asked to assess to what extent respondents perceived their religion (Islam) being under threat: the majority (68%) answered in the affirmative. When asked to define the type of threat, the majority (46%) classified it as an ideological threat, their religion being under a physical threat (35%), while 19% classified the threat as both ideological and physical. Those respondents who clarified indicated that ideological threat referred to the fact that to belong to a different religion manifested in not having equal opportunities in comparison to others. Not being able to live out their religion, some respondents also mentioned that being Muslim also meant that they were treated differently. Examples cited included interference from the government in religious affairs to being treated differently (often as terrorist suspects). According to one respondent, this discrimination manifested when a general in the defence force refused to allow Muslims to pray next to his house.

In categorising the origin of this threat perception, the majority of respondents (67%) identified the government as the source of the threat, followed by an external enemy (20%)

and other religions (13%). When asked to define the intensity of this ‘conflict’, 88% of respondents classified it as ‘ongoing’ and 12% as an ‘all-out war’.

The role of religion was again confirmed when asked why the person joined the ADF: 54% of respondents cited religion, while a further 9% combined religion with a second factor: politics (6%), economic (2%) and personal (1%). Religious identity was therefore a central component in binding respondents to the ADF.

In addition to motivation, the role of a religious figure in the recruitment process is also worth noticing as 29% of respondents indicated that they were approached by a religious figure.

4.4 Ethnic composition of respondents

Although members of the ADF were originally Ugandan nationals, the majority of its members are increasingly from the DRC, most notably from the Nande tribe. This ethnic group shares the same ethnic origins with the Bakonjo in Uganda (De Veenhoop 2007, 84). The practical part of the study was, however, unable to identify a correlation between joining the ADF and ethnic background as the primary reason for joining.

The majority of ADF respondents were Baganda (63%), 8% were Basoga, 7% were Munyankole, 3% were Bagisu and Bakiga, a further 2% were Kyondo and Mufumbira, while Munyarwadwa, Munyoro, Munyoli and Mwanba were represented by 1% each. Lastly, 4% of Tanzanian and 3% of Rwandan nationals who moved to Uganda as children also joined the ADF.

Notwithstanding the fact that ethnic divisions did not directly contribute to recruitment, the majority of respondents interviewed were Baganda. The Baganda is also the biggest ethnic group in Uganda, with 17.31% of the population (based on the 2002 national census) belonging to this ethnic group. People did not join the ADF to fight for minority rights, especially considering that the main beneficiaries of the NRA/M's ethnic favouritism have been westerners, as most key positions have gone to the Banyankole, Museveni's group, while the Bakiga, Banyoro and Batoro have also been prominently represented. The second main beneficiaries have been the Baganda, with clear overrepresentation in all three categories since 1986. This means that they were amply rewarded for the support they had given to the NRA/M during the war against Obote. Nevertheless, there is a growing feeling of marginalisation among many Baganda. First, some feel that westerners, especially the Banyankole, hold all the positions of real power and influence. Second, most of the Baganda ministers who retain prominent portfolios are at odds with the Kabaka (the Buganda king), which means that the views and interests of the Buganda kingdom elite are hardly represented in government, despite still being very influential in Buganda (Lindemann 2011, 396).

If the Baganda was in the minority and the only ethnic group represented in the ADF, resorting to a violent campaign to fight for the group's rights, ethnic identity could have been identified as a factor. What was, however, interesting was that seven respondents felt discriminated against, belonging to the following ethnic groups: Baganda, Basoga, Munyankole, Bakiga and Munyoli. Furthermore, 25% of respondents indicated that not all ethnic groups are equal and that ethnic diversity in the country was not good as one ethnic group attempted to dominate others. Despite the fact that ethnicity played a lesser role in respondents joining the ADF, 14% of respondents classified their ethnic affiliation as most important, 30% considered it very important and 19% as important. At the other extreme, 32% of respondents considered their ethnic affiliation as not important.

4.5 Political experiences of respondents

Earlier political experiences are an important indicator of the extent to which people have trust in politicians and the political system. To put it differently, one will expect that if people trust the political system they would rather resolve their issues and frustrations through legal and non-violent means. Resorting to violence or the illegal option is therefore regarded as the last option.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the family serves as the first introduction where a child gets to know the political culture of his/her country. It is at the heart of the political socialisation process. It was therefore not surprising to see a correlation between not discussing politics while growing up (59%) and not voting in elections before joining the ADF (57%).

In order to assess whether respondents trust politicians and the political system, respondents were asked if they trusted politicians: 81% answered in the negative, 14% indicated that they trusted politicians and four respondents did not want to answer the question. When asked if they thought that elections could bring change, 58% of respondents answered in the affirmative, while 37% indicated that they did not think that elections would bring change. Asked to clarify, 65% of respondents who answered in the negative did not consider elections as ‘free and fair’, while 35% did not recognise the political process. The latter group of respondents indicated that they did not recognise the political process for religious reasons because they belonged to the Tabliq – or, as some indicated, the jihadist – faction. A few respondents even indicated that they would not vote for a non-Muslim candidate and for this reason did not participate in the political process.

In addition to above, the student presented a statement: ‘Government only looks after and protects the interests of a few.’ Ninety-two per cent of respondents agreed with this statement. When asked if ‘standing up against government is legal and just’, only 18% of respondents answered in the negative, while seven respondents refused to answer the question. Two very important factors need to be taken into consideration when analysing answers to the last questions: first, all respondents had benefited from amnesty and, second, the student asked the person to reply based on the way he or she felt when they joined the organisation. Despite this request it is expected that some respondents, especially those who did not want to reply, felt too uneasy to reply truthfully. Despite these concerns it is clear that while some respondents still had trust in the political system, politicians and government face a serious legitimacy crisis.

4.6 Economic circumstances and radicalisation

One of the most controversial theories raised by, especially, politicians (see Chapter 3) is that poverty is a central contributor to radicalisation and recruitment into a terrorist organisation. This will be put to the test in referring to education and employment of respondents across all three organisations, starting with the ADF in Uganda.

Economically, Uganda grew after colonialism until the country was taken over by Amin in 1971. Due to destruction, displacement and the disruption of economic activities, gross domestic product declined by 40% between 1971 and 1986. As a result social-welfare indicators also worsened. Government initiated economic reforms in 1987 and recognised the private sector as an important development partner. Initiatives led to impressive poverty reduction, from 56% in 1992 to 34% in 2000. Unfortunately most of these improvements

were recorded in cities and not in rural areas, especially not among crop farmers (Okidi, Ssewanyana, Bategeka and Muhumuza 2005, 5 and 11).

National employment figures also improved to 2.7% during 1992 to 1999 and to 2.8% between 1999 and 2002. The difference between rural and urban improvements was again noticeable: 2.5% in rural areas versus 4.6% in urban areas during 1992 to 1999, and 2.3% in rural areas versus 5.7% in urban areas between 1999 and 2002. While employment increased in manufacturing, communications, trade, transportation and the tourism industry, the rural poor predominately continue to rely on farming. It is, however, noticeable that self-employment in agriculture decreased while self-employment in non-agriculture doubled between 1999 and 2003 (ibid, 15).

Returning to the introduction to this section, the ADF was formed at a time Uganda experienced economic growth, which puts a question mark over Gupta's theory (as presented in Chapter 4) that people are more willing to accept political repression at times of economic growth. Gurr (2006, 87), following his relative-deprivation theory, explained that groups resorting to terrorism seldom refer to poverty as a cause for their action. Instead, they act on behalf of a marginalised group, often based on ethnic, religious or class differences. Especially when economic progress and political representation visibly divide people based on ethnic or tribal and religious differences, the possibility for violence and terrorism increases. To support this statement, only 13% of ADF respondents interviewed referred to economic circumstances as a reason for joining the ADF, while a further 2% combined economic with religious circumstances. Recognising Gurr's argument, the specific role economic circumstances played in the radicalisation process is still debatable, considering that respondents who referred to economic circumstances indicated that they joined the ADF for the career opportunities it represented.

Considering that employment is closely associated with education, the first part of this analysis will analyse the level of education of respondents followed by employment or unemployment as a contributing factor to poverty.

4.6.1 Education of respondents

Apart from three respondents who did not attend school, 30% attended an Islamic school, followed by 27% who attended a Christian school, 26% public and 17% private schools. The most puzzling part of this analysis is that half of the respondents who attended a Christian school were Muslim. Two respondents who attended a Muslim school were previously Christians. It was strange to note that public and private schools did not feature as predominantly as expected. The answer for this can be found in Uganda's history, considering that religious groups controlled all of the schools from the colonial period until after independence. There were no government schools that were secular (Baldwin 1990, 316). In other words, schools should have served as an integrating tool, as the religion that influenced curriculum development was taught to children from other religions. Furthermore, even in religious schools pupils could interact with children from other religions. It is therefore not surprising that 96% of respondents indicated that growing up they had friends from other religious groups. Religion and the perceptions associated with it will be discussed below.

In addition to the type of school respondents attended, the level and duration a person attended should also be taken into consideration, especially following research conducted by Collier (1999, 12), who found that each extra year of schooling per capita reduced the risk of conflict by around 1%. Deininger (2003, 599) supported this finding and also stressed that higher levels of education decrease individuals' propensity to engage in civil strife. Among ADF respondents, 66% attended only primary school and 26% secondary school. When analysing school-leaving age, the majority of respondents (50%) left school between 15 and

19 years of age, followed by the ages of 10 to 14 (26%), 20 to 24 years of age (13%) and seven to nine years of age (3%). If we accept six as the school-going age, the majority of respondents had nine to 13 years of schooling, followed by four to eight years, 14 to 18 and, lastly, one to three years. The amount of years a person spent at school is therefore not the most important factor in preventing later radicalisation, but rather its value in later life in preparing a person for a career. To put this differently, not being able to finish school will have an impact on the type of opportunities or career options the person will have in later life. In other words, employment opportunities are determined by education.

4.6.2 Unemployment among respondents

According to the Amnesty Commission in 2008, 63% of respondents were employed (all of whom applied for amnesty until 2008), while 23% were unemployed at the time of joining the ADF (Information Counselling and Referral Services 2008, 25). These figures also corresponded with this study, which found that 61% of respondents interviewed were employed.

Economic growth, but more importantly overall economic upliftment, is, however, highly unlikely without education. It was therefore not surprising that when the analysis focused on the type of careers, 45% of respondents were in the low-income group, 18% were unemployed, while 39% indicated that they had their own business. In addition to careers mentioned already, 10% of respondents became religious scholars and one person joined the Uganda Defence Force.

The relatively high number of respondents with their own business possibly corresponds with the increase in micro business loans in an attempt to reduce poverty. According to Tushambomwe-Kazooba (2006, 27) small businesses grew from 800 000 in 1995 to

approximately two million in 2002, covering the following areas: farming, buying produce, market vending, catering and confectionery, shop keeping, second-hand clothing, health/herbal services, secretarial services, telephone services, handicraft and transport. Often family-owned, these businesses are categorised as labour intensive, but fail in the first five years. When asked why the business was started, respondents indicated that it was a means of survival (51.9%), followed by as a need for self-employment (23.3%), success of others, no other options, fighting poverty, professional inclination, and limited capital required. When looking at the reason why small businesses failed, it is clear that the majority of new business owners were not trained, leading to poor business planning and management.

Only six respondents out of 73 indicated that they had studied further (three in religious studies and engineering, economics and information technology) of which four respondents completed their studies. The areas in which the six respondents studied are equally interesting (see Chapter 8).

In addition to preparing children for a career, schools can also serve as a recruitment ground, considering that 25% of respondents joined the ADF between the ages of 10 and 19. This confirms the susceptibility of adolescents and early adults to be radicalised (as discussed in Chapter 2).

4.7 Why and how respondents joined the ADF

Despite the fact that the study does not intend to provide one specific reason for joining any of the organisations being analysed, or to profile a person joining these organisations, a few interesting trends were identified. To some extent some of the primary themes were covered

in this chapter, with specific reference to the role religion and political frustration played, including the age at which respondents joined the ADF.

Forty per cent of respondents joined the ADF between the ages of 10 and 24, followed by 25 and 29 years of age (26%), between 20 and 24 years of age (22%), and between 30 and 34 years of age (14%). A relatively small number – 10 respondents – joined the ADF above 35 years of age, while the oldest respondent joined at 54 years of age. In contrast to the mentioned susceptibility of adolescents and early adults, 40% of the ADF respondents interviewed joined between 25 and 34 years of age (a further 40% represented the age bracket between 10 and 24). This testifies to the vulnerability and susceptibility of not only adolescents and young adults to be radicalised and recruited to organisations such as the ADF.

As mentioned under religion, the majority of respondents (63%) referred to religion or the need to respond to a threat to their religious identity as a reason for joining the ADF. A second reason respondents identified was economic necessity (13%). It is, however, important to clarify that people did not refer to poverty, but rather that by joining they hoped that other employment opportunities would become available. In other words, by joining the ADF, the mentioned 13% of respondents referred to being lured into joining the ADF under ‘false pretences’ of work.

In addition to identifying the primary reason for joining, respondents were also asked to rate their level of frustration at the time of joining the ADF: 68% of respondents rated their level of frustration between 5 and 10 (19% rated frustration levels between 5 and 7, while the overall majority of 49% indicated their frustration levels between 8 and 10), while 32% of respondents reported lower frustration levels of between 1 and 4. This category specifically included those who felt forced to join the organisation. Respondents were asked to think back

and select one or a combination of emotions that best captured how they felt at the time. Anger was the most common emotion associated with respondents' decision to join the ADF: 43% of respondents indicated pure anger, while an additional 13% combined anger with hatred, and 11% combined anger with contempt. In total, 67% of respondents referred to anger in some way. Fear was identified as the second most referred emotion (24%), followed by contempt (7%). Fear referred to fear of the government and its security forces, finding strength in the collective (the group).

When asked to clarify or to provide additional information that finally 'pushed' the person to join, the majority of respondents referred to injustices towards fellow Muslims and the arrest and imprisonment of close family members. It is clear that the 'us' in referring to members of the organisation (59%) and Muslims (36%) versus 'them' government (79%) and other religions (11%) is very well defined.

As mentioned before, political circumstances and the relationship individuals at risk have with security forces or government's representation on communal level was the most prevalent factor in the radicalisation process among the ADF respondents in Uganda, starting with government interference in religious affairs and a perceived inability to openly practise religious beliefs as discussed in the first part of the chapter. The fact that most respondents regarded politicians as opportunistic and driven by their own interests, while not providing services or protecting basic human rights, directly referred to a lack in trust or the legitimacy crisis government is confronted with. When asked if it would have helped if the ADF were registered as a political party that would allow the organisation to achieve its objectives in a peaceful manner, one respondent – an ADF member from the beginning of its establishment – stated that the political process was considered not free and fair. Since the group would not been allowed to register as a political party, it would not have been allowed to participate in

the political process. It was especially after its founding members (including the respondent) were imprisoned that they realised that a violent campaign was the only available option to achieve their objectives.

Reasons for joining is only one part in understanding why people get involved in terrorist organisations; the second part deals with why a person would want to remain in the organisation. Belonging (30%) and responsibility (22%) and a combination of belonging and responsibility (8%) rated the highest in total (60%) in explaining why respondents wanted to stay in the organisation, followed by fear (36%), economic reasons (2%) and adventure (2%). Fear in this regard referred to fear of both security forces and members of the organisation, if the respondent indicated that he/she wanted to leave the organisation.

This again introduces the role identity played in joining and staying in groups such as the ADF. Belonging and responsibility are at the centre of this debate as it is clear that the majority of ADF members interviewed did not identify with being Ugandan. Religious identity and acceptance by the group, especially considering that the majority joined with family and friends, further contributed to a clear distinction between 'us' and 'them'.

5. CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that the ADF never posed an immediate threat to the Ugandan government, the reasons why individuals joined the organisation are cause for concern. After a brief discussion of the political developments in Uganda that led to the formation of the ADF, the second part of this chapter focused on personality traits and the roles of the family, siblings and peers in the radicalisation process. Using the Jungian/MBTI personality test, a large portion of respondents interviewed belonged to the ISTJ personality type. Furthermore, in

relation to their birth order, the majority of respondents were found to be middle children coming from relatively large families. Despite absent parents, the majority of respondents came from families where both parents were present. A correlation between an absent parent and later radicalisation with reference to this study of ADF members could not be detected. A father figure was present in making the rules in the family and was also responsible for punishing the majority of respondents. Although the majority of respondents referred to families where punishment (especially physical) punishment was moderate accompanied by parents who were involved in the lives of respondents, a number of respondents recalled very harsh punishment to no punishment in circumstances where parents were not involved at all in their lives while they were growing up. As mentioned earlier, the majority of respondents grew up in large families that, as explained in Chapter 2, as the size of the family increases, parents spent less time with each child. Furthermore, as Douglas (1964) suggests, the more children are born into working and middle-class families the existing limited financial and social resources are even further stretched, and parental concern decreases (Renshon 1975, 73). Furthermore, uninvolved and authoritarian parents will negatively impact on the development of a person's self-esteem, identity and emotional health.

It was therefore not surprising that the family, with particular reference to parents as a primary political socialisation agent, played a limited role in radicalisation to ADF respondents in this study. Peers and friends instead played a more prominent role in the radicalisation process. Firstly, respondents who informed others of their decision to join the organisation preferred to inform a friend. Secondly, friends (followed by a religious figure) played an active role in introducing most respondents to the ADF. Lastly, the majority of respondents joined the organisation with friends. Although the study confirms that people could be radicalised at any time of their lives, analysis confirmed that most respondents were radicalised during late adolescence and early adulthood. This confirmed the theoretical

assessment in Chapter 2 that, during early adolescence, when a person becomes politically more conscious, they are particularly vulnerable to the opinions of their peers. Consequently, peer influence during adolescence will play a prominent role in radicalisation.

Another important factor that facilitated radicalisation was the lack of education of respondents interviewed. Although educated individuals in other countries joined terrorist organisations, this study observed that none of the respondents interviewed had a tertiary education. This confirms the role the level of education plays in political socialisation, as presented in Chapter 2. Although Chapter 2 provided a discussion of the influence the level of education has on political socialisation, of particular importance in this regard is that better-educated individuals tend to participate more in conventional politics. Education also goes hand in hand with employment opportunities and economic upliftment to the degree that education is probably one of the most effective strategies to counter relative deprivation. More important, education ensures political competence and the ability to influence political developments through political participation.

Regarding the reasons for joining the ADF, it is clear that economic circumstances cannot be attributed as a causal factor in explaining why respondents interviewed joined the ADF. Instead a combination of religious and political frustrations, fuelled by efforts on the part of security agencies to deal with security challenges, played a direct role in the radicalisation process. Imprisonment of its founding members was a key moment in the founding of the ADF, with some respondents indicating that the imprisonment and marginalisation felt in being Muslim contributed to growing frustration. Frustration and the search for a sense of belonging played a central role in the decision to join and stay with the group. It is especially clear that respondents did not identify with being Ugandan, reflecting the inability of the Ugandan state to build an inclusive national identity. Instead, respondents identified with their

religion first. Religious identity is not sufficient to justify the resort to violence. Yet, when this identity is being threatened or even perceived to be under threat, as explained in Chapter 3, the need to defend it becomes the only viable option. It is equally important to highlight the fact that respondents referred to government (considered to be Christian) interference in Muslim affairs, leading not only to resentment but also to action. Viewed together with the central role religious figures played in the radicalisation and recruitment process, the majority of respondents interviewed regarded joining and staying as their responsibility.

It is clear that, in addition to the above, respondents had no trust in politicians or the political system. Instead, respondents regarded politicians as opportunistic and driven by their own interests, while not providing services or protecting basic human rights. This had a direct negative impact on the legitimacy of government and trust in the political system. In this regard, this chapter presented an important dilemma in preventing organisations such as the ADF: in the absence of an accepted forum, specifically referring to a political party that would allow individuals to achieve their objectives in a peaceful manner, the alternative will be unconventional political participation. Central to this debate is to what extent the political process is considered free and fair. Finding a solution to the ADF and preventing similar organisations from forming will require politicians to win back the trust of ordinary citizens. It also calls for a dedicated strategy to build an inclusive national identity, while respecting and treating the different religious and ethnic groups in the country equally. The worst outcome will be if these nation-building initiatives further threaten citizens' religious identity.

Not all people who are radicalised join a terrorist organisation or commit acts of terrorism. A catalyst is necessary to finally push the person to join a terrorist organisation. In the case of the ADF, respondents referred to the arrest of friends and family members. This unmistakably played an important role in the radicalisation process.

CHAPTER 6: RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT TO THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY IN UGANDA

1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, the ways in which religious division in Uganda contributes to identity and marginalisation with reference to the ADF was discussed. In this chapter the focus will be on the country's ethnic divide, most notably the Acholi and other ethnic groups in northern Uganda and the role ethnic identity played in the forming of the LRA. The origins of the LRA can be traced back to the historic economic and political marginalisation of northern Uganda, which manifested in two interlinked movements: the Holy Spirit Movement/Warriors (HSM/W) and the LRA, which will be discussed below.

A number of challenges were encountered while analysing the LRA. Firstly, although the origins of the LRA can be traced back to ethnic, political and economic marginalisation – broadly described as a division between north and south – the political objectives of the organisation are somewhat obscure. Secondly, it is important to understand that the LRA's origins are a mixture of Christianity, specifically Catholicism and traditional beliefs. Although groups based on Christianity have resorted to acts of terrorism in the past, the LRA is probably not the best example of this occurrence. Lastly, the LRA resorted to abduction of especially children as a recruitment technique. This implied that the questionnaire used throughout the study to analyse political socialisation in the radicalisation and recruitment of its followers was absolute, as the majority of its members did not join the LRA out of free will – in other words, assessing the early background would be meaningless. To counter this challenge, respondents who did join the LRA out of free will were identified with the assistance of the Amnesty Commission, which implied that the sample group was

considerably smaller than other groups analysed in this study. In addition to the analysis presented following the qualitative part of this study, where possible this chapter will also include material from secondary sources. Despite these challenges, including the LRA in this study still proved insightful.

Since this chapter is the second one that focuses on Uganda, background information provided here will only include information relevant to understanding the LRA. Since the LRA, similarly to the ADF, extended its reach well beyond Uganda, this chapter (similar to the previous chapter) will focus solely on developments in Uganda. This is not to say that regional politics did not serve as a lifeline to the LRA, but casting the LRA within broader regional politics will have no relevance in understanding radicalisation and recruitment to the LRA in Uganda.

2. POLITICAL HISTORY OF UGANDA AND THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY

The political tradition in Uganda since independence has been based on two interrelated principles: collect wealth while in power, and take revenge on other ethnic and religious groups, particularly those who were in power before, as discussed in the case of the ADF in the previous chapter. As Ndegwa (1997, 604) explains: ‘[F]or those who capture the state, the state becomes an arena in which to fulfill obligation to the subnational community. This is particularly so when one ethnic group in competition with others emerges as hegemonic. The new state elite is essentially an ethnic elite; its sphere of authority extends to the territorial limits of the state.’

Uganda comprises 57 ethnic groups that sometimes speak languages that are completely incomprehensible to one another (Muhereza 2011, 32). The largest of these ethnic groups are

All governments in the post-independence history in Uganda failed to accommodate ethnic, regional and religious cleavages. Under Milton Obote, positions of political and especially military power came to be dominated by northerners, especially the Langi (Obote's group) and the Acholi. For example, under Obote and Amin, the north contributed 75% of the army in Uganda (Bøås 2002, 6).

Under Amin, a narrow minority regime based on a Nubian–Kakwa core group and, more generally, Muslims was established. Although Amin, commander of the armed forces and Obote's long-time political ally, came to power after orchestrating a successful coup d'état, he feared that he might soon suffer the same fate as Obote at the hands of a northern-dominated army. This meant that northern Lwo-speakers, Acholi and Langi in particular, had to go (Kustenbauder 2010, 456). As a result, Amin ordered Acholi and Langi officers and enlisted men in 1972 to return to their barracks only to be massacred (Van Acker 2004, 340).

In the wake of this event, many Acholi and Langi soldiers fled to Tanzania, where they formed the UNLA. With the support of Julius Nyerere's Tanzanian troops under Obote's political leadership, Amin was defeated in 1979. After widely disputed general elections in 1980, Obote regained power under the auspices of the UPC, an Acholi-Langi political alliance (Kustenbauder 2010, 456).

The second Obote regime from 1980 saw the return to power of the Langi and Acholi. Yoweri Museveni formed his NRA and launched a bitter struggle against Obote's regime in 1981. It is important to note that the NRA bastion was based largely in the anti-Obote strongholds of central and western Buganda and the former kingdoms of Ankole and Bunyoro (Byrnes 1990). The most dangerous region of rebel activity emanated from the south, in the region north of the capital of Kampala, called the Luwero Triangle. Considered to be Museveni's

NRA power base, Obote authorised Operation Bonanza in January 1983. As a result, UNLA soldiers, who were predominately Acholi, indiscriminately killed approximately 300 000 people – civilians and NRA forces alike – in Luwero District. The indiscriminate killing directly facilitated the later formation of both the HSM and the LRA (Kustenbauder 2010, 456). Following this massacre, military violence along ethnic lines escalated and tension developed between Acholi and Langi within the Obote forces. When fighting broke out in the ranks of the UNLA, Langi troops routed their Acholi comrades, who retreated north into Acholiland to regroup. In July 1985, Acholi armed forces, led by General Tito Okello, returned to Kampala and defeated the Langi UNLA troops, forcing Obote into exile a second time. Okello declared himself president, and his Acholi lieutenant-general, Basilio Olara-Okello, became commander of the national armed forces. For the first time in the country's history, the Acholi held both executive and military power (ibid, 457). Okello Lutwa, however, agreed to start negotiations with Museveni and the NRA, which led to the Nairobi Agreement that was signed in December 1985. According to the agreement a military council would govern, during which the national army would be reconstructed. This agreement, however, bought time for the NRA to reconstruct its forces and capture Kampala in January 1986 (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 9–10). Only six months after the Nairobi agreement (January 1986), the NRM ousted the Acholi from all positions of real power. This situation gave rise to three ethnically based rebellions out of fear for reprisals in the north: the UPDA, the Holy Spirit Movement under Alice Auma, and the Lord's Resistance Army under Joseph Kony, which will be discussed below (Lindeman 2011, 408).

In addition to the rebellions mentioned above, Museveni's political manoeuvring served as 'a source of deep-seated grievance among some Acholi, who insisted that it showed President Museveni to be untrustworthy' (Kustenbauder 2010, 457). It was, however, not only the Acholi who resorted to violence to fight for a particular cause, considering that between 1986

and 2006 Museveni was confronted with more than 20 armed insurgencies: Action Restore Peace, the ADF (discussed in the previous chapter), the Apac Rebellion, the Citizen Army for Multiparty Politics, Force Obote Back, Former Uganda National Army, the HSM, the LRA, the National Federal Army, the National Front for the Liberation of Uganda, the Ninth October Movement, the People's Redemption Army, Uganda Christian Democratic Army, the Uganda Federal Democratic Front, the Uganda Freedom Movement, the National Democratic Army, the Uganda National Federal Army, the Ugandan National Liberation Front, the Ugandan National Rescue Fronts I and II, the Uganda People's Army, the Uganda People's Democratic Army, the Uganda Salvation Front and the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) (Quinn 2006, 2–3). Despite later elections, and as presented in the previous chapter about the ADF, one of the central reasons behind the existence of these organisations was because the political process in Uganda was not open and, when it did become open, it was far from free and fair. In the absence of political structures that people trust, the only viable option often is to resort to violence. Furthermore, Uganda's political culture is based on the principle that 'going to the bush' worked for previous governments and those in power before were only ousted through violence. In other words, democracy and all that it entails is an unknown political system to government and the broader populace alike.

The NRM government exhibited a strong ethnic bias in favour of western and central Uganda. Museveni, a member of the Banyankole ethnic group from Ankole in western Uganda, entered into a 'Bantu' alliance with the Baganda during the war (1981–86) and was consequently perceived as the country's first 'southern government' (Branch 2010, 4). The NRA/M was predominately based in the Luwero, Mpigi, Mubende and Mukono districts of Buganda, and was largely made up of Bantu-speakers (Baldwin 1990, 340). Instead of looking at decentralising political power, Museveni opted for a strong centralised government that did not accommodate ethnic and religious diversity. As referred to in the previous

chapter, only political activities intended to enhance national unity along the lines set by government were allowed. As a result, the forming of other political parties was limited, followed by intimidation, harassment and violence against opposition multiparty coalition political groups. Consequently, the political landscape prevented, instead of facilitated, diversity. The rebellion in northern Uganda was therefore predominately seen as a result of the fear of national marginalisation as northerners perceived the new government to be dominated by Ugandans from the western region. This was made worse by a lot of resentment against what they believed were NRM-sponsored atrocities and devastating cattle raids (Muhereza 2011, 32), which will be referred to again in the discussion of political circumstances.

Following tradition, the NRA took revenge on former Acholi soldiers after its defeat through plundering, raping, torturing and murdering them. It was under these circumstances that former soldiers joined the UPDA in Sudan, especially when the new government called for the disarmament of the Acholi in 1986. This order came over Radio Uganda to all former UNLA soldiers to report to Mbuya army headquarters within 10 days. This instruction immediately led to the recollection of a similar order under Amin that led to the massacre of Acholi soldiers (Van Acker 2004, 340). Driven by two primary memories – forced disarmament under colonialism and mass murder under Amin – more Acholi joined the ranks of the UPDA to the extent that NRA troops were forced to withdraw to Gulu and Kitgum. This victory was, however, short-lived (Bøås 2002, 8).

When the NRA came to power in 1986, propaganda broadcasts on the radio and in the print media blamed the Acholi for Uganda's problems: 'The bloodshed and violence of Uganda's post independence decades made many Acholi fear that it was kill or be killed: if Museveni was not overthrown, they believed his soldiers would destroy the Acholi' (Kustenbauder

2010, 458). The new Museveni government responded to the rebellion in Acholi with brutal force by deploying a battalion of the NRA, comprising largely former fighters of the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU), to Kitgum to deal with the unrest (Muhereza 2011, 32). FEDEMU was a former anti-Obote II insurgency unit that predominately included the Baganda from the Luwero Triangle. After it overthrew the Okello government, FEDEMU joined the pro-Museveni forces and was integrated in the 35th battalion of the NRA. It was deployed mainly in the Noma–Okora region and from the outset was driven by revenge for Operation Bonanza (January 1983). Although Museveni punished those responsible for the killings, it was not enough to restore the Acholi’s faith in the new regime; instead, the Acholi only remembered the negative aspects associated with the new government (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 14). Within the broader psyche of groups in the north, with specific reference to the Acholi, its identity was exclusively based on ethnicity. The implications of a well-established in-group based against a well-defined out-group that physically threatened the former, supported the theoretical principles presented in the first three chapters of this study.

A number of reasons can explain the specific cause for the rebellion in the north. One viewpoint is that, although northern Ugandans are divided by ‘ethnic identity or cultural traditions’, they suffered a shared experience of the violence of the Museveni regime. This directly relates to government’s inability to build an inclusive national identity in Uganda after the NRA’s 1986 victory. According to Van Acker (2004, 336) ‘the core of the conflict lies in the failure of consecutive Ugandan leaders to construct and consolidate a modern state that legitimises and promotes collective aspirations in Uganda, and to wield the magnitudes and levels of power a modern state conveys’. Although former Acholi military personnel had begun to surrender their weapons and demobilise, a new round of violence was sparked when the NRA began committing human rights abuses in northern Uganda on the pretext of

crushing a nascent rebellion. The violence in this period included ‘rape, abductions, confiscation of livestock, killing of unarmed civilians, and the destruction of granaries, schools, hospitals and bore holes’. The most referred to incident was the massacre of over 40 civilians from Namu–Okora in 1986 (Branch 2010, 34). Other human rights abuses were referred to in Amnesty International’s *Uganda: Human Rights Violations by the National Resistance Army*, which was released in 1991. Furthermore, government soldiers engaged in mass looting of cattle, which ‘was especially painful in the eyes of middle-aged and elderly Acholi’. This violence, combined with a government order for all former soldiers to return to barracks, which was met with deep suspicion, caused the former soldiers to go into hiding, flee to Sudan, or take up arms. Those who decided to fight were joined by ‘a stream of youths fleeing from NRA operations’, forming a group that became known as the UPDA (Mallinder 2009, 7).

3. HISTORIC ORIGINS OF THE LRA

Since independence Uganda experienced examples where victorious regimes, after defeating their opponents, were tempted to humiliate and marginalise those it defeated. Similarly, northerners interpreted the victory of the NRA in 1986 as a victory of the south over the north. Acholi and Iteso, who then set up the UPDA/M led by Otema Allimadi, and the Uganda People’s Front (UPF) led by Peter Otai, dominated the UNLA (Brett 1995, 146). The UPDA predominantly comprised people from the Lango and Acholi districts (Apuuli 2007, 38) and former military officers aiming ‘to vindicate the right of the people from all parts of the country to participate in government’ while its leaders wanted to regain its lost military and political power (Lindermann 2011, 408). According to Tim Allen in Brett (1995, 146), guilt, collective despair and intimidation drove fighters to turn against the new government.

The UPDA signed a peace agreement with the government in 1988 and although some of its members were incorporated in the Uganda Defence Force (UDF), others joined the HSM, led by Alice Auma Lakwena, a traditional priestess. Initially combining forces, the HSM even received arms from the UPDA, but in November 1986 the HSM split from the UPDA (Muhereza 2011, 32). In order to understand the HSM, the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) and the LRA, a brief reference is needed to the relationship between Christianity and traditional beliefs in the region. Traditionally the Acholi believe in the power of *jok*, or spirit, organised in more than 30 chiefdoms. Each of these villages had its own ritual centres and shrines, with the powers of protective spirits or *jogi* bound to the chiefdom and a very distinctive *jok* for different issues. The whole belief system was institutionalised through priests, or *won ngom*, who acted for the well-being of the chiefdom, while *ajwaka* worked for individuals (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 17).

These spirits are both a source of good and of evil – a creative and a destructive force. In pre-colonial times, Acholi chiefs (*rwodi*) would draw on the power of the chiefdom *jok* to ensure the prosperity of the people, the well-being of their livestock, and the fertility of the land. In times of war, however, they would also call upon the chiefdom *jok* to assist them in defeating their enemies. Likewise, the *jogi* were seen as keepers of the moral order. If the people contravened the social order, catastrophe would follow; if the people upheld the social order, they would receive blessing. With the introduction of Christianity, missionaries used this reference to the spiritual world to explain the core principles of Christianity, and the Christian God was given the name *Rubanga*, as the source of all goodness. Meanwhile, all other *jogi* became evil spirits, associated with Satan, and were given the name *jogi setani*. The Acholi also recognised that its *jogi* that offered guidance, healing and power to the individual and the community was the same as the Holy Spirit in Christianity. The identification of the Holy Spirit with *jok* gave rise to the idea that many holy spirits (like *jogi*) exist. Additionally the

Catholic Church, which already gave a central place to Mary and the saints, further contributed to a new group of spirit mediums, which opposed the pagan *jogi* by the power of their *tipu maleng*, or pure ancestors (Kustenbauder 2010, 459–461).

To explain the concept of the Holy Trinity, Christian priests introduced a new concept, *tipu maleng*, to explain the Holy Spirit. In the mind of the Acholi the *tipu maleng* could represent itself in different manifestations. A *tipu* became a Holy Spirit and the Lakwena is a *tipu*. New healers were introduced, called *nebi* (in both Hebrew and Arabic *nabi* means ‘to announce’). To distinguish them from the old *aiwaka*, the *nebi* dressed in a white robe and wore rosaries around their necks. Also in contrast to the former healers, they used objects associated with Christianity – holy water and rosaries, associated with Catholics – crosses and prayers (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 18). One of the unexpected results of this ‘translation process’ was that witches and witchcraft increased, and both Alice and Kony used this spiritual understanding of the Acholi and Christianity to their advantage (Kustenbauder 2010, 461).

Notwithstanding the fact that the LRA is publicly known as an extreme Christian extremist rebel group, both the LRA and the HSM cannot be associated with a clear religious foundation from a ‘theological’ point of view. In support of this argument, Van Acker (2004, 349) argues that Kony’s vision is not an orthodox Christian one as his religious convictions go beyond the biblical Ten Commandments and include elements of a traditional practice of the Acholi people specifically relating to finding a cure for a disturbed moral order, as described above. According to Johnson (2006), Kony envisions an Acholiland ruled by a ‘warped interpretation of the Ten Commandments’, and he actually advances a demonic spirituality crafted from an eclectic mix of Christianity, Islam and even witchcraft. Johnson also believes that any resemblance to the said religions is superficial. While LRA members observe rituals such as praying with a rosary and bowing toward Mecca, there is no theology

in the conventional sense. This means that Kony's beliefs are a haphazard mix of the Bible and the Qur'an, tailored to his own thoughts, desires and practical needs of the moment.

Since the Acholi's political and military leaders were incapable of protecting Acholi interests, and traditional leaders were unable to cleanse former UNLA soldiers after Okello's fall, tension mounted between community members (Van Acker 2004, 344–345). Within political-social terminology, traditional leaders lost their power over the youth due to three crosscutting reasons. First, modernity, through cash economies, industrialisation and Western education, eroded the role of traditional leaders, which was already weak. Second, the youth no longer had respect for the authority of chiefs or family heads. This led to conflict between generations that gained momentum within an existing atmosphere of a history of violence. Last, elders themselves broke the trust that existed between them and their communities when they started to play a mixed role: on the one hand they called on their traditional autonomous power base, while, on the other, they conducted negotiations with the government to obtain financial support, making them – especially in the eyes of the rebels – government agents (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 11–12).

As a result, Alice drew on the Acholi's cultural traditions of healing and cleansing at a time when the Acholi needed it most. Alice started as a *nebi*, for individual healing, before turning into a political leader for the salvation of society. The first spirit that took possession of Alice was Lakwena, an Italian who died during the first world war, who took possession of her on 25 May 1985 (ibid, 16, 18). According to LRA sources, on 6 August 1986, the spirit, Lakwena, ordered his medium, Alice, to build up the HSMF and wage war against evil. This evil was within the Acholi – who were responsible for murder, looting and raping – who had to convert to God for salvation from past sins to become members of God's chosen people (Bøås 2002, 8). As Van Acker (2004, 346–347) explains: 'The Holy Spirit Movement was an

attempt to reconstitute the moral order based on the formulation of an alternative theory of social tensions and power relationships. Waging war was understood as an ordeal, but nonetheless a necessary instrument in the process of cleansing or purifying: separating the just from the unjust to create a healed rather than suffering community.’

To be incorporated in the HSMF, soldiers had to be ‘rendered just’ (*maleng*), which included a process of accepting guilt and undergoing the rituals of cleansing. After undergoing a range of rituals, the Holy Spirit soldiers were considered invincible. If they were wounded or died on the battlefield, it was because they were no longer pure. They lost their purity because they had violated any of 20 rigorously proscribed Holy Spirit Safety Precautions, which aimed to create ‘a new humankind’. HSMF operations were directed by ‘Holy Spirit Tactics’, which often went against all military principles. The spirit Lakwena – mediated through Alice – was the overall ‘Chairman of the Movement’, with various spirits known as Wrong Element, Ching Po, and Franco heading the various ‘companies’ (Van Acker 2004, 347).

In addition to the link between Christianity and the traditional beliefs of the Acholi, there is also an ongoing rivalry between Catholics and the Anglican Church in Uganda. Whereas the Anglicans have always been tied to the highest levels of the state (all of Uganda’s presidents have been Anglican, with the exception of Amin, who was Muslim), despite being in the majority Catholics have had little success in achieving political office, which provides another dimension to the political life in Acholiland, which has the highest proportion of baptised Catholics of any region in Uganda. It was estimated that, in 1992, Catholics comprised over 60% of the population. For a very long time, up until the fall of Idi Amin, many Acholi saw the root cause of Uganda’s instability to be the result of political injustice directed at Catholics. This gave a new dimension to the interconnectedness between religion and politics in Uganda (Kustenbauder 2010, 462).

Instead of being an Acholi-based organisation, the HSM hoped to expand its reach beyond its base of strength and marched from Kitgum to Soroti, Kumi, Mable and Tororo, and found support and recruits among the Langi, Iteso and Japadhola. This changed only when the HSM reached the area of the Basoga. The NRA, however, defeated the HSMF at Jinja in October 1987 with Alice fleeing to the Ifo refugee camp in Kenya where she died in 2007 (Lindermann 2011, 410).

Joseph Kony, a former altar boy, initially joined the UPDA as a 'spiritual mobiliser' in the UPDA's 'black battalion' (Van Acker 2004, 348). Kony started his movement as the Holy Spirit Movement II, but renamed it the Lord's Salvation Army, the United Democratic Christian Force, and, finally, the LRA. The LRA was established in June 1987 as a splinter of the UPDA, which had taken over some of the HSM's members in the wake of Alice's defeat. Kony, a cousin of Alice, was born in 1961 in Odek in south-eastern Gulu. Mysticism around Kony started when Alice's father, Severino Likoya Kiberu, was clearing the bush near Bungatira and a snake (a sign of an evil spirit) appeared and bit the whole family, including Joseph and his brother. This brother died because he was unable to embrace the Spirit, but the same event made the rest of the family 'different'. Sometimes Alice, Severino and Kony are referred to as the 'trinity'. Kony was equated with *won*, the 'son', Likoya with *wod*, the 'father', and the absent (in exile) Alice with *tipu maleng*, the 'holy spirit'. After Alice's defeat, Kony made contact with her but she rejected him on the grounds that he was possessed by an 'evil spirit' for not performing the cleansing ritual. According to Mutaizibwa (11 August 2011) another reason why Kony did not form an alliance with Alice was because she mocked him as she 'advised him to use his limited spiritual powers to become a traditional healer, but not to lead a rebellion. Kony reportedly left in silence, feeling deeply insulted'. Kony also tried to form an alliance with Severino, who was not willing to accept him as a purified Acholi (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 21–22).

Similar to the HSFM, the LRA observed mixed Christianity and Acholi rituals and beliefs (Bøås 2002, 8-9). Like Alice, Kony served as a *loar*, or messenger, from the spirits that were passed on to his military commanders. Kony, however, introduced new and totally different spirits from those that had guided Alice (Van Acker 2004, 348). Kony was not only allegedly possessed by the Lakwena, but also by other minor spirits: Silly Silindi, originally from Sudan, a spirit in charge of strategy on the battlefield, followed by ‘the second in command’, a Chinese spirit, Ing Chu, who transformed the jeeps and tanks of the enemy into harmless toys. Major Bianca, a spirit of American origin, headed the intelligence service, and Juma Oris, a former minister of Amin and once a commander of the WNBF rebellion (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 23). In addition to induction rituals (to be discussed below), the LRA also reverted to Holy Spirit tactics where ‘holy water’ would protect fighters from gunfire as long as they respected the spiritual, divinely ordained, commands. But this rule had another implication in that caring for the wounded is equivalent to complicity in not respecting the command (Van Acker 2004, 349). The thinking behind the above is directly in line with Hofmann and Juergensmeyer, as presented in Chapter 3.

The 1990s were a period when the government launched major offensives against the LRA, which maintained a highly mobile guerrilla-like army that controlled no geographical area but directed their attacks not only at the UPDF but also the local population (Muhereza 2011, 35).

According to the Amnesty Commission, on 29 October 2013, 13 032 LRA members benefited from amnesty. Map 3 below (the original Uganda map was sourced from Tabuti, Kukunda, Kaweesi and Kasilo ((2012)) before information received from the Amnesty Commission was included) provides useful insight into where the LRA recruited its members. It is, however, again important to note that the majority of LRA fighters were abducted and did not willingly join the organisation. Although exact figures are not available, according to Pham, Vinck and

Kiliwa (45 kilometres north of Dungu). In February 2007, LRA fighters started operating between Lindimbia and the Central African Republic (CAR) (Van Puijenbroek and Plooijer 2009, 8–10).

Traditionally, the LRA was organised as a regular infantry army formation with five brigades: Control Altar (Kony's protection unit), Stockree, Sinia, Gilva and Shila. However, during the period of the negotiations, a restructuring of the LRA took place. Kony maintained Control Altar and changed the four remaining brigades into five brigades (Van Puijenbroek and Plooijer 2009, 4).

The LRA joined forces with the UPDA in 1988 and presented a very clear objective of transforming society, starting with the Acholi but even going further to transform the broader society (Van Acker 2004, 348). To facilitate this process of transforming society, Kony created the Mobile Institute of Moral Political Rehabilitation as only 'purified' Acholi people would be able to defeat Museveni's army. As part of being socialised into the new organisation, new members had to undergo specific rites of passage to mark their distinction from the broader Acholi community. To be cleansed of witchcraft and sorcery, new members were sprinkled with water and shea-butter oil to transform them into *malaika*, or angels (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 23), thereby creating a 'reference group' (as presented in Chapter 2) that set and enforced standards of conduct and belief, and provided a standard against which people could measure themselves and others.

Throughout the LRA's armed campaign, its political goals were shrouded in mystery, due to the reclusive nature of its leaders and its use of 'a mixture of Christian, Islamic, and traditional beliefs to validate its actions'. Kony, however, proclaimed that the LRA was fighting to 'establish a state based on the Ten Commandments', which was interpreted to

mean that the LRA was a religious extremist movement. The Lord's Resistance Movement (LRM), which represented itself as the LRA's political wing, comprised the diaspora and attempted to rectify misconceptions over the group's overall objectives and claimed that the LRA was fighting to overthrow Museveni, create multiparty politics and improve the rights of the Acholi people (Mallinder 2009, 11). The unfortunate reality is that since these claims were not articulated by the LRA but rather by members of the diaspora who were never in the 'bush', observers questioned the authenticity of these 'messengers'.

In the absence of a clearly defined political agenda, Kustenbauder (2010, 463–64), in reference to Van Acker, cast the LRA as a form of religious terrorism which 'does not so much seek political gains as it does the rejection of the rules of society through violence, which is divinely decreed, and hence morally justified, almost as a sacramental act'. In the words of Van Acker (2004, 348): 'The LRA sees its struggle against the government of Uganda as a divine cause that is being directed and guided by God through his prophet Kony.'

Although religiously motivated groups that resort to violence may give the impression of being irrational to an outsider, Kustenbauder (2010, 465–77) cast both the LRA and the Museveni government as two opposing forces that benefited from the ongoing conflict. The LRA did not present a threat to the Ugandan government, but scholars, such as Kustenbauder, are of the opinion that the Ugandan government was 'allowing' the conflict to continue, due to the additional benefits derived from keeping the UDF busy to Ugandan dependency on foreign aid (considering that 40% of Uganda's national budget comes from foreign aid).

When the LRA joined forces with the UPDA in 1988, Kony included Tabuley and Vincent Otti, who were part of the UNLA/UPDA, into the LRA. Moving away from Holy Spirit tactics, these UPDA advisers persuaded Kony to rather resort to battle-tested guerrilla tactics,

including terror (Van Acker 2004, 348). The LRA initially targeted government forces, but when the Acholi started to assist government forces, Kony began to attack civilians – his own people, who he claimed to represent. In the Teso region the Arrow Group and, in Lango, the Amuka Boys, were trained and equipped by government to protect their communities while government forces pursued the LRA (Apuuli 2007, 41). LRA attacks only drove the Acholi and other ethnic groups in the north further away from the LRA. Communities were punished, through massacres, rapes, mutilations, forced cannibalism, arson and looting for creating ‘Bow and Arrow’ civilian militias that were seen as government collaborators and supporters (Mallinder 2009, 10).

Then came the 1994 peace talks with remnants of the LRA led by the minister for the north, Betty Bigombe, an Acholi resident of Gulu, which gathered the support of the chiefs and elders (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 24). Following the collapse of the 1994 peace talks – which happened because some Acholi politicians in exile tried to undermine the process, and some army officers were not in the mood to make agreements with an enemy that was close to defeat – the LRA also began recruiting civilians, particularly children, forcibly into its ranks to work as soldiers and sex slaves. Unfortunately, government’s policy of forcing civilians into camps without providing proper protection made it even easier for the LRA to terrorise Ugandan civilians (Mallinder 2009, 10).

In Kony’s mind, the use of violence, or cleansing, was needed to save a small minority considered to be pure of heart. Apart from low-intensity and small-scale assaults, the LRA had also been responsible for some major massacres, such as the attack on 22 April 1995 at Atiak that left between 170 and 220 dead; an attack on 8 March 1996 at Karuma that left 50 dead; an attack on Acholpi refugee camp in July 1996 that resulted in 100 deaths; and the most devastating attack on Lokung-Palabek in January 1997 that left over 400 dead. In many

cases the victims were hacked and clubbed to death. Simultaneously, abduction gained ground as a new mode of recruitment to the extent that, in 1997, Human Rights Watch estimated that 8 000 people were abducted between 1994 and 1997 (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 25).

In 2002, with the Sudanese government's agreement, Uganda launched 'Operation Iron Fist I' where the UPDF, with about 10 000 troops, was for the first time allowed to enter southern Sudan to flush out the LRA bases inside Sudan. These attacks failed to wipe out the LRA. Instead, it forced the LRA back into northern Uganda, along with their military equipment (supplied by the government of Sudan), where it unleashed terror on the population, leading to massive internal displacement in northern Uganda. During the second half of 2003, the LRA extended the insurgency into the Teso and Lango sub-regions and this eventually spread to southern Sudan, the DRC and the CAR. Its target selection and modus operandi included murder, abduction, torture and rape of civilians – many of them women and children – as well as the targeting of churches, schools and markets (Muhereza 2011, 36 and 40). To put the magnitude of the devastation of LRA attacks in context, the LRA Crisis Initiative (2014) estimated that the LRA is responsible for more than 100 000 deaths over the course of the conflict, of which more than 2 400 people were killed in the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan between 2008 and December 2011. Additionally, the LRA was responsible for more than 3 400 abductions in the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan (between 2008 and October 2011). This figure, however, does not reflect abductions in Uganda as referred to earlier in this chapter.

Violence is traditionally seen as a method to achieve an objective, and although the LRA initially used violence against government forces as part of a political strategy, resorting to blind violence increasingly gave the impression that Kony was no longer interested in

winning a conflict, but that violence had become both a tool and an end in itself. Although there is truth in Doom and Vlassenroot's (1999, 26–27) assessment that 'blind terror' can produce political results, in the mind of field commanders these tactics serve a broader intimidation purpose. Through intimidation, these commanders can act far beyond their logistic and military capacities, implying that with minimum weaponry and well-trained troops they are able to traumatise the whole population. The broader community or the victims, in not knowing when and where the next attack would occur, were turned into permanent hostages that with every attack lost trust in government and its ability to protect them against the LRA. The core principle of waging a successful insurgency is still valid: without community support any or both parties will be defeated. In other words, both parties – insurgent and government, represented by security forces – compete for community support: although the LRA initially could capitalise on the fear the Acholi and other ethnic groups in the north felt towards the new government, the pendulum, in the wake of its campaign of blind terror, swung in government's favour.

Based on this introduction to the LRA, the next section will attempt to better understand who, and for what reasons, willingly joined the LRA. Recognising that the majority of LRA members were abducted, often as children, the respondents interviewed all willingly joined the organisation to provide a more accurate understanding of the political socialisation process that ultimately led to respondents joining the LRA. Although the LRA is based in the north-eastern parts of the DRC, all respondents interviewed were recruited in Uganda before the organisation moved to Sudan, the CAR and the DRC.

4. PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS

Respondents included 18 male and eight female LRA members who benefited from the amnesty process while they were between the ages of 30 and 63. Using the Jungian/MBTI personality test, the majority of respondents were classified as belonging to the ESTJ (35%) personality type, followed by INTJ (15%), ISTJ (12%) and ENTJ and ESFJ (11% each). Stephenson (2012, 55) describes the ESTJ personality type as ‘quick to take action on decisions as long as they are directly applicable and practical. Born organizers and doers of just getting things done. Seek no-nonsense approaches to steam-rolling toward their biggest goals in the most sensible way available. They absolutely love handling the routine details in life. They work to clear, logical, and very objective values when it comes to completing tasks. They also hold these highly rigid standards to others and can be relatively assertive when it comes to compliance with their ideas.’ Referring to the four sub-categories that the Jungian/MBTI test focuses on revealed the following results: introvert (35%) and extrovert (65%), sensing (72%) and intuition (28%), thinking (73%) and feeling (27%), and judging (96%) and perception (4%).

In making decisions, 92% of respondents indicated that they purposely made decisions, while only 8% made impulsive decisions. This was, however, questioned when respondents were asked how long the period was between introduction and joining of the organisation: 32% of respondents indicated that the period was between one and 30 days. The largest number of respondents (46%) indicated that this period was between two and 12 months, while 22% indicated that this process took longer than a year. Those who waited longer to join recorded periods of up to six years. The vast majority of respondents were, however, recruited within six months, which points to a rather impulsive decision-making process.

When asked what factors influenced respondents when they made decisions, 64% indicated obligations and thoughts (77%) based on ideas and beliefs (71%), and 36% referred to intuition influenced by feelings (23%) based on data and facts (29%). When asked whether other people were judged based on rules or context, the majority (62%) referred to context and 38% referred to rules. Ideas and beliefs played a very prominent role in decision-making, which possibly also speaks to the role perceptions played in joining the LRA.

In testing the link between narcissism and terrorism, remembering that Crayton (1983, 33-41), as discussed in Chapter 4, explained that people with narcissistic personality traits need an external enemy to blame for their own weaknesses while they are drawn to charismatic leaders and terrorist organisations that nurture the us-versus-them divide. A minority of 38% of respondents scored between 1 and 15 on the test, which can be categorised as ‘normal’, while 62% scored between 16 and 30 to resemble narcissistic personality traits. In addition to the overall score as mentioned, specific questions in the test speak to how the individual perceived the world around them. For example, 58% of respondents indicated that if they ruled the world it would have been a better place, while 87% indicated that they liked to set the standard for what is acceptable. In the minds of the respondents, the act of joining an organisation such as the LRA possibly provided an opportunity for them to right wrongs in creating an environment where they decided what was acceptable.

An analysis of interpersonal skills showed that 81% recognised an ability to influence but not manipulate (50%) others. This personality trait was particularly valuable when the person needed to recruit potential members. An analysis of respondents’ leadership qualities showed that 54% regarded themselves as good leaders, while 62% preferred to be the leader. The majority (83%) liked to take responsibility for their decisions, whereas, 58% of respondents

recognised an ability to read other people. These skills also form part of the narcissism test and point to individuals who are not always willing to follow orders.

In the company respondents preferred to keep, most (58%) considered visionary people as 'pleasant', pointing to being open to idealistic ideas. Similarly, the majority of respondents (62%) considered it a fault to be indifferent or apathetic, which would imply that these individuals would go over to action. When asked to decide which was worse, 54% of respondents indicated that it was worse to be unfair than harsh (46%) in explaining that circumstances categorised as unfair would stimulate a response. Considering the central role that ethnicity plays in the identity of respondents (northerners), being treated unfairly can be seen as a precursor to action. Respondents can also be categorised as determined as 54% of those interviewed indicated that they would be a success and would always know what they were doing (88%). It was therefore not a surprise that 69% regarded themselves as assertive or that 74% of respondents described themselves as a 'brick wall'. However, only 40% of respondents indicated that they would never be satisfied until they got what they deserved or insisted on respect (58%). In response to a question which was more important, truth or justice, 77% chose truth and 23% justice.

This begins to paint a picture of a personality that, when channelled in a more productive direction, could have achieved great heights. However, in the absence of opportunities, people who are driven, assertive and good leaders will find another way to achieve their objectives – even joining a terrorist organisation.

4.1 Role of the family in radicalisation

Of the sample group, 38% of respondents grew up without a father and 35% without a mother, while four respondents recorded that both parents had been absent. Although this seems dramatic, one needs to point out that the majority of respondents interviewed had a father (62%) and mother (65%) present in their lives. The absence of a father figure is traditionally regarded as a factor that has a negative impact on, especially, boys growing up, and is often cited as a possible reason why some might be vulnerable to radicalisation, as presented in the previous chapter. In the case of the LRA, an absent father figure cannot be conclusively referred to as having a definite impact. Instead, an absent parent directly influenced three respondents to join the LRA out of a need for protection, or, in the case where parents had been abducted, to find them.

In assessing the relationship the person had with his parents growing up, respondents were asked which parent had taken the lead in making the rules in the family, who punished the respondent and what type of punishment the person received. Respondents were also asked to indicate how severe this punishment was and how involved his or her parent had been, in an attempt to assess parental type. In families where both parents were present, the father made the rules in 80% of cases. Overall, the father made the rules in 69% of cases, followed by mothers (23%), grandparents (4%) and uncles or aunts (4%). When asked who punished respondents, fathers took the lead (57%), followed by mothers (38%) and grandparents (5%). Regarding the type of punishment, 77% of respondents indicated that they had been physically punished, 8% had been emotionally punished and 15% had not been punished at all (permissive parents). When asked how severe this punishment was and how involved the person responsible for punishing the child was in his or her life, the majority (57%) of respondents indicated that severity was between 1 and 5 and 43% referred to harsher physical

punishment. Of those receiving harsher punishment only 20% of respondents indicated a lower involvement of their authoritative figure. In other words, in the majority of cases, where harsher punishment was recorded, the authoritative figure was more involved in the respondent's life. This is indicative of a positive parent-child relationship that could have contributed to a successful political socialisation process where the values of the parent were accepted.

Regarding the respondent's position in the family, 54% of those interviewed were middle children, followed by oldest (15%) and youngest (31%). When asked to indicate the size of the family, the majority of respondents came from families of between one and four children (69%), followed by five to nine children (31%). In contrast to the ADF in the previous chapter, LRA respondents interviewed did not come from families with more than 10 children per household. Despite coming from smaller families than ADF respondents, only 44% of LRA respondents indicated that his or her parents discussed politics with them while they were growing up. It is not surprising that only 24% of LRA respondents interviewed indicated that his parents were aware of his or her decision to join the LRA. After joining the organisation, 26% of those who did not keep his or her decision to themselves informed the family, 11% informed another sibling, while 21% informed a friend. To put this analysis in context, 58% of respondents informed any other person. In other words, 42% kept quiet of their decision to join the LRA.

The majority of LRA respondents (26%) informed their parents of their decision to join the organisation. It is important to note that even when compared to other organisations analysed as part of this study, parents were still the most informed. Relatives also played an active part in introducing respondents to the LRA (27%). This was the second-biggest group, followed by a friend (31%), in introducing respondents to the LRA. Third, 12% of respondents

indicated that they had joined for their family. In addition to the majority who said they had joined for themselves (71%) and for their community (17%), the family represented the second-biggest collective group respondents joined the LRA for. Despite the influence of the family, none of the respondents indicated that they had recruited other family members.

The statistics cited here indicate that parents politically socialised respondents to consider their ethnic identity, bearing in mind that the Acholi was on the receiving end at the time of Amin, when Acholi military personnel were recalled to barracks to be massacred. A similar possible threat was identified when the new Museveni government in 1986 also recalled Acholi military personnel to barracks. Consequently, the need to protect the Acholi (and other ethnic groups in the north) emerged as a result of political socialisation from parent to child. In other words, at the time Museveni recalled Acholi soldiers, people in the north remembered a similar trend under Amin, which was transferred from one generation to the next. Ethnicity will be discussed in greater detail below.

Female respondents (eight out of 26) were as committed to the LRA than their male counterparts. In contrast to 69% of ADF female respondents, only 25% of LRA respondents followed their husbands in joining the respective organisations. All female respondents – with the exception of one, who referred to ethnic responsibility – indicated that they had joined for personal reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter.

4.2 Role of friends in radicalisation and recruitment

The role of friends in joining the organisation was unmistakable as friends were identified as the most active role players in introducing respondents to the organisation (31%), while only 12% of respondents indicated that they had recruited other friends. Forty per cent of

respondents indicated that they had joined the LRA at the same time as some of their friends did. However, when compared to the ADF, friends played a less prominent role among LRA respondents, despite being the single most important factor. Similar to the ADF, the fact that the majority of respondents joined with friends points to peer pressure. Joining with friends also introduces the importance of interpersonal relationships. Similar to the ADF, the majority of respondents (69%) preferred quality to quantity in friends, implying that a greater emphasis is placed on having a smaller circle of friends and emphasised by the fact that 74% considered themselves attached to others who like to do things for other people (84%). Being willing to do ‘things’ for others should be seen in the context of the topic at hand, especially when the sense of belonging is also included. In this regard, 42% of respondents rated their sense of belonging while being a member of the LRA between 8 and 10 (the highest), 23% rated it between 6 and 7 and 35% between 1 and 5. It is important to note that respondents’ sense of belonging decreased between joining the LRA, and while being a member of the organisation. This specifically points to the role joining the organisation with friends can play, while it also reflects on the group dynamics within the organisation while being a member and its influence, in the sense of belonging, that members can experience.

4.3 Religious background of respondents

Although the LRA is traditionally presented as a Christian-based organisation, 8% of respondents interviewed indicated that they were Muslim, while the remaining 92% specified that they were Christian. This confirms the discussion above that there is no theology, at least not in the conventional sense, behind the LRA. Instead, Kony’s and the LRA’s beliefs are a haphazard mix of the Bible and the Qur’an, tailored to Kony’s own thoughts, desires and practical needs of the moment. To emphasise this point further, religion was not referred to as a reason for joining; instead, the role that ethnicity played in joining the organisation was

more prominent and will be discussed below. Despite the fact that religion was not listed as a reason for joining the LRA, 15% of respondents indicated that their respective religions (both Islam and Christianity) were under an ideological threat and that another religion (according to 11%) was causing this threat.

Notwithstanding a very low threat perception, 42% of respondents classified their religious affiliation as 'most important', 50% considered it 'very important', and only 8% indicated that religion was merely 'important'. In comparison to only 33% of ADF respondents willing to get married to another person from another religion, 69% of LRA respondents indicated that they were willing to get married to a person from another religion. To support this, 96% of LRA respondents had a positive response when asked if he or she would be willing to accept other religions. A possible contributor to this positive image of other religions is the fact that only one respondent interviewed grew up in an area where his religion (Islam) was in the minority. This in all probability contributed to a sentiment that all religions are equal (92%), while only 19% of respondents considered that religious diversity had a negative impact on the country. Consequently, 81% of respondents felt that they could freely live out their religious orientations. This finding supports the statement made at the beginning of this section that, although the LRA is often presented as a religion-based organisation, those who freely joined the organisation were not driven by a particular religious conviction. Although the LRA had its foundations in a mixture of Christianity and traditional beliefs, as presented earlier in this chapter, religion did not serve as a factor in casting in- and out-groups, especially when compared to other organisations in this study.

4.4 Ethnic background of respondents

As discussed earlier in the chapter, especially the Acholi, but also other ethnic groups in the north, felt marginalised when the current government came to power in 1986. It was therefore not surprising that the majority (58%) of respondents were Acholi, 15% Lango, 15% Luo, 8% Alur and 4% Lugbara. None of the respondents felt that their ethnic group was in the minority, or that they were discriminated against, as only 8% indicated that they felt discriminated against. However, 52% of respondents were of the opinion that the different ethnic groups in Uganda did not receive equal treatment and that diversity led to domination by one (or a combination of two and more) over others.

To assess respondents' perception towards their own ethnic group, people were asked to first rate the size of their ethnic group according to them, and then to rank its influence in the country. The majority (58%) of respondents reflected a smaller influence of his and her ethnic group in relation to its size, followed by 29% of respondents who considered the size and influence at the same level. Only 13% of respondents were of the opinion that his or her ethnic group had more influence in comparison to its size. Influence in this regard can be seen as a way of being recognised. For example, being small in size while having influence contributes to a positive social identity. At the same time, when influence decreases when compared to size, one expects a negative social identity based on ethnicity. Under these circumstances, based on the discussion in Chapter 3 on identity and social identity, one can expect the individual to 'defend' or rectify wrongs being committed on behalf of his or her ethnic group. This will occur, especially, when the individual places a high importance on belonging to a specific ethnic group, considering that 23% of respondents rated their ethnic identity as 'most important', followed by 69% who ranked it as 'very important' and 8% who

considered it as 'important'. None of the respondents considered their ethnic identity as 'not important'.

In addition to focusing on the perceptions of ethnic groups in the north towards others in the country, it is equally important to recognise perceptions other ethnic groups might have of them. In another study, Van Acker (2004, 344) referred to a statement made by James Kazini, a former army commander: 'If anything, it is local Acholi soldiers causing the problems. It's the cultural background of the people here; they are very violent. It's genetic.' It is clear that 'us' and 'them' are clearly defined in ethnic terms. It is perceptions like these that are being transferred from one generation to another through political socialisation.

When respondents were asked to categorise their reason for joining, 19% specifically referred to ethnic reasons, while 58% indicated personal and 15% political reasons. It is, however, when one goes through the specific events that finally pushed the respondent to the LRA that it becomes clear that the majority of respondents, who cited personal and political reasons, were in fact driven by ethnic marginalisation. For example, 64% of respondents interviewed referred to different forms of harassment from the defence force while fighting the LRA. One respondent referred to his father being killed and that it took five days for him to join the LRA, while another female respondent recalled that her husband joined following persecution by government soldiers and that she followed him. Four other respondents specifically referred to the fact that community members and members of their ethnic group were killed while fighting the LRA. This highlights the importance of effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies as the army was seen to represent the interests of other ethnic groups and government exclusively and not the interest of all Ugandan nationals from all ethnic groups. Furthermore, these strategies need to be effectively implemented at grassroots level. Political circumstances and the role counterterrorism measures played in the

radicalisation process will again be referred to later in this chapter. Other respondents felt trapped between the LRA and government forces: five respondents even joined the LRA after being victims of LRA attacks in an attempt to find relatives (not trusting government forces) or, alternatively, joined out of fear because government forces were unable to protect them. The unfortunate reality, as Quinn (2006, 1) rightly stated, is that the Acholi, and, to a lesser extent, the Langi, Madi, Iteso and other ethnic groups from the north, were both victims and perpetrators.

4.5 Economic circumstances and radicalisation

Acholiland is approximately the size of Belgium, inhabited by approximately 700 000 people or 4% of Uganda's national population (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 7). The three Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader are in a region without any significant natural resources. Also, based on the basic human development indicator, households in these districts are below the poverty line when compared to the rest of Uganda. Poverty in Acholiland increased from 1997 to 2000, in contrast to other regions (Van Acker 2004, 337). For example, in 1999–2000, monthly household income in northern Uganda was \$36, one-half of the national average of \$72. The adult literacy rate in northern Uganda is 46%, in sharp contrast to the national average of 63%. Reflecting the level of development, only 57% of the north's population has access to toilet facilities, compared to 86% overall in Uganda (Westerhaus 2007, 593).

The Ugandan government has identified economic circumstances as a major contributing factor to the LRA and has provided a significant amount of resources for the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure in northern Uganda, and has established community projects for enhancement of individual incomes and household living conditions. The post-conflict

recovery and development interventions under the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan is one of the ways government is addressing the inequitable distribution of national resources, which is one of the key underlying causes of the conflict and factors that led to the rebellion and escalation of the armed conflict. Some of the underlying social, cultural and political causes of the armed conflict remain to be addressed. Many issues of social justice have not been appropriately dealt with (Muhereza 2011, 18–19).

When asked to cite reasons for joining the LRA, 4% of respondents pointed to economic marginalisation, while another 4% cited a combination of political and economic circumstances. This is not to say that the economic circumstances respondents found themselves in – 62% were unemployed at the time of joining the organisation – did not contribute to the individual’s willingness to join the LRA. It is important to note that only 11% classified themselves as ‘students’ at the time of joining the LRA, considering that the majority of respondents still fell in the school-going age bracket. These figures are very similar to the analysis conducted by the Amnesty Commission in 2008, which found that only 21% of respondents were employed and 58% unemployed at the time of joining the LRA. According to the Commission, the primary reason was the abduction of school-going children to fill its ranks (Information Counseling and Referral Services 2008, 25). Children are equally important to this analysis, but for a different reason, which will be discussed below. Respondents interviewed for this study all willingly joined the LRA, but that is not to say that the LRA did not abduct school-going children to fill its ranks, but rather that those who joined of their own volition presented a different profile. Although improving the economic circumstances of people are always welcomed, a counterstrategy to radicalisation that exclusively focuses on economic upliftment will not address the ‘real’ motivations behind the LRA. Consequently, economic upliftment as government’s single most important strategy to counter the LRA – and for that matter other similar organisations – will be ineffective.

Instead, counterstrategies should start with an understanding of the motivations behind the organisation while recognising the role other government departments, starting with education, can play, as presented in Chapter 2.

As a result of LRA tactics and government's policy of regrouping civilians in (internal displacement) camps, the lowering of educational standards in the north were identified (Van Acker 2004, 343). According to Human Rights Watch (2003, 4) more than 800 000, or approximately 70%, of the population of Acholiland are classified as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Consequently, 12% of respondents interviewed received no education. This trend specifically referred to female respondents. Furthermore, 79% of those who attended school attended primary school, while the remaining 21% attended secondary school. Only one respondent (female) finished secondary school to become a nursing assistant. As a result, the majority of respondents who categorised themselves as 'employed' were farmers or alternatively worked in low-income jobs.

Kony himself was a school dropout (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 21). According to Lomo and Hovil (2004, 27), Kony left primary school (reaching P-7). Although his age was not revealed, the normal age for reaching P-7 is around 12 years. As presented in Chapter 2, a lack of education impacts on a person's ability to clearly articulate his/her political opinions. It also negatively impacts on a person's ability to understand the political processes in a country. Creating new opportunities – as part of government's recovery and development plan – without developing an effective workforce will, as mentioned above, be counterproductive, especially if locals are not sufficiently educated. Attracting other ethnic groups from other areas will only further contribute to existing marginalisation.

4.6 Political circumstances and radicalisation

The relationship between the Ugandan government and communities in the north is rife with distrust, which is reinforced by the manner government responds to insecurity. As one respondent expressed it in a study conducted by Lomo and Hovil (2004, 36): ‘Museveni hates the Acholi’s and does not care whether we are killed by Kony, abducted, or raped. It is none of his business.’ This and other perceptions are the result of Museveni’s inability to successfully deal with the LRA. Additionally, the consequences of government’s counterstrategies through treating civilians as suspects as a result of ethnic profiling, but also through its IDP camps, further reinforced people’s negative perceptions of government. As one respondent describe: ‘The government, if they find you farming your lands, they beat you. But then they don’t feed you’ (Lomo and Hovil 2004, 39). This study reaches a very similar conclusion: 64% of respondents referred to different forms of harassment by government forces as a reason for driving them to decide to join the LRA. Consequently, as mentioned in the section dealing with ethnic circumstances, 15% of respondents referred specifically to political reasons for joining the LRA, while a further 4% combined political with economic circumstances.

The minister of state for defence, Major-General David Tinnyefuza, became notorious for his brutal response to counterinsurgency. Arrest and torture to force people to cooperate with the government were common practices. Although he was replaced in 1992, his conduct reconfirmed people’s perception of the government (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 23). For example, in March 1991, Tinnyefuza launched Operation North, which included a cordon-and-search policy that failed to distinguish innocent civilians from rebels. This resulted in massive human rights abuses. Because severe collateral damage was inflicted on the population, the NRA alienated itself from the Acholi and was regarded as an occupation force (Castelein

2008, 25). It should therefore not be surprising when respondents in this study, despite being victims of the LRA, also joined the LRA. This decision was more part of a strategy to defend themselves against the government than an expression of their support for and belief in the LRA.

Furthermore, despite IDP camps, the LRA still managed to attack these camps, which resulted in a new wave of negative perceptions towards the Museveni government as Lomo and Hovil (2004, 45) described: 'The UPDF is seen to represent the government on the ground, and their inability to protect the people from Kony's attacks feeds existing feelings of political alienation. Each child abducted, each home looted, and every family member killed, is viewed by the communities as further proof that the government is not protecting them.' This was made worse by the perception among locals that government forces were well aware of a potential threat: 'The attacks were gradual. We knew the rebels were camped at a certain place, but they did not attack for a long time, so we waited. We told the UPDF but they did not respond. So we waited, and suddenly places were attacked and because they didn't protect us, we had to run' (Lomo and Hovil 2004, 51).

Placing the negative sentiments communities in the north experience towards government, 84% of respondents interviewed in this study indicated that government is only interested in protecting the interests of a few. Among this group, 65% of respondents indicated that revolt against government is legal (and just). Justifying its confrontation with the government, the Acholi refer to the Karamojong (well-known cattle-rustlers and the traditional enemy of the Acholi) who were implicated in stealing the Acholi's cattle worth an estimated \$25 million between 1987 and 1997. Instead of being fair and look after the interests of all its citizens, the Ugandan government provided weapons to the Karamojong to defend themselves. Although the government was not primarily responsible for this loss, this turn of events did not sit well

with the Acholi. This was rationalised in light of the fact that 95% of Karamojong voters (84 000 registered voters) supported Museveni (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999, 12–13). In contrast, the Acholi community votes overwhelmingly anti-NRM, and specifically anti-Museveni, in local, parliamentary and presidential elections. During the 1996 elections, the LRA even declared a unilateral ceasefire to allow people to campaign and vote for the opposition (Van Acker 2004, 337).

Consequently, during the 1996 elections Museveni won only 8.5% and 10.5% of the vote in Gulu and Kitgum respectively; in comparison, his opponent, Paul Semwogerere, won 90.5% and 88.4%. In the 2001 elections, this figure was slightly lower: in Gulu, Museveni won 11.5% while Kizze Besigye won 81.8%, and in Kitgum, Museveni won 21.3% while Besigye won 72.4%. During the 2006 elections and despite the fact that the LRA continued to lose support among these communities, Museveni won 13.2% in Gulu and 18.8% in Kitgum versus Besigye, who won 82.3% in Gulu and 75.4% in Kitgum. Quinn (2006, 5) further explained that voting was not based on ethnic or religious alliances, but a protest vote against the government.

With reference to respondents interviewed as part of this study, only 20% voted in elections before, 29% trusted politicians, and a further 36% trusted that elections could bring change. Looking at the above election results for 1996 and 2006, voting for the opposition did not bring any change. It is therefore not surprising that respondents did not trust the political system as a vehicle to effect change.

4.7 Why and how respondents joined the LRA

According to a report released by the Amnesty Commission in Uganda, LRA members who benefited from amnesty were significantly younger than ADF members: only 61 WNBFA and ADF reporters were under 18, whereas 2 950 LRA members were under 18 (with 116 under 12 and 2 834 between the ages of 12 and 18) (Information Counseling and Referral Services 2008, 10).

The political socialisation process of children was not lost on Kony and the LRA. As a former junior LRA commander in Lomo and Hovil explained (2004, 31): ‘Children copy exactly what is taught during training. They don’t pretend.’ This explains why the LRA targeted younger people, whether through recruitment or abductions.

The socialisation process while being a member of the LRA was best described by an abducted girl: ‘They teach you “don’t fear”, otherwise you will be killed. They test your fear; they tell the children to kill an escapee otherwise you are killed. This is not done to everyone, but they see you are weak, and then they test you. They know these things’ (ibid, 32). Although those interviewed for this study joined the LRA out of their own free will, this is testimony of how ordinary people are conditioned into killing.

A very similar profile to what the Amnesty Commission presented was identified, as 40% (the biggest single group) joined the LRA between the ages of 15 and 19, while a further 4% represented the age group 10 to 14. However, remembering that this study exclusively focused on individuals who willingly joined the LRA, the majority (56%) of respondents joined the LRA between the ages 20 and 41: 20% joined between the ages 20–24, 12%

between 25 and 29, 12% between 30 and 34, 8% between 35 and 39 and 4% above 40 years of age.

Although the theoretical part of the study does not specifically refer to adult socialisation, respondents were asked to indicate whether they were married and had children of their own at the time of joining the LRA: 56% of respondents were single, while 44% were married at the time the individual decided to join the organisation. Focusing on the marital status of female respondents, it was interesting to note that only 25% of female respondents interviewed followed their husbands in joining the LRA. This is in stark contrast to the ADF, in which case 69% of female respondents followed their husbands in joining the organisation. Half of LRA female respondents joined the organisation for protection. In two of the most baffling cases female respondents were on the receiving end of LRA violence before they joined: in the first, the respondent's husband was killed by the LRA and a second single female's parents were abducted by the LRA, causing her to join the organisation five months later. Two other female respondents recalled similarly tragic events: one person referred to being mistreated by an aunt she stayed with (both her parents had passed away), while the second joined the LRA after her father was killed.

Offering another reason for joining the LRA, Van Acker (2004, 352) referred to fear for both the LRA and government in that 'there are reports that some villagers, especially in Kitgum and Pader, do follow the bandits into their hideouts and donate goats and fowl. Some even chat up the commanders and share meals. In discussion, government representatives in the north especially are wont to claim that there is an active level of support for or collaboration with the LRA, distinct from local support grounded in fear.' It was therefore not surprising that 29% of respondents in this study referred to fear as the emotion that captured how they felt best before joining, followed by 21% of respondents who recalled a combination of fear

and anger. Most respondents (34%), however, referred to anger, while 8% recollected hatred and a further 8% remembered a combination of anger and hatred. Anger can therefore be considered the most prominent emotion that drove respondents to the LRA. Assessing the role frustration played in joining the LRA, 88% of respondents rated their level at the highest mark – between 8 and 10 – while the remaining 12% ranked their frustration levels between 5 and 7. This assessment also raises the question about what respondents were angry and frustrated. To answer this crucial question, this chapter has explained, the core reason for joining among those interviewed was a combination of ethnic and political frustrations that finally pushed respondents to the LRA. Focusing on the period between first introduction and joining, respondents referred to a relatively short radicalisation period as 62% of respondents joined the organisation within six months – 27% of this figure even indicated that they joined within a month – followed by 23% who joined between seven and twelve months. Lastly, only 15% of respondents recalled a longer radicalisation period that extended between one to five years. This indicates a very emotional and possibly irrational decision-making process. To assess this, respondents were asked to assess their sense of belonging at the time they joined the LRA and again while being a member. Joining the organisation, 69% of respondents rated their sense of belonging between 8 and 10 – the highest mark – but this figure, however, decreased considerably to 42% while being a member; 15% of respondents rated their sense of belonging between 5 and 7 – the second highest – when they joined the organisation, but this figure increased to 23% while being a member. Lastly, 16% of respondents rated their sense of belonging between 1 and 4 – the lowest – when they joined the organisation, but this figure almost doubled to 35% while being a member.

In other words, the political socialisation process while being a member of the organisation was less effective in building group cohesion, as 92% referred to joining the LRA as the personal action they regretted most. Despite this, 84% of respondents still referred to

organisation members when asked to identify 'us', while 12% referred to family and the remaining 4% referred to his and her ethnic group. Therefore, despite a decreasing sense of belonging, the LRA was successful in establishing an in-group. The out-group was identified as the government as 92% of respondents referred to government when asked to identify 'them', 4% identified other ethnic groups and the remaining 4% referred to other countries.

Additionally, when asked to provide insights into why the respondent decided to stay in the LRA, the majority (44%) chose belonging, followed by 30% who referred to fear, while a further 13% of respondents pointed to a combination of fear and belonging. What is telling is that none of the respondents referred to being Ugandan as 'us'. Similar to the ADF in the previous chapter, this speaks to – at least in the mind of respondents interviewed – an absent national identity. At the same time it is important to note that the LRA is not regarded as representing the ethnic groups in the north, especially following Kony's ruthless tactics against his own people. In other words, there is still room for making minority ethnic groups in the north part of the political system. Keeping in mind that people in the north participated in the political process in 1996 and 2006, even if was part of a protest vote against the government. More telling is the fact that the LRA even declared a unilateral ceasefire to allow people to campaign and vote for the opposition in the 1996 elections. In other words, people in the north, including the LRA, still recognised the political process, despite the fact that some do not regard it as free and fair.

5. CONCLUSION

This chapter, the last of the two chapters that focus on Uganda's political history, focused on the role ethnicity played in identity formation that ultimately formed the core behind a terrorist organisation. Every Ugandan government since independence has used the military to

exclude and marginalise other (or outside government) ethnic and religious groups, which placed considerable stress on nation building. After a short overview of the role ethnicity played in Uganda's political development, the history of the LRA was traced back to the UPDA and the HSMF. Although the LRA is presented as a Christian organisation, both the HSMF and LRA have their origins in traditional beliefs cast in a few themes similar to those found in Christianity. It was therefore established early in the chapter that the identity of both the HSMF and the LRA is founded on ethnicity and not religion.

After providing a short overview of the LRA – its area of operations in Uganda, its modus operandi and target selection – the chapter analysed the personal backgrounds of respondents interviewed. Beginning with the personality of respondents, the study established that the majority of respondents belonged to the ESTJ personality type. In addition to the personality type, specific answers to the personality and narcissism tests started to form a picture of a personality that might be more attracted to joining a terrorist organisation than another individual without similar characteristics. However, it is not implied that one can refer to a terrorist personality type in which people belonging to such a personality type will exclusively be inclined to join a terrorist organisation. What respondents in both the ADF and the LRA presented was the emergence of a more vulnerable personality type to radicalisation and recruitment. This, however, does not imply that all individuals categorised in the ESTJ personality type will get involved in terrorism, considering that when channelled in a more productive direction these individuals could have achieved great heights. However, in the absence of opportunities, people who are driven, assertive and good leaders have to find another way to achieve their objectives.

The family structure is not only one of the most important role players in the political socialisation process, but also influences personality development. Similar to the ADF, the

majority (54%) of LRA respondents were middle children. Furthermore, the majority of respondents came from well-balanced families, where the majority of respondents grew up with both parents present who were involved in their children's development. Consequently, families, especially parents, were informed of respondents' decision to join the LRA, while some respondents even joined the LRA with the support of their parents. The fact that respondents informed their parents implies that respondents trusted their families. It also confirms the role of the family in transferring ethnic identity from one generation to another through political socialisation.

In addition to the role families played in the early political socialisation process of respondents, friends served as the most prominent role player in introducing individuals to the organisation. A very similar trend emerged when compared to the ADF in the previous chapter: through joining the organisation with friends, existing cohesion is transferred to the organisation. In other words, being in it together will enhance the sense of belonging individuals experienced when they joined the organisation. But as time progressed, 27% of respondents experienced a decrease in this sense of belonging. This trend was noted in all cases with the exception of one where the respondent joined the LRA alone. The exception mentioned referred to a respondent who joined with a friend (within five days) after her father was killed and while being a member she regretted her decision after she was required to kill others. The only other respondent who recorded a drastic decrease in belonging between joining (rated at 10) and being a member (rated at 2) joined the LRA alone after government soldiers took his goats, explained that the killing of civilians bothered him.

An opposite trend was also identified where a sense of belonging increased for three respondents (one male and two females), after all three joined alone. All three were the

victims of violence and found a sense of belonging in the LRA. When asked why they stayed in the organisation, all three pointed out belonging.

It was also established that respondents' social identity was rooted in their ethnic association as people of the north, which extended beyond the Acholi to also include other ethnic groups in the same geographical area. To associate with others again confirmed the influence of the social-identity theory in attracting individuals to join a collective driven to rectify the injustices people experienced based on their ethnic and geographic origins. At the core is the political socialisation process in which the family, friends and, ultimately, the organisation served as socialisation agents. For the majority of respondents (84%), 'us' referred to members of the LRA, while 'them' were identified as the Ugandan government (92%). In other words, the Ugandan governments since independence were unsuccessful in building a national identity that extends beyond religion and ethnicity. Although many respondents over the last two chapters referred to diversity as a stumbling block, diversity alone is not a cause, but rather the manner ethnicity and religion are used by governments in power to stay in power at the expense of others.

To conclude, poverty was, similarly to the ADF, not identified as a reason or cause behind the LRA, as only a small minority (4%) referred to economic circumstances as their reason for joining the LRA. This is not to say that unemployment and insufficient education did not make individuals susceptible to joining the LRA, but rather that, based on this study, economic development should not be seen as the only solution. Development based on creating an educated workforce, while addressing ethnic and geographic marginalisation that led to relative deprivation and eventually manifest in political frustration, will be a more effective counterstrategy to the LRA and other armed movements in African states.

CHAPTER 7: RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT TO AL-SHABAAB AND THE MOMBASA REPUBLICAN COUNCIL IN KENYA

1. INTRODUCTION

Islamist extremism did not manifest in Kenya for the first time – when al-Shabaab was implicated in a number of attacks on restaurants, public places and churches – at the time of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia in 2011. Instead, the most memorable manifestation of the growing threat of extremism, since independence, can be traced back to the US embassy attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which were attributed to al-Qa’eda on 7 August 1998. Although a number of political officials in Kenya and Tanzania claimed that their respective countries were completely innocent, and had merely been used as a battleground to target the US and its interests, individuals involved in the attacks included both foreigners and locals. Since then violent extremism gradually lost its exclusively foreign flavour and, instead, national and regional extremism expanded, which suggests that there must be a local and regional element to this growing threat.

Although al-Shabaab has its roots in Somalia, it managed to spread through the region and beyond through the Somali diaspora, but also through an increasing acceptance of al-Qa’eda and al-Shabaab’s philosophy in traditional African communities. The most dramatic manifestation of the group’s abilities to strike beyond Somalia came when it successfully executed two attacks in Kampala, Uganda, on 11 July 2010 and again on 21 September 2013 in Nairobi, Kenya. In the first instance, the group used two suicide attacks as its modus operandi, while in the Kenya strike attackers resorted to a Mumbai-style assault on the Westgate shopping mall, using automatic rifles and hand grenades.

Kenya and Uganda were, however, not only the recipients of al-Shabaab activities, but nationals from Kenya and Uganda were also directly involved in recruiting Kenyan and Ugandan nationals to join al-Shabaab's ranks. Initially, after being radicalised those individuals left their respective countries to fight in Somalia. This trend also gradually changed to the extent that locally marginalised, radicalised and recruited individuals are being used to execute attacks in their own countries. Turning against their own countrymen, as with other organisations, meant that those radicalised identified with something other than being Kenyan or Ugandan.

The chapter starts with a short introduction to Kenya's political history, with specific reference to the role of religion and ethnicity in politics. This will serve as a prologue to the Shifita war as precursor to the MRC, while al-Qa'eda served as the core to al-Shabaab. The focus will exclusively be on Kenyan and Somali-Kenyan nationals who grew up in Kenya and who were radicalised while being in Kenya. Other organisations, such as the MRC and Hizbul Tahrir, are associated with al-Shabaab. Although the primary focus is on al-Shabaab, it became apparent after a few interviews that there are very clear differences in the type of individual and the reasons why individuals joined al-Shabaab or the MRC. Although both share the same geographical area – with specific reference to predominantly the coastal region – they are two very distinct organisations. Even though al-Shabaab has another foothold in Nairobi and even attracted members from western Kenya, eastern Kenya particularly needs attention. It is also for this reason that the section introducing Kenya's political background will refer to developments that had a direct impact on that part of the country. Background to both these organisations and interviews with its members will therefore be included and referred to. This will contribute to a discussion on national identity later in the chapter.

Ethnicity and religion divide Kenyans politically and socially and have caused several violent clashes (the post-election violence in 2007 is the freshest in our memories). The reality is that ethnic coalitions and the rural-urban divide polarise politics in Kenya. This was especially felt in the north-eastern and coastal regions that also set the stage for marginalisation, frustration and resentment between these communities towards Nairobi, the centre of political power. This divide was, however, not based on ethnicity alone; religious divide between the coastal region, which was predominantly Muslim, versus Nairobi, which was seen as predominantly Christian, further complicated politics in Kenya. Furthermore, with specific reference to the MRC, Mombasa was not ruled as part of the British Empire, but was part of the Sultan of Zanzibar (to be discussed below). These factors contributed to the fact that religious identity (manifested in al-Shabaab) and ethnic identity (demonstrated by the MRC) threaten national identity.

Using the theoretical framework presented in chapters 1 to 4, the second part of this chapter will analyse interviews with 95 individuals associated with al-Shabaab, 45 individuals associated with the MRC, along with 46 relatives of individuals associated with al-Shabaab and five relatives of individuals associated with the MRC. A slightly different version of the questionnaire was used to conduct interviews with relatives (see Appendix 2). Relatives were interviewed in cases where primary members disappeared or were incarcerated or killed.

2. KENYA'S POLITICAL HISTORY

Following independence from Britain in 1963, the Kenyatta government adopted the British model, with the seat of political power based in Nairobi. Since independence tension existed between ethnic and national citizenship to the degree that how rival political parties formed was critical to their ethnic composition and to their reliance on activating ethnic citizenship to

mobilise votes. For example, from the beginning of Kenya's political history, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), one of two dominant political parties, drew the bulk of its leadership, membership and support from the Kikuyu and Luo, the two largest ethnic groups in Kenya supported by the Embu, Meru, Kamba and Kisii, which made up about 60% of the population. The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) instead united a diverse set of minority ethnic groups joined by the fear of domination by an exclusive Kikuyu-Luo post-independence government. Included in this camp was the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA), which combined a number of organisations in the Rift Valley region under the leadership of Daniel arap Moi. Each of these parties was supported in its original ethnic-dominated areas. After independence the majority Kikuyu-Luo alliance in KANU reined in majority power and bypassed other government agencies by withholding funds. Outnumbered and outmanoeuvred, KADU willingly dissolved and joined KANU to form a single-party state in 1964. KANU, then under a Kikuyu-Luo alliance (soon dominated by the Kikuyu), installed its vision of liberal citizenship and established the nation rather than ethnic groups (Ndegwa 1997, 604-05). This introduced single-party rule under both Kenyatta (1963-78) and Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) until 1982.

The reality experienced at grassroots level was that ethnic allegiances were a real factor in access to and distribution of resources. Colin Leys (Mawhood and Wallis 1993, 172) refers to the term 'ideology of tribalism' to describe what he saw as a conspiracy by the political leadership to manipulate ethnic identity to achieve its own goals. The initial Kikuyu-Luo alliance under the early years of Kenyatta's rule extended to the Kalenjin when Moi joined KANU. Since Moi took over the presidency, the Kalenjin expected and received benefits in the form of promotions. In addition to the Kalenjin, Moi forged new alliances with the Masai, who are closely related to the Kalenjin, to become much more involved in government. The position of the Somalis advanced also through promotions in the military and administrative

areas. All of this happened at the cost of the Kikuyu, who felt excluded, especially since employment and promotions were not based on merit but on ethnic and political allegiances. It resulted in a decline in the performance of the civil service and in corruption (Mawhood and Wallis 1993, 172).

Until the end of one-party rule, the role religion played in politics was kept in the background, with the exception of the Shifta war, which merged religion and ethnicity. This will be discussed below. It was only after opening the political landscape in 1982 that religion became a visible factor, when Moi refused to recognise the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) and the Democratic Movement (DEMO), due to their religious inclination. DEMO had its origins in traditional beliefs, especially that of Kikuyu, that ‘foster the spirit of communalism in the agrarian sphere, fidelity to indigenous cultural expressions, and reverence for the ancestors’ (Mazrui 1994, 193–94). Refusing to register these two parties was interpreted as an attempt on the part of the KANU government to deal with the potential challenge these two parties could pose to the predominantly Christian political status quo. Despite the fact that Kenya is a secular country, Muslims felt discriminated against, starting with the fact that Muslims are not well represented in key government positions and institutions. It is, however, when applying for national identity cards and passports that Muslims especially felt discriminated against. For example, when applying for a passport, Muslims are required to produce additional documentary evidence of citizenship. Whereas ‘Christian applicants only needed two birth certificates, their own and of one of their parents, applicants with Islamic names were required to produce, in addition, the birth certificate of one of the grandparents’ (Mazrui 1994, 198).

Despite the challenges in getting recognition as an Islamic political party, Kenyan Muslims achieved collective representation through the National Union of Kenya Muslims (NUKEM),

which was established in 1968 by junior members of KANU. NUKEM also established and maintained close links with Arab countries, most notably Saudi Arabia and Libya. This led to the establishment of the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) in 1973. Recognised as the sole legitimate representation of Muslims in the Kenyan government since 1979, its legitimacy within the Muslim community is not always acknowledged (Møller 2008, 113).

2.1 Shifta war

Muslims in post-independence Kenya have been kept on the fringes of the national agenda, which caused many to feel that they were not fully part of Kenya. Instead, it caused the then government and non-Muslims to question the patriotism of Muslims, a perception that was strengthened by the fact that after independence the Somalis started agitating for a separate homeland with the option of joining their brethren in Somalia.

This feeling of not being part of Kenya started before independence, at a time when Kenya's independence was being negotiated. During forums such as the Lancaster House conferences, many ethnicities were adequately represented except the Kenyan Somalis. Consequently, when Kenya attained independence in 1963, the Somali people in Kenya felt that they had been left out and were not part of the new government. This ultimately led to the Shifta separatist war, initiated by the Somali ethnic community of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya (a region that is and has historically been almost exclusively inhabited by ethnic Somalis). The Shifta war (1963–67) was a secessionist conflict in which ethnic Somalis in the NFD attempted to join with their fellow Somalis in a Greater Somalia. The Kenyan government named the conflict 'shifta', after the Somali word for 'bandit' (Mburu 1999, 19).

Calls for a 'Greater Somalia' – to unite all the Somali speaking people in the Horn of Africa – can be traced back to 26 June 1960, days after the British government granted independence to the former British Somaliland to become Somalia. This 'Greater Somalia' included areas in Djibouti (former French Somaliland), Ethiopia and Kenya (Wanambisi 1984). Therefore, in addition to negatively impacting on stability in Kenya, the source of the Ogaden separatist movement in Ethiopia can also be traced back to this period.

In an attempt to find a solution to the Shifta uprising, the Somali community was allowed to vote in the first referendum since independence to choose whether to remain part of Kenya or secede to Somalia. The outcome of the referendum was obvious – the Somalis chose to join Somalia – but authorities told those who voted for independence that they were welcome to leave Kenya for Somalia but that Kenya was not ready to surrender its territory. Consequently, this marked the beginning of the Shifta separatist war between 1963 and 1967, during which Somalis claimed part of the Kenyan coast from Kilifi to Lamu as part of Somalia, and started a guerrilla war to reclaim it (Macharia, 23 July 2012). The Kenyan government responded with brutal force by declaring the entire north-eastern part of Kenya and all regions bordering the Somali-populated regions security operation zones. A news article published in the *Daily Nation* of 1 February 2012 reported that members of the Bajuni community, who resided in the Kiunga coastal area of Lamu on the Kenyan border with Somalia, had told the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) of the atrocities they had suffered 40 years ago during the Shifta uprising. Athman Ali, who fled to Manda Island and later returned to Kiunga, told the TJRC that they were happier under the British colonialists than during the reign of Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya's first post-independence president). He accused the former president of sending security officers to uproot local people from 12 villages on the pretext that Bajunis (a predominantly Muslim community) had sided with the Somali Shifta militia.

Such are the grievances that Muslims have harboured against successive governments in Kenya, calling them historical injustices against Muslims (Ndurya, 1 February 2012).

Since the Shifta war and because the Somali Kenyans in many ways represent the face of Islam in Kenya, the Shifta separatist attempt ended up causing the marginalisation of the entire Muslim community. As a result of this, Muslims in Kenya have grown up with a kind of rage against successive Christian-dominated governments, thus making it easy for young Muslims to join extremist groups in the name of defending their faith.

2.2 Mombasa Republican Council

A renewed drive to fight for the self-determination of Muslims in the coastal region was echoed in 2008 when the MRC regained momentum, calling for secession from Kenya. On 18 October 2010 the Internal Security ministry in a gazette notice number 12585 (based on the Prevention of Organized Crime Act) banned the MRC, along with 31 other groups. The MRC was however unbanned on 25 July 2012 after the Mombasa High Court ruled that the banning was unconstitutional (Otieno 2012). The MRC focuses on land grievances and the fact that outsiders dominate the local economy, which consists predominantly of tourism (Gatsiounis 2012, 80). Although the majority of its members are Muslim, the respondents interviewed clearly showed that the MRC has a very different agenda than al-Shabaab. Despite the fact that a different area is being contested, influenced by a different history, the question is if both al-Shabaab and the MRC tapped into the same frustrations that often manifest in demonstrations following allegations that prominent radical Muslim clerics are being assassinated by Kenyan security agencies. Most notable examples include the killing of Sheikh Aboud Rogo in August 2012, Sheikh Ibrahim Omar in October 2013 (*Al-Jazeera*, 4

October 2013) and Sheikh Abubakar Shariff also known as Makaburi in April 2014 (*The Star*, 2 April 2014).

Whereas the Shifta conflict called for the integration of the NFD into Somalia, the MRC claimed that the 16km coastal strip of Kenya that used to be under the control of the Sultanate of Zanzibar should be independent as it was never really part of the area under British rule during colonialism (Akintola 2008, 37).

The MRC justifies its claim on an agreement signed by the then Kenyan prime minister and later president, Jomo Kenyatta, and his Zanzibari counterpart, Mohamed Shante, in 1963, granting Kenya a 50-year lease over the coast. After this agreement ended in June 2013, the region had to return to its indigenous people. The Kenyan government and historians in Nairobi have dismissed the existence of this treaty and claims that while the coast was ruled by the Sultan, it reverted back to mainland rule from Nairobi upon Kenya's independence from Britain in 1963 (Macharia 2012).

According to Sperling's (1988, 74) historical analysis, the 'Sultan of Zanzibar in 1887 had granted a concession to the British East Africa Association, which gave the Association authority to administer the coastal strip; the following year, the Association (under the name of the Imperial British East Africa Company) was granted a Royal Charter. In 1889, the Sultan and the British Government entered an Agreement regulating the concession to the Company, and in 1890 the Sultan placed his Dominions under British protection. When the Company went into liquidation in 1895, administration of the coastal strip was assumed by the British Government as a part of the East Africa Protectorate.'

3. AL-QA'EDA'S PRESENCE IN KENYA

During the cold war, the Horn of Africa was either a crisis zone or a battleground between the US and the Soviet Union (Sharamo and Mesfin 2011, xii). The end of the cold war introduced a new era in regional political dynamics. Somalia was the first casualty when the US suspended all financial aid to the Siad Barre regime, a former ally of the Soviet Union. As a result Somalia's security apparatus collapsed and the United Somali Congress (USC), led by Mohamed Farah Aideed, took control of Mogadishu in 1991 (Mohamed 2009, 13). These developments in Somalia facilitated al-Qa'eda and later al-Shabaab's reach in the region, as will be presented throughout this chapter.

Another factor that facilitated al-Qa'eda's reach in the Horn of Africa came as Osama bin Laden relocated to Sudan in 1991, after the Afghan Mujahideen defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is important to note that Bin Laden not only played a role in Afghanistan, but following the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1989, he continued to support militant Islamist organisations around the globe causing Saudi Arabia to recall his passport between 1989 and 1991. Welcomed by Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), Bin Laden expanded his business interests – which, according to him, started as early as 1983 – and moved to Sudan in 1991 (National Security Archive 2011, 1). Sudan hosted Bin Laden between 1991 and 1996 (before he returned to Afghanistan), which provided him with an invaluable opportunity to exploit the crisis and instability in Somalia (from 1991 onwards) to establish al-Qa'eda's East African cell. The latter has allowed al-Qa'eda to operate in Nairobi since at least 1993, and in Mombasa since 1994 (United States District Court Southern District of New York 1998, 17–18). In order to embed itself, al-Qa'eda undertook a number of important activities: Initially al-Qa'eda established safe houses for its members and sympathisers who were passing through. This facilitated not only illegal

cross-border movement within the region but further meant that Kenya also served as a gateway for terrorists to the Gulf, the Middle East, and South Asia. To enhance its reach and legitimise its activities, al-Qa'eda operatives opened diverse small businesses and relief organisations to subsidise and conceal its activities. For example, Wadih El-Hage established a business called 'Tanzanite King' and a relief organisation called 'Help Africa People'. In August 1994, Mohammed Sadiq Odeh, a Jordanian member of al-Qa'eda who had been trained in the camps in Afghanistan, arrived in Mombasa. During the same year Muhammad Atef, who would later be killed during the US bombing of Afghanistan in November 2001, visited Odeh in Mombasa and gave him a fibreglass boat to start a wholesale fishing business for al-Qa'eda. Under the arrangement, Odeh could take whatever money he needed to cover his expenses and give the rest to al-Qa'eda. From business ventures to a humanitarian organisation, al-Qa'eda operatives were successful in integrating themselves with the local community without arousing undue suspicion (Lacey and Weiser, 1 December 2002).

Furthermore, al-Qa'eda operatives not only lived among Kenya's Muslim population, but also married into the local community. Being an integral part of society, foreigners were able to identify and use local people to strengthen their cover, but also gained acceptance within these local communities. For example, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan married Fatma Ahmed Talo and Abdullah Mohammed married the daughter of Mohammed Kubwa, Amina Mohammed Kubwa, when he arrived on the island in 2002. Both established themselves in Lamu and were accepted in these communities (Babo, 8 March 2004). It is worth noticing that Lamu is still being considered a hotbed of activities and was included in the fieldwork.

Starting with the US embassy attacks in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam on 7 August 1998, for which the Islamic Liberation Army of the People of Kenya (ILAPK), an al-Qa'eda cover

organisation, officially claimed responsibility. In the communiqué that claimed responsibility, ILAPK inter alia stated (Haynes 2005, 1327–28):

[T]he Americans humiliate our people, they occupy the Arabian peninsula, they extract our riches, they impose a blockade and, besides, they support the Jews of Israel, our worse enemies, who occupy the Al-Aqsa mosque... The attack was justified because the government of Kenya recognized that the Americans had used the country's territory to fight against its Moslem neighbors, in particular Somalia. Besides, Kenya cooperated with Israel. In this country one finds the most anti-Islamic Jewish centers in all East Africa. It is from Kenya that the Americans supported the separatist war in Southern Sudan, pursued by John Garang's fighters.

The success of al-Qa'eda's East African cell was further emphasised on 28 November 2002 when two suicide bombers targeted the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa. Unlike in the case of the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998, all of the suspects involved in both of these attacks were Kenyan nationals, with the exception of Abu Talha al-Sudani (a Sudanese national). Even the two suicide bombers, Fumo Mohamed Fumo and Haruni Bamusa, were Kenyan nationals. During the subsequent investigation, another Kenyan national and suspect, Faizel Ali Nassor, killed himself and a Kenyan police officer when he detonated a hand grenade on 1 August 2003, rather than being arrested (All Africa, 4 August 2003).

When the reaction of Kenyan officials to above attacks are analysed, a number of key themes emerge: Most notably, denial that domestic circumstances in Kenya contributed to the radicalisation of Kenyan nationals. Politically, confronted with the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi and the subsequent acts of terrorism in Mombasa in 2002, some Kenyan governmental officials considered Kenya to be a victim, in the form of a third party, in the conflict between the US and Islamic extremists. For example, in July 2005 the then government spokesperson, Alfred Mutua, said: 'We do not think there is an element of terrorism in Kenyans; it's foreigners using Kenyans as conduits' (England, 29 July 2005). At that time, only a few officials accepted that there were internal problems that needed to be

addressed, such as Chris Murungaru, the then minister for national security, who on 29 June 2003 acknowledged that: ‘Kenya’s war against terrorism will only be won by accepting that the problem exists’ (All Africa, 30 June 2003). Nevertheless, despite growing evidence of the gradual radicalisation of a number of local Muslim community members, and evidence that Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan was directly involved in the attacks in Mombasa in 2002, the dominant opinion, including that of Kenyan investigators, remained that the attacks in 1998 and 2002 were orchestrated from abroad. This is clearly illustrated by a comment made by John Sawe, then Kenya’s ambassador to Israel, who in the aftermath of the bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa stated: ‘There is no doubt in my mind that al-Qa’eda is behind this attack, because we have no domestic problems, no terrorism in our country, and we have no problem with our neighbours, no problem whatsoever’ (Maclean, 28 November 2002).

As a result, the Kenyan leadership did not step in to address growing radicalisation when it could still make an impact. Instead, local conditions enabled growing frustrations to deteriorate, later enabling al-Shabaab to strengthen its foothold in Kenya.

The creation of al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin, or ‘The Youth’, can be traced back to *al-Ittihād al-islāmiyya* and *Ittihād al-mahākim al-islāmiyya*, commonly known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU has its origins in a coalition in 2006 between local Sharia courts and Islamists in Mogadishu, which defeated the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT). It is important to note that the ARPCT was supported by the US to counter the activities of the ICU (Mbaria, 24 October 2006). The ICU has both moderate and extremist elements, with the latter component including al-Shabaab. Headed up by Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, al-Shabaab was already the best-armed, the best-trained (often in Afghanistan) and perhaps the most committed of the different militant factions, providing a

level of stability and security not commonly known to Somalia (Mitchell 2006) – or, that was the impression from the outside, at least.

When Ethiopian forces defeated the ICU in February 2007, two principal factions emerged: the less militant members of the ICU, who went into exile in Eritrea and Djibouti where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia; and the more hardened and militant field commanders, who remained in Somalia and formed al-Shabaab and, later, Hizbul Islam. Although the ICU, including its al-Shabaab element, declined formally to align itself with al-Qa'eda in 2006, its earlier allegiance with key members of al-Qa'eda and the involvement of foreigners in its operations were unmistakable. For example, in July 2006, Sheikh Yusuf Indha'adde, the former defence minister for the ICU, was featured in a video that showed 'Arab fighters preparing for a major battle on the northern outskirts of Mogadishu. Arabic anthems and poetry play[ed] on the audio track urging Muslims to join the global holy war to advance Islam and defeat its enemies' (Roggio, 5 July 2006).

The deployment in 2006 of Ethiopian troops backed by the US prompted an outcry among the Somali diaspora worldwide. Within Somalia, a foreign enemy provided al-Shabaab with a new resolve. Under Sheikh Abu Mukhtar Robow (alias Abu Mansur), who served as a military commander and spokesperson for al-Shabaab, the group began to post propaganda videos on the Internet. Through this platform, al-Shabaab managed to connect with the Somali diaspora, leading to its members' radicalisation and eventual recruitment for terrorist activities (Grace, 21 November 2008). Although the radicalisation and recruitment among the Somali diaspora in Canada, Europe, the US and Scandinavian countries is worth mentioning, this thesis will not include these developments.

Despite the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia in January 2009, al-Shabaab continued aggressively to recruit foreign fighters through its Internet-driven propaganda network. With Ethiopia leading the initial campaign to stop the spread of the ICU in Somalia, followed by Uganda and Burundi (as part of the AU Mission in Somalia – AMISOM), extremists used this external interference to their advantage in presenting it as a Christian invasion of a Muslim country. It was this sentiment that attracted members of the Somali expatriate communities to return to Somalia to fight for the ‘liberation’ of their former homeland. The same sentiment was also used to enhance al-Shabaab’s influence in the entire region, but especially in Kenya, drawing both radicalised Kenyan Somalis and Kenyans to travel to Somalia and participate in the jihad against its foreign occupiers.

After the death of Saleh Al-Nabhan, after a US strike off Baraawe, al-Shabaab expressed its growing allegiance with al-Qa’eda in a video. In this video, which was distributed in September 2009, national emir Moktar Abu Zubair (alias Muktar Abdirahman ‘Godane’, or Ahmad Abdi Godane) for the first time declared the organisation’s loyalty to Bin Laden. The video featured among other things a large crowd waving their guns and chanting: ‘Here we are Osama! We are your soldiers Osama!’, as well as audio clips from a previous Bin Laden video that encouraged followers to: ‘Fight on oh Champions of Somalia’ (Investigative Project on Terrorism 2009). The important role the media play in the radicalisation process will be placed in context when the student discusses al-Shabaab’s influence in Kenya later in this chapter.

Significantly, in February 2010 Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki (commander of the Kamboni militia and a previous commander in the ICU), and Ahmad Abdi Godane (from al-Shabaab) issued the following statement:

We have agreed to join the international jihad of al-Qa'eda ... We have also agreed to unite al-Shabaab and Kamboni mujahideen to liberate the Eastern and Horn of Africa community who are under the feet of minority Christians (*The Daily Star*, 2 February 2010).

Following this declaration, al-Shabaab, under the direction of Godane, executed the twin suicide attacks on 11 July 2010 in Kampala and, in the wake of Kenya's intervention in Somalia in October 2011, the Westgate attack in Nairobi.

In Kampala, Uganda, on 11 July 2010, at approximately 22h25 at the Ethiopian Village Restaurant, and at 23h15 at the Kyadondo Rugby Club, suicide bombers targeted crowds watching a live screening of the FIFA World Cup. These attacks claimed the lives of 74 people and left 70 others injured. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks, saying they carried it out in retaliation to Uganda's support and participation in AMISOM (Delany and Straziuso 2010).

At the time of the attack al-Shabaab was under the leadership of Ahmed Abdi Muhammad Godane, alias Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed who served as al-Shabaab's commander in chief, and Abu Musa Mombasa (a Pakistani national), its head of security. It was particularly Abu Zubeir and Fazul who planned the Kampala bombings. Mohamood Mugisha, arrested before the attacks, confirmed in a press conference while in custody that the order came from Abu Zubayr. He also admitted that he joined al-Shabaab in 2008 and was tasked with renting a house from where operations could be directed (Ssempogo, 13 August 2010). In addition to the involvement of senior al-Qa'eda members based in Somalia in the planning of the attack, facilitating the attack called on the involvement of individuals in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

This attack was significant in the eyes of many analysts because it marked al-Shabaab's first attack outside Somalia. But there was something else that caught the eye of analysts and security agents: the people involved included Kenyan nationals and the logistics to carry out the attacks were almost entirely coordinated from Kenya. According to the UN report, Issa Ahmed Luyima, the leader of the cell in Uganda responsible for executing the attack, was radicalised in Kenya and Tanzania, before being trained with al-Shabaab in Somalia (United Nations Security Council 2011, 137).

It is important to note the personal backgrounds of those directly involved in the attacks, most notably the nationality, educational and professional backgrounds of members of the Ugandan cell. Although socioeconomic circumstances, as referred to in Chapter 4, will be discussed later in the chapter, the educational and employment background directly related to the attacks attracted specific attention. It is important to note that members of the Uganda execution cell were all Ugandan nationals and included Issa Ahmed Luyima, alias Abu Zargawi, the cell's leader who confessed that the suicide vests had come from Somalia. He was the direct link to al-Shabaab because he earlier fought for al-Shabaab in Somalia. He studied at Kawempe High School in Kawempe before working at Kampala International University. In a press conference, Issa Ahmed Luyima admitted that he recruited his brother, Haruna Hassan Luyima (a businessman based at Majestic Plaza in Kampala): 'I did not want to work with my brother but recruiting other people was very risky, so I manipulated him' (*Global Jihad*, 6 March 2011). Although recruiting family members only took place in 13% of al-Shabaab respondents and only 6% of respondents joined al-Shabaab with family members, the Kampala attacks called for additional security, which might explain why Issa recruited his brother Hassan. This particular example also practically demonstrates the implications of loyalty, obligations and responsibilities associated with kinship ties as presented in Chapter 2. Issa Luyima passed through Kenya to enter Uganda and delivered the suicide vests to his

brothers and returned to Kenya before the attacks were executed (Okanya, Anyoli and Nalumansi, 10 August 2010). According to investigations, Hassan Luyima, Issa Luyima and Edris Nsubuga visited the three intended targets on 9 July to assess security (Candia 2010).

Edris Nsubuga, a businessman at Pioneer Mall in Kampala, and a business student at Makerere University, was identified as the third suspect directly involved in the attack. Nsubuga confessed that he had taken the Somali suicide bomber to Lugogo and had detonated the second device (Ssempogo, 13 August 2010).

Mohamood Mugisha, aged 24, was tasked with renting a house in which the explosives could be prepared in Nakulabye (a city suburb). According to Mugisha, in a media interview following his arrest, al-Qa'eda recruited him in 2004 in Nairobi. His recruiters promised him he would head to Dubai, but he was sent instead to a training camp in Somalia where he trained alongside at least 40 others from Uganda, which is where he also met Ali Saleh Nabhan. In April 2010, Ugandan immigration officials arrested Mugisha in the border town of Busia as he attempted to enter Uganda from Kenya (Bariyo and Childress 2010).

Only Issa Luyima and Mugisha served as foreign fighters in Somalia. The others mentioned above were recruited, trained and instructed while in Uganda. There was shock and disbelief on the part of the attackers regarding the magnitude and consequences of the attacks. The attacks struck close to home even for the attackers: Edris Nsubuga's aunt, Margaret Nabankema, was also killed in the attack in Kyaddondo Rugby Club grounds in Lugogo (Ssempogo, 13 August 2010). Both Edris Nsubuga and Mohamood Mugisha were interviewed as part of this study and will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.

Al-Shabaab influence in Kenya is another topic that requires attention. The sentiment in Kenya before the July 2010 attacks in Kampala was that the conflict in Somalia was contained to Somalia. While recognising that its neighbour was in crisis and that its problems occasionally spilled over during the 1998 and 2002 attacks, the Kenyan government had no interest in intervening directly, at least not until October 2011 after hostages taken on the Kenyan coast ended up in al-Shabaab's hands. Earlier, the regional impact of Somalia became apparent as more Kenyan nationals were implicated as foreign fighters in attacks in Somalia, all radicalised in Kenya. Not only did al-Shabaab recruit foreign fighters in Kenya, it also recruited suicide bombers. For example, on 19 April 2007, a suicide bomber detonated his device as he rammed through the gates of the Ethiopian army base in Mogadishu. The initial explosion also caused secondary blasts to occur due to its proximity to nearby munitions. Al-Shabaab identified the suicide bomber as a Kenyan national, Othman Odayo (BBC Africa, 9 April 2008). In early October 2011, another al-Shabaab suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden vehicle into a checkpoint at the entrance to Somalia's Ministry of Education in Mogadishu. The blast killed over 65 people and injured many others. Shortly after the explosion, al-Shabaab on one of its websites claimed responsibility for the attack. A couple of weeks later, during a media briefing in Nairobi, a Kenya Defence Forces spokesman, while outlining some of the reasons why Kenyan soldiers were deployed in Somalia to pursue al-Shabaab, said that the person who carried out the attack on the Ministry of Education in the Somali capital was in fact a Kenyan national from Kiambu, a semi-rural town on the outskirts of Nairobi. This incident was particularly worrying as the Kenyan national referred to was from a rural area outside Nairobi, not from the coastal region that already was an area of concern. In other words, local Kenyan nationals were involved and not Somali Kenyan or Somali nationals as originally implied or even expected. Kenyan youth, particularly those of Somali or Afro-Arab-Swahili origin and those drawn from urban informal settlements such as Majengo (an old informal settlement in Nairobi's Eastlands) in Nairobi, have been linked to

al-Shabaab activities. This area again drew the attention of security agencies after it was reported that a large number of Kenyan Muslim youth, who have joined al-Shabaab in Somalia, came from Majengo. For example, in December 2011, Kenyan police released the names of 15 men they believed have left Kismayu for Kenya. The group included nine Kenyan nationals, between 24 and 32 years of age and known to have resided in Majengo and Mombasa before leaving for Somalia in 2010 (Angira 2011).

Al-Shabaab functioned through proxies in Kenya. One of these proxies is the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), which, if one analyses its statements and messages, also serves as al-Shabaab's public relations arm in Kenya. The MYC, also known as Pumwani Muslim Youth and al-Hijra, mainly based in Nairobi, has also developed a strong network of members and sympathisers in areas such as Eldoret, Garissa and Mombasa (Gatsiounis 2012, 78).

The MYC was implicated in recruiting and financing al-Shabaab in Somalia. This allegation was confirmed on 10 January 2012 when the MYC declared that al-Shabaab had named Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali alias Abdul Fatah as its 'Supreme Amir'. The MYC statement, issued on its blog, read:

Allah favours our beloved al Shabaab, and al Shabaab in return has placed the responsibility of waging jihad in Kenya in the capable Kenyan hands of our Amir Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali (Roggio, 13 January 2012).

Ahmad Iman Ali was a central figure in forging the link between the MYC, al-Shabaab and al-Qa'eda's East African cell. On 10 January 2012, the MYC released a statement on its blog that provided important insight into Ahmad Iman Ali's role (Roggio, 13 January 2012):

Some years back our beloved brothers in al Shabaab called upon our Amir to take up his duty and help the mujahideen in Somalia. Without hesitation or excuses like many of the other Sheikhs in Kenya our Amir left Majengo and MYC to begin fighting in Allah cause. As a result, many of us in MYC and others in Kenya followed our dear Amir to the land of Somalia... We in MYC have no doubt that our Amir Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali will continue the unfinished work of brother Fazul (referring to Fazul Mohammed, the former leader of al

Qaeda's operations in East Africa who also served as a senior leader in Shabaab before being killed) in Kenya and in the region of East Africa.

Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali was instrumental in Kenyans becoming the largest contingent of non-Somali fighters in al-Shabaab (Khayat 2012, 2). According to an article in *Sabahi* in August 2012, Ali commands up to 500 Kenyan fighters, many of them children, in Somalia (Boniface, 22 August 2012).

Before this open alliance, the UN Monitoring Group, in its report in 2011, explained that Ahmad Iman Ali was a student of Sheikh Rogo, an open campaigner for al-Shabaab based in Mombasa (before his death on 27 August 2012). After Ali left for Mombasa, Rogo's main ally in the MYC was Sylvester Opiyo Osodo, alias 'Musa', who heads MYC's resources centre (United Nations Security Council 2011, 141).

Alongside Ahmad Iman Ali, Sheikh Aboud Rogo (until he was killed in August 2012) was another central figure behind MYC's alliance with al-Shabaab, the radicalisation and recruitment of Kenyan youths and the channelling of fighters to Somalia. According to the United Nations Security Council, in its description of Rogo:

[A]s the main ideological leader of Al Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Center, Aboud Rogo Mohammed has used the extremist group as a pathway for radicalization and recruitment of principally Swahili speaking Africans for carrying out violent militant activity in Somalia. In a series of inspirational lectures between February 2009 and February 2012, Aboud repeatedly called for the violent rejection of the Somali peace process. During these lectures, Rogo repeatedly called for the use of violence against both the United Nations and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Somalia, and urged his audiences to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab's fight against the Kenyan Government. Aboud Rogo Mohammed also offers guidance on how Kenyan recruits joining al-Shabaab can evade detection by the Kenyan authorities, and which routes to follow when traveling from Mombasa and/or Lamu to Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia, notably Kismayo. He has facilitated the travel to Somalia of numerous Kenyan recruits for al-Shabaab. In September 2011, Rogo was recruiting individuals in Mombasa, Kenya for travel into Somalia, presumably to conduct terrorist operations. In September 2008, Rogo held a fundraising meeting in Mombasa to help finance al-Shabaab activities in Somalia (United Nations Security Council 2008, 12).

According to the United Nations Security Council Committee on 23 August 2012, ‘Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, [another MYC leader] is a leading facilitator and recruiter of young Kenyan Muslims for violent militant activity in Somalia, and a close associate of Aboud Rogo. He provides material support to extremists groups in Kenya (and elsewhere in East Africa). Through his frequent trips to al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia, including Kismayo, he has been able to maintain strong ties with senior al-Shabaab members. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed is also engaged in the mobilization and management of funding for al-Shabaab ... and has preached at mosques in Mombasa that young men should travel to Somalia, commit extremist acts, fight for al-Qa’eda, and kill U.S. citizens. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed was arrested in late December 2010 by Kenyan authorities on suspicion of involvement in the bombing of a Nairobi bus terminal. Abubaker Shariff Ahmed is also a leader of a Kenya-based youth organisation in Mombasa with ties to al-Shabaab. As of 2010, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed acted as a recruiter and facilitator for al-Shabaab in the Majengo area of Mombasa, Kenya’ (United Nations Security Council 2008, 13).

Radicalisation and recruitment can be conducted in many ways. In the case of the MYC’s campaign in Kenya, it utilised an all-inclusive communications strategy to achieve its objectives that will be highlighted below. Announcing Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali as an al-Shabaab ‘Supreme Amir’, and the subsequent video released by Al-Kataib, al-Shabaab’s official media company, analysts noted a few concerns for Kenya (Khayat 2012,1). Firstly, the video was delivered entirely in Swahili with English subtitles, indicating that its main target audience was Kenyan nationals. Secondly, the video was produced by and disseminated on jihadi forums under al-Shabaab, reflecting its effective communications strategy. Through this, al-Shabaab confirmed its allegiance with the MYC. To illustrate this, the MYC, on its blog and on Twitter, said: ‘Ali’s elevation to become the supreme emir of Kenya for al-Shabaab is recognition from our Somali brothers who have fought tirelessly against the

unbelievers on the importance of the Kenyan mujahedeen in Somalia' (Boniface, 22 August 2012).

In addition to social media, al-Shabaab also started with a jihadi magazine called *Gaidi Mtaani*, the first Swahili-language jihadi magazine that was first published online on 4 April 2012. In its first edition al-Shabaab referred to Kenya, as *dar al-harb* (house of war), and being declared as such an open declaration of war followed. This is particularly important in explaining al-Shabaab's dedicated focus on Kenya, especially considering that, MYC has made it clear that Kenya is its main focus in the arena of global jihad, and that the group's future activities inside and outside Kenya will be limited to jihad for the sole purpose of liberating Muslim brothers in Somalia in particular. The campaign in East Africa will however be conducted under the banner of al-Qa'eda in Eastern Africa (AQEA) (Khayat 2012,1).

Through its weekly newsletter, *Al-Misbah*, its Twitter account (@MYC_Press) and its blog (themovingcaravan.wordpress.com), the MYC radicalises and recruits supporters for its 'jihad' in Kenya. For example, shortly after the February merger of al-Qa'eda and al-Shabaab, the MYC issued a statement on its now-defunct blog, (mynjiawaukweli.blogspot.com), welcoming the 'long overdue' merger while announcing the establishment of AQEA. It added that MYC members were pleased to be part of 'this great union' and hoped Allah would grant the mujahideen in Kenya the strength to 'set jihad alight' in the country. The statement noted that, thanks to the merger, the *kuffar* could never again say that al-Shabaab was defeated or that al-Qa'eda was weak, declaring: 'We are now multiplying from East to West and from North to South' (Khayat 2012, 2). On 14 January 2012, the MYC vowed to carry out 'attacks against Kenya's *kuffars* [infidels] for our al-Shabaab brothers until the country withdraws its troops from Somalia' (Boniface, 22 August 2012). Then, in a post on 29 July 2012, the MYC

wrote: 'In Kenya, the *kuffar* [infidel] fears to go to the bars, church, and bus stops. We are locking down Kenya *insha 'Allah*' (Khayat 2012, 2).

Through Twitter messages the MYC explained what form its jihad would take. A statement on 10 January 2012 (mentioned above) read: 'We will wage defensive jihad as we have been instructed to do without mercy for the sake of our precious religion' (Roggio, 13 January 2012). Again, on 3 August 2012, the MYC justified its call to violence by posting 'Basic questions on jihad answered' on Twitter. It asked what a person could expect when joining, and wrote: 'For the privileged brothers and sisters who join jihad they are given training in everything from the true meaning of Islam to using RPG, AK-47s and other weapons.' Would a member be fighting other Muslims? 'Any Muslim who supports the *kuffar* against his Muslim brother cannot call himself a Muslim' (Boniface, 22 August 2012). This sparked the question whether attacks against churches were only intended to intimidate the Kenyan government to withdraw from Somalia, or whether the strategy behind these attacks was perhaps to draw Kenya into a religious war between Muslims and Christians? Although this might be seen as far-fetched, such conflict would be more sustainable than if the focus was solely limited to Kenya's intervention in Somalia. Looking at the bigger picture, through concentrating on a religious conflict between *dar al-Islam* (House of Islam) and *dar al-harb*, al-Shabaab, MYC and the broader AQEA get a new lifeline after losing ground in Somalia in establishing a more direct alliance with the idea of self-determination as presented by organisations such as the MRC. This growing religious divide again came to the fore after the killing of Aboud Rogo Mohammed on 27 August 2012 as 'an imam in the mosque shouted through the speaker "blood for blood", and immediately youths started stoning cars' (*Sabahi*, 27 August 2012).

This is the best example of the media as a political socialisation agent as discussed in Chapter 2, in influencing a person's political orientations. Similar to the workings of traditional international media to encourage those receiving their messages to adopt their values, those on the receiving end of al-Shabaab and the MYC's new communication strategy – the Internet, Twitter, blogs, newsletters and video and voice recordings – are equally influenced in changing opinions to adopt al-Shabaab's cause as their own. In other words, the new media not only inform or transform values, but socialise their readers and listeners to al-Shabaab's agenda through radicalising and recruiting people to its ranks. Through its media campaign, al-Shabaab is trying to achieve a very similar objective to what al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya managed to do (as explained before) in eroding national political identity and replacing it with a transnational identity. In the case of al-Shabaab, this new identity is based on extremism.

4. PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS

Respondents included 131 male and six female al-Shabaab members between the ages of 14 and 51. A further 47 male and four female MRC members between the ages of 20 and 78 were interviewed. Using the Jungian/MBTI personality test, the majority of al-Shabaab respondents (52 participants) were classified as belonging to the ESTJ personality type, followed by ENTJ (15) and INTJ (seven). An analysis of MRC respondents provided a similar outcome as the majority of respondents (14 participants) were classified as belonging to the ESTJ personality type, followed by ENTJ (nine) and INTJ (six). Overall the ESTJ personality is described as: 'Quick to take action on decisions as long as they are directly applicable and practical. Born organizers and doers of just getting things done. Seek no-nonsense approaches to steam-rolling toward their biggest goals in the most sensible way available. They absolutely love handling the routine details in life. They work to clear, logical, and very objective values when it comes to completing tasks. They also hold these highly

rigid standards to others and can be relatively assertive when it comes to compliance with their ideas' (Stephenson 2012, 55). Although the INTJ was already highlighted in the previous chapter, Stephenson (2012, 64) describes ENTJ as: 'These people are quick to lead and would not hesitate to let others know what's going on. They are eagle-eyed when it comes to pointing out inefficiencies in processes and procedures. They excel at designing, implementing, and empowering very robust systems inside of organisations in order to resolve major issues. They are natural visionaries and long-term goal setters. They enjoy being up-to-speed in relevant information, books and general knowledge – not just to learn but to share, too. They can be rather assertive when it comes to presenting & supporting their ideas.'

Each of the four sub-categories that the Jungian/MBTI test focused on revealed the following results: extrovert (88%) and introvert (12%) in the case of al-Shabaab, and extrovert (76%) and introvert (24%) in the case of the MRC; sensing (67%) and intuition (33%) in the case of al-Shabaab, and sensing (49%) and intuition (51%) in the case of the MRC; thinking (89%) and feeling (11%) in the case of al-Shabaab, and thinking (80%) and feeling (20%) in MRC respondents; and judging (98%) and perception (2%) in al-Shabaab respondents, and judging (90%) and perception (10%) in MRC respondents. Al-Shabaab and MRC respondents presented a very similar picture, although the values differ in all categories. Extroversion refers to people who are expressive and gregarious; sensing refers to people who favour literal and empirical perception; thinking includes people who prefer objective, detailed and logical decision-making; and judging people seek resolution and order. The most dramatic difference between al-Shabaab and the MRC relates to intuition and sensing, where intuition scored remarkably higher in MRC respondents. Intuition refers to people who prefer abstract and symbolic perception. In other words, whereas individuals who scored higher on sensing are influenced by literal and empirical perception, those leaning towards intuition are influenced

by the abstract and metaphorical perception. These findings start to present two different personality profiles associated with the two different organisations: whereas, al-Shabaab can be described as an Islamist extremist organisation, the MRC is driven by a sense of being discriminated against.

While conducting interviews, a few interesting trends were identified in the manner respondents answered some of the questions. In making decisions, 86% of al-Shabaab and 85% of MRC respondents indicated that they intentionally make decisions, instead of impulsively. When asked what influenced al-Shabaab respondents when making decisions, 58% indicated obligations and thoughts (63%) based on ideas and facts (59%), as opposed to 42% who referred to intuition influenced by feelings (37%) based on ideas and beliefs (41%). The opposite was recorded in MRC respondents, who preferred feelings (67%) and intuition (51%) based on ideas and beliefs (56%) versus thoughts (33%), obligations (49%) and data and facts (44%).

Given a choice between past experiences and instinctive feelings, 76% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that past experience was more imperative than instinctive feelings (24%). In the case of the MRC the margin between past experiences (51%) and instinctive feelings (49%) was less significant.

Respondents described themselves as rational (79%) and disciplined (80%), while being driven by passion (78%), but not easy-going (20%) or emotional (21%). MRC respondents also described themselves as rational (63%), disciplined (64%) and driven by passion (56%); again the margins were less defined than in the case of al-Shabaab respondents. Based on research findings thus far, joining al-Shabaab and MRC respondents presented the decision to join these organisations as a conscious, well-thought-out decision that is influenced by past

experiences and not impulsive emotions. Deliberate decision-making is a quality both al-Shabaab (86%) and MRC (85%) respondents cherished. When respondents were asked how long the period was between introduction to and joining the organisation, 2% of al-Shabaab and 3% of MRC respondents indicated that the period was between one and 30 days. The largest number of respondents – 63% in the case of al-Shabaab and 80% from the MRC – indicated that this period was between two and 12 months, while 35% of al-Shabaab and 17% of MRC respondents indicated that this process took longer than a year. Al-Shabaab respondents (15% of the above respondents) waited even more than five years before joining.

In testing the link between narcissism and terrorism, Chapter 4 presented that ‘as people with narcissistic personality traits who need an external enemy to blame for their own weaknesses while they are drawn to charismatic leaders and terrorist organisations that nurture the us-versus-them divide’. Based on the NPI-40, a majority of 56% of MRC respondents scored between 1 and 15 on the test, which can be categorised as ‘average’, while 44% scored between 16 and 33 to resemble narcissistic personality traits. In the case of al-Shabaab, the exact opposite was noted, with a majority (56%) scoring between 16 and 33 to resemble narcissistic personality traits, and 44% scoring between 1 and 15.

In assessing how the individuals perceive the world around them, 59% of MRC respondents indicated that if they ruled the world it would have been a better place, while a minority (49%) of al-Shabaab respondents gave the same answer. Interestingly, 52% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they prefer to ‘set the standard for what is acceptable’, to 46% of MRC who gave a similar answer.

Analysing interpersonal skills, 55% of al-Shabaab and 56% of MRC respondents recognise an ability to influence others, but not to manipulate other people. This personality trait is

particularly valuable when the person needs to recruit potential members. A group, however, includes a number of roles and responsibilities, most notably leaders and followers. In analysing the leadership qualities of respondents, 70% of al-Shabaab and 76% of MRC respondents regarded themselves as good leaders, but only 45% of al-Shabaab and 49% of MRC respondents prefer to be leaders. The majority of al-Shabaab (64%) and MRC (59%) respondents like to take responsibility for their decisions. Only 46% of MRC and 41% of al-Shabaab respondents recognise an ability to read other people.

In the company respondents preferred to keep, most al-Shabaab (92%) and MRC (95%) respondents considered visionary people as 'pleasant'. When asked to decide which is worse, 79% of al-Shabaab and 71% of MRC respondents indicated that it is worse to be unfair than harsh. However, when asked to choose between truth and justice, 64% of al-Shabaab respondents decided on truth, while 59% of MRC respondents chose justice. In other words, both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents were individuals who could not remain on the sidelines, but rather took action instead of being treated unfairly. This was confirmed by answers given to the question if it is worse to dream or keep going, in which both al-Shabaab (77%) and MRC (85%) respondents indicated that it is worse to dream. In spite of this, the two groups are driven by two very different objectives: MRC members are driven by justice for people in the coastal region, while al-Shabaab members are driven by what they interpret as the truth or a religious conviction.

Respondents can also be categorised as determined, always knowing what they are doing (93% of al-Shabaab and 90% of MRC respondents). Both al-Shabaab (75%) and MRC (76%) respondents considered it more important to be 'set in their ideas' and describe themselves (80% of al-Shabaab and 73% of MRC respondents) as a 'brick wall'. When asked whether other people are judged based on rules or context, a small majority (51%) of al-Shabaab

respondents referred to context, whereas MRC respondents who preferred context were slightly higher (59%). The question, however, is: what will the person do when he or she is not successful? Considering that 53% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they would never be satisfied until they got what they deserve, only 37% of MRC respondents felt as strongly. It is important to note that respondents who provided a clear and assertive answer of 'never being satisfied' referred to 'we' (with the organisation in mind) instead of referring to 'I'. In a control question in which interviewees were asked if he or she insisted on respect, both al-Shabaab (40%) and MRC (29%) respondents answered in the affirmative. A possible conclusion drawn from these two very different pictures is that, for many, the individual is less important than the group he or she is part of, confirming (as discussed in Chapter 2) that the extent to which a person identifies with the group will have a direct impact on socialisation and solidarity within the group. This specifically refers to group identification presented in Chapter 4, in that individual members perceive the group as an extension of themselves and impel themselves to remain in direct contact with the other members and to adhere to the group's standards.

It is clear from this analysis that the personal profiles of al-Shabaab and MRC respondents are different. Being driven by two very different objectives within the same country, the preliminary conclusion is that there is evidence of a group personality based on the fact that the majority of respondents interviewed presented very similar personalities. A possible explanation might be that individuals with similar personalities were drawn to, or found a common acceptance with others, they share a commonality with, while recognising the different roles and responsibilities within a single group.

4.1 Role of the family in radicalisation

Within the sample group, 18% of al-Shabaab and 31% of MRC respondents grew up without a father, while 16% of al-Shabaab and 20% of MRC respondents grew up without a mother. In the case of al-Shabaab, 11 respondents grew up without both parents present. What is particularly telling is the age of the respondent lost his or her father and mother respectively: in the case of al-Shabaab, 19% lost their father and 13% their mother when they were younger than five, 81% lost their father and 40% their mother between the ages of 16 and 18, while 47% lost their mother between 19 and 20. In the case of the MRC, 17% lost their father when they were younger than five, 75% lost their father and 75% their mother between 16 and 18, while 8% lost their father and 25% their mother between 19 and 20. Most al-Shabaab and MRC respondents lost a parent(s) between early adolescence and early adulthood, at a time individuals are particularly vulnerable to a loss of this magnitude.

In one of the most traumatic examples, Mugisha Mahmood, in an interview with Joan Kagezi and myself on 1 August 2013 at Luzira prison outside Kampala, explained that his mother left the family when he was eight, followed by his father, who passed away when he was nine. Before these tragic events, his father and mother constantly fought because his father claimed that Mugisha was not his son. Mugisha was the youngest of four children. His aunt (on his father's side) stepped in and took Mugisha to live with her in an attempt to save his parents' marriage, but while he stayed with her, his relatives abused him. Not being able to stay, he moved back to his parents' house where his older sister took care of him (at this stage his father had passed away and his mother had left). His parents never accepted him and due to a lack in stability he left primary school at 14. Although he grew up in a Christian household, he converted to Islam six years before joining al-Shabaab. Before joining, Mugisha studied at a Qur'an memorisation centre in Mulago, Kampala, where he completed his Islamic studies at

the age of 22. At 23 Mugisha officially joined al-Shabaab. Mugisha put the period between first introduction (when he was approached by al-Shabaab) and joining at four years. Although his personal history is relevant to the entire chapter, what is important at this particular point is that not being accepted in his family had led to a need to belong and to be accepted. Mugisha found this in al-Shabaab and rated his sense of belonging when joining at 8 and while being a member at 10 (the highest level of belonging). The organisation became his family (when asked who is 'us' he indicated al-Shabaab) against 'them', who he indicated as other religions. Considering his early history of rejection, it is no surprise that Mugisha was willing to go the extra mile for his new family – although not confirmed, Mugisha was supposed to be the third suicide bomber in the Kampala attacks on 11 July 2010.

The majority of respondents interviewed had a father (82% in al-Shabaab and 69% in the MRC) and mother (84% in al-Shabaab and 80% in the MRC) present in their lives. It is, however, through individual stories, such as Mugisha's, that one realises that each radicalised person has his or her own story. For analytical purposes one cannot pause at each of them, but that is not to say that the stories do not exist or are not important.

To assess the relationship a person had with his/her parents while growing up, respondents were asked which parent had taken the lead in making the rules in the family, who had punished the respondent and what type of punishment the person had received. Respondents were also asked to indicate how severe this punishment was and how involved his or her parent was while growing up in an attempt to assess parental type. In al-Shabaab families where both parents were present, the father made the rules in 100% of the cases. It is particularly interesting that where a father was absent the mother made the rules in the house in only three cases, while a male relative made the rules most of the time. The three cases where the mother made the rules in the family were the only time a female was 'permitted' to

make the rules overall. This is telling of a very conservative society. In the case of the MRC, the mother made the rules in the household in all cases where the father was absent, with the exception of two cases where an older sibling stepped in.

A similar trend was also noted in the person who was responsible for punishing respondents. Among al-Shabaab respondents fathers took the primary, almost exclusive, lead – in only two cases where both parents were present did the mother play a role. In one of these examples both parents punished the particular respondent and, in the other, the respondent was female (punished by the mother). Among MRC respondents, mothers played a slightly more prominent role where both parents were present: fathers took the lead (47%), followed by mothers (34%), both parents (8%) and older siblings (11%). Based on the theory presented by Hess and Torney (2009) as presented in Chapter 2, the prominent role a father figure played have a direct impact in the level of respondents interest in politics and therefore become an active role player in the political socialisation process.

Regarding the type of punishment, 73% of al-Shabaab and 71% of MRC respondents indicated that they were physically punished, 14% of al-Shabaab and 11% of MRC respondents were emotionally punished, and 13% of al-Shabaab and 18% of MRC respondents were not punished at all (permissive parents). When asked how severe this punishment was and how involved the person responsible for punishing the child was in his or her life, the majority al-Shabaab (59%) and MRC (80%) respondents indicated that severity was between 1 and 5, and 41% of al-Shabaab and 34% of MRC respondents referred to harsher punishment. In contrast, 54% of al-Shabaab referred to a lesser involvement of their authoritative figure. In four of the most severe cases respondents rated very severe punishment (between 9 and 10), but very little involvement from a parent (1 and 2). In comparison this, 31% of MRC referred to a lesser involvement of their authoritative figure.

Regarding the respondents' position in the family, 62% of al-Shabaab and 60% of MRC respondents were middle children, 26% of al-Shabaab and 11% of MRC respondents were the oldest, while 12% of al-Shabaab and 29% of MRC respondents were the youngest.

On the size of the family, the majority of respondents came from relatively small families. In the case of al-Shabaab, 68% and 56% of MRC came from families of between one and four siblings, while 28% of al-Shabaab and 39% of MRC respondents came from families of between five and nine siblings. A very small minority (4%) of al-Shabaab and MRC (5%) respondents came from families of between 10 and 14 siblings. This is in sharp contrast to the ADF discussed in the previous chapter.

Coming from smaller families had an apparent impact on the involvement of parents, especially fathers, in discussing politics with their children while they were growing up: 68% of al-Shabaab and 78% of MRC respondents discussed politics with them as children. It was not surprising that 59% of MRC respondents interviewed indicated that his or her parents were aware of their decision to join the MRC, while 21% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that a parent was aware of their decision.

Despite this, of those who did not keep his or her decision to themselves, only 24% of MRC and 11% of al-Shabaab respondents informed a parent of joining the organisation. In addition to informing their parents, MRC respondents also informed other siblings (18%) or other relatives (5%). In contrast, only 4% of al-Shabaab respondents informed another sibling. To put this analysis in context: 73% of al-Shabaab and 87% of MRC respondents informed another person. In other words, 27% of al-Shabaab and only 13% of MRC respondents kept quiet about their decision. These discrepancies can possibly be attributed to the two very different organisations. Due to the MRC's history, children were most probably politically

socialised to take up the mantle of the Coast Province from their parents. In contrast, al-Shabaab does not have a history in the area, despite the strong religious connections. In other words, the MRC is possibly more accepted than al-Shabaab, but, more importantly, the ideology behind al-Shabaab is new in the area, which requires its members to operate in greater secrecy.

In addition to relatively limited involvement from the parents in joining the MRC and especially al-Shabaab, siblings played the smallest role, introducing 7% of MRC and 3% of al-Shabaab respondents. However, only 7% of MRC and 6% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they had joined with their family. In contrast, 36% of MRC and 13% of al-Shabaab respondents recruited family members to the respective organisations. Despite this trend, it was interesting that Issa Ahmed Luyima, the head of the Uganda cell, recruited his brother when the mission was specific while sensitive at the same time (the Kampala attacks).

4.2 Role of friends in radicalisation and recruitment

The role of friends in joining the organisation was unmistakable, as friends were identified as the most active role players in introducing MRC (66%), and, to a lesser extent, al-Shabaab (38%) respondents to the organisation. Additionally, 60% of MRC and 54% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they had recruited other friends. Friends were also the biggest group that was informed by 34% of al-Shabaab and 33% of MRC respondents' decision to join the respective organisations.

The fact that the majority of respondents joined with friends testifies to peer pressure, but it also has an impact on how interpersonal relationships should be interpreted. In the first instance, 90% of al-Shabaab and 78% of MRC respondents preferred quality to quantity in

friends. This implies that a greater emphasis is placed on having a smaller circle of friends and, rather, people the person can count on. Secondly, 63% of al-Shabaab and 54% of MRC respondents considered themselves as attached to others, whereas 77% of al-Shabaab and 76% of MRC respondents indicated that they liked to do things for other people. At the same time, 76% of al-Shabaab and 66% of MRC rarely depend on others. Being willing to do ‘things’ for others should be seen in the context of the topic at hand, especially when the sense of belonging is also included. In this regard, 91% of MRC and 55% of al-Shabaab respondents rated their sense of belonging in joining their respective organisations between 5 and 10. When asked to rate their sense of belonging while being members, 100% of MRC and 87% of al-Shabaab respondents rated their sense of belonging between 5 and 10. Although both indicated an increase, al-Shabaab respondents recorded a substantial increase of 32%. In other words, over time the sense of belonging increased for most respondents.

This specifically speaks to the group dynamics within the organisation as drawing people to join the organisation with and through friends. Being part of something bigger than the individual possibly provides some part of the explanation why respondents rated their sense of belonging higher. This sense of belonging was also emphasised when respondents were asked to define ‘us’. For 84% of MRC and 68% of al-Shabaab respondents, ‘us’ referred to members of the organisation. In addition to the above 84%, 16% of MRC respondents referred to people from Coast Province at the same time as being members of the organisation. None of the respondents referred to other Kenyan nationals as part of ‘us’. Naturally, if there is ‘us’ there must be ‘them’: 52% of MRC and 30% of al-Shabaab respondents referred to the Kenyan government, while 5% of additional MRC respondents referred to a combination of government and other ethnic groups. In the case of al-Shabaab religion also played an important role in both ‘us’ and ‘them’ – this will be discussed below. As a result, clearly defined in- and out-groups exist for both al-Shabaab and the MRC.

4.3 Religious identity of respondents

Kenya is a multi-religious country based on 2009 census figures as presented in Table 2 below. Based on the figures provided in the 2009 census, Christianity is the most practised religion (84%), followed by Islam (11%).

Table 2: Religious representation

Religion	Total	Percentage
Catholic	9 010 684	23%
Protestant	18 307 466	49%
Other Christian	4 559 584	12%
Muslim	4 304 798	11%
Hindu	53 393	0%
Traditionalist	635 352	2%
Other religion	557 450	1%
No religion	922 128	2%
Unsure	61 233	0%

(Oparanya 2010, 33)

Starting with the importance of religion in respondents’ lives, al-Shabaab respondents placed their religion in the three top positions: most important (59%), very important (37%) and important (4%). MRC respondents equally regarded their religious affiliation as important: 32% regarded it as most important, 59% as very important and 9% as important. It is at this particular point important to note that, in contrast to al-Shabaab, MRC respondents came from different religious backgrounds, as 59% were Muslim, 25% Christian and 16% practised traditional beliefs. Therefore, although religious identity is important to MRC respondents, the organisation does not have an identifiable religious character. With regards to al-Shabaab, the Muslim community is predominantly concentrated in Coast and North Eastern provinces and in the Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi, where the Muslim community is in the majority. The remaining constitutes Muslim minorities living in Christian-dominated areas scattered across Kenya. The Somali and Kenyan Somali community represents the biggest part of Kenya’s

Muslim community; however, the Muslim community can increasingly be found among all ethnic groups.

Assessing whether respondents had had contact with people from other religions while growing up, 93% of MRC and 82% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they had had friends from other religions. To put this in context, 54% of al-Shabaab and 27% of MRC respondents indicated that they grew up in an area where their religion was in the minority. However, both al-Shabaab (69%) and MRC (64%) respondents remembered being discriminated against. When asked if the person could freely live out his or her religious beliefs, 83% of al-Shabaab and 69% of MRC respondents answered in the negative.

Evaluating respondents' position on religious diversity, only 21% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that religious diversity was not a 'good thing', and for the following primary reasons: there is no trust (67%), it contributes to a lack in understanding (12%), domination (11%) and it leads to violence (10%). In contrast, 49% of MRC respondents indicated that religious diversity was not a 'good thing' for the following primary reasons: there is no trust (28%), it contributes to a lack in understanding (18%) and it leads to violence (5%). In an attempt to determine the extent of exclusivity, respondents were asked if they would marry a person from another religion. The majority (96%) of al-Shabaab answered in the negative. In contrast, 53% of MRC indicated that they would marry a person from another religion. This directly speaks to respondents' willingness to accept others, of which only 27% of al-Shabaab respondents answered in the affirmative. In stark contrast, 76% of MRC respondents indicated that they accepted other religions. Most revealing is that 73% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they 'hated' other religions. This confirmed al-Shabaab's strong religious connotation, but to prove to what extent respondents perceived their religion (Islam) as being under threat, both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents were asked a series of questions

to establish respondents' threat perception. The majority (97%) of al-Shabaab respondents considered their religion to be under threat. When asked to define the type of threat, the majority (60%) classified it as physical threat, 34% regarded it as ideological, while 6% classified it as both ideological and physical. In contrast, MRC respondents referred to a threat from other ethnic groups, instead of a religious threat. This will be discussed below.

In categorising the origin of this perception of a threat, the majority of al-Shabaab respondents (49%) identified the government as the source of the threat, followed by other religions (24%), an external enemy (18%) and a combination of government and others (9%). When asked to define the intensity of this 'conflict', 74% of respondents classified it as 'ongoing' and 26% as an 'all-out war'. This relates to the perception among Muslims that they are treated as second-rate citizens; many feel they are on the receiving end of religious (Muslim) and ethnic (especially Somalis) profiling, including having problems to obtain passports.

The role of religion was again confirmed when asked why the person joined al-Shabaab, as 87% of respondents cited religion. Al-Shabaab's religious identity is, however, specific and related to their interpretation of which branch of Islam is being referred to. Kenya's Muslim community traditionally belonged to the Shafi'i school of Sunni, but, since the 1980s, Kenya witnessed the rapid growth and spread of Wahhabi Islam after the return of the Muslim students who went for religious studies in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism is a branch of Islam developed by the 18th-century Muslim theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) from Najd, Saudi Arabia. Al-Wahhab advocated purifying Islam of what he considered 'impurities' and 'innovations.' Wahhabism claims to adhere to the correct understanding of the general Islamic doctrine of Tawhid – the Uniqueness and Unity of God – shared by the majority of Islamic sects, but uniquely interpreted by Abdul Al-Wahhab. Al-Wahhab was

influenced by the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and questioned classical interpretations of Islam, claiming to rely on the Qur'an and the hadith. Wahhabism therefore dismisses Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Shafii interpretations of the hadith as impurities and innovations (Esposito 1988, 120). Al-Wahhab also condemned what he perceived as a moral decline and political weakness in the Arabian Peninsula and condemned what he perceived as idolatry, the popular cult of saints, and shrine and tomb visitations (he was actually attacking Shia Islam because of its tradition of shrine and tomb visitation). He further justified the resort to violence against fellow Muslims by making the case that non-Islamic practice followed by these groups effectively placed them outside Islam and made them into infidels (under these circumstances the rules against Muslims using violence against fellow Muslims no longer apply). As a result, Wahhabi scholars differentiate between what they categorise as 'true believers' and infidels, justifying the use of violence against other Muslims. This has led to an emphasis among Wahhabis on the practice of *takfir* (Mandaville 2007, 153 and 247). The terms 'Wahhabi' and 'Salafi' are often used interchangeably to mean ultraconservatism.

To understand the origins of extremism in Kenya, the historical origins of the Hanbali school need to be briefly referred to: Ahmad ibn Hanbal was taught by Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i, the founder of the Shafi'i school. There is therefore a direct link between the Shafi'i and the Hanbali schools. The Hanbali school derives its rulings almost solely from the Qur'an and Sunnah, which proves to be popular with groups of people wishing to return to a 'purer' Islam (the Wahhabi movement, for instance, emerged out of the Hanbali school). Additionally, during the Abbasid period (750–1258), when the Hanbali school was formed, jurists focused on the legitimacy of the government and the 'unity of the community' became an important instrument in politics. Ahmad ibn Hanbal introduced an important precedent when he placed the unity of the community over the legitimacy of the government when it comes to a conflict between these two principles: 'From now on the emphasis in the juridical theory was on the

authority of the leader (caliph) as a political symbol and the unity of the group as a human base' (Ayubi 1991, 14).

Gatsiounis (2012, 74) traced the origins of radical Islam in the region to the 1950s, when a small number of Muslim students returned after studying under Wahhabist teachers at Egypt's Al-Azhar University. It was, however, during the 1970s, in the wake of Saudi Arabia's increasing wealth, that Saudi Arabia began funding mosques, madrasas, social centres, charity groups and educational exchanges through organisations like the Muslim World League. Since then, Salafi (Wahhabi) missionaries have penetrated Muslim communities in Kenya, particularly in urban villages and marginalised rural areas, through social and economic empowerment programmes. Consequently, extremists have increasingly offered local governance structures in 'ungoverned spaces'. Therefore, through religious and other educational institutions, influenced by extremist ideals, the Muslim community is under threat from within.

In addition to this, Kenyan Muslims (especially the youth) have been influenced by extremist religious scholars to regard the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli crisis as part of a broader global campaign against Islam (Gatsiounis 2012, 78). In other words, through promoting a universal Muslim brotherhood, local Muslims began to accept political crises in other parts of the world as problems affecting all Muslims and, therefore, worthy of their involvement. At the centre of the development was the growing influence of the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam and Wahabi ideology in Kenya but also in the broader region.

One of the most successful strategies adopted by extremists is to take over the affairs of established Muslim organisations, starting with a pragmatist approach that included providing direct support to religious institutions (mosques and madrasas) in addition to social services to

local Muslim communities. In the process of adopting a domineering position, the Salafists have not been kind to anyone who opposed their takeovers, responding to such opposition with an elaborate propaganda machine that includes using the pulpit and other religious infrastructure to incite unsuspecting Muslims against their opponents. They go to the extent of infiltrating and undermining moderate Muslim organisations by invoking the Wahhabi doctrine that denounces traditional Islamic schools as being not pure (interview with Hassan Ole Naado 2012).

Through Middle Eastern financial assistance and the influx of imams and scholars from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, this ‘takeover’ strategy is gradual. This strategy often start with individuals within some mosques and smaller religious groups with the sole responsibility to identify regular visitors to the mosque and approach them with the intention of recruiting them to attend their ‘classes’. This is where new recruits undergo indoctrination through lectures presented by different scholars who subscribe to the Salafist doctrine. Through this strategy, extremists have also established cells in institutions of higher learning, particularly universities, and have also penetrated professional bodies and online discussion groups. This has led to the mushrooming of purely religious online discussions in Kenya and the East African region – the main topic being an attempt to show that certain Islamic schools of thought are wrong and not worth following. They also discuss socioeconomic issues, lack of opportunities for the ever-growing youth population, ‘injustices’ and political marginalisation meted out against Muslims by authorities, and engage broadly on the global jihadi discourses (interview with Hassan Ola Naado 2012).

These strategies have succeeded in rendering Sufis (Shafi’i), who for a long time dominated Islamic affairs in Kenya and the east coast of Africa, increasingly impotent and irrelevant in the governance of the welfare of Muslim communities. For example, in 2009, a bitter

leadership feud erupted at the Riyadhha mosque in Nairobi's Majengo area, where young faithful violently took over the management of the mosque and several income-generating ventures, thus ousting a committee of elderly people. The leader of the young people who led the Salafist 'palace coup' later went underground and resurfaced in a video sent to a local media house brandishing heavy machineguns and claiming to have joined the al-Shabaab militia group in Somalia. It is also important to note that the MYC was created at the Riyadhha mosque in 2008 (Nzes 2012, 15).

In November and December 2013, youths adopted a more direct approach when they stormed Sakina Jamia mosque in the Majengo neighbourhood in Mombasa, forcing out imam Sheikh Mohamed Idris on 29 November. Again, on 3 December, another group of youth temporarily took over another Mombasa mosque, this time the Umar Ibn al-Khattab mosque in Kisauni neighbourhood before police responded and returned control of the building to its imam (Boniface, 11 December 2013).

It is through these radical scholars, with specific reference to Ahmad Iman Ali, Sheikh Aboud Rogo and Sheikh Ibrahim Ismail (mentioned above) that the majority of respondents were radicalised. When respondents were asked to identify the most important factor that influenced their decision to join al-Shabaab, two central themes emerged: first, the manner in which government and its security forces treated fellow Muslims and their leaders (discussed below) and second, messages received from religious scholars.

In addition to motivation, the role of a religious figure in the recruitment process is also worth noticing as 34% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they were approached by a religious figure. This was the second-biggest group after friends that introduced respondents to the organisation. In contrast, none of the MRC respondents were introduced by a religious figure

or joined for religious reasons. These radical preachers, however, do not have to be directly or physically present to radicalise individuals, as a number of especially al-Shabaab and to a lesser extent MRC respondents interviewed referred to the effect videos, CDs and audiotapes of radical preachers had had on them.

It is clear from above analysis that religious identity, as presented in Chapter 3, was a central component in the radicalisation process among al-Shabaab respondents.

Another trend was that, in addition to being local – therefore not foreigners or part of the suspected Somalia expatriate or Kenyan Somali community – some of those implicated in attacks in Kenya were young people who had recently converted to Islam. For example, Elgiva Bwire Oliacha (28 years old), also known as Mohammed Seif, a Kenyan national, was arrested after the two grenade attacks on 17 and 24 October 2011 (Odula, 26 October 2011). Oliacha was found with six guns, 13 grenades and hundreds of rounds of ammunition in his house. He pleaded guilty to nine charges, including causing grievous bodily harm to two people and was sentenced to life imprisonment (*The Guardian*, 28 October 2011). What was interesting was that, according to his mother, he was brought up in a strict Catholic family and came from Busia in Western Kenya and attended schools in Nairobi (*Kenyan Whispers*, 28 October 2011).

This raised concern among the Muslim community as to the manner young people was converted to Islam. Extremists – not representing Islam – in effect manipulated new converts that were vulnerable and unable to defend themselves against the ideology of individuals with a sinister agenda. The UN monitoring group for Somalia confirmed this concern and noted that, since 2009 al-Shabaab had rapidly expanded its influence and membership to non-Somali Kenyan nationals. Some of the non-Somali Kenyans said to be fighting inside Somalia

include Juma Ayub Otit Were, Suleiman Irungu Mwangi 'Karongo' (also known as Habib), Mohamed Murithi and Ramadan Osao. In October 2011, a non-Somali Kenyan, Elgiva Bwire, was jailed for life after confessing to carrying out two grenade attacks in Nairobi (Leftie, 11 January 2012). In another example, Kenyan police officers arrested Titus Nyabiswa, a 26-year-old, in a nearby village on the Kenyan coast close to Mombasa and confiscated several firearms and hand grenades. According to information, Nyabiswa converted to Islam in the western part of Kenya before getting involved with Omar Faraj, who was allegedly involved in a bombing incident on 24 October 2012 that killed a police officer and two other suspected members of al-Shabaab after police officers raided the suspect's home in Mombasa (Kouri, 29 October 2012).

Among security officials in Kenya, newly converted Muslims are at the top of its list of possible suspects – based on the above examples it is a real concern. But among al-Shabaab respondents interviewed, only 9% converted to Islam before joining the organisation. This is, however, not to say that converts are not vulnerable to be radicalised and recruited into al-Shabaab's ranks, rather that Muslims who grew up in Islam – expected to be better informed – are equally vulnerable and should not be overlooked. Equally, treating new recruits to Islam as suspects will make them more susceptible to radical scholars and even possible recruitment to al-Shabaab.

4.4 Ethnic identity of respondents

Al-Shabaab respondents interviewed in Nairobi came from a vast number of ethnic groups; however, ethnicity was a more prevalent factor among MRC respondents (discussed below). Before getting to the ethnic identity of MRC members, a brief overview of the ethnic composition of Kenya will be presented.


Kenya's population is divided into more than 40 ethnic groups (the most prominent presented in Table 3 below) belonging to three linguistic families: the Bantu, the Cushitic, and the Nilotic. Language traditionally has been the primary characteristic of ethnic identity, in line with the theoretical framework provided in Chapter 3. Bantu-speaking Kenyans are divided into three different groups: the western group (Luhya); the central, or highlands, group (including the Kikuyu, the Kamba, and other subgroups); and the coastal Bantu (Mijikenda). Among Kenya's Nilotic speakers, the major groups are the River-Lake, or Western, group (Luo); the Highlands, or Southern, group (Kalenjin); and the Plains, or Eastern, group (Masai). The Cushitic-speaking groups include the Oromo and the Somali. The Kikuyu, who make up 22% of the population, are Kenya's largest ethnic group. Luhya is the second largest (14%), followed by the Luo (13%), the Kalenjin (12%) and the Kamba (11%). Although economic and political development has increased mobility and urbanisation among the country's inhabitants, the majority of Kikuyu live in south-central Kenya (Kiambu, Muranga and Nyeri districts), the majority of Luhya in western Kenya (Bugoma, Busia and Kakamega districts), the majority of Luo in south-western Kenya (consists of around 40 groups, each associated with an area), the majority of Kamba in east central Kenya, and the majority of Kalenjin (who include the Nandi, Kipsigis, Eleyo, Marakwet, Pokot and Tugen) are predominantly based in west central Kenya (Prinz 2008, 28–32).

Table 3: Ethnic composition

Ethnic group	Population	Predominantly based
Kikuyu	6 622 576	Central and Nairobi (estimated at 47%) and the Rift Valley (15%)
Luhya	5 338 666	Predominantly based in the Western region (80%) and 16% of Nairobi's population is Luhya
Kalenjin	4 967 328	Predominantly based in the Rift Valley (95%)
Luo	4 044 440	Predominantly based in Nyanza (estimated at 87%) and Nairobi (15%)
Kenyan Somali	2 385 572	Northeastern Province, Wajir area
Kisii	2 205 669	Predominantly based in Nyanza (95%)
Mijikenda	1 960 574	Coast Province
Meru	1 658 108	Eastern Province, Meru District
Turkana	988 592	Rift Valley Province, Turkana, Samburu, Trans-Nzoia, Laikipia, Isiolo districts
Maasai	841 622	Rift Valley Province, Kajiado and Narok districts
Teso	338 833	Western Province, Busia District
Embu	324 092	Eastern Province, Embu District
Taita	273 519	Coast Province, Taita District
Kuria	260 401	Nyanza Province, Kuria District
Samburu	237 179	Rift Valley, Baringo District
Tharaka	175 905	Eastern Province, East Meru District, Embu District and Kitui District
Mbeere	168 155	Eastern Province, Embu District
Borana	161 399	Northern Province
Basuba	139 271	Western Province, originally from the Lake Victoria islands of Rusinga and Mfangano
Swahili	110 614	Coast Province
Gabra	89 515	Northern Province
Orma	66 275	North Eastern and Coast provinces, Garissa and Tana River districts
Rendile	60 437	Eastern Province, Marsabit District, between Lake Turkana and Marsabit Mountain

(Oparanya 2010, 34–35) and Elischer (2008, 11)

Map 4: Kenyan ethnic groups



(University of Texas Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection)

Coast and North Eastern provinces are home to the Mijikenda (they include the Giriama, Digo, Kauma, Duruma, Jibaba, Kambe, Rabai, and Ribe) the Pokomo, Taita, Taveta, the Malakote and the Swahili (not referring to the language). Kenya's small ethnic minority groups, including the Borana, Burji, Garba, Orma, Sakuye and Waata, also live in these two provinces. However, over the years other ethnic groups including the Kamba, Kikuyu and Luo migrated to the coast from other regions (Makoloo 2005, 26). The economic consequences of this migration contributed to the ethnic marginalisation of the original inhabitants. Although MRC respondents interviewed included Bajun, Digo, Duruma, Gariama, Kamba, Luhya, Meru, Rabai, Shirazi, Somali and Taita, the majority of respondents came from the following ethnic backgrounds: Gariama (39%), Digo (13%), Bajun (9%) and Luhya (9%).

Al-Shabaab respondents, alternatively, included Arab-Kenyan, Bajun, Barawa, Boran, Gabra, Garre, Giriama, Jomvu, Kamba, Kauma, Kikuyo, Kenyan Somali, Luhya, Luo, Mgunya, Mijikenda, Mohonyi, Nubi, Orma, Pokomo and Swahimis. The majority of respondents interviewed came from the following ethnic backgrounds: Bajun (20%), Kikuyo (10%), Luhya (7%), Luo (7%) and Mijikenda (7%). Although a bigger pool of ethnic groups, there are remarkable similarities. One of the ethnic communities that are categorised as marginalised on both fronts is the Kenyan Somali community. Perceptions on the part of other Kenyan nationals that the Kenyan Somali community is responsible for the growing security risks in the country further contribute to marginalisation. Being visibly part of the Muslim community, despite not being in any way part of al-Shabaab, contributes to them being treated differently. Most notably, members of the Somali-Kenyan and Somali communities reported claims of racial, or, rather, ethnic, profiling and being rounded up and arrested.

The difference between al-Shabaab and the MRC is that only MRC respondents (25%) referred to ethnicity as a reason for joining. This was confirmed when respondents were asked to indicate whom they joined for: in addition to ethnic alliances (33%), 45% referred to their 'community'. When asked to explain what community they referred to, respondents indicated coastal people. Additionally, 43% of MRC respondents classified 'them' as other ethnic groups. Some respondents even specifically identified the Kikuyo and other ethnic groups in government as the 'enemy'. To make sure of respondents' ethnic identity, they were asked to rate the importance of their ethnic group: for 18% their ethnic group was most important, for 68% it was very important, and for 13% important.

Evaluating respondents' positions on ethnic diversity, 92% of MRC respondents indicated that ethnic diversity was not a 'good thing' for the following primary reasons: there is no trust

(48%), it leads to violence (24%), it leads to domination (16%), and contributes to a lack in understanding (12%).

From this analysis it is safe to reach the conclusion that ethnic identity for MRC respondents was more important than national identity, or being Kenyan. Although ethnic identity was not identified as a reason for joining, some al-Shabaab respondents still rated high on ethnic identity, as 5% indicated that their ethnic group is most important, 40% classified it as very important, 31% as important and 24% as not important. It was especially Bajun and Mijikenda respondents under al-Shabaab who rated their ethnic group as most important, serving as a link between al-Shabaab and the MRC when ethnic identity is referred to. It is important to emphasise that al-Shabaab respondents referred to their religious instead of their ethnic identity as being under threat.

4.5 Political circumstances and radicalisation

As explained earlier in the chapter, and based on the theoretical framework presented in chapters 2 to 4, prior political experiences is an important indicator of the extent to which people have trust in politicians and the political system. To put it differently, one would expect people who trust the political system to present their issues and frustration to the legal and non-violent option to influence change. Resorting to violence or the illegal option is therefore regarded as the last option.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the family serves as the first introduction where a child gets to know the political culture of his or her country. In both the MRC (78%) and al-Shabaab (68%) respondents indicated that parents discussed politics in their presence while they were growing up. Considering the important role of parents in the political socialisation

process, being politically active themselves, the parents of MRC respondents contributed to their children's later involvement in the cause of the coastal people. This confirms Greenberg's (2009, 5–6) position in Chapter 2 that in many instances adult opinions can be traced to political socialisation as a child in that 'the child is father to the man'. This is particularly relevant to basic political orientations such as identifications, loyalties and values. Remembering the Shifta war and subsequent developments surrounding the coastal people, the MRC presents the same succession agenda than before. Discussing politics possibly influenced later political participation in that 66% of MRC respondents voted before joining. In contrast, this might also explain why al-Shabaab respondents diminished political participation, considering that the ideology al-Shabaab represents is not historically embedded in Kenyan society. This is seen in 39% of al-Shabaab respondents who voted before joining, versus 66% of MRC respondents. Greenberg's theory therefore implies that the parents of al-Shabaab respondents (referred to as the first generation) played a lesser role in transferring their political orientations through socialisation to their children. Instead of parental influence, peers played a more active role as an agent of political socialisation that will be discussed later. However, trust in politicians and the political participation will also explain declining political participation.

Assessing whether respondents trusted politicians and the political system, none of the MRC and al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they trust politicians. Despite not trusting politicians, 22% of MRC respondents still believed that elections could bring change, while only 4% of al-Shabaab respondents had the same trust in the political process. When asked why respondents did not think that elections would bring change, 86% of MRC and 72% of al-Shabaab respondents did not consider elections to be 'free and fair', while 28% of al-Shabaab and 14% of MRC respondents did not recognise the political process. Among al-Shabaab respondents, those who did not recognise the political process indicated that their

religion did not allow them to participate in the political process. Additionally, when the researcher presented a statement, ‘Government only look after and protect the interests of a few’, all MRC and 99% of al-Shabaab respondents agreed with it. When asked if ‘standing up against government is legal and just’, only 4% of both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents answered in the negative.

Although some respondents had trust in the political process at some time, it is clear that, based on the answers provided, politicians and government face a serious legitimacy crisis.

4.6 Socioeconomic circumstances and radicalisation

When socioeconomic factors or reasons are mentioned, a number of scholars who consider poverty or poor socioeconomic conditions will read through the following section looking for proof that al-Shabaab and MRC respondents were driven to those organisations as a result of economic frustration. The student did not find any direct link between poverty and the reason why al-Shabaab and MRC respondents joined these respective organisations. What she did find was that uneven development and subsequent relative deprivation, as presented in Chapter 4, played a prominent role among MRC, but not al-Shabaab, respondents. To an extent, the description of the relationship between inequality and conflict, as published in the July 2006 World Development Report of the World Bank, could not have stated it better: ‘High inequality can lead to *latent social conflict*, which manifests itself through political struggles for public resources. Inequality may mean that different social groups have different interests, and the outcome of the political process through which those interests are reconciled may lead to reduce aggregate outcomes. This may happen because political processes (electoral or otherwise) seek to effect redistributions, but may do so in ways that have high economic costs. Influencing latent social conflict are factors such as *inequality, ethnic and*

linguistic fragmentation, and social distrust in government institutions' (World Bank 2006, 13) (emphasis added). These factors, in turn, directly impact on the state's ability to deal with social conflict.

As mentioned, both religion and ethnicity divide the country. As explained under ethnic composition, the most economically marginalised communities in Kenya include the Turkana in North Eastern province, the Miji Kenda and Sanye in Coast Province, the Burji in Eastern Province, the Massai and Ogiek in Rift Valley province, and Muslims in the North Eastern and Coast provinces, although Muslims are considered to be generally better off than other minorities (Makoloo 2005, 30). In Kenya, the coastal community feels economically marginalised despite the growth they see around them, leading to unmet expectations. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, it is when access is based on ethnic, cultural or even religious characteristics between the 'haves' and 'have nots' that economic conditions contribute to radicalisation and instability. The coastal region and North Eastern province are not only less developed than the rest of the country – it is also the two regions that have been traditionally Muslim (65% of MRC respondents interviewed are Muslim). In other words, what makes this uneven development more volatile is the perception that the religious divide in the country ultimately contributed to this situation. It is therefore not only a debate about development; it becomes a religious or ethnic and, eventually, a political debate. Subsequent calls for self-determination and independence from Nairobi become intertwined in religious, political and economic circumstances that are increasingly difficult to separate.

Underdevelopment is measured in terms of per capita income, the level of education and the availability of health services. Based on this model, the North Eastern province, which is almost exclusively Somali and Muslim, is still one of the most underdeveloped areas in Kenya. Although Mombasa might, on paper, give the impression of being better off than

expected, after spending time in the district evidence of relative deprivation is clearly visible. According to the Society for International Development (2004, 9) in Nairobi the top 10% of the households command about 45% of the total income while the bottom 10% command less than 2%. Nairobi, Nyanza and Rift Valley provinces seem to have the widest income inequalities. Based on this report, the following regional inequalities, presented in table 4 below were identified that facilitate marginalisation that although not always based on facts previously contributed to negative perceptions between ethnic groups. The divisions between Nairobi and communities in the North Eastern and Coast provinces serve as an example that will be presented below.

Table 4: Regional inequality

Region	Income (top 10%)	Unemployment	Access to electricity
Nairobi	45%	24%	71%
Nyanza	43%	12%	5%
Rift Valley	43%	12%	11%
Eastern Province	42%	7%	7%
Western Province	41%	28%	2%
Central Province	39%	6%	19%
Coast Province	34%	23%	19%
North Eastern	27%	35%	3%

(Society for International Development 2004, 10-13)

Claims by ordinary people that the Kenyan authorities disregard the needs of people at the coast are not unfounded, nor is it a new debate. According to Dick Foeken, Jan Hoorweg and RA Obudho, in their regional study on the Kenyan coast, the coastal region was traditionally far more developed as a trade route from the Middle East and India into the mainland. This situation changed dramatically since the 1900s:

Apart from Mombasa, no intermediate urban centres have been designated. There has not been any concerted effort or planning for the development of this part of the country by successive governments. Since Independence the centre has been dominated by up-country groups and there has been an under representation of ministerial positions given to coastal representatives. Not surprisingly, the Coast has also taken a relative marginal position in respect to the distribution of investments and services ... the Coast appears the most deprived region (Foeken, Hoorweg and Obudho 2000, 7).

Respondents were asked to identify the most important reasons for joining. While the majority of al-Shabaab respondents referred to religion (as discussed above), 6% combined religion with economic reasons, while a further 4% referred to economic reasons. In contrast, MRC respondents gave a very different picture: purely ethnic reasons were the most prevailing (25%); political reasons (21%); followed by combinations of ethnic and economic (14%), religion and economic reasons (14%); and ethnic and political (2%). A further 12% of MRC respondents (in contrast to 4% among al-Shabaab respondents) referred to economic reasons. This confirms that economic frustration linked to ethnic and political marginalisation is the driving force behind the MRC.

Although the link between economic circumstances and al-Shabaab is less defined (only 10% referred to economic reasons in any way), extremist movements have used poverty and unemployment, the growing gulf between rich and poor, inadequate government services, political corruption, and perceived government subservience to American demands to their advantage. Through providing humanitarian assistance, Islamists offer a solution: a return to core religious values would bring social justice, good government and a higher level of moral life. In summary, although the study recognises the role broad economic circumstances play in contributing to a person's susceptibility to extremism, MRC respondents were more susceptible than al-Shabaab respondents in this study.

In addition to economic and social development issues raised in this section, education or the lack thereof was identified as a crucial aspect contributing to relative deprivation in Chapter 4. Additionally, the previous chapters on the ADF and the LRA confirmed that education is an important factor that needs consideration when developing counterradicalisation strategies.

Education is key in not only securing a future, but, as mentioned before, the type of education a person receives is equally important. It is, however, on education that Muslim areas, most

notably the Coast and North Eastern provinces, feel discriminated against, especially when comparing education figures as presented in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Education figures based on the 2009 census

Province	Pre-primary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Population
Nairobi	155 936	490 314	176 837	69 345	3 138 369
Central	220 612	987 348	265 881	25 321	4 383 743
Coast	250 380	758 062	108 401	8 941	3 325 307
Eastern	257 690	1 509 526	268 751	13 645	5 668 123
North Eastern	24 383	414 541	60 133	2 431	2 310 757
Nyanza	426 046	1 513 952	309 130	18 359	5 442 711
Rift Valley	640 044	2 475 352	411 416	49 061	10 006 805
Western	271 971	1 276 295	195 918	11 016	4 334 282
Total	2 247 071	9 425 390	1 796 467	198 119	38 610 097

(Oparanya 2010, 26)

According to Mazrui (1994, 198–199) on the educational sphere, Muslims encounter inequality in the provision of essential services, facilities and opportunities. For example, in Mombasa the majority of government-sponsored elementary schools that have performed the poorest in the national examination happen to be predominantly Muslim. In contrast, Muslim schools that have performed relatively well have been predominantly privately owned (Møller 2008, 116).

In addition to the one al-Shabaab respondent who did not attend school, 72% of al-Shabaab and 75% of MRC respondents attended public school, followed by 25% of al-Shabaab respondents who attended an Islamic school. The remaining MRC respondents attended a combination of public and Islamic school (13%) and Christian school (2%). Schools should have served as an integrating tool for the majority of respondents who attended public school. As a result, the majority of both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents had contact with and friends from other religious and ethnic groups.

In addition to the type of school respondents attended, the level and duration a person attended should also be taken into account, remembering the theory that each extra year of schooling, per capita, reduces the risk of conflict by around 1%. Among MRC respondents, 67% only attended primary school, 24% secondary school and 9% studied further. Al-Shabaab respondents had a better record, with 47% only attending primary school, 45% secondary school and 8% studying further. When analysing school-leaving age, the majority of MRC (44%) and al-Shabaab (56%) respondents left school between 15 and 19 years of age, followed by 36% of MRC and 33% of al-Shabaab respondents who left school between 20 and 24 years of age. Considering that the school-going age is six years, the majority of respondents had nine to 13 years of schooling, followed by 14 to 18 years. Only 8% of al-Shabaab and 6% of MRC respondents attended school between four and eight years as they left school between ten and 14 years of age.

Of those al-Shabaab respondents who studied further, 12 decided on Islamic studies, four respondents studied electrical engineering, three studied information technology, while two studied commerce and business administration. One of the most impressive respondents studied medicine at Nairobi University, while another studied psychology at the same university, but did not finish his studies. Those MRC respondents who studied further focused on information technology, accounting and social work. Overall, al-Shabaab respondents were better educated.

The number of years a person spent at school is therefore not the most important factor in preventing later radicalisation, it is also the quality of education that determine its value in preparing a person for a career in countering unemployment. To put this differently, not being able to finish school will have an impact on the kind of opportunities or career options the

person will have in later life. Employment opportunities are determined by education, and a lack of education is the biggest cause of relative deprivation.

According to Rakodi, Gatabaki-Kamau and Devas (2000, 158), traditionally coastal people are found in all occupations but are disproportionately concentrated in unskilled and casual jobs because of their low educational levels. Up-country groups gained an early foothold in the large-scale formal sector due to their willingness to take up unskilled manual jobs. The Kikuyu came to dominate the lower grades in Mombasa Municipal Council's staff by the 1970s and are also successful traders. The Luo moved from labour-intensive professions in the port and railway sections to management and trade union posts, and the Kamba have developed woodcarving businesses. These groups are reputed to be more successful in petty trade and manufacturing than coastal people. Tending to see the city as their own, the latter resent the success of migrant groups and characterise up-country people as more aggressive, unscrupulous and grasping than themselves. In contrast, up-country people (referring to Kenyans in central and western regions), formed the perception that coastal people are unsophisticated, unprogressive and neither entrepreneurial nor hardworking. Respondents of coastal origin in the participatory poverty assessment considered themselves to be more susceptible to poverty because up-country people are single migrants or have only small families to support, while up-country people felt that they were most vulnerable because they lacked the support of local kinship networks (Rakodi, Gatabaki-Kamau and Devas 2000, 158). This discussion serves as a practical example to the section in Chapter 4 on the forming and role of perceptions in the forming of identity and stereotypes based on ethnicity (and religion) that in this case also has a geographical dimension.

Returning to the study and the potential role unemployment has on radicalisation, employment and unemployment figures among al-Shabaab and MRC respondents can be

summarised as follows: among al-Shabaab respondents 33% were employed, 50% unemployed and 17% were students at the time they joined. In contrast, 47% of MRC respondents were employed, 51% unemployed and 2% studied at the time. Regarding the type of employment, 56% of MRC and 20% of al-Shabaab respondents were employed in the unspecified low-income group (for example, petrol attendants, labourer, driver, etc.), while 26% of al-Shabaab and 19% of MRC respondents were fishermen (although it can also be classified as low-income, the number of respondents in this career justified it being a separate category). Considered to be in a better position, 33% of al-Shabaab and 25% of MRC respondents classified themselves as businessmen. A further 21% of al-Shabaab respondents were religious scholars. In addition to the employment status, respondents were given an opportunity to indicate whether their economic situation was a factor in them joining the organisation (discussed below). It is important to note that, with the exception of a few, the majority of respondents did not have the necessary education to secure better employment opportunities. One of the reasons for this situation might be access to quality education institutions as alluded to in the section dealing with education. The implications of limited education were discussed in Chapter 2, but will again be referred to in the concluding chapter.

4.7 Why and how respondents joined al-Shabaab and the MRC

The analysis above identified a number of differences and similarities between al-Shabaab and the MRC with reference to the personality and personal background of respondents, trust (or rather the lack thereof) in the political system and religious and ethnic background. The only remaining yet essential questions are why and how did respondents join the two organisations, and if there is a difference between the two organisations.

Regarding the age respondents joined: 57% of al-Shabaab and 52% of MRC respondents joined between the ages of 10 and 24. Although very close, when ages are broken down, a few interesting trends emerge: 5% of al-Shabaab respondents joined between ages 10 and 14, 17% joined between 15 and 19, and 35% between 20 and 24. Twenty-five per cent of MRC and 21% of al-Shabaab respondents joined these groups between the ages 25 and 29, followed by 20% of al-Shabaab and 14% of MRC respondents who joined between the ages 30 and 35. After 35, only 2% of al-Shabaab respondents joined, whereas 9% of MRC respondents joined, 7% among the latter even joined after 40 years of age. Implying that although al-Shabaab – in keeping with their name ‘the Youth’ – targets adolescents and young adults, there are also 43% of respondents who only joined after their 25th birthday. In contrast the MRC predominantly targets people in their 20s and older. This is also in line with its primary focus: that succession will resonate more with people who have experienced relative deprivation first-hand.

Assessing whether marital status and having children of their own at the time of joining al-Shabaab and MRC had any impact: 54% of al-Shabaab and 52% of MRC respondents were single, 42% of MRC and 41% of al-Shabaab respondents were married, 4% of each were divorced, and 2% of MRC and 1% of al-Shabaab respondents had lost their spouses at the time of joining. Although a majority of single respondents did not have children, 14% of al-Shabaab and 12% of MRC respondents had children when they joined their respective organisations. In other words, although the majority were not married at the time of joining, marital status did not have a specific impact in preventing individuals who were married and having children from joining. The small difference in marital status should also be interpreted along with the age of respondents at the time of joining, remembering that al-Shabaab attracted younger respondents.

The families of especially al-Shabaab respondents were asked to shed light on the process and changes they have noticed in the behaviour of respondents who disappeared, incarcerated or who were killed. Among the most noticeable changes: 85% became very religious, 65% isolated themselves, while 52% withdrew from older friends. Only 28% became very prescriptive to other family members as to their behaviour in what was acceptable and forbidden. Of those interviewed, 91% indicated that the person disappeared at some stage. These changes were noticed over the following periods: 3% over days to a month, 37% over two to six months, 23% over seven to 12 months, 23% over one to five years, and 14% over more than five years. In other words, the majority (63%) of family members noted changes in the behaviour of their sons/daughters, brothers/sisters and husbands within a year. Breaking this figure further down, the overall majority (37%) noted these changes between two and six months. These changes in behaviour reflect a relative short recruitment process (few months to a year). What is particularly interesting is the role a friend (41%) and a religious figure (37%) played in introducing the person (according to relatives) to al-Shabaab. As a result 72% joined with friends, 9% joined with family, and 19% joined alone. Similar trends were identified earlier in the chapter when primary respondents were interviewed.

As mentioned under religion, the majority of al-Shabaab respondents (87%) referred to religion or the need to respond to a threat to their religious identity, while a further 6% combined religion with economic reasons. Only 4% of al-Shabaab respondents exclusively referred to economic reasons. In sharp contrast, MRC respondents were motivated by a combination of ethnic, political and economic reasons as discussed under economic circumstances. Similar to the ADF in the previous chapter, some respondents who referred to economic reasons – 12% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab – thought by joining these groups, membership will become a career. This places a question mark on the ideological commitment of these individuals. In other words, if these individuals had access to other

employment opportunities they would not have joined these organisations. At the same time it also places a question mark to the success of strategies – based on a small percentage of respondents who raised employment – that by offering only employment opportunities, individuals will not join these groups.

Respondents were also asked to rate their level of frustration at the time of joining: 96% of al-Shabaab and 87% of MRC respondents rated their level of frustration between 5 and 10. Breaking this figure down among al-Shabaab respondents, 48% rated frustration levels between 5 and 7, with a further 48% placing their frustration levels between 8 and 10. With reference to MRC respondents: 54% rated frustration levels between 5 and 7, and 33% placed their frustration levels between 8 and 10, while only 13% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents reported lower frustration levels of between 1 and 4. These figures directly support the role emotion play in the radicalisation process as explained in Chapter 4. Furthermore, associated with frustration, respondents were asked to think back and select one or a combination of emotions that captured best how they felt best at the time of joining the organisation. Anger was the most common emotion among al-Shabaab respondents, followed by hatred (25%), guilt (19%) and contempt (15%). A further 6% combined hatred with anger, while 3% recalled fear. In contrast, 40% of MRC respondents referred to contempt, followed by anger (22%), hatred (18%) and guilt (18%). Only 2% of MRC respondents referred to fear. Considering the relatively high levels of guilt, respondents were asked to clarify what respondents recalled when choosing guilt. As a result, respondents recalled personal stories of letting close family and friends down and that guilt as a result made them leave for Somalia or staying in the organisation. The initial reasons for joining were, however, similar to other respondents already mentioned.

When asked to clarify or to provide additional information that finally ‘pushed’ the person to join, the majority of both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents referred to injustices at the hands of Kenyan security forces, specifically referring to ‘collective punishment’. When asked to identify the single most important factor that drove respondents to al-Shabaab, 65% specifically referred to government’s counterterrorism strategy. Comments included: ‘Government and security forces hate Islam’, and ‘All Muslims are treated as terrorists’, to more specific examples: ‘the assassination of Muslim leaders’, or the ‘extra-judicial killing of Muslims’. One respondent even referred to a specific incident (although the date was not provided): ‘Muslims were beaten badly by GSU at Makadara grounds’, while others referred to Muslims being arrested (for no apparent reason). All of these enforced the perception that government, with specific reference to its security forces (government’s representation in their day-to-day lives), hate them, leading to injustices (referred to by name) and marginalisation.

This led to discriminatory responses, further fuelling sentiments of marginalisation, as many of the arrests appear to have been discriminatory and arbitrary in nature. Even after the Paradise Hotel blast in 2002 – at a time when extremism was not well known and before the creation of al-Shabaab – local Muslim leaders feared for their community. This would provide further justification for the increasing radical faction. According to Najib Balala, the former mayor of Mombasa: ‘Harassment and intimidation [by the government] have always been there for us. Now we are already branded as second-class citizens because we are Muslims and Arabs.’ Similarly, according to the director of Muslims for Human Rights, Khelef Khalifa, police harassed Muslim residents in Mombasa in response to the attacks. Instead of pursuing the key suspects, the police arrested their relatives when they failed to arrest those directly involved in the attacks (BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 27 December 2002).

Talking to Kenyan Muslims, especially in the coastal region, one notices a growing perception of being treated as second-rate citizens. People complained and gave examples that, despite being born and regarded as Kenyan nationals, fellow Kenyans and especially police officers treat them as ‘foreigners’. Especially following growing insecurity in Kenya since the intervention of Kenyan forces in Somalia, people are told to ‘go home’, are often disregarded as fellow Kenyans at government buildings, and are arbitrarily arrested without due cause.

It is clear that strategies based on mass arrests, racial profiling, etc. proved more than once to be counterproductive. Additionally, police-led criminal justice responses to terrorism are more effective than an arbitrary and hard-handed response. One of the most prominent and recent examples occurred following the killing of three soldiers in November 2012 in Garissa. After the incident, attackers reportedly fled to the Bumula Mzuri area, resulting in an operation to pursue them. Although the incident is under investigation, according to reports, Kenyan troops retaliated by burning markets and opening fire on a school that left civilians dead, including a local chief, women and children (Mathenge and Angira, 21 November 2012). Even though the incident sparked retaliatory attacks and protests, it also opened debate on how the state should respond to a very challenging security threat. While security forces (police and military) have experienced constant threat of attacks since its intervention in Somalia, the consequences of blind retaliation is severe. Especially when fighting an often-unidentifiable enemy, who use the anonymity of the masses to hide among and to strike and then disappear, is extremely frustrating. However, lashing out against the collective is not only ineffective, it is also counterproductive as a real danger exists that those not involved in affected communities might see the need to defend themselves against the ‘other’, therefore ‘driving’ individuals to extremism.

It is, however, not only government and its security forces that treat people on the fringes of society as the ‘enemy’, but also the broader Kenyan community that is driven by an established perception that al-Shabaab only consists of Somali nationals or those who is visibly Muslim. To illustrate this, Kenyan nationals turned against and attacked Somali and Kenyan Somali nationals following the detonation of an explosive device on 18 November 2012 in Eastleigh, Nairobi. This was not the first occasion on which people retaliated. Earlier, on 30 September 2012, ordinary people attacked Somalis living in Eastleigh after a grenade attack on St Polycarp Church that killed one child and injured nine others. During this incident, at least 13 Somalis were injured and property destroyed (Boniface, 5 December 2012).

Consequently, it was not a surprise that the ‘us’ for al-Shabaab respondents referred to members of the organisation (68%) and Muslims (32%) versus ‘them’ in referring to other religions (67%) and government (30%). To al-Shabaab respondents, ‘them’ extends well beyond other religious groups in Kenya: 3% even specifically referred to Ethiopia (following its intervention in Somalia) and the US and other countries that fall in the category of being anti-Islam. One respondent categorically stated that imposed Western values finally drove him to join the organisation.

For MRC respondents ‘us’ referred to members of the organisation (84%) and a combination of organisational members and ethnic or coastal people (14%), versus ‘them’, who are the Kenyan government (52%), other ethnic groups (43%) and a combination of government and other ethnic groups (5%). Similar to al-Shabaab, MRC respondents referred to arrests and mistreatment on the part of security forces, but the vast majority specifically referred to: ‘Fighting for our tribal rights and the rights of coastal people’, ‘land grabbing on the part of government and other ethnic/tribal groups’ and ‘resource distribution’.

Reasons for joining al-Shabaab and the MRC are only one part in understanding why people get involved in these organisations; the second part deals with why a person would want to stay. In answering this question, the majority of both al-Shabaab (61%) and MRC (59%) respondents considered it their responsibility, followed by belonging (32% of MRC and 16% of al-Shabaab respondents). A further 13% of al-Shabaab and 7% of MRC respondents indicated that they stayed for the adventure, while 8% of al-Shabaab respondents referred to a combination of adventure and the sense of belonging they had experienced. The remaining 2% of both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents referred to a combination of responsibility and belonging.

Respondents were also asked if they had a regret of which 46% of MRC and 40% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that their biggest regret was that they did not recruit more members to the organisation; 42% of al-Shabaab and 33% of MRC regretted some of the tactics; 13% of al-Shabaab and 9% of MRC respondents regretted being caught; while 12% of MRC and 5% of al-Shabaab respondents regretted joining their respective organisations. These figures are in sharp contrast to the ADF and LRA. A possible explanation might be that former ADF and LRA members interviewed benefited from amnesty, while al-Shabaab and MRC respondents were still committed members. These results further emphasise the role identity plays in both groups in joining and staying, associated with belonging and responsibility. In assessing belonging, respondents were asked to rate their sense of belonging when they joined the organisation, but also while they were part of the organisation. Al-Shabaab respondents rated their sense of belonging when they joined as follows: 45% between 1 and 4, 33% between 5 and 7, and 22% at the highest levels between 8 and 10. While being members, al-Shabaab respondents rated their sense of belonging as follows: 13% between 1 and 4, 48% between 5 and 7, and 39% between 8 and 10. MRC respondents rated their sense of belonging when they joined as follows: 9% between 1 and 4, 79% between 5

and 7, and 12% between 8 and 10. While being members, MRC respondents rated their sense of belonging: none between 1 and 4, 53% between 5 and 7, and 47% between 8 and 10. Although the values differ, it is important to note that within both organisations the sense of belonging respondents experienced increased substantially the longer the person stayed in the group. Some al-Shabaab respondents explained that they rated belonging between 1 and 4 as a result of obstacles they had encountered and the dangers associated with being a member.

This confirms that the identity of the organisation becomes the identity of the individual, as presented by Post and supported by Taylor and Louis as explained in Chapter 3, in that belonging to the terrorist organisation can result in a collective identity, where individual identities are being replaced by a sense of being part of something bigger.

7. CONCLUSION

Based on the answers provided by al-Shabaab and MRC members, this part of the study can empirically state that the two organisations provided two very different profiles. Despite the geographical overlap, the two organisations are clearly driven by two different motivations: the MRC is driven by a combination of ethnic and economic reasons, while al-Shabaab's core is radical Islam. The two can meet in fighting against a 'common enemy' in the form of the Kenyan government and the politically influential ethnic groups it represents, but based purely on the answers provided by respondents, it will be a mistake to group extremists from both groups under one banner. Finding a solution to both – as well as other groups – requires a better understanding of its members and what drives the individual.

Despite these differences, al-Shabaab and MRC respondents shared basic common personality traits. Both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents confirmed an interesting trend

emerging (including the ADF and LRA) that middle children were particularly vulnerable to radicalisation. Although respondents from both organisations came from very similar family structures as most came from relatively small families, a number of important differences were noted. Firstly, more MRC (31%) than al-Shabaab (18%) respondents grew up with a father figure. This is particularly interesting since a number of practitioners the students interacted with are under the impression that growing up without a father is one of the single most important factors to facilitate later radicalisation. Secondly, more MRC than al-Shabaab respondents informed their families of joining their respective organisations. Thirdly, the parents of MRC respondents were more active in discussing politics with their children and were even aware of their child's decision to join the MRC. This refers to the active role parents played in the political socialisation process in establishing an active ethnic identity as coastal people that had a history of being marginalised by other Kenyans. In addition to peers that took over from parents – as another socialisation agent – by introducing respondents to the organisations, al-Shabaab respondents also exposed the central role religious figures played in the radicalisation process.

As mentioned earlier in the conclusion, al-Shabaab and MRC respondents leaned either to religious (al-Shabaab) or ethnic – which can be referred as a geographical – identity (MRC). This differentiation was also reflected in the reasons for joining, as well as the distinction made between 'us' and 'them' that presented clearly defined in- and out-groups. With reference to 'them', both organisations identified government. Although al-Shabaab respondents first referred to other religions and secondly to government as 'them', the majority of respondents identified the government as being behind the threat to their religion when asked if they consider their religion to be under threat and to identify the type of threat.

Government and the way it responded in the past to both al-Shabaab and the MRC is the biggest unifying factor. Political factors have pushed Muslim youth to join extremist groups as a counterreaction or retaliation to what they see as ‘collective punishment’, driven by a misguided perception that all Muslims are terrorists or potential terrorists. In addition to their religious identity, Kenyan Somalis as an ethnic group is also marginalised. As a result, a convergence of religious and ethnic identity provided a bridge between al-Shabaab and the MRC, especially within the coastal and north-eastern regions. This convergence did not start when Kenyan troops went into Somalia in 2011. Instead, ethnic marginalisation among Kenyan Somalis can be traced back to the Shifta war that gained momentum following growing economic and political marginalisation of coastal people. The role perceptions played in classifying people further fuelled marginalisation and the entrenching of in- and out-groups. At the same time it is important to remember that the MRC is multi-religious, although the majority is Muslim. Religious identity however became increasingly prominent following the anti-terrorist campaign after the US embassy bombings in 1998. As a result of its counterterrorism efforts, many Muslim youths (especially Kenyan Somalis) have ended up being arbitrarily arrested and incarcerated on suspicion that they are engaged in terrorist activities. This contributed to a form of xenophobia directed at Muslims, by non-Muslims, or at least that was the perception that was created. Furthermore, al-Shabaab was able to break through this ethnic separation, by attracting followers from other ethnic backgrounds.

Of even more concern are claims of extrajudicial killings of ‘problematic’ individuals, most notably radical Muslim scholars. The reality is however, that the ‘elimination’ or assassination of each and every leader or scholar radicalised and recruited dozens, if not hundreds, to its ranks, ensuring a new wave of radicalism and collective resolve of its members. Ultimately indicating that the elimination or threats of violence or even imprisonment are rarely effective deterrents. An effective counterterrorism policy and

strategy should appreciate the broader context in which violent actions or attacks occur and seek to meaningfully and non-violently attend to it.

It is apparent that Kenyans are tremendously divided. While diversity can be celebrated when mutual respect exists, it can also destroy a country from within, as described by al-Shabaab and MRC respondents when there is no trust with reference to both religious and ethnic differences. The biggest threat to stability in Kenya will be if extremists succeed in dividing Kenya between Muslims and non-Muslims or between the coastal people and those in Nairobi. Addressing and breaking these perceptions extend well beyond the responsibility of the police – it requires the entire Kenyan government to initiate dedicated strategies to build national identity in a country that is religiously and ethnically divided. As long as its citizens, especially those on the fringes of society, exclusively identify with an ethnic or religious identity that is perceived to be under threat, radicalisation will continue to increase.

In addition to political circumstances described above, economic circumstances – with reference to relative deprivation – played a prominent role in the radicalisation of MRC respondents. Similar to the ADF and LRA, it is important to emphasise that it was not poverty that drove respondents to the MRC, but rather evidence of inequality based on ethnicity and geographic location. Access to basic services, especially education and the quality of this education directly contributed to marginalisation to later facilitate radicalisation. Al-Shabaab respondents were however better off in comparison to their MRC counterparts in that more individuals attended secondary school – 45% versus 24%, considering that a further 67% of MRC respondents only attended primary school. This difference might also serve as a reflection to the agenda and driving force behind both organisations: whereas the MRC has a domestic agenda, al-Shabaab is driven by a radical interpretation of Islam that has an external origin where developments beyond Kenya influence its overall agenda. Despite this

observation, the student is still of the opinion that domestic circumstances directly influenced the individual's susceptibility to be radicalised and recruited. Returning to education, attention should be directed at the type and quality of education people receive. Similarly, even though the majority of both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents attended public school, the level of integration and contact with individuals from different ethnic and religious backgrounds needs attention and will be addressed in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

1. INTRODUCTION

The primary question this study hoped to answer as presented in Chapter 1 was: *To what extent can political socialisation explain the participation of individuals in terrorist organisations?* (Q1) Answering this question, the study referred to the role political socialisation agents – categorised between primary socialisation agents (family, peers, school and groups) and secondary socialisation agents (the media and political experiences) – played in the political development of members of the ADF, the LRA, al-Shabaab and the MRC. Individual characteristics, determined by personality and identity, influenced by birth order, gender, etc. were also taken into consideration. At the end, this study proved that for the ADF, the LRA, al-Shabaab and the MRC to exist, individuals had to move from the individual to the collective. In other words, transforming ‘me’ or ‘I’ to ‘us’ – a process in which political socialisation is a central component. Starting with ‘I’, multiple factors contribute to the development of ‘self’. Personality, which consists of multiple dimensions and factors, contributes to a person’s development and the choices he/she will make in life. Furthermore, individuals constantly learn and develop through socialisation. Since the focus is on joining a terrorist group – an unconventional form of political participation – political socialisation was analysed through the relevant agents. Most important was the family, school and peers. In doing so, this chapter will use the same framework used in chapters 5 to 7, starting with the personality of respondents and the influence of primary socialisation agents – the family, school and peers – in the respondent’s development.

This led to the next step in drawing on the collective: identity, or what the individual identifies with, creating groups of inclusion (in-groups) and exclusion (out-groups). All

groups discussed in this study turned away from their national identity (in other words, identifying first and foremost as Kenyan, or Ugandan), and instead moved towards their religious and or ethnic identity. Chapter 3 in part focuses on understanding how these identities are formed, and why and how it can justify violence against a perceived ‘them’. In addition to these ‘internal’ factors, external circumstances play an equally important role in leading people to join an organisation that would willingly resort to violence to protect or further the identity of the collective. Social identity, with reference to religious and ethnic identity, will be analysed in relation to national identity. It is particular in this area where the character of individual organisations was confirmed. This leads us to an assessment of the conditions that contributed to the individual’s decision to join a particular organisation. Political and economic circumstances form the core of this analysis.

The last part focuses on why and how respondents initially got involved, and later join the ADF, the LRA, al-Shabaab and the MRC. Although each organisation has already been analysed and discussed in detail, this concluding chapter aims to bring these analyses together in a comparative manner.

The analysis above contributes to answering additional questions as presented in Chapter 1, most notably: *Is there a difference in applicable factors between the different ideological frameworks? (Q2)* Furthermore, *Did these factors change over time? (Q3)* To answer these questions, this chapter will bring key findings between the respective organisations presented in chapters 5 to 7 together to add additional value in identifying the most prominent factors in the radicalisation process from a political socialisation perspective. In summary, as will be presented in greater detail below, this study concluded that each organisation presented an unique set of circumstances and reasons that facilitated radicalisation. The possibility of an overlap existed, as this study has proven, but to place exclusive emphasis on, for example,

economic development when the main cause is political frustration, ethnic or religious marginalisation, and the conduct of security forces will imply that these efforts will have limited impact. One of the most important findings of this study is that each organisation analysed – the ADF, the LRA, al-Shabaab and the MRC – has a unique character that goes beyond its geographical area and focus. This confirms the above statement that instead of adopting generic measures to prevent and combat extremism and terrorism, more time needs to be spent on the profile of the organisation, as well as the profiles of its members.

To substantiate a presumption made in Chapter 1 – that it is not possible to present a common factor to predict whether any one person is more likely to join an illegal organisation – this study can nonetheless conclude that certain useful trends were identified and will be highlighted in this chapter. Consequently, before one can start to develop counterradicalisation strategies, there needs to be a better understanding of why people join a specific organisation. This understanding should be based on empirical evidence and not guesswork, or analysis based on completely different organisations in different regions. In other words, although each study improves the overall understanding of radicalisation, counterradicalisation strategies should be tailored to address specific causes or triggers that only become apparent when more attention is paid to the type of individual and his/her reasons for joining a specific organisation in a specific country.

The last question that this study hoped to answer was: *Can one identify criteria that law enforcement and social organisations can use to identify and reach individuals at risk? (Q4)*

Based on the answers given to the first two questions, which will be clarified in greater detail below, the profiles of individuals who joined the four organisations presented interesting similarities, most notably with reference to personality type, respondents' position in the family, and the level of education. This is, however, not sufficient to claim that a person

categorised as belonging to an ESTJ personality type, or a middle-child with only a primary school education, will join a terrorist organisation. A few additional factors should be taken into account, most notably if the particular person's social identity (based on ethnicity and religion) overshadows his/her personal identity, and if that particular social identity is under threat. Furthermore, marginalisation needs to spill over into frustration and isolation of especially friends who find themselves in the same circumstances to enhance a sense of belonging beyond only ethnic and religious identity. It is at this particular point important to note that although the security apparatus of the state does not have the reach, access and authority to arrest a person manifesting these characteristics, it is especially the family and to a lesser extent social organisations that are better placed to identify individuals at risk. Following interviews with the family members of especially al-Shabaab members who disappeared, were arrested or killed, this study can empirically prove that all family members detected changes in the person's behaviour over a period of time. The follow-up question – why was nothing done to prevent the individual being radicalised from joining the group? – naturally requires attention. In answering this question, two primary factors were identified: in the first instance, the interviews were conducted in retrospect, which allowed family members to identify changes in hindsight; in the second, the level of trust between ordinary citizens and government agencies to allow family members to come forward with information places a question mark over the commitment of these individuals to the state. This is therefore indicative of the political socialisation of the family member. Not implying that this particular person is also being radicalised, or even agrees with the person being radicalised, loyalty rather rests with family or the person's religious or ethnic identity, and not national identity. Then the possibility exists that, by turning to authorities, this action will most probably result in the arrest of his/her family member and even the negative treatment the person might endure after coming forward with information.

2. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the study has no intention of presenting a new theory on political socialisation; instead, it borrows from an existing body of work. From the outset, this study supported the theory that political socialisation is a continuous process, where early lessons influence a person's predispositions, starting with the symbolic interaction school of thought on political socialisation, which explains that the individual is a product of the socialisation process. Additionally, this study draws on the cognitive, or developmental, school of thought, with specific reference to Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg's explanation that political socialisation occurs in stages. For this reason, this study did not start with when the person joined the relevant organisation, but rather included early childhood, school, friends, and ethnic and religious identity. One of the central questions that this study, and other practitioners, faced is the role economic circumstances play in conflict, as presented by the class theory of Karl Marx.

The pluralist theory contributed the most to this study through the focus it places on asking a series of questions: (a) who (b) learns what (c) from whom (d) under what circumstances and (e) with what effects. Through these questions, the effect of external (macro) factors on the individual shine a new light on the debate regarding 'push' and 'pull' factors in the radicalisation process.

3. POLITICAL SOCIALISATION AND THE INDIVIDUAL


In an attempt to prove that a direct link exists between a person's early childhood development – when identity and perception formation occur – and a later susceptibility to

radicalisation, this study specifically focused on factors that influence an individual's political participation at the psychological level.

At the beginning of the study, **personality** was presented as the filter through which the world or environment is interpreted, as well as the primary factor that influences, or even determines, political attitudes and behaviour. In other words, personality directly affects how each person will interpret their environment. The assumption was that personality might therefore be fundamental in explaining why one person might be attracted to an extremist group while another, confronted with the same external circumstances, might decide not to join.

Recognising that at the beginning of this study, Mondak et al. (2010, 104) were mentioned as caution against the assumption that people with similar personalities, who find themselves in similar circumstances, would respond in the same way. At the end of this study, based on the findings presented throughout, the similarity of personality types within organisations – based on the Jungian/MBTI – became one of the most telling findings, as summarised in Figure 5 below. Therefore, in contrast to earlier studies that attempted to identify specific personality traits, this study agree with David Long in Smelser (2007, 93) that 'a generic terrorist personality does not exist', but rather that a number of personality types proved to be more vulnerable to radicalisation than others, as described below.

Figure 1: Personality of respondents



Based on Figure 1 and on previous chapters, it is possible to identify a dominant personality type among members interviewed: the ESTJ type is represented highest in al-Shabaab, the MRC and the LRA, while the introvert version, ISTJ, represented most of the ADF respondents. Although these personality types will not be discussed again, it is interesting to refer again to the primary characteristics of the ESTJ personality type. According to Stephenson (2012, 55), the ESTJ type is ‘quick to take action on decisions as long as they are directly applicable and practical. Born organisers and doers of just getting things done. Seek no-nonsense approaches to steam-rolling toward their biggest goals. They work to clear, logical, and very objective values when it comes to completing tasks. They also hold these highly rigid standards to others and can be relatively assertive when it comes to compliance with their ideas.’ It is almost understandable why the majority of respondents were categorised as belonging to this personality type with its focus on being driven, not willing to wait and set in ideas. In the first instance, 69% of LRA, 62% of ADF, 53% of al-Shabaab and 51% of MRC respondents considered themselves as ‘assertive’. Second, 80% of al-Shabaab, 74% of LRA, 73% of MRC and 67% of ADF respondents categorised themselves as a ‘brick wall’ and set in their ideas. Not having another more acceptable – and legal – vehicle to

achieve their objectives, it goes without saying that individuals with these personality traits will be particularly vulnerable to recruitment.

In addition to the personality test, Appendix 1 also includes a basic test to determine narcissism traits. Based on this test, 62% of LRA, 56% of al-Shabaab, 44% of MRC and 38% of ADF respondents reflected narcissistic personality traits. In contrast, 62% of ADF, 56% of MRC, 38% of LRA and 44% of al-Shabaab respondents scored between 1 and 15 on the test, which can be categorised as 'normal'. It was therefore not possible to find a definitive link between narcissism and the likelihood of joining a terrorist organisation, as presented by Crayton (1983), (Akhtar 1999) and Veldhuis and Staun (2009) in Chapter 4.

It was, however, interesting that some respondents referred to 'we' in answering some of the questions in the narcissism test, with specific reference to, 'If I ruled the world it would be a better place', on which 60% of ADF, 59% of MRC, 58% of LRA and 49% of al-Shabaab respondents answered in the affirmative. As to 'I will be a success', 78% of ADF, 54% of MRC, 52% of al-Shabaab and 50% of LRA respondents answered in the affirmative. Lastly, to 'I like to set the standard for what is acceptable', 87% of LRA, 86% of ADF, 52% of al-Shabaab and 46% of MRC respondents answered in the affirmative. Referring to 'we' instead of 'I' speaks of the level to which the individual adapted to his/her social identity formed by the in-group, which will be discussed in greater detail in the latter part of this chapter.

Throughout the study other personality types of respondents were also discussed – ENTJ, INTJ and ISTJ – but not the types that were least represented in these organisations. The ENFP personality type – represented in only 1% of al-Shabaab respondents – was described by Stephenson (2012, 49) as 'very outgoing, handy with imagination, and can see the possibilities in anything in life. Able to make seemingly obscure connections amongst varying

sources of information and patterns in a quick manner. But they don't stop there as they implement with confidence. They do tend to seek loads of affirmation from other people, but are just as quick to give it right back with added support. They can act on a moment's notice and are adaptable. They can be very resourceful. Also have a firm grasp on communication skills.'

The ESFP personality type was only found in 3% of ADF respondents, and is described as 'good at stepping out on a limb, especially around other people. They are typically very friendly and can overlook a lot when it comes to judging others. They get a big kick out of enjoying life and the material wonder that enhances comfort. They are good at seeing what others around them need to enhance their lives and work while actively seeking to help. They make work enjoyable and prefer the route of common sense when it comes to getting things done. They tend to be quite spontaneous and adaptable. Have a preference of learning new skills in a group setting' (ibid, 46).

Another personality type that was not represented in the groups – with the exception of 3% in the MRC and 1% in al-Shabaab – was the ENTP personality type that Stephenson (2012, 52) describes as 'able to voice their thoughts with ease, speed, and ingenuity. They are keenly alert to their environment and are quite good at tackling new problems. Good at thinking through ideas strategically, while being able to judge their overall value and usefulness. Usually quite skilled at understanding the true intentions of others. Routine tasks and methods of work will bore them to death. They enjoy trying new ways of tackling the same old issues just to see what comes up. Can be hindered by starting, and not finishing, too many new things.' This personality type can equally find a place in organisations, especially for their abilities to recruit others and to adopt new approaches to challenges they may encounter.

In the introvert category, the INFP, ISFJ and INFJ types also deserve brief attention. Stephenson (2012, 37) describes the INFP personality type (4% of LRA respondents) as ‘visionaries and focused on the future but are dedicated to those closest to them. Their core values are deeply cherished and seek to align their environment accordingly. Curiosity is a key factor as they actively see patterns and available opportunities. Can be the deciding factor when it comes to getting ideas off of the drawing board and into the real world. They desire to empower people and help realise the dreams and potential in others. Tend to be quite flexible, resourceful, and tolerant so long as their values are not disturbed.’

The ISFJ personality type (6% of ADF, 4% of LRA and 3% of MRC respondents) is described as ‘more on the reserved side, while still being quite friendly and agreeable. Responsible and loyal to their commitments. Prefer to err on the side of perfectionism when it comes to completing tasks and supporting projects. They do put great importance on trying to get a feel for the emotions of others and even take note of important characteristics and events for those closest to them. Seek harmony and structured systems when it comes to work and home life’ (ibid, 22). Lastly, Stephenson (2012, 25) describes the INFJ personality type (7% ADF, 5% of MRC and 2% of al-Shabaab respondents) as people who ‘make it their duty to find the purpose and connections behind everything they touch and think about. Believe that relationships, goods, and random ideas fit into the big picture somehow. Tend to have a good grasp on what makes people tick and how to bring it out in them. Their values are rock-solid and are firmly planted in their core being. Will often spend a great deal of time figuring out how to better make a meaningful impact on the world. They are able to see their visions through to the realisation phase.’

Regarding the ability to read people, 58% of LRA, 47% of ADF, 46% of MRC and 41% of al-Shabaab respondents claimed that they have this ability. All of the above personality types

represented in the study are people who can be described as ‘doers’ and not necessarily ‘thinkers’. In other words, they are not willing to remain on the sidelines.

Four personality types not represented at all among the respondents interviewed were the ESTP, INTP, ISFP and ISTP personality types. The only extrovert type on this list, the ESTP personality type is described as ‘able to tolerate a lot while maintaining high levels of adaptability. Quite practical when it comes to getting things done and done efficiently. They are not stimulated or motivated by anything that doesn’t have a firm base in reality and practicality. They take a no-nonsense approach to getting things done and seek out solutions to problems with great energy. They enjoy being active with others around them and learn better through action. They are big fans of creature comforts and material goods’ (ibid, 43). Characteristics such as ‘being tolerant and only driven to take action after careful analysis of the facts are probably rarely found in terrorist organisations.

INTP personality includes people who ‘actively look for the logical connection in subjects and interests surrounding them. The routine and repetitive tasks bore them to death as they highly appreciate theory and the abstract. Tend to prefer working through ideas in their heads than through other people. Can be very quiet and reserved while maintaining reasonable flexibility. They can focus like a laser on the things that interest them beyond standard duties. Their days are full of analysis and critical questioning of everything around them’ (ibid, 40).

Being able to think critically and to question the intentions of those around them is considered one of the qualities that prevent these individuals from blindly following others, especially considering that 95% of MRC, 92% of al-Shabaab, 58% of LRA and 49% of ADF respondents prefer to be in the company of ‘visionary people’. Although it is not a fault to listen to and be influenced by others, the individual’s ability to be analytical is a crucial

characteristic. In this regard it is important to note the 79% of ADF, 58% of LRA, 44% of MRC and 22% of al-Shabaab respondents considered themselves as ‘analytical’.

The ISFP personality type includes people who ‘tend to be quiet and somewhat sensitive, but quite amiable and generous. Prefer to live in the moment than worry about the future or dwell on the past. Tend to seek environments that support their need to have high levels of latitude and control over their time and space. Their closest of family and friends are greatly cherished. They have very strong core-values that must not be disturbed. Tend to actively avoid imposing their own thoughts and beliefs on others’ (ibid, 34). A lack of concern about the future or the past, and not being driven to impose one’s own thoughts and beliefs on others, are probably the most important personality characteristics that would make joining, or influencing others to join, a terrorist organisation a less attractive aspect of this personality type. In contrast, 82% of al-Shabaab, 51% of MRC, 45% of ADF and 19% of LRA respondents are concerned about what happened in the past, while 81% of LRA, 55% of ADF, 49% of MRC and 18% of al-Shabaab respondents focus on what could happen. Furthermore, 81% of LRA, 70% of ADF, 56% of MRC and 55% of al-Shabaab respondents recognise their ability to influence others, another quality not associated with the ISFP personality type.

Lastly, the ISTP personality type describes people who are ‘reserved, highly adaptable, and effectively tolerant of others. They don’t wait around to solve problems and tackle them as soon as they appear. Good at sifting through the tons of data in life to get at the real meat of the problem and situation. They prefer to approach things from the factual and principled angle, making sure efficiency is a prime concern. They are not big fans of theory, always trying to focus on the cause and effect relationships surrounding them’ (ibid, 31). Similar to the ESTP personality type, being tolerant and able to see things for what they are will most likely lead people with these characteristics to steer clear of extremist organisations.

The majority of personality types not represented in the ADF, al-Shabaab, LRA and MRC respondents include people who rated very low on the perception category of the Jungian/MBTI indicator. Cottam et al. (2004, 21), as well as McCrae and Costa (1989, 19), describe people who rate high on perception as ‘curious, spontaneous and tolerant of disorder’. In other words, these people are flexible and adapt easily to different circumstances with a wait-and-see mentality. These characteristics can easily be interpreted as indifference, a trait that 62% of LRA, 57% of ADF, 55% of MRC and 36% of al-Shabaab respondents consider to be a fault. Additionally, the vast majority of respondents – 100% of LRA, 85% of MRC, 79% of ADF and 77% of al-Shabaab – believe it worse to dream without doing anything to rectify a wrong.

To a lesser extent respondents rated low on being guided by feelings (versus thoughts), a trait Cottam et al. (2004, 21) as well as McCrae and Costa (1989 19) describe as leading to subjective, value- or emotion-based decision-making. Such people are described as having sympathy with others and a preference to be personally attached and humane. These people are described as caring, warm and tactful. Of the respondents, 67% of MRC but only 37% of al-Shabaab, 23% of LRA and 16% of ADF respondents expressed that decisions are influenced by feelings. In contrast, 84% of ADF, 77% of LRA, 63% of al-Shabaab and 33% of MRC respondents were influenced by *thoughts* when making decisions.

Analysing these personality types should be read alongside specific answers provided in the personality and narcissism tests. Although these findings were already presented in the earlier chapters that dealt with the organisations mentioned, it is important to note that certain trends emerged across the different organisations, which require mentioning in the concluding chapter. From the onset, similar to the discussion on personality, it must be noted that personality characteristics alone do not imply that individuals with these traits definitely

would or would not join a terrorist organisation. The overall assessment is rather that personality traits play an important role in how an individual interprets the world around them.

Similarly, being driven, assertive and good leaders (characteristics found in more vulnerable personality types) equally implies that, if channelled in a more constructive direction, these individuals could have achieved great heights. However, in the absence of opportunities, people will find another way to achieve their objectives – even if this means joining a terrorist organisation.

Birth order plays not only a role in personality but was also one of the factors assessed throughout the study. As presented in Chapter 2, middle children experience the greatest feeling of not belonging, while it is also the position that socialises well with others. It was therefore not surprising that middle children had a prominent place in all four organisations, followed by the youngest in the family – especially within the LRA and the MRC. Overall, oldest children were less involved, despite attracting the second-highest number of respondents in the ADF and al-Shabaab. The average across all four organisations for middle children was 62.25%, followed by 20.5% for the youngest, and 17.25% for the oldest.

The **family** plays an essential role (whether positive or negative) throughout any person's life, but especially from being an infant until the child reaches school-going age. The family is deemed the first step in the transmission of fundamental values. Considering the extensive influence of family in political socialisation, a number of questions were asked to test its impact on respondents interviewed. Family size proves to be more of a factor in ADF than LRA, al-Shabaab and MRC respondents. As explained in Chapter 2, the greater the size of the family, the less time parents spend with each child. This has a direct impact on intellectual development, and it also affects the overall socioeconomic status of the family. Less time also

means that parental involvement decreases. The relationship between who makes the rules and who enforces these rules in the family was addressed in looking at the type of families that respondents came from.

One of the theories that was tested related to the role a mother might play in causing aggression when she also served as an authoritative figure. Authoritarian parents teach rather than punish their children, but if punishment is necessary, it is not harsh or arbitrary. Authoritarian parents are the most rigid of the three types of parents. They stress obedience and authority and do not allow verbal negotiation, which might contribute to later independence and the uniqueness of each child. In contrast, permissive parents can be psychologically controlling and manipulative, contributing to psychological problems that the child might need to face later in life.

Overall, the father – followed by the mother or both – physically punished the majority of respondents across all four organisations. It was interesting to note that the mother played almost no parenting role (either in making rules or punishment) among al-Shabaab respondents. Severity of punishment was also in good relation to the involvement of the parent in the respondent's life, although exceptions did occur in which respondents recalled being harshly punished, but where this did not correspond with constructive parental involvement. In other words, although the majority of respondents came from authoritarian parents, examples of both authoritarian and permissive parents were also found in all four organisations. It was therefore not possible to conclusively find a relationship between parenting style and the likelihood of someone joining a terrorist organisation.

These findings were, however, similar to a study of 250 West German terrorists from the Red Army Faction and the 2 June Movement. Post (1998, 28) found that 25% of the terrorists had

lost one or both parents by age 14, while 79% did not have a positive family relationship. The theory is that the absence of a parent, especially a father, plays an important role in political socialisation and possibly, later on, the radicalisation process. Feelings of abandonment or a lack of belonging, in particular, might contribute to making a young person susceptible to wanting another father figure, or the need to belong to a group where he or she will feel acceptance and a sense of belonging.

In assessing the relationship between an absent parent and joining a terrorist organisation, the results of this study regarding an absent father figure were very similar to those that Post had found in his study. Respondents across the ADF (44%), LRA (38%), al-Shabaab (18%) and MRC (31%) had grown up without a father figure. However, the majority of respondents who joined these organisations grew up with a father figure present. This is not to say that experiencing abandonment or a lack of belonging will contribute to making a young person susceptible to wanting another father figure, or the need to belong to a group to experience acceptance and a feeling of belonging. What is important to realise is that these feelings can be experienced even where both parents are present.

The study also tried to determine if family played a role in the radicalisation process (Q1). Starting with the socialisation process, the bond (or lack thereof) between parent and child plays an extremely important role in developing a person's self-esteem and identity. In other words, if there is not a strong bond between parent and child in early life, the possibility the person will carry over values and lessons to later life will be limited. Simplistic questions, such as whether the respondent's parents were aware of their decision to join the organisation, or whether their parents supported this decision, speaks to this level of trust. The overall assessment was that parents were informed and more involved in some organisations than others.

Only 6% of ADF and 11% of al-Shabaab respondents informed their parents of their decision to join the organisation. These figures increased as 24% of MRC and 26% of LRA respondents informed their parents of joining the organisation. When asked if their parents supported this decision, 3% of ADF, 21% of al-Shabaab, 24% of LRA and 59% of MRC respondents answered in the affirmative. One possible explanation for these differences relates to the history of these organisations and what they represent. Joining a banned group, such as al-Shabaab and the ADF, brought its own risks and might explain why parents were not informed. In contrast, following a parent's footsteps to take over the mantle in fighting for the rights of especially an ethnic or geographic group, might explain the person's willingness to inform their parents of his/her decision within the LRA and MRC. Chapter 2 specifically referred to transferring political antagonisms, loyalties and viewpoints from one generation to another through the family. Assessing how active parents were politically, respondents were asked if their parents discussed politics with them growing up. The parents of respondents in Uganda were considerably less politically active than those in Kenya: 41% of ADF and 44% of LRA parents discussed politics while growing up. In contrast, 68% of al-Shabaab and 78% of MRC parents discussed politics with their children. To some degree one can assume that primary political socialisation through parents – as an agent – was greater in Kenya than Uganda.

At a certain age, the school and peers take over from parents as the primary political socialisation agent. Although parents still play a role, depending on the person's relationship with his or her parents, going to **school** introduces a completely new environment (Q1). Through interaction with other groups – most notably religious and ethnic or tribal groups – the person will develop new or enforce existing perceptions of the 'other'. For this reason especially respondents were asked if they had contact with 'others' (particular attention was paid to whether ethnicity or religion was the core of the group the person joined), and whether

they had friends from the 'other' while growing up. When asked whether they had contact with people from other religious backgrounds, 100% of MRC, 97% of ADF, 88% of al-Shabaab and 88% of LRA respondents answered in the affirmative. Some 100% of MRC, 97% of ADF, 96 of al-Shabaab and 85% of LRA respondents said that they had had contact with other ethnic groups. Considering that the majority of respondents attended public school, having contact is, however, very different to having friends from other ethnic or religious groups, especially when the 'other' is later categorised as the enemy. For example, although 88% of al-Shabaab and 97% of ADF respondents had contact with other religions, al-Shabaab respondents especially indicated that only a small minority formed close friendships with Christians. The latter example speaks to the development of subgroups based on racial, religious, ethnic and social class, as presented by Dawson and Prewitt (1969, 169-170) in Chapter 2. As explained, through these subgroups, students establish their own school system that prevents members from their respective group from having meaningful contact with others. Through these subgroups and subsequently limited interaction, the positive influences of attending a mixed school are lost.

In other words, segregation at school occurs naturally as presented in Chapter 3. In a very unique trend, 27% of ADF respondents attended Christian schools while being Muslim, while 30% of ADF and 25% of al-Shabaab respondents attended Islamic schools. Similarly, attending school with other ethnic groups in the Coast region of Kenya or northern Uganda did not imply that respondents were in contact with ethnic groups they classified as the enemy; instead, these minority ethnic groups rather further confirmed the 'us' against 'them' paradigm. In other words, the political socialisation process continued and although respondents might have had contact with 'others,' these groups most probably build on perceptions of the 'other' that were established by their parents.

Friends, another primary socialisation agent, played a central role throughout the study in introducing respondents to the organisation (Q1), being informed of their (respondents') decision to join, or even joining the organisation with the respondents. Friends introduced 66% of MRC, 38% of al-Shabaab, 35% of ADF and 31% of LRA respondents to the organisation. Although the last three organisations reflected a percentage below 50%, it is important to note that friends still represented the biggest single role-player in terms of being informed of the respondent's decision to join.

Some 34% of al-Shabaab, 33% of MRC, 21% of LRA and 15% of ADF respondents informed a friend of his/her decision to join the organisation. Again, friends made up the single most important group in terms of being informed with the exception of the LRA, in which 26% (the majority) informed a parent. Lastly, 82% of MRC, 71% of al-Shabaab, 58% of ADF and 40% of LRA respondents joined their respective organisations with friends. In contrast, only 25% of LRA, 15% of ADF, 7% of MRC and 6% of al-Shabaab respondents joined their respective organisations with family members.

Respondents also indicated that they recruited other friends to the organisation: 60% of MRC, 54% of al-Shabaab, 23% of ADF and 12% of LRA as opposed to the 36% of MRC, 13% of al-Shabaab, 11% of ADF and 0% of LRA respondents who recruited family members. As a result, friends made up one of the most important political socialisation agents of this study, followed by religious leaders, in the case of al-Shabaab. These findings confirm the central role friends play in the radicalisation and recruitment process in both centralised organisations, such as those referred to in this study, and decentralised networks as found by Mark Sageman mentioned earlier in Chapter 2.

4. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE COMMUNITY

As noted, political socialisation focuses on what the individual learns, when it is learned, how it is learned, and what the personal consequences are of this process (Dowse and Hughes 1986, 190). This is a continuous process that starts with lessons learned by the family. Chapter 2 explained in great detail that basic loyalties towards racial, class, tribal, religious and geographical characteristics – to name a few – are formed by early political socialisation and transferred to the child by the family. These core identities are among the strongest and most resilient, but political socialisation also occurs on a communal level where political culture is transferred from one generation to the next.

The study has shown that in the absence of a national identity, subnational identities – based on religion and ethnic principles – are instead transferred from one generation to the next. This proves the theory presented by Robert LeVine, who found in 1963 that during the independence processes in many African countries, people were more loyal to local tribes and local government units than to newly established nation states (Dawson and Prewitt 1969, 125). Since 1963, neither Kenya nor Uganda has been able to establish an inclusive national identity beyond the brief periods of patriotism when the national team wins a football match. Although the majority of African scholars place the blame on colonialism, the inability of such countries to establish a national identity in 50 years rather reflects poor post-independence leadership.

Instead of building a new political culture, leaders sporadically drew on their own ethnic or religious identity, encouraging a new cycle of identity based on ethnic and religious association. It should therefore not be a surprise that the core of the ADF, LRA, MRC and al-Shabaab is still based on ethnic and religious identity. When asked what respondents thought

of religious and ethnic diversity, their answers did not come as a surprise: 79% of al-Shabaab, 49% of MRC, 26% of ADF and 19% of LRA respondents considered religious diversity to be negative. Similarly, 92% of MRC, 47% of al-Shabaab, 12% of LRA and 6% of ADF categorised ethnic diversity as negative. When asked if all ethnic groups are equal, 95% of MRC, 52% of LRA, 49% of al-Shabaab and 26% of ADF respondents answered in the negative. Similarly, 79% of al-Shabaab, 49% of MRC, 26% of ADF and 19% of ADF categorised religious diversity as negative. When asked if all religious groups are equal, 92% of LRA, 73% of MRC, 38% of ADF and 37% of al-Shabaab and respondents answered in the affirmative. Based on these answers, it is clear how respondents perceive diversity: al-Shabaab and the ADF emerged as having a negative sentiment about religious diversity, while the MRC and LRA referred to the unequal treatment of ethnic groups as having a negative impact on ethnic diversity.

In this regard, reference to the MRC provided valuable insight into the influence that a combination of religion, ethnicity and an attachment to a specific geographical area can have on a later generation continuing with the conflict of an earlier generation. It must be remembered that the family is where the child first learns to classify people into social categories based on ethnic or tribal affiliation, religious orientation and geographic location. In Kenya and Uganda, these first loyalties and forms of identification are the strongest and most difficult to change, not only because they are the oldest, but also because they are constantly enforced, which has a direct impact on the development of in- and out-groups.

Consequently, al-Shabaab and ADF respondents identified with their religious identity, whereas MRC and LRA respondents identified with their ethnic and geographic identity (Q2). However, joining these respective organisations was not only a means for the respondents to express their social identity, but also a vehicle to fight for their respective in-groups. To

assess this particular aspect two inter-related factors should to be present: firstly, religious or ethnic identity needs to be important, and secondly, there needs to be a perceived threat to this identity.

Starting with the importance of religion to al-Shabaab and ADF respondents, 59% of al-Shabaab and 56% of ADF categorised their religion (Islam) as most important, followed by 37% of al-Shabaab and 30% of ADF respondents who classified it as very important, while the remaining 14% of ADF and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that their religion was important. Although all four organisations included respondents who had converted from one religion to another, the impact of conversion was analysed more closely in organisations such as the ADF and al-Shabaab, where religious identity was more important. Although evidence exists – especially amongst al-Shabaab respondents – that individuals who were converted and radicalised by radical religious leaders were more vulnerable, only 9% of al-Shabaab respondents interviewed had converted before joining.

It is, however, important to note that the period between converting and joining differs considerably, as only 42% of this group converted to Islam up to a year before joining al-Shabaab. In other words, the majority (58%) had converted up to six years before joining the organisation. It is expected that those who had converted within a year before joining were most likely converted by a radical religious scholar, which means that reaching the same conclusion for the majority of respondents who converted is problematic. The conversion rate amongst ADF respondents was higher, with 22% of respondents interviewed having converted before joining the organisation. Among these respondents, 50% had converted within the year before joining, with some even indicating that they had converted and joined at the same time. In Chapter 1, it was asked whether this identity change had an impact on the political socialisation and radicalisation processes. In answering this question, political

socialisation – even among those who had converted over a longer period – had to change through the individual’s interaction with others who he or she did not have close associations with. If this change in political socialisation agent had an impact on the radicalisation process, it can be seen more accurately where conversion and radicalisation happened simultaneously or soon after one another, as with ADF respondents.

The more extreme views of al-Shabaab respondents were illustrated by the fact that only 4% indicated that they would marry someone from another religion, and 73% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they ‘hate’ other religions. In contrast, 33% of ADF respondents were willing to marry someone from another religion, while only 6% indicated that they ‘hate’ other religions. After determining that religion is important to al-Shabaab and ADF respondents, their threat perception also needs to be analysed: 97% of al-Shabaab and 77% of ADF respondents considered their religion to be under threat. Regarding the type of threat, 60% of al-Shabaab and 35% of ADF respondents classified it as a physical threat, whereas 46% of ADF and 34% of al-Shabaab respondents categorised it as an ideological threat. The remaining 19% of ADF and 6% of al-Shabaab respondents considered the threat to be both physical and ideological.

However, if there is a threat, there must be an enemy to complete the ‘us’ and ‘them’ equation, or, to put it differently, to establish in- and out-groups. Respondents were asked to indicate who was behind this threat. How respondents identified ‘us’ and ‘them’ will be analysed later in this chapter in relation to their national identity. In terms of who was behind this threat, 58% of ADF and 49% of al-Shabaab respondents identified their respective governments, while 20% of ADF and 18% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that the enemy was external. Some 24% of al-Shabaab and 11% of ADF respondents identified another religion as being

behind the threat, while 11% of ADF and 9% of al-Shabaab considered this threat to be a combination of their government and other countries or religions.

In terms of the importance of ethnicity, 23% of LRA and 18% of MRC respondents classified their ethnicity as most important, 69% of LRA and 68% of al-Shabaab respondents categorised it as very important, while the remaining 13% of al-Shabaab and 8% LRA respondents considered ethnicity as important. In contrast to the findings mentioned above, 85% of LRA and 81% of MRC respondents indicated that they would marry a person from another ethnic group. However, in contrast to religious classifications, neither MRC nor LRA respondents represented a single ethnic group. Rather, they represented a number of ethnic groups within a specific geographic area, among whom intermarriage would be more acceptable. Similar to the ADF and al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government (with respect to the MRC) and Ugandan government (the LRA) were identified as the primary enemy, followed by other ethnic groups. In contrast to religion, the MRC and LRA did not refer to an external enemy.

Consequently, social identity based on religion and ethnicity had been transformed into an organisational identity. In other words, the respective organisations represented the interest of the religious and ethnic identity, which will be discussed in greater detail under the next heading.

5. GROUPS AS AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALISATION

The manner in which a person identifies with the outside world will directly influence not only their perceptions, but also their behaviour. Chapters 2 to 4 explained that esteem-related needs – especially in feeling inadequate and blaming the ‘other’ – directly contribute to the

attractiveness of a group. In other words, ‘we’ – a collective identity that further transforms to ‘us’ against ‘them’ – replace ‘me’, or personal identity. Chapter 3 specifically explained how a person’s self-esteem could be replaced by the position of the group – based on religion and or ethnicity – the person associates with. It therefore explains why respondents referred to ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ when questions that assessed narcissism were asked. This confirms the theory presented by Simon and Klandermans (2001, 324–25) in Chapter 3 that ‘my grievances’ became ‘our grievances’.

The practical part of the study gave meaning to the social identity and self-categorisation theories presented in Chapter 3, as the study explained that religion (in al-Shabaab and the ADF) and ethnicity (in the LRA and MRC) were central when referring to in- and out-groups or ‘us’ and ‘them,’ as already discussed. Members of all four groups consist of individuals who were drawn to other members of an in-group (based on religious or ethnic affiliation) that stood together against an out-group. Although the in-group is based on religious or ethnic affiliation, the majority of respondents referred to the organisation when asked to identify ‘us’: 84% of both MRC and LRA respondents, 68% of al-Shabaab and 59% of ADF respondents. Additionally, a further 36% of ADF and 32% of al-Shabaab respondents also referred to their religion. With reference to their ethnic group, 14% of MRC combined organisational members with ethnicity, while a further 4% of LRA and 2% of MRC respondents categorised ‘us’ as members of their ethnic group, and/or people from their geographic area.

When asked to identify ‘them,’ answers varied from references to government and other religious to ethnic groups and other countries. For 92% of LRA, 79% of ADF, 52% of MRC and 30% of al-Shabaab respondents, their respective governments were classified as ‘them’. For 67% of al-Shabaab and 16% of ADF respondents, ‘they’ were identified as other religious

groups, while only 5% of ADF and 3% of al-Shabaab respondents referred to other countries. With reference to ethnicity, 43% of MRC and 4% of LRA respondents referred to other ethnic groups as ‘them’. Despite these different answers, ‘they’ referred to the best manifestation of ‘the enemy’ in the mind of each respondent.

For all respondents, social identity was paramount in influencing the person’s drive to join a particular organisation (Q2). In both the ADF and al-Shabaab, religion – in this case Islam – was central to the identity of each respondent. In contrast, MRC and LRA respondents referred to minority ethnic groups who are marginalised by those in power.

As explained in Chapter 3, when individuals join an organisation they incorporate organisational characteristics into their concept of self. The extent of this attachment will influence and determine the extent to which the individual will commit to the organisation. Referred to as ‘organisational identification,’ it relates to a form of psychological attachment in which members adopt the defining characteristics of an organisation as their own defining characteristics (Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail 1994, 242). For social or collective identity to exist, members need to belong or experience solidarity with others. In other words, when an organisation provides a distinctive culture, structure and other characteristics, individuals associated with the organisation will experience stronger organisational identification.

Assessing group cohesion and belonging, respondents were asked to rate their sense of **belonging** when first joining the group, and then again after having been a member of the group (differences between the two periods will be indicated by <, > or =). Starting with joining the organisation and the highest sense of belonging, 69% of LRA, 53% of ADF, 22% of al-Shabaab and 12% of MRC respondents rated their sense of belonging between 8 and 10 (out of 10); 79% of MRC, 33% of al-Shabaab, 17% of ADF and 15% of LRA respondents

placed their sense of belonging on the second tier between 5 and 7; while 45% of al-Shabaab, 30% of ADF, 16% of LRA and 9% of MRC respondents categorised their sense of belonging between 1 and 4, the lowest tier.

While being a member, 55% of ADF (>), 47% of MRC (>), 42% of LRA (<) and 39% of al-Shabaab (>) respondents placed their sense of belonging at the highest tier; 53% of MRC (<), 48% of al-Shabaab (>), 23% of LRA (>) and 18% of ADF (>) respondents placed their sense of belonging on the second tier between 5 and 7; while 35% of LRA (>), 27% of ADF (<) 13% of al-Shabaab (<) and 0% of MRC (<) respondents categorised their sense of belonging between 1 and 4, the lowest tier.

It is equally important to note that when asked why they stayed in the organisation, 44% of LRA, 32% of MRC, 30% of ADF and 16% of al-Shabaab respondents referred to the sense of belonging they experienced in the organisation. While 61% of al-Shabaab, 59% of MRC, 22% of ADF and 4% of LRA respondents considered it their responsibility, a further 8% of ADF and 2% of al-Shabaab and MRC respondents referred to a combination of belonging and responsibility.

The study therefore noted an increase in the sense of belonging while being a member of the organisation. This confirms the explanation given by Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail (1994, 244–248) that the longer a person is a member of an organisation and the more actively involved they are in the activities of the organisation, the more prominent the organisational identity will be to his or her personal identity. The LRA was the only group that reflected a decrease in belonging, especially at the highest tier – but as explained in detail in Chapter 6, some respondents found it difficult to take the lives of others. This can be attributed to an incomplete dehumanisation process during radicalisation.

As explained in Chapter 3, for in- and out-groups to be in conflict with another, a real or even just a perceived threat needs to exist, as explained under the previous heading. Due to political marginalisation or economic-based, relative deprivation, political power and access to resources served as the capital that in- and out-groups competed for. The individual must also attach meaning to the particular situation for him or her to respond (through the group). The study also confirms that smaller groups, whether religious and ethnic, established stronger in-group identification, experiencing the need to protect itself against a larger out-group. For example, Islam is the minority in both Kenya and Uganda, which serves as the social identity of both al-Shabaab and the ADF. Although the MRC and LRA are multi-ethnic, both groups attract smaller ethnic groups in very specific geographic locations where others present a threat. In all four groups, the government through its security forces represented the ‘other’ who was behind the threat. This study also confirms the observation made by Hector Avalos in Juergensmeyer (2005, 2) that religious conflicts are seldom about religion. Instead, it is about national territory, political leadership and other matters, framed within a religious context.

The theoretical chapters – especially Chapter 2 – also referred to secondary groups as another agent in the political socialisation process. Specific reference was made to the **media**, which can serve as ‘front’ to indoctrinate and radicalise susceptible individuals. Evidence of this was seen particularly in the dedicated communication strategy employed by both al-Shabaab and the MYC in using Internet-based channels such as blogs, Twitter and video and/or audio recordings to reach and indoctrinate potential and existing members. Considering the time spent and the relevancy of its messages, susceptible individuals changed their opinions to mirror those of the orator. It also emphasises the inability and oversight of governments to use the media to build national unity and identity following independence. Instead, the media is

often used as a platform to transmit divides, especially during elections, to harness political support based on religious and/or ethnic division.

In addition to the media, Chapter 2 also referred to **political experiences** as a socialisation agent, and also as a factor in the extent to which people will recognise and respect legitimate political processes. This will be discussed under a separate heading below.

6. RADICALISATION PROCESS AND EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Merging friends with personality, McIntyre and Platania (2009, 18) found that young people with insecure identities, driven by idealism, are particularly vulnerable to the development of an ideology and/or participation. The **age** of most respondents confirmed the vulnerability of adolescents and young adults and the risk of groupthink among friends. This contributes to their vulnerability, considering the prominent role that friends play in the radicalisation and recruitment process (already discussed): 7% of ADF, 5% of al-Shabaab and 4% of LRA respondents joined these organisations between 10 and 14 years of age; 40% of LRA, 19% of ADF, 17% of al-Shabaab and 7% of MRC respondents joined between the ages of 15 and 19; 45% of MRC, 35% of al-Shabaab, 24% of ADF and 20% of LRA respondents joined between the ages of 20 and 24; 28% of ADF, 25% of MRC, 21% of al-Shabaab and 12% of LRA respondents joined between the ages of 25 and 29; 20% of al-Shabaab, 15% of ADF, 14% of MRC and 12% of LRA respondents joined between 30 and 34 years of age; 8% of LRA, and 2% of MRC and 1% of ADF and al-Shabaab respectively joined between 35 and 39 years of age. Lastly, 7% of MRC, 6% of ADF, 4% of LRA and 1% of al-Shabaab respondents joined these groups after their 40th birthday. Based on these results, the most vulnerable period is between 20 and 34. Despite similarities, it is also clear that each organisation had a unique age profile. The most dramatic of these is the LRA, which presented a younger profile, while

the MRC manifested a somewhat older profile: none of its respondents represented the 10–14 age group, and only 7% fell in the 15–19 age group.

Radicalisation, as explained in Chapter 4, is a gradual process – therefore making it very difficult to define exactly when it happens. When respondents were asked to provide the **duration** of time between first introductions and actually joining the organisation, 27% of both the ADF and LRA, 3% of MRC and 2% of al-Shabaab respondents referred to a period between one and 30 days. About 50% of MRC, 46% of al-Shabaab, 39% of ADF and 35% of LRA respondents recalled a period between two and six months; 30% of MRC, 23% of LRA, 18% of ADF and 17% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that this period was between seven and 12 months; and 21% of al-Shabaab, 17% of MRC, 15% of LRA and 13% of ADF respondents referred to a period between one and five years. Lastly, 14% of al-Shabaab and 3% of ADF respondents indicated that the period between first introductions to actually joining the organisation was more than five years. In other words, all groups – with the exception of al-Shabaab – manifested an overall period of more than six months between first introductions and actually joining the organisation.

Becoming a radical – as explained in Chapter 4 – often involves a **role model** whom a new member can look up to in teaching him or her how to act. This person plays an important role in instilling the values that the group represents and to think and act for the collective, thereby serving as another political socialisation agent (Q1). Religious scholars and other leaders played an important role in the ‘collective conditioning’ or indoctrination process of its members. For example, 34% of al-Shabaab and 29% of ADF respondents were introduced to the respective organisations through a religious figure. Additionally, 26% of al-Shabaab respondents informed a religious leader of their decision to join the organisation. This was the second biggest group, after a friend, who was informed of respondents’ decision to join the

organisation among al-Shabaab respondents. This brings us to other active role players who introduced respondents to the mentioned organisations. As detailed in a previous section, 66% of MRC, 38% of al-Shabaab, 35% of ADF and 31% of LRA respondents were introduced by a friend, while a relative introduced 27% of LRA, 19% of ADF, 7% of MRC and 3% of al-Shabaab respondents. Additionally, the group approached 11% of LRA, 7% of both the ADF and MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents. It is at the same time important to note that 31% of LRA, 21% of al-Shabaab, 20% of MRC and 5% of ADF respondents joined these organisations on their own and without the introduction of another role player.

Emotions unmistakably played a prominent role in the radicalisation process, which is also part of the social identity and self-categorisation theories. Starting with the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ respondents were asked to identify the emotion that best describes their decision to join. The role of emotions in forming perceptions or ultimately contributing to a person’s decision to join an organisation cannot be questioned.

Anger was the most common emotion, as indicated by 43% of ADF, 34% of LRA, 32% of al-Shabaab and 22% of MRC respondents. Anger was also mentioned in combination with other emotions: 13% of ADF, 8% of LRA and 6% of al-Shabaab respondents combined anger with hatred; 11% of ADF respondents combined anger with contempt; and 21% of LRA respondents combined anger with fear. Contempt was the strongest emotion after anger, as 40% of MRC, 15% of al-Shabaab and 7% of ADF respondents referred to this emotion. Fear also extended across all four organisations as 29% of LRA, 24% of ADF, 3% of al-Shabaab and 2% of MRC recalled fear before joining their organisations. Hatred was another emotion across all four organisations: 25% of al-Shabaab, 18% of MRC, 8% of LRA and 2% of ADF respondents recalled hatred as the prevailing emotion before joining their respective organisations. Lastly, 19% of al-Shabaab and 18% of MRC respondents also referred to guilt.

These emotions – anger, contempt, guilt, fear and hatred – were presented in Chapter 4. Although the list did not include revenge or vengeance, respondents were asked if anything happened that influenced their decision to get involved or join the organisation. Based on the answers given, a large number of respondents referred to instances of injustice against members of their in-group based on religious and ethnic identity. This supports the findings of Martha Crenshaw (1992, 71–80), who identifies vengeance as the most central emotion common to both individuals and groups in driving them to acts of terrorism. This refers in particular to the desire to avenge not oneself but others, directed at those responsible for injustices.

The emotions named above are all driven by subjective perceptions and interpretations of instances of injustice or discrimination. These injustices were predominately based on political circumstances, associated with the way in which security agents dealt with a particular situation that involved members of the in-group. This supports the findings of Horgan (2006, 101–03), who explains that individual experiences of victimisation on the part of security forces are of key importance, as will be discussed under political conditions.

Frustration and the theories regarding how frustration leads to violence were discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Assessing the role of frustration in joining and being a member of the organisations discussed throughout the study, respondents were asked to rate their frustration levels at the time of joining. Some 88% of LRA, 49% of ADF, 48% of al-Shabaab and 33% of MRC respondents rated their frustration between 8 and 10 (the highest tier); 54% of MRC, 48% of al-Shabaab, 19% of ADF and 12% of LRA respondents rated their frustration levels between 5 and 7 (second tier); while only 32% of ADF, 13% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents placed their frustration between 1 and 4 (the lowest tier). Frustration cannot exist in isolation; a reason is needed for it. Two of the most prominent

reasons – religion and ethnicity – were already referred to in passing, but this section asked respondents to specifically identify the reason for joining the organisation. Firstly, referring to religion, 87% of al-Shabaab and 54% of ADF respondents referred to only religion as the main reason for joining. An additional 6% of al-Shabaab and 2% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of religious and economic reasons, and a further 6% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of religious and political reasons. Secondly, with reference to ethnicity, 25% of MRC and 19% of LRA respondents referred to only ethnicity. It is important to remember that although a further 58% of LRA respondents referred to personal reasons, the majority of these personal reasons could be categorised as ethnic reasons. Additionally, 14% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of ethnic and economic reasons, and a further 2% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of religious and political reasons. The remaining two reasons – political and economic – will be discussed below.

6.1 Economic circumstances and radicalisation

Based on Chapter 4, the practical part of the study also tried to analyse the relevance of the following two theories. Firstly, it was questioned whether a positive correlation exists between economic inequality and terrorism, referring to the theories of Tocqueville (1961) and Engene (1994) based on the internal inequality theory. Secondly, the study tried to determine whether economic development would prevent terrorism in the legitimacy hypothesis. Lipset (1963) presented that economic development that includes increased wealth, urbanisation, education, literacy, and communications is supposed to enhance legitimacy and tolerance. Associated with the spread of democracy, the theory is that development and democracy are the factors most likely to ensure stability.

One of the most common perceptions – that poverty is a cause of terrorism – was disproved by this study. Without denying that poor economic circumstances could make a person more susceptible, it must be noted that only a small minority – 13% of ADF, 12% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents – specifically referred to economic circumstances as a reason why they joined the organisation. As mentioned above, a further 6% of al-Shabaab and 2% of ADF respondents referred to a combination of religious and economic reasons, while an additional 14% of MRC respondents referred to a combination of ethnic and economic reasons.

Respondents who mentioned economic circumstances specifically referred to situations where increased economic disparities occur within identifiable ethnic, religious and geographic groups. The MRC in Kenya most prominently referred to a comparison between the economic circumstances of coastal people versus those in other parts of the country, but more specifically the discrimination they experience in comparison to outsiders living in ‘their’ region. This is the best example of how relative deprivation became a political issue and a driving factor behind frustration and radicalisation. Therefore, monitoring socioeconomic trends in preventing radicalisation will predominately be useful where there are economic disparities within identifiable ethnic, religious and geographic groups (Q4). Indicators that will be particularly useful are population growth, access to public service, uneven development, urbanisation and uneven unemployment and education opportunities – especially if these are based on religious, ethnic or any other identifiable categories. These factors will contribute not only to social conflict, but also to that country or community’s vulnerability to radicalisation.

Therefore, poverty alone does not drive people to radicalisation, although poor socioeconomic circumstances undoubtedly add to the susceptibility of individuals. An even more important factor is unequal social upward mobility based on religious, ethnical or even political

differences. The relative deprivation theory provides the best theoretical explanation for the role of economic circumstances among MRC members who listed economic circumstances. In Kenya, the apparent difference between Nairobi and the coastal region was therefore unmistakable, especially considering the contrast between the luxury of hotels and, immediately next to it, the poverty of ordinary Kenyans. In other words, poor socioeconomic conditions could bring forward individuals who have nothing to lose – in other words, replaceable foot soldiers. But, in this study, poor economic conditions alone – in a country or community where everyone is poor – do not ‘drive’ people to radicalisation or to commit acts of terrorism.

In addition to encouraging economic development, government also has the primary responsibility to provide basic services for all people, and especially to communities that are regarded as marginalised. The absence of the state in providing health care, education, infrastructure and so forth provides a void that other role players are willing to fill. Understandably, many of these non-governmental organisations, charities and even foreign governments provide valuable assistance to communities in need, and they should be allowed to continue under careful scrutiny. Governments, however, need to realise that providing these services is essentially their responsibility, and allowing others to take over this responsibility could come at a price. Since the complete absence of government allows suspect elements to potentially hijack these efforts through ‘buying’ the loyalty of ordinary people, this will have a negative impact on governmental legitimacy.

In addition to asking respondents to specifically identify the reasons they joined the organisation, they were also asked to indicate if they were **employed** at the time of joining. In the ADF, 51% of respondents were employed, 40% were unemployed and 9% were students; under al-Shabaab respondents, 33% were employed, 50% were unemployed and 17% were

students; among MRC respondents, 47% were employed, 51% were unemployed and 2% were students; and, lastly, among LRA respondents 27% were employed, 62% were unemployed and 11% were students. Being employed is, however, not the only factor to consider when assessing respondents' financial health. Respondents were also asked to indicate their profession. All LRA respondents, 75% of MRC, 46% of al-Shabaab and 45% of ADF respondents were in low-income careers, while 33% of al-Shabaab, 25% of MRC and 39% of ADF respondents indicated that they had their own businesses. Lastly, 21% of al-Shabaab and 10% of ADF respondents are religious scholars.

Creating new jobs is not the sole responsibility of government – it requires innovative thinking from ordinary people. Although government is not solely responsible, it can create an environment that encourages innovation. From offering possible tax breaks and low-interest loans to changing the mentality of future entrepreneurs at school level, much needs to be done to encourage and equip young people not only to be educated, but also to contribute to the financial stability of the country.

Education is one of the most important factors to be taken into consideration in preventing future radicalisation. Although the role of schools was already presented as a socialisation agent, education is the only way through which better career opportunities and social upliftment can be achieved – countering relative deprivation.

Regarding the level of education, the theory presented in Chapter 2 explained that the greater someone's level of education, the more engaged that person would be in conventional political participation. This also corresponded with research conducted by Collier (1999, 12), which found that each extra year of schooling per capita reduces the risk of conflict by around 1%. The reasons include that the person is better informed, has a better understanding of their

role within the political process, has the ability to express political opinions and has more at stake if the legitimate political process should fail. Based on above, the inability of respondents to stay in school and enhance their education is one of the most central factors that made them susceptible or vulnerable to later radicalisation. The majority of respondents – 79% of LRA, 67% of MRC, 66% of ADF and 47% of al-Shabaab – only had a primary school education, whereas 45% of al-Shabaab, 26% of ADF, 24% of MRC and 21% of LRA respondents reached secondary school.

At the other end of the spectrum, a very small minority of respondents – only 9% of MRC and 8% of al-Shabaab – indicated that they have received tertiary education. Influencing respondents' ability to question and actively participate in the legitimate political process, not having an education severely limited employment opportunities beyond low-paying, unskilled jobs. Those who studied further were predominately drawn to religious studies, especially Islamic studies. What is particularly interesting is that students were not required to finish school before becoming an imam or a religious teacher – some respondents only had a primary school education. In other words, madrasas and the traditional schooling system run on two very different criteria. The consequences are far reaching, as it correlates directly to the quality of education received by individuals who only attend religious schools, especially madrasas. Without questioning a person's ability to be a good follower of his or her particular religion, it must be debated how someone – placed in a position of authority – can guide others without the ability to understand other disciplines. This is particularly significant when it happens at a time in a young person's life when he or she should develop an ability to think critically. This is not to say that there is not a place for religious education, because there is, but people should have the necessary credentials to teach students about other disciplines.

The findings above support those of Berrebi (2007, 7–8), who explained that when education is religious it might encourage radical thought while only marginally increasing productive opportunities in the labour market. Consequently, although such individuals might consider themselves to be educated, they might not be able to do much with the education they received. This again contributes to the relative deprivation theory and the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Educated individuals are more likely to refer to violence to correct real or perceived injustices (frustration) since education enhances self-confidence and assertiveness. In other words, better education and encouraging young people to stay in school is the best strategy against relative deprivation, but then everyone needs to have the same opportunities, and career advancement and social mobility should be based on merit – not any other criteria.

6.2 Political circumstances and radicalisation

The discussion on political circumstances can be divided into two basic categories, namely: the broader political circumstances in Kenya and Uganda, and the way respondents interacted and experienced this process. Starting with the political character and traditions – as presented in the preceding chapters – neither country could speak of a unified national identity. Drawing on the fact that colonial powers did not respect ethnic boundaries when the country's borders were drawn, both countries, especially Uganda, experienced political turmoil since independence. This turmoil was based on ethnic and religious divisions in the country. In especially Uganda, a tradition was established that political power is attained through force, allowing a particular ethnic or religious group to receive the benefits until they in turn are overthrown, in which case the former will be on the receiving end of the wrath of the new dispensation.

Although political traditions in Kenya are somewhat different in that governments were not violently overthrown, the majority ethnic groups in central Kenya benefited more at the expense of others. Neither country has established democratic traditions to speak of, since both have either stopped holding elections, and/or prevent the registration of political parties based on its ethnic or religious background. Ultimately, a Kenya for all Kenyans or a Uganda for all Ugandan nationals does not exist – at least not in the mind of respondents interviewed.

The findings of the practical part of the study support Lia and Skjølberg (2000, 19). As set out in chapters 3 and 4, ethnic terrorism – and for that matter, religious terrorism with a domestic character – is more likely in less proportional democracies than in open proportional systems. The reason provided was that the threshold for using violence depends on whether people from different parts of society have alternative channels to express their concern and frustration, and through this influence government. All groups referred to in this study regarded violence as the only way through which it could communicate and present its opinions and interests.

Political parties based on a religion, especially Islam, are always treated with a lot of suspicion due to examples where these entities were used for ulterior motives, and also due to a lack of information and understanding. Consequently, one of the factors that has enabled Salafi preachers to successfully penetrate the social fabric of local Muslim communities is the obvious disconnect between the Muslim community and the state. In this regard, the key issue is the weakness of existing Muslim political mobilisation structures and their effectiveness in representing the frustration and interests of the Muslim community in the country. Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration is that extremists in the region have an additional advantage over moderate Muslim scholars: established regional networks that provide resources, and organisational capacity to sustain their operations. Being expansionist

in design, extremists have been successful in intimidating, marginalising and silencing moderate Muslim voices by using recruited youth to lead rebellions in mosque committees and other Muslim welfare organisations. Moderate Muslim scholars and activists, especially in Kenya, are simply being disregarded and isolated without any influence. As a result of limited capacity to mobilise, and inadequate financial resources, to threats of violence and negative campaigns against moderate Ulama, extremists have succeeded in intimidating or even silencing moderate Muslim scholars. Consequently, moderate Muslim scholars who are opposed to terrorism and support key principles of democratic culture – including recognition of human rights, respect for diversity and acceptance of secular laws – lack capacity, organisation and strategies to counter the ever-growing influence of extremists, and are, as a result, almost non-existing.

In the absence of a political party or parties able to articulate feelings of marginalisation and frustration within the framework of the law, the minority extremists become the only voice that both Muslims and non-Muslims will hear. The absence of a moderate voice, which speaks for the majority, will further fuel the perception among non-Muslims that the actions of extremists represent the entire Muslim community. This contributes to a vicious cycle of distrust and a lack of understanding on the part of non-Muslims, which is interpreted by Muslims as being treated as ‘terrorists’ and second-rate citizens, in turn leading to marginalisation and possible radicalisation.

Consequently, when respondents were asked to identify ‘them,’ 92% of LRA, 79% of ADF, 52% of MRC and 30% of al-Shabaab respondents referred to the government. Equally, when asked why respondents joined these organisations, 21% of MRC, 15% of LRA and 6% of LRA respondents specifically referred to political reasons, while a further 4% of LRA respondents referred to a combination of political and economical reasons. The role of

government, and its security forces in particular, in finally ‘pushing’ respondents to join these organisations became clear when respondents were asked to identify the most significant event or reason that drove them to join.

Martha Crenshaw (1981) in Veldhuis and Staun (2009, 26) refers to **catalysts** that accelerate the radicalisation process: a final ‘trigger’ that pushes respondents to join the respective organisations. The central theme across all four organisations was recollections of mistreatment, harassment and violence directed at the respondents’ in-group. In other words, in the attempt to prevent and combat terrorism, the manner in which it was done served to fuel a new recruitment cycle. Another unfortunate reality is that histories of mistreatment, harassment and violence are embedded in the psyche or collective identity – based on ethnicity or religion – that these organisations claim to represent. In other words, more recent experiences of mistreatment, harassment and violence only reconfirm existing perceptions.

This study, therefore, supports the observations of former secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, who identifies counterterrorism strategies as a condition conducive to terrorism when he states that ‘past cases show that governments that resort to excessive use of force and indiscriminate repression when countering terrorism risk strengthening the support base for terrorists among the general population. Such measures generally invite counter-violence, undermine the legitimacy of counterterrorism measures and play into the hands of terrorists. I therefore call on governments to avoid excessive use of force and to comply with international human rights law’ (United Nations General Assembly 2006, 7).

Although research findings were already presented on whether **parents discussed politics** with their children growing up, brief reference is needed to place in context respondents’ perceptions and their level of political participation before joining organisations. The theory

presented by Langton and Karns (1969, 146) in Chapter 2, that growing up in families where politics are discussed or with parents who are interested in politics makes children more likely to see the value of participating in the political process, does not always hold water. Equally, having parents who discuss politics does not necessarily imply that these parents supported the political disposition, or even the process. Respondents can equally easily have grown up in families where parents opposed the ‘other’ based on their religious and/or political identity.

In other words, respondents followed in their parents’ footsteps – as was most probably the case with MRC respondents, whose parents experienced the Shifta war and the subsequent history of marginalisation in the coastal region. Similarly, ethnic and religious marginalisation was experienced by many since independence in both Kenya and Uganda to contribute to these organisations. While a previous section already addressed the question of parents discussing politics with their children (the respondents), this section will address how respondents experienced the political process before joining the organisation and while being part of the organisation.

Participating in elections is the accepted method to express political frustration and participating in the overall political process (Q1). Elections are therefore considered to be the easiest measurement to assess participation in the formal political process. Assessing participation in the legitimate political process, respondents were asked if they had voted in elections before joining the organisations, to which 66% of MRC, 43% of ADF, 39% al-Shabaab and 20% of LRA respondents answered in the affirmative. This was followed by a series of questions to assess respondents’ trust in the political process, as trust will lead to legitimate instead of unconventional political participation. Some 61% of ADF, 36% of LRA, 22% of MRC and 4% of al-Shabaab respondents believed that elections can bring change. Based on this question, respondents were asked what was wrong with the political system:

86% of MRC, 72% of al-Shabaab, 65% of ADF and 34% of LRA respondents indicated that the political process was not 'free and fair'. Under the more extreme component, 35% of ADF, 28% of al-Shabaab, 14% of MRC and 4% of LRA respondents indicated that they did not recognise the political process, even in the ADF and al-Shabaab, where respondents indicated that their religion did not allow them to participate in the political process, or where respondents indicated that they will not vote for a non-Muslim candidate. As a result, the study recommends that opening up and levelling the playing field would go a long way to enhance legitimacy and counter radicalisation.

However, when asked if respondents trust politicians, 29% of LRA, 14% of ADF, 1% of al-Shabaab and 0% of MRC respondents answered in the affirmative. It is clear that although there is still some hope to rescue the political process, the majority of respondents have lost their trust in politicians. This was confirmed when respondents were given a statement on which they had to indicate whether they agreed or not: 'Government only looks after and protect the interests of a few?' One hundred per cent of MRC, 99% of al-Shabaab, 92% of ADF and 84% of LRA respondents agreed with this statement.

Consequently, respondents were given another statement on which they had to indicate if they agreed or not, namely, 'Standing up against government is legal and just?' Ninety-six per cent of both al-Shabaab and MRC respondents, 80% of ADF and 65% of LRA respondents agreed with this statement. This can almost be interpreted as an ultimatum that as long as people do not see the value in participating in the political process, or do not trust politicians to represent the best interests of the populace in a way that is not based on ethnic or religious bias, the existence of these and other organisations in future is a given.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

A variety of countermeasures, involving multiple actors, are required to successfully counter radicalisation. One of the biggest mistakes that governments and security agencies make is to be guided by their own perceptions of the causes of terrorism and why individuals join these organisations, and to base their strategies on those of other countries or regions. This does not imply that countries cannot borrow from each other's successes, but it must be appreciated that each group is driven by unique domestic circumstances. More importantly, developing countermeasures based on perceptions and not empirical evidence presents its own unique challenges that directly and negatively impact on the success of these strategies. To put it differently, what drives individuals in Europe to extremism is manifestly different to what one would experience in Africa. Even two neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Uganda are faced with very different circumstances and organisations. In other words, although circumstances in one neighbouring country will impact on the other, the local dynamics in each country are still different. One of the surprises that the study encountered was that although al-Shabaab means 'the youth', its membership profile did not reflect this entirely. Consequently, dedicated strategies should to be developed to reach all age groups and not only the youth, as traditionally recognised.

Furthermore, the majority of policy makers and security officers are often very adamant that poverty and poor socioeconomic conditions are the main catalysts for terrorism generally, and also in the specific organisations presented in this study. Based on empirical evidence, this study instead proved that political circumstances and the way in which governments respond to these organisations have a far greater impact than poor socioeconomic conditions. It is therefore essential that before developing a policy or implementing any measures, policy

makers and security agencies must be more conscious of the organisation, the circumstances that led to its formation and those who joined it.

Instead, this study had the individual in mind in what drove him or her to join the ADF, the LRA, al-Shabaab and the MRC from a political socialisation perspective. Regarding the role of political socialisation agents, parents played an important role in transmitting initial opinions and perceptions of government and other ethnic groups in, especially, the MRC and LRA. The ADF and al-Shabaab provided a somewhat different picture, in that friends and religious figures played leading roles in the joining of these organisations. This is, however, not to say that parents provided the initial predisposition through early political socialisation. Notwithstanding the role player, this study unmistakably concurs with Horgan and Taylor, in Chapter 1, where respondents referred to a ‘gradual exposure and socialisation towards extreme behaviour’ that extended over a long period, even in cases where joining the organisation gave the impression of being sudden.

Another central finding of this study – in addition to political circumstances and counterterrorism initiatives – is that education is one of the central components that governments need to invest in to prevent and combat later radicalisation. It is through developing the ability to think critically and to question – enabling the person to uplift him- or herself from limited opportunities – that the cycle of increasing radicalisation will be broken.

Although some respondents still have limited trust in the political process, government officials are considered to be in a position of power to secure the interests of a few who cannot be trusted. At the core of this break in trust between government and communities – especially those at the fringes of society – are government’s security forces and their conduct towards these communities. Real introspection and dedicated strategies are needed to build

the national identity of these countries, in order to break the cycle of existing religious and ethnic divisions. None of these initiatives is instant; instead, they require real leadership with vision committed to sustainable nation building that includes all political socialisation agents.

APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Please note that the information in this questionnaire will be used in an academic study dealing with in- out-group perceptions and conflict and how people get involved in groups based on religion and ethnic division that resorted to violence.

*Information revealed in this questionnaire will be treated confidentially and will **only** be used for academic purposes.*

Please answer the questions below as truthfully as possible.

Thank you.

ADF	LRA	Al-Shabaab	MRC
-----	-----	------------	-----

Name (optional)

Surname (optional)

Age

Date of birth

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

Place of birth.....

Currently living in (name of town/city)

Marital status:

SINGLE	MARRIED	WIDOWER	DIVORCE	NEVER MARRIED
--------	---------	---------	---------	---------------

Number of children:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	--

Parents

Did you grow up with both parents present?

(1) Father

YES	NO
-----	----

If No, reason:

DIED	WORKED FAR AWAY	LEFT
------	-----------------	------

Your age your father left or passed away:

--

(2) Mother

YES	NO
-----	----

If No, reason:

DIED	WORKED FAR AWAY	LEFT
------	-----------------	------

Your age your mother left or passed away:

--

If *orphaned*, with whom did you grow up?

Growing up, who made the rules in your family?

GRANDPARENTS	FATHER	MOTHER	OLDER BROTHER / SISTER
--------------	--------	--------	------------------------

Were you punished when you did something wrong?

PHYSICALLY (corporal punishment)	EMOTIONALLY	NOT PUNISHED
----------------------------------	-------------	--------------

Who punished you?

GRANDPARENTS	FATHER	MOTHER	OLDER BROTHER / SISTER
--------------	--------	--------	------------------------

How severe was this punishment?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Relative</i>					<i>Extreme</i>				

How involved were your parents in your life growing up:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Little</i>					<i>Most</i>				

Brothers and sisters

How many brothers and sisters do you have?

Brothers: Sisters

Indicate your position in the family; position of brothers and sisters and age difference:

No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
M / F											
Age differ											

No.	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
M / F											
Age differ											

Did you grow up in Uganda/Kenya? YES NO

If Not, at what age did you move to Uganda/Kenya

Where did you grow up?

(1) Town/village:

(1) Region:

School and Education

Did you attend school?

YES	NO
-----	----

Type of school

PUBLIC	PRIVATE	RELIGIOUS
--------	---------	-----------

If religious school

<i>Type</i>	CHRISTIAN	ISLAMIC
<i>Duration</i>		

Highest school grade passed:

At what age did you leave school:

Name of school:

Town:

After school did you study further:

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, at which institution:

Field of study:

Did you complete your studies?

YES	NO
-----	----

Age

If No, did you:

WORK	UNEMPLOYED
------	------------

If work, as what?

Where:

If unemployed, did you:

	STAY AT HOME	LOOK FOR WORK
<i>Duration</i>		

Religious Background

Did your family practice religion growing up?

YES	NO
-----	----

Which religion did you belong to growing up?

CHRISTIAN	MUSLIM	TRADITIONAL
-----------	--------	-------------

Rate the size of your religion in the country, according to your perspective:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Smallest</i>					<i>Biggest</i>				

Rate the influence of your religion in the country, according to your perspective:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Little</i>					<i>Most</i>				

Growing up, did you have contact with people from other religions? YES NO

Growing up, did you have friends from other religions? YES NO

Did you attend school with people belonging to other religions? YES NO

Growing up, did you live in an area where your religion was in the minority? YES NO

If Yes, did you feel discriminated against for your religious beliefs? YES NO

Do you think all religions should be treated equally? YES NO

Do you think religious diversity in your country is a good thing? YES NO

If No, because it leads to (select the most important reason):

NO TRUST	VIOLENCE	DOMINATION BY ONE	LACK IN UNDERSTANDING
----------	----------	-------------------	-----------------------

What religion did you belong to when you joined the organisation?

CHRISTIAN	MUSLIM	TRADITIONAL
-----------	--------	-------------

Did you convert to another religion before joining the organisation?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, to which religion did you convert before joining the organisation?

ISLAM	CHRISTIANITY
-------	--------------

If Yes, how long before joining the organisation?

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS

How important is your religion to you?

Most important	Very important	Important	Not important
----------------	----------------	-----------	---------------

Will you marry a person belonging to another religion?

YES	NO
-----	----

Do you consider your **religion** to be under threat?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, what type of threat?

PHYSICAL	IDEOLOGICAL
----------	-------------

Who is behind this threat?

GOVERNMENT	EXTERNAL ENEMY	OTHER RELIGION
------------	----------------	----------------

Did you consider this threat as:

ONGOING CONFLICT	ALL-OUT WAR
------------------	-------------

Did you feel that you could openly live out your religion?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did all your friends belong to your religious group?

YES	NO
-----	----

Your overall feeling towards other religions (then)?

ACCEPT	HATE
--------	------

Tribal / Ethnic Background

To which ethnic / tribal group do you belong?.....

Rate the size of your tribal / ethnic group, according to your perspective:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Smallest *Biggest*

Rate the influence of your tribal / ethnic group, according to your perspective:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Little *Most*

Growing up, did you have contact with people from other tribe / ethnic groups?

YES	NO
-----	----

Growing up, did you have friends from other tribes / ethnic groups?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did you attend school with people belonging to other ethnic groups?

YES	NO
-----	----

Growing up, did you live in an area where your tribe / ethnic group was in the minority?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, did you feel discriminated against for belonging to your tribe / ethnic group?

YES	NO
-----	----

Do you think all tribal / ethnic groups are equal?

YES	NO
-----	----

Do you think diversity in your country is a good thing?

YES	NO
-----	----

If No, because it leads to (select the most important reason):

NO TRUST	VIOLENCE	DOMINATION BY ONE	LACK IN UNDERSTANDING
----------	----------	-------------------	-----------------------

How important is your ethnic / tribal group to you?

Most important	Very important	Important	Not important
----------------	----------------	-----------	---------------

Will you marry to a person belonging to another ethnic/tribal group?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did you consider your **ethnic/tribal group** to be under threat?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, what type of threat?

PHYSICAL	IDEOLOGICAL
----------	-------------

Who is behind this threat?

GOVERNMENT	EXTERNAL ENEMY	OTHER ETHNIC GROUP
------------	----------------	--------------------

Did you consider this threat as:

ONGOING CONFLICT	ALL-OUT WAR
------------------	-------------

Do all your friends belong to your ethnic / tribal group?

YES	NO
-----	----

Your overall feeling towards other ethnic / tribal groups?

ACCEPT	HATE
--------	------

Political Experience

Growing up, did your family discuss politics?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did you ever vote in elections before joining the group?

YES	NO
-----	----

Do you trust politicians (then)?

YES	NO
-----	----

Do you think elections can bring change (then)?

YES	NO
-----	----

If No, why?

GROUP TOO SMALL	CANNOT REGISTER PARTY	ELECTIONS NOT FREE & FAIR	NOT RECOGNIZING POL PROCESS
-----------------	-----------------------	---------------------------	-----------------------------

Government is responsible for (if more than one – 4 most and 1 less important)?

GOVERN	PROVIDE SAFETY	PROVIDE SERVICES	PROTECT RIGHTS

Government only look after and protect the interests of a few?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, standing up against government is legal and just?

YES	NO
-----	----

Period during which you joined or became involved in the organisation

At what age did you become aware that you needed to participate in the group?

--

Do you think your parents supported your decision or involvement in the group?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did you inform anyone that you plan / joined the organisation?

Grand-parents	Mother Father	Brother Sister	Uncle Aunt	Cousin	Community leader	Religious leader	Friend
---------------	---------------	----------------	------------	--------	------------------	------------------	--------

Did you join for:

SELF	FOR YOUR FAMILY	COMMUNITY	RELIGION	ETHNIC GROUP
------	-----------------	-----------	----------	--------------

Looking back, what emotion captured your decision to join best?

ANGER	FEAR	GUILT	CONTEMPT	HATRED
-------	------	-------	----------	--------

Did you work at the time you joined or got involved in the organisation?

Yes	No
-----	----

If Yes, what did you do?.....

If No, did you?

STUDY	UNEMPLOYED
-------	------------

Did anything happen that influenced your decision to get involved?

.....

.....

.....

Who introduced you to the organisation?

Self	Relative	Friend	Approached by the group	Religious figure
------	----------	--------	-------------------------	------------------

Rate your level of frustration at the time of joining the organisation:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Least</i>					<i>Most</i>				

Primary reason for joining the organisation?

Religious	Tribal / Ethnic	Economic	Political	Adventure	Personal
-----------	-----------------	----------	-----------	-----------	----------

How long was the period between first interaction and actively joining the organisation?

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS

Did you join the group with others?

FRIENDS	FAMILY
---------	--------

Did you recruit other family members to the group?

Yes	No
-----	----

Did you recruit other friends to the group?

Yes	No
-----	----

Rate your sense of belonging you experienced as you joined the organisation:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Least</i>					<i>Most</i>				

Rate your sense of belonging you experienced while being part of the organisation:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Least</i>					<i>Most</i>				

The term 'us' (then) refers to:

FAMILY	ORGANISATION MEMBERS	MUSLIM / CHRISTIAN	KENYANS / UGANDANS
--------	----------------------	--------------------	--------------------

The term 'them' (then) refers to:

GOVERNMENT	OTHER RELIGIONS	OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS	OTHER COUNTRIES
------------	-----------------	---------------------	-----------------

Thinking back, what changes would you want to make?

NOT JOIN THE ORGANISATION	NOT GET CAUGHT	RECRUIT MORE MEMBERS	CHANGE TACTICS
---------------------------	----------------	----------------------	----------------

Why would you want (wanted) to stay involved?

BELONGING	RESPONSIBILITY	ADVENTURE	FEAR
-----------	----------------	-----------	------

DIRECTIONS: Pick the answers that describe you the most accurately.¹

- 1. It's more of a fault to be too:**
(a) enthusiastic / passionate (b) indifferent / apathetic
- 2. You take more pride in your:**
(a) grounded / substantiated nature (b) creative qualities
- 3. When you make a choice, is it:**
(a) deliberately / purposely (b) hastily / impulsive
- 4. You're more influenced by your:**
(a) thoughts (b) feelings
- 5. You're more interested in:**
(a) assembling / building (b) designing / planning
- 6. At work, your desk appears to be:**
(a) orderly (b) in disarray / disorder
- 7. You prefer to live life more:**
(a) pragmatically / practically (b) philosophically / morally
- 8. What's worse, having projects:**
(a) undone (b) done
- 9. You feel it's worse to be more:**
(a) reserved / shy (b) out-going
- 10. Do you want matters:**
(a) decided and done (b) undecided and in-progress
- 11. Visionary / idealistic people are mostly:**
(a) irritating / annoying (b) pleasant / likeable
- 12. You judge other people by:**
(a) rules / decrees (b) context / circumstance
- 13. You do routine tasks:**
(a) the tried and tested way (b) a new / innovative way
- 14. In dealing with others, you're more:**
(a) detached / impersonal (b) attached / personal
- 15. You'd prefer people to be more:**
(a) level-headed (b) vision-minded

¹ Richardson 2012, 8–13.

- 16. You think rules and requirements are:**
 (a) set in stone / unchangeable (b) guidelines
- 17. You are more guided by:**
 (a) data and facts (b) ideas and beliefs
- 18. For events, you prefer:**
 (a) arranged / planned (b) impromptu / spontaneous
- 19. Common sense is more of a:**
 (a) rule (b) guide
- 20. You prefer people who are:**
 (a) judicious / just (b) creative / innovative
- 21. What's impresses you more, being:**
 (a) meticulous / disciplined (b) adaptable / easy-going
- 22. You prefer:**
 (a) structure (b) leeway / flexibility
- 23. You're more influenced by:**
 (a) logical arguments (b) emotional stories
- 24. In friendships, you'd rather have:**
 (a) quantity over quality (b) quality over quantity
- 25. You're usually more:**
 (a) resolute / firm (b) fluid / adaptable
- 26. For everyday work, you'd rather:**
 (a) talk to people face-to-face (b) send an email
- 27. You prefer work that's:**
 (a) steady and definite (b) informal and open
- 28. You're more at ease:**
 (a) after agreements (b) before agreements
- 29. You would describe yourself as more:**
 (a) rational / logic (b) innovative
- 30. When talking to strangers, you speak:**
 (a) easily (b) reserved / reluctant
- 31. In daily life, you expect:**
 (a) predictability (b) whatever happens
- 32. When with other people, you:**
 (a) start conversations (b) wait for the right moment
- 33. In making decisions, what's more comfortable:**
 (a) using logic (b) determining value
- 34. For advice, you'd rather provide:**
 (a) direct suggestions (b) subtle hints

- 35. It's better to live with:**
 (a) clarity of thought (b) strength of emotion
- 36. You tend to be more of a:**
 (a) brick-wall (b) push-over
- 37. For new electronics, you'd rather:**
 (a) read the manual (b) give it a go
- 38. It's more important to be:**
 (a) unshakeable / set in your ideas (b) loyal
- 39. The later it gets at parties, the more you:**
 (a) gain energy (b) lose energy
- 40. You want meetings to be more:**
 (a) objective / independent (b) subjective
- 41. You're generally prefer the:**
 (a) routine (b) spontaneous
- 42. For decisions, you prefer to go by:**
 (a) requirements / obligations (b) intuitions / feelings
- 43. For friends and coworkers, you're:**
 (a) up to date on things (b) out of date on things
- 44. You'd rather be more:**
 (a) systematic / logical (b) understanding / sympathetic
- 45. In being on time, you're more:**
 (a) exacting / thorough (b) approximate / estimate
- 46. It's worse to be more:**
 (a) tolerant (b) demanding / persistent
- 47. Kids these days aren't:**
 (a) applied / practical enough (b) imaginative / inventive enough
- 48. For everyday living, you prefer to be more:**
 (a) deliberate / planned (b) carefree / relaxed
- 49. When going to town, you get more pleasure from:**
 (a) buying something (b) browsing / perusing around
- 50. With dealing with others, It's harder to:**
 (a) see their perspective (b) use their talents
- 51. Should people let things happen by:**
 (a) careful choice (b) random chance
- 52. You're more:**
 (a) composed / calm (b) sympathetic/considerate

- 53. You're more interested in:**
 (a) what happened (b) what could happen
- 54. When at a social event, you interact with:**
 (a) as many as possible (b) as few as possible
- 55. You're usually more likely to figure out how:**
 (a) useful others are (b) differently others see
- 56. New and varied experiences with others:**
 (a) energizes you (b) depletes you
- 57. You prefer lessons to be more:**
 (a) straightforward (b) metaphorical / symbolic
- 58. What do you like more:**
 (a) accuracy / truth (b) fairness / justice
- 59. For usefulness, facts and data:**
 (a) are usable as is (b) need to be applied
- 60. You'd rather give someone feedback based on:**
 (a) facts (b) perceptions
- 61. You're more often:**
 (a) pragmatic / rational (b) visionary / far-sighted
- 62. You're usually more:**
 (a) calculated (b) free-flowing
- 63. It's worse to:**
 (a) daydream (b) keep going
- 64. You're more moved by:**
 (a) fundamentals (b) passion
- 65. You prefer to make goals based on:**
 (a) clear milestones (b) current motivation
- 66. When writing, authors should:**
 (a) stick to the data (b) use more examples
- 67. In conversations, you're more pleased with:**
 (a) discussing all options (b) coming to agreement
- 68. For split-second decisions you prefer to rely on:**
 (a) past experiences (b) instinctive feelings
- 69. You prefer statements to be:**
 (a) concrete / specific (b) negotiable / open
- 70. It's more admirable to be:**
 (a) analytical (b) passionate
- 71. It is more important to be:**
 (a) unambiguous (b) unbounded / unrestrained

72. In general, you're more:

(a) impartial / independent

(b) compassionate

73. For projects, you'd prefer to be:

(a) organized

(b) flexible

74. Before a phone call you:

(a) don't plan what to say

(b) practice what to say

75. In relationships, things should be:

(a) open for discussion

(b) taken as they come

76. It's worse to be:

(a) unfair

(b) harsh

77. When the doorbell rings you:

(a) jump to attention / look forward to the visit

(b) hunker down / not wanting guests

1.²

A. I have a natural talent for influencing people.

B. I am not good at influencing people.

2.

A. Modesty doesn't become me.

B. I am essentially a modest person.

3.

A. I would do almost anything on a dare.

B. I tend to be a fairly cautious person.

4.

A. When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.

B. I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.

5.

A. The thought of ruling the world frightens the hell out of me.

B. If I ruled the world it would be a better place.

6.

A. I can usually talk my way out of anything.

B. I try to accept the consequences of my behavior.

7.

A. I prefer to blend in with the crowd.

B. I like to be the center of attention.

8.

A. I will be a success.

B. I am not too concerned about success.

² Raskin and Terry 1988, 894–95.

9.

- A. I am no better or worse than most people.
- B. I think I am a special person.

10.

- A. I am not sure if I would make a good leader.
- B. I see myself as a good leader.

11.

- A. I am assertive.
- B. I wish I were more assertive.

12.

- A. I like to have authority over other people.
- B. I don't mind following orders.

13.

- A. I find it easy to manipulate people.
- B. I don't like it when I find myself manipulating people.

14.

- A. I insist upon getting the respect that is due me.
- B. I usually get the respect that I deserve.

15.

- A. I don't particularly think I'm attractive.
- B. I am attractive.

16.

- A. I can read people like a book.
- B. People are sometimes hard to understand.

17.

- A. If I feel competent I am willing to take responsibility for making decisions.
- B. I like to take responsibility for making decisions.

18.

- A. I just want to be reasonably happy.
- B. I want to amount to something in the eyes of the world.

19.

- A. My body is nothing special.
- B. I like to look at my body.

20.

- A. I try not to be a show off.
- B. I will usually show off if I get the chance.

21.

- A. I always know what I am doing.
- B. Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing.

22.

- A. I sometimes depend on people to get things done.
- B. I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done.

23.

- A. Sometimes I tell good stories.
- B. Everybody likes to hear my stories.

24.

- A. I expect a great deal from other people.
- B. I like to do things for other people.

25.

- A. I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.
- B. I take my satisfactions as they come.

26.

- A. Compliments embarrass me.
- B. I like to be complimented.

27.

- A. I have a strong will to power.
- B. Power for its own sake doesn't interest me.

28.

- A. I don't care about what is acceptable.
- B. I like to set the standard for what is acceptable.

29.

- A. I like to look at myself in the mirror.
- B. I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.

30.

- A. I really like to be the center of attention.
- B. It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention.

31.

- A. I can live my life in any way I want to.
- B. People can't always live their lives in terms of what they want.

32.

- A. Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.
- B. People always seem to recognize my authority.

33.

- A. I would prefer to be a leader.
- B. It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or not.

34.

- A. I am going to be a great person.
- B. I hope I am going to be successful.

35.

- A. People sometimes believe what I tell them.
- B. I can make anybody believe anything I want them to.

36.

- A. I am a born leader.
- B. Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop.

37.

- A. I wish somebody would someday write my biography.
- B. I don't like people to pry into my life for any reason.

38.

- A. I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.
- B. I don't mind blending into the crowd when I go out in public.

39.

- A. I am more capable than other people.
- B. There is a lot that I can learn from other people.

40.

- A. I am much like everybody else.
- B. I am an extraordinary person.

Thank you very much for your assistance

*Anneli BOTHERA
Tel: +27 82 822 6412
Email: abotha@issafrica.org*

Completed by:.....

Tel nr:

Email:

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RELATIVES

Please note that the information in this questionnaire will be used in an academic study dealing with in- out-group perceptions and conflict and how people get involved in groups based on religion and ethnic division that resorted to violence.

*Information revealed in this questionnaire will be treated confidentially and will **only** be used for academic purposes.*

Please answer the questions below as truthfully as possible.

Thank you.

Name and Surname of respondent

Relationship to primary:

MOTHER FATHER	BROTHER SISTER	OTHER
------------------	-------------------	----------------

Whereabouts of primary:

PASSED AWAY	IN PRISON	DISAPPEARED
----------------------	-----------	----------------------

Details of primary

Name

Surname

Gender

MALE	FEMALE
------	--------

Age

Date of birth

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

Place of birth.....

Marital status at the time of joining / participating:

SINGLE	MARRIED	WIDOWER	DIVORCE	NEVER MARRIED
--------	---------	---------	---------	---------------

Number of children at the time of joining / participating:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	--

Parents

Did he/she grow up with both parents present?

YES	NO
-----	----

(1) Father

YES	NO
-----	----

If No, reason:

PASSED AWAY	WORKED FAR AWAY	LEFT
-------------	-----------------	------

Primary's age his/her father left or passed away:

(2) Mother

YES	NO
-----	----

If No, reason:

PASSED AWAY	WORKED FAR AWAY	LEFT
-------------	-----------------	------

Primary's age his/her mother left or passed away:

With whom did he/she grow up if not parents?.....

From what age:

Growing up, who made the rules in the family?

GRANDPARENTS	FATHER	STEP FATHER	MOTHER	STEP MOTHER	OLDER BROTHER / SISTER
--------------	--------	-------------	--------	-------------	------------------------

Were he/she punished when he/she did something wrong?

PHYSICALLY (corporal punishment)	EMOTIONALLY	NOT PUNISHED
----------------------------------	-------------	--------------

Who punished him/her?

GRANDPARENTS	FATHER	STEP FATHER	MOTHER	STEP MOTHER	OLDER BROTHER / SISTER
--------------	--------	-------------	--------	-------------	------------------------

How severe was this punishment?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Relative</i>					<i>Extreme</i>				

How involved were you in his life when he grew up:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Little</i>					<i>Most</i>				

Characteristics

Thinking back, which characteristics best describe him/her (choose one)?³

His choices were traditionally made:

(a) deliberately / purposely

(b) hastily / impulsive

He is more influenced by:

(a) thoughts

(b) feelings

³ Richardson 2012, 8-13.

- You would describe him as more:**
 (a) pragmatically / practical (b) philosophically / moral
- You will you describe him best as:**
 (a) out-going (b) reserved / shy
- When he completed routine tasks he preferred:**
 (a) the tried and tested way (b) a new / innovative way
- According to you, he is more guided by:**
 (a) data and facts (b) ideas and beliefs
- You will describe him as:**
 (a) meticulous / disciplined (b) adaptable / easy-going
- In friendships, he preferred to:**
 (a) quantity over quality (b) quality over quantity
- When he met new people, he would:**
 (a) start conversations (b) wait for the right moment
- You will describe him as a:**
 (a) brick-wall (b) push-over
- It is more important for him to be:**
 (a) unshakeable / set in his ideas (b) loyal
- Making decisions, you normally will be guided by:**
 (a) requirements / obligations (b) intuitions / feelings
- You will normally regard him as:**
 (a) systematic/logical (b) understanding /sympathetic
- At social events, you rather interact with:**
 (a) as many as possible (b) as few as possible
- You'll describe him more often as:**
 (a) pragmatic / rational (b) visionary / far-sighted
- According to you, he is more moved by:**
 (a) fundamentals (b) passion

- 1)⁴
 A. He has a natural talent for influencing people.
 B. He is not good at influencing people.
- 2)
 A. He prefers to blend in with the crowd.
 B. He likes to be the center of attention.
- 3)
 A. You're not sure if he would make a good leader.
 B. You regard him as a good leader.

⁴ Raskin and Terry 1988, 894–95.

- 4)
 A. You regard him as assertive.
 B. You do not consider him as assertive.

- 5)
 A. He has authority over other people.
 B. He prefers to follow others.

- 6)
 A. He will insist upon getting the respect that is due to him.
 B. He does not mind getting the respect that he deserves.

- 7)
 A. He sometimes depended on other people to get things done.
 B. He rarely depended on anyone else to get things done.

- 8)
 A. He expect a great deal from other people.
 B. He preferred to do things for other people.

Brothers and sisters

How many brothers and sisters do/did the primary have?

Brothers: Sisters

Indicate his/her position in the family; position of brothers and sisters and age difference:

No.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
M / F										
Age differ										

No.	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
M / F											
Age differ											

How would you describe his/her relationship with his/her brother(s) and sister(s)?

.....

Would you describe him as:

A) The one taking care of siblings or B) The one that was cared for by others

A) Sensitive or B) Indifferent

Did he/she grow up in Kenya?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Not, at what age did he/she moved to Kenya

--

Where did he/she grow up?

Town/village:

Region

School and Education

Did he/she attend school?

YES	NO
-----	----

Type of school?

PUBLIC	PRIVATE	RELIGIOUS
--------	---------	-----------

If religious school

Type	CHRISTIAN	ISLAMIC
Duration		

Highest school grade passed:

At what age did he/she leave school:

Name of school:

Town:

After school did he/she study further:

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, at which institution:

Field of study:

Did he/she completed his/her studies?

YES	NO
-----	----

Age

If NOT, what is the primary reason according to you?

If *work*, as what?

Where:

If *unemployed*, did he/she:

	STAY AT HOME	LOOK FOR WORK
Duration		

Where:

Religious Background

Did the family practice religion growing up?

YES	NO
-----	----

Which religion?

CHRISTIAN	MUSLIM	TRADITIONAL
-----------	--------	-------------

Growing up, did he/she had contact with people from other religions?

YES	NO
-----	----

Growing up, did he have friends from other religions?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did he attend school with people belonging to other religions?

YES	NO
-----	----

Growing up, did he live in an area where his religion was in the minority?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, do you think he/she felt discriminated against for his religious beliefs?

YES	NO
-----	----

Do you think he considered all religions to be equally?

YES	NO
-----	----

Do you think he considered religious diversity in the country as a good thing?

YES	NO
-----	----

If No, because it leads to (select the most important reason):

NO TRUST	VIOLENCE	DOMINATION BY ONE	LACK IN UNDERSTANDING
----------	----------	-------------------	-----------------------

What religion did he/she belong to when you joined the organisation?

CHRISTIAN	MUSLIM	TRADITIONAL
-----------	--------	-------------

Did he/she convert to another religion before joining the organisation?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, to which religion did he/she convert before joining the organisation?

ISLAM	CHRISTIANITY
-------	--------------

If Yes, how long before joining the organisation?

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS

How important is your religion to you?

Most important	Very important	Important	Not important
----------------	----------------	-----------	---------------

How important do you think his/her religion is/was to him/her?

Most important	Very important	Important	Not important
----------------	----------------	-----------	---------------

Do you think he/she will (would) marry to a person belonging to another ethnic/tribal group?

YES	NO
-----	----

Do you think he/she felt that his/her religion is being threatened?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, what type of threat?

PHYSICAL	IDEOLOGICAL
----------	-------------

Who – in his/her mind – is behind this threat?

GOVERNMENT	EXTERNAL ENEMY	OTHER RELIGION
------------	----------------	----------------

Did you think – in his/her mind – that this threat is:

ONGOING CONFLICT	ALL-OUT WAR
------------------	-------------

Did you think that he/she felt that he/she could openly live out his/her religious beliefs?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did all his/her friends belonged to their religious orientation?

YES	NO
-----	----

His/her overall feeling towards other religions?

ACCEPT	HATE
--------	------

Tribal / Ethnic Background

To which ethnic / tribal group do you belong?.....

Rate the size of your tribal / ethnic group, according to your perspective:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Smallest</i>					<i>Biggest</i>				

Rate the influence of your tribal / ethnic group, according to your perspective:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Little</i>					<i>Most</i>				

Growing up, did he/she have contact with people from other tribe / ethnic groups?

YES	NO
-----	----

Growing up, did he/she had friends from other tribes / ethnic groups?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did he/she attend school with people belonging to other ethnic groups?

YES	NO
-----	----

Growing up, did you live in an area where your tribe / ethnic group was in the minority?

YES	NO
-----	----

If Yes, did he/she feel discriminated against for belonging to your tribe / ethnic group? YES NO

Do you think all tribal / ethnic groups are equal? YES NO

Do you think diversity in your country is a good thing? YES NO

If No, because it leads to (select the most important reason):

NO TRUST	VIOLENCE	DOMINATION BY ONE	LACK IN UNDERSTANDING
----------	----------	-------------------	-----------------------

How important is your ethnic / tribal group to you?

Most important	Very important	Important	Not important
----------------	----------------	-----------	---------------

How important is his/her ethnic / tribal group to him/her?

Most important	Very important	Important	Not important
----------------	----------------	-----------	---------------

Do you think he/she will (would) marry to a person belonging to another ethnic/tribal group? YES NO

Political Experience

Growing up, did you discuss politics with him/her? YES NO

Do you vote in elections? YES NO

Did he/she ever vote in elections before joining/getting involved with the group? YES NO

Do you think he/she trust(ed) politicians? YES NO

Do you think he/she believe(d) that elections can bring change? YES NO

If No, why?

GROUP TOO SMALL	CANNOT REGISTER PARTY	ELECTIONS NOT FREE & FAIR	NOT RECOGNIZING POL PROCESS
-----------------	-----------------------	---------------------------	-----------------------------

Do you think he/she thought that government only look after and protect the interests of a few? YES NO

If Yes, standing up against government is legal and just? YES NO

Period during which he/she joined or became involved in the organisation

At what age did you think he/she became interested in the group or its ideals?

--

Were you aware of his/her decision to join or get involvement in the group?

YES	NO
-----	----

Did he/she inform anyone that he/she planned / joined the organisation?

Grand- parents	Mother Father	Brother Sister	Uncle Aunt	Cousin	Community leader	Religious leader	Friend
-------------------	------------------	-------------------	---------------	--------	---------------------	---------------------	--------

For whom do you think he/she joins?

SELF	FAMILY	COMMUNITY	RELIGION	ETHNIC GROUP
------	--------	-----------	----------	-----------------

What emotion captured his/her decision to join the group best according to you?

ANGER	FEAR	GUILT	CONTEMPT	HATRED
-------	------	-------	----------	--------

Did he/she work at the time he joined or got involved in the organisation?

Yes	No
-----	----

If Yes, what did he do?.....

If No, did he?

STUDY	UNEMPLOYED
-------	------------

Did anything happen that might have influenced his/her decision to get involved?

.....

.....

.....

Who introduced him/her to the organisation according to you?

Self	Relative	Friend	Approached by the group	Religious figure
------	----------	--------	----------------------------	------------------

Rate his/her level of frustration at the time of joining the organisation:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Least</i>					<i>Most</i>				

Primary reason you think he/she joined the organisation or got involved?

Religious	Tribal / Ethnic	Economic	Political	Adventure	Personal
-----------	--------------------	----------	-----------	-----------	----------

Did you notice changes in her/her behaviour?

YES	NO
-----	----

If YES, please indicate which type of changes did you noticed (rate level: 1=least and 10=most)?

Becoming very religious	
Becoming prescriptive of what female family members should and should not do	
Becoming withdrawn from previous/old friends	
Becoming isolated and only interact with people sharing his/her ideas	
Suddenly disappeared	

Over which period did you noted these changes?

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS

Did he/she join the group with others?

FRIENDS	FAMILY
---------	--------

Did he/she recruit other family members to the group?

Yes	No
-----	----

Did he/she recruit other friends to the group?

Yes	No
-----	----

Do you think he/she felt that he/she belonged as he joined the group?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Least</i>									<i>Most</i>

Do you think he/she felt accepted as he participated in the group's activities?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<i>Least</i>									<i>Most</i>

The term 'us' for him/her (then) refers to:

FAMILY	ORGANISATION MEMBERS	MUSLIM / CHRISTIAN	KENYANS
--------	----------------------	--------------------	---------

The term 'them' for him/her (then) refers to:

GOVERNMENT	OTHER RELIGIONS	OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS	OTHER COUNTRIES
------------	-----------------	---------------------	-----------------

Thank you very much for your assistance

Anneli BOTHER

Tel: +27 82 822 6412

Email: abotha@issafrica.org

Completed by:.....

Tel nr:

Email:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abadie, A. 2004. 'Poverty, political freedom and the roots of terrorism'. Harvard University. <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/aabadie/povterr.pdf> [accessed on 19 September 2012].
- Abádi-Nagy, Z. 2003. 'Theorizing Collective Identity: Presentations of Virtual and Actual Collectives in Contemporary American Fiction'. *Neohelicon*, 30(1): 173-186.
- Akhtar, S. 1999. 'The Psychodynamic Dimension of Terrorism'. *Psychiatric Annals*, 29(6): 350-355.
- Akintola, I. 2008. 'Islam in Africa'. In *Political Islam and the State in Africa*, edited by H Solomon, A Fadare and F Butler. University of Pretoria: The Centre for International Political Studies.
- Alexander, MG, S Levin and PJ Henry. 2005. 'Image Theory, Social Identity, and Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying International Images'. *Political Psychology*, 26(1) (February): 27-45.
- Al-Jazeera*. 2013. 'Kenyan Muslim cleric killed in aftermath of mall attack'. 4 October. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/4/popular-muslim-clerickilledinkenyaaftermathofmallattack.html> [accessed on 15 November 2013].
- All Africa*. 2003. 'Anti-terror squad mounts big hunt for blast escapee'. 4 August.
- All Africa*. 2003. 'Kenya: Suspected Terrorist, 24, is arrested'. 30 June.
- Almond, G and S Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture*. Princeton: Princeton.
- Aly, A and JL Striegher. 2012. 'Examining the Role of Religion in Radicalization to Violent Islamist Extremism'. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 35(12): 849-862.
- Angira, Z. 2011. 'Police name 15 key Shabaab fugitives'. *Daily Nation*, 31 December. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/1297974/-/10c6s8kz/-/index.html> [accessed on 15 January 2012].
- Anthias, F. 2002. 'Where do I belong? Narrating collective identity and translocational positionality'. *Ethnicities*, 2(4): 491-514.
- Apuuli, KP. 2007. 'Amnesty and international law: the case of the Lord's resistance army insurgents in Northern Uganda'. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 5(2): 33-61.
- Arena, MP and BA Arrigo. 2005. 'Social Psychology, Terrorism, and Identity: A Preliminary Re-examination of Theory, Culture, Self, and Society'. *Behavioral Sciences and the Law*, 23: 485-506.
- Arena, MP and BA Arrigo. 2006. *The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat*. New York: New York University Press.
- Aronoff, MJ. 1998. 'The politics of collective identity'. *Reviews in Anthropology*, 27(1): 71-85.
- Ayubi, NN. 1991. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. New York: Routledge.
- Babo, A. 2004. 'Small village with a reputation for terrorism'. *All Africa*, 8 March.

- Baldwin, FN Jr. 1990. 'Freedom and Constitutionalism in Emerging African States: A Special Look at Uganda with Possible Lessons for a United South Africa'. *Wisconsin International Law Journal*, 9: 301-375.
- Banks, JA. 2008. 'Diversity, Group Identity, and Citizenship Education in a Global Age'. *Educational Researcher*, 37(3) (April): 129-139.
- Bardis, PD. 1980. 'Violence: Theory and Quantification' In *Political Sociology: Readings in Research and Theory*, edited by G Kourvetaris and B Dobratz.. London: Transaction Books.
- Bariyo, N and S Childress. 2010. 'Uganda suspects explain details of July attacks'. *Garoweonline*, 12 August.
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Africa_22/Uganda_suspects_explain_details_of_July_attacks.shtml [accessed on 13 August 2010].
- Bartlett, J and C Miller. 2012. 'The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization'. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(1); 1-21.
- BBC Africa*. 2008. 'Four civilians killed following attack on peacekeepers in Somali capital'. 9 April.
- BBC Monitoring Newsfile*. 2002. 'Kenyan police say 'key' suspect in Mombassa terror attacks has Yemeni links'. 27 December.
- Beck, PA. 1977. 'The Role of Agents in Political Socialization'. In *Handbook of Political Socialization*, edited by SA Renshon. New York: The Free Press.
- Beck, PA and MK Jennings. 1982. 'Pathways to Participation'. *The American Political Science Review*, 76(1) (March): 94-108.
- Bergami, M and RP Bagozzi. 2000. 'Self-categorization, affective commitment and group self-esteem as distinct aspects of social identity in the organization'. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 39: 555-577.
- Berrebi, C. 2007. 'Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians'. *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 13(1).
- Boås, M. 2002. 'The Great Lakes Region in Uganda and Uganda in the Great Lakes Region'. Paper for the 10th General EADI Conference, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 19-21 September.
- Boniface, B. 2012. 'Muslim Youth Centre aims to create religious strife in Kenya, analysts say'. *Sabahi*, 22 August.
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/22/feature-01 [accessed on 23 August 2012].
- Boniface, B. 2012. 'Somali Kenyans urge police, citizens to stop ethnic profiling'. *Sabahi*, 5 December. http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/12/05/feature-01?change_locale=true [accessed on 6 December 2012].
- Boniface, B. 2013. 'Mombasa faithful worry mosque takeovers could lead to widespread insecurity'. *Sabahi*, 11 December.
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/12/11/feature-01 [accessed on 12 December 2013].
- Borum, R. 2004. *Psychology of Terrorism*. Tampa: University of South Florida.

- Branch, A. 2010. 'Exploring the roots of LRA violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland'. In *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality*, edited by Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot. London: Zed.
- Branscombe, NR and DL Wann. 1994. 'Collective self-esteem consequences of outgroup derogation when a valued social identity is on trial'. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 6(24): 641-657.
- Brett, EA. 1995. 'Neutralising the use of force in Uganda: the role of the military in politics'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(1): 129-152.
- Brewer, MB and MD Silver. 2000. 'Group Distinctiveness, Social Identification and Collective Mobilization'. In *Self, identity, and social movements*, edited by S Stryker, TJ Owens and RW White. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, E and ES Dickson. 2007. 'The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, counterterrorism, and mobilization'. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2): 364-381.
- Byrnes, RM. 1990. 'The Second Obote Regime: 1981-85.' Uganda: A Country Study. Library of Congress, 16 January. <http://countrystudies.us/uganda/12htm> [accessed on 10 January 2014].
- Campana, A and L Lapointe. 2011. 'The Structural 'Root' Causes of Non-Suicide Terrorism: A Systematic Scoping Review'. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(1): 79-104.
- Campbell, BA. 1980. 'A theoretical approach to peer influence in adolescent socialization'. *American Journal of Political Science*, 24(2) (May): 324-344.
- Candia, S. 2010. 'Uganda detains top al-shabaab commander'. *New Vision*, 23 September, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/PA/8/12/732933> [accessed on 25 September 2010].
- Cartwright, D and A Zander. 1960. 'Group Pressures and Group Standards: Introduction'. In *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, edited by D Cartwright and A Zander. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Cartwright, D. 1968. 'The Nature of Group Cohesiveness'. In *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, 3rd Edition*, edited by D Cartwright and A Zander. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Castelein, KJ. 2008. *Counter-insurgency in the Greater North of Uganda*. Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights, Utrecht University.
- Chaffee, SH, M Jackson-Beeck, J Durall and D Wilson. 1977. 'Mass Communication in Political Socialization'. In *Handbook of Political Socialization* edited by SA Renshon. New York: The Free Press.
- Cinoğlu, H. 2010. 'Sociological understanding of the relationship between terrorism and religion'. *International Journal of Human Sciences*, 7(2): 199-209.
- Cohen, JL. 1985. 'Strategy or identity: New theoretical paradigms and contemporary social movements'. *Social Research*, 52(4): 663-716.
- Collier, P. 1999. *The challenge of Ugandan reconstruction, 1986-98*. World Bank. 2 November.
- Conversi, D. 1999. 'Nationalism, Boundaries and Violence'. *Journal of International Studies*, 28(3): 553-584.

- Cook, TE. 1989. 'The Psychological Theory of Political Socialization and the Political Theory of Child Development: The Dangers of Norman Science'. *Human Development*, 1(32): 24-34.
- Cottam, M., B Dietz-Uhler, EM Mastors and T Preston. 2004. *Introduction to Political Psychology*. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- Crayton, JW. 1983. 'Terrorism and Psychology of the Self.' In *Perspectives on Terrorism*, edited by LZ Freedman and Y Alexander. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources.
- Crenshaw, M. 1981. 'The Causes of Terrorism'. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4): 379-399.
- Crenshaw, M. 1988. 'The subjective reality of the terrorist: Ideological and psychological factors in terrorism'. In *Current Perspectives in International Terrorism*, edited by RO Slater and M Stohl. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Crenshaw, M. 1992. 'How terrorists think: Psychological contributions to understanding terrorism'. In *Terrorism: Roots, impact, responses*, edited by L Howard. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.
- Crenshaw, M. 1998. 'Questions to be answered, research to be done, knowledge to be applied'. In *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*, edited by W Reich. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Crenshaw, M. 2003. 'The Causes of Terrorism'. In *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, edited by CW Kegley Jr. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Cutin, N, AJ Steward and LE Duncan. 2010. 'What Makes the Political Personal? Openness, Personal Political Salience, and Activism'. *Journal of Personality*, 78(3) (June): 943-968.
- Dalton, RJ. 1980. 'Reassessing Parental Socialization: Indicator Unreliability Versus Generational Transfer'. *The American Political Science Review*, 74(2) (June): 421-431.
- David, O and D Bar-Tal. 2009. A sociopsychological conception of collective identity: The case of national identity as an example. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 13(4): 354-379.
- Davies, JC. 1965. 'The Family's Role in Political Socialization'. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 361(1): 10-19.
- Dawson, RE and K Prewitt. 1969. *Political Socialization*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Delany, M and J Straziuso. 2010. 'New al-Qaida threat: Somali group claims blasts'. *Associated Press*, 13 July.
- De Veenhoop, HR. 2007. *Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo*. Conflict & Transition Consultancies.
- De Waal, A. 2004. *Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa*. Addis Ababa: Shama Books.
- Deininger, K. 2003. 'Causes and consequences of civil strife: micro-level evidence from Uganda'. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 55(4): 579-606.
- Dodge, K and D Schwartz. 1997. 'Social information processing mechanisms in aggressive behaviour'. In *Handbook of antisocial behaviour*, edited by Stoff, D. and Breiling, J. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

- Dollard, J. 1939. *Frustration and Aggression*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Doom, R and K Vlassenroot. 1999. 'Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda'. *African Affairs*, 98(390) (January): 5-36.
- Dowse, RE and JA Hughes. 1986 *Political Sociology*, 2nd ed. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Duckitt, J and CH Sibley. 2010. 'Personality, Ideology, Prejudice, and Politics: A Dual-Process Motivational Model'. *Journal of Personality*, 78(6) (December): 1861-1893.
- Dutton, JE, JM Dukerich and CV Harquail. 1994. 'Organizational images and member identification'. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39(2): 239-263.
- Easton, D and RD Hess. 1962. 'The Child's Political World'. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6(3) (August): 229-246.
- Eckstein, D. 2000. 'Empirical Studies Indicating Significant Birth-Order-Related Personality Differences'. *The Journal of Individual Psychology*, 56(4) (Winter): 481-494.
- Elischer, S. 2008. *Ethnic Coalitions of Convenience and Commitment: Political Parties and Party Systems in Kenya*. German Institute of Global and Area Studies, No. 68, February.
- Ellemers, N, P Kortekaas and JW Ouwerkerk. 1999. 'Self-categorisation, commitment to the group and group self-esteem as related but distinct aspects of social identity'. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29(2-3): 371-389.
- Ellemers, N, R Spears and B Doosje. 1997. 'Sticking together or falling apart: In-group identification as a psychological determinant of group commitment versus individual mobility'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72(3): 617-626.
- Esposito, JL. 1988. *Islam: The Straight Path*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- England, A. 2005. 'Kenya struggles to tackle threat of terrorism: Seven years after the US embassy blast, the east African nation is still trying to find effective counter measures'. *Financial Times*, 29 July.
- Foeken, D, J Hoorweg and RA Obudho. 2000. 'The Kenya Coast: A Regional Study'. Leiden University. <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/4675/ASC-1241504-044.pdf?sequence=1> [accessed on 10 October 2013].
- Forgas, JP and K Fiedler. 1996. 'Us and them: Mood effects on intergroup discrimination'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(1): 28-40.
- Franks, J. 2005. *Rethinking the roots of terrorism: Orthodox terrorism theory and beyond*. St. Andrews University.
- Froman, LA. Jr. 1961. 'Personality and Political Socialization'. *The Journal of Politics*, 23(2) (May): 341-352.
- Gambetta, D and S Hertog. 2009. 'Why are there so many Engineers among Islamic Radicals?' *European Journal of Sociology*, 50(2): 201-230.
- Gatsiounis, I. 2012. 'After Al-Shabaab'. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, 14: 74-89.

- Gerber, AS, GA Huber, D Doherty and CM Dowling. 2010. 'Personality and political attitudes: Relationships across issue domains and political contexts'. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1) (February): 111-133.
- Gerber, AS, GA Huber, D Doherty and CM Dowling. 2011. 'Personality traits and the consumption of political information'. *American Politics Research*, 39(1): 32-84.
- Gergen, KJ and M Ullman. 1977. 'Socialization and the Characterological Basis of Political Activism'. In *Handbook of Political Socialization*, edited by Renshon, S.A. New York: The Free Press.
- GIS Research and Map Collection. 2011. 'Uganda Ethnic Groups'. Ball State University Libraries, Bracken Library, Muncie, Indiana. <http://bsumaps.blogspot.com/2011/10/ball-state-university-libraries-maps-in.html> [accessed on 10 January 2014].
- Global Jihad*. 2011. Kampala Blasts 4 Main Suspects. 6 March.
- Grace, N. 2008. 'Shabaab leader sanctioned as Zawahiri responds to group's oath of loyalty'. *The Long War Journal*, 21 November. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/shabaab_leader_sanct.php [accessed on 10 October 2010].
- Greenberg, ES. 2009. 'Consensus and Dissent: Trends in Political Socialization Research'. In *Political Socialization*, edited by ES Greenberg. New Brunswick: AldineTransaction.
- Greenstein, F. 2009. 'Children and Politics'. In *Political Socialization*, edited by ES Greenberg. New Brunswick: AldineTransaction.
- Grusec, JE. 2011. 'Socialization Processes in the Family: Social and Emotional Development'. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 62: 243–269.
- Gupta, DK. 2001. *Path to Collective Madness: A study in social order and political pathology*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.
- Gupta, DK. 2005. Exploring roots of terrorism. In *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, edited by Bjørge, T. London: Routledge.
- Gurr, TR. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gurr, TR. 1998. 'Terrorism in Democracies: Its social and political bases'. In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by W Reich. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Gurr, TR. 2006. 'Economic Factors'. In *The Roots of Terrorism*, edited by L Richardson. New York: Routledge.
- Hadden, JK. 1992. 'Religious Fundamentalism'. In *Encyclopaedia of Sociology*, edited by EF Borgatta and M Borgatta. New York: Macmillan Publishing.
- Hardy, SA, A Bhattacharjee, A Reed and K Aquino. 2010. 'Moral identity and psychological distance: The case of adolescent parental socialization'. *Journal of Adolescence*, 33: 111–123.
- Haslam, N. 2006. 'Dehumanization: An Integrative Review'. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10(3): 252–264.
- Haynes, J. 2005. 'Islamic Militancy in East Africa'. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(8): 1321-1339.

- Hess, RD and JV Torney. 2009. 'The Development of Political Attitudes in Children'. In *Political Socialization*, edited by ES Greenberg. New Brunswick: AldineTransaction.
- Higgins, GE, ML Ricketts, CD Marcum and M Mahoney. 2010. 'Primary socialization theory: an exploratory study of delinquent trajectories'. *Criminal Justice Studies: A Critical Journal of Crime, Law and Society*, 23(2): 133-146.
- Hoffman, B. 1998. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Horgan, J. 2006. *The Psychology of Terrorism*. London: Routledge.
- Horgan, J and M Taylor. 2001. 'The making of a terrorist'. *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 13(12).
- Hovil, L and E Werker. 2005. 'Portrait of a Failed Rebellion: An Account of Rational, Sub-Optimal Violence in Western Uganda'. *Rationality and Society*, 17(1): 5-34.
- Howard, L. 1992. *Terrorism: Roots, impact, responses*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.
- Huddy, L, S Feldman and E Cassese. 2007. 'On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger'. In *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of emotions in political thinking and behaviour*, edited by WR Neuman, GE Marcus, AN Crigler and M MacKuen. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Human Rights Watch*. 2003. Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda. Vol. 15(12) (July). <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uganda0703.pdf> [accessed on 17 March 2014].
- Hyman, HH. 1959. *Political Socialization: A study in the Psychology of Political Behaviour*. New York: The Free Press.
- Information Counseling and Referral Services. 2008. *Preliminary analysis: Reporter profiling from the Amnesty Commission of Uganda*. ICRS Database, 4 December 2008.
- International Crisis Group*. 2012. Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU's Lost Rebellion. Africa Briefing No 93, 19 December.
- Investigative Project on Terrorism*. 2009. 'It's official: Al-Shabaab ties the knot with Al Qaeda'. 22 September. <http://www.investigativeproject.org/1425/its-official-al-shabaab-ties-the-knot-with-al> [accessed on 1 October 2009].
- Janis, IL. 1968. 'Group Identification Under Conditions of External Danger'. In *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, 3rd Edition*, edited by D Cartwright and A Zander. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Jaros, D, H Hirsch and FJ Fleron (Jr.). 2009. 'The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture'. In *Political Socialization*, edited by ES Greenberg. New Brunswick: AldineTransaction.
- Johnson, PW and TB Feldman. 1992. 'Personality types and terrorism: Self-psychology perspectives'. *Forensic Reports*, 5(4): 293-303.
- Johnson, CJ. 2006. 'Deliver us from Joseph Kony'. *Christianity Today*, 50(1). <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/january/18.30.html?start=2> [accessed on 14 March 2014].
- Jones, JW. 2006. 'Why does religion turn violent?: A psychoanalytic exploration of religious terrorism'. *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 93(2): 167-190.

- Juergensmeyer, M. 2005. 'Does Religion Cause Terrorism?' National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security and America's Purpose, Washington DC, September 6-7 2005. http://demcoalition.org/pdf/Does_Religion_Cause_Terrorism.pdf [accessed on 2 April 2013]
- Kagoro, J. 2013. 'The Military Ethos in the Politics of Post-1986 Uganda'. *Social Sciences Directory*, 2(2): 31-46.
- Kawakami, K and KL Dion. 1995. 'Social Identity and Affect as Determinants of Collective Action'. *Theory & Psychology*, 4(5): 551-577.
- Kenison, K. 2009. 'Becoming a Radical'. In *Political Socialization*, edited by ES Greenberg. New Brunswick: AldineTransaction.
- Kenya Law Report. 2012. 'Randu Nzai Ruwa & 2 others v Internal Security Minister & another, Miscellaneous Application 468 of 2010'. http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_preview1.php?link=75808736388005509511415 [assessed on 15 November 2013].
- Kenyan Whispers*. 2011. 'Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, alias Mohamed Saif Jailed for life'. 28 October. <http://www.kenyanwhispers.co.uk/angelaspess/?tag=elgiva-bwire-oliacha> [accessed on 30 October 2011].
- Khayat, M. 2012. 'Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen and Kenyan Muslim Youth Center Strengthen Ties'. The Middle East Media Research Institute. Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 870. 12 August. http://www.memri.org/report/en/print6581.htm#_edn5 p. 1 [accessed on 30 November 2012].
- Kim, H. 2012. 'Explaining Coethnic, Non-coethnic and Cross-ethnic Voting in Uganda'. www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/grads/calAPSA/kimCalAPSA.pdf [accessed on 15 November 2013].
- Koff, D and G von der Muhll. 1967. 'Political Socialization in Kenya and Tanzania—A Comparative Analysis'. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5(1): 13-51.
- Kolocharova, E. 2011. 'The Sociological Dimension of Political Identity'. *Sociological Research*, 50(3) (May-June): 39-55.
- Kouri, J. 2012. 'Suspected Al Shabaab terrorists in Kenya linked to Obama family'. *Examiner*, 29 October. <http://www.examiner.com/article/suspected-al-shabaab-terrorists-kenya-linked-to-obama-family> [accessed on 30 October 2012].
- Kourvetaris, GA and BA Dobratz. 1980. *Political sociology: Readings in research and theory*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.
- Kustenbauder, M. 2010. 'Northern Uganda: protracted conflict and structures of violence'. In *War and Peace in Africa*, edited by T Falola and RC Njoku. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
- Lacey, M and B Weiser. 2002. 'After Attack, Kenya Traces Qaeda's Trail in East Africa'. *The New York Times*, 1 December.
- Lange, M and A Dawson. 2010. 'Education and Ethnic Violence: A Cross-National Time-Series Analysis'. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 16(2) (July): 216-239.
- Langton, KP. 1969. *Political socialization*. London: Oxford University Press.

- Langton, KP and DA Karns. 1969. 'Influence of Different Agencies in Political Socialization'. In *Political Socialization*, edited by KP Langton. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Laqueur, W. 1977. 'Interpretations of Terrorism: Fact, Fiction and Political Science.' *Journal of Contemporary History*, 12(1): 1-42.
- Lavi, I and M Slone. 2012. 'Parental Practices and Political Violence: The Protective Role of Parental Warmth and Authority-Control in Jewish and Arab Israeli Children'. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 82(4): 550–561.
- Leftie, P. 2012. 'Al-Shabaab executes 'Kenyan spy''. *Daily Nation*, 11 January. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Al+Shabaab+executes+Kenyan+spy+/-/1056/1303950/-/vx9k9u/-/index.html> [accessed on 13 January 2012].
- Lia, B and KHW Skjølberg. 2000. *Why Terrorism Occurs: A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism*. Kjeller: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (FFI), Report 2000/02769. <http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/04307.pdf> [accessed on 4 March 2013].
- Lindemann, S. 2011. 'Just another change of guard? Broad-based politics and civil war in Museveni's Uganda'. *African Affairs*, 110(440): 387–416.
- Lipset, SM. 1963. *Political man: The social bases of politics*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Lomo, Z and L Hovil. 2004. *Behind the Violence. The War in Northern Uganda*. Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 99.
- Loveless, M. 2009. 'The Theory of International Media Diffusion: Political Socialization and International Media in Transitional Democracies'. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44: 118–136.
- LRA Crisis Initiative. 2014. 'Key Statistics'. The Resolve, Washington, DC. <http://www.theresolve.org/the-lra-crisis/key-statistics/> [accessed on 17 March 2014].
- Macharia, J. 2012. 'Separatist storm brewing on Kenya's coast'. *Biyokule*, 23 July. http://www.biyokulule.com/view_content.php?articleid=5009 [accessed on 16 December 2013].
- Maclean, W. 2002. 'Israelis attacked in Kenya – 11 die, al-Qaeda blamed'. *Reuters*, 28 November.
- Makoloo, MO. 2005. *Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity*. Minority Rights Group International.
- Malečková, J. 2005. 'Impoverished terrorists: Stereotype or reality?' In *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, edited by T Bjørgo. London: Routledge.
- Mallinder, L. 2009. *Uganda at a Crossroads: Narrowing the Amnesty? Working Paper No.1 From Beyond Legalism: Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation*. Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice: Queen's University Belfast.
- Mandaville, P 2007. *Global Political Islam*. London: Routledge.
- Mathenge, O and Z Angira. 2012. 'Garissa erupts in violence after soldiers' killing'. *Daily Nation*, 21 November. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Garissa-erupts-in-violence-after-soldiers-killing/-/1056/1625452/-/ex3xjcz/-/index.html> [accessed on 23 November 2012].

- Mawhood, P and M Wallis. 1993. 'Ethnic minorities in Eastern Africa: Kenya and Tanzania'. *Regional Politics and Policy*, 3(1): 170-189.
- Mazrui, A. 1994. 'Ethnicity and pluralism: the politicization of religion in Kenya'. *Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal*, 14(1-2): 191-201.
- Mbaria, J. 2006. 'Up to 12 countries could be sucked into conflict'. *All Africa*, 24 October.
- Mburu, N. 1999. 'Contemporary Banditry in the Horn of Africa: Causes, History and Political Implications'. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 8(2): 99.
- McCrae, RR and PT Costa. 1989. 'Reinterpreting the Myers-Biggs Type Indicator from the Perspective of the Five-Factor Model of Personality'. *Journal of Personality*, 57(1) (March): 17-40.
- McCormick, GH. 2003. 'Terrorist Decision Making'. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 6(1): 473-507.
- McDevitt, M and S Chaffee. 2002. 'From Top-Down to Trickle-Up Influence: Revisiting Assumptions About the Family in Political Socialization'. *Political Communication*, 19(3): 281-301.
- McDonough, DS. 2008. 'From Guerrillas to Government: post-conflict stability in Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda'. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(2): 357-374.
- McIntyre, KA and J Platania. 2009. 'Giving in to Group Pressure: The Impact of Socialization and Risk on Perceived Outcomes'. *Current Research in Social Psychology*, 15(1) (December): 16-32.
- Merelman, RM. 1986. 'Revitalizing political socialization'. In *Political psychology*, edited by Margaret J. Herman. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey Bass.
- Michalski, RL and TK Shackelford. 2002. 'An Attempted Replication of the Relationships between Birth Order and Personality'. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 36(2) (April): 182-188.
- Mishra, M. 2003. *Press and Political Socialization*. New Delhi: Dominant Publishers and Distributors.
- Mitchell, CR. 1989. *The Structure of International Conflict*. London: The Macmillan Press.
- Mitchell, A. 2006. 'Extremists emerge as the real face of Somalia's Islamic movement'. *Associated Press*, 5 October.
- Moghaddam, FM and AJ Marsella. 2004. *Understanding terrorism: Psychological roots, consequences and interventions*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Mohamed, MA. 2009. *U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia: From Cold War Era to War on Terror*. Master of Arts Thesis, Department of American Studies, State University Buffalo.
- Møller, B. 2008. Political Islam in Kenya. In *Political Islam and the State in Africa*, edited by H Solomon, A Fadare and F Butler. University of Pretoria: The Centre for International Political Studies.
- Mondak, JJ, MV Hibbing, D Canache, MA Seligson and MR Anderson. 2010. 'Personality and Civic Engagement: An Integrative Framework for the Study of Trait Effects on Political Behavior'. *American Political Science Review*, 104(1) (February): 85-110.

- Muhereza, FE. 2011. *An Analysis of Disarmament Experiences in Uganda*. Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) Nairobi, RECSA.
- Mutaizibwa, E. 2011. 'The roots of war: How Alice Lakwena gave way to Joseph Kony'. *The Observer*, 11 August. http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14678%3Athe-roots-of-war-how-alice-lakwena-gave-way-to-joseph-kony&catid=57%3Afeature&showall=1 [accessed on 18 March 2014].
- Nagel, J. 1994. 'Constructing ethnicity: Creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture'. *Social Problems*, 41(1): 152-176.
- National Security Archive. 2011. 'The Osama Bin Laden File'. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 343, 2 May. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB343/osama_bin_laden_file01_transcription.pdf [accessed on 3 April 2014].
- Ndegwa, SN. 1997. 'Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics'. *The American Political Science Review*, 91(3): 599-616.
- Ndurya, M. 2012. 'Villagers who fled from Shifta militia in new push to return'. *Daily Nation*, 1 February. <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/regional/Villagers+who+fled+from+Shifta+militia+in+new+push+to+return+/-/1070/1099896/-/whbv9k/-/index.html> [accessed on 10 October 2013].
- Neumann, PR. 2008. 'Introduction'. In *Perspectives on radicalisation and political violence: papers from The First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence*, edited by PR Neumann, J Stoil and D Esfandiary. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.
- Nisbet, EC and TA Meyers. 2010. 'Challenging the State: Transnational TV and Political Identity in the Middle East'. *Political Communication*, 27: 347-366.
- Nzes, F, 2012. 'Terrorist Attacks in Kenya Reveal Domestic Radicalization.' The Combating Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, 5(10) (October):13-16.
- Odula, T. 2011. 'Kenya Attacks: Elgive Bwire Oliacha, Al Shabaab Member, Pleads Guilty'. *The Huffington Post*, 26 October. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/26/kenya-attacks-al-shabaab_n_1032508.html [accessed on 27 October 2011].
- Okanya, A, E Anyoli and A Nalumansi. 2010. 'Kampala 7/11 bomb suspects confess'. *New Vision*, 10 August. <http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/728385> [accessed on 11 August 2010].
- Okidi, J, S Ssewanyana, L Bategeka and F Muhumuza. 2005. *Growth strategies and conditions for pro-poor growth: Uganda's experience*. Economic Policy Research Centre. December.
- Olum, Y. 2012. *From Liberation Movement to Government: Lessons from Uganda*. Presented at a high-level workshop at Villa La Collina, Cadenabbia, Italy, on 5 October 2012, organised by the Brenthurst Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, under the theme, "From Liberation Movement to Government: Past Legacies and the Challenges of Transition in Africa".
- Omach, P. 1986. 'Democratization and Conflict Resolution in Uganda'. *Les Cahiers*, 41: 1-20.
- Oparanya, WA. 2010. '2009 Population & Housing Census Results'. Minister of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030.

- Orum, A. 1976. 'On the Explanation of Political Socialisation and Political Change'. *Youth and Society*, 8 (December): 147-174.
- Otieno, B. 2012. 'AG to appeal lifting of MRC ban'. *The Star*, 26 July. <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-8724/ag-appeal-lifting-mrc-ban> [assessed on 15 November 2013].
- Pham, P, P Vinck and E Stover. 2007. 'Abducted: The Lord's Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda'. Berkeley-Tulane Initiative on Vulnerable Populations. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley and Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University. June. https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Publications_Abducted_06-2007.pdf [accessed on 17 March 2014].
- Patel, CK. 2013. 'Socialization Processes and Children Development in the Family'. *International Journal for Research in Education*, 2(1): 121-125.
- Perdue, CW, JF Dovidio, MB Gurtman and RB Tyler. 1990. 'Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Process of Intergroup Bias'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59(3): 475-486.
- Peterson, SA. 1983. 'Biology and Political Socialization: A Cognitive Developmental Link?' *Political Psychology*, 4(2): 265-288.
- Peterson, SA and A Somit. 1982. 'Cognitive Development and Childhood Political Socialization'. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 25(3) (January/February): 313-334.
- Polletta, F and JM Jasper. 2001. 'Collective identity and social movements'. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27: 283-305.
- Post, J. 1984. 'Notes on a psychodynamic theory of terrorist behaviour'. *Terrorism*, 7: 241-256.
- Post, JM. 1987. "It's us against them": the group dynamics of political terrorism. *Terrorism*, 10: 23-35.
- Post, JM. 1998. 'Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces'. In *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*, edited by W Reich. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Piazza, JA. 2006. 'Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, poor economic development and social cleavages in Terrorism and Political Violence'. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18. <http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/jpiazza/PiazzaRootedinPoverty.pdf> [accessed on 25 September 2012].
- Prinz, J. 2008. *Determination of national identity in ambivalence of traditional means of communication and the medium radio in the case study of Kenya*. Magister thesis, Wien University, Vienna, Austria.
- Quinn, JR. 2006. 'Sophisticated Discourse: Why and how the Acholi of Northern Uganda are talking about international criminal law'. Paper presented on the panel "Social Effects of Political Transitions" at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 3 June.
- Quintelier, E, D Stolle and A Harell. 2011. 'Politics in Peer Groups: Exploring the Causal Relationship between Network Diversity and Political Participation'. *Political Research Quarterly*, 20(10): 1-14.
- Rakodi, C, R Gatabaki-Kamau and N Devas. 2000. 'Poverty and political conflict in Mombasa'. *Environment and Urbanization*, 12: 153-170.

- Raskin, R and H Terry. 1988. 'A principal-components analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and further evidence of its construct validity'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54: 890–902.
- Reich, W. 1998. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theories, States of Mind (Second edition)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Renno, DC, J Twinamasiko and CP Mugisa. 2012. *Kasese District Poverty Profiling and Mapping 2011-2012*. Kasese District Local Government, Planning Unit and the Belgian Technical Cooperation, Kasese District Poverty Reduction Programme.
- Renshon, SA. 1975. 'Birth Order and Political Socialization'. In *New Directions in Political Socialization*, edited by DC Schwartz and SK Schwartz. New York: The Free Press.
- Renshon, SA. 1975. 'Personality and Family Dynamics in the Political Socialization Process'. *American Journal of Political Science*, 19(1) (February): 63-80.
- Renshon, SA. 1975. 'The Role of Personality Development in Political Socialization'. In *New Directions in Political Socialization*, edited by DC Schwartz and SK Schwartz. New York: The Free Press.
- Renshon, SA. 1977. 'Assumptive Frameworks in Political Socialization Theory'. In *Handbook of Political Socialization*, edited by SA Renshon. New York: The Free Press.
- Roggio, B. 2006. 'Al-Qaeda in Somalia'. *The Long War Journal*, 5 July. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/07/alqaeda_in_somalia_u.php [accessed 19 February 2011].
- Roggio, B. 2012. 'Shabaab names new leader of Kenyan branch'. *The Long War Journal*, 13 January. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/shabaab_names_new_le.php [accessed on 14 January 2012].
- Rohier, IS. 1975. 'A Social-Learning Approach to Political Socialization'. In *New Directions in Political Socialization*, edited by DC Schwartz and SK Schwartz. New York: The Free Press.
- Romkema, R. 2007. 'Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in The Democratic Republic of Congo: The cases of the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program'. The World Bank, June 2007.
- Rothman, J. 1992. *From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving ethnic and religious conflict*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Sabahi. 2012. 'Muslim Youth Centre vows violent response to killing of its leader Rogo'. 27 August. http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/27/feature-01 [accessed on 28 August 2012].
- Sageman, M. 2004. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Salkind, NJ. 1990. *Child Development, Sixth Edition*. Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
- Saunders, C. 2008. 'Double-edged swords? Collective identity and solidarity in the environment movement'. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 59(2): 227-253.
- Schaefer, RT. 2013. *Sociology: A Brief Introduction, Tenth Edition*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

- Schmid, C. 2012. 'The value "social responsibility" as a motivating factor for adolescents' readiness to participate in different types of political actions, and its socialization in parent and peer contexts'. *Journal of Adolescence*, 35: 533–47.
- Schwartz, SK. 1975. 'Patterns of Cynicism: Differential Political Socialization among Adolescents'. In *New Directions in Political Socialization*, edited by DC Schwartz and SK Schwartz. New York: The Free Press.
- Schwartz, SJ, CS Dunkel and AS Waterman. 2009. 'Terrorism: An identity theory perspective'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32(6): 537-559.
- Sears, DO and S Levy. 2003. 'Childhood and Adult Political Development'. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by DO Sears, L Huddy and R Jervis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sharamo, R and B Mesfin. 2011. *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*. Monograph 178 (April). Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.
- Sigel, R. 2009. 'Assumptions about the Learning of Political Values'. In *Political Socialization*, edited by ES Greenberg. New Brunswick: AldineTransaction.
- Sigel, RS and MB Hoskin. 1977. 'Perspectives on Adult Political Socialization – Areas of Research'. In *Handbook of Political Socialization*, edited by SA Renshon. New York: The Free Press.
- Silbiger, SL. 1977. 'Peers and Political Socialization'. In *Handbook of Political Socialization*, edited by SA Renshon. New York: The Free Press.
- Silke, A. 2005. 'Fire of Iolau: The role of state countermeasures in causing terrorism and what needs to be done'. In *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward*, edited by T Bjørge. London: Routledge.
- Simon, B and B Klandermans. 2001. 'Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Psychological Analysis'. *American Psychologist*, 56(4) (April): 319-331.
- Smelser, NJ. 2007. *The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Society for International Development. 2004. *Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on inequality in Kenya*. <http://www.sidint.net/docs/pullingapart-mini.pdf> [accessed on 10 February 2014].
- Sosis, R and CS Alcorta. 2008. 'Militants and martyrs: Evolutionary perspectives on religion and terrorism'. *Natural security: A Darwinian approach to a dangerous world*. <http://www.efiko.org/material/Militants%20and%20Martyrs-%20Evolutionary%20Perspectives%20on%20Religion%20and%20Terrorism%20by%20Richard%20Sosis.pdf> [accessed on 2 April 2013]
- Sperling, DC. 1988. *The growth of Islam among the Mijikenda of the Kenya coast, 1826-1933*. Dissertation submitted for the Ph.D. degree, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
- Ssempeggo, H. 2010. 'We are sorry, say 7/11 suspected bombers'. *New Vision*, 13 August.
- Stagner, R and ET Katzoff. 1936. 'Personality as related to birth order and family size'. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 20(3): 340-346.

- Staub, E and D Bar-Tal. 2003. 'Genocide, Mass Killing, and Intractable Conflict: Roots, evolution, prevention and reconciliation'. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, edited by DO Sears, L Huddy and R Jervis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stephenson, RK. 2012. *Jungian 16 type personality test*. RichardStep.com Publishing.
- Taylor, DM. 1997. 'The quest for collective identity: The plight of disadvantaged ethnic minorities'. *Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne*, 38(3): 174-190.
- Taylor, DM and W Louis. 2004. 'Terrorism and the quest for identity'. In *Understanding terrorism: Psychological roots, consequences and interventions*, edited by FM Moghaddam and AJ Marsella. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- The Daily Star*. 2010. 'Somalia's rebel groups unite, profess loyalty to Al-Qaeda'. 2 February.
- The Guardian*. 2011. 'Al-Shabaab attacker given life sentence for Kenya grenade blasts'. 28 October. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/28/kenya-jails-alshabaab-attacker?intcmp=239> [accessed on 29 October 2011].
- The Star*. 2014. 'Radical preacher Makaburi shot dead'. 2 April. <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-161436/radical-preacher-makaburi-shot-dead> [accessed on 3 April 2014].
- Think Security Africa*. 2012. 'Factsheet on the Allied Democratic Forces'. August 2012.
- Tabuti, JRS, CB Kukunda, D Kaweesi and OMJ Kasilo. 2012. 'Herbal medicine use in the districts of Nakapiripirit, Pallisa, Kanungu, and Mukono in Uganda'. *Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine*, 8(35) (September).
- Tolley, H. Jr. 1977. 'Childhood Learning About War and Peace: Coming of Age in the Nuclear Era'. In *Handbook of Political Socialization*, edited by SA Renshon. New York: The Free Press.
- Tushambomwe-Kazooba, C. 2006. 'Causes of Small Business Failure in Uganda: A Case Study from Bushenyi and Mbarara Towns'. *African Studies Quarterly*, 8(4): 27-35.
- United Nations General Assembly. 2006. *Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counterterrorism strategy*. 27 April. <http://www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/sg-terrorism-2may06.pdf>, [accessed 1 May 2006].
- United Nations. 2006. *The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy*, A/RES/60/288, 20 September. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed on 30 September 2006].
- United Nations Maps. 'Uganda by Districts'. <http://www.ugandamission.net/aboutug/map1.html> [accessed on 10 September 2013].
- United Nations Security Council. 2008. 'List of Individuals and Entities Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of Security Council Resolution 1844'. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/pdf/1844_cons_list.pdf [accessed on 10 February 2009].
- United Nations Security Council*. 2011. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916. S/2011/433, 18 July. <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/asmp/issueareas/manpads/S2011433.pdf> [accessed on 5 October 2012].

- United States District Court Southern District of New York. 1998. US Grand Jury Indictment against Usama Bin Laden. 6 November. <http://cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/binladen/indict.pdf> [accessed on 21 October 2013].
- University of Texas Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. '1974 Kenya Ethnic Groups from Map No. 501721'. <http://understandingthehorn.org/1974-kenya-ethnic-groups-map-no-501721> [accessed on 12 September 2013].
- Valenzuela, S, Y Kim and H Gil de Zúñiga. 2012. 'Social networks that matter: Exploring the role of political discussion for online political participation'. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 24(2) (November): 163-184.
- Van Acker, F. 2004. 'Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No One Ordered'. *African Affairs*, 103(412) (July): 335-357.
- Van Deth, JW., S Abendschön and M Vollmar. 2011. 'Children and Politics: An Empirical Reassessment of Early Political Socialization'. *Political Psychology*, 32(1): 147-173.
- Van Puijenbroek, J and N Plooijer. 2009. *How EnLightning is the Thunder? Study on the Lord's Resistance Army in the border region of DR Congo, Sudan and Uganda*. IKV Pax Christi, (February). Utrecht, The Netherlands.
- Vasta, R, MM Haith and SA Miller. 1995. *Child Psychology: The Modern Science, Second Edition*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Veldhuis, T and J Staun. 2009. *Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.
- Verhulst, B, LJ Eaves and PK Hatemi. 2012. 'Correlation not Causation: The Relationship between Personality Traits and Political Ideologies'. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1) (January): 34-51.
- Verhulst, B, NG Hatemi and NG Martin. 2010. 'The nature of the relationship between personality traits and political attitudes'. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 49: 306-16.
- Verkuyten, M and C Lay. 1998. 'Ethnic Minority Identity and Psychological Well-Being: The Mediating Role of Collective Self-Esteem'. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 28(21): 1969-1986.
- Voss, J and E Dorsey. 1992. 'Perception and International Relations: An Overview'. In *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*, edited by E Singer and VM Hudson. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.
- Wanambisi, TL. 1984. 'The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware. The Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 6 April. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/WTL.htm> [accessed on 10 October 2013].
- Weber, C, M Johnson and K Arceneaux. 2011. Genetics, Personality and Group Identity. *Social Science Quarterly*, 92(5) (December): 1314-1337.
- Westerhaus, M. 2007. Linking anthropological analysis and epidemiological evidence: Formulating a narrative of HIV transmission in Acholiland of northern Uganda'. *Journal of Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS*, 4(2) (August): 590-605.

White, RW and MR Fraser. 2000. 'Personal and collective identities and long-term social movement activism: Republican Sinn Fein'. In *Self, identity, and social movements*, edited by S Stryker, TJ Owens and RW White. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

World Bank. 2006. 'World Development Report'. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/10/07/000090341_20031007150121/Rendered/PDF/268950PAPER0WDR02004.pdf [accessed on 13 September 2006].

Zartman, IW. 1995. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. London: Lynn Rienner Publishers.

Ziemke, CF. 2009. *Perceived Oppression and Relative Deprivation: Social Factors Contributing to Terrorism*. Zurich: International Relations and Security Network.

Specific interviews referred to in the thesis:

Edris Nsubuga at Luzira prison outside Kampala, Uganda on 1 August 2013.

Hassan Ola Naado in Mombasa, Kenya on 26 April 2012. Former Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance and current Deputy Secretary General, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims.

Hussein Maiga in Kampala, Uganda on 27 July 2013. The personal assistant to the ADF chief of staff.

Ismaila Ssempagala in Kampala, Uganda on 28 July 2013.

Mugisha Mahmood at Luzira prison outside Kampala, Uganda on 1 August 2013.